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TITOLO TESI

Transatlantic Brokers. A global history of Jean Monnet's network 1914-1943

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Contents

Abbreviations

ACL – Amherst College Library, Amherst (MA)

ADLC – Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve, Paris

BL – Bodleian Library, Oxford

FDRL – Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park (NY)

FJME – Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne

HAEU – JMDS - Historical Archives of the European Union, Jean Monnet Duchene Sources, Fiesole

LOC – Library of Congress, Washington (DC)

NA – National Archives, Kew

PA – Parliamentary Archives, London

PUL – Princeton University Library

YUL – Yale University Library

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

In April 1950, a grey-haired and little-known Frenchman left Paris for the Swiss Alps. His country was going through numerous issues that were constantly on his mind. Recovery, social conflict, security, the cold war, it seemed the beginning of a story he already lived decades before. After weeks of endless walks, accompanied by phone calls and telegrams to his friends John McCloy and John Foster Dulles, he returned to the French capital with a luggage full of notes containing an answer to his government's dilemma.

The man was Jean Monnet, the Father of Europe, the great architect of the Schuman Plan. That is the almost mythical story of the origin of his most celebrated project.

As Duchene says, *European integration is too young for myths*[1], although its institutions are always desperately looking for some. Jean Monnet is undoubtedly one of them. However, those who decide to study his work in an Anglo-Saxon context live an intrinsically contradictory experience: on the one hand, the name is always mistaken for the famous master of Impressionism. Indeed, Jean Monnet is usually only known among the few historians or politicians who are directly concerned with the history of European integration. On the other hand, this lack of interest or expertise is faced with a

[1] Duchene, *Monnet's Method*, in Hackett, Clifford, and Douglas Brinkley, eds, *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*. 1992 edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992, p. 184

genuinely overwhelming flood of documentation, conference boards and individual scientific publications, mostly in French, about Monnet and his role in the early construction of many European Institutions. Monnet himself has built a political monument to his image through the publication of its extensive memoirs, which are translated in English[2].

If he has nevertheless been somewhat forgotten in the public consciousness of any country but France, this seems to have three reasons: firstly, he has been an actor who, for a long time, was mostly afraid of public scrutiny of his work. His achievements never actually made headlines under his name. Moreover, Monnet's disappearance from public consciousness has a second reason: he has been standing in the shadow of his great compatriot Charles de Gaulle throughout his public life. The French president has always claimed the credit for having laid the ground for reconciliation between French and Germans. The work Monnet did with the Reconstruction Plan and with the ECSC was left in the shadows by this narrative. The third reason is that the real measure of his influence consisted of his reach inside established networks of officials that worked mostly behind the scenes[3].

For Monnet, decision-making was ultimately a tiring and industrious activity of bringing people of power together. By the time of the Schuman Plan, he has been a channel of communication of different interests from several stakeholders. His understanding of the right political timing, his ability to coordinate a vast network of friends and acquaintances, his readiness for compromise is almost legendary if we look at the literature.

Monnet took advantage of his European and American networks consisting of top-level businessmen and politicians whom he advised and people from the media whom he used to spread his ideas. His real influence can be measured by his ability to transform, through his deep relationship with

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[2] Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*. Paris: Fayard, 2011; Jean Monnet, Richard Mayne, and Roy Jenkins, *Memoirs*, 2015.

[3]Gérard Bossuat. *Jean Monnet. La mesure d'une influence*. Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire, n°51, juillet-septembre 1996., 1996.

influential people on both sides of the Atlantic, international and European relations. From the rearming of wartime France to the Plan, from the Victory program to the Schuman plan, from the ECSC to the work carried with the Kennedy administration, there were many successes the European Institutions can claim as founding legends. However, there were also some ambiguous aspects of this story: Monnet was more of an organizer than a democrat, his choice of targeted conflicts sometimes led him to underestimate the general political situation, his determination to remain on the side-lines weakened his impact on public opinion until he published his Memoirs.

Main argument and Structure

There are numerous studies addressing Monnet's role in the process of early European integration and his personality. Firstly, is the extensive and well documented biography by Eric Roussel[4]. It has an almost encyclopaedic character, which at the same time is its strength and weakness. It is in fact intriguing that the most versatile and at the same time the most impressive contours of Monnet's life are available in English. The historian and journalist François Duchêne[5], one of Monnet's youngest collaborators, describes a pragmatic internationalist who managed to convince politicians, policymakers, financiers and businessmen from different countries that interdependence was the only possible way forward for international relations. Based on more recent archival research, the American historian Sherrill Brown Wells[6] has published a narrower biography of Monnet, which focuses mostly on its diverse relations with the United States. What all these works have in common is the always mentioned influence behind the scenes in Europe and the United States through his

[4] Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet, 1888-1979*, Paris: Fayard, 1996
[5] François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*, 1. Ed, New York London: Norton, 1994
[6] Sherrill Brown Wells, *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman*, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011

extensive connections with people in power, although without an extensive analysis of the ways, methods and context behind the building of this network. Moreover, Valuable scholarship on Monnet's international roles written by scholars and officials who knew Monnet has been published in French as chapters edited by Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens[7]. Clifford Hackett[8] collected into a book several essays showing the influence of American players on Monnet and the role of these actors in early European integration. This work covered Monnet's relationships with a few key people, such as Harry Hopkins, George Ball, Robert Nathan, Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and John McCloy. Duchêne argued that Monnet "*built up networks of such individuals, powerful and not so powerful on whom he could call as occasion demanded*"[9]. Thomas Schwartz talked about the transnational partnership between Monnet and McCloy and concluded, rather controversially, that Monnet was "*a man whose action conformed to Washington's interests, not to those of Paris"* [10].

Monnet is therefore seen in the literature as part of a network that included several influential individuals who, at different moments, held key positions (for example, in 1950, Dean Acheson was US Secretary of State, and John McCloy was High Commissioner for Germany). An important aspect in this regard is that, according to Winand[11], some of Monnet's American friends promoted European integration and contributed to the *cross-fertilization process* across the Atlantic. Considering that most of the authors either list a number of people as being part of this network, or focus on particular individuals' relationship with Monnet, it is fair to ask to what extent his network helped him in

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[7] Gérard Bossuat , Andreas Wilkens, ed, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et Les Chemins de La Paix: Actes Du Colloque de Paris Du 29 Au 31 Mai 1997*, Série Internationale / Université de Paris-I--Panthéon Sorbonne 57, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999.

[8] Clifford P. Hackett, ed., *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and His U.S. Supporters*, Washington, D.C: Jean Monnet Council, 1995

[9] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p.35

[10] Thomas Schwartz, *The Transnational Partnership: Jean Monnet and John McCloy*, in Clifford P. Hackett, ed., *Monnet and the Americans,* p. 172

[11] Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. XV

pursuing his goals, if Monnet was simply accepted, and why, in already existing networks, if we can consider his as a transatlantic working group and if we can retrace in this story elements of continuity and *long durée* that can contribute to the historiography of early European Integration.

Considering new trends and interpretations that highlight the role played by networks[12], examination of Monnet's techniques and his reliance on his transatlantic connections reveal important findings about his relationship with policymakers, shading also a light on important features of XX century diplomatic and transatlantic history. According to Kaiser[13]: "*Policy networks could be defined as entities consisting of public, quasi-public, or private actors who are dependent on each other and [. . .] maintain relations with each other*". These political networks "*could contribute to shaping partially transnational public discourses about freedom, market economy, democracy, and the Atlantic partnership, for example*"[14]. Kaiser is here describing a political phenomenon that belongs, in his mind and discourse, to a much more recent time in European History. This dissertation's attempt, therefore, is to define these as elements of continuity throughout the formative years of one of founding fathers of the Integration process. To do that it will investigate three main open question about Monnet's political experience:

- How the context of transatlantic crossings throughout the period 1914-1943 enabled him to become a channel of ideas of cooperation.
- To what extent Monnet's actions were instead group efforts on a transatlantic and sometimes global scale, throughout the period before his consecration as one of the Fathers of European Integration

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[12] Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leught, Morten Rasmussen, eds, *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity, 1950–72,* Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.Wolfram Kaiser, ed, *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration:Governing Europe, 1945–83,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

[13] Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leught, Mark Rasmussen, eds, *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity, 1950–72,* p. 15

[14] Wolfram Kaiser, ed, *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration:Governing Europe, 1945–83,* p. 10

- Could we describe these people simply as transatlantic brokers, people that uses ideals of cooperation merely as a necessary mean to *get things done* and to *fix* situations of conflict?
- Can we locate Monnet's network in the broader context of XX century transatlantic elites? Can the word *Atlantic* be associated to the Frenchman's ultimate goal of forging a liberal anchor for post-war Europe?

The archival investigation comprehensively describes the numerous actors cited in this work by mapping their biographical, social and educational background, their institutional spaces and roles, and their connections and practices. Moreover, although the analysis follows Monnet's early life, is not an attempt to write another unnecessary biography. It studies the formation and composition of Monnet's network as a process – in a certain time and space – beyond completely neat chronology, using of course Monnet as the glue that connects all of these stories. Processes and connections are in fact at the centre. It is a qualitative exploration, which will end up defining some of these actors as part of a working community. The research is based on a set of criteria or key questions:

1) What were the social, educational and generational traits of the most centrally placed actors within Monnet's network?
2) How did these actors coordinate with each other, what it meant to be part of their group?
3) What strategies did this group employ to influence policy on a transatlantic level?

In this sense, this work establishes the universe in which these people act, examines the background and formative years of Monnet's method, concerns with the early connections that constituted the first sources of his influence. The individual is constantly considered with reference to his links to the whole. Moreover, by going beyond Monnet's biography and investigating if and who these actors were as a collective, we can make more sense of their political action and social reality.

- The first chapter retells the story of Monnet early career as a Cognac salesman, using already known material and creating a necessary background for the story as it unfolds in the next chapters. His experience is put in the broader context of transatlantic war cooperation and the process of Anglo-Saxon convergence on the idea of international institutions that leaves out a country, France still reckoning with the challenges of XX century diplomacy. Monnet is seen as the man who can help filling a void left by his government.
- The second chapter analyses instead the Frenchman's experience inside the League of Nations, the reasons which led to his appointment, the effort of building transnational networks within American and European banking circles, citing the case of the financial rescue of Austria in 1923
- The acknowledgment of the failure of the League in establishing durable peace lead many people who lived through the Paris Conference to find purpose in the world of law firms and investment banking. The third chapter therefore tells a much less known story. Monnet is seen as transatlantic broker, a man that without a qualification or experience is dragged inside the world of international investment banking, a fixer who is called to act as a broker for the Chinese government. This is the first test of the workability of his method, something that puts his network on a collision course with the geopolitical strategy of both the United Kingdom and Japan
- The fourth chapter reconstructs instead one that new archival material from the United States and Europe allows us to describe as a transatlantic triangle. How an investment banker and unknown broker is welcomed again into French public service without having the classic pedigree of the people working for the Quai d'Orsay? Is it possible that it was an American, William Bullitt, to introduce him to transatlantic foreign policy? Who was Felix Frankfurter? Did the Justice act a link between networks in an effort to create a transnational base to influence American foreign policy?

- The final chapter will finally describe a pivotal moment for both Monnet's life and the story of European Integration. Monnet's mission to Algiers is put in context, again using new archival material, describing the struggle of American and British foreign policy in the *caesarean* fight between Giraud and De Gaulle, with Monnet and Frankfurter's working group acting as a transnational brokerage firm trying to forge a liberal anchor for a new freed France.

With Monnet's mission to Algiers ends the chronological scope of our analysis. After 1943 starts a progressive transition from the transatlantic broker to the patriotic French Europeanist. Without forgetting to use the extensive network he had patiently built throughout his thirty years as a private individual, he put the ideas of cooperation he and his group had developed into practise in the European context. With this background we could say that the Franco-German issue was the greatest problem Monnet's network of brokers ever fixed.

The concepts of transnationality and continuity in the literature on European Integration

To understand what this dissertation has to offer to integration history one has to deal with two struggles within the field: that of the role of the nation state and the issue of continuity before and after 1945. Unsurprisingly, the two are inseparable. This paragraph retraces the concept of transnationality within the last four decades of historiography on European Integration, drawing the backdrop against which this dissertation is positioned.

Two years ago, we marked the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. Anniversaries, especially if declined in decades, are a way to make us celebrate and commemorate, of course, but also an occasion to look back to what has been done and said on the process of European Integration in the last decades

in historical writing. The anniversary marked also the end of the fourth decade of systematic study of European Integration, started in the mid-1970s.

This new field of research was entrusted to historians of ideas, like Walter Lipgens and the team of researchers that populated the new European University Institute in Fiesole, near Florence. The first studies, understandably since it was the 1970s, focused on the wartime and pre-wartime roots of European Integration, assigning a key role to transnational social and political actors. Lipgens especially looked at how concepts and plans for integration were developed by these elites, how they were promoted and circulated during the war, in a timeframe that rarely extended beyond 1945[15].

However, these studies made no effort in drawing a link between integration ideas and the political developments of the integration process after the war. They did not manage also to shed a light on the struggle many political actors lived through in making a compromise between a wartime idealism and a post-war pragmatism.

Also, this first wave of integration studies left opened too many crucial questions, like the relationship of actors to pre-existent transnational elites, how American actors became involved, why certain ideas were successful and many others rejected, and, most importantly, why the vast post-war rhetoric on European Unity achieved so very little in on the relatively long term.

This leads us the second decade of studies on European Integration, that coincided with the political revival of the political process in middle of 1980s. Two were the most important bodies of work that appeared during those years, one carried out by diplomatic historians and the other by economic revisionists, both introducing for the first time concepts and accounts that tried to better and less idealistically explain the formation of what was afterwards called Core Europe, and that are still a

[15] Walter Lipgens, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950,* Stuttgart : Klett, 1977, Walter Lipgens, ed., *Documents on the History of European Integration,* vols. 1-4, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984-1991

much valid reading today. The most important diplomatic history account resulted into the two *Power in Europe* volumes[16], while Alan Milward and his team, again in Fiesole, lead the way of an economic revisionist attempt in integration studies[17]. Explaining why war-time idealism was eventually followed by sheer pragmatism in the post-war era created a crucial divide between these two schools of thought, both challenging the early studies by Lipgens and the idealistic account found in the memoirs. The first explored how short-time political interests and classic international relations dynamics determined policy and preference formation, and ultimately the institutionalization of European Integration in the 1950s[18]; the second emphasized the influence of domestically derived economic necessities on governmental policymaking. Milward, although agrees with Lipgens about the significance of the role of wartime experiences and the reality of post-wartime weakness of the nation-state, shifted from the German historian in assessing the consequence this process was leading Europe to: if for early historians the war had represented the beginning of the end of the nation-state, for him it launched its rescue and restoration. Both schools of thought added new levels of analysis to why European integration happened in the way it did, especially explaining the French motives. Politically, the need of France to control Western Germany's production and to assume political leadership in western Europe while consenting the Germans to regain their national sovereignty within a strong institutionalized framework and the new US-led western Alliance. Economically, the French aim to secure its reconstruction and modernization program (led, not by chance, by Jean Monnet), while resolving the so-called German problem.

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[16] Franz Knipping & Josef Becker, eds, *Power in Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986; Ennio di Nolfo, ed., *Power in Europe?* vol. II: *Great, Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC, 1952-1957*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992

[17] Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51,* London: Methuen, 1984*; The European Rescue of the Nation-State,* London: Routledge, 1992*; The Frontiers of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992*, London: Routledge, 1993

[18] See also Anne Deighton, ed, *Building Postwar Europe National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995

From this point of view the two waves of study do not seem to diverge significantly, especially in the emphasis, shared by both, on the nation-state policymaking and the practical short-term motivations behind the seemly radical steps of early integration.

The 1980s also represented a milestone in creating the first networks of historians within a western European space, cemented by conferences like the ones set up by the European Liaison Committee of Historians, and the projects on European identities led by René Girault and then by Robert Frank. The volumes published in those years still represent a perfect starting point for students reading about early history of European integration[19].

But all these developments during the second decade of integration studies share also an important limitation: "*a strong tendency to organise research primarily along national lines and to focus chapters on a succession of key episodes rather than considering the longue durée*"[20]. These two points made sense at the time for a variety of reasons. Research on early European integration was carried out by historians with a strong expertise on the functioning and formation of political systems of their own country, having also experience in accessing their own national archival sources. And this guaranteed, within early pan-western European conferences, a good variety of national points of view. But this was useful only if the timeframe of historical research stopped at the period before

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[19] Including: Raymond Poidevin, *Histoire des débuts de la construction européene (Mars 1948-Mai 1950) : actes du colloque de Strasbourg 28-30 novembre 1984*, Brussels: Bruylant, 1986; Klaus Schwabe, ed., *Die Anfänge des Schumans-Plan 1950*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988; Enrico Serra, ed., *The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); Gilbert Trausch, ed., *Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom : Pläne und Initiativen, Enttäuschungen und Misserfolge : Beiträge des Kolloquiums in Luxemburg, 17-19 Mai 1989*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993; Michel Dumoulin (ed.), *Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947*, Brussels: Bruylant, 1995; Alan S. Milward & Anne Deighton, eds., *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community, 1957-1963*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999; Wilfried Loth, *Crises and Compromises: the European Project 1963-1969*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001; Marie-Therèse Bitsch & Raymond Poidevin, *Institutions européennes et identitées européennes*, Brussels: Bruylant, 1998; Anne Deighton, ed., *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-1963*, London: Macmillan, 1995

[20] N. Piers Ludlow, *Widening, Deepening and Opening Out: Towards a Fourth Decade of European Integration History*, in Wilfried Loth, ed., *Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Construction 1957–2007*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009, 33–44

1958. After that it left opened multiple questions on a level of analysis that had to go beyond the national one. Also, this left out the role of any actor that did not fit within the official decision-making process, like pressure groups, informal elites and lobbies and, again, extra-European influences, especially from the US.

Ludlow gives a further explanation to the missing emphasis on the *long dureés* of this second decade, highlighting the fact that historians were limited by how member states' own archives worked and released their documents, most of them after three decades had elapsed from the facts. This created a big blind spot, namely the longer-term processes of transformation within European institutions and the level of continuity on a timeframe that went beyond a set of given milestone dates.

The first of these limitations, the over-reliance on the national approach, has been partially resolved in the course of the third decade of European integration history.

Three waves of study have begun to appear during the 1990s and early 2000s. The first focused on a long-needed analysis of the development of single European institutions[21]. This was followed by successful attempt to study European policymaking in its own right[22]. The second focused on bilateral cooperation within the wider European framework, especially Franco-German[23], and on the

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[21] Raymond Poidevin & Dirk Spierenburg, *Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier: une expérience supranationale*, Brussels : Bruylant, 1993; Antonio Varsori, ed., *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in European Integration 1958-1972*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006

[22] Christina Knudsen's work on the CAP, Elena Calandri's work on Community external relations, Lucia Coppolaro's work on the Kennedy Round, and Laurent Warlouzet's work on competition policy all successfully used this approach. Ann-Christina Knudsen, *Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study*. PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2001; Elena Calandri, *La CEE et les relations extérieures 1958-1960* in Varsori, ed., *Inside the European Community*; Lucia Coppolaro, *Trade and Politics across the Atlantic: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States of America in the GATT Negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1962-1967)*, PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2006; Laurent Warlouzet, *At the core of European power : the Birth of Competition Policy (1957-1964)* in *The making and unmaking of the European Union*, HEIRS Conference, Portsmouth 4-5 November 2005, http://www.cjcr.cam.ac.uk/heirs/HEIRS2006-conferencepapers.pdf

[23] On France and Germany see, e.g., Ulrich Lappenküper, *Deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949-1963*,, Munchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001; Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-*

relationship between the early six member states and the EEC institutions [24]. Alongside these two approaches, a new transnational layer of analysis has been added to the literature, with an early assessment of the roles of transnational networks and influences that affected European Integration, like the works by Wilfram Kaiser and Micheal Gehler on Christian Democracy[25], or Brigitte Leucht's on the role of transatlantic networks on the ECSC negotiations, built upon pioneering studies on the United States' relationship with European Integration carried out by Pascaline Winand, Gérard Bossuat, Geir Lundestad, Will Hitchcock and Max Guderzo[26].

The third decade of European integration history does therefore strike as one where several important breakthroughs have been made. It has been a period where it had been possible to go beyond the nationally focused approach. It is one where some of the orthodoxies have broken down. It is a time when some of the most contentious issues of earlier historiography seem to have been overcome: the

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stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Paris: Fayard, 1996; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, ed., *Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2001; on German-Italian Carlo Masala, *Italia und Germania: die deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen 1963-1969*, Vierow bei Greifswald: SH, 1997; on Anglo-German: Martin Schaad, *Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration, 1955-1961*, London: Macmillan, 2000; on Anglo-French: Sabine Marie Decup, *France-Angleterre: les relations militaires de 1945 à 1962*, Paris: Economica, 1998; on Italian-French: Bruna Bagnato, *Storia di un'illusione europea. Il progetto di Unione Doganale italo-francese*. London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995; on Dutch-German: Friso Wielenga, ed., *Nachbarn: Niederländer und Deutsche und die Europäische Einigung*, Bonn: Niederländische Botschaft, Presse- und Kulturabteilung, 1997; on Anglo-Dutch, Nigel Ashton & Duco Hellema, *Unspoken Allies: Anglo-Dutch Relations since 1780*, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2001

[24] Eleonora Guasconi, *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea*, Firenze: Polistampa, 2004; N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s : Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, London: Routledge, 2006

[25] Wolfram Kaiser, Michael Gehler, *Transnationalism and early European integration: The NEI and the Geneva Circle 1947-57, The Historical Journal* check year/vol; *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, London: Routledge, 2004;

[26] Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, London: Macmillan, 1993; Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944-1954*, Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1997; Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: the United States and European Integration 1945-1997*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; William Hitchcock, *France restored : Cold War diplomacy and the quest for leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998; Massimiliano Guderzo, *Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale. Gli Stati Uniti, l'Alleanza Atlantica e l'integrazione europea 1963-9*, Firenze: Aida, 2000

old economic vs political motivation question, for instance, seems to have been largely answered not with a decisive victory of one over the other but instead with the much more pragmatic and sensible realisation that the two were inextricably intertwined. Any attempt to identify either as the sole cause for any one country's European engagement was bound to be a rather pointless endeavour. And most important, it is a period when the diversity of topics studied, approaches adopted, and archives employed has reached unprecedented heights.

Nonetheless, despite its growing conceptual and narrative sophistication, integration historiography since the 1990s has reinforced a fixation on the so-called *Core Europe*. It has also focused almost entirely on developments since 1945, segregating the various periods along the established divides of political history. And this leads to the last decade of studies of integration, the one this thesis tries to respond to and be part of.

What recent trends in historical research have mostly challenged is popular assumptions about 8 May 1945 as a 'zero hour' for Europe, heralding a new age of cooperation and integration. Recent literature explores specific forms of connection among ideas and institutional practices between the interwar, war and post- war periods during the twentieth century, using at the same time a transnational approach that seems to be more and more the norm of recent historical research. It could be pointed out that we already referenced in this very paragraph that Lipgens studies already tried to conceive such an approach, but recent attempts do not follow the same thread. Although others have traced such links at the level of intellectual history, examining how ideas about European unity travelled from the 1920s to the 1940s and 1950s, much of the historiography of European Integration of the last decade focuses on the concrete nuts and bolts of cooperation and integration in Europe as much neglected carriers of continuity.

This was a response to the early trend of research that left a whole series of studies on the connections between the interwar, war and post-war periods to the history of ideas and intellectual history, which

has been focusing on individual actors and institutions[27]. Therefore, more recently others have tried to bring this debate within the perimeter of European international relations, trying to find continuity trajectory that better explain the developments in the European and Atlantic cooperation and that only at first glance seem as a complete break with the past. Three lines of research in this direction. The first focused on the link between European integration logistical aspects and pre-war experiences[28]; the second on those international organizations created in the pre-1939 period and have proceeded to serve as a model or logistic support to institutions created after the Second World War[29]; the third focused on individuals, their informal transnational networks and the process by which they replaced official negotiation channels between the states with an exchange between experts and non-state actors[30], The depoliticization of international relations that for some has made the EU institutions highly technocratic.

