Political legislation cycles

This thesis examines Political Legislation Cycles (PLC), defined as the strategic manipulation of the timing and content of legislative production around elections, as a key manifestation of agency problems between voters and politicians. While Political Budget Cycles have been widely studied, PLCs remain largely explored through single-country cases. This dissertation offers the first comparative, multi-level analysis of the institutional, budgetary, and political drivers of PLCs, investigating how, why, and under what conditions legislators exploit the legislative process for electoral gain. Using a rigorous empirical design, the thesis tests PLC theory across three levels: (1) a panel study of twenty countries, (2) a subnational analysis of Italian regions, and (3) a content-based classification of laws in eight countries. The results highlight the central role of institutional design. Legislative activity declines early in the term, followed by a surge before elections, especially in the last six months. The magnitude of these cycles depends on context: proportional systems produce cycles about 67 percentage points larger than majoritarian ones; presidential systems with divided government show stronger cycles than parliamentary ones; and fiscally decentralized countries experience cycles about 64 points higher than centralized states. The democracy–PLC relationship is non-linear. Further, PLCs are more pronounced in Italian regions with lower fiscal autonomy, weaker economies, or alignment with central governments. Content analysis reveals that public goods-oriented laws peak before elections, while private-interest laws display weaker cycles. Overall, the thesis offers new tools to measure political accountability and guide reforms to strengthen democratic governance.