Aesthetic disagreement as a political problem: a rancièrian perspective

The problem of aesthetic disagreement arises from the supposition that there is a kind of universality of aesthetic judgement; and the problem is politicalized when the judgement is regarded as relevant to the subject. This problem is the joint between the different perspectives such as Bourdieu’s distinction of tastes and Rancière’s discussion of the common. This research investigates the political significance of aesthetic disagreement from a Rancièrian perspective. First of all, Rancière characterizes the structure of politics as the distribution of the sensible, which means a mode of sharing and division at once. The division is maintained by presupposing a shared common language, and the disagreement arises from the divided understanding with regard to the common. Therefore, there are two ways to interpret Kant’s aesthetics. On the one hand, Rancière reads the conception of disinterestedness as a suspension of any hierarchical division, which thus implies a method of emancipation. On the other hand, Bourdieu regards the conception of universality as a tool of suppression, which legitimatizes the bourgeois taste and denies not only the popular taste, but also the distinction between them. Regarding this theoretical confrontation, Rancière’s critique is based on his presupposition of equality as a principle. For Rancière, equality is a principle that must be presupposed and verified in practice. The practice makes the process of subjectivation, which means a rupture of the hierarchical division and the appearance of a new subjectivity. In this process, the conception of the common is examined. In the end, aesthetic disagreement is not only a passive effect of the police distribution, but also an active factor that contributes to the political reconfiguration.