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[27]Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria, eds., *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2012; Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, eds., *Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War*, New York: Palgrave, 2002; Michael J. Wintle and Menno Spiering, eds., *European Identity and the Second World War*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Elisabeth du Réau, *L'idée d'Europe au XXe siècle: Des mythes aux réalités*, Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1996;

[28]Alexander Badenoch, Andreas Fickers, eds., *Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Vincent Lagendijk, *Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks*, Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008; Kiran Klaus Patel and Johan Schot, *Twisted Paths to European Integration: Comparing Agriculture and Transport in a Transnational Perspective*, Contemporary European History, 20, 4, 2011, 383–403;

[29]Kiran Klaus Patel, Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Multiple Connections in European Cooperation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967–1992*, Special Issue of the European Review of History 24, 3, 2017; Gianni Toniolo, *Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank of International Settlements, 1930–1973*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Kazuhiko Yago, *The Financial History of the Bank for International Settlements* London: Routledge, 2012; Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and the Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012; Paul Weindling, *Philanthropy and World Health: The Rockefeller Foundation and the League of Nations Health Organisation*, Minerva, 35, 3, 1997, 269–81; Ludovic Tournès, *La fondation Rockefeller et la naissance de l'universalisme philanthropique américain*, Critique Internationale, 35, 2007, 173–97; Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, e.g. 14–5, 135–7, 287–92;

[30] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Martin Conway and José Gotovitch, eds., *Europe in Exile: European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–45*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2001

Individuals and informal transnational networks constituted an important trajectory of continuity. Their pre-war and wartime experience is often left to memoirs or hagiographic biographies, but often it provided the very scaffolding on which European integration was built on. The work of Wim Weenick on Johan Willem Beyen in one example. The Dutch foreign minister is well known as a prominent father of European Integration, since he played an important role in creating the EEC. But his interwar story is fundamental in order to explain this role. He worked as vice-president at the BIS, the Bank for International Settlements, until 1937, and as president in the following years. The Bank, originally set up in Basel to facilitate reparations imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty, became, after the Hoover moratorium in 1931, on of the centres of banking transatlantic cooperation. After the war, the institution would act as an agent for the European Payments Union and, after the end of the Bretton Woods system and the creation of the BCBS, as a global meeting place for developing banking international standards. Beyen with his transatlantic network of bankers and economists, contributed to these developments during his time as president, laying the foundation for the European monetary agreements[31]. Like Beyen, other well-known actors have been re-analysed, and their story re-assessed in light of their interwar experience, like leading politicians like Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, or thinkers such as Richard Count Coudenhove-Kalergi[32]. Naturally famous actors are not the only focus of recent research. Other individuals played an important role in bridging the inter-war and post-war periods. For example, the experts cooperating in the technical sub-committees of the League of Nations often created networks and contacts that they then carried

[31] Wim H.Weenink, *Bankier van de wereld, bouwer van Europa: Johan Willem Beyen 1897–1976,* Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2005

[32] See, as one of the most recent examples, Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe: A History of European Unification,* Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015.

into the post-war world[33]. Another example would be the networks created by Christian democratic politicians, whose contacts provided the bedrock institutionalised forms of cooperation after 1945[34].

Such research is closely connected to studies taking a biographical approach, most notably Piers Ludlow's study of Roy Jenkins[35]. Among its values, "*Ludlow's work underscores the significance of access to private papers of the relevant actors. While the official paper trail sometimes does more to hide than to reveal internal deliberations and the dynamics of European integration, such privately documented sources are often indispensable to arrive at new findings"*[36]. Jean Monnet's life has recently been re-examined in a biography by Klaus Schwabe[37]. While largely building on existing studies, it might come as a surprise that this is the first biography on Monnet ever published in German. All in all, biographical research has been somewhat on the rise since the beginning of the decade, with biographical monographs on commissioners such as Sicco Mansholt[38], and compilations of biographical essays.

If International Relations scholars in particular tend to usually reduce transnational history to the involvement of non-state actors in international politics, historians of European integration took a more comprehensive approach and defined transnational history as a perspective, interested in the analysis of phenomena that transcend nations and nation states and that span territorial borders and boundaries[39].

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[33] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

[34] Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[35] Ludlow, N. Piers, *Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976–1980*: *At the Heart of Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York 2016

[36] Kiran Klaus Patel, *Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History*, *Neue Politische Literatur* 64, no. 2 (1 July 2019): 327–57

[37] Schwabe, Klaus, *Jean Monnet. Frankreich, die Deutschen und die Einigung Europas*, Nomos, BadenBaden 2016

[38] Merriënboer, *Johan van: Sicco Mansholt: A Biography*, Lang, Brussels 2011

[39] See, for instance, Thomas Risse, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

This present dissertation fits in this line of the debate by adding two new points of view. The first, which sees another element of continuity between the interwar, war and post-war periods in the learning process described by Mark Mazower, in which the "*protagonists of the post-war world were driven by a desire to avoid those that they believed the mistakes of the past* "[40]. This process is an observable phenomena in archival sources: the post-1945 use of the experience and technical work that many actors are procured in the interwar period (one example, Jean Monnet), the abandonment of many experiments attempted in previous years but without success (as the Briand plan of 1929 and the Franco-British union of 1940), and recovery after the war of alternatives previously remained unexplored and never really considered, but materialized in reports, memoranda, notes, diaries and correspondences. Researchers also need to pay attention to professional bodies and formal and informal networks amongst experts, business representatives and others, as well as their role in the production of knowledge and in international organisation. Such work needs to be informed by the insights of cultural history. This leads to our second point of view, a more defined network analysis with an historical and cultural approach. This is not to be seen as an attempt to define theoretically this analytical tool, activity that has seen Sociology and Political Sciences busily engaged for decades. What is proposed, and described in the next paragraph, is an approach, a perspective that gives a description to the ideal place in which the above-described processes occur. Not forgetting the importance of the spatial dimension in which these networks develop, in a period when geography and mental maps changed in light of the war dynamics and shifting geopolitical strategies.

The network concept, a *magpie* approach

[40] Mark Mazower, *Reconstruction: The Historiographical Issues*, Past & Present, 210, 6, 2011, 25;

During the last fifteen years a new wave of studies started to emerge. Network theories have finally met history, although historical science has yet to fully acknowledge networks as a mainstream analytical tool.

But of course, they are more than simply that. As Niall Ferguson shows in his powerful book "The Square and the Tower"[41], they are also comprehensive metaphors of our social and political life, with its complexity and interdependencies, a way to tell the story of the human experience through relationships, connections, exchange and trust. Furthermore, networks, as an approach, seem to have been spreading among different social science disciplines and appearing in a growing number of studies, sometimes as a mere visual representation of data, more recently as a new layer of analysis, in contrast with a literature in the past much focused on institutionalized and hierarchical narrative.

The consequence of what many consider a fashion is that now words like network, relational, cooperation, social capital are invading our systems of references, creating a new narrative, one that evokes the existence of a world of ties that go beyond the traditional borderlines. Two are the main reasons perhaps why historians are more prevented than other scholars from using such interpretational tools. First, the fashionable character of this kind of research and the temptation of many to sacrifice the real historical interest for the sake of complexity. Second, the notion that stating "*social ties matter*" should really be old news and that in many studies and papers the word network could easily be replaces by others, like group or elite, without any substantive change of meaning.

However, even if these two notions are sometimes true, when it comes to contemporary transatlantic relations and European integration the need to go beyond the traditional layers of analysis requires to be answered using every tool in the box. In an era, post-1945, in which the states are in a process of rethinking their role in governing several areas of policy, and in which the concept of transnational

[41] Niall Ferguson, *The Square and the Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power*, Penguin Random House, 2018

governance has made its way in the future narrative of global politics, theorizing the contrast between fluid and non-hierarchical governance and the institutionalized nation-state is more crucial now than ever. And one could easily assume that historians would have tried to ascertain the precise nature of this conceptual shift. Not so, however. Especially in the case of Euro-Atlantic relations, "*political scientists will be forgiven for thinking that at least historians would have attempted to take up this challenge long ago, possibly as part of cross-disciplinary cooperation to better understand diachronic change in governance up to the present day"*[42].

The aim of this paragraph, therefore, is to tackle this question proposing a possible "historical" way to networks, giving a comprehensive description of this tool.

What are networks?

There is no specific unifying definition of what a network is, or what a network analysis should be. Therefore, any discipline chose a different paradigm and set of tools. History should not be left behind in this, and, perhaps taking advantage of what already theorized by other disciplines, using what could be called a magpie approach, should reach a balanced equilibrium between formal theory and a more loose interpretational mean, "*neither ignoring it nor making methodology the aim of historical studies, helping us to go beyond a fashion and actually insert networks in serious historical explanations and narratives*"[43].

In political science great importance has been given to the relationship between networks and governance, implying a radical shift in the latter's definition. From institutionalised organisations characterised by hierarchical forms and defined chains of decision-making, the word *governance* has

[42] Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, *Transnational Networks in regional integration*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 6

[43] Claire Lemercier, *Formal networks methods in history: how and why*, Social Networks, Political Institutions and Rural Societies, Brepols, pp. 281-310, 2015

come also to describe a "*decentralized form of political communication and decision-making consisting of sets of state and non-state actors in less hierarchically or even non-hierarchically structured relationships"*[44]. Therefore, the changing conditions in which negotiations and policymaking take place led to the emergence of studies about "policy networks", comprising state or non-state actors, modern elites with common interests in policy implementation and shared values. The term "policy network" has been used since the late 1970s, although phenomena of blurred boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors in different historical settings have been described in other terms. A broad literature has been built around this term, now one of the most used concepts of political science, and since it is rather disparate and various, it gives many definitions of what a policy network is. The variety if explained by the different analytical focuses, precise settings, countries, and sectors observed and described. Therefore, although the network concept varies considerably between and within disciplines (we could call it *concept nomade*, nomadic concept) Tanja Borzel writes that they "*all share a common understanding, a minimal or lowest common denominator definition of policy networks, as a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals."*[45].

Although she distinguished between different schools and interpretations of networks analysis in political science[46], their common characteristics, as defined by literature, are the confused boundaries

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[44]Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Michael Gehler, *Transnational Networks in regional integration*, p. 2.

[45]Tanja Borzel, *Organising Babylon. On a different conceptions of policy networks*, Public Administration 76, 2002, 233-273, p. 245

[46] Borzel distinguishes two main trends in the policy network literature: the *interest intermediation* or *Anglo-Saxon school* and the *governance* or *German school.* As Brigitte Leucht summarises, *Interest intermediation* refers to the relations between the state and societal interests. "*Against this backdrop, policy networks represent a broad concept that applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors and to different forms of relationships between interest groups and the state*", Brigitte Leucht, *Transatlantic Policy Network and the*

between public and private sectors[47]; the constant communication and negotiation of issues between different actors[48]; a certain degree of informality; a great exchange of resources[49]; a self-organization of the people involved, a "*shadow of hierarchy*"[50], like Fritz W. Scharpf would say.

The last two points are perhaps the most paradigmatic to understand the way Political Science sees networks. These are built through a personal interpretation of policymaking, largely a process of exchange of resources, using political strategies within the "*understood rules of the game*"[51]. These rules, the shadow of hierarchy and confuse boundaries are now widely described as main characteristics of policy networks and the nature of the resources exchangeable within a network

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Formation of Core Europe, PhD Thesis, Plymouth University, 2008, p. 37. The understanding of policy networks according to the *governance* school is more ambitious since it also forwards a theoretical claim. Here, policy networks are the key element of a original form of interaction between public and private actors, based on non-hierarchical co-ordination. "*To describe this interaction the governance school rejects the notion of hierarchy and market as the two inherently distinct modes of governance and assumes a mechanism based on the mobilization and subsequent dispersion of political resources between public and private actors*" (*Idem*). The growth of networks finally represents a new form of governance. If therefore is important to keep in mind the different interpretations of the role of policy networks, the choice to adopt and describe, for the purposes of this article, a historical perspective to the concept leads us not to be greatly concerned whether networks constitute a new form of governance or merely contribute to it. In fact, studying the various literature about this issue the impression is that not so many historians or political scientists could easily answer this question, very difficult to resolve empirically. Since historical research is mostly based on empirical evidence, it would be more relevant to analyse the contingent influence on actual policy of a single policy network, than to start a theoretical argument about the nature of governance, leaving that to political science theorists.

[47] Tanya Borzel, *Organizing Babylon*

[48] Frans van. Waarden, *Dimensions and types of policy networks*, in Jordan and Schubert, *A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labelling*, 1992, pp 7-28.

[49] Kenneth Benson, *A Framework for Policy Analysis* in Rogers, D., D. Whitten, and Associates, eds., *Interorganizational Co-ordination: Theory, Research and Implementation*, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1982, pp 137-176; R.A.W. Rhodes, *Policy Networks. A British Perspective*, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, 3, 1990, pp. 293-317

[50] Fritz W. Scharpf, *Political Institutions, Decision Styles, and Policy Choices*, in Czada, Roland M. and Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier, eds., *Political Choice. Institutions, Rules and the Limits of Rationality*, Frankfurt aM: Campus, 1991, pp. 60-94

[51] R.A.W. Rhodes, *Power-dependence, policy communities and intergovernmental networks*, Public Administration Bulletin 49, 1985, pp 4-31

defines also its objectives and impact[52]. The broad interaction between a multitude of actors and different interests depends on each one's resources, while rules and pattern of communication between actors develop as these interact, insulating the networks from the outside world. Summarising using the words of Gerry Stoker, "*a) organizations committed to collective action are dependent on other organizations* (or actors)*; b) in order to achieve goals, organizations have to exchange resources and negotiate common purposes; c) the outcome of exchange is determined not only by the resources of the participants but also by the rules of the game and the context of the exchange"*[53].

Of course, we could add an almost infinite list of examples to this account, defining policy networks in terms of resource interdependence, but at this point it should be clear that this interpretation is by now broadly discussed in political science. Beyond the theoretical issues, in the last forty years the network concept has been used to analyse many aspects of actual policymaking, especially regarding international relations, supranational governance, cross-borders political exchange. Within political science, an interest in the network approach coincided recently with the adoption of new approaches to the study of European integration. Originally developed to reconceptualise public policymaking in the national arena, the network concept has become important for the analysis of policy and decision-making within the EU and of the process of European transnationalization.

What this paragraph proposes although is not to advance an historical formal theory of networks, or to engage with the political and sociological debate on key elements related to the network concept. Instead, a new narrative can be built on a set of categories and characteristics that can help us

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[52] Martin J. Smith, *Pressure Power & Policy. State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States*, Hempel Hempstead: Harvest Wheatsheaf, 1993

[53] Gerry Stoker, *Governance as theory: five propositions*, International Social Science Journal 50 (155), 1998, p 22

understand the formation and functioning of transatlantic networks in the XX century. Within this view, a network is not a method, a theory, a paradigm, an epistemological concept, but something looser, an approach, a way to assess the relational aspect of reality. Whether what we sometimes see in other disciplines approaches is a study of networks as something separate from the outside world. Furthermore, the objective should not be to show that social relationships are important, since it could understandably trigger the question "so what?". Instead describing exactly how, and at which scale, they matter, which tie does more, which less, how actors interact, is much more interesting and perhaps more difficult.

Three are the concepts that are central in this approach: the exchange of resources, the cultural encounter and the concept of trust.

An accessory to the use of term "exchange" when talking about policy networks, is the concept of political and social "entrepreneurship". The word in fact is widely used to explain innovation if public policy, to describe a successful political attempt or a career. Economics has already studies which are the main characteristics of an entrepreneur, these being persistence, the ability to create opportunities, a competitive spirit and a strategic thinking. In short entrepreneurs are actors that, using Dimitrios Christopoulos words, *can respond to exceptional challenges and rise above their peers by means of their strategic thinking, forethought and ability to manipulate their environment"*[54]. They influence policy using their personal and relational abilities, creating networks by which to achieve different goals. But how can we identify an actor with "entrepreneurial" characteristics? After having identified an exceptional political event, or policy development, the key elements of analysis should be to trace the network of actors associated with it and seeing it as the context where a person with political initiative can act. This will have distinctive brokerage roles, being able to create ties and trigger

[54] Dimitrios Christopoulos, *Relational Attributes of Political Entrepreneurs: a Network Perspective*, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 5 (2006), pp 757-78, here p 758

dialogue between different entities, specific views affecting his/her ability to intervene and unique relational attributes affecting the power to control the flow of exchange within the network.

The main characteristic of this kind of actor could be then be summarised as the ability of establishing communities. Main features of these communities are a shared set of normative and principles beliefs, a vision of the world and a common political endeavour. This concept adds another element of analysis to transnational networks, since it highlights their being coalitions based on shared values. Actors that share perspective and political ideas will be more likely to form exchange relationships with each other and identifying the common cause of these actors in the sources makes it possible to identify their network, its scope and its impact. Crucially, since the objective of this work is to identify a way to analyse networks in a transnational and more specifically Atlantic space, we use Thomas Risse definition of a transnational network being one in which "*at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization*"[55] And since these kinds of networks imply a mobilization of information, knowledge and values across national borders, this introduces to the second key elements of this analysis, the cultural transfer. This concept is not new in historical research, it has been adapted and reinvented in a variety of cultural, literary, sociological and pedagogical studies for decades. It could be argued, ad Brigitte Leucht does[56], that cultural transfer, while reinforces the way networks work, challenges at the same time the idea of Americanization, because it denies the existence of an original and target culture when dealing with international relations. It is true that the word "transfer" carries other important concepts like interchange, interaction, translation and dialogue, that seem to contradict the notions of influence and coercion, at the base of the mainstream narrative behind modern transatlantic relations, meaning the

[55] Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transitional Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*, Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 23

[56] Brigitte Leucht, *Transatlantic Policy Network and the Formation of Core Europe*, PhD Thesis, Plymouth University, 2008, p. 37

growing power and presence on both sides of the ocean of the American Empire. However this is not completely true. Dialogue and cultural transfer do not contradict the existence of an original and a target cultures, even within a transnational network. Instead they simply add a different layer of analysis useful when the reality of networks presents a more complex interchange. What the example of Jean Monnet shows is exactly that within a process of growing influence of Anglosaxon political ideas and influence on the global stage from the 1910s, non-state actors and public official had begun a collective debate that crossed political and cultural barriers, producing a Euro-American exchange of political and legal concepts that emerged when the members of this network found themselves in positions of power in the post-war period.

This then leads to the final element of this analysis, namely the role of trust in the creation of this kind of networks. Engaging in a theoretical argument on the topic would set us on a dangerous collision course against sociological, philosophical and psychological studies. To use the words of Charles Tilly, the concept of trust clearly calls to mind two different images: an epistemological one, the other related to social transactions. "*We can think of trust as an attitude or as a relationship, trust consists of placing valued outcomes at risk to others' malfeasance*"[57]. In networks based on trust, people regularly take such risks. Although the concept could lead us to break down a group into a series of dyadic connections, for the most part people of trust operate within larger networks of similar relationships. Summarising, "*Trust networks, then, consist of ramified interpersonal connections within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance of others*"[58]. In transatlantic networks, what the sources show us is that trust relationships grow based on political, cultural and psychological foundations. The key elements being actors'

[57] Charles Tilly, *Trust and rule*, Theory and Society, 33(1), 2004, p.5
[58] *Ibid*

reputation, the ability to speak the political language of the counterpart, the willingness of others to vouch for his/her integrity and the effectiveness, the acknowledgment of a common objective.

These three elements of analysis have guided an archival research that redrew the map of Jean Monnet's network on both sides of the Atlantic.

Sources

Direct access to primary sources thus makes it possible to reinforce the reflection and perspectives on the issues in question, reinvigorating the role of the archive and its heritage in the new perspectives of research on transatlantic networks. Through a thorough analysis of archives from both sides of the Atlantic, we discover a certain reciprocity between the ideas of Jean Monnet and his American friends, especially around the concepts of peace, institutions and cooperation.

At present, the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe in Lausanne and the Archives of European Union at the European University Institute are the institutions with the largest catalogue of sources concerning Jean Monnet and other founding fathers of European integration. The latter hosts mainly the working paper collected by Duchene for his biography of Monnet, consisting of photocopies of documents from archives in Europe and the United States, of great help when we needed to access again documents only available in Lausanne. The Archives of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe contains thousands of documents, catalogued according to a temporal and thematic order that follows the various chapters of Monnet's political life. Although much of the correspondence of the pre-1940 period was lost during the German occupation of France, an idea of the role and relations of the Frenchmen during the interwar years is derived from his memoirs, rich in details and references, and from the memoires and personal archives of his numerous contacts in Europe and America.

Among the fonds used for the purpose of this research:

- Fonds AMB: Première Guerre Mondiale
- Fonds AMC: La Période De 1919 À 1933
- Fonds AMD: Les Activités De Consultant Financier (1933-1940)
- Fonds AME - L'action De Jean Monnet Pendant La Seconde Guerre Mondiale
- Fonds AMF - Plan De Modernisation Et D'equipement De La France
- Fonds AMG - Plan Schuman
- Fonds AMM - Notes De Jean Monnet
- Fonds AMU - Organisation Du Temps De Travail
- Fonds AMS - Mémoires

ost of the papers from the Fondation are pieces of correspondence between him and members of his network throughout the decades. Particular attention has been paid to correspondences between Jean Monnet and his *Transatlantic* friends, in Great Britain and the United States as they bear witness to events and processes little-known or unknown to the general public. The exchange of ideas between Jean Monnet and the Anglo-Saxon elites through correspondence is indeed a considerable documentary body that allowed us to grasp a universe made by an unstopped multilateral flux of ideas crossing the Atlantic Ocean.

To that purpose, of great interests are the interviews (recorded and typed) conducted in the seventies and eighties by journalist Leonard Tennyson and by Francois Duchene. The essential contribution of these interviews is their ability to account for the nature and quality of Jean Monnet's relationship especially with Washington political elites. These interviews also provide insights into the perception of many of the members of the Frenchman’s network in relation to US foreign policy. There are two types of interviews concerning people associated with Jean Monnet: the first group was conducted on behalf of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lausanne by Tennyson; the second was carried by Duchene and now stored in Fiesole.

Moreover, at the Fondation's archives, it is possible also to consult articles and memorandums sent by eminent members of generations of American foreign policy elites such as Dean Acheson, John Mac Cloy, Georges Ball, John F. Dulles, Walt and Gene Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Bowie, Robert Schatzel or David Bruce. Added to this the so-called *Archives Americaines*, a list of finding aids referencing files in many archives in the USA concerning Monnet. This collection is the product of a research project conducted in partnership with the European University Institute. It was led by Professor Sherill Wells of the Department of History at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She worked together with a group of young researchers and students to visit institutions and archives related to Jean Monnet in the United States (personal archives, presidential and university libraries). Since February 1994, the Archives of the Fondation Jean Monnet have acquired, by eight successive submissions, a total of 771 file references.

Furthermore, this research benefitted from the analysis of papers from the Archives Diplomatiques, the archives of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at La Courneuve, Paris and the archives of the League of Nations in Geneva, related to Monnet's period at the League. Moreover, we were able to link the existing archives directly linked to Jean Monnet to others containing the , thus they did not draw the attention of Well's researchers, but that help us putting his network in the context of already existing elites in the United States and in Great Britain.

The ones in the United States:

- Amherst College Library (Amherst, Massachusetts). The Amherst College Library retains the personal records of Dwight Morrow and John McCloy.
- Library of Congress (Washington District of Columbia). The Library of Congress of the United States preserves Felix Frankfurter's documents, Joseph Alsop's documents, and the Averell Harriman collection. Most of the papers retrieved at the Library of Congress are unpublished and never historically linked to Jean Monnet.

