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DARLINGTON KWABENA WIREDU

RELATORE
PROFESSOR ARRIGO PALLOTTI

COORDINATORE DOTTORATO
PROFESSOR DANIELA GIANNETTI

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Three Essays on Democratic Theory and Practice

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Darlington Kwabena Wiredu

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Dissertation Advisor:

Professor Arrigo Pallotti

Author:

Darlington Kwabena Wiredu

Three Essays on Democratic Theory and Practice

Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to expound on the meaning of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” It attempts in three essays to explore the depths of this all-encompassing ‘Lincoln’ definition of popular government. If democracy is government *borne* ‘of the people,’ how has it evolved and developed with the growth of the nation-state? And if it is *crafted* ‘by the people,’ what are its ascriptive features and characteristics? And if it is *made* ‘for the people,’ how is it perceived and practiced by them? The first essay focuses on the origins of democracy and the political revivals that have shaped its present development. It thus undertakes a study of the political systems of Classical Athens and Rome, and performs an analysis of the democratic revolutions that ensued in England, the United States, and France. The second essay explores some *model* theoretical constructs of representative democracy, as well as the conditions required for its functional practice. The third essay however moves away from theory to empirics, and performs a qualitative case study of democratic practice in Ghana, by which means it attempts to shed light on what Professor Harry Eckstein has called “the improbable combination of circumstances that make democracy work.”[†]

[†] *A Theory of Stable Democracy*. Princeton: CIS, 1961, p. 47.

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*Do all the good you can,
By all the means you can,
In all the ways you can,
In all the places you can,
At all the times you can,
To all the people you can,
As long as ever you can.*

[Rev. John Wesley, 1703 – 1791][†]

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[†] Qtd. in Pritchard, John. *Methodists and their Missionary Societies, 1900-1996*. London: Routledge, 2016, p. 237.

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Il Signore Gesù Cristo vi benedica grandemente tutti.

Dedication

In loving memory of
my *dearest friend and comrade*

Talent C. Hwati
[MCMXC – MMXVII]

Donec Iterum Conveniant.

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Introduction: The Audacity of Self-Government

Madiba reminds us that democracy is about more than just elections. When he was freed from prison, [...] he could have been president for life. Am I wrong? Who was going to run against him? I mean, [Cyril] Ramaphosa was popular, but come on. Plus, he was a young... he was too young. Had he chosen, Madiba could have governed by executive fiat, unconstrained by checks and balances. But instead, he helped guide South Africa through the drafting of a new Constitution, drawing from all the institutional practices and democratic ideals that had proven to be most sturdy. He understood that it is not just about who has the most votes. It is also about the civic culture that we build that makes democracy work.

[Barack H. Obama, *16th Nelson Mandela Lecture*]

Whenever I read the Bible and come across the statement regarding “the law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not” (cf. KJV, *Daniel*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 8, 12, 15), I am filled with a profound appreciation for democratic government. For by this *regel*, an immaculate prophet by the name of Daniel would be unjustly cast into a den of lions;¹ and likewise, an evil plot to annihilate the people of the Jews would be notwithstanding executed,² all because “no man may reverse the writing which is written in the king's name, and sealed with the king's ring” (cf. *id.*, *Esther*, Chap. VIII, Vrs. 8).³ Wherefore Professor John Dewey (1969, 228) rightly noted that “it was only in a democratic state that the mass

of the people were opened to change and progress.”⁴ More also, Professor

Dankwart Rustow (1970, 363) remarked that:

[...] the essence of democracy is the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever-changing issues and amidst ever-changing alignments. Totalitarian rulers must enforce unanimity on fundamentals and on procedures before they can get down to other business. By contrast, democracy is that form of government which derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one half of the governed.

We may define a democracy as that governmental system wherein the people organize the affairs of politics as they deem fit.⁵ It differs from a monarchy in that the reins of power are not the exclusive privilege of a succession of dauphins, but are the solemn right of the people as a collective whole. And though it conducts government through an elite cadre of representatives, it differs from an oligarchy in that power is competitively contested, rather than ascribed to a few ‘best men.’ Also because it derives legitimacy from the popular masses through periodic elections, it differs ostensibly from the one-man rule of an autocracy. Wherefore Professor Robert Dahl (1989, 89) remarked that democracy, by virtue of its popular and consensual basis, “promotes freedom as no feasible alternative can.” Furthermore, Professor William Taylor (1945, 207) espoused that:

Democracy makes for survival particularly [...] through the free competition of ideas. Darwin pointed out that continental species are more robust than island species, because continents support large numbers, hence allow for more

favorable variations to appear and survive. In like manner, a democracy is an intellectual continent: [...] a continent which encourages ideas to grow up and compete freely [...] Despotism, on the other hand, is an intellectual island which allows relatively few ideas to grow up [...] In this respect, any despotism, from the despotism of ‘only one party and only one policy within the party,’ to the despotism of the toughest dictator, is on a level with a conventional finishing school in which immature minds are protected from tabooed ideas. Democracy is more realistic, robust, and adaptable.

But despite its palpable merits,⁶ democracy has not always been viewed favorably by all.⁷ For instance, Sir Henry Maine described it in his *Popular Government* (Essay I, p. 20) as “the most fragile and insecure of all governments;” and Plato remarked in his *Republic* (Book VIII, Sec. 561) concerning the democratic man that “his life is subject to no order or restraint, and he has no wish to change an existence which he calls pleasant, free, and happy.” Friedrich Nietzsche also in his *Will to Power* (Book III, Sec. 752, p. 397) criticized democracy as representing “a disbelief in great human beings and an elite society: *for* everyone is equal to everyone else, *so that* at bottom, we are all self-seeking cattle and mob.”⁸ Yea, even the Italian theologian St. Thomas Aquinas was opposed to democracy, for he remarked in his *De Regimine Principum* (Book I, Chap. II, pp. 41-2) that the rule by one man was more useful for political society than the rule by many:⁹

Again, whatever is in accord with nature is best: for in all things nature does what is best. Now, every natural governance is governance by one. In the

multitude of bodily members there is one which moves them all, namely, the heart; and among the powers of the soul one power presides as chief, namely, the reason. Even among bees, there is one queen (rex) and in the whole universe there is one God, Maker and Ruler of all things. And this is reasonable. For every multitude is derived from unity. Wherefore, artificial things imitate natural things and since a work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is in nature, it necessarily follows that it is best, in the case of human multitude, that is be ruled by one person. And this is also evident from experience; for provinces or cities which are not ruled by one person are torn with dissensions and are tossed about without peace [...] *whereas* those provinces and cities which are ruled under one king enjoy peace, flourish in justice, and delight in prosperity.

Invariably, these arguments against democracy may be explicated by what Larry J. Diamond (1990, 49-50) has referred to as the paradoxes of democracy.¹⁰ The first, he says, is the *conflict-consensus* paradox: which is that whereas democracy sanctions an institutionalized competition for power, it at the same time requires public consensus on democratic norms and values for the tempering of cleavages. Closely related to this is the *representativeness-governability* paradox: which is that whereas democracy attempts to diffuse power by means of representation, yet at the same time requires that the government of the day be cohesive and autonomous enough to respond to competing groups interests without being paralyzed or captured by any.¹¹

The third paradox relates to the coupling of *consent* with *effectiveness*.

And in this, Professor Diamond (*ibid.*) commented as follows:

Democracy means, literally, ‘rule by the people,’ or at least rule with the consent of the governed [...] But founding a democracy and preserving it are two different things. To be stable, democracy must be deemed legitimate by the people; they must view it as the best, the most appropriate form of government for their society. Indeed, because it rests on the consent of the governed, democracy depends on popular legitimacy much more than any other form of government. This legitimacy requires a profound moral commitment and emotional allegiance, but these develop only over time, and partly as a result of effective performance [...] *And* herein lies the paradox: Democracy requires consent. Consent requires legitimacy. Legitimacy requires effectiveness. But effectiveness may be sacrificed to consent. Elected leaders will always be reluctant to pursue unpopular policies, no matter how wise or necessary such policies may be.

And so we see that the arguments levelled against democracy have often been advanced along these lines: for it is criticized either for its reliance on public opinion; or for its allowance of conflictive pluralism; or for its supposed inability to sacrifice consent for effectiveness. Nevertheless, the overwhelming number of transitions made to democracy in the third wave (of which, cf. Diamond 2008, 36-7; 2015, 141-2; Huntington 1991, 12-4; 1991a, 579-80)¹² stands to attest conspicuously to the merits of self-government. “For all its imperfections,”¹³ espoused President Obama in his *Mandela Lecture*, “democracy is the only form of government which upholds the idea that government exists to serve the individual

and not the other way round.”¹⁴ And in no other also is the dignity and freedom of man assured¹⁵ – and the sanctity of his appurtenances preserved¹⁶ – than in a democracy (cf. Mackinder 1919, 237; Mosca 1939, 256; O’Donnell 2007, 9).¹⁷

This dissertation is thus a humble attempt to expound on the meaning of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”¹⁸ It attempts in three essays¹⁹ to explore the depths of this all-encompassing ‘Lincoln’ definition of popular government. If democracy is government *borne* ‘of the people,’ how has it evolved and developed with the growth of the nation-state? And if it is *crafted* ‘by the people,’ what are its ascriptive design features and characteristics? And if it is *made* ‘for the people,’ how is it perceived and practiced by them?

The first essay focuses on the origins of democracy and the political revivals that have shaped its present development. It thus undertakes a study of the political systems of Classical Athens and Rome, and performs an analysis of the democratic revolutions that ensued in England, the United States, and France. The second essay explores some *model* theoretical constructs of representative democracy, as well as the conditions required for its functional practice. The third essay however moves away from theory to empirics, and performs a qualitative case

study of democratic practice in Ghana,²⁰ by which means it attempts to shed light on what Professor Harry Eckstein (1961, 47) has called “the improbable combination of circumstances that make democracy work.”

Essay I:

The Genesis of Democracy

There are three blessings for which I am grateful to Fortune:

first, that I was born a human being and not an animal;
second, that I was born a man and not a woman; and third,
that I was born a Greek and not a barbarian.

[*Socrates*, 469-399 BC].¹

1.1. *Demokratia* in Classical Athens

Direct democracy² was established in the Greek city-state of Athens³ in 508 BC⁴ and endured until 322 BC following the conquest of Athens by Antipater of Macedonia (cf. Thorley 1996, 77; Roper 2012, 33). Nonetheless, an exposé of *how* and *why* democracy succeeded⁵ in Athens [and not in any other Greek city-state]⁶ would require a careful review of some critical antecedents,⁷ particularly in the socioeconomic and ethnopolitical fronts.

Regarding the former, two developments are noteworthy. The first appertains to the increase in agricultural productivity in the eighth century⁸ which allowed for greater interaction amongst Greek societies by means of trade.⁹ Attica's strategic coastal location facilitated this trade "by means of commodity exchanges over medium and long distances" (cf. Anderson 1974, 20), leading to the urbanization of coastal

cities, and the creation of several small- and large-scale enterprises linked with the sea trade.¹⁰ Professor Kurt Raaflaub (2007, 118) succinctly points out that:

[...] by the mid-fifth century, Athens had developed into a large [...] and demographically diverse community that became the economic center of the Greek world. A vast infrastructure and a whole industry, encompassing many trades, was created to build and maintain three hundred ships and to support the required personnel.

In addition to the development in agriculture, Attica's Laurion silver mines [which contained the largest deposits of silver-bearing ore in the ancient Greek world, cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 16] contributed further financial returns¹¹ to the *polis*¹² by means of silver exports.¹³ The revenues that accrued to Athens from these exports enabled the state to advance itself geopolitically and militarily.¹⁴

These socioeconomic developments, although providing a *necessary* embedment for democracy where not *sufficient* to realize its establishment in Attica until after other *attendant* ethnopolitical issues had been resolved. Principal amongst these was the class struggle¹⁵ that ensued between [*and* amongst] the nobles and the *demos*¹⁶ during the mid-seventh and late sixth centuries (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 11; Ste Croix 1981, 280; Osborne 2009, 211-3). To wit, the *demos* and some propertied

elites began to demand for greater participation in the affairs of the state.

As tensions intensified,¹⁷ the nobles were forced to accept some degree of reform¹⁸ that would grant unprecedented political and economic rights to the emboldened *demos*. These reforms were enacted in succession: first by the archon Solon in 570 BC, then by the Alcmeonid Cleisthenes in 508 BC, and lastly by the democrats Ephialtes and Pericles in 462 and 451 BC respectively.

Although Athenian democracy is widely associated with Cleisthenes' political reforms (cf. Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VI, Chap. CXXXI: Sec. 1; Isocrates, *Antidosis*, Sec. 232; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 3), it was Solon's¹⁹ ingenious and dexterous handling of the class conflict that made possible its actual practice in Attica (cf. Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, Sec. 83; Ober 2007, 86-7; Rhodes 2007, 101). Solon's reforms²⁰ were political and economic in scope. On the economic front, he reconstituted property classes in Athens,²¹ redefined tributary relations between landowners and peasants,²² and promoted local trade and commerce.²³ Then on the political front, he enacted a new constitution that established a governing Council of Four Hundred,²⁴ redefined the composition and powers of the *Ecclesia*,²⁵ and

instituted a court system that included jurors from all four property classes.²⁶

Although his astute reforms did not completely purge debt bondage and interclass feuding in Athens,²⁷ they nonetheless succeeded in liberalizing Athens' hitherto closed politico-economic system.²⁸ This is finely iterated by Robin Waterfield (2018, 82) as follows:²⁹

[...] the Athenian people needed citizens who were not dependent on others, and who could therefore afford to serve the state in the administration and [in] the army, and it was Solon who made this future possible. And by limiting the amount of land [that] men could own, he created one of the remarkable features of Classical Athens: that although there were [...] some who were [...] rich and others who were [...] poor, overall there was no great inequality of income. He [thus] changed the status of the poor from subjects to citizens.

In a later self-assessment of his work, Solon emphasized the impartiality and neutrality with which he had carried out his reforms:³⁰

For the common people I gave so much power as is sufficient,
 Neither robbing them of dignity, nor giving them too much;
 And those who had power, and were marvelously rich,
 Even for these I contrived that they suffered no harm.
 I stood with a mighty shield in front of both classes,
 And suffered neither of them to prevail unjustly [...]
 With neither too much freedom nor compulsion.
 [Solon, *Fragments*, Sec. 5].³¹

Nonetheless, the class struggle continued to supervene in Athens despite Solon's conciliatory reforms, and led invariably to the seizure of state

power by the tyrant³² Peisistratos.³³ But far from pursuing self-willed interests,³⁴ Peisistratos maintained a variedly *democratic* course in his public policies which greatly prospered and stabilized Athens during his tenure. For instance, he reinforced Solon's liberal political reforms,³⁵ improved the welfare of peasant farmers,³⁶ allayed the in-fighting amongst the noble families,³⁷ and advanced trade and art in Athens.³⁸ As rightly observed by Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. XVI, Sec. 7-9), his dexterity and discretion in steering a middle course between the nobles and the masses allowed him, even as tyrant, to rule for an unusually lengthy period of time: ³⁹

[...] And in all matters too he [*Peisistratos*] gave the multitude no trouble during his rule, but always worked for peace and safeguarded tranquility [...] And the greatest of all the things said of him was that he was popular and kindly in temper. For he was willing to administer everything according to the laws in all matters, never giving himself any advantage [...] Owing to this, he remained in his office for a long period [...] For both the notables and the men of the people were most of them willing for him to govern, since he won over the former by his hospitality and the latter by his assistance in their private affairs, and was good-natured to both.

In 508/7 BC, after the tyranny of the Peisistratids was brought to an end in Athens,⁴⁰ Cleisthenes the Alcmeonid⁴¹ went on to institute the most radical democratic reforms in the history of Athens.⁴² These reforms were *political*, *structural*, and *juridical* in scope. On the political

sphere, he reconstituted the Athenian *polis*,⁴³ created a new Council of Five Hundred [*Boule*],⁴⁴ and reinforced the authority and mandate of the *Ecclesia*.⁴⁵ With regards structural reforms, he enacted new regulations that reordered the appointments of generals [*strategoí*]⁴⁶ and magistrates⁴⁷ in Athens, and allowed for *undesirable* persons to be ostracized from the state.⁴⁸ Then, in the administration of justice, he created *popular* law courts that allowed a proportionate number of Athenians to serve as jurors and judges in civil and criminal matters.⁴⁹ These reforms enhanced popular sovereignty⁵⁰ at Athens (cf. Ostwald 1986, 18-24; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 49-50) and established the city-state as a dominant politico-economic force in Greece (cf. Isocrates, *op. cit.*, Sec. 316-7).⁵¹ Fig. 1.1 illustrates the power structure at Athens following Cleisthenes' reform.

Howbeit, it would be the democrats Ephialtes⁵² and Pericles that would come to fashion Athenian democracy into one truly representative of the *demos* (cf. Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 48-50, 78-80; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XLI: Sec. 1; Raaflaub 2007, 122).⁵³ In 462 BC, Ephialtes successfully appealed⁵⁴ to the Athenian *Ecclesia and Boule* to strip the Areopagus Council⁵⁵ of its controlling and supervisory functions⁵⁶ (cf. Plutarch, *Pericles*, Chap. VII: Sec. 6; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, Book I,

Chap. XXIX: Sec. 15; Rhodes [1983], 287, 314-7) arguing that the Council's powers had been *acquired* rather than *given* by the consent of the *demos*.⁵⁷ Aristotle (*Athenaion Politeia*, Chap. XXV, Sec. 2) and Diodorus Siculus (*Bibliotheca Historica*, Book XI, Chap. LXXVII, Sec. 6) recounted this measure respectively as follows:⁵⁸


καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀνεῖλεν πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, ἀγῶνας ἐπιφέρων περὶ τῶν διωκημένων. ἔπειτα τῆς βουλῆς ἐπι Κόνωνος ἄρχοντος ἅπαντα περιεῖλε τὰ ἐπιθέτα δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακὴ, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, τὰ δὲ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀπέδωκεν.⁵⁹

ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις ἐν μὲν ταῖς Ἀθήναις Ἐφιάλτης ὁ Σοφωνίδου, δημαγωγὸς ὢν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος παροξύνων κατὰ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, ἔπεισε τὸν δῆμον ψηφίσματι μειῶσαι τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν, καὶ τὰ πάτρια καὶ περιβόητα νόμιμα καταλῦσαι.⁶⁰

Ephialtes' reform of the Areopagus spiraled, as anticipated, a chain of related developments towards popular sovereignty and democratic consolidation at Athens. For instance, the *graphe paranomon* was introduced to supplant the traditional 'guardianship' role performed by the Areopagus Council.⁶¹ In addition to this, a special board of jurors, called *nomothetai*, was created to oversee the enactment and review of *nomoi* at Athens.⁶² Moreover, the archonship [and so consequently, membership of the Areopagus Council] was extended to include as well members of the *zeugitai* class,⁶³ and it was also at this time that archons

were prohibited from adjudicating cases by themselves without referring them foremost to the *dikasteria*.⁶⁴ Then, with the growth of Athenian wealth and prosperity, the *strategos* Pericles led a parallel reform which introduced *misthós* for jury service,⁶⁵ and restricted citizenship rights only to ‘full-born’ Athenians.⁶⁶

Fig. 1.1: Governance Structure at Athens Following Cleisthenes’ Reform



Source: Author, adapted from Held (2006, 18); Tangian (2014, 18).

 S: peculiar conditions of participation applied

L: selection by lot

E: selection by election

P: service term continuous, albeit subject to a *euthymai*

D: service term rotated daily

R: service term rotated annually

But democratic development in Athens did not go without challenges. On three successive accounts, the democracy was toppled over and a reduced form of popular government was created in its stead. The first instance occurred in 415 BC when an expeditionary attempt by Athens to invade Sicily proved unsuccessful.⁶⁷ In the aftermath of this defeat, a body of ‘preliminary councilors’ was appointed to limit the agenda of topics that could be deliberated upon by the *Boule* and *Ecclesia* (cf. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Book VIII, Chap. I: Sec. 3-4).⁶⁸ Then in 411 BC, amidst grave economic downturns, popular democracy was suspended by the Athenian *Ecclesia* and an oligarchy was instituted in its stead.⁶⁹ To this end, ten commissioners⁷⁰ were appointed to re-write the old constitution, and to dissolve and replace the democratic institutions of the *Boule* and *Ecclesia* (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. LXVII: Sec. 1-3; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 2-5).⁷¹

Lastly, in 404 BC, following the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (cf. Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, Sec. 119; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XIII, Chap. CVI: Sec. 1-7; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. I: Sec. 23-30),⁷² a tyrannical committee of thirty [popularly referred to as the ‘Thirty Tyrants,’ or ‘The Thirty’]⁷³ was appointed by the Spartans to constitute a proxy government in Athens (cf. Plutarch,

Lysander, Chap. XV: Sec. 5; Pausanias, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. II: Sec. 2; Book III, Chap. V: Sec. 1; Book IX: Chap. XI: Sec. 6; Xenophon, *loc. cit.*, Chap. III: Sec. 11).⁷⁴ Like the Oligarchy of 411 BC, these tyrants were much opposed to democracy and worked to erode popular sovereignty in Athens.⁷⁵ Howbeit, democracy continued to prevail at Athens⁷⁶ until its eventual dissolution⁷⁷ in 322 BC⁷⁸ by Macedonia, following the latter's triumph in the battle of Crannon. Nevertheless, because Athenian democracy represented the first known experiment of popular governance,⁷⁹ it left in its tracks valuable blueprints that would come to shape and influence later conceptions of democracy.

The trajectory of democratic development at Athens can be viewed in three attendant phases, namely: its transition, consolidation, and eventual breakdown. Regarding transition, this was instigated by two coeval circumstances: the first being the replacement of monarchs with archons (cf. Note 3), and the second, the class struggle that obtained thereafter (cf. Note 15, 17, 32). The appointment of archons in the stead of hereditary monarchs meant that the *demos* became acquainted over time with the vital democratic norm of choosing from *amongst* alternatives. In addition, the class struggle that obtained established a vital precedent in democratic transition theory: that economic growth

predisposes an emboldened working mass to press for political liberalization (cf. Tilton 1974, 562; Dahl 1966, 364-6).⁸⁰ This is cogently underscored by Geoffrey de Ste Croix (1981, 279-80) as follows:

[...] when the rule of the Greek tyrants ended [...] hereditary aristocratic dominance had disappeared [...] and had been succeeded by a much more 'open' society: political power no longer rested on decent, on blue blood, but was mainly dependent upon the possession of property, and in many cities, such as Athens, it was later extended in theory to all citizens, in a democracy.

Regarding consolidation, the themes of history and social conflict are particularly instructive. As Cleisthenes' democratic reforms addressed the social crisis that supervened following Solon's (cf. Note 42-9), one could argue that a bounded measure of social conflict does help to deepen democracy in a polity. Furthermore, a subtle lesson is derived from the tyrannical rule of the Peisistratids: it offered Athenians the historic experience of an alternative to democracy (cf. Note 33-40). This did not only have the effect of arousing *popular* support for Cleisthenes and his reforms, but it more also enhanced the commitment of the *demos* to the *patrios politeia*.⁸¹ The following quote by Herodotus (*The Histories*, Book V, Chap. LXXVIII: Sec. 1, *emphasis added*) bears credence to this observation:

[...] the Athenians grew in power and proved, not in one respect only but in all, that equality is a good thing. Evidence for this is the fact that while they were under tyrannical rulers, the Athenians were no better in war than any of

their neighbors, yet once they got rid of their tyrants, they were by far the best of all. This, then, shows that while they were oppressed, they were, as men working for a master, cowardly, but when they were freed, each one was eager to achieve for his own cause [*to which they may have found demokratia a suitable means for doing so*].

But the breakdown of *demokratia* at Athens can be traced chiefly to the polity's elevation of popular sovereignty over the sovereignty of law.⁸² Although Ephialtes' reforms had led to the creation of the *nomothetai* in the 4th century (cf. Note 62), the Athenian *Ecclesia* continued albeit to decide on all major policy matters of the state.⁸³ The fact that these decisions of the *Ecclesia* were final and not subject to further scrutiny meant that the *demos* had unprecedented control over the affairs of the state.⁸⁴ As evidenced by the decisions on the Sicilian expedition and the Oligarchy of 411 BC (cf. Note 67, 69-71), the system gave recourse to demagogues to unduly influence the judgment of the Assembly.⁸⁵ Aristotle (*Politics*, Book IV, Sec. 1292a, pp. 156-7) made mention of such form of 'democratic extremism'⁸⁶ as follows:

In democracies where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people become a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively [...] And the people, who is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot [...] The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, and refer all things to the popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, because the people have all things in their hands.

Moreover, in an impassioned juridical speech to the Athenian *dikasteria*, Demosthenes (*Against Midias*, Sec. 224) remarked that laws, however stringent they may be, would always remain subjugated to the will of the *demos*, unless there are institutions in place to moderate popular sovereignty and enforce established *nomoi*:⁸⁷

And what is the strength of the laws? If one of you is wronged and cries aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to assist him? No; they are only written texts and incapable of such action. Wherein then resides their power? In yourselves, if only you support them and make them all-powerful to help him who needs them. So the laws are strong through you and you through the laws.

Thus it may be observed that a moderate check on the governing apparatus of a state does help to prevent the erosion and consequent breakdown of democracy.⁸⁸

Besides an analysis of the cycle of democratic development at Athens, one could also examine the pros and cons of the political system in its entirety. Of the former, two administrative inventions are particularly noteworthy. The first pertains to the lottery system of appointments to public offices⁸⁹ which ensured that all citizens had equal opportunity to partake in the administration of the state.⁹⁰ In addition to that, the annual rotation of public appointments and the restrictions on term limits⁹¹ allowed not only for a greater number of the *demos* to experience

political leadership, but also that they were in turn ruled by their fellow citizens.⁹² This had the twin effect of diffusing political knowledge and experience amongst the entire populace.⁹³

Furthermore, contrary to Thomas Hobbes' (1962, 132, but also 100-2, 235-6) conception of the 'Leviathan' as a 'third party' solution to the social conflict,⁹⁴ or to Plato's 'Philosopher-Kings,'⁹⁵ Athenian democracy seemed to have functioned seamlessly on an ideology of collective action.⁹⁶ This was borne primarily out of the pre-Solonian class conflict which ensured that the resulting democratic reform was one which incorporated the vital interests of both the elites and the masses.⁹⁷ As such, the democratic institutions of the *Ecclesia*, *Boule*, and *dikasteria* were all framed to function on a peer-to-peer basis: that is, to involve the local people as promoters and guardians of the *patrios politeia*.⁹⁸ Thus, the invention of ostracism, and the maintenance of a small police force of 'Eleven' (of these, cf. Note 47-8) were contrived essentially to eliminate the dominion of a 'sovereign,' and to make the *demos* directly and communally responsible for the actions and inactions of their fellow citizens.⁹⁹

Regarding the drawbacks of Athenian democracy, two critiques are particularly noteworthy. The first relates to the restricting of political

rights to adult males citizens [cf. Note 66],¹⁰⁰ which invariably excluded women and *metics*¹⁰¹ from direct participation in the affairs of the state (cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Sec. 1275a; Book VII, Sec. 1326a; Sussman 2012, 37-8).¹⁰² This has led many to contest the *democratic-ness* of the Athenian experiment, given the fact that suffrage was the prerogative of just about a tenth of the population (cf. Nef and Reiter 2012, 12; Cairns and Sears 2012, 16).¹⁰³ A popular quote by Jill Claster (1967, 2, *italics supplied*) encapsulates this thought avidly as follows:

Although the Athenians bequeathed us their conception of equality and freedom [...] one may have to determine whether Athens ever had a viable democracy [...]; whether true democracy could exist when Athens had a servant population, when women were unable to exercise the franchise, [and] when foreigners were unable to become citizens [...] These limitations on Athenian democracy provide a basis for the argument that there was [*in fact*] no democracy at all.

Besides the restriction on suffrage, Athenian democracy, with its overemphasis on *demo* action, has been criticized for undermining the will and freedom of the individual citizen. Prominent among these critics is Professor Giovanni Sartori (1965, 261; 1987, 284-7) who asserts that the Athenian political system led to a “frantic politicization of life,” which effectively made the citizen into an *homo politicus* than into an *homo oeconomicus* (cf. also Constant 1997, 594; Hyland 1995, 117-8; Nippel 2016, 348).¹⁰⁴ Professor Sartori’s critique had years earlier been

intimated by Max Weber (1922, 805, 809-10) who had remarked that the Athenian citizen was unable to develop any initiative of enterprise because the political system enjoined him to be a *communal* man, rather than to be a rational, self-interested individual:

Die politische Situation des mittelalterlichen Stadtbürgers wies ihn auf den Weg, ein *homoeconomicus* zu sein, während in der Antike sich die Polis während der Zeit ihrer Blüte ihren Charakter als des militärtechnisch höchststehenden Wehrverbands bewahrte: der antike Bürger war *homopoliticus* [...] Der Bürger blieb in erster Linie Soldat [...] Auf Markt und Gymnasion verbringt der Bürger den Hauptteil seiner Zeit. Seine persönliche Inanspruchnahme: durch *Ekklesia*, Geschworenendienst, Ratsdienst und Amtsdienst im Turnus, vor allem aber durch Feldzüge: jahrzehntelang [...] war in Athen gerade in der klassischen Zeit eine solche wie sie bei differenzierter Kultur weder vorher noch nachher in der Geschichte erhört ist. Auf alle irgend erheblichen Bürgervermögen legte die Polis der Demokratie die Hand.¹⁰⁵

Thus, Aristotle in his *Politics* (Book I, Sec. 1253a; Book III, Sec. 1275a) described man as a *political* animal [not as an *economic* one], and defined a citizen as “one who shared in the administration of justice, and in *public* offices,” implying thereby that persons engaged sufficiently in economic pursuits did not pass for citizens in the ancient city-state.¹⁰⁶ And it may have been for this reason also that Athens harbored a large population of bondservants and *metics*:¹⁰⁷ primarily to free citizens from economic labor, so as to afford them the leisure and time needed to

participate adequately in the affairs of the state (cf. Patriquin 2015, 3; Watson and Barber 2000, 25; Tilly 2007, 26-7).¹⁰⁸

But as to whether the Athenian experiment did indeed offer a viable blueprint for modern democracies, as Professor David Held (2006, 13) persuasively asserts, or rather, as Professor Giovanni Sartori (1987, 279) vehemently protests, left nothing in its tracks to which posterity could emulate, is a question best left to one's reflection and judgement.¹⁰⁹

1.2. Roman *Respublika* and the British Revolution

Although *demokratia* collapsed at Athens in 322 BC, its legacy continued to permeate political systems in succeeding years, leading ultimately to the conceptualization of representative democracy. Of the political experiments and revivals that shaped this novel conception of popular governance, four are particularly of note, namely: the Roman Republic, and the British, American, and French Revolutions.¹¹⁰ This section would not attempt to offer a thorough historic exposé of the revolutions that ensued in these three nation-states,¹¹¹ but would only focus on the democratic reforms that obtained in their wake.¹¹² Nevertheless, particular emphasis would be given to the Roman experiment and its relation to that of Athens.¹¹³

The Roman Republic was established in 508 BC,¹¹⁴ after the overthrow of the last Etruscan monarch Tarquinius Superbus,¹¹⁵ and lasted some five centuries.¹¹⁶ Following victories in the Punic wars against Carthage, amid other successful military undertakings in the Mediterranean, the Roman Republic soon expanded beyond the scope of a city-state.¹¹⁷ These conquests furthered economic development in the Republic, in that Rome gained control of the wealth of other states, and utilized the labor of war victims in large-scale agricultural production (cf. Brunt 1971, 18-9; Mann 1986, 250; Applebaum 1992, 97). Furthermore, the rapid territorial expansion led invariably to the development of extensive infrastructural networks for trade and commerce (cf. Roth 1999, 215; Schlippschuh 1987, 87),¹¹⁸ whilst also enhancing urban civilization through contact with foreign cultures (cf. esp. Hirschman 1981, 17; 1982, 1470-1).¹¹⁹

Despite these developments, Roman society remained sharply divided into patrician and plebeian orders.¹²⁰ The former held all key political positions in the state,¹²¹ whilst the latter merely constituted a working class.¹²² Over time, the Plebeians began to agitate for greater participation in the affairs of the state,¹²³ and this led to a ‘conflict of the orders’¹²⁴ a situation which also altered the political landscape¹²⁵ of

the Republic (cf. Raaflaub 2005, 4; Mouritsen 2017, 31-5; Tatum 1999, 9). Thereafter, the Plebeians attained significant political rights,¹²⁶ and popular sovereignty was greatly enhanced in the Republic.¹²⁷

But unlike Athens which disintegrated from without following her conquest by Macedonia, the fall of Rome was orchestrated by elements from within (cf. esp. Weber [1950], 75, 78-9; Parsons 1964, 352).¹²⁸ For instance, the rich succeeded in acquiring, at the expense of the poor, a disproportionate share of the provincial lands that had been conquered by Rome in warfare.¹²⁹ There also arose powerful military commanders as Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla who, through promises of redistribution, were able to lure the loyalties of the poor away from the state.¹³⁰ This was then followed by the triumvirate of Pompeius Magnus, Lucinius Crassus, and Julius Caesar which further plunged the Republic into civil strife and anarchy until its eventual dissolution in 27 BC (cf. Marin 2009, 113-4; Zoch 1998, 185-90; Belliotti 2009, 4-7).¹³¹

In a number of salient ways, Roman *Respublika* differed in form and scope from Athenian *demokratia*. For instance, Athenians used lots in selecting citizens for public appointments, whereas the Romans only resorted to elections.¹³² More also, deliberation was observed in the Athenian *Ecclesia* but was strictly prohibited in the Roman

assemblies.¹³³ But third and most important, whereas power was absolutely retained by the *demos* of Athens, the Roman Republic, not following after this example, separated power finely between the offices of the consuls, Senate, and assemblies.¹³⁴ According to the Greek historian Polybius (*The Histories*, Book VI, Chap. XI: Sec. 11-3; Chap. XVIII: Sec. 7-8), such separation of powers prevented the Republic from falling into the hands of tyrants, or into a state of anarchy, as had obtained at Athens:¹³⁵

As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium [...] for if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy [...] For when any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked by its fear of the other.

Additionally, a vital lesson could be drawn from Athens and Rome regarding the way both states managed their class conflict. In the case of the former, an impartial intermediary in the person of Solon was sought to resolve the conflict between the elites and the masses, whereas the latter saw both Patricians and Plebeians work together over a

protracted period of time to bring lasting solutions to the conflict. As it turned out, Athens fell many times thereafter into a state of tyranny and anarchy, whereas the Roman Republic remained perpetually free from such social upheavals (cf. esp. Straumann 2016, 157; Atkins 2018, 22).¹³⁶ This goes to augment the fact that systemic institutional change effected through a process of learning does more to facilitate political stability in a state than quick-fix solutions implemented from without. This was avidly underscored by Marcus Tullius Cicero (*De Republica*, Book II, Sec. 2) as follows:

Nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum, nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus. Nam neque ullum ingenium tantum [...] ut quem res nulla fugeret quisquam aliquando fuisset, neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu ac vetustate.¹³⁷

Furthermore, one may observe peculiar differences between Athens and Rome on the scope of citizenship rights. In the case of Rome, citizenship was extensive whilst participation was limited – being tied directly to one’s civic duties to the state; whereas at Athens, citizenship was exclusive, and participation, extensive. In this light, the Roman model made a firm distinction between citizens and subjects, and only permitted the former to participate in the affairs of the state (cf. Machiavelli 1965, 17-20; Pocock 1975, 197-204).¹³⁸ This thus enabled

the Republic to attain a high degree of stability, as the *nobilitas* were able to maintain a firm grip on the system, thereby facilitating political order in Rome. Howbeit this came at the cost of exercising less reconnaissance on the annexed territories and provinces of the state – a thing which also precipitated the fall of the Republic.¹³⁹

Lastly, as with Athens, the Roman Republic fell because of a gradual erosion of its republican institutional structure. The notion of ‘*Respublika*’ which meant ‘a thing of the people’ was greatly undermined when the wealthy were given preeminence in voting; when the Senate, which was exclusively Patrician,¹⁴⁰ was made the sole advisory body of the state; and when there existed grave wealth disparities between the *nobilitas* and the peasantry. It was of little surprise then that, as had occurred at Athens, personalistic military commanders as Sulla and Pompey with parochial objectives arose to lure the allegiance of the masses [most of whom were at the bottom end of the resource pool] away from the state. And just as *demokratia* was supplanted by oligarchic rule at Athens before her conquest in 322 BC, so also did Roman *Respublika* degenerate into a dictatorship before its collapse in 27 BC.

Thus, neither rule by the many at Athens, nor rule by the few at Rome was in itself sufficient to guard against the abuse of power. This was reiterated by Alexander Hamilton in his June 18th Conventional Speech where he espoused that it was not the distribution of power that mattered, but rather the extent to which such power was countervailed and delimited in a state:

In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. Hence, separate interests will arise [...] Give all power to the many, [*and*] they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, [*and*] they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have power, that each may defend itself against the other (qtd. in Farrand 1911, 371, *italics supplied*).

As was verily observed, Athens elevated popular sovereignty over the sovereignty of law, and this gave the *demos* recourse to implement any policy decision of their choosing. Rome, on the other hand, had the *nobilitas* and *cursus honorum* so well bonded that they could bypass the procedural safeguards established by the republican constitution, and so pursue any policy ambition of their choosing (cf. Ward et al. 1999, 66-7; Yakobson 2006, 384).¹⁴¹ In either case, the governing apparatus was endowed with much power without the necessary institutional restraints to safeguard its accountability. Perhaps Henry David Thoreau (1849, 3)

was right when he asseverated that “the best government was that which governed not at all.”

But the notion of representation, although minimally conceived by the Romans¹⁴² was only first realized centuries later by the English.¹⁴³ An edict by King Edward I in 1295 for counties and towns to elect representatives to Parliament¹⁴⁴ would come to constitute the very foundations of representative democracy (cf. Finer 1997, 1039-42; Maitland 2001, 95; Brand 2009, 10-5). These knights and burgesses, as they were called, later came to constitute the House of Commons which became also the prime legislative body in England (cf. Savage 1833, 131; Hume 1869, 239; Previt -Orton 1929, 369-70). This, thus, established the rudimentary foundations of representation: an elite few *procedurally* selected from amongst the body of citizens to a house of deliberation with the charge of shaping policy decisions in the *relative* interests of the latter.

Thereafter, a series of hostilities between Parliament and the Crown¹⁴⁵ would result in a civil war and a revolution, both of which would come to define the institutional basis¹⁴⁶ of liberal democracy. A discourse by way of antecedent seem in place. Parliament, though a legislative body, was responsible for raising tax revenue for the Crown. Howbeit, in cases

where Parliament refused to do so because it disagreed with the policy priorities of the Crown, the later would resort to arbitrary means of expropriating private wealth and property.¹⁴⁷ To aid in this cause, the Crown devised institutional mechanisms that allowed it to circumvent oppositions by parliament. For instance, it issued royal prerogatives which were enforced by specially constituted prerogative courts.¹⁴⁸ It also established the Star Chamber which had preeminence over the common law courts and could reverse rulings that were against the Crown.¹⁴⁹

In time, Parliament organized an opposition against the Crown, leading consequently to the Civil War of 1642.¹⁵⁰ Following the victory of Parliament in the War,¹⁵¹ a number of procedural measures¹⁵² were promulgated which reconstituted the powers of the Crown, and furthered the supremacy of parliament. Of these measures, three are particularly noteworthy. First, the sovereign, 'divine' rights of the Crown were firmly curtailed, so that only with the consent of Parliament could royal decrees and edicts attain legitimation.¹⁵³ In the same wise, restrictions were placed on the powers of Parliament so that only by the approval of the Crown could parliamentary proposals be effected into law.¹⁵⁴ This double-edged limitation helped ensure that neither the

Crown nor Parliament wielded absolute power in the state¹⁵⁵ (cf. North and Weingast 1989, 816-9, esp. 818).

Second, the supremacy of the common law courts, and with that, the common law as paramount law of the land, was reaffirmed following the abolition of the Star Chamber and the prerogative courts (cf. Pound 1921, 81-4; but also Mares 2013, 177-8; Kenyon 1986, 104-6; Esmein 2000, 340-1). This led not only to the furtherance of political and economic rights, but also to the flourishing of private capital markets in 17th-century England (cf. esp. Parsons, *loc. cit.*, 353; but also Ogg [1955], 413, 422-5; Macaulay 1914, 2438).¹⁵⁶ Third, and a corollary of the second, the independence of the judiciary was guaranteed under the new regime, and with that, the tenure of judges (cf. Weingast 2010, 44; Klerman 2017, 420; Chavez 2004, 11).¹⁵⁷ As avowed by North and Weingast (*loc. cit.*, 819), this ensured that the courts exercised an “important and unchallenged authority in large areas of economic activity,” thereby “raising the predictability of government actions” and “assuring a commitment to secure [*property*] rights.”

With these institutional mechanisms firmly entrenched, the stage was now set for the extension of *suffragia* to the masses.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the Great Reform Act of 1832, the Representation of the People Act of 1867, and

the Franchise Act of 1832 successively lowered property qualifications for voting and therewith increased the size of the electorate.¹⁵⁹ This had two immediate effects. First, it redirected government policies away from special-interest politics towards the provision of public goods¹⁶⁰ (cf. Lizzeri and Persico 2004, 752-5; Evans 2001, 489-94); and second, it eliminated the corruption and patronage associated with parliamentary elections¹⁶¹ (cf. Cox 1987, 56-9; Seymour 1915, 453-7). These thus established England as a *Rechtsstaat*,¹⁶² and consequently paved way for industrialization and other attendant forms of social mobilization (cf. Parsons, *loc. cit.*, 353; North 1981, 171-86; Bollen 1979, 573; Hirschman 1994, 347).¹⁶³ Kenneth Dam (2006, 86) summarized these developments as follows:¹⁶⁴

[...] the legal measures surrounding the Glorious Revolution taken together with earlier common law decisions and Parliamentary legislation established a set of rules protecting property rights and enforcing contracts, free from arbitrary actions of the Crown. These rules enabled Britain in the eighteenth century not only to enjoy faster growth of the economy but also to lead the way into the Industrial Revolution.

But given the fact that the English and the Romans both established and maintained a form of limited government, why then did the institutions fostering separation of powers attain more success in the former than in the latter? Indeed, the offices of the Senate, Consul, and

Tribune, like those of the Court, Crown, and Parliament, were separate one from the other, and each was intended to serve as a check on and a counterbalance to the powers of the other. Nevertheless, this goal was not effectively realized in the Roman Republic as it was in 17th-century England. Wherefore was this the case? Invariably, this may be rooted in what Professor George Sabine (1952) has called the “two traditions of democracy,” namely: liberty and equality. Both of these virtues seemed to have been less prevalent in the Roman Republic than they must have been in England.

To elucidate this, a quote by Professor Sabine (*loc. cit.*, 451, 452, 474) seems in place:

[...] from the time when democracy first became a force in Western politics, there have been two democratic traditions [...] the first gave primary importance to liberty while the second gave primary importance to equality [...] the one democratic tradition was founded on the principle that understanding depends on the freedom of parties at interest to speak their minds without fear of reprisal, and it took for granted that a social and political system that does not allow for agreement by the tolerant device of agreeing to differ, or which equates difference of interest or belief or manner of life with moral delinquency, is not compatible with a workable plan of equality. The other democratic tradition was founded on the principle that there can be no genuine meeting of minds where one party negotiates on an assumption of superiority that the other party regards as gratuitous, and it took for granted that a social and political system in which status is virtually hereditary and which sets up discriminations that are practically impassible bars to opportunity is not compatible with a workable plan of liberty [...]

equality does depend on liberty and liberty on equality, because each expresses a phase of the kind of human relationship that democracy hopes measurably to realize.

From this, the root cause becomes rather palpable. Roman society was neither free nor equal.¹⁶⁵ Thus, one may observe that in the two voting assemblies of the Republic, citizens could do no more than vote on items already deliberated upon and approved by the nobler Senate (cf. Note 135, 172).¹⁶⁶ Moreover, the fact that the tribunes were inferior in rank to the consuls meant that they were neither able to relate with the latter on an equal footing nor serve as a counterweight to the latter's powers.¹⁶⁷ Alas, then, the Plebeian Revolution may have only served to empower the Plebs without giving them *real* opportunity to participate in policy matters of the Republic.¹⁶⁸ This is further commented upon by Professor Sabine (*loc. cit.*, 467, 469) as follows:

[...] a society in which citizenship is stretched to cover the whole range of human interests and in which there are no private associations able to exert a collective influence in politics – the result is to reduce the individual to impotence. The absolutely sovereign and omniscient state is the logical correlate of a society which consists of atomic individuals [...] in order to be democratic, a society has to be a complex structure of lesser societies [...] which stand for interests that [...] are personal to their members [...] and such groups have to provide the conditions for giving their members a justified sense of participation.

The English, on the other hand, attempted to circumnavigate this problem through the design of Parliament and the common law courts. The former incorporated the House of Lords and the House of Commons into a single institution; whilst the latter served as an independent intermediary between the Crown and Parliament. In this regard, the ‘nobles’ and the ‘people’s representatives’ were made equal, to the extent that both Houses conjointly approved all legislative bills before they passed into law.¹⁶⁹ This was starkly different from the Roman Republic where the *concilium plebis* and the Senate were not only unequal in terms of class, but also in terms of function.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, unlike the Roman Republic where the office of praetor was a politically contested position,¹⁷¹ the judges of the common law courts, to cite the words of Justice Coke, were professionals and experts of the law who had attained their knowledge by “long study and experience” (cf. qt. in Pound, *loc. cit.*, 61). As such, these were less likely than their Roman counterparts to show fear or favor in the dispensation of justice.¹⁷²

Nevertheless, Professor Nadia Urbinati (2012) in her influential essay on “the Republican Critique of Democracy” has argued persuasively that the Roman conception of political liberty – *aequa libertas* [as opposed to the Athenian *isonomia*] – conveyed more the idea of ‘non-domination’

than of ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government’ (*loc. cit.*, 611, 618).¹⁷³ According to her, the Romans strived to achieve political equity rather than equality,¹⁷⁴ and designed their institutions to foster a *concordia ordinum* between “the noble and popular orders in the public realm” (*loc. cit.*, 613-4).¹⁷⁵ Viewed in this wise, the Roman Republic was free in so far as the people’s assemblies held the sole right to ratify legislative proposals of the Senate; and was equal, in so far as enacted laws applied generally and equally to both *optimates* and *populares* (cf. esp. Hutter 1978, 156-9). Howbeit, Hannah Arendt (1965, 25), echoing the earlier views of Professor Sabine, has stressed that such notion of freedom was singularly inadequate insofar as it endowed citizens with negative, rather than positive liberty. Professor Urbinati (*loc. cit.*, 619) summarized this thought succinctly as follows:¹⁷⁶

[...] the unequal status that the disassociation of negative and positive liberty entails [...] may be primed to make individual liberty as non-domination insecure. Indeed, for a law to be stopped or contested, a decision must have been made that instituted that law: and if those who enjoy the right to contest it do not also enjoy the right of participating, directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions by majority rule, they will not have any certainty that their contestatory power will protect them from those who have full political power.

Thus, whilst Professor Maurizio Viroli (2002, 7) may have been right to point out that *Roman Republicanism* was a completion of *Athenian*

democracy,¹⁷⁷ one may also advance the like argument that English parliamentary democracy was a perfection of Roman Republicanism,¹⁷⁸ in so far as the institution of Parliament allowed for both ‘commoners’ and ‘lords’ to participate conjointly and equally in the enactment of laws, and in the formulation of public policy.

1.3. The French and American Revolutions

Although the English were the first to experiment with large-scale representation within the confines of a constitutional monarchy, it was the French that foremost incorporated it within the framework of a centralized *République*.¹⁷⁹ Here, too, a piece of narration by way of antecedent is in place. Following the war of independence,¹⁸⁰ amid deteriorating economic conditions,¹⁸¹ an Estates-General meeting¹⁸² was convened by King Louis XVI in 1798 to find a lasting solution to the crisis (cf. Lefebvre 1962, 99).¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the meeting was stalemated by the Third Estates insistence that the three Estates met conjointly, and that voting be carried out by head and not by order.¹⁸⁴ When their motion was rebuffed by the King,¹⁸⁵ the Third Estate proceeded to constitute itself into an *Assemblée nationale*,¹⁸⁶ and promulgated a new constitution two years later.¹⁸⁷ This legal code established France as a constitutional monarchy,¹⁸⁸ and set in order a

series of liberal provisions – the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* – which abolished feudalism¹⁸⁹ and safeguarded civil liberties and freedoms.¹⁹⁰

Nonetheless, an unyielding socioeconomic crisis, and mass unrest in several parts of rural and urban France¹⁹¹ would give impetus to a counter-revolution that would effectively supplant the ruling Legislative Assembly.¹⁹² The ‘Jacobin’ government¹⁹³ that ensued therefrom effectively displaced the monarchy and established a radical form of *République* in France.¹⁹⁴ It also approved a new liberal constitution in 1793 which granted universal suffrage to adult males, and abolished all feudal dues and payments that peasants owed to their lords.¹⁹⁵ Notwithstanding, the government was fraught with much brutality and corruption,¹⁹⁶ and in 1795 was ousted by ‘Thermidorian Reactionaries’ in the *Convention nationale*.¹⁹⁷ Thereafter a new constitution was promulgated, which also established a conservative government – *le Directoire*,¹⁹⁸ but these were altogether overthrown by Napoléon Bonaparte following his ascension to power in 1799.¹⁹⁹

Although the French Revolution²⁰⁰ did not leave in its wake an enduring legacy of representative democracy, it nonetheless contributed towards the latter’s development in a number of salient ways. The first is evinced

in the Revolution's double conceptualization of popular sovereignty. As was observed in the turnout of events, *souveraineté populaire* was foremost identified with a *régime représentatif*, and then later, with a *régime totalitaires* (cf. Note 190, 192, 196). Interestingly, whereas both traditions were opposed to the *ancien régime* and in favor of a *république*,²⁰¹ they tended to differ only in their conception of the role and composition of government. In this wise, the *régime représentatif* advocated for a 'government by proxy' where the sovereign will of the people was represented by a single *Assemblée* of elected delegates (cf. Sieyès 2003, 134-8; Pasquino 1998, 175-6; Forsyth [1987], 60-3, 74-7; 138-42).²⁰² Years earlier, James Madison (2011) had proffered in the *Federalist Papers* (No. X, p. 46) that such *gouvernement représentatif* was more effective at articulating the *volonté commune* of the people:

The [...] difference between a democracy and a republic [...] is, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest [...] The effect [...] is [...] to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the [same] purpose.²⁰³

In this light, the ‘Sovereign People’ became segmented into two groups, namely: “the producers” and “the auxiliaries” – the former being the class of citizens who made the laws for all, and the latter, the class of citizens who obeyed the laws made by the former (cf. Urbinati 2006, 143).

This distinction nevertheless was lacking in the conceptualization of popular sovereignty by the *régime totalitaires*. The same undermined the role of representatives as conveyors of the common will, and instead involved the entire mass of people directly in all affairs of the state.²⁰⁴ Professor Robert Palmer ([1952], 69, 72) in his “Reflections on the French Revolution” gives an apt description of this practice as follows:²⁰⁵

Revolutionary democracy [...] was an over-mastering and obsessive belief in the Sovereignty of the People [...] It was not [...] the idea [...] that government rose out of and represented the community. It was new, and revolutionary, in that it really meant Sovereignty, that is, absolute lawmaking or norm-setting power, and it really meant People, that is, the whole population considered in its relation to public authority [...] The fundamental feeling [...] was that government and governed should be made up [...] of interchangeable parts [...] There was no such thing, in this philosophy, as of a kind of men who were normally and permanently the guardian or leaders of others. There was no fixed ruling *élite*, whether based on heredity, property, wisdom, merit, special training or anything else.

To a large extent, this radical conceptualization of popular sovereignty derived its moral basis from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the general will. Although Rousseau was sure to distinguish the ‘general

will' form the 'will of all,'²⁰⁶ he nonetheless remarked unequivocally that the former could only be realized if all citizens were represented in the legislature (cf. his *Œuvres complètes*, Vol. III, pp. 371-2, 429-30).²⁰⁷ But this practice presented a palpable challenge: for how could the people which *commanded* the laws simultaneously be the people which *obeyed* the laws; nay, how could a people unequal in class and wealth submit to a 'general will' which served *equally* the interests of all?²⁰⁸

As was observed in the course of events, the Jacobin government – which also embodied the *régime totalitaires* – sought to address these challenges in two principal ways: first, by reconstituting 'the people' to include only the virtuous; and second, by terrorizing 'the people' into submitting to the 'general will' (cf. Note 198).²⁰⁹ Of the former shall more be spoken thereunto presently. But it was the latter which more than most defined the 'totalitarian' nature of the regime: for it sought to homogenize society by subverting all forms of dissent to the *volonté générale* (cf. Gauchet 1989, 23-8; Baecque 1993, 128).²¹⁰ Thus Professor Jacob Talmon (1919, 1-3) coined the phrase 'totalitarian democracy' to connote such regimes which promoted conjointly direct popular rule and egalitarianism at the same time.²¹¹ In his view (*loc. cit.*, 46), such

combination was a sure recipe for dictatorship, as was also evinced by the *Comité de sûreté générale*:²¹²

Now at the very foundation of the principle of direct and indivisible democracy, and the expectation of unanimity, there is the implication of dictatorship, as the history of many a referendum has shown. If a constant appeal to the people as a whole, not just to a small representative body, is kept up, and at the same time unanimity is postulated, there is no escape from dictatorship.

Thus, it would not be hasty to conclude that *souveraineté populaire* mediated through a body of representatives offered a more viable and enduring form of government than a *ré-totale*.²¹³ This viewpoint was also touched upon by Professor Talmon (*loc. cit.*, 1-3, *italics in original*) in his landmark distinction between a liberal and a totalitarian democracy:²¹⁴

The essential difference between the two schools of democratic thought as they have evolved is not, as is often alleged, in the affirmation of the value of liberty by one, and its denial by the other. It is in their different attitudes to politics. The liberal approach assumes politics to be a matter of trial and error, and regards political systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity. It also recognizes a variety of levels of personal and collective endeavor, which are altogether outside the sphere of politics [...] Liberal democrats *thus* believe that in the absence of coercion men and society may one day reach *through a process of trial and error* a state of ideal harmony. In the case of totalitarian democracy, this state is precisely defined, and is treated as a matter of immediate urgency, a challenge for direct action, an imminent event [...] This is the reason why the extreme forms of popular sovereignty became the essential concomitant of this absolute purpose. From

the difficulty of reconciling freedom with the idea of an absolute purpose spring all the particular problems and antinomies of totalitarian democracy.

Now unto the subject matter of *vertu*. Although this conception was haphazardly employed by the Jacobin government to axe political opponents, it nonetheless has remained an enduring requisite of a democratic polity. The ideal of virtue, as pertaining to democracy, can be perceived in two primary forms: first, as personal, and second, as civic. The latter is discussed in succeeding sections of *this essay*, but it is the former which has come to be most identified with the selection of representatives. To explicate this, a quote by John Stuart Mill (*Representative Government*, Chap. II, p. 121) and Claude Adrien Helvétius (*De L'esprit*, Essay I, Chap. XVII, p. 129) seem in place:

What, for example, are the qualities in the citizens individually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society? Everybody will agree that those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence. But are not these, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in the community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression.

A person solely subject to reason and virtue might then brave every prejudice, and arm himself with those manly and courageous sentiments that form the distinguishing character of a virtuous man; sentiments desirable in every citizen, and which we have a right to expect from the great. How shall the person, raised to the highest posts, remove the obstacles to the general welfare,

which certain prejudices raise against it, and resist the menaces and cabals of men in power, often interested in the public misfortune, if his souls is not inaccessible to all kinds of solicitations, fears, and prejudices?

From these, we understand that personal *vertu* acted as a self-enforcing filter,²¹⁵ or better, as an “internal check” – as Professor Robert Dahl (1956, 18) likes to call it²¹⁶ – ensuring that persons elected as representatives were also those who were least likely to *misrepresent* or *subvert* the interests of their electoral communes for private gain (cf. Wood 1980, 11; Crittenden 2002, 14-6; Mansfield 1987, 59).²¹⁷ And this is particularly important because as Professor Dahl (1967, 957) rightly points out, the large size of republics naturally inhibited citizens from exercising direct and effective control over their representatives, save only in elections.²¹⁸ Hence, the need for *vertu* to ensure the promotion of the public good by elected representatives during their term in office (cf. esp. Burke 1906, 319; but also Manin 1996, 94; Gutmann 1987, 41-7).²¹⁹

But that *vertu* acted as a ‘self-enforcing filter’ did not mean that it was to be regarded as a given [that is, to be perceived as a quality that was perpetually present and active in a person].²²⁰ Surely, “men are not angels,” as James Madison (*op. cit.*, No. LI, p. 269) rightly reminded, for if they were, said he, then “no government would be necessary.”²²¹

Thus, political analysts have stressed the need for institutional designs or “external checks” which help to facilitate personal *vertu* amongst elected representatives (cf. esp. Rossiter 1953, 429-32; Dahl 1956, 17-9).²²² For instance, the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham in his *Principles of Judicial Procedure* (Chap. IV, p. 199) advocated for instituting rewards and punishments as a means of “uniting interest with duty” amongst individuals, but particularly public officials:²²³

The legislator should [...] endeavor to unite interest with duty [...] But how is this union to be brought about? [...] To create a duty and affix a punishment to the violation of it, is to unite a man's interest with his duty [...] But [...] if punishment alone were sufficient for the establishment of the desired connexion between interest and duty, what legislator is there who would fail in its accomplishment? [...] In this phrase, by the word *interest*, *pleasure* or *profit* is understood: the idea designed to be expressed is, the existence of such a provision in the law, as that conformity to it shall be productive of certain benefits which will cease of themselves so soon as the law ceases to be observed. In a word, the union in question is produced whenever such a species of interest can be formed as shall combine the *force* which is peculiar to punishment with the *certainty* which is peculiar to reward.

A similar measure also was advanced by French philosopher Élie Halévy (1904, 334-5) in what he called the “artificial identification of interest” – to wit, the placing of individuals in social conditions, by acts of legislation, which allowed for their private interests to coincide with the general interest:²²⁴

Tous les hommes veulent être heureux; mais ne peut-il pas, ne doit-il pas arriver que les moyens employés par les divers individus pour être heureux soient contradictoires entre eux? Pendant que l'un veut jouir en paix du produit de son travail, l'autre peut vouloir le lui ravir par la ruse ou par la violence [...] Puisque celui-ci cède à l'attrait du plaisir, il faut le menacer de l'infliction d'une douleur au moins égale en intensité au plaisir auquel il aspire. Par ces menaces, des actes sont érigés en délits. La science de l'intimidation, voilà la législation; l'utilité générale est la raison d'être, et la peine est la sanction des obligations qu'elle impose [...] Le législateur est, dans la société, le grand dispensateur des plaisirs et des peines. C'est lui qui crée l'ordre moral, l'équilibre des intérêts. La société est l'œuvre de ses artifices. Ainsi trouve son application ce que nous avons appelé le principe de l'identification artificielle des intérêts.²²⁵

Thus Alexis de Tocqueville (1959), in his seminal study of American democracy (*Fragments inédits*, pp. 307-8), observed that political *vertu* amongst Americans was more the work of art than of nature:

Les Américains ne forment pas un peuple vertueux, et cependant ils sont libres. Ceci ne prouve pas absolument que la vertu, comme le pensait Montesquieu, n'est pas essentielle à l'existence des Républiques. Il ne faut pas prendre l'idée de Montesquieu dans étroit [...] Ce qu'il entend par vertu, c'est le pouvoir moral qu'exerce chaque individu sur lui-même et qui l'empêche de violer le droit des autres. Quand ce triomphe de l'homme sur ces tentations est le résultat de la faiblesse de la tentation ou d'un calcul d'intérêt personnel, il ne constitue pas la vertu aux yeux du moraliste; [...] En Amérique, ce n'est pas la vertu qui est grande, c'est la tentation qui est petite, ce qui revient au même. Ce n'est pas le désintéressement qui est grand, c'est l'intérêt qui est bien entendu, ce qui revient encore presque au même. Montesquieu avait donc raison, quoiqu'il parlât de la vertu antique, et ce qu'il dit des Grecs et des Romains s'applique encore aux Américains.²²⁶

Lastly, the crucial role played by the *bourgeois* and the *sans-culottes* in the French Revolution would come to establish the middle class as a central actor in democratic politics.²²⁷ This ‘middle class,’ as defined by Gideon Sjoberg (1960, 118-21), encompassed highly-educated persons who owned significant amounts of wealth and property by virtue of their expertise and social capital. Because these formed a virtual bridge between the upper and lower echelons of society, they have tended also to be the natural agents of political change and reform (cf. López 2012, 171-2; Lipset 1959, 83; Huntington 1991, 66).²²⁸ Aristotle underscored this fact succinctly in his *Politics* (Book IV, Sec. 1295b-6a, pp. 169-70) as follows:²²⁹

[...] a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes [...] Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme, – either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy [...] And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government.

As was thus observed in the Revolution, the leadership of the *Tiers État* which displaced the absolutist *ancien régime*, and the *réactionnaires thermidoriens* which ousted the tyrannical Jacobin government were both composed predominantly of *bourgeoisie*. More also, it may have been because the *sans-culottes* had a large number of *petite bourgeoisie* within their ranks that they were able to constrain the *Assemblée nationale* to outlaw feudalism in France. It is perhaps for this cause that Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966, 417-8) asseverated that there could be no democracy without the *bourgeois*:²³⁰

[...] a decisive precondition for modern democracy has been the emergence of a rough balance between the crown and the nobility, in which the royal power predominated but left a substantial degree of independence to the nobility [...] But [...] one may ask what happens when [...] the landed aristocracy tries to shake free from royal controls in the absence of a numerous and politically vigorous class of town dwellers. To put the question in less exact form, what may happen if the nobility seeks freedom in the absence of a bourgeois revolution? [...] Without going into the evidence further or discussing the [...] materials that point in the same direction, we may simply register strong agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.

But if ‘no *bourgeois*, no democracy,’ then a *laissez-faire* capitalist system guided by the “invisible hand” was destined to become the economic system *par excellence* of a functional democracy.²³¹ This is

discussed presently, as we turn our attention now, and lastly, to the American Revolution.

Like the French Revolution, the American Revolution did not commence with the express aim of securing independence from Great Britain.²³² On the contrary, it was started in humble opposition to new taxes levied by the British Crown on account of the Seven Year's War.²³³ Until then, the colonial assemblies had been responsible for tax legislations within their respective boundaries, and were thus unwilling to accept Parliament's trespass in this respect.²³⁴ Parading on a slogan of 'no taxation without representation,' the colonies, but particularly Massachusetts, embarked on a series of mutinous protests which, *amid others*, culminated in the Boston- Massacre and Tea Party.²³⁵

As expected, the British Parliament responded with more 'Coercive Acts' to suppress the rebellion,²³⁶ but these only worked to further unite the colonies against what they deemed a 'tyranny of the British.'²³⁷ Thus, on 5 September 1774, a Continental Congress was convened in Philadelphia for this purpose, during which time delegates of the colonies issued a *Declaration of Colonial Rights and Grievances*,²³⁸ and also resolved to boycott all British wares and products within the space of a year. Albeit this plan of action was scarcely followed through when

the inevitable die of the revolutionary war was cast: for on 19 April 1775, an expeditionary attempt by General Thomas Gage [the British Royal Governor of Massachusetts] to capture colonial military supplies at Lexington and Concord²³⁹ precipitated what Ralph Waldo Emerson (cf. *Concord Hymn*, S1: L4) has heralded the “shot heard round the world.”²⁴⁰

Soon afterwards, a second Continental Congress was convened on 10 May 1775 which led successively to the formation of a Continental Army,²⁴¹ and the declaration of independence from the British Crown.²⁴² Following independence,²⁴³ the thirteen colonies constituted themselves into a loose confederation of sovereign states represented at the center by a United States in Congress,²⁴⁴ and regulated constitutionally by Articles of Confederation.²⁴⁵ Nevertheless, it would take a Shays’ Rebellion,²⁴⁶ and mounting war debts²⁴⁷ for a 1787 Philadelphia Convention to be convened that would establish a federal constitution for the new nation.²⁴⁸ Thereafter, a bloody civil war would come to divide the nation for a time, times, and a time – pitting Union states against Confederate,²⁴⁹ but in the aftermath would establish the United States as one truly indivisible nation – *e pluribus unum*.²⁵⁰

In some respects, the model of government adopted by the founders of the United States – what Professor Robert Dahl (1956, 4) has called ‘Madisonian Democracy’ – was a novelty, in that it differed in form and scope from the then existing forms of government.²⁵¹ Like the *régime représentatif* of the French Revolution, it placed sovereignty in the hands of the people, whilst restricting the conduct of government to a small cadre of elected representatives (cf. Pocock 1975, 517-8; Wood 1995, 216; McLaughlin 1935, 109).²⁵² James Madison described this political arrangement in the *Federalist Papers* (No. XXXIX, p. 194) as follows:

[...] we may define a republic to be [...] a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; [...] It is sufficient for such a government, that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people.

Elsewhere in the anthology (*op. cit.*, No. LXIII, p. 327) he impassionedly averred that such government by representation was the surest means by which the United States could escape the chaos and disorder that characterized popular rule at Athens:

As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of

its rulers: so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.

To a varied extent, the founders of the new nation were much opposed to populistic democracy²⁵³ because they perceived it as deleterious to secure property rights (cf. Deudney 2007, 165).²⁵⁴ As such, a republican government was opted for because it was believed that its elaborate checks and balances would enable the nation survive the rise of economic inequalities – that is, would ensure that future disparities in property ownership were rendered immune from governmental interference (cf. esp. Foner 1998, 22).²⁵⁵ Consequently, the protection of private property furthered the development of *laissez-faire* capitalism,²⁵⁶ which thereafter became strongly associated with liberal democracy.²⁵⁷

But Madison's immaculate conception of representative government did not go without criticism. For instance, there were anti-federalists at the

time who expressed legitimate concerns about the elite composition of the federal government. They argued that the design only furthered the power and dominion of the aristocracy, and jeopardized in the process the liberties of the common people (cf. Bonwick 1991, 224; Hayek 1960, 186).²⁵⁸ As a result, the founders were forced to append a Bill of Rights to the constitution which served essentially to protect citizens from the federal government.²⁵⁹ For instance, the second amendment afforded citizens the right to bear arms, whilst the fifth proscribed the exercise of eminent domain without due compensation.

Viewed in its entirety however, the American Revolution may best be seen to have furthered in the United States the virtue of possessive individualism. As Professor Crawford Macpherson (1962, 3) explicates, the individual was perceived as “proprietor of his person and capacities,” and therefore was “free from dependence on the wills of others.”²⁶⁰ Albeit, because one could only be ‘free from dependence on the wills of others’ when one possessed economic means,²⁶¹ it was the case that individuality came to be strongly associated with the ownership of property. Thus, sprung the emphasis on *Rechtssicherheit*²⁶² as a necessary safeguard to private property. This is finely captured by the

English Philosopher John Locke in his *Two Treatises of Government* (Book II, Chap. XI, Sec. 138, pp. 308-9) as follows:²⁶³

The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property [...] Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to the goods which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take them or any part of them from them, without their own consent; without this they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in that which another can by right take from me when he pleases, against my consent.

In addition to promoting secure property rights, individualism furthered radical rationalism and a freedom of conscience amongst Americans (cf. esp. Ranney 1976, 143-5; Greenleaf 1964, 274-5).²⁶⁴ In essence, it allowed for persons to hold independent views and opinions about matters of the state – ones deduced from their *eigen* reflections and experiences.²⁶⁵ This had two effects: first, it enhanced communication and collective endeavors amongst citizens; and second, it enlarged the scope and quality of public deliberations.

As regards the former, Professor Grace de Laguna (1946, 131) has noted that “it is only the individual, in his difference from others, who has anything *at all* to communicate to them;” and also that “it is the freely communicating individual who is fully rational and the source of

creativity.”²⁶⁶ More also, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Hegel in his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Sec. 40, p. 50) adjoined that “die Person, sich von sich unterscheidend, verhält sich zu einer anderen Person, und zwar haben beide nur als Eigentümer füreinander Dasein.”²⁶⁷ Thus Alexis de Tocqueville observed accurately in his *Democracy in America* (Vol. I, Chap. XII, pp. 204-5) that Americans were by virtue of their individualism particularly skillful at creating civic associations to meet shared objectives:²⁶⁸

In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects, than in America [...] The citizen of the United States is taught from his earliest infancy to rely upon his own exertions, in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life [...] This habit may even be traced in the schools of the rising generation, where the children in their games are wont to submit to rules which they have themselves established, and to punish misdemeanors which they have themselves defined. The same spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a thorough fare, and the circulation of the public is hindered, the neighbors immediately constitute a deliberative body; and this extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power, which remedies the inconvenience, before anybody has thought of recurring to an authority superior to that of the person immediately concerned. If the public pleasures are concerned, an association is formed to provide for the splendor and the regularity of the entertainment. Societies are formed to resist enemies which are exclusively of a moral nature, and to diminish the vice of intemperance: in the United States, associations are established to promote public order, commerce, industry, morality, and religion.

As regards the latter, this was the case because citizens, as free-thinking individuals, were able to contribute diverse perspectives and contra-arguments to discussions on civic, economic, and political matters, thereby enhancing the efficacy of public policy decision. (cf. Manin 1994, 194; Walker 1966, 285).²⁶⁹ But besides this, effective public deliberation helped to offset what Professor Dankwart Rustow (1950, 116) has called “the crystallization of majority-minority alignments.”²⁷⁰ And particularly so for a nation as the United States with a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system, the frequent recomposing of the public on policy matters worked to prevent the rise of factions, and withal, a tyranny of the majority (cf. esp. Dahl 1956, 27-31).²⁷¹ This is avidly underscored by Professor James Buchanan (1954, 118-20) as follows:²⁷²

A decision reached through the approval of a majority with minority dissent has never been, and should never be, currently interpreted as anything other than a provisional or experimental choice of the whole social group [...] The fact that such decisions may be formally inconsistent provides one of the most important safeguards against abuse through this form of the voting process [...] Majority rule is acceptable in a free society precisely because it allows a sort of jockeying back and forth among alternatives [...] Majority rule encourages such shifting, and it provides the opportunity for any social decision to be altered or reversed at any time by a new and temporary majority grouping. In this way, [...] it serves to insure that competing alternatives may be experimentally and provisionally adopted, tested, and replaced by new compromise alternatives approved by a majority group of ever changing composition [...] The definition of democracy as ‘government by discussion’

implies that individual values can and do change in the process of decision-making.

A final subject of interest relates to the fact that the United States remains the only revolutionizing nation to not have had a feudal past.²⁷³ Indeed, the American Revolution, unlike the French and English, was not staged to topple an *ancien régime*, but was simply aimed at independence from a ‘tyrannical’ colonizer. Thus Alexis de Tocqueville (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, Book II, Chap. III, p. 108) famously noted that “the great advantage of the Americans was that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and *that* they have been born equal instead of becoming so.”²⁷⁴ One of the downsides to having a feudal past, as argued by Professor Albert Hirschman (1982, 1475), is the fact that it generates a *bourgeoisie* class that are “servile, supine, [...] and too weak to play the progressive role history has supposedly assigned to it.” In effect, the *bourgeoisie* in such nations continue to submit to the values and codes of the old feudal order, and as a result, are only able to build a capitalist structure that is “stunted and distorted.”²⁷⁵

But having not had a feudal past, the United States has been successful at developing an active *bourgeoisie* class, and withal, a vibrant market economy.²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, this had come at the expense of social and

ideological diversity in the nation.²⁷⁷ For instance, Professor Louis Hartz ([1955], 140-2, 285) argued persuasively in his *The Liberal Tradition in America* that the strong preference for “liberal absolutism” in the United States, and the consequent weakness of socialist movements are owed in very deed to the absence of a feudal past.²⁷⁸ More also, Geoffrey Hodgson (1999, 93) adjoined that the lack of a feudal tradition has fostered a “particularly individualistic form of capitalism in the United States where money – rather than nation or duty – was the preeminent criterion of personal success.”²⁷⁹ More also, Professor Moses Abramovitz (1981, 2) observed that Americans appeared much opposed to welfare distributions because of the perception that “the more income was diverted to social uses, the less any was left to income earners for their own personal use.”²⁸⁰ Herbert G. Wells (1906, 73-6) summarized these thoughts succinctly as follows:²⁸¹

It is not difficult to show [...] that the two great political parties in America represent only one English party: the middle-class Liberal party [...] of freedom and industrialism. There are no Tories to represent the feudal system, and no Labor party [...] Americans started almost clear of the medieval heritage, and developed in the utmost [...] the modern type of productive social organization [...] All Americans are [...] liberals of one sort or another; [...] and they have the same attitude toward property and social duty – individualists to the marrow [...] In England, you can still find feudalism, medievalism, the Renaissance, at every turn [...] The English grew inside a frame of regal, aristocratic, and feudal institutions, and have chafed against it, struggled with it, modified it, strained it, and been modified by it, but have remained within

it; the Americans *on the other hand* broke it and escaped to complete self-development.

Nevertheless, to the extent that the American ‘science of politics’ is largely regarded a model *par excellence* of representative democracy,²⁸² *laissez-faire* capitalism is sure to continue as the preferred economic system of the same.²⁸³

1.4. Summary

Thus far we have attempted a review of the evolution and development of representative democracy. *Demokratia*, as we have seen, began at Athens where its practice was limited exclusively to adult male *astos*. But its direct nature meant that popular sovereignty was bound to be elevated over the sovereignty of law. Thereafter, the Romans built upon the model by introducing a mixed constitution to check the excesses of popular rule. Howbeit, Patricians continued to exercise superior political rights over Plebeians, and the latter were not always treated favorably in legal proceedings. The English then perfected the democratic creed further with the introduction of Parliament and the Common Law Courts. The former allowed for both ‘Lords’ and ‘Commoners’ to participate conjointly in legislation; whilst the latter worked to

safeguard private property. Nevertheless, the monarchy was retained, and peerage and gentry norms continued to persist in British society.

Then following her victory in the Revolutionary War, the United States redefined democracy on the fundamental principle of the equality of persons; and successfully applied the norm of representation to a wider geographical territory. More also, the ideals of individualism and free enterprise were concurrently developed alongside the political system. Representative democracy thus came to imply a constitutionally limited government, controlled by checks and balances, and answerable to an electorate that were free, equal, and independent. This 'republican principle' later influenced the ideology of the *Tiers État* in their revolt against the *ancien régime*, and consequently established the tripartite virtues of *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité* as chief epithets of the French state.

Essay II:

The Essence of Democracy

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth [...] a new nation [...] dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation [...] can long endure. It is [...] for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us [...], that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

[Abraham Lincoln, *Gettysburg Address*, 1863].¹

2.1. Three Conceptions of Democracy

Since its conception, representative democracy has been severally defined under three rubrics, namely: the classical, the elitist, and the contemporary [otherwise called polyarchy]. The classical theory – which in some respects is a variant of Athenian democracy – stresses the importance of citizens' active and continual participation in the political process (cf. Eisenstadt 1998, 219; Berelson 1952, 329).² In this sense, democracy is viewed as a regime type wherein public policy is the function of citizens' deliberation and voting in popular assemblies (cf. Walker 1966, 288-9; Dahl and Lindblom 1953, 309). Government's role in the system is thus perceived to be one of facilitating the civic and moral development of citizens (cf. Tussman 1960, 121).

The elitist theory, on the other hand, construes democracy as a non-teleological “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions” (cf. Schumpeter 1942, 269; Weber 1988, 553).³ The theory perceives the political system to be segmented into two mutually exclusive groups: the elites, otherwise known as ‘political entrepreneurs;’ and the entire body of citizens, called the apolitical mass (cf. Dahl 1961, 225-7). Democracy is thus viewed as a procedural mechanism whereby the former acquires the mandate of the latter to decide the affairs of the state (cf. Downs 1957, 23-4).⁴ The citizen of this system only performs the limited role of voting, and of shaping policy preferences through popular opinion.⁵

The distinctive disparity between the two traditions hinges on the fact that whereas the classical theory emphasizes the role of citizens over elected officials in the political process, the elitist theory tends to do the exact opposite (cf. Mayo 1960, 32; Kelsen 1955, 4).⁶ To the classicist, the political system is only as good as the citizens are informed. And this was so conceived because as leaders were chosen from amongst the people, their success or otherwise in government could only be a function of how politically inclined they have been as citizens.⁷ This was well

underscored by John Stuart Mill in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (Chap. II, pp. 39-40) as follows:

[...] the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities [...] moral, intellectual, and active. The government which does this the best has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the government depends.

But the elitist theory, because it treats *leaders* and *voters* as two separate entities, tends to condition democratic success solely on the ingenuity of the former, and the passivity of the latter.⁸ In fact, most elitists tend to believe that democracy becomes threatened when the uninformed masses participate largely in political affairs.⁹ As Professor Jack Walker (*loc. cit.*, 287) avidly remarked, this was perceived to have the effect of “breaking down democratic self-restraint,¹⁰ and rendering peaceful competition amongst the elites impossible.”¹¹ And because the elites were deemed *Führers* of the political system, the only vice that needed be forestalled was disunity amongst their *own* rank (cf. Truman 1959, 489; Key 1961, 558; Higley and Burton 1989, 28; Mills 1956, 292).¹²

The seeming incomprehensiveness of the two theories – the one, “normatively sound but unrealistic;” the other, “realistic but skewed

toward elitism” (cf. Bachrach 1967, 99) – has led to a contemporary redefinition of democracy that attempts a blend of the core elements of both ideals. This conception – called polyarchal democracy¹³ – was foremost advanced by Professor Robert Dahl (1972, 35) as follows:

All political systems fall considerably short of achieving rule by the people based on consent and political equality [...] These systems are not democracies in the ideal sense, yet they contain democratic components. Nor are they dominated by a cohesive elite, yet elites and leaders play powerful parts. These systems, a mixture of elite rule and *pure* democracy, are called polyarchies.

Elsewhere in another monograph, Professor Dahl (1986, 230) expatiates on the essence of polyarchies as follows:

Polyarchy can be seen as simply a distinctive kind of regime for governing the modern state – a regime with characteristics that distinguish it pretty sharply from all regimes prior to the nineteenth century, and also from most regimes existing among the nation-states of the world today. Its distinctiveness arises from the combination of two general features: its relatively high tolerance for oppositions [...] and the relatively widespread opportunities for participating in influencing the conduct of government.

From these, we understand that polyarchal democracy represented a form of government where there existed *real* opposition to the ruling elite,¹⁴ and where political participation extended beyond voting in scheduled elections.¹⁵ In the case of the former, it meant that political contestation was opened to all qualified persons, and was not the exclusive privilege of a cadre of elites; and in the case of the latter, it

implied that there existed multitudinous avenues for citizens to shape the behavior and policy choices of their elected representatives. To this end, polyarchies tend to have enshrined within them autonomous civic associations – as political parties, the mass media, trade unions, etc. – which facilitate the performance of these militating functions (cf. Dahl 1971, 2-3; Diamond 1999, 8; Putnam 1995, 67; Shils 1991, 9-10).¹⁶

But moving from theory to empirics, we indeed discover that democratic nations tend to possess varying forms of the procedural requisites of polyarchies. In this respect therefore, democracies have generally been classified¹⁷ as liberal-, electoral-, pseudo-, and non- democracies.¹⁸ Liberal democracies are the most approximate to polyarchies. They boast of a fair and competitive process for electing representatives, and a vibrant civil society to boot.¹⁹ Electoral democracies²⁰ on the other hand are a manifest representation of the elitist doctrine, emphasizing more the essence of electoral competition, than of civil liberties (cf. Linz 1978, 5-6; Lipset 1981, 27; Huntington 1989, 15).²¹ Then down below the electoral scale are pseudo-democracies, which are regimes that do not pass distinctly for electoral democracies, but at the same time, are not at all authoritarian.²² Non-democracies are all but authoritarian regimes.²³

Howbeit, because the actual installation and practice of popular government tends to be contingent upon a nation's historical and sociocultural configurations, it has usually been argued for democracy to be perceived in developmental rather than in appraisive terms (cf. esp. Diamond (1999, 17-8). As Professor Richard Sklar (1987, 714) keenly noted, "democracy comes to every country in fragments – each of which then becomes an incentive for the addition of another." Adjoinedly, Professor Amartya Sen (1999, 4) has remarked that it need not be priorly thought whether or not some countries are "fit *for* democracy" because all could become "fit *through* it." Thus, whilst political theory may necessitate a rigid stratification of democracies based on some measured output, it is best that these are conceived of merely as guides for research, and not as an appraisal of the said political system in its entirety.²⁴

2.2. Model Designs of Democratic Systems

Now as regarding the model designs of democratic regimes, these may be seen in three aspects, namely: the governmental, the political, and the electoral. On the nature of government, democracies have been usually organized as presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential, or semi-parliamentary systems. In presidential systems, both the executive

and the legislature possess independent sources of legitimacy, so that the one need not answer to the other (cf. Linz 1990, 53).²⁵ But as Stepan and Skach (1993, 17-8) remind, this mutual independence is wont to create a political impasse between the two for which there usually is no constitutionally available remedy.²⁶

Parliamentary systems on the other hand have only one democratically legitimate institution – parliament, from which then derives the cabinet.²⁷ (cf. Linz, *loc. cit.*, 52). As Walter Bagehot (*The English Constitution*, Chap. I, pp. 76-7) famously noted, the system allows for “a close union, a nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers:” in that a committee selected from amongst the legislative body comprise the executive.²⁸ This system of mutual dependence makes parliamentary systems less prone to the stalemates that frequently beset presidential regimes.²⁹ For this cause also, they have been deemed a superior alternative for neophyte political regimes looking to undertaking structural reforms,³⁰ and to consolidating democracy. Stepan and Skatch (*loc. cit.*, 22) commented in this wise as follows:

[...] the reason why parliamentarianism is a more supportive constitutional framework lies in the following theoretically predictable and empirically observable tendencies: its greater propensity for governments to have majorities to implement their programs; its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting; its lower propensity for executives to rule at the edge of

the constitution [...]; its lower susceptibility to military coup; and its greater tendency to provide long party-government careers, which add loyalty and experience to political society. The analytically separable propensities of parliamentarianism interact to form a mutually supporting system. This system increases the degrees of freedom politicians have as they attempt to consolidate democracy. The analytically separable propensities of presidentialism also form a highly interactive system, but they work to impede democratic consolidation.

But flipping the coins around, we observe also that presidential systems do have their *eigen* virtues, and parliamentary systems, their drawbacks. For instance, the disjointedness that oftentimes persist between the legislative and executive organs in presidential systems may actually work to promote transparent governance, and efficient policy making.³¹ Besides, as Professor Donald Horowitz (1990, 75) interestingly noted, the fact that the legislature and executive could be controlled by different parties goes to prove that presidential systems do not always produce “a winner-take-all result.”³² And for parliamentary systems also, there are instances where a majority government is formed from a coalition of parties; or a minority, from a single party, in which case a gridlock is wont to ensue that could lead to a breakdown of government.³³ It seems therefore that the choice of a governmental system may be more the question of which is better suited to a nation’s

historical and cultural setting, than to the merits of the system itself (cf. Lipset 1990a, 83; Powell 1982, 67).

Nevertheless, some nations have skillfully woven the merits of both governmental types into hybrid systems called semi-presidentialism and semi-parliamentarism. In semi-presidential systems, executive power is shared conjointly by a president who acts as head of state, and a prime minister who acts as head of government. The former, like in presidential systems, is popularly elected with a fixed mandate; whilst the latter, like in parliamentary systems, is chosen by and from amongst members of parliament (cf. Skach 2005, 347; Duverger 1978, 18; Sartori 1994, 121).³⁴ Likewise, in semi-parliamentary systems, the legislature is separated into two popularly elected units,³⁵ only one of which retains the power to vote-out the prime minister and his cabinet (cf. Ganghof 2018, 265).³⁶ Thus in both hybrid systems, the emphasis appears to be on enhancing governmental stability and efficiency.³⁷

As regarding political systems, these also, like governmental systems, are organized into three formats, namely: unitary, federal, and consociational. Unitary systems, quite palpably, need no further expatiation,³⁸ but federal and consociational systems, though different, boast of some unique similarities. A federal political system, as

tentatively defined by William H. Riker (1975, 101), is one wherein “the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (cf. also Singh 2005, 431-2; Wheare 1963, 10).³⁹ A consociational political system on the other hand is one wherein political power is shared between the elites of a fragmented society in such a way that all partake conjointly in decision making at the national level, but each exercises relative autonomy in matters pertaining to their locality (cf. Lane 1977, 256-7; Lijphart 1969, 216).⁴⁰ Both therefore, as Professor Arend Lijphart (1979, 499) notes, provide constitutional arrangements for mitigating sectoral tensions in plural societies.⁴¹

Nevertheless, whilst federations represent a “holding together” of a people for reasons of governability, consociations represent a “coming together” of the same for reasons of stability (cf. Stepan 1999, 21-2).⁴² Wherefore all consociations tend to be democracies, whereas some federations are nondemocracies (cf. Riker, *loc. cit.*, 107; Elazar 1985, 31-2).⁴³ More also, consociational designs are only found in plural societies,⁴⁴ whereas some homogenous societies, like Germany, are federations (cf. Lijphart 1979, 509; Boix 1999, 610). And thirdly, whilst

all consociational systems are composed of asymmetrical political units, some federal systems, like the United States, are symmetrical in form (cf. Watts 1966, 95).⁴⁵ It appears therefore that Professor Daniel Elazar's (*loc. cit.*, 29-30) characterization of federations as *political forms*, and consociations, as *regime types*, holds true in many respects.⁴⁶

Closely related to political systems are the institutional mechanisms by which representatives are elected. These are grouped into majoritarian and proportional systems.⁴⁷ The former employs single member districts and plurality election rules to limit the representation of smaller parties, and to create durable majority governments (cf. Cox 1990, 906; Powell 1989, 110); whilst the latter, by allocating legislative seats in proportion to the number of votes polled by each party, encourages the formation of coalition governments, and withal, the inclusion of minority parties in policy making (cf. Dow 2011, 345; Powell 2000, 92).⁴⁸

Viewed in this wise, electoral systems appear indeed to be "specific manipulative instruments of politics," as Professor Giovanni Sartori (1968, 273) rightly asseverated: for where the need is for electoral decisiveness,⁴⁹ then majoritarian systems are the better; or where for effective representation, then proportional systems (cf. Powell 1989, 115-8; Lijphart 1991, 75-6).⁵⁰ Howbeit there are those who hold the view

that proportional systems endanger cabinet stability by virtue of the many parties represented in the legislature (cf. Friedrich 1941, 291; De Grazia 1951, 202-3).⁵¹ Yea, these analysts argue that the overemphasis on justice, fairness, and equality⁵² in proportional systems results in a situation where legislative power is divided amongst several parties who are unable to exercise cohesive control over the activities of government (cf. esp. Hermens 1938, 381-4).⁵³ Professor Dankwart Rustow (1950, 116) espoused this argument most cogently as follows:

The difference between P.R. on the one hand and a single-member plurality system [...] on the other, is that under P.R. the voter is sure to influence the composition of the legislature at every election, whereas under the plurality system he is merely given a chance to do so. From this it might be concluded that P.R. gives the voter more power than the plurality system. *Actually*, it does not, for [...] P.R., by facilitating cabinet crises, parliamentary stalemates, and legislative inaction, will tend to prevent any exercise of power whatever. Proportional representation will thus create a situation where everyone has his will represented exactly but where no one's will is carried out. The single-member plurality system, on the other hand, tends to create two unified parties in constant competition with each other and thereby makes possible a responsible and consistently planned exercise of power. It can be said, therefore, that in any country where P.R. with cabinet instability is substituted for a plurality system with cabinet stability, the voter trades power distributed with slight short-run inequalities for permanent impotence parceled out with mathematical precision.

It stands to reason therefore that by adopting a majoritarian electoral system, a nation essentially sacrifices the 'eggs' of equal representation

for the ‘omelettes’ of cabinet stability, as Professor Herman Finer (1932, 915) so finely simlized.⁵⁴ Howbeit, to the extent that some P.R. nations such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark enjoy stable and fluid cabinet systems may further attest to the relevance of such conditions as social consensus to the conduct of democratic politics,⁵⁵ a point we shall be returning unto presently.

2.3. Conditions of a Stable Democracy

The (pre)requisites⁵⁶ of a functional democracy may be analyzed in three respects, namely: the economic, the political, and the social.

As pertaining to economic factors, urbanization stands out as the preponderant determinant of democracy (cf. Fried and Rabinowitz 1980, 66). A number of empirical studies, such as those by Daniel Lerner (1958, 60-3), Seymour M. Lipset (1959, 78-83), and Phillips Cutright (1963, 259-63), have identified strong positive correlations between the degree of urbanization and the incidence of democracy.⁵⁷ Moreover, because urbanization, as a social mobilization process, tends to be directly associated with such factors as education development and media growth, it has been the case that these also have been found to be indirectly correlated with democratic development (cf. Winham 1970,

817-8; McCrone and Cnudde 1967, 78; Inkeles 1969, 208).⁵⁸ Professor

Daniel Lerner (*loc. cit.*, 60) expressed this thought succinctly as follows:

The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases – literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.

A second determinant of democracy closely related to urbanization is industrialization. And here, the argument has been that the growth of industries furthers capitalism and economic development: two factors which are deemed necessary requisites of a democratic polity (cf. Almond 1991, 468-9; Shannon 1958, 380-1; Bhagwati 1992, 40-1; Collier 1999, 2).⁵⁹

On capitalism, it has been immensely argued that it furthers democracy by bringing people into contact with one another in a civilized fashion

(cf. Condorcet 1795, 238; Paine 1792, 215; Durkheim (1902, 207), and thereby, “softens and polishes the manners of men” (cf. Robertson 1769, 67).⁶⁰ Samuel Ricard (1781, 463) advanced this thought most cogently as follows:⁶¹

Commerce attaches *men* one to another through mutual utility. Through commerce the moral and physical passions are superseded by interest [...] Commerce has a special character which distinguishes it from all other professions. It affects the feelings of men so strongly that it makes him who was proud and haughty suddenly turn supple, bending and serviceable. Through commerce, man learns to deliberate, to be honest, to acquire manners, to be prudent and reserved in both talk and action. Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed, he flees vice, or at least his demeanor exhibits decency and seriousness so as not to arouse any adverse judgement on the part of present and future acquaintances; he would not dare make a spectacle of himself for fear of damaging his credit standing and thus society may well avoid a scandal which it might otherwise have to deplore.

Others also, like Friedrich A. von Hayek (1945, 524-5) and Charles E. Lindblom (1977, 162), have asseverated that the competitive and decentralized nature of capitalism makes it particularly congenial to liberal democracy.⁶² Notwithstanding, there are those, like Fred Hirsch (1976, 157-8) and Joseph Schumpeter (1942, 143), who argue that the virtues of reason and self-interest which capitalism promotes are in themselves detrimental to democratic society.⁶³ George Fitzhugh (1854, 24-5) underscored this point succinctly as follows:

In free society none but the selfish virtues are in repute, because none other help a man in the race of competition. In such society virtue loses all her loveliness, because of her selfish aims. Good men and bad men have the same end in view: self-promotion, self-elevation. The good man is prudent, cautious, and cunning of fence; he knows well, the arts which enable him to advance his fortunes at the expense of those with whom he deals; he does not 'cut too deep;' he does not cheat and swindle, he only makes good bargains and excellent profits [...] He bides his time; takes advantage of the improvidence and vices of others, and makes his fortune out of the follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. The bad man is rash, hasty, unskillful and impolitic. He is equally selfish, but not half so prudent and cunning. Selfishness is almost the only motive of human conduct in free society, where every man is taught that it is his first duty to change and better his pecuniary situation.

As regards economic development, an overwhelming number of studies tend to agree that it influences democracy in some way (cf. Helliwell 1994, 244; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, 907; Olson 1993, 573).⁶⁴ For instance, Professor Seymour Lipset (*loc. cit.*, 83-4) noted that:⁶⁵

Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class [...] The general income level of a nation will also affect its receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms. The values which imply that it does not matter greatly which side rules, that error can be tolerated even in the governing party can best develop where: (a) the government has little power to affect the crucial life chances of most powerful groups, or (b) there is enough wealth in the country so that it actually does not make too much difference if some redistribution does take place. If loss of office is seen as meaning serious loss for major power groups,

then they will be readier to resort to more drastic measures in seeking to retain or secure office.

Howbeit, the point of contention in the studies appear to be on whether economic growth is a prerequisite or a requisite of democracy; to wit, whether its influence on democracy is endogenous or exogenous.⁶⁶ On the one hand, scholars like Professor Deane Neubauer (1967, 1007), who argue in favor of an endogenous effect, maintain that:⁶⁷

[...] political development, to the extent that it represents democratic political development, is a threshold phenomenon. Certain levels of 'basic' socio-economic development appear to be necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy. Once above this threshold, however, the degree to which a country will 'maximize' certain forms of democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development.

And on the other hand, scholars like Professor Adam Przeworski (2003, 46-7), who argue in favor of an exogenous effect, maintain that:⁶⁸

There is no evidence that democracies are more likely to emerge when a country becomes modernized. Rather, the evidence is overwhelming that if democracy emerges in a country that is already modern, then it is much more likely to survive [...] Throughout history, about 70 democracies have collapsed in poorer countries. In contrast, 35 democracies spent a total of 1,000 years under more affluent conditions, and not one collapsed. Affluent democracies survived wars, riots, scandals, and economic and governmental crisis. The probability that democracy survives increases monotonically with per capita income. Between 1951 and 1999, the probability that a democracy would fall during any particular year in countries with per capita income under US\$1000

was 0.089, implying that their expected life was about 11 years. With incomes in the range of US\$1001 to US\$3000, this probability was 0.037, for an expected duration of about 27 years. Between US\$3001 and US\$6055, the probability was 0.013, which translates into about 78 years of expected life. And above US\$6055, democracies last forever.

Besides this, other scholars like Mancur Olson, Jr. (1963, 551-2), Albert O. Hirschman (1967, 174), and Samuel P. Huntington (1965, 405-6) have remarked on the destabilizing effects of rapid economic growth on political development,⁶⁹ whilst others more have made mention of the debilitating impacts of economic inequality on democratic stability (cf. Muller 1988, 65-6; Karl 2000, 152-6; Bermeo 2009, 25-6).⁷⁰

As regarding the political requisites of democracy, these are grouped into three broad themes namely: the rule of law, constitutionalism, and institutionalism. But these three, far from being distinct, are actually associated: for the rule of law cannot be upheld without a legal code to begin with, and this also cannot be firmly observed unless the political system is institutionalized – to wit, is deemed effective and legitimate.

On the essence of the rule of law, the English Philosopher John Locke commented thereupon most ardently in his *Two Treatise of Government* (Book II, Chap. VI, Sec. 57, p. 234) as follows:⁷¹

[...] the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is

no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man's humor might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.

Thus, as Ernest Barker (1925, 44) observed, the rule of law entailed “the certainty of being governed legally in accordance with known rules.”⁷²

And the intent behind this is to forestall arbitrary rule: for where power is arbitrary, “the citizenry will not know how to behave, for it will fear that any action could produce an unforeseen risk” (cf. Lipset 1994, 15; but also Drah 1991, 99). Moreover, this further presupposes that the laws of the state are enacted by “common consent” rather than by “one man or a junto of men;” and also, that the principle of the separation of powers is maintained (cf. Price 1778, 7; Hayek 1960, 127). This thought was cogently espoused by the English clergyman William Paley in his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (Book VI, Chap. VIII, pp. 374-5) as follows:

The first maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and administered by another: in other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept separate. When these offices are united in the same person or assembly, particular laws are made for particular cases, springing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends: whilst they are kept separate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom

they may affect [...] When the parties and the interest to be affected by the law were known, the inclinations of the lawmakers would inevitably attach on one side or the other; and that, where there were neither any fixed rules to regulate their determinations, nor any superior power to control their proceedings, these inclinations would interfere with the integrity of public justice. The consequence of which must be, that the subjects of such a constitution would live either without any constant laws, that is, without any known, pre-established rules of adjudication whatever; or under laws made for particular cases and particular persons, and partaking of the contradictions and iniquity of the motives of which they owed their origin.

Therefore is a *Grundgesetz*,⁷³ whether written or unwritten,⁷⁴ a functional requisite of a stable democracy,⁷⁵ for without it cannot fundamental rights be guaranteed in a state (cf. Jennings 1959, 40; Friedrich 1963, 849; Powell 2004, 99).⁷⁶ But the idea of a *Rechtsstaat*, or an *Estado Democrático de Derecho* extends beyond the firm maintenance of a legal code. In another sense, it entails the ability of the state to be effective: both in ensuring justice and fairness; and in dealing with the issues that arise within its domain.⁷⁷ The German jurist Friedrich J. Stahl (1878, 352) expounded on this notion of a *Rechtsstaat* as follows:⁷⁸

The State should be a State of law, this is the watchword and, in truth, also the tendency of recent times. It should exactly and irrevocably determine and secure the *directions* and the *limits* of its activity and the free sphere of the citizen, and not enforce on its own behalf or directly any moral ideas beyond the sphere of law. This is the conception of the *Rechtsstaat* and not that the

state should [...] pursue no administrative purpose, or only protect the rights of the individual.

If one would thus agree with Professor Seymour Lipset (1959, 86) that the twin virtues of effectiveness and legitimacy are necessary for the smooth functioning of a political system (cf. also Mkandawire 2001, 290),⁷⁹ then it stands to reason also that a *Rechtsstaat*, anchored on a *garantiste* constitution,⁸⁰ is a functional requisite for the survival of any democracy. As Professor Juan Linz (1997, 119) rightly observed:⁸¹

a weak, flawed, underdeveloped, corrupt, incompetent state apparatus is a poor instrument for democratic government, *for* much of the dissatisfaction of citizens with the way democracy works in their country is really not dissatisfaction with democracy, but with how the state and its agents work.

Now as regarding social conditions, the preponderant themes have been political culture, pluralism, and Protestantism. Political culture may be construed as a people's predisposition or orientation to action (cf. Eckstein 1988, 790).⁸² And according to Larry J. Diamond (1999, 163), such 'orientation' existed in three forms, namely: a *cognitive* – which involved knowledge of and beliefs about the political system; an *affective* – which consisted of shared feelings about the same; and an *evaluational* – which involved commitments to values, and judgements about the performance of the system. More also, because these are developed over time through a process of learning, it has been severally stated that the

elements of political culture, while informing political structure and behavior, are unmalleable and resistant to change (cf. Pye 1985, 20; Eckstein 1988, 792-3).⁸³

But as it relates to democratic politics, political culture may be perceived as the general acceptance by the masses and elites of the principles underlying free government (cf. Lipset 1994, 3). Thus Professor Harry Eckstein (1966, 240-1) maintained that democratic stability was only possible when social authority patterns were congruent throughout all or most of the society; or in other words, when there was widespread consensus amongst the elites and masses on democratic norms and procedures (cf. Budge 1970, 176; Rustow 1971, 23-4). This did not of course imply that there was an absence of conflict or cleavage,⁸⁴ but rather that there was a measure of democratic self-control, and tolerance for difference of opinion (cf. Crick 1964, 24; Lipset et al. 1956, 15-6; Gough 1950, 53).⁸⁵ The Danish philosopher Benedict de Spinoza expressed this thought succinctly in his *Ethics* (Part IV, Prop. XVIII, pp. 233-4) as follows:

Nothing, I say, is more to be desired by men, or more valuable as means for the preservation of their being, than that all should in all things so agree that the souls and bodies of all should constitute, as it were, one soul and one body; and that together all should endeavor, as far as possible, to preserve their being; and that together all should earnestly seek after whatsoever is for the

common good. From this it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is to say, men who under the guidance of reason strive after what is truly useful, desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for all men, and consequently are just, faithful, and honorable towards their neighbors.

A variant of the ideal of political culture is what Almond and Verba (1963, 5-6) have called “the civic culture.”⁸⁶ And by this is meant the attitudes and behavioral patterns of citizens that are congenial to democratic politics.⁸⁷ One of such civic virtues frequently mentioned is that of an attentive and competent public (cf. Almond 1950, 34-5; Key 1961, 546; Putnam 1993, 87-8). As Professor Robert Dahl (1992, 45) avidly noted, the democratic citizen is expected to “possess both knowledge of the public good, and a robust and sustained desire to achieve it.” And this was necessary because, as Almond and Verba (*loc. cit.*, 136) rightly observed:⁸⁸

Democracy is a political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites; [...] In all societies, [...] the making of specific decisions is concentrated in the hands of very few people. Neither the ordinary citizen nor ‘public opinion’ can make policy. If this is the case, the problem of assessing the degree of democracy in a nation becomes one of measuring the degree to which ordinary citizens control those who make the significant decisions for the society – *to wit*, governmental elites.

To this end, Professor Frank Michelman (1998, 90; 1999, 59) has noted that a deliberative public sphere, which allowed for citizens to partake meaningfully in discussions on policy matters,⁸⁹ was essential for the

sustenance of a democracy.⁹⁰ Adjoinedly, other scholars like G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1986, 36-7) and Arend Lijphart (1997, 10) have remarked severally on how, for instance, the active participation of citizens in elections contributed towards the legitimacy and stability of democratic systems.⁹¹

Howbeit, Almond and Verba (*ibid.*) were sure to mention that such ‘participant orientation’ on the part of citizens was not all there was to a civic culture. According to them (*loc. cit.*, 484-5), a balance of activity and passivity was necessary for the stability of a political system.⁹² And so in enumerating the categories of political culture, they made mention of a ‘subject’ culture, and a ‘parochial’ culture,⁹³ both of which saw reduced political activity on the part of the citizen (cf. *loc. cit.*, 17-22). And their argument was that citizens’ participation in political affairs ought to be intermittent yet balanced: a time where they are actively involved and engaged; another where they play a ‘subject’ role and submit to the leadership of their elected officials; and a third where their ‘parochial’ affiliations to church and family afforded them some time off the political arena (cf. *loc. cit.*, 487-9). As they firmly noted:

An intense emotional involvement in politics endangers the balance between activity and passivity, for that balance depends on the low salience of politics. [...] such intense involvement tends to raise the stakes of politics: to foster the sort of mass, messianic movements that lead to democratic instability [...] The

preservation of a sphere of activity that is outside of politics is important if one is to have the balanced participation of the civic culture (cf. *loc. cit.*, 486-7).

Closely related to the ideal of political culture is pluralism. And by this is meant the toleration of diversity and difference in a polity (cf. Wolin 1993, 467). The toleration of diversity is what Professor Robert Dahl (1967, 24) has called ‘organizational pluralism:’ to wit, “the existence of multiple centers of power, none of which is wholly sovereign, which help to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully.”⁹⁴ Moreover, as Professor Peter Merkl (1993, 257-8) notes, such participant civil society “facilitate the formation of the popular will,” and thereby, enhance the efficacy and legitimacy of governmental policy decisions.⁹⁵

But the toleration of difference, or what Professor Dahl (1978, 191-2) has called “conflictive pluralism,” carries with it a cultural connotation, and involves, as Professor Joseph LaPalombara (1974, 440) has noted, the intersection of multiple cleavage lines in a polity.⁹⁶ Viewed in this sense, a plural society is one wherein allowance is made for the parallel coexistence of multiple identities, and where these interrelate with one another at different levels (cf. Lijphart 1977, 10-1).⁹⁷ Such conflictive pluralism, quite palpably, helps to militate against conflicts in political

society, and thereby, vouchsafes the stability of democracies (cf. Emerson 1960, 277-8; Eisenstadt 1964, 349-50). Professor Edward Ross (1920, 164-5) commented in this wise as follows:

Every species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society [...] save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another [...] A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions-long lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts.

The final social condition deemed to be necessary for the sustenance of a democracy is Protestantism. And this is because of its greater emphasis on individualism, compared with others such as Catholicism, Islam, and Confucianism which tend to bear more relation to the state (cf. Lipset 1994, 5; Huntington 1996, 70).⁹⁸ Thus, Professor Kenneth Bollen (1979, 584), in a study of the development trajectories of 99 countries, noted conclusively that the level of political democracy in a country was a function of “the extent to which the culture of said country was Protestant-based.”⁹⁹ But by ‘Protestant-based’ is to be understood, besides the emphasis on Judeo-Christian values, the extent to which religious practice was disassociated from the political sphere (cf. Kazancigil 1991, 345);¹⁰⁰ for otherwise a nation such as India, which

is predominantly Hindu, should not have emerged a thriving democracy in South Asia (cf. Huntington 1996, 70; Eisenstadt 1967, 667-9).¹⁰¹

But regarding Judeo-Christian values, and its influence on democratic stability,¹⁰² a number of scholars have commented severally thereupon. For instance, in a highly acclaimed symposium with John Plamenatz and J. Roland Pennock, Ernest S. Griffith (1956) espoused, *amid others*, that the virtues of justice, and integrity, and conscientiousness, which the Holy Bible enjoineeth, are particularly congenial to democratic survival.¹⁰³ On justice, for example, he remarked as follows:¹⁰⁴

As political scientists, we may at least observe the effect on attitude of regarding a man – any man – as a child of God. It provides a norm by which political and economic conduct is to be judged. There are things, if you will, which one who regards himself as a child of God just does not do to another child of God. One does not exploit him, for example; nor does one terrorize or cheat or deceive him; nor irrationally and arbitrarily coerce him. Conversely and affirmatively, it leads straight to a conviction of the importance of justice for the individual (cf. *loc. cit.*, 105-6).

