Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

Gilotta, Sergio (2010) Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Diritto delle società e dei mercati finanziari, 21 Ciclo.
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The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Gilotta, Sergio
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze giuridiche
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
disclosure trasparenza riservatezza s.p.a. emittente innovazione
Data di discussione
25 Giugno 2010

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