- Yale University Library (New Haven, Connecticut). Of great interest to this research project were the documents preserved in the Department of Manuscripts and Archives of the Library of Yale University, from the Dean Acheson, Walter Lippmann and William Bullitt collections.
- Princeton University Library (Princeton, New Jersey). The library hosts the John Foster Dulles collections, that testimony a long and lasting relationship between him and Jean Monnet, many of them overlooked by both Duchene and Wells.
- Roosevelt Presidential Library (Hyde Park, New York). Among the papers in the Roosevelt archives, documents related to Monnet's mission in Washington in 1938, his appointment to Algiers in 1943, the papers of Harry Hopkins and Henry Morgenthau Jr's.
- Truman Presidential Library (Independence, Missouri). The Library hosts the working papers of Dean Acheson, including correspondence with Frankfurter and John McCloy

In Great Britain:

- National Archives (Kew). At the National Archives of great interest were the papers related to Jean Monnet's mission in China, his appointment to Washington by Churchill and his relationship with Arthur Salter, Harold Macmillan and Roger Makins
- Bodleian Library (Oxford). The Bodleian Library hosts the Macmillan collections and Sherfield Collection. Permit for accessing some of folders related to world war II was obtained by the Macmillan Family Fund. Many of these documents, especially from the Sherfield Collection, are unpublished and reproduced for the first time in this work.
- Winston Churchill College Library (Cambridge). The Library hosts collections of papers of many members of the War Cabinet, including Sir Arthur Salter and Lord Beaverbrook.
- Parliamentary Archives (Londra). The archives of the British Parliament contain two files of extreme interest for the purpose of this research, the correspondence between Lord Beaverbrook and members

of the British Supply Council in Washington and the papers of the investigation by the British Military Intelligence on Monnet.

1. The Cognac lessons. War cooperation and the Atlantic dimension of a young policy entrepreneur

1.1 The true cognac lessons

Alcohol is often a vital tool for historical research. Dating back to the dawn of times, intentionally fermented beverages have been a significant feature of civilisation for reasons not yet fully explored. Neither religion nor state intervention managed to keep humans away from them. "*I have taken more out of alcohol than alcohol has taken out of me*". Churchill's famous words always strike as a powerful metaphor for what is the purpose of social and cultural history. Jean Monnet would have surely subscribed to Churchill's statement. Not much of a drinker himself, the lesson he took out of alcohol, or better the Cognac Atlantic trade, would prove essential to the development of his ideas and political method in the years ahead when he became Mr Europe.

Biographers and friends have, in fact in many occasions talked about a Cognac lesson, directly linking Monnet's method and way of thinking to the strong trading tradition of the Poitou-Charentes region where he was born. While it is widely recognised that this had made Cognac a peculiar place in an increasing chauvinist France, the link proves rather rushed and naïf against the documentary sources. These show a slightly more sophisticated lesson that Monnet took from his years working for the family business, mainly an Atlantic spatial mindset, a trust in the logistical power of infrastructures and an inclination to networking.

Monnet's hometown still is the miniature world capital of brandy, and its past is inextricably linked to trade. Thanks to commerce, the small rural community of Cognac had grown with an internationalist attitude not shared by the rest of the country, "*cosmopolitan peasants*" as Frederic

Fransen called them[1]. Early in the XVIII century, the *eau-de-vie* distilled in the region was already famous all over the world thanks to the maritime trade. English and Dutch merchants had helped to spread this product in Northern Europe, Asia, Canada, the United States. The whole town was involved in its production. That included the Monnets.

In his own words, "*l'ensemble de la société Cognac a été divisé en deux catégories très distinctes : les commerçants et les autres, i.e. les fournisseurs"*[2]. His grandparents belonged to the second category, farmers, attached to the land, suppliers of large brandy firms like Martells and Hennessys. His father, Jean-Gabriel, instead, was a salesman, a minor member of the merchant aristocracy of Cognac, a network of producers that had helped the town to adopt a free-trade mentality a long time before France did. In 1838 they had established a cooperative society to escape the monopoly of larger firms, the United Vineyard Proprietors' Company of Cognac in English, and in 1897 they asked Jean Gabriel Monnet to run the business, after then known as J.G. Monnet & Co. Monnet's dining room became the place where an extensive network of businessmen, trustees, accountants and suppliers regularly met to discuss issues related to trade. "*Donc les gens de Cognac* – Monnet told Alan Watson during an interview in 1971 – *s'intéressent aux conditions qui existent dans ces différent pays. Je dirais même qu'ils s'y intéressent plus qu'aux conditions qui existent en France, parce que le commerce est plus sensible à ce qui se passe à Winnipeg, au Canada, qu'à Bordeaux ou en France. Donc le gens sont tout naturellement tournés vers l'extérieur. C'est naturel"*[3].

Unlike many French communities, internationalism and free trade were a vital feature of the *Cognacais* community. Many foreigners lived in the area since the XVI century, Scottish, Swedish

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[1] Frederic Fransen, *Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community*, Contributions to the Study of World History, no. 87, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001, p.6.
[2] Jean Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 15
[3] H. Rieben, C. Camperio-Tixiere, F. Nicod, ed., *À l'écoute de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 2004, p. 250

and Irish mainly. "*Beaucoup de grandes familles de la ville avaient des ancêtres étrangers.*"[4] Monnet himself took pride in remembering that the town had dedicated a street to Richard Cobden, the English high priest of free trade. Therefore, the community was not as nationalist as others in a pre-1914 France desperate to reverse the catastrophic defeat against Prussia in 1871. None of this mattered in a town open to the world, with a spatial mindset so projected to the outside. While the French used the phrase "visiter le monde", the people of Cognac said "visiter le clients", whether in London or Shanghai. Especially Great Britain and its empire were a natural place to work for a Cognac salesman. "*Entre Cognac et Londres, il y avait des liens directs qui contournaient Paris. A Cognac, on était sur le même pied que les Britanniques"*[5], something that would resonate as a mantra in the decades of Monnet's political activity. There was always a direct link that bypassed the traditional ways of politics and diplomacy. His assistants described this feature as *internationalist provincialism*, a "provincial" curiosity about different customs and languages, vital to establish business relationships, that put him at direct and personal contact with everyone he met.

If there is one thing that does not transpire from his biography, it is the role of school in his life. In his memoirs, he clearly states that he "*disliked going to school"*, he lacked a desire to gain any specialised education of some sort. His assistants and friends gave different explanations for this disdain. He did not want to be forced into "*cartesian categories*", or "*limited by a French formal education*". For his biographers, the reason for his lack of enthusiasm for learning was that his practical mindset was not compatible with the French education system at the fin-de-siècle, putting this under a positive light. "*Theories do not interest him"* said about him Pierre Mendes-France. «*If a reporter asked him who had been his teacher* – wrote Fontaine – *he would reply it is a question that has never had meaning for me"*[6]. That is the reason why it is so fascinating to learn about the origin

[4] Jean Monnet, *Memoires*, p.15
[5] *ibid*
[6] Cited in Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 34

of his political ideas. For others, this would have been found in a library, for him travelling would be the most vital learning process.

At sixteen, after he renounced studying the law, he obtained from his father permission to be trained to run the family business.

In 1904, after a few months as an apprentice for J.G. Monnet & Co, he was sent to London. The Monnet family had a client in the City, W.H. Chaplin & Co, wine merchants who also acted as agents for the Cognac trade in the UK. The Chaplin family welcomed the young Jean as an apprentice. The City at the time was the centre of the world, where he would appreciate the exact dimensions of global trade more than he could have ever had in France. He learned how business negotiations unfolded, how clients were handled. He accompanied Chaplin everywhere a deal could be made, whether it was a restaurant, a club, a golf course or a pub. What became apparent to him was that London businessmen constituted an exclusive community made of knit personal relationships and cautiously build connections. Therefore, his first foreign experience gave Monnet three fundamental assets: a close understanding of the British mentality, fluency in a language vital to his family business and an ability to think about issues without the lenses of a small nationally spaced mindset, but with a global, logistical one. As a result, what transpires from his memoirs is that regardless of politics, the relationship between a producer, a seller and a client was successful only when built on a good personal relationship with mutual respect. It was common thinking in England, whereas in France there was the feeling that businessmen were under the influence of their counterparts, so not to be trusted.

Back from London, he stayed in Cognac only for a few months, because his father wanted him across the Atlantic selling the Monnet brand name in a market where it was unknown. At eighteen years old, he took the first of many Atlantic trips, on an ocean liner headed for Quebec, with a large trunk full of samples of brandy. It was not an easy task; the ghost of prohibition haunted that part of the world since the end of the XIX century (Ontario had held its first referendum on the issue in 1894). He

travelled by train throughout the country, visiting small towns like Winnipeg and Calgary, managing to make a deal with the Hudson Bay Company in 1911, making his family "*the sole suppliers of brandy to HBC's vast Canadian market*"[7]. This deal meant a small fortune for his family, but also put him in contact with an old and powerful company, whose director, Robert Kindersley would later become the chairman of the board of the investment bank Lazard Brothers of London and one of the governors of the Bank of England, and which would prove an invaluable asset in the years ahead. The correspondence related to the deal indicates that Monnet "*would come next year to take with your different travellers a thorough trip of western Canada*"[8]. Duchene, in his book, points out that this was maybe the reason why Monnet tried but failed, to book a ticket on the maiden voyage of the Titanic.

Nonetheless, he became an inveterate traveller, going back and forth from England, visiting clients in Sweden and Russia, accompanying his agents in hidden villages in Greece and even Egypt, where he could appreciate for the first time a different trading mindset that would later come useful in the Far East. Although some biographers refer to a trip to China during these years[9], there is no evidence of this in the papers. From all these experiences transpires the importance of travelling in the formation of the young Jean. Of course, it could be pointed out that there is nothing special about it; he was not the only one at that time travelling for business. So, what's the point? Trygve Ugland has tried to respond[10], saying that there is a difference between a mere traveller and what he calls a *political theorist*. For the latter, experiencing the new civilisation unfolding in the West became a special occasion when to find ideal elements featured in real societies for the first time. The lesson was not a philosophical and existentialistic one, but a political one. However, Monnet was neither a

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[7] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 26

[8] *ibid*

[9] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 31*;* Sherrill Brown Well, *Jean Monnet*, p.9

[10] Trygve Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity*, European Union Studies, Toronto-Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 2011, p. 22

mere traveller, nor a political theorist. He was a salesman that went from selling liquor to sponsoring trade deals and supranational solutions to Euro-Atlantic issues.

1.2 Tocqueville and Monnet, Europeans travelling through a new world

Ugland, in his book on the early travels of Monnet in Canada, dedicates a paragraph to the real value of travelling. He uses Sheldon Wolin's definition of *theoria* to point out that the Frenchman was a theorist in his own right because of him being a traveller. "*According to Wolin, a theorist relies on the method of comparison and seeks to draw lessons from similarities and differences observed. A theoria is formed when the disparate empirical observations are elevated to an abstract plan and into a conceptual whole […]. The book illustrates why Monnet should be considered a significant theorist in term of his own theory, although unbeknownst to him, in the context of historical theory"*[11].

If Monnet was to be considered a theorist, therefore, it was not because of travel itself, but for his particular approach to it. He had turned it in a learning process, made in a new kind of nation, Canada, that Ugland thinks to be inspirational for Monnet's future European plans. The attraction for this idea is understandable. Monnet arrives in Winnipeg amid the Wheat Boom of the late XIX century. Canada had been an economic confederation since 1867, an arrangement between the former British colonies of Ontario and Quebec made possible by a large infrastructural system of canals and railways. The two territories were home to communities that in Europe were thought to be incompatible with each other. However, new challenges started to arise; namely, the threat of American expansion and the near bankruptcy of both the colonies after the removal of preferential tariffs for wheat by the British in 1846. Therefore, the Canadians had to make the best of it. The 1867 interstate union, therefore,

[11] Trygve Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity*, European Union Studies, Toronto-Buffalo [N.Y.]: University of Toronto Press, 2011, p. 25

had one cause in Monnet's mind: necessity, the kind that "*leaves no room for hesitation*". Of course, it is easy to create a connection between the Canadian federal experience and Monnet functionalist ideas, but historically there is no proof that such a link ever unfolded in his mind. Nonetheless, it is fascinating to imagine a very young Monnet travelling through a confederation where two cultures, English and French, were living together under the rule of law, experiencing an economic boom that seemed never to end, while back in the Old Continent the Nation-states were progressively losing their military, economic, political and ideal hegemony over the world.

Ugland then draws a parallel between Monnet and a political theorist whose ideas were based on what he saw and experienced during a journey in the New World, Alexis de Tocqueville. This comparison was later picked up and put more in context by Mattia Frapporti in his dissertation on the power of logistics in Monnet's political action. What the Canadian scholar, and in a way also Frapporti, tried to do is to fill a metaphorical library of the Frenchman, pointing out which authors' words would resonate more in his experience (an entire paragraph of Frapporti's dissertation is dedicated to Rousseau's *Emile*). Although this is a fascinating literary exercise and makes a very cultured and enjoyable read, the attempt of turning Monnet in a political theorist may be missing the point of his real experience. Nonetheless, the parallel between his and Tocqueville's North American travels is worth exploring.

It is not a rushed notion to consider Monnet in a way the *Tocqueville of the XX century*[12]. Although there is no comparison between them in education, culture and political depth, the Frenchman, like his fellow countryman seventy years before, demonstrated a perfect understanding of what made America the New World.

[12] M. Frapporti, *Lo Spazio Logistico Dell'Europa Unita. Jean Monnet e la razionalità dell'integrazione*. PhD Thesis, University of Bologna, 2017, p.56

"Just as Tocqueville's journey to America in 1831 convinced him that he had witnessed the future – says Ugland – it appears that Monnet's trip to Canada in 1907 formed the quintessential core of the inspiration for his lifelong fixation on European supranational unity. Although their approaches were different in a number of ways, comparisons between Tocqueville's and Monnet's encounters with America can be made"[13].

Tocqueville in his most famous work, *Democracy in America*, was convinced, as Monnet was, to have witnessed the future. Providence had given him "a light denied to our fathers that allows us to see the first causes, in the destiny of nations, that the darkness of the past had obscured for them"[14] . The same light that perhaps filled Monnet with confidence in his way to see the challenges in the Old World. "*Ta vrai force, c'est la vue objective, désintéressée, complete d'un problème, et la solution que tu y donnes*"[15]. The same confidence, or arrogance, that made him knock on René Viviani's door a few years later, proposing a coordinating agency for the war supplies of France, England and Italy. We can see in this the influence also of his mother, the young (she was nineteen when Jean was born) devout Catholic Maria Demelle Monnet. She was close to her first son, treasuring the report of his travels, always pushing him to make use of his experience and abilities. "She distrusted ides as such" recalls Monnet in his memoirs, "she wanted to know what was done with them"[16]. He made his purpose of replicating in a Europe at war the joint management of resources and logistics that had made the fortunes of Canada and the United States.

He, and in a way also Tocqueville, did not come to politics with a theoretical preparation, something they shared with other thinkers of the late XIX century. His young mind was shaped by his journeys, starting that transatlantic flux of political ideas at the origin of the European Integration process after

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[13] T. Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada*, p. 10.
[14] S. Wolin, *Tocqueville between two worlds, the making of a political and theoretical life*, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 139
[15] H. Rieben, C. Camperio-Tixiere, F. Nicod (edited), *A l'écoute de Jean Monnet*, p. 43.
[16] J. Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 32

WWII. For the first time in his life, he had experienced a new kind of judicial and federal polity, a new world so different from the nation-states and empires at home. "*Canadian federalism, like American democracy for Tocqueville, was for Monnet a discovery of an ideal model to tend towards to, something that implied supranational spatial dimensions to replicate*"[17].

This tension between the new and the old worlds is another parallel between the two men. "*the theoretical form that we know as Democracy in America resulted from a political insight stimulated by the contrast between the New and the Old*" says Wolin in his work on Tocqueville. Words that resonate in Ugland "*Monnet's ideas for Europe were clearly prompted by the contrasts between the Old and the New World*". What he saw in Canada was something he couldn't experience in Europe, at the end of the Belle Epoque: optimism, the potential of significant economic growth, the complete absence of the aristocracy and other feudal institutions that still lingered in the old imperial European powers. So, again Wolin's words to describe Tocqueville's work resonate in Monnet's experience. "*the comparison was between a society in which a certain institution barely survives as an anachronism and one where it never existed*". Although this cannot be wholly applied to Canada, still European society must have been a long-lost memory in the young Frenchman's mind. He also took note of the fact that there were no barriers to travel in an immense and diverse territory. On his journey to Winnipeg, he travelled more than three thousand miles without ever being checked or stopped. The same was unthinkable in Europe, where incompatible railway tracks and custom checks made moving a long and challenging affair. Canada and the United States then appeared to him ready, and equipped to the challenges of the XX century, and the same had to be done in Europe.

What brings the two men together was also their notion of the American and Canadian people. For Tocqueville, the equality in starting conditions of American citizens had created a significant democratic spirit. Monnet was impressed by other virtues. Personal initiative, dynamism, trust in what

[17] Frapporti, *Lo Spazio Logistico Dell'europa Unita*, p 61

the future would bring. "*Je suis allé à Winnipeg rendre visite à nos clients, des hommes forts dans un climat difficile, face à des forces de la nature qui étaient gratifiantes mais sans pitié pour les faibles. Ces hommes étaient sensibles à la fine qualité du cognac. Ils exigeaient le meilleur. (…) Ce qui se passait en Europe n'avait aucun intérêt pour ces Européens qui faisaient l'Occident, tournant le dos au vieux monde. Leurs efforts, leur vision d'un avenir plus large et plus riche, c'est ce dont on parlait presque tout le temps"*[18].

He also draws attention to the fact that these people were all immigrants from Europe, the same people that in the Old Continent were on the verge of a world war. "*Because those whom Monnet met in Canada were immigrants, newly arrived in Europe, Monnet concluded that changes were also possible in Europe – if only the overriding context of people's lives could be modified*"[19]. Frapporti analyses these last words from a Marxist point of view, for which the economic structures were modifying the political and cultural superstructures in Canada, drawing a parallel with functionalism in the European integration process. What perhaps is more accurate is that these early American travels had given him a peculiar perception of what change could be. His observations in Canada produced almost a Schumpeterian image of the process, it "*encouraged him to think systematically in dynamic terms of change as a normal condition of politics,* an ideal based on the *"judgement of the practical man*"[20]. He knew that although human nature could be modified and remains constant, changing the setting and the logistics in which people live, and work would influence their attitudes and behaviour towards one another.

The last aspect that transpires from this comparative analysis is their shared understanding of the need for compromise and an absence of ideological rushes. Wolin highlights that Tocqueville had a notion

[18] Jean Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 45
[19] T. Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada,* p.25
[20] *ibid*

of democracy as something that "*would always remain foreign rather than his elements"*[21]. The same could be applied in a way to Monnet. His work to unite the European nation-states was not inspired by an impractical dream of United States of Europe. As we will see throughout this dissertation, he made his purpose of selling plans that were realistically feasible in the short term, acceptable to everyone at the table, and advantageous for all parts involved. Gill Grin called this way of operating "*community method"*[22], Cornelia Navari "*functional federalism"*[23], giving Monnet a certain aura of a political theorist, an effort joined recently by Ugland as mentioned earlier. Political analysis aside, the point this work tries to make is that Monnet was not a theorist, a political activist, an ideologue. He did not need to be one and did not have the right education and background. He was a seller, educated in the art of the deal, someone who realised soon enough that infrastructure and logistics, under the control of supranational institutions, could be used to make countries economically interdependent and therefore less inclined to engage in activities that were bad for business, like war.

This last point also helps to draw attention on a further notion that Monnet, and in a way also Tocqueville, learned during their travels in the Anglo-Saxon New World, the importance of stability and organisation. If for Tocqueville, there was a close link between doubt and revolution. "*Doubt was in his eyes, a prime cause of social instability and a contributory factor to modern revolutionary moments*"[24], Monnet, on the other hand, had a more pragmatic and less political notion. "*Au cours de mes voyages, j'avais appris que là où l'organisation est là se trouve le vrai pouvoir"*[25]. His action and his plans all have in common this aim, to put everything under the control of clear and rational institutions. It was a notion of rationality that he learned from logistics in a very modern fashion,

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[21]S. Wolin, *Tocqueville between two worlds*, p. 157

[22] Gilles Grin, *Méthode communautaire et fédéralisme: le legs de Jean Monnet à travers ses archives,* Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Collection debats et documents, n. 2, settembre 2014, p 27

[23] Cornelia Navari, *Functionalism Versus Federalism: Alternative, Vision of European Unity*", in P. Murray, P. Rich, ed, *Vision of European Unity*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996

[24] S. Wolin, *Tocqueville between two worlds*, p. 87.

[25] Monnet, *Memoires,* p.81

something that gave him a language that, we will see, he would use to talk to the Americans and to make his way into the rooms of power in Washington, acting as a real bridge between the Old and the New.

Therefore, when Ugland says that Canada gave Monnet inspiration for his European Coal and Steel Community, he is describing only part of the picture. Although it is clear also from these pages that these early travels were crucial for the development of his method, the essence of this experience is something very different from scouting for replicable federal models. In this regard, Frapporti is right. One lesson Monnet got from Canada was that organised mobility and logistics could unite spatial dimensions so different in cultural and social characteristics. In his eyes, legacies of different national notions had marked the history of Canadian territories, but the creation of a common infrastructural system had transformed the country in a united logistical space, on which the new federation was built. However, this notion is only part of the truth. Monnet was not enlightened on his way to Winnipeg by a federalist revelation. He was there to sell Cognac, and that's what he did. The main lesson he took from the experience was that trade was a tool for modern politics and international relations, that businessmen had a role to play in the post-XIX century world. His biography, unlike his political ideas, was therefore unique and untransferable, that is why it is so crucial to understanding where his method came from, this nomadic education on both sides of the pond. He learned how to sell plans, how to collect support by identifying networks that could help in his endeavours, how to talk the language of informal diplomacy. He became an Atlantic policy entrepreneur.

1.3 Monnet and the logistics of allied cooperation

The origin of logistics has been historically associated with the concept of modernity. It tried to respond to the new needs of war and commerce in a world with increasingly fewer borders. It was designed to establish order in a spatial revolution made possible by new infrastructures like railways, maritime innovation in ship construction and then aviation. Monnet happened to fit perfectly as an agent of order in a world going through its first globalisation. In these next pages we will discuss his role in the allied supply coordination during the first world war and how, through him, the world of logistics abruptly entered the transatlantic discussion on the future of international relations.

On the role of logistics in military history, a lot has been discussed by scholars. Especially during the XIX century, infrastructural innovation, like railways and ironclads, had changed the very nature of war. Railways allowed a swift movement of troops to the front with little notice. Objectives and strategy were also affected by how an attack could better disrupt enemy supply and communication. Since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, each European state had heavily invested in its railway infrastructure. In 1914 the whole continental map was striped by a network of tracks that already moved tens of thousands of passengers and tons of goods from urban and industrial areas to international ports. In fifty years, the distance covered by train had increased ten times over, and "*qualitatively progress was even greater"*[26]. Every track in 1914 could sustain five times the number of trains of 1870, and speed had been considerably incremented. "*It was possible to carry the subsistence of a corps for two days on a single train, which was halved the number required in 1870"*[27]. Although this was a significant breakthrough for military tactic and strategy, it has its limits. Each country has its measurement and requirement for the construction of tracks and trains, keeping

[26] Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, 2nd ed, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.112
[27] *ibidem*

each network incompatible with the others. To enter enemy territory meant to abandon a network of supply and transportation that was confined to, and behind, the front. Beyond that, the primary means of transporting troops and supplies, other than rarely used portable railway tracks, were "*the legs of man and beast"*. This issue constituted one of the main problems for the German invasion of France in 1914, therefore didn't affect Monnet or the French. They had a different issue, maritime supply routes, and how to control them and defend them.

The already mentioned meeting between the young Cognaçois and French prime minister René Viviani is often told as part of a mythical story by his biographers. It was mid-September 1914 and France was going through one of its darkest hours. The Schlieffen Plan was already underway. Belgium and a large part of the North-East of the country was being occupied by the Germans after an advance that seemed increasingly unstoppable. On September 2nd the French government had already left Paris for the secured Atlantic port of Bordeaux, fearing a possible fall of the capital. Then came the miracle of the Marne. Through ferocious fighting not far from the streets of Paris what a few days earlier seemed impossible happened. The Germans were stopped. Logistics played the most crucial role in this development of events. German divisions in a few weeks had covered hundreds of kilometres in enemy territory, stretching their supply lines, having to rely on animals and carriages to transport ammunition and subsistence for the troops, since their trains were not compatible with Belgian and French railway tracks. The French instead relied on a network of railways that encircled the capital, allowing new divisions to be conveyed to the front in a very short time. The consequence of the success of the French counterattack is well-known. What had begun as a short campaign hopefully rewarded by a swift victory, turned to be a long war, fought in trenches on a few hundred miles' front that stretched from Switzerland to the English Channel.