More also, in a 1797 Christmas-day homily to his diocese (cf. *Omelia*, pp. 12, 14, 20), the Bishop of Imola, Cardinal Barnaba Chiaramonti [who would later become Pope Pius VII] commented unsparingly on how the values and doctrines of Christianity were consistent with democratic practice. He remarked as follows:¹⁰⁵

La forma di Governo Democratico adottata fra di Noi, o dilettefratelli, non è in opposizione colle massime fin qui espote, né ripugna al Vangelo; esige anzi tutte quelle sublimi virtù, che non s' imparano che alla scuola di Gesù Cristo, e le quali, se saranno da voi religiosamente praticate, formeranno la vostra felicità, la gloria e lo splendore della nostra Repubblica [...] Le morali virtù, che non sono poi altro che l' ordine dell' amore, ci faranno buoni Democratici, ma di una Democrazia retta, e che altro non cura, che la comune felicità, lontana dagli odi, dall' infedeltà, dall' ambizione, dall' arrogarsi gli altrui diritti e dal mancare ai propri doveri. Quindi ci conserveranno l'uguaglianza intesa nel suo retto significato, la quale dimostrandoci, che la legge si estende a tutti gl' individui della Società, e nel dirigerli, e nel proteggerli, e nel punirli, ci dimostra ancora in faccia alla legge Divina ed umana, quale proporzione debba tenere ogni individuo nella Democrazia tanto rapporto a Dio, quanto rapporto a se stesso ed ai suoi simili, conservando ciascuno i suoi poteri soltanto per la propria e comune felicità, e per quella adempiendo i suoi doveri [...] La Religione Cattolica sia l' oggetto più prezioso del vostro cuore, della vostra divozione, e di ogni altro vostro sentimento. Non crediate ch' ella si opponga alla forma del Governo Democratico. In questo stato vivendo uniti al vostro Divin Salvatore, potete concepire giusta fiducia dell'eterna salute, potete operare la felicità temporale di voi stessi e dei vostri simili, e procurare la gloria della Repubblica, e delle Autorità costituite [...] Sì, miei cari Fratelli, siate buoni Cristiani e sarete ottimi Democratici.¹⁰⁶

Additionally, the French Catholic Philosopher Jacques Maritain ([1943], 31, 36) noted in his *Christianisme et Démocratie* that it was only when bourgeois democracy [which he called atheistic democracy] became theistic in form and scope [that is, became imbued with Judeo-Christian values] that its very essence would be realized.¹⁰⁷

Notwithstanding, other scholars have advanced the contrary view.¹⁰⁸ For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau [in stark contradiction to the Bishop's exhortation] asseverated in his essay on "Civil Religion" (cf. *The Social Contract*, Book IV, Chap. VIII, pp. 118-9) that Christianity, by virtue of its belief in a 'heavenly Kingdom of God,' fashioned men to become bad citizens of the state:

There remains therefore the religion of man or Christianity [...] By means of this holy, sublime, and real religion, all men, being children of one God, recognize one another as brothers, and the society that unites them is not dissolved even at death. But this religion, having no particular relation to the body politic, leaves the laws in possession of the force they have in themselves without making any addition to it; and thus one of the great bonds that unite society, considered in severalty, fails to operate. Nay, more, so far from binding the hearts of the citizens to the State, it has the effect of taking them away from all earthly things. I know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit [...] Christianity as a religion is entirely spiritual, occupied solely with heavenly things; the country of the Christian is not of this world. He does his duty, indeed, but does it with profound indifference to the good or ill success of his cares. Provided he has nothing to reproach himself with, it matters little to him whether things go well or ill here on earth. If the State is prosperous, he hardly dares to share in the public happiness, for fear he may grow proud of his country's glory; if the State is languishing, he blesses the hand of God that is hard upon His people [...] Christian charity does not readily allow a man to think hardly of his neighbors. As soon as [...] he has discovered the art of imposing on them and getting hold of a share in the public authority, you have a man established in dignity; it is the will of God that he be respected: very soon you have a power; it is God's will that it be obeyed: and if the power is abused by him who wields it, it is the scourge wherewith God punishes His children; [...] and after all, in this vale of sorrows, what does it matter whether

we are free men or serfs? The essential thing is to get to heaven, and resignation is only an additional means of doing so.

Adjoinedly, Professor John Plamenatz remarked in the afore-mentioned symposium (*loc. cit.*, 126) that if Christians tended to be good citizens, then it was ordinarily the result of their desire for self-preservation, more than it was for the preservation of the body politic:

Puritanism is not conspicuously tolerant. The Puritan is a man of independent temper; his self-respect is greater than his respect for others. He feels himself primarily responsible to himself alone among men for how he lives. No doubt, when he prays, he takes care to address God with proper humility; but in his dealings with other men, he is apt to make too free a use of God's authority, as if he were somehow on better terms with his Maker than other men are. The Puritan is not remarkably charitable, but his self-reliance and his common sense tend to make him a respecter of rules and of rights. He sees that he cannot, in practice, have the independence he requires for himself unless he allows it to others; and he has enough justice to admit that others should also have what he claims for himself. By temperament he is not mild and tolerant; he is too sure he is right, and sometimes even too pleased with himself, actually to think it good that there should be people in the world who think and behave quite differently from himself [...]. He loves freedom and justice more than he loves his neighbors. Independence and respect for law are his characteristic virtues; egotism and arrogance, his characteristic vices.

What is one to make of this even-sided dialectic on *Christianisme*?

Surely one cannot assail the fact that Judeo-Christian doctrines are consonant with democratic practice. Nor can one downplay the fact that Christians are wont, on occasion, to be more concerned with the

spiritual than with the earthly.¹⁰⁹ So what to do? A noble attempt to reconcile the two positions was undertaken by John Stuart Mill in his *Essays on Religion*. Mill (*op. cit.*, Essay II, pp. 99-100) began his argument by asserting that religion stereotypes moral values to the point that it binds the minds of people towards a dogmatic way of life:¹¹⁰

[...] there is a very real evil consequent on ascribing a supernatural origin to the received maxims of morality. That origin consecrates the whole of them, and protects them from being discussed or criticized. So that if among the moral doctrines received as a part of religion, there be any which are imperfect – which were either erroneous from the first, or not properly limited and guarded in the expression, or which, unexceptionable once, are no longer suited to the changes that have taken place in human relations [...], these doctrines are *nevertheless* considered equally binding on the conscience, *and adhered to amongst men* [...] *for* wherever morality is supposed to be of supernatural origin, it is stereotyped, as law is.

He (*loc. cit.*, 100) then went ahead to espouse his famous dictum: which is that one needed not be religious in order to be moral:

Belief [...] in the supernatural, great as are the services which it rendered in the early stages of human development, cannot be considered to be any longer required, either for enabling us to know what is right and wrong in social morality, or for supplying us with motives to do right and to abstain from wrong. Such belief, therefore, is not necessary for social purposes, at least in the coarse way in which these can be considered apart from the character of the individual human being.

Per Mill's reasoning, Christians, as citizens, tend to be more inclined to the heavenly than to the earthly because of the nature of their beliefs.

Their faith in a heavenly God, and their deep reverence for the same, makes it utterly impossible for them to commit thoroughly to the secular affairs of their immediate societies.¹¹¹ Why, instead of engaging in rowdy protests and loquacious public discourses, why not spend the time praying and worshipping? And instead of following the news each day to no avail, why not spend the time finding hope in Scripture? And why should one desire to be so encumbered by the vain affairs of politics, when one could spend the time being the ‘hands and feet’ of the Lord Jesus Christ? Wherefore Rousseau (*loc. cit.*, p. 120) famously remarked that the idea of a ‘Christian republic’ was mistaken because the terms were contradictory:¹¹²

But I am mistaken in speaking of a Christian republic: the terms are mutually exclusive. Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to tyranny that it always profits by such a *régime*. True Christians are made to be servants, and they know it and do not much mind: this short life counts for too little in their eyes.

Perceiving therefore the near impossibility of an active Christian citizen, Mill (*loc. cit.*, pp. 104-5) advocated for a ‘religion of humanity’ that would further moral civic virtues without an association to the supernatural.¹¹³

The value [...] of religion to the individual [...] as a source of personal satisfaction and of elevated feelings, is not to be disputed. But it has still to be considered, whether in order to obtain this good, it is necessary to travel

beyond the boundaries of the world which we inhabit; or whether the idealization of our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made, is not capable of supplying [...] a religion, equally fitted to exalt the feelings, and (with the aid from education) still better calculated to ennoble the conduct, than any belief respecting the unseen powers.

He (*loc. cit.*, pp. 108-11) then set forth the essence of such design as follows:¹¹⁴

If [...] persons could be trained [...] not only to believe in theory that the good of their country was an object to which all others ought to yield, but to feel this practically as the grand duty of life, so also may they be made to feel the same absolute obligation towards the universal good [...] The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire. This condition is fulfilled by the Religion of Humanity in as eminent a degree, and in as high a sense, as by the supernatural religions even in their best manifestations [...]; for [...] it carries the thoughts and feelings out of self, and fixes them on an unselfish object, loved and pursued as an end for its own sake. The religions which deal in promises and threats regarding a future life, do exactly the contrary: they fasten down the thoughts to the person's own posthumous interests; they tempt him to regard the performance of his duties to others mainly as a means to his own personal salvation; and are one of the most serious obstacles to the great purpose of moral culture.

Mill's solution to the dialectic seemed thus to be a form of separation of church and state: Christians could remain Christian all they want in their private sphere, but the state must be highly atheistic to the point that they are left with no choice but to engage therein, should they so desire to live in political society. But considering the fact that the very

basis of morality is religious,¹¹⁵ one can only wonder how a wholly secular society could long stand the tests of time. As Nathaniel Micklem (1957, 92) avidly espoused, “it is to religion we must look for the moral dynamic that will spur men to that life of virtue which the State desiderates.” Adjoinedly, Alexis de Tocqueville (*Democracy in America*, Vol. I, Chap. XVII, p. 336) remarked that:¹¹⁶

Religion is much more necessary in a republic [...] than in a monarchy, [...] and it is more needed in a democratic republic than in any other. *For* how is it possible that society should escape destruction if the moral tie be not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed? And what can be done with a people which is its own master, if it be not submissive to the Divinity?

Thus concludes the discussion on the conditions of a stable democratic polity. Albeit, because democracy is generally conceived as a universal value (cf. Sen 1999, 16; Diamond 2008, 20),¹¹⁷ it is better that these conditions are conceived of as guiding blueprints wherewith a more complex form of democratic society could be achieved,¹¹⁸ rather than as ‘deep-seated’ requisites without which nations may be deemed to be unable to democratize.¹¹⁹

2.4. Summary

When Professor Dankwart Rustow ([1970], 350-1, 358-9) developed his dynamic model of democratic transitions, it was only natural that he

should conceive of nation building as the continuing and ever-present challenge of new democracies.¹²⁰ As he (*loc. cit.*, 360) keenly noted: “the hardest struggles in a democracy are those *struggles* against the birth defects of the political community.”¹²¹ But as he noted elsewhere in another monograph (1967, 30), the development of such ‘nationalistic tendency’ amongst a people was only possible when there was “an increasing degree of equality of opportunity” so that the same are able to “effectively share in the economic resources *of the state* without the fear of sliding back into poverty” (cf. Deutsch 1966, 84; but also Shills 1962, 87).¹²² Sadly however, this appears to be a thing most lacking in the new democracies of the global south, as also was articulated by Professor Rupert Emerson (1960, 278) as follows:¹²³

The most basic explanation for the failure of democracy in so many of the new states is the almost universal absence of what have been assumed to be the preconditions for its success. Although argument still rages as to precisely what these may be, the usually accepted list includes such items as mass literacy, relatively high living standards, a sizable and stable middle class, a sense of social equality, and a tradition both of tolerance and of individual self-reliance. In virtually no instance are these conditions met in the colonial countries whose independence had led them into democracy. Instead, these countries are characterized by peasant masses living at the subsistence level, overwhelmingly illiterate, unacquainted not only with the great world but even with their own country [...] The representative government which emerges can be no stronger than the society which it represents.

This essay has so far examined some *model* theoretical conceptions of representative democracy, and has underscored how that these not need be generalized for nor required of all nations, but that new democracies be granted adequate allowance to experiment with democratic practice in light of given sociocultural and historical realities. Howbeit, to the extent that democracy, as a political system, could be *maximally* developed to vouchsafe transparency and accountability on the part of political elites, and improved socioeconomic wellbeing on the part of the masses, there may be a *real* and *dire* need for democratic assistance to be extended to said new states to enable them develop a kind of political democracy that may resonate favorably with the values and aspirations of their common people.¹²⁴

Essay III:

The Practice of Democracy

Africa, it has been claimed, has its own unique history and traditions, and the introduction of democracy, an alien concept, would violate the integrity of African culture. This argument, premised on the misconception that democracy is solely a Western creation, stems from a confusion between the principles of democracy and their institutional manifestations [...] Traditional African political systems were infused with democratic values. They were invariably patrimonial, and consciousness was communal; everything was everybody's business, engendering a strong emphasis on participation. Standards of accountability were even stricter than in Western societies. Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural catastrophe such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters, chiefs could be required to go into exile or 'asked to die.'

[Claude Ake, *Rethinking African Democracy*].¹

3.1. Background of the Study


Ghana attained independence from the British in 1957,² and after a spate of military upheavals,³ finally transitioned to democratic politics in 1992.⁴ Since then, she has flourished in this mode of governance, having never experienced again a military coup,⁵ and having successfully passed the two-turnover tests of democratic consolidation in 2008.⁶

Now for the reason that a considerable number of studies have already explored at length the success of democratic practice in Ghana,⁷ we did

not think it meet to pursue the same course in this study. Rather, we thought of focusing on a specific subject matter that was peculiar to the Ghanaian nation, but had received little attention in the literature. And reviewing the political history of Ghana, we found out that the nation has never once experienced a popular revolution,⁸ nor a civil- or guerrilla warfare.⁹ Now because mass disturbances are usually orchestrated to topple a regime, to plead a cause, or to right an injustice, we could assume one of two things: either that the people have been generally satisfied with the affairs of the nation so that they have never had a reason to revolt; or that a combination of factors have systemically inhibited them from such course of action.

To substantiate these initial guesses, we set forth to examine some data on the Ghanaian nation.¹⁰ Our first, shown in Fig. 3.1, is from the *Varieties of Democracy* (V-Dem) index. Here, we observe that the level of political corruption in the country is quite high, whilst the extent of the rule of law is rather average for a consolidated democracy. At the same time, we find that social variables such as ‘associational freedom’ and the ‘freedom of expression’ are particularly high in the country. Thus, what we gather from this piece of data is that social, more than political, factors tend to be determinant of Ghanaian democracy.¹¹

Fig. 3.1: Ghana, V-Dem Political Indices



Source:

V-Dem Institute. *Varieties of Democracy: Global Standards, Local Knowledge*. 2019 Dataset. <www.v-dem.net>.

Data Key:¹²

V-Dem, AF: Associational Freedom

V-Dem, FE: Freedom of Expression


V-Dem, PC: Political Corruption

V-Dem, RL: Rule of Law

Our second piece of data, shown in Fig. 3.2, is from the World Bank's *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. Here too, as in the V-Dem data, we find that the strength of political variables is surprisingly low, compared to social ones. For instance, averaging three political indices of the data set – 'Regulatory Quality,' 'Government Effectiveness,' and the 'Rule of Law' – and comparing this with a social variable as 'Voice and Accountability,' we find the latter to be considerably over and above the former.¹³ Thus, we gather again from this data that there appear to

be issues with the Ghanaian political system, and that the success of democratic practice in the country may be attributed largely to social causes.

Fig. 3.2: Ghana, WGI Political Indices



Source:

World Bank. *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. 2019 Dataset. <www.worldbank.org>.

Data Key:¹⁴


WGI, AG: Avg. (Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law)

WGI, VA: Voice and Accountability

Exploring further the strength of this preliminary conjecture, we set forth to examine some survey data in this respect. Our first, shown in Fig. 3.3, is from the *World Values Survey* (WVS). Therein we find that in a question probing the effectiveness of government, many persons were of the view that government needed to be more proactive in

attending to the needs of the Ghanaian people¹⁵ – a thing which would not have been affirmed had the government been wont to doing so. Also, in the *Afrobarometer Survey*, shown in Fig. 3.4, we find that in a question ascertaining the extent of democracy in the country, many were of the view that the nation had some issues with her democracy.¹⁶ We thus may have some basis for ruling out the idea that a popular revolution had not occurred in the country because the political system has been favorable all along.

Fig. 3.3: Ghana, Government Responsibility




Source:

World Values Survey. Wave 6 Dataset: 2010-14. <www.worldvaluessurvey.org> (N = 1552).

Scale:¹⁷

1- Government should take more responsibility for the welfare of all people.

10 - People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.

Fig. 3.4: Ghana, Extent of Democracy

 Source:

Afrobarometer. Wave 7 Dataset: 2016-18. <www.afrobarometer.org> (N = 2400).

Scale:¹⁸

1- Not a democracy

2 - Democracy, with major problems


3 - Democracy, with minor problems

4 - Full democracy

But some man may say that if a popular revolution had not occurred in the country because the political system has been favorable, then it sure must be because the economic system has been. And this conjecture being sound, we proceeded to examine some data in this respect. This is displayed in Fig. 3.5. Therein we observe from the Gini index that the nation continues to experience rising income inequality despite her steady economic growth.¹⁹ More also, the HDI which measures several aspects of socioeconomic well-being is not particularly high either. Thus,

it may not particularly be for reasons of luxury and leisure that the Ghanaian people have never felt the need to undertake a revolution.

Fig. 3.5: Ghana, Economic Indices



Source:

International Monetary Fund. *World Economic Outlook* (GDP, per capita). <www.imf.org>.

World Bank. *World Development Indicators* (Gini). <www.worldbank.org>.

United Nations. *Human Development Index*. <www.undp.org>.

Having thus shown that it is neither for a ‘perfect’ political system nor for a ‘sound’ socioeconomic profile that a revolution has never occurred in Ghana, we are left only with our second guess as probable cause for our present case – which is that a combination of factors tend to inhibit the Ghanaian people from undertaking such form of action. But before exploring this thesis any further, it may behoove us to address a

palpable question: which is, that if Ghana has transitioned to democratic politics since 1992, and has also flourished in this mode of governance until date, why then should the masses be expected to revolt, or why should their not doing so be considered a great thing?

To answer this question would require a review of some theories on the subject matter. To begin, Professor Samuel Huntington (1968, 265) has noted that revolutions are only a thing of modernizing nations,²⁰ and since Ghana has not only undergone a democratic transition, but has also consolidated this form of government, it could be assumed that some significant institutional changes have been made to the political system, which could serve as probable basis for a popular revolt. This thought then leads directly to the question of the causes of revolutions; or precisely put, of why revolutions are wont to occur in modernizing nations.²¹

In his *Anatomy of Revolutions*, Professor Crane Brinton (1952, 264-6) made mention of five 'tentative uniformities' that were characteristic of modernizing nations which underwent a revolution.²² We would examine three of these presently, and the other two, in succeeding segments of the essay. Let us remind that we are here only attempting

to explain why a popular revolt ought not to be thought an improbability in Ghana.

The first causal ‘uniformity’ that Professor Brinton noted was economic discontent. Indeed, it has been severally stated that when the gains of economic growth are not equitably distributed, or when these do not satisfy the material expectations of a segment of the populace, that this becomes probable cause for a mass revolt (cf. Le Bon 1913, 28; Edwards 1970, 70; Marx 1915, 84-5; Gasset 1932, 60).²³ Professor James Davies (1928, 8) commented in this wise as follows:

A revolutionary state of mind requires the continued *and* habitual but dynamic expectation of greater opportunity to satisfy basic needs, which may range from merely physical (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety from bodily harm) to social (the affectional ties of family and friends) to the need for equal dignity and justice. But the necessary additional ingredient is a persistent, unrelenting threat to the satisfaction of these needs: not a threat which actually returns people to a state of sheer survival, but which puts them in the mental state where they believe they will not be able to satisfy one or more basic needs.

Thus economic discontent builds up in a nation when citizens begin to perceive wide discrepancies between their value expectations and their value capabilities.²⁴

Now in the most recent survey data published by the Ghana Statistical Service (2018, 11), it was stated that the rural population, comprising

half the total population, contributed over 80 percent to the nation's poverty incidence.²⁵ More also, the report (*loc. cit.*, 10) noted that in the four-year period between 2013 and 2017, the number of poor people increased by over 400,000. Additionally, on the matter of extreme poverty,²⁶ the report (*loc. cit.*, 14) indicated that some 2.4 million people,²⁷ mostly rural dwellers, “are unable to consume the minimum daily requirement of 2,900 calories per adult equivalent of food per day, even if these were to spend their entire earnings on food.” Could it be thus presumed that these poor folks, which also comprise about half the population, are somewhat satisfied with their living conditions?²⁸

The second ‘uniformity’ which was seen to characterize revolutionizing nations was that of an “inefficient government machinery.” Now in this, Professor Brinton (*loc. cit.*, 265) emphasized that the ‘inefficiency of government’ lied in “its failure to make changes to old institutions” in light of new social conditions; partly because of neglect, and partly because the governmental system had become adapted to “simpler, more primitive conditions.”

An examination of the Ghanaian nation would reveal a rather ‘strange’ governmental system which has remained unaltered since her transition to democratic politics in 1992. It must be recalled that the present

constitution of the country is that which was created when the nation transitioned from military to civilian rule the self-same year.²⁹ Thus, one may quite comprehend why though composed of territorially-based ethnic identities, the nation maintains a unitary governmental system,³⁰ and a unicameral legislature.³¹ More also, her *de-facto* two-party system, which naturally follows from the present configuration of government, and which was intended to unify and aggregate sectoral interests,³² has rather furthered divisiveness and polarization in Ghanaian politics. As was avidly noted by Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012, 101-2):

Political contestation between the NPP and NDC rarely focuses on principled policy-based disagreement over concrete issues. Personal attacks and *ad hominem* accusations are more common. Every matter of significant public interest or controversy [...] is seized upon by the two rival parties and turned into an occasion for political grandstanding and gamesmanship. Underlying this increasingly incendiary tone of contemporary Ghanaian politics is the winner-takes all, zero-sum character of the country's political system. Within the broad limits established by the constitution, the party that wins control of the presidency and Parliament in the quadrennial general elections wins nearly absolute power, no matter how narrow the margin of victory. Political control of the state provides the party in power with enormous material and political resources and advantages over its rivals. A multitude of public-sector opportunities – *as* jobs, consultancies, directorships, civil-service posts, and construction contracts – are reallocated almost entirely on the basis of party loyalty after a party turnover in government [...] This has had the effect of turning the country's electoral campaigns into 'do-or-die' affairs between the NPP and NDC [...] Ethnoregional voting patterns and party identification among the electorate have helped to deepen ethnic polarization, especially

during elections, *as* each party has sought to maximize turnout and votes in its own ethnic stronghold, at times by making divisive ethnic appeals.

So how does this become probable cause for a revolution? Invariably, the zero-sum, ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of the nation’s political system should result in a situation where a segment of the population, but particularly opposition parties, are excluded from active participation in the affairs of government.³³ More also, if as has been noted, public sector jobs and appointments are consistently awarded to party faithfuls, then this should ordinarily inhibit the creation of “a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and *esprit de corps*” (cf. Schumpeter 1942, 293, but also Ekeh 1975, 108; Bratton and Van der Walle 1994, 458).³⁴ Put together, this should lead over time to a form of political decay where government attains a lower capacity to deal with problems facing the state and society (cf. Gillis 1970, 348-9; Eisenstadt 1964, 357).³⁵ Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (*loc. cit.*, 102) commented in this wise as follows:

The partisan polarization in Ghanaian politics not only degrades the substance and tone of public policy debates, but has made it nearly impossible to build a broad and enduring political consensus on a national development agenda. Although the constitution established a National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) that is required to produce a national-development plan, the NDPC’s domination by political appointees of the sitting president has

impeded the acceptance of its work beyond the term of a particular party administration. Ghana thus lacks a politically binding national development plan. Instead, the national interest has become fragmented along party lines, with the result that each new administration has followed its own short-to-medium-term development agenda and spending priorities based on its party's election platform. Consequently, there is a perpetual discontinuity in plans, policy direction, and projects following party turnovers in government.

The third 'uniformity' that Professor Brinton highlighted was what he calls "a desertion of the intellectuals;" or as is better put by Professor Lyford Edwards (*loc. cit.*, 38), "a transfer of the allegiance of the intellectuals." These intellectuals are the middle class – but more specifically, the non-productive laborers of society, as artists, authors, lecturers, preachers, etc. – whose function it is to form and guide public opinion.³⁶ Although they tend to be allied with the elite class by virtue of the rewards they receive from the same, a revolution usually occurs when these 'publicists' develop a conscience of their own, and therefore break away from the influences of the ruling elite.³⁷ Professor Edwards (*ibid.*, 40-1) described the process as follows:

Any social system, no matter how excellent at the time of its adoption, is likely to become repressive with the lapse of time and the progress of civilization. A given institution, proving itself to be good, is 'sold' to the society by the publicists and becomes an integral part of the social structure [...]. When the institution becomes repressive, the inarticulate masses feel the repression first but do not understand the causes of it. An interval, usually a long one, occurs between the time any institution is first felt to be repressive

and the time the publicists lose their faith in it. During such intervals [...] the publicists support repressive institutions. But sooner or later, the publicists become infected with the prevailing unrest and begin to sympathize with the repressed class. Frequently, after a time the publicists feel the repression themselves. In that case they bestir themselves energetically to discover the cause of the existing unrest [...] When the publicists are sure that an institution, which they had supposed to be good, is really repressive, they attack that institution with a zeal proportionate to their anger at having been deluded as to its nature. In other words, they desert the cause of the existing institution and support the cause of the institution that is [...] to replace it.

But if the intellectuals are paid wages by the ruling elites, then it would stand to reason that they could only oppose the latter when they do not generally depend on the same for their means of livelihood – i.e., when they have developed the capacity to generate private income. Now in the survey data by the Ghana Statistical Service ([2019], 63, 74), it was stated that of the 65 percent of the population that were employed, 76 percent were involved in occupations other than wage employment.³⁸ This thus shows that a significant portion of the Ghanaian labor force do not depend much on the government for their livelihood income.³⁹ Moreover, there appears to be a considerable number of said ‘publicists’ in Ghana presently (cf. *ibid.*, 77, 79), and the general rise in education attainment amongst the population⁴⁰ is sure to burgeon out the number in coming years.⁴¹

3.2. Methodological Design

Based on the afore discussion, we could set forth the following hypotheses for the study.

First, if as has been noted, there seem to be the possibility of economic discontent amongst the rural poor in Ghana, and yet the same have endured and contained it until date, then we could conjecture that the poor either tend to find, on occasion, pacifist ways to deal with their deprivations, or that they have not hitherto been oriented in a better way of life. Hence the hypotheses:

H_{1a} = The poor in Ghana are wont on occasion to find pacifist ways to deal with their deprivations.

H_{1b} = Most deprived persons in Ghana have hitherto not been oriented in a better way of life.

Moreover, if despite the ills of her zero-sum, ‘winner-takes-all’ politics, the nation has changed regimes on four occasions via the ballot box, and continues to make strides in economic development,⁴² then we could think of two possible explanations: either that the elites of the two dominant parties are somehow allied in practice, so that they tend to exercise moderation in their antagonism towards one other;⁴³ or that regime policies are generally inclusive and broad-based, so that these

tend to benefit a considerable section of the population.⁴⁴ Hence the hypotheses:

H_{2a} = The elites of Ghana's dominant political parties tend to be allied in practice, and therefore exercise moderation in their antagonism of one another.

H_{2b} = Regime policies in Ghana tend to be inclusive and broad-based, and thus benefit a considerable section of the population.

And finally, to the extent that revolutions are undertaken in concert by large groups of people, it must be the case that a number of factors tend to inhibit collective action endeavors amongst Ghanaians. Moreover, given the fact that there are a considerable number of 'publicists' and 'self-dependent' persons in Ghana who could set forth a mass revolt, its nonoccurrence must be the result of some path-dependent idiosyncrasy which tends to deter such course of action. Hence the hypotheses:

H_{3a} = To the extent that revolutions are undertaken in concert by large groups of people, it may seem to be the case that a number of factors work to inhibit collective action endeavors amongst Ghanaians.

H_{3b} = Given the considerable number of publicists and self-dependent persons in Ghana that could set forth a revolution, its non-occurrence must be the result of some deterring path-dependent peculiarity.

Before proceeding with our research design, it is meet that we again address two related questions about the study. The first concerns why

we opted for Ghana [and not some other democratic country] as case choice,⁴⁵ and the second, how our study contributes novel knowledge to research on democratization.

As regards the first, our choice of Ghana was based purely on practical reasons.⁴⁶ Besides the fact that Ghana is a democratic success story, and one apt for the study,⁴⁷ the lead author of the research happened also to hail from the country, and so this made it relatively convenient and cost-effective to conduct fieldwork therein.⁴⁸ As regards the second, because such violent upheavals as revolutions, or “internal wars” – as Professor Harry Eckstein (1964, 12) likes to call it – undermine political stability in a state,⁴⁹ our study, by examining the factors which have forestalled the same in Ghana, would be shedding lights on how a coordinated network of ‘non-revolutionizing tendencies’ work to vouchsafe democracy in a state. And lo, this research goal was what Professor Deane Neubauer (1967, 1008-9) had in mind when he noted that:

One must be most careful when drawing inferences about the effect which social and economic conditions have on the institutions and practices of nations. It is quite clear, one might say obvious, that extremely poor, traditional societies characterized by illiterate, rural populations, in which intergroup communication is barely developed and national identifications and institutions barely extant, will have considerable difficulty in establishing and maintaining political democracy. *But* it is not at all clear that the more well-

developed societies are, the more likely they are to become democratic, at least if one wishes to respect differences in the degree to which basic democratic practices are implemented. If we are to have theories of democracy which take into consideration the full range of factors which impede or enhance democratic development, we must go beyond consideration of those factors which are at best threshold conditions.

Now unto a discussion of our research design. In order to ascertain the information needed to validate our founding hypotheses, we embarked on a field research trip to the country, primarily to observe transactional behaviors⁵⁰ and to organize focus group interviews. The former was to orient the research team on political behaviors⁵¹ and socializing norms⁵² that were ascriptive of the Ghanaian people;⁵³ and the latter, to offer insights into said norms.⁵⁴ We thus spent a considerable period of time in the country⁵⁵ – observing its systems,⁵⁶ following the news media, and dialoguing with persons we came across.⁵⁷ The information we gathered from this field observation, together with those we underscored in the literature,⁵⁸ enabled us to identify seven key aspects of the Ghanaian nation that were pertinent to our hypotheses, and upon which also we centered our focus group interviews. These focal dimensions are here presented as follows:

Table 3.1: Dimensional Aspects of the Ghanaian Nation

Dimension	Code Name	Defining Aspects
Culture	CUTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Chieftaincy ○ Norms, Customs ○ Language
Politics	POLI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Systems ○ Policies ○ Elite Networks
Economy	ECON	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Unions, Markets ○ Employment ○ NGOs & LLCs
Media	MDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Print & News ○ Music & Movies ○ Public Discourse
Religion	RELI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Socialization ○ Value Patterns ○ Unity of Faith
Society	SOCI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Family ○ Sport, Transport ○ Clothes, Names
Technology	TECH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ICT Learning ○ Social Media ○ Mobile Money

Source: Author

As regards the focus group interviews, these were conducted to validate the field observations priorly documented by the study.⁵⁹ As Professor

Siegfried Lamnek (1989, 128) rightly noted, such method was useful for “ascertaining the beliefs and attitudes of individual participants towards the analysis of group processes.”⁶⁰ Moreover, group interviews offered an economic means by which large amounts of information could be ascertained in a relatively short period of time (cf. Green and Thorogood 2004, 111). Thus, and considering the time- and resource constraints of the study,⁶¹ a total of three focus group interviews were conducted, each comprising between seven and eight persons, and spanning an average duration of about an hour and forty-five minutes.⁶² More also, we held separate dialogue sessions with students and faith leaders to gain further insights into some observed patterns and processes.⁶³

Now because the focus group interviews were primarily intended to validate – but also to corroborate – the field observations, the selection of participants⁶⁴ was random, and was not based on any peculiar attributes as ethnicity, occupation, or gender.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, we did require that participants be at least forty years old, and have voted at least twice in national elections.⁶⁶ The former was necessary to ensure that these were people who had lived through many different regimes, and could therefore contribute meaningfully to the discussions. And the latter was occasioned to corroborate the former: that is, to attest to a

participant's depth of political participation. Moreover, because the interviews were conducted in English, it was subsumed also that the participants were persons who had attained a level of education sufficient enough to be abreast with the key issues of the country.⁶⁷

As regards the conduct of the focus group interviews,⁶⁸ we endeavored to overcome the two challenges generally associated with the same (cf. Bruck and Stocker 1996, 48). The first – the 'dominant speaker' problem⁶⁹ – we surmounted by requiring that participants speak in turns on an issue, and not overlap and speak over one another.⁷⁰ As regards the second – the issue of the generality of responses⁷¹ – we allowed for as many follow up questions as possible, as well as intra-dialogues between participants.⁷² Also, because we did not go into the discussions with a structured list of questions,⁷³ there was no urgency on our part to 'get through' a fixed number of issues. Instead, we allowed the discussions to flow seamlessly, and to swing freely from one dimensional aspect to another.⁷⁴

Our analysis of interview data was done using the MaxQDA software. We foremost obtained the express permission of interview participants to audio record the discussions.⁷⁵ We then transcribed the audio scripts,⁷⁶ and developed codes and themes therefrom, based on the seven

focal areas under study (cf. Table 3.1, *supra*). These coded themes were then used to make meaning of the field observations, and withal, to appraise our founding hypotheses.⁷⁷

We must mention also – if it is not thus far obvious – that we employed a grounded theory approach in the study, which meant that our ultimate findings were solely ‘grounded’ on the field data we collected and analyzed.⁷⁸ And this method we employed, primarily to ensure that our research findings corresponded closely to given realities in the Ghanaian nation, so as to sharpen sensitivity to the issues raised therein (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1967, 239-40; but also Likert and Lippit 1953, 583).

A final item of note on the reporting of observations is in place. As priorly mentioned, before conducting the group discussions and dialogues, we foremost undertook a preliminary field study of the Ghanaian nation and documented key patterns and behaviors that we found to be relevant to our research focus.⁷⁹ Now during the interview sessions, we presented these observations to our discussants and received their commentaries thereon.⁸⁰ An observation was thus reported, if it was largely affirmed by participants in at least two of the focus group sessions [including the dialogue sessions, where applicable], otherwise, it

was not reported.⁸¹ Howbeit, where a transactional pattern or behavior was not priorly documented by the study, but was severally mentioned by respondents in at least two of the interview sessions, the same was reported by the study.

3.3. Field Observations

The following are the transactional patterns and behaviors observed about the Ghanaian nation, which also were seconded by participants in the group discussion- and dialogue sessions.⁸²

The first relates to demographics. The Ghanaian nation is divided into ten administrative regions,⁸³ each of which is composed of unique tribes and ethnicities.⁸⁴ And proof of this is the fact that a different language is spoken in each of the ten regions.⁸⁵ Also, as noted afore, the political system of the nation is unitary; the governmental system, presidential; and the electoral system, majoritarian. The unicameral legislature, called Parliament, has a total of 275 single-member constituency seats, which are assigned on a plurality basis. Furthermore, the nation boasts of an institutionalized two-party system: the one representing largely socialist ideologies, and the other, capitalist.⁸⁶ Furthermore, because of the majoritarian nature of the nation's electoral system, it is the case, as is wont to be, that most Ghanaians tend to identify with one of the

two parties.⁸⁷ Albeit, save for a few conservative regions, party identification tends not to be regional in scope, so that the existence of ‘swing regions’ ensures that elections are decided by party manifestos, rather than by appeals to party ties.⁸⁸

Another interesting observation appertains to the centralized nature of the nation’s political system, which has led to a rapid modernization of the center at the expense of the periphery.⁸⁹ For this cause, rural-urban migration continues to be on the rise in the country.⁹⁰ Moreover, the fact that political power is contained at, and distributed from the center means that little political activity and self-initiative is promoted at the periphery.⁹¹ Yea, also many of these areas are underdeveloped,⁹² and there are some villages and townships which to this present day do not boast of electricity and sewage water.⁹³

The third observation relates to the education system. Presently, basic- and high school education⁹⁴ in public schools remain free of charge for all Ghanaians. In basic schools, for example, much emphasis is placed on punctuality and discipline, and other Christian values are systemically inculcated to school children.⁹⁵ Most high schools also have boarding facilities, which facilitate mobility across regions, and allow for students to form bonds and relationships with persons from different

ethnicities.⁹⁶ In addition to high schools, there are also vocational and technical schools for persons with competences and interests in these arts, as well as non-formal literacy centers for aged person who have had no prior education. Furthermore, graduates of tertiary institutions are wont to pursue further studies abroad: some, for their intellectual capabilities, which afford them scholarships and fellowships to do so, and others, for the hope of securing a better job prospect.⁹⁷

Also, some broad-based social policies of the Ghanaian government have included:⁹⁸ the National Health Insurance Scheme, which affords the public access to health care services at reduced costs; the Metro Mass Transit Service, which provides low-cost inter-city transport services to the populace; the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty initiative, which offers cash transfers to extremely poor households; the Savannah Accelerated Development Initiative,⁹⁹ which facilitates development in the three northern regions – which, as we have seen, contribute the greatest to the nation's poverty incidence;¹⁰⁰ and the National Youth Employment Program, which offers short-term job placements to graduates,¹⁰¹ as well as other young persons with informal skill sets.¹⁰²


Another interesting observation relates to the diffusion of democratic practice in the country. For instance, in both high schools and tertiary

institutions, the election of student representatives is carried out in like manner as that of national elections.¹⁰³ Moreover, most trade unions, professional bodies, and social clubs, like the national government, have an office of a ‘president,’ and maintain either a centralized distribution of power, or a hierarchical chain of command.¹⁰⁴ There is also a National Commission specially mandated by the Constitution to promote civic education in schools, and amongst the populace.¹⁰⁵

We observed also amongst the Ghanaian people certain unifying norms and practices. For instance, there is a popular traditional fabric that most people wear on Fridays, called ‘African Wear.’¹⁰⁶ These clothes are generally worn by all persons, regardless of tribe or ethnicity, and has become a symbol of shared identity. Likewise, there are special names that are called people, based on the day of the week on which said persons were born. So, for instance, all males born on Sunday are affectionately called *Kwesi*, and the females, *Akosua*; or on Thursday, the males, *Yaw*, and the females, *Yaa*.¹⁰⁷ Thus, two people who hitherto are unacquainted may end up identifying with one other for the mere fact that they bear the same affectionate name, to wit, were born on the same day.

Another unifying practice relates to sports, but particularly soccer – which may be deemed the thing that most unites Ghanaians. When the Ghanaian national teams are playing, all ethnic differences are laid aside, and national support is rallied behind them.¹⁰⁸ Besides this, support for local premiership clubs is also another means by which people are brought to identify one with another. For instance, two people may find their support of the same club, say, ‘Accra Hearts of Oak’ a source of shared identity.¹⁰⁹ And because the Ghanaian youth are ardent viewers of international football, sometimes such identification extends to foreign clubs as well – as ‘Real Madrid,’ ‘Manchester United,’ ‘Paris St Germain,’ or ‘Juventus.’¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the fact that sport competitions of diverse sorts are observed in all basic- and high schools – as also tertiary institutions – serve further to augment this source of identity amongst young people.¹¹¹

In Ghana also, there is a fine dividing line between ethnic and national identity, so that people tend to identify with the one just as much as they do the other. This was revealed in the recent *Afrobarometer Survey*, displayed in Fig. 3.6, where a greater number of Ghanaians admitted that they identified equally with the nation and with their tribal group.

Fig. 3.6: Ghana, National vs. Ethnic Identity

 Source:

Afrobarometer. Wave 7 Dataset: 2016-18. <www.afrobarometer.org> (N = 2390).

One reason for this dual identification is owed to the language situation.

In Ghana, English is the official language of correspondence in schools and at workplaces. And because English is foreign to all ethnic groups, its use causes people to identify with the nation,¹¹² whereas the use of local dialects causes people to identify with their ethnic groups.¹¹³ To the extent that people grow up speaking both languages, they are wont to identify equally with nation and tribe.¹¹⁴ And the government reinforces this also by making it mandatory for basic school children to learn to read and write in their local dialects.¹¹⁵

Albeit, a reason why the adoption of a common language has not been a pressing policy issue in the country is perhaps owed to the unique role that families play in the social system. Paradoxically, ethnic diversity may be said to be the source of national unity in Ghana. And this could be understood in three respects. First, most people are wont to help others of their own kin and tribe. And because ethnic groups are territorially concentrated, it means that people are able to access support in their ethnic localities, so long as they remain therein.¹¹⁶ Second, the desire of each ethnic group to be ahead and to have its members occupy key positions¹¹⁷ in the nation tends to breed a form of healthy competition which promotes hard work and diligence amongst Ghanaians.¹¹⁸

But it is probably the third which bears the most relation to national unity: which is that for cultural reasons, people tend to exercise a measure of decorum towards others from different tribes.¹¹⁹ Thus, ethnic diversity helps to moderate the behaviors and attitudes of Ghanaians towards one another. Howbeit the family is the knot which ties the whole nation together, for they bear the responsibility for the education and training of the child, so that the state is practically spared in this respect.¹²⁰ When people face difficulties, they are wont to seek support

from their family and kin,¹²¹ rather than the state – which most likely would be of little help.¹²² Wherefore the government endeavors to stay clear of matters relating to the family, – and allowing each ethnicity to maintain its own language and culture is one means by which the family is kept closely knit together.¹²³

Another interesting observation relates to processes that facilitate social communication amongst the populace. For instance, the primary means of short-distance transport in the country is by way of shared minibuses called ‘trotro,’ or ‘trosky.’¹²⁴ These buses are regular and affordable, and are thus patronized by all and sundry. They provide a practical means by which people get to establish new acquaintances,¹²⁵ as well as engage in dialogues and ‘small talks’ on political and social matters. Also, owing to imperfect market information, prices of consumer goods, save for those sold in supermarkets, are usually not deemed fixed, and are thus subject to bargains.¹²⁶ And this informal process of bargaining serves as a means by which some form of communication is facilitated between and amongst persons.¹²⁷

This trend is further observed in the preparation of food. For instance, be it ‘apkle’ amongst the Ewes, ‘banku’ amongst the Akans, or ‘tuo zaafi’ amongst the Hausas, the preparation always involves two people: the

one stirring the meal, and the other, fanning the pot. Or in the case of ‘fufu,’ amongst the Ashantis, one person does the pounding of the meal, and the other, the kneading.¹²⁸ And these conjoined roles offer subtle ways by which face-to-face communication is furthered in the family.¹²⁹ More also, some social practices like the balancing of waterpot on the head serves to promote carefulness and diligence amongst women, which virtues are required in the nursing of children. In the same vein, other occupations like fishing, where a large number of men join efforts together to pull a load of fish from the sea, tend to facilitate teamwork and conscientiousness amongst persons.

And now unto religious matters. It may be said that in Ghana, there is a parallel coexistence of religious traditions. The two dominant religions, Christianity and Islam, are practiced side-by-side without any conflicts whatsoever. And in this, one may have to ascribe the praise to political leaders, and the ingenious means by which they have brought this about. For instance, all Christian and Islamic celebrations are likely observed as national holidays. Also, the Islamic community being a minority, an office of the Chief Imam – which is political – has been created to oversee all matters and interests of the same. Additionally, a statutory Pilgrims Affairs Office exists to facilitate the yearly Hajj pilgrimage of

Muslims to Mecca. More also, it has been the case in Ghana that the President and the Vice have severally – and in almost all regimes – been members of the two religious traditions.¹³⁰

But as it relates to Christianity, which also is the dominant religion,¹³¹ there exists a Christian Council, though not statutory, which oversees the conduct and organization of church activities in the country. More also, the orthodox churches, but especially the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Anglican, as well as the Catholic Church, have branches in almost every part of the country.¹³² And it is particularly common to see Christian ministers and missionaries preaching the Word of God publicly on the streets and in buses.¹³³ It appears to be the case that the Ghanaian government consciously permits a diffusion of Judeo-Christian doctrines amongst the populace, in so far as these are deemed to promote virtues that are conducive to democratic stability.¹³⁴

For instance, the Ghanaian national anthem begins with the words, “God bless our homeland Ghana,”¹³⁵ and likewise, the national pledge ends with the words, “So help me God,”¹³⁶ and both these two are respectively sang and recited daily in all basic schools throughout the country.¹³⁷ More also, a distinct course, called ‘Religious and Moral Education,’ which entails the beliefs, values, and doctrines of the

Christian and Islamic religious traditions, is taught to basic school children at all grade levels. In addition to this, and in respect to Christian schools,¹³⁸ some time is kept each Wednesday morning for ‘Worship,’ which is a period where school children and teachers pray together, and sing songs of adoration to God.

In high schools also, some form of religious education and training is observed. For example, an elective course called Christian Religious Studies [or Islamic Religious Studies, in the case of Islamic schools] are offered and taught to students.¹³⁹ More also, Bible-based clubs such as the Scripture Union, or the Catholic Students Union, are found in almost every high school in the country. Such faith-based clubs and associations are even more numerous and vibrant in tertiary institutions, where they usually undertake evangelistic missions to towns and villages throughout the country. In addition to that, a number of Christian voluntary associations, as the National Intercessors Assembly, and Aglow International Ghana, organize monthly prayer sessions throughout the country, which see several thousands of persons gather to pray for the peace and unity of the country.

And now unto observations regarding the media. It may indeed be said that the one thing every Ghanaian has in his house is a radio. And this

is owed largely to the multitude of radio stations in the country. And quite conveniently also, many of these broadcast in the dialect of the locality wherein they are based, so that this makes it relatively easy for many to keep abreast with the salient issues of the day. More also, these stations usually offer a platform for the public to engage in public discourses,¹⁴⁰ to wit, for the elites [i.e., the leaders of political parties] to dialogue with one another on pertinent issues,¹⁴¹ and for the masses to call-in and partake in said discussions.¹⁴²

The television networks perform similar functions as the radio stations, except that they are not as multitudinous as the latter. Also, many only broadcast in English, and there are some whose coverage do not extend across the entire country.¹⁴³ But recognizing this deficit, and realizing also the added effects of visual broadcasting, many offer programs that unite the Ghanaian public in especial ways. For instance, one of the dominant TV networks, Television 3 (TV3), organizes reality shows such as “Ghana’s Most Beautiful,”¹⁴⁴ ‘Mentor,’¹⁴⁵ ‘Ghana’s Strongest,’¹⁴⁶ ‘Talented Kids,’¹⁴⁷ ‘Celebrations,’¹⁴⁸ – which all are contests that draw participants from across all regions of the country.¹⁴⁹ Another of the networks, Ghana Television (GTV), sponsors and broadcasts annually

a Science and Math Quiz Contest between senior high schools across the country.¹⁵⁰

Howbeit the greatest contribution of the media to Ghana's democratic stability may lie in their coverage of national elections. During this period, the radio- and TV networks pool their resources together and send agents to all polling centers of the country to report on the results – as and when they are released. By this means therefore, they provide an independent tally by which the declared results of the Electoral Commission may be verified. Yea, also because the two reports are wont to differ only by a negligible margin, it is usually the case that election results are known in advance, ere they are officially announced by the EC.¹⁵¹ And besides this role, the media also provides a platform during electioneering periods for political parties to expound on their policy proposals, and to respond to questions from the public.¹⁵²

On matters of the economy, one interesting observation relates to trade unions and their active role in countervailing the powers of the state. It seems as if every labor-group is organized into a union, for there exists many of such in the country. For instance, there is the Ghana Medical Association – for doctors, and the Union of Professional Nurses and Midwives, Ghana – for nurses and midwives -- one can only wonder why

these two are not organized into a single union of health workers. Moreover, in the field of education, there is the University Teachers Association of Ghana – for college professors; the Polytechnic Teachers Association of Ghana – for polytechnic teachers; the Ghana National Association of Teachers – for trained teachers at the basic- and high school level; and the Teachers and Educational Workers Union – for all other workers in education.¹⁵³

Another observation relates to unemployment, but particularly graduate unemployment. For instance, the Ghana Statistical Service (2019, 105) noted in its survey that unemployment was highest amongst graduates of high school- and tertiary education, but least amongst persons with no formal education. And one reason for said pattern is owed to the high expectations that have come to be associated with formal education. For instance, when most young think of a university degree, what comes to mind is a well-remunerated job in an air-conditioned office.¹⁵⁴ They are therefore not willing to settle for a job that might actually pay less than they had priorly anticipated.¹⁵⁵ More also, other occupations such as farming, hairdressing, plumbing, carpentry, masonry, and the like, which appear to have better job prospects, are generally considered ‘menial,’ or ‘low-class’ amongst the

youth – ones they would disdain to be employed therein.¹⁵⁶ Thus, you have an instance where one has a university degree in classics, or anthropology, or fisheries, but is unemployed.¹⁵⁷ Professor David Kimble (1963, 62) has remarked persuasively that such disinclination amongst the youth for manual work has its roots in orientations passed down from the colonial era:

It was not long, however, before those in closest contact with the European came to attribute his material advantages to the mystique of his education. They also saw that only Africans who had been to school could hope for employment as teachers, or clerks, or in some higher posts. Education thus offered the prospects of a higher salary, increased authority and prestige, possibly the chance of a trip to Europe, and certainly the means of avoiding manual labor, which was traditionally allotted to slaves, but was liable to be demanded by the white man of any illiterate African.

The overemphasis on formal education has other effects besides. For instance, many graduates, unable to find a job after completion, resort to abroad scholarship programs, and therewith emigrate out of the country – the nation losing a considerable talent pool as a result.¹⁵⁸ More also, because formal education mostly prepares one for work in the service sector, it has been the case that basic products which otherwise could have been produced in the country are imported, owing to a depletion of skilled labor in the agricultural and industrial sectors (cf. GSS, *ibid.*, 76). And what is more, many young people are inhibited

from harnessing their talents in other equally relevant areas because they are all expected to churn out a life career through the school system.¹⁵⁹

Nevertheless, the service sector is the engine of growth of the Ghanaian economy, and the impact of skilled labor therein cannot be understated. Additionally, such corporations and business, by virtue of their capital investments, are wont to lend support towards policies of good political governance, in an effort to guarding their financial interests from loss.¹⁶⁰ More also, the large amount of royalties, taxes, and rent¹⁶¹ paid by these companies is enough reason to deter the elites from undertaking actions that may threaten the stability of the nation.¹⁶² For instance, the nation's discovery of oil in 2008 has seen massive investments from large multi-national oil and gas companies such as Tullow Oil, Kosmos Energy, ENI, and ExxonMobil.¹⁶³

Another observation on the economy relates to the multitude of small businesses in the country. There are some jobs, for instance, like selling food or wares by the street, or conducting for a 'trotro' van, which one need not have a prior license to carry out.¹⁶⁴ Also, other 'little jobs' as hawking in traffic, or carrying travelers' luggage at bus stations, are particularly prevalent in urban centers. Many persons also have self-

built structures called 'kiosks' wherein are carried out various kinds of small business, as hairdressing, food vending, lottery, and the like. And there are several financial institutions that offer credits at low interests to individuals seeking to engage in any of such small businesses. It is therefore the case that persons who migrate from rural to urban centers in search of work are usually able to find some means by which they could earn a living.¹⁶⁵

One other popular economic activity in Ghana relates to the making of music and movies. It is one of the few professions that one could say is 'made by Ghanaians for Ghanaians.' Many of such music are Christian and 'church-like,'¹⁶⁶ whilst others are secular, and either convey themes of love, hope, and respect; or teach lessons on life.¹⁶⁷ And these are heard everywhere: in car stereos, at marketplaces, at homes, on the streets, in bars and pubs, etc.¹⁶⁸ The movies however are of two forms. The one has a rural setting and attempts to manifest the realities of rural living to the Ghanaian public. This kind appears to be the more preferred of the two, particularly because it is comedic, and is spoken in the local dialect.

The other however, because it is fashioned for an urban audience, and is acted only in English, draws only a limited following. Nevertheless,

the prime actors of both movie forms, as well as the musicians, are greatly celebrated in the country, and their unique ethnic identities further serve as a means by which the Ghanaian people are brought to identify with one another.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the production and distribution of these media generate revenue for the nation, and income for those engaged therein.

Our penultimate observation is in the area of technology. And in this are three aspects of note, namely: ICT learning, mobile telephony, and the internet. As regarding ICT learning,¹⁷⁰ there seems to have been a steady improvement therein. For instance, the module is presently compulsory in all basic schools, and is also amongst the core courses taught in high schools. Moreover, most tertiary institutions offer a degree program in computer science, which provides students with advanced knowledge in the field. There are also several opportunities for one to specialize in the field, assuming one desires to be an IT professional.¹⁷¹ And the effect of said learning has been the general rise in IT services. For instance, the production and broadcasting of media, the publication of newspapers, the creation of websites, and the design of advertising content have seen great improvements as a result of the increase in ICT learning amongst the Ghanaian youth.

Besides ICT learning is mobile telephony. At present, a total of five multi-national telecommunication networks are based in the country,¹⁷² all of which boast of a nation-wide coverage. Also, most of the networks have a money transfer service which makes it possible for persons to transfer money to, and receive remittances from friends and family via their mobile devices with relative speed and ease.¹⁷³ Furthermore, owing to the high level of social mobility in the country, for reasons of work, education, marriage, etc.,¹⁷⁴ mobile telephony offers a convenient way by which people are able to stay in touch with their family and loved ones, – the low cost of mobile services helping also in this regard.¹⁷⁵

And closely associated with mobile telephony, and a corollary of it, is the internet. In Ghana, this service is accessed predominantly via network-enabled mobile phones, but also via broadband- and wireless devices. That most people can access the internet means also that they are able to access social services such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and the like, all of which enable them to connect with the local community, and with the diaspora.¹⁷⁶ More also, other educational sites such as YouTube enable persons to acquire basic skills in, say, website design, phone- and computer repairs, programming, baking, etc.; and need one say more about the search capabilities of Google, or its maps

for that matter?¹⁷⁷ What is more, the spread of the internet has made it virtually impossible for any regime or cadre of elites to control the political narrative, or to restrict access to information in the country.¹⁷⁸

And finally, unto observations on cultural norms. It must be noted that Ghana upon independence opted to preserve the authority and honor of chiefs, which hitherto had been the figure heads of the various tribes and ethnicities.¹⁷⁹ Thus the 1992 Constitution of Ghana (Chap. XXII, Art. 270, Sec. 2) states categorically that:

Parliament shall have no power to enact any law that *shall*:

- a) confer on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever, or,
- b) in any way detract or derogate from the honor and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.

Furthermore, in attempting to integrate the authority of chiefs into the political process, the Constitution (*loc. cit.*, Art. 271, 272b-c) provided for a National House of Chiefs which shall undertake, *amid other roles*:

- i) the progressive study, interpretation, and codification of customary law with a view to evolving [...] a unified system of rules of customary law [...],
- ii) an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful.

Therefore are chiefs a vital part of Ghanaian politics and society,¹⁸⁰ which thing also is consonant with the observation made by Professor James Coleman (1960, 259) on chiefdoms in sub-Saharan Africa:

Where conquest states and centralized chiefdoms have been recognized and used as units in local administration by colonial authorities, they tend to become foci for separatist sub-nationalisms in the modern territorial system, partly because they provide structures through which status and power can be secured, but also because they are a symbol of cultural continuity and thereby provide the cultural basis for a national sentiment.

One means by which chiefs facilitate social integration in the country is through the celebration of traditional festivals. These are ceremonies held annually to reinforce traditional bonds, and to display the glory and majesty of chiefdoms. They are kept by all ethnic groups in the country. For instance, the Ga people celebrate *Homowo*, the Ada, *Asafutofiami*; the Anlo, *Hogbetsotso*; the Akyem, *Odwira*; the Ashanti, *Adae*; the Efutu, *Aboakyer*, just to name a few.¹⁸¹ Most members of the community who had migrated to urban centers are able to return home for these festivals, so that they serve as marked occasions for reconnecting with one's roots and heritage.

But besides all the hysteria and merrymaking that goes on during such festivities, the occasion most importantly reintroduces people to cultural norms and values, which in addition to Judeo-Christian virtues,¹⁸² are

the principal forces regulating the moral behavior of citizens.¹⁸³ A number of these values are the same across cultures. For instance, young people are taught to rise up before the hoary head; women, to be chaste and submissive; men, to be hardworking and diligent, and the elderly, to counsel the youth in the way of life.¹⁸⁴ There are also a number of taboos which are observed in most societies to proscribe deviant behavior. For instance, it is forbidden for one to whistle at night, and they say that one is sure to be visited by ghosts when one does so, but essentially it is so peace and quiet could be observed at night. Also, they say that when you sweep your room at night, you are in effect sweeping away all your riches, but in essence, this is once again to cause household chores to be done during the day, so that peace and quiet could be observed at night.¹⁸⁵

In addition to customs and beliefs, certain cultural symbols are used to transmit behavioral norms and values amongst people. These symbols, called *Adinkra* by the Akans¹⁸⁶ are usually found printed on royal clothing, furniture, earthenware pots, and sculptures. For example, the symbol *Gye Nyame*, which literally translates, ‘except God,’ but better, that ‘self-effort is futile without God’s help’ is presently printed on the nation’s highest currency denomination – the GHS 200 banknote.¹⁸⁷

Other of such symbols include: *Tamfo Bebre*, which translates, ‘the enemy will suffer,’ or better, that ‘the doer of evil would find no peace;’ “Okuafo Pa,” which translates, ‘the good farmer,’ signifying hard work and diligence; *Sankofa*, which translates, ‘go back and fetch it,’ signifying that people are not to lose track of their ancestral heritage; and *Akoma Ntoaso*, which translates, ‘the joining of hearts,’ signifying love, unity, and concord.¹⁸⁸ Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s founder and first president, commented interestingly on the essence of such symbolisms for national identity as follows:

My Cabinet has decided, with my agreement *of course*, to put my head on the coinage, because many of my people cannot read or write. They’ve got to be shown that they are now really independent. And they can only be shown by signs. When they buy stamps they will see my picture – an African like themselves – and they will say: ‘Aiee...look, here is our leader on the stamps, we are truly a free people!’¹⁸⁹

Besides symbols, cultural values are further passed on through proverbs and folklores. The former are wise sayings that are often spoken to teach a moral lesson. For instance, there is, *woforo dua pa a na yepia wo*, which translates, ‘it is when you climb a good tree that you are pushed,’ signifying that a noble effort is rewarded by the community. There is also, *hu m’ani so ma me nti na atwe mmienu name*, which translates, ‘it is to help blow the dust off each other’s eyes that two antelopes are

wont to walk together' intimating that there is strength in joint endeavors. And then there is, *aboa o onni dua no, Nyame na opra ne ho*, which literally translates, 'for the animal that is without a tail, it is God that grooms its body,' intimating that God makes adequate provisions for the needs and impediments of all persons."¹⁹⁰

But as pertaining to folklores, these are short stories, usually fictitious, that are told to convey diverse lessons on love, unity, kindness, diligence, and the like. They are usually centered around the person of '*Kweku Ananse*' [lit. trans., Kweku Spider] – an imaginary character that is employed to depict craft, subtlety and wisdom, as Socrates is in Greek dialogues. For instance, in one of the stories, it is said that there was a contest held in a village to determine who could drink a cup of hot water. And when many had been unsuccessful in the attempt, Kweku Ananse leaped forward and said that he was able to drink the cup of hot water. And when one had been poured out for him, he retorted that in order to convince everyone present that he had indeed drank a cup of hot water, he would have needs first pass the cup before their eyes, so they could verify this truth for themselves. And when he was done temporizing, to wit, had passed the cup before all them there present, the water was now quite warm, and he was able to gulp it down with

relative ease. And this story is told to teach that one could maneuver one's way out of difficult situations when one acts with patience and guile.¹⁹¹

Nevertheless, the advent of modernization, and the attendant exposure to foreign cultures have taken a toll on cultural mores in the country.¹⁹² On the one side, this has been beneficial particularly regarding gender roles in the country. For girls and women are no longer consigned to bearing children and taking care of the home.¹⁹³ Thus the Ghana Statistical Service (2019, 23) recorded in its recent survey that about 76.1 percent of females [as against 87.9 percent of males] have attained some form of education. And the effect of this is presently seen in the country, for a considerable number of cabinet ministers and parliamentarians are women, besides those that occupy executive positions in corporations and government.¹⁹⁴ For instance, the current Electoral Commissioner and Attorney General are women, as was also the immediate former Chief Justice.¹⁹⁵

Another positive effect of modernization on Ghanaian culture is evinced in the disbandment of unsavory traditional practices as female genital mutilation,¹⁹⁶ cruel widowhood rites,¹⁹⁷ the inscription of tribal marks,¹⁹⁸ amid others.¹⁹⁹ But by the same token, civilization and

modernity have led to a loosening of moral virtues and cultural norms.

As Professor Carle Zimmerman (1970, 11) rightly adumbrated:

The climax of a modern civilization is one in which the family system has lost much of its power to control the individual. In such a case there tends to rise an inability or unwillingness of the family to control the individual and of the individual to sacrifice for the family. Hence a vast increase of confusion arises which is associated with desertions, divorces, juvenile delinquencies, the increased dependency of individuals upon public relief, the decay of former sex mores, and the inability of larger and larger portions of the social system, keyed to family life, to function at all well.

And this, we say, is the case in the country. For most young people now consider it ‘normal’ to cohabit with another, or to have a child ere that one is married²⁰⁰ – a practice which aforesaid was detestable, and greatly frowned upon.²⁰¹ This besides, social mobilization appears to be furthering a ‘culture of individualism,’ amongst Ghanaians, where more and more people are growing callous each day towards the needs and concerns of their immediate families. More also, the influx of diverse persons into urban centers, and the frantic pursuit of means of livelihood have had the effect of engendering distrust and intolerance amongst persons, not to mention the many social vices that are perpetuated as a result.²⁰²

Thus far are the field observations documented by the study. We would now assay to analyze them in light of our founding hypotheses.

3.4. Result Analysis

Our first twain hypotheses were stated as follows:

H_{1a} = The poor in Ghana are wont on occasion to find pacifist ways to deal with their deprivations.

H_{1b} = Most deprived persons in Ghana have hitherto not been oriented in a better way of life.

Let us begin with *H_{1a}*. To do so, it is necessary that we review a popular theory by Professor Albert Hirschman (1973) in this respect – one he calls the tunnel-effect.

In its basic sense, the tunnel-effect²⁰³ represents a situation where the progress of one group of people in society leads others to believe that their own welfare would soon likewise improve.²⁰⁴ Professor Hirschman (*loc. cit.*, 545) depicted the phenomenon in an analogy, as follows:

Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while, the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane's turn to move will surely come any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move. But suppose that the expectation is disappointed and only the right lane keeps moving: in that case I, along with my left lane co-sufferers, shall suspect foul play, and many of us will at some point become quite furious and ready to correct manifest injustice by taking direct action (such as illegally crossing the double line separating the two lanes).

From this, we understand that one reason people may be willing to live with acute deprivations is their expectation of a favorable future turnout of events. In his seminal essay, Professor Hirschman (*ibid.*, 553-9) made mention of three factors which influenced said tunnel-effect: namely, empathy on the part of the deprived [for the gainers], nature of the family system, and popular perceptions towards success.

One reason the deprived are able to empathize with the gainers is due to the absence of rigid cleavage lines between the two.²⁰⁵ As Professor Hirschman (*ibid.*, 553-4) rightly noted:

The fluidity or rigidity of class lines has an obvious bearing on the intensity of the tunnel effect [...] If, in segmented societies, economic advance becomes identified with one particular religion or region, then those who are left out and behind are unlikely to experience the tunnel effect: they will be convinced almost from the start of the process that the advancing group is achieving an unfair exploitative advantage over them. The nonmobile group may thus make the prediction opposite to that implied in the tunnel effect: as a result of another group's advance, it will expect to be worse off.

As we have already reviewed, there appear to exist fluid cleavage lines between people groups in Ghana. For though ethnicities are territorially concentrated and speak distinct dialects, yet the people share many things in common, – as the same official language, faith, schools, political party affiliations, employment opportunities, cultural norms, etc.²⁰⁶ More also, the centralized system of government ensures that all

regions of the country receive, *in theory*, a fair and equal share of national resource allocations,²⁰⁷ so that disparities between them may not be attributed to institutional causes.²⁰⁸ As such, it is less likely that a nonmobile group would attribute the fortunes of a mobile group to causes other than merit.²⁰⁹

Besides empathy is the nature of the family system. It has been stated that the tunnel effect is likely to operate in traditional family systems where children owe binding obligations to their parents.²¹⁰ That is, to the extent that parents expect their children to grow up and provide for the family, they would be the more willing to endure present deprivations for the sake of the same (cf. Hirschman, *loc. cit.*, 556).²¹¹ And particularly for a nation as Ghana with closely-knit family systems, – where parents are wholly involved in the education of their wards, and where custom and duty requires the latter to revere and requite the former, it becomes quite clear to see why the tunnel effect would operate in this regard, to wit, why persons would hope enduringly in the gains of the future, than attempt to alter their present circumstances.²¹²

A final determinant of the tunnel effect relates to people's perceptions towards personal success. And this may be viewed in three respects. First, where personal success is largely attributed to 'chance,' then this

is likely to occasion the tunnel effect, because the nonmobile group could hope that their season of change would soon come in time.²¹³ Second, where said success is attributed to merit or hard work, rather than to favoritism or unfair advantage, then this should likewise occasion the tunnel effect, because those left out, rather than becoming envious of the gainers, would be inspired to work harder towards achieving like gains for themselves. And third, where the success of the mobile group is attributed to unfair practice on the part of the same, then those who have not gained would be content to continue in their 'righteous' ways, believing that this would earn them a just recompense in time.

Now, as it relates to the Ghanaian nation, we find that people's devotion to their faith tends to make them attribute good breaks to 'acts of God,' for which cause they are the more willing to endure present deprivations, in the hope that their 'season of breakthrough' would soon come.²¹⁴ The second – which is merit – we have already discussed. But as regards the third, there are instances where peoples' wealth are attributed to causes such as 'ritual money,'²¹⁵ internet hacking and fraud,²¹⁶ misuse of public funds,²¹⁷ and the like, in which case the nonmobile group, rather than desire to get ahead in like fashion, may be content to continue in their righteous – though seemingly unrewarding – ways, but probably also

because of the risks and losses associated with said faithless and evil practices.²¹⁸

Thus we find that H_{1a} is true in many respects. For owing to the operation of the tunnel effect in Ghana, people try to find alternative ‘tunnel routes’ by which they could escape their deprivations, rather than deal with them head-on. So, for instance, if a particular regime is not meeting their needs, rather than remonstrate with it, they would simply wait until the next election period and vote it out of power. For they would say, ‘surely, when the other party comes into power, then things would probably get better.’ And for the religious, personal deprivations are but temporary hardships for which the LORD would make a way in due time. Why, did not the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the *Galatians* (KJV, Chap. VI, Vrs. 9) admonish Christians “to never grow weary in well doing, for in due season they shall reap if they fainted not”?²¹⁹ Otherwise also, deprived persons could always take consolation in the fact that their children would someday alter the course of their lives.

And so we rightly observe many of said ‘pacifist’ attitudes amongst Ghanaians. For instance, in places where there is not a constant supply of sewage water, people either dig wells, or buy barrels by which they

store water when the taps are running. Or, as regards to frequent power outages, people either have generators, candles, lanterns, touches, or rechargeable lamps by which they try to adapt to the situation.²²⁰ And most village families are not offended to eat the same basic meal, every day, all year round.²²¹ Also, most people that suffer need would rather ask for money from their friends or families, than cry to the government for assistance. And so in 1988, for example, some towns and villages which were not covered by the government's electrification project, rather than protest against the move, undertook a parallel 'self-help' effort, where they provided the material and financial resources needed to connect them to the National Grid (cf. Bawumia 1998, 63-4).²²²

Let us proceed now to H_{1b} . And in this also, we may have to resort once again to Professor Hirschman (1970) for a theoretical statement in this regard – one he calls 'exit and voice.'²²³

Because these two concepts are direct opposites,²²⁴ understanding one provides a clear meaning of the other. Professor Hirschman (*loc. cit.*, 30) defined 'voice' as:

[...] any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition [...], through appeal to a higher authority [...], or through various types of actions and protests.

Thus ‘exit’ may be inferred to mean “an attempt to escape from an objectionable state of affairs, either through actual movement away from a location,²²⁵ or through mental resignation, where one ‘turns a blind eye’ to the issues at hand, and avoids dealing with them directly.²²⁶

Now why is this important to our hypothesis? It is because if deprived persons in Ghana are choosing the exit option, – to wit, are not effectively articulating their needs, then it must be because the voice option is either out of their reach, or is not perceived to be a viable alternative.²²⁷ As Professor Hirschman (*ibid.*, 37) rightly noted, the decision to exit is often taken “in light of the prospects for the effective use of voice.” It may therefore behoove us to examine the factors which restrict the use of voice amongst deprived persons in Ghana. But before doing so, a brief digression seems in order. We formulated our present hypothesis as follows:

H_{1b} = Most deprived persons in Ghana have hitherto not been oriented in a better way of life.

Our reasoning behind this hypothesis was that, to use voice, a person would have needs first be aware of his rights and privileges. For only if he is oblivious of these would he resolve to use exit when the same are

denied him. It is like owning a car. If someone should challenge you to it, and claim that the car you own does not belong to you, would you, for the sake of peace, simply allow him to take away your car? We trow not! You would surely employ every means possible to prove that you indeed own the car. In the same vein, we conjectured that the reason most deprived persons would chose exit over voice may be because they are not fully oriented on their entitlements: to wit, on how much of a better life they could be living, but more also, on how said life was not solely their responsibility to bring about.²²⁸ Professor Hirschman (1974, 13) commented in this wise as follows:

A criterion for discriminating between exit-prone and voice-prone situations can be defined as ignorance and uncertainty, shared by consumers and producers, about the manner of producing a desired good and service and, in fact, about their precise nature [...] The ignorance criterion is helpful in accounting for swings from the predominance of exit to that of voice in relation to the same goods or services [...] In fact, in many cases doubts about the desirability of the product in its present form arise for the first time after a more or less prolonged period of unquestioning acceptance [...] It is then quite proper that exit should be the principal reaction of dissatisfied students when no fundamental questions are widely asked about the value and current methods of the university, while voice will predominate during periods of generalized loss of confidence in the traditional system.

Now as regarding why deprived persons in Ghana may not be prone to using voice, we expectedly find that this is owed much to their lack of the means – to wit, the know-how and the wherewithal – to do so.

Because voice, in comparison to exit, appears costly,²²⁹ as was also underscored by Professor Hirschman (1993, 176):²³⁰

Easy availability of exit is [...] inimical to voice, for in comparison with exit, voice is costly in terms of effort and time. Moreover, to be effective voice often requires group action and is thus subject to all the well-known difficulties of organization, representation, and free riding. By contrast, exit, when available, does not require any coordination with others. Hence [...] *is the case* that the presence of an exit alternative [...] atrophies the development of the art of voice.

Thus, what Professor Robert Merton (1995, 394) has famously termed the ‘Matthew Effect’²³¹ becomes apposite in this stance: for the wealthy and educated, by virtue of their social capital, tend to have more avenues to effect change – and are also more likely to be heard – than the illiterate poor. Which is why until date, there still are some villages in Ghana that do not boast of sewage water and electricity. Yet, the government was quick to implement the National Youth Employment Program when students began to agitate for jobs, – for it perceived their discontent a threat to national security;²³² whereas a few rural folks sleeping in the dark, or drinking unclean water, or being battered by mosquitos should have no severe impacts on the nation whatsoever. How quickly the nation seems to have forgotten, that the very Commission report which founded her democracy had advised against establishing a ‘political democracy without economic democracy:’

[...] for there is no political democracy without economic democracy, and until economic democracy, grounded in principles of resource generation and equitable distribution is guaranteed, there can be no real democracy (qtd. in Pepera 1991, 69).²³³

Another reason is the centralized nature of the governmental system. All corporate headquarters are in Accra; the tall towers and skyscrapers are in Accra; the fancy mansions and apartment complexes are in Accra; the premier airport is in Accra; the premier shopping mall is in Accra; all governmental ministries and agencies are in Accra; all foreign embassies and consulates are in Accra; the nation's largest university is in Accra; the nation's largest stadium is in Accra; is there anything that is not in Accra? Now such concentration of business at the center has some palpable effects, as we have already seen, – one of which is that it inhibits political initiative at the peripheries.²³⁴ Wherefore when the country folks visit the city and behold the glamour, splendor, and pace of its development,²³⁵ they are overwhelmed, nay atomized, thereby, and would dare not assert themselves therein.²³⁶ And so Professor Hirschman (1976, 387) rightly noted that “voice is more apt to become mobilized when the area to which it extends is none too large.”

In light of these, voting becomes the only semblance of voice that is left deprived persons in the country, – which leads us quite aptly to our next twain hypotheses, – stated as follows:

H_{2a} = The elites of Ghana's dominant political parties tend to be allied in practice, and therefore exercise moderation in their antagonism of one another.

H_{2b} = Regime policies in Ghana tend to be inclusive and broad-based, and thus benefit a considerable section of the population.

Let us commence with *H_{2a}*. In their highly influential essay on political transitions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 945) noted that elites would be unwilling to undertake a coup if they perceived the gains of such, – that is, of capturing political power and reducing redistributive taxation – to be lesser than the cost of the coup.²³⁷ Professor Carles Boix (2008, 400-1) further corroborated this assertion in an empirical study where he remarked that the elites of a polity would forbear to antagonize one another, so long as they perceived unity amongst their ranks a necessary requisite to their maintaining dominance in the system.²³⁸ Put together, we could thus say that political elites, fearing the losses that may accrue to them from zero-sum confrontations, may be content to form pacts with one another, although such undertaking would only yield relative, rather than absolute, returns.²³⁹

It is therefore understandable to see why the two-dominant parties in Ghana may actually be allied in practice. For since both parties have an almost equal chance of being elected, and it is guaranteed that one of them would be elected at each term, why should they be involved in a zero-sum, winner-take-all contestation, which could potentially spill over into destructive conflict – and leave them both worse off, when they could rather be leagued together and maintain their hold on the system?²⁴⁰ And indeed empirical evidence has been tabled in this respect. For instance, a study by Anja Osei (2015, 547-8) of MPs in Ghana revealed that the same were ‘consensually united’ one with the other.²⁴¹ In stating her findings,²⁴² Osei (*ibid.*, 553) was quick to underscore the two-party system as prime cause for said consensus:

The [...] two-party system has had important consequences for elite politics. First, the small number of actors reduces collective action problems and makes cooperation more feasible. Second, the existence of strong parties with high numbers of core voters lends legitimacy to the process of elite settlement [...] Besides, the two-party system provides a regular and routine channel for political contestation. Both parties have huge followings, and therefore the costs associated with breaking up the consensus are high. Neither of the parties would be guaranteed to gain anything, but would instead face opposition from a large segment of Ghanaian society. Electoral competition is no longer perceived as a zero-sum game: today, losers are not threatened with political demise but can hope to be more successful in the next election. In this way, trust and mutual security have been gradually established.

Moreover, such ‘consensual unity’ between the NDC and NPP is seen in other formal dimensions also. For instance, there are a number of select- and standing parliamentary committees wherein the minority party plays a dominant role,²⁴³ – besides the fact that two-thirds majority is required for most legislative procedures.²⁴⁴ There is also the ‘ex-gratia’ rewards²⁴⁵ which makes the two parties the more willing to work together for the good of the nation. Additionally, other joint initiatives such as the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC),²⁴⁶ and the Ghana Political Parties Programme²⁴⁷ allow for dialogue and mutual understanding amongst political parties on fair electoral procedures.²⁴⁸ And let us not forget to mention the so-called ‘golden handshake’ protocol which, besides other things, facilitates trust and goodwill amongst the elites (cf. Cheeseman et al. 2017, 101).²⁴⁹

And so hypothesis H_{2b} may well be a corollary of H_{2a} . For because it is highly improbable that either of the two parties could win an election by appealing solely to its core voters, it has become thus necessary that the same developed policy proposals that were broad-based and inclusive, and addressed the preferences and interests of a wider segment of the population.²⁵⁰ And we see evidence of this in the study conducted by Weghorst and Lindberg (2011, 1205-8) on the 2008 presidential

elections in Ghana, where they observed that the opposition NDC were able to win said elections because they promised to provide the Ghanaian people with collective goods, whereas the ruling NPP lost because they resorted rather to ethnic appeals and clientelistic tactics. In a related essay on the study, Weghorst and Lindberg (2013, 730-4) articulated their findings as follows:²⁵¹

In line with extant scholarship, clientelistic goods have been seen to increase the extent to which people are likely to consider switching political loyalties. However, there is less evidence that incumbents obtain their only voting rewards from providing private goods, such as cash handouts, paying for school fees, giving jobs to particular individuals, and other private transfers [...] Our results demonstrate that significant numbers of swing voters evaluate incumbent MPs in terms of collective constituency goods, lawmaking, and improvement of the economy. The greater the dissatisfaction with performance on collective goods, the more likely these citizens will support challenger MPs, and the other way around [...] Clientelism may be ubiquitous in Africa, but as democracy matures in Ghana, voting decisions are shaped by many factors, including MP performance-based evaluations. Our results thus suggests that even in highly clientelistic environments, incumbents who wish to get reelected must seek to meet voter demands, including delivering collective goods. As such, the process of winning elections in the new democratic dispensation ought to drive competitors to provide higher quality collective goods.

And this may well explain the success of the NPP in the 2016 general elections. For until then, and since multi-party democracy was started in 1992, there has never been an instance where a sitting president was unable to secure a second-term electoral victory. But the NPP was able

to dispense with that tradition – though in opposition – in large part because it promised high-end collective goods to the Ghanaian people: as, free senior high school education; one factory for every district; one dam for every village; a US\$1,000,000 development fund for each constituency, *amid others*.²⁵² Thus we see that in spite of party identifications along ethnic lines, Ghanaians tend to be united in their commitment to democratic procedures, and would usually opt for the ballot box than resort to destabilizing practices in ousting an inefficient regime, in so far as opposition parties continued to offer policy alternatives that were broad-based and representative.²⁵³

And now unto our final twain hypotheses. These were stated as follows:

H_{3a} = To the extent that revolutions are undertaken in concert by large groups of people, it may seem to be the case that a number of factors work to inhibit collective action endeavors amongst Ghanaians.

H_{3b} = Given the considerable number of publicists and self-dependent persons in Ghana that could set forth a revolution, its non-occurrence must be the result of some deterring path-dependent peculiarity.

Let us begin, as usual, with *H_{3a}*. And to do so, it seems in order that we examine some theoretical thoughts on collective action, more generally.

Professor Mancur Olson (1965, 1-2) in his seminal monograph *The Logic of Collective Action* advanced what has come to be known as the ‘zero-

contribution thesis,⁷ – which is that rational, self-interested individuals would voluntarily be opposed to acting in concert to achieving common goals:

The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically from the widely accepted premise of rational, self-interested behavior. In other words, if the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective. But this is, in fact, not true [...] Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*. In other words, even if all of the individuals in a large group were rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest.

Elsewhere in the monograph (*loc. cit.*, 53), he dilated further on why this was the case with large groups:²⁵⁴

When the number of participants in a group is large, the typical participant will know that his own efforts will probably not make much difference to the outcome, and that he will be affected by the group's decision in much the same way no matter how much or how little effort he puts into studying the issues. Accordingly, the typical participant may not take the trouble to study the issues as carefully as he would have if he had been able to make the decision by himself. The decisions of the group are thus public goods to the participants, [...] and the contribution that each participant will make towards achieving or improving these public goods will become smaller as the group size becomes larger.

But surely, modern society could not possibly subsist on small groups, as was primitive society.²⁵⁵ For whereas such groups may have served a useful purpose in the latter, the sheer size of modern society may require that activity and business are carried out in large groups, as also was reckoned by Professor Olson (*ibid.*, 20-1):

In primitive societies, small primary groups prevailed because they were best suited (or were at least sufficient) to perform certain functions for the people of these societies; in modern societies, by contrast, large associations are supposed to predominate because in modern conditions they alone are capable of performing (or are better able to perform) certain useful functions for the people of these societies. The large voluntary association, for example, could then be explained by the fact that it performed a function - that is, satisfied a demand, furthered an interest, or met a need - for some large number of people that small groups could not perform (or perform so well) in modern circumstances.

So if small groups – which tend to be more effective – are uncongenial to the modern state; and members of large groups are wont to be opposed to acting in concert to achieving common goals: yet large groups are required for much of the business of modern society, then the question becomes how best the dynamics of large groups could be altered to achieve the same or like efficiency as those of small groups.²⁵⁶

Professor Olson (*ibid.*, 15) remarked in his monograph that “the very fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in

the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.” Howbeit, because the cost of bringing such goal to pass is borne individually by group members, it means that the rational actor would seek to minimize his ‘cost of participation,’ whilst still enjoying the common good to the full. But what if every participant of the group decides to be thus disposed? It would mean that ultimately no effort is made towards achieving the common good. Professor Garrett Hardin (1968, 1244) has labelled such demeanor “the tragedy of the commons,” – although he applied the term more specifically to a common good that was used by all but maintained by none:

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture *that is* open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons [...] As a rational being, each herdsman would seek to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘what is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’ This utility has one negative and one positive component. I) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. II) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular herdsman is only a fraction of -1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a common. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the

destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Thus, we see that the problem of collective action exists in two forms: the one is where people are opposed to working together to achieving joint goals; and the other, where they are unwilling to contribute their just quota towards maintaining a common good. So what to do thereabout? One solution proposed by Professor Olson (*ibid.*, 60-1) involves the use of “selective incentives:” that is, distinguishing amongst the participants of a group by rewarding contributors and punishing noncooperators.²⁵⁷ In this way, people would be dissuaded from ‘free riding’ and would be induced instead to contributing towards the cause of the common good.²⁵⁸

Another renowned theorist on collective action dynamics – Professor Elinor Ostrom (1997) has proposed two other solutions to the issue. The first involves facilitating communication amongst group members; and the second, promoting the learning of social norms. On communication, Professor Ostrom (*loc. cit.*, 6-7) remarked as follows:

In noncooperative game theory, players are assumed to be unable to make enforceable agreements. Thus communication is viewed as cheap talk. In a social dilemma, self-interested players are expected to use communication to try to convince others to cooperate and promise cooperative action, but then to choose the Nash equilibrium strategy when they make their private decision

[...] it is obvious that simple communication would not be sufficient to escape the dilemma. From this theoretical perspective, face-to-face communication should make no difference in the outcomes achieved in social dilemmas. Yet, consistent, strong, and replicable findings are that substantial increases in the levels of cooperation are achieved when individuals are allowed to communicate face to face. This holds true across all types of social dilemmas studied in laboratory settings and in both one-shot and finitely repeated experiments [...] No other variable has as strong and consistent an effect on results as face-to-face communication. Communication even has a robust and positive effect on cooperation levels when individuals are not provided with feedback on group decisions after every round.

One reason people may be unwilling to commit to group causes is because they are usually unable to guarantee that other members of the group would follow suit.²⁵⁹ Communication therefore bridges this gap by ensuring that members are made aware of one another's motivations and intents, so as to be able to make informed judgments about the dynamics of the group (cf. Dawes et al. [1977], 3, 6).²⁶⁰ But even as Professor Ostrom (*ibid.*, 7) also acknowledged, "communication alone may not be sufficient to guarantee successful collective action under all conditions." There may also be instances where the learning of social norms and rules may help to facilitate cooperation amongst members of a group,²⁶¹ as she (*ibid.*, 9) reckoned as follows:

Because individuals are boundedly rational, they do not calculate a complete set of strategies for every situation they face. Few situations in life generate information about all potential actions that one can take, all outcomes that

can be obtained, and all strategies that others can take. In a model of complete rationality, one simply assumes this level of information. In field situations, *however*, individuals tend to use heuristics – rules of thumb – that they have learned over time regarding responses that tend to give them good outcomes in particular kinds of situations. They bring these heuristics with them when they participate in laboratory experiments. In frequently encountered repetitive situations, individuals learn better and better heuristics that are tailored to particular situations. With repetition, sufficiently large stakes, and strong competition, individuals may learn heuristics that approach best-response strategies [...] *For instance*, after experiencing repeated benefits from other people’s cooperative actions, an individual may resolve that he would always initiate cooperative actions in the future. Or, after many experiences of being the ‘sucker,’ an individual may resolve never to be the first to cooperate [...] *Thus* one may think of norms as heuristics that individuals adopt from a moral perspective, in that these are the kinds of actions they wish to follow in living their life. Once some members of a population acquire norms of behavior, they affect the expectations of others.

So how do all these relate to our present hypothesis? Well, a look at the Ghanaian nation would reveal a number of factors which do indeed inhibit collective action endeavors amongst the populace. For instance, the territorial concentration of ethnicities tends to proscribe any form of joint, conscientious effort on the part of the people. Then there is the distinct tribal dialects which causes people to identify less with others, or to perceive others as being different from themselves, – so that mutual trust is impacted as a result. Besides this is the economic situation: for because people tend to be occupied for the most part of the day with

work-related activity, they are denied the leisure needed for such joint, civic endeavors.²⁶² More also, the strong party identification means that people are likely to channel their grievances through their parties, – and ultimately through the ballot box, than resort to mass protests. Then there is finally the centralized police system, which makes it relatively easy for the ruling government to quell any uprisings or protests that may erupt in any part of the country.²⁶³

Besides these, there are other subtle factors which inhibit collective action endeavors amongst the populace. For instance, the overemphasis on ‘contests’ tends to encourage competition rather than cooperation amongst the populace.²⁶⁴ More also, there is the routinized nature of the school system which orients towards sticking with the protocol rather than effecting change to the system.²⁶⁵ In addition, Ghanaian cultural norm proscribes young people from raising their voice when talking to an adult,²⁶⁶ and school children are actually punished if they talked too loudly in class.²⁶⁷ And to the extent that the president – who also is the head of government – is regarded the ‘father’ of the nation, it is quite understandable to see why people would generally refrain from ‘raising their voice’ at *his* regime through mass protests.²⁶⁸

But a greater inhibiting factor, if not the greatest, is the fact that there exists very little opportunity, especially in the cities, for people to meet and relate with one another. Remember when we rhetorically asked if there was anything that could not be found in Accra? Well, the answer to that is a large, spacious recreational park! That certainly cannot be found in Accra, – or in any other city for that matter.²⁶⁹ More also, many of the cities and towns are built in such a way that they do not converge at a center,²⁷⁰ and most housing structures are semi-detached, or better, ‘self-contained,’ – as they are popularly called – and isolated one from the other.²⁷¹ Thus, people tend to keep to themselves, and remain in closely-knit family groups, – shut out to persons from without. Perhaps the only occasion where people get to interact with others from outside their circles is during church service meetings,²⁷² but as people’s faith tends to dissuade rather than encourage them to resort to voice,²⁷³ such weekly rendezvous are less likely to engender any meaningful collective action towards political change.

And now, but finally, unto H_{3b} . And here too, some theoretical exposition on path dependence might serve a useful purpose. In its basic sense, path dependence, as noted by Professor William Sewell (1996, 262-3), implies “that what happened at an earlier point in time will

affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”²⁷⁴ Professor Margaret Levi (1997, 28) explicated the concept most cogently as follows:

Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other [...] the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.

Now because it is possible, as Professor Levi has vividly illustrated, for one to ‘turn around or to clamber from one branch to the other,’ path dependence, taken by itself, may not necessarily imply that preceding steps in a particular direction would *certainly* induce further movements along the same path (cf. Pierson 2000, 252).²⁷⁵ For this to be the case however would employ the idea of increasing returns, – wherefore also the two concepts are usually observed together, because to continue down the same path would mean that the relative benefits of doing so have increased overtime, or rather, that the cost of exiting to another alternative has likewise increased with time.

One reason it might appear expedient to continue on a previous path is because of the difficulties associated with institutional political change.

For institutions, once established and oriented towards a path process, develop a life of their own, and therefore become costly to reverse,²⁷⁶ – as also was noted by Professor Paul Pierson (*loc. cit.*, 259) as follows:²⁷⁷

[...] efforts to coordinate actors in the pursuit of public goods often require the construction of formal institutions [...] *Such* institutions *however* induce self-reinforcing processes that make reversals of course increasingly unattractive over time. In contexts of complex social interdependence, new institutions and policies are costly to create and often generate learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. Institutions and policies may encourage individuals and organizations to invest in specialized skills, deepen relationships with other individuals and organizations, and develop particular political and social identities. These activities increase the attractiveness of existing institutional arrangements relative to hypothetical alternatives. As social actors make commitments based on existing institutions and policies, their cost of exit from established arrangements generally rise dramatically.

But even so, the short time horizons of political actors may tend to discourage any efforts at institutional change, as was addedly remarked by Professor Pierson (*ibid.*, 261-2), as follows:²⁷⁸

Many of the implications of political decisions – especially complex policy interventions or major institutional reforms – only play out in the long run. Yet, political actors, especially politicians, are often most interested in the short-term consequences of their actions; long-term effects tend to be heavily discounted. The principal reason is the logic of electoral politics. Because the decisions of voters are taken in the short run, elected officials generally employ a high discount rate. They will pay attention to long-term consequences only when these become politically salient or when they have little reason to fear short-term electoral retribution [...] This difference in time horizons has profound consequences. If time-horizons tend to be short, then we can expect

that long-term costs and benefits will have a limited effect on the chosen path. Further-more, once on a particular path, political actors will generally have powerful incentives to stay on it. Switching costs are typically borne in the short run, and the benefits will generally only accrue in the long run, that is, to someone else.

These besides, the timing of past events has been seen to influence increasing returns. As Professor Pierson (*ibid.*, 263) noted, “an event that happens too late may have no effect *on a present path*, although it might have been of great consequence, had the timing been different.”

Now as it relates to the Ghanaian people, and their disinclination to mass revolts, we may attribute this to two attendant path-dependent events that occurred at critical periods in the nation’s history. The first was the series of bombings²⁷⁹ that took place in the country during the reign of the CPP, – the first civilian government of the new nation.²⁸⁰ In addition to that were the several military coup d’états that were staged during the post-independence era, which were fraught with much violence and civil disorder.²⁸¹ The second, which very much is a corollary of the first, relates to the praetorianism that characterized much of the pre-democracy era. Many of these military regimes – as the PNDC²⁸² – were authoritarian and dictatorial, and did not encourage civic participation in political matters, besides banning all forms of political party contestations in the country.

These two incidents may have been ‘critical’ because they occurred in the early years of the new nation, and so may have defined very much the course of politics in later years. For instance, the first may have had the effect of ‘frightening’ the people out of any collective endeavors towards political change; and the second, quite relatedly, may have conditioned the masses to look to the elites for any form of change, rather than attempt to occasion this by their self-effort.²⁸³ And these may indeed be the case because the post-democracy generation have only now attained the age of 30,²⁸⁴ which means that a greater portion of the adult population in the country are person who were born in and have lived through the ‘boisterous’ pre-democracy dispensation, and so may be the more thus disposed. The Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim (1952, 297-8) commented in this respect as follows:

Members of a generation are ‘similarly located,’ first of all, in so far as they are exposed to the same phase of the collective process [...] The fact that people are born at the same time, or that their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience the same events and data, etc., and especially that these experiences impinge upon a similarly ‘stratified’ consciousness [...] The human consciousness, structurally speaking, is characterized by a particular inner ‘dialectic.’ It is of considerable importance for the formation of the consciousness which experiences happen to make those all-important ‘first impressions,’ [...] and which follow to form the second, third, and other ‘strata’ [...] Early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive

their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification and fulfillment or as its negation and antithesis.

But by the same token, this presents some hope for the nation. For said generation which have been without this troubled past, and which tend to be oriented towards the 'democratic way of life,' are likely to develop the confidence and virtue needed for effecting innovative changes to the political system. And is it not often said that a country transforms into a nation after having existed for a century?²⁸⁵

3.5. Summary and Conclusion

So far, we have attempted a review of democratic practice in Ghana. Our study sought to examine the factors which, by forestalling a mass revolution in Ghana, have contributed towards democratic stability in the same. These we found to include: first, the operation of the tunnel effect, which induces deprived persons to resort to pacifist forms of behavior; second, the disorientation, and low social capital of the poor, which predisposes them to evince a preference for exit rather than voice; and third, the close informal relations between the two dominant parties, which causes them to exercise moderation in their antagonisms towards one another. These besides, the fact that either of the two parties must needs secure swing votes in order to win national elections

has forced party manifestos to represent the interests and preferences of a large section of the population. And lastly, we found that certain structural norms and social policies, as also some path-dependent peculiarities, have had the effect of conditioning the masses against collective action endeavors towards political change.

These findings are instructive for two reasons. First, they corroborate the statements made by scholars such as Deane Neubauer and Claude Ake that any holistic theorizing on democratic determinants must needs go beyond general conditions into a study of in-country variables.²⁸⁶ And because democracy, like any other political system, could only be established in the context of given sociocultural and historical realities, it becomes easy to see why such country case studies may significantly enhance our understanding and perception of popular government. And whilst said undertaking might prove daunting, it should not appear too far removed from the task of political science.²⁸⁷

But second, and more importantly, our findings show how democracy in Africa may need to be stripped of 'Western' labels, and conceived in its own light. The social and cultural factors which augment political democracy in Ghana may be nonextant in most Western democracies, but this should not prevent said idiosyncrasies from being given due

consideration in the literature on democratization. Professor Claude Ake, for one, would usually prefer to say ‘African democracy,’ than say ‘democracy in Africa,’ and it is all too clear now why he does so.²⁸⁸

In conclusion, two directions for further research may be proposed. The first could explore the prospects of a federal or a consociational system of government in Ghana. It is true that the sociocultural ‘tendencies’ discussed in the study does help to augment political democracy in the country. However, because these, like in most advanced democracies, are certain to phase-out with time, it may behoove the nation to experiment on a political system that is self-sustaining, and does guarantee ‘equality of opportunity and representation’ for all sections of the population.²⁸⁹ A federal or consociational system appears most apt because it would help to mitigate electoral tensions in the country, whilst providing for inclusive growth, and greater reconnaissance of all economic areas and sectors – but particularly those in the peripheries.²⁹⁰

The other however could attempt to build on and develop the findings of this study into some normative ‘social theory’ that could help explain the survival of democracy in developmental states.²⁹¹ To do so, quite obviously, would require that similar inductive studies are carried out in other developing democracies – but preferably African ones²⁹² – to

ascertain further relations and correlations with the observations herein presented.²⁹³ And after political and economic determinants have so repeatedly proved a poor predictor of democratic development, would it be a great thing if we turned now to social anthropology for help in this respect?²⁹⁴

Notes to Introduction

¹ Cf. account in *Daniel*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 1-23.

² Cf. account in *Esther*, Chap. III, Vrs. 1-15; Chap. VIII, Vrs. 1-8.

³ Not that this rule of irrevocability was disruptive in itself, for we read elsewhere in the Bible, in the book of the priest *Ezra* (Chap. V, Vrs. 3-17; Chap. VI, Vrs. 1-15) how that King Darius permitted the returned Jews to continue with the building of their Temple only because the former King Cyrus had made a prior decree to this effect. Here however, the focus is on the fact that such device could be employed to further tyranny and arbitrary rule, besides the fact that it could pervert justice, particularly in cases where the decree is premised on erroneous information, or is made from unwise council. For instance, we read in the book of *Esther* (Chap. II, Vrs. 1; cf. preceding story in Chap. I, Vrs. 10-19;) how that King Ahasuerus later realized that his ‘irrevocable decree’ against the Queen Vashti was both hasty and unfair [cf. also the similar case of King Darius with Daniel in *Daniel*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 14].

⁴ Thus Glenn R. Morrow (1942, 300) defined a democracy as that form of government which allows for all who are to be affected by its decisions to have a part in the making of them. Cf. also Lucius Garvin (1953, 528) who noted that by allowing for “full and informed discussions” on policy matters, democracy enables a people to achieve “the best common life;” – which thing agrees well with Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative of treating rational human beings “not merely as means to an end, but as ends in themselves” (cf. his *Metaphysic of Morals*, Chap. II, p. 95; *Doctrine of Virtue*, Part II, Chap. I, Sec. 38, p. 132).

⁵ The ‘people’ of a democracy, like all other governmental forms, comprise the rulers and the ruled (cf. Pye 1991, 501). Howbeit democracy is distinguished in that the former are chosen from amongst the latter [and also are periodically reconstituted], whilst the latter are they which legitimate the rule of the former. And so Professor Sidney Hook (1942, 277) accurately observed that democracy was “that governmental form wherein the basic decisions of government rest upon the freely given consent of the governed.”

⁶ The merits of popular government have been severally discussed by Henry B. Mayo (1960, 218-43) and Larry J. Diamond (1999, 2-7), and include, *amid others*: the orderly and peaceful change of power; the minimum use of coercive force; the attainment and promotion of justice and freedom; the peaceful resolution of disputes; the furtherance of diversity and tolerance; to which we may add another by Robert A. Dahl (1971, 26): the effective representation of citizen preferences and interests in policy making.

⁷ For instance, the Marxists argue that democracy, being “the political system of a class society” cannot really reflect the interests of the majority, since it is the elite few, that is, the bourgeoisie, who are largely involved in the process of government and also make all political decisions of the state. Others also contend that democracy suffers from a leadership deficit, in that persons who succeed at winning elections may not always be those who possess the political acumen needed to govern a state (cf. Mayo, *loc. cit.*, 280, 283; Hook 1940, 291-3). Others also contend that democracy leads to the promotion of rights which may not always appear right in the moral sense. For instance, the religious community, but particularly the Christian, have been ardently opposed to such liberal rights as planned parenthood and same-sex marriages (which are guaranteed under the laws of most modern democracies) because they run contrary to the provisions of the Bible [on the former, cf. *Psalms*, Chap. CXXVII, Vrs. 3-5; on the latter, cf. *Genesis*, Chap. XXXVIII, Vrs. 7; *Leviticus*, Chap. XVIII, Vrs. 22; Chap. XX, Vrs. 13; *Romans*, Chap. I, Vrs. 26-7; *1 Corinthians*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 9-10; *1 Timothy*, Chap. I, Vrs. 9-11].

⁸ Cf. also the like argument by Aristotle (*Politics*, Book III, Chap. VII; *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VIII, Chap. X) who described democracy as the deflected form of a *politeia*: the latter being a governmental form where the many rule for the common interest, and the former, where the poor and indigent, being a dominant group, bear rule for their own gain. And such governmental form, according to him, was wont to be unstable because the poor, not being involved in occupations that enhance virtue, were unlikely to make wise decisions in policy matters. More also, the fact that these were without property meant that they were wont to be severally focused on their personal interests, rather than on the gain of the polity as whole (cf. Newman 1892, 289-93; Lintott 1992, 115-25, for added excursus in this respect). Albeit, elsewhere in his *Politics* (*loc. cit.*, Chap. XI, pp. 121-2) he commended democracy as being superior

to oligarchy in that ‘the many,’ acting as a collective whole, are wont to make better decisions than the ‘best few.’ He remarked as follows: “The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best [...] seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, [...] when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively [...] For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; [...] Hence the many are better judges than a single man [...]; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them, they understand the whole.”

⁹ Cf. also the Greek poet Homer who noted in his *Iliad* (Book II, p. 65) that: “[...] no good thing is a multitude of lords, let there be one lord, one king.” Cf. also Polybius (*The Histories*, Book VI, Chap. IX) who remarked that the rule by a majority was inherently unstable because of the “craving for prominence,” which predisposed individuals to seek elevation above their fellows. Cf. albeit the contrary view by Niccolò Machiavelli (*Discourses on Livy*, Book I, Chap. LVIII, pp. 175-6) as follows: “But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been likened to the voice of God [...] And if a people err in adopting courses which appear to it bold and advantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are touched, as is far oftener the case with them than with a people. We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates, a people will choose far more honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a people that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and profligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to do so.”

¹⁰ Another of such paradox was explored by Professor Robert Dahl (2000, 36-9, qt. at 39), only that he sought to decipher why most citizens of democratic states continue to believe in the desirability of democracy, despite professing little confidence in key democratic institutions. He concluded that it was because they “valued the rights and opportunities that their democratic system of government provides them,” and so are usually willing to overlook “their dissatisfaction with the way their government works.”

¹¹ Cf. for instance Emil Brunner (1945, 191) who commented corroboratively in this wise as follows: “The so-called representatives of the people should not decide what their electors want, but what is right. And that is precisely what the truly democratic citizen expects of them [...] In a genuine democracy with a responsible government, the government does not first consider the will of the people, but the weal of the people: *to wit*, justice. Where the government considers from the outset, not what is just, but what is the will of the people, the justice of the State is in a sorry plight.” Cf. also Professor Eric Voegelin (1952, 32-5) who noted adjoinedly that democratic representation must be existential as well as elemental: *to wit*, that representatives must not merely act as agents of their communities for the sake of the democratic process, but must effectively address the needs and concerns of said constituencies. Cf. also Valdimer O. Key (1961, 483-4) who remarked relatedly in this respect as follows: “When governmental action becomes more dependent upon public opinion, the effect is that [...] the autonomous capacity of government shrinks, and groups of brigands with comparatively small public followings demand and obtain governmental action promotive of their indefensible ends [...] In the end, we have a government incapable of decisive and timely action in foreign politics for lack of assured capacity to command popular support; of a government hamstrung in domestic affairs by its forced preoccupation with the distribution of loaves and fishes; of a government so responsive to even synthetic popular clamor that it must infringe the liberties of its citizens and commit wrongs that outrage the sense of decency of honorable men.”

¹² The so-called ‘third wave’ of democratization was a term coined by the eminent American political scientist Samuel H. Huntington (1991b, 15) to denote the “group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes” which took place between the periods of 1974 and 1996. Prior to this wave, Professor Huntington (1991, 12) had noted that two other waves of democratization had previously taken place: first, the ‘long’ wave of democratization which began in the 1820s and continued until 1926, resulting in the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and the coming into being of some 29 democracies; and second, the post-World War II democratizations which took place between 1943 and 1964 and saw some 36 countries transition to democratic governance. The third wave however began in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, and then spread to the military regimes

of South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thereafter, it extended to East, Southeast, and South Asia by the mid-to the late 1980s, and then at the end of the 1980s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union, saw a surge of transitions to democracy from communist authoritarian states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which trend also extended to Central America during the period. Then in the early 1990s, following the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, and the ending of Apartheid in South Africa, the wave spread finally to sub-Saharan Africa, so that by 1996, there were a total of about 18 transitions made to democracy in the region. Cf. also Geddes 1999, 115-44; Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2019, 99-113; Doorenspleet 2004, 311-8; Huntington 579-616, for an extended discussion of the same.

¹³ Cf. for instance John Morley (1923, 93) who remarked in his *Oracles on Man and Government* that “[...] we are yet to be acquainted with a writer or politician of the very slightest consideration or responsibility who has committed himself to the astounding proposition that popularly elected *governments* are infallible.” And for this cause, A. D. Lindsay (1929, 81-2) has argued that the practice of democracy required faith [though a reasoned one], arguing that whereas “complacent optimism” about democracy is harmful, “disillusioned skepticism” is far worse. Cf. also James K. Feibleman (1940, 124) who remarked corroboratively that: “Democracy requires the same unconscious belief in its rationality as does science. To question the validity of democracy is to disbelieve in it, for we must not even be aware of our belief if it is to be profound enough to mean anything.”

¹⁴ Cf. for instance Professor Richard Wollheim (1958, 241) who noted that: “since every individual has a natural right to control government, and that this right is recognized only in a democracy, it stands to reason therefore that democracy is the best form of government.” Cf. also Professor Gregory Vlastos (1953, 359) who remarked that “a defender of democracy does not claim that the people’s rule will be good because the people are just and wise, but only that their rule will be responsible and equal: [...] for the power of any man in office, when counterpoised against the equal power of his fellows [...] will be held under constraint of equality within the just limits of lawful rule.”

¹⁵ Cf. for instance Maurice Duverger (1958, 161) who noted that “[...] civil rights in a country existed in direct proportion to the degree of democracy to be found there.” Cf. also Harold D. Lasswell (1951, 473) who noted that “a democratic community is one in which human dignity is realized in theory and fact.” Cf. also Thomas Mann (1938, 19) who remarked that “democracy is that form of government and of society which is inspired above every other with the feeling and consciousness of the dignity of man.”

¹⁶ For instance, Professor Michael Doyle (1983, 213) famously noted that “even though liberal states have been involved in numerous warfare with nonliberal states, yet constitutionally secure liberal *democratic* states have yet to engage in warfare with one another.” He then went on to state that “whilst such prospect was not impossible, preliminary evidence does indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal *democratic* states.” Cf. also Professor Bruce Russett (1993, 119) who remarked connectedly that “democracies rarely fight each other even at low levels of lethal violence.” Immanuel Kant explained in his *Perpetual Peace* (Sec. II, pp. 122-3) that this was the case with democracies because “where the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies that: they must themselves fight in the war; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; *and* they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind.”

¹⁷ Cf. thus Professor Judith Shklar (1984, 234) who noted that “if anything is clear, it is that the only opportunity, the only hope we can possibly have for self-improvement, is under conditions of freedom and the strict enforcement of legal rules [i.e., *under a democracy*], [...] for the purpose of politics is to serve our capacity [...] for putting together a better set of dispositions.” And so James Bryce (1921, 602) rightly remarked that “the wish to be rid of tangible evils” has been “the only road which has in the past led into democracy.”

¹⁸ Cf. Abraham Lincoln, *Gettysburg Address*, 19 November 1863.

¹⁹ These three essays, though seemingly distinct in focus, are actually conjoined in essence: for the first essay lays a groundwork for understanding the origins of

representative democracy; which then is followed upon by the second essay, which examines the theoretical aspects of said political system. The third essay then performs a case study of a democratic nation to ascertain how the practice of democracy therein differs from the ideal conception or understanding of the same, but more also, on how said difference could add to knowledge on democratic practice in different sociocultural settings.

²⁰ The rationale for selecting Ghana as case choice is explicated in the third essay.

Notes to Essay I

¹ Qtd. in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Book I, Chap. II: Sec. 33. The quote is also sometimes ascribed to Thales of Miletus, 620-546 BC (cf. Diels and Kranz 1903, 11: Sec. A1).

² Direct democracy, as opposed to representative democracy, is a form of political organization where the people [*demos*, the politically active] meet ‘in-person’ to deliberate and vote on all major policy decisions and undertakings of the polity [hence the origin and import of the term ‘democracy’ – from *demos* (people) and *kratos* (power or rule), therefore meaning: ‘rule by the people’ or ‘power in the hands of the people’]. In Attica [that is, ancient Athens], the *demos* was particularly patriarchal, being restricted only to adult males aged 18 and over, and excluding women, as well as *metics* [foreign residents] and bondservants (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XLII: Sec. 1-5; Wood 1995, 185; Hansen 1991, 62; Just 1989, 10; Behrouzi 2005, 5; Weale 2007, 207; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 77-8). The Attic orators Aeschines (*Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 157) and Demosthenes (*On the Crown*, Sec. 273) both make mention of the fact that the *demos* “were present at every meeting” to debate and vote individually on matters of the state.

