Essays on Information Economics

Glynia, Nektaria Spyridoula (2022) Essays on Information Economics, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Economics, 33 Ciclo. DOI 10.48676/unibo/amsdottorato/8280.
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This thesis consists of three essays on information economics. I explore how information is strategically communicated or designed by senders who aim to influence the decisions of a receiver. In the first chapter, I study a cheap talk game between two imperfectly informed experts and a decision maker. The experts receive noisy signals about the state and sequentially communicate the relevant information to the decision maker. I refine the self-serving belief system under uncertainty and Ι characterise the most informative equilibrium that might arise in such environments.In the second chapter, I consider the case where a decision maker seeks advice from a biased expert who cares also about establishing a reputation of being competent. The expert has the incentives to misreport her information but she faces a trade-off between the gain from misrepresentation and the potential reputation loss. I show that the equilibrium is fully-revealing if the expert is not too biased and not too highly reputable. If there is competition between two experts the information transmission is always improved. However, in cases where the experts are more than two the result is ambiguous, and it depends on the players’ prior belief over states.In the last chapter, I consider a model of strategic communication where a privately and imperfectly informed sender can persuade a receiver. The sender may receive favorable or unfavorable private information about her preferred state. I describe two ways that are adopted in real life situations and theoretically improve equilibrium informativeness given sender's private information. First, a policy that suggests symmetry constraints to the experiments' choice. Second, an approval strategy characterised by a low precision threshold where the receiver will accept the sender with a positive probability and a higher one where the sender will be accepted with certainty.

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Glynia, Nektaria Spyridoula
Dottorato di ricerca
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
information economics, cheap talk, persuasion
Data di discussione
30 Giugno 2022

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