With the prospect of years of fighting, organisation and supply coordination was the key to success, and France was in a difficult situation. After the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, the country had relied on its North-East as a source of alloy and coal. Now this territory was also occupied by the

enemy. As Monnet writes in his memoirs, "*Nous avons soudainement perdu les deux tiers de notre fer et de notre acier, ainsi que la moitié de notre charbon"*. He also realised the danger of this logistical nightmare "*L'intérêt de nos investissements à l'étranger a commencé à se tarir. Notre balance des paiements était gravement menacée"*. This issue was aggravated by the fact that the shortage of supply had made France "*dépendant de la navigation étrangère"*. And yet, the government, still in October 1914, had seized only "*une petite partie de notre flotte marchande*"[28], as much as necessary for war. This issue had caused rising prices on every essential good and a logistical deficit that undermined the war effort and the stability of the home front.

The British were instead in a different situation. The Empire, connected by a still intact merchant fleet travelling on routes well protected by an unchallenged Royal Navy, carried on regular trade. But again, French needs now threatened to create competition among allies for access to increasingly scarce overseas supplies, which would inflate even further prices and shipping rates. What the French needed most was coordination between the two countries for the transport of material, for both civil and military use, avoiding competing logistical structures that could undermine and, in the end, endanger both the war strategy and relationship with the British.

With that in mind, Monnet met the Prime Minister in Mid-September 1914. As mentioned before, the story looks like a mythical one in the words of Duchene and Roussel. The Frenchman had just watched his brother join his reserve regiment at the front. He was rejected as medically unfit. He suffered from nephritis (an inflammation of the kidneys). Trying to be useful even if he couldn't carry a bayonet, he managed, in his words, "*to find the man that could put to work my idea"*. His father had a friend, Fernand Benon, a lawyer and frequent visitor, who was by chance a close acquaintance of the Prime Minister. "*Open to new ideas, Benon offered to introduce the young man to the French*

[28] Monnet, *Memoires,* p 49

leader"[29]. Viviani was aware of the conditions France suffered after the invasion and of the need to involve the British government in managing supply, and, in Bordeaux, he met Monnet and listened carefully to what he proposed. Highlighting the importance of accessing British economic power, he floated the idea of setting up a joint Anglo-French body that could estimate the combined resources of the Allies and make real choices and decisions. To Viviani's objection that it would be difficult to convince the British, Monnet replied that he knew them, having worked with them in the past, and it was possible to make cooperation work if the French were ready to rely on them and "*play fair"*. Monnet's Memoirs then describe a convinced Viviani recommending him to call on Alexandre Millerand, the minister of war, to explain the plan to him. It is hard to believe that a suddenly converted Viviani would send an unknown young Cognac seller to Millerand with a program of inter-allied cooperation. Most likely, the reason why the Prime Minister appeared convinced by the Monnet's ideas was a much more practical one. He was still an agent for the Canadian Hudson Bay Company and carried the power of dealing with the powerful entity for the purpose of transporting badly needed supply on the Atlantic route. Involvement in significant negotiations like that *"captured the attention of key figures in a government evacuated to Bordeaux during a life-and-death crisis"*[30]. After all, Monnet had not waited to meet Viviani to put his plan into action.

At a meeting in 1922, HBC vice-chairman, Charles Sale, talking about the events of 1914 with Robert Kindersley, "*credited Monnet with proposing as early as August 1914 that it should become a purchasing agent of the French government for vital civilian supplies"*[31]. Therefore, Viviani was not only meeting a young enthusiastic Cognac salesman but a twenty-five years old agent of a company that at the time acted as a multinational for logistics throughout the British Empire. Again, Charles Sale, in a letter to Robert Kindersley, mentioned that the "*The deal [with France] was due "entirely*

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[29] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p.65
[30] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p.33
[31] *ibidem*

to [Monnet's] initiative and efforts". Something that Kindersley himself would remind Monnet in a letter in 1916. "*nobody realises more fully than we do, that the large developments which have taken place in the business relations between the French government and the Hudson's Bay Company have only been made possible by your exertions. Without your kind and energetic support […] this combination would long ago have ceased to exist*"[32].

The negotiations between Monnet, the French government, represented by the Alexander Ribot, minister of finance, and Alexander Millerand, and Frank Charles Ingrams (representing the HBC), lasted for a month. The deal was signed on October 9th 1914. The contract made HBC the sole supplier to France of goods like "*agriculture and alimentary products, raw material, and articled that the French government might choose to ask them to buy"*[33]. For that, the French had to pay a 1% commission on every supplied item.

The idea of putting resources and supplies under an inter-allied agency was momentarily put aside by Viviani, thus confirming the theory that he was willing to meet Monnet primarily because of his ties to HBC. Instead, he decided to put the young Frenchman under the supervision of Millerand. They moved then to London, to join the newly established CIR, *Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement*. It was a very limited version of what Monnet had envisaged. Behind this name operated an organisation that was primarily British and had the sole purpose of controlling inflation caused by competition between allies as it was clarified in the House of Commons by Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, on 24 February 1915. A written question was placed on the Order Paper by Murray MacDonald, a Scottish MP, regarding the CIR and "*whether its operations put an unnecessary restriction"* on British trade of goods with the Allied Governments. The reply was meant to reassure the MP. It stated that the CIR was intended to "*prevent harmful*

[32] Letter from Robert Kindersley to Jean Monnet, 25 July 1916. HAEU, JMDS-6.
[33] Contract between the French ministry of War and the Hudson Bay Company, 9 October 1914, p.1, HAEU, JMDS-6.

competition in the same markets and a consequent inflation of prices; to place the French Government in communication with firms who are capable of carrying out orders satisfactorily and at a reasonable price, and to spread the orders in such a way as to distribute employment, and thus accelerate delivery"[34]. As Monnet had already put it a year before, at the time the British government had an "*foi irrationnelle dans les mécanismes du commerce international"*[35].

It was not enough to coordinate the Allied war effort and when Italy entered the war in 1915 it meant that a more integrated structure was needed to control supplies and the import of materials.

At this point Etienne Clémentel enters the stage. As the months went on, Viviani could not hold his cabinet together any longer, so in late 1915 he resigned, only to switch places with his minister of Justice, Aristide Briand. Briand immediately appointed Clémentel as head of a large Ministry, that included control over commerce, industry, the postal service, maritime transportation and the entire French merchant fleet. Before long he called Monnet from London to become his *chef de cabinet*, his emissary and a friend.

By 1916 the situation of resources and supplies was deteriorating. An increasing number of cargo ships had been sunk by German U-boats, and the States of the Entente began to suffer from a severe shortage of raw materials. Wheat was the primary commodity that aroused the most significant concern of both the British and the French. Monnet then proposed again his idea of an interconnected body meant to manage the supply and distribution of wheat. This time with success. The deal was signed on November 29th 1916.

As Arthur Salter, the British officer responsible for the shipping infrastructure, recalls "*A Committee, called the Wheat Executive, including representatives of France and Italy, as well as Great Britain,*

[34] House of Commons minutes, Sitting of 24 February 1915, vol 70 cc279-80W, available online at https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1915/feb/24/commission-internationale-de
[35] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 36

was formed to arrange for the wheat supplies of all countries to be bought together and allotted by agreements"[36].

It was to be organised with a small structure, with an executive consisting of three members representing Italy (Bernardo Attolico), France (Ernest Vilgrain) and England (John Beale). Its tasks included assessing the wheat needs of each of the three countries, finding the required quantity and transporting it to storage sites. In Monnet's words, the Executive would work *"as much as possible as a commercial firm" […] "with full powers, to meet the Allies' needs for the purchase and distribution of wheat subject to inventory and to ensure transport*». It had the advantage of working autonomously, even without unanimous agreement by the Allied Governments. This ensured its success and led to the inclusion of other commodities under its supervision like all cereals, sugar, meats, fats, oil and seeds[37].

For that time, it was a massive step toward efficient and direct cooperation between different European countries. It involved a common policy on trade, an inter-governmental control over inflation and prices, coordination of trade routes and supply chains, and sharing of cargo ships. Logistics, until then merely an instrument of support for national politics, had become a source of supranational institutionalism.

However, it had a weakness. It relied on maritime trade routes. And, in 1917, these were under increased threat by German U-Boats. The famous unrestricted submarine warfare, declared by Berlin in January 1917, that would provide later the casus belli for American intervention, put under pressure a structure that could not clamp down on the loss of cargo ships by submarines' attacks. The allied

[36] A. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control: an experiment in international administration*, Oxford: Claredon Press, 1921, p. 135.
[37] A. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 93.

governments had to find a way to shift the focus of cooperation from a specific good to the whole movement of goods and supplies on the Atlantic routes.

As Arthus Salter remembers in his book, the situation was getting difficult. "*In the autumn of 1917 the prospect was less desperate than in the spring, but the actual pressure on shipping was even greater; 17.000.000 tons of the world's tonnage had been lost and less than half had been replaced. Great Britain alone had lost 10 million tons. France and Italy had lost about 2 million tons. More tonnage was lost in the first ten months of 1917 than in the previous thirty months of the war"*[38]. The German submarines were threatening to cut the precious trade routes between Europe and North America.

Clémentel was eager to put his and Monnet's ideas of cooperation to work, so, together with Arthur Salter, he pressured the British government, who initially did not want to get involved without guarantees of US involvement, to sign the first draft of the agreement on November 3rd 1917. This draft did not include any mention of American assistance or participation. It was signed only by French, British and Italian representatives, who promised to supply "*according to anyone's possibility, the tonnage needed, with or without the USA"*. It was the beginning of what later was called the Allied Maritime Transport Council – AMTC), created at a Conference in Paris on November 29th. In the end, the American government sent an official to the conference, which was also joined by representatives from Belgium, China, Cuba, Japan, Greece, Liberia, Montenegro, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia.

The new organisation consisted of two agencies. The first would handle transportation of allied troops where they were needed. The second, under the primary supervision of the four big powers, would deal with financial matters and logistics. A Special Committee for Maritime Transport and General Imports was also created, with the purpose of managing *"all movements of allied and neutral ships,*

[38] *Ibidem*

their specifications, their routes and cargo". As Nicole Piétri argued in 1999, Monnet had a crucial role in how the negotiations were handled, something that mirrored closely how he had worked with the HBC[39]. In two memorandums sent to Clémentel themes and strategy then employed at the table were already described in detail. The AMTC, in his words, cited by both Salter and Duchene, was "*the most advanced experiment yet made in international cooperation"*[40]. But since it was an experiment, it had to cope with government officials' resentment at their loss of control in favour of a collective entity, which was also run by an Executive (AMTE). The first meeting of the board did not take place until March 11th, 1918. The AMTE had four officials, Arthur Salter, Bernardo Attolico, George Rublee (from the United States) and Jean Monnet, who, because he was the mind behind the whole structure, took for himself the role of managing it. In a way, they created one of the first real supranational institutions, in which the Executive had powers of governance, and the Council had regulatory prerogatives, like a legislative chamber. As the minutes of the first meeting state: "*Its general responsibilities are to secure the necessary Executive action to give effect to decisions by the Council, to prepare information relevant to any question that the Council may desire, to consider at any future meeting, to suggest definite proposals for the approval to the Council, and in general to take such Executive action as a desirable and practicable, in pursuance of the general duty of assisting in the allocation and most advantageous use of Allied tonnage by cooperative action*"[41].

The efficiency of the AMTC is all in the data cited by Salter in his book, which show that "*towards the end of the war, the Shipping Commissariat, as it became known informally, controlled 90 per cent of the world's sea-going tonnage"*[42].

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[39] N. Petri, *Jean Monnet et les organismes interalliés durant la Première Guerre Mondiale,* in Bossuat, Wilkens, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et Les Chemins de La Paix: Actes Du Colloque de Paris Du 29 Au 31 Mai 1997*, Série Internationale / Université de Paris-I--Panthéon Sorbonne 57, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999

[40] Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 47; Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 57

[41] Cited in N. Petri, *Jean Monnet et les organismes interalliés durant la Première Guerre Mondiale*, p. 35

[42] Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 50

The practical advantages of having a common institution managing every aspect of allied shipping mirrored closely the ones that would later define the EEC and the single market. This agency allowed every cargo to benefit from a logistical and regulatory continuity from ship-to-destination. Supplies and material did not encounter bureaucratic and infrastructural bottlenecks that otherwise would have slowed or stopped their movement throughout allied territory.

The speed of the operations inside the AMTC is also remarkably demonstrated by the sources. In October 1918 the French Government was unprepared for the challenge of feeding and supplying the north-eastern areas that were being freed of German occupation in the last weeks of the war and was under attack by members of National Assembly. The supply needed could only come from Britain and the US via maritime shipping. In only three weeks half a million tons of British material was ready for French use, in time for the government to respond to a parliamentary question time on November 15th. This example shows how efficient the Allied cooperation and decision-making had become in the last months of the war. The AMTE and the AMTC constituted two well-oiled networks of individuals who had great access to national leaderships, organized like concentric circles. The real power lied with the first, the Executive, which formed the nucleus of this international committee, with very young members (Monnet was under thirty at the time, Salter and Attolico were in their late thirties and Rubble, the most senior, was forty-one), with incredible influence at home. The effective unofficial ways through which this network operated guaranteed its freedom and authority, but at the same time they constituted one of the reasons behind government and parliamentary distrust towards such organisations[43]. Their very nature made them dependent on unique and irreplaceable personal relationships, as Salter himself writes in his Allied Shipping Control. "*the position of members of an international committee with a dual personal capacity, national in relation to their own country,*

[43] Duchene tells the story behind the attempt of the Minister for Armaments, Loucheur, a close friend of Clemenceau, to fire Monnet and have him sent to the front in late 1917. It took all Clémentel influence and a close meeting between Monnet and the new prime minister to convince the later to confirm the mission in London by a decree in January 1918.

*international in relation to other countries, is one of great delicacy. (…) It is a problem of the utmost difficulty to know how much of this (*the information from their governments and departments) *can be communicated to their Allied colleagues (…). Given the proper personal relations, many things can be explained which would never be put on paper or stated in a formal meeting; Such work is only possible under conditions of personal confidence and long personal association"*[44].

Nonetheless the lesson learned through the experience of setting up such organisation was that necessity had been and would always be the main drive for integration. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that such an innovation in international governance was due to the situation of emergency during a global conflict. These were exceptional times that would end once Germany would surrender. Nonetheless Monnet, like others, primarily David Mitrany and Arthur Salter, saw in this early successful example of cooperation between allies an opportunity not to be missed in the future. His memoirs and biographies, confirmed by archival sources, talk about an attempt to convince Clémenetel of the advantages of keeping in place the AMTC for reconstruction purposes. Monnet "*avait apporté, enfin, a Clémentel les meilleurs arguments en faveur du maintien de la coopération interalliée après la guerre, particulièrement du point de vue français*". He did not succeed in convincing the French government, now chaired by Clemenceau. He shared his frustration with Ryamond Fillioux, an officer who worked in London to manage French supply needs. "*Au moment ou la guerre finit le maintien des arrangements interalliés deviant vital pour la France. Il est évident que la consolidation des mécaniques existantes s'impose et que nous devons éviter toutes modifications des attributions essentielles des organisations existantes*"[45].

The same spirit was shared by David Mitrany[46], later one of the fathers of functionalism. In 1943, with his pamphlet *A working peace system: an argument for the functional development of*

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[44] Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, p.135

[45] Telegram by J Monnet to commander Raymond Fillioux, November 25th, 1918, FJME, AMB 1/1/97.

[46] F. Samoré, *Funzionalismo → Reticolarità*, in P. Perulli, ed., *Terra mobile*, Turin: Einaudi, 2014, p. 175

international organization, he highlighted that the problem of that age was to find a way to merge together common interests without excessive interference in national matters, for him the only way opened for integration in a fractured continent like Europe. He recalls the example of the AMTC. "*It was indeed characteristic of the post-Armistice period 1918-19 that even the victors hastened to undo their common economic and other machinery. Such as the Allied Shipping Control. Which had grown and served them well during the war. (...) as well as many old connections were disbanded in the international sphere at the very time when a common constitution was being laid down for it*"[47].

Anyway, Monnet did not succeed in convincing his government. The meeting of March 10th, 1919 was the last one, that concluded the experience of the AMTC. Nothing like would again be established until the Second World War.

Nonetheless the relationship between Monnet and Clémentel is one the keys to better understand the process through which personal networks worked their way through the bureaucratised official international relations that constituted the greatest barrier to cooperation during the war years. As Duchene highlights, "*Clémentel was the ideal chief for Monnet"*[48]. He represented the first of many relationships within the second tiers of government ranks that made so effective his political action. The loss of many of his personal papers during the German occupation of France after 1940 means that a real assessment of the influence that Monnet exercised on the powerful minister during the years 1916-1918 would not be completely possible. However, whether he was only a mere executant of Clémentel's orders or one of people behind them (one does not exclude the other), "*there were at one on goals and in constant contact on means"*[49]. Clémentel was not only his boss, but also his way

[47]David Mitrany, *A working peace system: an argument for the functional development of international organization*, London, 1943. Reprinted by Quadrangle Books, London, 1966, p. 13
[48] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p.37
[49] *idem*

in a transnational debate, begun even before the first shot had been fired in 1914, about what the future of Europe would look like and what would be the French role in it.

1.4 Thinking about a League of Nations

With the United States joining the allies in 1917, President Wilson made clear that the older powers, guided by the newer had the ahead of them the fundamental task of changing the world order to avoid a new war. From every level of society, diplomatic personnel included, the generation of 1914 was unified by a desire for major change, whatever it may be. The transformations that came before 1914, the dominance of Britain and France sweeping away to make place for the new power on the other side of the Atlantic, were subtle and nothing like the destabilising effects of the Great War. It debilitated and undermined the will and the right of European ruling classes to dominate and rule the old empires. The generation of Jean Monnet was to turn on the old men who had sent so many of them to die in a variety of pointless endeavours. The appetite for change would translate in support for a progressive agenda in matters of national and foreign policy but also would eventually sow the seed of totalitarian ideologies[50].

The Paris Peace Conference was, therefore, not only a way to end a war but to establish some order on the chaos that international relations had become[51]. It was an attempt, like others before in European history, to set up an international society of nations, but this time also made of private bodies and public institutions, the most important of which the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. Among the private entities, the Council of Foreign Relations and

[50] Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981
[51] Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000

the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), but also the first NGOs. Many people who worked in the corridors of the Conference, part of the junior tier of diplomats sent to negotiate the treaty, were to make significant contribution to international relations in the decades ahead, and got to know each other often on a personal level, forming a network of likeminded individuals that would prove essential when the twenty years' truce would eventually end in 1939.

The British had set up, already in 1916, their committee to work on the possible terms of a peace treaty once the war would be won[52]. The PID, Political Intelligence Department, led by sir William Tyrell, was born in the corridors of the Foreign Office, and then officially recognised as a formal entity in 1918. It worked with other departments of the FO on drawing up extremely detailed memoranda on every possible issue pertaining the peace conference. It produced one of the most influential documents of those years, the Blue Books, as well as the Peace Books. They gave an account of every question regarding economic conditions of belligerent countries, geography and political history. It could be said that the PID "*laid some of the main foundations for British foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s"*[53].

The department was very homogenous in background and education. Of the sixteen members, nine had attended Oxford, five Cambridge and two Edinburgh, although some studied in foreign universities afterwards. Some, like Arnold Toynbee, went to dominate British IR thinking up until the 1950s, as well as the historians Harold Temperley, G.P. Gooch and R.W. Seton-Watson.

The Books were essential also for the American effort to study the question of the post-war order. Edward House, one the leading foreign policy advisors to President Wilson, had established a similar

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[52] Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991

[53] Williams, Andrew, *France, Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century 1900 – 1940,* London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 65

group, called The Inquiry, whose existence was kept secret for many years[54]. It reported directly to him and through him to Wilson, without the State department being involved in any way. It included several members of the future American Commission to Negotiate the Peace (ACNP, the US delegation in Versailles in 1919), like the journalist Walter Lippman and the geographer Isaiah Bowman. The final report was called "Black Book", including 2000 pages of memoranda and a final "Outline of Tentative Recommendations"[55]. The distrust by Wilson towards his own State Department and Secretary Robert Lansing meant that the effectiveness of this effort proved somewhat limited compared to the British one. His stubbornness in these matters was to have catastrophic consequences in the month during and after the signing of treaty of Versailles, as he discovered once back home. Alienating Lansing was to contribute to the failed attempt to convince American public opinion and political class to allow the United States to be part of League of Nations. During the Conference the American delegation relied on the British Blue Book for information and intelligence, which also weakened its negotiating position and strategy.

Their position was not an easy one, since the British and the French, although agreeing that the US would have a crucial role in bringing the peace, did not know very well what exactly they wanted from their Americans ally. The "New Willard Hotel" speech of 27 May 1916 and the "Peace Without Victory" speech of 22 January 1917 had worried significantly Western European powers, since they challenged, through the enounced principle of "*self-determination*", the very idea of the empire and its sovereignty over colonies and dominions. The second speech especially suggested that the principle of the balance of power, a key to the British understanding of foreign policy, would have to be replaced by a *New Diplomacy*, accompanied by *Freedom of the Seas*. This was a direct challenge to the XIX century order guaranteed by the hegemony of the Royal Navy and caused much distress

[54] Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry; American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963
[55] Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, p. 64

in Lloyd George's cabinet. "*American peace is to be more dangerous to the British Empire than a German war*"[56] said the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey.

Nonetheless, one thing was certain. That "*the main question was as to whether the United States took its place as a natural concomitant of the changed balance of power, which was President Theodore Roosevelt's view, or spread its principles throughout the world, a messianic view of America's role as espoused by Wilson. For Britain and France there was arguably no practical difference between the two conceptions insofar as they both locked the United States into a global security complex"*[57]. The idea of a League of Nations found support in sections of both American and British public opinion, progressive, liberal and conservative internationalists. The latter was a group whose tendency was voiced prominently by former President Theodore Roosevelt. An Anglophile conservative, he did not believe in what he had dismissed as a Wilsonian League, but rather something that resembled more closely a vision of spheres of influence. "*Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds while the United States did that in its hemisphere"*[58]. This view was shared by British liberal elites, especially Lloyd George and many in his Cabinet. The fear was also that self-determination really meant for the people of the newly established eastern European states to make their own decision about their destiny without guidance of an allied commission of some sort. On the other side of the spectrum, Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of the Blockade within the FO, had conceived his idea of the need for some permanent post-war machinery to maintain peace, therefore was deeply sympathetic with Wilson's dream of a League[59]. He shared this belief with Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary of the former Asquith

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[56] Quoted in Knock, T.J., *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the quest for a new world order,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1997

[57] Williams, Andrew, *France, Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century 1900 – 1940,* p. 78

[58] Roosevelt, Theodore, *The Belgian Tragedy*, The Outlook, 108, 23 September 1914, quoted in Knock, *To End All Wars*, p.225

[59] Raffo, P., *The Anglo-American Preliminary negotiations for a League of Nations,* Journal of Contemporary History, vol.9, No. 4, October 1974, pp. 154-155

Cabinet until February 1916. The early experience of the chain of events that had led to the war and the atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium had convinced him of the need of a new kind of association of nations in Europe, based on legal measures of arbitration (something that echoed the decision to create the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1899) underpinned by international legal sanctions. The new foreign secretary, Balfour, was sympathetic with the idea, but not confident about its viability, something he made precise many times during the months that led to the Conference. However, his indecision and his lack of leadership gave way to Cecil to work closely with House to further their grand design.