³ According to the account of the Attic historian Thucydides (*Peloponnesian War*, Book II, Chap. XV: Sec. 1-2; Chap. XVI: Sec. 1), Athens in the period before the Trojan War [that is, sometime between the 13th or 12th century BC] consisted of several independent communities that were fragmented across Attica. Thus, in a process known as *sunoiikismos* [to mean, ‘living together’], the Greek King Theseus [at this time, although later efforts of unification were pursued in the eighth century BC following the collapse of the Mycenaean kingdoms] made efforts to unite Athens and Attica into one *polis* (cf. esp. Strabo, *Geography*, Book IX, Chap. I: Sec. 20; but also Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 6-7; Theophrastus, *Characters*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 6; Philochoros, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Book III/b, Nr. 328: Frag. 94; Plutarch, *Life of Theseus*, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 1, 3; Walker 1995, 196-7) [More so, Thucydides (*op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. XVI: Sec. 2, Chap. LXIII: Sec. 2-3) informs that this unification process was particularly difficult to carry out because the indigenes of Attica maintained strong loyal attachments to their ancestral homelands and were thus

unwilling to take up residence at Athens. And even when they were finally compelled to do so, they endeavored to live distinctly as individual family groups [with one having little or no dealings with the other] and “refused to come together.” Theseus then, in attempting to contain this social divide, suffered the new inhabitants of Athens to live autonomously under their own customs and to “manage their own affairs.” This, then, signaled the beginnings of tribalism in Athenian political culture – a trait which also came to endure in the city-state for so long a time]. Athens then, until the seventh century BC, had been ruled by monarchs, but after this period, the institution of monarchy was done away with [in large part because the kings increasingly proved ineffective at addressing altogether religious, political, and civil matters in the polity] and three new administrative offices were created in their stead. In his *Athenian Constitution* (Chap. III: Sec. 1-6), Aristotle describes these offices as follows: i) the Basileus [in charge of religious and state rituals, also ceremonially perceived as King of Athens], ii) the Polemarch [in charge of war: particularly instituted following the cowardice that most monarch kings exhibited in wars], iii) the Archon [in charge of administering civil, legal, and judicial matters]. The holders of these offices were of noble birth, and their offices were held for a duration of ten years. Later, as Athens developed socioeconomically, six new offices of Archon [called *thesmothetai*, to mean ‘lawsetters’] were added to assist in the general administration of the polity. Then also was the tenure of archon appointments reduced from ten years to one year [primarily to provide opportunity for many noble families to occupy the position, to the end that in-fighting and feuding would be least amongst them]. After their service, ex-archons became automatic and life members of the Council of the Areopagos – a distinguished body of elderly statesmen that was perceived as guardian and custodian of Athenian laws and customs. They oversaw the proper conduct of state officials [*to wit, archons*], and functioned as jurors in civil matters (cf. Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 92; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 7, 41-2; Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, Sec. 37).

⁴ Hornblower (1992, 1-2, cf. also Lucardie 2014, 2; Isakhan 2016, 54) has contested the popular notion that democracy originated from Attica, and has to the contrary argued that democracy formerly existed [though *minimally*] in parts of Phoenicia and Western Asia. Thus, Stockwell (2011, 47-8, *emphasis added*), corroborating this viewpoint,

adjoins that “the Phoenicians *that settled in Greek cities* had a formulative influence on the rise of democratic political institutions *therein*” because they “brought with them the experience of people *used to* governing themselves.” As such, “the Athenian contribution *to democracy* was based on powerful ideas that were already in circulation amongst Greeks who had contact with the Phoenicians.”

⁵ Ste Croix (1981, 284) has described Athenian democracy as “the first fully fledged and sustained system of participatory democracy in history” [cf. also a similar assertion by Patriquin 2015, 4, who remarks that the Athenian experiment “has been the most radical form of democracy in the history of humanity”]. Professor David Held (2006, 13, *emphasis added*), in like manner, asserts that the ideals and practices of Athenian democracy has been a “central source of inspiration” and a blueprint for political thinking amongst Western nations.

⁶ Of the dominant [intending, *political and economic vibrancy*] Greek city-states at the time, Sparta and Crete were oligarchies, and Macedonia was a monarchy.

⁷ By and large, these antecedents are embodied in the revival of Greek determinism between the periods of 800 BC and 500 BC, which, as espoused by Anderson (1974, 29), “underpinned the emergence of an urban pattern of classical civilization.”

⁸ As noted by Professor Robin Osborne (2004, 24), the eighth century marked the era when iron supplanted bronze “as the main working metal” in Greece. Consequently, this development led to the large-scale production of iron tools and weapons, most of which were applied in soil cultivation and artificial irrigation (cf. Mann 1986, 185; Millett 2000, 27).

⁹ Owing to the predominant rural disposition of Greek societies at the time (cf. Anderson, *loc. cit.*, 19), the boost in trade did not only increase interaction and communication amongst *and across* peasant farmers but more so enhanced their ability to contribute *economically* and *militarily* to the polity (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 15).

¹⁰ The overwhelming profits that accrued to these cities from the sea trade consequently stimulated their civilization and sociocultural development. In this wise, the cities provided specialized services for rural communities, and served as nodal points for agricultural- and sea trade.

¹¹ Silver mines were predominantly owned by the wealthiest members of Athenian society who leased them at will under various tributary agreements [such as tenancy, serfdom, debt bondage] (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 17; Ste Croix, *loc. cit.*, 112, 280). Thus, the profitability of silver trade in Attica only tended to accentuate the class divide between the haves and the have nots.

¹² In describing the profitability of silver trade in Athens, Professor Osborne (1985, 111) documents the view that silver was the most important Athenian resource which, being the only export commodity of the polity, was exported in substantial quantities.

¹³ The strategic importance of the Laurion silver mines to Athenian economy was particularly marked in later years [precisely in 413 BC] when the state suffered grave economic downturns because 20,000 bondmen that worked the mines had defected and escaped to the Spartan garrison in Deceleia (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VII, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 5; but also Cartledge 2011, 77; Renshaw 2015, 64; for precedential commentary on the subject matter, cf. Note 69, *infra*).

¹⁴ According to Millett (*loc. cit.*, 37), Athens channeled significant portions of its export revenues in the construction of powerful navy ships for military purposes.

¹⁵ Athenian society in the early eighth and late seventh century was finely segmented into three social classes: the ruling nobles, or birth elites (Greek: *Eupatridae*) [*which owned land by hereditary means*], the dominant propertied class, or wealth elites [*which owned land but were not nobles*], and the peasant population [*which were destitute of property and maintained tributary labor relations with landowners*] (Waterfield [2018], 43-4, 81). Thus, the general increase in wealth resulted in two *natural* conflicts. First, the dominant propertied class, being emboldened by their accumulation of new wealth, proceeded to challenge the moral authority of the ruling nobles, and demanded an equal opportunity to participate in policy decisions of the polity. Second, the peasant population [but particularly farmers, known as *hektemorioi*], aware of the general rise in wealth, and being straitened by debt bondage to landowners [*which required that they paid one-sixth of their produce as rent*] proceeded to oppose and revolt against the dominion of the propertied elite (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 10; Ste Croix, *loc. cit.*, 112, Roper, *loc. cit.*, 17-8).

¹⁶ As observed by Ste Croix (*loc. cit.*, 280) the ruling nobles put little distinction between the dominant propertied class and the peasant population and tended to refer collectively to both as the *demos* [that is, *the ‘common’ people*, cf. for instance, Peisander’s later description of Athenian democracy as a government of the “inconstant commons” in Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LXX: Sec. 2)].

¹⁷ The crisis persisted until the early fifth century for two reasons. First, the centralized state apparatus – the Council of the Areopagos [*which was composed solely of representatives from the ruling noble families*], in seeking to preserve the vested interests and dominion of the propertied ruling elite [*but also because they had little or no dealings with the masses and were therefore less sympathetic to their plight*] were unwilling to accede to the demands of the *demos*. As succinctly espoused by Ste Croix (*loc. cit.*, 286, *emphasis added*), Greek nobles perceived oligarchic rule to be in the interests of the propertied class, and viewed democracy as an arrangement that tended only to further the interests of the masses. Second, because peasants comprised a large proportion of the Athenian army [*and because many possessed arms and military experience*], it was counterintuitive to apply military force to curb the crisis [*but also because many non-peasant members of the army tended to share the concerns of the peasantry*]. Thus, in the absence of a countervailing force from the State Council, the mass revolt only tended to grow in strength and popularity.

¹⁸ This was eventually done to preserve the continued viability of Athenian society, and to prevent a popular revolt of the masses (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 18).

¹⁹ Solon, considered one of the Seven Sages of the Greek world, was an aristocrat of noble birth. A merchant [*and a poet*] by occupation, he soon gained reputation for his wisdom and moderation [*particularly regarding his minimal dealings with the feuding noble families, and his empathy towards the wellbeing of the peasantry*] and in 594 BC was appointed to one of the nine high offices of archon [*chief magistrates who adjudicated all religious, military and judicial matters*] in Athens. Two decades following his appointment as archon, in 570 BC, he was given a special charge by the Council of the Areopagos to resolve the class conflict then existent in Athenian society (Curnow 2010, 69-70; Perkinson 2002, 28-9; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. V: Sec. 2; Ostwald 1986, 175).

²⁰ The Areopagos Council priorly assured Solon [*probably to ease his pressure, and to allow him much room to develop his initiatives*] that his reforms would be accepted and applied in Athens for a period of ten years, regardless of its stipulations (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 16; Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 1; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XI: Sec. 1; Herman 1991, 31; Fredal 2006, 84; Tangian 2014, 10; Baker and Baker 1997, 22).

²¹ Because the governing state apparatus – the Council of the Areopagos – consisted solely of ex-archons who *exclusively* were of aristocratic descent (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. III: Sec. 6; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XIX: Sec. 1; *Pericles*, Chap. IX: Sec. 3), Solon sought it necessary to redefine archon appointments so that they were not limited only to the nobility, but could extend as well to other members of the propertied class [*who were not of the nobility. Also, to change the form by which archons were appointed: for previously they had been appointed at the sole discretion of the ‘unrepresentative’ Areopagos Council*] (cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. III: Sec. 6). In this way, the Council of the Areopagos would eventually come to be composed not only of nobles, but also of abled persons with property titles. To achieve this, Solon codified four property classes upon which he based future legislations regarding archon appointments. These four classes, based on *annual income*, included: i) the *pentakosiomedimnoi* [‘five-hundred-bushelers,’ who by virtue of their propertied estates produced annually at least 500 *medimnoi* – a dry and a liquid measure of which one *medimnos* (bushel) was equivalent to approximately 38 kilograms or 50 liters]; ii) the *hippeis* [‘horsemen’ or ‘knights,’ who by virtue of their property titles produced between 300 and 500 *medimnoi* annually]; iii) the *zeugitai* [‘yoke men,’ who by virtue of their owned yoke of oxen produced between 200 and 300 *medimnoi* annually]; and iv) the *thetes* [‘serf’ or ‘bondman,’ who by virtue of their service produced less than 200 *medimnoi* annually] (cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII: Sec. 2-4; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 19; Thirlwall 1855, 182; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 1-2; Van Wees 2006, 351-2; Wallace 2007, 60-1; Moulton 1998, 61; Hooper 2000, 132; Hueglin 2008, 29). Thus, archon appointments, contrary to previous hereditary restrictions, were now opened to all Athenians who fell within the top two classes [*thus it thereafter became the norm that Athenians elected a short-list of forty candidates eligible for the*

position, out of which the nine archons were chosen by lot (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 13-4; 52; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII: Sec. 1, Chap. XXII: Sec. 5).

²² To ease the financial burdens on peasants, Solon proceeded to cancel all debts owed by them to their lords [This measure was popularly ascribed the phrase *seisakhtheia* – to mean ‘the shaking off of burdens’] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. VI: Sec. 1, 24-5, Chap. XII: Sec. 4; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XV: Sec. 3-5, Chap. XVI: Sec. 3; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 12; Ober 2005, 193; Phillips 2013, 3;). In addition to that, he established a law [which also applied retrospectively, thereby freeing many bondservants in the process] that prohibited landlords from holding in bondage peasants who defaulted in their debt obligations, as well as peasants from giving themselves as surety for debts] (cf. Ste Croix, *loc. cit.*, 281-2; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX: Sec. 1). Moreover, Solon placed a limit on the amount of land that could be owned by a single individual, thereby reducing the concentration of land in the hands of a few wealthy individuals. Also, he did not yield to popular demands by the masses to redistribute or confiscate land owned by the aristocratic class. Rather, he endeavored in all things to steer a fair course between both parties, arguing famously that “[*social*] equality [*amongst parties*] does not make [*provision for*] war” (Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XIV: Sec. 2, *emphasis added*; cf. also corroborating remarks by McGlew 1993, 98; Almeida 2003, 9; Roberts 2011, 61; Serval and Tranié 2015, 5-6; Thompson 2009, 76-7; Burger 2013, 57).

²³ In this regard, three initiatives are particularly noteworthy. First, he prohibited the export of food items [*other than olive oil, which Athens produced in abundance*] to keep food prices low in Attica and to prevent the possibility of future shortages. Second, he reformed metric measurements in Athens to conform to those applied in other Greek city-states [*as Corinth, Sparta, and Euboea*] to facilitate and promote inter-city trade. Third, he encouraged skilled foreign craftsmen to take up residence in Athens and to teach their craft to the local people. This policy allowed many Athenians to develop [*beside their skill in farming*] craftsmanship in [*for example*] pottery [*which subsequently became a chief export commodity in Athens*] (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 12; Humphreys 2018, 60; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 1-2; Garnsey 1988, 110; Murray 1980, 46; Green 1970, 17; Andrewes [1982], 379, 382-4; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 43; Seltman 1933, 44-6; Homer and Sylla 2005, 33).

²⁴ In a bid to further devolve the powers of the Council of the Areopagos – which Solon perceived to be variedly detached from the realities of the *demos*, he proceeded to establish a Council of Four Hundred [*Boule*] which consisted of 100 members [*drawn from the top three property classes*] from each of the four Ionic tribes [descended from the four sons of Ion namely: *Teleon, Hoplês, Argadês, and Aigikorês*, although etymological eruditions has reduced the names of these tribes instead to title groups, enumerated respectively as: *priests, workers, husbandmen, and warriors*] (cf. Euripides, *Ion*, Sec. 1575-1580; Whibley 1931, 441; Grote 1854, 280; Bulwer 1843, 55). The functions of the Council included [*but was not limited to*] maintaining oversight responsibility of all state offices, and deciding the agenda for meetings of the Assembly (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 14; Almeida 2003, 13; Buckley 1996, 98; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XIX: Sec. 1; Forrest 1966, 164-166; Laix 1973, 13-7; Rhodes 1972, 208-9; 1981, 153; Ober 1989, 64; Hansen 1989, 98; Starr 1990, 8-9; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. VIII: Sec. 4; *Politics*, Book VI: Sec. 1322b; Kagan and Viggiano 2010, 110).

²⁵ In restructuring the People's Assembly [Greek: *Ecclesia, which had long existed and functioned since the late sixth century*], Solon pursued two concomitant measures. First, he extended its membership eligibility to include males of all four property classes aged 18 and over [*previously only members of the top three property classes could participate in meetings of the Assembly*] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. II: Sec. 3, Chap. IV: Sec. 2; Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 80). Albeit, because the agenda for discussion in the Assembly was set by the [minimally representative] Council of Four Hundred, the *Ecclesia* in Solon's time was not particularly deemed as democratic [*in a denotative sense*] (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 15; Morris and Powell 2006, 208; Whibley 1931, 443; Woodruff 2005, 46-7; Clarke and Foweraker 2001, 196-7; Fine 1983, 203-4; Blois and Spek 1997, 90; Cahill 2012, 17). Second, he retained exclusive power in the hands of the *Ecclesia* [howbeit *invariably* in the Council of Four Hundred, *as it set the agenda for discussion in the Ecclesia*] to deliberate and decide [*by means of majority voting*] on all legal, judicial, and financial matters [*which fell outside the purview of the archons*] of the city-state. In the process, he confined the powers of the Areopagos Council to safeguarding the laws of the new Constitution, and to overseeing the ethical conduct of state officials [*whilst the archons maintained their administrative functions*]

as chief magistrates] (Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 81; Arnold 1871, 66, Ostwald 1996, 56-7; Raaflaub 1993, 71-2; 1996, 1060; 2000, 42; Wallace 2007, 61).

²⁶ Before Solon's reforms, Athens, then governed by Drakon Laws [*which were not only harsh in their import of punishment for wrongdoing, but were also discriminatory – in that they afforded considerable privileges to the noble class at the expense of all others*, cf. Stroud ([1968], 5-6, 28-9)] placed the powers of judicial review in the hands of the elite and unrepresentative Council of the Areopagos (Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XVII: Sec. 1, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 3; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. II: Sec. 1-2, Chap. VII: Sec. 3, Chap. VIII: Sec. 4, Chap. IX: Sec. 1). Solon, in a bid to further reduce the Council's overarching powers, created a new court system [Greek: *Heliaia*] that included all persons [*from all four property classes*] as jurors (cf. Hansen [1989], 28, 242-9, 258-61; 1991, 30; Sealey 1987, 60-70; Welwei 1992, 187-90; Raaflaub 2001, 95; Allen 2000, 45-9; Jones 1996, 84). The *Heliaia* allowed Athenian citizens both to appeal decisions handed down by higher courts [in a procedure known as *epheisis*, wherein the archons, but particularly the *thesmothetai* retained their role in administering justice], and to bring legal suits [Greek: *dikai*, which could only be brought forth by a prosecutor who was himself the person that has suffered wrong] or writs [Greek: *graphai*, which any disinterested citizen, and not necessary a person that has suffered wrong, could bring forth concerning matters of public interest and safety] against their fellow citizens (cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1273b-74a; Ostwald 1986, 9-10; Harrison 1977, 10-1; Demand 1996, 148; Boulanger 1962, 34; Bitros and Karayiannis 2013, 15-6; Snodgrass 1980, 145; Van Wees 2011, 132-4; Lyttkens 2013, 77). Rhodes (1981, 160) observes moreover that they included "cases of private injury where the injured party was, either in law or for obvious personal reasons, unable to prosecute on his own account". In all such cases, verdict decisions in the *Heliaia* were reached by majority vote – a practice which Waterfield (*loc. cit.*, 82, *emphasis added*) has described as "a critical democratic innovation, with the implication that every citizen was [*deemed*] as good as every other citizen" [cf. also a corroborating remark by Professor Osborne (2010, 224; but also Plutarch, *loc. cit.*, Sec. 5) who asseverates that Solon, by instituting the *Heliaia*, developed Athens into a city where "those who were not wronged could attack and punish wrongdoers as much as the wronged did"].

²⁷ In the case of the latter, it was because the noble families [*the dominant two being Alcmaeonidae and Boutadae, led respectively by Megacles and Lycurgus*], having been relieved of most of their former privileges, begun to contend belligerently with one another for the minimal opportunities now available [*particularly with regards to archon appointments*] to exercise dominion in the polity. In the case of the former, it was because most peasants, destitute of sufficient capital to see them through a farming year, were compelled once again to enter into tributary agreements with landowners: many thereby contracting debts in the process [*and thus contending with landowners over their seeming exploitation – although they could no longer be held in bondage for debts owed*] (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 16-7; Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 82-3; Herodotus, *Histories*, Book I, Chap. LIX: Sec. 5-6; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 1; Andrewes 1982, 377-84).

²⁸ This fact is succinctly adjoined by Aristotle (*Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1273b) as follows: “[...] as for Solon, he is considered by some people to have been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having liberated the people from servitude and restored the ancestral democracy with a skillful blending of the constitution: the Council on the Areopagus being an oligarchic element, the elected magistracies, aristocratic, and the law-courts, democratic” [cf. also the remark by Isocrates (*Areopagiticus*, Sec. 16) who describes Solon as “a reformer who proved himself above all others the friend of the people”]. Moreover, Ste Croix (*loc. cit.*, 279-80, *emphasis added*) attributes the ‘openness of Athenian society’ in the early fifth century BC to Solon’s well-administered reforms, asserting that: “[...] hereditary aristocratic dominance had disappeared [...] and had been succeeded by a much more open society: [*in that*] political power no longer rested on decent, on blue blood, but was mainly dependent upon the possession of property [...] [*which formed the basis of participatory democracy in Athens*].”

²⁹ Cf. also the remark by Professor Josiah Ober (2012, 842-3) that Solon’s law code established a form of civic dignity at Athens by “ending conditions of systematic humiliation and infantilization of nonelites by elite peers.”

³⁰ According to Herodotus (*op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 1), after Solon’s proposed reforms were accepted [as was priorly agreed with the Areopagos Council:

that his proposals would be accepted and applied, and would remain unaltered, regardless of its stipulations, for a duration of ten years] at a special meeting of the People's Assembly, he embarked on an extensive trip to Asia Minor and Egypt [*and remained abroad for ten years*] to avoid being badgered by factions of the *demos* or the elites into repealing or amending any of the proposed laws (cf. also Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 16-7; Baker and Baker 1997, 22; Bury 2015, 187; Bulwer 1843, 209).

³¹ Qtd. in (Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XII: Sec. 1-2).

³² As verily observed by Ste Croix (*loc. cit.*, 283), the class struggle provided a unique and *natural* opportunity for non-aristocratic members of the propertied class to seize power as tyrants. Being opposed to the political dominance of the nobles but sympathetic to the cause of the *demos*, they were able to effectively rally the masses against the nobility by promising quick-fix solutions to the grievances of the former whilst defaming the latter through demagogic and calumniating polemics.

³³ Peisistratos, from the noble tribe of Neleid, was an aristocrat who reigned as tyrant in Athens from 546 BC to 527 BC. Prior to this period [*that is, between 560 BC and 546 BC*], he had seized power and established himself as tyrant in Athens on two occasions, although his reigns during the period were short-lived because of enduring power struggles with the Alkmaeonidae family. However, on his third coup attempt, he endeavored *foremost* to mobilize popular support from farmers [*and the peasantry*] in east Attica [*which was his home base*], and together with an army of mercenaries [*backed by military contingents from the city-states of Thebes and Eretria, and the island of Naxos*], was able to defeat the Athenian army in the battle of Pallene. He thereafter entrenched himself firmly in power for twenty years, having expelled from Athens the nobles of the Alkmaeonidae family (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XV: Sec. 1-3; Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. LXIV: Sec. 3, Book V, Chap. LXV: Sec. 3; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 17-8; Waterfield, *ibid.*; Thomas 1989, 149; Andrewes 1982, 399-406; Bulwer, *loc. cit.*, 210-4; Philips 2013, 4-5).

³⁴ Albeit, Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 18) remarks that Peisistratos was sure to appoint members of his own family as archons during his reign, so that in time the Areopagos Council [*which was served by ex-archons*] was dominated by his family members and allies (cf.

also Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. LVI: Sec. 6; Kendrick 2016, 72-3; of the accustomed pursuit of self-willed interests by tyrants, cf. Andrewes 1956, 20-30).

³⁵ Peisistratos endeavored to maintain all the niceties of Solon's political reforms. By way of addition, and to further weaken the jurisdictional hold of the local aristocracy, he introduced the office of *deme-judges*: which were thirty local justices appointed by lot to go in circuit about the country to inspect and settle disputes and grievances amongst the peasantry "in order that men might not neglect their agriculture by coming into the city" [*for judgement on petty issues*] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XVI: Sec. 2, 5, 8, Chap. LIII: Sec. 1; *Politics*, Book V, Sec. 1311a; Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. LIX: Sec. 6; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. LIV: Sec. 6; but also Finley 1983, 47; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 56; Manville 1990, 162; Hignett 1952, 115).

³⁶ To resolve the landowner-peasant conflict that had resuscitated following Solon's reforms, Peisistratos, in a bid to make peasant farmers less reliant on the wealthy for working capital, offered generous state loans to farmers which were paid for out of a ten percent tax he levied on all farm produce (cf. Bothmar 1985, 27; Rhodes 1981, 215). In this way, the farmers were not only kept from the hands of extortionate money lenders, as observed by Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 18), but also, as adjoined by Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XVI: Sec. 2), were now able to support themselves financially through a farming year. Furthermore, Aristotle (*loc. cit.*, Sec. 3) adds that the state tax had two principal effects: first, it prevented farmers from coming into the city [*to seek out assistance from the state*], and therefore remained in the country and focused on their farming business; and second, it prevented farmers from actively engaging in public matters of the state: as they tended to be preoccupied with and committed to work on their farms. Albeit, Millet (1989, 22-3) asserts that Peisistratos' giving of state loans to poor peasants had an obscurely parochial objective: the peasantry would no longer be dependent on aristocrats or other powerful creditors, but would instead owe their allegiance to him as patron. More so, Rose (2012, 236, esp. fn. 84) is of the view that the ten percent tax levied proportionately on the produce of both the rich and poor only tended to reinforce the existing wealth division between them [*whilst generating in the process significant revenue for Peisistratos and his state apparatus*]. This view however is contested by Millett ([1991], 49, 51) who surmises

that because the rich paid more in kind than the poor [*because the former earned more on their produce than the latter*], the taxes were largely redistributive in scope – and could supply the poor farmers with the [*zero-interest*] loans they needed to till their farmlands. In so doing, Peisistratos sought to distort the existing patron-client relationship between *exploiters* and *exploited*, and to turn peasants from being subjects of their debtors to citizens of the state (cf. also Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. LIV: Sec. 5; Berve [1967], 53, 65-66).

³⁷ This he achieved by ostracizing members of the Alkmaeonidae family [*his prime opponents*], as well as other dissenting noble families, from Attica: *so that only his nobles and allies were appointed into positions of authority in Athens* (cf. Kyle 2015, 163; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 20).

³⁸ During the reign of Peisistratos, olive oil and pottery became prime export commodities in Athens. Moreover, the production of pottery led to the development of other related crafts such as sculpture and vase painting which provided employment opportunities for both Athenians and foreign craftsmen. Furthermore, the new wealth generated in Athens allowed Peisistratos to expand infrastructural facilities [*such as water supply, recreational and athletic parks, gymnasia, festive buildings, military parade grounds*] across the city of Attica (Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 83; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 18-9; Freeman 2014, 179-80; Fine 1983, 218-9). As well noted by Herington (1985, 96), the rapid urbanization and growth of civilization that characterized the period attracted several artists and craftsmen to Athens, thus turning the city into a burgeoning center of poetry, art, and music (cf. esp. Ostwald 1986, 183-4; Plutarch, *Pericles*, Chap. XII: Sec. 5-6; Xenophon, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. I: Sec. 13, Chap. II: Sec. 9-10, Chap. III: Sec. 8).

³⁹ For additional corroborating remarks, cf. (Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 19; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 20; Finley, *loc. cit.*, 46-7; Buckley 1996, 111). Howbeit, Shuckburgh (1901, 83) is of the view that whereas Peisistratos allowed Solon's constitutional reforms to remain unaltered during his reign [*particularly because it served his interests well*], he nonetheless reserved to himself final authority in all foreign and military matters, thereby undermining the *democratic* institutions of the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*.

⁴⁰ After the reign of Peisistratos, Hippias, his son, assumed control of the state apparatus in Athens [in around 527 BC] and reigned for seventeen years. However, because he lacked the acumen and discretion of his father to continue in his room, he was ultimately deposed and expelled from Athens in 510 BC in a popular uprising led by Cleisthenes the Alcmeonid, with support from the Spartan King Kleomenes I (cf. Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book V, Chap. LXV: Sec. 2-5; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 19-21; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. LIX: Sec. 4; Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 85-7; Kagan 1991, 14).

⁴¹ Following the reign of the Peisistratids, two noble families began to contend with one another for political control of Athens. The one consisted of returning aristocrats who were exiled from Athens during the reign of the Peisistratids, and the other of aristocrats who had remained in Athens during the reign of the same. The former, led by Cleisthenes the Alcmeonid [*son of Megacles, and head of the Alcmaeonidae family*], were in favor of granting greater political rights and liberties to the local people [*having secured the popular support of the demes in overthrowing the Peisistratids*], whilst the latter, led by Isagoras, were in support of preserving the political dominance and oligarchic rule of the noble- and propertied elites in Athens [*being allies with the Peisistratids and other members of the aristocratic class*]. In 508 BC, Isagoras prevailed over Cleisthenes and was appointed chief archon of Athens [*by virtue of his connections and ties with prominent members of the aristocratic class*]. Cleisthenes then resorted to the *Ecclesia* [*as a private citizen*] to propose his constitutional reforms, which steadily gained widespread support amongst the *demoi*. However, Isagoras and members of the ruling aristocracy [so called, *the Heraierai*] began to perceive Cleisthenes as a threat to their political dominance, and soon thrust out the Alcmaeonidae and seven hundred other noble families [*that supported the ideal of popular sovereignty*] from Athens. Thereafter, Isagoras and his *Heraierai*, in a bid to establish an oligarchic rule in Athens, attempted to dissolve the Council of the Areopagos [*so they could readily and easily organize political appointments amongst themselves*]. When they were opposed by leading members of the Council, they moved with military strength to seize the Areopagos. Nevertheless, the *demoi*, [*perceiving that their lives would be greatly improved should Cleisthenes' pro-democratic reforms be implemented*], rose up to oppose and revolt against Isagoras and his aristocratic

band. Thus, after several clashes and skirmishes, the latter were besieged at Acropolis [*where was the Council of the Areopagos*], and after three days were expelled [*on a pact of truce*] from Athens. Afterwards, the Athenians recalled the Alkmaeonidae [*together with the other seven hundred pro-liberal noble families*] from exile, and firmly installed Cleisthenes as chief archon of Athens: granting him *thereby* ample leeway to implement his pro-democratic constitutional reforms (cf. bibliographical references in Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XX: Sec. 1-4; Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book V, Chap. LXVI: Sec. 2, Chap. LXXII: Sec. 1-2; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 20-1; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 21; Waterfield, *loc. cit.*, 89-90; Hansen, *loc. cit.*, 33-4; Forsdyke 2005, 135; Parton 2004, 71-5; Stanton 1990, 87; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 16-8; Wade-Gery 1958, 142-3; Cadoux 1948, 114-6).

⁴² Cleisthenes' political reforms rested on the notion of *isonomia*: the ideal that political equality should subsist between archons [*who formulate policy*], and members of the Council and Assembly [*who approve or disapprove such policies*]. To this end, he sought to transfer to the entire population of Athenians political rights and privileges that were hitherto enjoyed *chiefly* and *exclusively* by a closed group of wealth and birth elites [*particularly with regards to the enacting of laws and the adjudication of justice*]. To achieve this, Cleisthenes began by simply adopting the term *nomos* [*law enacted by common consent*], to replace the former designation *thesmos* [*law imposed by a higher authority*], for all official statutes enacted in Athens (Wood 2008, 36). According to Professor Martin Ostwald (1969, 158-60), this was done "to stress the democratic aspect of his reforms": that no enactment could be ratified without the common consent of the people, regardless of their social or economic status). Moreover, Asmonti (2015, 81) adjoins that such measure was necessary to promote "a common civic and political identity" amongst the people that transcended tribal and regional divisions. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that Cleisthenes' pro-democratic reforms were only possible in Athens because of the liberal politico-economic institutions and structures that were priorly established by Solon and enforced [*although minimally*] by Peisistratos (cf. Santillan and Randall 2018, 91-3; Ninet 2013, 24; Gordon 2002, 60).

⁴³ Prior to Cleisthenes' reforms, the aristocratic class [*by virtue of their wealth and intellect*] continued to exert considerable dominance in political and juridical affairs at both the local and state level. Cleisthenes attributed their continued dominance in

Athenian politics to the old tribal system of political organization which placed the aristocratic class at the helm of affairs, and all others in subservience to them [*thus, it became relatively easier for them to secure appointments into positions of influence at the expense of the working peasantry*]. To curb this, Cleisthenes saw it necessary to reconstitute the polis [*in effect, the four Ionic tribes, as priorly discussed, cf. Note 24, supra*] in a way that allowed all persons to partake equally in the political affairs of the state. Thus, he began by dividing Athens into three constituent areas: coast, city, and inland, and then proceeded to further segment each of these areas into ten different precincts [called *trittys*]. Then, each of the thirty *trittyes* was further divided into small administrative units called *deme* [*which numbered about four to five in each trittys, so that there were a total of 139 demes in the Athenian polis*]. The *deme* or local village thus became the unit of political organization in Athens. As such, all adult males aged 18 years and over [who were not bondservants nor *metics*, but had been born to Athenian parents] were eligible for enrollment in the local *Ecclesia* of the *deme* [Lysias, the Attic Logographer, remarks that every young Athenian man eligible for registration into the *deme* was thoroughly scrutinized before the *deme Ecclesia* (in a process called *dokimasia*), and was only registered when his biographical credentials were approved by a majority of *deme* members in the *Ecclesia* (cf. *On the Scrutiny of Evandros*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 21; cf. also Demosthenes, *Against Leochares*, Chap. XLIV: Sec. 41; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LV: Sec. 2-4, Chap. XLV: Sec. 3; Aeschines, *op. cit.*, Chap. III: Sec. 14-15, 29)]. Moreover, to prevent citizens from aggregating in particular regions to form factions, Cleisthenes decreed that a citizen's registration and affiliation to a particular *deme* was permanent and binding, and could not be altered even when the said individual relocated to a different part of Athens (cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XLII: Sec. 1; Demosthenes, *Against Eubulides*, Sec. 10)]. Each *deme* was headed by a *demarkhos* who oversaw the registration of qualifying citizens and presided over meetings of the *deme Ecclesia*. Cleisthenes then proceeded to create ten new tribes to replace the four Ionic tribes. In creating these new tribes, he carefully assigned one *trittys* from each of the three constituent regions of Athens to form a tribe, so that each tribe was composed of three *trittys* [*of between twelve and fifteen demes, representing a proportionate blend of Athenians from the coastal, city, and inland regions*]. Moreover, unlike the previous Ionic tribes which were exclusively hereditary in nature [*because they were descended from the four sons of Ion*],

Cleisthenes endeavored to rename the ten new tribes after popularly acclaimed Athenian heroes [*which were: Hippothoon, Antiochos, Aias, Leos, Erechtheus, Aigeus, Oineus, Akamas, Kekrops, and Pandion*] to the intent that the new tribes, having been cleared of all hereditary affiliations [*because they were mere compositions of trittys from demographically disjointed areas of Athens and thus bore no claim to a common ancestry*], would foster a sense of national pride and identity amongst the Athenian populace (cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXI: Sec. 2-6; Ober, *loc. cit.*, 86, 96-7; Wood 1988, 105; Hansen, *loc. cit.*, 247-9; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 22-4; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 23-7, 47-9; Roisman 2011, 156-7; Coulanges 2006, 282; Freeman, *loc. cit.*, 182-3; Ranke 2014, 153-4; Papazarkadas 2011, 99; Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. CXXXI: Sec. 1; Ramesh 2018, 129-30; Abat Ninet, *loc. cit.*, 25-6). However, although his pro-democracy reforms professed political equality for all Athenians, Cleisthenes preserved Solon's exclusion of the *thetes* property class from appointments to high political offices [although they could vote in their deme Ecclesia for candidates nominated for such offices – which mostly were from the top two property classes] (cf. Badian 1971, 9-10; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII: Sec. 3; Hignett 1952, 142-3; Jones 1957, 105; Rhodes 1972, 2; Rhodes [1981], 140-1, 145-6; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 28-9; Chambers 1965, 34-5). Moreover, Professor Ostwald ([1986], 17, 21) asserts that Cleisthenes' inclusion of a *trittys* from the city region [*where was the largest concentration of aristocratic families*] in each tribe bears credence of his reluctance to completely subvert the dominance of the elites in Athenian politics [cf. also a similar viewpoint by Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 23) who remarks that Cleisthenes, by keeping intact the dominance of the aristocracy in the Areopagos Council and in archon appointments, was not averse to benefiting his Alkmeonid clan at the expense of other clans in the reform process]. This assertion however has been challenged by Bradeen (1955, 28-30) who remarks that the presence of two other *trittys* in each tribe [*composed predominately of persons without the aristocratic class*] presents an even counterweight to the political dominance of wealth and birth elites in tribal assembly deliberations.

⁴⁴ The Council of Five Hundred [*Boule*] [*which was contrived to replace Solon's privileged Council of Four Hundred*] served as the executive branch of Cleisthenes' democracy. Its primary duty involved preparing the agenda for meetings of the *Ecclesia* [*this was prepared and presented as preliminary decrees or draft proposals*

called ‘*probouleumata*’: which essentially were recommendations or open questions for deliberation in the state Assembly]. However, after decisions are made by the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule* then became the sole state agency responsible for implementing such decisions and policies [which usually pertained to the finance and organization of public works and service, as well as to expenses incurred by the military in wars and combats]. The *Boule* was opened to all Athenian males aged 30 years and over, and was composed of 500 citizens [called *Councilors* or *Bouleutai*]; which comprised of 50 persons selected by lot from each of the ten tribes [these were evenly selected from the three *trittyes* in each tribe, with at least one person from each *deme* within a *trittys*]. The *Bouleutai* [after having passed a procedural scrutiny test (of which, cf. Note 43, *supra*)] served for a duration of one year [of which they swore an oath of office to advise, without fear or favor, and according to the laws of the land, what was best for the Athenian people and the city, cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Book I, Chap. I: Sec. 18; Andocides, *Against Alcibiades*, Sec. 3; Demosthenes, *Against Neaera*, Sec. 4-5; Lysias, *Against Philon*, Sec. 2; *Against Nicomachus*, Sec. 10] and a citizen could only serve on the *Boule* twice in a lifetime [albeit not for two consecutive years, to allow for other adult males to serve in the same capacity, cf. Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 25; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LXII: Sec. 3; Busolt 1926, 1022)]. Furthermore, Cleisthenes endeavored to limit *Boule* membership to the top three property classes [of these, cf. Note 21, *supra*] with the justification that these classes, owing to their financial holdings in the state, were more likely [than the *thetes* class, which he argued were susceptible to demagogic appeals because they stood to lose little in the event of a political upheaval] to show greater interest in good governance, and exercise careful moderation in political deliberations. Moreover, to enhance the participation of all *Bouleutai* in the workings of the *Boule*, the 50-member contingent of each tribe took turns to serve as *Prytaneis* [a standing committee, which were housed at the *Tholos*, and were always on hand to attend to urgent matters of the state] for a duration of 36 days [called a *prytany*: one of the ten equal divisions of a legislative year]. During this period, one of the *Bouleutai* of the tribe was chosen [by lot] to serve as president for a day [and could not do so for a second time], and kept the keys to the treasury, archives, and state seal [the chosen president chaired over meetings of the *Boule*, and presided also over meetings of the *Ecclesia* – in the case where the Assembly met on the day of his presidency]. The periodic change of *Prytaneis*, as well as the daily change

of the president of the *Prytaneis* [of which, because there were 354 days in a legislative year, about two-thirds of all *Bouleutai* would have served as presidents for a day at the end of their yearly term in office] was contrived: in the case of the former, to prevent one tribe from exerting much control over the agenda of the *Ecclesia* [in effect, to prevent factionalism and aristocratic domination from permeating the the workings of the *Boule*], and in the case of the latter, to curb corruption and malfeasance [as the *Bouleutai* of a *Prytaneis* could not know in advance when they would be chosen to serve as president]. Albeit, the relatively short term of office of the *Bouleutai*, though effective at meeting the afore ends, had the obvious drawback of preventing the statesmen from developing depths of expertise and experience necessary to enhance the bureaucratic efficiency of the *Boule* (for further bibliographical references, cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 27-31; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 24; Hansen, *loc. cit.*, 250-6; Held, *loc. cit.*, 18; Hueglin 2008, 29-30; Mott 2013, 247-8; Patriquin 2015, 23-4; Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*, Sec. 92; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XLIV: Sec. 1-4, Chap. XLIII: Sec. 2-4; Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. II: Sec. 35; Ehrenberg 1969, 63; Traill 1975, 56-8; Larsen 1955, 10-1; Lewis 1963, 27-36; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 20; Siewert [1982], 118-20, 131-8, 156-63; Rhodes, *loc. cit.*, 50-1, 171-8).

⁴⁵ Because Cleisthenes' *Boule* was more representative than that of Solon's (of which, cf. Note 24-5, *supra*) it meant that the *Ecclesia* were presented by the *Boule* with a broader and more meaningful agenda on which to deliberate and make decisions [although Cleisthenes' reforms made it possible for the *Ecclesia* to direct the *Boule* to include certain issues of concern in the agenda of the next meeting (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 32; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 25)]. The *Ecclesia* consisted of males aged 20 years and over [of which Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XLII: Sec. 1, 4-5) notes that adult males were enlisted in their *deme Ecclesia* when they turned 18, after which they undertook two years of service as military cadets before joining the state *Ecclesia*] and met at the Pnyx [this was the case during the periods between 460 BC and 322 BC. Before this time, meetings of the *Ecclesia* were held at the agora (or marketplace) (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. XCVII: Sec. 1; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 395-6)] four times in each *prytany* [thus, 40 times each year. Of the four meetings held in each *prytany*, one was particularly distinguished as a 'Sovereign Assembly' or *kuria ekklesia*, where according to Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. XLIII: Sec. 3) internal polity matters

such as food supply and defense strategies were discussed, incumbent magistrates were confirmed, and confiscations of private property and lawsuits regarding inheritances were announced. Another of the three remaining meetings in each *prytany* was dedicated to hearing the grievances and complaints of citizens against their neighbors on private and public matters (cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XLIII: Sec. 6), of which Aeschines (*Against Timarchus*, Sec. 60) remarks was necessary to curb bad and deviant behaviors in the state. Beside these two special meetings, the remainder of the meetings in each *prytany* were dedicated to deliberations on such matters as the maintenance of public order, ratification of foreign policy, finance and direct taxation, ostracism, assessments of military performances, and reevaluation of foreign alliances, *amid others* (cf. Held, *loc. cit.*, 17; also Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XLIV: Sec. 4; Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 21; Ostwald 1986, 26; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book VI, Chap. IV: Sec. 20)]. Proceedings in the *Ecclesia* were coordinated by the *Bouleutai of the Prytaneis* on duty at the *Tholos* [whose functions involved managing the flow of discussions in the *Ecclesia*: that is, deciding when to put a question to vote, and when to stop deliberations on a subject matter (cf. Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. VII: Sec. 14; Aeschines, *On the Embassy*, Sec. 67-8, 84). Howbeit, in the mid-4th century, Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. XLIV: Sec. 2) notes that meetings of the *Ecclesia* were administered by nine *Proedroi* (chairmen) chosen by lot from amongst the *Bouleutai* not currently serving as *Prytaneis*]. The minimum quorum for meetings in the *Ecclesia* was 6000 citizens (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LXXII: Sec. 1-2; Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 45) and issues [*such as, the impeachment of generals, the approval of formal laws*] were decided by a show of hands or by secret ballot [the latter of which, according to Demosthenes (*Against Neaera*, Sec. 89-90) was limited to decisions requiring a quorum of 6000 citizens (cf. also Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. VII: Sec. 9; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXXIV: Sec. 1; Hansen, *loc. cit.*, 167-70). More so, Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 33) remarks that any member of the Assembly could demand a recount when the tally of votes was marginally close]. In both cases however, the preference of the *majority* decided the matter at hand, although Roper (*loc. cit.*, 25) notes that such was the rule only where “unanimity and consensus” was not reached on an issue (cf. also Ste Croix, *loc. cit.*, 284). Furthermore, during deliberations in the *Ecclesia*, all citizens could freely offer their views and opinions on a subject matter [in effect, preference was not given to one’s wealth or

social status (cf. Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 26-7; Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, Sec. 3, 191, 273; *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*, Sec. 1; *Third Philippic*, Sec. 3). Albeit, in Plato's *Protagoras* (Sec. 319b-d), Socrates informs that members of the *Ecclesia* only tolerated professionals or craftsmen (*and would shout down or laugh to scorn an attempt by any other*) to speak on technical matters, whereas for non-technical subjects, any member of the Assembly, be he "a smith, shoemaker, merchant, or sea-captain," could freely address the audience (cf. also a corroborating remark by Demosthenes, *On Organization*, Sec. 14). Moreover, Aeschines in his speech *Against Timarchus* (Sec. 35) makes mention of a protocol regarding how members ought to address the Assembly: "... anyone addressing the *Boule* must keep to the matter at hand, must not deal with two separate matters together, and must not speak twice on the same matter in any one meeting. He must not engage in slanders or scurrility, or interrupt others." In addition, in his speech *Against Ctesiphon* (Sec. 2), Aeschines notes that prior to the fifth century, younger citizens were permitted to address the Assembly only after older persons above the age of 50 have had their say on an issue]. Notwithstanding, citizens could lose their right to participate in meetings of the *Ecclesia* when they are found to have committed offences such as: owing a debt to the public treasury, beating one's father or mother, squandering one's inheritance, throwing away one's shield in battle, *amid others* (cf. Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 123; *On the Crown*, 132; Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 28-32; 72). Also, Aristotle (*Politics*, Book IV, Sec. 1293a-4b; but also *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 5, Chap. XXXIII: Sec. 1) notes that Athenians were paid for attending meetings of the *Ecclesia*, and adds that such remuneration enhanced citizens' [*but particularly the poor's*] participation in meetings of the *Ecclesia* (cf. also Colaiaco 2001, 96; Held, *loc. cit.*, 18; Hyland 1995, 246; Webster 1973, 101). All decisions by the *Ecclesia* were recorded and published as decrees, and important ones were carved on stone tablets (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 33; Aeschines, *On the Embassy*, Sec. 58, 89; *Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 75; Jha 2010, 19; Missiou 2011, 93).

⁴⁶ As an addendum to Solon's reforms [where one *general* was appointed from each of the four Ionic tribes], Cleisthenes, by virtue of his new tribal design, made provisions for the appointment of ten *stratego*i to serve in the Athenian army. Each tribe elected one *strategos* [*who was an Athenian citizen aged 30 years and over*] in its *deme Ecclesia*

and presented him for final confirmation in the state *Ecclesia* [*which procedure was a mere formality as tribal appointees were almost always approved*] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXIV: Sec. 1; Lysias, *Against Alcibiades 2*, Sec. 2; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 38). The *stratego*i commanded and administered their respective tribal fleet in the Athenian army, and were under the command of the Polemarch [who was one of the nine archons of Athens (cf. Note 3, *supra*)]. Because competence and experience were needed for one to function effectively as a *strategos*, the appointments thereof were based solely on merit and were not left to selection by lot [of this, cf. an adjoining remark by Xenophon (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. I: Sec. 3, *emphasis added*) as follows: "... there are those magistracies which bring safety or danger to the people as a whole depending on whether or not they are well managed: of these the people [*namely the peasantry*] claim no share (they do not think they should have an allotted share in the generalships or cavalry commands). For these people realize that there is more to be gained from their not holding these magistracies but leaving them instead in the hands of the most influential men. However, such magistracies as are salaried and domestically profitable the people are keen to hold" (cf. also corroborating remarks by Jones [1957], 55, 68-9; Ostwald 1986, 82). Thus, although not in law, howbeit in practice only persons of the hoplite classes (*that is, persons of the top three property classes*) were nominated for election as *strategos* in the tribal assemblies (of this, cf. Ostwald 1986, 22-3; Hignett 1952, 191-2; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 27)]. Although appointed for a duration of one year, there were no established limits to their terms of office, so that a *strategos* could retain his position for as many years as his tribal assembly are willing to appoint him [*a relevant case in point being Pericles who for fifteen successive years (443-429 BC) was appointed to the office of strategos*]. Notwithstanding, the *stratego*i were required to appear in-person before the *Ecclesia* for a review of their conduct and estate at the end of each service year [*although the review process could also be carried out in absentia when the strategoi are involved in a military expedition abroad*] in a juridical process known as *euthynai* which according to Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. LIV: Sec. 2, but cf. also Chap. XLVIII: Sec. 3-4) involved three boards of ten members [*which were chosen by lot: the first and the third from amongst the entire citizens of Athens, and the second, exclusively from amongst the Bouleutai: one member from each tribe*]. These included: the *logistai*, which examined the financial estates of the *stratego*i (albeit there was also an *ad hoc* board of *logistai*,

which comprised of ten members chosen by lot from amongst the *Bouleutai*, that reviewed the financial holdings of the *strategos* once in every *prytany*); the *euthynoi*, which investigated the military actions and inactions of the *strategos* whilst in office; and the *synegoroi*, which prosecuted those *strategoï* adjudged with misconduct by the two preceding boards (cf. Harris 1964, 81; Harrison 1964, 81; Harris 2013, 156; Jones 2004, 115; Hamel 1998, 128-9; Cataldi 1996, 48). In all cases, three charges were usually brought up by the *synegoroi* against offending *strategoï*: embezzlement, bribery, or malversation. The offending *strategos* then appeared before a jury of 501 members [*who were chosen by lot from amongst the citizens of Athens, and whose verdict was final and unrepealable*] and is tried on the said charges. When convicted on account of the first two charges, a *strategos* was obligated by law to pay ten times the amount embezzled or taken as bribe, whereas in the case of the third, he was required only to make a simple restitution of the amount malversated (cf. Ostwald 1986, 55-6; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893, 234-5; Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 22; Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, Sec. 250; Busolt, *loc. cit.*, 1078; Rhodes 1981, 561-2) [Notwithstanding, Harris (*loc. cit.*, 226, *emphasis added*) notes of a practice where *strategoï* that had pilfered accounts conspired with speakers in the Assembly to have words of praise passed for them on account of their term in office. Thus, if they were subsequently prosecuted by the *synegoroi* after their accounts had been checked [and their malfeasance found out], the members of the jury would be reluctant to convict them: deeming it unseemly (and thereby doubting the assessment of the *synegoroi*) to “condemn persons that had received so great a commendation from the Athenian people”].

⁴⁷ In pre-Solonian times, the election and appointment of magistrates was administered exclusively by the Council of the Areopagus. According to a statement by Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. VIII: Sec. 2, *emphasis added*), the Council “summoned and judged persons suitable for appointment to a state office and commissioned them [*after a satisfactory dokimasia*] to a tenure of one year.” Solon, however, in his liberal political reforms allowed for magistrates to be appointed by popular elections in tribal assemblies, and only confined the role of the Areopagus Council to scrutinizing elected officials and “assigning to each that office for which he was deemed best fitted” [this he did to grant the people a voice in the appointment of magistrates, but more so to

make the composition of magistrates more egalitarian and representative: as priorly they were restricted only to those of noble birth, but later (*through Solon's reforms*) came to include all persons within the *hoplite* classes] (cf. Hignett, *loc. cit.*, 78-9, 321-2; Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1274a; Ostwald 1986, 14). Cleisthenes, in his institution of democracy at Athens restricted the appointment of magistrates solely to *popular elections* and *selections by lot* [thereby relegating to the background the *qualifying* role priorly performed by the Council of the Areopagus in the appointment process. Moreover, the conduct of the procedures of *dokimasia* and *euthynai* of state magistrates were further transferred from the Areopagus Council to the *Heliaia*, of which, Ostwald (*loc. cit.*, 71) asseverates "gave the people the most powerful instruments of popular control over public officials"]. According to Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 3; cf. also corroborating remarks by Meiggs 1972, 215; Roesch 1965, 22-4; Hansen 1980, 166-7; Buckley 1996, 250), a total of 1400 magistrates [Greek: *archai*, of which 700 dealt with domestic matters, and the remainder, foreign affairs] were employed annually by the Athenian state to support the vast expanse of its administrative oversight functions. All magistrates were aged 30 years and over, and came from the *hoplite* classes [although Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 39) notes that this eligibility criteria was later extended to include some persons of the *thetes* class]. In all cases, magistrates were either elected or selected by lot depending on the nature of work performed by the office in question (cf. Ehrenberg 1973, 98; Katz 1997, 11-2; Hansen [1991], 52, 230, 233-4; Cox 1878, 228). Thus, Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 40) notes that magistrates were *elected* to offices which performed specialized and sophisticated roles (*as the oversight of financial transactions of the state, and the command and training of military conscripts*) and were *selected by lot* to offices which oversaw less technical affairs (*as the control of market weights and measures, and the maintenance of roads and social amenities*) [thus, Tangian (2014, 17) notes that of the 700 state offices that dealt with domestic issues, 100 were filled by elections and the remainder, by lots]. To this effect, Headlam ([1993], 27-8, 89) maintains the view that in a heterogeneous society as that of classical Athens [where the citizens shared diverse interests], the selection of officials by lot was necessary to maintain perfect equality amongst citizens and to ensure the representation of a broad range of interests and competences [as opposed to a homogeneous society where elections were more preferred and meaningful because the citizens shared common interests and agreed on basic principles and

ideologies], although he remarks that such egalitarian ideal was unattainable because “equality [*of the people*] was aimed for where no equality [*amongst the people*] existed” (cf. also supporting remarks to this effect by Manin 1997, 40). Moreover, magistrates [barring the appointment of *strategoí*] could not be appointed to the same office twice, but could albeit occupy other different magistracies [*each for a duration of one year*] over the course of their lifetime [this was contrived to curb possible incidents of corruption which may be brought about when magistrates habituate in a particular office for a lengthy period of time], although this periodic reshuffle meant that magistrates could not develop much depth and experience in carrying out the functions of the state offices they occupied. Additionally, because magistrates had to undergo the ‘clearing process’ of *euthynai* at the end of their service terms [which usually spanned many months into the new service year], they were in practice restricted from occupying other state magistracies in consecutive years [as they could only do so after their service records for the previous year have been cleared in the *euthynai* process] (cf. Manin, *loc. cit.*, 12; Przeworski 2010, 30; Roberts 1998, 45; Ostwald 1986, 74). In the performance of their duties, the magistrates usually worked in small committees of ten [*comprising one delegate from each of the ten tribes*] with each committee overseeing a specific aspect of state administration (Pownall 2013, 291; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 40; Rhodes 1992, 80-2; Hansen 1991, 237-45). Also worth mentioning are the Athenian Eleven which were a board of magistrates charged with the duty of keeping the state prisons and punishing persons convicted as *kakourgoi* [that is, persons found guilty of mischievous acts against their fellow citizens and the state] (cf. Hunter 1994, 135-8; Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Book I, Chap. II: Sec. 62; Lysias, *On the Property of Aristophanes*, Sec. 7; Hansen [1976], 18, 36-48, 114). Like most magistrates, the Eleven were selected by lot and served for a duration of one year (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LII: Sec. 1; Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 113; *Against Aristocrates*, Sec. 69; Lysias, *Against Alcibiades 1*, Sec. 17; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Chap. VII: Sec. 10; Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 16; Lipsius 1905, 74-81; Harrison [1971], 17-8, 223-5; Hansen, 1976, 38-47; 1991, 190-1; MacDowell [1978], 75, 238; Bleicken [1986], 202, 242; Welwei 1992, 189; Herman 1994, 114). Burgess (2005, 329, *emphasis added*; cf. also Lysias, *Against Agoratus*, Sec. 85-6; *Against Theomnestus 1*, Sec. 10; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 1108-9; Isaeus, *On the Estate of Nicostratus*, Sec. 28) has recently offered a compelling thesis on why these magistrates were

numbered eleven and not ten (there being only ten tribes in Athens, as per the reforms of Cleisthenes), arguing that “their uneven number [...] was to enable them make decisions [in effect, to prevent a tie when matters were put to a vote] in certain judicial procedures.”

⁴⁸ This practice was contrived by Cleisthenes to banish persons that had become either popular through their wealth and status, or unpopular through their disturbance of social peace. In the case of the former, it was thought that such persons, by reason of their high repute and vast economic resources, would be capable of unduly persuading their fellow citizens and thereby influencing decision making processes in the *Ecclesia* [a development that would distort the democratic norm which allowed all citizens equal voice in deciding the issues of the day]. In the case of the latter, it was to prevent such persons from dismantling the democratic system [through demagogic appeals, revolts and insurgencies] and possibly starting a tyranny in Athens (cf. Ostwald 1986, 27, Thomsen 1972, 97-9; Lewis 1974, 3; Williams 1978, 105-6). In all cases, persons that were ostracized were required to leave Athens for a period of ten years, although such persons continued to maintain their citizenship status and property whilst in exile. The procedure for carrying out an ostracism followed two concomitant steps. First, during the sixth prytany, the citizens of Athens voted [by show of hands], during a meeting of the *Ecclesia*, whether they desired to hold an ostracism that year. If they desired to do so, then each eligible member of the *Ecclesia* wrote on a potsherd [in Greek, *ostrakon*, hence the derived name ‘ostracism’] they wished to see removed from the state. If a total of at least 6000 *ostraka* were turned in [this being the required quorum, of which Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 43) asserts was necessary to “prevent a small group from forcing an ostracism and achieving their aim on a small turn-out on the day.” Also, MacDowell (1962, 127-8) asserts that “a vote of 6000 was regarded as equivalent to a vote of the whole Athenian people, as more than this number could not be expected to attend a meeting of the *Ecclesia*.”] then the person whose name appeared on the most number of *ostraka* was banished from the state (cf. Martin 1974, 25-6; Plutarch, *Aristides*, Chap. VII: Sec. 4-5; Williams 2005, 59; Raaflaub 2012, 100; Shuckburgh 1901, 92-3; McGregor 1987, 18-9; Katz 1997, 13; Tangian 2014, 17-8; Whibley 1931, 445; Botsford 1922, 121; Nails 1995, 166-7; Hignett 1952, 165-6). Some prominent persons ostracized from Athens included Hipparchus [in 488/7 BC],

Megacles [in 487/6 BC], Callias [in 486/5 BC], Xanthippus [in 485/4 BC], Callixenus [in 454/3 BC], Aristides [in 483/2 BC], Themistocles [in 472/1 BC], Cimon [in 462/1 BC], Alcibiades [in 461/0 BC], Thucydides [in 444/3 BC], and Hyperbolus [in 416/5 BC] (cf. bibliographical references in Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 177; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. CXXXV: Sec. 3, Book VIII, Chap. LXXIII: Sec. 3; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXII: Sec. 6; Andocides, *Against Alcibiades*, Sec. 33; Plutarch, *Nicias*, Chap. XI: Sec. 1-6; *Alcibiades*, Chap. XIII: Sec. 3-4). Aristotle, in his *Politics* (cf. Book III, Sec. 1284a-b, 1288a; Book V, Sec. 1302b, 1308b) argues that whereas the law on ostracism was unjust in its construction [*in that it expelled citizens not for proven acts of wrongdoing but for their sheer notoriety or popularity*], nevertheless it helped to sustain peace and tranquil in Athens by preventing strife and tensions amongst factional groups. In effect, because Athenian citizens were by this law able to expel the leaders of such factional groups out of the city, the possibility that tensions amongst tribal groups would escalate into full-blown civil wars was greatly reduced.

⁴⁹ Building upon Solon's *Heliaia*, Cleisthenes developed a people's court [*dikasteria*] made up of 6000 jurors to decide all manner of disputes and suits in the state [of this, cf. Hignett 1952, 216-8; Rhodes 1972, 168-9]. Also, Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 34) avers that Cleisthenes built upon Solon's *Heliaia* because "the Athenian people had become used to the idea of having cases tried and penalties set by large numbers of their fellow citizens" The jurors [*dikastes*] were selected by lot [600 from each of the ten tribes] from a pool of interested citizens [aged 30 and over, of which Lanni (2010, 19; but also Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 24; Hansen 1974, 50-1; Dover 1994, 102-6) has interestingly averred was due to the nature of Athenian society which strongly associated age with "wisdom and rationality"] and served for a duration of one year (cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 661-2; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 3, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 4; Martin 2013, 135-6). Moreover, Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. LXIII: Sec. 3) observes that no property requirements were maintained for selection as juror, so that any citizen "who did not owe any debts to the treasury nor had lost his citizenship through any legal action could serve in the *dikasteria*". Like Solon's *Heliaia* (of which, cf. Note 26, *supra*) Cleisthenes' *dikasteria* adjudicated both *dikai* and *graphai* cases brought forward by citizens. In the case of *graphai* cases, Ruschenbusch (1968, 53; cf. also Harrison 1971, 76-8; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*,

Chap. XLIII: Sec. 4; Ostwald 1986, 51-2; Roberts [1982], 15-7, 21-4; Isocrates, *Antidosis*, Sec. 314) informs that they involved cases of *eisangelia* and *epheisis*, the former being crimes committed against the state in which “the injured party was not an individual but the community as whole” (thus, making it possible for any concerned individual to bring up a lawsuit in this regard)], and the latter being appeals on decisions handed down by the Areopagus Council, the *thesmothetai*, and the *demejudges*. Notwithstanding, Cleisthenes’ court system differed primarily from Solon’s in its division into ten separate sections. In this regard, each section comprised of 600 jurors [60 persons from each tribe] and dealt with a category of public matter [such as family and inheritance, immigration, fiscal property, taxes owed to the state, *euthynai* and *dokimasia*, amid others. To this end, Bonner and Smith (1930, 221-3; but also Sealey 1967, 48) have surmised that the division of the courts into separate sections was as a result of the growth and prosperity of the Athenian empire, which brought with it “a train of public matters” that needed to be dealt with concomitantly]. Court sessions were held on all days except on festival days or on days when a meeting of the *Ecclesia* was scheduled [thus, making it 200 meeting times in a year]. The size of each court session varied correspondingly with the nature of each case, so that although 600 jurors were assigned to each of the ten courts, not all cases adjudicated by each court required the presence of all jurors. Thus, Thorley (*loc. cit.*, 36; but also Ostwald 1986, 68-9; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LIII: Sec. 3, Chap. LXVIII: Sec. 1; Hommel 1927, 78-83; Harrison, *loc. cit.*, 47-8; Kroll [1972], 55-6, 91-104) notes that *dikai* cases involving sums of less than 1000 drachmas required the presence of 201 *dikastes* whereas those involving sums of more than 1000 drachmas required the presence of 401 *dikastes*. Also, *graphai* cases were mostly adjudicated by a total of 501 *dikastes*, but where the case in question was of great importance, then multiples of 500 (+1) *dikastes* were required [thus Andocides (*On the Mysteries*, Sec. 17) speaks of the trial of Speusippus in 415 BC where the presence of all 6000 jurors constituted the tribunal for the case. Also, Dinarchus (*Against Demosthenes*, Sec. 52) makes mention of the *eisangelia* procedure against Pistias where a total of 2500 jurors were solicited for the trial. Furthermore, Demosthenes, in his speech (*Against Timocrates*, Sec. 9) informs that an odd-numbered panel of *dikastes* was employed in all cases to prevent the occurrence of a tie vote]. In the late fifth century, the assignment of *dikastes* to cases was carried out on a ‘first-come-first-served’ basis [that

is, all eligible *dikastes* queued at the entrance of each court room and were allowed in, according to the order in which they first arrived, until the number of required jurors for the case was reached]. Howbeit, because this system over time became susceptible to bribery and corruption [in that both prosecutors and defendants alike came early to the court house and attempted to bribe those jurors that would adjudicate their case, knowing beforehand by the queue those jurors that would be allowed into the courtroom] a random selection procedure [which assigned jurors to each court session and for each case at the last minute] was employed with the help of a *kleroterion* [a special machine developed for this purpose] to curb this misdemeanor (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LXIII: Sec. 1-2, Chap. LXIV: Sec. 1-5; but also Grote (1854, 125, *emphasis added*) who notes that the share size of each jury, coupled with their secret suffrage, and their random allotment to each case (*and also of the fact that all court cases were concluded in one day*) made jurors “inaccessible (*but also insusceptible*) both to corruption and intimidation”). Although the *thesmothetai* [but also magistrates with expertise in legal matters] organized and presided over court sessions [in reforming the Heliaia, Cleisthenes endeavored to limit the judicial powers of the *thesmothetai* so that they no longer could adjudicate cases by themselves but could only arrange for such cases to be heard by a jury court, after that they have taken preliminary documentary evidence from both sides to the case] they could not influence the outcome of the trial in any way, as all verdict decisions were reached by majority voting of the sitting jury. More so, because there were no finer points of law by which jurors could base their decisions, they had to rely chiefly on their own judgements, and on the tenor of statements made by the plaintiff and defendant in the court room [to this end, they were required at the start of their term of service to take the ‘Heliastic Oath’ as follows: “I will vote according to the laws and decrees passed by the Assembly and the *Boule*, but concerning things about which there are no laws I shall decide to the best of my judgement, without favor or enmity. I will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to the accusers and defenders alike” (qtd. in Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 36; cf. also Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*, Sec. 118; Sinclair 1988, 211; Hansen 1991, 178-82)]. Notwithstanding, the Athenians were content to select by lot any citizen [with little or no expertise in legal matters] to serve as juror because of their reasoning that “large numbers of *dikastes* were less likely to get it wrong than small numbers of archons

[referencing, the six *thesmothetai*, and in earlier times, the Areopagites (that is, members of the Council of the Areopagus)]” (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 34). Albeit, the jurors were composed predominantly of elderly states men who could rely on the experience they had acquired over the years to adjudicate matters fairly. During judicial proceedings, both plaintiff and defendant were allotted fixed amounts of time to speak on the case at hand [Aristotle, in his *Athenian Constitution* (Chap. LXVII: Sec. 1-5; cf. also Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 34) made mention of a water-clock [*klepsydra*, a large jar that lets out water at fixed rates] that was employed in this regard. Thus, at the commencement of each proceeding, a member of the jury was selected by lot to pour a certain amount of water in the *klepsydra*, relative to the case at hand [so for cases involving sums of up to 2000 drachmas, each side was allotted seven measures of water; for cases involving sums between 2000 and 5000 drachmas, nine measures of water; for cases involving sums above 5000 drachmas, ten measures of water; and for cases where both sides stood to lose all their property, their citizenship, or their lives, eleven measures of water – which corresponded to the whole day – was granted to both sides] (cf. also O’Halloran 1998, 11-2; Livingstone 2017, 79-80). After each side has used up his allotted time, the matter was put to a vote before the jury [without further deliberation amongst them] and the side that received majority affirmation won [at the start of each trial, jurors are given two ballots – one for the plaintiff and the other for the defendant. Thus, after both sides have finished speaking, the jurors place the ballot of their preferred side in a bronze urn and the other unused ballot in a wooden urn (although jurors may also choose to place both ballots in the wooden urn if they wished not to vote on the matter). After the jurors have voted, the bronze urn is emptied, and the ballots are counted in the presence of the two parties to the case] (cf. Roberts 1998, 48; Webster 1969, 67). All decisions passed down by the jury courts were final and were not subject to *epheisis*.

⁵⁰ This was cogently attested to by Pericles in his famous Funeral Oration: “[...] our form of government is a democracy because it is managed not for the few but for the majority. Still, although we have equality at law for everyone here in private disputes, we do not let our system of rotating public officers undermine our judgements of a candidate’s virtue, and no one is held back by poverty or because his reputation is not well-known, as long as he can do good service to the city [...] We live together without

taking offence on private matters; and as for public affairs, we respect the law greatly and fear to violate it, since we are obedient to those in office at any time, and also to the laws – especially to those laws that were made to help people who have suffered an injustice” (qtd. in Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Book II, Chap. XXXVII: Sec. 1-3). Howbeit, other classical analysts (Littman 1974, 145; Ostwald 2009, 35; Ostwald 1986, 17-8; Martin 1974, 12-8; Finley 1983, 9; on the general definitions and exclusivity of citizenship at Athens, cf. Sussman 2012, 37-8; Held 2006, 19-20,) have been skeptical about the ‘democratic-ness’ of Cleisthenes’ reforms arguing that the system only tended to favor the *hoplites* [that is, members of the three property class, which also were the minority] at the expense of the *thetes* [which, although constituting the majority, were denied all possibilities of political participation, save for their representation as jurors in the *dikasteria and heliaia*] [the population estimate of *hoplites* and *thetes* in classical Athens has been variedly reported by historians, although they all tend to converge on the fact that *thetes* were at least twice the size of *hoplites*, cf. Miller 1997, 251; Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 100-1, who report a figure of 30,000 to 60,000; and Salmon 1984, 165-9; Hansen 1991, 51, who have the estimate at 15,000 to 30,000; but also Kitto (1951, 131) reports a total citizen population of 30,000 during the fifth-century]. So, for instance, Vidal-Naquet (1968, 166), in criticizing the exclusion of the *thetes* majority from participation in government, labelled Cleisthenes’ democracy as being more of a “schéma idéal d’une république des hoplites” (cf. also corroborating comments by Bicknell ([1972], 32-7; 45) who avers that Cleisthenes deliberately arranged the deme quotas in the *Boule* in such a way that “pro-Peisistratids would be underrepresented whilst Alcmaeonids and other anti-Peisistratids would be overrepresented”).

⁵¹ This was typified chiefly in the victories of Greece against Persia in the Greco-Persian wars, particularly in the battle of Marathon in 490 BC [where the newly democratic Athenian state, led by Miltiades, united to oppose the attempt by Darius I, the king of Persia, to establish Hippias, the son of Peisistratos as tyrant over Athens] (cf. Herodotus, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. CXIII: Sec. 1-2, Chap. CXVI: Sec. 1, Chap. CXVII: Sec. 1; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, Book I, Chap. XXV: Sec. 2, Chap. XXXII: Sec. 3). A further showcase of Athenian dominance in Greece is attested to by the formation of the Delian League in 478 BC [in which Athens, playing a leadership

role, joined itself in confederation with several other Greek city-states] to ward off further insurgencies of Persia in Greece (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. XCVI: Sec. 1-2; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XI, Chap. XLVII: Sec. 1; Meijer 1986, 63-9; Rutishauser 2012, 87-8; Buckley 1996, 189-96; Freely 2010, 42-3; Nakamura-Morro 1988, 567; Gorman 2001, 215; Tritle 2004, 33-4) [It is worth mentioning also that Athens [following after the example of Sparta with the Peloponnesian League (where the latter installed oligarchic governments in the poleis of member states)] endeavored to establish and maintain democratic governments in the poleis of League members, arguing that the design was necessary to “ensure their future loyalty to Athens, and to protect Athenian citizens from greedy and powerful aristocrats” (cf. Richard 2003, 61). This is much evinced in the ‘Erythrai Decree’ which saw Athens impose a *minimal* form of democracy on the small city-state of Erythrai, requiring an administrative Council to be set up therein, after the fashion of the Athenian *Boule* [where councilors, who could be appointed no more than once in every four years, were chosen by lot from all eligible citizens aged 30 years and over] (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 64; Forsdyke 2005, 207; Robinson 2011, 175; O’Neil 1995, 47-8; Meiggs 1972, 113).

⁵² Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, was an Athenian general who was much opposed to Athens deepening diplomatic relations with Sparta (cf. Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XI, Chap. LXXVII: Sec. 6; Plutarch, *Cimon*, Chap. XIII: Sec. 5). Though an aristocrat by birth, Ephialtes was much sympathetic to the common people and saw the Delian League and the growing dominance and popularity of Athens in Greece as a subtle means by which the aristocratic class could begin to assert undue influence in domestic political matters, and thereby distort in the process the nascent democratic reforms instituted by Solon and Cleisthenes. In his bid to forestall this and to safeguard the tenets of democracy in Athens, he moved to attack the Areopagus Council [*which then was the only undemocratically-constituted institution at the time*] by demanding that its acquired ‘guardianship’ powers [*nomophylakia*] be taken away and given to the democratic and representative institutions of the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule* and the *dikasteria* (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXV: Sec. 2; Plutarch, *Cimon*, Chap. XV: Sec. 2; *Pericles*, Chap. IX: Sec. 5; Rhodes [1972], 168, 201-7; Martin 1974, 29-33).

⁵³ Cf. additional bibliographical references in Hall (1990, 319); Wallace (1989, 85-7).

⁵⁴ It is noteworthy to mention that before Ephialtes appealed to the *Ecclesia* and *Boule* for the curtailment of the powers of the Areopagus Council, he endeavored foremost to press charges against some members of the Areopagus Council for their wrongful conduct in office. Thus, as verily espoused by Buckley (1996, 242; but also Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXV: Sec. 2) his success in prosecuting these Areopagites and removing many from office on accounts of maladministration created a mood of distrust amongst ordinary Athenians for the Council, and lowered its prestige as a result. Howbeit, the success of his appeal [*and subsequent reform*] was hinged in large part on three concomitant factors. The first is provided by Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 1, *emphasis added*; cf. also *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1274a) who narrates that a large number of the common people had priorly manned the *triremes* [*Athenian naval ships*] that enabled Athens to win naval victories against Persia in the battles of Salamis and Mycale. As a result, many of the *demos* begun to develop a feeling of power and pride, and a desire for greater participation in the affairs of the state. Ephialtes therefore capitalized on this state of affairs and “urge the state [that is, *the Ecclesia and the Boule*] strongly in the direction of the city’s naval power, thereby emboldening the multitude to desire a government that was more in their hands [*than in the hands of unelected nobles*] (*emphasis added*).” A second reason cited for the success of Ephialtes’ appeal is seen in light of Solon’s earlier reforming of archon appointments in Athens [of which, cf. Note 21, *supra*]. That is, because archons came to be selected by lot rather than by hereditary appointment, and because the Council of the Areopagus was composed solely of ex-archons, it became the case that the Council was increasingly regarded by the *demos* as less prestigious and therefore unworthy of maintaining overarching power in the affairs of the state (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 54; Rhodes 1981, 311). But the third, and perhaps most convincing reason why Ephialtes could pass his appeal through the *Boule* and the *Ecclesia* was because of a key political circumstance that had occurred in Athens at the time. In 462 BC, the *strategos* Cimon [in a bid to strengthening Athenian relations with Sparta] successfully convinced the *Ecclesia* [although this move was strongly objected to by Ephialtes (cf. Plutarch, *Cimon*, Chap. XVI: Sec. 8)] to send 4000 hoplites with him to the Peloponnese to aid Sparta in suppressing a helot revolt.

This venture however proved unsuccessful, so that Sparta in the aftermath dismissed the Athenian contingent that had been sent to aid its cause. Ephialtes then, taking advantage of the absence of so great a number of *hoplites* [his earlier objections also being vindicated by the turnout of events] appealed successfully to the *Ecclesia* [with the help of the *strategos* Pericles] to limit the powers of the Areopagus Council (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 53-4, 61-2). It must be noted however that although it was the *Ecclesia* that had priorly sanctioned the sending of Athenian troops to aid Sparta in the Peloponnese, Ephialtes nevertheless targeted the Areopagus Council because he saw in the Areopagites an undue affinity to Sparta and withal a predisposition to preserving aristocratic traditions in Athens. For instance, the Areopagus Council, acting as ‘guardian of the laws,’ could veto any decree or proposal of the *Boule* or *Ecclesia* that it deemed to be ‘unconstitutional’ (cf. Jones 1987, 57-8; Ostwald 1986, 518; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. III: Sec. 6, Chap. IV: Sec. 4, Chap. VIII: Sec. 4). In this regard, Ephialtes reasoned that if a body of unelected statesmen had preeminence over all laws of the state, and yet were individually inclined to preserving aristocratic traditions rather than promoting popular sovereignty, then this could not augur well for democracy in Athens. Thus, he moved to curtail the powers of the Areopagus Council, so it is unable to unduly interfere with future workings of the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule*, or the *dikasteria* (cf. additional corroborating remarks to this effect by Conley 1990, 4-5; Goldhill 2004, 11; Sealey 1987, 130; Änggård 2014, 108; Braun 1998, 69-70; Amemiya 2007, 44; MacDowell 1963, 39; Lotze 2000, 127-8; Glotz 1996, 125).

⁵⁵ For a discussion of the composition and function of the Areopagus Council prior to Solon’s reforms, cf. (Note 3, 17, 21, *supra*).

⁵⁶ The performance of these functions, which included most chiefly the conduct of the procedures of *dokimasiai*, *euthynai* and *eisangeliai* [of which, cf. Note 43, 46, 49, *supra*, but also Buckley (1996, 244) who stated these functions to include: i) the right to punish persons who committed crimes against the state; ii) the right to hear complaints against public officials; and iii) the right to try persons who conspired against the constitution] was transferred instead to the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule*, and the *dikasteria*. Thus, the elite Council of the Areopagus was “deprived of superintendence in affairs of the state” and was left only to deal with cases “pertaining to the body” [that is,

cases of homicide and other related injuries to the body] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 1; Philochoros, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Book III/b, Nr. 328: Frag. 64; Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, Sec. 681-5; Demosthenes, *Against Neaera*, Sec. 80; Lysias, *Defense in the Matter of the Olive Stump*, Sec. 22; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 53; Asmonti 2015, 114; Sammons 2016, 81-3; but also Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*, Sec. 4, where it appears the Areopagus Council dealt as well with cases of malfeasance by public officials). To this end, Professor Ostwald ([1986], 49, 71) notes that the transfer of power from the unrepresentative Council of the Areopagus to the *Ecclesia* [which comprised every adult male aged 18 and over], the *Boule* [which comprised representatives from all *demes* in Attica], and the *dikasteria* [which was opened to all adult males from all four property classes] “gave the people the most powerful instruments of popular control over public officials. Moreover, Buckley (*loc. cit.*, 243, *emphasis added*) asserts that the fact that a new institution was not created in Athens to directly supplant the Areopagus Council attests to the self-will of the Athenian people and the confidence they placed in the democratic institutions of the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule*, and the *dikasteria* as being sufficient and effective enough to govern Athens (cf. also Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book I, Chap. VII: Sec. 20, 34; Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, Sec. 1089-90, where the decree of Cannonus provides evidence to attest the fact that certain *kakourgoi* [public offenders] were tried before the *demos* and not before the Areopagus Council, as was priorly the case).

⁵⁷ This he avers in respect of the Council’s heritage as an elite body of unelected aristocrats whose decrees were final, whose terms of service were interminable, and who were themselves not accountable to any other for their actions and inactions, as opposed to the *Ecclesia*, the *Boule*, and the *dikasteria* which were popular and representative in scope, in that they were composed of the *demos*, organized by the *demos*, and functioned for the *demos*.

⁵⁸ Throughout this *essay*, only the English versions of the afore-mentioned books are cited [as per Note 59, 60, *infra*] and also referenced. The Greek titles have been supplied in this stance because the respective passages were quoted therefrom [they have not however been included in the list of ‘Works Cited’].

⁵⁹ “First, he [i.e., Ephialtes] made away with many of the Areopagites by bringing legal proceedings against them about their acts of administration; then in the archonship of Conon he stripped the Council of all its added powers which made it the safeguard of the Constitution, and assigned some of them to the Five Hundred and others to the People and to the jury-courts” (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXV: Sec. 2).

⁶⁰ “While these events were taking place at Athens, Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, who being a popular leader had incited the masses to anger against the Areopagites, persuaded the Assembly to vote to curtail the power of the Council of the Areopagus and to destroy the renowned customs which their fathers had followed.” (cf. Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XI, Chap. LXXVII: Sec. 6).

⁶¹ With the Council of the Areopagus now stripped of its superintendence over new and existing laws, a procedural measure known as the *graphe paranomon* [prosecutions for unconstitutional motions] was introduced to guard legislative proposals from arbitrary violations. By this measure, the *demos* were made guardians of their own laws in that any Athenian citizen could bring a legal suit [*graphe*, that is, a public prosecution] against another citizen who proposed a law or decree in the *Ecclesia* that was “either in conflict with existing laws or was procedurally incorrect” (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 55). More also, Professor Mogens Hansen (1991, 206) avers that a *graphe paranomon* could be brought forward when a decree passed by the *Ecclesia* was deemed to be unconstitutional [that is, when the decree was proposed by a citizen who had undergone an *atimia* (a total or partial disenfranchisement as a result of debt owed to the state), or when a decree was brought to the *Ecclesia* for deliberation without a prior *probouleuma* (a preliminary decree by the *Boule*, of which cf. Note 44, *supra*; but also Demosthenes, *Against Androtion*, Sec. 5-7, 24, 33, 69; *Against Neaera*, Sec. 5; Yunis 1988, 364-8)] or when a decree passed by the *Ecclesia* was deemed damaging to the interests of the Athenian people. In all cases, the person filing a *graphe paranomon* first took the *hypomosia* [a sworn testimony], after which he delivers a written statement of his accusation [where he also states the grounds for his charge] to one of the six *thesmothetai*. The case is then processed by the *thesmothetai*, who also performs an *anakrasis* (that is, a preliminary investigation) to ascertain the verities of the case at hand. When convinced of a ground for the charge, he transfers

the case formally to the *dikasteria* for adjudication, where a panel of 501 jurors are assigned to it [the number of jurors could increase by multiples of 500, depending on the nature of the *graphe*, cf. Note 49, *supra*; but also Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, Sec. 17, 22; Hansen 1991, 168]. If the proposal in question had already been passed by the *Ecclesia* into a decree, then a positive verdict from the *dikasteria* could render the said decree null and void. On the other hand, if the offending proposal was currently being debated in the *Ecclesia*, then this was put in abeyance until a decision was reached by the *dikasteria* (cf. Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 55; MacDowell 1978, 50; Hansen, 1987, 75-80; 1991, 207; Carawan 2007, 36-7; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book I, Chap. VII: Sec. 12-4) [Howbeit, the ideal sense of *graphe paranomon* was chiefly associated with the former case (where one moves to challenge the legality of an existing decree) whereas the latter (where one challenges a proposal currently being debated in the *Ecclesia*) was given the more unique name: *graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai* (that is, “public prosecutions against unsuitable laws”, cf. Hansen, 1987, 44-8; 1991, 166; Wolff 1970, 40-1). In this instance, Hannick (1981, 394-5; cf. also Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 11-4; Hansen, *loc. cit.*, 52; Schaefer 1887, 84; Wankel 1976, 13-4; Cloché 1937, 224) remarks that such proposals are automatically validated into decrees when they are upheld by the *dikasteria*, although the said proposals may not have yet been passed by the *Ecclesia*]. A verdict in favor of the accuser [that is, the person bringing forward the *graphe paranomon*] meant a fine for the defendant [that is, the mover of the unconstitutional proposal] and a reward [in monetary terms] for the accuser (cf. Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, Sec. 82; *Against Theocrines*, Sec. 1; Hyperides, *Against Athenogenes*, Sec. 6, 18) [also, the defendant receives a total and permanent *atimia* if he loses a *graphe paranomon* on three occasions (cf. Hyperides, *In the Defense of Euxenippus*, Sec. 11-2)]. On the other hand, a verdict in favor of the defendant meant a fine of 1000 drachmas for the accuser plus a possible *atimia* if less than a fifth of the jurors voted in his favor [to this end, it must be noted that the punishment for losing a *graphe paranomon* was made to be more stringent for the accuser than the defendant in order to ward off frivolous suits against one’s political rivals [of this, cf. Dillon 2004, 25; Sealey 1994, 128, esp. fn. 38; but also Professor Osborne 1985, 53, who asserts that one may usually choose to bring forward a *graphe* instead of a *dikai* charge because the former allows the accuser to court “public attention” by appearing before a greater number of jurors (cf. Note 49, *supra*, on the

number of sitting jurors for *graphai* and *dikai* cases)], but more so, to prevent “corrupt demagogues and sycophants” from inciting the *Ecclesia* into voting for an “unconstitutional decree” (cf. Hansen 1991, 207-8; but also Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 3-5, 16; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chap. XLIII: Sec. 4-5; Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*, Sec. 97; Bleicken 1984, 395-6). Succinctly put, the *graphe paranomon* placed “the control of social as well as political norms firmly in the hands of the sovereign people [acting through the agencies of the *Boule*, the *Ecclesia*, and the *dikasteria*],” and thereby provided “a statutory guarantee against the arbitrary violation of *nomos* in Athens” (cf. Ostwald 1986, 136, *emphasis added*; cf. other related references in Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LIX: Sec. 2; Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*, Sec. 1; *Against Aristogiton 1*, Sec. 8; *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 138; Wolff, *loc. cit.*, 13-4, 21, 46-8, 65; Jones 1957, 123; Roberts 1994, 44; Carey 1997, 180; Sinclair 1988, 153-4).

⁶² The *nomothetai* [i.e., law-setters, which is distinguished from *thesmothetai* by the simple fact that the latter are appointed from amongst the higher property classes whereas the former are selected by lot from amongst the *demos* (cf. also Note 42, *supra*, for the distinction between *nomos* and *thesmos*)] was a special legislative board established in Athens around 403/2 BC to oversee the enactment and review of laws [it is noteworthy to mention also that the *nomothetai* oversaw the codification of all Athenian laws (that is, those of Drakon and Solon, as well as all decrees and laws issued by the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*) into a single constitutional document (cf. Lysias, *Against Nicomachus*, Sec. 2, 25; Hansen 1991, 163; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 58]. The *nomothetai* comprised of all 500 *Bouleutai* plus 1001 *dikastes* selected at random from amongst the 6000 jurors that served in the *dikasteria* for the given year (cf. Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 19-23, 27-8; *Against Leptines*, Sec. 92-4; Ostwald 1986, 524; Sinclair 1988, 83-4; Freeman 2014, 267; Hansen 1991, 167-70; Sealey 1982, 301-2; MacDowell 1975, 63-5; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 25; Pettit 2012, 196; Fishkin [2018], 52, 204). Principally, the institution of *nomothetai* was created to allow for proposals to be thoroughly deliberated upon before they were passed into law [this was particularly instructive because laws were priorly passed (and existing laws abrogated) in the *Ecclesia* by a simple majority vote: a procedure which gave recourse to demagogues and sycophants to incite the *demos* into passing hasty legislations].

Thus, with the *nomothetai* firmly in place, the *Ecclesia* could only approve proposals which were then forwarded to the *nomothetai* for final passage into law [notwithstanding, the *Ecclesia* continued to pass *psēphismata*, which were decrees relating to specific, short-term policy matters, as opposed to laws passed by the *nomothetai* which were fundamental in scope, and intended to be applied on a more permanent basis] (cf. Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*, Sec. 92; Straumann 2016, 229; Ober 1989, 144; Schwartzberg 2004, 319-20; 2007, 58; Hansen [1979], 34-6, 41-2; Raaflaub 2007, 4). Any citizen intending to propose a new law or amend an existing law submitted his proposal in writing to the *Ecclesia*. This proposal was then read out at several meetings of the *Ecclesia*, and also displayed on public notices for all citizens to peruse for themselves. If the proposal receives a positive affirmation in the *Ecclesia*, it is forwarded to a meeting of the legislative board of *nomothetai* for final deliberations [but particularly, to consider the merits of the proposed law in depth, and to determine whether it conflicts with the provisions of other existing laws] where a simple majority vote [by show of hands, and not by secret ballot] in favor of the said proposal passes it into a law. Notwithstanding, to regulate the legislative powers of the *nomothetai*, three statutes were instituted to ensure that laws passed by the *nomothetai* were coherent in scope, and were in the best interest of Athenian citizens. According to Professor Hansen (1985, 346-7) these included: i) the repeal law, which could be initiated by any citizen who wished to have a law in the law code replaced by another (cf. *prima facie* evidence in Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 33); ii) the review law, which is performed annually by the *Ecclesia* to review inconsistencies and redundancies in any of the laws contained in the four law code categories [these four law groups, as espoused by Professor Hansen (1991, 165; cf. also *Demosthenes, loc. cit.*, Sec. 20-3) included: i) general laws (that is, laws passed by the *Ecclesia*); ii) laws within the jurisdiction of the *Boule*; iii) laws within the jurisdiction of the nine archons; iv) laws within the jurisdiction of other magistrates]. In the event where any such inconsistencies are found, they are forwarded to the *nomothetai* for the necessary correction (cf. MacDowell 1978, 48-9); iii) the inspection law, where a special legal committee is assigned the task of inspecting laws passed by the *nomothetai* to address any seeming conflicts between new and existing laws (cf. documentary evidence in Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 38-40) [to these three statutes, MacDowell (1975, 63-6) adds the following two: i) the old legislation law, which allowed for a new law

that conflicted with an existing law to be repealed via a *graphe* motion, and another law to be ratified in its stead by the *nomothetai*; ii) the new legislation law, which replaced the old legislation law after 307 BC and redefined the procedures for reviewing existing laws by the *Ecclesia*. Howbeit, Rhodes (1985, 56) and Professor Hansen (*loc. cit.*, 346) have argued to the contrary, asserting that these two additions are unwarranted because they are absorbed respectively under the provisions of the repeal law and review law (cf. additional remarks to this end by Kremmydas 2012, 28-30).

⁶³ This was done with the sole purpose of “democratizing” the Areopagus Council [as ex-archons were automatically admitted to the Council as life members], but more also, to enhance popular sovereignty by giving deserving members of the *demos* [but particularly members of the lower property classes, although restrictions to political participation continued to apply to the *thetes* class] equal opportunity of becoming archons in Athens, and thereby assuming the reins of political leadership [according to Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 2), the *zeugitai* were nominated to the preliminary list of forty candidates (which previously was restricted to the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis*) from which the nine archons of Athens were selected by lot (cf. Note 21, *supra*)]. This reform somehow consolidated popular government in Athens as the *demos* were now able to participate fully in the workings of all three branches of Athenian government namely: the *Ecclesia*, the *magistracy* [which also included the *Boule*], and the *dikasteria* (cf. Ostwald [1986], 22, 50, 184; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 2; Hignett 1952, 225; Asmonti 2014, 114; Raaflaub 2006, 417; Crawford and Whitehead 1983, 241).

⁶⁴ This reform was a further boost to popular sovereignty in Athens. And the rationale appears apparent: the nine archons were largely drawn from the top two property classes [and only now had the *zeugitai* been granted admission thereunto] whereas the 6000 jurors that comprised the *dikasteria* were drawn, without restriction, from all four property classes. This move therefore was designed to grant the *demos* [rather than a privileged class of wealth and birth elites] greater jurisdiction in the affairs of the state. As rightly espoused by Professor Ostwald (1986, 50, *emphasis added*), “by extending to judicial proceedings the *isonomia* that Cleisthenes had given the people in legislative matters, he [*that is, Ephialtes*] created popular sovereignty, which was justly called *demokratia*.” More also, Rhodes (1972, 204; cf. also Roberts 1998, 48) is

of the view that this change may have evolved “naturally and gradually” [rather than enforced “abruptly by decree”] from the democratic changes that were made to the Areopagus Council and the *Heliaia*, and may only have been confirmed into law after it became an established practice [in effect, the Athenian people had now become so accustomed to having cases tried by the *dikasteria* that they were more willing to appeal to and appear before a panel of jurors (selected democratically from amongst the *demos*), than before an archon (selected exclusively from a pool of wealthy elites; cf. also Note 49, *supra*; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 33-4, for added comments on the *demos* preference for having cases tried by the *dikasteria*].

⁶⁵ Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, from the district of Cholargus, was an Athenian *strategos*, democrat, and “natural leader of the Athenian people” [as designated by Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Book II, Chap. LXV: Sec. 9, cf. also Sec. 1, 4, 8; but cf. Socrates’ critique of him as a ‘wild’ leader who only spurred the people on to “kick, butt, and bite” in Plato, *Gorgias*, Sec. 516a-d; for a summary detail of Pericles’ birth and life, cf. Tracy 2009, 14-5] who had priorly assisted Ephialtes in reforming and reconstituting the Areopagus Council. In 451 BC, he followed up on Ephialtes’ reforms by introducing a daily pay [*misthos*] of 2 obols [which was equivalent to the bare subsistence means of an adult male] to jurors for their services in the *dikasteria* (cf. Loomis 1998, 9-10; Grote 1854, 121-2; Patriquin 2015, 47; Martin 2000, 113; Thorley, *loc. cit.*, 56; Buckley 1996, 184; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 88, 300, 694; Ostwald [1986], 82-3, 225; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. LXIX: Sec. 2; Gygas 2016, 157; but Pantel 1992, 196 is of the view that the *misthos* was more of a ‘counter-gift’ for jury service than it was a salary). The rationale for instituting this *misthos* for *dikastes* was to encourage members of the *thetes* class to avail themselves for jury service [Harding (2015, 15) informs that the lowest pay grade in Athens during the fourth century was that of unskilled laborers who were paid 3 obols for a day’s service. Thus, Professor Ostwald (*loc. cit.*, 182; cf. also Shaffern 2009, 34; Howard 2010, 31) adjoins that the *misthos* was necessary to “assure even the poorest Athenian that he would not completely forfeit a day’s earning by serving as a juror in the *dikasteria*. Howbeit, Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 2-4; cf. also corroborating remarks by Lyttkens and Gerding 2018, 77-8; Inamura 2015, 207-8; Keaney 1992, 126; Hignett 1952, 342-3; Rhodes 1981, 340-2) has argued rather persuasively that Pericles’

original intent for introducing the *misthos* was to offset and counteract the munificence (*euergesia*) of his rival Cimon [as it were, Cimon, who was a wealthy aristocrat, generously gave to the poor and by so doing brought the common people in subjection to him. Pericles, on the other hand, thought it better to distribute a form of remuneration (from the surpluses of the state) to the poor so that they too could subsist on their own resources and not have to rather solicit patronage from wealthy families]. Plutarch (*Pericles*, Chap. XII: Sec. 5-6, *emphasis added*) however maintains the view that the *misthos*, like the *Periclean building program*, was introduced to induce the elderly and others who *for one reason or another* were unable to avail themselves for war to participate decently as citizens in the daily affairs of the state [of which, Gygax, *loc. cit.*, 158, adjoins succinctly that: “public money was used to help the poorest citizens [...] in a way that made them servants of the polis rather than objects of charity;” cf. also a corroborating remark by Jones (1952, 124; but also Xenophon, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. I: Sec. 16-8; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 231; *Knights*, Sec. 255) who asseverates that “fifth-century *Athenian* juries consisted chiefly of old men from the lower classes to whom the prospect of earning some extra money by listening to juicy gossip proved irresistible.” Although this *misthos* was later increased by Cleon [*Pericles’ successor*] to 3 obols and endured until the latter parts of the fourth century (cf. Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 220, 223; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 240-4, 1117-21; *Knights*, Sec. 41, 51, 255-7, 797-8, 800; Pritchard 2015, 53-5), it was greatly opposed in the days of Pericles as a counterproductive measure. For instance, in Plato’s *Gorgias* (Sec. 515e; cf. also Martin 2016, 215; Tangian 2014, 21), Socrates argued against Callicles that the introduction of *misthos* for *dikastes* “corrupted Athenians into becoming lazy, cowardly, talkative, and greedy” [on the subject matter of greed, cf. the parallel account of Aristophanes (*Wasps*, Sec. 1358-60, *emphasis added*) who narrates an account where appeals were made to jurors to confiscate *unjustly* the property of an accused, urging that such measure would increase the revenues from which jurors got paid;” cf. also a similar narration by Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 5; cf. also Roisman 2011, 278) of the trial of Anytus where the latter succeeded in bribing his way through the court and was acquitted, although he had willfully lost Pylos to the Spartans]. Furthermore, Xenophon in his *Athenian Constitution* (Chap. I: Sec. 1, 13; cf. also Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 225-6) intimates that the *misthos* only tended to induce jurors “to care more for what

was to the people's advantage [which ultimately was to their own advantage] than for what was just." As such, said he, the *demos* tended to fare better than the elites under the democratic system but also grew the more ignorant, undisciplined and mischievous. Nevertheless, Durant (1966, 249) has vehemently argued to the contrary that it is superfluous to assume that the modest sums paid to *dikastes* could have weakened and corrupted the moral fiber of Athenians, for if such were the case, then "every state that pays its judges or jurymen would long since have been destroyed." Furthermore, Van Hook (1919, 485-6) corroborates this viewpoint by adjoining that the *misthos* for *dikastes* was neither intended as "a sop to placate the discontented and starving proletariat" nor yet "a living wage," but was rather construed as "a mere contribution intended to promote the participation of all Athenians, and not only the well-to-do, in civic affairs" [cf. also a related statement by Ferguson (1963, 64) who remarks that Pericles' "sought to establish political (but not economic) equality in Athens: to enable all, irrespective of wealth or station, to use the opportunities and face the obligations that democracy brought in its train"].

⁶⁶ In 451/0 BC, Pericles famously passed a law [the Periclean Citizenship Law (PCL)] through the *Ecclesia* which confined citizenship rights only to person born to two Athenian parents [whereas previously it had sufficed for one born to at least one Athenian parent to acquire citizenship (of this, cf. Blok 2009, 146-7)] (on PCL, cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 3; *Politics*, Book III, Sec. 1278a; Plutarch, *Pericles*, Chap. XXXVII: Sec. 3-4; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, Book VI, Chap. X: Sec. 1, Book XIII, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 1; Blok 2017, 1-3; Philochoros, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Book III/b, Nr. 328: Frag. 35a; Kennedy 2014, 14-6; Krateros, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Book III/b, Nr. 328: Frag. 4; cf. also Kamen 2013, 62-5, for the various conditions under which persons were denied citizenship by the PCL). Regarding Pericles' intent for passing this law, a few salient reasons have been proffered thus far. For instance, Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, *ibid.*) surmises that the law was intended to curtail the ever-increasing number of citizens in Athens. This was particularly instructive because, as noted by Lambert (1998, 43), the rise of Athens as an imperial power in the 470s and the strengthening of democratic structures therein attracted many foreigners into the state who easily acquired citizenship through intermarriages with Athenians (cf. esp. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap.

II: Sec. 6; but also Raaflaub 1998, 29; Ruschenbusch 1979, 83-4; Rhodes 1981, 333-4; Ste Croix 2004, 247; Davis 1977, 107) [cf. thus Aristotle (*Politics*, Book III, Sec. 1276a) who noted that cities tend to define citizenship generously when short of men, but straitly when the opposite is the case; cf. also Carawan 2008, 389-91, who draws attention to the fact that the expansion of the Athenian empire enabled many Athenian men to emigrate from Attica and to acquire foreign wives in other Greek cities, thereby producing children that were considered “undesirable citizens of Athens” (because they had not been birthed on Athenian soil)]. Thus, under the popular notion of “Athens for Athenians,” the PCL sought to retain the rights and privileges that came along with citizenship [which included, amid others, *misthos* for public service, ability to acquire and own property in Athens, ability to file a *graphe* or *dikai* suit in the *dikasteria*] to “full-born Athenians” only [that is, to persons born to two Athenian parents (cf. Davies 1977, 106; Hansen 1991, 38; Carey 2017, 48-9; Hornblower 1983, 35-6; regarding *misthos* for public service, cf. an argument to the contrary by Professor Hansen (1991, 130-2) who maintains that because a fixed quorum of 6000 male citizens was required for important decisions in the *Ecclesia*, and also that only 6000 and 500 of the same were selected by lot each year to serve respectively in the *dikasteria* and the *Boule*, an increase in the number of citizens would have had no direct impact on the *misthos* paid for public service, as these numbers would have remained the same “regardless of whether the population size was 50,000 male citizens or 30,000”]. More so, because Athenian citizens earned the right to partake directly in policy decisions, law-making, and judicial functions in Athens, Humphreys (1974, 84; cf. also Golden 1990, 169-70; Davies 1971, 302-5) asseverates that the PCL was necessary to obstruct the practice where, owing to marriage alliances with ‘foreign friends,’ sympathies, loyalties, and connections were created which skewed rational Athenian policy in many directions [cf. also an interesting supposition by Isaac (2004, 117), that the PCL was directed *particularly* at marriages between Athenian heiresses and foreign men in order to prevent the latter from gaining control over Athenian properties; and also Professor Osborne 1997, 6-7, who remarks that such external marriage alliances [citing the cases of Peisistratos and Cleisthenes, who both solicited foreign military support to establish their reign in Athens, of which cf. (Note 33, 40, *supra*)] gave foreign aristocratic families unprecedented leeway [though unjustly] to influence and intervene in the democratic politics of the city). Another rationale cited for the PCL relates to the

desire to maintain ethnic homogeneity in Athens. A passage from the popular play *Erechtheus* by Euripides [(Frag. 360, qtd. in Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, Sec. 100; cf. also similar narrations by Lysias, *Funeral Oration*, Sec. 17; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 1075-80; Euripides, *Ion*, Sec. 587-92; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. XXXVI: Sec. 1; as well as the procedure of *sunoikismos* by King Theseus, where the early Athenians expressed grave unwillingness to dwell together with persons from other Greek cities (cf. Note 3, *supra*)] describes Athenians as “an autochthonous people” who, unlike other communities, “were not introduced from elsewhere.” Euripides (*Erechtheus*, *ibid.*) then goes on to narrate that “someone who settles in one city from another is like a peg ill-fitted in a piece of wood - a *politês* in name, but not in his actions” [a *politês* in this sense referring to one that merely resides in a *polis*, and not necessarily one that is politically active therein, cf. also Isaac (*loc. cit.*, 115) who associates autochthony with the values of “mutual solidarity” and “social equality;” and Thucydides (*op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. XVII: Sec. 4) who referred to the mixed population of Sicily as a motley people because they were “never of one mind in counsel and incapable of any concert in action;” but cf. the antithesis by Gomme (1956, 93) who avers that “Attica remained longest free from internal strife because [...] the same people always inhabited the land;” cf. also the corroborating observation by Rosivach (1987, 297-301), that autochthony has preserved political equality amongst Athenian citizens, and has guaranteed the superiority of even the lowest Athenian citizen to any non-citizen”]. It seemed therefore that a foreigner (*xenoi*), even after marriage to an Athenian, was not fully considered an *astos* [that is, a citizen by birth with full *legal* and *participatory* rights], nor were their children regarded [in practice, but not in theory] as *Athenaios* [that is, one that had a share (*metechein*) in the polis] (cf. esp. Euripides, *Ion*, 289-97, 670-5; but also Blok 2005, 30-1; Osborne 1981, 15-6; Cohen 2000, 70-8, 85-7). As such, Pericles may have succeeded in passing his citizenship law through the *Ecclesia* because the ideal of ‘ethnic exclusivity’ may have been one that already resonated with many Athenians (cf. Boegehold 1994, 59, who remarks that the PCL may have “answered to a popular pre-existing mistrust of marriages with non-Athenians; cf. also Hignett 1952, 346, who assert that marriages with non-citizens [particularly with non-Greeks] were viewed by Athenians as a “debasement of their racial purity”). More also, it may have behooved Athens to guard herself against such “foreign citizens” who were unlikely to maintain the same level of loyalty to the city,

particularly in times of war, as would Athenians, but rather, as intimated by Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Sec. 3, *emphasis added*), may assay to “pillage *for themselves* from the common stock *of the city* by arts of speech or party violence,” or as put differently by Isaac (*loc. cit.*, 119), “may seek material gain for themselves at the expense of their new homeland;” cf. also Bakewell (2013, 34-5, *emphasis added*) who surmises that the PCL may have been intended to “restrict *metic* political activity” because “non-citizens could not be trusted to subordinate their own interests to *those of Athens* [...] nor speak and listen *in the Ecclesia* like Athenians”. In addition to the arguments on autochthony, scholars have cited xenophobia towards *metics* as a possible rationale for the PCL in Athens. For instance, Xenophon in his *Athenian Constitution* (Chap. I: Sec. 12) avers that “Athens has set up equality between bondmen and freemen and between *metics* and citizens,” and elsewhere (*loc. cit.*, Chap. II: Sec. 8) asseverates that “[...] whereas most Greeks speak their own dialect and have their own customs and dress, Athenians notwithstanding appear the only Greeks to use a combination from the whole Greek and barbarian world” [barbarian in this sense denoting all non-Greeks (cf. Kahn 2011, 9; Christie 1792, 130; Saïd 2002, 68; Kuper 2005, 20-2; but also the words of the Apostle Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians, where he ascribes the term to persons who are alien to a particular language of focus: “Therefore if I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto me” (cf. KJV Bible, *1 Corinthians*, Chap. XIV, Vrs. 11); of the negative connotations of the term, cf. Koselleck 2004, 161, who submits that barbarians were perceived as “cowardly, unskillful, gluttonous, and brutish;” and also Hall 1989, 2, who remarks that barbarians were “portrayed as the opposite of the ideal Greek”)]. More also, Isaac (*loc. cit.*, 118) adjoins that “the notion of being indigenous was used by Athenians as justification for keeping immigrants in an inferior position” [cf. also Davies (1977, 111) who remarks that the fear of foreigners generated varied forms of “obsessions, anxieties, and insecurities amongst Athenians”]. In view of these developments, it may have been the case that the PCL was enacted to give impetus to a covert form of discrimination against *metics*, but more also to reassure Athenians of their rights and entitlements to their homeland [cf. esp. Pericles’ Funeral Oration (in Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. XXXVII: Sec. 1) where he submits that “Athenian citizens (that is, *astos* citizens) are distinguished from all others by virtue of merit, and not of privilege;” cf.

also Professor Osborne (*loc. cit.*, 11) who adjoins that the PCL worked to bar foreigners from ever exercising undue influence over the politics of Athens]. Nevertheless, Lape (2004, 70-1) has argued persuasively on the virtues of the PCL, asserting that the law “invested marriage and the family with new significance” by making *astos* women “the sole bearers of legitimate children and citizens in Athens” [the institution of marriage is particularly noteworthy because children borne out of wedlock by two Athenians were likewise deemed illegitimate (*nothoi*) and denied citizenship; of this, cf. Ogden (1996, 15-7; but also Podlecki 1998, 159-61; and Lape 2010, 133, who submits that the legal meaning of bastardy was thus expanded by the PCL in order to make conception by two married *astos* the sole means of legitimate citizenship in Athens;” cf. also a corroborating remark by Vernant (1974, 50, *emphasis added*) who notes that the PCL transformed family life in Athens in that matrimonial unions no longer were a pretext for establishing relationships of power between great autonomous families, but became instead the means by which the permanence of Athens was safeguarded by means of the constant reproduction of *astos* citizens (cf. also Lacey 1968, 100-6; Murphy 2013, 52). Thus, when challenged of his citizenship status before the *dikasteria*, Euxitheos affirmed cogently to his accuser Eubulides that he was indeed an Athenian citizen because he has been borne to *astos* parents on both sides and has also received his lot (*kleros*) of the family property (cf. Demosthenes, *Against Eubulides*, Sec. 46)]. Additionally, Professor Osborne (*loc. cit.*, 32) espouses that the PCL “brought Athenian wives and mothers into the public eye” in that “men could secure their claim to citizenship only by advertising that their wives and mothers conformed to the ideals of Athenian womanhood, and that their homes were models of domestic restraint, unsullied by the exotic.” Furthermore, with the passing of the PCL, women came to be frequently represented in Athenian funeral monuments [particularly in the iconography of white-ground *lekythoi* (which were oil flasks that were deposited in graves) and grave *stelai* (which were stone-carved depictions of deceased persons) whereas previously they were underrepresented, if not unrepresented, in this wise [it is noteworthy to mention also that such representations on funeral monuments signified status and virtue in Athens, cf. Osborne (*loc. cit.*, 30). As such, the increase in women representations on funeral monuments indicated a parallel increase in the status and value of women in Athens. So, for instance, Euripides, in his play *Medea* (Sec. 250-1) represents the man and woman as joint

promoters of the permanence of the city: the man as defending the future of the city by his standing in line for battle, and the woman as providing the future citizens of the city by her bearing the pains of childbirth] (on statistical data comparing fifth and fourth century representations of women on funeral monuments, cf. Richter 1961, 54; Ridgway 1970, 45-8, 51; Lissarrague 1988, 102; Osborne, *loc. cit.*, 12-8). But perhaps the most significant hallmark of the PCL was that it allowed the Athenian *demos* to decide for themselves who was and was not to enjoy citizenship and the privileges that went along with it [that is, the PCL only defined the rules for citizenship in Athens, but its enforcement was left to the *demos*. As such, any Athenian citizen could file a *graphe* suit against a fellow citizen if the former had reason to believe that the latter was not a legal Athenian citizen. More also, such *graphe* cases were only adjudicated by the *dikasteria* which was composed of citizens from all four property classes] (cf. Ostwald 1986, 182-3; Patterson 1981, 104-7). So, for instance, Plutarch (*loc. cit.*, Sec. 4, *emphasis added*; but cf. also parallel accounts in Philochoros, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Book III/b, Nr. 328: Frag. 119; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Sec. 718) reports that when the Egyptian King Psammetichus donated 40,000 measures of grain to Athens for distribution to its citizens, there was a “great crop of prosecutions by *astos citizens* against *fellow* citizens of illegal birth [that is, persons not borne by two *astos* parents, according to the law of Pericles] who had *until then* escaped notice and had been overlooked.” On this account, some 5000 citizens of illegal birth were prosecuted by the *dikasteria* and sold as bondmen cf. Roisman 2011, 279; Garnsey 1988, 125-6; Podlecki, *loc. cit.*, 87) [howbeit, the PCL did not take a retrospective effect, so that persons borne by single *astos* parents prior to the promulgation of the law did not lose their citizenship. So for instance, Cimon who was the son of a Thracian princess retained his citizenship and position as *strategos* of Athens until 450 BC (cf. Plutarch, *Cimon*, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 1; on the nonretroactivity of the PCL, cf. also Rhodes 1981, 332-4; Blok 2009, 146, 149; Ogden, *loc. cit.*, 63; Abbott 1892, 412-3].

