Meta-cognitive processes in reasoning and intuition: the role of feedback information and individual thinking styles

One composite topic addressed by researchers within cognitive sciences concerns the way people manage their mental effort in order to solve a problem, and how people feel about their decision-making process. The theoretical background of this thesis is centred on the extant models describing human mind through a dual-process account. Moreover, a metacognitive approach has recently brought new insights in this field, emphasizing the importance of monitoring and control processes in reasoning. The present dissertation adds to this literature by exploring the role of context-related features, and of individual characteristics, that relate to cognitive and meta-cognitive processes in reasoning. The first part is focused on the function of feedback information: in Study 1, participants primed for the adoption of intuitive or reflective thinking processes got information about their accuracy or inaccuracy during the resolution of reasoning tasks. Study 2 investigates the effects of feedback anticipation, that is how people adapt their mental effort according to the knowledge that their performance will be evaluated. The second part explores individual differences that could predict distinct levels of confidence in one’s reasoning process: in Study 3, performance and metacognitive feelings of individuals with a preference for intuitive thinking were compared with those of individuals with a preference for rational thought. Finally, in Study 4, individual characteristics of decision-making style (namely, propensity to experience regret, and maximizing vs satisficing tendencies) were examined as potential predictors of meta-reasoning components. Overall, this thesis highlights the importance of developing a metacognitive perspective inside the psychology of higher cognition.