To make clear what a League could look like, the Phillimore Committees were established in January 1917. Cecil wanted to look at the idea jointly with House already in September that year, but neither Wilson nor his leading foreign policy advisor wanted to get involved so soon after American involvement in the war had started. It was only in January 1918 that Wilson publicly asked for support for a League, with the last of his famous Fourteen Points. However, at this time the British government's disbelief about the League turned it into a possible bargaining chip in exchange for American flexibility on the other points, especially when it came to decide about Ireland and the Middle East[60].

1.5 The French way to the peace

The French did not leave their allies alone in this process, although they were somewhat left out of the increasingly apparent Anglo-American unique concord, according to Priscilla Roberts the main lasting result of the discussions about and during the Peace Conference. "*Before 1914, relatively few*

[60] Stevenson, David, *With our backs to the wall, victory and defeat in 1918*, London:Allen Lane, 2012

on either the American or British side of the Atlantic were dedicated to the promotion of Anglo-American entente. By the time the war ended, their numbers had grown substantially, and they perceived themselves as a coherent group who shared a common faith and who intended to continue to work together in international affairs"[61].

Rare were the Atlanticists on the French side by that time, like Clémentel, the young Monnet and Henri Beranger, who had already preconized necessary permanent cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon world. Instead the main French interest in a post-war settlement hinged on providing security guarantees against a repeat of the events of 1871 and 1914. The idea was to set up either a robust system of alliances or a new method of mutual guarantees[62]. However, by 1917, it was clear that France's allies were not interested in the former. Therefore, the French government established a Commission to consider a *Société des Nations* in September 1917, chaired by Léon Bourgeois[63]. The term was not new in French political thinking. The expression was in a preamble to the convention adopted by the twelfth Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, and it was echoed in the title of a book by Bourgeois himself, in 1910[64]. He had founded the Association Française pour la SDN during the war, and now, with President Wilson sponsoring the idea and the British seemingly sympathetic, the French government did not want to be left out. In June 1917 foreign minister Aristide Briand and Finance minister Etienne Clémentel, at the opening session of the Chambre des Députés, both noted the increasing British and American emphasis on "a community" rather than a "balance" of powers. In their words, this notion was something to deal with if France wanted to have a say on the

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[61] Roberts, Priscilla, *World War I as cathalyst, the impact on Anglo-American relation; the role of Philip Lothian and the Round Table*, Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Studies, Vol. 95 issue 383, January 2006

[62] Blair, Scott G., *Les origines en France de la SDN, la commission interministérielle d'études pour la SDN 1917-1919*, in Relations Internationales 75, 1993, pp. 277-92

[63] *Commission interministeriélle d'études pour la Société des Nations,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Quai d'Orsay, Paris

[64] Bourgeois, Léon, *Pour la Société des Nations*, Frasquelle, Paris, 1910

compelling matters which interested the government, reconstructions and reparations[65]. There is no mention in the papers of a connection between the work Jean Monnet was doing in London at the time with the AMTC and the Commission's discussions about the SDN, but Clémentel's association with it provided the French entrepreneur with unique access to the early results.

In 1917 there was some real doubt as to whether France would not be defeated as its armies had been annihilated in the last great French offensive of the war on the Aisne. That offensive which led to mutinies, summary executions and an end to all pretensions of a breakthrough, which had to be left to the Americans and British in August 1918. A very early session of the Commission had proposed the setting up of a Société des Nations (SDN, League of Nations) that would both be an extension of that had happened in the pre-war period, and especially at The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. It was to be a multi-lateralisation of the principles of law established at these great disarmament conferences to which the French looked for inspiration. It was assumed that the main war aim was to "*etablir l'humanité dans le regle du droit*"[66]. Partly this was due to the precedent career of the leading members of the Commission. Bourgeois had himself been at The Hague and saw the SDN as a multilateralization of the bilateral arbitration treaties of the pre-1914 era, not as a new experiment in 'open diplomacy' as envisaged by Wilson.

Senator Gabriel Hanotaux called The Hague meetings "*les premiers battements du coeur de l'humanite*"[67]. This notion required, in the words of Alexandre Ribot in 1916, a peace "*basée sur le droit international et garantie par des sanctions contre laquel aucun pays ne pourra se dresser*"[68] a theme to which the Commission returned several times. However, this had to be a Hague 'with power', not some form of a glorified '*Union des Télégraphes*'. For another theme that comes through

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[65] Quoted in Stevenson, David, *The First World War and European Integration,* The International History review, Vol. 34, No. 4, December 2012, p.850

[66] *Commission Bourgeois,* 19 December 1917, SDN 1, ADLC, Paris

[67] Senator Gabriel Hanotaux, 30 January 1918, SDN 1, Affaires Etrangeres, ADLC, Paris

[68] Alexandre Ribot, Memorandum, April 1916, SDN 1, Affaires Etrangeres, ADLC, Paris

loud and clear is that the peace must not prove to be a truce, a claim most famously summed up later by Marshall Foch of the Treaty as announcing a 'Twenty Year Truce'. This view was voiced as early as 21 November 1917 in the 4th meeting of the Commission in a report by a Quai d'Orsay's legal advisor ('*juriconsulte-adjoint'*) Henri Fromageot that "*la paix doit être une paix réelle et non une trêve dangereuse*"[69]. This led to the question as to whether the '*pacte general d'association'* should precede or follow the end of hostilities and how could it have teeth while not affecting the sovereignty of states. These were all questions that also preoccupied the American Senate and have dogged international organisation ever since.

An association required cooperation, and one possible vector lay with the American Inquiry. Geographer and Sorbonne of professor Emmanuel de Martonne in October 1918 had led a *Comité d'Etudes* close to the Inquiry, and he knew and liked most of the members, many of whom were academics. This included Isaiah Bowman, by now the Director of the American Geographical Society and the chief territorial specialist on the Inquiry. Besides he knew Charles Seymour (Yale University) and George Louis Beer, an American Anglophile and Chief of the Inquiry's 'Colonial Division', as well as James Shotwell of Columbia. In a telling remark he pointed out that they all liked France but knew England better. Even if they were not such a pacifist or *philogermanique* as might have been the case, *"suspect influences are nonetheless to be feared"*[70]. The good news for de Martonne was that Wilson and House had set up and controlled the body so tightly it should have escaped the possible contamination of the State Department, which had a higher percentage of the 'German lovers' Paris feared. Equally he felt it was unlikely that Wilson or House would have read the more than one thousand pages of documents produced.

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[69] Report by Henri Fromageot, 21 November 1917, SDN 1, Affaires Etrangeres, ADLC, Paris

[70] Emmnanuele De Martonne, Report of 24 October 1918, Paix 22, SDN 1, ADLC, Paris, quoted in Williams Andrews, p.87

The French diplomat so charged, Louis d'Aubert, was in any case convinced that the main American desire from the moment they had entered the war was to *"arbitrate a reciprocal consensus of the two sides in the conflict, and to be careful what the other Allies suggest"*[71]. Keeping the immigrant populations in the United States happy was the main aim of Wilson's demands for self-determination, he thought. The government was sure the President would not make too much of their obvious claims on Alsace-Lorraine, and he did believe the Americans would accept that France had suffered and therefore should be given large indemnities in recompense. He also thought that the United States would accept the need for an extended Rhine frontier, giving them dine if attacked for "*the democracies to come to France's aid"*. This neatly pre-figured the Maginot Line. The French vision at the time was of a triple entente, with the Anglo-Saxon "Thalassocracies" to guard the seas and the French soldiers defending the Rhine. What it is apparent in these analyses by the Commission and d'Aubert is an extraordinary lack of knowledge of Edward House of President Wilson's plans for Europe, of the American way of thinking and of the vision the US representative had for post-war international relations.

Nevertheless, such preliminary exchanges and works were borne out by the events in Paris during the Conference itself. Negotiations and talks between the "Big Four" and their teams became chaotic, and the absence of coordination between the study groups set up before the Conference meant that no one had a clear idea of what the others were yearning for. The Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando eventually left Paris in protest, witnessing his country's territorial demands being dismissed. Even if some discussions went rather successfully, especially on the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, on all other matters a wedge intervened between the French and the Anglo-Americans. The main faultlines of both sides' aspiration were around issues like the Saar and the way the League of Nations was to operate. The carefully prepared and studied logic behind the results of

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[71] Quoted by Williams, Andrews, *Why don't the French do think tanks, France faces up to the Anglo-Saxon superpowers, 1918-1921*. Review of International Studies, 34(1), 53-68

the Commission Bourgeois was utterly overshadowed by the arguments of the PID. What was missing was real dialogue between the parties, and mutual respect, the things that made all the difference during the experience of the AMTC. Lord Cecil was outraged that Marshall Foch continuously dismissed the League of Nations as an Anglo-Saxon fantasy. He was convinced that the French could not understand how dangerous their positions were. Bourgeois was not well considered either, "*rather feeble physically and cannot see very much, he only makes speeches of interminable length"*[72].

In the end, France got its revenge on Germany, but it was a pyrrhic victory in the context of a Treaty from which it did not get much in terms of future standing. Even during the war, when France lost its industrial powerhouse in the north-east and crucially its Russian ally in 1917, it became increasingly reliant on the Thalassocracies, "*a realization that added to French feelings of bitterness over what they saw as the dominance of special (including some ethnic) interest groups in the United States over foreign policy"*[73]. As Daniel Stephenson said France had been "s*chooled in the politics of weakness"* and even if it seemed that in first years after the war France had some predominance over European affairs, "*by 1924 the future was clearly defined as Anglo-Saxon"*[74]. This would eventually create a sentiment of distrust and bitterness that would influence French foreign policy for several decades to come.

On the other side, those who had worked on the British and American teams in Paris was starting to resemble the "*coherent group"* that Priscilla Roberts describes. Those who had worked together on the Treaty on the American and British sides often developed lasting relationships on a personal level in Paris. When this generation came to full influence in the 1920s and 1930s it began to embody a vital vector for an Anglo-American version of international society. For the period between 1919 and

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[72] Lord Robert Cecil Diary, Entries 6,8,9, 26 January 1919, The Cecil Of Chelwood Papers, Add. Mss. 51131, BL, London

[73] Williams, Andrew, *Why French don't do think tanks*, p. 65

[74] Stephenson, Daniel, *With backs against the wall*, p. 167

1940, and beyond, the main fora for the development of this debate were to be the American CFR and Chatham House. The initial prime mover of the British end of this was Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, the co-founder of the Round Table movement in 1910 and British Ambassador to Washington in 1939-1940. The Round Table group was one of the most interesting of cross-party movement in Great Britain, trying to square liberal ideas like self-determination within the Empire and between English speaking people in general, something that would eventually resonate in President Wilson's rhetoric during the war. Williams goes on to say that this was "*the heart of the Special Relationship",* pointing to a broader implication "*than purely Anglo-American relations"*[75]. Instead it encompassed all the autonomous English-speaking areas of the Empire. Kerr was the "*the most influential member of the epistemic community"*[76], and the associated journal RoundTable published articles on themes related to the concepts of imperial federalism, greater Britain and Anglosaxonism throughout the twentieth century. Andrea Bosco has highlighted the influence of this journal during the period 1919-39, and its importance is difficult to exaggerate[77]. Most of the Round Tablers were firm advocates of Anglo-American cooperation during the Great War, and that helped in the case of the AMTC, and this added significant value to Kerr's posting to Washington as ambassador in 1939.

The interwar historical role played by Round Table was to steer the transition from an Anglo-French to an Anglo-American dyarchy in the management of world power. As Roberts shows in detail[78], Kerr was close to the people of the Inquiry as well as to other Americans in Paris, including the academics (Shotwell, Bowman), and the lawyers (John W. Davis and Paul Cravath, the latter also an

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[75] Williams, Andrew, *France, Britain and the United States,* p.43

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] Bosco, Andrea, *From empire to Atlantic 'system': The Round Table, Chatham House and the emergence of a new paradigm in Anglo-American relations,* Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Volume 16, 2018 - Issue 3, pp. 223-243

[78] Roberts, Priscilla (ed.), *Lord Lothian and Anglo-American relations, 1900-1940*, Republic of Letters, Dordrecht, 2010

influential diplomat and former Assistant Secretary of State), who were to become leading figures of the CFR. Kerr also published a considerable number of articles in the journal RoundTable during the war extolling the growing Anglo-American relationship. American thinkers of the period were similarly drawn from a reasonably narrow elite pool, with prominent academics like Nicholas Murray Butler and James T. Shotwell also acting as policymakers (Butler and Shotwell, for example, played a crucial role in disarmament and peace discussions within the League). They met in think tanks like the Carnegie Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations and were tuners and outers in numerous governmental roles after 1919.

Those who were in Paris, in senior or junior positions, had especially bad memories that continued to inform their views (and indeed prejudices) about Europe, and France in particular, for many years to come and can be said to have coloured their more comprehensive analyses of international relations. Many members of the ACNP had significant roles in American foreign affairs until beyond the Second World War. John Foster Dulles, future Secretary of State under Eisenhower and Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Republican Presidential candidate Thomas Dewey against Roosevelt in 1944, was one such.

They, and many like them, created a trans-Atlantic elite that shaped, and still does, the intellectual basis on which the Anglo-American Special Relationship was eventually built. This group was one from which the French were excluded for reasons of lack of understanding, miscommunication and old prejudices. Creating a permanent link between French aspiration and the Anglo-Saxon intellectual power base was the ultimate goal behind the work Jean Monnet was about to carry out in the post-war period and also behind the way European integration would initially evolve after the Second World War.

2. Monnet and The League of Nations. Financial networks between cooperation and failure

"*Today we stand on a bridge leading from the territorial state to the world community. Politically, we are still governed by the concept of the territorial state; economically and technically, we live under the auspices of worldwide communications and worldwide markets*"[1]. These are the words Christian Lange, Norwegian secretary-general of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, used for his acceptance speech of the Nobel Prize in 1921.

The ideas expressed by this speech were rather common in the aftermath of the First World War. The collapse of the pre-1914 order and the great clash of the old empires opened new possibilities of organising a world order according to progressive views. Internationalism and institutionalised international relations were a way to challenge the old certainties of the absolute rights of sovereign states. In the mind of people like Jean Monnet, they had just proved to be the only practical way also to win a war in the XX century.

What emerged during the Paris Conference in 1919 was a unique and bold set of new international institutions, first of all, the League of Nations, created to "*promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security"*[2]. Lange's bridge - the hopes for a new internationalism of the *"high politics between states"* never reached his prophesied end. As an international mechanism of war prevention, the League was left virtually untested through the 1920s. Any appearance of accomplishment was violently punctured by its inability to deal with the multiple crises of the 1930s,

[1] Christian L. Lange, *Internationalism*, Nobel Lecture, 13 December 1921, in Frederick W. Haberman (ed.), *Nobel Lectures: Peace. Vol. I: 1901-1925*, Amsterdam: Elsevier,1972, 336-346. Lange was co-recipient of the Peace Prize for 1921 with Hjalmar Branting of Sweden.

[2] *The covenant of the League of Nations*, Preamble, www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp

most prominently over the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the collapse of international disarmament efforts and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The failure was conceded even by the League's greatest champion of all, the British politician and president of the country's League of Nations Union, Lord Robert Cecil. Reflecting in 1941, amid that ultimate catastrophe so feared by Lange, Cecil lamented: "*It was to prevent this that the Great Experiment of the League of Nations was carried out. It has done much admirable work, but it has failed in its main purpose"*[3].

That primary purpose was set out by Article 8 of the Covenant of the League, in terms of necessary disarmament of all countries. Member states had to "*recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety"*. If peace had to be preserved, the world had to disarm, with the League taking the lead in this process. In the first years after the first world war, widespread revulsion with militarism made untenable the pre-war notion of armaments as deterrent and guarantee of stability. After all, it was the arms race leading up to 1914 that many blamed for the catastrophe of the Great War. A sentiment made clear during the first two meetings of the League of Nations' Assembly in Geneva[4]. Second, it was the conception of how horrific the *next war* was going to be in the future, with destructive and deadly weapons used to destroy the enemy's industrial capability and population's morale. The power of aviation, shown in the last years of the war, prompted in the minds of many, images of destroyed cities and asphyxiated civilians, with millions dead in a few hours of area bombardments.

The issue of disarmament never faded from prominence, even as the war receded in memory. The League of Nations provided a natural forum for an international debate on the topic, pursued continuously during the two decades of peace after 1919. To mark the League's tenth anniversary, in 1930, the Secretariat published a volume which avowed: "*None of the League's activities had aroused*

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[3] Viscount Cecil, *A Great Experiment*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941

[4] *The Records of the first Assembly*, Vol. 1: Plenary Meetings, Geneva, 1920; *The records of the second Assembly*, Vol. 2, Geneva, 1921

so much interest in the world as its work for the limitation and reduction of armaments, and none has so closely or so continuously engaged the attention of the League"[5]. Nevertheless, the absence of the United States and the institution's little power of enforcement meant that especially in this area, the outcomes were few. Despite public interest and debate, two decades of negotiations did not produce a treaty covering any sphere of armaments. The collapse of the endeavour came after the failure of the World Disarmament Conference of 1922-1924. Another arms race ensued. War followed a few years later. General Foch's prophecy self-fulfilled. Perhaps it was because no other area of the League's work was held in such universally high regard for its political significance that arguably nothing was more completely condemned in subsequent judgments.

The scholarly literature on the interwar efforts for international disarmament has been a story of inevitable failure stemming from unbridled nationalism. Theorists who viewed the League as a case study demonstrating the dynamics of power in the post-1945 world dismissed it as useless: an artificial creation based on trust, voluntary cooperation and altruism that was unable to account for the natural imperatives of self-interest inherent in all states existing within a starkly competitive international system.

This focus on a state-centred order and the maintenance of peace rejected the possibilities for the provision of security through international institutions or global disarmament following from collaborative state efforts[6]. For most of the twentieth century, historians similarly argued that the irresistible primacy of nationalism defeated the League's efforts to provide security. The ultimate

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[5] *Ten years of World Cooperation,* Geneva, Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930, p.49

[6]For example, see Ernst B. Haas, *Types of Collective Security: An Analysis of Operational Concepts,* American Political Science Review 49, 1 (1955), 40-62; F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); HansJ. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Natioms: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 3rd edn. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Richard K. Betts, *Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe,* International Security 17, 1 (1992), 5-43; and John J. Mearsheimer, *The False Promise of International Institutions,* International Security 19, 3 (1994-95), 5-49.

failure of the League's efforts on disarmament was held up universally as an example of the organisation's misguided intentions and irrelevant role, to the extent that, to this day, not a single full-length study has attempted to provide a comprehensive international history of the issue. Attention focused instead on disarmament solely concerning the policies of the major states. This approach removed the League from accounts of the international process it oversaw and drew almost entirely upon national archives rather than the records of the League. Only one sphere of interwar disarmament attracted significant attention: the naval arms limitation resulting from specific treaties among a limited number of powers and pursued entirely outside of the ambit of the League itself. The particular characteristics of those efforts were attractive as a source of data for arms control theorists during the Cold War who sought to support their models of the nuclear disarmament process.

The new research on the League of Nations since the turn of the twenty-first century has prompted a reinterpretation of the role of this institution. Perhaps the most noticeable features of this scholarship are, first, the extent to which it draws upon the League archives directly and tells a story in which the League is a functioning internationalist presence laying the foundations for modern regimes of global governance. Second, the use of new methodological approaches rooted in international history and, to an even greater extent, cultural history[7]. Third, the dramatic shift of attention in research away from the traditional security issue and towards a new focus on topics such as minority protection and human rights, the relationship between mandates and the persistence of empire, international systems for combating disease or drug and sex trafficking[8]. Forth, the promotion of intellectual cooperation and the role of global public opinion, and the creation of new frameworks of international economics

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[7] Joëlle Droux, *Children and Youth: A Central Cause in the Circulatory Mechanisms of the League of Nations (1919–1939)*, *Prospects* 45, no. 1 (2015): pp 63–76.

[8] Mark Mazower, *Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe*, in Global Minority Rights, Routledge, 2017, 17–33; Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, OUP Oxford, 2015; Lassa Oppenheim, *The League of Nations and Its Problems*, BoD–Books on Demand, 2018; Norrie MacQueen, *The Sins of the Fathers? From League of Nations Mandates to United Nations Peacekeeping*, Taylor & Francis, 2018; Benjamin Auberer, *Murder, Intrigue, Sex and Internationalism. Novels about the League of Nations, The League of Nations. Perspectives from the Present*, 2019, 211–22

and finance. Two issues still lack a central place in revised interpretations of the League's work. First, a transnational analysis of the problem of disarmament. Secondly, a comprehensive assessment of the role of the League as a natural forum for the formation of policy networks of like-minded people, internationalist politicians, bankers, policy entrepreneurs. This chapter tries to analyse this second issue through the experience of Jean Monnet.

2.1 Monnet and the League of Nations

In his memoirs as well as in the biographies, Monnet's appointment to the Secretariat of the League of Nations is the subject of very brief mentions. On the other hand, the experience he gained during those three and a half years is underlined and presented as a timely extension of his first international engagement in London from November 1914 within the AMTC. Nonetheless, in the works dedicated to Jean Monnet, little is mentioned about the spirit, the real intentions and the personal contributions of the Frenchman during the establishment of the League.

In his Memoires, Monnet describes very briefly the creation of the League of Nations[9]. According to him, at the beginning of the Peace Conference in Paris, as early as January 1919, he was retained in London to liquidate the inter-allied coordinating committees and, because of this, he did not participate in any form in the elaboration of the Covenant of the League. Furthermore, if we read only his words, it does not appear that this 30-year-old young man had any original personal ideas to put forward in terms of international organisations in general: "*A l'époque, je ne cherchais pas la solution de problèmes internationaux en termes de délégation de souveraineté*"[10]. Moreover, he continues, "*personne ny pensait encore, même si dans les mots on semblait appeler une autorité supérieure aux*

[9] Jean Monnet, *Mémoires,* pp. 105-130
[10] Jean Monnet, *Mémoires,* p.109

nations"[11]. As for his assessment of the organisation set up by the Covenant, he admitted that he had formulated it only long after, that is, following other experiences of international cooperation. He rightly believed, however, that the success of the reasonable objectives set by the League depended on the processes and administrative procedures set up to achieve them. Now, in the matter of organisation capable of assuring peace among peoples through the voluntary cooperation of States, there was, he wrote correctly, no precedent on which the artisans of the League could have relied upon, except for the inter-allied committees in London in which he participated during the war. He correctly attributes to this previous experience the fact that Clemenceau and Balfour called him to the position of Deputy Secretary-General of the League. To this regard, it is good to point out that Monnet understates his designation, and indeed the very results obtained by the League of Nations. He confesses and fully recognises that the rereading that he makes of his work in Geneva happened in the light of the events that have affected the institution after he left as well as in the light of his own subsequent experiences. "*Avec le recul, je comprends mieux ce qu'il y avait de supranational avant le lettre dans le SDN: c'était l'entente profonde au sein du secrétariat entre les hommes qui disposaient chacun dans son pays de réseaux d'influence tels que l'intérét général pénétra les centres de décision nationaux (...). Une certaine délégation de pouvoir aurait du prendre le realis d'un système qui n'avait fonctionné que grace à l'autorité et à l'entente personnelles de quelques individualités"*[12].

Therefore, what he writes does not, above all, describe his actual experience, but more accurately corresponds to what the same Monnet would have liked this new organisation to be, based on actual international cooperation, and to which he devoted some years of his youth. Are we also to see, beyond the assessments made several decades later, inconceivable sketches of what will then be called the "Monnet method"? After all, was it not a question of competent people with influence in the

[11] *Ibid*
[12] *Ibid.* p.116

national decision-making, consulting with all the stakeholders of a specific issue, coming to a common solution, and ultimately being able to have the latter adopted by their respective authorities?

And yet, reading the few pages of the Memoires, dotted with the appreciation of the goals, imperfections and failures of the League of Nations, the question arose whether Jean Monnet had any original vision of the League and its activities. Did he espouse Léon Bourgeois's views, a League perfectly structured and provided with an army to impose its justice? Or, on the contrary, it was his experience in London that informed him on his early conceptions about the League? After all, it is well established that the institution had been built along with Anglo-Saxon ideals of cooperation, something only a few French individuals were familiar with[13].