⁶⁷ The Athenian *Ecclesia* voted to send a massive naval fleet [this was the greatest ever naval fleet in Athenian history to have set sail from Greece on a military expedition] to Sicily in large part because they were zealously convinced of absolute success and triumph by the *strategos* Alcibiades. In his impassionate rhetoric to the State Assembly, Alcibiades intimated that a naval victory against the island of Sicily

would not only enrich Athens [because they would therewith have conquered and possessed the prosperous city of Syracuse], but would more so prevent the Sicilian cities from aiding Sparta in the event of a future war with Athens [it is noteworthy to mention that the *strategos* Nicias vehemently withstood Alcibiades in this quest, arguing to the contrary before the *Ecclesia* that such military expedition was too tedious (because of the greatness of the island and the multitude of people living therein), and expensive (considering the fact that Athens was then at war with Sparta in the Peloponnese) for Athens to embark upon at such a time (cf. Plutarch, *Nicias*, Chap. XII: Sec. 3-4, Chap. XVII: Sec. 1-3, *Alcibiades*, Chap. XII: Sec. 1-2, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 2)]. As it turned out, Alcibiades led the *Ecclesia* in the wrong direction, and Athens should probably have exercised restraint and prudence as cautioned by Nicias [howbeit the Athenian *Ecclesia* sought to curtail the zeal of Alcibiades by subordinating him under Nicias, who was named chief general of the expedition, accounting perhaps that the latter's level-headedness coupled with the former's enthusiasm were the right blend of virtues needed for success in the expedition (cf. esp. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 1)]. Thus, the historian Thucydides writing about the expedition in his *Peloponnesian War* (Book VI, Chap. I: Sec. 1; cf. also Ferguson 1935, 310; Busolt 1904, 1400) recounts that Athens was defeated therein because she had underestimated the geographical size and military prowess of Sicily [which was allied with Sparta, and from whom it received valuable military reinforcements during the siege by Athens] and had over-relied on the strength of her own military armada and those of her allies [but particularly of Segesta, which had promised Athens huge financial aid should the latter assist her in waging war against Selinus, a rival city off the southern coast of Sicily (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. VI: Sec. 2; Andocides, *On the Peace*, Chap. III: Sec. 30)]. More also, Buckley (1996, 407; cf. also Ostwald 1986, 337; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VII, Chap. XV: Sec. 1; *loc. cit.*, Chap. XVI: Sec. 2) notes that after the expedition suffered initial naval defeats in Sicily, the Athenian *Ecclesia*, instead of "cutting their losses and getting out of Sicily" chose rather to increase their stakes by sending out a second lavish relief force under the *stratego*i Demosthenes and Eurymedon, in the vain hope of capturing the island of Syracuse and thereby maintaining Athens' imperial dominance in Greece.

⁶⁸ The appointment of a board of preliminary councilors [Greek: *probouloi*] was necessitated by the fact that the *Ecclesia* had priorly harkened to demagogic appeals to send Athenian *triremes* on an ill-advised expedition to Syracuse. Following the overwhelming defeat of Athens in this escapade, the *probouloi* [which was a body of elderly Athenian statesmen] was created to carefully screen subject items that passed on to the *Boule* and *Ecclesia* for deliberation, so as to prevent a similar incidence from occurring in the future (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. I: Sec. 3). But besides this role, the *probouloi*, according to Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Sec. 4), served as preliminary advisors in emergency situations where the *demos*, owing to the ‘panic of the moment’ [or, because a large number of *hoplites* were on military duty overseas and could not be present for deliberations in the *Ecclesia*, as evidenced in the time of Ephialtes, who took advantage of such an instance to stir up a depleted Assembly into stripping the Areopagus Council of its regulatory and supervisory powers (of this, cf. Note 52, 54, *supra*)] are unable to arrive at level-headed decisions in the *Ecclesia*. Howbeit, Aristotle in his *Politics* (Book IV, Sec. 1299b) surmises that if a *probouloi* composed of a few appointed statesmen [verily, a small number is ideal in this respect because a large number may only tend to encumber the work of the Councilors, particularly with regards to achieving consensus in deliberations and decisions] that was oligarchic in nature [of this, cf. Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, Book III, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 5-6; Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, Sec. 420-3, 590-610; Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes*, Sec. 65] was a way of ensuring that decisions by the *Ecclesia* [which was the epitome, *par excellence*, of Athenian popular sovereignty] were prudent and rational [cf. also the remarks by Plutarch (*Solon*, Chap. XIX: Sec. 1-2) who asseverates that Solon originally instituted the *Boule* “to prevent the people from damaging the constitution”], then it may be the case that less democracy led to greater prudence in decision making.

⁶⁹ The circumstances that led the Athenian *Ecclesia* to supplant the city’s thriving democracy with an oligarchy in 411 BC are all too well documented. In 413 BC, Sparta, taking advantage of the loss to Athenian men and military equipment in the Sicilian expedition, and acting upon the advice of Alcibiades [who, although being one of the three *strategos* of the Sicilian expedition (the other two being Nicias and Lamachus), had deserted the fleet and defected to Sparta, when he was recalled by Athens to answer questions concerning an act of religious sacrilege believed to have

been committed by him before the expedition to Sicily: fearing he may not receive a fair hearing at Athens, and so may lose his life as a consequence (cf. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, Chap. XX: Sec. 2-3)], installed a garrison in Deceleia [a major city in northeastern Attica] to restrict agricultural supplies by land into Athens [that is, agricultural produce brought in to Athens from Euboea by the way of Oropus through Deceleia. But more also, the incessant incursions and raids made on Athenian landed estate by the Spartan troops stationed at Deceleia generally discouraged agricultural activity and enterprise amongst the local people (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VII, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 3-4; cf. also *loc. cit.*, Chap. XIX: Sec. 1-2; Buckley, *loc. cit.*, 408)]. As a result, Athens had to resort to importing its food supplies by sea at great economic cost, particularly because of the sinuous circuit the route makes about the promontory of Sunium (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. XXVIII: Sec. 1-2, 4; Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, Chap. XXIII: Sec. 2). Furthermore, a total of over 20,000 bondmen that worked the silver mines at Laurion escaped and sought refuge in the Spartan camp at Deceleia, resulting in huge revenue losses for Athens (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 5; but also *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. XCI: Sec. 7). In the face of these economic downturns, and with many Athenians [but particularly the influential *hoplites*] already beginning to lose faith in the primacy of the present radical democracy, the Athenian *Ecclesia* was compelled to approve a proposal by a coordinated group of *hetaireiai* (upper-class social clubs) for state power to be placed in the hands of a few elderly individuals (cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LIV: Sec. 4). It is noteworthy to mention however that although the *hetaireiai* employed democratic means to effect this change [that is, by arguing their rationale for an oligarchy before the *Ecclesia* (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Sec. 2)], they also resorted to depredating tactics such as intimidation and violence to instill fear in the Athenian *demos* so that their proposal is met with least resistance in the Assembly (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. LXVI: Sec. 1-2). Principal amongst the rationale proffered by Peisander (the leader of the *hetaireiai* coalition) for an oligarchic rule in Athens [it is noteworthy to mention that Peisander wilily refrained from employing the term ‘oligarchy’ to describe the new form of government but stated equivocally that it was “a different form of democracy,” of which the Athenian *demos* could at any time overturn (and replace with the old system of democracy) when they deemed fit] was that such was the only means by which a bilateral pact with Persia could be

effectively realized and sustained [that is, financial aid from Persia was desperately needed by Athens to revive her staggering economy and rebuild her depleted military. Notwithstanding, the Persians were less willing to enter into a league with Athens whilst the latter remained a democracy (probably because the system allowed too many people to partake in decision- and policy making), but preferred instead an oligarchy, as Sparta, where a few individuals were in charge of state power. But it must also be noted that Peisander proposed for Athens to be governed by an oligarchy because he thought this would in some way appeal to the Spartan King Agis (who was presently stationed at the garrison in Deceleia) so he would come to terms with Athens and lessen his hold on the city (cf. for instance, the peace appeal made by Athens (under the new Oligarchy) to King Agis where they signified that “it was better and more reasonable for the King to treat with them than he might before *had done* with the inconstant commons [i.e., the previous democracy]” in Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LXX: Sec. 2, *emphasis added*; but also, *loc. cit.*, Chap. LXXI: Sec. 3, Chap. XC: Sec. 2)]. More particularly, Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Chap. LIII: Sec. 3, Chap. LIV: Sec. 1, *emphasis added*) quotes Peisander’s argument [before the *Ecclesia*] as follows: “[...] this [*that is, a league with Persia, being negotiated through Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of Lydia and Caria*] you cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation and bring the power into the hands of a few that the king may rely upon us. And we deliberate at this time, not so much about the form as about the preservation of the state; for if you dislike the form, you may change it again hereafter. [*And*] the people, hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously at first; but when Peisander had proved evidently that there was no other way of safety, in the end, partly for fear, and partly because they hoped again to change the government, they yielded thereunto.”

⁷⁰ Thucydides’ (*op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LXVII: Sec. 1) account of ‘ten commissioners’ contrasts with that of Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 2) who informs that twenty commissioners were appointed by the Oligarchy in addition to the ten *probouloi* priorly appointed in 415 BC [so that, according to him, a total of thirty *probouloi* were altogether employed about the matter].

⁷¹ The thirty *probouloi* [if Aristotle’s account is to be employed] were only able to come up with one proposal on the new constitution: which was that the *graphe*

paranommon procedure should be suspended to allow anyone the freedom to propose whatsoever he wanted, without the fear of prosecution [Buckley (1996, 414-5) notes that the *probouloi* were only able to agree on this one proposal because they were unable to agree amongst themselves on the desired form of the new constitution. Nevertheless, the suspension of the *graphe paranomon* meant that the new Oligarchs could pass unconstitutional motions through the *Ecclesia* with little fear of retraction by the *demos*]. With the *probouloi* unable to come up with a substantive proposal for the new constitution, Peisander proceeded to lay before the *Ecclesia* his idea of a governing Council of Four Hundred. As avidly recounted by Thucydides (*op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. LXVII: Sec. 3), five men were to be chosen as presidents, and these were then to collectively choose a 100 others, who in turn would each choose three men, thus making a total of 400 *Bouleutai* [or 405, if the presidents are to be reckoned. The new Oligarchs further claimed that a Council of Four Hundred was particularly ideal for Athens because it was as the ancestral constitution priorly established by Solon, cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXI: Sec. 1; on Solon's Council of Four Hundred, cf. Note 24, *supra*. More also, Buckley (*loc. cit.*, 408) notes oligarchic element in the new government by recounting that the appointed *Bouleutai* had permanent membership to the *Boule* and were unaccountable to the *Ecclesia* for their decisions and actions]. Elsewhere (*loc. cit.*, Chap. LXV: Sec. 3; cf. also Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 5), Thucydides informs that this Council of 400 dissolved and reconstituted the existing *Ecclesia* by electing a new class of 5,000 persons from the top three property classes [thus, a far cry from the previous democracy where the Assembly constituted of 6,000 persons chosen by lot from all four property classes. Additionally, it was decreed (cf. Thucydides, *ibid.*) that "no one should receive *misthos* for public service, except those serving in the war," thus discouraging the participation of the *thetes* in the affairs of the city]. Buckley (*loc. cit.*, 418) further informs that this new Assembly of 5,000 "existed only in name" and were "consulted as little as possible" by the Council of 400 [Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Chap. XCII: Sec. 11) notes the rationale of the Oligarchic Council for doing so: "because they thought that sharing power with so many as 5000 people would be outright democracy"]. Notwithstanding, the existing *Ecclesia* accepted Peisander's motion [although not willfully, but out of fear and intimidation, as Peisander's *hetaireiai* had actively coerced and threatened certain of the *demos* into acquiescing to their plan. Howbeit, Buckley (*loc. cit.*, 407) has surmised

that a probable reason why the Athenian *Ecclesia* acquiesced unresistingly to Peisander's motion was because it had "lost confidence in its own ability, through its democratic institutions, to make headways in the war against Sparta," although Steiner (1994, 186, *emphasis added*), quoting Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Chap. LXVI: Sec. 3-4; cf. also corroborating remarks by Isocrates, *Antidosis*, Sec. 172; Euripides, *The Suppliants*, Sec. 438-9; Cohen 2000, 106) believes on the contrary that this was due to a breakdown of face-to-face communication amongst the members of the *Ecclesia*: "the Athenians were unable to oppose the oligarchs and to organize any counteraction on account of the size of the city and their ignorance of one another. (*Ideally*) what prohibits a coordinated response is the silence of citizens (*who are*) fearful of addressing someone whom they do not know, or whom they know but do not trust;" cf. also a similar assertion by Professor Robert Dahl (1967, 963) that because deliberations took the form of orations in the *Ecclesia*, it may have been the case that most Athenian citizens never did once speak *directly* to their fellow citizens in the Assembly] and overwhelmingly voted to hand over state power to the new Oligarchy [Aristotle (*op. cit.*, Chap. XXXII: Sec. 1; cf. also Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. LXIX: Sec. 4; Lintott 1982, 135-7) narrates that the new Council of 400, upon receiving the people's mandate to rule, went hurriedly to the *Boule* with an armed gang and paid off the existing democratic Council of 500 for the rest of their service terms, and sent them home]. Howbeit, the Oligarchy of 400 were unable to deliver on their promise of securing the patronage of the Persian King Darius. More also, a series of shadowy dealings with Sparta made the Athenian *demos* to suspect that the Four Hundred were indeed plotting to betray the city [of these dealings with Sparta, cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. LXX: Sec. 2, Chap. XC: Sec. 2, Chap. XCI: Sec. 3; Rutishauser 2012, 127-8; but also Buckley, *loc. cit.*, 416-20, for an elaborate exposé of the same]. As such, the 'moderates' of the *demos* [these were sections of the *demos* opposed to either 'extreme oligarchy' or 'radical democracy;' the preeminent figures amongst them were Theramenes and Aristocrates], together with an army of Athenian soldiers [led by the generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus] stationed at Samos [these were wholly in favor of Cleisthenes' democracy but had only acceded to the Oligarchy because the latter had promised that the elected *Ecclesia* of 5,000 would play an active role in the new government, and also that in future, members of the *Boule* of 400 would be selected on a rotational basis from the 5,000, cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. XCIII: Sec. 2]

joined forces together [Fuks (1953, 107-13) in his seminal work *The Ancestral Constitution* asseverates that the efforts by the Athenian *demos* to oppose the Oligarchy was hinged on a prevailing conception of *patrios politeia*, which Ostwald (1986, 367, *emphasis added*) succinctly defines as a “fear of danger to the (*radical*) democracy (*posed*) by imminent tyranny, (*and revealed through the imposition of*) antidemocratic decrees and laws [*which run contrary to the ancestral provisions of liberty and sovereignty established by Solon and Cleisthenes*];” cf. also Roberts 1994, 59-61; Shear 2012, 277-8; Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae*, Sec. 336-9, 357-8; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXXIV: Sec. 3, for related conceptions of the *patrios politeia*. In this wise, Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Chap. LXXXIX: Sec. 1-2, *emphasis added*) narrates that “(...) the people (in a fair exhibition of *patrios politeia*) organized themselves into groups and began to criticize how the state was being run (...) proclaiming that it was necessary for the Five Thousand to exist in reality and not just in name, and that a fairer constitution should be established”] to oust the Oligarchy, after only four months of rule in Athens (cf. Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, Chap. XCVII: Sec. 1-2; Quinn 1981, 19; Patriquin 2015, 33-4). Thereafter the government was placed in the hands of the elected 5,000 which in turn elected a new Council of 500 (cf. esp. the decree of Demophantus, where mention is made of a *Boule* of 500 “not chosen by lot,” as distinct from the previous *Boule* of 500 established by Cleisthenes in 508 BC, of this, cf. Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, Sec. 96; of Cleisthenes’ *Boule* of 500, cf. Note 44, *supra*; cf. also related references in Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 398-9; Hignett 1952, 372; Rhodes 1972, 117; Ste Croix 1956, 22). Howbeit, because this new government, like its predecessor, comprised solely of *astos* citizens of hoplite status [Buckley (*loc. cit.*, 422) however is of the opinion that the government was a *moderate* blend of democracy and oligarchy: the former being that the *Ecclesia* had preeminence over the *Boule* in policy decisions, and the latter being that only citizens of hoplite status were admitted into the government], it was much opposed by the *thetes*, whose rights of participation and inclusion had been guaranteed under the previous democracy by the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes [besides, the *thetes* also provided much of the rowers for the *triremes*, and had helped Athens the same year to an astonishing victory in the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BC, of this, cf. Buckley, *loc. cit.*, 423; but also Hunt 1998, 124; Lee 2010, 503]. As such, the *demos* were compelled to retire the government of 5,000, and to reinstall radical democracy in Athens a year later (cf. Shear 2011, 112-3; Buckley, *loc. cit.*, 423)

[albeit the government of 5,000 received high praise from Thucydides (*loc. cit.*, Chap. XCVII: Sec. 2; cf. also a related narration by Critias in Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. III: Sec. 48) who attests that it best aided Athens to recover itself from economic recession: “during the first period of its rule, the Athenians seem to me to have been better governed than ever before, at least in my lifetime. For there took place a moderate blending of the few and the many, and it was this that first brought about a recovery of the state from its desperate situation.”

⁷² This was in the battle of Aegospotami [fought in 405 BC between Athens and Sparta at the Hellespont, a strait between the Aegean and Marmara Seas] which effectively brought to an end the Peloponnesian War. The two rival forces had set themselves in array against each other for four days, although none engaged the other in battle [the Athenians were all set and ready for battle at sea, but the Spartans refused to accept, albeit wilily, the call to battle by the Athenians, so as to wear them out and cause them to become complacent. Thus, the Athenians would set sail each day from their base at Aegospotami to the Hellespont and then back again without combat, and this was their manner the four days that the battle lasted]. However, on the fifth day, Lysander, the commander of the Spartan army made a surprise attack on the Athenian fleet while they were disembarking from their ships at their anchorage off Aegospotami, following a routine sail to the Hellespont [more also, Philocles, the commander of the fleet for the day, had set sail with 30 *triremes* to acquire food supplies nearby for the army, and Lysander, having been informed of this division in the Athenian fleet by some deserters, took advantage of the situation and launched an attack on the fleet] and utterly defeated the unprepared rival army [thus, the entire Athenian fleet of about 180 *triremes* and crew were captured by the Spartans, save Conon, the chief commander of the Athenian fleet, and a few men who were able to escape with 10 ships to Cyprus [but others set sail to Sestus, where they remained in exile indefinitely]. The Spartans thereafter proceeded to capture the city of Athens (cf. bibliographical references in Plutarch, *Lysander*, Chap. XI: Sec. 1-6, *Alcibiades*, Chap. XXXVII: Sec. 2; Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, Book II, Chap. XXIII: Sec. 12; *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXIV: Sec. 2; Isocrates, *Panathenaicus*, Sec. 99; *Panegyricus*, Sec. 119; *Against Callimachus*, Sec. 59; *Plataicus*, Sec. 31; Lysias, *In Defense of*

Mantitheus, Sec. 4; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, Book III, Chap. XI: Sec. 5; Isaeus, *Dicaeogenes*, Sec. 7).

⁷³ The term was first employed by Polycrates (cf. Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, Book II, Chap. XXIV: Sec. 3) to designate the thirty Athenians who were appointed to govern the city in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War.

⁷⁴ After her resounding victory in the Peloponnesian War, the allies of Sparta [but particularly Corinth and Thebes] pressed upon her to utterly destroy Athens. Howbeit Sparta would not yield to their demands, arguing instead that “it would not be expedient to pluck out one of Greece’s two eyes” [cf. qt. in Justin, *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus*, Book V, Chap. VIII: Sec. 4; but cf. also a differing thought by Polyaeus, *Strategems of War*, Book I, Chap. XLV: Sec. 5, who asserts that Lysander had refrained from destroying Athens in order to maintain a counterweight against Thebes and Corinth, who were likely to become more powerful and pose a formidable enemy to Sparta in the absence of an Athenian state]. Nonetheless, the Spartans demanded that Athens be grafted into Sparta [that is, Athens be made a polis of Sparta, in which case she was required to relinquish her hold on the polis territories she had craftily possessed by means of the Delian League, of this, cf. Note 51], and that she destroy her defense fortifications about Piraeus [that is, the Athenian Long Walls that was built in 475 BC (after the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, King of Persia) to link the city to the harbor of Piraeus, and to forestall future invasions (of Persia, but also of Sparta) into the city], and recraft her Constitution [in this regard, the Spartans demanded that Athens remodel her laws to favor oligarchy, as per those of Sparta] (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXIV: Sec. 3; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. II: Sec. 20; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XIII: Chap. CVII: Sec. 4, Book XIV, Chap. III: Sec. 2; Andocides, *On the Peace*, Sec. 11-2, 39; Lysias, *Against Agoratus*, Sec. 14). But although Athens accepted these conditions [in April of 404 BC], the *Ecclesia* were unable to agree on the proper form of the new government [the *Ecclesia* was basically split into three factions: there were those that wanted the city to be governed according to the *patrios politeia* (that is, the ancestral laws of Solon and Cleisthenes) [these comprised of Athenian nobles and elites who had opposed the *hetaireiai* that had established the Oligarchy of 400]; others that favored a moderate form of democracy [these comprised mainly of citizens belonging to the

lower property classes]; and others more that preferred an oligarchy (after the manner of Sparta) [these comprised of returned exiles and supporters of the *hetaireiai* that had established the Oligarchy of 400]. Thus, being exasperated by the indecision of Athens to institute a new government, the Spartans ordered the city to select thirty men (these become thereafter known as ‘The Thirty,’ and were nominated ten apiece by each of the three factions mentioned afore) that would take charge of the city and manage its affairs [more specifically, they were charged with drawing up the *patrios nomoi* upon which the city would be thereafter governed] (of the composition of ‘The Thirty,’ cf. Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes*, Sec.75-6; Diodorus Siculus, *op. cit.*, Book XIV, Chap. III: Sec. 3, 6; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 469; cf. other bibliographical references in Fuks 1953, 61; Thorley 1996, 76; Skirbekk and Gilje 2001, 46; Gottesman 2014, 210; Osborne 2003, 251; Ostwald 1986, 475-7; Whelpley 1826, 93; Xenophon, *loc. cit.*, Chap. III: Sec. 2; *Memorabilia*, Book II, Chap. VI: Sec. 26, Book IV, Chap. III: Sec. 12; Krentz 1982, 50; Bradford 2001, 95; Diodorus Siculus, *loc. cit.*, Chap. IV: Sec. 1; cf. also Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, Book I, Chap. I: Sec. 1, on the assertion that the appointment of The Thirty was necessary to maintain a form of ‘social and political order’ in Athens). The oligarchic rule of ‘The Thirty’ spanned a period of eight months before they were overthrown in a bloody battle by pro-democracy forces (led by Thrasylbulus, a democrat who had been in exile during the reign of the ‘The Thirty’) at the harbor of Piraeus (cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. IV: Sec. 10-22; Justin, *loc. cit.*, Chap. IX: Sec. 14; Diodorus Siculus, *op. cit.*, Book XIV, Chap. XXXIII: Sec. 2-4; Aristotle, *ibid.*, Chap. XXXVIII: Sec. 1; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 489-90).

⁷⁵ Although ‘The Thirty’ started out their reign well in Athens [that is, they re-established the *Boule* of 500, and appointed state officials (such as magistrates, the Eleven, *strategoï*, the nine archons, treasurers, and a new group called *mastigophoroi* which, together with ‘the Eleven,’ maintained law and order in the city) to administer the affairs of the city], they soon degenerated into a repressive and malignant government [‘The Thirty,’ under the cover of “purging the city of ‘undesirables,’” confiscated property unjustly, and meted out harsh punishments to offenders in unfair trials. They also revised the ancestral laws of Solon, and repealed those laws which seemed to oppose their oligarchic mandate. More also, they repealed the reforms of Ephialtes and reinstated the Areopagus Council to its supervisory and guardianship

roles (cf. Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes*, Sec. 5; *Defense Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy*, Sec. 19; *Against Nicomachus*, Sec. 13; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. III: Sec. 12-14; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXV: Sec. 3-4; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XIV, Chap. IV: Sec. 2-4)]. But most of all, they attempted to model *democratic* Athens after *oligarchic* Sparta, in that they segmented the *demos* into three factions namely: the *gerousia* [*literally*, council of elders, in whom supreme authority was vested], the *homoioi* [*literally*, equals, or persons who are alike, and therefore enjoyed full citizenship rights], and the *perioikoi* [*literally* dwellers about, who were considered free, but were yet denied citizenship rights]. ‘The Thirty’ thus constituted themselves into the Athenian *gerousia*, and then proceeded to select 3,000 Athenians (who also made up the *Ecclesia*) [this list was revised from time to time, although Theramenes, the leader of the democratic faction in the *Ecclesia* had contended with the Oligarchs that “so small a group (as 3,000 men) would have “no monopoly of excellence” in decision making. (cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXXVI: Sec. 2; Xenophon, *loc. cit.*, Chap. III: Sec. 19; cf. also the supposition by Whitehead 1982/3, 123-4, that ‘The Thirty’ may have attempted to model Athens after Sparta because of their social affinity with the Lacedemonians (that is, the Spartans) which may have caused them to identify with the institutions of Sparta; but also a corroborating supposition from Dorjahn 1932, 64, and Ollier 1933, 167] (most of whom were staunch supporters of the new government) to comprise the *homoioi*. The remainder of Athenians were classified as *perioikoi*, and were thus excluded from participation in the affairs of the city [in time also, the *gerousia* and *homoioi* were the only group of citizens that were permitted by law to live in the *asty* (the physical city space) of Athens, the *perioikoi* were forced to relocate to other parts of Attica] (cf. Ostwald 1986, 485-6; Krentz 1982, 64-7). In the meanwhile, the Oligarchs grew increasingly oppressive and violent, and committed several atrocities, so that many Athenians were forced as a result to flee the city for their lives (cf. Young 1786, 329; Carnes 2014, 124-5; Isle 2006, 30-1; Thomas 2014, 62; Barker 1918, 99; Isocrates, *Panathenaicus*, Sec. 182; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 483-4). The horrific oligarchic experience of ‘The Thirty’ left an indelible dent in Athenian political society, so much that the city was never again under oligarchic rule [that is, after the Oligarchs were overthrown and radical democracy was restored in Athens] for the next four decades.

⁷⁶ The Athenian *demos* opted to reinstitute radical democracy after each stunt of oligarchic rule [referring to the oligarchic regimes of 415, 411, and 404 BC, of which, cf. Note 68-71, 74, *supra*], in part because the said oligarchic regimes proved grossly ineffective, but in part also because of the enduring affinity of the Athenian *demos* for the *patrios politeia* [in effect, the Athenian *demos* were now so used to the ancestral constitution of liberty, freedom, and participation, so much that any government that curtailed these virtues and promised anything different was perceived vile in their eyes; cf. for instance the concluding remarks of Thorley (1996, 77-82) in his *Athenian Democracy* where he describes *demokratia* as an efficient form of government which provided the *demos* of Athens with a sense of purpose and involvement; but cf. an argument to the contrary by Plato (*The Republic*, Book VIII, Sec. 558c) who avers that Athenian democracy “distributed a kind of equality *indiscriminately* to equals and unequals alike” (that is, *demokratia* allowed citizens that were *unequal* in social and economic standing to participate *equally* in the affairs of the state). This argument is further corroborated by Xenophon (*Athenian Constitution*, Chap. I: Sec. 1) who asseverates that the *patrios politeia* of Athens tended to favor the mob rather than the respectable people (that is, made the lower people better off than the upper classes]. A good case in point, for example, of the Athenian belief in the *patrios politeia* is the smooth transition to democratic rule that took place after ‘The Thirty’ were disposed. Xenophon (*Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. IV: Sec. 23-4) narrates that the city nominated ten men [one person from each tribe] to take charge of the city, and to alleviate the fears and concerns of the people, who had by then degenerated into “a state of great disquiet and distrust of one another.” Thereafter, efforts were made to codify all the laws of Athens into a single document [this was primarily because published laws were scattered across the city at different locations and in varied forms so that it had become difficult to decipher the validity and original source of a *nomos*. More also, Ostwald (1986, 409-10) remarks that many additional laws and decrees (*psephismata*) that had been enacted over the years by the *Ecclesia* and *Boule* had become obsolete and unintelligible, whilst others overlapped with the *patrios nomoi* of Solon and Cleisthenes. As such, it became necessary to review and codify these laws into a unified whole in order to bring order back into the state; cf. also corroborating words by Theseus to this effect in Euripides, *The Suppliants*, Sec. 433-7) as follows: “when laws are written down, rich and weak alike have equal justice, and it is open to

the weaker to use the same language to the prosperous when he is reviled by him, and the weaker prevails over the stronger if he has justice on his side’], and a committee of 30 *syngrapheis* [these were persons appointed to review all sources of law in Athens and to codify them into a single legislative document, albeit pending final review and approval by the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*, of this, cf. Thucydides, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. VII: Sec. 4, Book V, Chap. XLI: Sec. 3; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 2-3; Plato, *Gorgias*, 518b; *Minos*, 316d; *Phaedrus*, 258a; *Euthydemus*, 272a; Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, Sec. 177; *Panathenaicus*, Sec. 158], and 100 *anagrapheis* [these were persons appointed to publish, for the perusal of the Athenian public, *nomoi* and *psephismata* approved and validated by the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*, of this, cf. Thucydides, Book V, Chap. XLVII: Sec. 11; Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, Sec. 3; Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates*, Sec. 23; Aristotle, *Politics*, Book VI, Sec. 1321b; Ostwald 1986, 415-8] were appointed to carry out this task [Andocides (*On the Mysteries*, Sec. 83-4; cf. also Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 512-3) informs that a commission of 500 *nomothetai* (comprising possibly of 50 *demes* men from each of the ten tribes) was appointed by the *Ecclesia* to deliberate on and scrutinize the proposals of the 30 *syngrapheis* in a democratic setting, so as to ensure that the new codified laws were in the best interests of the state]. Furthermore, in a bid to secure the peace of the city, and to prevent a cycle of vindictive retaliations for past wrongs, the Athenian *demos* swore an oath to grant amnesty to the 3,000 Athenians that had served as *homoioi* in the government of ‘The Thirty’ [many of these had fled to Eleusis, following the defeat of ‘The Thirty’]. More also, ‘The Thirty,’ were permitted to return to Athens on condition that they would submit to a *euthynai* for their term in office [of the procedure of *euthynai*, cf. Note 46, *supra*; of the amnesty granted to the Oligarchs, cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book II, Chap. IV: Sec. 43; Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, Chap. XL: Sec. 4; Justin, *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus*, Book V, Chap. X: Sec. 8-9; Cloché 1915, 274-6; Walbank 1982, 94-6; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, 500-1].

⁷⁷ Though the spates of tyranny and oligarchic rule had their toll on popular sovereignty at Athens, it would be Macedonian imperialism that would come to permanently displace radical *demokratia* in the city state. This breakdown of democracy howbeit occurred gradually in a series of interrelated events. Following the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta strengthened herself and became

the *de facto* hegemon of the Greek world. But not long afterwards, it suffered a major defeat in 371 BC at the hands of Thebes [this was in the battle of Leuctra, also sometimes called the Boeotian War, cf. a full account in Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book VI, Chap. IV: Sec. 3-15; Diodorus Siculus, *op. cit.*, Book XV, Chap. LIV: Sec. 6-7, Chap. LV: Sec. 1-5, Chap. LVI: Sec. 1-4], who had begun to assert themselves in Greece [Thebes went ahead thereafter to defeat a combined army of Sparta and Athens in 362 BC in the battle of Mantinea, thus establishing herself as the most dominant city state in Greece at the time] under the general Epaminondas [whose bravery and courage is spoken of by Homer in his *Iliad* (Book XII, p. 561, 563) where the Theban general is quoted (in a speech to his fighting men) as saying: “(...) one omen is best, to fight for one’s country. (*But*) wherefore dost thou fear war and battle? For if the rest of us be slain one and all at the ships of the Argives, yet is there no fear that thou shouldest perish, for thy heart is not staunch in fight nor warlike. Howbeit, if thou shalt hold aloof from battle, or shalt beguile with thy words an other, and turn him from war, forthwith smitten by my spear shalt thou lose thy life. So spake he and led the way, and they followed after [*him*] with a wondrous din”]. But on the other side of the Greek world, Macedonia, a once small state, was rising quickly into a powerhouse under the leadership of Philip II. In 338 BC, she defeated a combined force of Athens and Thebes in the battle of Chaeronea, and thereafter forced Athens to join the League of Corinth [which League was a Pan-Hellenic alliance of Greek states created to oppose the invasion of Greece by Persia, but turned out also to be a medium by which Macedonia exercised preeminence over the affairs of other Greek states]. Macedonia thus came to control and dominate the entire Greek world. Years later, Alexander the Great would come to succeed his father Philip II as King of Macedonia, and thus also, the *de facto* ‘president’ of federal Greece. In 335 BC, the young King Alexander departed from Greece in his quest to conquer Asia [but particularly, the Persian empire], and left behind a Macedonian force in northern Greece under Antipater to quell any insurgencies that may arise from the states under Macedonian dominion [it was during this period that Sparta, under King Agis III, attempted an insurrection against Macedonia but were defeated by the regent Antipater in the battle of Megalopolis in 331 BC]. During this period of Macedonian rule, Athens continued to maintain her democratic institutions and practices, and conducted her *domestic* affairs independently without foreign interference [notwithstanding, her *foreign* policies were

subject to Macedonia approval before they could be carried out]. But things changed in 324 BC when King Alexander announced from western Asia his Exiles Decree [which was a decree to all Greek cities to accept again their exiled and disenfranchised citizens, that is, to restore unto them any confiscated property, as well as the rights to full citizenship], and his intention to end Athenian control of Samos [Samos was an independent Greek state that joined the Delian League in 478 BC (of the Delian League, cf. Note 51, *supra*). In c. 440 BC, she had attempted to leave the League when she, like other member states, realized that the League was a mere improvisation of Athens to dominate other Greek states. Notwithstanding, Athens, under the *strategos* Pericles besieged the city and forced her to pay tribute, and to remain under Athenian control (as such, the city of Samos was thereafter governed by pro-elite Athenians appointed by the *Ecclesia*). Samos was also briefly controlled by Sparta following the latter's victory in the Peloponnesian War (in which case the city was governed by ten pro-Spartan Samians appointed by the general Lysander, cf. a similar policy by Sparta in Athens with 'The Thirty' in Note 70-1, *supra*), but was again recovered and controlled by Athens in 366 BC, and beyond]. This decree was not well received by Athens, who perceived it as an undue meddling in their domestic affairs. As such, Athens began to organize an army of mercenaries [many of these were men that had been rendered unemployed following King Alexander's invasion and conquest of Persia], and together with support from other mutinous Greek allies [these included Aetolia, Thessaly, Corinth, and Argos], launched an attack on the Macedonian force stationed in northern Greece [under the command of the *strategos* Leosthenes, in a solemn bid to regain her independence from the Greek hegemon]. Thus began the battle of Crannon in 323 BC [otherwise referred to also as the Lamian or Hellenic War], which saw the defeat of Athens [this occurred, howbeit, in the summer of 322 BC], both on land and sea, to Antipater's men [which were later joined by a reinforcement sent under the command of Macedonian general Craterus]. Macedonia then went on to impose a settlement on Athens [in this regard, the constitution of Athens was modified to confine citizenship only to the wealthy (that is, to persons whose estate amounted to at least 2000 drachmas, and this was done to reward the wealthy because they had attempted to dissuade the Athenian *Ecclesia* from insurrecting against Macedonian rule). Habicht (1997, 40) informs that the number of active Athenian citizens fell from 21,000 to 9,000 as a result of this decree, and the

disenfranchised citizens were resettled in Thrace (cf. also. Waterfield 2018, 357-358, but esp. 358; Whitby 1998, 106)] and to install a garrison at the harbor of Piraeus. Thereafter, the institutions of democracy [as the *Ecclesia* and the *Boule*] continued to function notwithstanding, but popular sovereignty would forever remain limited and constrained in Athens [cf. bibliographical references in Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XVIII, Chap. XV: Sec. 1-9, Chap. XVIII: Sec. 1-6, Chap. LV: Sec. 2, Chap. LVII: Sec. 1, Chap. LXIX: Sec. 3; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, Book I, Chap. XXV: Sec. 3-5; Plutarch, *Phocion*, Chap. XXVII: Sec. 3, Chap. XXVIII: Sec. 1-4, Chap. XXIX: Sec. 1; Borza 1999, 59; Habicht, *loc. cit.*, 41-49, 57; Baynham 2003, 23-4; Tracy 2003, 10-11; Tarn 1933, 459-60; Ferguson 1911, 22-6; Hanink 2014, 221; Patriquin 2015, 68-9; Mossé 1973, 100; Boorstin 1992, 228; Lape 2014, 1-2; Davis 1960, 134; Walker 2000, 45; Salinger 1974, 104; Harding 2015, 56-7).

⁷⁸ Athenian popular sovereignty, as observed within the framework of the *patrios politeia* of Solon and Cleisthenes, did indeed end in 322 BC when Athens was brought under Macedonian rule. Nevertheless, a diminutive form of democracy continued to prevail in the city, even as far as to 146 BC [which also was the time when Athens was declared a *civitates foederatae* (that is, an allied state that is granted autonomy to conduct her domestic affairs independently) by the Romans (who had conquered Macedonia the same year and had taken direct control of the latter's provinces, Athens thus included, of which, cf. Whibley 1931, 447; Gilbert 1968, 161-2)]. Howbeit, a few events that occurred within the period are particularly instructive and noteworthy. In 318 BC, an army of pro-democracy forces regained control of Athens and immediately sliced the wealth criterion for citizenship by half [thus, making persons with a total estate of at least 1000 drachmas eligible for citizenship and admission into the *Ecclesia*. Wood and Wood (1978, 251) informs that the total number of citizens increased at this time from 9,000 to 12,000, although Patriquin (2015, 69) asseverates that many of the newly enfranchised persons were unable to "recoup their rights"]. But after reigning for only a year [that is, in 317 BC], the new regime fell to Macedonian forces headed by the general Cassander, who thereafter also appointed an Athenian aristocrat named Demetrius of Phalerum to serve as governor of Athens for a period of ten years. During the latter's reign, he abolished the *misthos* for jury service (which had priorly been instituted by Pericles, of which, cf. Note 65, *supra*), and also ended the use of

both the *graphe paranomon* and the *graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai* [(of which, cf. Note 61, *supra*). In place of the *graphai paranomon*, he appointed a board of seven *nomophylakes* (lit. guardians of the law) to exercise a “pre-emptive check on the legislative powers of the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*” (this role of the *nomophylakes*, although similar in form to that performed by the *graphai paranomon* procedures, lacked albeit the democraticness of the *latter*; that is, the *nomophylakes* performed this role independently without recourse to and consultation with the people’s *dikasteria*), cf. Canevaro [2011], 58, 67; Gehrke 1978, 151-5; Hansen 1974, 55). In 307 BC, following the defeat of Cassander’s army by Demetrius Poliorcetes, Athens was liberated from Macedonian rule, and democracy was once again restored in the city. Notwithstanding, foreign powers continued to dominate the politics of the city, so that the pre-322 BC democracy was never again reconstituted at Athens (cf. bibliographical references in Plutarch, *Demetrius*, Chap. VIII: Sec. 4-7; Polyaeus, *Strategems of War*, Book IV, Chap. VII: Sec. 6; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XX, Chap. XLV: Sec. 1-2, Chap. XLVI: Sec. 1; Grieb 2008, 68-73; Shear 2012, 278; Mikalson 1998, 75-6; Paschidis 2008, 78-90; Stikker 2002, 91; Bayliss 2011, 102-6; Sickinger 1999, 188; Konstan 1995, 3; Wallace 2018, 58-9; Oliver 2007, 116-9).

⁷⁹ For scholarly reservations on this notion, cf. Note 4, *supra*.

⁸⁰ Howbeit Professor Karl Mannheim (1936, 218) noted in his *Ideology and Utopia* that the working class would be less likely to develop such self-assertive tendencies in cases where they were readily accepted into the economic and political order by the ruling elites.

⁸¹ That is, to the ancestral constitution, which according to Sir Frederick Pollock (1920, 10) embodied the “pattern and ideal of life of the citizen body.”

⁸² In principle, there were other salient factors that led to the breakdown of democracy at Athens. For instance, one could speak of the preoccupation of Athens in foreign alliances, such as the Delian League, which led her to focus less on domestic policy matters. Another factor of equal note could be the countervailing strength of rival Greek states such as Thebes and Sparta (and in later times, Macedonia) which intermittently waged war with Athens and depleted much her military and economic resources. But as democracy eroded before it broke down at Athens, it is probably

best to attribute its fall to the decision making apparatus of the state, which in this case was built on the foundations of popular sovereignty rather than on the sovereignty of law [thus, in the event of a crisis, decisions were based more on ‘what the *demos* wanted to do,’ than on ‘what was ethically expedient to do’].

⁸³ Until the end of the 5th century, the Athenian *Ecclesia* was responsible for two forms of *nomothesia* (legislation), namely: *nomoi* (laws), and *psephismata* (decrees) [of the distinction between the two, cf. Note 76, *supra*]. These two were used almost interchangeably to refer generally to enactments by the *Ecclesia* (cf. for instance, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book I, Chap. VII: Sec. 20-2; Mikalson 2016, 120; Todd 1996, 122-3; Farenga 2006, 327). Howbeit, following the restoration of democracy in 403 BC (cf. Note 75-6, *supra*), a special board of *nomothetai* was set up to deal exclusively with the enactment of laws at Athens, whilst the *Ecclesia* continued to issue out decrees. During this period, laws attained precedence over decrees [this was mainly because the *nomoi* were passed under careful scrutiny and through an elaborate process than the *psephismata* which were passed on any meeting day of the *Ecclesia* by a simple majority vote], and in some cases, established the limits within which decrees were issued (cf. Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 177; Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*, Sec. 87, 96; *On the False Embassy*, Sec. 179; Cohen 1995, 52; Abat Ninet 2013, 22; cf. also the adjoining distinction made by Strauss 1991, 229, between the radical Athenian democracy of the 5th century, and the constitutional democracy of the 4th). Nevertheless, all matters relating to the expenditure of state funds, as well as to military undertakings, and foreign relations were decided upon by majority voting in the *Ecclesia*, maintaining albeit a quorum of 6000 [cf. for instance the testimony of Apollodorus before the Athenian *dikasteria* (qtd. in Demosthenes, *Against Neaera*, Sec. 88) where he affirmed that “the civic body of Athens had supreme authority over all things in the state, and could do whatsoever it pleased;” cf. also the remark by Gabriel Herman (2006, 219), that the “Athenian *Ecclesia* was the ultimate source of law and the ultimate authority in *all* foreign affairs.”

⁸⁴ Although the *nomoi* and *psephismata* governed the conduct of public affairs and private life at Athens, it was the policy decisions of the *Ecclesia* that determined by large the direction and course of action of the state. To the extent that the latter, which also determined the stability and longevity of the state, was left entirely in the

hands of the *demos* [who by the way were unbounded in their exercise of such power] meant that popular sovereignty was unduly elevated over any regulation of law (cf. esp. Parry and Moyser 1994, 44; French 2011, 322-3; Barber 1984, 150-1). More also, the fact that no distinction was made between people and state meant that the *demos* perceived themselves as custodians of the state and therefore felt morally entitled to make decisions on her behalf without having to answer to a superior body [cf. esp. Ober (1989, 299-304) who asserts that the Athenian *demos* were unable to wholly conceptualize and abstract the notion of *sovereignty of law*, and so were unable to disengage it from their interests; cf. also Rhodes (1981, 489; but also Ostwald 1986, 10) who surmises that Athenians never thought of their courts as a source of authority distinct from and superior to the *demos*]. But one could also reason that because the *demos* partook directly in and implemented the policies they decided upon in the Assembly, they may have felt that that was a limiting check in itself [so, if say the *Ecclesia* voted for Athens to make war with, or to defend herself against a city, it was the same *demos* who voted on the decision that provided *hoplites* for the said military undertaking].

⁸⁵ Cf. thus Thomas Hobbes (1969, 143; but also Putterman 2010, 104; Aquinas 1987, 18) who noted that Athens would have been a stable polity had power been centralized in the hands of a few individuals, and state affairs not debated upon in “great and numerous assemblies.”

⁸⁶ I here employ the construct of Paul Lucardie (2014, 154), who defines ‘democratic extremism’ to mean “when all *governing* power is placed in the hands of the people” [cf. also the twin terms of *constitutional democracy* and *democratic constitutionalism* by Sheldon S. Wolin (1994, 39-40), the latter implying a state of affairs where popular sovereignty has precedence over established *nomoi*, and the former, the opposite].

⁸⁷ Cf. for instance the remark by Ernest J. Weinreb (1987, 59) who asserts that because laws are not spontaneous, self-existing, and immune to change, their creation, administration, and interpretation would always remain prone to acts of human agency.

⁸⁸ Here, the famous quote by John Emerich Edward (1887, *Letter I*, S9) becomes highly apposite: “if there is any presumption, it is [...] against holders of power,

increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.”

⁸⁹ This included magistracy and archonship appointments, as well as services in the *Boule* and *dikasteria* (cf. Note 21, 44, 47, 49, *supra*).

⁹⁰ Thus, per Cleisthenes’ reforms, all public service appointments (as referenced in Note 89, *supra*), together with the election of *strategoï* (cf. Note 46, *supra*) saw an equal number of representation from each of the ten tribes. Howbeit, cf. the restrictions that applied to the system of selection by lots in (Note 47, *supra*).

⁹¹ So, for instance, archons were elected to serve for a period of one year, after which fresh elections were held (cf. Note 3, *supra*); the *Bouleutai* had a fixed service term of one year, after which new members were appointed by lot [more also, a citizen could only serve twice on the *Boule* in a lifetime, and this could not be undertaken in two consecutive years] (cf. Note 44, *supra*); the *dikastes* that manned the *dikasteria* were appointed for a fixed one-year term, after which new jurors were selected by lot (cf. Note 49, *supra*); the Eleven, which acted as the police force of the polity, were appointed by lot for a fixed service term of one year, after which a new contingent was appointed by the same means (cf. Note 47, *supra*); magistrates were either appointed by lot or by elections depending on the technicality of the office they occupied. Either way, they held their office for a duration of one year, and were barred from holding the same office twice in a lifetime [although they could be reappointed to other magistracies for as many times as their tribal assemblies would nominate them] (cf. Note 47, *ibid.*); the *strategoï* were appointed exclusively by elections for a fixed one-year term, after which they could be reappointed to the same post in successive years for an unlimited number of one-year terms (cf. Note 46, *supra*). But whilst the rotation system allowed for many Athenians to partake in the administration of the state [and also helped to curb corruption and malfeasance, which resulted when one occupied a particular office for an extended period of time], yet the

fixed one-year term limits for most offices may have inhibited appointees from acquiring significant political experience in the workings of the said offices.

⁹² Cf. for instance the fascinating calculation by John Thorley (1996, 30-1) to this end, that about 10,000 Athenians [of *zeugitai* status and upward], corresponding to nearly half of the population at the time, would have had the privilege of serving as president of the *Boule* for at least once in their lifetime [of the presidency of the *Boule*, cf. Note 44, *supra*].

⁹³ Thus the *demos*, though ordinary citizens, and though plying diverse crafts, may have been capable, notwithstanding, of making informed political decisions in the *Ecclesia*, in large part because their service terms in the *Boule* [but also in magistracies] would have imbued them with some knowledge and experience on the workings of the state.

⁹⁴ In Hobbes' view, there are three principal causes of quarrel inherent in the nature of man: competition, diffidence, and glory. The first, according to him, predisposes men to greed and aggrandizement; the second, to secure safety for themselves and their dependents; and the third, to court reputation from others. Thus, in the absence of a 'leviathan' [that is, a common power to moderate the strivings and pursuits of men and to "keep them in awe"], men would degenerate into a perpetual state of warfare and strife so that the life of man would be all but "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (1962, 99-100).

⁹⁵ Plato in his *Republic* (Book V, Sec. 473c-d) asserts that the only way a polity could rid itself of all civil strife and trouble was "to have philosophers become kings in the state" or "to have rulers and kings pursue philosophy seriously and adequately," so that in both instances "there is a blend of political power and philosophic intelligence." Plato's rationale for a rule by philosopher-kings is threefold: first, that only philosophers possess the moral will to rule in the interests of the people (cf. *loc. cit.*, Sec. 520e-1b); second [and holding the first to be true], that only the rule by philosophers would eliminate civil descension and strife over the right to rule [particularly because the entire citizenry would accept the philosopher-king as their most ideal ruler] (cf. *loc. cit.*, Sec. 499d-500c); and third, that only philosophers possess categorical knowledge of what is just and fair, which makes them therefore better

rulers than non-philosophers (cf. *loc. cit.*, Sec. 500d-1c; and also Bobonich 2002, 42-6; Held 2006, 26; but also *Euthyphro*, Sec. 7b-d, where Plato argues that philosophers are better at making decisions than non-philosophers because the former are adept at employing virtuous measurements in deciphering between the “the just and unjust, the fine and base, the good and bad,” whereas the latter merely resort to assumptions and guesses, and therefore risk making ill-advised decisions [cf. however Aristotle’s questioning of the practicability of a rule by philosophers in *Protrepticus*, Frag. 48, qtd. in Chroust 1968, 17; *Nicomachean Ethics*, Sec. 1144b, 1181b; cf. esp. *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1265a; Book III, Sec. 1277a; but also Book IV, Sec. 1290a, where Aristotle asserts that the good leader must be a “wise and practical man,” and must “avoid all impossibilities,” an obvious slight at Plato’s other idealistic conception of “a city without fortified borders whose strength is in the virtue and prowess of its citizens” (cf. *Laws*, Sec. 778d).

⁹⁶ Essentially, three forms of collective action mechanisms were distinctive of Athenian *demokratia*. The first is evinced by the *Ecclesia* where all citizens were afforded the liberty to address the Assembly on any subject matter under deliberation [this virtue was popularly termed *isegoria*, to mean, *equality of public address*; and more generally, *parrhesia*, to mean, *freedom of speech*; cf. Raaflaub 1983, 523-4; [1980], 11-7, 34-8; Werhan 2004, 28; Szakolczai 2003, 176; Ober 1989, 296]. Thus, the herald of the Assembly always opens the floor with the words: “who wishes to speak” (cf. Euripides, *Suppliant Woman*, Sec. 430-42; Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, Sec. 26-7; *Against Ctesiphon*, Sec. 6, 220; Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, Sec. 191; *Against Androtion*, Sec. 30; *Against Midias*, Sec. 124; Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, Sec. 48; *Ecclesiazusae*, Sec. 130; also Plato, *Gorgias*, Sec. 461e, where Socrates avows that there was more freedom of speech in Athens than in any other Greek state), and this was so done because all members of the *Ecclesia*, barring apparent differences in their social and economic standings, were held in equal esteem, and as such were deemed mutually responsible for the laws and policies of the state]. The second, which already has been discussed at length, is revealed in the lottery system of public appointments (cf. Note 89, *supra*) which ensured that there was an equal and unbiased representation of persons from all sects of the state: coast, city, and inland [this, like the first, had the effect of involving all Athenians in the workings of the *polis*. More also, the later introduction

of *misthos* for *dikastes* meant that citizens from all walks of life, but particularly those of the *thetes* class (cf. Note 65, *supra*) could afford to forgo a day's work to serve as jurors in the *dikasteria*]. The third, and perhaps most instructive of all, is seen in the *demos'* direct involvement in the implementation of policies decided upon by the *Ecclesia* (cf. Note 83-4, *supra*). As a result of this unity of purpose, the Athenian citizenry may have felt particularly motivated and inclined to participate in political proceedings of the Assembly as much as they could, essentially to prevent their fellow citizens from making decisions at their expense [for instance, in matters of warfare, or state contributions] for which they albeit would be obliged and enjoined to fulfill, as all others.

⁹⁷ It is particularly instructive to note that it was an unbiased third party, in the person of Solon, that was commissioned to resolve the social conflict – in effect, to find a middle ground that was favorable to both parties. Had the conflict been resolved by the elites, it would have led to a moderate form of liberalization that would not have been wholly welcomed by the masses. And had it been forced by the masses, it would have resulted in an excessive redistribution of land resources to the detriment of the elites. As it stood, both elites and masses did not lose too much nor gain too little with the resulting *demokratia* that was instituted. As such, they were both willing to commit to the democratic system, and to partake mutually in the work of its progress.

⁹⁸ So, for instance, the procedures of *dokimasia*, *euthynai*, *graphe paranomon*, and *epheisis* were all conducted by citizens for citizens in the preservation of the *nomoi* and *eiréné* of the polity (of discussions on these processes, cf. Note 26, 43, 46, 61, *supra*).

⁹⁹ Also of particular note is the decision by Solon and Cleisthenes to withdraw from the political scene immediately after their reforms were instituted at Athens. Being pioneers of the democratic system, they could have easily taken charge of the state [and that, for an indefinite period of time] had they so desired, but chose instead to epitomize the spirit of their reforms by placing power exclusively in the hands of the *demos*. Their selfless act of leadership consequently established and reinforced an enduring legacy in Athenian politics: that *demokratia* was to be “of the people, by the people, and for the people” (cf. Goebel 2002, 1; Jennings 1956, 25).

¹⁰⁰ It is important to note that the Athenian conception of citizenship transcended the popular notions of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, although both were required for one to be considered a citizen of Athens [cf. esp. Note 66, *supra*, where *jus soli* finds itself in the Athenian ideal of autochthony, and *jus sanguinis*, the Periclean Citizenship Law which required a citizen to have been born by two *astos* parents]. For Athenians, a citizen, in the literal connotation of the term, was simply one who partook directly in the affairs of the *polis* [in effect, one who partook in decision- and policy making, as well as in the execution of the said decisions and policies]. As such, women were not regarded as Athenian citizens [i.e., in practice only, though they were in principle] because they were confined to keeping the house and bearing children, and were thus denied all avenues of participation in the political affairs of the state, *as per the manner afore specified*.

¹⁰¹ Howbeit, a male *metic* [that is, a foreign resident] could under rare circumstances attain Athenian citizenship by a decree of the *Ecclesia* [with a quorum of 6000 votes (cf. Demosthenes, *Against Neaera*, Sec. 89); in instances where the *metic* makes an heroic exploit in a war whilst serving with the Athenian army, or possesses exceptional skills and expertise in a craft or vocation deemed to be of value to the state] after having resided in the state for a duration of time. More also, a male bondservant could be granted freedom from servitude, in which case he automatically attains the status of a *metic*, with the possibility of future citizenship by a decree of the *Ecclesia* [cf. for instance the story of Pasion, who upon attaining freedom as a bondservant, established a shield factory, and accrued significant wealth therein, and when he had made a number of significant donations to the state's public institutions, was awarded Athenian citizenship in the fourth century] (cf. Kasimis 2018, 6; Robinson 2004, 248; Kennedy 2014, 2; on the obligations and duties required of *metics* by the state, cf. Whitehead [1977], 7-10, 75-6, 90-1; Goldsmith 1823, 41-2; Sinclair 1988, 28-31). But unlike male *metics*, women [be they citizens or *metics*], were permanently barred from any form of political engagement in the state. For instance, Richard (2008, 77-8, cf. also Evans 2010, 61) notes that women were sequestered, and confined to working in the house as weavers, spinners, and vendors. They were only allowed to leave the house during festivals; and could attend plays, but were relegated to sitting at the back. More also, they could not owe property besides clothing and jewelry; and could

not enter into a business transaction exceeding a certain amount of money. Furthermore, they required a male guardian to represent them in legal and contractual matters, for which Pritchard (2004, 173; cf. also Gould 1980, 44) has averred that they were in this light regarded as “perpetual minors incapable of any self-determined act.” Thus in Euripides’ *Medea* (Sec. 230-50), the character Medea, after having been betrayed by her husband, is quoted as saying: “[...] of all creatures that have breath and sensation, we women are the most unfortunate. First, at an exorbitant price we must buy a husband and master of our bodies [...] And when a woman comes into the new customs and practices of her husband's house, she must somehow divine, since she has not learned it at home, how she shall best deal with her husband [...] A man, whenever he is annoyed with the company of those in the house, goes elsewhere and thus rids his soul of its boredom [...] But we must fix our gaze on one person only. Men say that we live a life free from danger at home while they fight with the spear. How wrong they are! I would rather stand three times with a shield in battle than give birth once” [cf. also a similar espousal by the character Procne in Sophocles’ *Tereus* (Sec. 583-5) as follows: “I have observed women's lot from this perspective [...] In childhood in our father's house we live the happiest life [...] of all mankind [...] But when we have understanding and have come to youthful vigor, we are pushed out and sold, away from our [...] parents, some to foreign husbands, some to barbarians, some to joyless homes, some to homes drafty and poor. And this, once a single night has yoked us, we are forced to praise and say that all is well”]. It may thus be observed that the Athenian playwright Aristophanes repeatedly endeavored to address the bias against women in his plays by representing the possibility of women participating in the affairs of the polity [cf. for instance, his plays: *Lysistrata*, where the female character Lysistrata organized the women of Athens and Sparta into demanding that their men end the Peloponnesian War; *Ecclesiazusae*, where the female character Praxagoras led some women of Athens into the *Ecclesia* under the cover of disguise, and succeeded in convincing the men that women could do a better job administering the city when given the opportunity; *Thesmophoriazusae*, where at a yearly festival, the women of Athens assumed the role of men, and even staged proceedings of the *Ecclesia* and *Boule*]. Nevertheless, because *astoi* citizens could only be produced by the union of native Athenian men and women, the status of women in Athens remained

elevated to a measurable degree, particularly after the introduction of the Periclean Citizenship Law (of which, cf. Note 66, *supra*).

¹⁰² For instance, Professor Hansen (1976, 96-8) notes that if a *metic* or a bondservant was found participating in proceedings in the *Ecclesia*, he was immediately arrested and tried as a *kakourgoi* [on the import of the term, cf. Note 47, 56, *supra*] (cf. related references on the exclusivity of Athenian citizenship in Lewis 1996, 119; Fouque 2015, 150; Wood 1994, 60).

¹⁰³ Cf. other related bibliographical references in Raaflaub (2007, 11); Richard (2008, 77-8).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. also a similar espousal by Bellamy (2008, 35) who avows that the political system of ancient Athens, by requiring its citizens to sacrifice their private interests for the service of the state, was totalitarian and oppressive in nature. Of the distinction between the terms *homo politicus* and *homo oeconomicus*, the former appertains to a politically active citizen who prioritizes the civic and communal interests of the state above his personal needs (cf. Buechler 2014, 78; Held 2006, 29; Cohen 1992, 190); whereas the latter appertains to a rational, self-interested citizen who employs his affiliation to the state as a means of furthering his own private enterprise (cf. Styhre 2013, 11-2; Schmidt 1996, 165-6; Veblen 1898, 389-90; Kirchgässner 2008, 25-6). Maurice Duverger (1972, 110) has averred however that the indulgence of an *homo politicus* in the affairs of the state may be motivated in large part by his desire for the “material advantages of power,” in which case he may also be regarded an *homo oeconomicus* in a narrow sense. More also, in the absence of individual enterprise [because the political system made the citizen into an *homo politicus*], Athens seemed to have maintained a minimal form of wealth redistribution to cater for the needs of all its citizens. For instance, Hans van Wees (2013, 1) makes mention of a progressive tax system at Athens where only the property of the rich was subject to tax [cf. also Davies 1984, 35; Sinclair 1988, 68; Patriquin 2015, 43-4; but also Ober 1996, 27, who asserts that the democratic ideal of equality both justified and encouraged the voluntary redistribution of wealth at Athens, in effect, the taxing of the rich to make supplies available to the poor]. Furthermore, Matthew R. Christ (2006, 34) intimates that Athenian citizens may have contributed regularly to the public treasury in the

form of taxes and duties, from which also they received financial assistance for their businesses.

¹⁰⁵ “The political situation of the medieval townsman determined his path, which was that of a *homo oeconomicus*, whereas in Antiquity, the polis preserved during its heyday its character as the technically most advanced military association: the ancient townsman was a *homo politicus* [...] The burgher remained primarily a soldier [...] In the market and the gymnasium the citizen spent the largest part of his time. In classical Athens, the claims upon the citizen's time were in regard to services in the *ekklesia*, jury court, state offices, and military campaigns: which were carried out for many decades – in proportions which no other differentiated culture in history has ever experienced before or after. All accumulations of burgher wealth of any significance were subject to the claims of the polis of democracy” (translation qtd., *with minor alterations*, from English version of book, referenced as follows: Weber, Max. *Economics and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Ross, and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: California UP, 1978, pp. 1354, 1361).

¹⁰⁶ It may have been for this reason also that the *thetes* class were excluded from appointments into public offices: they being the working class and mostly engaged in economic activity. And even with regards to their service in the *dikasteria*, they had to be paid a *misthos* of 3 obols per service day before they could afford the time to do so [and even so, most of those that served as *dikastes* were old men that presently had no economic undertakings on their hands, cf. Note 49, 65, 96, *supra*; although Cleisthenes had said that the reason for their exclusion from public appointments and services was because they had little financial holdings in the state and so stood to lose little in the event of a political upheaval, cf. Note 44, *supra*].

¹⁰⁷ Contrary to her ideal of *isotimia* [that is, equal respect and consideration for all, although this may be understood to apply only to Athenian citizens] (cf. McCord and McCord 1977, 226; Cartledge 2009, 9; Zimba 1984, 4), Athens maintained a bondservant population of about two-thirds her population size (that is, between 200,000 and 250,000 persons, from a total population of about 400,000) [cf. Hansen 2006, 56; Hedrick 1994, 289; Fisher 2001, 35; Held 2006, 19; Bresson 2016, 459; Murphy et al. 2014, 16]. Many of these worked at the Laurion silver mines (cf. Note 13, *supra*);

whereas others were engaged predominantly in agriculture, but also in artwork, building construction, and in steel factory works (cf. Isager and Hansen 1975, 16-7; Cohen 2000, 17; Garland 1988, 52-3; Jones 1957, 17-8; Aristotle, *Politics*, Sec. 1253b-4a). Professor Osborne (1995, 27) has offered a compelling thesis on why there may have been many bondservants at Athens during the classical period. According to him, and citing the dialogue between Socrates and Aristarchus in Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, Book II, Chap. VII: Sec. 1-13), it was because Athenian men were unwilling to put their women and dependents to work, and so had to naturally rely on servants to assist them in their work. [Osborne (*ibid.*) asserts further that the employment of bondservants at Athens inhibited technological advancements in the state in that it promoted rather passively the use of manual labor in getting work done, rather than the development of smart tools and equipment]. *Metics*, on the other hand, were usually persons from other Greek *polies* who have taken up residence in Athens for the sole purpose of plying a trade or craft [John W. Roberts (1984, 38-40) and Arnold W. Gomme (1933, 47) have respectively conjectured that a total of about 20,000 and 25,000 *metics* may have been resident at Athens in 431 BC. Robert K. Sinclair (1988, 9) however estimates the *metic* population slightly higher at between 30,000 and 40,000 for the said year]. They were required to pay a *metic* tax (*metoikion*) of 12 drachmas per year [this applied only to *metic* men; single *metic* women were charged a *metoikion* of 6 drachmas per year] if they intended to reside at Athens for a period exceeding three months [in addition to this, they were required to have an Athenian sponsor – a *prostates*, before they could be duly registered in the city]. In exceptional cases also, *metic* men were called upon to serve with the Athenian army in military expeditions (cf. Todd 1993, 198-9; Lape 2010, 48; Lewis 1996, 127; MacDowell 1978, 77-8; VerSteeg 2002, 228; Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 99; cf. also Note 101, *supra*, for related statements in this respect).

¹⁰⁸ Professor Robin Osborne (1995, 38; cf. also Hansen 1991, 309) has remarked however that such argument is unduly overstated as the predominantly agricultural nature of Athenian enterprises meant that the citizens indulged therein were free for the most part of the year to participate in the affairs of the state [and as such, did not need to acquire the services of *metics* and bondservants to afford them the requisite leisure to do so].

¹⁰⁹ Professor Held's argument centers on the fact that the democratic practices observed at Athens served as a reference point for the development of later democratic ideals, whereas Professor Sartori is of the view that the *polis* within which Athenian democracy was practiced is entirely different from the mega *polis* of the modern world, so that it is practically impossible that any meaningful blueprints could be derived therefrom. This viewpoint is further corroborated by Professor Robert Dahl (1967, 956) as follows: "[...] however one may feel about these matters, the essential point is that representative government in the nation-state is in many respects so radically – and inescapably – different from democracy in the city-state, that it is rather an intellectual handicap to apply the same term – democracy, to both systems, or to believe that in essence they are really the same."

¹¹⁰ Others such as the Dutch revolution of 1568 (of which, cf. Ellis 1789; Parker 1977); the Meiji restoration of 1868 (of which, cf. Wilson 1992; Beasley 1972); and the German revolution of 1918 (of which, cf. Lutz 1922; Broué 1971) were of varied significance to the evolution of representative democracy. Howbeit, they are not discussed further in *this essay*.

¹¹¹ For a detailed historic account of these revolutions, for Britain, cf. Coward 2014; Manning 1996; Hughes 1991; for the United States, cf. Bonwick 1991; Raphael 2001; Zinn 1999; for France, cf. Rudé 1988; Soboul 1977; Lefebvre 1971.

¹¹² Such an undertaking would unnecessarily divert the focus of the section, which is to offer a chronology of political systems and attendant reforms that shaped the conception of representative democracy.

¹¹³ As the democratic experiments of Athens and Rome formed the basis for later conceptions of popular governance in succeeding nation states (cf. esp. Richard 1995, 13), such a comparison is necessary to elucidate the structural reforms that obtained in the two city states.

¹¹⁴ This was about the same time that Cleisthenes' initiated his democratic reforms at Athens (cf. Note 41, *supra*).

¹¹⁵ Lucius Tarquinius Superbus was the seventh and last Etruscan king of Rome during the period of the monarchy [for a concise account of the reigns and deeds of the

previous kings of the Roman state, cf. Byrd 1995, 16-20]. Following his ousting in 509 BC, the *populus Romanus* [i.e., the people of Rome] under the direction of Lucius Junius Brutus made the solemn vow: *neminem regnare passuros nec esse Romae unde periculum libertati foret* [lit. trans., “that they would suffer no man to reign or live in Rome by whom the public liberty might be imperiled”], particularly because the reign of Tarquinius Superbus had been fraught with much brutality and tyranny [but also because his son, Sextus Tarquinius had forcefully ‘uncovered the nakedness’ of the noblewoman Lucretia, wife of Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, the rage of which started a popular revolt that overthrew the monarchy (cf. qt. in Livy, *History of Rome*, Book II, Chap. II: Sec. 5; on Tarquinius Superbus, cf. Goodrich 1864, 31; Stocker 2014, 96; Levene 1993, 143; on the deed of Sextus Tarquinius and the ousting of the monarchy, cf. Pecknold 2010, 12; Chernaik 2011, 35-6; Cornell 1995, 215; Izzet 2012, 69-70). Thereafter, the new Republic [formally called, *Senatus Populusque Romanus*, i.e., Senate and People of Rome] would come to be governed by two consuls, who were appointed annually [and also served for a duration of one year], and were vested individually with *imperium* (i.e., the power formerly retained by the king) [so that one could in principle (though it rarely ever happened in practice) veto the decisions of the other, to the end that a single individual may not wield absolute power in Rome, as had obtained during the reign of the monarchy] (cf. esp. Yenne 2012, 6-7). Nevertheless, in the event of an emergency or crisis, a *magister populi* [i.e., a dictator] was appointed by the Roman Senate, and was vested with the *imperium* of both consuls for a period not exceeding six months, or until the end of the crisis, whichever came first (on the consuls, cf. Lintott [1999], 104-7, 144-6; North 2010, 263-4; Polo 2011, 3; Forsythe 2006, 150; on the *magister populi*, cf. Morolli, 2012, 26; Heitland 1909, 61; Brennan 2000, 38; 2014, 37).

¹¹⁶ The Romans chose to call the government that obtained after the monarchy a *res publica* [hence the name, Roman Republic]; *res* meaning ‘a thing or affair,’ and *publica*, ‘the public,’ thus implying that the established government was to be ‘a thing or an affair of the public’ [cf. esp. Cicero, *De Republica*, Book I, Sec. 39, who equates *res publica* with *res populi* (lit. trans., ‘a thing of the people’), and defines the term as: *coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus* (lit. trans., “a large assemblage of people bond together in respect of justice and the common good”);

cf. additional remarks on *res publica* in Cornell 2000, 214; Digeser 2004, 9; Wood 1988, 126-7; Klingshirn 1994, 44].

¹¹⁷ This may have been pursued for purposes of self-defense, and for the defense of the allies of Rome, rather than motivated by a desire to dominate and subjugate other states. This is well noted by Cicero in his *De Officiis* (Book II, Sec. 27) where he avers the following: *nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari* [lit. trans., “and the highest ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and allies with justice and honor. And so our government could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion”]; cf. also an adjoining remark by Vergil (*Aeneid*, Book VI, Sec. 851-3) as follows: *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento – hae tibi erunt artes – pacique imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* [lit. trans., “remember, people of Rome, it is for you to rule the nations with your power – that will be your skill – to crown peace with law, to spare the conquered, and subdue the proud”]; cf. also a related citation by Livy (*op. cit.*, Book XXX, Chap. XLII: Sec. 17) as follows: *populo Romano usitata ac prope iam obsoleta ex uictoria gaudia esse ac plus paene parcendo uictis quam vincendo imperium auxisse* [lit. trans., “for the Roman people the joys of victory were familiar and now all but threadbare, and they had enlarged their empire almost more by sparing the vanquished than by conquest”]. Cf. additional bibliographical references in Gruen 1984, 275-6; Vogt 1935, 89-92; Dunstan 2011, 41.

¹¹⁸ This was also carried out in large part for military purposes, in effect, to make it easier for Roman troops to respond to an invading army, or to suppress an insurrection in the newly captured territories of the Republic, or to send supplies to Roman garrisons stationed in the provinces (cf. for instance the construction of the Via Appia which was originally intended to ease travel by the army from Rome to Capua (cf. Pearson 2008, 89; Bohec 1994, 215; Bang 2008, 86-91).

¹¹⁹ Unlike Athenian citizenship which was reserved only to persons born on Athenian soil and by Athenian parents, Roman citizenship was extensive, and was conferred, amid others, on adult males in provincial territories and allied states. This allowed for

the integration of foreigners into Roman society, and furthered the exchange of value patterns through interaction [on this, cf. John Stuart Mill (*Principles of Political Economy*, Book III, Chap. XVII: Sec. 5, p. 594) who remarked connectedly as follows: “it is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar (...) And commerce is the purpose of the far greater part of the communication which takes place between civilized nations (...) Such communication has always been, and is peculiar in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress. To human beings (...) it is indispensable to be perpetually comparing their own notions and customs with the experience and example of persons in different circumstances from themselves: and there is no nation which does not need to borrow from others, not merely particular arts or practices, but essentially points of character in which its own type is inferior”]. More also, the fact that the provinces paid taxes and fought in the army [like native Romans] enabled the Republic to further strengthen and consolidate its dominance in the region (cf. Flower 2004, 6; Stambaugh 1988, 93-4; Finlay 2014, 114; Scullard 1982, 263). According to David Shotter (2005, 21; cf. also Millar 2005, 12-4), citizenship was granted either as *connubium* [i.e., the right of intermarriage], or *commercium* [i.e., the right to undertake commerce], or both; and in other cases, as *civitas sine suffragio* [i.e., the rights of both *connubium* and *commercium* but without voting and political rights], or *civitas cum suffragio* [i.e., full citizenship rights]. Howbeit, it must be noted that because political transactions were only conducted in Rome, so that one had to be physically present in Rome to exercise the franchise, many foreigners who lived in the provinces were unable to vote as a result, though they had full citizenship rights; and neither were they able to contest for political offices, as election campaigns entailed considerable amounts of cost, not to mention the fact that they would be unable to match their native Roman counterparts in popularity and patronage (on patronage, and its role in Roman politics, cf. Goldberg 1995, 120; Brunt 1988, 392-400; Yakobson 1999, 66-71; Meyers 2012, 461). Thus, Peter Brunt ([1971], 9, 30) rightly observes that the extension of *suffragia* to the provinces and allied states did little to alter the political landscape in Rome or threaten the interests of the ruling class, because the system at the time was undemocratic and skewed towards the wealthy.

¹²⁰ In ancient Rome, Patricians constituted citizens of noble birth [the term is derived from the root word, *patres*, to denote, ‘father,’ hence the popular belief that these were directly descended from the senatorial founders of Rome, and as such were rightly entitled to bear rule in Rome; cf. for instance the remarks of Livy, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. VIII: Sec. 7; but also Book IV, Chap. IV: Sec. 7, to this effect: *centum creat senatores, sive quia is numerus satis erat, sive quia soli centum erant, qui creari patres possent. patres certe ab honore, patriciique progenies eorum appellati* (lit. trans., “He created a hundred senators; either, because that number was adequate, or because there were only a hundred heads of houses who could be created. In any case they were called *patres* by virtue of their rank, and their descendants were called *patricians*”); cf. also a corroborating remark by Cicero, *De Republica*, Book II, Sec. 23, as follows: *ille Romuli senatus, qui constabat ex optimatibus, quibus ipse rex tantum tribuisset, ut eos patres vellet nominari patriciosque eorum liberos* (lit. trans., “the Senate of Romulus consisted of the best men, whom the king himself had so favored, and whom he had so wished to be called *patres*, and their children, *patricii*,” cf. other adjoining remarks in Plutarch, *Romulus*, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae*, Book II, Chap. VIII: Sec. 1-3], whereas Plebeians comprised all other citizens that were not of noble birth, and in effect, not Patricians [although they may be distinguished from Equestrians, which were wealthy and prominent citizens not of noble birth; the root word *pleb* denoting more accurately, one of lowly social standing, as regarding citizens of the working class, such as farmers, craftsmen, artisans, merchants] (cf. also Breaugh 2007, 76-7; Ste Croix 1981, 333; Botsford 2001, 20; Raaflaub 2010, 139). Thus, years later, the Venezuelan statesman Simón Bolívar would apply the same ‘hereditary principle’ when in 1819 he awarded senatorial positions to descendants of the founding fathers of the Republic (cf. Bolívar 1969, 109).

¹²¹ For instance, only Patricians were elected to the top three magistracies of the State (i.e., as censor, consul, and praetor); as well as to the Senate (cf. Heitland 1909, 53; Roberts 2011, 144; Aldrete 2004, 44).

¹²² Additionally, Plebeians served largely as infantrymen in the Roman army (cf. Boak 1921, 68; Gibbon 2008, 282; Francis 2009, 55-6).

¹²³ Besides their exclusion from public appointments, Plebeians were barred also from intermarriages with Patricians, and were discriminated against in court proceedings (primarily because there were no written laws at the time). Additionally, they were held in bondage for defaulting on debt payments (on the prohibition of *connubium* with Patricians, cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *op. cit.*, Book X, Chap. LX: Sec. 5; Cicero, *De Republica*, Book II, Sec. 61-3; Boatwright et al. 2004, 53; Roselaar 2013, 106-7; Livy, *op. cit.*, Book IV, Chap. I: Sec. 2; on discriminations in law courts, cf. Adam 1797, 107-8; Homo 1996, 46-7; 120; Kabir 1963, 16).

¹²⁴ The conflict of the orders [i.e., of the orders of Plebeians and Patricians] spanned a period of about 200 years (i.e., from 494 – 287 BC) during which time the hitherto closed political system of the Roman Republic attained some level of liberalization. The Plebeians who constituted the working base of the Republic had begun to protest for equal treatment and the right to participate fully in the affairs of the state. On three successive occasions, they abandoned the city of Rome for a sacred hill [i.e., the Aventine, in the first two secessions; and the Janiculum, in the third] where they threatened to dwell permanently until their demands for inclusion and participation were met by the ruling Patrician aristocracy [in effect, they refused to serve in the military, and to pay taxes to the State]. The patricians, recognizing the value of the Plebeian class to the State, both in the army where they formed a significant part of the infantry, and in the economy where they produced most of the goods and food consumed in the city, acceded much to their demands and granted them equal rights of participation in the affairs of the State (cf. Linderski 1990, 34; McNulty 2014, 30; Scott 2005, 104-5; Loewenstein 1973, 22-4).

¹²⁵ Prior to the conflict of orders, the political system of archaic Rome was much tilted in favor of the rich Patrician class. And such bias against Plebeians was perpetrated on the basis that because the wealthy provided more equipment for military warfare (and also paid more in taxes to the State), they should by reason of this investment have more voice and representation in political matters. Thus, in the *comitia centuriata* [i.e., the military assembly, where magistrates were elected] citizens (i.e., both Patricians and Plebeians) were divided into 193 centuries and each century had a vote of one [in effect, voting was conducted independently within each century, and the majority decision of the century constituted the vote of that century]. Yet, the

distribution was done in a way as to ensure that the wealthy had majorities in at least half of the centuries. And because voting started from the wealthiest century unto the least, and stopped only after a majority vote had been attained, it meant that the Plebeian class [i.e., those that constituted the working class, as equestrian Plebeians were likely grouped together with Patricians, by virtue of their wealth] although being represented in the assembly, were never really afforded the opportunity to partake in the election of state magistrates (cf. North 1990, 15-6; Momigliano 1989, 92; Malden 1851, 27; Ramsay 1851, 118).

¹²⁶ These rights and privileges were granted in succession over a protracted period of time that spanned nearly two centuries. In 494 BC, the Plebeians were allowed to set up their own assembly, the *concilium plebis* [i.e., the council of the plebs], and this council elected tribunes, which were persons that represented the plebs, and presented their views and decisions to the consuls and the Senate. Furthermore, a second assembly was created, the *comitia tributa*, which allowed for representation of citizens by tribe, rather than by wealth [as was the case in the *comitia centuriata*, cf. Note 125, *supra*]. And this was to allow all citizens equal opportunity to exercise their franchise, regardless of their wealth status [howbeit there were a total of 35 tribal divisions (in both assemblies), composed of 4 urban, and 31 rural. And because voting was only conducted physically in Rome, it meant that only the wealthy from the rural tribes could afford to frequently exercise their franchise, making the system again biased in favor of the rich] (cf. esp. Mouritsen 2001, 130). The only difference between the two assemblies was the fact that the former was an all-Plebeian council, whereas the latter was composed of both Plebeians and Patricians (cf. Livy, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. XXXIII: Sec. 1-3; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *op. cit.*, Book VI, Chap. LXXXIX: Sec. 1-2; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Book XI, Chap. LXVI: Sec. 8; Tacitus, *Annales*, Book XI, Chap. XXII). Thereafter, in 448 BC, the Valerian-Horatian law appointed ten commissioners [*decemviri*] which codified the laws of Rome on Twelve Tables, essentially to prevent magistrates from ruling arbitrarily, and to afford Plebeians the opportunity of appeal (cf. Livy, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chap. IX: Sec. 32-4, 57; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *op. cit.*, Book X, Chap. III: Sec. 34; Diodorus Siculus, *op. cit.*, Book XII, Chap. XXVI: Sec. 1; Byrd 1995, 25-6; Hamen 2015, 33-4). Thereafter, in 445 BC, the *lex Canuleia* [also called, the *lex de conubio patrum et*

plebis] allowed for intermarriages between Patricians and Plebeians [although it must be noted that members of the Senate and their children were not permitted to intermarry with Plebeians] (cf. Flower 2010, 45; Smith and Lawrence 1875, 41; Eder 2005, 258; Becker 1866, 155). Thereafter, in 367 BC, the Licinian-Sextian law established the right of Plebeians to contest for the office of consul, the highest office of the State (cf. Smith 2006, 270; Rüpke 2012, 24; Cary and Scullard 1975, 78; Forsythe 2005, 234-9). Thereafter, in 326 BC, the Poetelian-Papirian law abolished *nexum*, or debt bondage, making it thus illegal for Plebeians to be held in bondage for defaulting on debt payments (cf. Wenger 1940, 225; Schiller 1978, 209; Hunter 1876, 875; Mackenzie 1876, 374). Thereafter, in 342 BC, the *lex Genucia* made it mandatory that one of the two annually-elected consuls of the State be a Plebeian [whereas the Licinian-Sextian law had made it possible for Plebeians to be elected to this position, the sheer wealth and popularity of Patricians, coupled with their dominance in the *comitia centuriata*, made it almost impossible that a Plebeian would ever be appointed to the office. Thus, this law was to guarantee a Plebeian representation in the highest office of the State] (cf. Lomas 2018, 228; Livy, *op. cit.*, Book VII, Chap. XLII: Sec. 2; Valerius Maximus, *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, Book VIII, Chap. VI: Sec. 3; Plutarch, *Camillus*, Chap. XXXIX: Sec. 1; Drogula 2015, 40). Then finally, in 287 BC, the *lex Hortensia* was passed which made legislations of the Plebeian assemblies [i.e., the *comitia tributa* and the *concilium plebis*] binding on all Roman citizens [hitherto, such *plebiscites* applied only to Plebeians, but not to Patricians] (cf. McCuaig 1989, 104; Fritz 1954, 212-4; McIlwain 2005, 47; Schiavone 2000, 70).

¹²⁷ Howbeit with some notable limitations. The political empowerment of Plebeians, and their intermarriages with Patricians facilitated a ‘union of the orders’ and brought about the emergence of a Patrician-Plebeian aristocracy, called the nobility [*nobilitas*], which thereafter dominated the politics of the Republic, and pursued laws and policies which furthered the interests of the rich. Plebeians of working-class status however continued to remain marginalized and sidelined in political matters of the State (cf. Ward et al. 1999, 66; Anderson 1974, 53; Taylor 1966, 6; Rostovtzeff 1928, 48).

¹²⁸ Max Weber (*loc. cit.*, 78-9) attributes the fall to such factors as “despotism, a decline of morality, and the loosening of marriage ties in the ruling class;” whilst Professor Talcott Parsons (*loc. cit.*, 352) on the other hand blames the fall on “the

lack of institutional capacity to maintain the necessary economic, political, and administrative structures of the Republic.”

¹²⁹ The rich *nobilitas* were able to acquire a significant portion of these new lands by virtue of their ties to the Senate (cf. esp. Rosenstein 2004, 103-5; Cowell 1961, 136-7; Burger 2013, 111).

¹³⁰ Following the failure of the agrarian reforms by the Gracchi brothers [first by Tiberius Gracchus, through the *Lex Sempronia Agraria* to redistribute state lands to poor landless citizens; and second, by his brother Gaius Gracchus through legislations to offer state-subsidized corn rations to the peasantry (cf. esp. Appian, *Civil Wars*, Book I, Chap. I: Sec. 7-14; Scullard 1982, 25-9; Shotter 2005, 30-7; Long 1864, 189-93)] these two military leaders – i.e., Marius and Sulla – promised the landless poor a share of all conquered bounty if the latter would pledge their uncompromising allegiance to them. As such, private armies developed within the Roman army that were more committed to the person of the commander than to the state of Rome (cf. esp. Taylor 1961, 47-8; Gruen 1974, 378; Axelrod 2014, 21). Nevertheless, Cicero in his *De Officiis* (Book II, Sec. 79-80; cf. also Urbinati 2012, 614) has argued that it was the Gracchi agrarian reforms that stirred up this divisive and partisan passion amongst the people in the first place, in that it fueled the popular desire for more land and money, and thereby induced the people to prioritize their personal interests above the good of the Republic [cf. other adjoining remarks to this effect in Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Book I, Chap. XXXVII, pp. 117-21).

¹³¹ First, these three combined their influences to seize power in Rome. Thereafter, the defeats of Pompey and Crassus [the former in the battle of Pharsalus against the men of his ally-turned-rival Julius Caesar; and the latter, in Parthia, in the battle of Carrhae] left Caesar alone in charge of Rome, who afterwards appointed himself permanent dictator for 40 years until his assassination by a posse of senators in 27 BC (cf. Bunson 2002, 556; Goldsmith 1775, 419-23; Kenneth 1767, 14).

¹³² Because the ideal of *isonomia* [that is, equality amongst citizens] was entrenched in the *patrios politeia* of Athens, the lottery system was employed for public appointments to ensure a fair representation of citizens from all segments of the state (cf. Morrison 1941, 8). The Romans however were divided between Patrician and

Plebeian orders, and as such were naturally opposed to selections by lots (lest the less-esteemed Plebeian class should per adventure gain more access to important political positions in the State). Howbeit, lots were only applied in the *comitia tributa* to determine which tribe voted first (cf. Lintott 1999, 48; Williamson 2005, 223; Millar 2002, 94) [more also, it is interesting to note how in the case of both Athens and Rome, elections were employed for public appointments which were deemed too technical or important to be left to chance, whereas lots were applied for less important posts; cf. for instance, Note 46-7, *supra*, where the appointment of *strategoï* and other magistrates at Athens was carried out exclusively by elections in the tribal assemblies]. Here, Professor Ronald Rogowski's ([1974], 69, 71-2) thesis of "total and modified interchangeability" becomes apposite. According to him, the former was when all members of a society were deemed equally capable, so that one set of office holders could be randomly replaced by another without any loss in efficiency. And this he ascribed to selections by lot. On the other hand, where this view is objected, and it is rather held that "different people may show different aptitudes, or may need different amounts of training in the pursuit of different occupations," then modified interchangeability applies, because then, although one set of office holders are replaced by another, the selection is done through careful scrutiny, as in the case of selections by popular election.

¹³³ In the Roman Republic, deliberation on policy issues was carried out only in the Senate, the non-representative, purely aristocratic organ of the State. The Senators were ex-magistrates who brought their expertise in political matters to bear in policy decision making. The assemblies, on the other hand, could only vote on proposals brought to it by the Senate or the consuls, but could not deliberate on the issues presented therein. A pre-assembly meeting called a *contio* was usually organized to orient the people on such policy proposals, but even in these, the people could only listen to their 'betters' speak, but could neither ask questions nor participate in said discussions (of this, cf. Roberts 1994, 126; Heitland 1909, 69; Morstein-Marx 2004, 34-5; Mouritsen 2004, 38-9; Livy, *op. cit.*, Book X, Chap. XLV: Sec. 1). However, in the case of Athens, because citizens were deemed equal, and because absolute power resided with the *demos*, all citizens partook freely in deliberations on policy matters in the *Ecclesia*.

¹³⁴ In this respect, the consuls which had *imperium* (after the manner of monarchs) depended upon the people to be elected, and even afterwards, could only serve for one year, after which they must stand again for re-election, if they so desired. They could propose laws, but these could only be passed in the assemblies, and they had to (but were not required to) avail themselves to the counsels of the Senate. The Senate was unelected, and as such could not pass laws or decrees. Nevertheless, it exercised great influence on Rome's foreign policy, as well as superintendence on other financial, legal, and military matters of the State. The assemblies could not deliberate on policy proposals, except to vote them into law; to elect magistrates; and to ratify foreign policy treaties (cf. Ranjan 2016, 117; Korab-Karpowicz 2010, 113; Lang and Wiener 2017, 11). As such, John Adams (1788, 142) in his *A Defense of the Constitutions of Government* remarks that "if all the powers of the consuls, senate, and people had centered in a single assembly of the people, collectively or representatively, could any man have pretended to believe that Rome would have been long free, or ever great?" Also, James Madison adjoins this statement in *The Federalist Papers* (No. XLVII, p. 249) when he asserts that: "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" [cf. also a more general thesis on the separation of powers in Montesquieu (*Spirit of the Laws*, Book XI, Chap. VI) as follows: "when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. There would be an end of everything were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people to exercise those three powers: that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals"] (cf. also Arthur F. Bentley 1908, 321-9, for added excursus on the same).

¹³⁵ Cf. other related references of the mixed constitution of the Roman Republic in Cicero, *De Republica*, Book I, Sec. 42, 45, 69-70; *Epistulae ad Atticum*, Book XIII, Chap. XIII: Sec. 2; Plato, *Laws*, Sec. 681d, 693b-e; *Republic*, Sec. 557d, *Menexenus*, Sec. 238c-d; *Statesman*, Sec. 291a-2b, 301a-3b; Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Sec. 1266a-7b; Book IV, Sec. 1297b-8a; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Book VII, Chap. I: Sec. 131; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chap. VII: Sec. 7). Polybius' central idea seems to be that the mixed constitution furthered a *virtue of moderation*, in that it guarded against the excesses of power by the *populares* [through demagoguery, or by means of majority voting], and the abuse of power by the *optimates* [but especially by elected magistrates] (cf. Wood 1988, 193; Urbinati 2012, 614-5; but also Shoemaker 1966, 88, who notes that the mixed constitution of republics imbues them *generally* with “a sense of stability, strength, and virtue”).

¹³⁶ Thus we observe that the class conflict continued to supervene at Athens following the reforms of Solon, giving recourse to the rule by the tyrant Peisistratos, and necessitating the reforms of Cleisthenes, Ephialtes and Pericles. The Roman Republic on the other hand seemed not to have endured such periodic cycles of class conflict, although this may have more to do with the social structure of both states than with the class conflicts themselves. For instance, in Athens, all citizens were regarded equal, and all partook severally in the affairs of the state, and so mass revolts were wont to be more pronounced than in Rome where the *nobilitas* were at the helm of affairs, and the Plebeians not only approved their rule, but also deferred to them in matters of public policy.

¹³⁷ “But that the constitution of our republic was not the work of one, but of many; and had not been established in the life of one man, but during several generations and ages. For [...] so powerful a mind had never existed; from which nothing had escaped; nor that all minds collected into one, could foresee so much at one time, as to comprehend all things without the aid of practice and time” [translation qtd. From English version of book, referenced as follows: Cicero, Marcus T. *The Republic*. Translated by George W. Featherstonhaugh. New York: G. & C. Carvill, 1829, p. 80].

¹³⁸ Thus, Professor Henrik Mouritsen (2001, 16) remarks that: “the people,’ who formally represented the primary source of political legitimacy in the Roman state,

bore little relation to the people who exercised these powers in the popular institutions. There were two ‘peoples’ in Roman politics: the ideal and the actual. The people as a political concept were distinct from the people as physical reality, and the direct nature of participation meant that the two were effectively separated. There was a stark contrast between the *Populus Romanus* as collective political agent and the restrictive way in which this role was performed in practice.” This is not to say that such segmentation of the populace into ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’ [the former being those who owed legal obligations to the state in the form of military service, tax payment, amid others; and the latter, persons that were ‘accommodated’ by the state, but owed no formal legal obligations to it – in effect, the peasantry, and members of the lower property classes] is in itself favorable to the peace of a Republic, but is only to demonstrate that the people of a state are more likely to be committed to and involved in the affairs of the state if they perform a duty or an obligation to the state.

¹³⁹ With the expansion of the Roman Republic via conquest came also an extension of citizenship rights to members of the conquered territories (cf. Note 119, *supra*). Nevertheless, that a commensurate system of representation was not devised to ensure the effective integration and participation of these provinces in the affairs of the Republic meant that these ‘quasi-citizens’ remained ideally available to be coopted by ambitious patrons as Sulla and Marius for parochial, anti-state objects.

¹⁴⁰ Although most senators were originally ex-magistrates, and of Patrician heritage, the conflict of orders and the resulting political reforms that obtained saw also the induction of low-ranking magistrates into the Senate. These persons were popularly called *senatores peditarii* because they were barred from speaking on the senate floor, and only voted by show of hands, or by joining the ‘vote group’ they most agreed with (cf. Ryan 1998, 85-7; Morsan 1740, 163; Vertot 1721, 13). In later years, a significant number of *peditarii* inducted into the Senate were *homines novi* [lit. trans., ‘new men’], which were persons without a noble heritage, and who also had not aforesaid occupied a higher magistracy (cf. Wiseman 1971, 105; Gruen 1974, 522-3; Salmon 2004, 48; Lee-Stecum 2014, 462; Roselaar 2019, 241).

¹⁴¹ In describing how the offices of the consul, tribune, and Senate coalesced together in their ends [although ideally conceived to work ‘separately,’ and to serve as checks

on the other's powers] Allen Ward and associates (*loc. cit.*, 66) write that: "magistrates during their brief year of office were not really independent of the noble-dominated senate. Not only were they dependent for advice on the collective wisdom of the ex-magistrates who comprised the senate, but also they [...] were looking to become senators if they were not already, and those who already were senators hoped to advance in rank. Even the consuls were dependent on the senate for funds and for appointment to prestigious or lucrative military commands and, after the acquisition of an oversea empire, provincial governorships. Accordingly, there was great pressure to conform to the wishes of the powerful consulars in the senate, who formed a virtual oligarchy." Elsewhere (*loc. cit.* 67), they asseverate that "the new tribunes [...] desired to cooperate with the consular nobles, who controlled the senate, and they were willing to exercise their vetoes over fellow tribunes in the interest of powerful nobles." John North (1990, 15, *italics supplied*) further adds that "the Roman oligarchy exercised an inherited, unchallenged authority [...] including a virtual monopoly over all forms of political initiative, *so that* if there was such a thing as Roman democracy, it was non-participatory to an extreme degree" [cf. other adjoining remarks to this effect in Dunn 2005, 54; Katz 1997, 14].

¹⁴² Minimal forms of representation were observed in the Republic notwithstanding. For instance, the tribunes were appointed to 'represent' the views and plights of the Plebs in the Senate. More also, in the voting assemblies, each tribe [in the case of the *comitia tributa*] or property class [in the case of the *comitia centuriata*] was assigned a single vote which 'represented' the collective vote of the entire members of that tribe or property class. But the thought of extending the political process beyond the city of Rome, in which case the several provinces would have elected their own representatives did not appear feasible to the Romans. And this was particularly so for two reasons. First, because a greater proportion of the nobility were resident in the city of Rome, which also was the economic and cultural hub of the state; and second, because such provinces may presently lack the institutional structures of a decentralized government [such as defense, finance, expertise, economy] although these would have developed with time.

¹⁴³ Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD, the Italian peninsula was broken up into several independent city states. Many of these new states, but

particularly the city-states of Florence, Venice, Siena, and Pisa, established and maintained varied forms of republican democracy. Howbeit, these are not discussed further in *this essay*, for the reason that the forms of government established therein were not so different in scope to that of the Roman Republic [albeit for chapter-long discussions on the subject matter, cf. Monahan 1994, 1-49; Tangian 2014, 57-94; Stockwell 2012, 131-42].

¹⁴⁴ The English Parliament evolved out of the periodic gatherings of Witan and Moot (cf. Stobaugh 2012, 62). The former were a privileged group composed mainly of nobles as clergymen, barons, and earls, who were specially appointed by the king to discuss pertinent matters of the state, such as the imposition of taxes and customs. Over time, and with the increase in the number of appointees, the Witan evolved into the *magnum concillium* [lit. trans., ‘Great Council’], and in later years, came to constitute the House of Lords. The Moot on the other hand comprised largely of bishops, sheriffs, landlords, and village representatives who met at the county level to discuss local grievances and other issues of mutual concern. Now, following the signing of the Magna Carta Libertatum in 1215, the Witan were given the sole right to serve as consultants to the king on matters of the state [this was also the first instance that a limitation was placed on the powers of the sovereign]. As such, the first Parliament that was convened the same year comprised solely of nobles and barons, and in 1236, the *magnum concillium* came to be popularly referred to as Parliament. Howbeit in the first Parliament convened by King Edward I in 1275, he ordered each English county and shire to elect two knights and burgesses respectively to represent their localities in Parliament [in effect, to join the Witan in parliamentary proceedings] (of the plausible reasons for the inclusion of burgesses and knights in Parliamentary meetings, cf. Robert et al. 2016, 91-2). Thereafter, the second Parliament in 1295, and succeeding ones came to always include these elected burgesses and knights (cf. bibliographical references in Pasquet 1925, 126-7; Thompson 1953, 9-10; White and Hussey 1958, 32-3; Lehmberg 2002, 77-80; Stubbs 2012, 483).

¹⁴⁵ By and large, this was rooted in the Crown’s efforts to overstep Parliament in the raising of revenue for the administration of the realm. Parliament, which was made up of representatives of landowners, barons, sheriffs, and clergymen were unwilling to tolerate the Crown’s utter disregard for traditional property rights and personal

liberties. As such, Parliament would refuse to provide the Crown with tax revenue, and the Crown would in turn circumvent Parliament and resort to other arbitrary means of meeting this end. This impasse led to Parliament being dissolved many times by the Crown [this was during the reign of the Stuarts] (cf. extensive discussions on the subject matter in Thackeray and Findling 2004, 165-84; Herrup 2002, 124-42; Coward 2014, 343-53).

¹⁴⁶ In their seminal essay on *Constitutions and Commitment*, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989, 806, *italics supplied*) in attempting to elucidate the importance of political institutions pose the following question: “if the state has a comparative advantage in coercion, what prevents it from using violence to extract all the surpluses of the economy? In their answer, they espouse that: “it is not always in the ruler’s interest to use power arbitrarily or indiscriminately; [and that] by striking a bargain with constituents that provide them with security, the state can often increase its revenue.” Such self-enforcing ‘bargain,’ or ‘constitution,’ in the words of Brennan and Buchanan (1981, 67) “imposes binding constraints on choice options after the rules themselves have been established;” or rather as Williamson (1985, 48-9) adjoins, “constitutes *ex ante* safeguards that prevent transactions from being exploited by *ex post* opportunism.” In effect, self-enforcing institutions help to foster the credible commitment of parties to a set of regulations or contractual obligations, thereby promoting trust, secured property rights, and long-term economic growth in a state (cf. Weingast 1993, 288; Mantzavinos 2001, 241-2; Kasper et al. 2012, 128-30; Altmann 2011, 43-4; North and Weingast, *loc. cit.*, 803)].

¹⁴⁷ These included but were not limited to forced loans [that is, loans that were secured by threat, and without a guarantee of repayment; cf. Ashton 1960, 36; Cust 1987, 3; Millstone 2016, 222], sale of dispensations [these were temporary right granted one to dispense with parts of a law or restriction; cf. Ganahl 2013, 173], purveyance [that is, the willful seizure of private property by the Crown for public use, cf. Hirst 1986, 113-4] [for a more general discussion of the subject matter, cf. North and Weingast (*loc. cit.*, 808-12); but also Jones ([1973] 47, 50), on the Crown’s deliberate weakening of the Whig-led opposition party; and Kenyon (1985, 43), on the view that the Crown’s arbitrary actions depicted a “move towards absolutism”).

¹⁴⁸ These were new laws [or rather, edicts and decrees] issued by the Crown to counteract and/or dispense with existing laws of Parliament, particularly those that tended to curtail the actions of the Crown [on the distinction between the Crown's ordinary and absolute prerogatives, cf. Smith (2003, 235)]. A useful distinction however is offered by Watkins (2002, 89) between the prerogative courts and the common law courts as follows: "the prerogative courts reinforced the view of the sovereign as the source of English Law, whilst the common law courts emphasized English law as an evolving body of precedents and opinions that set limits even on the king's prerogative;" cf. also a reference of the prerogative courts by Maitland (2001, 263) as "a court of politicians enforcing a policy, [and] not a court of judges administering the law"].

¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, because judges of the common law courts were paid from public funds administered by the Crown, the latter used this power to intimidate and in some cases dismiss judges that ruled against its actions [cf. Hirst, *loc. cit.*, 121; Lockyer 2005, 424; Marshall 2013, 57-8; but also Davies (1959, 21), who adjoins that the "dismissal of independent judges and the appointment of subservient successors" allowed the Crown to "obtain servile instruments" while depriving judicial decisions of "all moral weight"]. A particularly popular episode in this regard was the Crown's dismissal of Justice Edward Coke. The latter had told the king that "all cases, civil and criminal, were to be determined in some court of justice according to the law and custom of the realm." To this, the Crown, then King James I, answered: "I thought law was founded upon reason, and I and others have reason as well as judges." Judge Coke then replied: "True it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent science and great endowments of nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods or fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it." Now when the King was much offended by this remark – thinking it treason that anyone in his realm should suggest that he should be under the law, Judge Coke answered that "the king ought not to be under any man but under God and the law." And with this saying, he was removed from office by a prerogative of the king [narration qtd. From Pound 1921, 60-1].

¹⁵⁰ This was fought between the supporters of Parliament [also referred to as *Roundheads*, led by Oliver Cromwell) and the supporters of the Crown [also referred to as *Royalists* or *Cavaliers*] (for a historic exposé of the War, cf. the works of Parry 1970; Hibbert 1993; Bennett 2013).

¹⁵¹ In actual fact, three civil wars took place in England in the mid-17th century. The first occurred between 1642 and 1646; the second, 1648 and 1649; and the third, 1649 and 1651. The first and second wars conjointly ended the reign of King Charles I, who had inherited the throne from his father, James I [first Stuart King of England] in 1625. Thereafter, the monarchy was dispensed with, and England was turned into a Republic [then called, the Commonwealth of England] administered by Parliament and a Council of State, between 1649 and 1653. Thereafter, Oliver Cromwell, who had led the *Roundheads* to victory against the *Royalists*, was unanimously crowned Lord Protector of England by Parliament, and his personal rule [for he was not crowned a monarch] lasted until 1658. He was then succeeded by his son, Richard Cromwell, who only ruled for two years before his abdication in 1660. In the selfsame year, the monarchy was restored, and Charles II, son of King Charles I, was crowned King of England and reigned until 1685 [cf. the interesting observation by Samuel R. Gardiner (1897, 181) that it was Oliver Cromwell's vain attempt to enforce concurrently a 'rule by Parliament' and a 'rule by the saints' that "wrecked the *Puritan* revolution and led ultimately to a restoration of the monarchy"]. He was then succeeded by his brother, James II, as King of England, who in turn reigned for three years, before being deposed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Thereafter, the daughter of James II, Mary, and her husband, William of Orange were jointly crowned King and Queen of England in 1689 following the Revolution. But because the pair could not produce an heir to the throne, the succession fell to Anne, sister of Mary, as Queen of England in 1702. It was during her reign that England and Scotland finally agreed to unite their separate lines of successions, a development which led also to the uniting of the two nations into a single state of Great Britain. Queen Anne produced no heirs and was thus the last Stuart monarch. Later, the eldest son of Sophia [granddaughter of James II], George I of Hanover would come to be crowned the first King of Great Britain in 1714 [seven years after the signing of the Union Act in 1707]. Principally, the English Revolution, as discussed in *this essay*, involves the reign of the Stuarts, particularly

until the Glorious Revolution of 1688 [that is, until the reign of James II]. But because of the long line of monarchs and the attendant chain of successions, *this essay* uses the same generic term ‘Crown’ to refer to the many dispensations of the Stuart monarchy.

¹⁵² These institutional changes were largely effected between the periods following the second Civil War of 1649 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

¹⁵³ By and large, these were contained in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the attendant Settlement Act of 1701 which laid down the rights of the ‘Subjects’ [that is, the English people and Parliament] in relation to the Crown in the newly established constitutional monarchy. Amid other provisions, these Acts altogether ensured that the Crown could no longer dissolve Parliament nor dispense with its laws at the former’s sole discretion; that freedom of speech was guaranteed in Parliament; that free Englishmen had the right to petition Parliament and the King without the fear of retribution; and that the Crown could not levy taxes without parliamentary approval (cf. Rivera 1970, 16-7; Wiltshire 1992, 85; Hakim 2005, 22-3; Roper 2012, 116; Hill 2002, 274-5; on the Settlement Act, cf. Stevens 2005, 7-10; Williams 1960, 56-60). More also, the Triennial Act of 1641 was enacted to ensure that the Crown convened a parliamentary session at least once every three years [which was so contrived to ensure that Parliament was always at hand to be consulted by the Crown on all policy matters of the state] (cf. Congleton 2011, 364; Graber and Gillman 2015, 220). Furthermore, Parliament attained the right to audit the expenditures of the Crown, as well as to exercise a veto over such expenditures. North and Weingast (*loc. cit.*, 816) summaries these measures as follows: “[...] the Revolution initiated the era of parliamentary ‘supremacy,’ [which] settled for the near future the issue of sovereignty: it was now the ‘king in Parliament,’ [and] not the king [acting] alone [by volition]. No longer [could] the Crown, arguing the ‘divine rights of kings,’ claim to be above the law. Parliamentary supremacy established a permanent role for Parliament in the on-going management of the government and hence placed a direct check on the Crown.”

¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, North and Weingast (*loc. cit.*, 818, 829) assert that certain actors in Parliament, such as representatives of wealth holders, were vested with veto powers

to ensure that parliamentary decisions on taxes and loans were in the interests of those most affected by them. Furthermore, they add that the “natural diversity of views in Parliament raised the cost of supplying private benefits in the form of favorable legislation” (cf. also Ekelund and Tollison 1981, 149). One may also speak of the 1694 amendment to the Triennial Act (of which, cf. Note 153, *supra*) which required that an elected Parliament lasts no longer than three years [in effect, that fresh parliamentary elections be held every three years], which was so contrived to prevent the corrupting of Parliament by Crown ministers who [taking advantage of the long session of Parliament] may employ inducements such as patronage and pensions to build a reliable support base for the Crown amongst members of parliament (cf. Williams, *loc. cit.*, 49-50; Deazley 2004, 10; but also Holmes 1993, 325-6, who asseverates that the Act “metamorphosed the English electorate into a “force genuinely [...] representative of the will of the politically-conscious classes in the country.”

¹⁵⁵ On the balance of power between the Crown and Parliament, cf. a popular quote by Erskine May (1844, 324) as follows: “the Crown demands money, the Commons grant it, and the Lords assent to the grant: but the Commons do not vote money unless it be required by the Crown; nor do they impose or augment taxes, unless such taxation be necessary for the public service, as declared by the Crown through its constitutional advisers.”

¹⁵⁶ Cf. for instance Professor Robert Barro (1987, 245-6; but also North and Weingast, *loc. cit.*, 823) who employed 18th-century British data [although this extended to the periods between 1701 and 1918] to study the economic effects of government purchases. He found out that prices remained stable during the period without any incursions of inflation, despite the presence of a huge governmental budget deficit, which went to prove that the market was fairly certain about future governmental behavior, and did not expect any drastic form of inflationary finance – a fact which further attested the commitment of the governing regime to secure property rights. Cf. also Phyllis Deane (1979, 184-5) who asserts that the presence of common law courts to enforce private property rights “lubricated the channels linking savings and investment,” making it thus possible for “deposits from private sources to be employed further as credit to the private sector” [cf. other related comments in this respect by Ashton (1955, 185)]. Invariably, these factors contributed towards establishing an enduring securities and

investment market in England (cf. Dickson 1967, 457; Mathais 1983, 100; Kindleberger 1984, 74).

