The intentional structure of emotions: a Husserlian approach

This dissertation investigates the nature of emotions through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology, arguing that emotions are not merely reactive states but intentional acts that fulfill a dual function: they both apprehend values and respond to them. While emotions undoubtedly manifest a responsive character, they also grasp objects and states of affairs in terms of their axiological significance, thereby playing an intrinsic value-disclosing role. This study aims to demonstrate that emotions are best understood as intentional processes rather than static, object-directed states. At first glance, this thesis appears paradoxical: how can emotions respond to the value of an object if that very value is apprehended through the emotion itself? To resolve this apparent contradiction, this dissertation draws on Husserl’s concept of functional intentionality, which conceives intentional acts as dynamic processes. By analyzing Husserl’s recently published “Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins,” this study reconstructs his account of emotional intentionality, focusing on its structural complexity, affective dimension, and epistemic significance in value experience. The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter I contextualizes Husserl’s reflections on emotions within his broader phenomenological framework, examining the “Studien” in relation to his earlier work and comparing his approach to that of Brentano and Stumpf. Chapter II investigates the non-objectifying nature of emotions. Chapter III explores Husserl’s analogical method in the study of emotions, demonstrating that he employs analogy as a heuristic tool rather than a mere argumentative strategy. This chapter introduces the concepts of “Wertapperzeption” and “Wertauffassung”, of which “Wertnehmung” represents a specific case. Chapter IV examines Husserl’s notions of emotional coloring and emotional position-taking (Gemütsstellungnahme), emphasizing their role in highlighting the affective and responsive dimension of emotions. It then addresses objections to Husserl’s model. Finally, the dissertation defends the functional and processual nature of emotional intentionality by introducing the concepts of “Hingabe” and emotional motivation.