Certainty and Normativity from a Phenomenological Point of View

Zanetti, Luca (2018) Certainty and Normativity from a Phenomenological Point of View, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Philosophy, science, cognition, and semiotics (pscs), 30 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/8659.
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Abstract

In this Dissertation I argue on phenomenological grounds that our cognition is so structured that its aim is to possess absolutely certain knowledge. In Chapter I I clarify the notion of absolute certainty and discuss an argument to the effect that it is impossible to satisfy the conditions for absolute certainty. In Chapter II I characterise the sort of phenomenological method which I will use in order to investigate the commitments of the most fundamental ingredients of cognition. Chapters III, IV and V are devoted to an investigation of the normative profile of judgment, suspension of judgment and doubt respectively. In Chapter VI I introduce constitutivism about normativity, namely the view according to which the authority of some norm is constitutive of some suitably inescapable activity. I explain how phenomenology is needed in order to claim that some norm is constitutive for cognition. In Chapter VII I argue that global and pyrrhonian scepticisms are untenable. In Chapter VIII I argue that fallibilism and externalism are untenable. Crucially, it will emerge that the sole tenable standpoint is the one that countenances the existence of certainties and in particular certainty about the fundamental epistemological theory itself. In Chapter IX I argue on phenomenological grounds that truth is the constitutive aim of cognition. In Chapter X I offer a constitutivist view of alethic normativity that grounds the validity of the truth-norm on the fact that cognition itself is constitutively aimed at truth. In Chapter XI I extend constituvism to epistemic normativity, and argue that certainty is the norm or aim of cognition. Finally, in Chapter XII, I distinguish between local and transcendental hinges, the latter being the proposition whose truth is presupposed by any engagement in cognition, and argue that only transcendental hinges can be immune from doubt.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Autore
Zanetti, Luca
Supervisore
Dottorato di ricerca
Ciclo
30
Coordinatore
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
Certainty Normativity Phenomenology Descartes Husserl Constitutive Norms
URN:NBN
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/8659
Data di discussione
27 Aprile 2018
URI

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