¹⁵⁷ To this end, Judges received a permanent and fixed tenure of office, and could no longer be removed by a royal prerogative, but only when convicted of a criminal offence, or voted out by Parliament on grounds of deviancy (cf. North and Weingast, *loc. cit.*, 816).

¹⁵⁸ Three forms of franchise extensions were carried out in 19th-century England. The first was parliamentary franchise; the second, municipal franchise; and the third, franchise for bodies governing welfare spending (cf. Lizzeri and Persico 2004, 736). But only the first is of particular significance to, and is discussed in *this essay*.

¹⁵⁹ Lizzeri and Persico (*loc. cit.*, 737) note that these Reform Acts conjointly led to an 88 percent increase in the size of the electorate. In previous years, Lizzeri and Persico (*loc. cit.*, 707, *italics supplied*) note that the members of parliament of some boroughs had been elected by as few as 100 [wealthy] voters. It is noteworthy also to mention that the 1832 Act enfranchised members of the middle class; the 1867, members of the urban working class; and the 1884, members of the lower working class, particularly agricultural laborers (cf. Whitfield 2001, 201-9). More also, McWilliam (1998, 45) notes that “the franchise extension was important because it determined the ability of people to be heard, and played a part in defining classes.” To this, A. V. Dicey (1867, 82-3) adjoins that because the franchise defined social classes, it also over time constituted these social classes into a political identity [that is, into those who had the vote, against those who had not]. And as such, the extension of the franchise was necessary to ensure that identity could be constructed on citizenship, rather than on class, and this helped to reduce social tensions in the state. Cf. also a corroborating assertion by Acemoglu and Robinson ([2000], 1168, 1186) who asseverate that “the British elites were forced to extend the franchise because of the threat of revolution [by the masses]:” to which franchise extension was necessary to serve as “a commitment [by the elite] to future redistribution [for the lower classes]” (cf. also Searle 1993, 223; Smith 1967, 27-8; Iverson and Soskice 2019, 80-1; Przeworski 2009, 292, for adjoining comments in this regard). Nevertheless, a number of objections were raised to the extension of the suffrage to the lower classes. For instance, Walter Bagehot (1963, 277), writing in

1867, noted that “a political combination of the lower classes [...] is an evil of the first magnitude; that a permanent combination of them [by means of their acquiring the suffrage] would make them supreme in the country; and that their supremacy [...] would mean the supremacy of ignorance over instruction, and of numbers over knowledge.” Cf. also Lord Thomas Macaulay (1873, 261) who noted that: “[...] it cannot be pretended that it is not for the immediate interest of the people [that is, the lower classes] to plunder the rich. Therefore, even if it were quite certain that, in the long run, the people would, as a body, lose by doing so, it would not necessarily follow that the fear of remote ill consequence would overcome the desire of immediate acquisitions.” To this, Jeremy Bentham (*Plan of Parliamentary Reform*, Intro., p. 470) remarked that the enfranchised lower class would themselves have an interest in “possessing, acquiring, and retaining property,” and as such would not be disposed to supporting a policy that redistributed property on a large scale. Cf. also a related espousal by James Mill (1939, 888) that the lower class would most assuredly be led by the enlightened middle class in voting decisions. He wrote as follows: “[...] the opinions of that class of the people who are below the middle rank are formed, and their minds are directed, by that intelligent, that virtuous rank, who come the most immediately in contact with them, who are in the constant habit of intimate communication with them, to whom they fly for advice and assistance in all their numerous difficulties [...], whose opinions they hear daily repeated and account it their honor to adopt. There can be no doubt that the middle rank, which gives to science, to art, and to legislation itself their most distinguished ornaments [...] is that portion of the community of which, if the basis of representation were ever so far extended, the opinion would ultimately decide. Of the people beneath them a vast majority would be sure to be guided by their advice and example” [Cf. also an interesting note by his son John Stuart Mill (*Autobiography*, Chap. IV, p. 106) on how education enlightens the masses to make informed voting decisions that represented a broad spectrum of interests. He remarked as follows: “So complete was my father’s reliance on the influence of reason over the minds of mankind, whenever it is allowed to reach them, that he felt as if all would be gained if the whole population were taught to read, if all sorts of opinions were allowed to be addressed to them by word and in writing, and if by means of the suffrage they could nominate a legislature to give effect to the opinions they adopted. He thought that when the legislature no longer

represented a class interest, it would aim at the general interest, honestly and with adequate wisdom.”

¹⁶⁰ Fewer voters meant that there would be a general tendency amongst legislators to support policies that served the interests of a narrow cartel of elites, but the opposite is to be expected with franchise extension to a larger segment of the population: the support of broad-based policies that served the good of the public (cf. esp. Cox 1987, 59). In the case of Great Britain, these were particularly in the areas of public health and education. With regards the former, this was evinced in the provision of public health infrastructures and sanitary amenities to cope with the rapid growth of urban centers, which had engendered a rise in mortality rates (cf. Williamson 1990, 282). Cf. thus, Jindrich Veverka (1963, 111-27, esp. 114, 119) who provides data to show a doubling of government expenditure on ‘social’- and ‘economic and environmental’ services (the former, from 9% to 20%; the latter, from 9% to 15%) between 1840 and 1890 [cf. also Harris (2004, 11-3) for adjoining comments in this regard]. With regards education, this was seen in the enactment of the Foster Act in 1870, and the Education Act in 1902, which together boosted education development in Great Britain [the former providing for free and compulsory primary education up to the age of twelve; and the latter, providing for the funding of secondary schools out of government grants] (cf. Maclure 2006, 149-53; Roberts 2001, 27; but also Lizzeri and Persico, *loc. cit.*, 754-5; Ringer 1979, 207; Acemoglu and Robinson, *loc. cit.*, 1191).

¹⁶¹ Prior to the extension of the franchise, only a few voters elected a handful of legislators to the House of Commons. As such, it became regular practice for large corporations and wealthy landowners to employ bribes to influence the choice of voters for their preferred candidate (cf. Harling 1996, 15-6). These candidates then, once elected to Parliament, only served the purposes and interests of their patrons, at the expense of broad-based legislation and efficient public policy. Cf. for instance the parliamentary speech by Lord Chancellor Brougham to the House of Lords as follows: “[...] the best interests of the country are sacrificed by the masters of the rotten boroughs – for their nominees must vote according to the interest, not of the nation at large, whom they affect to represent, but for a few individuals whom alone they represent in reality [qtd. In Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1831: 245; cf. also a related speech by Lord Russell to the House of Commons as follows: “[...] I do not wish

to see men returned here for commercial houses, representing only their partners, and naturally anxious to oblige the government in order to procure patronage and favor for their establishments (qtd. In Hansard, *op. cit.*, 1822: 64)]. Thus, with the extension of the franchise, it became nearly impossible, and also proved too expensive to directly bribe voters in “a large and organized” fashion, as had obtained aforesaid. As such, candidates were obliged instead to win constituency elections through “promises of legislation” (cf. Seymour 1915, 453-4, 447; but cf. also Rubinstein 1983, 74-5). This was further underscored by Japanese political theorist Yoshino Sakuzō (1958, 232-3) as follows: “[...] if the suffrage is limited, corrupt practices are carried on unreservedly. When the suffrage is extended to the limit, there can be absolutely no distribution of bribes and the like. Moreover, only when it has become absolutely impossible for candidates to fight one another with money and things of value will they compete by sincerely and frankly presenting their views and personal qualifications to the people. Consequently, the people will gain an opportunity of receiving a political education through this means.”

¹⁶² On this, cf. a validating statement by Adam Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Chap. V, pp. 42-3) to this effect: “That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labor, is alone sufficient to make any country flourish [...] and this security was perfected by the revolution, much about the same time that the bounty was established. The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without assistance [...] capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity.” Cf. also a corroborating quote by Professor George Sabine (1952, 457) as follows: “What the English Revolution contributed to the democratic tradition was the principle of freedom for minorities, together with a constitutional system both to protect and to regulate that freedom. For the individual, it meant freedom of association in accord with his own understanding of his own interests, and for the group it meant freedom to decide for itself its own manner of life within a framework of legally supported and legally limited rights and duties consonant at once with public order.”

¹⁶³ On how the prevailing rule of law in England may have helped usher in the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th- and early 19th century, cf. the remarks by

Professor Parsons (*loc. cit.*, 353) as follows: “[...] the [...] legal order is, in my opinion, the most important single hallmark of modern society. So much is it no accident that the Industrial Revolution occurred first in England, that I think it legitimate to regard the English type of legal system as a fundamental prerequisite of the first occurrence of the Industrial Revolution;” cf. also Patrick O’Brien (1993, 133) who adjoins that the factor and commodity markets in England operated within “an established framework of law and extra-legal codes of conduct during the Industrial Revolution.”

¹⁶⁴ It is also noteworthy to mention the contributions of the Puritan Movement [i.e., the sect of Protestants that broke away from the doctrines of the Church of England in the 17th century to practice their own ‘Bible-centered’ religion] to individual rights and freedoms. For instance, James Davis ([1992], 510, 515, 524, 529) notes that the movement furthered virtues such as toleration, liberty of conscience, and religious pluralism – all of which were consonant with parliamentary democracy in England. Cf. howbeit contra arguments on the puritan revolution, first by Professor Giovanni Sartori (1997, 58) who remarks that the puritans championed “the freedom of their own conscience” rather than freedom of conscience and opinion in its entirety]; and second by Crawford Macpherson (1962, 295) who questions the ‘democratic-ness’ of the movement giving the fact that it was opposed to universal manhood suffrage.

¹⁶⁵ Professor Sabine (*loc. cit.*, 465) offers a tentative definition for equality and liberty as follows: “In [...] wherever democracy prevailed, it tended to level off inherited rank and position: by extending the suffrage until it became practically universal, by making parliamentary constituencies into numerically equal blocks of population, by abolishing legal privileges and disabilities before the law, and by changing the law itself to offset the advantage that power may give to a litigant. Equal citizenship was a concept indispensable to the growth of democratic government [...] and again wherever democracy prevailed, democratic government depended on freedom of association and the collective power of minorities: by permitting organized agitation by freely formed political parties and pressure groups, in legalizing collective bargaining, and in supporting freedom of thought, publication, and speech, which are in effect the liberties of groups as much as of individuals.”

¹⁶⁶ Professor Sabine's definition of liberty (cf. Note 165, *supra*) stresses the fact that the citizens of a state are afforded the freedom to form voluntary associations and pressure group by which they could air their opinion on policy matters of the state. That this right was denied the Plebs in the Roman Republic meant that civil liberties were strongly curtailed in the state [cf. Note 133, *supra*, for related statements in this respect].

¹⁶⁷ In theory however, this ought not to have obtained. For instance, Robert Byrd (*loc. cit.*, 23, *emphasis added*) in his exceptional piece, *The Senate of the Roman Republic*, describes the institutional powers of the tribunes as follows: "[...] each tribune could veto the acts of the other tribune; each tribune could veto the acts of a consul; each tribune could veto and annul the *senatus consultum* [...]. The tribunes were also declared sacrosanct, so that an assault on their person was proscribed and punishable by law [...]. The tribunes therefore had great power and an aura of inviolability." In practice however, this was far from the norm, for although they possessed such powers and privileges, the tribunes, as reported by Ward and associates (*loc. cit.*, 66; in Note 141, *supra*) were wont to defer to senators and consuls on matters of public policy. Cf. also Bukovansky (2002, 62) who tells of a high degree of homogeneity and liaison amongst the *nobilitas*, so that they tended to identify more with one another than with the people they represented.

¹⁶⁸ Niccolò Machiavelli, in his *Discourses on Livy* (Book I, Chap. IV, pp. 20-3, qt. at 21-2) asserts that the disjointedness between the Plebs and the Senate made the Roman Republic "free and powerful." By 'free,' he relates of course to episodes of Plebs remonstrating with the Senate over decisions and policies of the state which the former deemed to be against their common good and welfare. He writes as follows: "I affirm that those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the commons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming free; and give more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions were attended, than to the good results which followed from them; not reflecting that while in every republic there are two conflicting factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this conflict that all laws favorable to freedom have their origin, as may readily be seen to have been the case in Rome [...]. For he who looks well to the results of these tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor to violence hurtful to the common good,

but to laws and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty.” Whilst this observation seems true and instructive, and appears to constitute political participation on the part of the Plebs, it nonetheless does not stand to imply that the Plebs were ‘free,’ or that the Roman Republic championed the cause of civil liberty, as per Professor Sabine’s definition of the term (cf. Note 165, *supra*). Also, it is particularly interesting to note how Machiavelli opted against using equally befitting qualifiers as ‘responsive,’ ‘transparent,’ ‘equal,’ or ‘accountable’ to describe the Roman Republic, and this may have been because it was none of these in actuality. For what it seemed, a system of limited government was unskillfully implanted upon a social structure that was both divided and polarized. This proved both uncongenial and incompatible.

¹⁶⁹ It is noteworthy to mention that although both Houses of Parliament were initially comprised of wealthy members of British society, nonetheless, the institutional design was equalitarian, so that with the later extension of the franchise, it became possible for all British citizens to not only vote in parliamentary elections but also to contest for constituency seats [in effect, to become elected members of parliament in the lower House of Commons] This thus minimized the constraints of wealth, status, and class on political participation.

¹⁷⁰ A piece of note by way of antecedent is in place. During the reign of the monarchs, there existed only a single voting assembly of the people. This was called the *comitia curiata* and was divided into 30 *curiae* [lit. trans., ‘groups;’ of which cf. Michael Crawford (*loc. cit.*, 194) who notes that these 30 *curiae* were composed of ten groups from each of the three archaic Roman tribes namely: the *Tities*, *Ramnes*, and *Luceres*; on the historic origins of these archaic tribes, cf. Gianmario Prugni (1987, 102) who remarks that they were “autonomous subunits which had long existed before the creation of the Roman state;” on the notion that these early Roman citizens that constituted the *curiae* were first called *Quirites*, cf. Mouritsen 2017, 25; Tellegen-Couperus, 1993, 59; Palmer 1970, 156-60; cf. also related literature on the etymology and composition of the *comitia curiata* in Dumézil 1974, 172; Richard 1978, 131; Humm [2005], 199-203, 404-6, 414-9; Mispoulet 1882, 7-9; Momigliano 1963, 108-114; Martino 1972, 152-5; Humbert 1994, 180-1; Wolff 1951, 39; Loewenstein, *loc. cit.*, 106-7]. But after the monarchy was displaced, the *comitia curiata* was supplanted by the *comitia centuriata*, after which the twin assemblies: *comitia tributa* and *concilium*

plebis were later created following the Plebeian Revolution. The *comitia tributa* differed from the *concilium plebis* on the sole count that the former constituted a gathering of all adult male citizens aged 21 and over [that is, of both patrician and plebeian orders], whilst the latter constituted a gathering solely of plebeians. Resolutions passed within the *concilium plebis*, called *plebiscites*, were formally only binding on plebeian citizens, but after the introduction of *lex Hortensia* [of which, cf. Note 126, *supra*] gained the force of law, and became binding on all Roman citizens. But the question then remains that if the plebeian assembly could enact laws that were binding on all Roman citizens, then could they not also have served as a check on, and a counterweight to the overarching powers of the Senate? The answer, really, is no, and for good reason. First, as Robert Byrd (1995, 44) points out, the people's assembly could not initiate any legislative proposals of their own, but could only vote on resolutions [called *senatus consultum*] presented to them by the Senate [Here, Tom Stevenson (2015, 64) makes a good point that although it was the Roman people that made [or better, passed] laws, and as such could disregard the decrees of the Senate, nevertheless, this rarely happened because of the Romans' "commitment to consensus and compromise," and their "deep respect" for the integrity of the Senate; cf. also Valentina Arena (2012, 202) who characterizes the *senatus consultum* as a "vote of trust" which assured tribunes and consuls that they had the full backing of the Senate on a policy issue]. And second, owing to the rural-urban configurations of the 35 voting tribes of the assembly [of which, cf. Note 126, *supra*], even if the people's assembly did vote on the said *senatus consultum*, they were more likely to vote for it than against it [in effect, the wealthy plebeians, which after the Plebeian Revolution joined together with Patricians to form the *nobilitas*, were more likely to align with the interests of the Senate than with the plights of lower-class plebeians].

¹⁷¹ Praetors served as judges in the Roman Republic and were elected by the *comitia centuriata* for fixed one-year terms. They held the power of *imperium* and could command the Roman army in the absence of the consuls. The fact that these persons exercised concurrently executive and judicial powers may have meant that they were likely to apply the laws for their own private benefits [cf. for instance the remark by Professor Dankwart Rustow (1968, 43) that in societies where judges were not clearly distinguished from administrators, 'rule application' tended to be blurredly

differentiated from ‘rule adjudication; cf. also Baron de Montesquieu (*Spirit of the Laws*, Book XI, Chap. VI) who notes that “if the power of judging [...] were joined to the executive power, *then* the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.”

¹⁷² More also, Justices of the common law courts, although receiving life tenures upon their appointment by the Crown, could be spontaneously removed by Parliament on grounds of deviancy (cf. Note 157, *supra*). On the contrary, however, the praetorship was an elected position with a fixed-duration, and this meant that in the event where a magistrate became corrupt and biased, he could not be removed until after the expiration of his term of office. Thus, individual- and property rights may have been less secure in the Roman Republic than they might have been in 17th-century England, *ceteris paribus*.

¹⁷³ Professor Urbinati (*loc. cit.*, 610-1) in her essay makes mention of three types of liberty, namely: liberty as non-domination [i.e., protection from the rule of a *dominus*]; liberty as non-interference [i.e., secure political rights, and a rule by law]; and liberty as autonomy or self-government [i.e., political equality, and popular participation in government]. The first two, she says, are negative and obstructive [because they are only realized or enjoyed in the absence of external threats and constraints]; and the last, positive and assertive [because it mandates citizens to actively pursue and seek their interests and common good] (cf. added remarks to this effect in Berlin 1970, 121-34, esp. 121-2; Pitkin 1988, 535; Pettit 2001, 137; Ostwald 1982, 11). Thus, to the Romans, it was sufficient that the *populares* were endowed only with negative liberty. For because political participation required *virtue*, and this *virtue* could not be guaranteed in all citizens, it was thus necessary to restrict political activity of the *populares* to a ‘silent’ yes/no voting on legislative proposals by the ‘competent’ Senate (cf. Harrington [1996], 38, 143; Skinner [1998], 32, 74; Urbinati, *loc. cit.*, 618). In this respect, “public silence” was the price to be paid by the *populares* for their inclusion in political matters of the state (cf. Milton 1950, 174-5; but also, Pocock 1981, 357).

¹⁷⁴ This idea was foremost pioneered by Cicero in his *De Officiis* (Book II, Sec. 73-85), where he avers that the primary role of the state was to establish a balance of rights, and equality before the law for all social classes, and not rather to equalize wealth and

power for all persons. According to him (*loc. cit.*, Sec. 41-2), the foundations of political order rested on the principles of equity [*aequitas*, i.e., the constant and impartial application of law], justice [*iustitia*, i.e., fairness in the administration of law], and faith [*fides*, i.e., uncompromising respect for and trust in the provisions of law], which ensured that each social class was treated fairly and equally in relation to other classes in the state [cf. Hutter 1978, 158; but also Kelsen 1955, 29, who notes that “legal security, rather than absolute justice, was the prevailing legal consciousness”]. Thus, political equality in the Roman Republic meant that members of the same social class enjoyed equal political rights, although such rights differed across social classes – that is, the political rights of Patricians differed in form and scope from those of Plebeians, although all Patricians and all Plebeians enjoyed equally the rights that appertained individually to them (cf. Raaflaub 1983, 533-4; Wirszubski 1968, 10-1; Taylor 1949, 26; but also Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, Book V, Sec. 23, 67). The Romans therefore thought of Athenian *isonomia* [i.e., equality amongst persons] to be highly inequitable in so far as it conferred the same degree of political rights on both great and small, and allowed for all to partake equally in the affairs of the state (cf. Mably [1749], 51, 80; Kraut 2002, 227). To them, the instability that characterized Athenian democracy was owed to the fact that preference was given to numbers and quantities, rather than to quality and competence – thereby elevating *passion* over thought, and reducing political participation to the expression of *consent*, rather than of *virtue* (cf. Pettit 2004, 54; Urbinati, *loc. cit.*, 613). Nevertheless, Raaflaub and Wallace (2007, 28) have noted that Athenians opted for a form of liberty that allowed for citizens to engage actively in public discourses because “submissiveness and blind-obedience” [as had obtained amongst the *populi* in Rome] were atypical of their conception of popular sovereignty [on the Athenian notion of equality, cf. the Funeral Oration by Pericles who remarks as follows: “our form of government is a democracy because it is managed not for the few but for the majority. Still, although we have equality at law for everyone here in private disputes, we do not let our system of rotating public officers undermine our judgements of a candidate’s virtue, and no one is held back by poverty or because his reputation is not well-known, as long as he can do good service to the city [...] We live together without taking offence on private matters; and as for public affairs, we respect the law greatly and fear to violate it, since we are obedient to those in office at any time, and also to the laws – especially

to those laws that were made to help people who have suffered an injustice” (qtd. In Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Book II, Chap. XXXVII: Sec. 1-3).

¹⁷⁵ According to Horst Hutter (*loc. cit.*, 156-7), the Romans endeavored to maintain a fine distinction between the terms *concordia* and *amicitia*. The latter, to them, was a form of relationship that existed *naturally* amongst persons that were equal in virtue and character. These persons were likely to treat one another with dignity and respect, and to relate with one other on an equal footing. Nevertheless, because the state was sure to be composed of people with diverse characters, it became necessary that *concordia* – i.e., concord between persons dissimilar in status and virtue – was ensued by the state. A *concordia ordinum* thus implied equality before the law for all classes of persons in the state; or as Janet Coleman (2000, 285) puts it, “a reconciliation of irreconcilable interests [...] by means of a law which was just for all and produced a concord of the orders.” This was further underscored by Marcus Tullius Cicero in his *De Republica* (Book I, Sec. 49; cf. also *De Legibus*, Book I, Sec. 16, 44) as follows: *Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas?* [lit. trans., “And therefore, since law is the bond of civil society, and rights under law are equal, then by what right can a society of citizens be held together when the status of citizens is not the same? Even if equality of property is not appealing, and if the mental abilities of all cannot be equal, certainly the rights of all who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. What is a state if not the association of citizens under law?” (translation qtd. From English version of book, referenced as follows: Cicero, Marcus T. *On the Commonwealth and On the Laws*. Edited by James E. Zetzel. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999, pp. 21-2)].

¹⁷⁶ Professor Urbinati (*loc. cit.*, 619) further avers that without the participation of citizens in the making and changing of the law, “legal liberty, and due process of law” would be anything but secure acquisitions.

¹⁷⁷ That is, in the design of the mixed constitution, which guarded against the elevation of popular sovereignty over the sovereignty of law, as had obtained at Athens (cf. Note 135, *supra*).

¹⁷⁸ That is, as evinced in the election of representatives to the House of Commons – a thing proscribed in the Roman Republic, where Senators were unelected, and thus, were unrepresentative.

¹⁷⁹ Chronologically, the American Revolution occurred before the French Revolution. Nevertheless, because representative democracy was practiced in France within a single centralized state, but in the United States, within a federation of states, it seems palpably expedient to discuss the former before the latter. But also, because the concept of representation was best perfected in the latter than in the former.

¹⁸⁰ That is, the American War of Independence from Great Britain, fought from April 1775 to September 1783. France proffered her support to the United States through the Treaty of Alliance in 1781 (cf. Armitage 2007, 81-3), by which it offered such supplies as gunpowder, canons, clothing, and shoes to the American military. The French navy also engaged the British along the American coast, and about 5,500 French foot soldiers had aided the continental army which defeated General Lord Cornwallis' men in the battle at Yorktown, Virginia in 1781. Although Hobson (2015, 57; cf. also Armitage, *loc. cit.*, 87) notes that the French rationale for aiding the American revolutionists was to “maintain the liberty, sovereignty and independence of the United States,” nevertheless, the report by Comte de Moustier [minister of France to the United States] to King Louis XVI hints on the fact that France had joined the war in order to “deprive Great Britain of that vast continent” [that is, the United States] (cf. Echeverria 1957, 137-8), who at the time were a dominant power in Europe, having previously won the Seven Years' War [fought between 1756 and 1763] against France and Spain (cf. Roper 2012, 127).

¹⁸¹ France was bankrupted following the war of independence, and this plunged the state into economic doldrums (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 162; Hobson, *loc. cit.*, 82). More also, agricultural yields were particularly low during the period and this resulted in grain shortage, unemployment, and an increase in food prices (but particularly bread, the beloved staple of the French) (cf. Magraw 2014, 1; Jones 1988, 15-20, esp. 16).

¹⁸² French society during the reign of the monarchs was sharply divided into three estates. The first comprised the clergy which was responsible for the moral and spiritual wellbeing of the state. The second comprised birth elites (that is, the nobles) which owned vast amounts of land and property and received fixed royalties from their tenants in feudal agreements. And the third comprised everyone else (that is, the commoners), from professionals such as doctors and bankers to the jobless and homeless. An Estates-General then was a meeting of the representatives of all three estates – the equivalent of parliament in the *ancien régime* (cf. Hampsher-Monk 2005, 5; Popkin 2015, 23-4).

¹⁸³ Because taxes had been priorly increased following France's war with Britain [that is, in the Seven Years War], it was thought inexpedient to further increase taxes as a way of raising revenue for the state. Besides, taxes were solely borne by the peasantry, laborers and bourgeoisie, which together held a lesser share of the wealth of the state relative to the nobility [which were exempt from paying taxes]. When the then finance minister Charles Alexandre de Calonne proposed equal taxation for all Frenchmen (regardless of social standing), the nobility protested in defiance, asserting that it was their privileged right to be exempt from paying taxes (cf. Soboul 1974, 98-102; 1977, 97). Thus, unable to either tax the poor or the rich, and seeing no other viable way around the matter, King Louis XVI was forced to convene an Estates-General meeting in order to legislate on the matter (cf. Rudé 1988, 7-9; McGarr 1989, 28-9).

¹⁸⁴ In previous meetings of the Estates-General, the three Estates had met separately and voted by order. But owing to the sensitivity of the present matter at hand, the Third Estate insisted on a break from this norm. It wanted the Estates to meet together as one unified body, and for voting to be carried out by head and not by order. And this it proposed, because although the representatives of the Third Estates were twice as much as those of the other two Estates (of which, cf. McPhee 2002, 50-1; Jones 1995, 54), it was possible that they could be outmaneuvered by the two if voting was conducted by order [in which case each Estate would have a vote of one – but the first and second Estates aligned on most subject issues]. As espoused by Roper (*loc. cit.*, 164), the rule of the thumb in previous settings had been that issues pertaining to taxes were decided by a head count, whilst constitutional matters were settled by a vote of the orders. Now, whereas the present issue pertained to taxes and

should have been settled by a head count, yet the representatives of the first and second estate, being aware of the numbers of the Third Estate were unwilling to face the risk of having a tax burden passed unto them [in the event that they are outvoted by the Third Estate]. As such, they pushed for the matter to be resolved via a vote of the orders – which they were much assured of winning. This thus engendered the stalemate, for the bourgeoisie, which dominated the social hierarchy of the Third Estate had come to possess great wealth in France and were now much sensitive to the inferior position they were allotted in policy and legal decisions. They thus held to their grounds and pressed for the Estates to meet separately.

¹⁸⁵ McGarr (*loc. cit.*, 31) quotes the *séance royale* of King Louis XVI as follows: “The King wishes that the ancient distinction of the three Orders of the State be preserved in its entirety, as essentially linked to the constitution of his Kingdom; that the deputies, freely elected by each of the three Orders, forming three chambers, deliberating by Order [...] can alone be considered as forming the body of the representatives of the Nation.” In actuality, the revolt of the Third Estate preceded the edict of the king, but the reverse has been so stated to maintain fluidity in the narration. During the debate over the form of the Estates-General, the king vacillated in opinion and did not issue a clear stand on the matter. The Third Estate may have thus thought of the king as not showing sufficient support or concern for their cause (cf. esp. Soboul 1974, 117).

¹⁸⁶ By and large, this was spurred on by the activism and determinism of Abbé Sieyès, a previously unknown delegate of the Third Estate, who went on to play a pivotal role in the newly founded National Assembly. In 1789, he published an influential pamphlet titled: *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État?* [lit. trans., ‘What is the Third Estate?'] which gave impetus to the revolutionary cause of the said Estate. In this writing, Sieyès asks three questions concerning the estate of the *Tiers État*, which he answers as follows: “What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been in the political order up to now? Nothing. What does it demand? To become something” (cf. Sieyès 1963, 51; 2003, 110). The logic of Sieyès’ argument seems to be that the Third Estate constituted the embodiment of the French nation because its members did all the useful work of the state. Nevertheless, they have been persistently marginalized and sidelined in legal and policy matters of the state [that is, the Third Estate, though constituting 98

percent of the population of France have been assigned into a single order, whereas the clergy and nobility, which are few in number, have been grouped into separate voting orders so that the two could conjointly outvote the former on all policy and legal matters]. Sieyès then proceeded to assert that the nation was a pre-political entity, so that all political establishments based on class and wealth were not constituent of the state. In this regard, only the Third Estate represented the sovereign identity of France, as the other two orders were guardians of their own corporate privileges – the Third Estate had no corporate interests of their own, but the good of the nation. As such, it was expedient that they [that is, the Third Estate] “separated themselves from an outdated subservience to political elites who no longer represented the will or interests of the nation” (cf. Kramer 2011, 41-2; but also Sieyès 2003, 136; Baker 1991, 87-8; Kloppenberg 2016, 480).

¹⁸⁷ A few events of note took place before the promulgation of the 1791 Constitution. For instance, King Louis XVI attempted to disperse the Assembly by shutting the doors of their regular meeting place, but the members retreated to a nearby location – an indoor tennis court yard – and took a solemn oath – *serment du jeu de paume* [lit. trans., ‘Oath of the Tennis Court’] to continue meeting until they have readied a constitution for the state. Following this show of resilience by the Third Estate, a majority of the clergy and about 47 liberal nobles moved to join the Assembly (Lefebvre 1962, 114). Thereafter, the king undertook further military measures to disperse the Assembly but these proved futile also, particularly because a National Guard was set up by the Parisian commune to offset all counter-revolutionary attacks against the National Assembly [previously this National Guard had stormed the Bastille (the state prison) and had seized a considerable amount of weaponry from the army, and thereby had become a powerful force] (cf. Rudé, *loc. cit.*, 43-4, 54-9; McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 32). It must be noted however that King Louis XVI, being a devout Catholic, chose on purpose not to apply extreme measures to quell the popular revolt, but maintained instead a conciliatory posture towards the Third Estate. Such disposition by a ruler was severely criticized by Niccolò Machiavelli in his *Il Principe* (Chap. III, p. 10) where he avers that the Prince, in the event of a popular revolt, must either make generous concessions to the people, or crush the rebellion with brute force, but could not afford to condescend to the estate of the people. He writes as

follows: *Per il che si ha a notare, che gli uomini si debbono o vezzeggiare o spegnere; perché si vendicano delle leggieri offese, delle gravi non possono: sicché l'offesa che si fa all' uomo deve essere in modo, che la non tema la vendetta* [lit. trans. "It should be observed here that men should either be caressed or crushed; because they can avenge slight injuries, but not those that are very severe. Hence, any injury done to a man must be such that there is no need to fear his revenge" (translation qtd. From English version of book, referenced as follows: Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Edited by Quentin Skinner, and Russell Price. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988, p. 9)]. Thus, Professor Theda Skocpol in her *States and Social Revolutions* (1979, 123) noted that the calling of an Estates-General meeting [such of which had not been convened since 1614] demonstrated weakness on the part of the King and paved way for the Revolution, in that it "invited every peasant community to ruminate on the troubles of the realm," and thereby offered "possibilities for the peasants to rebel."

¹⁸⁸ In this constitutional design, the monarchy shared powers conjointly with the National Assembly [thereafter called Legislative Assembly]. Among the powers of the monarch included the right to veto legislations of the Assembly; to appoint cabinet ministers; and to engage in diplomatic relations with other states. The Legislative Assembly on the other hand had the sole right to enact laws and to set tax rates. It was organized as a single chamber and was only accountable to the people through elections which were held biennially (cf. Rudé, *loc. cit.*, 61; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 167-8). That this form of government did not endure for long was less a fault of the system than it was of the monarchy. As is rightly remarked by Professor Robert Palmer (1952, 70), "sovereignty of the people [...] might go with constitutional monarchy or with republicanism, though in practice it led to republicanism because few monarchs were yet willing to be constitutional."

¹⁸⁹ This was largely inspired by the peasant revolt of 1789 which culminated in the *Grande Peur* [lit. trans., 'Great Fear']. The peasants had heard rumors that a band of mercenaries had been hired by the king and his aristocrats to destroy their crops – so as to plunge the peasants into greater debt, and thereby thwart the popular revolt for reform [and in essence, the work of the National Assembly – as the peasants formed a large part of the National Guard which protected the Assembly from counter-revolutionary attacks]. To this the peasantry responded by way of mass riots,

attacking the châteaux of local seigneurs, and seizing and destroying records of seigneurial dues. Thus, to restore social order, and to prevent further attacks on private property, the deputies of the National Assembly ruled to abolish feudalism in the state (cf. esp. Hanson 2015, 147; but also Rudé, *loc. cit.*, 47; Soboul 1974, 148). Nevertheless, all existing feudal dues and payments which peasants owed to their lords were kept in place.

¹⁹⁰ Amongst the liberal provisions of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* included: inviolability of the individual and private property; equality of all persons before the law; freedom of speech, worship, and association; equality in public appointments. The liberal basis of the Declaration is found in its first article which states the following: *Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l'utilité commune* [lit. Trans., “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good”]. In addition to these rights, the 1791 Constitution extended the franchise to all adult males aged 25 and over who met a property qualification [that is, who paid taxes equivalent to three days of unskilled labor – these were regarded as active citizens, all others were regarded as passive, and were thus denied the franchise] (cf. Hall 1951, 234; Kropotkin 2009, 141-5; Blaufarb 1995, 611). More also, a two-tier electoral system was maintained. In this wise, the masses [that is, the ‘active citizens’ – as afore defined] elected persons to the cantonal primary assemblies, who in turn then elected delegates to the secondary assembly [that is, the *Convention nationale*]. Rafe Blaufarb (*loc. cit.*, 612) notes that for person to be eligible for election to a secondary assembly or another public office, they needed to have hitherto been paying in taxes, the equivalent of ten days’ labor. He thus goes on to assert that “the most significant distinction within the electorate was not that which divided active from passive citizens but rather that which separated those who could exercise their political rights only in the primary assemblies from their social betters who could be elected to secondary assemblies and public offices – the *éligibles*.”

¹⁹¹ According to the account of Alex Callinicos (1989, 143-4; but also Roper, *loc. cit.*, 169), these events were fueled by four concomitant factors. The first was the rising price of food which caused recurrent outbreaks in several parts of rural and urban France. The second involved peasant revolts and demonstrations against seigniorial

rights and dues – which had been maintained, although feudalism had been abolished in its institutional and juridical forms (cf. Note 189, *supra*). The third pertained to the fear of counter-revolutionary attacks from two fronts: on the one side were royalist factions who wanted to return power to the king and continue a reign of absolute monarchy; and on the other side were radical factions who were unsatisfied with the present constitutional monarchy and desired a *République* instead. The last had to do with the war against Austria, which the Legislative Assembly had so declared and promoted in the hope that it would “allow for the deepening social conflicts [...] to be diverted into unity behind the nation [...] and so stabilize the Revolution” (cf. McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 45). Notwithstanding, France suffered severe setbacks in the war, and this further heightened existing social tensions in the state.

¹⁹² The events leading to the revolutionary uprising which toppled the Legislative Assembly are all too well known. Following the economic hardships that continued to supervene in the state, and the reversals that the French army suffered in the war against Austria and Prussia, the Parisian commune asserted themselves once again and demanded the suspension of the king – whom they blamed for the prevailing crisis (cf. Hall, *loc. cit.*, 303). When the Legislative Assembly appeared unwilling to dispense with the king, the Commune took matters into their own hands and stormed the Tuileries palace – where they arrested the king and other of his royalist allies. Following this incident, and hoping to curb further insurrections by the Parisian crowd, the Assembly voted to suspend the king, and thereafter, began to share power conjointly with the Commune. In 1792, the Assembly was dissolved and replaced with a *Convention nationale* [lit. trans., ‘National Convention’], which effectively abolished the monarchy and established an antiquarian form of *République* in France (cf. Hobson, *loc. cit.*, 91-3; Roper, *loc. cit.*, 169-73; McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 45-9).

¹⁹³ The Jacobins were previously a minority faction in the Legislative Assembly [on the factional composition of the Legislative Assembly at its first meeting in 1791, cf. Soboul 1974, 230-1]. They were nicknamed ‘Jacobins’ because they met at the Dominican monastery [which monastery was called ‘Jacobin’ in France because of its affiliation with the church of St. Jacques] but were properly called *Société des Amis de la Constitution* [lit. trans., ‘Society of the Friends of the Constitution’]. Because they constituted a minority group in the Assembly, they sought to gain popularity

and support from elements without the Assembly through journal publications which they circulated to the general public. Now, following the creation of the National Convention, there emerged three new factions [these albeit evolved from the left-right-center factions of the previous Legislative Assembly] – the Girondins [these formed the right-wing: they were conservatives, and wanted to keep power and private property in the hands of the nobility]; the Montagnards [these formed the left-wing: they were radicals, and held ideas that tended to communism – in effect, that all citizens, but particularly members of the lower classes, should share equally in the wealth of the state. The Jacobin club developed out of this faction]; and the Plains [which occupied the center] (cf. Kates 1985, 8; Kennedy 2000, 8; Soboul 1977, 87; McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 51-2). Initially, the Girondins held a majority in the National Convention, but soon after, there grew an impasse between the two factions resulting from suspicions that both factions held one against the other. For instance, the Girondins thought that the Montagnards were aspiring towards a dictatorship and were thus aligning with the *sans-culottes* [that is, members of the lower income class, which also formed a large part of the Parisian commune. The name *sans-culottes* literally meant: ‘without knee-breeches,’ and these were so called because they usually donned trousers, as opposed to the knee breeches preferred by the rich aristocratic class]; the Montagnards on the other hand thought that the Girondins were aspiring to re-establish the *ancien régime* and were thus aligning with royalist sects to topple the revolution. Thus, in June of 1792, about 80,000 armed *sans-culottes* [who were allied with the Montagnards] surrounded the Convention and arrested certain delegates of the Girondins. This weakened the support base of the same, and gave the Montagnards – and in effect, the Jacobins – a majority in the Convention. But with the Convention beset with matters of the war, a dictatorial committee – *Le Comité de sûreté générale* [lit. trans., ‘the Committee of Public Safety’] was established to attend to domestic matters of the state – in effect, to alleviate the prevailing economic crisis, and to ward off counterrevolutionary threats against the new regime (cf. McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 59). The same eventually outranked the National Convention in power, and singularly decided on all policy matters of the state [the Convention was at this time relegated to approving the decisions of the Committee].

¹⁹⁴ In this light, the Jacobin government replaced the mediated form of representation with an unmediated version called *ré-totale*. The government, under the leadership of Maximilien de Robespierre, argued that a representative government was a less suitable form of popular government because one could never be sure that what was re-presented at the National Convention was indeed the general will of the people. On the other hand, a *ré-totale* – which was a direct form of democracy would allow for a better and true representation of the sovereign will of the people (cf. Hobson, *loc. cit.*, 99-100, 104-5). As such, the dictatorial *Comité de sûreté générale* sought to involve the local people directly in all matters of the state [cf. also François Furet (1981, 52) who remarks that democracy under the Jacobins involved mainly the mobilization of the masses for parochial political ends, and served as a means by which the regime “dictated opinion and appropriated the Revolution’s discourse on itself”]. A relevant case in point was the popular *levée en masse* [lit. trans., ‘mass conscription’] that was issued in August of 1793 to call the entire nation to arms in the war against Austria and Prussia. In this respect, a total of about 800,000 men between the ages of 18 and 25 were trained and prepared for the war within the space of a year. Jean-Baptiste Duvergier (1835, 107) quotes the first article of the edict as follows : *Dès ce moment, jusqu’à celui où les ennemis auront été chassés du territoire de la République, tous les Français sont en réquisition permanente pour le service des armées. Les jeunes gens iront au combat ; les hommes mariés forgeront les armes et transporteront les subsistances ; les femmes feront des tentes, des habits, et serviront dans les hôpitaux ; les enfants mettront le vieux linge en charpie ; les vieillards se feront porter sur les places publiques, pour exciter le courage des guerriers, prêcher la haine des rois et l’unité de la République* [lit. Trans., “From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic” (translation qtd. From Anderson 1908, 184-5)] (cf. other relevant commentary on the *levée en masse* in Laurent and Mavidal, *Archives Parlementaires*, Chap. LXXII: Sec. 160; Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, Chap. V: Sec. 345-64; Paret 1992, 53-74, esp. 62-5;

Bouloiseau 1983, 127-35, esp. 127-9). Professor John A. Lynn (1984, 64-5) commented on the effects of the *levée en masse* as follows: “[the] expansion of the army to the gargantuan size it attained in the summer of 1794 meant that young Frenchmen from all walks of life were called upon to serve [...] Volunteers and conscripts made the army *as never before in French history* a representative cross-section of the French Population. The troops were now composed of the respectable and hard-working sons of its peasantry, artisans, and bourgeoisie. In the past, those who suffered economic hardship, social inequality, or plain hard luck marched behind the regimental flags; they had reason to be reluctant or dispirited; they were certainly alienated. But by 1792-94, those young men who possessed full talent, confidence, and elan of the French people rallied around the banners of the revolutionary battalions [...] It is impossible to read their letters without being struck by the intense pride of these soldiers who fought in defense of their homes and families and who expressed enthusiastic support for the revolutionary social and political order.” Thus, Professor Theda Skocpol (1989, 64) notes that as a result of the *levée en masse*, the armies of revolutionary France were able to “adopt new, rapid, and flexible battlefield tactics involving the enhanced use, not only of artillery, but also of aggressive dives by highly motivated citizen soldiers,” which consequently allowed “beleaguered France to defeat the forces of Prussia and Britain – the most modern and efficient of the monarchical coalition that arrayed against her.”

¹⁹⁵ In this regard, the suffrage was extended to all adult males aged 21 and over [cf. the franchise restrictions of the previous 1791 Constitution in Note 190, *supra*, where only those aged 25 and over, and who met a property qualification, were granted the franchise]. Furet and Ozouf (1989, 577) note that eligible citizens were only required to “give proof of one year’s residence in the same canton, and of income sufficient to prove that they ‘lived on the fruits of their labor’” [in effect, that they were taxpayers – the previous restriction of needing to have paid in taxes the equivalent of three days’ labor was altogether abolished. Additionally, the two-tier electoral system of the previous Constitution was maintained, only that the property requirements for election to the second Assembly was scrapped off]. Thus, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin (1879, 2) in a later speech to the Chamber of Deputies commended the 1793 franchise extension as being expressive of the founding goals of the Revolution: *La souveraineté du peuple*,

tel est, en effet, le grand principe qu'il y a près de cinquante années, nos pères ont proclamé [...] Pour nos pères, le peuple c'était la nation tout entière, chaque homme jouissant d'une part égale de droits politiques, comme Dieu lui a fait une part égale d'air et de soleil [lit. Trans., "The sovereignty of the people, is, in effect, the great principle that, nearly fifty years ago, our fathers proclaimed [...] For our fathers, the people included the entire nation with each man taking an equal share of political rights, just as God had given him an equal portion of the air and the sun" (translation qtd. from Jones 2008, 130)]. More also, the 1793 Constitution retained and further augmented the liberal provisions of the previous Constitution. To this end, the government, in addition to safeguarding equality, liberty, and property rights, introduced progressive taxation; a welfare system for the needy; and free primary education in public schools for both sexes (cf. Hardman 1981, 169; Dwyer and McPhee 2002, 93; Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, 164; Klar 2016, 97-8). But perhaps the greatest achievement of the 1793 Constitution was its abolition of seigneurial dues without compensation, thereby effectively ending feudalism in the state [these dues had been kept in place when the *Assemblée nationale* outlawed feudalism two year ago, cf. Note 189, *supra*]. Following the new law passed on 17 June 1793, all existing feudal dues owed by peasants to their lords were permanently written off – a move which more than most demonstrated the commitment of the Jacobin government to the cause and welfare of the *sans-culottes*, though this came at a great loss to the propertied elites (cf. McGarr, *loc. cit.*, 60; Shovlin 2006, 192; Crubaugh 2012, 232). Thus, Alexis de Tocqueville would note years later in his *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (Book I, Chap. V, pp. 35-6) that the single most important effect of the French Revolution was that it abolished feudalism in Europe, and established in its stead a "social and political organization marked by uniformity, simplicity, and [...] equality."

¹⁹⁶ This was particularly evinced in the period known as *La Terreur* [lit. trans., 'The Terror,' or more popularly, 'The Reign of Terror'] which occurred in the Republic between September of 1793 and July of 1794. The Montagnard ruling faction in the *Convention nationale* had declared the need to institute terror as a means of warding off counterrevolutionary threats to the regime. At the time, France was at war with several states in Europe, and the ruling faction of the Convention had become paranoid that émigrés and foreign spies were plotting to topple the Jacobin government. To

this, the regime enacted the *Loi des suspects* [lit. trans., ‘Law of Suspect’] which allowed for anyone suspected of devising mischief against the regime to be arrested and tried [in practice, ‘devising mischief against the regime’ was broadly defined to include persons who: hoarded grain – so as to trigger an economic crisis in the state (of which the *Loi du Maximum général*; lit. trans., ‘Law of General Maximum,’ was enacted to curb such misdemeanor); spoke critically of the regime – so as to weaken its support base in the Convention; and evaded the *levée en masse* – so as to weaken the numbers of the French army] (on the vagueness and generality of the Law of Suspect, cf. Frey and Frey 2004, 31; on the Law of General Maximum, and how it served to curtail free market trading, cf. Aftalion 1990, 149-50). Invariably, this law was triggered by a revolutionary ideology of *vertu* [lit. trans., ‘virtue’] spearheaded by Maximilien de Robespierre – leader of the *Comité de sûreté*. According to him (2007, 111-5, esp. 111, 113), “the fundamental principles of popular governance was virtue.” As such, it behooved the nation to ensure that both the people and their representatives were virtuous, so as to guarantee a fair representation of the sovereign will of the people. In this respect therefore, it was necessary that the nation purged itself of all internal and external enemies – that is, of those that lacked *vertu* – so as to safeguard the “purity of the Republic” [cf. also an excursus on the subject matter in Palmer 1964, 120-6]. To this end, the *Décret du 22 Prairial* [lit. trans., ‘Decree of 22 Prairial’ – so called because it was promulgated on 10 June 1794 which corresponded to 22 Prairial on the French Revolutionary Calendar] was enacted by the Convention to allow the *Tribunal révolutionnaire* [lit. trans., ‘Revolutionary Tribunal’] expedite the trial of persons suspected of unvirtuous machinations against the state [in this respect, all trials were completed within three days; accused persons were denied the right of defense; and persons found guilty were condemned to death by guillotine]. But besides the horrors of death by guillotine, the terror was particularly sparked by Article 9 of the *décret* which stated that: *tout citoyen a le droit de saisir et de traduire devant les magistrats les conspirateurs et les contre-révolutionnaires. Il est tenu de les dénoncer dès qu’il les connaît* [lit. trans., “every citizen has the right to seize conspirators and counter-revolutionaries, and to arraign them before the magistrates. He is required to denounce them as soon as he knows of them” (cf. original qt. in Amic and Mouttet 1841, 192; translation qt. in Anderson 2007, 227)]. This bred much suspicion and paranoia amongst the citizenry, and greatly curtailed the freedoms of

speech, worship, and association [cf. for instance, the letter of Rosalie Ducrolay (better known as ‘Madame Jullien’) to her son, Marc-Antoine Jullien (on 24 December 1792), where she writes as follows: “[...] the Revolution has aroused such passions that it is impossible to see the truth about anybody. You must be prudent to avoid the traps of designing men. You must keep a lock on your lips and a key to your mouth, and not let a word escape that can be held against you”] (qtd. in Palmer 1993, 25). *La Terreur* thus became *l’ordre du jour* [lit. trans., ‘the order of the day’] in revolutionary France, and many lives were lost as a result (cf. Carlyle 1837, 202; Censer and Hunt 2001, 89-91; Schechter 2018, 174-8, esp. 176-7; Fitzsimmons 1987, 98-9). Albeit, this was justified by Robespierre (1967, 357) as a necessary measure towards maintaining the stability of the French Republic: [...] *Si le ressort du gouvernement populaire dans la paix est la vertu, le ressort du gouvernement populaire en révolution est à la fois la vertu et la terreur: la vertu, sans laquelle la terreur est funeste; la terreur, sans laquelle la vertu est impuissante. La terreur n’est autre chose que la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu; elle est moins un principe particulier qu’une conséquence du principe général de la démocratie appliqué aux plus pressants besoins de la patrie* [lit. trans., “[...] if the mainspring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the mainspring of popular government in time of revolution is both virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless. Terror is nothing but justice: prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is less a particular principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the pressing needs of the country”] (translation qtd. from Hammersley 2005, 139). Thus, the French poet, André de Chénier (qtd. in Palmer 1948, 140) who himself fell victim to *La Terreur*, wrote ironically concerning the mandate of the Jacobins as follows: “Unwise and unhappy is the state where there exist various associations and collective bodies whose members, on entering them, acquire a different spirit and different interests from the general spirit and the general interest! Happy is the land where there is no form of association but the state, no collective body but the country, no interest but the general good.” For a summary discussion of these incidents, cf. Palmer 1953, 214-7; also, on why *La Terreur* was not discontinued even after France secured major victories against the Austrian and Dutch armies in the battle of Fleurus, cf. Linton 2013, 229-30.

¹⁹⁷ These *réactionnaires thermidoriens* were conservative Republicans who aspired to end the ‘Reign of Terror’ and withal, to liberalize the French economy. They comprised a loose coalition of Girondins, Montagnards, and Plains, but several of them were also Jacobins who had fallen out with Robespierre and his policies in the *Convention nationale*. These delegates orchestrated a coup to topple the *Comité de sûreté générale* in what has come to be known as the ‘Thermidorian Reaction’ [in French, *Réaction thermidorienne*]: ‘Thermidorian,’ because it occurred on 27 July 1794, which corresponded to 9 Thermidor on the French Revolutionary Calendar; and ‘Reaction,’ because it was devised partly in direct response to a threatening speech made by Robespierre on 8 Thermidor, wherein he vowed to purge the *virtuous* ‘French Republic’ of all unscrupulous persons (allies and all) – so much that the delegates of the Convention each feared for his own life [cf. albeit the view by Sylvia Neely (2008, 221) that the Thermidorian movement was ‘reactionary’ because it sought to revert things “back to the way they were before;” cf. also Gaines (2007, 379-80) for added remarks on the movement). More also, as Fremont-Barnes (2007, 714) remarks, many of these delegates were of the view that the present “centralization of government authority [in the body of the dictatorial *Committee of Public Safety*] and the restriction of democratic practices [the Committee had at this time put the 1793 Constitution in abeyance until after the internal and external enemies of the Republic had been defeated; cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 174] had stifled the initial aims of the French Revolution” (of which, cf. Note 186, 190, *supra*). But equally important also was the fact that the peasants and bourgeoisie in the Jacobin government were no longer in tune with the aims of the Revolution – the former, because feudalism had been abolished, and they were now secured on their lands, and so were no longer interested in continuing with the Revolution; and the latter, because they were free-market capitalists, and so were increasingly dissatisfied with the egalitarian policies of the Committee as social welfare and price control (of which, cf. Note 195-6, *supra*). Thus, Robespierre and his Jacobin allies were arrested on 9 Thermidor and were executed the following day without trial. Thereafter the reactionaries took control of the *Convention nationale*, after having subverted the *Comité de sûreté générale*, and instituted a counter revolutionary campaign called *La Terreur blanche* [lit. trans., ‘the White Terror’] to blot out all traces of Jacobinism from the French state (cf. added statements in Miller 2012, 338;

Popkin, *loc. cit.*, 81; Fremont-Barnes, *loc. cit.*, 715; Morison and Commager 1942, 277).

¹⁹⁸ This was the *Constitution du 5 Fructidor An III* [lit. trans., ‘Constitution of 5 Fructidor in the Year III’] which was endorsed in a Plebiscite on 22 August 1795. It sought to strike a balance between the 1791 and 1793 Constitutions by maintaining the liberal provisions of the latter (of which, cf. Note 195, *supra*) whilst re-introducing the franchise qualifications of the former (of which, cf. Note 190, *supra*). The Constitution also devised a new system of government which divided power between a bicameral legislature and a five-member executive. The bicameral legislature – *Corps Législatif* – was organized into a lower house – *Conseil de Cinq-Cents* [lit. trans., ‘Council of Five Hundred;’ these comprised 500 delegates aged 30 and over, which were appointed for fixed three-year terms], and an upper – *Conseil des Anciens* [lit. trans., ‘Council of Ancients;’ these comprised 250 delegates aged 40 years and over, which were likewise appointed for fixed three-year terms] (cf. Hanson, *loc. cit.*, 92-93). The former was responsible for proposing legislation, and for drawing up a list of potential candidates [that is, 50 nominees] for the executive office, whilst the latter accepted or vetoed such said legislative proposals [they could neither amend legislative proposals nor initiate counter proposals – these remained under the purview of the *Conseil de Cinq-Cents*], and selected delegates for the executive office from the list drawn by the lower house (cf. Hanson, *loc. cit.*, 105). The five delegates selected for the executive office constituted ‘the Directory’ [in French, *le Directoire*], and were responsible for appointing government officials, and for implementing policy decisions of the legislature [these were elected for fixed one-year terms, and had to be aged 40 and over; also a member of the Directory was selected by lot as chief executive for a period of three months on a rotational basis] (cf. Hanson, *ibid.*; Fremont-Barnes, *ibid.*; Woloch 2013, 449; Brown 2002, 77). Furthermore, to ensure continuity in government, and to guard against insurrections and counter-revolutions, the new constitution introduced a ‘Two-Thirds’ clause which required that two-thirds of new delegates to both houses of the legislature be selected from existing members of the *Convention nationale* (cf. Carlyle, *loc. cit.*, 268-9; Duvergier, *loc. cit.*, 242, 250; Mason 2013, 321; Jones 2017, 84; Slavin 1984, 386-9).

¹⁹⁹ That the new government was instituted in reaction to *La Terreur* meant that it was fundamentally opposed to a return to power of the Jacobins. More also, its institutional structure of bicameralism portrayed a staunch abhorrence for absolute monarchy. As such, during the spate of time that the Directory lasted, it found itself eternally at war with royalist sects on the one hand, and Jacobins on the other. This caused the government to allocate more time and resources guarding off political oppositions than attending to domestic economic issues. For instance, on 1 April and 20 May of 1795, it deployed the military to suppress by violence a crowd of *sans-culottes* who had gathered in front of the Convention building to protest against the conservative policies of the government [that is, but principally, the government's free market policies, which had increased the cost of living at urban centers to the detriment of the poor]. Moreover, on two occasions, it used force and fiat to annul election results because rival factions had won more seats therein [the first was the 1797 elections, which saw royalist sects obtain a greater number of seats in the legislature. The government reacted to this by annulling election results in 49 *départements* [lit. trans., 'districts']; also royalist press were banned, and eminent members of the sect were imprisoned. The second occurred a year later in the 1798 elections which saw 'neo-Jacobins' win a large share of seats in the legislature. In like manner, the government annulled electoral results in some 29 *départements*, shut down the newly-formed 'constitutional circles' (which were political mobilization clubs of the neo-Jacobins), and arrested leading members of the party] (on polling data of the annulled elections of 1798, cf. Woloch 1970, 298-306, esp. 305; for a discussion of these 'constitutional circles,' see Woloch, *loc. cit.*, 83-93; 1994, 106; Hunt 1984, 143; Gough [1988], 130, 148-50; for added discourses on the afore-stated elections, cf. Homan 1971, 117-28; Bailleu 1881, 183; Barras 1895, 227; Meynier [1928], 45, 78, 109; Edelstein 318-20). As Sylvia Neely (*loc. cit.*, 230, *italics supplied*) succinctly remarks, "the Directory [...] made it clear by their violent acts of repression that they governed, not by the consent of the people in open elections, but by the support of the army." More also, Howard Brown (2013, 345, *italics supplied*) avows that "despite holding annual elections, the Directory simply could not accept pluralistic politics [...] thus democratic republicanism steadily gave way to liberal authoritarianism." Further, James Arnold (2009, 80, *italics supplied*) adjoins that "the Directory had hoped to bring political stability to France [...] and to create a moderate, liberal parliamentary system; [but]

in the end, it failed to do either.” The faint commitment of the regime to political liberties began thus to arouse much frustration and discontent amongst various sects of the general public. Therefore, it came to pass that when Abbé Sieyès [who had priorly pioneered the revolt of the Third Estate, and had also advocated for a single representative body; of which, cf. Note 186, *supra*] was appointed to the Directory, that he conspired with General Napoléon Bonaparte to oust the government in a coup d’état staged on 18 Brumaire of the Year VIII [that is, on 9 November 1799]. Thereafter, a Consulate was installed in its stead, and General Bonaparte, appointed as its first consul (cf. Payan 2002, 79; Dubois 2009, 97; Parker 2017, 252).

²⁰⁰ Professor Theda Skocpol (1989, 53) has argued persuasively that it was only with the French Revolution that the term ‘revolution’ came to take on its modern meaning. According to her, the term, as applied to the English Revolution, and though entailing some form of fundamental political change, always retained the sense of “a cycling back to a previous state of affairs.” Howbeit, following the French Revolution – with its attendant political changes, the term came to connote “a sudden, fundamental, and innovative departure in a nation’s social and political life.” Nevertheless, because the American Revolution preceded the French, and also that the former resulted in ‘a departure in the nation’s social and political life, one may be tempted to question Professor Skocpol’s thesis. To this it must be noted that the American Revolution was orchestrated by native colonists to topple a foreign colonial power, and resulted in the birth of a new nation; whereas in the case of France, it entailed an internal political struggle by local actors, within an already existing French state, which resulted in a complete change in the nation’s social and political life. Thus, Professor Skocpol’s argument may seem on point when viewed in this wise.

²⁰¹ Both regimes recognized the twin importance of the ‘sovereignty of law’ and the ‘sovereignty of the people’ as necessary requisites of a *république*. In this import, the people [as constitutive power] devised a set of legal codes [the constituted power] by which the former is bound and governed. Thus, the former was ‘sovereign:’ in that it was the source of all legal and political order in the state; and the latter was ‘sovereign:’ in that once established, it was binding on and above all persons in the state (cf. Sieyès 2003, 137; Kalyvas 2005, 226-9; Lupel 2009, 16-7).

²⁰² In this regard, Sieyès (1963, 130) argued that since it was impossible for a large nation to physically assemble when extraordinary circumstances made that necessary, it was thus necessary to “entrust extraordinary representatives with the necessary powers to perform such function on behalf of the state.”

²⁰³ Cf. also a similar appendage by James Madison elsewhere in the *Federalist Papers* (No. XIV, p. 63) as follows: “[...] in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person: *whereas* in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.”

²⁰⁴ This form of governance has rightly been ascribed the name ‘Jacobin nationalism’ probably because it most defined the rule of the Jacobins (cf. Mounier 1822, 122; Hayes [1931], 52, 110-13; Möbius 2003, 146). According to Caldwell (2006, 23; but cf. also Snyder 2003, 50; Lawrence 2005, 88-9) the régime was characterized chiefly by “intolerance of internal dissent, the use of force both internally and externally, patriotic fanaticism, and the idea that the individual owes supreme loyalty to the state.”

²⁰⁵ Cf. also a similar espousal by Eric Hobsbawm (1990, 87) to this effect: “The original, revolutionary-popular, idea of patriotism was state-based rather than nationalist, since it related to the sovereign people itself, i.e., to the state exercising power in its name. Ethnicity or other elements of historic continuity were irrelevant to ‘the nation’ in this sense [...] And the patrie to which their loyalty lay, was the opposite of an existential, pre-existing unit, but a nation created by the political choice of its members who, in doing so, broke with or at least demoted their former loyalties.”

²⁰⁶ According to Rousseau (cf. *Œuvres complètes*, Vol. III, pp. 371-2, 429-30), *volonté générale* [that is, the ‘general will’] expresses the common interests of all, whilst *volonté de tous* [that is, the ‘will of all’] expresses the sum total of the different particular interests of citizens. Thus, whereas the latter is always determined via ordinary majority voting, the former could only be realized via the same if, and only if, two conditions applied: first, if all citizens were represented in the legislature, partook collaboratively in deliberations, and voted individually in person; and second, if the object of voting was general and universal in scope, and was not directed at any individual or sectional interests. Thus, in the *Geneva Manuscript* (Book I, Chap. IV: p. 167), he writes that “when a particular object has different relationships to different

individuals, with each one having its own will concerning this object, there is no general will that is perfectly unified concerning this individual object.” More also, in *Emile* (Book V, p. 462), he adds that “when the whole people make a statute applying to the whole people, it considers only itself; and if a relation is formed, it is between the whole object seen from one point of view and the whole object seen from another point of view, without any division of the whole. Then the object applying to which the statute is made is general, and the will which makes the statute is also general.” Cf. also a similar espousal on the ‘general will’ by Denis Diderot (1915, 432) as follows: *que l'homme qui n'écoute que sa volonté particulière, est l'ennemi du genre humain; que la volonté générale est dans chaque individu un acte pur de l'entendement qui raisonne dans le silence des passions sur ce que l'homme peut exiger de son semblable, et sur ce que son semblable est en droit d'exiger de lui* [lit. trans., “the man who listens only to his ‘particular will’ is the enemy of the human race; for the ‘general will’ is, in each individual, a pure act of the understanding which reasons in the silence of the passions about what a man can demand of his fellow-man, and about what his fellow-man has the right to demand of him” (translation qtd. from Riley 2015, 341)]. To a varied extent, Rousseau’s distinction between *volonté générale* and *volonté de tous* bears striking semblance with Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian conceptions of ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number,’ and ‘greatest happiness of all:’ the latter being the sum of the private interests of individuals, and the former, the common interests shared by said individuals, barring all existing conflicts of interest (cf. his *Constitutional Code*, Book I, Chap. I, pp. 5-6).

²⁰⁷ For an extensive discussion of Rousseau’s ‘general will,’ cf. Kain 1990, 315-22; Wright [1929], 76, 97; Levine [1993], 18-25, 34-6; Talmon 1919, 40-9.

²⁰⁸ On the first, cf. Joseph de Maistre (1996, 45) who remarks as follows: “[...] the people is sovereign, they say; and over whom? Over itself apparently. The people is therefore subject. There is surely something equivocal here, if not an error, for the people that commands is not the people that obeys” [cf. also a similar espousal by the Apostle James in his epistle to the early Jewish Christians, as follows: “Speak not evil one of another, brethren. He that speaketh evil of his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh evil of the law, and judgeth the law: but if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge. There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to

destroy: who art thou that judgest another?" (cf. KJV Bible, *James*, Chap. IV, Vrs. 11-2)]. On the second, cf. James Madison (*op. cit.*, No. X, pp. 44, 46) who argues as follows: "[...] the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society [...] A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views [...] Theoretic politicians [...] have erroneously supposed, that, by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions" (cf. also Ray 1939, 372, for added comments in this respect).

²⁰⁹ The use of force in effecting the 'general will' was sanctioned by Rousseau (*On the Social Contract*, Book I, Chap. VI-VII, pp. 53-5) as a necessary means of giving legitimacy to civil engagements, without which such engagements would be "absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses." He writes as follows: "[...] the sum of forces can arise only from the cooperation of many. But since each man's force and freedom are the primary instruments of his self-preservation, how is he to engage them without harming himself and without neglecting the cares he owes to himself? [...] Indeed, each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from the general will he has as a citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently from the common interest. His absolute and naturally independent existence can bring him to view what he owes the common cause as a free contribution, the loss of which will harm others less than its payment burdens him. And considering the moral person of the State as an imaginary being because it is not a man, he might wish to enjoy the rights of the citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject, an injustice whose spread would cause the ruin of the body politic. Therefore, in order for the social compact not to be an ineffectual formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement, which alone can give force to the others: that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be free." Thus, Professor Talmon (1919, 132) in commenting on the totalitarian rule of the Jacobins noted that: "the Jacobins sincerely and deeply

believed that their terrorist dictatorship, even when maintained for no compelling reason of defense, was nothing but a prelude to a harmonious state of society, in which coercion would become unnecessary [...] Jacobinism was nurtured on a deep eighteenth-century faith in man, his essential goodness and perfectibility, and on the belief in continuous social progress, at the end of which there was some terminus of social integration and harmony [...] Not a permanently pessimistic conception of man and society bred Jacobin Terror, but an impatient hope, exasperated by obstacles, which ardent faith refused to acknowledge as natural or inevitable.”

²¹⁰ This was manifested in a number of ways. For instance, the electoral regulations of 1789 barred candidates from putting themselves forward to contest electoral seats. Instead, voters were given the freedom to nominate whomsoever they desired for public office [these persons howbeit were proscribed from campaigning or voicing out political opinions and ideas]. The absence of declared candidacies, as noted by Rafe Blaufarb (1995, 614) “led voters to scatter their suffrage over an absurdly large number of choices, [...] and thus allowed small groups of activists to [...] mobilize electoral support for shadowy candidates” [for instance, he cites in his essay the 1792 election in Beaune which was contested by 103 candidates nominated by some 167 voters]. He further remarked (*ibid.*) that elections served only as a means for “designating worthy individuals for public office” rather than as a “forum for confronting ideas and working out compromises between opposing groups” [Thus, Patrice Gueniffey (1993, 233) observed accurately that when the electoral laws were modified in 1795 to allow for declared candidacies, opponents of the Directory were able to garner majority seats in the 1797 elections (of which, cf. Note 199, *supra*) because they were able to freely express their views and ideas to the public (by means of ‘constitutional circles’ which the neo-Jacobins established for this purpose)]. Another popular means by which dissent to the ‘general will’ was curtailed was in the enactment of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. This legal code required newly elected priests and bishops to swear an oath of allegiance to the regime, and to the laws of the land. Furthermore, future appointments of priests and bishops was effected by the laity via local elections, and the salaries of said clergy, fixed and determined by the state, but payable only to those amongst them which took the oath of allegiance (cf. Ford 2005, 23-6; Johnson 2013, 97-101; Gilchrist and Murray 1971, 97-8; Rapley 2001, 96-7;

Shusterman 2014, 67-70). The promulgation of the Civil Constitution was in some respect inspired by François Voltaire (2010, 102) who in his discussion of the *Ecclesiastical Ministry* had said that: “the institution of religion exists only to keep mankind in order, and to make men merit the goodness of God by their virtue; thus everything in a religion which does not tend towards this goal must be considered foreign or dangerous.” Thus, these ‘constitutional clergy’ were compelled to maintain loyalty to the regime in the performance of their duties to the church.

²¹¹ According to Professor Talmon (1919, 1-2) totalitarian democracy is “based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It may be called political Messianism in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive. It recognizes ultimately only one plane of existence, the political. It widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence. It treats all human thought and action as having social significance, and therefore as falling within the orbit of political action” [cf. also an adjoining remark by Weichlein (2011, 21) that such regimes “refused to accept pluralism as the basis of democracy” and instead, “allowed the use of force against those who voluntarily oppose the pre-existing political order”] (cf. also Sabine, *loc. cit.*, 461-3, for related discussions in this respect).

²¹² On the dictatorial acts of the Committee, cf. Note 194, 196, *supra*. To be sure, the Jacobin government did not dismantle the institution of the National Convention but kept this body of representatives in place – in which also it held a majority. For Robespierre (2007, 111) had famously defined democracy as “a system of government in which the sovereign people, guided by laws which are its own work, do for itself all it can do properly, and through delegates all that it cannot do for itself.” It was only when there arose a need to secure the regime from counter-revolutionist threats that the dictatorial Committee of Public Safety became necessary (cf. Note 193, *supra*). Thus, a *régime totalitaires* is ‘totalitarian’ not because it does not practice a system of representation [although where such systems of representation are in place, the governing regime usually holds an overwhelming majority therein], but because it maintains a set of pre-defined political ends, to which it perceives deliberation and majority voting as ineffective in achieving said ends (cf. esp. Talmon, *loc. cit.*, 2-3). Thus, Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis – the drafter of the French civil code – rightly

noted (qtd. in Seidensticker 1811, 12) that the *esprit révolutionnaire* [lit. trans., revolutionary spirit] that had characterized the Jacobin government had been nothing but: *un désir exalté de sacrifier violemment tous les droits à un but politique, et de ne plus admettre d'autre considération que celle d'un mystérieux et variable intérêt d'état* [lit. trans., “an ardent resolve to sacrifice violently all rights to a revolutionary aim and no longer to admit any other consideration than an indefinable and changeable notion of what the state interest demands” (translation qtd. from Hayek 1960, 195)].

²¹³ That the former was a more enduring form of government than the latter is evinced by the fact that two of the three governments established in the course of the French Revolution were representative governments – that is, the regime of the Third Estate in 1789 and the Directory of 1795 (of which, cf. Note 188, 198, *supra*). These two *régimes représentatifs* were particularly significant in the sense that the first was established following the overthrow of the absolutist *ancien régime*, and the second, following the overthrow of the dictatorial Jacobin government. Cf. also the interesting point by Maurice Duverger (1958, 163) that the French have, following the episode of the Jacobin regime, “learned to live surrounded by radically contradictory political philosophies,” with the belief that “the coexistence of multiple philosophies *about government* was an essential condition of freedom.”

²¹⁴ Howbeit, cf. the remark by Professor Hans Kelsen (*loc. cit.*, 95) that the distinction made by Professor Talmon between a liberal and a totalitarian democracy is merely one “between liberalism and socialism, and not between two types of democracy” (cf. also added excursus on this distinction in Hayek 1958, 230-1).

²¹⁵ *Vertu* can only be ‘self-enforcing’ [that is, requiring minimal external checks] if it is not acted out [that is, if it is not feigned for the purpose of winning elections], but is rather a defining trait of the said representative. And this may perhaps explain why persons were required to live a certain number of years in a locality before they could qualify to contest elections as representatives of the said constituency. The essence was, besides ensuring that candidates were well acquainted with their locality, to provide electorates with a basis and a frame for measuring up and comparing candidates. In effect, if candidates A, B, and C have all lived for at least five years in a said locality, then their actions and inactions during those number of years, rather

than their catchy campaign promises and slogans, would be a better determinant of their *vertu*, as well as their capability as future representatives of the said locality. This is particularly underscored by Professor Austin Ranney (1976, 147-8) who notes that the gap between pre-election promises and post-election performances of political candidates could be narrowed if “ordinary citizens paid more attention to what the former have done in the past and less to what they say they will do.” He then proceeds to say rather humorously that “if you and I stop yearning for ideal leaders who sound like Churchill in the Battle of Britain, then perhaps our actual leaders will less often seem like Hitler in the Battle of the Bunker.”

²¹⁶ Professor Dahl (1956, 18) defines ‘internal checks’ as “conscience, attitudes, and basic predispositions which determine whether any given individual will seek to tyrannize over others,” and further adds that “the probability of tyranny emerging in a society is a function of the extent to which various types of internalized responses are present amongst members of that society.” The American judicial philosopher Learned Hand (1963, 189-90) commented in this wise as follows: “I often wonder whether we do not rest hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.”

²¹⁷ Diamond et al. (1966, 75) cogently explain the essence of personal *vertu* as follows: “[...] as the extremes of selfishness are moderated, the representative can become free to consider questions affecting the national interest on their merits. The jostling of innumerable interests gives him a margin of freedom from any single interest group. He is thereby enabled, to some extent, to pursue the national interest as he comes to see it in the instructive national arena.”

²¹⁸ Professor Dahl (1967, 957) comments as follows: “[...] whenever the number of citizens grows large, to maximize their equal opportunities to control their government people must resort to representation [...] Yet if time’s constraint demands this shift from direct democracy to representative government, it also reduces and ultimately eliminates the possibility that every citizen can engage in a discussion that includes the officials who are charged with the authority to decide. [Thus] the greater the

number of citizens, then, the longer and more indirect must be the channel of communication from the citizen to his top political leaders. But the communication between a citizen and his leaders is not an asymmetrical relationship for the larger a system grows, the more and more one-sided becomes the communication between citizens and top leaders: the President of the United States can, in principle, speak directly to a hundred million potential voters, of whom only an infinitesimally small fraction can ever speak directly to him” [cf. also a restatement of the same in Lindsay 1929, 23-4; Borgeaud 1894, 153-4]. Thus Jakob A. Larsen (1955, 228) keenly noted that it was not because representative institutions were unknown in antiquity that they were not employed, but because the people, being small in number, deemed the same a far less important arrangement than their primary assemblies which allowed for all citizens to participate severally in decision- and policy making.

²¹⁹ Professor Amy Gutmann ([1995], 560-5, 576-9; cf. also Galston 1989, 91-2) has especially argued that such *vertu* could be inculcated in citizens by means of a state-sponsored civic education. As she noted elsewhere (cf. 1989, 80), such democratic education would provide the sure means by which the many “individual selves” of society could be “brought together to fairly share the goods of society,” and would more also “supply the foundations upon which a democratic society could secure the civil and political freedoms of its citizens.” This thought was also advanced by Baron de Montesquieu in his *Spirit of the Laws* (Book IV, Chap. V; cf. also Book III, Chap. III-IV) as follows: “It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear of despotic governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and punishments; the honor of monarchies is favored by the passions, and favors them in its turn; but virtue is a self-renunciation, which is ever arduous and painful. This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtue [...] This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is entrusted to private citizens. Now a government is like everything else: to preserve it we must love it. Has it ever been known that kings were not fond of monarchy, or that despotic princes hated arbitrary power? Everything therefore depends on establishing this love in a republic; and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education.” Nevertheless, Montesquieu (*op. cit.*, Book III, Chap. V, fn. 9) was sure to distinguish

political *vertu* from moral *vertu* insisting that the former was a type of the latter, whereas the latter was self-existent, and may not derive from the former. He remarked as follows: “I speak here of political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is directed towards the public good; I speak less of particular moral virtues, and not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths” [Cf. thus Cranford Pratt (1955, 29) who, reiterating John Stuart Mill, notes that the role of education should be: first, to provide aids to the intelligent pursuit of pleasure; and second, to discourage the pursuit of pleasures injurious to the happiness of others]. Notwithstanding, John Rawls (1988, 251-2) has remarked that the mere creation of institutions to facilitate *vertu* would by itself serve no meaningful purpose unless those institutions “also sustained ways of life that citizens could affirm as worthy of their full allegiance” [i.e., provided citizens with opportunities to realize their individual conceptions of the good].

²²⁰ Cf. for instance John Keane (2013, 56-7) who notes that “the whole point of elections was to discipline representatives who have disappointed their electors,” for, said he, “if representatives were always virtuous, impartial, competent, and responsive, then elections would lose their purpose.”

²²¹ Elsewhere, in the Philadelphia Conventional Debates on the adoption of the Federal Constitution, James Madison (1941, 162) equates *vertu* with “conscience,” and says that the latter is “known to be inadequate in individuals,” and that, “little is to be expected from it.” Jeremy Bentham (*Constitutional Code*, Book I, Chap. IX, p. 60) has offered perhaps the most thorough explanation of the inadequacy of *vertu* in what he describes as the “self-preference principle,” – to wit, that individuals are by nature egoists, and would almost always, in the absence of external checks, be disposed to maximizing their private benefits at the expense of the public good. He notes (*loc. cit.*, Chap. XVII, p. 127) as follows: “[...] be the community what it may, to every member of it belong two opposite and continually conflicting interests: [1.] His share in the universal interest – that interest which is common to himself and every other member of the community; [2.] That interest which is particular and peculiar to himself, with or without some comparatively small number of associates. In the ordinary state of things, of a man's particular interest, the value will generally, in his eyes at least, be greater than the value in his share in the universal interest: only in times of extraordinary public danger will the value of his social interest have the ascendant in

his breast. Hence, in so far as between the two interests a competition has place, the social will yield, and be made a sacrifice to the self-regarding interest” [cf. also relevant commentary on the subject matter in Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, Chap. III: Sec. 25, esp. p. 143; Rousseau, *Œuvres complètes*, Vol. III, p. 246]. Thus, we read in the Book of *Exodus* (KJV Bible, Chap. XVIII, Vrs. 20-1) how Jethro the priest of Midian admonished Moses, the servant of the Lord, to seek out amongst the people “able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness” and to set them as judges over the people in all seasons.” Howbeit, there is in theory a system of government by holy men, called hagiocracy, although this continues to remain too utopian and romantic to be practical.

²²² Professor Robert Dahl in his *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956, 17) defined external checks as “[...] the application of rewards and penalties, or the expectation that they will be applied, by some source other than the given individual himself.” He then went on further to remark (*ibid.*, 19) that “[...] even if external checks might frequently inhibit impulses to tyranny, they may not always do so with all individuals likely to be in a position to tyrannize.” Thus, Yoshino Sakuzō (*loc. cit.*, 235), for instance, advocated for instituting strong electoral regulations that would preempt “the election of corrupt legislators by the people in the first place.”

²²³ Cf. a similar espousal by David Hume (1875, 117-8, *emphasis in original*) as follows: “[...] in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be *supposed a knave*, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to public good. Without this [...] we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions.” Elsewhere, Jeremy Bentham, in his *Official Aptitude Maximized* (Paper I, pp. 265-8), frames such union of interest with duty as “maximizing official aptitude, and minimizing expense” – to wit, that such measure would enhance the efficiency of public officials, whilst minimizing any losses they may cause to the state through malversation [cf. esp. Postema (1986, 393-402); Schofield (2006, 272-80) for critical comments in this respect].

²²⁴ Halévy's formulation of an 'artificial identification of interests' developed from Bentham's prior conception of a 'natural identity of interests.' In this light, Bentham argued that since all humans were egoists, and yet have managed to survive for so long a time, there must have obtained amongst them a sort of natural ordering and subordination of interests which promoted a furtherance of their general good. Howbeit, because such natural ordering of individual interests could not be perpetually guaranteed in the long term [possibly because the growth of society brought individuals into contact with other "unassignable persons" – which Bentham defines as "persons which one cannot sufficiently distinguish by name or at least by description" (the reverse being "assignable persons;" cf. his *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. XVIII, p. 97)], there was the need for legislators to "unite interest with duty," in effect, to artificially order individual interests to identify with the general interest [and more so because people tended to relate differentially with persons they deemed assignable and unassignable; and particularly for elected representatives or public officials, such 'artificial identification of interests' would ensure that they do not curry favor for their 'assignables,' but rather sought actively the interest and welfare of the general public] (cf. further remarks on the subject matter in James 1981, 51-6, esp. 54-6; Lewis 1940, 476; Dahl 1956, 17-9). But cf. the reservation by Professor F. A. Hayek (1958, 236-7; 1978, 260) that social institutions which succeeded at conforming individual interests to the 'general will' tended to evolve through a graduated process of trial and error; and that it should be the role of the legislator to observe, build, and improve upon such spontaneously developed customs and practices, rather than seek to actively influence individual behavior through new legislation [howbeit cf. Professor Moses Abramovitz (1986, 402) who cautions that such institutional commitments induced by past antecedents may in some instances act as obstacles to future societal progress, particularly in the area of technological development.

²²⁵ "All men want to be happy; but may it not, must it not happen that the means employed by various individuals to become happy are contradictory to each other? While one man wishes to enjoy the product of his labor in peace, another may wish to deprive him of it by guile or by violence [...] Since the latter yields to the attraction of a pleasure, he must be threatened with the infliction of a pain at least equal in

intensity to the pleasure for which he hopes [...] Legislation is the science of intimidation; the general utility is its reason of being, and punishment is the sanction of the obligations which it imposes [...] The legislator is the great dispenser of pleasures and pains in society. It is he who creates the moral order, the equilibrium of interests. Society is the work of his artifices. In this way is applied what we have called the artificial identification of interests” (translation qtd. from English version of book, referenced as follows: Halévy, Élie. *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. Translated by Mary Morris. London: Faber & Faber, 1928, p. 487).

²²⁶ “The Americans are not a virtuous people and yet they are free. This does not absolutely prove that virtue, as Montesquieu thought, is not essential to the existence of republics. The idea of Montesquieu must not be taken in a narrow sense [...] What he means by virtue is the moral power that each individual exercises over himself and that prevents him from violating the rights of others. When this triumph of man over temptation is the result of the weakness of the temptation or of a calculation of personal interest, it does not constitute virtue in the eyes of the moralist [...] In America, it is not virtue that is great, it is the temptation that is small, which comes to the same thing. It is not disinterestedness that is great, it is interest that is well understood, which again comes back to almost the same thing. So Montesquieu was right although he spoke about ancient virtue, and what he says of the Greeks and Romans is still applicable to the Americans.” [translation qtd. from Schleifer 2012, 110]. On Montesquieu’s conception of virtue, cf. Note 219, *supra*; on the sense of ‘Americans not being a virtuous people,’ cf. Wood (1992, 229) who notes that this was revealed in their being “too deeply involved in trade and moneymaking to think beyond themselves or their neighborhoods;” on the virtue of the Greeks and Romans, cf. Helvétius (*De L’esprit*, Essay III, Chap. XXII, p. 316) who comments as follows: “[...] I cast my eyes over the republics more fruitful in virtuous men: I stop [...] at Greece and Rome, and see a multitude of heroes arise. Their great actions, preserved with care in history, seem collected there, to spread the odor of virtue into the most corrupt and distant ages [...] whoever considers the virtuous actions history has transmitted of these people [...] will find that it proceeded from the address with which the legislators of those nations united private and public interest;” on the American design of republican government to facilitate *vertu*, cf. James Madison (*op. cit.*, No. LI, p.

269) who comments as follows: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” Cf. also a similar espousal by Hume (*loc. cit.*, 119) as follows: “[...] men are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honor is a great check upon mankind: but where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamors of adversaries.”

²²⁷ Per their form of economic activity, the bourgeois could be deemed as belonging to the upper middle class, and the *sans-culottes*, the lower middle class [on the differing characteristics of these two classes, cf. Warner et al. 2006, 74-6].

²²⁸ The middle class plays a mitigating role in the social strata, in that it sustains the wealth of the upper class by its productive activity, and guides the aspirations of the lower by its knowledge and expertise (cf. James Mill, *Essays on Government*, p. 888). As such, it is able to control the actions of the former, and moderate the exigencies of the latter. This was finely iterated by the Italian political philosopher Gaetano Mosca (1939, 337) as follows: “Historians so far [...] have especially stressed the achievements of the supreme heads of states, of people who stand at the vertex of the political pyramid, and occasionally, too, the merits of the lower strata in the pyramid, of the masses who with their toil and often with their blood have supplied the supreme heads with the material means required for accomplishing the things they accomplished. If this new perception of the importance of the ruling class is to gain a hold, we must, without denying the great importance of what has been done at the vertex and at the base of the pyramid, show that, except for the influence of the intermediate social strata, neither of the others could have accomplished very much of any significance and permanence, since the type to which a political organism belongs and the efficacy of its action depend primarily upon the manner in which the intermediate strata are formed and function.”

²²⁹ More also, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 285) remarked that because the middle class tends to favor less radical policies, it naturally consolidates democracy in a state: in that, while the median voter is a middle-class agent (by virtue of their numerical superiority), the rich would have little to fear from redistributive policies, and would thus be less likely to employ coups to topple the democratic regime [Cf. other added remarks to this effect in Rueschemeyer et al. [1992], 5, 14, 80, 91); Persson and Tabellini 2000, 57-8].

²³⁰ Cf. also a similar espousal by Korean political scientist Kyung-won Kim (1992, 24) as follows: “History shows [...] that democracy emerged out of a dialectic of opposition between competing forces, not thanks to the good will of potentates. It was the rise of the bourgeoisie that led to the placement of limits on the traditional power structures of feudalism [...] The process was more gradual and less violent in some nations than in others, but the pattern has been the same in every successful democracy. All of them have seen the rise of a social class deriving its living from commercial, industrial, or professional pursuits rather than traditionally agrarian sources. Since the state was tied to privileges based on birth and the landed economy, it was only natural that the new bourgeois groups should seek to limit state power. The democratic polity, in other words, sprang from the womb of the capitalist economy.” Cf. also the remark by Gwynne Lewis (1993, 72-3) that to deny the crucial role played by the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution [as pertaining to the abolition of feudalism, and consequent development of capitalism] would be to “barter historical truth for ideological advantage.”

²³¹ On the ‘invisible hand,’ cf. Adam Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Chap. II, p. 423) who comments as follows: “Every individual [...] neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it [...] He intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Elsewhere, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Part IV, Chap. I, pp. 264-5), he notes further that: “*The rich* consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity [...] they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution

of the necessities of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”

²³² As was observed in the French Revolution, the Third Estate did not priorly plan to constitute themselves into a National Assembly during the Estates General, but had merely demanded that their vote be weighted equally as those of the other Estates. And it was only when this demand was rebuffed that they proceeded to form a *de-facto* national government. The like thing also ensued in the American Revolution: for the colonists merely mounted opposition against direct taxes imposed on them by the British, and it was only when the latter responded with more aggression that the former resolved to dispense with the latter’s tyranny, and to fight for their independence.

²³³ The Seven Year’s War, also known as the French and Indian War, was fought between France and Britain between the periods of 1756 and 1763. The expansion of the French empire into the Ohio River valley had brought it into repeated conflicts with the British colonies in North America, but particularly Virginia. And Britain, perceiving this conflict as an opportunity to further expand her empire, officially declared war on France in 1756, and borrowed heavily from British and Dutch bankers to finance the war. But despite emerging victorious, the war proved rather costly for Britain so that she was heavily indebted at the end of the war. Thus, in an attempt to raise additional revenue to pay off the national debt, the British Parliament passed the Stamp Act, the Townshend Act, and the Tea Act which altogether imposed varied forms of direct taxes on the North American colonies (cf. Makin and Ornstein 1994, 53-6; Rogers 2014, 40).

²³⁴ Three peculiar reasons had inspired Britain to impose direct taxes on the colonies. First, King George III had expressly stated that because British involvement in the war had helped secure the borders of the colonies from further invasion by France, that it was only meet that the colonies contributed in paying off the accrued debt. Second, because it was necessary to guard the newly-won territories from further encroachment by foreign imperial powers, the British had installed permanent army

units in the colonies for this purpose, and thus wanted to raise revenue by means of the taxes to help cater for the upkeep of the army. And third, during the Seven Year's War, the colonists in America seemed to have enjoyed a fairly higher standard of living than the British: for during the period, the average colonist appeared to have paid less than one-twentieth the tax paid by his British counterpart in England. Thus, the British only thought it fair that their citizens be not made to solely bear the costs of the war – which in large part had benefited the colonies (cf. Harris 2006, 357; Murphy 2014, 57-60; Martin and Smith 2003, 14-5). But as this happened to be the first time that the British Parliament had bypassed the authority of the colonial assemblies to impose a direct tax on the colonies, the latter were the more vehement in their opposition against said taxes. John P. Reid (1987, 68-71) for example cites two principal arguments by the colonists against the new taxes. The first was that the colonies had jointly participated in the war efforts with Britain and “had done everything they were asked to do, and since they had not been asked or expected to make the same war effort Britain had made, could not legally be charged with a debt.” The second, they argued, was that military protection could not be cited as a valid ground for Parliament's taxation of the colonies “since such protection was due the Americans from the mother country under the original contract between the king and the first settlers” [in which contract the colonies remained subject to the King, and dependent on the kingdom of England, and in return, received protection, and enjoyed all the privileges of free born Englishmen].

²³⁵ These protests were in large part spearheaded by a group of affluent patriots called ‘the Sons of Liberty.’ Although they had hitherto been a secret political organization, they became more open and belligerent in their cause for liberty following the passage of the Stamp Act of 1765 [which was an Act requiring that the colonies purchased a one-penny stamped paper from the British for all printed materials such as newspapers, legal documents, and magazines]. In opposition to this Act, the Sons of Liberty took to the streets in raucous demonstrations, and harassed persons sent by the British to collect said tax. Eventually, these civil disturbances began to hurt British merchants in the colonies and the Act was effectively repealed by Parliament. Notwithstanding, the British issued a Declaratory Act [the day the Stamp Act was repealed] which stated that they had the right to impose taxes on the colonies. To this

end, the British passed in the following year the Townshend Acts – which imposed new taxes on imported products (i.e., products imported by the colonies from Britain) such as tea, glass, and paper – but these were likewise opposed by the colonists under the rubric of ‘no taxation without representation.’ One of such protests in 1770 led to the Boston Massacre, which saw British troops open fire on a crowd of civilians – killing five persons, and injuring others more. Then three years later, a protest in opposition to the Tea Act [which Act required that the colonies purchased tea only from the British-owned East India Trading Company] led to the Boston Tea Party, which saw Libertarian radicals board three cargo ships anchored at the Boston Harbor, and dump 342 chests of tea worth £90,000 into the sea (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 131). However, Professor John Rainbolt (1973, 430) in his essay on the American Revolution, argued that the colonists were particularly radical in their revolt against the edicts of Parliament because they perceived a “degenerate political culture in England,” and wanted by their actions to “awaken Englishmen at home to their own political decay and the internal threats to their liberty.”

²³⁶ These ‘Coercive Acts’ were more popularly termed by the colonists as ‘Intolerable Acts’ because they regarded them as being too unfair to be tolerated. Prominent amongst these were the Boston Port Act [which effectively closed down the Port of Boston until compensation was paid for the damped chests of tea], the Massachusetts Government Act [which strengthened the power and authority of the British governor, and also increased the number of British appointees to the colonial government of Massachusetts] and the Administration of Justice Act [which empowered the governor to transfer capital trials against government officials to Britain, thereby making it difficult for witnesses to travel to Britain to testify against said government officials] (cf. Knight 2014, 41-3).

²³⁷ Brian Roper (*loc. cit.*, 132; cf. also Zinn 1999, 70-1; Raphael, *loc. cit.*, 16-8) notes that the colonies were concerted in their opposition to the ‘Coercive Acts’ because they presumed that Massachusetts was not an isolated case, and that the British could on occasion apply the same measures to them. Cf. albeit Louis Hacker (1940, 161) who notes that the British were particularly ‘coercive’ in their demands because they understood that the survival or collapse of English mercantile business in the colonies depended on their continued control and domination of the same.

²³⁸ This meeting was convened by the colonial government of Massachusetts and was attended by all the other colonies with the exception of Georgia [who owing to wars they were presently fighting with neighboring tribes were unwilling to take actions that would jeopardize British military assistance]. The Declaration of Rights and Grievances was a letter sent to King George III in which the colonies enumerated their issues and plights with the ‘Intolerable Acts,’ whilst asserting their rights and liberties against tyrannical rule. The colonies petitioned for the Acts to be repealed, but also agreed to a campaign of non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation of British products should their plea be rebuffed by the Crown (cf. Bonwick 1991, 82).

²³⁹ The British first clashed with about 70 American minutemen at Lexington and easily overpowered them. But at Concord, they were repulsed by a much larger American army and were forced to retreat as a result (cf. Bonwick, *loc. cit.*, 84).

²⁴⁰ The related stanza of the poem (qtd. in Emerson 2015, 130, S1:L1-4) is as follows:
By the rude bridge that arched the flood / Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled, / Here once the embattled farmers stood / And fired the shot heard round the world.

²⁴¹ The formation of the Continental Army, of which George Washington was appointed commander general, was intended to put the colonies in a state of defense much more than it was to go on the offensive against Great Britain.

²⁴² This was effected by the United States in Congress on 4 July 1776. The essential elements of the Declaration, which was singularly penned by Thomas Jefferson, are summarized as follows: “[...] we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government [...] The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States [...] We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America [...] appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do [...] solemnly publish and declare, That these United

Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is [...] totally dissolved” (qtd. in Brown 2000, 170-2).

²⁴³ This albeit occurred five years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence – in 1781, when British General Lord Charles Cornwallis surrendered his troop of about 7,000 men to Continental Army General George Washington in the battle of Yorktown. Thereafter, the Treaty of Paris was signed two year later which formally and effectively recognized the United States as a free and independent nation (cf. Paine 2015, 485-8).

²⁴⁴ The United States in Congress was a unicameral legislature composed of delegates from all thirteen provincial governments. Its primary duty was to formulate and implement policy for the new nation. Though each state could be represented by as many as seven delegates, each state nonetheless maintained only one vote in Congress.

²⁴⁵ The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, as it was formally called, served as the written constitution of the new nation. It was a collection of thirteen articles which “set out the general principles of [the central] government, the structure of its machinery, and the extent and limits of its lawful authority” (cf. Bonwick, *loc. cit.*, 121). It was therein also that the new nation was first called the ‘United States of America.’

²⁴⁶ Shays’ Rebellion, named after the Continental Army veteran Daniel Shays, was an armed uprising of small farmers in Western Massachusetts. Many of these farmers had served in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War, and during the period of their absence had incurred considerable amounts of debt on their farms. Furthermore, because many of them had not yet been compensated for their services in the Army, they presently had no means to offset these debts. Thus, it came to pass that when their petition for debt relief to the state legislature of Massachusetts fell on deaf ears; when the new Constitution of the state raised property qualifications for voting; and when the state courts resolved to confiscate the lands and property of debtors, that these farmers organized themselves into an armed force and embarked on a series of mutinous disturbances across the region. But although the Rebellion was

short-lived, it nonetheless drew the attention of the provincial states to apparent flaws in the Articles of Confederation, and the need for a new constitution “that would establish a more powerful and effective central government for the United States” (cf. Roper, *loc. cit.*, 138) [for instance, President George Washington, in a 1783 letter to Doctor William Gordon of Massachusetts commented on the weakness of the central government – i.e., the United States in Congress – as follows: "For certain I am, that, unless adequate powers are given to congress for the general purposes of the federal union, we shall soon molder into dust, and become contemptible in the eyes of Europe, if we are not made the sport of their politics. To suppose that the general concerns of this country can be directed by thirteen heads, or one head without competent powers, is a solecism” (qtd. in Crosskey and Jeffrey 1981, 146; cf. also Hamilton, *The Federalist Papers*, No. XV, pp. 68-75, for added remarks in this respect]. Howbeit, John Jay in the *Federalist Papers* (No. II, pp. 6-7) commented that the deficiency and inadequacy of the confederate government was owed to the fact that it was created “at a time so inauspicious, [...] when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflection which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government” [cf. also James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. XXXVII, p. 184, for added comments in this regard].

²⁴⁷ According to Bonwick (*loc. cit.*, 103) the cost of the Revolutionary War to the United States was between \$158 million and \$168 million, of which the states were able to raise half the amount. Congress therefore, bereft of the power to raise money through taxes, sought to offset the remainder of the costs by issuing vast quantities of notes and coins. This triggered rampant inflation in the new nation, and also made it difficult for the United States to pay off debts it owed to foreign nations.

²⁴⁸ The federal constitution sought to establish a central government that would be “national and supreme” – separate from, and independent of the state governments (cf. Kaplanoff 2000, 472). Furthermore, the delegates envisaged a government that would be well equipped to deal with matters beyond the competencies of the states, but at the same time would not be too powerful to infringe on the sovereign rights of the states or the people. In this respect, a federal government finely comparted into legislative, executive, and judicial offices was conceived – the balance of power helping to ensure that no one single office exercised overarching powers so as to become

tyrannical (cf. Mann 1993, 156). The legislature, called Congress, was bicameral in scope – consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate. The number of delegates each state could elect to the former was tied to its population size, whilst the latter held an equal number of delegates for all states [i.e., two delegates per state]. Delegates to the former served for renewable two-year terms, whilst those of the latter served for six [howbeit these were finely divided into three classes so that at the time of elections to the former, one part of delegates in the latter would be up for election too]. The executive office was composed of the president and his cabinet. Initially, the delegates proposed that the president be elected by the legislature for a non-renewable seven-year term. Howbeit it was later decided that he be popularly elected for a renewable four-year term by an electoral college [in which each state was granted a number of electors relative to its population size] (cf. Kaplanoff, *loc. cit.*, 476). The judicial office was embodied in the Supreme Court which had justices appointed on life tenures. The Court, following the Judiciary Act of 1789, was granted the powers of judicial review, thus enabling it to exercise reconnaissance over state laws to ensure their conformity to provisions of the federal constitution (cf. Diamond et al., *loc. cit.*, 227; McIlwain 1939, 278) [Thus, in the landmark case of *U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton*, which bordered on the fact that some states were applying their own laws to impose term limits on their delegates to Congress, the Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 split vote that “individual states cannot impose term limits on members of Congress, and that congressional term limits could only be established through an amendment of the federal Constitution” (cf. Schultz 2005, 478)].

²⁴⁹ The American Civil War took place between 1861 and 1865, and was fought over the subject matter of slavery. Although the provincial states had joined together into a single United States, they were nonetheless separated informally into northern and southern states. The former had transitioned from farming to industry and as a result had little need of slave labor, but the latter had continued to maintain large-scale plantation farms and thus depended heavily on slave labour. As Howard Zinn (*loc. cit.*, 88; cf. also Roper, *loc. cit.*, 142) rightly puts it, “the combination of African Americans in the military, and the lack of powerful economic need for slaves” led to the gradual elimination of slavery in the northern states, whereas in the southern states, “slavery remained central to economic production, and the key source of wealth

for southern Patriot elites” [for instance, Professor Grace de Laguna (1946, 126-7) remarked that the American defenders of slavery held that the institution, despite “minor abuses” was as “greatly advantageous to the slave as to the master,” in that it “provided the only condition under which the former could attain such goods as he is capable of realizing”]. Thus, it came to pass that when the anti-slavery candidate of the new Republican Party Abraham Lincoln was elected president of the United States in 1860, that the southern states, fearing that he would work to outlaw slavery in the entire nation, seceded from the Union [some howbeit remained and became known as border states] and constituted themselves into a new nation – the Confederate States of America (cf. esp. McPherson 1988, 230; Harman 1999, 348). What followed thereafter was a series of bloody battles between the two nations which claimed the lives of over 620,000 soldiers (cf. McPherson, *loc. cit.*, 854; Boorstin 1953, 99). Ultimately, the Confederate states were defeated, and slavery was permanently outlawed in the United States following the ratification of the thirteenth amendment in 1865.

²⁵⁰ Although slavery was indeed outlawed in the United States by the thirteenth amendment, and thereafter, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were conceived to guarantee equality for all persons, there continued to exist varied forms of racial sentiments against persons deemed to be of ‘non-native American’ descent. For instance, the Ku Klux Klan emerged after the Civil War and committed egregious acts of violence against African Americans (cf. Bullard 1997, 6-15); Jim Crow laws in the South allowed for persons to be discriminated against on account of their race, gender, and religion (cf. Tischauser 2012, 17-8); and until the belated case of *Brown vs. Board of Education*, the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in *Plessy vs. Ferguson* continued to justify ‘separate but equal’ facilities for non-native Americans (cf. Rountree 2004, 49). It would only be through the tireless efforts of activists like Martin Luther King Jr., and the determinism of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would come to be promulgated to proscribe all systemic forms of discrimination in the United States (cf. Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 132).

²⁵¹ The reference models of government at the time were popular democracy, as had pertained at Athens, and later, was adopted to a varied degree in the Swiss cantons;

republicanism, as had pertained in Rome, and later in the Italian city-states, and in the Netherlands; constitutional monarchy, as was pertaining in Britain; and absolutism, as was pertaining in the empires of France, Austria, and Prussia. The founders outrightly rejected absolutism as a form of rule, by virtue of the fact that they had only presently secured independence from the Crown of Britain [which, they, in the Declaration of Colonial Rights and Grievances, had described as tyrannical and arbitrary], but also because the founding Declaration of Independence stressed the ‘equality of all men’ and their unalienable right to govern themselves by a government of their own choosing (cf. Note 242, *supra*). That absolutism was outrightly rejected meant also that not much consideration was given to the British model of government [although there were some that wanted the new nation to maintain the British Crown as Head of Government – and withal, to establish a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, this stance was strongly argued against by Thomas Paine (2004, 40), who in his *Common Sense* urged the founders to “steer clear” of any alliance with Britain, as such would only entangle the United States further in the wars, corruption, and contentions of European monarchs, for monarchical governments, said he, “happened never to be long at rest”]. Nevertheless, the institutional set-up of Parliament was adopted by the founders in the design of the United States Congress, so that the House of Representatives corresponded somewhat to the House of Commons, and the Senate, to the House of Lords. Howbeit, the aspect of the mixture of social orders – that is, of the one (Crown), the few (Lords), and the many (Commoners) – was rejected by the founders, again on grounds that “all men were created equal,” so that there was in effect nothing to mix because none was inherently inferior to the other [albeit, by ‘men’ was meant free-born, native males, and not, as it were, bondservants and women] (cf. esp. Hobson, *loc. cit.*, 66; but also Pocock 1975, 61-5, on the view that the founders settled for a functionally-mixed, rather than a socially-mixed constitution). Thus, Gordon S. Wood (1969, 248-50) succinctly notes that the United States Congress did not comprise two houses representing different social classes, but rather, two houses that were a double representation of the same people. As pertaining to Athenian democracy, it was written off as ‘excessive democracy’ – a form of mob rule that furthered demagoguery, and led to the loss of private property [for instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his *Discourse on Political Economy* ([1978], p. 213) writes that “Athens was not in fact a democracy, but a highly

tyrannical aristocracy, governed by learned men and orators;” cf. also James Madison who writes in the *Federalist Papers* (No. LV, p. 288) that “had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob;” cf. also Aristotle (*Politics*, Book III, Sec. 1279b) who described democracy as a degenerated form of constitutional government – one in which the masses ruled for their own private benefits, and not for the common good of the state. Thus, the only viable form of government that remained was republicanism, but this too was viewed with some skepticism, particularly because of the large size of the United States, but also because previous experiments of republicanism had been conducted in smaller states, not to mention the fact that the Roman Republic had disintegrated following her rapid territorial expansion [on the matter of the size of republics, cf. Baron de Montesquieu who writes in his *Spirit of the Laws* (Book IX, Chap. I) as follows: “if a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection. To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are equally liable, whether they be good or bad”]. More also, the then existing republics did not furnish the founders with a model worthy of emulation. For instance, the Dutch free republics, and the Italian city-states were generally perceived as weak and tumultuous (cf. esp. Hobson, *loc. cit.*, 52, 57; Venturi 1991, 59).

²⁵² Christopher Hobson (2005, 66) explicates this procedural measure as follows: “[...] the people remained the locus of sovereignty [i.e., the constitutive power], as in a democracy, but subsequently alienated their powers to elected representatives [i.e., the constituted power]. Representation thereby allowed for the creation and maintenance of a ruling elite that governed, one selected by merit and regularly answerable to the people.” Elsewhere (*loc. cit.*, 67) he notes that such government by representation allowed for the *necessities of popular consent* and the *dangers of mob rule* to be reconciled, in that the former was furthered, whilst the latter was constrained.

²⁵³ In his *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Professor Robert Dahl (1956, 34-8, esp. 37-8) defined populist democracy as a form of government that was characterized chiefly by popular sovereignty and political equality, and thus, tended to a rule by majorities [i.e., a state of affairs where the preference of the greater number of citizens are almost always considered above all others in the selection of government policy]. Ideally, this form of rule was frowned upon by the founders because it supposedly

would have granted unprecedented power to the ‘poor and middling folk’ – which comprised the majority – who in turn would have employed such power to launch an attack on the properties of the elite few [cf. for instance the remarks by Plato (*The Republic*, Book VIII, Sec. 557a, 558e, *italics supplied*) to this effect as follows: “[...] a *populistic* democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both citizenship and offices [...] *It is* a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike.” Cf. also James Madison (*The Federalist Papers*, No. X, p. 46) who adjoins that: “pure [i.e., popular] democracies [...] have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.” Cf. also Professor Malcolm Crook (1996, 13) who notes that the popular masses were perceived of by the barristers of Paris as “a class of men incapable of participation in public affairs, by virtue of their education and the type of work to which their poverty had condemned them.”

²⁵⁴ Although this view was maintained to protect private property in general, Charles Beard (1913, 149-50) in his influential monograph *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* asserts that this was largely resolved because of the estate holdings of the founding delegates, who altogether owned substantial property in land, industry, shipping, banking, and public securities, and as such, found it both practical and beneficial that a strong central government was established to safeguard private property.

²⁵⁵ The ‘republican principle’ achieved this objective in two principal ways. First, the procedure of representation ensured that the property-less masses were significantly excluded from government, thereby reducing their propensity to despoil the wealth of the rich. And second, the creation of a *laissez-faire* capitalist system ensued that citizens were afforded the liberty and freedom to pursue their individual enterprises, but also, that government was variably constrained from attempts to equalize society by means of redistributive taxes, and/or price control mechanisms.

²⁵⁶ For instance, Eric Hobsbawm ([1987], 55, 70) in his influential monograph *The Age of Empires* notes that such free-market enterprise was spurred on by the geographical spread of industrialization, the expansion of communication infrastructures, and the advance of scientific knowledge (cf. also Held et al. 1999, 291). Additionally, Professor Moses Abramovitz (1993, 224) remarks that capitalism was particularly congenial in the twentieth century because the period saw a remarkable shift in capital accumulation, from tangible assets [in the form of raw labor power] to intangible assets [in the form of labor augmented by education and other cumulative investments in the advance of knowledge]. Such change in factor input consequently accelerated technological advancements that were conducive to business in the private sector [for instance, Professor Alexander Field ([1992], 406-9, 412-3) makes mention of one of such technological innovations – the magnetic telegraph, which in the nineteenth century enabled the United States to save considerably on her rail infrastructure, and further increased her total factor productivity].

²⁵⁷ According to Brian Roper (*loc. cit.*, 206), this association was owed to the fact that capitalism promoted an extensive differentiation of interests and widespread diffusion of power – both of which tended to facilitate representative democracy. Cf. thus Professor Mancur Olson (2000, 32) who observed in his *Power and Prosperity* that the autonomous emergence of representative democracy over the course of history has been associated with “a pluralistic dispersion of power.” Cf. also Professor Louis Hartz (1955, 89) who adjoins that: “in a society [...] where virtually everyone, including the nascent industrial worker, has the mentality of an independent entrepreneur, two national impulses are bound to make themselves felt: the impulse toward democracy and the impulse toward capitalism. The mass of the people, in other words, are bound to be capitalistic, and capitalism, with its spirit disseminated widely, is bound to be democratic.”

²⁵⁸ In effect, they argued that a federal government, composed predominantly of the elite few, may with time grow estranged from the common people, so as to pursue policies which undermined the latter’s rights and liberties [in effect, that it would over time degenerate into a government of men, rather than remain a government of laws, cf. a statement against such in the 1780 Constitution of Massachusetts (Part I, Art. XXX); cf. also Neumann 1957, 31, for a related remark in this respect]. Nevertheless,

the federalists were of the view that this could not be the case because any powers not specifically granted to the federal government by the constitution were by default retained by the states and the people [so that it was not possible for the federal government to appropriate to itself any powers not directly reserved to it]. Albeit, some state legislatures were unwilling to sign the draft constitution until a Bill of Rights was appended to it.