What is certain is that Monnet's eventual participation in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, due to his close relationship with Clémentel and Clemenceau, gained him valuable experience as well as lifelong friends. While some other delegations viewed him as being outside the French establishment, the French leadership considered him a reliable source of information and their private spokesman. When the Allied leaders created the Supreme Economic Council, which had replaced the AMTC, Clémentel designated Monnet as France's representative in the Council's Supply Section headed by American Herbert Hoover. At the Peace Conference, the young Frenchman met some crucial individuals who later became influential and remained lifelong friends. New York lawyer John Foster Dulles, who was acting legal counsel to Bernard Baruch, the US representative on the Reparations Commission, remained especially close to Monnet and corresponded with him until the American's death in 1959. Others included Allen Dulles, Foster Dulles's brother and the director of the CIA in the Eisenhower administration, and prominent British economist John Maynard Keynes. Monnet also developed a close relationship with the US

[13] Blair, Scott G., *Les origines en France de la SDN, la commission interministérielle d'études pour la SDN 1917-1919*, in Relations Internationales 75, 1993, pp. 277-92

banker of J. P. Morgan, Dwight Morrow, with whom he had worked in London when the financier was an adviser attached to the US section of the AMTC. The Morrows and the Monnets developed close family ties and often visited each other's homes. The Morrows' daughter, writer Anne Morrow, and her husband Charles Lindbergh were often Monnet's guests in Paris[14].

Monnet at the time strongly supported Clementel's proposals to extend Allied wartime cooperation to the postwar reconstruction period and his plan for worldwide control of raw material supplies. Clémentel's real aim was to contain German economic power after the war and protect France against the superior strength of Germany in any Franco-German relationship. While it is unclear whether Monnet had any role in shaping these ideas, he argued for Allied economic planning as well as the continuation of wartime economic controls in the reconstruction period. However, British and US opposition killed these proposals. Not wanting to perpetuate the wartime system of rationing supplies, those nations wished to maintain a free hand in the distribution of postwar relief, which the Americans knew would be primarily funded by them[15].

Established on June 28, 1919, when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the League of Nations was to prevent war through collective security and disarmament and to settle international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. Its Council, composed of representatives of nine sovereign states, governed this intergovernmental organisation by unanimous decisions. The Permanent Secretariat, located in Geneva, was composed of representatives from member nations who were experts in various spheres. Called the "motor" of the League of Nations, that body assisted the Council in

[14] Monnet-Morrow correspondence, Series I, 1900-1931, Dwight Morrow papers, Amherst College Library; John Foster Dulles to Monnet, telegram, September 23, 1931, and report from Dulles to Monnet, November 14, 1940, John Foster Dulles Papers, PUL; Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p.40; Harold Nicolson, *Dwight Morrow*, New York, Brace, 1935, pp 240-41; Fransen, *The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet*, pp. 27-28

[15] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 39-40; George Henri-Soutou, *L'Or et le sang. Le buts de guerre économique de la premiere guerre mondiale*, Paris, Fayard, 1989

its work while the forty-seven-nation Assembly could issue only opinions, resolutions, and recommendations[16].

Monnet's name surfaced on both British and French leaders' lists as a possible candidate for this critical job. Although he was suggested by the wartime British Minister of Blockade Lord Robert Cecil, it was Sir Eric Drummond, British diplomat and the League's designated secretary-general, who personally chose Monnet among other nominations to be the highest-ranking of four deputies of the Secretariat[17].

Drummond, Monnet, and Raymond Fosdick, the designated US League representative, were members of the committee that met to set up the Secretariat during the summer of 1919. Meeting at their headquarters in the London mansion called Sutherland House, these men believed that the League's authority was based on reason and cooperative goodwill. They idealistically clung to the hope it will would prevail by sheer moral strength and force of habit and significantly appeal to public opinion. In a letter to his wife that summer, Fosdick wrote that since his generation was in a "*race with international anarchy*" he and Monnet had stressed that the world had "*very little time in which to set up the framework of international government and establish the habit of teamwork*"[18]. Fosdick, who served as undersecretary-general of the League, left this post shortly after the US Senate voted on March 19, 1920, not to ratify the Versailles Treaty.

Monnet understood the shortcomings of the League: it had no powers of enforcement and had to rely on persuasion. Writing in a May 27, 1919 memorandum, he asserted that cooperation among nations would grow from there getting to know each other better and "*from the interpenetration*

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[16] Antoine Fleury, *Jean Monnet au Secretariat de la Société des Nations*, in Bossuat, Wilkens *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et le Chemins de la paix*, p. 35

[17] *Ibid*, p. 35

[18] Raymond B. Fosdick, *Letters on the League of Nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 17-18

between their constituent elements and those of their neighbours"[19]. Both Monnet and Arthur Salter, who later joined the Secretariat as head of the Economic and Finance Division, saw the League "*as a means to organise the peace.*" Monnet believed a quality Secretariat with useful contacts in governments would invite the states to "*appreciate the problem as a whole in the light of the general interest*"[20]. Dwight Morrow also shared Monnet's faith in the Secretariat and his belief that it was a much more substantial body than either the League Council or Assembly. "*Keep the organisation a fact-finding body, and let its power grow, and keep in mind that it takes a very long time to accomplish anything that is to be permanent,"* he wrote Monnet. *"Your League of Nations may not get started, or it may get started, and it may fail, but men will come back to the work that you did in London during the war and will turn over the precedents that you made, and some of them will be used in the real concert that will last.*"[21]

However, besides the idealistic premises, the concrete objectives of the one who had just been named the second of Eric Drummond pose a fundamental problem, because of the argument he will develop in the Mémoires. What lessons does he draw for the post-war period from the understanding he lived and experienced in London?

The *Mémoires*, which are a particularly later source, retained a narrow if not flattened view of it, in comparison with the reflections and direct testimonies of those who were Monnet's closest interlocutors among the Allied executives. The former delegate of Clémentel develops, in fact, irenic rhetoric about the general interest and the relations of trust within the small team governing the League, before insisting on its imperative of unity of views and actions. Although aware of the weight of the constraints of war, Monnet celebrated friendship and respect, without accounting for

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[19] Fleury, *Jean Monnet au Secretariat*, pp. 34-41. For a copy of the memorandum, see Bossuat, Wilkens (ed), *Jean Monnet*, pp 441-445

[20] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 41

[21] Dwight Morrow to Jean Monnet, letter, November 10, 1919, Dwight Morrow Papers, ACL. See also Morrow's letter to Monnet of August 2, 1920, Dwight Morrow Papers

the rivalries that remained between the delegates of the four great powers, through delicate and complex negotiations, something that remained a limit of his method.

His former American partners, Rublee and Morrow, began discussing the issue of the League in early 1919, and they did not hesitate to mark the limits of inter-allied cooperation in the last fifteen months of the conflict[22]. The committees within the ACTC never had any decision-making or supervisory power, which remained in the hands of national governments. They were responsible for collecting statistics and verifying the available information, they had to ensure that the collective resources were managed as efficiently as possible, but nothing more. As stated before, but often forgotten in the literature about Monnet, the joint effort of the four warring states never led to active cooperation between military and civilian supply and transport systems.

To Salter, in particular, it was clear where the real deciding power was, and he was aware of the realpolitik behind the war cooperation. Without ever losing sight of the enormous amount of effort engaged by the French, Monnet's closest London colleague attributed the Allied success in supplying for the war effort to the British Empire's availabilities of raw materials[23]. The special needs of a very poor Italy or an industrially weakened France called inevitably for bilateral agreements with London, and then Washington. Mutual trust and respect, the basis for Allied relations in wartime, was, in fact, a necessity and only the result of a common threat. As a defense strategy against submarine warfare, Salter saw the allied cooperation measures as a circumstantial accident.

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[22] George Rublee, *Inter-Allied machinery in war-time*, in *The League of Nations starts: an outline by its organisers*, London, Macmillan, 1920, pp. 29-45; Joseph R Cotton, Dwight W. Morrow, *International cooperation during the war*, The Atlantic Monthly 123 (Dune 1919), p. 809

[23] James Arthur Salter, *Allied shipping control*, pp. 179-80, 187-88, 223-24, 244-48, 256; in other forms he would articulate the same reasoning in *Memoirs of a public servant*, Londron, Faber & Faber, 1961, chap. IV -VI.

The wartime committees had not led to any loss of political authority by the national governments. Serruys, a colleague of Monnet's in the Ministry of Commerce, insisted on the same point even before the armistice, when the ACTC was at its peak of effectiveness[24]. For his part, Drummond went so far as presenting war-time cooperation on the opposite side against his idea of international public service[25].

The observation is not without merit: if we were to admit like some biographers appear to do, that in the summer of 1919 Monnet's thoughts about wartime cooperation matched those which he would repeat in the Mémoires, the new Deputy Secretary-General retained a very biased image of the ways and objectives of the war collaboration. Although he did not underestimate the prominence of the national interests at stake, if we look at the Mémoires he seems to have expectations similar to those of Clémentel, with a view of a new League managing trade of raw materials and industrial products by means of a structure embodying a spirit similar to the one of the coalition forged in 1917-1918[26].

However, as we know at the age of thirty, Jean Monnet was not only an idealistic former cognac trader who had become the delegate of the Ministry of Commerce to the inter-allied cooperation committees. The reasons behind his warm attitudes towards the League of Nations could not only come from an idealistic view of continued inter-allied cooperation. The theory presented in these pages is that his decision to join the League was more business-driven, based on the concept of

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[24] Daniel Serruys, *La structure économique de la coalition*, Revue de Paris 25 (15 juillet 1918), pp. 326-45, Bibliothèque National de France, https://gallica.bnf.fr/services/engine/search/sru?operation=searchRetrieve&version=1.2&collapsing=disabled&query=%28gallica%20all%20%22Daniel%20Serruys%2C%20La%20structure%20%C3%A9conomique%20de%20la%20coalition%22%29%20and%20arkPress%20all%20%22cb32693668j_date%22&rk=21459;2

[25] Eric Drummond, *The Secretariat of the League*, Public Administration 9 (1931), p. 228.

[26] Étienne Clémentel, *La France Et La Politique Economique Alliée*, Paris, Presses Universitaires De France, 1931. Bibliothèque National de France https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5657606j/f5.image.texteImage

financial solidarity and the need to reestablish stable Atlantic economic relations, something beyond Clémentel's reasoning. Although unable to resort to missing private documentation, lost during the Nazi occupation of France, an analysis of the period between the end of the inter-allied committees and his appointment at the League is necessary.

This period marked a somewhat comeback by the *Charentais* to the world of North Atlantic trade, precisely while his offices in London were being closed, what appears to be a kind of parallel path, before his appointment to the Secretariat of the League.

Before returning to the Ministry of Commerce, and with the strong background of his experience in maritime trade management, Monnet joined again his colleagues in London at the end of March 1919. Lord Robert Cecil, president of the ACTC as of the new supreme Economic Council, welcomed Clémentel's delegate in the subcommittee in charge of supplying Germany. On the same day, Monnet became the French member of the Shipping Section, of the general secretariat[27]. He thus found himself in frequent contact with Robert H. Brand (financial adviser to Lord Robert and representative in Paris for Lazard Brothers), as with Thomas W. Lamont (financial adviser to the President of the United States and representative of J.P. Morgan), both participating in the sessions of the Supreme Economic Council.

Therefore, from his point of view, old partnerships became involved again in his business and political action. The Lazards had a close financial and personal relationship with the Hudson Bay Company, a preferred partner of Monnet & Co in Canada since 1896. During the war, the HBC put considerable cargo of freight and civil supplies at the disposal of the French government because of Monnet; it also consolidated its banking positions, when its governor Robert Kindersley

[27] The Shipping section was a sub-committee established in *special conference* with the purpose of incorporating the AMTC within the Supreme Economic Council. Memorandum, 24 mars 1919, in FRUS 1919, *the Paris Peace Conference*, vol. X, pp. 126-27

became, as an officer of Lazards, one of the directors of the Bank of England[28]. This was the embryo of Monnet's future support network inside banking circles. Through these relationships, Monnet became directly informed of the development of several competing commercial projects for post-war Europe. In fact, in mid-May, he presented together with Brand Lazards' post-war plans to Thomas Lamont, partner at J.P. Morgan and appointed as representatives of the US Treasury Department to the Paris Peace Conference[29]. This happened without any French banking, political or administrative support. Monnet, even though he was officially a representative of his country, was again acting as an independent business unit within inter-allied committees.

When Cecil, as suggested by Drummond, offered him the prominent post in the Secretariat of a League that remained to be set up, Monnet gave himself a long time to think about it before accepting[30]. It seemed to him that the challenges to which the economic projects sponsored by John Maynard Keynes, Thomas Brand and Thomas Lamont were trying to respond offered the new League an arena in which to make a difference[31]. This consideration put aside any importance of political and legal functions of the League, explaining why the already-mentioned Memorandum of May 1919 appears to be just an incomplete profession of faith in the Wilsonian ideal, without any concrete contribution to the 1919 debate about the League. In Monnet's view, the Commission's powers at that time would have to respond to a threefold concern: facilitate or otherwise frame the resumption of world trade in a spirit of free trade; nevertheless, prepare for

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[28] Richard S. Sayers, *The Bank of England, 1891-1944*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, vol. I, p. 122. On Kindersley, see, David J. Jeremy (ed.), *Dictionary of Biography Business*. London, Butterworth, 1985, vol. III, p. 596; *The Dictionary of National Biography, 1951-1960*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 585.

[29]Anne Orde, *British policy and European reconstruction after the First World War*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 60-61.

[30] Monnet to Drummond (personal letter), May 8, 1919, Monnet File, piéce 10, Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva

[31] In addition to the Cecil and Salter's Papers, see also Robert H. Brand Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Thomas W. Lamont, Baker Library, Harvard Business School and Norman Davis at the Library of Congress.

the dismantling of war organizations by means of "*rétablir l'équilibre mondial [par] une paix d'organisation*"[32], therefore to safeguard the equality of status of the great European powers among themselves; finally, to relaunch cooperation between public authorities and businesses, the potential of which was revealed especially during the war, particularly in the field of transport and credit.

It is then of no surprise that, according to an amicable division of responsibilities between Drummond and his deputies, Monnet took over the economic and technical sections, while Drummond was responsible for monitoring the work of the Political Sections and the relations with the Council and the Assembly of the League. One of the first tasks which would enable Monnet to show his talents as an organiser was the International Financial Conference held in Brussels during September 1920. This was the first conference organised by the League of Nations, even before the first Assembly had taken place. Convened by the Council, following the demands of American and European bankers who urged the allied governments to examine together the remedies to the disorganisation of the currency exchanges, the objective of the conference was "*d'étudier la crise financière et de rechercher les moyens d'en conjurer ou d'en atténuer les dangereuses consequences"*[33]. If this conference foreshadowed the future economic forums of the 20th century, the objective was nothing more or less than to prepare the reconstruction of the world economy by restoring real free trade.

Under the presidency of Gustave Ador, former President of the Swiss Confederation, the precise aim of the conference was also to study and to adopt ways to ensure that economic reconstruction without being hindered by financial difficulties. The conference itself had given rise to growing expectations as it was postponed many times. Therefore, the organisers, the President and his

[32] Jean Monnet, *Mémoires,* p. 86
[33] *Ibid,* p.120

young collaborator Monnet understood, already from the preparatory work, that these ambitious objectives could not be achieved without an agreement between the French and the English.

Its failure is due, between May and October 1920, above all to the issues of debt and reparations which, initially, were only part of an elaborate and ambitious plan, and it had profound consequences for the establishment of the interwar period and international relations in general. As Monnet discovered, it was not merely a question of bringing together, through an effective organisation, a group of bankers, experts and senior officials whose recommendations would govern international economics after the war. The concerns within participants to the Conference mirrored closely the ones shared by the global credit and trade communities before the signing of the peace treaty with Germany[34]. Since the beginning of 1919, the businessmen and financiers present at the Paris Conference expressed deep concern about the transition to the peace economy under the terms of the treaty, and the dangerous social tensions it could trigger. The aim, therefore, was to reduce barriers to trade (tariffs and monetary instability) and to provide agents with new credit instruments (credit insurances for exports and special loans for the new established States). Bled dry, Europe lacked means, which could only be provided by the financial markets of London and New York. In political terms, it was also a question of treating winning and losing sides on an equal footing, so to rationally commercialise the debt resulting from the war and the Treaty[35].

Monnet, after consultations between the Americans and the British, tried to integrate these objectives into an overall project which could serve, at the beginning of 1920, as a twofold short-term plan. The first step was to obtain assistance from American financiers at a time when the

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[34] In particular the memorandum from Amsterdam, written by John Maynard Keynes during October-Novembre 1919, *The International Loan Proposal*, published in *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, Londres, Macmillan, 1978, vol. XVII, pp. 136-41.

[35] *Observations upon the European economic situation : possible measures to be taken*, memorandum by Thomas W. Lamont and Norman H. Davis, 15 May 1919, published in Ray S. BAR (ed), *Woodrow Wilson and the world*, London, William Heinemann, 1922, vol. DI, pp. 352-62

Senate had rejected the peace treaty. The second was to choose a city where the headquarters of the League of Nations would be located: the French were the most vigorous advocates for Brussels, an easily accessible capital but in the end, Switzerland seemed to everyone a better compromise and a way to guarantee the institution's independence. In this issue, like in many others during the conference, Monnet took the side of his government, of which he was unofficially a representative[36]. Because of the Mèmoires not being a reliable source on this topic, we can only imagine the struggle between the businessman, who understood the importance of the neutrality of the location for the League's headquarters, and the loyal Frenchman, sent by his government to take care of his country's interests. It is a struggle that characterises his entire political experience.

About the issue of financial cooperation, Monnet, like many of his interlocutors, reiterated the topic of the interdependence of the industrialised world. Like them, however, he was convinced that the return to peaceful exchanges between nations could not take place in the spirit of anti-statist liberalism. This came at a time in which liberal internationalism was informed by a strong desire to limit and challenge state power. This sentiment was shared especially among bankers and businessmen in Britain and the United States, seeking to stabilise the European economy, integrating it again with the international financial market in the aftermath of the First World War. Especially the British sought coordination and cooperation between government on the issue of currency stabilisation, but they did not favour the continuation of government intervention on the scale that had been necessary to wage war[37]. This view was expressed in private in Paris. It was

[36] Antoine Fleury, *L'enjeu du choix de Genève comme siège de la SdN*, in Saul Friedlânder (ed.), *L'historien et les relations internationales : Recueil d'études en hommage à Jacques Freymond,* Genève, 1981, pp. 251-78

[37]Patricia Clavin, *Men and Markets, Global capital and the international economy*, in Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (ed.), *Internationalisms, a twentieth-century history*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 97

John Maynard Keynes who then provided the cry the world should consider *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*[38].

Monnet, still a Frenchman after all, knew from experience that purely private solutions to the post-war challenges could be unsatisfactory without a say by the state and tried to reach a compromise[39]. The recommendations of the Brussels Conference reflected, therefore, a balance of interests. First, they called for active fiscal and monetary restraint and stabilisation measures. These measures were the prerequisite for the allocation of import credits on a global scale, managed by a Commission made of bankers and businessmen within the Council of the League. This Commission was being awarded, by the decision of the Council, financial powers superior to those of national governments[40]. Although this proved ineffective and impossible to implement fully, we could see in this plan, something that would resonate in the Marshall Plan of 1947.

Nonetheless, this experience convinced Monnet at an early stage of the enormous obstacles in proposing compromises between States on immediate economic issues. In his Memoirs, he evokes the meeting in Brussels which, in his eyes, had to respond to the long-awaited promises of a reorganization of international relations between victors and vanquished, since Germany had been invited, as well as neutral States, to participate; in retrospect, he regretted that the proposed solutions did not receive the full support of the national governments and that "*le seul résultat*

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[38] John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic consequences of the Peace*, London, 1920

[39] About the debate on financial stabily within the banking community in those years see Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*, Oxford University Press, 2013; Denise Artaud, *La queztion des dettes interallées et la reconstruction de l'Europe 1917-1929*, Paris, Fayard, 1976; Anhony Adamthwaite, *Grandeur and misery: Freance's bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940*, London, Bloomsbury, 2014; Robert Boyce, *The great interwar crisis and the collapse of globalisation,* London, 2009

[40] *Art. 9 et 10 of the Annex : International Financial Conference, 1920*, Rapport de la Conférence, Bruxelles, 1920, pp. 27-28. The resulting Plan ter Meulen, originally intended to finance imports of raw materials, will adapt to the needs of the economic situation, changing its scope and purpose. André-Émile Sayous, *Le projet des crédits internationaux de la SdN*, in *Revue économique internationale* 14 (January 1922), pp. 54-74

concret de la première conférence économique mondiale fut la création, auprès de la SdN, de l'organisation économique et financière. Tout le restes'envola en recommandations audacieuses qui eussent pu économiser vingt ans de stagnation et une guerre à Europe si le pouvoir de les appliquer avait été donné en même temps"[41].

The new Economic and Financial Organisation would benefit from substantial internal autonomy within the Council, similar to that of the ILO. Adopted by the Conference and immediately approved by the Council, the setting up of the new permanent organisation started on December 1st. During the first Assembly of the League though, member States demanded, for reasons of economy, firm opposition to further development of the Secretariat and any new permanent structure. Besides, the Assembly voted for the formation of a supervisory body which, under the name of the Noblemaire Commission, would prove to be a very punctilious budgetary body throughout the interwar period, limiting the scope of the Committee only to economic observation and statistical calculation.

Monnet bared witness to these developments, in a Secretariat that mirrored Drummond's idea of civil service. In London and then in Geneva, Drummond applied the tried and tested practices of the Foreign Office. He was not comfortable in encouraging Monnet to set up a cabinet in the *French* sense because, in his mind, a Deputy replaced the Secretary-General only when he was absent[42]. It could not have equivalent or even autonomous administrative support, even though by 1920 a de-facto two-headed Franco-British structure had been set up, through the clever action of Monnet, at the head of the Secretariat.

Moreover, while Drummond appreciated the links established by Monnet since the summer of 1919 with several Parisian ministries and diplomats, he had somewhat reservations about an

[41] Monnet, *Mémoires*, p.131
[42] Lubor Jìlek, *Les règlements d'autriche et de haute-silésie*, in Boussuat and Wilkens (ed), *Jean Monnet*, p.49

assistant who, to hear him, did not examine the texts with adequate attention. "*Monnet does not enjoy looking over papers and giving the careful consideration to some of the memoranda and specific problems which are presented for the opinion of and action by the Secretary-General*"[43]. The preparatory work for the Brussels Conference was carried out by Monnet's sole assistant, the young René Cassin, who was employed by the secretariat from October 1919 to November 1920. When coordination within technical committees started to be difficult, in particular, because of Monnet's continuous travels, Drummond resolved to appoint Pierre Denis, until then a member of the Political Section, to the position of temporary assistant to the Deputy Secretary-General[44]. Denis was also to assist Drummond himself in matters of economics while also serving as private secretary to Felix Calonder, president of the German-Polish conference on the question of the future of Upper Silesia. In London as in Geneva, inside and outside the Sections and committees, a small but growing team was working around the Deputy Secretary-General.

Many of the people who animated the Secretariat were Normalists of pacifist spirit, something Albert Thomas mentions as a French cliché[45]. Their presence at the League was the result of personal decisions by Drummond, at least for Paul Mantoux, Pierre Comert, Robert Haas, Pierre Denis and Henri Bonnet. They were all professors (Mantoux, Denis and Thomas of History and Geography, Comert of German and Haas of Philosophy) and, for the most part, as young as Monnet[46]. Drummond's choices resulted in a remarkable homogeneity, for academic education:

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[43] Sir Eric Drummond, letter to Fosdick, 22 January 1920, in Raymond Fosdick, *Letters on the League of Nations,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 110-12.

[44] Note by Drummond, 24 November 1921, League of Nations' Archives, Personal file Pierre Denis, Box 60, n. 958.

[45] Address given by Albert Thomas at a conference in Bordeaux in January 1928, cited in Albert Thomas, *Politique sociale internationale*, Genève, BIT, 1947, p. 134.

