Essays in Political Economics and Voting Behavior

Gulino, Giorgio (2016) Essays in Political Economics and Voting Behavior, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Economia, 28 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/7355.
Documenti full-text disponibili:
Documento PDF (English) - Richiede un lettore di PDF come Xpdf o Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (5MB) | Anteprima


This dissertation consists of two papers. The first paper ``Do Electoral Systems Affect the Incumbent Probability of Re-election? Evidence from Italian Municipalities'' empirically investigates how electoral systems affect the incumbent likelihood of re-election in Italian municipalities. It also sheds light on the mechanism through which the electoral system affects the re-election probability. The overarching goal of the paper is to connect different aspects of the issue. I provide new insight into how different electoral systems affect accountability, politician selection and then economic policies. Results show that the probability of re-election is significantly higher in majoritarian systems for mayors but not for assessors and councillors. The majoritarian system defines a clear majority within the city council and its leader, which increases accountability toward the mayors. Indeed, in the majoritarian systems, the effort of mayors, measured as the probability of having a social welfare investment, is higher. Finally, We show that the observed evidence is not driven by political selection. The second paper ``Separated Under the Same Roof: Fiscal Inefficiency of Parties' Fragmentation and Mayor's Political Power" investigates the effect of political fragmentation of local government on fiscal policies. It shows that the effect of fragmentation on fiscal policies depends mainly on two factors: the presence of a binding budget constraint and the political power of the executive leader. Results show that, in the presence of a binding budget constraint, a more fragmented majority performs less public spending and collects less revenue. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of political fragmentation disappears while the political power of the mayor increases.

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Gulino, Giorgio
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
Local electoral rules, Re-election, Difference-in-discontinuities Design, Parties’ Fragmentation, Fiscal Policies.
Data di discussione
1 Giugno 2016

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza la tesi