²⁵⁹ The Bill of Rights are the first ten amendments to the federal constitution of the United States. They were singularly penned by James Madison, and formally ratified by the state legislatures on December 15, 1791. Their essence was to limit the powers of the federal government, so as to protect individual rights and liberties. But as afore stated, many statesmen were opposed to appending a “Bill of Rights” to the federal constitution. For instance, Alexander Hamilton famously espoused in the *Federalist Papers* (No. LXXXIV, pp. 445-6) that such Bill of Rights were “not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to power not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done, which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible presence for claiming that power.” Ideally, the objections that were raised seemed to have centered on the fact that the Constitution was intended to safeguard a range of individual rights and liberties that were wider in scope than could be contained in a single document, so that enumerating some of these and leaving out others would convey the idea that those left out were not as important as those included (cf. esp. Hayek 1960 185-6). This was finely iterated by Professor James Wilson (1792, 42-3) in a speech he delivered at the 1787 Pennsylvania Convention [on the adoption of the Federal Constitution] as follows: “But in a government, consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary, but in my humble judgement, highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution, is an enumeration of the powers reserved.

If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated, is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration [of the rights of the people] would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. On the other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the powers of government, reserves all implied power to the people; and, by that means the constitution becomes incomplete; but of the two it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the constitution; for an omission in the enumeration of the powers of government, is neither so dangerous, nor important, as an omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people.” Nevertheless, Joseph Story (1833, 718-20), writing in support of the ‘Bill of Rights,’ noted that these were “important and indispensable,” so long as they “operated as a qualification upon the powers actually granted by the people to the government;” or “protected against unjust and oppressive conduct on the part of the people themselves.” More also, James Madison (1865, 426), in a 1788 letter to Thomas Jefferson, noted that a ‘Bill of Rights’ was useful for Popular Government because “the political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion. *And* although it be generally true [...] that the danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the Government, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.”

²⁶⁰ Such freedom from dependence on the wills of others precluded of course the will of the state, which was deemed to supersede the will of the individual. For because the individual could only realize his rights within the state, and by virtue of his association with other members of the state, he could in essence have no rights against the state for those decrees of the state which impede on his will, so long as such decrees worked together for the good and sustenance of the state as whole (cf. Laguna, *loc. cit.*, 118-9). This is best explicated by T. H. Greene in his *Principles of Political Obligation* (Book II, Sec. 141-2, pp. 146-7) as follows: “[...] thus the citizen's rights [...] are yet to the citizen derived from the state [...] which secures to the citizen his family rights and his rights as a holder of property [...] But [...] what does the assertion that

he can have no right to act otherwise than as a member of his state amount to? Does it mean that he has no right to disobey the law of the state to which he belongs, whatever the law may be? That he is not entitled to exercise his powers in any way that the law forbids and to refuse to exercise them in any way that it commands? [...] The only unqualified answer that can be given to it is [...] that so far as the laws anywhere or at any time in force fulfil the idea of a state, there can be no right to disobey them; or, that there can be no right to disobey the law of the state except in the interest of the state; i.e., for the purpose of making the state in respect of its actual laws more completely correspond to what it is in tendency or idea, viz. the reconciler and sustainer of the rights that arise out of the social relations of men. On this principle there can be no right to disobey or evade any particular law on the ground that it interferes with any freedom of action, any right of managing his children or 'doing what he will with his own,' which but for that law the individual would possess.”

²⁶¹ Cf. an explication of this viewpoint by Swiss theologian Emil Brunner (1945, 58) as follows: “[...] it was not only the power to dispose freely of his body and limbs, however, which was given to man by creation, but also ‘property.’ The man who has nothing at his disposal cannot act freely. He is dependent on the permission of others for every step he takes, and if they so wish, they can make it impossible for him to carry on any concrete activity. Without property there is no free personal life. Without property there is no power to act [...] And the word ‘property’ must be taken literally as ownership, or, as we say today, private property. Without private property, there is no freedom.”

²⁶² The term, in German jurisprudence, implied ‘security in the application of law.’ To wit, the certainty that the law would be applied uniformly to all, and would not be subject to arbitrary interpretations or amendments by government to serve parochial objectives (cf. Kelsen, *loc. cit.*, 77-80, esp. 78-9). Thus, Professor F. A. Hayek in his *The Road to Serfdom* (1944, 72) remarks that “[...] nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the general principle known as the ‘Rule of Law.’” To this, Professor Robert Humphreys (1937, 98) adds that the authors of the Federal Constitution of the United States were concerned “not to make American safe for democracy, but to make democracy safe for America [...] For the controlling rule of

law which the seventeenth century set above King or Parliament; which the Puritans exalted in matters both civil and ecclesiastical; which the philosophers saw as the governing principles of the universe; which the colonists invoked against the absolutism of Parliament; this was now made the essential principle of *the* Federation.”

²⁶³ Cf. an adjoining quote by Alexander Hamilton in the *Federalist Papers* (No. LXXVIII, p. 403) as follows: “By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no *ex post facto* laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” Cf. also James Madison (qtd. in Farrand 1911, 133) who averred in a speech at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that the chief objects of the national government were “to provide more effectively for the security of private rights, and *to ensure* the steady dispensation of justice.”

²⁶⁴ Professor Austin Ranney (*loc. cit.*, 144) describes radical rationalism as the process of deducing descriptive and prescriptive truths, not from divine revelation, nor from historical experience, but from first principles based on the laws of nature.” Cf. also John Locke, who in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Book IV, Chap. XVIII, Sec. 2, p. 526) defined reason as “[...] the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation or reflection.” Thus Professor F. A. Hayek noted in his *Constitution of Liberty* (1960, 183) that “Americans were [...] in a sense [...] guided by a spirit of rationalism, a desire for deliberate construction and pragmatic procedure.”

²⁶⁵ By and large, this was rooted in the founders’ skillful design of the governmental system, which was based predominantly on reason and empiricism (cf. esp. Wood 1969, 7-8; Bryce 1888, 35-7; Prescott 1968, 211-2). For instance, in the *Federalist Papers* (No. XX, p. 99) James Madison noted frankly that “experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred.” Elsewhere in the anthology (*op. cit.*, No. XXXIV, p. 162), Alexander Hamilton

remarked adjoinedly that “to argue upon abstract principles [...] would be to set up theory and suppositions against fact and reality. *For* however proper such reasonings might be [...] they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of [...] contrary to the evidence of the fact itself.” [cf. also Crawford Macpherson (1943, 46-7) who asserts that the founders of the new nation applied a form of “indolent inductive” in their design of the constitution – which according to him involved the founders relying on their own factual and experiential knowledge, as well as knowledge attained through discourse with others]. As such, the founders endeavored to design the institution of government in a way that afforded latter generations the opportunity to deliberate upon and make amendments to the constitution in light of new information (cf. esp. Rossiter, *loc. cit.*, 414-5; Koch 1961, 131-2; Bailyn 1967, 231). This fact was well noted by David Ramsay (1789, 356-7) in his *History of the American Revolution* as follows: “[...] it is true *that* from the infancy of political knowledge in the United States, there were many defects in their form of government. But in one thing they were all perfect. They left the people in the power of altering and amending them [i.e., the forms of government], whenever they pleased. In this happy peculiarity, they placed the science of politics on a footing with the other sciences, by opening it to improvements from experience, and the discoveries of future ages.”

²⁶⁶ Professor de Laguna (*loc. cit.*, 128-9) explicates further as follows: “Communication is possible only between dwellers in a common world, but it would be unnecessary if men did not live in different localities of this world and have private possessions within it. It is because individuals carry on different economic enterprises and produce different goods that they need a public market and a common system of transportation. And, as a system for the exchange of economic goods at once depends upon and fosters differential and specialized production, so a language is the means at once of communicating the ideas and feelings of different men and of enlarging and enriching the private experiences of each.”

²⁶⁷ “A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two really exist for each other” [translation qtd. from English version of book, referenced as follows: Hegel, Georg W. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Edited and translated by Thomas M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967, p. 38].

²⁶⁸ Elsewhere in the monograph (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, Book II, Chap. IV, pp. 110-1), in a chapter titled: “That the Americans Combat the Effects of Individualism by Free Institutions,” Alexis de Tocqueville noted further that such tendency for collective action amongst Americans was not solely owed to the individuality of citizens, but was more also the work of the founding fathers, who took great care to engineer political institutions – or what Professor Bernard Crick (1959, 4) calls “deliberate political arrangements” – which brought citizens together to pursue social and civic goals. He remarked as follows: “[...] the Americans have combated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued it. The legislators of America [...] thought that it would be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory, in order to multiply to an infinite extent, opportunities of acting in concert, for all the members of the community, and to make them constantly feel their mutual dependence on each other. The plan was a wise one. *For* the general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each other afterward, no lasting ties are established between them. But if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted, and to adapt themselves to one another.”

²⁶⁹ Professor Manin (*loc. cit.*, 193-4) noted further that such effective public deliberation ensured that governmental decisions on legal and policy matters were the manifest result of the *deliberation of all* rather than the mere representation of the *will of all* (cf. also Habermas 1975, 108, for added remarks in this respect). Professor Albert Hirschman (1989, 77) comments further on this viewpoint as follows: “[...] for a democracy to function well and to endure, it is essential [...] that opinions not be fully formed in advance of the process of deliberation. The participants in this process – both the public at large and its representatives – should maintain a degree of openness or tentativeness in their opinions and be ready to modify them both as a result of the arguments that will be put forward by the contending parties, and more simply, in the light of new information that will be developed in the course of public debates. Without a political process that manifests at least some aspiration toward this admittedly somewhat idyllic picture, democracy loses its legitimacy and will thus be

endangered.” It is important to note however that Professor Hirschman expressed the afore as the moderate and preferred form of public deliberation. He noted also in his essay (*loc. cit.*, 76-8) the low and high ends of deliberation [both of which were to be avoided]: the former being when “political parties offered citizens a full range of ready-made and firm opinions on all the issues of the day” [so that little deliberation is actually carried out by the citizens on such matters]; and the latter being when persons were so rigid in their views and unwilling to tolerate the opinions of others, and/or to compromise their stands in the light of new information [thereby leading to “an over-production of opinionated opinion”].

²⁷⁰ ‘Crystallization’ represents the situation where a sect of voters are strongly attached to the ideologies and positions of one party, and are thus unable and unwilling to swing to those of other parties. Thus, when majority-minority alignments are crystallized, it simply implies that the composition of the majority and minority, in relation to the political parties therein present, remains unchanged over a long period of time, thereby allowing an established majority faction to *always* have its way on policy matters at the expense of the minority (cf. esp. Kendall 1941, 122). And this was so, either because constituency boundaries were not well demarcated so that a single political party had majority support in most districts; or that deep-seated ethnopolitical cleavages had caused voters to identify with and establish strong ties to specific political parties (cf. Rustow 1950, 115-6; Boix 1999, 620-1). Thus, effective public deliberation helped to ensure that the public were not polarized into distinct majority and minority factions, but rather that they were able to recompose themselves fluidly on the policy issues of the day – as the activity allowed participants to dialogue, and to exchange information with one another, thereby enabling them to broaden their understanding of complex policy matters (cf. Manin, *loc. cit.*, 194-5). This was particularly affirmed by Professor Seymour M. Lipset (1959, 96) who observed that “the most isolated *people* of every political stratum were the ones most likely to accept extremism, whereas those who belonged to groups predisposed in different directions were those less likely to be strongly committed politically” [for added remarks on how political cosmopolitanism enhance tolerance and compromise amongst electorates, cf. Friedrich 1937, 50-1; Stouffer 1955, 138-9].

²⁷¹ In the *Federalist Papers* (No. X, pp. 43-5), James Madison defined a faction as “any number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” He then went on to state that if such faction were a minority, then they could simply be overcome by the application of the republican principle – to wit, by being outvoted by the majority. However, if such faction were a majority, then their sinister interests could be limited only by making the electorate more “numerous, extended, and diverse in interests” [the first and second are achieved by granting suffrage rights to the masses; and the third, by means of public deliberations]. In this light, Sigmund Neumann (1990, 47-8) advocated the need for political parties to remain agents of representation rather than of integration – the former being where political parties represented key policy positions that cut across ethnopolitical cleavages, and thereby united the electorate along such themes; and the latter being where political parties attempted to integrate a section of the electorate into the said parties’ *Weltanschauung* [lit. trans., ‘world view,’ or ‘basic ideology’], and thereby isolated them from discourse with the wider public. The former tended to proscribe the rise of factions, whilst the latter gave impetus to it. Thus, Professor Moses Abramovitz (1981, 13), in a critique of the Party System in the United States, noted that “[...] our national parties are no more than fluid, transitory, and undisciplined coalitions of regional and economic interest groupings. Their lack of central organization and authority, reflecting the size and diversity of the country and people, and our lack of ideological commitment, lay us wide open to the distorting influence of special-interest lobbies and single-issue politics.” Cf. also Professor Olson (2000, 32) who notes that democracy was likely to thrive in a nation when “the different forces among which there is a rough balance of power were not separated in a way that made mini-autocracies feasible.”

²⁷² Cf. also Professor Ian M. Little (1952, 428) who adjoins as follows: “[...] it is quite reasonable to suppose that no such deadlock, or equilibrium, set of orders would ever result, especially in a large society. The dynamics of value formation may imply that values are, as a result of mutual influence, in a state of permanent flux.” Cf. also Frank Knight (1969, 235) who remarks that “values are established and recognized through

discussion, an activity which is at once social, intellectual, and creative.” Cf. also Professor Pendleton Herring (1940, 434) who notes that “the democratic way lies not in the preservation of any fixed set of institutions nor in rule by any one set of interests, but in the constant preadaptation of ideals and organizations to answer emerging social demands” [cf. also Sen (1995), 10, 15-7; Arrow 1951, 7-8, for added remarks in this respect].

²⁷³ This fact was well articulated by the eminent German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his poem *Den Vereinigten Staaten* (1981, 333, S1: L1-8) as follows: *Amerika, du hast es besser / Als unser Kontinent, der alte, / Hast keine verfallenen Schlösser / Und keine Basalte. / Dich stört nicht im Innern, / Zu lebendiger Zeit, / Unnützes Erinnern / Und vergeblicher Streit.* [lit. trans., “America, you are better off / Than our continent, the old. / You have no castles which are fallen / No basalt to behold. / You are not disturbed within your inmost being / Right up till today's life / By useless remembering / And unrewarding strife.” (translation qtd. from an anthology by the author, referenced as follows: Goethe, Johann W. “To the United States.” *The Permanent Goethe*. Translated by Stephen Spender. Edited by Thomas Mann. New York: Dial, 1948, p. 655)].

²⁷⁴ Cf. also a related espousal by David Ramsay (*loc. cit.*, 356) as follows: “In this [...] view of the formation and establishment of the American constitutions, we behold our species in a new situation. In no age before, and in no other country, did man ever possess an election of the kind of government, under which he would choose to live. The constituent parts of the ancient free governments were thrown together by accident. The freedom of modern European governments was, for the most part, obtained by the concessions, or liberality of monarchs, or military leaders. In America alone, reason and liberty concurred in the formation of constitutions.” Cf. also a related quote by Chief Justice John Jay (qtd. in Niles 1876, 181) in his 1777 New York address to the Supreme Court as follows: “The Americans are the first people whom heaven has favored with an opportunity of deliberating upon, and choosing the forms of government under which they should live. All other constitutions have derived their existence from violence or accidental circumstances, and are therefore probably more distant from their perfection, which, though beyond our reach, may nevertheless be approached under guidance of reason and experience.”

²⁷⁵ Thus, Karl Marx in a preface to his *Das Kapital* (1867, ix-x; cf. also Engels 1968, 97) commented on how capitalist development in Germany had been impeded by established norms of the old feudal order. He wrote as follows: *In allen andren Sphären quält uns [...] nicht nur die Entwicklung der kapitalistischen Produktion, sondern auch der Mangel ihrer Entwicklung. Neben den modernen Notständen drückt uns eine ganze Reihe vererbter Notstände, entspringend aus der Fortvegetation altertümlicher, überlebter Produktionsweisen, mit ihrem Gefolg von zeitwidrigen gesellschaftlichen und politischen Verhältnissen* [lit. trans., “In all other spheres, we [...] suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms” (translation qtd. from English version of book, referenced as follows: Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Translated by Samuel Moore, and Edward Aveling. Edited by Friedrich Engels. New York: Bennett A. Cerf, 1906, p. 13)]. A similar remark also was made by Professor Ralf Dahrendorf (1969, 44) concerning capitalist development in Germany, as follows: “economic development stuck onto an existing social structure so that while the economic superstructure was assimilated, the social and cultural context remained unchanged.” Professor Dahrendorf (*loc. cit.*, 52; cf. also Parsons 1969, 71) went on further to explicate that industrialization in Germany could not produce an assertive *bourgeoisie* with its own political aspiration particularly because the German *bourgeoisie* entered the prevailing institutional structure as individuals rather than as a class, and so were unable to collectively alter the existing feudal order. As such, German society remained quasi-feudal, in that it became an industrial state but not a liberal capitalist society. Cf. also Professor Thorstein Veblen (1915, 241) who notes that the “industrial arts” in *Imperial* Germany were “wholly out of consonance with their institutional scheme” and so became “disposable for the uses of the dynastic State.” In the case of Italy, Antonio Gramsci (1949) has argued that because the *Risorgimento* was successfully conducted without a prior or commensurate peasant revolution, the Italian bourgeoisie have tended to be constitutionally weak as a result. In comparing the *Risorgimento* with the French Revolution, Gramsci (*loc. cit.*, 70, 84-7) observed that in the case of the latter, the agrarian policies and dictatorial rule of the popular Jacobin government led the French bourgeoisie to assume a leadership

role in restoring economic and political order back into the nation – so that thereafter, a bourgeoisie state with permanent foundations was established in France. Whereas, in the case of Italy, because the *Risorgimento* was singularly aimed at reunification, and was not, as it should have been, directed at counteracting the adverse policies of a populist regime – in large part because the *Partito d’Azione* did not follow after the example of the Jacobin government, it so happened that no agrarian reform nor democratic program was effected thereafter; so that the *Risorgimento* became no more than a ‘passive revolution’ which only furthered “municipal particularism and catholic cosmopolitanism” in Italy (*loc. cit.*, 106, 136, 167; qt. in Gerschenkron 1962, 92) [cf. also Brennan 1950, 10-5; Daalder 1966, 56-7, for related explications in this respect].

²⁷⁶ Thus in his February 1890 letter to Friedrich Adolph Sorge, Friedrich Engels (1945, 410) wrote that “America is so purely bourgeois, so entirely without a feudal past, and so proud of its purely bourgeois organization.” A similar remark also was averred by David Gartman (2009, 26) who noted that “early America was the land of unadulterated capitalism, where no feudal past stood in the way of the pursuit of profits, and *where* new methods of production were invented incessantly.”

²⁷⁷ Thus Max Weber in his *Essays in Sociology* ([1946], 181, 186) observed that the working class in feudal societies constituted a *Stand* [lit. trans., ‘status group’], whose members shared unique lifestyles, and observed peculiar norms of social intercourse. As such, industrial societies which sprung from feudal traditions and have inherited these status groups tend to have a working class that are politically conscious and able to assert their interests through collective activity. On the contrary, industrial societies which have been ‘born anew,’ and are without a feudal past, tend to be organized solely into “economic classes” whose members share a “common market situation” rather than a “corporate identity.” As a result, class-conscious politics tend also to be less pronounced in such societies (cf. Lipset 1983, 2-3; Epstein 1980, 134-5; Dahrendorf 1988, 61, for related comments in this respect). Cf. thus Selig Perlman (1928, 167), who in explaining the lack of class consciousness amongst American workers, noted that this was the result of: “[...] the free gift of the ballot which came to labor at an early date as a by-product of the Jeffersonian democratic movement. In other countries where the labor movement started while workingmen were still denied the franchise, there was in the last analysis no need for a theory of ‘surplus value’ to convince them

that they were a class apart and should therefore be ‘class conscious.’ There ran a line like a thread between the laboring class and the other classes. Not so, where the line was only an economic one.” Nevertheless, one may observe that such has not been the case with Australia, which although an industrial society, and without a feudal past, has had a strong labor party – the Australian Labor Party – in federal-level politics since 1891. Russel B. Ward (1959, 18) and Richard N. Rosecrance (1960, 121) have explained that this has been the result of the settling into Australia of nineteenth-century working-class immigrants from industrial Britain, who coming therein, brought a strong class awareness with them, and thereby facilitated class-conscious politics in the host nation. More also, Paul F. Sharp (1955, 371-2) has explained further that rural Australia was highly stratified and sharply divided between the owners of large farm lands and the peasant population that worked on these farms, so that this may have contributed towards the emergence of class feelings on the island country.

²⁷⁸ Professor Hartz (*loc. cit.*, 5-6) explicated further as follows: “one of the central characteristics of a nonfeudal society is that it lacks a genuine revolutionary tradition [...] and this being the case, it lacks also a tradition of reaction [...] Marx went wrong in his historical analysis, attributing as he did the emergence of the socialist ideology to the objective movement of economic forces. Actually, socialism is largely an ideological phenomenon, arising out of the principles of class and the revolutionary liberal revolt against them which the old European order inspired. It is not accidental that America which has uniquely lacked a feudal tradition has uniquely lacked also a socialist tradition. The hidden origin of socialist thought everywhere in the West is to be found in the feudal ethos.” Cf. also an adjoining espousal by Tony Cole (1986, 19) as follows: “[...] there are significant differences between the development of US Society and that of European society. Notably here is the absence of a feudal past with its connotations of paternalism. Consequently, America had no tradition of protection of the poor by the rich, however inadequate this might have been in practice. As a result, there was less opposition in higher circles to the doctrine of *laissez-faire* individualism than there was in England and Germany” [cf. also Bowles and Gintis 1986, 31-3, for a critical discussion of the subject matter].

²⁷⁹ Thus Jeremy Bentham, who clearly appeared to support such ‘individualistic form of capitalism,’ noted emphatically in his *Defence of Usury* (Lett. I, p. 2) that “[...] no

man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit: nor *should* anybody be hindered from supplying him, upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.” Elsewhere in the monograph (*op. cit.*, Lett. II, pp. 14-5), he asks rhetorically “why a man who takes as much as he can get, be it six, or seven, or eight, or ten percent, for the use of a sum of money, should be called a usurer, should be loaded with an opprobrious name, any more than if he had bought an house with it;” and also “why the legislator should be more anxious to [...] set his face against the owners of that species of property more than of any other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting *more* than a certain price for the use of it, rather than to prevent their getting *less*? Why [...] he should not take means for making it penal to offer less [...] as well as to accept more?” But besides the utilitarian philosopher, many economists have expressed varied forms of support for *laissez-faire* capitalism.’ For instance, Professor Joseph Schumpeter ([1961], 66, 153-4; cf. also [1939], 87, 130) noted avidly that it was by virtue of the risk-taking ventures of entrepreneurs that innovation was brought about in society, so that the large profits earned by such were a just recompense of their labor. Furthermore, Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* (Book IV, Chap. II, p. 423, *emphasis added*) averred that he had “never known much good done by those who affected to trade for *the sole purpose of the public good*.” Also, Eiichi Shibusawa (1985, 12), the acclaimed ‘father of Japanese capitalism’ asserted succinctly that people would be willing to work for the welfare of the public if they expected to obtain wealth and profit for themselves in the process. He remarked as follows: “What if a particular work has no relation to your own profit? You will not put your heart and soul into the work if it is clear that the success of the work earns others a fortune but not yourself or that the failure of it costs others a fortune but not yourself. However, if it is your own *profit-related* work, you would wish to develop it, and it is a plain fact that you actually will develop it.” And lastly, Professor Albert Hirschman (1977, 130) in his *The Passions and the Interests* noted that one sublime benefit to a preoccupation in money-making was the fact that it kept persons engaged therein “out of mischief,” and thereby imposed restraints on “princely caprice, arbitrary government, and adventurous foreign policies.” This was also underscored by British economist John M. Keynes (1936, 374) as follows: “[...] dangerous human proclivities can be canalized into comparatively

harmless channels by the existence of opportunity for money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandizement. It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative.” For a more general exposé of the subject matter, cf. Donaldson 1982, 61-70; Lazonick 1991, 122-30.

²⁸⁰ Professor Abramovitz (*loc. cit.*, 7) remarked further that such opposition to welfare distribution by Americans may be owed to the observed effects of welfare spending on the economy, which he enumerated as follows: “first, a decline in the rate of capital deepening; second, a decline of worker effort symptomized by absenteeism and a drop in hours worked relative to hours paid; third, a disinclination for risky, innovatory effort [which tended to retard total factor productivity growth]; and fourth, the diversion of resources [which otherwise could have been invested] to regulatory compliance [the benefits of which do not register in measured output].” Cf. also a case for *laissez-faire* capitalism by Professor F. A. Hayek (1966, 605) who in his theory of ‘catallaxy’ argued that a society which encouraged free enterprise tended to generate higher personal incomes for its members than one which enforced “a unitary scale of concrete ends.” Cf. also Professor Werner Sombart ([1906], 135, 140) who noted that American workers were quick to embrace capitalism as a viable economic system [and thus rejected the Marxist view of the same] because it provided them with the independence and security that they needed to exploit the abundant opportunities present in the country; whereas European workers were more attracted to socialism because there existed few of such opportunities in the same, – so that choosing capitalism as an economic system would only have worked to widen the income and social gap between the rich and the poor.

²⁸¹ For discussions on how strong feudal institutions have fostered class awareness in Europe, but particularly: in Finland, cf. [Rokkan 1981, 57; Martin and Hopkins 1980, 186]; in Great Britain, cf. [Thompson 1968, 887-8; Pulzer 1967, 98]; in Sweden, cf. [Tingsten 1973, 11; Rokkan, *loc. cit.*, 60-1]. Likewise, for statements on how weak feudal traditions have limited class-conscious politics: in Switzerland, cf. [Gruner 1968, 156]; in Belgium, cf. [Landauer 1959, 479]; in Denmark, cf. [Castles 1978, 14]. For a

more general excursus on the subject matter, cf. [Sturmthal 1993, 18; Bell 1973, 371-2; Bendix 1977, 90-1; Mayer 1981, 135].

²⁸² That the American design of representative democracy would become a model for the world was adumbrated by James Madison (qtd. in Koch, *loc. cit.*, 128) [in a letter he wrote to the French jurist Pierre E. Du Ponceau on 23 January 1826], as follows: “[...] the free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation and a desire of imitation, as avenues may be found for truth to the knowledge of nations [...] Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the workshop of liberty to the Civilized World, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.” Cf. also a related espousal by Dr. Ezra Stiles (1783, 88-9) in a sermon he preached to the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut as follows: “This great American Revolution, this recent political phenomenon of a new sovereignty arising among the sovereign powers of the earth will be attended to and contemplated by all nations [...] That prophecy of Daniel is now literally fulfilling [...] There shall be an universal traveling to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased. This knowledge shall be brought home and treasured up in America; and being here digested and carried to the highest perfection, may realize back from America to Europe, to Asia, and to Africa, and illuminate the world with truth and liberty.”

²⁸³ On this linkage, cf. Professor Robert Dahl (1990, 80) who remarked as follows: “It is a historical fact that modern democratic institutions [...] have existed only in countries with predominantly privately owned, market-oriented economies, or capitalism if you prefer that name. It is also a historical fact that ‘socialist’ countries with predominantly state-owned, centrally directed economic orders [...] have not enjoyed democratic governments but have in fact been ruled by authoritarian dictatorships. To put it more formally, it looks to be the case that market-oriented economies are necessary to democratic institutions, though they are certainly not sufficient. And it looks to be the case that state-owned, centrally directed economic orders are strictly associated with authoritarian regimes, though authoritarianism definitely does not require them. We have something very much like a historical experiment, so it would appear, that leaves these conclusions in no great doubt” [cf. also Schumpeter (1942, 296-7) for added remarks in this respect].

Notes to Essay II

¹ Qtd. in Olson 2005, 44-5.

² Professor Shmuel Eisenstadt (*loc. cit.*, 219) describes this construct of democracy as ‘republican participatory’ and contrasts it from ‘communitarian participatory’ which he likens to the *ré-totale* practiced by the Jacobin government. The difference, he says, is the fact that popular participation is institutionalized in the former and forms a key part of the civil traditions of the polity, whereas in the case of the latter, it is merely construed as a basic right of citizens that need be invoked or exercised without institutional restraints.

³ On the non-teleological nature of democracy, Professor Joseph Schumpeter (*loc. cit.*, 220) remarks as follows: “Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions, and hence *is* incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given [...] conditions.”

⁴ Professor Anthony Downs (*loc. cit.*, 23) for instance noted categorically that his eight defining features of a democratic polity were ‘descriptive,’ and not teleological.

⁵ This function of citizens, although minimal, helps to keep the system in check. For because political leaders require the support of voters to secure victory in the polls, they are wont to shape public policy to fit the desires of citizens (cf. Dahl 1961, 164; Almond and Verba 1963, 487). More also, the fact that several elites have to compete with one another for the peoples’ vote means that it becomes “extremely difficult for any one group to engineer consent by manipulating public opinion” (cf. Walker, *loc. cit.*, 286).

⁶ To be sure, the elitists are not entirely opposed to popular participation, but as Samuel Beer (1960, 46) notes, seek only to combine a relative amount of it with a system of power capable of governing effectively and coherently. And this was so conceived because the classical ideal was perceived by elitists to be both unsatisfactory and incomplete. For instance, Professor Schumpeter (*loc. cit.*, 250-1) remarked that classical theory posits that citizens deliberate and vote on policy decisions for the

common good of society, yet does not offer an explanation of how the common good is realized in the first place, or how it could possibly meet the individual needs of all persons. And second, Professor Lane Davis (1964, 38) adjoins that the theory rests on untenable and naïve conceptions of man and politics, for democratic man, he says, is “neither as rational, [...] as informed, nor as active in public affairs as he is assumed to be [cf. also adjoining remarks by Berelson et al. 1954, 322; albeit the reservation expressed by Professor V. O. Key, Jr. (1966, 7) that “in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of alternatives presented to it, and the character of information available to it”]. The elitists therefore sought to define a theory of democracy that was both realistic and functional, and which encapsulated the separate virtues of political leadership and popular participation (cf. Mayo, *loc. cit.* 33; Schumpeter, *loc. cit.*, 296; Hartz 1960, 29) [cf. thus Cobb and Elder (1971, 895) who noted that the elitist theory was “empirically more viable as a descriptive statement of functioning democracies than is the classical theory”]. Howbeit in so doing, the elitist theory has been criticized for attempting to turn democracy into a political mechanism – a conservative political doctrine, as opposed to it representing “a set of ideals towards which society ought to be striving” (cf. Walker, *loc. cit.*, 288; Easton 1969, 1052).

⁷ For an elaborate discussion of this distinction, cf. Mackie (2009, 141-7).

⁸ The elitists argue that the safety of democracy depended on the “high-minded sense of responsibility of its leaders, the only elements of society actively striving to discover and implement the common good” (cf. Walker, *ibid.*). The citizens on the other hand – *homo civica* as they are called (cf. Dahl, *loc. cit.*, 225) – are deemed apolitical beings who only appear on the political scene when they sense an imminent threat to their personal freedom [(cf. esp. Stirner (1892, 272); albeit the remark by Professor Davis (*loc. cit.*, 41; cf. also Barker 1942, 22; 1951, 42-3) that the private life of individuals – their family, friends, work, religion – form a part of “the necessary foundation upon which the citizen builds his concern with, and participation in, public affairs”]. Besides this fact, the masses were perceived to be lacking “a well-defined sense of social justice that would allow them to stand in judgement on their society and its institutions,” so that they are wont to *naturally* defer to the *competent* elite to lead and stir the affairs of the state (cf. Lane 1962, 475; Stokes 1962, 72; but esp. Michels 1962, 88) [cf. also

Vladimir O. Lenin (1940, 74-5) who in his *Left Wing Communism* advocated for an “elitist party of professional revolutionists” that would lead the “slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert, and dormant” masses into socialism].

⁹ For instance, Professor Bernard Berelson and associates (*loc. cit.*, 314-5) remarked to this effect as follows: “How could a mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits, too [...] Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community [...] Some people are and should be highly interested in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be. Only the doctrinaire would depreciate the moderate indifference that facilitates compromise.” Cf. also Walter Lippmann ([1956], 23-4, 53) who noted that because the masses were generally unlearned, their involvement in politics only tended to impose a veto upon the informed and responsible judgements of the elites, and thus inhibited the latter’s ability to govern.” Cf. also Professor Robert Dahl (1966, 301) who reminds that “the rapid rise in electoral participation in the late years of the Weimar Republic did not make it a better democracy, nor did it enable that Republic to solve its problems. Instead, it was associated with factors that transformed that experiment in democracy into a monstrous system.”

¹⁰ Professor Lester Milbrath (1965, 143-5) has explained that whereas the average citizen of the ancient city-state was able to fully participate in public affairs [one, because the population size was small; and two, because public issues were not particularly complex and technical], the modern society, because of its size and complexity, has developed a high division of labor where only a few qualified persons are able participate in public affairs, whilst the rest of the population remain occupied in their specialized fields of work. Thus, to the extent that these ‘ruling elites’ were effective in the work they did, there needed not be a reason for the masses to indulge themselves in public affairs, save for exercising their franchise in periodic elections.

¹¹ Ideally, it was believed that a political system attained stability only because a large part of its members was politically inactive [in effect, that only a few issues were the subject of controversy from time to time], and/or did not belong to the ruling class. In the case of the former, it ensured, for example, that “disagreements that arose

during campaigns and elections did not involve large numbers of people, or plunge the society into violent disorders” (cf. Walker, *loc. cit.*, 289). In the case of the latter, it ensured that the mandate of the ruling elite was not challenged, and that the political system was thus protected from demagoguery [as was also observed in the early years of the Roman Republic] (cf. Truman, *loc. cit.*, 491).

¹² Such ‘consensus of the elites’ on fundamental principles was necessary, as Professor Walker (*loc. cit.*, 287) notes, to ensure that “the otherwise passive public was not aroused to organize against its leaders” [because the latter seemed unable to put their acts together]. Cf. thus Professor Gabriel Almond (1950, 144) who noted that a looseness in the elite structure, particularly in the area of foreign policy, was wont to “leave unclear and unspecified, by formal prescription or established tradition, where the initiative in matters ought to be taken.” Cf. also Higley et al. (1991, 45-50) who in a study of the United States, Australia, and West Germany noted that the close integration of their elite networks accounted for much of the stability of their political systems.

¹³ For a detailed enumeration of the procedural requisites of polyarchies, cf. Dahl (1953, 277-9; 1956, 84; 1982, 11; 1989, 221). Professor Dahl’s list of conditions appears identical with that of Professor Downs (*loc. cit.*, 23-4), save for the former’s inclusion of the additional point that “all individuals must possess identical information about electoral alternatives” – a condition which further attests to the relevance of civil societies for polyarchies.

¹⁴ Professor Dahl (1958, 464) conceptualized the ‘ruling elite’ to be “a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevailed [...] on key political issues,” and who were not “a pure artifact of democratic rules.”

¹⁵ Professor Edward Shils (1991, 11) attempted a fine distinction of the three theories [the elitist he called ‘retrospective democracy;’ the classical, ‘mass democracy;’ and polyarchy, ‘civil society’] as follows: “Liberal democracy is the most general class of society, variants of which, among others, are mass democracy, retrospective democracy, and civil society. Mass democracy [...] is at another pole from civil society insofar as it considers one stratum of society, albeit the majority of the population, as the properly sole beneficiary of policies regarding the distribution of goods, services,

and honors. Mass democracy would disregard representative institutions, replacing them by demonstrations and plebiscites [...] Still another alternative is retrospective democracy [...] in which the electorate confirms or dismisses its rulers in accordance with whether it is satisfied with their accomplishments during the most recent electoral period. Civil society differs from mass democracy in its concern for the interests and ideals of all sections of the population and not just for one. It differs from retrospective democracy in its constant scrutiny and assessment of government, and its refusal to allow it to extend its range or depth of activities.”

¹⁶ Cf. thus Professor William Kornhauser (1959, 77) who noted that such intermediate groups “helped to protect elites by functioning as channels through which popular participation in the larger society may be directed and restrained.” And for this cause also, some scholars have called the same, but particularly the media, as “the fourth branch of government,” or the *de facto* “third chamber of a bicameral legislature” [or the second of a unicameral] (cf. Herring 1929, 18; Odegard and Helms 1938, 753; Almond 1958, 278-9; Cohen 1963, 31-6; Carter 1959, *passim*).

¹⁷ Cf. albeit Professor Leonardo Morlino (2004, 9-18) who in an essay he titled “Good’ and ‘Bad’ Democracies” offered a more general framework for measuring the quality of democracy based on functional indicators such as the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness.

¹⁸ Cf. Diamond, *loc. cit.*, 8-17; but also Andreas Schedler (1998, 92-4) who categorized these instead as advanced-, liberal-, electoral- democracies, and authoritarian regimes. Howbeit the latter’s category of ‘advanced democracies’ appears rather utopian and romantic, so that the former’s four-fold typology seems better. Cf. albeit Professor Giovanni Sartori (1987, 184; but also 1991, 248) who objects to the practice of classifying democracies in graded terms, calling it “an analytically stultifying exercise in ‘degreeism’ which misses the basic fact that political systems are bounded wholes” (cf. also a similar argument in this respect by Alvarez et al. 1996, 21). Nevertheless, Bollen and Jackman (1989, 612, 618) have argued that treating democracy as dichotomous is a flawed practice because it “lumps together countries with very different degrees of democracy, and blurs distinctions between borderline cases.”

¹⁹ Larry J. Diamond (*ibid.*, 10) noted that besides the observance of competitive, free and fair elections, liberal democracies were further distinguished in three aspects, namely: first, the absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate; second, the vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled, and the horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another; and third, the provision for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms.

²⁰ These regimes tend to commit what Professor Terry Karl [(1990, 14-5); cf. also Schmitter and Karl (1991, 78)] has called the ‘fallacy of electoralism.’ To wit, because these emphasize the conduct of competitive elections over civil society activism, citizens are able only to choose from the policy alternatives offered them by political parties [whereas in the case where autonomous civic associations are active and vibrant, these would be able to articulate the interests of a cross-section of the masses, and so have these interests considered by political parties who would be looking to winning the support of the electorate]. And in the case where the parties are organized along cleavage lines – ethnic, class, religion, etc. – it would mean that the interests of a considerable segment of the population would not be represented in policy decisions [for added statements on these regime types, cf. Przeworski 1991, 10-1; Powell 1982, 3; Pennock 1979, 6-7; Di Palma 1991, 16; Vanhanen 1990, 17-8].

²¹ A peculiar midrange conception to be found between the liberal and electoral continuum is what Professor Guillermo O'Donnell (59, 60-1) has called delegative democracy. These are regimes wherein the executive, after having been elected via free and competitive means, proceeds to disband all forms of horizontal accountability to its personalistic rule, and resorts instead to clientelism and other forms of corruption to keep itself in power. Another midrange conception closely related to this is Fareed Zakaria's (1997, 22ff) illiberal democracy – to wit, democratically elected regimes that routinely undermine constitutional limits to their power, and in turn deprive citizens of basic rights and freedoms.

²² Collier and Levitsky (1997, 440) have classified these regimes severally under such rubrics as oligarchical democracy, restrictive democracy, tutelary democracy, and the like. Generally, they tend to be distinguished in three respects. The first comprise those regimes wherein the ruling party employs varied acts of violence and

intimidation to suppress opposition parties, so that the former always emerges victorious in elections (which in most cases are fraught with malpractices) [cf. Brett L. Carter's (2016: 36ff) exceptional essay for cases of such regimes]. The second are those regimes wherein a ruling party or coalition, owing to its popularity with the public and/or hegemonic control of public resources, succeeds almost always at getting reelected (usually such elections are conducted with reasonable fairness), so that there is never an alternation in power (cf. Sartori 1976, 30-8). The third are those regimes wherein the ruling party, after having been elected, is unable to exercise effective power and control because certain policy areas remain under the purview of the military and other actors unaccountable to the electorate (cf. O'Donnell 1996, 35).

²³ Two fine examples of non-democracies are Professor Guillermo O'Donnell's (1973, 89-95; 1978, 6-9) bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, and Levitsky and Way's (2002, 52-4; 2020, 55-60) competitive authoritarian regimes [cf. also Linz 2000, 34-7, for a review of other subtypes of the same].

²⁴ For this cause also, Thomas Carothers (2002, 6-9) noted in his essay that some donor nations have been unwilling to withdraw financial support from nations with transitional or unconsolidated democracies because of the former's belief in the context-specific nature of democracy, and the varied difficulties associated with its installation and governance.

²⁵ This is because both are elected separately with fixed mandates, and so are both, in principle, [and barring other procedural horizontal checks] accountable to the people; although in extraordinary circumstances, the legislature could initiate impeachment proceedings against the chief executive.

²⁶ This has been popularly termed, but particularly in the United States, as divided government: to wit, the situation where a party, other than that of the chief executive, controls the legislature, so that both branches of government are in effect controlled by different parties (cf. Mainwaring 1990, 167-70). In this respect, the one party may work, sometimes on purpose, to undermine, and even oppose, the policies and proposals of the other [cf. also Laver and Shepsle (1996, 269) who noted that divided government does not only obtain in presidential regimes, but occurs also in parliamentary systems, for instance, in the event where the prime minister does not

control a majority in the legislature]. Howbeit, in the event where the party of the president is also that which commands majority support in the legislature, this creates a winner-take-all effect which is likewise uncondusive to democratic politics (cf. Linz 1994, 18).

²⁷ The cabinet is the executive branch of government, and is composed of the prime minister and his chief ministers. Usually, the political party that wins a majority of seats in the popular election earns the right to form a government, and the leader of that party is often ceremoniously appointed prime minister. Howbeit, in the case where no single party is able to garner a majority of seats in parliament, then the party with the largest number of seats could choose to form a minority government, or could enter into a coalition with other parties to form a majority government.

²⁸ Albeit Mr. Bagehot (*loc. cit.*, 205-6) was quick to add that the mere fact that the executive was formed from the majority party in parliament did not imply that the cabinet and parliament always agreed on every policy matter, which thing would have made parliamentary government “the worst of governments” as the party in power would go all the lengths their orators proposed, and do that their formulae enjoined.” But this is usually not the case because, like he explains concerning the British model, “the partisans of the English Parliament are not of such a temper. They are Whigs, or Radicals, or Tories, but they are much else too. They are common Englishmen [...] that are not eager to press the tenets of their party to impossible conclusions.”

²⁹ This mutual dependency – to wit, the executive's right to dissolve parliament, and the legislature's right to pass a vote of no confidence - did not, as Stepan and Skach (*loc. cit.*, 18) note, assure that any particular government will be stable, and/or efficient in formulating policies, but only served to provide the constitutional means necessary for ensuring fluidity in government.

³⁰ This is owed in part to the rigidity of presidential term limits, and in part to the disjointedness that often persists between the legislative and executive organs in said political regimes. And because a measure of flexibility, stability, and compromise is required by a regime in its early years to undertake the tasks of economic and social restructuring, a parliamentary system, which allows for parliament and the cabinet to work in close unison, may seem the better option for new democracies (cf. Stepan and

Skach, *loc. cit.*, 4). Thus, Professor Myron Weiner (1987, 19) observed that most of the postwar ‘new nations’ that became enduring democracies were also former British colonies, attesting to the fact that “tutelary democracy under British rule [where parliamentarism was practiced] was a significant determinant of democracy in the Third World.”

³¹ This may be owed to the fact that the party in opposition would be careful to scrutinize the activities of the ruling government, as well as be forthright in matters of public policy. But besides this fact, Professor Seymour Lipset (1990, 204-5) noted in his *Continental Divide* that presidential regimes, with their dominant two-party system, are able to better absorb societal protests [and withal, forestall the rise of factions] in that various groups are made to “identify with one or another of the two major electoral alliances on whatever basis of division is most salient to them;” whereas in parliamentary systems, the emphasis on party discipline [or as Mildred Schwartz (1981, 84) notes, the fact that individual legislators are wont to vote along party lines, and are unable to adopt single issues of the public as their own, or to bring them to the forefront] “encourages the transformation of political protest, of social movements, of discontent with the dominant party in one's region or other aspects of life, into third, fourth, or fifth parties.”

³² Howbeit, as Professor Juan Linz (1990b, 89-90) has stated, such division comes at the expense of inefficiency in governance, for the party controlling the legislature would be unwilling to work with the president and his party, as doing so would enhance the popularity of the latter in the next election.

³³ This may be owed to the fact that the different parties represented in parliament may not always share the views of the prime minister on policy matters, and as such, may choose to withhold legislative support from him. But this notwithstanding, and even in such instances where no party commands a clear majority, parliamentary systems, as Professor Lipset (1990b, 80) has observed, “gives different constituencies more access to the decision-making process [...], and helps bind them to the polity.”

³⁴ Cf. a detailed explication of this regime type in Sartori 1994, 131-5, esp. 132.

³⁵ That is, in the case of a unicameral legislature. In such instances, as Steffan Ganghof (*loc. cit.*, 274) notes, a system of differentiation could be employed to establish two distinct set of units in the legislature. One way of doing so could be by placing a legal threshold on legislative seats, so that all parties which commanded a certain number of seats and over would comprise one unit, whilst those which commanded below that number would comprise another. In this respect, the unit which controls the prime minister and his cabinet would be that which commands the greater number of legislative seats. Howbeit, in the case of a bicameral legislature, the two distinct units would then be the lower and upper houses. And because the lower house is usually the more representative of the two, in most cases it is that also which exercises oversight responsibility over the prime minister and his cabinet.

³⁶ Other variants of semi-parliamentarism have a popularly elected president with a fixed mandate, together with the afore discussed configuration [that is, a prime minister chosen by and from amongst one distinct unit of the legislature, and dependent on its confidence vote; and a second unit of the legislature which exercises no control over the prime minister and his cabinet, and which also cannot be dissolved by it (cf. Ganghof, *loc. cit.*, 264). Howbeit in such models, the powers of the president are less extensive relative to that of parliament (cf. Troxel 2003, 33).

³⁷ For instance, semi-presidentialism ensures that executive power is divided between a president accountable to the people, and a prime minister accountable to parliament. Now, because of the rigidity of term limits, this configuration ensures that all executive power is not vested in a president who might choose to do as he please because of the security of his fixed mandate. Also, by virtue of the fact that the prime minister could be voted-out by parliament at any time, some portion of executive power is effectively controlled in this respect. Additionally, the fact that the prime minister could dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections helps to reduce the possibility of extended gridlock between the executive and legislative organs (cf. Duverger 1974, 122; 1996, 500-1; Lijphart 1992, 8; Skach 2005, 1-3; 2007, 96-8). In like manner, the separation of the legislature into two distinct units in semi-parliamentary systems helps to ensure that at all times there is a part of the legislature that cannot be dissolved by the prime minister, thus enhancing governmental stability. The same virtue is vouchsafed in those variants that allow for a popularly elected president to share executive power

with the prime minister: in the event where the latter is voted-out of office, the former could act temporarily in his stead.

³⁸ Otherwise, these are political systems wherein all or most of the governing power resides in a single centralized government. They are normally operated by nations with fairly homogenous societies, and usually employ the majority principle in decision making (of which, cf. Ranney and Kendall 1956, 38). For a detailed discussion of the distinguishing features of this system, cf. Lijphart 1985, 6-8.

³⁹ Professor Arend Lijphart (1979, 502) notes that besides the central-regional division of power, federations were further distinguished in five respects, namely: “a written constitution, bicameralism, equal or disproportionately strong representation of the smaller component units in the federal chamber, decentralized government, and the right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal constitution but to change their own constitutions unilaterally” [cf. also Elazar 1968, 356; Friedrich (1974), 21, 55; Corwin 1950, 3; Duchacek 1970, 230-1, Rosem 1994, 5-6, for related espousals in this respect]. Cf. also Professor Aaron Wildavsky (1966; 127) who makes a distinction between “social federalism” and “structural federalism:” the former, he says, is when the federal system was crafted to hold together territorially concentrated social units to a center [and remains therefore the reason for the system’s existence]; and the latter, when the federal system was adopted only because it provided a structural framework for the governance of a large territory. In this wise therefore, the former was wont to be found in heterogenous societies, like the United States; and the latter, in homogenous ones, like Australia.

⁴⁰ In addition to the defining features of power sharing and segmented autonomy, consociational systems, according to Professor Lijphart (*ibid.*, 500-1) tend to be further distinguished by the principle of minority veto and proportional representation. The former, he says, ensured that none of the constituent units “could be outvoted by a majority when its vital interests were at stake,” and the latter was necessary to guarantee a “parity of representation” particularly in cases where the units were unequally sized.

⁴¹ In this wise also, federations can be consociations, and consociations, federations. For instance, both guarantee a level of segmental autonomy, a participation of the

constituent units in national-level politics, and a rejection of the majoritarian principle (cf. Lijphart, *ibid.*, 506-7; 1985, 8-9; Vile 1977, 4).

⁴² In other words, the different political units in federal systems are usually territorially concentrated, and the regional boundaries are constructed along such lines (cf. Livingston 1967, 37) [Professor Carl Friedrich (1968, 124; cf. also a case example of such in Uustalu 1952, 220) has called the contrary case, that is, where the units are not territorially concentrated, as corporate federalism; but cf. Professor Elazar (1968, 357), who notes that “no authentic federal system has existed without an areal basis for the federal division”]. Thus, the regions and the center are 'held together' in this fashion. Conversely, the segments in consociational systems are in all cases geographically interspersed, so that the elites of these units must needs 'come together,' voluntarily, or be brought together via constitutional means to establish a stable polity (cf. Lijphart 2004, 104-5). For this cause, consociational systems have also been referred to as “government by elite cartel” (cf. Lijphart 1969, 216; Dahrendorf 1967, 276).

⁴³ Howbeit many have viewed consociational systems as undemocratic, particularly because, in some cases, closed party lists, rather than competitive elections, are used to select representatives (cf. Lijphart 2002, 40-7, for a critical excursus on the subject matter). Cf. also Professor Donald Horowitz (2002, 25) who referred to the coalition governments of consociational systems as a crude “one-size-fits-all” model. Cf. also Professor David Truman (1951, 525) who noted that consociational systems operate under the “absurd assumption” that by making the legislature “truly representative” of active political groups, that all differences in the body politic would be easily and peacefully resolved.

⁴⁴ Consociational arrangements were particularly necessary in plural societies because as Professor Donald Horowitz (1993, 18; but also 1971, 238) cogently observed, there existed in such societies “the tendency to conflate inclusion in the government with inclusion in the community, and exclusion from the government with exclusion from the community” (cf. also the studies by Cedermann et al. 2010, 113-4; Paller 2015, 49; Morrison and Stevenson 1972, 924-6, for related statements on the same).

⁴⁵ Professor Ronald Watts (*loc. cit.*, 95) defined such symmetry as a kind of equilibrium “wherein the pressures for unity and diversity are closely balanced.” In other words, a symmetrical federal system was one wherein “the social forces making for diversity among the differentiated communities are in approximate balance with the forces making for unity” (cf. Stein 1968, 727). Thus, A. V. Dicey (1959, 141) popularly noted that a precondition for the creation of a federation was for the members of the federal society to “desire a union, and not unity.” For as Professor Elazar (1998, 3; cf. also Davis 1978, 5) explicates, the federal pact was but a ‘contractual’ agreement by which political units are brought together to pursue common interests more efficiently, whilst retaining competencies in matters relating to their regions. Thus, consociational systems were in this sense asymmetrical because in almost all cases, the forces making for diversity therein far outweighed those making for unity; which is also why the leadership of such systems are organized into grand coalitions, attesting to their desire for unity, rather than for just a union. Howbeit, Professor Charles Tarlton (1965) has offered a slightly different definition of symmetrical and asymmetrical federations. According to him (*loc. cit.*, 868-9) the former are those composed of political units with “equal territory and population, and that have similar economic features, climate conditions, cultural patterns, social groupings, and political institutions,” so that the component units are a “miniature reflection of the important aspects of the whole federal system.” The latter [that is, consociational systems] on the other hand are those composed of “political units that are starkly different in interest, character, and makeup,” so that the component units do not sufficiently represent the norms and values existent within the whole society. Therefore, symmetrical federal systems boast of an even distribution of power and representation amongst the various units, whereas in consociational systems, the various political units may possess varying degrees of autonomy and power, besides their uneven representation in the coalition government [cf. also Professor Lawrence Mayer (1970, 795-6) who in a similar explication of symmetrical and asymmetrical systems characterized the former as *formalistic*, and the latter, as *congruent*].

⁴⁶ According to Professor Elazar (1985, 29-31), a political *form* represents “a permanent arrangement which permeates and shapes every aspect of the polity, and is constitutionally anchored; whilst a *regime* type is a relatively transient arrangement

which may change shape from time to time based on prevailing social conditions. In this wise, consociational systems are *regime* types because they are created to meet specific objects, and can only be sustained when particular social conditions are prevalent [for instance, consociational systems are only created in plural societies, so that the less plural a society becomes, the less useful also becomes the consociational arrangement]. Federations however, as political *forms*, are structurally flexible, and could be designed to serve a variety of objects, as well as to endure perennial changes in the social structure.

⁴⁷ There exist mid-range conceptions between the two, such as semi-proportional-, and mixed systems (of which, cf. Norris 1997, 302-4; Lijphart 1994, 10).

⁴⁸ Professor Stein Rokkan (1970) has offered a compelling thesis on the emergence of proportional electoral systems. According to him (*loc. cit.*, 157), whereas PR systems were initially developed in ethnically heterogeneous societies, yet the dynamics of the democratization process further facilitated their implementation, also in homogenous societies. To wit, "through a convergence of pressures from below and above. *For* the rising working class wanted to gain access to the legislature [and so tended to be in favor of PR arrangements], whilst the most threatened of the old-established parties demanded PR to protect their position against the new waves of mobilized voters created by universal suffrage." A similar argument also was advanced by Professor Arend Lijphart (1992, 208-9) who noted that "the extension of universal suffrage forced both the ruling elites and their challengers to introduce PR in order "to protect their *respective* interests:" the former, to minimize their *predictable* losses; and the latter, to guarantee that they would gain at least a substantial share of representation and political power."

⁴⁹ Electoral decisiveness implies that voters are able to rightly predict, based on the outcome of an election, the policies to be adopted by a future government. In majoritarian systems, this is well guaranteed because there are usually two dominant parties, with two very different policy proposals, so that voters are certain of what to expect once a party that gets elected. In proportional systems however, this is not well guaranteed, particularly in those systems where coalitions are formed after the elections, as this leaves voters uncertain about the types of policies to be adopted by

the new government. But besides electoral decisiveness, and closely related to it, majoritarian systems also enhance clarity of government responsibility. This implies that voters are able to clearly identify the agent responsible for policy decisions. As Professor Powell (1989, 120) rightly remarked, the system, to the extent that it only permits the election of a single majoritarian government, “makes it possible for citizens to see who is in charge, and to act *accordingly* on that knowledge.” Quite palpably, in proportional systems, citizens are unable to clearly ascertain which of the parties in the coalition government is to be blamed or praised for policy decisions (cf. esp. Huber and Powell 1994, 323-4).

⁵⁰ According to Professor Powell (2006, 314), proportional systems enhance effective representation: in that they provide for more inclusive committee systems, as well as offer opposition parties the opportunity to exercise greater reconnaissance over the activities of government. Furthermore, the multi-party nature of proportional systems ensures that voters are able to identify with a party that closely relates to their policy preferences (cf. Cox 1990, 927; Indridason 2011, 969; Dow 2011, 357) [The two-party nature of majoritarian systems does not quite guarantee this for most voters]. Thus Professor Samuel Finer (1975, 30-1) observed that the poor economic performance of post-World War II Britain was rooted in the majoritarian nature of the electoral system, which though creating strong leadership in economic policy, yet produced alternations in government that were “absolute, abrupt, and *antagonistic*.” He argued further that a proportional system would have provided for “greater stability and continuity,” as well as “greater moderation in policy making.”

⁵¹ In this way, many have viewed proportional representation as being perfect in theory but calamitous in practice (cf. Grabowsky 1934, 147; Rustow 1950, 111).

⁵² The arguments made towards proportional systems being ‘just’ and ‘fair’ have largely centered on the fact that it is the only electoral mechanism that provides exact representation for all, and thereby ensures the representation of minority groups in policy decisions (cf. Hallett 1940, 3-18). Howbeit, others have argued that such view of proportional systems are only held by parties who either harbour an existential “fear of majority rule,” or have “no hope of *ever* gaining a majority” in the legislature (cf. Horwill 1925, 9-13) [this view was also articulated by Professor Carles Boix (2010,

406) who noted that nondominant parties were more likely to favor proportional systems than dominant ones].

⁵³ Professor Dankwart Rustow (1950, 112) commented on the relation between the composition of the legislative assembly and cabinet stability as follows: “the primary function of a legislative assembly in a modern democracy is not to hold up a mirror to the electorate, but rather to determine the country's policy. Under a cabinet system of government, for example, the legislature ‘passes’ most new legislation, and at the same time closely controls and supervises the cabinet's legislative, executive, and administrative activities. It thus controls, directly or indirectly, all governmental power exercised in the state. And it follows from all this that any voter who can, at more or less frequent intervals, affect the composition of the legislature, controls an aliquot share of governmental power in his society. The problem of devising a system of representation for use in connection with a cabinet form of government is, on this showing, the problem of dividing up governmental power among the society's members” [cf. also Hermens 1941, 4-9, for further excurses along these lines].

⁵⁴ Professor Finer (*loc. cit.*, 915) commented as follows: “If there were no consequences to count, then we should say that representation means mathematically exact representation; the single-member constituency stands in the way; it should be abolished. But omelettes cannot be had without the sacrifice of eggs: is the omelette worth it? That is the question. It is urged by many students that the procedure involved in producing mathematically exact representation involves the loss of other desirable qualities in the system of government, and that this must be taken into count in a judgment of the system.”

⁵⁵ Professor Rustow (1950, 114) defined such consensus as “the extent to which the individuals in a society are willing to subordinate all other aims to the maintenance of their society as a single body politic;” and stated further that this did not mean that “the members of the society shared the same opinions, beliefs, or valuations, except in so far as the sharing of these things affected their willingness to preserve the body politic.” He explicated therefore that in countries where the degree of consensus was low, cabinet stability could only be assured by a two-party system “in which one or the other of the parties would necessarily have a majority of legislative votes at its

command.” Howbeit in countries where the degree of consensus was high, cabinet stability could be realized even under a multi-party system “because the parties’ devotion to the common interest could be counted upon to prevent their forming negative majority alignments.” Cf. thus Professor John Rawls (1993, 36-9) who advanced the view that a liberal-democratic society must be characterized by “reasonable pluralism,” to wit, that there must be a set of “universal points of view” which command the loyalties of all. Cf. also Professor Barry Weingast (1997, 246, 256-9) who found said “(elite) consensus on values and interests” to be the prime cause of democratic stability “in the divided societies of the West.”

⁵⁶ Democracy has generally been perceived to require some threshold conditions, known as prerequisites, – without which it cannot be fully established in a country. But once these threshold conditions have been attained and mastered, the degree to which a country will maximize certain forms of democratic practice would now remain a function of a new set of conditions to be developed, known as requisites. In other words, prerequisites are those factors which make possible the prior establishment of democracy in a country, whilst requisites are those factors which sustain and develop a democratic polity after that it has been established. Throughout the discussion in this section however, emphasis is not placed on whether a said condition of democracy is a prerequisite or a requisite.

⁵⁷ A more subtle contribution of urbanization to democratization has been advanced by Professor James Coleman (1954, 411) who noted that the concentration of relatively large numbers of people in urban centers to meet labor demands generally “loosens kinship ties, accelerates social communication between detribalized ethnic groups, and [...] contributes towards national integration” [cf. also his chapter in the anthology *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960, 532-6, qt. at 532) where he noted that a common characteristic of the ‘developing’ areas, of which many were nondemocracies, was the fact that they were not “modern political societies,” to wit, were not characterized by “a comparatively high degree of urbanization, widespread literacy, [...] extensive geographical and social mobility, [...] an extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media, and in general, by widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes” [a similar remark also was made by Professor Harvey Leibenstein (1957, 39-41) who

noted that such societies were characterized by a complex of associated cultural and political characteristics, such as illiteracy, the lack of a middle class, and crude communication systems].

⁵⁸ On how education, or more generally, literacy, promotes democracy, cf. Professor John Dewey (1916, 108-10) who noted that education, as a civic function, promotes “the absorption of the aims and meaning of organized political institutions,” and thereby produces citizens who are “subordinated to the superior interests of the national state.” Elsewhere also (1944, 789), he remarked that “human attitudes and efforts are the strategic center for promotion of the generous aims of peace among nations; promotion of economic security; the use of political means in order to advance freedom and equality; and the worldwide cause of democratic institutions. Anyone who starts from this premise is bound to see that it carries with it the basic importance of education in creating the habits and the outlook that are able and eager to secure the ends of peace, democracy, and economic stability.” Cf. also James Bryce (1912, 546) who noted that “education, if it does not make men good citizens, makes it at least easier for them to become so.” Cf. also Professor Russell Fitzgibbon (1950, 128) who remarked that “the education of a people, even if it involves nothing more than the spread of literacy, operates powerfully to integrate them ‘into the national life.’ Social reforms, a prerequisite of democracy, are made more intelligible and desirable to a literate than to an illiterate people. Then, too, mass living standards are gradually being raised with the resulting incorporation of more persons in the national life. A ‘middle class,’ which we long have considered a cornerstone of democracy, is thus born” (cf. also Smith 1948, 77, Easterlin 1981, 14-5, for related statements in this respect). As pertaining to media growth, cf. Professor David Apter (1965, 456) who noted that it allowed for information sources and communication systems to be widely accessible; to be of various kinds; and to be not subject to control by the same interests.

⁵⁹ A third, more distant, corollary of industrialization is the growth of autonomous social groups which help to facilitate democratic politics. Professor Roland Pennock (1979, 228; cf. also Lipset 1959, 84) explicated this as follows: “an industrial society, as contrasted from a primarily agrarian one, is more mobile, more flexible in its beliefs and attitudes, and more complex and varied in its associational and organizational patterns and structures [...] The varied competences, statuses, interests [...], and life

experiences of the members of an industrial society lead inevitably to a plurality of interest groups, both organized and unorganized, that is bound to weaken any monolithic power structure. By the same token, it will give rise to demands for broad-based participation in the political system, as many interests would seek to make their presence felt, and to bargain with one another for mutually satisfactory public policies.” Thus Professor Edward Banfield (1958, 15-9, qt. at 12) in a seminal study of a region in southern Italy noted that underdevelopment in the area furthered “a lack of public spiritedness, and enlightened self-interest.”

⁶⁰ For instance, Émile Durkheim remarked (*loc. cit.*, 402-3) that capitalism “produces solidarity [...] and creates among men a comprehensive system of rights and duties which tie them one to another in a durable fashion.” Cf. also Bertrand A. Russell (1953, 68-9) who remarked adjointedly as follows: “Read Plato’s Republic and More’s Utopia – both socialist works – and imagine yourself living in the community portrayed by either. You will see that boredom would drive you to suicide or rebellion [...] The impulse to danger and adventure is deeply ingrained in human nature, and no society which ignores it can long be stable.” Cf. also Simmel ([1955], 61-3, 260-1), for added remarks along these lines.

⁶¹ Qtd in Hirschman 1982, 1465.

⁶² For instance, Professor F. A. Hayek (1978, 132) noted that “freedom under the law [i.e., democracy] implied economic freedom [i.e. capitalism]; whereas economic control [i.e. socialism], *implied* a restriction on all freedoms possible.” Also, Professor Charles Lindblom (*loc. cit.*, 162) remarked that “democracy and capitalism are historically tied together because in the forms in which they have arisen, [...] both are manifestations of constitutional liberalism.” Cf. also Francis Fukuyama (1992, 108) who remarked that “capitalism is a more efficient engine of economic growth than socialism, and thus is more likely to generate the rapid socioeconomic change that favors the emergence of stable democracy.” Cf. also Professor Samuel Huntington (1984, 205) who remarked that “a market economy appears more likely to sustain economic growth than a command economy [...], and hence is more likely to give rise to the economic wealth and the resulting equitable distribution of income that provide the infrastructure of democracy.” Cf. also Professor Franklin Jameson (1926, 41) who noted that “political

democracy came to the United States as a result of economic democracy [...] The nation came to be marked by political institutions of a democratic type because it had, still earlier, come to be characterized in its economic life by democratic arrangements and practices.”

⁶³ Professor Schumpeter (*loc. cit.*, 143) noted that “capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitudes does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values.” Also, Professor Hirsch (*loc. cit.*, 117-8) remarked in this wise as follows: “the social morality that has served as an understructure for economic individualism has been a legacy of the precapitalist and preindustrial past. This legacy has diminished with time and with the corrosive contact of the active capitalist values -- and more generally with the greater anonymity and greater mobility of industrial society. The system has thereby lost outside support that was previously taken for granted by the individual. As individual behavior has been increasingly directed to individual advantage, habits and instincts based on communal attitudes and objectives have lost out. The weakening of traditional social values has made predominantly capitalist economies more difficult to manage.” Cf. also John Taylor (1814, 274-5) who remarked connectedly that “wealth, like suffrage, must be considerably distributed to sustain a democratic republic; and hence, whatever draws a considerable proportion of either into a few hands will destroy it.” Cf. also Weber [1930], 72, 76; Wesley 1989, 529-30; Horkheimer 1947, 34-6; Parson [1951], 98, 125-7; Lipset 1993, 53-4, for added remarks in this respect. Essentially, this thought appeared to have formed the thrust of the argument of the communists in their demand for a “dictatorship of the proletariat:” for they perceived liberal democracy anchored on capitalism to be severely detrimental to the poor. Thus, Vladimir I. Lenin (1935, 91) famously noted that the purpose of socialist democracy was to go beyond the bourgeoisie ideal of “giving to each according to his ability,” to “giving to each according to his needs.” (cf. also Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chap. II, pp. 40-1; Weffort 1992, 94-6, for added remarks in this respect).

⁶⁴ Cf. also Barro 1999, 166; Huber et al. 1993, 83-4, Potter 1954, 112; for related statements in this respect.

⁶⁵ A similar statement also was made by Professor Roland Pennock (1979, 235) who remarked that “higher incomes [...] relieve the strain caused by the relative losses inevitably incurred by many in any dynamic society.” Cf. also Professor John Rawls (*Theory of Justice*, Chap. IX, Sec. 82, p. 542) who noted that “as the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance for our good of further economic and social advantage diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, which become stronger as the conditions for the exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized.”

⁶⁶ An endogenous effect is when economic development increases the likelihood that a nation would undergo a transition to democracy, whereas an exogenous effect is when economic development makes a democracy, once established, less likely to erode, breakdown, or fall to dictatorship (cf. Boix and Stokes 2003, 517). Cf. albeit Gerring et al. (2005, 355-7) who remarked that the prospective effect was more dependent on the institutional path of the country in question, as well as its secular-historical experience with democracy and authoritarianism. Cf. also Professor Martin Needler (1968, 895) who remarked that “a country developing economically develops politically, but this heightened level of political development can appear either as a greater fidelity to constitutional norms or as a higher degree of participation in political processes: whether one or the other direction is taken depends in large part [...] on the degree of egalitarianism in the social structure.” Cf. also Professor Ronald Inglehart (1990, 45) who noted that it was only by means of an ‘enabling political culture’ that economic development could have a meaningful impact on democracy. Cf. also Heo and Tan (2001, 469) who noted in their causal analysis that “economic growth influences democracy just as much as democracy influences economic growth,” – although this viewpoint is disputed by Professor Giovanni Sartori (1995, 107) who reckons instead that “it is growth that entails democracy, and not democracy that generates growth” – thereby assenting to an endogenous effect.

⁶⁷ Cf. also the pioneering work of Boix and Stokes (2003, 518-9) for added statements in this respect. Notwithstanding, this study concluded (*ibid.*, 545) that the effect of

economic growth on democracy was, to a relative extent, both endogenous and exogenous; to wit, that economic growth both engenders and sustains democracy.

⁶⁸ Cf. other related statements in Przeworski et al. 1996, 40-1; Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 176-7. Cf. also Professor Lucian Pye (1985, 232-6) who remarked on how rapid socioeconomic development was responsible for political liberalization in Taiwan.

⁶⁹ For instance, Professor Olson (*loc. cit.*, 551-2) commented in this wise as follows: “Rapid economic growth, whatever the nature of the economic system, must involve fast and deep changes in the ways that things are done, in the places that things are done, and in the distribution of power and prestige. Most people spend such a large proportion of their time working for a living and draw such a large part of their social status and political influence from their economic position that changes in the economic order must have great effects on other facets of life. This is especially true in underdeveloped societies, where the institutions that exist were developed in relatively static conditions and are not suited to making rapid adjustments. Therefore [...] rapid economic growth, far from being the source of domestic tranquility it is sometimes supposed to be, is rather a disruptive and destabilizing force that leads to political instability.” Also Professor Samuel Huntington (1968, 41) noted that “if poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich [...] for the more man wages war against ‘his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance,’ the more he wages war against himself.”

⁷⁰ Cf. for instance Persson and Tabellini (1994, 617) who noted that “income inequality is harmful for growth because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights, and that do not allow for full private appropriation of returns from investment.” Albeit, other variants of this thesis have also been noted. For example, Professor Robert Jackman (1974, 41) observed that “while industrialization results in greater social equality in the earlier phases of economic development, a threshold is reached in later phases of this process where the effects of industrialization on social equality become progressively weaker.” Conversely, Professor Simon Kuznets (1955, 6-8) observed that whereas economic growth may initially lead to some form of social inequality, nevertheless after a period of time, and provided continued economic growth is maintained, this income gap diminishes, and gives rise to sustained equality. Cf. also

Professor Christian Houle (2009, 615-6) who observed in his empirical study that inequality had an adverse effect on democratic consolidation but had no net impact on democratic transition.

⁷¹ For corroborating statements on the rule of law and its relation to individual liberty, cf. McIlwain 1934, 27.

⁷² Henry J. Bolingbroke (*A Dissertation Upon Parties*, Letter X, p. 111) referred to such as “government by constitution,” as opposed to “government by will.” Cf. also Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Part IV, Chap. XLVI, p. 448) who remarked that “in a well-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the law.” Cf. also Acton, *History of Freedom*, Chap. I, pp. 7-8; Aristotle, *Politics*, Book IV, Sec. 1292, pp. 156-8, for related statements in this respect.

⁷³ Cf. albeit the distinction made by Professor Giovanni Sartori (1962, 861) between a *garantiste*-, a *nominal*-, and a *façade* constitution. And connectedly also, Professor Francis Drah (*loc. cit.*, 98) remarked that the mere fact that “a government rules in accordance with a documentary constitution” does not imply that constitutionalism operates in said nation, for “although government may be conducted according to the terms of the constitution of a country, this constitution may do no more than lay down the institutions of government and leave them (or some of them) to act as they like – to wit, give them unlimited discretion.”

⁷⁴ That is, as per Sir Ivor Jennings ([1958], 33, 36), who defined a constitution as “a *written* document wherein are set out the rules governing the composition, powers, and methods of operation of the main institutions of government,” or, where it is unwritten, simply, “the rules determining the creation and operation of governmental institutions.” Cf. also Professor Kenneth Wheare (1966, 1) who defined the same as “the whole system of government of a country: the collection of rules, both *enforceable* legal rules and *effective* non-legal rules, which establish and regulate the government.” Cf. also Professor Francis Drah (*ibid.*, 99) who defined the same as “a set of rules, procedures, and institutional arrangements which effectively limit the exercise of governmental power and authority in order to safeguard such fundamental values as political stability, individual- and group liberty, and justice.”

⁷⁵ Cf. Immanuel Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Doctrine of Elements, Part II: Book I, Sec. 1, p. 312), who asserted that such constitution must “guarantee the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others.” Also in his *Perpetual Peace* (Sec. II, pp. 120-1) he noted that a constitution must be founded: “foremost, in accordance with the principle of the freedom of the members of society as human beings; secondly, in accordance with the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common legislation; and thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality of the members as citizens.”

⁷⁶ Cf. other corroborating statements to this effect in Schmitter 2004, 52; O’Donnell 2001, 24-5.

⁷⁷ Cf. other related statements in this respect by Radbruch 1913, 108; Forsthoff 1950, 394; Schumpeter 1942, 293-4. Howbeit, Professor Franz Neumann (1953, 910) who appears to associate this conception of the *Rechtsstaat* with the German state, and the other, with the English, noted in his essay that for this cause, “the English Rule of Law and the German *Rechtsstaat* doctrines have nothing in common.” Albeit this should be taken as having been unduly overstated.

⁷⁸ Qtd. in Hayek 1960, 483.

⁷⁹ Professor Lipset (1959, 86) remarked that by effectiveness is meant “the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system.” And by legitimacy is meant “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.”

⁸⁰ Professor Sartori (*ibid.*, 855) applied this qualifier to denote a constitution *par excellence*, to wit, one that effectively guarantees the principles and provisions contained therein. It is necessary also that such constitution is, as Immanuel Kant notes in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Doctrine of Elements, Part II: Book I, Sec. 1, p.

312), one that “allows the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others.”

⁸¹ Cf. also Professor Pendleton Herring (1940, 27) who remarked connectedly that “good government, if it means anything, must mean government that is good for someone in terms of recognized satisfactions enjoyed through workable institutions.”

⁸² But broadly defined, it represents, as Professor Sidney Verba (1965, 513) note, “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place;” or, as Larry J. Diamond (1999, 163) puts it, “the predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations of a people about the political system of their country.” The same view also was shared by Professor Lucian Pye (1965, 8, *emphasis in original*) who defined political culture as “those widely shared beliefs and sentiments that form ‘the particular patterns of orientation’ which give order and form to the political process.”

⁸³ Professor Pye (*loc. cit.*, 20) noted that this was the case because such elements are rooted in national histories and in the personalities of individuals: the former is thus passed on through learning in schools; and the former, through socialization by the family [cf. Jennings and Niemi (1968, 169-70); Hyman (1959, 69), for added remarks in this respect]. Also, Professor Eckstein (*loc. cit.*, 793) remarked that “the expectation of continuity in political cultures follows [...] from the assumption of orientational cumulativeness, namely, that earlier learning conditions later learning and that actors tend to seek orientational consonance.” Albeit cf. Professor Gabriel Almond (1990, 144-7) who noted that the cognitive, attitudinal, and evaluational dimensions of political culture are relatively plastic, and do change in response to regime performance, historical experience, and political socialization. Cf. also Professor Ronald Inglehart (1990, 17) who noted that such cultural orientations, once established, develop “a momentum of their own,” and so are wont to be “autonomous in their influence on politics and economics.”

⁸⁴ On the essence of conflict for the smooth functioning of a democratic polity, cf. Professor Dankwart Rustow (1967, 234) who remarked as follows: “[...] only by means of dissension can democracy become a learning and a problem-solving process, a way of finding proximate solutions to insoluble questions. Only through continual

expression by sharply rivaling groups can political participation be maximized, and political equality thus approximated.”

⁸⁵ Cf. for instance Professor Giovanni Sartori (1997, 63) who noted that consensus did not consist of “the one mind postulated by the monochromatic vision of the world, but *rather* involved the endless process of adjusting many dissenting minds and interests into changing ‘coalitions’ of mutual persuasion and reciprocal concessions.” Cf. also Professor Lucian Pye (1990, 15) who noted that consensus implied “an acceptance of the idea that no one had a monopoly on absolute truth and that there could be no single, correct answer to public policy issues.” Cf. thus Professor John Hallowell (1944, 164) who noted that “the breakdown of democracy comes when [...] common agreement on fundamentals no longer exists, so that parties no longer endeavor to work through the state, but become the state.”

⁸⁶ Broadly defined however, the civic culture, and in effect, the civic virtue, relate to attitudes and practices that promote the public good and the effective functioning of the civil and political order (cf. Walzer 1980, 64; Skinner 1984, 218).

⁸⁷ These civic virtues were extensively discussed by Professor Harold Lasswell (1948, 148-73) in his seminal monograph, *Power and Personality*, particularly in the seventh chapter, which he titled, “The Formation of Democratic Personality.” Another useful discussion of the same is found in Professor Henry Mayo’s *Introduction to Democratic Theory*, in the tenth chapter (cf. 1960, 260-78). They include, *amid others*: an inquiring, rational attitude; confidence in the political system and its policies; sympathy to the claims of others; a willingness to compromise; a desire to partake in civic engagements; and openness to new ideas and experiences [cf. a discussion of the same also in Inkeles 1961, 195-8; Diamond 1999, 165-74; Macedo 1990, 125].

⁸⁸ Cf. also Professor Sidney Hook (1940, 290) who noted that “a positive requirement of a working democracy was an intelligent distrust by citizens of their political leaders: a skepticism, stubborn but not blind, of all demands for the enlargement of power.”

⁸⁹ Cf. Professor Charles Taylor (2004, 83) who defined such public sphere as “a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of

common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these.” Cf. also Professor Michael Evans (2012, 874) who noted that such deliberative sphere was important because it acted as a site of political decision making, and thereby, enhanced the legitimacy and rationality of policy decisions. Cf. other related statements on the subject matter in Benhabib 1996, 69; Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 5; Habermas 1996, 307; 2001, 772.

⁹⁰ Professor Michelman (*loc. cit.*, 90) remarked that it was only by means of such public deliberation that anyone could hope to gain “a sufficient grasp of relevant historical conditions to produce for the country in question, in a legally workable form, an apt interpretation of whatever abstract practical norms can pass the justice tests of universalizability and democratic-discursive acceptability.” Cf. also Professor William Galston (1988, 1285) who noted that such public discourse involved “a willingness to listen seriously to a range of views, [...] and the willingness to set forth one's own views [...] as the basis of a politics of persuasion rather than *of* manipulation or coercion.” Cf. also Professor Peter Bachrach (1962, 452) who remarked that such “widespread debate and discourse within and between publics” enabled the formation of “broad-based popular consensus on the important issues of the day.”

⁹¹ Cf. other related statements in this respect by Berelson and Steiner 1964, 422; Riggs 1963, 139; Hook 1940, 287-8; Macpherson 1966, 58; but also Professor Robert Ward (1963, 570-1) who included “widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system” among his attributes of a modern *democratic* polity. Albeit on the subject matter of voting, some scholars have expressed the contrary view that high voter turnouts could be deleterious to democratic stability (cf. Riggs 1988, 263-4; Abraham 1955, 21; Tingsten 1937, 225) [cf. added explications on this point in Note 9, *supra*].

⁹² Professor Albert Hirschman (1970, 32) has referred to the same as “a blend of exit and voice, of alert and inert, of involvement and withdrawal, of influence and deference,” on the part of citizens, - the rationale being, as he notes, that “the citizen must be able to express his point of view so that the political elites know and can be responsive to what he wants, but then afterwards, must be able to give place to the

elites to make decisions on said concerns” (cf. also Lane 1959, 345, for related statements in this respect).

⁹³ Almond and Verba (*loc. cit.*, 17-26) discussed these as distinct cultural types that characterize particular civilizations. So for instance, they noted that a *parochial* political culture was characteristic of traditional societies that have yet to develop specialized political roles, so that in such civilizations, though there existed a centralized political authority, a majority of the people tended to bear little relation or deference to it. Also, they noted that the *subject* culture was characteristic of civilizations in which “citizens’ orientation toward specific input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approached zero.” In such civilizations, citizens tend to bear some general affiliation and orientation to the centralized political authority, but have yet to develop the capacity and consciousness needed to participate actively in public affairs – so that they only maintain a passive relationship to the governing authority. The third cultural type they discussed – the *participant* culture – is that which characterizes civilizations wherein “the members are explicitly oriented to the system as a whole – that is, to its political and administrative structures and processes; and have developed an activist role of the self in the polity.” Howbeit, Almond and Verba were sure to mention that some societies tended to maintain a coarse blend of these cultural types, so that it was possible for some nations to be characterized by a *parochial-subject* culture, others by a *subject-participant* culture; and others more, by a *parochial-participant* culture.

⁹⁴ Cf. other related statements to this effect in Lipset et al. 1956, 15; Gellner 1991, 500.

⁹⁵ Cf. Professor Giovanni Sartori (2005, 23-4) who ascribed this ‘interest aggregation’ function particularly to political parties. Cf. also Herbert G. Nicholas (1951, 64) who noted that such ‘political pluralism’ helped to guard against majority dominance in a democracy in that “each major party [...] was *forced* to presents itself as offering the policy interests of a cross section of the population.” Cf. also Stephens 1993, 414; Huntington 1984, 202-3, for related statements in this respect.

⁹⁶ This was further observed by Professor Giovanni Sartori (1997, 64) who remarked as follows: “the [...] understanding of pluralism can be encapsulated by a single

indicator: the presence of cross-cutting cleavages. This is the bottom line, for the absence of cross-cutting cleavages is enough to rule out the claim to be pluralistic of any society whose articulation hinges on distinctions of tribe, clan, race, caste, religion, or self-contained customary groups.”

⁹⁷ Cf. Professor Michelman (1998, 91) who noted that such conflictive pluralism produced a kind of “contentious but reasonable disagreement” that was necessary for democratic political communication. Cf. also Professor Elmer Schattschneider (1957, 935) who noted that “a democratic society is able to survive because it is able to manage conflict at the point of origin” [that is, by means of conflictive pluralism].

⁹⁸ Cf. for instance, Pierre E. Trudeau (1960, 245) who noted that “Catholics have been closely linked to the state, adhering to a church which has been hierarchical, and authoritarian in spiritual matters, and since the dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal may be very fine or even confused, they are often disinclined to seek solution in temporal affairs through the mere counting of heads.” Cf. other related statements to this effect: on Islam, in Vatikiotis 1988, 118; Wright 1992, 133; Lewis 1993, 96-8; Pipes 1983, 144-7; on Confucianism, in He 1992, 134; Eisenstadt 1968, 27; Huntington 1993, 15; Pye 1968, 16.

⁹⁹ But besides Judeo-Christian values, Protestantism furthers democracy by virtue of its emphasis on the transcendentality of God. In effect, the belief in a God that is all seeing, all knowing, and all existing, and who rewards and punishes righteously, is one which is deemed to induce people to observe right judgments towards their neighbors (cf. Hickman 2008, 194). Howbeit, others have expressed reservations in this respect. For instance, Professor John Dewey (1934, 46-7) noted in his *A Common Faith* that persons who hold a “belief in the supernatural as a necessary power for the apprehension of the ideal” are likely also to perceive “natural means” [such as reason], as “an impotent and corrupt” way of arriving at decisions or solving problems. As Professor Richard Rorty (1998, 27) put it, “your devotion to democracy is unlikely to be wholehearted if you believe, as monotheists typically do, that we can have knowledge of an ‘objective’ ranking of human needs that can overrule the result of democratic consensus.” Cf. also James A. Reichley (1986, 801) who noted that

“individuals [...] claiming to represent transcendent moral authority are often tempted to attach certainty to their opinions on complex issues in secular politics.”

¹⁰⁰ This point was further affirmed by Alexis de Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America* (Vol. I, Chap. XVII, p. 337) where he noted that “the peaceful dominion of religion” in the United States was owed in large part to “the separation of church and state.” In the second volume of the monograph (Book I, Chap. IX, p. 134), he set forth the relation between religion and democracy as follows: “Let it be supposed that, in order to attain happiness in this world, a man combats his instinct on all occasions and deliberately calculates every action of his life; that, instead of yielding blindly to the impetuosity of first desires, he has learned the art of resisting them, and that he has accustomed himself to sacrifice, without an effort, the pleasure of a moment to the lasting interest of his whole life. If such a man believes in the religion which he professes, it will cost him but little to submit to the restrictions it may impose.” Tocqueville’s argument seems to be that religious doctrine makes it easier for men to control their urges, excesses, proclivities, and indulgencies, which in turn makes it possible for all persons to enjoy the freedom due them in society, so that by this means democracy is strengthened in the state [cf. a restatement of the same in Graebner (1976, 269)].

¹⁰¹ Professor Huntington (*loc. cit.*, 70) remarked that Hindu civilizations come second only to the West in the extent to which religion and politics were separated. Also, Professor Eisenstadt (1965, 667-8) noted concerning India that “it is probably the only complex and highly differentiated historical civilization that has maintained its cultural integrity without being tied to any particular political framework.”

¹⁰² On this relation, cf. American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1950, xi, xiii) who noted that “modern democracy requires a religious basis,” and also that “a Christian view of human nature is more adequate for the development of a democratic society.” Cf. albeit A. D. Lindsay (1943, 255) who remarked that “however true it may be that modern democracy could not have come into being without the influence of Christian ideals, these ideals are clearly not enough in themselves to produce democracy.”

¹⁰³ On integrity, he (*loc. cit.*, 108) quoted the words of the Lord Jesus Christ in the Gospel of Matthew (*KJV Bible*, Chap. V, Vrs. 33-7) as saying: “Again, ye have heard

that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.” And on the virtue of conscientiousness, he (*loc. cit.*, 109-10) quoted a passage from the First Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Corinthians (*op. cit.*, Chap. XII, Vrs. 12-26) as saying: “For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath pleased him. And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary: And those members of the body, which we think to be less honourable, upon these we bestow more abundant honour; and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. For our comely parts have no need: but God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked: That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it.”

¹⁰⁴ Cf. a similar espousal by the Swiss theologian Emil Brunner (1945, 46) who noted that “[...] the Christian religion is the only one which emphasizes equally the equality and inequality of human beings and recognizes the independence of the individual as well as his subordination to a social whole as anchored in the will of God. Hence

Christianity alone can protect men from the demands both of one-sided individualism and one-sided collectivism.” Furthermore, Immanuel Kant, after an extensive discussion of the beatitudes of the Lord Jesus Christ [of which, cf. *Matthew*,] proceeded to note that “[...] we find in Christ's tenets a finished sketch and outline of a religion that can be brought home to the convictions and conceptions of every one; and that, by force of his own reason, the practicability whereof has been set forth by an example, making intuitive the possibility and necessity of adopting that ideal prototype as the standard of our manners” (cf. his *Religion Within the Boundary of Pure Reason*, Book IV, Apot. I, Sec. 1, p. 216).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. a similar espousal by John Stuart Mill (*Essays on Religion*, Essay II, pp. 97-9) as follows: “I grant that some of the precepts of Christ as exhibited in the Gospels [...] carry some kinds of moral goodness to a greater height than had ever been attained before [...] The ‘new commandment to love one another;’ the recognition that the greatest are those who serve, not who are served by, others; the reverence for the weak and humble [...]; the lesson of the parable of the Good Samaritan; that of ‘he that is without sin let him throw the first stone;’ the precept of doing as we would be done by, and such other noble moralities as are to be found [...]; these are surely in sufficient harmony with the intellect and feelings of every good man or woman [...] There will be, as there have been, shortcomings enough for a long time to come in acting on them; but that they should be forgotten, or cease to be operative on the human conscience, while human beings remain cultivated or civilized, may be pronounced, once for all, impossible.”

¹⁰⁶ “The democratic form of government adopted among us, my dear brethren, is not in opposition with the maxims I have laid down; it is not contrary to the gospel; it exacts, on the contrary, those sublime virtues which are only to be acquired in the school of Jesus Christ. If you practice them religiously, they will be the pledge of your happiness, of your glory, and the splendor of our republic [...] The moral virtues, which consist in the love of order, will render us good democrats; but this pure democracy, which labors without ceasing for the general good, and which, abjuring hatred, perfidy, and ambition, is also attentive to respect the rights of all who properly fulfill their duties; which consolidates that equality which, in its just acceptation, shews the law, extending over all the members of the social body, to direct, protect, and punish;

which, coordinate with the dispositions of all laws, divine and human, preserves to each the necessary means of fulfilling his duties, and which, the guarantee of individual liberty, as it is that of the happiness of all, traces out to every individual of a democratic state, the just measure of what he owes to God, to himself, and to his fellow-creatures [...] Let the Catholic religion be the dearest object of your hearts, of your piety, of all your affections. Do not conceive that it is repugnant to the democratic form of government; in living united with your divine Savior, you may conceive a just hope of eternal salvation; you may, by operating your temporal happiness, and that of your brethren, operate the glory of this republic, and the authorities which govern it [...] Yes, my dear brethren, be all Christians, and you will be excellent democrats” [translation qtd. from (The Monthly Magazine, *Parisian Anecdotes*, p. 316)].

¹⁰⁷ Other studies have found also that the asceticism which Christianity preaches allows for its members to get ahead in life, a little faster than others who do not live by said principles. For instance, Hans Zetterberg (1957, 31) noted in a study that because Christians were prohibited from wasting their money on the “vanity of the world” – as liquor, ostentation, and entertainment, they were by this means able to accumulate capital, and to start an enterprise; thereby attaining higher rates of upward mobility, compared to their ‘conformist’ contemporaries, *ceteris paribus*. Cf. other corroborating statements on the same in Fauman 1958, 119-37; Glazer 1958, 138-46; Lipset and Bendix 1959, 55-6.

¹⁰⁸ For instance, Professor Hans Kelsen (1955, 67) quoted passages from the Epistles of the Apostle Paul [to wit, *1 Timothy*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 1-2; *Ephesians*, Chap. VI, Vrs. 5-9; cf. also *Titus*, Chap. II, Vrs. 9-10; *Colossians*, Chap. III, Vrs. 22-4) to prove Christianity's toleration of slavery, and noted further that “a state which does not recognize slavery, if it is a government by the people [that is, any governmental type established and legitimated by the people] is in a higher degree democratic than a government by the people [that is, a democracy] under which slavery is permitted.” Cf. also related statements to this effect by John Plamenatz and J. Roland Pennock in the afore-mentioned symposium (cited as Griffith et al. 1956). For instance, Professor Plamenatz (*loc. cit.*, 118) noted that: “[...] the early Christians accepted slavery and the subjection of women. Were the Christians of the Roman Empire less deeply and less sincerely Christian than they are today? Yet they loyally accepted the

absolute power of the Emperor in all temporal matters, and refused him nothing except a worship which they felt was due to God alone. Can we say that Christians, when they are democrats, are, if not more sincerely, then more adequately Christian than when they are not democrats? Surely, we ought to say nothing of the kind. When we are tempted to do so, it is, I think, only because we happen to be both Christians and democrats, who like to see a close connection, logical and psychological, between our two faiths. But in themselves these faiths neither exclude nor suppose one another.” Also, Professor Pennock (*loc. cit.*, 129) remarked that: “[...] it will do no harm to bear in mind [...] that even the Christian religion is not always productive of attitudes that are either peaceful or democratic. One does not need to appeal to the history of religious wars and Christian autocracies to prove this point. One need only mention Fascist Italy or contemporary Spain.”

¹⁰⁹ And this is the more so when one adopts Immanuel Kant’s (*ibid.*, Book IV, Apot. I, p. 203) definition of religion as, “the acknowledgement and recognition of all our duties as if they were divine commandments.”

¹¹⁰ Professor Milton Rokeach (1960, 57) in his seminal monograph *The Open and Closed Mind* noted that a person's belief system was open or closed “to the extent that the same can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside.” In this respect, and as he (*loc. cit.*, 58) noted further, “the more open one's belief system, the more should the person be governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing forces and the less by irrational inner forces. Consequently, the more should he be able to resist pressures exerted by external sources to evaluate and to act in accordance with their wishes [...] Conversely, the more closed the belief system, the more difficult should it be to distinguish between information received about the world and information received about the source [...] To the extent that a person cannot distinguish between the two kinds of information [...] means that he is not free to receive, evaluate, and act on information in terms of inner requiredness. He should be exposed to pressures, rewards and punishments, meted out by the source, and designed to make him evaluate and act on the information in the way the source wants him to.” Now because the precepts of Christianity, as with many other religions, have been handed down from a higher

source, and are neither debatable or amenable, it is usually the case that people tend to observe them almost absent-minded, i.e., without having nor requiring a peculiar reason for doing so. Blaise Pascal in his *Pensées* (p. 8-9) explained the rationale for said disposition as follows: “We know the existence and the nature of the finite, because, like it, we are finite and have extension. We are aware of the existence of the infinite, and are ignorant of its nature, because, like us, it has extension, but, unlike us, it has no limits. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of God, because He has neither extension nor limits [...] If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no correspondence with us; we are therefore incapable of knowing who He is, or what He is [...] Who then shall blame Christians, who profess a religion for which they cannot give reasons, for being unable to give reasons for their belief? [...] If they proved it, they would belie their words; it is the lack of proofs which shows that they do not want understanding.” Cf. also René Descartes (*Discourse on Method*, Meditations, Chap. IV, p. 113) who commented corroboratively as follows: “[...] I am not surprised if I am not always capable of comprehending the reasons why God acts as he does; nor must I doubt of his existence because I find, perhaps, that there are several other things, besides the present respecting which I understand neither why nor how they were created by him; for, knowing already that my nature is extremely weak and is limited, and that the nature of God, on the other hand, is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no longer any difficulty in discerning that there is an infinity of things in his power whose causes transcend the grasp of my mind: and this consideration alone is sufficient to convince me, that the whole class of final causes is of no avail in physical [or natural] things; for it appears to me that I cannot, without exposing myself to the charge of temerity, seek to discover the [impenetrable] ends of Deity.” Professor Giovanni Sartori (1969, 410) has remarked persuasively that said disposition has somewhat to do with the abstract [and complex] nature of the doctrines of the belief system [to wit, the Christian faith], which causes the mass of believers to resort to the elites [i.e., to the priests and preachers] for interpretations and guidance in this respect, so that what is usually delivered to them is least questioned by them. More also, because religious beliefs are usually “bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (cf. Converse [1964], 207, 212), it is usually the case that believing

one thing leads *naturally* to believing another, and the next, ... and ultimately, the entire whole.

¹¹¹ Howbeit, Blaise Pascal in his *Pensées* would conceive of Christians as being at “peace with themselves” because they do not attempt to live with ‘reason’ and ‘the passions’ at the same time. As he noted (*op. cit.*, p. 7), “man’s inward conflict has always been between reason and the passions. Had he reason only, without passions [...] had he passions only, without reason [...], but having both, he must always be at war, since only by combating the other can he be at peace with the one: thus he is always divided against himself.”

¹¹² Cf. also a similar espousal by Niccolò Machiavelli (*Discourses on Livy*, Book II, Chap. II, p. 201) as follows: “[...] the religion of Christianity glorifies men of a humble and contemplative, rather than of an active life. For while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity, bodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave, our religion places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do.”

¹¹³ A similar solution was advanced by Rousseau (*loc. cit.*, pp. 121-2) in what he called a ‘civil religion,’ which he set forth as follows: “There *should therefore* be a purely civil profession of faith, of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject. While it can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the State whoever does not believe them - it can banish them, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty [...] *And* whoever dares to say: ‘outside the Church is no salvation’ ought to be driven from the State, unless the State is the Church, and the prince, the pontiff.”

¹¹⁴ A similar statement was espoused by Bertrand Russell (1957, 23) in his *Why I am Not a Christian*, as follows: “The whole conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms. It is a conception quite unworthy of free men. When you hear people in church debasing themselves and saying that they are miserable sinners, and all the rest of it, it seems contemptible and not worthy of self-respecting

human beings [...] A good world needs knowledge, kindness, and courage; it does not need a regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a fearless outlook and a free intelligence. It needs hope for the future, not looking back all the time toward a past that is dead, which we trust will be far surpassed by the future that our intelligence can create.”

¹¹⁵ This was well explicated by Professor Carle Zimmerman (2008, 25-34) in his seminal monograph *Family and Civilization*. According to him, the family system has evolved over the years in three attendant phases. In pre-industrial times, the dominant family type was the *trustee family*. In this family type, individual members were completely dependent on the decisions of the head of the family, whilst state and church influences were at a bare minimum. More also, because family descent was a means of passing on wealth and status, it was the case that the family head wielded enormous power and control over the actions of individual family members. Also, this family type, by virtue of its exclusivity, was successful at transmitting values and mores from one generation to the other. But over time, with the advent of industrialization, and also as a result of the occasional abuse of power by the supreme family head, the *trustee family* gave way to the *domestic family*. In this family system, the state and church stepped in to counteract the authority of the family head by providing relief, sustenance, and legal rights to individual members; howbeit, the nuclear family structure was condoned, preserved, and recognized as an agent of socialization. The *domestic family* thus represented a coarse balance between the authority of the family head, and that of the church and state. Then with the growth of the modern state, the *domestic family* evolved into a final structure: the *atomistic family*. In this family system, the state wielded enormous power and authority over individuals, so that the family group had little control over its own members. And this was the case because laws and customs were liberalized, so much that the individual was guaranteed rights that could not be infringed upon even by family members. As Professor Zimmerman (*loc. cit.*, 30) noted, this family type is called ‘atomistic’ because of “the rise of the conception that, as far as is compatible with the successful carrying-on of society, the individual is to be freed from the family bonds, and the state is to become much more an organization of individuals.” He (*loc. cit.*, 33) noted further that “the atomistic

family is essentially found in societies where law and custom bring the individual, as far as possible, out from under the covert [...] of the family and make him the agent of the government, the one responsible directly to the law, and bound least to family obligations.” According to Professor Zimmerman, this last phase of the family marked the doom of civil society, since the state supplants the authority of the family – which socializes and trains the individual, so that the latter is unable to duly perform this function. And because individuals are no longer trained and disciplined, social control breaks down, and society degenerates into an unscrupulous and amoral state. Now as it relates to Mill’s proposition, it could be said that since the very foundation of the family – to wit, the institution of marriage, and the procreation of children – is religious, the undermining of religious standards and principles would most certainly impact the family system, which in turn would affect the organization of society. And so Professor Zimmerman ([1974], 3, 6) observed elsewhere that “‘social,’ ‘family,’ and ‘religious’ systems were bound together in a more or less common shape because each was a part of the other;” and also that “a major disruption of a system permitting change tends to bring about a necessity for all to alter.” Cf. also Professor William Galston (1991, 222) who noted that the family is the critical arena in which independence and a host of other virtues are engendered, so that the weakening of the family system is certain to be fraught with danger for liberal society.

¹¹⁶ Cf. also Reinhold Niebuhr (1950, 125) who commented adjoinedly in this wise as follows: “Religious ideas and traditions may not be directly involved in the organization of a community. But they are the ultimate sources of the moral standards from which political principles are derived. In any case, both the foundation and the pinnacle of any cultural structure are religious; for any scheme of values is finally determined by the ultimate answer which is given to the ultimate question about the meaning of life.” Cf. also Professor Hans Kelsen (1955, 55) who remarked that “Christian theology can vindicate the democratic political system more effectively than can skeptic secularism, hampered by its disavowal of religion.”

¹¹⁷ Professor Amartya Sen (*loc. cit.*, 16) noted that the “intrinsic,” “instrumental,” and “constructive” merits of democracy are “not regional in character,” but constitute “a dominant part of most, and perhaps all, major cultures.” More also, Larry J. Diamond (*loc. cit.*, 20) remarked that “[...] the view of democracy as particular to Western

culture does not square up with the growing body of public opinion survey data, which shows considerable support for democracy around the world.”

¹¹⁸ Professor Alfred Stepan (2000, 44) described this as “the fallacy of unique founding conditions,” to wit, the assumption that the unique constellation of specific conditions required for the creation of a phenomenon are to be the same for all instances wherein the said phenomenon is replicated. He (*ibid.*) thus noted that it should not be considered a thing impossible, that “polities strongly influenced by Confucianism, Hinduism, Orthodoxy, or Islam could emulate or recreate, using some of their own distinctive cultural resources, a form of democracy that would meet the minimal institutional conditions of a polyarchy.”

¹¹⁹ Cf. for instance Professor Filmer Northrop (1942, 318) who commented in this wise as follows: “Democracy is a normative social theory. Were democracy a factual social theory, its correctness could be determined by social scientists applying the methods of natural science to social phenomena without any contribution from philosophy. But, being a normative social theory, there can be no trustworthy, publicly valid criterion of its validity or invalidity.” Cf. also Professor Dankwart Rustow (1970, 346) who noted that “the genesis of democracy need not be geographically uniform *because* there may be many roads to democracy.”

¹²⁰ Cf. also Stein Rokkan (1975, 570-2) and Lucian Pye (1966, 62-7) who observed the same in their models on nation-state formation.

¹²¹ And this was particularly so because “the nation establishes the demographic and geographic frontiers of the state [...] and supplies the emotional cement which holds the members of the state together when disagreements threaten to pull them apart” (cf. Emerson 1960, 17).

¹²² Cf. for instance the essay by Reenock et al (2007, 677-99) for empirical statements on how regressive socioeconomic distribution impacts democratic stability.

¹²³ Cf. also Binder 1964, 622-31, esp. 627-30, for added statements along these lines.

¹²⁴ For a helpful discussion on the form and impact of such democratic assistance, cf. Carothers 2009, 5-19; 2015, 59-73; Barkan 2012, 129-37; Levitsky and Way 2005, 20-

34; Gerschman and Allen 2006, 36-51; Whitehead 1996: 3-25; Ottaway and Chung 1999: 99-113.

Notes to Essay III

¹ Cf. qt. in Ake 1991, 34.

² On this, and other discussions on the history of Ghana, cf. esp. Apter 2008, 6-22; but also, Arden-Clarke 1958, 29-37; Sekyi 1973, 197-201; Meyerowitz 1952, 319-23; Bratton et al. 2001, 232-4; Hammond 1963, 249-58; Boahen 1966, 212-22.

³ For an in-depth discussion of these military dispensations, cf. Agyeman-Duah 1987, 613-42; Le Vine 1987, 169-78; Morrison 2004, 421-42; Graham 1985, 54-68; Hansen and Collins 1980, 3-23; Anthony 1969, 337-9; Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1981, 3-16; cf. also Hutchful 1997, 251-78; 1997a, 535-60; Baynham 1978, 155-68; 1985, 623-42, for a discussion of civil-military reforms and policies during the period.

⁴ Cf. a discussion of the same in Gyimah-Boadi 2007, 107-143, esp. 108-26; Saine 2000, 191-209; Ninsen 1993, 5-22; Haynes 1993, 451-67; Jeffries and Thomas 1993, 331-66; Oquaye 1995, 259-75; Aye 2008, 185-214; Goldsworthy 1973, 8-25; Whitfield 2009, 50-70. Essentially, the liberation movement in Ghana began in 1946 with the formation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) which campaigned for independence under the rubric of “self-government within the shortest possible,” but were shortly overtaken by Kwame Nkrumah’s more radical Convention People’s Party (CPP) which agitated instead for “self-government now” (cf. Austin 1970, 195-7; Apter 1955, 167; Arden-Clarke, *loc. cit.*, 31). Following independence in 1957, the CPP government continued in power for nine years, until 1966, when they were overthrown by the National Liberation Council (NLC) in a military coup led by General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka. The same appointed his compatriot General Joseph Ankrah to head the military government that was formed, and General Ankrah continued in power for three years, after which he was replaced by his compatriot General Akwasi Afrifa in 1969. In the same year, a new constitution was promulgated, and legislative elections were held, in which the Progress Party (PP) won 105 of the 140 seats in the National Assembly. Thereafter the PP formed a civilian government, in which Kofi Abrefa Busia, the leader of the party, was appointed prime minister, and Edward Akuffo-Addo, ceremonial president. But in 1972, just three years after being in power, the PP was deposed in a military coup by the National Redemption Council (NRC) headed

by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The NRC continued in power for three years, and after having banned all political contestation in the country, changed its name to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975. The SMC attempted to merge civilian and military institutions into a single organized party, so as to remain the only legitimate political party of the country. But the government was marred by rampant corruption, and in 1978, General Acheampong was forced to resign as head of state, and was replaced by his comrade General Frederick Akuffo. A year later, Ft. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings spearheaded a ten-member Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which overthrew the SMC. That same year, legislative elections were held, and the People's National Party (PNP) won a majority of seats in the National Assembly [to wit, 71 out of 140]. As such, Dr. Hilla Limann of the PNP was elected president the same year, and ruled for two years before being deposed in a military coup by the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) led by Ft. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings in 1981 (cf. Chazan 1983, 286; Oquaye [1980], 9-12, 135; Nugent 1995, 41). The PNDC continued in power for ten more years, and in 1991, the military general announced that the nation would be returning to constitutional rule the following year. A new constitution – the 1992 Constitution – was approved that year, and popular elections were also held, in which Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, now leader of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), was elected first president of the Fourth Republic. He continued in power for two successive terms, and in 2000, handed over power to John Agyekum Kuffour of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). President Kuffour, like his predecessor, continued in power for two successive terms, and then in 2008, handed over power to John Evans Atta-Mills of the NDC. President Atta-Mills however ruled for only one term, until 2012, and passing away from natural causes, was replaced by his vice-president John Dramani Mahama, who again won the presidential elections held the same year. In 2016, President Mahama lost the presidential elections to Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo of the NPP. President Akuffo-Addo has continued in power until date, and would remain so until 2024 – having again won the 2020 presidential elections.

⁵ For a discussion of electoral successes in Ghana since 1992, cf. Gyimah-Boadi 1997, 78-91; 2009, 138-152; Lyons 1997, 65-77; Smith 2002, 473-533, esp. 519-26;

⁶ Professor Samuel Huntington (1991, 266-7; cf. also Przeworski 1991, 10) argued that a two election-turnover test was necessary to establish a democracy as consolidated. According to him, the first election turnover was when the winners of the founding elections are defeated in a later election, and then yield power accordingly. This first test was necessary to show that the voters can oust a ruling regime, but also that the opposition party was institutionalized and integrative enough to run the government. The second election turnover was when the new winners themselves are able to hand over power to another winner in a successive election. The second test was necessary to demonstrate that democracy has been widely accepted by both the elites and masses as a formal way of changing rulers, and not regimes. And this was indeed observed in Ghana, for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won the founding democratic elections in 1992, and then handed over power to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2000, who in turn handed it over to the NDC in 2008 (cf. Lynch and Crawford [2011], 276, 279).

⁷ Cf. Whitfield 2009, 621-41; Jockers et al. 2010, 95-115; Abdulai and Crawford 2010, 26-67, just to name a few.

⁸ That is, a popular revolt of the masses which results in a change of regime, or as is more precisely defined by Professor James Davies (1962, 6), “a violent civil disturbance that causes the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support.” Cf. also Professor Samuel Huntington (1968, 264) who defined the phenomenon as “a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activities and policies.” Cf. also Arthur Bauer (1908, 11) who defined ‘les révolutions’ as *les changements tentés ou réalisés par la force dans la constitution des sociétés* [lit. trans. ‘a change of the constitution of society realized by violence’]. Cf. also Professor Harry Eckstein (1965, 133) who, equated revolutions with ‘internal wars,’ and defined the term as “any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or policies” (cf. other related definitions of the term in Pettee 1971, 3; Vierkandt 1922, 19-20; Sorokin 1925, 11; Yoder 1926, 440-1; Hatto 1949, 512-3; Cobb 1969, 272-3; Neumann 1957, 251). The regime changes that have taken place in the country’s history have been orchestrated from above, by military factions, by way of coup d’états (cf. Note 4, *supra*). Our conception of popular revolutions however

agrees with that set forth by Professor Davies: to wit, a regime change orchestrated by an elite faction with broad-based popular support, which may or may not involve the use of violence, such as those that removed Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire, and Mamadou Tandja of Niger from power [cf. Johnson 1966, 7-8; Lenin 1970, 78) for statements on how revolutions could take on a 'nonviolent' nature].