[46] Monnet's age was no exception within the Secretariat: Layton, Crowdy, Denis and Rappard were four years older; de Madariaga was two years older; Walters, Loveday, Sweetser and Bonnet were his contemporaries. The only forty-year-olds in 1920 (Drummond, Colban and Mantoux) looked like patriarchs, at least in the eyes of Haas, Nixon, Gilchrist, Jacobsson, Quesnay or Montenach less than thirty at the time of their appointment.

on the British side, history and classical letters were the rules. The League's sources would undoubtedly allow a prosopographic study of the civil service *genevois*, to better understand the role of specific schools and universities in forming the ideas of members of the Société. The fact remains that the failure of the Brussels Conference led to the shortcomings of a permanent body which should have coordinated the Leauge's economic and financial activities. The Austrian case, although successful in the end, helps to examine the modalities and limitations of the Secretariat's and Monnet's role in the early 1920s.

2.2 The Austrian Rescue

Not quite well known, at the time the Austrian crisis garnered enormous international attention. It was a national crisis that mobilised financial and humanitarian networks whose ideas and practices istituzionalized within the League of Nations. The rump state of a once-mighty empire, the population — notably in its capital city - was starving after the war. Unable to feed its people, the government faced a combination of financial, political and social pressures that threatened to devastate it and that infected other successor republics of Austria-Hungary. By October 1921, the Austrian Schilling had descended into hyperinflation, with a monthly inflation rate of 46 per cent, and unemployment was running at more than 33 per cent. Images of starving Austrian children were prominent in the activism of women such as Eglantyne Jebb, who founded 'Save the Children' in May 1919, and art produced by Austrian orphans adorned Christmas cards distributed by the International Red Cross as part of its campaign for food aid for the republic.

If women's agency helped bring the Austrian hunger crisis to public attention[47], greater official engagement was delivered by the ones who had overseen the management of food, shipping and finance for the Allies in the First World War, notably the group working around Jean Monnet. As demonstrated before it was this network of financiers and technocrats forged in the war who helped to develop the notion that the League might be used for common economic needs. Members of the Allies' Supreme Economic Council, and participants at the Brussels Conference of 1920, they all argued that the new League of Nations should facilitate economic cooperation. The Austrian crisis was one of the founding reasons behind the creation of before-mentioned Economics and Financial Organisation within the League.

The move to the League was significant. The first attempts to obtain international funding for Austria were on a private, commercial basis and failed resoundingly between 1919 and 1921. It was then that international bankers overtly began to support calls already made by some economists and government officials that the international organization should take a more direct role in managing the Austrian crisis. Although the United States was outside the League of Nations, it still helped to determine the loan package forged by the organization. In keeping with the Progressive ethos of US domestic politics, there was great emphasis placed on technocratic solutions. In 1919, Herbert Hoover, then serving as Head of the American Relief Administration (ARA) argued for a discrete post-war economic commission to re-establish "*currency, transportation, the stimulation of production, and the normal flow of distribution…some sort of economic dictatorship"*[48]. His ideas were to presage what the League of Nations imposed on Austria to deal with its financial emergency in 1922, and strategies to promote human security and international development after 1945. As in the war, the staff of J. P. Morgan & Co. was a

[47] Patricia Clavin, *The Austrian Hunger Crisis and the genesis of international organization after the First World War*, International Affairs 90 *(2014),* 2, 265-278.

[48] Hoover to Wilson, 27 June 1919, HI, Supreme Economic Council and ARA Documents Project, Box 9, in Patricia Clavin, *The Austrian Hunger Crisis*, p.267

key player. Its members included John Pierpont 'Jack' Morgan Jr. and Paul Warburg, as well as Benjamin Strong, President of the Federal Reserve, and Pierre Jay, the director of its board. In Europe, League Council members Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands and Spain guaranteed bonds that would be marketed by major Austrian banks in New York and London. Of course, it is essential to note that although the guarantors of the loan were European states, the cash was predominately from US banks, and their profits were generous.

The financial crisis, the acute phase of which put Austrian society and the State on the brink of an unprecedented collapse in the modern history of the country, called in fact for several relief or 90ecisions90d9090n plans. In March 1921, Jean Monnet attached a "*importance capitale*" to the Austrian affair, promised to "*marquer un tournant des développements de la SdN*"[49].

At first, however, he was involved intermittently in the ups and downs of the successive plans of allied governments and financial groups in London and New York. Through the Financial Committee, Joseph Avenol, also Financial Attaché at the French Embassy in London, elaborated the conditions for the League's assistance, in particular during a first attempt, undertaken in March-June 1921. This was doomed to failure, in particular, because of the refusal of the creditor States to give up their rights to the country's income. The precedent of the failed Upper Silesia crisis management fueled the idea that a League suffering from the French preponderance was unable to assume the role it had been invested in 1919. The events of 1921 would be for Monnet the real genesis of Lloyd George's Grand Design: the Prime Minister intended to set up a new organization, particularly in charge of the economic and financial reconstruction of Europe.[50]

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[49] Letter, 28 mars 1921, Monnet File, piéce 11, Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva, also cited by Nicole Piétri, *Le rôle de Jean Monnet au Secrétariat de la SdN*, PhD Thesis, 1967, p. 61

[50] Monnet to Bourgeois, 24 January 1922, Fonds Bourgeois 40, Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve, Paris, cited also in Carole Fink, *Genoa, Rapallo, and European reconstruction in 1922,* New York,

Therefore, the apprehension caused by a possible Anglo-German rapprochement led Monnet to approach the Genoa conference in 1922, convened to find a compromise on the international loan, with a cautious attitude. Anxious to safeguard the relationship of trust between Paris and London, which remained a prerequisite for any institutional consolidation of the League, Monnet and Drummond took a back seat when it came to instructing the restricted delegation going to Genoa. Its mission would be to inform and observe, since the League is "*rien d'autre qu'un ensemble de règles adoptées par des gouvernements souverains pour préparer ou exécuter des décisions communes*"[51]. Monnet's job was also to ensure that the tasks entrusted to the Society did not yield unilaterally to the influence of London.

It, therefore, sought to contain, in agreement with Avenol, the British Treasury's ambition to exert a growing hold on the economies and treasuries of the small countries of Central Europe. With the sudden abundance of capital markets, the English demand for control of borrowing by Austrian private lenders, in his view, reflected a desire to remove French influence from the region, starting with Austria. "*A civilized country cannot be supervised by a capitalist controller*" he insisted with Sir Basil Blackett, Comptroller of Finance at the Treasury[52].

In Monnet's mind, the League had to find a way to counterweight the British use of the financial weapon. If the Bank of England supporting a British group facilitated a borrowing operation, "*il sera impossible de se passer du concours des prêteurs anglais : ils exigeront vraisemblablement [...] qu'on renonce au projet de contrôle international. [...] Il me serait très utile de connaître la façon dont le gouvernement français envisage ce problème et, si cela est possible, les méthodes*

Cambridge University Press,1991; Marta Petricioli (ed.), *Une occasion manquée ? 1922: la reconstruction de l'Europe*, Berne, Peter Lang, 1995.

[51] Monnet to Bourgeois, 7 April 1922, Fonds Bourgeois, 40, ADLC, Paris

[52] Conversation between Monnet and Sir Basil Blackett, memorandum 24 February 1922, Monnet File, piéce 103, ALON, Geneva

qui lui paraissent actuellement les meilleures pour aboutir à un règlement de la question autrichienne »[53].

However, the depreciation of the Austrian Crown and the refusal, in mid-August 1922, by the Allied Governments to grant Vienna new relief funds only called for one outcome, referring the question to Geneva. Poincaré and Lloyd George, negotiating in London, appealed to the Council of the League, "*because they had no other idea and they had to close*"[54]

In the procedure adopted by the Secretariat, the influences of personal intervention from Monnet proves challenging to determine fully: the analysis of the available sources does not lead to substantiating the authenticity of the reminiscences collected half a century later in the Mémoires. Did Monnet personally inspire, even behind the scenes, the two innovative dimensions of the Austrian Regulation, namely the conversion of competing actions to a joint one with a common guarantee, and the rallying of the City, the Treasury and Bank of England, behind the first international financial solidarity project[55]? It is, in fact, symptomatic that he did not take part in any of the thirty sessions where two corporate bodies assisted by the Secretariat negotiate the so-called Geneva Protocols, signed on October 4, 1922.

In terms of a collective political guarantee, the agreement was proving difficult to reach because of the impotence of the States facing, separately, a crisis of this magnitude. "*Neither country can afford to let the other get to Vienna alone…*" observed the British Minister in Vienna[56]. Then, on the eve of the Council meeting, Bourgeois and Balfour agreed, on a one-to-one basis, to set up a small Austrian Committee to bring together, even before the Austrian Government delegates

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[53] Monnet à Bourgeois, 13 June 1922, MAE, Fonds Bourgeois 38, ADLC, Paris

[54] Avenol to Salter, 18 August 1922, Monnet File, piéce 106, ALON, Geneva, also cited in Nicole Piétri, *La reconstruction financière de l'Autriche, 1921-26,* Genève, Centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1970.

[55] *La restauration financière de l'Autriche,* Genève, Publications de la SdN, 1926, p. 329

[56] Aker-Douglas to the *Foreign Office,* 17 August 1922, in Nicole Piétri, *La reconstruction financière de l'Autriche,* p. 267

arrival, experts and politicians from countries directly involved in the crisis. They would all be present at the Geneva-based Assembly on September 4th. Supported by Salter, Balfour insisted at the outset on the need for a joint Council declaration. The perseverance of Balfour, eager to assert the political role of the League despite the reservations it aroused in England, resulted in the establishment of a control structure with broad powers but directly dependent to the League's Council alone.

Much of the so-called technical work was carried out in parallel within the Financial Organisation, although Monnet was systematically absent, unlike his colleagues Drummond, Salter and Nixon. He was continuously informed and consulted by its members. Composed of bankers and financial experts, the Committee adopted significant provisions for the monetary, administrative and fiscal reforms of the Austrian State, which remained the prerequisites for the international loan.

The support of the British Treasury resulted from Blackett's change of attitude during the September negotiations. Salter mentions to this regard a pic-nic held by Monnet in the days before the Committee would eventually gather, but it would be difficult to assess if it had any role in bringing about the British representative[57]. We could say that several convergent variables allowed Balfour to play a decisive role via à vis Whitehall, despite reservations within the Treasury, in which there remained opposition to any form of control assumed by the League, at the expense of British banks.

The loan was not launched until June 1923, six months after Monnet's departure from the League. Having resigned, he nevertheless took a very active part in the mission of the Provisional Delegation which, on behalf of the Financial Committee, went to Vienna in December 1922 to prepare, in agreement with Chancellor Seipel, the implementation of the program. In this coordinating role, where he oversaw the budgetary and monetary aspects as well as the preparation

[57] Arthur Salter, *Memoirs of a public servant*, London, Faber&Faber, 1961, p.459

of the political and parliamentary terrain, without overlooking the financial side of the operation in London and New York, Monnet clearly anticipated the activities he would carry out from 1926 at the head of the Parisian branch of Blair & Cie[58].

During the last few years spent in Geneva, Monnet's thinking seemed to be more sympathetic to the problems being faced by French foreign relations. While he was favourable, until the eve of Genoa 1922, to the entry of Germany in the League[59], the terms of his analysis got stiffer in the wake of Rapallo. The issue was the rapprochement between Berlin and London at the Genoa Conference, which jeopardized the Franco-British agreement within the Council, which had hitherto been central to the League occasional success. Faced with the growing isolation of France, Monnet feared that the admission of Germany would occur despite the opposition of Paris. Its entry into the Council, he believed, "*ferait courir un très grand danger au bon fonctionnement de cet organisme ; elle risquerait de lui enlever la force qui, jusqu'à ce jour, a fait son autorité, c'est-à-dire l'unanimité des decisions intervenues »* Not believing in the ideal of Geneve, and anxious to weaken the authority of the League, the German government would have an "*intérêt à détruire le bon fonctionnement* » of the Council[60].

In contributing to give the League new technical powers, Monnet was thinking in particular about the countries of Central Europe. Their economic and political fragility, making it difficult to open up to neighboring countries, called for a regional coordinating effort that should be taken on by the League. At the end of his stay in Prague, he outlined an action plan for the countries of the Petite-Entente, and beyond: "*[…] 11 faut qu'un programme soit élaboré en dehors d'eux, avec leur collaboration et présenté sous le couvert d'une autorité plus grande. Cette autorité peut-*

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[58] Lubor Jìlek, *Les réglements d'autriche et de Haute-Silèsie,* p. 59

[59] Francis P. Walters, A *History of the League of Nations,* London, Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 166-67.

[60] Note by Jean Monnet for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 July 1922, SdN 50, ADLC, Paris

elle être la SdN ? Je ne sais. Mais je ne crois pas que l'Angleterre seule aboutisse et que la France ait seule le moyen de l'exécuter. Je me suis également convaincu du rôle considérable qu'est appelée à jouer Vienne — malgré sa détresse actuelle — dans l'ensemble de l'Europe centrale au point de vue économique et financier. C'est la seule ville qui ait réellement un organisme financier ou des banques ayant des traditions et un personnel capable d'être à la tête du réseau économique et financier du Centre Europe »[61].

The budgetary and monetary consolidation of Austria would, therefore, be supported by the financial markets of Paris, London and New York with a view of regional consolidation, and in the longer term, a progressive opening up of national economies to trade. However, the result was achieved only through meticulous backdoor negotiations carried out by people like Monnet, towards finding a compromise between British and French geopolitical ambitions in the newly fragmented Central Europe. The League of Nations did not become the privileged forum for these negotiations between powers, although provided like-minded people the means and power to influence their governments.

2.3 An assessment

On 18 December 1922 Monnet resigned from the League of Nations. Not a word is mentioned about this in the papers in Geneve, except for the letter he signed and delivered to the Secrétariat, citing *"des obligations de famille"*[62]. The exchange of correspondence with Léon Bourgeois does not enlighten us any further, except that the latter insisted on Monnet reversing his decision, because "*votre départ*, he writes, *semble de nature à compromettre le développement d'un organisme*

[61] Monnet to Bourgeois, 28 June 1922, Fonds Bourgeois 22, ADLC, Paris
[62] Letter, 18 December 1922, Jean Monnet File, piece 83, ALON, Geneva

auquel des tâches si importantes ont été confiées et qui est appelé àse voir demander d'autres efforts"[63]. Monnet insists on his *affaires de famille*. However, this argument does not in any way mean that Monnet had departed disenchanted from the League - as suggested by Roussel[64]. He, in his reply to Bourgeois on December 1922, stated that he "*est plus pénible de quitter le secrétariat en ce moment que la SdN, désormais fermement établie, va voir s'accroître les tâches qui lui sont confiées et que j'aurais été heureux de participerencore à l'effort commun*"[65]. In other words, the interpretation which tends to say that Monnet has left behind the world of the League because he would have felt that he could no longer see his ideas flourish is erroneous. It was precisely in 1922 that Monnet was full of initiative and helped to involve the Secretariat in the tackling of essential questions, like Austria and those arising from the resolution of the Genoa Conference of April 1922. Even though he lacked a role in the international intellectual debate on supranational institutions, he helped to entrust the League with essential tasks in the field of economic and financial cooperation

The man who, on December 1922, went on the road to Charentes left a small circle of civil servants animated like him by a firm collective conviction. A dual loyalty allowed each to weigh the particular interests of the States to the benefit of the League. He was different from the others in more ways than one. An outstanding organiser, a skilled and obstinate negotiator, but also an administrator eager to escape the routine of daily tasks, Jean Monnet is hardly seen here as an innovating part of the debate at the origin of the new institution. By playing on the ambivalence of its powers, it seemed to be trying to set up instead structures in which technocrats and politicians could dialogue to find solutions, inside or outside the League. The defence of the national interest, if the subject of negotiations within permanent supranational bodies served by experts open to the

[63] *ibid*
[64] Roussel, *Jean Monnet,* p.105
[65] Monnet to Bourgeois, December 1922, Monnet File, piece 83, ALON, Geneva

reasoning of each other, would not be an obstacle to forging stable links between the world's major regional powers. It was perhaps only here, in its concerns for the future of the world economy, shared by his close network, that a specific sort of hidden Wilsonism took place.

Faced with more modest stakes, Monnet advocated for the adoption of formulas already in the minds of economists and financiers who, like him, were aware of the inability of State administrations to cope with the challenges facing industrialised societies in a phase of transition to peace. The failure of 1920, while commensurate with the expectations raised in the run-up to the Brussels Conference, highlighted the need for permanent structures for financial negotiations, but in the end national interests had precedence. In the Austrian regulations of 1922, the politicians present at the September Assembly were much preoccupied to avoid disagreement between the French and the British, trying to ensure arbitration of interests between the two States. The Secretariat, for its part, was in a way a supplement to the absence of permanent bodies when, in close support of the expert bodies, it proposed to the parties, under the guise of a technicality if necessary, elements of transaction offered by a regional logic transcending immediate and long-term political interests.

In conclusion, despite some reservations on its role and scope, we cannot overlook the fact that the League had promoted Monnet's rise in international society, something that could also explain the young man's enthusiastic acceptance of the role. He was now a well-known actor within the Anglo-Saxon diplomatic, financial and corporate elite, and a close friend with Dwight Morrow, the leading spokesman of J.P. Morgan. Some of the knotted relationships he would exploit in the future were born in Paris and Geneva during those months, like the Dulles brothers, William Bullitt, a close party colleague of Franklin D. Roosevelt and later US ambassador to Paris, and John McCloy, a lawyer, future American High Commissioner in Germany after World War II, and the man who *saved* the European Coal and Steel Community from failure in the final stages of negotiations. Good networking instincts led Monnet to develop also a relationship with American

journalists as Walter Lippmann. All considered it could be said that Monnet took from the League more than he gave. His actual influence during the forty-two months spent within the Secrétariat is best attested by his correspondence with Léon Bourgeois, an indispensable partner whose role, three decades away, mirrors closely that of Robert Schuman. However, to identify Monnet's effective weight within the Secretariat with greater precision and depth continues to be a difficult task, for the partiality of the sources and the absence of further testimonies. Therefore, it remains an open question.

3. Transatlantic bankers and the *extracurricular* Frenchman

The 1920s and 1930s pose serious questions to every historian working on Jean Monnet. We do not know much about the sixteen years (1923-1939) during which Jean Monnet worked as an international banker, then an international investor. He was in business with the most important American financial circles of his time, before becoming one of the fathers of contemporary European unity after the Second World War. The moments of Monnet's professional life devoted to banking and international investment show a man embracing the way of life of a travelling banker, meeting on transatlantic liners members of the European, American and even Chinese high society, a *transatlantic* and *transpacific* man, equally comfortable in Paris, as in London, New York, Washington or Shanghai. In 1945, Monnet was known in the world of business and finance as a renowned international banker: "*Ce Français, qui connaît l'anglais comme sa langue maternelle, écrit une revue professionnelle suisse, qui a travaillé avec Blair and Co., une des plus grosses fi rmes bancaires américaines, qui a encore renfloué le trust suédois des allumettes, Kreuger and Toll, que la République chinoise appela un jour au chevet de sa monnaie malade, vient d'établir un plan que Léon Blum exposa aux Américains"*[1]. In 1944, Fortune journalist John Davenport published an article titled "*Jean Monnet from Cognac*", "*businessman, banker, extraordinary envoy during the two wars; he acted to ensure that France remained part of American friends*"[2]. It is therefore intriguing to turn our attention to Jean Monnet during the inter-war period, when he was not yet one of the fathers of a united Europe. Money and power were very much present in Monnet's life between the two wars, much more so than at the time of European construction. Monnet was an broker, connected with the financial circles of New York, Paris and London, seeking profitable deals for J. P. Morgan, Lazard,

[1] *Jean Monnet, profil*, La Fédération horlogère suisse, 27 June 1946, n° 26, p. 9, in Bossuat (ed), *Jean Monnet banquier*, Fayard, Paris, 2014, p. 87

[2] John Davenport, *M. Jean Monnet of Cognac*, Fortune, vol. XXX, n° 2, August 1944, p. 121-216.

Blair and Co., and founder of an investment bank, the Monnet, Murnane and Co. and no doubt this was the reason behind his growing number of contacts with national and international political circles. However, this period in Monnet's life is less well documented than the next. This chapter, therefore, opens up real prospects for understanding Jean Monnet as a banker and investor, trying to restore his role in its specificity.

What is the nature of Monnet's political-financial network? Is he the man of Wall Street? What are the motives behind the actions of Monnet, banker, investor, international official? Doing business? To rationalise the economic and financial organisation of the European States, to modernise and develop the economy of a large and still poor State, China? What can be seen from these years of maturity – 30 in 1918 and 50 in 1938?

These pages try to respond to these questions analysing the existing literature and adding perspective from new sources in the British National Archives at Kew, London.

3.1 Rescuing Monnet & Co

Although it would seem that during his time at the League his private affairs did not attract much of his attention, Jean Monnet remained watchful. Clifford Hackett, in his Biography/Chronology, gives a brief account of Monnet's relationship with his family firm[3]. He was asked by Jean Gabriel Monnet Company to approach E. R. Stettinius, a senior officer at J. P. Morgan in Paris, and to make a proposal on a possible takeover of Mumm, a seized German Champagne firm[4]. Stettinius was indeed very suspicious about this business deal, and the FED eventually advised J.P. Morgan against the sale.

[3] Clifford P. Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology, origins of the European Union in the life of a Founder, 1888 ta 1950,* Washington DC, Jean Monnet Council, 2008

[4] Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology,* p. 28.

Indeed, Mumm eventually remained in German hands. This was a difficult time for Cognac sales. Despite an exclusive contract for Monnet's liquor in Sweden, JGM was in deep waters because of Prohibition's effect on Monnet's prospected expansion in the American continent. The 40,000 pounds offered to Monnet by the Hudson Bay Company in appreciation of his war services, were given instead to JGM in the form of a loan without any interest or reimbursement. Nevertheless, during his time at the SDN, Monnet remained occupied by the significant issues managed to his office, like Austria's monetary recovery (the plan of September 1922). It does not appear that Monnet was involved in private banking business if we do not count the loan of 130 million dollars to Austria which he supervised as a commissioner of the League of Nations[5].

But the poor health of JGM may be part of those *obligations de famille* cited before that forced him to leave the League. His sister Marie-Louise had travelled to Geneva to ask him to go back home and take charge of JGM[6]. A change of management and a turn on the company's American expansion saved it from ruin. Another loan from the HBC repaid in full in 1930, and the Swedish market allowed a provisional recovery of JGM and the initial deficit turned into profit in 1925-1926[7].

However, Monnet did not remain in Cognac. He started a partnership with an investment bank, Blair and Co., headed by a renown New York broker, Elisha Walker, in 1926[8]. The bank was dealing with very high-level business ventures regarding currency stabilisation of newly created European states. Blair and Co was one of the leading American corporations investing in Europe, in a time when the US financial community was greatly expanding its investments on a global scale. Because the financial structure of the continent was threatened by the near-collapse of the Weimar Republic, its rampant inflation, and its default on its reparations instalment in 1923, US policymakers were willing,

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[5] Lubor Jilek, *Les règlements d'Autriche et de Haute-Silésie*, in G. Bossuat, A. Wilkens, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe.*, p. 49

[6] Letter to Monnet, AMD 1/1/2, FJME

[7] Cl. P. Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology*, p. 39-40 who cites Monnet's *Mémoires*

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 51, 29 mars 1922 ; François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, p. 44 ; É. Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, p. 106.

by the end of that year, to play a significant role in the financial rehabilitation of Germany and the stabilization of European currencies. Banker and politician Charles G. Dawes, a member of the Allied Reparations Commission in 1923, chaired the international committee of experts that was mandated by this commission to find a solution to the crisis. This committee devised the Dawes Plan in 1924, which provided US finance primarily through loans to revive the German economy, reduce somewhat the burden of its reparations, and stabilise the European currencies. The policymakers assumed that as Germany's economic growth resumed and European economies began to recuperate, they were laying the basis for US prosperity as well as the framework for stable and peaceful world order[9].

Therefore. In the mid-1920s, powerful New York investment bankers to extend their interests in Europe. They floated loans for industrial firms or governments that by themselves were unable to raise the credit needed for capital investment.