⁹ Albeit cf. Artur Bogner (2000, 183-203) who so ambitiously labelled the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict that ensued in 1994 as a kind of 'civil war.' But this should be taken as unduly overstated. For it was not in any wise a civil war, in the formal use of the term. For it was an inter-tribal conflict that occurred mainly around the northern parts of the country, and was not, as it should have been, a kind of war between a dissenting faction and the state, or between two warring factions with popular, nationwide support, as was the case with all combats that have been labelled as 'Civil War,' - as the British and American Civil Wars, the Biafra Civil War, the Rwandan Civil War, etc. And so Buhaug and Gates (2002, 418) rightly noted that civil wars are fought over a political objective - to wit, over an attempt to gain control over the apparatus of the state, or over the creation of a new sovereign state by a factional group; or as Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 564) rather put it, "to capture the state or to secede from it." Howbeit, Blattman and Miguel (2010, 3-4) would agree with Artur Bogner's characterization of the 1994 conflict as civil war, because to them, any internal conflict which results in more than 1000 deaths in a single year counts as *civil war*, whereas those that result in at least twenty-five deaths count as *civil conflicts*. And since close to 2000 people lost their lives, and over 150,000 were displaced in the afore-mentioned conflict, it is quite understandable to see why one may conceive of such as a civil war. Nevertheless, the characterization of internal conflicts by political objective rather than by impact seem best in defining the essence of civil wars.

¹⁰ The data are commenced from 2009 because it was in the preceding year that Ghana became a consolidated democracy, as per Professor Huntington's two election-turnover test (cf. Note 6, *supra*).

¹¹ We regard 'associational freedom' and 'freedom of expression' as social factors because they are that which engender organizational pluralism in a state [although

these must needs be guaranteed under the laws, making them somewhat tied to the political]. The other two we classified as ‘political factors’ because they are associated with the machinery of government.

¹² The four dimensions represented in the graph are scaled from 0 (lowest) - 1 (highest). And the question asked in each are as follows: On Freedom of Expression (V-Dem, FE), “To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?”; On Associational Freedom (V-Dem, AF), “To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?”; On Political Corruption (V-Dem, PC), “How pervasive is political corruption?”; On the Rule of Law (V-Dem, RL), “To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?”

¹³ The same trend [that is, of social factors being more determinant of democracy in Ghana] is observed also in the Freedom House and Polity IV Democracy indices. Moreover, in the 2019 EIU democracy index (pp. 11, 43), the nation scored [on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest)] 8.33 on a *social* dimension as ‘pluralism,’ and 5.71 on a *political* dimension as the ‘functioning of government.’

¹⁴ The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators includes six dimensions, namely: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Rule of Law, Governmental Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability, and Regulatory Quality. The ‘WGI, AG’ index averages the scores of the three political dimensions indicated [that is, Rule of Law, Governmental Effectiveness, and Regulatory Quality], whilst the ‘WGI-VA’ index represents solely the Voice and Accountability dimension. The scores are scaled on an interval of 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

¹⁵ It seems what the people appear to be saying is not that a particular regime ought to promote social welfare as a policy directive, but rather, that the machinery of government should be obligated by the constitution to take responsibility for the welfare of the people [i.e., that such should be made into a law or a Parliamentary Act that would be observed by all regimes of government].

¹⁶ And from the data already examined, we may surmise that these issues are political in nature, rather than social.

¹⁷ The question asked in the survey was as follows: "Now I would like for you to tell me your view on an issue. '1' means you agree completely with the statement on the left [which is, that 'the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for']; '10' means you agree completely with the statement on the right [which is, that 'people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves']; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between."

¹⁸ Adjoinedly, a recent survey by the Ghana Statistical Service (2018, 23-6) revealed a considerable gap in income earnings and consumption patterns between urban and rural regions of the country.

¹⁹ The question asked in the survey was as follows: "In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Ghana today?"

²⁰ Professor Huntington (*loc. cit.*, 265) commented as follows: "Revolution is an aspect of modernization. It is not something which can occur in any type of society at any period in its history. It is not a universal category but rather an historically limited phenomenon. It will not occur in highly traditional societies with very low levels of social and economic complexity. Nor will it occur in highly modern societies. Like other forms of violence and instability, it is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change."

²¹ Henry M. Hndyman (1921, 12) has noted that "there can be no revolution until the economic and social conditions are ripe for a change," so that to speak of 'making' a revolution would be "absurd" since it only comes about "when the conditions of change are prepared." And in this are revolutions differentiated from coup d'états, for whereas the later could be staged just about any time with the use of force, the former could only occur when attendant *economic, social, and political* conditions have built up over a period of time to a point where its occurrence becomes unpreventable. And it

is for this reason that the causes of revolutions could be studied, because the conditions that precipitate them are usually not context specific, but apply for most cases.

²² Professor Brinton arrived at these five ‘tentative uniformities’ by a critical study of the American, French, English and Russian revolutions. They include: economic discontent [mainly on the part of the unprosperous masses]; inefficient government machinery; a transfer of the allegiance of the intellectuals; dissention amongst the ruling elites; and class antagonism.

²³ Aristotle albeit noted in his *Politics* (Book V, Sec. 1302a, pp. 190-1) that revolutions could as well occur “when men, conceiving themselves to be superior, think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors.” Thus according to him, revolutions could be orchestrated by groups of persons who, though generally wealthy, think that their living standards have worsened relative to those of their contemporaries or inferiors. As Professor Mancur Olson, Jr. (1963, 538-9) rightly explained: “in cases where the number of gainers from economic growth exceeds the number of losers, there is apt to be a number of those who, while having gained in absolute terms, have lost in relative terms; *that is*, have come to have a lower position relative to the rest of the income earners in that society.” Professor James Duesenberry (1949, 27) has labelled this the “demonstration effect:” which is that people who habitually use one set of goods are wont to become dissatisfied with them when others in their income group begin to ‘demonstrate’ superior patterns of consumption. Professor Thorstein Veblen (1915, 31) commented further on this phenomenon as follows: “In any community where goods are held in severalty, it is necessary, in order to insure his own peace of mind, that an individual should possess as large a portion of goods as others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; [...] But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the earlier standard did. The tendency in any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary classification of oneself as compared with one’s neighbors [...] So long as the comparison is distinctly unfavorable to himself, the normal, average individual will live in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot.” Our present discussion however, on the matter of

economic discontent, would focus on persons who, owing to deprivation, perceive little or no possibility to better their living conditions – which thing is expedient considering the fact that the rural population of Ghana, which also comprise half the total population, contribute 80 percent to the nation’s poverty incidence (cf. Ghana Statistical Service 2018, 11).

²⁴ Cf. Professor Ted Gurr (1970, 24) who defined value expectations as “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled;” and value capabilities, as “the goods and conditions they think they are *presently* capable of getting and keeping.” The difference of the two, according to him, constituted the index of relative deprivation.

²⁵ The poverty incidence, also called the headcount index, measures the proportion of the population that are poor. Nevertheless, because this index does not show the extent to which such persons are deemed poor, the poverty gap index is usually preferred because it measures the extent to which the poor actually fall below the established poverty line.

²⁶ Extreme poverty, as defined by the Ghana Statistical Service (*loc. cit.*, 14) refers to “the condition where a household’s living standard is insufficient to meet their basic nutritional requirement, even if they were to devote their entire consumption budget to food.”

²⁷ That is, close to a tenth of the population, which total about 28 million (cf. Ghana Statistical Service 2019, 6).

²⁸ For instance, the Palma index, which compared the consumption patterns of the richest 10 percent to the poorest 40 percent, averaged about 2.5 for the three northern regions of the country, which also record the highest incidence of poverty. More also, the Gini indices revealed a higher income inequality in the rural- savannah, coastal, and forest regions of the country (cf. Ghana Statistical Service 2018, 17-21, 23-6). Indeed, also we find evidence of such mass discontent in the nation’s history, particularly during the reign of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), where some unpopular economic policy decisions of the regime attracted great displeasure from

affected groups in the country (cf. Hayward 1974, 165-92; 1979, 109-26; Rothchild 1979, 127-47; 1980, 459-79; Owusu 1975, 31-52).

²⁹ Indeed the *democraticness* of the 1992 Constitution may be questioned, considering the events that transpired during the consultative process. For instance, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) regime maintained a closed list of allied organizations it called ‘identifiable bodies’ whose views were prioritized above others during the deliberation process (cf. Gyimah-Boadi 1991, 36-7). Moreover, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), which was charged with enlightening the public about the democratic process, was greatly dominated by the government, and their activities were strictly controlled by the same (cf. Jonah 1991, 82). Additionally, the Committee of Constitutional Experts which reviewed and made proposals to the report of the NCD were denied the opportunity to tour all parts of the country to receive independent views from all section of Ghanaians on the new constitution, so that their work may have been impacted as a result (cf. Jonah, *ibid.*). Furthermore, beside the fact that the ‘Consultative Assembly’ which approved the final draft constitution was “overloaded with pro-government bodies and organizations,” the members thereon were not granted total immunity for their views and remarks, so that they may not have been able to freely perform their stated role (cf. Bluwey 1991, 63-4; Boafu-Arthur 1991, 48-9). And finally, the absence of a free press at the time may have allowed the PNDC regime to unduly control the political narrative, not to mention the fact that the public would have been much hindered from partaking in the deliberation process (cf. Jonah, *ibid.*; Bluwey, *ibid.*).

³⁰ And this in some respects was premised on the thought that a centralized system of government would help curb any form of divisiveness and conflict that may be caused by ethnic fragmentation. And so the National Redemption Council (NRC), upon its ascension to power in 1972, made every effort possible to curtail the manifestations of ethnicity in the country, for it perceived said differences a threat to “national unity and progress” [cf. Chazan 1982, 464-5; but see original bibliographical reference in Government of Ghana, *NRC Two Years in Office*. Accra: Government Printer, 1974, p. 57; *ibid*, *Report of the First Conference on the National Charter of Redemption*. Accra: Government Printer, 1975, p. 45].

³¹ Essentially, this was to afford more powers to the executive president and his government. The unitary system ensured that a single party was in charge of all policy matters of the state, and a unicameral legislature further helped to ensure that executive proposals could be easily passed into law, in instances where the president's party held a majority in Parliament. And considering the fact that the chairman of the PNDC regime, Ft. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, was at the time preparing to contest in the 1992 civilian elections as flag bearer of the NDC, it would seem logical that such governmental system was adopted by the Constitution [For instance, Abeeku Essuman-Johnson (1991, 58) noted that the PNDC chairman expressed solid reservations about returning the country to party politics during the consultative process; also Amos Anyimadu (1991, 111-2) noted that the NCD report to the PNDC had proposed that executive power be split between a president and a prime minister, but this was not considered by the Consultative Assembly, and instead, an Executive Presidency was opted for, perhaps due to the fact that the Assembly was dominated by pro-PNDC appointees]. Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012, 102-3) commented tentatively on the powers of the Ghanaian president as follows: "Ghana's politics of patronage is made possible by a constitutional framework and legislative tradition that vests vastly disproportionate power and control of resources in the hands of the president. Nearly all constitutional and statutory offices, including senior posts in the police and security services and directorships and senior-management positions in state corporations, are filled by presidential appointees. Apart from judges and commissioners of independent constitutional bodies, virtually all such appointees hold their offices at the pleasure of the president [...] Existing law also grants the president the authority to create, reorganize, and abolish government ministries and departments without going through legislative channels. Thus ministries come and go with each new presidential administration. Despite a formal policy of decentralization, local government also is effectively subordinated to the president. The president appoints the mayors as well as a third of the voting members of all 170 metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies in the country. Moreover, local authorities, even in municipalities with viable economies, depend on allocations from the central government for almost their entire budget. Despite the formal separation of powers, the constitution ensures the supremacy of the presidency over Parliament. Only the president or a minister acting on his behalf has the authority to introduce in

Parliament a bill or amendment that might have fiscal consequences. As a result, every legislative initiative, as well as control of the national legislative agenda and timetable, is effectively in the hands of the president.”

³² On this function of political parties, cf. McDonald 1955, 22-6; Crotty 1971, 302-15.

³³ Besides the fact that this would lead to a situation where some sectoral interests are not represented in policy decisions, it is likely also to further corruption in the ruling party, – because of the 'winner-takes-all' system which allows the same to control all aspects of government with little opposition (cf. Sabine 1950, 343; Olson 1982, 2).

³⁴ Cf. a discussion of the same in Prempeh 2008, 97-125; Clapham [1985], 54-9, 70-1; Pye 1966, 68; Nugent 2007, 252-75, esp. 259-73; Van de Walle 2003, 297-321; 2007, 50-67; Hyden 1983, 21; Bayart 1993, 242-52; Young 1998, 346; Szeftel 1998, 235-7; Kpundeh 2004, 121; Theobald 1982, 549; 2007, 98; but particularly, Kopecký 2011, 713-32, esp. 721-9; Lindberg 2010, 121-40, esp. 127-35; Asunka 2017, 29-53, esp. 44-50, who found evidence of such in their empirical studies on the country. Professor John Gillis (1970, 349) has remarked that such nepotism and clientelism leads to a breakdown of the state, because political personnel begin to “lose their dedication to the tasks of government, and devote their attention instead to interests peripheral to those of the state.” Albeit cf. Huntington 1968, 70; Arriola 2009, 1343-4, who noted that such patronage networks facilitated the building of stable political systems, in so far as they “connected political leaders to a cross-section of ethno-regional groups and localities where the state could otherwise not make its presence felt.” Cf. also Professor Simeon Nichter (2008, 29) who noted in his study that such clientelism enabled political parties to activate their own passive constituencies by inducing unmobilized supporters to turn out for voting. Cf. also Professor John Powell (1970, 417-8) who noted corroboratively in his study of peasant society that clientelist politics allowed political parties “to organize peasant clienteles into union movements that interpenetrated the party system at the local, regional, and national levels.”

³⁵ Professor Samuel Huntington (1965, 415-7) has remarked that political decay is the antithesis of political development: the latter being where political structures are continually adapted to on-going processes of social mobilization so that these are able

to support the changes that take place (cf. Almond 1963, 7; Eisenstadt 1962, 462); and the former, where political institutions lose their legitimacy and stability because they cease to be effective, primarily as a result of “a break in the continuity of political development” (cf. Gillis, *loc. cit.*, 348). Professor Huntington (*loc. cit.*, 415) has noted that the discontinuity is the result of “the increasing dominance of disruptive social forces” in the state [cf. also Professor Lawrence Stone (1966, 165) who attributes the same to a “dysfunction” of the sociopolitical system – to wit, “a lack of harmony between the social system on the one hand, and the political system on the other”].

³⁶ Professor Edwards (*loc. cit.*, 38-9) noted that these intellectuals comprise the second class of society [assuming that society is generally segmented into three classes], the first being the ruling elites, and the third, the workingmen. In revolutionary terms however, the ruling elites may be termed exploiters or capitalists; the intellectuals, non-productive labor or publicists; and the workingmen, productive labor or proletariat. As he explained (*ibid.*, 39), “exploiters are those who control, direct, and live by the labor of others ‘without giving;’ productive laborers, those who do the work necessary to maintain society at any given level of culture; and non-productive laborers, those whose work consists in maintaining and transmitting the system intact to future generation.” In most cases, the exploiters number just about the same as the publicists, and both together constitute a small part of society, compared with the workingmen.

³⁷ Cf. for instance George S. Pettee (*loc. cit.*, 11) who referred to such intellectuals as the ‘intrinsic elites’ of society, and the ruling elites, as the ‘extrinsic,’ and noted that, all things being equal, the more the two identified with each other, the less tension there would be in society. And this was the case because, as Professor Chalmers Johnson (*loc. cit.*, 96) rightly explicated “the co-option of persons specially gifted with intellect [...] neutralizes one obvious group of people *in society* who, when unreconciled to the status quo, are capable of creating a revolutionary ideology.” And so we rightly find that it was by means of the tireless activism of said publicists that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was prevented from implementing its unpopular Union Government concept in 1977/8 (cf. Hitchens 1979, 171-6; Owusu 1979, 89-108; Chazan and LeVine 1979, 177-207, for a discussion of the same).

³⁸ Wage employment must of course be understood to include both private and public work engagements.

³⁹ For instance, the survey (*loc. cit.*, 79) showed that a greater section of the labor force was employed in “agriculture, forestry and fishing” (38.3%); “wholesale and retail trade” (21.3%); and “manufacturing” (11.9%). But of course, these are general work categories, and it may be possible that some persons engaged therein are paid wages – either by government, or by private entities [cf. for instance, *ibid.*, 83-4, where some skilled agricultural- and fishery workers were shown to be paid employees].

⁴⁰ The survey report (*loc. cit.*, 23) noted that some 87.9 percent of males, and 76.1 percent of females, aged 15 years and over, have attained some form of education. Howbeit, and quite expectedly, only a small percentage of these have attained post-secondary education (cf. *ibid.*, 19-22).

⁴¹ For instance, we observe in the survey data (cf. *loc. cit.*, 19) that a greater proportion of school attendees are enrolled at the basic level [i.e. about 53 percent of all school attendees, including those at the secondary and tertiary levels]. And this has more to do with the population distribution of the country, which is greatest for persons aged below 20 (cf. *ibid.*, 8).

⁴² Because economic development generally depends on the inputs of a large section of the population [and not just a few], its realization in Ghana might attest to the fact that a greater segment of the population are somewhat satisfied with the rewards of the work they do, but also with their lives, more generally.

⁴³ That is, though they are wont to act as rivals before the public eye, yet behind the political scene, may tend to rub each other’s hands, and maintain friendly relations one with the other.

⁴⁴ By broad-based policies, we mean to imply those that do not necessarily benefit a particular ethnic group, or geographical region, such as infrastructural developments, education- and health insurance policies, social welfare, *amid others*.

⁴⁵ The suitability of single-case research designs for theory development has been severally noted by scholars. For instance, Professor Jack Snyder (1984, 35; but also

Durkheim 1938, 129-30) noted that, studies which employ a method of controlled comparisons usually “provide an inferior means of testing causal relationships, because so many variables are left uncontrolled.” He then went on to state that “given the difficulty of finding two cases that are similar in all respects except the variable to be tested, comparisons within cases [i.e., of single-case studies] tend to be better controlled than comparisons between cases [i.e., of multi-case studies]” Cf. also Professor Giovanni Sartori (1970, 1035) who noted that the comparative method, by reason of the small number of cases it employs, tends only to “provide extensions of knowledge, rather than a strategy for acquiring and validating new knowledge.” Therefore, George and Bennett (2005, 132-3) noted that in some respects, single-case studies may seem better than multi-case observations, because the former allows a researcher “to explain as much as possible with as little as possible,” and thereby “ensures that the observations imputed to a theory achieve the quality, validity and relevance needed to access the theory” (cf. also King et al. [1994], 29-31, 123; Lijphart 1971, 691, for related statements in this respect). Albeit, the same (i.e., George and Bennett, *loc. cit.*, 62) were quick to add that single-case designs, when employed, must maintain “scientific consciousness” in that they must not be shaped by “whatever historical data was available” nor reflect the “special interests of the investigator” but must commit to “an orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question.”

⁴⁶ And indeed, Professor Arend Lijphart (1971, 691) has noted that a case may be selected for analysis merely because the researcher has an interest in the case *per se*, and not so much because of an interest in the formulation of general theory. In our case however, our choice of Ghana was foremost because of our interest in the country, but also because we were hoping by the study to document some preliminary findings that could serve as probable basis for the development of a normative social theory on the success of democracy in transitional states. Our case study may have therefore been of the ‘theory-confirming’ type, insofar as we sought thereby to test, but ultimately to confirm, the validity of a number of propositions related to democratic practice in Ghana.

⁴⁷ For instance, not only was Ghana the first sub-Saharan African nation to attain independence from colonial rule, but was also amongst the first to transition to

democratic rule in the early 1990s. And because she has been largely successful in this form of governance, a study of democratic practice therein would, beside adding to knowledge on third-wave democratizations more generally, shed more lights on the dynamics of democracy in Africa.

⁴⁸ Of course, we are not by this insinuating that a foreigner would have experienced less convenience in conducting a similar study in the country. By ‘convenience,’ we mean, as it relates to the organization of focus group interviews and the observation of transactional behaviors. These were relatively easier to do because there were no language and administrative barriers, besides the fact that the lead author had already acquired much information [by means of previous research, and personal experiences] on the Ghanaian nation. And by ‘cost-effective,’ we mean, as it pertains to visa- and research permits [for we had no need of such to conduct fieldwork in Ghana], not to mention the excessive overhead costs (on, say, transport, rent, food, etc.) that might have been incurred had the study been conducted in a new and unfamiliar locality. And these were particularly of note because of the time- and resource constraints on the study.

⁴⁹ And this is the more so because, besides the violence that is employed, and the mayhem that is caused, one successful revolution usually sets a precedent for future ones to follow suite. And so Arthur T. Hatto (1949, 513) noted that revolutions share the idea of a “continuous forward pressure, *followed by* retardation by backward pressure, *then* explosion, *then* further forward and backward phases, in terms of parties conflicting through their varying degrees of forwardness and backwardness.” Albeit it must be stated that a revolution justifiably orchestrated [i.e., to topple a tyrannical regime] should usually result in a more stable polity.

⁵⁰ This is somewhat related to Professor Robert Cialdini's (1984) conception of ‘social proof,’ although he applied the term to the act of observing societal behavior in order to emulate those that are generally held as ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate.’ As he noted (*loc. cit.*, 117), “we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.” Our field observation had thus a similar goal: for we sought to document those transactional behavioral patterns that were most characteristic and ascriptive of the Ghanaian people, although unlike Professor

Cialdini, we had no teleological goal in doing so, except to enable us to better understand the Ghanaian peoples' disinclination to mass revolts.

⁵¹ That is, as relating to “those actions and interactions of men and groups which are involved in the process of governing” (cf. Truman 1951, 37). Professor Charles E. Merriam (1926, 7) has remarked that the study of political behavior is of particular importance because “government, after all, is not made up merely of documents containing laws and rules, or of structures of a particular form, but is fundamentally based upon patterns of actions in types of situations.”

⁵² A number of definitions have been offered for such ‘socialization process.’ For instance, Irvin L. Child (1954, 655) defined it as “the whole process by which an individual born with behavioral potentialities of enormously wide range, is confined within a much narrower range - the range of what is customary and acceptable for him according to the standards of the group;” David F. Aberle (1961, 387), as “those patterns of action [...] which inculcate in individuals the skills [...] motives, and attitudes necessary for the performance of present and anticipated roles;” Robert A. LeVine (1963, 280), as “the acquisition of dispositions toward behavior that is positively valued by a group, and the elimination of dispositions towards behavior that is disvalued;” Gabriel A. Almond (1960, 27), as “the process of induction into the political culture;” Harry H. Eckstein (1963, 26), as “the processes through which values, cognitions, and symbols are learned and internalized;” and Marion J. Levy, Jr. (1952, 187), as “the inculcation of the structure of action of a society on an individual.” Professor David Easton (1968, 134) has noted that the essence of such socializing norms is to “provide for the continuity of existing forms and actions of society – to assure the stability, both in the sense of consensus and of constancy, of the system over time.” Cf. also Claude Ake (1975, 273) who noted that it enables the members of society “to restrict themselves to behavioral patterns which fall within the limits imposed by political role expectation.”

⁵³ In this, we employed the mechanism of process tracing, by which means we sought to identify and analyze those “dynamics of events” which have played out historically and contemporarily to inform our dependent variable, to wit, the Ghanaian peoples' disinclination to mass political action (cf. Tarrow 1995, 472; Collier 2011, 823). As was

noted by George and Bennett (*loc. cit.*, 6) such systemic investigation entailed resorting to data sources as archival documents, interviews, field observations, narratives, etc., to test “whether the causal processes hypothesized by the study was in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”

⁵⁴ Nevertheless, because such behaviors and norms are themselves produced by varied institutional designs (cf. Easton 1963, 97-8; Easton and Dennis 1967, 38), it meant that our discussion of them extended to include said institutional designs. As Professor David Easton (1957, 384) remarked, “if we hold the system of political actions as a unit [...] we can see that what keeps the system going are inputs of various kinds. These inputs are converted by the processes of the system into outputs and these, in turn, have consequences both for the system and for the environment in which the system exists.” cf. also Professor Robert Dahl (1961, 770) who noted that “because an individual is not a political system, and analysis of individual preferences cannot fully explain collective decisions, there is the need to understand the mechanisms by which individual decisions are aggregated and combined into collective decisions.”

⁵⁵ Our physical presence in the country was for a period of six weeks. Thereafter, we continued to follow the news and print media on developments in the country.

⁵⁶ Not that we began our observation of the nation’s systems from this period forth, as that would have proven too little a time to gather any meaningful data thereon. Rather we began to do so remotely – about a year before our field trip to the country – through the news, print, and online media, as well as through reports, studies, and essays published on the nation. Thus, during our visit to the country, we sought only to have a feel of some of the things we have read and learnt about the nation. And so we visited a session of Parliament, attended a party rally, observed teaching and learning protocols in some basic- and high schools, frequented market- and social centers, boarded the local ‘trotro’ buses, just to name a few.

⁵⁷ These informal dialogues were apart from the group discussions we later organized, and were merely intended to provide the research team with a view of some matters prevalent in the Ghanaian nation, particularly from the perspective of the local people.

⁵⁸ The primary literature we consulted for the study are as follows: on Ghana's political history, we reviewed the works of David E. Apter (1955), John D. Fage (1959), and David Kimble (1963); on contemporary political trends, the works of Jeffrey Herbst (1993), and Paul Nugent (1995); on ethnicity and culture, that of Donald I. Ray (1986), and Lentz and Nugent (2000); and on the economy, the seminal monograph by Mozammel M. Huq (1989). We also consulted the following three essays for a general discussion of the Ghanaian nation: that of Maxwell Owusu (1996, 307-43), of Jon Kraus (1969, 107-30), and of Naomi Chazan (1982, 461-85).

⁵⁹ That is, we sought by this means to receive popular commentaries on the observations – both to ascertain their verity, and to understand the rationale for their practice.

⁶⁰ Cf. also Bruck and Stocker (1996, 48), for related statements in this respect.

⁶¹ That is, the research, being a doctoral dissertation, had a limited budget, and could only be conducted within a specified period of time – in our case, in about two years, but a considerable part of this time was spent reviewing literature on the Ghanaian nation, so that the actual fieldwork was conducted within a time frame of less than a year.

⁶² Whilst the number of group interviews conducted by the study may seem a little too few, it must be noted that our primary goal was to document democratic practice in the country, which we were going to better achieve by observation than by interaction: because people can lightly say things they do not do, whereas they cannot lightly do things they are not oriented to doing [thus, for example, we read in the Bible, in the book of *Judges* (Chap. XII, Vrs. 6) how that the Ephraimites were unable to say the word 'Shibboleth,' and said instead – as they were wont to saying – 'Sibboleth,' because they "simply could not bring themselves to pronounce it right"]. We therefore spent a considerable part of our research time gathering information about transactional behaviors and processes that resonated with a large section of the Ghanaian people –particularly considering the fact that the nation is made up of distinct ethnic identities. The interactions therefore were to corroborate these initial findings, but also to enable us appraise them from the perspective of the local people.

⁶³ These dialogue sessions did not form part of the focus group discussions, but were separate one-on-one talks we had with students and heads of religious establishments. And this we did because students and religious heads, besides having a particularly tight schedule, are severally based at a unique location, so that it was more expedient to go over to them, than to invite them over for said discussions. Also, said dialogue sessions, because they were solely intended to offer further insights on some educational- and religious matters, were not regarded as distinct from the three group discussions, and the comments received therein were analyzed together with the other group discussions on matters relating to education and religion.

⁶⁴ In recruiting participants for the study, the research team visited workplaces, market centers, educational- and religious establishments, research institutions, think tanks, *amid others*, and presented our research objective, and invited interested persons to our focus group interviews. For ease of convenience, and also to cut on cost, we conducted all three focus group interviews in the capital city Accra, but also because being the most modernized city of the country, it is the one that was most likely to have persons that were open-minded, socialized, and versed in the affairs of the nation (cf. Pennock 1979, 228; Lipset 1959, 84), not to mention the fact that persons from all ethnicities of the country are resident therein [cf. for instance, the survey data by the Ghana Statistical Service (2019, 110), which showed that the Greater Accra Region receives the largest number of in-migrants in the country, about 51.3 percent to be precise].

⁶⁵ And this we did, particularly because we employed a thematic, rather than a discourse approach in our analysis of data. As such, we were not so much interested in the form of individual responses, as we were of the relations and themes we could draw from the interview data as whole. And granted, on some issues men might have more to say thereon than women, or the more educated, than the less. Nevertheless, because our unit of analysis was the nation, and we were not hoping to document any findings on our interview participants *per se* – but to receive only their commentary on our field observations – we tended to discard their personal attributes. But of course, we did ensure that in every group session, we had a diverse blend of participants [that is, as pertaining to attributes such as gender, occupation, ethnicity, and the like, cf. Appendix B, for a descriptive overview of the same].

⁶⁶ And so in recruiting participants for the discussions, we asked as proof for the first and second requirements, their national- and voters ID cards respectively. Also, no kind of *per diem* was paid to interview participants, save for those who requested a refund of their transport costs. Albeit we did provide some light refreshments for participants, which were served after each interview session.

⁶⁷ Not that we actually planned this out, but all our interview participants were persons who had never travelled outside of the country. And so basically our discussants were persons who had lived in the country for over forty years [which means that they have lived through many regimes – both military and civilian, and also through a generation or two], had a minimum level of education to be abreast with the news media, and had voted multiple times in national elections.

⁶⁸ In the conduct of the group discussions, we employed a circular sitting structure to allow for respondents to make eye contact with one another, and to facilitate group rapport [which sitting structure is preferred to the linear which does the exact opposite] (cf. Hennink 2014, 82). Also, at the start of each dialogue session, we asked participants to briefly introduce themselves, and to inform about their motivations for taking part in the dialogue session. In addition, we observed two 15-minute breaks during the sessions, to allow for participants to grab a snack [which the research team provided], and to converse with one another. And these we did to create a friendly and an enabling atmosphere that would facilitate group cohesion and enhance the depth of participant responses (cf. Festinger 1950, 274; Shaw 1981, 213-4; Pennington 2002, 83).

⁶⁹ The dominant speaker issue is where, in a given dialogue session, a participant or a number of participants attempt to dominate the discussion proceedings by speaking above and over everyone else (cf. Bromley 2014, 106; Wodak et al. 2009, 107). And this is the more so because such persons often tend to be distinguished by age, expertise or social status, so that the other participants usually feel that these have better ideas to contribute than themselves (cf. Miller and Turnbull 1986, 234) [albeit cf. Shaw, *loc. cit.*, 192-8) who attributes this demeanor rather to the personality traits of individuals]. And granted, in every group discussion where participants are randomly sampled, all persons could not possibly be expected to possess equal knowledge on the

matters being discussed, so that there are wont in almost every stance to be some ‘dominant speakers’ (cf. Marier et al. 2020, 307-8; Stewart et al. 2007, 23-5; Shaw, *loc. cit.*, 192-8, for added excursus on the subject matter).

⁷⁰ What really helped curb this issue in our focus discussions was threefold. First, the issues that were discussed did not require any special, technical knowledge, so that it was relatively easy for all participants to contribute their knowledge and personal experiences thereunto. Second, because participants had to be at least forty years of age, there was no wide variation in age amongst the participants, so that it was easy for them to perceive one another as equals, and to relate as such [that is, they being all matured persons, they were much disposed to learning from one another, and to allowing others speak freely with minimum interruptions]. The third, however, was designed and facilitated by the research team. For we had one amongst us who kept watch of the time, and signaled to participants when they have exhausted their allotted speaking time [which was three minutes for ‘first-round’ responses, and about half that time for follow up remarks or comments] (cf. Note 72, *infra*, for further statements on the conduct of the group discussions).

⁷¹ It has been argued that because focus group dialogues involve several persons, that it was usually not possible for issues to be discussed in their detail, to wit, for the moderator to probe and ask more penetrating questions, and/or for respondents to speak at length on a subject matter, compared to personal, one-on-one interviews. And this has been owed to the constraints of time which makes it largely impossible for the specifics of issues to be explored.

⁷² In moderating the focus group dialogues, we adopted a ‘supportive leadership’ approach towards participants, so that we treated all persons as equals, and made everyone feel that what they had to contribute was as important to the research team as all others’ [cf. Stewart et al., *loc. cit.*, 70-3; Pennington, *loc. cit.*, 145, for added excursus on the essence of such moderating strategy]. But because the research team [which was composed of one doctoral student – who also was the lead researcher, and two research assistants - who were master students] were youths compared to the participants who were much older, we hired a matured, experienced journalist to moderate the focus discussions. And this we did, principally because of a cultural

protocol in Ghana, which proscribes younger and older people from relating on an equal footing [i.e., either that the young, out of respect for the old, may not be able to moderate the discussions as candidly as they should; or that the old, by virtue of their age, would disdain to be spoken to in a certain way, or may simply refuse to comment on some matters]. However, this was unlikely to be the case with a matured moderator, who the participants were wont to see as an equal, so that this bias was by this means curbed. In the conduct of the discussions, we usually had questions we called: ‘first-round questions’ which were general questions about a dimensional aspect. So, for instance, one of such general questions was: “what do you think about the political rivalry between the NDC and the NPP?” Or another, “what roles do chiefs play in Ghana's democracy?” Or another, “What are your views on religious practices in public schools?” Now, in such 'first-round' questions, we moved in turns from one participant to the next – the participants being seated in a circular setting, cf. Note 68, *supra* – and received their commentaries thereon [also we besought participants not to simply repeat the comments of others – even when they agreed completely – but to, in any wise, endeavor to add thereunto]. Then, if we had further questions to any of the responses given, we followed up as such. Also, we allowed participants to freely refute, comment, and expound on one another's responses during the dialogue proceedings.

⁷³ Of course, because the essence of the focus group discussions was to corroborate the field observations priorly made by the study, we did have some questions prepared for the purpose. Nevertheless, we did not ask them all directly, as in personal interviews, because there being about seven to eight persons in the focus discussions, it was usually the case that one round of responses to a question ends up answering several questions we had on our list. For example, a simple question as: “how do you perceive the zero-sum, winner-take-all electoral system in Ghana?” ended up generating information on ethnicity [as regards regional voting patterns], employment patterns [as regards clientelism and cooptation], demographics [as regards family roles, and gender differences], education [as regards dynamics between the elites and masses], and the like, all of which were useful to our research focus.

⁷⁴ Because we employed a grounded theory methodology, and our ultimate findings were going to be based on the field data, it would have been inexpedient to constrain

participants in their responses, to wit, to have gone into the discussions with a list of pre-structured questions, as this would have limited perspective on the matters being discussed. Nevertheless, we did endeavor to interrupt participants when they seemed to be digressing too far from the subjects under discussion.

⁷⁵ This we preferred to note taking because it offered “a verbatim record of the *group* discussion” (cf. Hennink, *loc. cit.*, 83), which is ideal, especially in our case, where we would be ‘grounding’ our findings entirely on the field data. But it was because all participants consented thereto that we were able to audio record the discussions, otherwise we may have been constrained to resort to note taking.

⁷⁶ We did not, of course, perform a verbatim transcription of the entire recording of all three dialogue sessions, as this, whilst unnecessary, would have taken a considerable amount of time to do. Instead, we did only those parts that were relevant to our research focus.

⁷⁷ This basically comprises the standard procedure for analyzing qualitative field data using grounded theory, as laid out by Tie et al. 2019, 3-7. The first was purposive sampling, which we did with our review of theoretical literature on the Ghanaian nation, which also helped to direct the scope and form of our field research. Next was data collection, which we did with our field observations, and group discussion- and dialogue sessions. Thereafter is data coding [by which means we interact with and make meaning of the field data, cf. Charmaz 2012, 4-5], and finally, result interpretation. We did not however perform a theoretical sampling of data - which Birks and Mills (2015, 68) have defined as “the process of identifying and pursuing clues that arise during the analysis of data” - because our research design did not require one [i.e., the field observations and group discussions were sufficient in themselves to provide information towards our research goal]. Howbeit, we may be said to have performed some form of theoretical sampling, in so far as we endeavored to explore in succeeding group discussions matters that were not extensively discussed in the previous.

⁷⁸ And so Glaser and Holton (2004, 43) defined grounded theory as “the systematic process of generating a set of integrated conceptual hypotheses *from data* to produce an inductive theory about a substantive area.” Cf. also Strauss and Corbin (1998, 12)

who defined the same as “the formulation of theory from data systemically gathered and analyzed through a research process.” Cf. also John W. Creswell (2009, 13) who defined the same as a qualitative procedure of inquiry where a researcher derives “abstract and general theories of processes, actions, or interactions from the views of participants of a study.”

⁷⁹ Cf. Appendix A, for a summary of the field interviews conducted during this preliminary study.

⁸⁰ We did not of course say to our participants: “hey guys, we have made these number of observations in a prior field study, and only need your approbation to validate them,” as this would have greatly influenced the objectivity of their responses [that is, many might have too easily confirmed our observations, either because they might think that by such means, they would be doing the research team a favor, or that they might think that if such observations had been documented after a careful study, then they must certainly be true in all respects]. What we did instead was to pose general questions relating to the observations we made, and to receive participants’ responses thereon. So, for example, one of the observations we made was the fact that persons from different ethnicities tended to exercise a degree of respect and friendliness towards one another. And so, in this, we asked the question: “how do people generally relate to others from different ethnicities?” And stringing all the answers together, we indeed discovered that this was the case amongst persons from different ethnicities, except that such demeanor was influenced by factors such as one’s social upbringing, religious orientation, level of education, level of mobility, amid others. And so in this case, we reported the transactional behavior – as we had observed – and explicated further by including those conditions which facilitate its practice amongst the Ghanaian people.

⁸¹ This did not of course mean that we reduced participant responses to numbers, and thereby compromised on saliency. Certainly, an observation made by, or upheld by a single person could nonetheless be true in many respects. However, because we were trying to document behavioral norms which resonated with a greater section of the Ghanaian population, it seemed best to prioritize those observations which were affirmed by a greater number of participants in the study. Otherwise, how may we call a practice a 'behavioral norm' if not many persons are acquainted with the same?

⁸² Cf. Appendix C, for a detailed overview of the same. It must be noted however that what we are referring to as ‘observations’ do not comprise solely of those behavioral patterns we physically observed in the country during our field study, but also of information we reviewed in the literature, and those we obtained via the media.

⁸³ These include the: Upper West, Upper East, Northern, Volta, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Western, Greater Accra, Eastern, and Ashanti regions. Howbeit in 2019, the nation, upon the request of local chiefs, decided to re-demarcate some these regions, thus increasing the number to sixteen. For instance, the Northern region was reconstituted into three new regions, namely: Northern, North East, and Savannah; the Volta, into: Volta, and Oti; the Western, into: Western, and Western North; and the Brong Ahafo, into: Bono, Bono East, and Ahafo.

⁸⁴ In effect, these tribes and ethnicities are territorially concentrated, and for this cause also, a thick border line is usually employed on cartographic drawings of the country to segment these seemingly ‘distinct’ sectors. For a discussion of the same, cf. Price 1973, 470-5; Brown 1982, 37-69; Boyon 1958, 7-10; Smock and Smock 1975, 223.

⁸⁵ Of course, some of these languages are not so different one from the other. For instance, Asante Twi of the Ashanti Region, and Akuapem Twi of the Eastern Region evince little difference in semantics, save for the phonetics [the same is true also for the Ga and Dangme languages]. Moreover, some regions that are proximate speak the same dominant language. For instance, Fante is predominantly spoken in the Central and Western regions, as is Hausa is the northern regions (cf. a discussion of the same in Laitin 1994, 622-34, esp. 623-4; Obeng 1997, 63-81, esp. 64-7).

⁸⁶ The NPP is largely perceived as capitalist, and the NDC, socialist, cf. Morrison 2004, 423-4; Pinkney 1997, 34; Sandbrook 1998, 79; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 146. Cf. also Fobih 2010, 24-41; Arthur 2009, 44-73, for related statements on the same.

⁸⁷ Cf. a discussion of the same in Nugent 1999, 287-319; 2001, 2-7; 2001b, 405-28; Fridy 2007, 281-305; 2012, 107-21; Saaka 1994, 263-80; Ichino and Nathan 2013, 347-8; Jockers et al., *loc. cit.*, 111-2; Morrison and Hong [2006], 235, 239; Lindberg and

Morrison 2005, 565-86; 2008, 95-122; Oelbaum 2004, 250; Haynes 2003, 68; Gyimah-Boadi 2001, 115; Smith 2002, 621-50, esp. 623-38; Osei 2012, 581-5.

⁸⁸ To a varied extent, this is promoted by the *Constitution* (cf. Chap. VII, Art. 55, Sec. 4) which mandates every political party in the country to be “of a national character,” and “to not have membership based on ethnic, religious, regional, or other sectional divisions.” Additionally (cf. *ibid.*, Sec. 7b-c) political parties are enjoined to “have branches in all regions of the country, and to be organized in no less than two-thirds of the districts in each region. Also, party names, emblems, colors, mottos, and other symbols must have no ethnic, regional, religious, or sectional connotations nor give the appearance that their activities are confined only to a part of the country.”

⁸⁹ Professor Karl Deutsch (1953, 173-4) has perceived the same as the *natural* corollary of the process of social mobilization which often results in “the existence of more advanced regions side by side with more underdeveloped ones,” with the view that the former would “function as centers of cultural and economic attraction for some of the populations of the latter, and thus become a nuclei for further integration.” Albeit cf. Professor Albert Hirschman (1957, 550-1) who attributes the same [which he rather calls “the cohabitation of progress and backwardness within the same country”] to influences of local politics on investment decisions [as, for instance, when a regime prioritizes the developmental needs of its support region or group because ethnic differentiation was horizontal, and party identification, regional (cf. also Grayson 1975, 126-33, for related statements in this respect)].

⁹⁰ For instance, the survey by the Ghana Statistical Service ([2019], 5-7, 109) reported that a greater number of the total population, many of which were in-migrants, resided in the Greater Accra- and Ashanti Regions – the two principal urban centers of the country [cf. also Hart 1971, 21-36; Bawumia 1998, 47-70, for related discussions along these lines]. One effect of such rural-urban migration is that it deprives rural regions of the human resources they need to develop, to wit, reduces the concentration of labor in the agricultural sector [as rural dwellers tend to be more employed in this sector, cf. Ghana Statistical Service 2019, 77]. Thus Hamid Tabatabai (1986, 399-400) noted in his essay that the acute food shortage that was experienced in Ghana during the

early 1980s was in part due to the large rural migrations that had taken place prior to the period.

⁹¹ Cf. a discussion of the same in Yaro 2006, 125-56, esp. 138-53; Kobo 2010, 67-94. To some extent, such little political activity and lack of self-initiative tends to contribute further to underdevelopment in these regions. As Esman and Uphoff (1984, 40) rightly noted: “a vigorous network of membership organizations is essential to any serious effort to overcome mass poverty [...] For while other components – infrastructure investments, supportive public policies, appropriate technologies, and bureaucratic and market institutions – are necessary, we cannot visualize any strategy of rural development [...] in which participatory local organizations are not prominent.” Thus, Professor Robert Dahl (1961, 289) noted in his study of New Haven that “the more a voter participates in local political life, the more likely he is to participate in other forms of community organization, and *vice versa*.” Cf. also Professor Robert Putnam (1966, 652-4) who found in his empirical study that membership in local community associations enhanced one's social and political participation at the national level. Cf. also Montgomery 1988, 42-57, for related statements in this respect.

⁹² For a fine depiction of the same, cf. the 2011 movie, *An African Election*, by Jarreth J. Merz, and Kevin Merz, wherein some of these issues in rural Ghana were highlighted. For instance, one rural farmer commented therein as follows: “if you are born into the poorer regions of the country, you go down [...] there is no one to help you. It is true! [...] I am presently not working, yet I have strength to work, but where is the work?”

⁹³ Cf. other related discussions on Ghana's political economy in Jeffries 1982, 307-17; Rado 1986, 563-72; Rimmer 1966, 17-32.

⁹⁴ By basic school is to be understood grade levels from one to nine [i.e., six years of primary-, and three years of junior high school education]; and [senior] high school, from grades ten to thirteen [although previously it was for a duration of three years, until an Act of Parliament extended it to four].

⁹⁵ For instance, before the formal commencement of classes each morning, children in basic schools gather at an ‘assembly ground,’ by grade levels, usually in lines of two

[with the females in front, and the males behind], in an orderly manner. During this time, a Christian hymn is sang by the students, after which they recite together the ‘Lord’s Prayer.’ Thereafter, the national anthem is sung, and then the national pledge is recited. These are observed on each school day. On select days also, usually on Mondays and Wednesday, inspections are carried out on pupils’ uniforms, nails, and hair, and offenders are usually asked to return home and have this done. Also, school children are formally required to report to school at 7am, and those who report late are usually punished with some grounds work for a few hours of the day.

⁹⁶ The same practice is observed also in tertiary institutions, as universities, colleges of education, and polytechnics, except that high school dormitory rooms are much larger, and house also a greater number of students [usually between 15 to 20 persons per dormitory room], compared with those in the tertiary, which are smaller, and house fewer persons, usually a maximum of four. For a general discussion of how education facilitates social mobility, cf. the essays by Floud and Halsey 1956, 519-32; Becker 1961, 93-104.

⁹⁷ That is, either that they may after their studies secure an opportunity to work in the host nation, which would translate invariably into improved living standards for their families back home, or that their foreign qualifications may enhance their chances of employment upon their return to the country. Many of such persons self-sponsor their foreign studies, either through family support, or through loans from financial agencies. These differ however from those who study on scholarships, in that the latter, by virtue of their academic merits, are wont to perceive foreign studies as a natural continuation of their academic career, whereas for the former, this is a conscious effort they make to improve their future job prospects.

⁹⁸ Cf. a discussion of the same in Ayee 2008, 199; Arthur 2009, 67.

⁹⁹ This initiative is overseen by the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), an independent statutory body that was established in 2010 for the purpose by Parliamentary Act 805.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Note 28, *supra*. Roger G. Thomas (1973, 79-103; 1975, 427-67) has remarked quite convincingly that underdevelopment in the three northern regions has its roots

in British colonial policy which purposively inhibited education development in said regions so the inhabitants thereof could serve as a source of cheap labor for the more industrialized south.

¹⁰¹ That is, graduates of both high school and tertiary institutions.

¹⁰² To wit, persons with technical and vocational skill sets, as carpentry, confectionery, plumbing, and the like.

¹⁰³ That is, they tend to be majoritarian in nature, and like in national elections, persons that vie for the position of student union president usually choose a running mate with whom they campaign, and who also becomes vice president upon the successful election of the duo.

¹⁰⁴ These also conduct their internal elections in like manner as that of national elections.

¹⁰⁵ One effective means by which the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) does so is through a 'constitution game' which is usually played amongst students of senior high schools. This is a board game where every play sees one student ask the other a question [the questions being pre-framed on a number of cards, so that the student asking the question would need to select from one of these] concerning an aspect of the constitution. A right answer would see a player advance in the game, and a wrong, the reverse. And these games are organized as annual competitions amongst public high schools in the country. Besides this, the NCCE organizes also public lectures, seminars, and workshops to orient the public on matters of the constitution. For instance, when the government purposes to undertake constitutional amendments, the NCCE works the public to receive their views and opinions on said amendments.

¹⁰⁶ The same is also called 'Friday Wear,' and is likewise worn by school children on Fridays [i.e., some basic schools maintain a special kind of uniform made of such fabric, which is worn by their pupils on Fridays].

¹⁰⁷ This is particularly characteristic of the Akan ethnic group, which also is the largest in the country. The same naming scheme is practiced also amongst other ethnicities,

albeit in a slightly different fashion. For instance, the Akans call boys and girls born on Wednesday as *Kwaku* and *Akua* respectively; whereas the Fantes call the same *Kweku* and ‘*Ekua*,’ and the Ewes, *Awuku* and *Aku*.

¹⁰⁸ Although presently, the ethnic composition of the national teams is becoming a matter of contention in public discourses. That is, there are some who argue that the selection of players is done to favor persons from particular ethnicities over others, - which argument does indeed hold substance, considering the fact that the national teams have been consistently dominated by players from the Akan ethnic group - though, of course, these have not been without talent.

¹⁰⁹ The supporters of rival teams sometimes antagonize one another, but this is usually done within the limits of soccer only.

¹¹⁰ This provides income also for owners of satellite TV, who usually invite the public to view such live fixtures at a fee.

¹¹¹ This besides, soccer is enjoyed by many Ghanaians simply as a pastime activity. And for this cause also, many young people in Ghana are particularly fond of soccer video games, such as FIFA and PES.

¹¹² Cf. other added discussions on the same in: ‘Appendix C/C2/POLI/GVPO/OB-1/a.’

¹¹³ Cf. a discussion of the same in Owiredu 1957, 295-9; 1964, 142-5. Albeit cf. Joseph M. Kaufert (1980, 65-74) who in an empirical study of Ghanaian university students observed that their ethnic identities tended to vary in different situational contexts. For example, there were instances where some identified themselves as Northerners or Southerners [i.e., along superethnic or regional lines]; and in other contexts, as ‘Akan-speaking’ or ‘Ewe-speaking’ [i.e., along linguistic lines]; and in other instances, as a ‘Fante,’ or a ‘Ga’ [i.e., along tribal lines]; besides other identifications along township and kinship lines (cf. a general restatement of the phenomenon in Barrows 1974, 287-8; Mitchell 1966, 58-60).

¹¹⁴ Cf. thus Klineberg and Zavalloni (1969, 224) who in a study of Ghanaian university students noted that “both tribal and national identity had meaning for these students,

and that little or no sense of conflict was experienced between the two.” Cf. also Wallerstein 1960, 129-39; Hurd and Johnson 1967, 55-79; Hayward 1972, 40-59, for related discussions on the same.

¹¹⁵ In this, children in basic schools are required to study the language of the commune wherein the school is located. Then at high school, they are provided the option of specializing further in said language, assuming they opt for a school within the same region.

¹¹⁶ More also, the convenience of being able to communicate in one's local language, and the identification which goes along with the same makes this particularly possible. And this promotes national unity, in that when people are able to access said support in their ethnic localities to engage in productive enterprises, they are less likely to migrate to urban centers in search of jobs – which usually are nonexistent. So that instead of ending up in the city with little provision and income – and being incensed against the government as a result, they could enjoy a fairly comfortable life in their ethnic localities, and be satisfied with their lot in the country.

¹¹⁷ Such striving for success is foremost so people could do well for themselves – they being convinced that it is a ‘whom-you-know’ country [i.e., the popular perception that one is likely to secure employments, contracts, credits, etc., when one has ‘friends in high places,’ – to wit, when one knows or is known by persons in authority. Which means therefore that persons which boast of no such ‘friends’ – and that includes a greater majority of the population – have nothing but their hard work and self-effort to help them get by in the country]; but also so they could, upon their elevation to positions of authority, help their kinsmen and fellows rise higher as well [cf. a restatement of the same in Sklar 1967, 5; Ladouceur 1979, 251).

¹¹⁸ And this promotes national unity, in that people are inspired to achieve something for themselves and their families – the conditions being ripe for them to do so, rather than blame their problems and deprivations on the government; but also because people would be the more disposed to attributing one's prominence or success to one's hard work and diligence, rather than to the same's ethnic affiliation – thus offsetting strife and contention in the country.

¹¹⁹ This must be understood of course to mean persons that one is not presently acquainted with, though even where acquainted, one is unlikely to relate as freely as one would another from one's own tribe. It may be said that the reason for said decorum is the feeling of uncertainty that people generally harbor towards persons from different tribes, so that because they are unable to predict said persons' behavior, being 'nice' becomes a practical means by which any form of 'unsavory' behavior by the latter is obviated [cf. a restatement of the same in Habyarimana et al. 2007, esp. 723-4, but also 'Appendix C/C2/ SOCI/SONV/OB-1/d']. And it is probably also the reason why inter-tribal marriages are to date not so common in Ghana: it is because most people do not believe they could dwell together and become one – in mind and soul – with another who is culturally different from themselves [cf. also Price 1974, 173-204, for related discussions on inter-tribal marriages in Ghana].

¹²⁰ Not that the state does not concern itself with the education of children in the country, for presently, basic- and high school education in public schools is free for all Ghanaians. What we mean by 'spared' is that the responsibility for the education of children is borne foremost by the family – particularly tertiary education, where governmental support is minimal or nonexistent. And even in basic- and high schools where government bares the cost of tuition- and boarding fees, the family still caters for all other expenses of the child, including uniforms, books, pocket money, health, miscellaneous items, and the like.

¹²¹ And this is perhaps a reason why unemployment is particularly pervasive in Ghana. It is because the primary motivation for seeking work, which is sustenance, is catered for by one's family and friends, so that it is possible for people to survive for many years without a job. But this also means that people would not have enough financial means to, say, start family, so that the institution of marriage may be impacted as a result.

¹²² And this is owed paramountly to the centralized nature of the governmental system. For because all decisions are made from the center, a lot of bureaucracy and nepotism ensues as a result, so that individual requests may not always receive a fair hearing, and/or be processed in a timely fashion.

¹²³ On this, and other related statements on ethnicity in Ghana, cf. Sandbrook [2000], 52, 64; Barrows 1974, 288; Gyekye 1997, 98-9; Kuada 1994, 173; Arthur 2009, 68; Boafu-Arthur 2006, 365-6;

¹²⁴ This term derives from the Ga language and means ‘three pence fare.’ Its etymology dates back to colonial days when local farmers, following the high prices charged by government-controlled municipal buses, began to operate private buses to carry their produce directly to the coast. Thenceforth, the term came to be generally applied to all private vehicles that were in the business of transporting people and goods on public roads.

¹²⁵ And this offers a ‘practical’ means, particularly because there are not many avenues in the country – as recreational centers, social hubs, etc. – whereby people may establish personal contacts with others.

¹²⁶ The same practice is observed also with taxi fares, but this is more because of the traffic situation in the country, which makes it practically impossible for taxis to use the cost meter. Wherefore this practice is mainly observed at urban centers: for in rural and suburban areas, taxis usually ply by fixed route fares (cf. the interesting and insightful field study by Kristin Michelitch 2015, 43-61, for added statements along these lines).

¹²⁷ Ideally, urbanization as a social mobilization process tends to isolate persons one from the other, or as Professor Karl Deutsch puts (1961, 494) it, “raises significantly the frequency of impersonal contacts.” Therefore, such subtle forms of interpersonal communication as these help to strengthen the bonds of society, and facilitate national integration (cf. Poggi 1972, 59).

¹²⁸ Of course, both functions could be, and sometime are, performed by a single person.

¹²⁹ Presently however, these values are being phased-out by technology: for there are now electronic devices which could perform many of these culinary tasks – and that, faster also – so that more people may now prefer to, or better, are now able to cook by themselves without employing the services of another.

¹³⁰ Not that such combination is mandated by law, as was the Roman Republic during the Plebeian Revolution where the *lex Genucia* made it mandatory for one of the two annually-elected consuls of the State to be a Plebeian (cf. Essay I, Note 126), but is observed ceremonially out of good will, – to promote national peace and unity. But of course, not all regimes have been thus configured. Actually, such Christian-Islam configuration of the President and Vice may be said to have effectively commenced in 2000, following the election of John A. Kuffour and his Vice, Aliu Mahama. The previous regimes have not been thus paired: to wit, the 1992 government of Jerry J. Rawlings and his Vice, Kow N. Arkaah; and the 1996 government by the same pair, though in the latter case, the Vice was ‘fired’ by the President in 1998, and replaced by John E. Atta-Mills, who would also be elected president of the country a decade later.

¹³¹ Cf. for instance the survey report by the Ghana Statistical Service (2019, 15-6) where about 80 percent of the population were shown to be Christians; 16 percent, to be Muslims; and the rest, to be of other ‘traditionalist’ religious orientations.

¹³² As also other charismatic churches and denominations as the Church of Pentecost, the Christ Apostolic Church, Jehovah’s Witness, Assemblies of God, Deeper Life, Lighthouse Chapel, amid many others (cf. McCauley 2013, 1-21; Omenyo 2002, 90-7; Baëta 1962, 60-4; Turner 1967, 13-22, for a discussion of the same).

¹³³ Otherwise, they are also featured abundantly on the media – on the radio, and on TV. Moreover, most public events, such as receptions, workshops, and conferences are usually commenced and ended with a prayer to God.

¹³⁴ For example, during the ‘Ghana at 50’ anniversary celebration, the nation distributed customized ‘Good News’ Bibles to all citizens of the country, *free of charge*.

¹³⁵ The first stanza of the national anthem which usually is sang in basic schools, and which essentially is a prayer to God, reads as follows: "God, bless our homeland Ghana / And make our nation great and strong / Bold to defend forever / The cause of Freedom and of Right / Fill our hearts with true humility / Make us cherish fearless honesty / And help us to resist oppressor’s rule / With all our will and might for evermore [Amen].”

¹³⁶ The national pledge reads as follows: “I promise on my honor / To be faithful and loyal to Ghana my Motherland / I pledge myself to the service of Ghana / With all my strength and with all my heart / I promise to hold in high esteem our heritage / Won for us through the blood and toil of our fathers / And I pledge myself in all things / To uphold and defend the good name of Ghana / So help me God.”

¹³⁷ And we may also add the preamble of the current Constitution of the country, which begins with the words: “in the name of the Almighty God.”

¹³⁸ Some schools in Ghana may indeed be labelled ‘Christian’ or ‘Islamic,’ to the extent that they are independently organized by said religious traditions. For instance, the orthodox churches, namely the Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican, and Catholic have their own schools which are named after them, as: the Presbyterian Boys High School, or the Wesley Girls High School (which is Methodist), or the St. Thomas Aquinas High School (which is Catholic), or the Kumasi Anglican High School, just to name a few. The same is true also for schools organized under the auspices of the Islamic Council, as: the T. I. Ahmadiyya Girls High School, the Hamdanniya Islamic High School, the Al-Azariya Islamic High School, amid others. The remainder of schools may be termed ‘secular,’ in so far as they do not identify with any religious sect, and are solely managed by the district, municipal, or metropolitan assembly wherein they are located. Wherefore also they are usually named after said localities, as for example: Ada Senior High School, Keta Senior High School, Aburi Girls Senior High School, etc.

¹³⁹ Howbeit this course is offered only to students enrolled in the liberal arts program, not to those in the natural sciences.

¹⁴⁰ Most radio stations in Ghana usually reserve the early hours of the morning, [i.e., between 6am to 11am] for such purpose, during which time they review newspaper articles, interview persons-of-interest, and receive contributions from the public by way of phone calls-ins.

¹⁴¹ That is, in-person dialogues at the studios of radio stations.

¹⁴² Cf. a discussion of the same in Alidu and Gyekye-Jandoh 2016, 1-27; Arthur 2010, 203-26. Also, on how mobile telephony facilitates such virtual public deliberations, cf.

Wasserman 2011, 146-58; Tettey 2011, 19-35; Goggin and Clark 2009, 585-97; Castells 2009, 413; Hermanns 2008, 74-82; Bivens 2008, 113-29; Gibson 2009, 289-99; though it must be noted that the cost of mobile telephony may mean that not all persons are able to partake in said deliberations, i.e. the rich, and more generally, persons in urban regions, may be able to do so more than the rural poor (cf. Neumayer and Stald 2014, 117; Walton and Donner 2011, 118).

¹⁴³ Cf. added statements on the same in: ‘Appendix C/C2/MDIA/DIMO/OB-2/b.’

¹⁴⁴ This is a beauty pageant for young maidens in the country. But far from being a regular beauty pageant, the contestants engage the public weekly in cultural practices that are characteristic of the ethnicity to which the former belong, by which means also the public is oriented on said practices.

¹⁴⁵ This is a singing contest for young aspiring musicians.

¹⁴⁶ This is a contest for bodybuilders and weightlifters, though in theory, any adult male could endeavor to partake therein.

¹⁴⁷ This is a contest where young children below the age of 12 display their talents in singing, dancing, poetry recitals, etc.

¹⁴⁸ This is a contest for Christian choral bands and singing groups.

¹⁴⁹ And for this cause, they are the more viewed by the public, as each region tends to desire that their representative would emerge as winner. In the process however, they serve as a means by which people are acquainted with the cultures and values of other ethnicities.

¹⁵⁰ And we may include also ‘Di Asa’ [lit. trans., ‘do the dance’] by Atinka Television, which is a contest wherein plus-sized market women are invited to dance to the tune of a song before an adoring public.

¹⁵¹ Cf. for instance Ichino and Schündeln (2012, 292-307, esp. 304-6), who in a study conducted during the 2008 Voter Registration in Ghana found that the presence of registration observers at the centers influenced the behavior [i.e., in a positive sense] of electoral officials, party agents, and voters, more generally.

¹⁵² Cf. added discussions on the subject matter in Temin and Smith 2002, 585-605; Gyimah-Boadi 1999, 409-27; Nugent 2001a, 85-106; Kasoma 1995, 537-55, though the ruling party is usually granted greater media coverage than opposition parties during election periods, – probably because of the former’s command of state resources [cf. Bofo-Arthur 1999, 77-92, for added statements on said ‘incumbent advantages’ in Ghana].

¹⁵³ Trade unions in the country chiefly resort to work strikes as a way of negotiating with the government, particularly on matters relating to wages and salaries.

¹⁵⁴ The ‘air-conditioned office’ is important because of the particularly sunny nature of the country’s climate, which makes people the more desirous of working within the comforts an office than without.

¹⁵⁵ More also, most families tend to harbor high expectations for their educated wards, and would usually dissuade them from taking up a job offer below a certain pay grade – they being desirous of reaping a good return on their wards’ education. Whereas those who have had little or no formal education are seldom unemployed because they are usually willing to accept any job prospect that may come their way.

¹⁵⁶ This is the more so because persons who take up such employments are thought to have done so because they lacked the capacity to succeed in the school system. And because educated persons are often held in high repute for their intellect, it is usually the case that persons engaged in such employments are looked down upon as not being ‘smart enough’ for skilled employment. Yet some of such occupations, as cocoa farming for example, present great opportunity for upward mobility, as was also noted by Martin L. Kilson, Jr. (1958, 373) who observed that said farmers were amongst the ‘upper tenth’ of the population, besides commanding a standard of wealth that was comparably high by Western standards. But as David Kimble (1963, 62) rightly noted, employment in the formal sector was effectively portrayed by the British as the hallmark of civility, as was also the ‘suit and tie’ which went along with it, so that these came to be much preferred and desired over time, compared to occupations in the ‘non-formal’ sector.

¹⁵⁷ And this is the more reason why it might be expedient for the education ministry to periodically review course offerings by universities to ensure that these are consonant with the market situation of the country, and/or that the knowledge acquired therein could be put to practical use, so as to be rewarding for the graduates in question. Howbeit, some scholars have argued that such phenomenon was the natural corollary of education expansion: to wit, that education expansion, like an increase in the supply of paper money, resulted in a form of ‘academic inflation’ or ‘a devaluation of education,’ where more education was required to ‘buy’ employment in a given job position (cf. Carlsson 1958, 123-6; Williams 1965, 490-2; Kotschnig 1937, 173-8). Cf. added statements on the same in: ‘Appendix C/C2/ECON/UNEM/OB-1/a-f.’

¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the experience and expertise that foreign studies provides cannot be understated, and where said persons are able to return to the country after their studies, they are the more prepared and equipped to contribute meaningfully to national development.

¹⁵⁹ This is principally a result of the ‘one-size-fit-all’ nature of the school system, which does not effectively take into account the fact that not all persons are endowed with the intelligence needed for success in the school system, and so does not provide avenues for young children to harness their skills and talents in other creative areas, as say singing, dancing, soccer, ministry, pottery, painting, entrepreneurship, amid others [cf. an elaborate discussion of the same by Sir Ken Robinson (2009, 1-26, esp. 9-17)]. So for instance, children that do not make it through the school system have few avenues for pursuing their interests in other relevant areas. Moreover, the technical and vocational training institutes, which originally were conceived to provide the opportunity for doing so, have become very much structured like the formal school system, with tests, grades, and examinations being the order of the day.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. added statements on this fact in Tangri 1992, 97-111; Bonga-Bonga and Ahiakpor 2016, 153-72, esp. 165; Boix 2011, 809. Also worth mentioning are nonprofit organizations and international donor agencies which supplement the efforts of government in the fields of education, health, social welfare, and rural development,

cf. Whitfield 2005, 641-64; Kamstra and Knippenberg 2012, 583-609; Briggs 2012, 603-24; Killick 2008, 20-35.

¹⁶¹ Albeit cf. the World Bank's (2020, 101) recent *Ease of Doing Business* report which noted that Ghana, by converting a portion of the recoverable value added tax into two new levies payable to the Ghana Education Trust- and the National Health Insurance- Funds, has made taxes more complicated and costly for firms and businesses.

¹⁶² More also, said private corporations and enterprises provide means of livelihood – by way of employment – for a considerable number of persons in the country, and so ease the burden on government in this respect, cf. Chalfin 1996, 421-40; Gyimah-Boadi 1991, 193-208.

¹⁶³ Cf. a discussion of the same in Kopiński et al. 2013, 583-601; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012, 94-108.

¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, such informal business activities are regulated by law, and persons engaged therein are required to pay taxes notwithstanding.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. a discussion of the same in Hart 1973, 61-89; 1976, 488-97.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. a discussion of the same in Atiemo 2006, 142-63; Nketiah 1957, 15-7. For examples of such music, cf. Gyan 1981, 17-38; Bediako 1993, 13-24.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. a discussion of the same in Geest and Asante-Darko 1982, 27-35; Collins 1976, 62-8; Coplan 1978, 96-114; Nketiah 1958, 21-7; 1963, 10-4. For examples of such music, cf. Nketiah; 1974, 189-205; 1988, 53-86, esp. 63-78.

¹⁶⁸ Such 'local music' – as they are popularly called, are chiefly propagated by the media, but particularly, radio stations.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. added statements on the same in: 'Appendix C/C2/MDIA/MUMO-/OB-1/c, /OB-2/b.'

¹⁷⁰ By ICT learning is to be understood the learning of computer hardware components, as also operating systems, and software application packages.

¹⁷¹ And in this, persons learn more advanced modules as website creation, software application development, computer programming and coding, and information systems analysis and design.

¹⁷² The nation's premier telecom company – Ghana Telecom - sold 70 percent of its stakes to Vodafone Group PLC in 2008, so that presently the nation is without a local mobile service provider. Cf. also ‘Appendix C/C2/TECH/MOTL/OB-1/a,’ for added statements on the same.

¹⁷³ This has also offered opportunities for many locals to work as vendors and operators of said money- and credit transfer service. Cf. added statements on the same in: ‘Appendix C/C2/TECH/MOTL/OB-1/c.’

¹⁷⁴ And rightly also, this form of mobility has been termed as ‘forced’ mobility, because it is impelled by the forces so named, as opposed to ‘pure’ mobility, where persons relocate voluntarily, – usually as a result of a change of their statuses (cf. esp. Yasuda 1964, 16). For a discussion on how said forced mobility was the result of modernization, cf. Lipset and Bendix 1959, 11-75; Westoff et al. 1960, 375-85; Sorokin 1927, 414-80; Schumpeter 1955, 127-9; Pirenne 1953, 501-17.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. a discussion of the same in Tettey 2017, 685-94.

¹⁷⁶ More also, the wide spread of the internet has made it possible for students to access foreign scholarship- and job opportunities online, and for businesses to expand their market base for products and services; as also the emergence of online transport- and delivery services as Uber, Glovo, Bolt, Avis, etc. Cf. other added statements on the same in: ‘Appendix C/C2/TECH/INTR/OB-2/a-d.’

¹⁷⁷ But of course, the wide spread of the internet has its vices as well. For instance, the fact that the service could be accessed via mobile-enabled devices means that parents are not always able to monitor the contents accessed by their wards. Thus, most young people, but especially teenagers, are often tempted to visit sites that may be deleterious to their moral and psychosocial development. Besides this also, many persons are wont to download media illegally through torrent sites – which thing greatly inhibits foreign investments in the country, although the culprits frequently claim that it is because financial institutions in the country do not allow debit cards

to be used for online purchases; and/or that the cost of such is too expensive, when considered in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. A third is hacking, which quite palpably, need no further expatiation. Cf. added statements on the same in: 'Appendix C/C2/TECH/INTR/OB-3/a-d.'

¹⁷⁸ Cf. for instance Professor Fred Hayward (1976, 446-51) who documented a similar finding in his empirical study of the country. Also, for added statements on how social media may be employed to facilitate political communication during elections, cf. Akoh and Ahiabenu 2012, 349-65; Tenhunen 2011, 398-420; Campbell and Kwak 2011, 1005-24; Bailard 2009, 334; though the technical and sophisticated nature of some web applications may mean that the educated, more than the uneducated, are able to employ its use in said communication (cf. Rotberg and Aker 2013, 112). More also, the cost of mobile services may further restrict its access to the wealthy, or to persons resident in urban centers, so that these only are able to partake in political discourses, and/or contribute to social issues.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. a restatement of this fact in Asafu-Adjaye 1958, 184.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. added statements on this point in Sutton 1984, 41-62; Kleist 2011, 629-47; Boafo-Arthur 2003, 125-53. George M. Bob-Milliar (2009, 543) has noted in his essay that Chiefs, besides promoting the learning of cultural norms and values, help to facilitate socio-economic development within their communities – to wit, undertake varied forms of development projects and initiatives, - as the building of educational- and health centers, the supply of clean drinking water, the repair of roads, etc.; which thing they are able to do through material and human resource mobilization from their local and expatriate communities, and/or through funding support from government and other nonprofit organizations (cf. also Brempong and Pavenello 2006, 6, for a restatement of the same). Howbeit chiefs are not at all omnipotent, nor may they choose to elevate themselves above accepted norm and custom. As Kofi A. Busia (1968, 184) noted in his seminal study of Ashanti chiefs, there exist stringent procedures in place for deposing chiefs who were found to be lacking in performance or integrity.

¹⁸¹ For a detailed account of the form and significance of these festivals, cf. Odotei 2002, 17-34; Lentz 2001, 47-72.

¹⁸² For an interesting discussion of how Christianity influences moral behavior in Ghana, cf. Bediako 1989, 58-65; 1995, 172-88.

¹⁸³ And for this cause, the *Constitution* (Chap. VI, Art 39, Sec. 1-2) mandates the State to take necessary steps to: i) encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the conscious introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning; and, ii) to ensure that appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an integral part of the growing needs of the society as whole; [...] and that traditional practices which are injurious to the health and well-being of the person are abolished.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. a discussion of the same in Geest 2016, 190-201; 2002, 3-31.

¹⁸⁵ Amongst the Akans, for example, taboos exist in two forms, namely: *akyiwade*, [lit. trans., a forbidden or prohibited act, as hunting down a pregnant animal]; and *musuo* [lit. trans., an abominable act, as incest]. According to Christian A. Ackah (1988, 99), such taboos are obeyed unconditionally by members of the society because of the fear that a defiance would prompt an automatic punishment from a supernatural deity. The Akan society further believe in totems [called locally, *akyeneboa* or *atweneboa*] which are spirits that work through animal figures [as Crows, Leopards, Bats, Parrots, Hawks, etc.] and are believed to represent entire clans. And owing to the significance of totems in most traditional societies, it is usually prohibited for one to hunt or kill totemic animals (cf. Freud 1918, 3-4). This however has led to the protection of said animal species. For instance, the Monkey Sanctuary at Boabeng-Fieman has been preserved over the years because the monkeys therein are believed to be the children of deities (cf. Adu-Gyamfi 2011, 149). The same is true also for the Osudum sacred groove in Aburi-Akuapem, which is believed to be home to the river deity *Osudem Ama*. Because human activity within this groove is believed to bring bad omens on the entire community, the inhabitants of Osudum are restrained from hunting and farming therein. As a result, the groove has provided habitation and protection for endangered species of plants and animals (cf. Awuah-Nyamekye 2009, 259; 2014, 101). Moreover, in most Akan communities, farming is prohibited on Thursdays because that day is regarded the resting day of the earth deity *Asaase Yaa*. Thus, any form of

farming activity is believed to incur the anger of the same and result in poor harvest and crop yield. Relatedly, the belief in *nsuo bosom* [lit. trans., ‘water deity’] amongst Akan coastal communities has led to taboos restricting fishing and laundry on Tuesdays, as well as the use of metal equipment and poisonous chemicals in fishing [cf. esp. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, Vol. III, Sec. 1533-42, for an interesting discussion of how said superstitious beliefs are employed to influence behavior in society].

¹⁸⁶ The word ‘adinkra’ is from the Twi language of the Akan people, and means ‘farewell’ or ‘goodbye.’ It was so named because the symbols were formerly only employed on funeral cloths worn by royalty and spiritual leaders. Today however, said symbols have taken on a broader meaning so that they are employed not only on funeral cloths but also on festive ones, as well as on artifacts such as pottery, sculpture, furniture, etc.

¹⁸⁷ Also on the second highest currency denomination – the GHS 100 – is the adinkra symbol *dwannini mmen*, which literally translates, ‘ram’s horn:’ – depicting strength and humility.

¹⁸⁸ Other of such symbols include, *Ananse Ntontan* which translates, ‘spider’s web,’ depicting wisdom and creativity – as the spider is largely held to be; *Denkyem*, which translates, ‘crocodile,’ depicting adaptability – because the crocodile is amphibious; *Boa Me Na Me Mmoa Wo*, which literally translates, ‘help me and let me help you,’ depicting cooperation and interdependence; and, *Mate Masie*, which literally translates ‘I hear, I hide,’ but better, ‘I keep that which I hear,’ denoting discretion, fidelity, and prudence.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. bibliographical reference in: Nkrumah, Kwame. “Why the Queen’s Head is Coming Off Our Coins.” *Daily Sketch*, 20 June 1957, p. 12.

¹⁹⁰ In relation to this proverb, Emil Rado (1986, 564) interestingly asked in his essay that: “what of those animals which once had a tail but lost it, who grooms their bodies for them?” Speaking, of course, of the need for government to offer interventions to persons who had waxed poor in the nation by un- or underemployment.

¹⁹¹ Another popular story which probably every child in Ghana has heard before is that of the stone and the gold dust. It is said that the young men of a village were asked one time by their chief to go over to the market square and collect hewed stones for the building of a palace. The stones were of various sizes, and the men were told to carry as many as they could – they were to be engaged in this work the whole day. Now those who were indolent went for the small stones, and sluggishly carried it to the village, whilst the hardworking ones went for the bigger stones, and did so hurriedly, so that they ended up carrying many stones back to the palace. Now at the end of the day’s work, the chief told them that everyone’s reward was hidden within the stone(s) they had carried - for he had asked a stone cutter a day before to secretly plant some gold dust within each stone in proportion to its size. Thus, it so happened that those which labored in the work and carried many large stones back to the village were enriched by their hard work, whilst the indolent ones found nothing at all in their little stones. And this story is told to teach that there is great reward in industry, even when one does not presently see a gain in sight.

¹⁹² And this has chiefly been promoted by the internet. For whilst the government can and do control the broadcast contents of radio- and TV stations, it is usually not able to do so when it comes to the internet. And coupled with the increase in education attainment, many of the younger generation are now able to access foreign content – as TV shows, movies, clip videos, digital magazines, and the like – with relative ease. And these ways of life they usually adjudge to be better than their own, probably because such nations are generally perceived as civilized and developed – hence, the imitation.

¹⁹³ Whilst this may be true, – in the sense that women are not forced or required to do so, the strong influence of religious and cultural orientations continue to consign them to this role. For instance, the Bible instructs wives to be submissive to their husbands, to bear children, and to keep the house [on submission, cf. *Ephesians*, Chap. V, Vrs. 22-4; *Colossians*, Chap. III, Vrs. 18; *1 Peter*, Chap. III, Vrs. 1-6, esp. 1, 5; *1 Corinthians*, Chap. XIV, Vrs. 34-5; on procreation, cf. *Titus*, Chap. II, Vrs. 3-5; *1 Timothy*, Chap. II, Vrs. 9-15, esp. 15; Chap. V, Vrs. 3-15, esp. 14]. And to the extent that such views are continually held and propagated by the church, women attendees and believers may feel obliged to adhere to the same [although this may apply more

for the uneducated than the educated; cf. for instance the study by Professor Gerhard Lenski (1953, 533-44) which found that the upwardly mobile were less likely to show much interest in (and so be influenced by) religion than the stable or downwardly mobile, which means that highly educated women were, by virtue of their academic and professional attainments, less likely to conform to said mores. Nevertheless, to the extent that the upwardly mobile may want to have their children succeed them in high positions, may mean that they are likely to evince some interest in procreation]. And as regarding cultural norms, a woman who is unmarried and without children is doubly held in low esteem [for both are expected of every woman, so that those who are without either, to wit, are married but are without children, or are with children but are not married, are generally scorned and deprecated]. Albeit cf. Emmanuel K. Akyeampong (2000, 227), who notes that the assertiveness of women in the nuclear family has more to do with the increasing decline of men's real wages, which has engendered the need for women to help out financially in the household [cf. other related statements on the subject matter in Bortei-Doku 2000, 321-43; Clark 2000, 717-29; Manuh 1994, 61-77.

¹⁹⁴ But as is to be expected, this trend is more pronounced in urban regions than it is in rural ones (cf. Ghana Statistical Service 2019, 23-5), probably because of the former's exposure to modernizing trends. Howbeit, as regards to persons who have never had any form of education, females tend to outnumber males in both areas of the country – although this may also be because there are more females than there are males in the country (cf. for instance, *ibid.*, 8, where the percentage of females to males is estimated at 52 to 48). Albeit, there continue to exist grave differences in gender roles in the informal economy, particularly at urban centers. For instance, *all* 'trotro' minibuses drivers are males, and about 98 percent of food vendors, or traders of food items, are females.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. the insightful essay by Ragnhild Overå 2007, 539-63, esp. 546-60, for interesting depictions of changing gender roles amongst Ghanaians in the formal and informal economy.

¹⁹⁶ This constitutes the partial or total removal of the clitoral glans which is believed to incite young women into pre-marital sexual relations. By 'mutilating' this part of

the female genitalia, it is believed that young women would keep at home and remain chaste until the time of their espousals. The procedure however presents severe health risks to women such as complications in childbirth, urinary- and menstrual problems, tetanic infections, psychological disorders, etc.

¹⁹⁷ These widowhood rites take many forms, and differ across cultures. For instance, in some tribes, women, following the death of their husbands, are expected to wear mourning cloths [which usually are black or red in color] for a period of a year [although the same is not required of the husbands]. Widows are usually confined in dark rooms during the first month of said period, at which time they sleep on reed mats and are given large stones for their pillows. Thereafter, they are allowed out, but must abstain from cooking and eating certain types of meals. Amongst northern tribes, the widow is obliged to hold a calabash – which is a representation of her deceased husband – when going out of her room, to depict her bearing the burden of his demise. Also, she must take her meals from said calabash, and may only take their bath in cold water. In some tribes also, but particularly amongst the Gas, the widow is asked during the mourning period to drink of the water used in bathing her deceased husband. And this is done, usually as a test of the widow's innocence: to prove that she had no hand in the death of her husband [which thing is fashioned after a similar procedure in the Bible, though wrongly employed, cf. *Numbers*, Chap. V, Vrs. 11-31]. There is also the test of love, where the widow is made to sleep in the same room with her deceased husband for a day or two, and the idea behind this is that if the woman truly loved her husband, then she would entertain no fears whatsoever in sleeping with his corpse alone in the dark. In extreme cases also, the widow is heckled by relatives of the deceased husband, in that they try to inflict some form of pain on her, as strangling her neck with bare hands, or putting pepper in her eyes - particularly when they have reason to believe that she had a hand in the death of her husband. But at the end of one full year, the widow, after having endured all afflictions of the period, is taken to the beach at dawn and given a bath with sea water. Thereafter, she puts off the mourning cloths, and puts on 'white' or bright cloths – signifying her fulfillment of the days of mourning for her late husband. At this time also, all relations with the deceased husband and his family are effectively severed, and the widow is thereby granted liberty to remarry, work, and rejoin society as aforetime. Presently however,

widowhood rites of all forms which inflict bodily harm or cause psychological injuries to women are punishable by law in the country [cf. *Criminal Code* [Art. 29], Chap. VII, Sec. 278a, which states that “who[so]ever *shall* compel a bereaved spouse or a relative of such spouse to undergo any custom or practice that is immoral or grossly indecent in nature shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”].

¹⁹⁸ These are cuts or burns that were made to the body during childhood. And this was done for a number of reasons. The first, quite obviously, related to identification. During precolonial times, local tribes were wont to clash with one another in battles for dominance. And because such tribes tended to look alike in appearance, facial marks were a practical means by which said tribes could distinguish their members from rival groups during such encounters. There was also the reason of aesthetics: for amongst some tribes such as the Dagombas, facial inscriptions were made solely for decorative purposes. There was also the spiritual rationale. For it was held by some tribes that unseen spirits in the underworld tended to be attracted to goodly children, and would thus attempt to take such away from this life when they were born [to join them in the spirit world]. Thus, hard marks were made on the faces of said children to render them unappealing to the spirits, so the former’s life could be spared. There was also the medicinal reason. For among some tribes, when a child was born and became very sick, the medicine men were wont to make a slight incision on the right cheek of the child to allow some of his blood to ooze out, after which the cut was filled with herbal medicine to heal the child. And lastly, some tribes believed that when a child was born and died shortly afterwards, and this occurred for a second and a third time, then it was the same child that had reincarnated those three times. Therefore, when the same was born a fourth time, facial inscriptions were made to his right cheek as a way of binding him to the earth, – to prevent him from suffering the same fate again, because it was believed that after departing the earth a fourth time, he may no longer be able to return thither.

¹⁹⁹ Another also is puberty rites, which are passage rites performed for girls that have come of marriageable age, – but may one call such rites unsavory? The most prominent ones are the Dipo rites amongst the Krobos, and the Bragoro amongst the Akans, which are usually carried out in specific months of the year. When a girl has had her first menses, she is announced by her parents, but usually the mother, to the

community, – but specifically, to the queen mother. Then at a set time, said girls are sequestered for a period of about three weeks, during which time they are groomed by elderly women in the community on some vital aspects of womanhood, as childbirth, chores and housekeeping, and relations with men. Thereafter a number of ritual- and purification rites are performed to usher them into womanhood, – as the sprinkling of water on the girl with *Odwen Ahaban* [lit. trans. ‘Leaves of Odwen’] believed to drive away evil spirits that cause barrenness; the ritual bath by the seaside, where she is dipped three times into the water, to signify her transition to womanhood and readiness to bear children; the swallowing of a whole boiled egg - which she may not bite into, to ensure she would have no miscarriages during pregnancy. She is also, at some point in the initiation rites, blindfolded, and made to touch two children out of many gathered together [usually a somewhat balanced number of boys and girls]. And whatever the sexes are of the children she touches is what is believed she would bear in the course of her life [thus, if she touches a boy and a girl, then it is believed she would bear a mix of these, or if two of the same sex, then the same, as children]. Thereafter, the initiated ‘women’ are adorned all over in rich traditional garments, - save for their breasts, stomachs, and thighs which usually are left uncovered – and patrolled around the city to be congratulated and cheered by the public for their virtue, but more particularly, to be seen by young men who have come of age and are looking to choosing a bride for themselves [which is also why those parts of the body that are perceived to entice and seduce are left uncovered]. In former times, girls which were found to have ‘bruised their flowers’ before said passage rites were ostracized together with the male culprit, but nowadays, special purification rites are done them to ‘renew’ their virginity.

²⁰⁰ Not that said children are considered illegal or anything, -- only the practice is frowned upon because it is believed to breed dysfunction amongst children, i.e., it is generally doubted that parents who acted irresponsibly themselves would be able to raise up children into responsible adults.

²⁰¹ And so the Ghana Statistical Service (2019, 9) rightly recorded in its survey that only about 36.5 percent of the population were married, whilst about 44.5 percent were not. Also, a further 12.9 percent were either separated, divorced, or involved in consensual relationships. But besides the influx of foreign cultures – which makes such

acts completely acceptable to many, there are also other causes as education attainment and unemployment which tend to engender the same. As regard the former, that people spend more years in school means that they are likely to settle down at an older age, and not very many people may be willing to remain celibate until then. Also, as people are the more likely to get married when they have a stable source of income, unemployment tends to render such concubinary relationships a practical means by which people get to build a family: for why should one be expected to wait until gainfully employed before having a child, and who knows how long this might actually take?

²⁰² Cf. a discussion of this effect in Durkheim 1951, 246-54; Gutkind 1967, 380-405; Lipset and Bendix, *loc. cit.*, 64-5. Émile Durkheim (*ibid.*, esp. 252-3) for instance argued that both upward and downward mobility results in a form of status discrepancy, where one attains a high rank in one form of group affiliation, and a low one in another. So for instance, a person who has relocated from his township to take up a job offer in the city may lose his network of ethnic associations, but may earn a high income in the process. Or a recent graduate who is unemployed may be held in high repute by others for his academic attainments but may only boast of a low personal income as a result of his inactivity. According to Durkheim, such status discrepancy leads in most cases to anomie because people tend to lack the social structures needed to support their new status positions. So for instance, in the case of the former, the detachment from one's ethnic associations may mean that one is denied the support and direction that is typically provided by one's family and kin, so that the income earned in the city may not always be put to good use. And in the case of the latter, a person might either fall into depression, or might resort to 'unwholesome' ways of making money in an attempt to maintaining prestige and reputation amongst his contemporaries and acquaintances respectively.

²⁰³ According to Professor Hirschman (*loc. cit.*, 546), the tunnel effect operates because "the advances of others supply information about a more benign external environment, which information then produces gratification on the part of the deprived [about future improvements to their present condition] so that they are able to overcome, or at least suspend, their envy of the gainers."

²⁰⁴ Cf. some empirical statements on the same in Casanova 1965, 133; Tumin and Feldman 1961, 165-6.

²⁰⁵ Professor Hirschman (*loc. cit.*, 559-60) has noted that where societal cleavage lines are rigid, the people would bethink themselves as being involved in a zero-sum game. As such, the advance of one group would be perceived by the other as detrimental to the latter's well-being, particularly because the same would be led to believe that the mobile group would employ their newly acquired power and status to subvert their social and economic progress (cf. Morgenstern 1964, 578; Foster 1967, 153-5; Bettelheim and Janowitz 1950, 74-93, for related statements in this respect). Albeit other scholars have advanced the contrary view that rigid cleavage lines, as caste systems, may tend to further the operation of the tunnel effect, in so far as they may serve to offer a motivation and an incentive for members of the lower or minority classes to strive for upward mobility (cf. Lipset and Bendix, *loc. cit.*, 62-3; Srinivas 1952, 30; 1956, 483; Schumpeter 1955, 124-34, esp. 126-9, 130-2).

²⁰⁶ This means also that people are more likely to attribute one's success or achievement to merit rather than to one's ethnic, regional, or religious affiliation. And even where an individual has not been able to improve his income or position, it is yet likely that he may know several persons in his tribal group who have been successful at doing so, so that he would have little justification for blaming his lot on unfair favoritism by the state.

²⁰⁷ By 'fair and equal,' we mean in relation to matters of government. For instance, all constituencies in the country, irrespective of size, elect one representative to the nation's unicameral parliament. Also, each region, irrespective of size, is headed by one minister, and the local governments – to wit, the metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies – receive a fairly equal amount of financial allocation [based of course on their budgetary statements] from the central government. The same however cannot be said of regime policies, which quite obviously, may not be the same across regions, as ruling parties may tend to prioritize electoral bases in policy decisions, and so undertake more extensive development projects therein than in other areas.

²⁰⁸ Of course, as in every state, there are wont to be some form of disparities amongst persons. For instance, persons in urban centers are more likely to be well off than

those in rural regions, due, quite obviously, to the multitude of opportunities available in the former. Also, a person born into a wealthy and/or functional family may have a greater chance at success than another born into a deprived and/or dysfunctional one. There are also other variables, like one's IQ, and social upbringing which may tend to thrust one ahead in life. Nevertheless, because these fall outside the domains of government, - to wit, are brought about by natural causes, and/or by the pace of social mobilization, and are not directly engineered by government, one may not be able to appeal to them as probable cause for one's deprivation.

²⁰⁹ And granted, other causes are sometimes brought to the forefront. For instance, the Akans tend to be more numerous than the other ethnicities because they evolved from the once-dominant Ashanti Kingdom; the South, but particularly the Fantes, are perceived educated and civilized because of the close relations they shared with the colonizers who were mostly based along the coast; and the northern tribes may have become underdeveloped over time because they were far removed from the urban south, where all the commerce and trade took place (cf. Kimble 1963, 83—94). Thus, one may project these antecedents as probable cause for present-day hardships or fortunes. Howbeit, the legal code of the country does not discriminate against any person on grounds of ethnicity, religion, or creed, so that every child born into the country has no less opportunities, rights, or privileges as any other child, as far as the laws of the land are concerned (cf. for instance the study by Philip J. Foster (1963, 150-71, esp. 163-7) for added statements on the 'egalitarian nature' of the country's legal code, particularly with regard to education access).

²¹⁰ But by 'traditional,' it should be understood, of course, of extended family systems, where children owe binding relations not only to their parents, but also to other members of the family tree; as opposed to modern family systems, which are more nuclear in scope, and wherein children are not so obliged by custom to requite their parents, nor parents, to be wholly responsible for the financial needs of their children.

²¹¹ And for this cause also, most scholars have pointed out that the modern family system better supports economic development, because it pushes each individual to churn out a living for himself, whereas the dense network of obligations that exists in traditional family systems discourages this, as other family members could simply

recline and feed on the fortunes of the gainer (cf. Levy 1952, 123-4; Bauer and Yamey 1957, 66; Higgens 1959, 256; La Rochefoucauld 1898, 63, *Max.* XIV). Nevertheless, other scholars have argued that the individualism that is furthered by modern family systems may be detrimental to economic advance because it does not dispose people to engaging in common and joint ventures that may be necessary for societal development (cf. Hirschman 1958, 14-20; 1971, 313-6; Geertz 1963, 42-7).

²¹² Albeit cf. ‘Appendix C/C2/SOCI/SONV/OB-2/a-d,’ where other subtle factors as prayer, power outages, the transport system, and the preparation of food, were found to induce a culture of ‘waiting’ amongst Ghanaians.

²¹³ The reverse scenario has also been considered but has been deemed improbable. That is, when one experiences a good break, and this good break is attributed to chance, then this is likely to occasion the tunnel effect because others would be led to believe that their time of change would soon come. However, when one experiences a bad break, rather than for others to think that this might likewise happen to them, they would instead attribute the bad break to something the person did wrong, or did not do right, so that by avoiding said act, they would in essence be preventing the bad break from happening to them. Thus, this would have no effect on the operation of the tunnel effect, because others would continue to hope for a good break, as they attempt to avoid what they perceive the person did wrong to occasion the bad break. So for instance, if a Christian neighbor suddenly takes ill with a disease, or is met with a misfortune, others might think it is probably because he has sinned against the LORD, or did not spend more time in prayer, or did not treat someone right [and we see examples of such in the Bible, in the book of *Job* (esp. Chap. IV, Vrs. 1-21; Chap. VIII, Vrs. 1-27; Chap. XI, Vrs. 1-20, Chap. XV, Vrs. 1-35; Chap. XXII, Vrs. 1-30) where his friends blamed his misfortunes on such misdoings as these], so that rather than entertain the thought that such misfortune could happen to them, they would endeavor rather to become ‘better’ Christians by avoiding the wrongs they perceive the other did, in the hope that doing so would allow them to continue receiving good breaks from the LORD (cf. a related discussion along these lines in Shaw and Skolnick 1971, 380-3).

²¹⁴ And such hopes are nurtured and furthered by the church which, as we have seen, are actively engaged – but also sheltered – in the country. This besides, there are many lottery- and betting platforms in the country where the nonreligious could ‘try out their luck,’ and hope to win something for themselves, – thus keeping alive their hopes of a better tomorrow.

²¹⁵ This is a practice where people purportedly ‘sell their souls’ to the devil in exchange for wealth and riches. It is also sometimes called ‘blood money,’ because the process may sometimes require a person to give up a loved one [that is, to put to death - but spiritually, of course]; or where not possible, to sacrifice a part of one's body [that is, of the person desiring to undertake said ritual], - for women, mostly the womb [so they are unable to conceive], and for men, mostly the secrets [so they are unable to cause to take seed]. Also, because they sell their souls to the devil in the process, they are required from time to time to offer additional sacrifices, and/or to perform certain duties – quite encumbering, one might say. But they do almost always get the wealth and riches they desire, but lose their freedom and sanity in the process.

²¹⁶ This is a practice, mostly amongst young, tech-savvy people, where they hack into people's financial data, as credit cards, online banking credentials, etc., and use said information for their own personal purchases.

²¹⁷ That is, as relating to corruption, and embezzlement of public funds. In Ghana, this is usually done by way of over-bloated expense receipts [that is, where state executives increase the actual value of incurred expenses, so that it becomes possible to keep some part of the money for themselves]; or by contract kickbacks [that is, where a contract is awarded to the company that would be willing to pay back a percentage to a figurehead in the awarding state agency]. And public officials may indeed relate in such manner with state funds because, as Friedman and Friedman (1980, 116-7) rightly remarked, they do tend to “spend someone else’s money on someone else,” and so have little incentive either to economize [on work-related expenses chargeable to the state], or to get the best value for money [as regard to contracts and projects].

²¹⁸ As regarding hacking and political corruption, one could be indicted when caught, and charged with a lengthy prison sentence. The other we have discussed in preceding

sections, which is that one is made to sacrifice loved ones, or a part of one's organs, or one's freedom and dignity, more generally. These besides, other scholars have noted of the psychological and social impacts of high upward mobility, which may further serve to deter the non-mobile group from desiring same. For instance, most women in Ghana who are highly educated, or are celebrities, tend to face difficulties in finding a 'befitting' spouse, or where they eventually do, tend to struggle in their marriages. Also, persons who are wealthy [i.e., live in a large house, and drive a decent car] tend to face treats of armed robbery from time to time (cf. also Durkheim, 1951, 246-54; Ellis 1952, 558-63; Hollingshead and Redlich 1954, 695-701, for related statements on some anomic aspects of upward mobility).

²¹⁹ Cf. other related scriptural passages on the same in: *Isaiah* (KJV, Chap. XL, Vrs. 30-1; cf. also Chap. XLIX, Vrs. 22-3; Chap. LXI, Vrs. 3, 7) wherein is written: "Even the youths shall faint and be weary, and the young men shall utterly fall: But they that wait upon the LORD shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; and they shall walk, and not faint;" *Psalms* (*id.*, Chap. XXVII, Vrs. 13-4; cf. also Chap. XXXVII, Vrs. 9, 34) wherein is written: I had fainted, unless I had believed to see the goodness of the LORD in the land of the living. Wait on the LORD: be of good courage, and he shall strengthen thine heart: wait, I say, on the LORD;" *Zechariah* (*id.*, Chap. IX, Vrs. 12, 16) wherein is written: "Turn you to the strong hold, ye prisoners of hope: even today do I declare that I will render double unto thee [...] And the LORD their GOD shall save them in that day as the flock of his people: for they shall be as the stones of a crown, lifted up as an ensign upon his land;" *Philippians* (*id.*, Chap. IV, Vrs. 4-7) wherein is written: "Rejoice in the LORD alway: and again, I say, Rejoice. Let your moderation be known unto all men. The LORD is at hand. Be careful for nothing; but in everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus." These besides, it must be noted that the very nature of prayer [i.e., rehearsing one's cares and concerns in the ears of the LORD] may have the effect of relieving stress and depression, insofar as it offers an effective means by which one could air out grievances and resentful feelings. Cf. 'Appendix C/C2/RELI/BNRE/OB-

1/a-b,' for added statements on the benefits of religious practice, but particularly prayer.

²²⁰ And of course, it is to be expected that people would attempt to improvise in the midst of a difficult situation. Our concern however is the fact that there is a tendency for said improvisation to be overdone, so that the thing which was originally devised to deal temporarily with a problem becomes something that one gets acclimatized to over time, so that the same ever has incentive to alter the situation permanently.

²²¹ These basic meals are eaten more for sustenance than for nourishment. So, most village families in the Ada community eat mainly mashed corn and pepper, sometimes without fish, for most parts of the year. Also, some Akan village families eat mostly pounded cassava and plantain with soup, sometimes without other supplements, for most parts of the year.

²²² While such 'self-help' efforts are laudable in themselves, they may have the effect of 'shielding the government' from taking responsibility for the welfare of the people. For instance, if one could look to the LORD for one's daily bread, then one is less likely to impress upon the government to maintain a better economy, or to curb political corruption, for example. Or, if one could always get (financial) support and assistance from one's immediate family, then one is more likely to be disassociated from the politics of the country, because the same is less impacted by it.

²²³ In a related essay, Professor Hirschman (1993, 175-6) defined 'exit and voice' in this wise: the former, as: "the act of simply leaving, generally because a better good or service or benefit is believed to be provided by another firm or organization [...]; and the latter, as: "the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired."

²²⁴ On this, cf. Professor Hirschman (1970, 34) who noted that "the actual level of voice depends on the lack of opportunity for exit, [...] so that the role of voice would tend to increase as the opportunity for exit declines, and vice versa." Cf. also Oliver P. Williams (1971, 29) who noted that persons dissatisfied with their stay in a location have two *mutually exclusive* options available them: they could either move away from said location, or attempt to change its characteristics to suit their preferences.

²²⁵ On this conception of exit, to wit, the movement away from a location of discontent to a favorable location, cf. Lévi-Strauss 1944, 53-4; Evans-Pritchard 1940, 279; Marshall 1960, 17, 34-5; Turnbull 1965, 106. Taken in this respect therefore, exit may be seen as a form of ‘flight,’ and voice, as a form of staying to ‘fight,’ so that the twain may otherwise be perceived as ‘flight and fight’ alternatives (cf. Hirschman 1986, 89-90).

²²⁶ This form of exit is usually employed when there exists some alternative means by which one may minimally satisfy one's needs. In this way, one continues in his deprivation, and business is carried on as usual. Wherefore it has been severally stated that once people get used to employing said form of exit in dealing with their discontent, it becomes particularly difficult for them to resort alternatively to voice (cf. Evans-Pritchard, *loc. cit.*, 291-5; Hirschman 1970, 43; 1978, 94).

²²⁷ That is, either they lack the know-how and wherewithal to employ said means, or do not think that employing such would successfully alter their present circumstance - that is, do not think that their voices would be loud enough, or would be at all heard for that matter [cf. thus Professor Michael Parenti (1970, 522-3) who noted that one reason most deprived person do not resort to protests - that is, voice - is because “they tend to be convinced that such means is futile, - given the enormity of the conditions needing change - and hence give no political expression to their grievances”].

²²⁸ For discussions on how social justice is a public good that must needs be enjoyed by all and sundry, cf. Thurow 1971, 327-36; Morawetz et al. 1977, 511-22.

²²⁹ Nevertheless, there are instances when exit could prove more costly than voice, as in when an individual has to relocate to a new, unfamiliar location, or when a couple decide to go their separate ways after being married for many years. In both cases, the transactional costs involved in starting over from scratch may outweigh that which may be accrued from employing the voice option (cf. Hirschman 1974, 14-5).

²³⁰ Cf. thus Orbell and Uno (1972, 478-80) who found in their empirical study that owing to reasons of cost, high-status persons appeared more prone to using voice, whereas low-status persons appeared more prone to using exit. Cf. also Professor Michael Lipsky (1968, 1157) who noted that relatively powerless groups are unable to

use protests – that is, voice – with a high probability of success because they lack the organizational resources needed to be effective, to wit, are unable to afford said resources.

²³¹ This thought is taken from the Gospel of St. Matthew (KJV, Chap. XIII, Vrs. 12; cf. also Chap. XXV, Vrs. 29) wherein is written: “For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more *in* abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that *which* he hath.” Recently however, some scholars (cf. Bothner et al. 2011, 440-1) have advanced the contrary proposition – in what they call the ‘Mark Effect’ [which is taken from the Gospel of St. Mark (*id.*, Chap. X, Vrs. 31) wherein is written: “But many that are first shall be last; and the last, first”] – arguing that it is perhaps expedient that more is not always given to those who already have – which thing would only tend to greater inequality, but rather, that more is given to the less privileged, so that they too could, by such means, advance their status in society. Howbeit, these so-called ‘Effects’ must be seen to have been unduly taken out of context. In the case of the former [i.e., the Matthew Effect], our Lord Jesus Christ was surely not intimating that more should be given to those who have more, and less, to those who have less. Rather, this quote came at the end of a parable, where three servants, being entrusted with different talents in proportion to their servile abilities, generated different returns on the principal, based on their work input. Thus, our LORD was implying that to those who make the most of the little talent they have been given, shall more be added thereunto for them, whereas those who despise it, or hid it, because it presently looks small, shall, in due time, lose it entirely. And in the case of the latter [i.e., the Mark Effect], our LORD was not intimating that those who get ahead first would end up last, and those who start off sluggishly would end up first. Rather, he was implying that those who try to get ahead through untoward self-will and determinism would end up losing everything (cf. *Jeremiah*, Chap. XVII, Vrs. 11; *Ecclesiastes*, Chap. II, Vrs. 26), whereas those who try to do so patiently, with humility and compassion, would be thrust ahead in time, though they may presently be slacking behind (cf. *Matthew*, Chap. V, Vrs. 3, 5; and more narrowly also, the parable of the prodigal son, in: *Luke*, Chap. XV, Vrs. 11-32).

²³² We observe the same also with government’s eagerness and willingness to deal with trade union demands, particularly when the latter occasion strike actions. Also in

2011, when a team of graduate students established the Unemployed Graduates Association of Ghana (UGAG), the government became apprehensive and began to give much thought to graduate employment. This led ultimately to the promulgation of such initiatives as the Nation Builders Corps (NABCO), and the National Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (NEIP): the former providing capacity building and short-term job appointments for graduates; and the latter, funding for graduate start-up initiatives.

²³³ Cf. original bibliographical reference in: National Commission for Democracy. *Evolving a True Democracy: Summary of NCD's Work Towards the Establishment of a New Democratic Order*. Report Presented to the PNDC. Accra: NCD, March 1991.

²³⁴ And this was more so the case because not having any real prospects of effecting change, - because all decisions have to be handed down from the center, the dwellers therein would have less motivation to take ownership for their communes, as they are likely to think that their efforts would yield little impact. And this may also account for much of the underdevelopment of said regions: for the local government authorities there present – who are better acquainted with the day-to-day workings and exigencies of the commune, are denied the autonomy to make fiscal policy decisions therein, whereas those who do [to wit, the agents of the central government] tend to be mostly resident in city centers, so that there is usually a disconnection between what is actually needed in said communes, and what the central government is willing to provide.

²³⁵ Albeit cf. Davis and Golden (1954, 6-26, esp. 11-4) who note that the sharp divide between urban and rural regions in most pre-industrial societies has more to do with the general pace of urbanization therein, than it has to do of the political system of said societies.

²³⁶ Therefore also we find Professor Hirschman (1970, 108) asking rhetorically in his monograph, “why anyone would consider raising his voice against an issue and get into trouble when he could always remove entirely from the given environment, should it become too unpleasant.” In this respect, inner city neighborhoods have been seen as community ‘organizations,’ which though sensitive to voice, yet chose the exit option because they lacked the means and will needed to employ the former (cf. Hirschman,

ibid., 122; Orbell and Uno, *loc. cit.*, 487; Orbell and Sherrill 1969, 50-4, esp. 53). More also, the depression that most deprived persons are wont to experiencing may rob them of the confidence and self-will needed to assert themselves in the public sphere.

²³⁷ Cf. also Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 688-90, for a restatement of the same. And this is because any such inter-elite conflict is sure to dissipate the wealth of the state as whole [assuming it leads to a full-blown civil war], so that whilst one of the two may afterwards end up with absolute gains, yet may not be able to enjoy such gains perpetually: for they are sure to be met with opposition, either from the Ghanaian people – who may be experiencing an economic setback from the crisis; or from other contending political parties; whereas agreement between the two parties would, though affording relative gains, vouchsafe their continued dominance of the system.

²³⁸ More specifically, Professor Boix (*loc. cit.*, 396) noted that this was dependent on the ‘repression costs’ of the elites - to wit, the cost to be borne in repressing and containing the people. According to him, said cost would be low when "the least well off are completely demobilized, or the country's geography makes the suppression of political protest and violence relatively easy, or the government receives support from other states or external allies;" and would be high when “the poor is organized into political parties and trade unions, or live in highly mountainous terrain, which may breed the formation of guerrilla movements, or when the state has poor roads and is badly organized.” In the case of the latter, any attempt by a single faction of elites to repress the people or subvert democracy would prove too costly to be undertaken. As such, the only means by which they could hope to do so would be to join efforts together with other elites. Now whereas Professor Boix's theory may be far removed from our present discussion, it could be applied notwithstanding. For because the Ghanaian people are highly mobilized and politically conscious, it would be difficult, even impossible, for either of the two parties to wholly dominate the political scene. Thus, rather than antagonize one other to no avail, it would perhaps serve them better if they were allied together in practice – though not in the eyes of the public – so they could continue to maintain their hold on the system – although the occasional transfer of power would mean that they only get to enjoy relative, rather than absolute, gains from such undertaking.

²³⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 37) have defined such elite pacts as “an explicit [...] agreement among a select set of actors to define rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the *vital interests* of those entering into it.” Cf. also Professor Nic Cheeseman (2011, 344) who referred to the same as “the politics of pacting:” to wit, the process of generating political consensus through negotiation and compromise, which protects the interests of core parties and retains the support of key actors.

²⁴⁰ Cf. thus Professor Daniel Levine (1978, 102) who in a study of Venezuela noted that enduring elite pacts were only possible when there existed dominant political parties in the system.

²⁴¹ Higley and Burton (2006, 11) have noted that such consensus entailed a willingness on the part of elites to share basic values and norms of political behavior, and more also, to recognize bargaining as an acceptable mode of operation (cf. also Putnam 1976, 119; Pappi 1984, 85; Sartori 1987, 147, Higley et al. 1991, 36-8; Moore 1979, 673-5, for added statements in this respect).

²⁴² Cf. a related study by the same (cf. Osei 2018, 35-6), where in comparing elite networks in Ghana and Togo, she found that elites in the former were consensually united and related freely one with the other, regardless of party identifications, whereas in the case of the latter, the elites were homophilous, i.e., identified only with persons from their own political associations. In another study focused solely on Ghana, the same (i.e., Osei 2016, 62-3) found extensive formal and informal relationships amongst the two dominant parties at the constituency level, and somewhat also, at the party level.

²⁴³ A prominent example is the 26-member parliamentary appointments committee which vets the ministerial nominees of the president: for it is usually composed of an equal number of members from both parties: to wit, thirteen from each side, - so that cabinet ministers may be deemed to be persons who have the support and approbation of both parties.

²⁴⁴ The prominent ones include: the granting of tax exemptions (*1992 Constitution*, Chap. XIII, Art. 174, Sec. 3); the exemption of any class of transactions, contracts, or

undertakings relating to the exploitation of mineral resources (*ibid.*, Chap. XXI, Art. 268, Sec. 2); the annulment of any Order, Rule, or Regulation previously established (*ibid.*, Chap. IV, Art. 11, Sec. 7c); the removal of the President from office (*ibid.*, Chap. VIII, Art. 69, Sec. 11); the censoring of a Minister of State (*loc. cit.*, Art. 82, Sec. 1); the ‘re-passing’ of a bill previously refused presidential assent (*ibid.*, Chap. X, Art. 106, Sec. 10); the extending of the ‘life of parliament’ during periods of war or public emergency (*loc. cit.*, Art. 113, Sec. 2).

²⁴⁵ These are lump-sum emoluments, or what is more specifically referred to in the *Constitution* as “retiring benefits” (cf. Chap. VIII, Art. 71, Sec. 3) that are credited to Members of Parliament, – as also the President and his cabinet, and other high ranking public officials, as the Speaker of Parliament, Chief Justice, Auditor-General, etc. – after the expiration of their terms of service. Now because this is a reward granted by the state to deserving public officials, irrespective of their party affiliations, it is wont to have the effect of engendering desire on the part of both parties to work conscientiously towards the good of the state. To put in perspective, the most recent of such ex-gratia payments (i.e. in 2017) was the equivalent of about US\$48,000 for MPs, and around US\$70,000 for the president.

²⁴⁶ The Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) is an informal, non-statutory organization that comprise representatives of all political parties in the country, as also agent of the Electoral Commission. Its primary role is to serve as a forum for generating proposals for electoral reform, so as to build trust in the electoral process amongst stakeholders, – but particularly, amongst political parties (cf. esp. Asante 2013, 62-3; Frempong 2012, 62-3).

²⁴⁷ The Ghana Political Parties Programme is a joint initiative by the Ghana Institute for Economic Affairs, and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Like IPAC, it provides a safe and informal platform for politicians from across the political spectrum to dialogue and build trust with one another through the formulation of joint policies that enhance the quality of democracy in the country.

²⁴⁸ Cf. added statements on the same in Porter 1965, 528; Giddens 1975, 120; but also, Professor Crane Brinton (*loc. cit.*, 264-5) who noted that “dissensions amongst the

ruling elite class” was one of the factors which precipitated a revolution in modernizing nations.

²⁴⁹ The ‘golden handshake’ protocol is a practice where an incoming regime forbears to prosecute an outgoing regime for any misdoings whatsoever, - so that by this means, the economic interests, but also the reputation, of outgoing politicians are protected. Also, taking after the Lord Jesus Christ’s parable of the shrewd manager in the Gospel of Luke (cf. Chap. XVI, Vrs. 1-15) – but also because of the ‘winner-take-all’ electoral- and dominant two-party system – it is usually the case that a ruling party reserves some contracts specifically to members of the opposition party during the former’s term in office, in the hope that the like favor would be done them when the other comes to power. And these are subtle ways by which the two parties rub each other’s back, and thereby maintain their hold on power in the country. In the case of the latter, for example, reserving some contracts for the opposition is a way by which the one party ensures that the other could finance its activities and operations when the same is out of power.

²⁵⁰ Thus, the two dominant parties are forced by this means to be oriented towards the *gesellschaft* than the *gemeinschaft* - to use the terminology of Richard L. Sklar (1963, 474); or as Sigmund Neumann (1932, 403-5) better puts it, to become parties of “representation” than of “integration.” In both cases, the former conveys the idea of party identification based on policy interests and preferences; whereas the latter conveys the opposite idea: where identification is based more on ethnic affiliation, geographical proximity, and other such ascriptive factors, so that whereas *gesellschaft* parties may exist to serve the needs of the general body politic, the latter may exist solely to promote the interests of their ascriptive groups, and/or to conform such groups to said parties' *weltanschauung* (cf. also Duverger 1954, 124-5; Fridy 2007, 283-5; but also Koter 2013, 225-6; Mozaffar et al. 2003, 388-9; Osei 2015, 553-4, for added statements on the same).

²⁵¹ Cf. also the study by Robin Harding (2015, 682-5) who observed that the provision of ‘attributive goods,’ [i.e., public goods whose provision could be directly linked to the action or policy decision of the ruling government] – such as roads, classrooms, health centers, etc. – enhanced a regime’s chances of winning an election.

²⁵² Howbeit this was made possible because of the circumstances of the time. For the then Vice President John D. Mahama assumed the office of president for a few months in 2012 following the demise of President John E. Atta-Mills of the NDC. And winning again the presidential elections later that same year, most Ghanaians construed it as him having been in office for two terms, which was the more reason they were willing to lend their vote to Nana Akuffo Addo of the NPP four years later, barring of course the fact that the country was not in a good economic situation at the time.

²⁵³ This point was particularly emphasized by Mckown and Finlay (1976, 177) who noted that ethnic and class difference were likely to become pronounced in a country, the more possibilities for upward mobility were circumscribed.

²⁵⁴ For related statements on the efficacy of small groups to large ones, cf. James 1951, 474-7; Hare 1952, 261-8; Simmel 1950, 92; Homans 1950, 454-6; Chamberlain 1955, 347-8; Krupp 1961, 171-6. Albeit, cf. Muller and Opp (1986, 483-4) who found in their empirical study evidence against such ‘private interest theory’ of collective action. According to them, “average citizens may [in certain instances] adopt a collectivist conception of rationality because they recognize that what is individually rational is collectively irrational – and that if people like themselves were individually rational free riders, the likelihood of the success of rebellious collective action would be very small, and that, therefore, it is collectively rational for all to participate, even though the objective probability of a single individual influencing the outcome is negligible” (cf. also Barbera Salert (1976, 49) for related statements on the same).

²⁵⁵ Such small groups have been explicitly defined by George C. Homans (1950, 1) as “a group of persons who communicate with each other often over a period of time, and who are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not at second-hand, but face-to-face” [cf. also Bales 1950, 3; Verba 1961, 11-2; Cooley 1909, 23, for related statements in this respect]. And these tended to be suited to primitive societies because therein, as Robert M. MacIver (1957, 147) noted, “the social expression of interests was mainly through caste or class groups, age groups, kinship groups, neighborhood groups, and other [...] loosely organized solidarities.” Howbeit with the advancement of society, social functions came be performed by non-kinship groups as states, churches, firms, universities, etc., so that the apparent ‘loss of

function' on the part of kinship units led to their eventual phasing away in the modern society (cf. Parsons and Bales 1955, 8-9; Truman 1958, 35-6; Eisenstadt 1964, 580; 1965, 455; 1969, 454; Pennock 1966, 424).

²⁵⁶ This point was well made by George C. Homans (*loc. cit.*, 468) who remarked as follows: "At the level of the small group, society has always been able to cohere. We infer, therefore, that if civilization is to stand, it must maintain, in the relation between the groups that make up society and the central direction of society, some of the features of the small group itself."

²⁵⁷ This thought was corroborated by Michael D. Caldwell (1976, 278) who observed in a stimulated prisoner's dilemma game that the threat of sanctions raised cooperation levels amongst participants from 46% to 65%; although he was quick to add that said sanctions acted better as "deterrents, than as corrective influences."

²⁵⁸ Cf. albeit Professor Brian Barry (1970, 23-46) who remarked that such measure may have a somewhat narrow range of applicability, to wit, may prove unapplicable in some instances, as demonstrations and voting, for example; although Professor Olson (*loc. cit.*, 62) was also quick to note that such measure was more feasible in "groups of smaller size" [cf. also Karl-Dieter Opp 2009, 70-2, for added statements on the subject matter].

²⁵⁹ Professor Robyn Dawes and associates (1977, 10) have noted that the same applies also with the decision to defect. For just as a group member may be unwilling to cooperate if he has reason to believe that others may not do same, so another may be unwilling to defect if he has reason to believe that everyone else would cooperate. The latter scenario is quite interesting because it may help explain why most people would generally forebear to go against the status quo, – because they may not wish to be known as the 'defecting one' in a society of full cooperators.

²⁶⁰ Communication essentially promotes empathy and understanding amongst group members, which enhances their propensity to cooperate. Otherwise, communication also allows group members to learn of one another's motivations and intents, which enables them to make informed judgments about whether to continue in the activities of the group or to leave it.

²⁶¹ Cf. a discussion of the same in Acemoglu and Jackson [2015], 427-30, 448-9; Ostrom 2000, 148-54; Axelrod 1986, 1102-08.

²⁶² Cf. Richard A. Musgrave 1974, 625-32, esp. 629-31, for a useful discussion of the ‘work-leisure’ trade off. For instance, the same defined leisure (p. 629) as “the useful uses of time for purposes other than income-earning activity or the consumption of goods;” which means that persons actively engaged in work-related activity may not be able to make time for ‘other civic purposes.’

²⁶³ This stands in contrast to federal republics, as the United States, where each state has control over its own police force, thus making protests on national matters the more feasible, because the federal government would in this stance be unable to employ police force to ‘mute’ all dissenting voices in all parts of the country at the same time. Which is also why till date, there continue to be successive incidents of police brutality against protesters in several parts of the country.

²⁶⁴ On this, cf. Note 144-50, *supra*.

²⁶⁵ Which thing indeed is possible, as Professor John Dewey, writing in 1916, also observed with education in Germany, on which he commented as follows: “Under the influence of German thought in particular, education became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the realization of the ideal of the national state [...] *For* since the maintenance of a particular national sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior interests of the state [...] the educational process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development” (pp. 108-10) [cf. also Koff et al. (1973, 234-6, 238-9) for related statements on the integrative effects of formal education]. In the case of Ghana, the ‘disciplinary training’ promoted by the education system may be summed up in two respects, namely: regard for authority, and unquestioned obedience to rules and regulations. Albeit cf. Naomi Chazan (1978, 20-1) who in an empirical investigation of the determinants of political socialization in Ghana noted that the integrative effects of the education system may tend to be more pronounced in lower than in higher levels of education. For in the case of the latter, said she, when graduates of high school- and tertiary education are faced with the realities of unemployment, they are wont to become dissatisfied with the state, and consequently, to be unwilling to accept its authority, so that “education

may, at certain high levels, act as a barrier to absorption into political activities at the state level” (p. 20). Now whereas Professor Chazan's observation may be true to some extent, our focus notwithstanding was on the training received by pupils in basic schools, which also tends to influence much of their thinking and behavior in successive years. And whilst it may be true that un- and/or underemployed persons may hold negative sentiments against the state, these may not be in proportions that might lead them to openly oppose the state, or to seek to overthrow it.

²⁶⁶ This besides, it is likewise considered disrespectful for a youth to look an older person in the eye for a prolonged period of time, especially when the latter is doing the talking, – as conveying an advice, or giving a rebuke. And if young people are unable to look the elderly in the eye, how may they then be expected to stand up to them, or to act against them?

²⁶⁷ In most basic schools, the usual practice is that each day, the grade teacher secretly appoints three members of the class to write down the names of ‘talkatives:’ defined as persons who converse raucously and vociferously about nonacademic matters during class hours [that is, for periods that the teacher would be out of class, for they would usually forebear to talk when the same is present. Also, three listers are usually employed in the work to ensure fairness, because a single lister might be expected to spare his allies and friends]. At the end of the day, the listers deliver their lists to the teacher, and persons whose names appear concurrently on two of the lists are usually punished with some grounds work the next day.

²⁶⁸ This conditioning of the people is both systemic and pervasive. It begins in the home where children are not allowed either to raise their voices at their parents, or to talk back at them [and also to advise them, as this can only be given by the parent to the child, and not the other way around]. Then there is the school system where, besides the ‘list of talkatives’ we have already spoken about, pupils are allowed only to ask or answer questions by raising their hands, and waiting to be called upon – spontaneous speaking is usually discouraged and frowned upon by teachers. Thus, Ghanaians tend on the whole to be reserved and introverted, and would usually refrain from meddling in another’s business, or in our case, in a regime’s administrative affairs.

²⁶⁹ And so for most families, the weekends are days they get to enjoy one another's company, as there really is no other place to go, besides staying at home and watching television, or doing some house chores, as washing, cooking, cleaning, and the like. But of course, there are a great many recreational centers for families in the cities, as spas, restaurants, swimming pools, and the like, but these are privately owned and so tend to be expensive, at least for most low-income families. Notwithstanding, other factors as the extremely sunny temperature during the day, and the abundance of mosquitoes during the night may, by themselves, inhibit such rendezvous amongst persons, had said national parks been present, cf. 'Appendix C/C2/SOCI/SOCM/OB-2/d.'

²⁷⁰ Save, of course, for those cities that were inhabited by the Europeans of the colonial era, – as Osu, Cape Coast, Elmina, etc. And if a city or a town is not designed to have a center, would it be at all surprising if its inhabitants do not engage in collective action endeavors?

²⁷¹ That is, local families tend to live in small housing units that are separate one from the another. There are of course modern apartment complexes with co-sharing facilities, but these overly expensive, even for a middle-income family – as they are intended for foreign nationals and top business executives. Some of the more affordable apartments in the cities allow for persons to rent rooms which may or may not be self-containing – that is, boasting of a washroom and a kitchenette – depending on the price. Where the washroom is shared by many persons in the building, these are usually cleaned in turns by the women of the place, – the men are usually excluded from such chore.

²⁷² Of course, that is, as pertaining to Christians, but this is so stated because they comprise the majority in the country. Muslims, quite obviously, would do same at a mosque; and other secular, nonreligious persons, at a bar or club.

²⁷³ Which thing really is a mystery, considering the fact that the Great Commission was a charge for Christians to engage with the world, and not to disassociate from it (cf. *Matthew*, Chap. XXVIII, Vrs. 19-20).

²⁷⁴ Cf. Liebowitz and Margolis ([1995], 207, 211) who distinguish between remediable and non-remediable path dependence. The former, they say, is when feasible, but

superior, alternatives exist to the present path chosen, so that it is possible to ‘remedy’ the current trajectory by changing course; whereas the latter is the reverse: that is, where there exist no superior alternatives to the current path chosen, either presently, or at the time when the said path was initially chosen.

²⁷⁵ Cf. for instance Professor Douglass North (1990, 98-9) who commented in this wise as follows: “[...] at every step along a *chosen path* there are choices – political and economic – that provide [...] real alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future.” Cf. also March and Olsen (1984, 743) who, whilst conceding that “specific characteristics of political institutions are affected by historical processes,” noted also that some historical processes may either “lead to non-unique equilibria or result in unique but suboptimal outcomes.”

²⁷⁶ Albeit other scholars, as Pierson, *loc. cit.* 262; Moe 1990, 125, have noted that the difficulty may be owed to the work of political actors, who may sometimes choose to render formal institutions change-resistant in order to prevent their opponents, but ultimately themselves also, from effecting arbitrary changes to the system, - that is, from reversing 'tried-and-tested' institutional arrangements.

²⁷⁷ Cf. also Brian W. Arthur 1994, 112-3; Douglass C. North, *loc. cit.*, 95, Oliver E. Williamson 1993, 116-7, for related statements on the same.

²⁷⁸ Furthermore, it has been noted that unlike in the economic sphere [where price changes and repeated interactions facilitate learning amongst actors], little learning actually takes place in the political environment to induce a change of the status quo. As Professor Pierson (*loc. cit.*, 260) remarked, “many participants in politics (voters, members of interest groups) engage in activities only sporadically. Their tools of action are often crude, such as the blunt instrument of the vote, and their actions have consequences only when aggregated. There may be long lags and complex causal chains connecting these political actions to political outcomes. The result is that mistaken understandings often do not get corrected.”

²⁷⁹ These occurred as follows: on 7 July 1961, two bombings in the capital city Accra; on 1 August 1962, one bombing in Accra, near the village of Kulungungu [purportedly

targeted at the life of President Kwame Nkrumah]; on 9 September 1962, one bombing in Accra, near the Flagstaff House; between 18-22 September 1962, a series of bombings in Accra [claimed the lives of several individuals, and nine school children]; on 11 January 1963, a bombing at a CPP rally in Accra [claimed the lives of more than 20 persons].

²⁸⁰ This besides, the first president of the new nation did not particularly set a good example for succeeding leaders to follow suit. Unlike first presidents like George Washington of the United States, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, who played by the democratic rule book, Kwame Nkrumah moved to declare himself life president, and effectively turned Ghana into a one-party state. He also kept a revolutionary guard, and a secret police, and implemented the unpopular Preventive Detention Act, which allowed for party opponents to be detained for up to five years without trial (cf. Apter 1968, 779-87; 2008, 16-21; Zolberg [1966], 2, 82-4). And so the National Liberation Movement (NLM) which overthrew his regime remarked in this wise concerning him: "Ghana's independence and freedom meant to Kwame Nkrumah [...] personal freedom to act as his whims and fancies dictated. He resurrected the colonial District Commissioner [...] and killed democratic local government in the process. His security agents were everywhere making his oppressive presence felt in every nook and corner of this country. His District Commissioners and Party hirelings were party despots scattered all over the country to keep the people in subjection. He pressed religion into his service and came to believe he was a god. He deliberately encouraged the cult of his personality and appropriated such titles as 'Katamento,' [i.e., a covering for the body]; 'Osuodumgya' [i.e., literally, water that quenches fire; but better, a reliever of pain]; 'Oyeadieyie' [i.e., one who does things well]; 'Kasapreko' [i.e., one who is faithful and unequivocal in word and deed]. He was omnipotent. He was a god."

²⁸¹ On this, cf. Note 4, *supra*. Cf. also the seminal monograph by Giorgio Borsa (1955) for a critical discussion of the same.

²⁸² The PNDC was particularly important because, besides ruling the nation for 11 years [i.e., from 1981 to 1992], it was also the regime that immediately preceded the transition to democratic politics, so that its policies and laws may have had a great impact on national politics in succeeding years.

²⁸³ Furthermore, the ills of colonialism may have further contributed toward said disposition, as it would be naive to conceive of the Ghanaian nation solely in post-independence terms – i.e., without her ‘Gold Coast’ antecedent. For instance, the Indian anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has argued persuasively that British indirect rule had the effect of creating a ‘bifurcated state’ in Africa, where ‘settlers’ were governed by civil law, and ‘natives,’ by customary law. As he (*loc. cit.*, 18) noted, “the bifurcation of the colonial state in Africa meant that it contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights; rural power, of community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledged to enforce tradition. The former was organized on the principle of differentiation to check the concentration of power, the latter, around the principle of fusion to ensure a unitary authority.” This dualism, which was carried out through “a decentralized despotic system” effectively turned the settlers and their political aides into citizens and the rest of the masses into subjects. Thus, following independence, the ‘nationalists’ simply assumed the role of ‘the settlers’ and continued to perpetuate such dualism in the state: i.e., much of the business of politics was carried out at the center and by a cadre of elites – which also included local figureheads, as chiefs – with the rest of the ‘illiterate masses’ conditioned to follow and to look to the former for their ‘work and bread,’ thus creating a form of citizenship that was ethnic and not civic, and which guaranteed privileges for a few persons at the expense of the majority. And so Professor Mamdani (*loc. cit.*, 25) tentatively noted that “the most important institutional legacy of colonial rule in Africa was the inherited impediments it posed to democratization in the region” (cf. also Mamdani 1996, 146-50; 1999, 870-4; 2001, 653-7, for related statements in this respect).

²⁸⁴ That is, persons born into the country in 1991 would in 2021 have attained the age of 30 - the purported definitional age of a generation [although others estimate the same at 35].

²⁸⁵ This thought is, to some extent, taken from the Bible, where the LORD is often quoted as saying that he would visit the sins of the fathers on their children until the third and fourth generations (cf. *Exodus*, Chap. XX, Vrs. 5, Chap. XXXIV, Vrs. 7; *Numbers*, Chap. XIV, Vrs. 18; *Deuteronomy*, Chap. V, Vrs. 9). Now, because a century

comprises a period of three generations, it is generally held that after such period, all misdoings of the past would have given way to right ones; all wrongdoings or injustices to a group would have been forgiven and, perhaps also, forgotten; and that the people would have become acquainted with the complexities of society, so much that, put together, they would become more coherent as a people. More also, the popular proverbial sayings: “from clogs to clogs in three generations;” “three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves;” “from rice paddies to rice paddies in three generations;” “seldom three descents continue good,” “from rags to riches in three generations,” all convey the thought that a virtuous or vicious cycle is usually discontinued after three generations, or that some ‘forgetfulness’ is experienced after the same (cf. Chaucer, *The Wife of Bath’s Tale*, p. 493; Schumpeter 1955, 129; Stamp 1926, 687; Wittfogel 1957, 313; Lipset and Bendix, *loc. cit.*, 73-5).

²⁸⁶ On said statements, cf. Ake 1993, 244; Neubauer 1967, 1008-9.

²⁸⁷ Cf. for instance Professor Samuel Huntington (1988, 9) who noted that the role of political science should be “to help save the world by generating understanding of political processes, by illuminating the feasibility and consequences of alternative governmental arrangements, and by enhancing appreciation of the potentialities and the limits of political engineering.” Cf. also Professor Karl Deutsch (1971, 19) who noted adjointedly that the task of political science should be “to discover the dynamics of social and political reality, so as to be able to develop from them a dynamics of possible political and social change toward human self-determination.”

²⁸⁸ Albeit, it is quite interesting to see how his contemporary, Richard L. Sklar – an American scholar of African politics, chose the self-same resented phrase: to wit, ‘Democracy in Africa’ – for his seminal 1983 essay.

²⁸⁹ Cf. for instance the [2021 Freedom Index](#), where the nation scored lowest on this measure of ‘equality of opportunity.’

²⁹⁰ Cf. the interview with the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, documented in Appendix A, for statements on the suitability of such governmental system.

²⁹¹ Ideally, a social-network theory of democracy may be useful in two respects. First, it would help donor nations which are involved with democratic development in the

third world, but particularly Africa, to achieve more success with their work, in so far as it would direct them to those social institutions that, when promoted and supported, would better enhance the quality of democracy therein. But second, and more importantly, it would help African nations, which currently are under-going a fast-paced process of social mobilization, to not ‘lose themselves’ in the process, but to protect and sustain those aged-long sociocultural norms and practices which, whilst being nonextant in most Western nations, may be the key to their establishing a democratic political system that is more congenial to the conditions and dynamics of the region. And whilst said normative theory is sure to be viewed with skepticism by the hard-headed empiricist, let us not forget the solemn words of Professor Robert Dahl (1961, 772), that it is only when the study of politics is able to generate “broad, bold – *and even vulnerable* – general theories” that it may be prevented from “heading into the ultimate disaster of triviality.” Cf. also Professor Talcott Parsons (1950, 5; but also 1938, 14-5) who noted adjointedly that “the basic reason why general theory is so important to *social research* is because the cumulative development of knowledge in a scientific field is a function of the degree of generality of implications by which it is possible to relate findings, interpretations, and hypotheses on different levels and in different specific empirical fields to each other.”

²⁹² This is so stated because cases in a geographical area tend to share a number of close characteristics and similarities in common, so that they tend to lend themselves quite well to the comparative method, particularly because said similarities could be employed as controls in the study. As was noted by Professor Cyril Black (1966, 39), “the comparison of societies or smaller groups that are concerned with reasonably similar problems is more likely to lead to satisfactory conclusions than comparisons between societies existing many centuries apart” (cf. also Heckscher 1957, 88; Macridis and Cox 1953, 654, Almond 1966, 875-7, for related statements in this respect). An excellent example of such study is Gabriel Almond and James Coleman’s (1960) *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, where they analyzed the sociopolitical development trajectories of distinct geographical regions, to wit, of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Southeast Asia, etc. Albeit cf. Professor Dankwart Rustow (1968, 45) who argues that “geographical proximity does not necessarily furnish the best basis of comparison,” as cases in a given area could likewise evince grave differences in characteristics.

According to him (*loc. cit.*, 47), “comparability is a quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects, but is imparted to them by the observer's perspective” (cf. also Hitchner and Levine 1967, 7-8; Bronowski 1965, 13-4, for related statements on the same). Now whilst Professor Rustow's assertion may be true in some respects, - and indeed any ‘third-wave’ democracy could be employed for said study – our discussion of democratic practice mainly took into consideration social and cultural practices that tended to be more ascriptive of African societies than of Oriental or Eastern ones. So that in attempting to develop a normative social theory on the subject matter, it might seem more expedient and instructive to consider the same as case choices, than other country cases which may not share said characteristics.

²⁹³ Some scholars are of the view that ‘single-observation’ research designs oftentimes lead to incorrect inferences, and may suffer from “a risk of indeterminacy in the face of more than one possible explanation” (cf. King et al. *loc. cit.*, 108, 208-11). Cf. also George and Bennett (*loc. cit.*, 224) who noted that “a single case study cannot be the sole basis for a valid generalization, and that a consideration of other relevant cases would “lead to the identification of additional variables, and to the refinement of concepts and indicators (cf. also Ray 1995, 132; Lijphart 1968, 181; Rogowski 1995, 468, for added statements in this respect). Such comparative study therefore could employ, for example, John Stuart Mill's ‘Method of Difference,’ and ‘Method of Concomitant Variation’ to observe *amongst a select number of other cases*: first, the presence or absence of the operative variables discussed in the essay; and second, the quantitative variations of said operative variables in relation to one another (cf. his *System of Logic*, Book III, Chap. VIII, pp. 280-9).

²⁹⁴ And so the eminent French anthropologist Georges De Lapouge, writing in 1897, rightly adumbrated that “anthropology was destined to revolutionize the political and social sciences as radically as bacteriology has the science of medicine.” And this he said was certain to be the case because “the application of anthropology to the solution of the problems of social development promises more significant results,” in so far as it furnishes “a scientific explanation of the historical development of civilizations” (p. 54).

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Appendix A:
Preliminary Field Study

A1. Introduction

The doctoral research embarked on a field trip to Ghana in the months of August and September [to wit, 17 August 2018 – 28 September 2018] to study the democratization process in the country. During the period, the research conducted interviews with key stakeholders of the country’s democracy, and documented observable civic and elite behaviors in the political process.

A2. Interview Protocol

The research conducted a total of seven field interviews during the six-week period of the field trip. Originally, about fourteen interviews were planned, but because prior appointments were not secured with respective organizations before the field trip, some key persons were unable to make time for the interview. Howbeit, to the extent possible, prospected organizations were replaced with comparable others that were readily available to be interviewed. The organizations interviewed are shown in the table below:

Preliminary Field Interviews
Organizations
Government Agencies:
- <i>Ministry of Education</i>
- <i>Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs</i>
- <i>Electoral Commission</i>
Civil Society Organization:
- <i>Center for Democratic Development (CDD)</i>

<p>Political Parties:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>New Patriotic Party (NPP)</i> - <i>National Democratic Congress (NDC)</i>
<p>Media Organization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Peace FM</i>

A3. Questions and Comments

The interviews were held in the office premises of the respective organizations. They were unstructured and open-ended in form, and spanned a duration of about an hour. The proceedings of the interviews are summarized as follows:

[Government Agencies]
Ministry of Education
<p><u>Research Goal:</u></p> <p>To understand the character of the education system in Ghana, and its consequent impact on democracy promotion in the country.</p>
<p><u>Resource Person:</u></p> <p>Deputy Minister of Basic and Secondary Education.</p>
<p><u>Sample Questions:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Could you tell me a bit more about the state of education delivery in Ghana at the basic and secondary level? 2. You mentioned earlier the issue of education quality in rural areas across the country. Why do you think this has been pervasive over the years? 3. One aspect of a good democracy is that all citizens are able to actively participate in the political process. Would you say that the education system in Ghana is preparing the youth for effective political participation?

Sample Quote [paraphrased]:

“The NPP government has followed through on its campaign promise of making education free at the secondary level. This is a good first step to education reform in the country. However, there remain a few issues that need to be tackled. For instance, there are infrastructural strains in many schools, and the quality of teachers remain debatable. More so, you have so many children going through the system at a go, and this means that there is little opportunity for individualized teaching and learning that fits the academic capabilities of each child [...] In the end, only a handful of children succeed through the system [...] But the noteworthy remark I would add about the education system is the fact that for the years that children spend in school, they are made aware of basic social and legal structures in the country, and this improves their civic responsibility, and also their prospects for effective political participation – when given the space and opportunity [...] If one can read and write, then one is able to follow discussions on political matters, and to invariably participate therein. In the event of conflicting perspectives, such person is likely to resort to constructive deliberation than to uninformed gainsaying – which tends only to disrupt the fabric of political tolerance.”

Sample Observations:

1. Basic and secondary education in the country is free and accessible to all children of school-going age. However, issues of education quality remain pervasive.
2. The education system appears to focus more on inculcating social and civic norms in school children than in shaping their critical faculties for problem solving. While this may promote civic competence amongst the citizenry in the short-term, it could also have adverse effects on graduate employment rates, and in the long term, on economic development.

Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs
<p><u>Research Goal:</u></p> <p>To understand how the institution of chieftaincy interplays with the political machinery of government, and how this ‘dual authority’ structure augments political democracy in the country.</p>
<p><u>Resource Person:</u></p> <p>Deputy Minister of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs</p>
<p><u>Sample Questions:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 1992 Constitution safeguarded the authority and autonomy of traditional institutions in the country. To what extent has this legal provision influenced political democracy in Ghana? 2. Have the institutions of Chieftaincy not outlived their usefulness in the country? Do you not think that they are glorified excesses in the Ghanaian sociopolitical system? 3. The ideal governance structure of traditional institutions is one that is variedly antithetical to democracy. Therefore, in your interactions and work with chiefs and traditional authorities, how do you assess their commitment to the nation’s political democracy?
<p><u>Sample Quote (paraphrased):</u></p> <p><i>“I think it is praiseworthy that the 1992 Constitution upheld the sovereignty and autonomy of traditional institutions. By safeguarding the authority of Chiefs, the Ghanaian political system received a measure of legitimacy that it otherwise would not have had had these traditional institutions been disrupted [...] Remember that before Ghana’s unification in 1957, and even in earlier times – before the advent of colonialism and even during that period, Ghanaian societies were governed predominantly by Chiefs and traditional rulers [...] These Chiefs were significant in a number of respects. First, they organized their societies of domain through customary laws and norms and therefore helped to maintain civility and order</i></p>

amongst their people. Second, owing to their personal legitimacy as divine leaders of their people, they furnished, to a large extent, a sense of subservience and genuflection to authority amongst their people. These two virtues have been particularly instrumental in Ghana's state building efforts after independence. You have citizens who, through a process of learning and adaptation across several generations, have become accustomed to respecting norms and laws, and submitting to legal authority [...] That the average Ghanaian citizen is less prone to civil disobedience is perhaps the single greatest attainment of our liberal democracy to date."

Sample Observations:

1. Chiefs continue to command respect and authority in their social domains. For instance, traditional festivals in Ghana are attended by large masses of people, and most communities continue to observe traditional norms, rites, and taboos.
2. Because of their potent ability to command, direct, and indoctrinate their followers, Chiefs are a prime focal point for political parties wishing to broaden their scope of representation. Through deliberative discussions with political parties on policy objectives and mandates, Chiefs are active participants in Ghanaian politics.

Electoral Commission

Research Goal:

To understand the functional role of the EC in organizing presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, as well as discuss some reforms and developments in the structure and governance of the EC over the last two decades.

Resource Person:

Chairman of the Electoral Commission

Sample Questions:

1. The Electoral Commission survived the scare of the 2008 presidential elections, and was in 2013 vindicated by the Supreme Court, when the New Patriotic Party (NPP) disputed the election results. How would you say the EC has evolved as an institution over the last decade?
2. At present, there are 25 registered political parties in Ghana. Of this number, only about three parties are evenly represented in all ten administrative regions of the country. Would the presence of many small political parties in the country not lead potentially to factionalism: where left-leaning demagogues rise and use their party platforms to integrate rather than represent their followers?
3. One of the goals of my research is to make a case for a consociational or federal system of government in Ghana. In your view and experience as Electoral Commissioner, is this a proposal you are likely to welcome as suitable for the country?

Sample Quote (paraphrased):

“I have been an ardent admirer of federal systems and think that it is to a large extent a more efficient and superior form of political governance. But whether such system can work in Ghana is another discussion on its own [...] You know if you are the Electoral Commissioner, you do not have much opportunity to air your personal views about the political system: lest you are seen by the public as taking sides with the ideology or mandate of one political party or another. But I am happy that young scholars like yourself who are the future of our country are attempting to bring some innovation into our present political system [...] A unitary system is by itself functional under the right political institutions and social conditions. But in Ghana, we have some structural issues that make central governance a bit problematic [...] In 1992, when the fourth republican constitution was crafted, we totaled about 15 million as a people. Today, we are about 28 million, and who knows how many we would be in 2030? Besides our burgeoning population, we have ethnolinguistic issues, inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth, and particularistic considerations in the allocation of public resources. By large, I think

that these structural problems have been further accentuated by the central governance structure of the country. It has created a central government that is powerful, unchecked, and unable to evenly distribute resources across all regions of the country [...] I think that a federal system could be instructive in many ways. For instance, it would allow for political and economic experiments in policy at the state level and would better promote an agenda of inclusive growth – where we are able to harness our natural and human resource capabilities in all parts of the country. Additionally, it would serve as training grounds for prospective leaders at the state level before they are ready to govern at the national level: thus helping to curb corruption and gross mismanagement of state resources. And in the case of consociation, as you are attempting to study, it would offer a more effective representation for minority ethnic groups in the country, and would allow for competing political ideologies and views in our national debates [...] But political change is hard to effect, and requires a conscientious will on the parts of the elites and the citizenry. In Ghana, people are just used to the old ways of doing things. And because the present system is seen by the citizenry as functional and peaceful, and by the governing elites as rewarding, they would be even the more reluctant to change it.”

Sample Observations:

1. In 2013, following the unsuccessful disputation of the presidential election results by the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Supreme Court of Ghana ordered the Electoral Commission to undertake structural reforms in voter registration and polling results compilation. These modifications contributed in large part to the successful conduct of the 2016 general elections.
2. A general rise in literacy levels over the course of the last decade has made the average Ghanaian more prone to being influenced in his suffrage choice by the saliency of policy mandates than of clientelistic considerations. This means therefore that political parties are least able to resort to ethnic, factional, or ideological appeals, but are instead pressured to follow through on their campaign mandates.

[Civil Society Organization]
Center for Democratic Development (CDD)
<p><u>Research Goal:</u></p> <p>To understand, from the perspective of a civil society organization, the barriers to effective political governance in Ghana.</p>
<p><u>Resource Person:</u></p> <p>Director of Research and Programs</p>
<p><u>Sample Questions:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What would you say is the single greatest challenge to democracy development in Ghana? 2. Before the interview, I read your interesting publication on the ongoing constitutional review process in the country. Could you elaborate further, for the purposes of my thesis, on what you meant when you stated that the present constitution fosters a hegemonic executive, and weakens institutional checks and balances? 3. In the literature on democratic consolidation, much emphasis is placed on the need for civic competence amongst the populace: that citizens should be able to participate and engage actively in political processes and deliberations – particularly outside of the election season. In this regard, how would you assess civic competence amongst the Ghanaian populace?
<p><u>Sample Quote (paraphrased):</u></p> <p><i>“It is hard to single out a particular challenge as the greatest of all the hurdles facing our nation’s democracy [...] But a peculiar one of note would be the semi-institutionalized patronage-driven politics that has so entrenched itself in our political system. This patron-client relationship sees itself in horizontal interest groups that are subordinated to vertical state authorities. The effect has been that elected representatives, instead of investing in qualitative public goods, choose rather to skew political incentives and government spending in favor of their</i></p>

patronage networks. [...] This misdemeanor has been accentuated in large part by the ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system of the country. In the absence of a strong middle class, coupled with an ever-widening income gap, a first-past-the-post electoral system only tends to deepen ethnic polarization and makes it difficult, even impossible, to build political consensus on national development projects [...] Our two dominant parties – the NPP and the NDC – in their single-minded pursuit of state capture are ever willing to employ ethnocentric appeals, and disruptive electoral tactics to meet their political ends [...] Additionally, we have a Constitution that grants enormous state power to the president. To wit, all constitutional and statutory offices, as well as senior positions in the police and security forces, are filled by presidential appointment. Also, because formally decentralized state agencies depend on financial allocations from the central government to fulfill their budgetary needs, they tend to act accordingly to the dictates of the president – and they are the more willing to do so because the departmental heads of such agencies are usually members of the ruling party. Then, we have the case where only the president or a minister acting on his behalf can introduce a bill to Parliament that has fiscal implications [...] I think that what our nation needs is a political system that delimits the powers of the president, and offers the possibility for a wider representation of political actors in government [...] The 1992 Constitution was drafted at a time when the nation was transitioning from military to civilian rule. It is therefore quite understandable to see why the president was rewarded with so much ruling power. Besides, most of the appointed members of the Consultative Assembly that drafted the Constitution were aligned to the PNDC government and so there was not really bi-partisan consensus on most of the provisions of the Constitution [...] Today, it is important, even imperative, that we begin to have serious discussions about the political future of our country. And this may mean that we amend the Constitution to reflect our present sociopolitical conditions.”

Sample Observations:

1. Particularistic relationships between state authorities and horizontal interest groups mar the performance of ruling governments – who are pulled

away in two directions upon assuming office: first, towards their party of affiliation, and second, towards their clients. This tendency has further accentuated social, political, and economic inequality in the country.

2. The vast powers vested in the president could be delimited through a consociational system of representation. This system was keenly considered by the Consultative Assembly during the drafting of the 1992 Constitution but was surpassed for a majoritarian one.

[Political Parties]

New Patriotic Party (NPP)

Research Goal:

To discuss the resolve and commitment of political parties to democratic governance in Ghana. In the case of the NPP, being the incumbent ruling party, the goal of the interview was to discuss some of their policy mandates for the country: in particular, development without foreign aid, and an all-inclusive socioeconomic growth.

Resource Person:

Director of Communications

Sample Questions:

1. A recurring issue in public discourse regarding your party has been the uncouth presence of vigilante groups – Delta Forces and Invisible Forces, as they are popularly called – that act on behalf of your party, sometimes even carrying out violent acts against members of the public. Would you not say that their presence and affiliation to your party mars the credibility of the president to govern effectively without favor to party members, or retribution to members of the opposition?
2. There has been much disapproval expressed by the Ghanaian public regarding the incumbent president's appointment of a record 110 ministers

into his cabinet. Is such act not a classic example of clientelism which so often disrupts good political governance?

3. I would like to ask about the free senior high school policy which is currently underway. Many observers – and particularly the opposition – have described it as a hasty policy that is only intended to fulfill a campaign promise. And indeed, there are justifiable concerns regarding infrastructural requisites, and the quality of education delivery. Are these concerns founded in your opinion?

Sample Quote (paraphrased):

“Why does everyone think so ill of clientelism? To me, it is simply a legal-rational way of affairs. You said that you are studying your PhD in Italy, right? Under a scholarship? Good. So someday, if you become let’s say the president of this country, and you decide to have special diplomatic relations with Italy, can anyone accuse you of being patrimonial? Of course not! They were just nice to you, and you got an opportunity to study in their country under a scholarship, and so you may someday want to extend a kind gesture to them in return. It is just the way things work in politics also. If someone works with you tirelessly during an electoral campaign season – running to and fro under the hot sun, even going from house to house to secure votes for you – would you say that when you finally win the elections, it would be clientelistic of you to appoint them into public offices? Surely not [...] You are a young man who may someday become a leader of this country and so I want to give you some advice. It is for free. Politics is all about loyalty. You need to know who your friends are and need to reward them adequately because they are the ones who would be there for you in the lean seasons – when you are in the opposition and things are not going so well. Besides, most people who are appointed into public offices are qualified to occupy those offices. That they are members of the ruling party does not make them less apt for the task. They are Ghanaians just like you and me and deserve an opportunity to enjoy public resources, just like anyone else [...] But let me add one more thing about electoral campaigns because I think that it is instructive. The Constitution does not guarantee any form of funding for political parties to assist with their electoral campaigns. Some form of

logistic support [like campaign vans] are made available to us by the Electoral Commission, and we have free access to the media to deliver our campaign messages. But that is about all. It costs a lot to run a presidential and parliamentary election campaign. Most of the time, the work is made possible by the generous donations of individuals, firms, and foreign agencies. They all have their own special interests with the monies they donate – even if they do not explicitly say so. Therefore, when this funding support helps you to carry your political message across the country and you end up winning the election, it is only right that you award the contract to that firm that helped you, or to fine-tune your policies to incorporate some requests of the foreign agency, or to work with that individual in your administration. Once again, the rewards are given on merit because these firms or individuals are usually qualified for the kind of patronage they receive. To wit, all ministerial nominees of the president are thoroughly vetted and screened by parliamentary standing committees [some of which are headed by members of the opposition party] before they are approved to work on behalf of the State – which invariably attests to their competence to serve in public capacity [...] The 1992 Constitution accords every president the solemn right to organize his cabinet according to the demands of his administration and policy mandate. Thus, if the president deems it necessary to work with 110 cabinet ministers in his administration, I do not see why this should elicit outcries from the opposition. At least, had they administered the country well aforetime, perhaps the president may not have need of many ministers to undo their grossly ineffective socioeconomic policies. It is the reason they lost the election and we won.”

Sample Observations:

1. The NPP government has been greatly lauded in Ghanaian public opinion polls for: restoring teacher training- and nursing student allowances [which were unpopularly taken away by the previous NDC government], imposing foreign travel bans on ministers to ensure that they spend more time working in the country, and making senior high school education free for all children. The government seems on course also to fulfilling its other campaign promises such as creating a relevant factory in each Ghanaian

district, and making available a million-dollar expenditure budget for each constituency in the country.

2. The single-party cabinet structure of the country – a result of the nation’s majoritarian governing system – does not allow much prospects for forming coalition governments. This greatly restricts the opposition from taking part in policy decisions, and consequently limits consensus building on local and foreign policy initiatives.

National Democratic Congress (NDC)

Research Goal:

To discuss the resolve and commitment of political parties to democratic governance in Ghana. In the case of the NDC, being the main opposition party, the interview sought to reflect on their just-ended tenure in office, and to understand how the party intends to stand up to the single-party cabinet of the NPP – which also holds a majority in Parliament.

Resource Person:

National Youth Organizer

Sample Questions:

1. As national youth organizer, I believe that one of your tasks include mobilizing the Ghanaian youth for political action, and for representation in your party. In your experience, how would you assess civic competence amongst the youth, and what would you say are the barriers to effective political participation amongst young people?
2. In a recent interview with the Center for Democratic Development, the Director of Research and Programs expressed his displeasure at the disruptive nature of the de-facto two-party system in Ghana to good political governance. According to him, the present system tends to elevate political competition over effective consensus building on national policy issues. In your opinion, and

if you can be civic rather than partisan in your response, would you accede to the fact that the present majoritarian system of representation is indeed disruptive to our long-term political stability?

3. It looks like our electoral system really lives up to its name: a ‘winner-takes-all’ system. And this has also been true for your party in past electoral victories, but at present, the NPP has a single-party cabinet, and a decisive majority in Parliament. Therefore, my question is this: does the opposition act merely as a dissenting voice to the ruling government, or do they get to work with the government on key policy issues?

Sample Quote (paraphrased):

“I think that the Ghanaian youth are very enthusiastic about politics, perhaps more than youths in any other African country. Largely, this zeal has been accentuated by the rise in ICT development in the country over the last decade. Today, about 8 out of 10 young people have a smartphone that has internet access. This means that young people, given that they have had some level of education, are able to keep abreast with political trends, both locally and internationally. This notwithstanding, I think that youth participation in politics outside election seasons is rather low. And there are two reasons for this. First, our young people do not have a lot of leisure time – which usually comes with job security and a general rise in income levels. Most young people are frantically looking for jobs, or where they do have jobs, tend to spend most of their time at the workplace. There are a few civil society groups comprising of young people, but these groups rely heavily on external funding and are therefore not very stable. And for a young man or woman who is just starting out in life, this is certainly not the ideal picture of a job that they may have had in mind. Thus, only a handful of young people are full time, active members of civil society groupings. Second, and precisely because of rising youth unemployment, it is difficult for young people to mobilize for political action. Because any positive political change effected by a few people would be equally enjoyed by everyone else in the country, there is a lot of freeriding in this regard. Everyone thinks like: ‘I do not have time. I am busy. Let the others who have more time on their hands go out and demonstrate.’ So, in the end, no one has time, and change is never effected

[...] The Ghanaian youth are well-educated and critical in their political analysis. This was made evident in the 2016 general elections where young people in many communities across the country – some of whom were NDC affiliates – rallied popular support against a government that was clearly not performing to their expectations [...] I think that instead of political parties patronizing young people to win elections, we should rather, as a nation, think of smarter, more efficient ways by which we could incorporate the vigor and intellect of young people in our national policy deliberations. So, for instance, we could provide more opportunities for university students to intern in state agencies to build their competence in public administration. Or, we could create state-sponsored youth advocacy groups across the country that would serve as training platforms for young people to deliberate on policy matters in a nonpartisan setting [...] But ultimately, these measures would have to include proactive economic policies that improve the job prospects of young people in the country. Because young people are less likely to stand up to the policies and acts of government if they have not hitherto been emboldened by the security and dignity that a regular job provides.”

Sample Observations:

1. Rising levels of youth unemployment in the country has inhibited the effective participation of young people in politics. Those that end up participating in politics become “foot soldiers” of opposition political parties, patrons of the ruling government, or advocates of foreign donor organizations – thereby compromising their ability to remain constructive and nonpartisan in their political views and opinions.
2. There exist few legal-institutional opportunities for young people to serve in public offices. Where these opportunities exist, they are greatly marred by particularistic interests so that only a privileged few have access to them.

[Media Organization]
Peace FM
<p><u>Research Goal:</u></p> <p>To understand the intermediary role of the media in providing a platform for political deliberation and consensus building in the country.</p>
<p><u>Resource Person:</u></p> <p>Director of Program Content</p>
<p><u>Sample Questions:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What would you say are some of the pertinent challenges facing the Ghanaian media today? 2. Your radio station broadcasts in the local Akan language. While this may allow much of the rural population to follow and engage in political debates, some are of the view that local language specifications in the media may only tend to accentuate ethnic polarization in the country. What are your views on such conservative concerns? 3. Ghana's democracy has been lauded by Freedom House as one of the most liberal in Africa, and in the world. What critical role has the Ghanaian media played in the nation's democratic development over the last decade?
<p><u>Sample Quote (paraphrased):</u></p> <p><i>"Oh! Why would anyone say something like that? Do they want us to broadcast in English? English is not our native language. It is a foreign language. Our local languages are the hallmark of our ethnic identities so why should it breed disunity if the media broadcasts therein [...] In Italy, do they not speak Italian? In China, in Russia, in Japan, in Germany, ..., just check all the developed countries. They all speak in their local languages and it has been very beneficial for them. Instead of making English a national language, which is grossly unhelpful for our political and economic future, we should rather enhance the life and worth of our local languages by communicating therein. Today, our young people say that there is</i></p>

civilization and that they are modernized and so they do not speak in their local languages anymore. Most of them do not even know how to write therein [...] I think that it was a misstep on the part of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah not to have created a local national language for the country after independence. So almost six decades afterwards, we are still having popular debates about our national identity – partly because we do not have a common local language that we share, and partly because with the English language comes a gravitation towards Western culture and norms. This is the psychological divide our young people have had to deal with over the last two decades [...] Before we launched Peace FM, and subsequently UTV, most of the existing media networks at the time were broadcasting in English. But when we launched and began broadcasting in the Akan language, we were amazed at the number of viewer traffic we received for most of our programs. Then when we introduced voice dubbing in the local language for popular English and Spanish TV shows, the number of views for these shows skyrocketed dramatically. Usually in most of our programs, we allow viewers and listeners to call-in and express their views and opinions on a subject matter, and you can always see the excitement in the voices of people when they are allowed to speak in the local language. They do not have to think about grammatical errors, nor do they have to worry about being understood. They just speak out their heart in a dignifying way. So I do not think that we need less of local language specialization in the media. Rather, I think that we need more of it. Or else, how are many of the rural people going to be made to understand complex policy issues, or how are political parties to effectively convey their messages to the public? Let me add that our ethnic diversity need not divide us. Rather, it should make us stronger as a nation. It is the politicians who like to emphasize such polarity to win ethnic votes during elections. But in reality, we are one people with a common national pride. If the same political issues are being discussed in Akan, in Fante, in Ga, in Ewe, in Hausa, ..., it means that we can get everyone on board to participate in the political deliberation process, though in different language media [...] Let those who want to speak English speak their English. But so long as we live in Ghana, we need to promote our local languages, and take pride in speaking – and even conducting business – therein. I think that this would be good – even consolidating – for our democracy.”

Sample Observations:

1. Freedom of the media and press is one of the many liberal provisions guaranteed under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. As a result, media activism in politics is particularly vibrant in the country – and more so during election seasons, when the media works closely with the EC to broadcast election proceeding at all polling centers to the Ghanaian public.
2. The media also engages the public, political parties, and the government in political debates, discussions, and deliberations on policy issues. More recently, many have expressed varied concerns at derogatory, ethnocentric, and defamatory remarks that are increasingly being made on media platforms. Many have described this demeanor as a misuse of the freedom of speech, and think that such unruly remarks by political enthusiasts could heighten political and ethnic tensions in the country.

A4. Summary

In the six-week field visit to Ghana, the doctoral research conducted seven interviews with key stakeholders of Ghana's democracy. These interviews, amid other observations of transactional behaviors in the country, pointed the research to a mix of formalized social institutions that sustain political democracy in Ghana. As such coordinated social networks that augment political institutions have received little emphasis in the literature on democratic consolidation, the research settled to focus extensively on the subject matter in its dissertation.

Appendix B:

Descriptive Overview of Interview Participants

B1. Group Discussions

Focus Group Discussion 1 [FGD-1]					
Date: 22 February 2020					
Venue: David M. Balme Library, University of Ghana, Legon ^a					
Duration: 1:52:06					
Participant ^b	Code Name ^c	Gender	Age	Field of Work ^d	DFAs ^e
Bernard B.	BER-B	M	48	Research	SOCI POLI ECON TECH
Baidoo G.	BAL-G	M	44	Health	
Dzibordi T.	DZI-T	F	41	Education	
Dankwah K.	DAN-K	M	56	Petty Trading	
Derrick Y.	DER-Y	M	49	Services	
Kafui T.	KAF-T	F	59	Services	
Isaac O.	ISA-O	M	67	Union	
Focus Group Discussion 2 [FGD-2]					
Date: 14 March 2020					
Venue: David M. Balme Library, University of Ghana, Legon					
Duration: 1:58:23					
Participant	Code Name	Gender	Age	Field of Work	DFAs
Charity B.	CHA-B	F	49	Services	

Charles M.	CHA-M	M	49	Services	MDIA POLI RELI CUTR
Geoffrey O.	GEO-O	M	56	Services	
Mensah A.	MEN-A	M	40	Education	
Ralph F.	RAL-F	M	58	Construction	
Rita N.	RIT-N	F	47	Petty Trading	
Yaa A.	YAA-A	F	46	Health	
Focus Group Discussion 3 [FGD-3]					
Date: 13 April 2020					
Venue: David M. Balme Library, University of Ghana, Legon					
Duration: 2:01:11					
Participant	Code Name	Gender	Age	Field of Work	DFAs
Adwoa N.	ADW-N	F	51	Petty Trading	ECON MDIA CUTR SOCI
Benson A.	BEN-A	M	67	Retail	
Charles H.	CHA-H	M	45	Education	
Ruth E.	RUT-E	F	45	Services	
Ransford T.	RAN-M	M	46	Agriculture	
Qwesi T.	QWE-T	M	49	Petty Trading	
Samuel P.	SAM-P	M	48	Health	
Sarah F.	SAR-F	F	60	Services	

a: This location we chose, particularly to ensure that we could have a private and a quiet discussion session – that is, so participants could easily hear one another, and so we could get a clear audio recording of the

proceedings. As Monique M. Hemmink (2014, 82) rightly noted, outdoor locations tend to be less ideal for focus group discussions because “participants may feel exposed, or passers-by may stop to listen or join the group uninvited.” Moreover, onlookers can disrupt group dynamics in that they may “distract participants or cause the same to withhold comments for lack of privacy.”

b: We chose to abbreviate the last name of respondents in order to maintain confidentiality in interview responses, though not anonymity. By safeguarding confidentiality, the study attempted to ensure that, other than the research team, no third person was able to identify interview participants by their responses. In other words, maintaining anonymity would have required that all persons, including the research team, were unable to identify interview participants per their responses.

c: This denotes the code identification of participants, and was necessary for referencing purposes, for say, when we wanted to quote a remark by a participant on a subject matter.

d: Some discussants that were above the age of 55 were retired from active employment at the time of the interview [for example, SAR-F in FG3, and GEO-O in FG2], and so in that case, we noted their most previous employment. Others however [such as BEN-A in FG3, and RAL-F in FG2] though above the legal retirement age, were actively engaged in private enterprises – and so we noted this accordingly. The activity labelled ‘services’ broadly defines all employment types involved in the production of intangible or non-physical goods and products, as say banking, insurance, marketing, and the like.

e: That is, Dominant Focal Areas, and denotes the focal areas that were most discussed in the said group interview – though all seven areas were somewhat discussed in all three sessions.

B2. Dialogue Sessions^f

School Dialogue Session [SDS]					
Date: 2-3 April 2020					
Institution: University of Ghana, Legon (Main Campus) ^g					
DFAs: POLI (Education Policy); SOCI (Ethnic Integration)					
Participant	Code Name	Gender ^h	Age	Study Year	Duration
Lucy G.	LUC-G	F	21	Junior	00:23:15
Kwame M.	KWA-M	M	21	Junior	00:14:17
Nancy M.	NAN-M	F	20	Sophomore	00:19:04

Nana O.	NAN-O	M	24	Senior	00:17:10
Faith Dialogue Session [FDS] ^{i, j}					
Date: 8-9 May 2020					
Denomination: Christian // Protestant // Charismatic ^k					
DFAs: RELI (Beliefs & Attitudes); SOCI (Unity of Faith)					
Participant	Code Name	Gender	Age	Title	Duration
Emmanuel A.	EMM-A	M	39	Clergy ^l	00:24:54
John N.	JOH-N	M	47	Clergy ^m	00:32:12
Solomon D.	SOL-D	M	54	Clergy ⁿ	00:24:13

f: These dialogue sessions were special one-on-one talks we had with students and faith leaders on matters relating to education and religion respectively [apart from those discussed thereon in the focus group interviews]. The goal was to shed further lights on said matters from the perspective of persons directly involved in the same.

g: We held these dialogue sessions with university students because these have also passed through the basic- and high school levels of education, and so could very much comment holistically on the education system in its entirety.

h: We were able to maintain a gender balance amongst participants in the school dialogue session because, unlike the focus group discussions, which had some restrictions on participation, and which were subject to participants being able to make time to travel to the event location (cf. Essay III, Note 63-4), this dialogue session was conducted on the premises of the university, and so it was fairly easy to find students who were willing to partake in the same, and the abundance of choice options made it possible to select an even number of males and females for the session.

i: It would have been instructive to hold dialogue sessions with other faith denominations also, as Islam for example, but this we were unable to do for purely contingent reasons: first, because churches tend to be more numerous in the country, and also easily assessable, than mosques [particularly because Christianity constitutes the dominant religious tradition in the country, cf. *ibid.*, Note 131]; and second, because much of the literature we reviewed on religion were on Judeo-Christian practices, so that this tended to inform our focus in the dialogue sessions. Nevertheless, some of the participants of the focus group discussions,

though not strictly Muslim, had extensive knowledge on the doctrines and traditions of the religion, and so were able to comment considerably thereon.

j: We did not hold dialogue sessions with church members because about 80 percent of participants of the focus group discussion were practicing Christians, and so were able to speak considerably on their faith, and on matters relating to the church in Ghana. To be sure, an interview with church members at a church facility would have yielded no different results, as these, like the interview participants, were not wholly involved in church activity, but maintained regular jobs as the latter, so that they may not have possessed any greater knowledge on said matters than these did.

k: These sessions were held in the church premises [but specifically, the offices] of the respective ministers, which were all based in the Metropolitan City of Accra.

l: The same is a minister associated with the Presbyterian Church of Ghana.

m: The same is a minister associated with the Methodist Church of Ghana.

n: The same is a minister associated with the Lighthouse Chapel International, Ghana.

Appendix C:
Data Coding

C1. Code Categories

Primary Codes

These represent the dimensional aspects upon which we carried out our study of the Ghanaian nation.

<i>Dimensional Aspect</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Politics	POLI
Economy	ECON
Society	SOCI
Religion	RELI
Media	MDIA
Technology	TECH
Culture	CUTR

Secondary Codes

These represent the focal categories under which observations were made for each of the afore dimensional areas.

POLI	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Governmental System	GOVT
Electoral System	ELEC

Government Policies	GVPO
Political Machinery	POMA
Educational System	EDUC
ECON	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Informal Economy	INEC
Formal Economy	FOEC
Unemployment	UNEM
Rural-Urban Dynamics	RUUR
Trade Unions	TDUN
SOCI	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Ethnic Integration	ETIN
Diffusion of Democratic Practice	DFDM
Unifying Norms	UYNM
Role of the Family	FAML
Social Communication	SOCM
Ethnic and Social Differentiation	ESDF
Social Norms and Values	SONV

RELI	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Unity of Faith	UYFA
Religion and Education	RLED
Dimensions of Religious Practice	DMRE
Adverse Impacts of Religious Activity	AVRE
Benefits of Religious Practice	BNRE
MDIA	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Diffusion of Media Outlets	DIMO
Types of Media Programs	MEPR
Music and Movie Industry	MUMO
Political and Business Dimensions	POBU
Coverage of National Elections	NAEC
TECH	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
ICT Learning	ICTL
Mobile Telephony	MOTL
The Internet	INTR

CUTR	
<i>Focal Category</i>	<i>Code Label</i>
Institution of Chieftaincy	CHFT
Cultural Learning	CULR
Advent of Modernization	MODN

C2. Data Themes

These represent the items observed under each focal category.

POLI	
Category	Observed Items
GOVT	<p>[OB-1]: Centralized system of government:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Development of the center at the expense of the periphery.</i> b. <i>Centralized deployment of police apparatus.</i> c. <i>Less reconnaissance of the periphery by the center.</i> <p>[OB-2]: Decentralization and local government:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies [with varied limitations on power and mandate].</i>
ELEC	<p>[OB-1]: The two-party system:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Swing regions, as pertaining to elections.</i>

	<p><i>b. Broad-based and representative party manifestos.</i></p> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>‘Winner-takes-all’ electoral system:</p> <p><i>a. Opposition parties sidelined much in ruling government machinery.</i></p> <p><i>b. Less transparency in and accountability of the activities of the ruling government.</i></p>
GVPO	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Aspects of national integration:</p> <p><i>a. The use of English as official national language facilitates communication amongst ethnic identities, and enhances identification to the nation.</i></p> <p><i>- Albeit there is an adulterated form of the English language that is spoken informally amongst persons, but particularly amongst young males, called ‘pidgin English.’ This ‘language,’ for some reason, is widely understood by most uneducated persons, including old people, and serves as a means by which people from different ethnicities are able to communicate one with another.</i></p> <p><i>b. The adding of the country’s name to the national currency.</i></p> <p><i>- i.e., the national currency, although originally called Cedi, was renamed Ghana Cedi (GHS) in 2007 to facilitate a form of identification to the nation.</i></p> <p><i>c. The singing of the national anthem in all basic- and (some) high schools at the beginning (and sometimes, at the end) of each school day.</i></p> <p><i>d. The observance of an Independence Day ‘march past the flag’ ceremony [usually held annually on 6 March] by all basic schools in the country.</i></p>

	<p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Broad-based social policies of government:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).</i> b. <i>Metro Mass Transit Service (MMTS).</i> c. <i>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP).</i> d. <i>Savannah Accelerated Development Initiative (SADI).</i> e. <i>National Builders Corp (NABCO).</i> f. <i>National Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (NEIP).</i>
POMA	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Demarcation of administrative regions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Territorial concentration of ethnic identities.</i> b. <i>Geographical distribution of ethnic identities.</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Public & civil servants:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Some personnel tend to have covert political affiliations and attachments.</i> b. <i>Clientelism and patronage tend to apply in public appointments.</i>
EDUC	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Education forms:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Formal</i> b. <i>Non-formal</i> c. <i>Vocational & technical</i> d. <i>Special needs</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Education financing:</p>

	<p>a. <i>Government funding [free education] (public basic & senior high schools).</i></p> <p>b. <i>Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND) [local and foreign tertiary studies].</i></p> <p>c. <i>Government allowances (teacher & nurse trainees).</i></p> <p>d. <i>Student Loan Trust Fund (university students).</i></p> <p>[OB-3]: Educational routines, norms, and protocols:</p> <p>a. <i>Uniforms (for public basic- and high schools; teacher- and nurses training colleges).</i></p> <p>b. <i>Discipline (e.g., canning of students in most basic schools as a means of instilling subordination to authority).</i></p> <p>c. <i>Punctuality, submissiveness, and cleanliness is generally required of students.</i></p> <p>d. <i>Much emphasis on examinations and grades, - therefore tends to be competitive rather than collaborative.</i></p> <p>e. <i>Sports and cultural competitions (at all educational levels)</i></p>
ECON	
Category	Observed Items
INEC	<p>[OB-1]: Types of small businesses:</p> <p>a. <i>Petty trading, selling wares and food items in small stores and kiosks.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Petty trading, selling wares and food items by the streets and in traffic.</i></p>

	<p>c. <i>Petty trading, selling wares and food items from house to house.</i></p> <p>d. <i>'Kayaye,' or helping traveling passengers out with their luggage for a fee.</i></p> <p>e. <i>Driving, or conducting for 'trotro' buses.</i></p> <p>f. <i>'Okada,' or motor bikes for transporting passengers on pathway routes.</i></p> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Dynamics of small business enterprises:</p> <p>a. <i>Entails a lot of price bargaining amongst sellers and buyers.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Require little skill or education to get started.</i></p> <p>c. <i>Some do not require prior license to get started.</i></p> <p>d. <i>Provide a viable means by which rural migrants are able to earn a living in urban centers.</i></p> <p>e. <i>Some minors are involved in the same, particularly with regards to '[OB-1]/b & c.'</i></p> <p>f. <i>Availability of short-term loans and credits for small businesses, mostly provided by private firms.</i></p>
FOEC	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>The service & financial sector:</p> <p>a. <i>Requires university and/or professional training to work therein, as such, abundance of business courses and programs in the country, as accounting, finance, insurance, marketing, etc.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Sector contributes the greatest to economic growth, by way of taxes and royalties.</i></p> <p>c. <i>The added impacts of Ghana's 2008 oil find to growth of the sector.</i></p>

	<p><i>d. The added contribution of an increasing number of scalable start-up businesses to the sector, particularly in the IT, manufacturing, and aviation industries.</i></p> <p>[OB-2]: The public sector:</p> <p><i>a. A significant portion of the population employed and remunerated by the government: as teachers, health workers, state bureaucrats, public officials, etc.</i></p> <p><i>b. Other state-owned enterprises, as the electricity company, the water- and sewage company, the state transport corporation, etc. [of course, many of these companies are not wholly owned by the state (though it owns a majority share), but are owned in part by private entities, as the electricity company, for example].</i></p>
UNEM	<p>[OB-1]: Graduate unemployment:</p> <p><i>a. Some available jobs are filled by foreign nationals, because local expertise is either minimal or nonexistent, e.g., in petroleum, IT, business, computing, actuary, etc.</i></p> <p><i>b. The expansion of education access has naturally triggered a kind of ‘academic inflation’ where more education is required to ‘buy’ employment.</i></p> <p><i>c. Some degree programs seem to have outlived their usefulness [as it relates to the economics of the country], and so graduates thereof tend to have little prospects of securing a job with the same.</i></p> <p><i>d. Most graduates tend to harbor high job expectations, and may thus be unwilling to accept job offers that fall short of the same.</i></p>

	<p>e. <i>Also, most unemployment is caused by undue bias in recruitment processes, where positions are usually awarded to ‘wholly identifiable’ persons, i.e., to persons that are known by or related to employers, in some way.</i></p> <p>f. <i>Some graduates set their minds on travelling out of the country for study or work purposes, in which case they may not be presently disposed to taking up employment in the country.</i></p>
RUUR	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Dynamics of rural-urban migration:</p> <p>a. <i>Massive migrations by the rural youth to urban centers in search of jobs.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Caused predominantly by the uneven pace of development between urban and rural regions, - thus persons migrate to urban centers in search of jobs.</i> - <i>Moreover, the centralized system of government has concentrated business in city centers.</i> - <i>Depletion of skilled labor in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, owing to the exodus.</i> - <i>Un- and underemployment of persons who migrate to urban centers.</i>
TDUN	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Trade unions – organization & structure:</p> <p>a. <i>Almost all labor groups are organized into a union.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Most of these are structured very much like the national government: i.e., have an office of a president, and maintain either a centralized distribution of power, or a hierarchical chain of command.</i></p> <p>c. <i>Many employ strike actions in negotiating with the government.</i></p>

	<p><i>d. Serve as an important intermediary between worker groups and the government, i.e., help very much in articulating worker demands to the government, and vice versa.</i></p>
SOVI	
Category	Observed Items
ETIN	<p>[OB-1]: Things which facilitate ethnic integration:</p> <p><i>a. Boarding facilities in high school, which allow for mobility across ethnic regions.</i></p> <p><i>b. Inter-tribal marriages</i></p> <p><i>c. Co-sharing apartments in cities, because cities contain the greatest number of migrants [i.e., ethnically diverse persons] from the peripheries.</i></p> <p><i>d. Television reality shows, and quiz competitions, which draw participants from across all regions of the country.</i></p> <p><i>e. Tribal food delicacies, transposed to and enjoyed by other ethnicities, e.g., fufu likely enjoyed by Ewes (though specialty is apkle), tuozaafi, by the Gas (though specialty, kenkey), etc.</i></p>
DFDM	<p>[OB-1]: Diffusion of democratic practice:</p> <p><i>a. Elections in high schools, tertiary institutions, and professional bodies very much formatted like the national.</i></p> <p><i>b. Leadership set-up in most organizations very much structured like that of the national government.</i></p>

	<p>c. <i>The unique role of the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in promoting democratic values and norms across all regions of the nation.</i></p>
UYNM	<p>[OB-1]: Some unifying norms of the Ghanaian people:</p> <p>a. <i>The donning of the so-called African wear by most workers and students, usually on Fridays, but for all others, at all times.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Affectionate names, given according to the day of the week on which one was born.</i></p> <p>c. <i>Support for the national sports teams, as well as identifications with local and foreign soccer clubs.</i></p>
FAML	<p>[OB-1]: The role of the family:</p> <p>a. <i>Provide support for members of the kinship group.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Cater for the socialization and moral upbringing of children.</i></p> <p>c. <i>Assume responsibility for the education of children.</i></p> <p>[OB-2]: Dynamics of marriage:</p> <p>a. <i>The influx of foreign culture seems to have induced a preference for cohabitation amongst persons of marriageable age, although this may likewise be attributed to the length of education attainment, and unemployment.</i></p> <p>b. <i>The high cost of traditional marriages, which usually involve the payment of a 'bride price,' and the purchase of 'a list of bridal items,' not to mention the added cost</i></p>

	<p><i>of the engagement- and wedding ceremonies, may serve to further discourage the practice amongst young people.</i></p> <p><i>c. Based on the afore, most women sometimes choose to get pregnant whilst dating, usually as a way of ‘forcing’ their men into marrying them [who most often tend to content themselves with cohabitation, and may thus be unwilling to do so; and/or to force the woman’s family into reducing the ‘bridal price- and items’ considerably [because the woman is already pregnant, and the marriage has to be arranged at all cost, to make the child somewhat ‘legal’].</i></p>
SOCM	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Forms of social communication amongst persons:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. Greetings [usually regarded as disrespectful when one forbears to do so, particularly in the mornings].</i> <i>b. Price bargaining dialogues amongst buyers and sellers.</i> <i>c. Small talks by passengers in ‘trotro’ buses, or amongst persons engaged in like professions [as fishermen, market women, traders, etc.]</i> <i>d. Other forms of ‘kennenlernen’ amongst persons at worship centers, social hangouts, work places, etc.</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Factors which inhibit social communication:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. Most urban housing structures are built to facilitate isolation amongst tenants [i.e., offer few co-sharing facilities, and also house a fewer number of persons; otherwise, most housing structures are semi-detached, and are suitable for a single family].</i> <i>b. Also, most houses are built with particularly thick cement blocks which ensure complete intra-room privacy [or better, so tenants do not have to deal with one</i>

	<p><i>another, or come into conflict, or be familiar with one another's routine].</i></p> <p><i>c. Also, most cities are built in such a way that they do not converge at a center [i.e., the buildings are so sparsely structured that there is no particular place therein that one may call a 'city center.']</i></p> <p><i>d. Also, there are few public recreational facilities in cities [as national- and amusement parks, for example] where persons and families could meet and establish contact with one another.</i></p> <p><i>- Albeit other factors as the extremely sunny temperature during the day, and the abundance of mosquitoes during the night may, by themselves, inhibit such rendezvous amongst persons, had said parks been present.</i></p> <p><i>e. Also, most Ghanaians tend to maintain little contact [or better, are denied the opportunity to develop such relations] with foreigners: first, because of linguistic barriers, as it relates to rural and less-educated persons; second, because said foreigners usually reside in plush urban housing, and/or hostels or hotels, and do not usually take up residence in those housing structures inhabited by the local people; and third, the result of policy, for said local housing tend nevertheless to be particularly difficult to attain for most foreigners, because they are usually not listed online; and even in most tertiary institutions, as the University of Ghana, for example, separate hostel facilities are reserved for foreign students, so they do not have to 'mingle' with the local student population [i.e., reside in the same halls or hostels with them].</i></p>
ESDF	[OB-1]:

	<p>Forms of ethnic differentiation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Territorial concentration of ethnicities, with the attendant differences in dialect, and thought patterns.</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Forms of social differentiation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Observable differences in urban residential patterns; some areas considered ‘rich’ [because housing structures are large and expensive, and so are inhabited mainly by the rich], and others, ‘poor’ or ‘squalid’ [because they are basically slums, or lowly housing structures, that are inhabited by poor and low-income persons].</i> b. <i>Other inferred differences amongst persons, relating to income- or wealth status, and unfortunately also, skin pigmentation [i.e., fair or dark], and facial beauty [Ghanaians tend to have a ‘strange’ and ‘institutionalized’ understanding of beauty, as it relates to persons – i.e., what types of facial and bodily outlooks may be perceived as beautiful, and what may not].</i>
SONV	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Some cross-cutting norms and values:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>It is usually forbidden for one to use the left hand when speaking to an elderly.</i> b. <i>In some cultures, looking an elderly in the eye for too long, especially when the former is speaking, is generally regarded disrespectful.</i> c. <i>Conscientiousness, friendliness, and politeness are values that are greatly esteemed by Ghanaians, and persons who act otherwise are usually avoided and shunned [e.g., a person who does not greet others is usually considered unfriendly and disrespectful].</i>

- d. *Reciprocity is another cherished value amongst Ghanaians [as is also evinced in the saying, “one good turn deserves another”], so that persons who act kindly towards another [whether in kind or in deed] could expect to receive the same treatment in return; and vice versa [i.e., one may want to act politely towards another because of the dread that a rude behavior towards the same may trigger a like response].*
- e. *Other values as humility amongst children, respect for authority amongst young people, submissiveness amongst women, diligence amongst men, and integrity amongst the elderly, are generally held in high repute by Ghanaians.*

[OB-2]:

Some things that induce a ‘waiting culture’ amongst Ghanaian:

- a. *Frequent power outages, usually without prior notice, so that people are left with no choice but to ‘wait patiently’ for the lights to come back on.*
- b. *The transport system, for passenger vans and minibuses do not run by a fixed time schedule, and so passengers simply ‘wait patiently’ at bus stops for their destination cars to come by.*
- c. *The medium of prayer, for usually one is unable to tell when an answer to one’s prayer would come from above, so that one must needs ‘wait patiently’ on the Lord for said answer.*
- d. *The preparation of food, for most traditional meals require close to about two hours to have ready, so that overtime, people get acquainted with ‘waiting to have their meals done,’ or better, ‘waiting to eat.’*

RELI	
Category	Observed Items
UYFA	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Practices which promote unity of faith:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Christian and Islamic festivities are likely observed as national holidays, as Christmas, Easter, Eid ul-Fitr, Eidul-Adha.</i> b. <i>Christian and Islamic prayers are offered simultaneously during national events.</i> c. <i>The President and Vice have, since the year 2000, been members of the two religious traditions [i.e., either the President has been a Christian, and the Vice, an Islam; or vice versa.</i>
RLED	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Religious aspects of the education system:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Some basic- and senior high schools are organized under the auspices of the two religious traditions [i.e., the orthodox churches, as Presbyterian, Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist, have schools that are named after and organized by them, as also the Islamic Council, their schools.</i> b. <i>Some religious courses as ‘Religious and Moral Education,’ ‘Christian Religious Studies,’ ‘Islamic Religious Studies’ are thought in basic- and high schools.</i> c. <i>Also in most Christian basic schools, some religious practices are observed, as the reciting of the Lord’s Prayer each morning, or the observance of a ‘Worship’ session on Wednesday mornings, where school children</i>

	<p><i>and teachers pray and sing songs of adoration to the Lord.</i></p> <p><i>d. Other forms of religious penetration, as the National Anthem, which essentially is a prayer to God; the National Pledge, which ends with the words, ‘So help me God’ [and both two are respectively sang and recited daily in all basic schools]; and the Preamble of the 1992 Constitution, which begins with the words: ‘In the name of the Almighty God.’</i></p> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Some religious activities in public schools:</p> <p><i>a. Student-based clubs as the Scripture Union, the Catholic Students Union, etc. in basic- and high schools.</i></p> <p><i>b. Several other church-based student groups in tertiary institutions. These tend to be more vibrant [but also because of the greater freedom that is afforded tertiary students], and also undertake evangelistic missions in different parts of the country.</i></p>
DMRE	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>As relating to Christian practice:</p> <p><i>a. Some voluntary Christian associations, as the National Intercessors Assembly, and Aglow International Ghana, organize monthly prayer sessions, which see several thousands of people gather to pray for the peace of the nation.</i></p> <p><i>b. There is also a Christian Council, though not statutory, which oversees the activities of a number of churches.</i></p> <p><i>c. As regarding the preaching of the Word, this is done predominantly in churches, but also on the streets, in ‘trotro’ buses, and on the media, but particularly, radio- and TV stations.</i></p>

	<p>d. <i>Also, there seem to be at least three churches in almost every village in the country. It seems there is no part of the country where there is not a church.</i></p> <p>e. <i>Additionally, the translation of the Bible into every single local dialect in the country makes it particularly convenient for many persons to relate with the precepts of Christianity.</i></p> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>As relating to Islamic practice:</p> <p>a. <i>There is an office of a Chief Imam, which is both political and statutory, and oversees the activities and concerns of the Islamic community.</i></p> <p>b. <i>There is also a statutory Pilgrims Affairs Office which provides financial and technical assistance to Muslims which embark on the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca.</i></p> <p>c. <i>As regarding Islamic worship, this is done predominantly in mosques, but as Muslims are wont to doing, prayers are also offered publicly on mats – at homes, work places, schools, and sometimes, by the streets.</i></p> <p>- <i>Oftentimes, the five salat prayers are transmitted over loud speakers at the prayer centers to allow for Muslims in the neighborhood, who are unable to come by the worship center, to fellowship notwithstanding in the comfort of their homes, workplaces, or wherever they may presently be stationed.</i></p>
<p>AVRE</p>	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Some adverse effects of religious practice:</p> <p>a. <i>Religious hyperactivity on the part of some Christians tends to make them somewhat indifferent to the realities</i></p>

	<p><i>and issues of the day, and/or prevents them from partaking meaningfully in political affairs [because everything can be solved by praying, and all that matters is the service of the Lord – and nothing else, really]. For example, members of Jehovah’s Witness do not partake in voting. Cf. also the attendant scripture in Psalms (KJV, Chap. CXXVII, Vrs. 1-2) which, when misunderstood, may be seen to be the force sanctioning said apathy. It reads: “Except the LORD build the house, they labor in vain that build it: except the LORD keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain. It is vain for you to rise up early, to sit up late, to eat the bread of sorrows: for so he giveth his beloved sleep.”</i></p> <p><i>b. The rise of so-called ‘seeing prophets,’ particularly in the charismatic churches, which speak ‘hidden truths’ to people, and set family members one against the other [i.e., people are sometimes informed that their family members, relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances are responsible for some hardships they may be facing, so that they are wont to distrust, hate, or be particularly suspicious of said persons].</i></p> <p><i>c. Other forms of spiritism, particularly in the traditional sphere, causes people to be especially tender and careful in their dealings with others, as they would not like to offend anyone, for the person to employ said occultic divinations against them. And this may well account for why most Ghanaians tend to be introverted and reserved.</i></p> <p><i>d. Amongst Muslims, for example, inter-marriages between a Muslim woman and a Christian man is usually disallowed, because of the perception that the man would dissuade the woman from her Islamic faith, although the reverse is usually welcomed, because it is believed that</i></p>
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	<p><i>the man, being the head of the household, would be able to insist that the Christian woman convert to Islam.</i></p> <p><i>e. Other forms of wickedness are usually perpetrated for purposes of ritual money [this obtains solely, if not predominantly, in the traditional sphere], where sometimes one is made to sacrifice a virgin, or a relative, or some parts of a human; or at other times, different types of animals. Otherwise also, said persons are asked to perform some dehumanizing rituals, as for example, sweeping naked in front of one's house at midnight; lying naked in a coffin for a number of days, drinking the blood of a human or an animal, etc.</i></p> <p><i>f. Also, because Christianity preaches against pre-marital sexual relations, or fornication, if one likes that term, it is usually the case that most Christian- schools and families refrain from educating adolescents on their reproductive health, with the view that not doing so would prevent the same from being drawn into thinking about said matters. Howbeit this yields the opposite effect, and with such protective instruments as condoms and morning-after pills being 'forbidden' in some way: the former, because of the scripture in Genesis (cf. Chap. XXXVIII, Vrs. 8-10); and the latter, because it is regarded a kind of 'abortion,' which runs contrary to the scripture in Psalms (cf. Chap. CXXVII, Vrs. 3-5), it is usually the case that teenage pregnancies are increasingly recorded amongst young people, but particularly high-school students.</i></p> <p><i>g. Also, most Christian women tend to believe that procreation is a duty required of them by God, and so many are too willing to give birth, with little consideration given to their readiness or preparedness</i></p>
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	<i>[i.e., as relating to the financial capability or emotional maturity of the couple] to doing so.</i>
BNRE	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Some benefits of religious practice:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Prayer, for instance, reduces stress and depression, insofar as it offers an effective means by which one could air out one's grievances and resentful feelings.</i> b. <i>Also, the belief in a supernatural, all-powerful, and all-knowing God tends to endue many believers with a sense of security and hope: in the case of the former, that there is a 'big brother' out there looking-out for them, as is also noted in Psalms (Chap. XCI, Vrs. 1-16); and the latter, that the same is able to answer their prayers, and grant their heart desires, as well as cater for their daily needs, as is noted in Ephesians (Chap. III, Vrs. 20); Philippians (Chap. IV, Vrs. 19); St. Matthew (Chap. VI, Vrs. 25-34); St. Luke (Chap. XII, Vrs. 22-31).</i> c. <i>Also, the doctrines of some religious traditions, as Christianity, tends to be consonant with democratic government, so that its practice might have the effect of moderating the behaviors and attitudes of men towards greater conformity with the statutes of the state.</i> d. <i>Additionally, service in ministry offers a means of livelihood for persons engaged therein, be they church pastors, or street preachers. For all other believers, the service of God provides an alternative means, apart from the state, by which they could find help and support for their issues, challenges, and concerns [i.e., one might not have so much need for the government, so long as one can hope in God to supernaturally provide a job; help one find a spouse; cause others to 'give unto</i>

	<p><i>one's bosom,' etc. And the government is the more happier, because said disposition on the part of the people is likely to prevent them from looking to the former all the time for their needs and concerns, and/or be unduly critical of the same should the latter be facing hardships and deprivations in their lives.</i></p> <p><i>e. Lastly also, religious leaders, as a kind of elite group, mediate between the government and the people, in that they help their congregation better understand the positions of government on policy matters, and also rehearse the grievances and concerns of the people to the government.</i></p>
<p>MDIA</p>	
Category	Observed Items
<p>DIMO</p>	<p>[OB-1]: Radio stations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. There seem to be at least one radio station in every tribal community, or better, local district, across the country.</i> <i>b. Most of the radio stations broadcast in the dialect of the community wherein they are based, and so facilitate an audience with the local people.</i> <i>c. Most of these stations finance their activities and operations through paid advertisements [from businesses], and the selling of air-time [to persons, and organizations who may want to broadcast a program on the network].</i> <p>[OB-2]: TV stations:</p>

	<p>a. <i>These are not as multitudinous as the radio stations, and only a few of them boast of a nationwide coverage.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Also, because of the move of the TV network, by the National Communications Authority (NCA), from an analogue to a digital platform, many more new TV stations have emerged in the country, often broadcasting to a specific geographical area. Nevertheless, one must needs have a satellite dish to access such stations, so that not all households are able to tune-in to them.</i></p> <p>[OB-3]:</p> <p>Print media:</p> <p>a. <i>These are also extensively distributed across the country. Most of them as the Daily Graphic, the Ghanaian Times, the Mirror, etc. publish daily, whilst others publish midweekly, or at weekends.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Many of them are privately-owned, and finance their operations through the selling of ad spaces in the newspaper, as well as selling of the newspaper.</i></p>
MEPR	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Radio stations:</p> <p>a. <i>Most radio stations frequently invite the public to partake in discussions on public matters through phone call-ins.</i></p> <p>- <i>Many of such programs are political dialogues, or counselling sessions that invite the public to air their opinion on the matter at hand.</i></p> <p>b. <i>This besides, some radio stations actually invite personalities to their studios to hold such dialogues meetings in person – particularly the representatives of businesses, political parties, and government agencies.</i></p>

[OB-2]:

TV stations:

- a. *Because of the added effects of visual broadcasting, TV stations usually organize reality programs that span a number of weeks and draw audience from all sections of the country.*
 - *Examples of such programs include: music- and dance contests, beauty pageants, fitness contests, quiz- and spelling bee contests, etc.*
- b. *This besides, and like the radio stations, they also organize talk shows, social events, and political dialogues, which invite contributions from the general public through phone call-ins, and text messages.*
- c. *Quite unique to TV stations are the so-called ‘novellas’ which are movie series (usually of foreign origin, but dubbed in the local dialect) that are televised in episodes each weekday or weekend. Now because these tend to be characterized by great suspense [i.e., the fact that after watching one episode, one would naturally look forward to viewing the next one the following day], it is usually the case that they tend to be particularly effective at capturing the attention and expectation of viewers over the duration of the series].*

[OB-3]:

Print media:

- a. *The print media engages the public predominantly through its job listings, but also through its business advertisements.*
- b. *Occasionally also, some of these advertise public essay contests for students, or business start-up contests for young entrepreneurs.*

MUMO	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>The music industry:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Many Ghanaians are engaged in music, and produce songs that are greatly enjoyed by a significant section of the population.</i> b. <i>Many of the songs are Christian in scope, and speak concerning the love for, and trust and hope in God. Or, others simply worship the majesty of God. These are generally called ‘gospel music.’ There is then the secular, which are either called ‘hiplife’ – i.e., the more contemporary; or ‘highlife’ – i.e., the more ‘archaic,’ and convey themes of conjugal love, hope, right living, prudence, perseverance, etc.</i> c. <i>Most of these songs are sang in the local dialects, and so appeal the more to many persons, besides the fact that they help to foster a form of ethnic integration [i.e., first, because of the artists, who are regarded as celebrities across ethnicities; and second, because of the songs, which are likely listened to and sang in different parts of the country, and so foster some form of identification to the dialect (and ultimately, the ethnicity) in which the music was produced].</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>The movie industry:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>These movies are of two forms:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The one is comedic and attempts to showcases the realities and intricacies of rural living. They are acted out in the local dialect, and so attract a larger audience.</i>
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	<p>- <i>The other has a more urban setting and is acted out only in English. As a result, it tends to attract a small, mainly elite, audience.</i></p> <p>b. <i>Howbeit, as with music artists, the actors thereof are considered celebrities across cultures, and their unique ethnic identities serve as a means by which the Ghanaian people are brought to identify with one another.</i></p> <p>[OB-3]:</p> <p>The revenue component:</p> <p>a. <i>The production and distribution of these media provide revenue for the nation, and income for those engaged therein.</i></p>
POBU	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Political and business dimensions:</p> <p>a. <i>Some media outlets tend to have political affiliations, and so serve mainly as platforms for articulating and propagating the agenda of their respective political parties.</i></p> <p>- <i>In this stance, news items may not always be analyzed objectively, but may be skewed in favor of the party in question.</i></p> <p>b. <i>The same trend is observed in the business dimension also. Because most media outlets are self-sponsored, they are usually constrained to prime news articles to suit financial- or stakeholder interests, thereby compromising on objectivity once again.</i></p> <p>c. <i>Economic-wise, the media help to promote local business in the country by directing consumers to products and services on offer.</i></p>

NAEC	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Coverage of national elections:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Media outlets, but particularly radio- and TV stations, engage actively in the coverage of national elections.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Most of them, for instance, send representatives to all 33,367 polling stations in the country to report on election results.</i> - <i>Thus, it is usually the case that electoral results are known in advance by the public, ere they are officially announced by the EC.</i> b. <i>This besides, most media networks offer opportunities for candidates and party representatives to engage with the public on the former's policy manifestos.</i> c. <i>Additionally, some radio- and TV stations provide platforms during the period for independent experts and analysts to discuss the policy manifestos of political candidates from a holistic perspective, so as to better inform the public on said policy proposals.</i>
TECH	
Category	Observed Items
ICTL	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Diffusion of ICT education:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Introductory module is compulsory in all basic- and high schools, as also some tertiary institutions.</i> b. <i>There exist diverse opportunities for professional development in the field, as an advanced university degree in Computer Science, or a chartered certification in IT.</i>

	<p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Observed impacts of ICT learning:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>An increase in computer literacy amongst young people [i.e., many of them, even children of about five years old, are able to operate a personal computer, as well as perform some basic tasks as coding, programming, gaming, office applications, etc.].</i> b. <i>Improvements in diverse services as:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The publication of newspapers, and other literary materials.</i> - <i>The creation of websites.</i> - <i>The design of marketing- and advertising content.</i> - <i>The production of media [but particularly, music, movies, and art].</i>
MOTL	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Some aspects of mobile telephony:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>There are about four major multinational telecom companies currently operating in the country [there is presently no local telecom company operating in the country, following the sale of Kasapa Telecom Limited and Ghana Telecom – the two local telecom companies – to Expresso Telecom and Vodafone Group PLC respectively].</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Only about two of these multinational telecom companies, however, boast of a nationwide coverage.</i> b. <i>Mobile telephony provides a viable means by which family and friends are able to keep in contact with one another.</i> c. <i>Many of the networks operate a so-called ‘mobile money’ service which allows for persons to receive</i>

	<p><i>remittances abroad, as well as transfer funds to others locally via their mobile devices.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The service also provides employment to some locals as ‘transfer operators;’ and in some instances, offer small credit loans to individuals and small business owners.</i>
INTR	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Accessing the internet:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>This is carried out predominantly through mobile-enabled devices, as smartphones, but also via fixed cable and wireless routers.</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Benefits of internet penetration and diffusion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Access to social media platforms, as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, etc., which facilitate communication amongst persons, both locally and across borders.</i> b. <i>The increasing use of online portals for university admissions and job applications, thus supplanting effectively the use of manual paper applications.</i> - <i>This has helped to improve transparency in said applications by eliminating the need for ‘middlemen’ [i.e., persons who acted as facilitators, to wit, introduced people to said opportunities, and helped them with the application process]. Also, the fact that college admissions and job advertisements are listed online means that they can be accessed likely by all persons across the country, and not just by a privileged few.</i> c. <i>The opening of new business opportunities as:</i>

- *Car sharing- and rental services, such as Uber, Bolt, Avis, etc.; as also online delivery services, as Glovo.*
- *Digital- and electronic payments, as well as internet banking.*
- *Online stores, for sales and purchases;*
- *Live online broadcasting of social events.*

d. Other educational benefits:

- *For instance, many learn basic skills in baking, computer repairs, website development, programming, etc. via sites as YouTube and Daily Motion.*
- *Also search engines as Google and Bing enable research and knowledge dissemination on several topics, and Google Maps may help one navigate one's paths and bearings in a new country, or a driver, a destination.*

[OB-3]:

Adverse impacts of internet penetration and diffusion:

- a. The opportunity for persons to engage in shady attempts to hack into people's financial data, as credit cards and bank accounts.*
- b. The opportunity for teenagers, and sometimes children, to access explicit contents on the internet – via their mobile phones – which may be deleterious to their psychosocial development.*
- c. The opportunity for some unscrupulous persons to spread 'fake' news that may inspire fear, or stir-up hate and divisiveness amongst persons.*
- d. The opportunity for downloading media online illegally, via Torrent sites, for example, which may tend to inhibit foreign investments in the country.*

CUTR	
Category	Observed Items
CHFT	<p>[OB-1]: The institution of chieftaincy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Safeguarded under the 1992 Constitution, together with a National- and Regional House of Chiefs.</i> <p>[OB-2]: The functions of chiefs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Oversee the observance of traditional festivals.</i> b. <i>Promote socioeconomic development in their community areas, usually through cooperation with government and the international community.</i> c. <i>Mediate between government and their local subjects, particularly on political matters.</i> d. <i>Actively promote the propagation and learning of cultural mores and values amongst the local community, but particularly the younger generation.</i>
CULR	<p>[OB-1]: Forms of cultural learning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Taboos, which are superstitious beliefs that are enforced to induce acceptable forms of behavior, as:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The prohibition of fishing and farming on Tuesdays and Thursdays respectively, which has allowed for persons engaged in such professions to rest on said days, as also the land and sea.</i> - <i>The prohibition of the killing of totemic animals, as crows, monkeys, bats, etc., which in essence has</i>

	<p><i>helped to protect such animal species from extinction.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Also, it is prohibited for one to hunt down a pregnant animal, which, in essence, is to help safeguard procreation. Also, one may not whistle at night, or sweep one's room at night, for it is believed that one would be visited by ghosts or lose one's wealth respectively when one does so, but in essence, this is to help maintain peace and quiet during such times.</i> b. <i>The use of adinkra symbols to convey certain behavioral norms.</i> c. <i>The use of proverbs and folklores – but particularly the so-called Ananse stories – to teach diverse moral lessons.</i>
MODN	<p>[OB-1]:</p> <p>Positive aspects of modernization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Girls are no longer consigned to taking care of the home and bearing children, but can have an education, just as the boys.</i> - <i>As a result, an increase in the education of the girl-child, greater gender parity in public- and private employments, and the general rise of women to positions of leadership.</i> b. <i>The disbandment of unsavory traditional practices as female genital mutilation, cruel widowhood rites, the inscription of tribal marks, etc.</i> <p>[OB-2]:</p> <p>Negative aspects of modernization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>The loosening of social and cultural mores.</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>For instance, most young people are content to engage in concubinary relationships, or have a child ere they are married.</i> - <i>A greater tendency towards individualism, and less care for and responsibility towards one's immediate family.</i> <p><i>b. Rise in social vices at urban centers, as a result of the frantic pursuit of means of livelihood, – also engendering intolerance and indifference amongst persons.</i></p>
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C3. Code Tallies

These represent a statistical summary of the data themes, as also their source, and medium of communication.

POLI				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
GOVT	OB – 1	a – c	FCT _x	LIT _x
	OB – 2	a	BAI – G _y DAN – K _y	FGD – 1 _y
			GEO – O _z RIT – N _z	FGD – 2 _z
ELEC	OB – 1	a – b	FCT _x	LIT _x
	OB – 2	a – b	BAI – G _y DER – Y _y	FGD – 1 _y
			MEN – A _z GEO – O _z	FGD – 2 _z
GVPO	OB – 1	a – d	FCT _x	LIT _x
	OB – 2	a – f		

			$\left \begin{array}{l} \text{DZI} - \text{T} \\ \text{BER} - \text{B} \end{array} \right ^y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{CHA} - \text{B} \\ \text{RIT} - \text{N} \end{array} \right ^z$	$ \text{FGD} - 1 ^y$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 ^z$
POMA	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $	$ a - b $ $ a - b $	$ \text{FCT} ^x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{ISA} - \text{O} \\ \text{DAN} - \text{K} \end{array} \right ^y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{CHA} - \text{M} \\ \text{GEO} - \text{O} \end{array} \right ^z$	$ \text{LIT} ^x$ $ \text{FGD} - 1 ^y$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 ^z$
EDUC	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $ $ \text{OB} - 3 $	$ a - d $ $ a - d $ $ a - e $	$ \text{FCT} ^q$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{NAN} - \text{M} \\ \text{NAN} - \text{O} \end{array} \right ^x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{DZI} - \text{T} \\ \text{DER} - \text{Y} \end{array} \right ^y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{YAA} - \text{A} \\ \text{RAL} - \text{F} \end{array} \right ^z$	$ \text{LIT} ^q$ $ \text{SDS} ^x$ $ \text{FGD} - 1 ^y$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 ^z$
ECON				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
INEC	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $	$ a - f $ $ a - f $	$\left \begin{array}{l} \text{DZI} - \text{T} \\ \text{DAN} - \text{K} \end{array} \right ^x$ $ \text{MEN} - \text{A} ^y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{CHA} - \text{H} \\ \text{RAN} - \text{M} \end{array} \right ^z$	$ \text{FGD} - 1 ^x$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 ^y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 ^z$
FOEC	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $	$ a - d $ $ a - b $	$\left \begin{array}{l} \text{BER} - \text{B} \\ \text{BAI} - \text{G} \end{array} \right ^x$ $ \text{RIT} - \text{N} ^y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{RAN} - \text{M} \\ \text{QWE} - \text{T} \end{array} \right ^z$	$ \text{FGD} - 1 ^x$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 ^y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 ^z$

UNEM	OB - 1	a - f	LUC - G KWA - M ^q ISA - O BER - B ^x GEO - O ^y ADW - N BEN - A ^z	SDS ^q FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
RUUR	OB - 1	a	DAN - K DER - Y ^x RAL - F ^y RUT - E SAM - P ^z	FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
TDUN	OB - 1	a - d	FCT ^q KAF - T DER - Y ^x RIT - N ^y CHA - H BEN - A ^z	LIT ^q FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
SOC1				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
ETIN	OB - 1	a - e	KAF - T ISA - O ^x GEO - O ^y ADW - N BEN - A ^z	FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
DFDM	OB - 1	a - c	KAF - T BER - B ^x	FGD - 1 ^x

			GEO - O y	FGD - 2 y
			ADW - N z RAN - M z	FGD - 3 z
UYNM	OB - 1	$a - c$	DZI - T x DAN - K x	FGD - 1 x
			MEN - A y	FGD - 2 y
			CHA - H z BEN - A z	FGD - 3 z
FAML	OB - 1	$a - c$	BAI - G x ISA - O x	FGD - 1 x
	OB - 2	$a - c$	RIT - N y	FGD - 2 y
			RAN - M z RUT - E z	FGD - 3 z
SOCM	OB - 1	$a - d$	DER - Y x KAF - T x	FGD - 1 x
	OB - 2	$a - e$	GEO - O y	FGD - 2 y
			CHA - H z ADW - N z	FGD - 3 z
ESDF	OB - 1	a	ISA - O x DER - Y x	FGD - 1 x
	OB - 2	$a - b$	CHA - B y	FGD - 2 y
			SAR - F z SAM - P z	FGD - 3 z
SONV	OB - 1	$a - e$	KAF - T x DAN - K x	FGD - 1 x
	OB - 2	$a - d$	CHA - M y	FGD - 2 y
			SAM - P z RAN - M z	FGD - 3 z

RELI				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
UYFA	OB - 1	a - c	FCT <i>p</i> JOH - N EMM - A <i>q</i> BER - B <i>x</i> CHA - M GEO - O <i>y</i> CHA - H <i>z</i>	LIT <i>p</i> FDS <i>q</i> FGD - 1 <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>
RLED	OB - 1 OB - 2	a - d a - b	FCT <i>p</i> NAN - M LUC - G <i>q</i> JOH - N SOL - D <i>s</i> DZI - T <i>x</i> GEO - O RIT - N <i>y</i> RAN - M <i>z</i>	LIT <i>p</i> SDS <i>q</i> FDS <i>s</i> FGD - 1 <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>
DMRE	OB - 1 OB - 2	a - e a - c	EMM - A <i>q</i> DER - Y <i>x</i> YAA - A RIT - N <i>y</i> SAM - P <i>z</i>	FDS <i>q</i> FGD - 1 <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>
AVRE	OB - 1	a - g	JOH - N EMM - A <i>x</i>	FDS <i>x</i>

			MEN - A CHA - B ^y	FGD - 2 ^y
			ADW - N ^z	FGD - 3 ^z
BNRE	OB - 1	a - e	SOL - D ^x CHA - M CHA - B ^y	FDS ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
MDIA				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
DIMO	OB - 1	a - c	FCT ^x	LIT ^x
	OB - 2	a - b	CHA - M CHA - B ^y	FGD - 2 ^y
	OB - 3	a - c	RAN - M SAR - F ^z	FGD - 3 ^z
MEPR	OB - 1	a - b	BER - B ^x	FGD - 1 ^x
	OB - 2	a - c	RIT - N YAA - A ^y	FGD - 2 ^y
	OB - 3	a - b	BEN - A SAR - F ^z	FGD - 3 ^z
MUMO	OB - 1	a - c	BAI - G ^x	FGD - 1 ^x
	OB - 2	a - b	RIT - N MEN - A ^y	FGD - 2 ^y
	OB - 3	a	ADW - N BEN - A ^z	FGD - 3 ^z
POBU	OB - 1	a - c	BAI - G ^x	FGD - 1 ^x

			$\left \begin{array}{l} \text{RAL} - \text{F} \\ \text{CHA} - \text{M} \end{array} \right _y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{QWE} - \text{T} \\ \text{SAM} - \text{P} \end{array} \right _z$	$ \text{FGD} - 2 _y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 _z$
$ \text{NAEC} $	$ \text{OB} - 1 $	$ a - c $	$ \text{FCT} _x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{RAL} - \text{F} \\ \text{MEN} - \text{A} \end{array} \right _y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{RUT} - \text{E} \\ \text{QWE} - \text{T} \end{array} \right _z$	$ \text{LIT} _x$ $ \text{FGD} - 2 _y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 _z$
TECH				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
$ \text{ICTL} $	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $	$ a - b $ $ a - b $	$ \text{FCT} _x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{BER} - \text{B} \\ \text{DZI} - \text{T} \end{array} \right _y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{CHA} - \text{H} \\ \text{RAN} - \text{M} \end{array} \right _z$	$ \text{LIT} _x$ $ \text{FGD} - 1 _y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 _z$
$ \text{MOTL} $	$ \text{OB} - 1 $	$ a - c $	$ \text{FCT} _x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{KAF} - \text{T} \\ \text{ISA} - \text{O} \end{array} \right _y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{ADW} - \text{N} \\ \text{RUT} - \text{E} \end{array} \right _z$	$ \text{LIT} _x$ $ \text{FGD} - 1 _y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 _z$
$ \text{INTR} $	$ \text{OB} - 1 $ $ \text{OB} - 2 $ $ \text{OB} - 3 $	$ a $ $ a - d $ $ a - d $	$ \text{FCT} _x$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{DAN} - \text{K} \\ \text{ISA} - \text{O} \end{array} \right _y$ $\left \begin{array}{l} \text{SAM} - \text{P} \\ \text{QWE} - \text{T} \end{array} \right _z$	$ \text{LIT} _x$ $ \text{FGD} - 1 _y$ $ \text{FGD} - 3 _z$

CUTR				
Category	Theme(s)	Sub-theme(s)	Source	Medium
CHFT	OB - 1 OB - 2	a a - d	FCT <i>x</i> CHA - B RAL - F <i>y</i> BEN - A SAM - P <i>z</i>	LIT <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>
CULR	OB - 1	a - c	DAN - K <i>x</i> RIT - N YAA - A <i>y</i> RUT - E QWE - T <i>z</i>	FGD - 1 <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>
MODN	OB - 1 OB - 2	a - b a - b	FCT <i>q</i> NAN - O KWA - M <i>x</i> RIT - N MEN - A <i>y</i> ADW - N CHA - H <i>z</i>	LIT <i>q</i> SDS <i>x</i> FGD - 2 <i>y</i> FGD - 3 <i>z</i>

Notes

A: The same standard questionnaire was employed in all three focus group interviews, except that the questions were varied in each session to reflect the dynamics of each group interaction. And this we did, because the goal of the FGDs was to enable the research team evaluate the substance and depth of the field observations priorly documented on the nation, so that discussing the same issue items in all three focus discussions would allow for the team to identify those observations which were widely held by respondents to be true, and those which were not.

B: The interviews were semi-structured in form because we did not attempt to stick stringently to the letter of the questionnaire, but endeavored to ask new- and follow-up questions [that were not originally a part of the questionnaire] when this became necessary, as say, when respondents brought to light certain norms and behavioral patterns which the research team found to be relevant and interesting [cf. Essay III, Note 72, for a detailed statement on how the group discussions were organized and conducted].

C: Because the discussions were conducted in line with the observations made by the study, the questions posed therein were not so different in form to said observations, so that it was not necessary to list again said questions in this section. For instance, as regards to, for example, ‘C2/SOCI/ETIN/OB-1/a-e,’ the question posed was: “*what are some of the norms and practices which facilitate ethnic integration in the country?*” Or, to ‘C2/RELI/BNRE/OB-1/a-e,’ the question, “*what are some of the benefits that people derive from their religious practice?*” Or, to ‘C2/ECON/UNEM/OB-1/a-f,’ the question, “*what are some of the causes of graduate unemployment in the country?*”

D: On section C3, the category labelled ‘SOURCE’ indicates where validation was derived for the given observation; and ‘MEDIUM,’ the channel by which said validation was communicated. A simple function, $f(|x, n|) = f(|y, n|)$ was employed for the two, so that if the former could be denoted as S , and the latter, M , then we could say that $f(|S, n|) = f(|M, n|)$, where n is the variable notation. Also, the item labelled |FCT| denotes ‘factual observation,’ and is always corresponded to the item labelled |LIT|, which denotes ‘literature.’ |FCT|s are simply observations which are factual and need not be further affirmed or validated by respondents in the group interviews. They are thus corresponded to |LIT| because they are observations whose verity could be ascertained via literature, thus rendering them incontrovertible. For instance, the *dominant two-party system*, the *centralized system of government*, the *‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system*, the *number of administrative regions*, some *social policies of the government*, the *number of telecom companies*, the *territorial concentration of ethnicities*, some *aspects of the education system*, etc., are all observations that could be ascertained factually via literature, and need not be further discussed nor affirmed in the group dialogues.

E: Based on the afore, the following sample tallies could, for example, be read as follows:

ECON				
UNEM	OB - 1	a - f	LUC - G KWA - M ^q ISA - O BER - B ^x GEO - O ^y ADW - N BEN - A ^z	SDS ^q FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z
RELI				
RLED	OB - 1 OB - 2	a - d a - b	FCT ^p NAN - M LUC - G ^q JOH - N SOL - D ^s DZI - T ^x GEO - O RIT - N ^y RAN - M ^z	LIT ^p SDS ^q FDS ^s FGD - 1 ^x FGD - 2 ^y FGD - 3 ^z

CUTR				
EDUC	OB - 1	a - d	FCT _q	LIT _q
	OB - 2	a - d	NAN - M _x NAN - O	SDS _x
	OB - 3	a - e	DZI - T _y DER - Y	FGD - 1 _y
			YAA - A _z RAL - F	FGD - 2 _z

i) On | ECON |, the focal category | UNEM | has a *single* theme | OB - 1 |, which in turn has *six* sub-themes | a - f |. These observations were affirmed and validated by: { | LUC - G |; | KWA - M | } in the *school dialogue session* (| SDS |); by { | ISA - O |; | BER - B | } in the *first focus group discussion* (| FGD - 1 |); by { | GEO - O | } in the *second focus group discussion* (| FGD - 2 |); and by { | ADW - N |; | BEN - A | } in the *third focus group discussion* (| FGD - 3 |).

ii) On | RELI |, the focal category | RLED | has *two* themes: | OB - 1 | and | OB - 2 |, which in turn have *four* and *two* sub-themes, | a - d | and | a - b | respectively. These observations have aspects that were ascertained factually through literature, hence the linkage, $f(|FCT, p|) = f(|LIT, p|)$. The rest however were affirmed and validated by: { | NAN - M |; | LUC - G | } in the *school dialogue session* (| SDS |); by { | JOH - N |; | SOL - D | } in the *faith dialogue session* (| FDS |); by { | DZI - T | } in the *first focus group discussion* (| FGD - 1 |); by { | GEO - O |; | RIT - N | } in the *second focus group discussion* (| FGD - 2 |); and by { | RAN - M | } in the *third focus group discussion* (| FGD - 3 |).

iii) On | CUTR |, the focal category | EDUC | had three themes: | OB - 1 |, | OB - 2 |, and | OB - 3 |, in which the first two have *four* sub-themes, | a - d | apiece, and the third, *five*, | a - e |. These observations had aspects that were ascertained factually via literature, hence the linkage, $f(|FCT, q|) = f(|LIT, q|)$. The rest however were affirmed and validated by: { | NAN - M |; | NAN - O | } in the *school dialogue session* (| SDS |); by { | DZI - T |; | DER - Y | } in the *first focus group discussion* (| FGD - 1 |); and by { | YAA - A |; | RAL - F | } in the *second focus group discussion* (| FGD - 2 |).

F: Whereas each focal category was somewhat discussed in all three focus group discussions, only the sessions wherein the said focal category was dominantly discussed are shown in the tallies. Also, whereas a lot more participants contributed towards each observation in the three focus group discussions, only the dominant contributors on the said focal category are listed in the tallies. And of course, we did consider all responses in our analysis; nevertheless, because it would have been unduly pedantic to provide an exhaustive list of all contributors to each focal observation, such selection mechanism was employed to allow for conciseness in our reporting.

G: For reasons of verbosity, which we sought to avoid, we did not think it meet to include the transcripts of the focus group- and dialogue interviews in this appendix section, but these have been duly catalogued as supplementary data, and are readily available upon request.