US investment in Europe fuelled this period of rapid growth. While most of the money came from open capital markets, the consortia formed for each of these loans had the prior backing of the four major central banks, those of the United Kingdom, France, United States, and Germany, headed by powerful governors[10].

Blair had asked Monnet to set up a joint European affiliate, of which he would be a vice-president with Chase Nationals, its foreign corporation. Since Blair and Co. had developed during the war business ties with Lazard of London, through Kindersley, Robert Brand and his son Thomas, Monnet came highly recommended.

His investment banking experience from 1926 to 1932 initiated him into the culture of the financial world and underscored the intense nationalism of the period, the political nature of the loans, and rivalries among the central banks. It also provided critical European contacts and expanded his

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[9] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the Worold Economy,* p 65-68
[10] *ibid*

network of influential Americans. René Pleven, later French prime minister in the early 1950s, served as Monnet's primary assistant in Blair and Co.'s financial dealings from 1925 to 1929 and worked periodically for him until 1940. Pleven later expressed how much he learned from his early experience of working with his friend from Cognac. "*Monnet was my guide during the early years of my life,"* wrote Pleven. "*He was one of the great men who marked our time, not only because of his extraordinary clairvoyance and the sureness of his judgment*" but because "*his indomitable spirit was never dampened by events. … He was above all a man of action*."[11]. In the 1920s, Monnet's fascination with the United States never abated. His friendship with prominent Americans in New York like Dulles and Morrow, who also worked on the European loans, deepened during the lengthy negotiations. The Frenchman met the young lawyer John McCloy, the "*American Monnet"* writes Roussel[12], who joined the New York law firm Cravath in 1924, through Donald Swatland, McCloy's Harvard Law School classmate and lawyer for Blair and Co. When he headed the Paris office for Cravath in 1930, McCloy had frequent contact with Monnet[13]. During these years, Walter Lippmann, a prominent US journalist of worldwide prominence who had befriended Monnet at the Versailles Conference, became in the 1920s one of few individuals Monnet considered "*his friend*"[14]. These two men corresponded regularly until Lippmann's death in 1963 and often met in Paris, New York, or Washington. Frequently dining in each other's homes[15], their wives also became good friends. Lippmann often sent the Frenchman his articles from the New York Herald, and Monnet occasionally responded with policy statements he had written in hopes of getting coverage in the US press[16].

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[11] René Pleven, *Temoignage de René Pleven*, in *Temoigrages à la memoire de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne, 1989, p. 391

[12] Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, p. 67

[13] McCloy Papers, Monnet Folder, ACL

[14] Monnet to Walter Lippmann, telegram, April 16, 1943, Lippmann Papers, YUA

[15] Monnet's Diary 1954-55, AMD, FJME

[16] Letters from Lippmann to Monnet, September 30, 1948, December 30, 1948, January 10, 1949, June 1, 1950, Lippmann Papers, YUA

Membership in Blair and Co. proved to be the excellent chance for Monnet to use and improve his interpersonal skills within the new XX century social *milieu* of businessmen, investment banks and journalists. Where did Monnet get this new interest for investment banking is not clear in the sources. He indeed increased his revenues compared to his time as head of his family firm, and he could use fruitfully his experience at the League of Nations and the inter-allied committees during the war, his only qualifications at the time, but since he does not explain his reasons, these can be only ex-post speculations.

3.2 The French, Polish and Romanian monetary stabilisation

As the first task in his new position, Monnet was consulted on the stabilisation of the French Franc, which had been severely weakened since the end of the war. Introduced by Rist[17], he was the unofficial link between Benjamin Strong, of the Federal Reserve, the American banking circles and Strong's counterpart at the Banque of France, Émile Moreau. He was in favour of intervention by the Bank of France to stabilise the franc and as he said to with Pierre Quesnay, secretary of the Bank's Committee of Experts[18]. The relationship between the two men, explored in depth by Renaud Boulanger, is crucial to this story and also represents a new kind of entanglement, a sort of mix between private and public interest, which is also applied on a transnational dimension. It resembled almost entirely the kind of relationship Monnet had created within the League and its economic and financial committees. Members of such groups could originate from member states, but they were not official representatives of their countries. In the official documents of the League, as in the case of the attempted stabilisation of the Franc, it was kept unclear if the experts who adviced on the

[17] Wells, *Jean Monnet*, p.56
[18] Renaud Boulanger, *Histoire d'une "zone grise", Jean Monnet et Pierre Quesnay (1920-1930)*, Paris, Fayard, 2004

different matters were to be bankers, businessmen, politicians or civil servants. The added value of Monnet, a man without any advanced education, was, therefore, a sort of *atlantisation* of the proposed solutions, no doubt vis à vis the conservatism of the Banque de France. Indeed, American banks could have helped France honouring the Washington agreements on war debts with the United States (April 1926). The Franco-American axis could have rebalanced the heavy influence of Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England, and that of Hjalmar Schacht, governor of the Reichsbank[19]. Elisha Walker and Monnet proposed to form a consortium of US banks to support the stabilisation of the franc, but eventually, Prime Minister Poincaré put abruptly an end on the attempt, that disappears from the sources.

Blair and Co. Bank looked at other countries in their attempt to capitalise on European need for currency stabilisation. Two operations seemed to be taking shape at the end of the 1920s: two loans were being negotiated for Poland and Romania, to which should be added Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Currency stabilisation plans for Poland were negotiated with a consortium of several American banks, and Blair and Co., Banker's Trust, Chase National and Kuhn Loeb. The Polish plan was to use the new resources for an internal economic reform program designed to counter inflation anti stimulate a period of stable economic growth. While the Bank of England had been weakened by World War I, its governor, Montagu Norman, still believed in the institution's power to be the financial guardian of Europe. While on good terms with Norman, Monnet regarded him as an imperialist with a superiority complex[20]. Emile Moreau, on the other end, fostered hopes to bolster France's relations with Eastern European countries as bulwarks against Germany[21]. Ludwik Rajchman, a cultivated Polish doctor who was the health director of the League of Nations, and future chairman of UNICEF, alerted his former French colleague to the Poles' fears that Norman intended to make political

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[19] Roussel, *Jean Monnet,* p. 116.

[20] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 47

[21] Emile Moreau, *Souvenirs d'un Gouverneur de la Banque de France. Histoire de la stabilisation du Franc (1926-1928),* Paris: Editions Genin. 1954.

demands on Poland. Rajchman hoped Monnet and Blair and Co. would help Poland resist British insistence that its existing borders with Germany be revised. During most of 1927, when negotiating with the Polish government in Warsaw, Monnet wrote, "*Je me suis trouvé au carrefour des influences rivales émanant de Londres, Paris, Berlin et Washington, puisque les grandes banques centrales ont toutes senti leur devoir de surveiller la parité à laquelle la monnaie polonaise était fixée*[22]. John Foster Dulles of Sullivan and Cromwell of New York, one of the largest law firms in the country, served as the principal US lawyer and legal adviser in these negotiations. With the help of his American friend, Monnet navigated through the web of rivalries and was able to establish himself at the centre of the negotiations mainly because Strong trusted him. He succeeded in persuading Moreau to become a counterweight to British intervention. In the battles over the loan to Poland, Strong settled the British-French dispute by taking the lead and forcing the two governors to follow. As Moreau noted in his diary, Monnet told him that US bankers had decided that the Bank of England would no longer be their sole channel for loans to European governments. However, Monnet also warned Moreau against sharing France's political aim in Eastern Europe with the Americans. In establishing a Franco-American alliance in these financial negotiations, "*it is not clear how much Monnet acted as an American banker or extracurricular Frenchman*"[23] Duchene concludes. Indeed, he was starting to understand that aligning with the Americans to overcome European opposition was compatible with his duty to France, something that came useful in subsequent decades.

On April 3, 1927, a meeting in Calais between Strong, Moreau, Norman and Schacht resulted in the acceptance of the American French plan. Monnet organised the work with Dulles's help. Received in August by Marshal Pilsudski, Monnet negotiated the rate, 7%, on a loan amounting to $72 million, of which $47 million coming from the American financial market. The agreement was signed on October 13, 1927. The sources indicate two other deals Monnet was negotiating at the same time. In

[22] Jean Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 67
[23] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 48

September 1926, Monnet managed to organise a meeting between Ivanoff, governor of the National Bank of Bulgaria, and Strong, for a discussion about a loan. The Great Depression in 1929 put a stop eventually to the attempt. In February 1927, Monnet facilitated an agreement between Blair and the governor of the Bank of Serbia, Novakovich, for a loan to stabilise the dinar.

As a result of the Polish loan, Monnet acquired a reputation for competence and trust. According to the Pole "*a superb banker, but also a great politician, an expert in European situation*"[24].

In January 1928, Monnet became the critical negotiator for Blair and Co. on a loan made to Romania to stabilise its currency and revive its economy. While the strategy resembled that of the Polish loan, it proved more difficult. The sum was $100 million, and US willingness to invest in foreign securities diminished after the stock market decline of 1928, precursor to the crash of October 1929. The plan foresaw a reform of the Central Bank and the modernisation of the railways[25]. Paribas would participate, buying Romanian debt bonds, but it could offer only 250 million francs, a small figure compared to the 25 million dollars expected from French banks (750 million francs). An agreement was reached on the sum of 500 million francs. This negotiation, like the Polish loan, is an excellent example of the complexity of these less known financial operations of the 1920s, but also the interlinking of private and public interests while showing the *atlantisation* of the banking market and the ease with which bankers would cross the oceans. The places where these loans were being negotiated were New York, London and Paris. When, during autumn 1928, Elisha Walker informed Monnet of the difficulty of issuing the Romanian loan on the New York stock market[26], Kindersley of Lazard proposed to facilitate the operation in London. Blair and Co. agreed to fund $10 million when Monnet finally sealed the deal after securing the support of the Kreuger Group. Businessman

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[24] Marta A Balinska, *For the Good of Humanity: Ludwik Rajchman, Medical Statesman* (Translated by Rebecca Howell). Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998, p.124

[25] Eric Bussiere, *Jean Monnet et la stabilisation monétaire roumain de 1929*, in Bossuat (ed.), *Jean Monnet*, pp. 63-76

[26] Letter to Monnet, AMD 2/4/5, FJME, cited in Bussiere, *Jean Monnet*, p. 64

Ivar Kreuger, the Swedish "match king" and an important client of J. G. Monnet and Co., promised the final $30 million needed to conclude the loan in February 1929. Monnet had Swatland from Cravath to work on the details of the Romanian loan. Meanwhile, Kreuger, one the most considerable financial intelligence of the twenties, proposed to hire Monnet in his corporation. Monnet refused because of his responsibilities at Blair and Co. A loan of 100 million dollars was finally granted to Romania, on 1" February 1929[27].

3.3 The time of Transamerica

Following the stabilisation of the Romanian currency in 1929, Monnet re-joined his colleague Elisha Walker in New York. The banker was looking for new financial opportunities on Wall Street, trying to take advantage of the rapid expansion of Us stock markets. They found a like-minded partner in Amadeo Pietro Giannini, president of Bank of America in San Francisco, the largest banking network East of New York, with holding companies in many European countries. Walker signed an agreement in March 1929 with Transamerica Corp., the partner company of Bank of America, to merge with Blair & Co, creating the Banamerica-Blair Corporation, with Walker as president and chairman of the executive committee and Monnet as vice-chairman. A staggering period of Monnet's life begun, engaged in the management of, at this time, the largest American banking holding company. Amedeo Giannini, whose banking adventure had begun in 1904 with the Bank of Italy and knew Blair and Co., admired Elisha Walker and the talents around him, like "*some of Walker's energetic young executives, like Monnet, a French industrial expert in charge of foreign operations*"[28]. Why was Monnet appointed Vice-president of Transamerica? Perhaps because he has the key to many

[27] Eric Bussiere, *Jean Monnet*, p. 70
[28] Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, p. 126.

European banking and political circles. "*Monnet est une sorte d'informateur gris de la Banque de France*"[29], which gave him the opportunity to strengthen his position with Blair and Co. by involving his European connections, such as Pierre Quesnay at the Bank of France, and then the first director of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), "*pour favoriser la mise en place d'une banque centrale moderne*"[30]. He thought that Transamerica, the "*Giannini blairisée*", was "*la conception d'avenir du financement des affaires américaines* [31]", "*la plus grande holding des États-Unis et du monde, ayant un portefeuille de plus d'un milliard de dollars*"[32]. Transamerica guaranteed the future of his investment banker career since its network "*permet le crédit à court terme par ses banques de dépôts (Bank of Italy, Bank of America), le crédit à long terme par les émissions (Bank America, Blair), les participations permanentes sous forme d'achats ou souscriptions de titres (Transamerica)[33]».* Shares of Transamerica rose from 2 to 25 dollars when the two men took control[34]. Monnet received $50,000 a month for his job and Walker, the president, $100,000.

However, it did not last. When the stock market crashed on October 24, 1929, Monnet and Walker precipitously lost the fortune they had made in only five months as a result of the merger. In January 1930 the two men discovered that the declared assets of Transamerica had been fraudulently overvalued[35]. The news expedited the tumble of the company's shares from $165 in September 1929 to $2 by the end of 1931. In early 1932, Walker and Monnet both supposed that the general situation called for the contraction and liquidation of Transamerica, which infuriated its founding partner, Amadeo Peter Giannini. Giannini counter-attacked in February 1932 in a proxy fight for control of the company and won. The board of directors was then reshuffled. Monnet was forced to resign as

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[29] Boulanger, *Histoire d'une "zone grise"*, p. 45
[30] *ibid*
[31] *ibid*
[32] *ibid*
[33] *ibid*
[34] Marquis James, Bessie R. James, *The Story of Bank of America, Biography of a Bank,* Beard Books, 1954, p. 297
[35] M. James, B. R. James, *The Story of Bank of America,* p. 310

vice-president on March 15, 1932. His salary, paid by Transamerica, virtually evaporated. In 1930 and 1931, he obtained an annual salary of US$ 44,861 and US$ 50,000 plus a bonus respectively. In 1932, he was paid only US$ 6,250 and received no bonus.

Having been a millionaire for a very brief period, Monnet lost the entire sum he had acquired in that venture. He later remarked, "*I may have been good at making money perhaps, but certainly not at keeping it.*"[36]

Monnet also lost the critical support of Ivar Kreuger, that had played a key role in securing the loan to Romania. At the peak of his career, Kreuger's fortune was estimated at a value equivalent to approximately today's $100 billion. However, after the stock market crash in October 1929, it became impossible for Kreuger to raise money to pay dividends, his empire collapsed, and he committed suicide in March 1932. An audit in the aftermath revealed that assets were unreasonably overvalued.[19]

After his suicide, the Kreuger's American creditors were represented by Cromwell and Sullivan which set up a board of liquidators with five members. Following John Foster Dulles's recommendation, that came as a helping hand to a friend in trouble, Jean Monnet was elected as one of them in September 1932[37]. The creditors' committee could only recover $2.5 million of Kreuger's $100 million debt. Monnet's interest in this liquidation was, Duchêne said, a stopgap[38].

! series of events including Kreuger's suicide, but especially the death of Senator Dwight Morrow, and the abduction and death of young Lindbergh, Morrow's grandson clouded, even more, Monnet's *annus horribilis*. On top of this, of course, was the failure of the Transamerica in February 1932. He was looking for a new job.

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[36] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p.51

[37] P. Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology,* p. 76, Duchêne, *Jean Monnet,* p. 49; E. Roussel, *Jean Monnet,* p. 132.

[38] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p.49

3.4 Jean Monnet in China, between business and geopolitics

At the end of 1932, Monnet was approached by H. H. Kung, former Minister of Industry and Trade, special envoy of the Chinese government to the United States and European countries, at the request of T.V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Tchang Kai-shek's brother in law, to organize the financing operation of China's development investments[39].

Soong's was planning to set up an international financing group made of American and European banks to finance China's modernisation and was cooperating with the League of Nations to that effect, through the newly established National Economic Council (NEC), created under the tutelage of Sir Arthur Salter[40]. Although, in 1931, taking into account the Sino-Japanese conflict, the League had to explicitly exclude financial and economic construction from its Chinese agenda, leaving to Soong and Ludwik Rajchman, the League special envoy to Beijing, enough room to organize international cooperation outside of, but along with, the League's goals in the Far East. The Pole had visited China in 1925 and again in 1929, and was convinced of the need for central coordination of foreign investments in the country, and had joined his Chinese counterpart in his quest to free China from the financial tutelage of the so-called China-Consortium, a cartel of US, British, French and Japanese banks chaired by representatives of the respective countries. It was Rajchman who recommended Monnet as financial advisor, when asked by Soong, at some point in 1932[41].

While Kung stayed in New York on November 1932, he received a telegram from Soong, asking him to "*approach Jean Monnet's bank if he could organize American European Bank groups to finance*

[39] Yuichiro Miyashita, *Jean Monnet et l'Extrême Orient (1933-1940)*, DEA Mémoire, IEP de Paris, 2005
[40] Arthur Salter, *Memoirs*, p. 219-222
[41] M.A. Balinksa *Une Vie pour l'Humanitaire: Ludwik Rajchman 1881-1965*, La Découverte, Paris, 1995, pp.156-157;.

development in China. Monnet knows of my plans through a Geneva friend"[42]. This 'Geneva friend' was undoubtedly Rajchman.

The League in China had dilemmas that Monnet came to know soon himself. "*To plan without consulting the Japanese might precipitate a conflict between the League and Japan, while on the other hand, to consult Japan beforehand might [give] appearance of recognising that she occupies a predominant position in Chinese affairs*"[43].

After begin contacted in November-December 1932, Monnet did not give an answer for a while. For the moment he only agreed to work to mediate for a loan. In March 1933, he began contacting the State Department, the White House and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Farm Board to lobby for loans to China. This lobbying included even an intended visit (that did not happen) to President Franklin D. Roosevelt[44]. Via Rajchman, Monnet and Soong had an intensive exchange of telegrams in April 1933, to organise their collective work in lobbying the Americans[45].

Soong arrived in Seattle on May 2 and finally met Monnet in Chicago the week later[46]. The minister had scheduled exploratory meetings with Wall Street officials and bankers, and members of the State Department. According to Su, Soong's real mission aimed to "*obtain the cooperation from the three Western powers [France, Britain and the US] to begin participating in the Chinese reconstruction and to realise if the Western powers could jointly impose sanctions upon Japan"*[47].

The minister and Monnet continued their discussion in June when they sailed on the same steam liner to Britain. They had an appointment on the 14th at Lazard Banks with Robert Brand, Kindersley and

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[42] Yuichiro Miyashita, *Jean Monnet et l'Extrême Orient (1933-1940),* p. 23
[43] Cadegan to Foreign Office, 08.05.1934, FO 371/18097, NA
[44] C. Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology,* pp.61-62
[45] AMD 1/1/4, FJME
[46] *ibid*
[47] Hungdah Su, *The Father of Europe in China: Jean Monnet and the creation of the CDFC (1933-1936),* Journal of European Integration History, vol. 13, n° 1, 2007, p. 14

the British financier Charles Addis. Soong's purpose in London was to make Lazard the sole purchasing agent in England for Nationalist China, a deal that was probably eased by Monnet's relationship with the bank. At this time, therefore, the Chinese Minister and the Frenchman shared a meaningful financial connection. It is at this point that the London-based bank issues a substantial loan to Monnet[48], and the assumption can be made that in exchange for this financial support, the bank expected him to generate business in China and channel some of it to them.

On July 13, Soong received a 'total mandate' from Chiang Kai-shek "*to sign a loan contract with the US government in order to purchase wheat and cotton in the US"*[49]. On July 19, Soong and the American Reconstruction Finance Corporation signed the wheat and cotton loan contract for a sum of US$ 50 million, guaranteed by the US government. Monnet kept the French embassy in D.C. informed of all the developments[50]. This loan was a doubtless victory for the Kuomintang diplomacy, since the Consortium's golden rule, guaranteed by Japan continuous intervention, was to condition any new loan to China upon its full payment of all the old debts. Moreover, at Soong's request, Roosevelt and Soong issued a joint statement on July 17. Both worried about "*the serious developments in the Far East which have disturbed the peace of the world during the past two years*"[51]. The Consortium that had put China under tutelage for many years had failed in enforcing its rules. This left space for a new entity, for which the Chinese wanted Monnet and his influential connections' contribution.

Soong's offer included a remuneration of USD 150,000 per year[52], as well as funds for Monnet's offices in China, Paris, London and New York related to the reconstruction plan and for cable and

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[48] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p.47
[49] Su, *The Father of Europe in China*, p. 15
[50] Embassy at Washington to ministry, 06.06.1933. Série Asie 1918-1940, Sous-série Chine Finance, Vol.845, ADLC, Paris
[51] Memorandum, 21.03.1934, China 1930-1939, Reel 7, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files
[52], AMD 1/1/6,10,14, FJME

travel costs[53]. The same day *"Monnet wrote to Kreuger & Toll liquidators that he was resigning as a member of their committee"*[54].

Monnet did not share Rajchman's passion for China. He consistently denied that his activities in China were an integral part of Chinese preparations for resistance against Japan's attacks. Second, he sympathised to a certain extent with Japanese expansion in China during the interwar period. He believed that Japan's aggression resulted from its deeply rooted fear of its continental giant neighbour, even after its conquest in Manchuria[55]. "*His aim is*", said a British diplomat in China, *obviously to steer it as clear as possible away from the political rocks and place it on sound economic foundations, but that is no easy matter at the present moment*"[56].

Monnet presented his first ideas to Soong, which aimed "*to investigate the question of raising fresh money for large-scale undertakings in China*"[57]. He advised the Chinese minister to establish an international corporation "*in which the Chinese Government would participate together with leading American and European groups including industries and Banks*". This corporation "*should be entrusted with the centralization of all Chinese Government purchases abroad also with negotiation arrangements for imports into China of such raw materials as flour, cotton, etc*."[58].

Soong, on behalf of the Chinese government, and Monnet had already drafted "*two memos in May 1933 that detailed their project to establish the above mentioned international corporation*"[59]. However, they were unable to exclude the Japanese from this project, and because of the

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[53], AMD 1/1/6,10,14, FJME

[54] C. Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronology,* p.63.

[55] Y. Miyashita, *Jean Monnet et l'Extrême Orient (1933-1940),* DEA Mémoire, IEP de Paris, 2005, pp.145-146.

[56]Beale to Foreign Office, 11.06.1934. FO 371/18078, NA

[57]Ingram to Foreign Office, 01.03.1934, FO 371/18097, NA

[58]AMD 1/1/5, FJME

[59] Su, *The Father of Europe in China,* p.17

Consortium's own rules, it was rejected both by the British and by J. P. Morgan[60], crippling Monnet's plan for lack of financial backing.

Monnet therefore revised the plan by adding more roles to the consultative committee in July 1933. First, the committee's headquarters were moved from Shanghai to London. This would strengthen the committee, however it would weaken its consultative role with the Chinese government. Second, Monnet would assume the direction of this committee[61]. Third, the committee would be a non-governmental organisation composed of prominent financiers and industrials, excluding all governmental participation from any country, including China[62]. In order to satisfy the Japanese, Monnet insisted that Japan participate in the committee, but Soong held that it was politically impossible for him to invite the Japanese. It was finally agreed between him and Monnet that they might "*form an original group with the idea of subsequently inviting Japan to join when political relations between China and Japan had improved*"[63].

On August 9, Soong issued a communiqué:

"*I have been considering possibility of forming international group of high standing and wide experience to advise Chinese Government as to how Chinese and foreign capital can cooperate to best advantage in reconstruction China. Chinese people recognize its magnitude and realize fully that reconstruction can be carried out only with cooperation of world. Everything being done to establish community of interest between ourselves and all foreign interests which wish cooperated in the work*"[64]. "*La dernière phrase de ce communiqué*", said Monnet to Henri Cosme of the Quai

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[60] *ibid*

[61] *Ibid*

[62] Corbin to Paul-Boncour, 28.07.1933, Série Asie 1918-1940, Sous-Série Chine Finances Vol.848, ADLC; Idid., Vol.845, "Lettre de Soong au Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le 20 juillet 1933", Soong to ministry, 20.07.1933.

[63]Drummond to Francis, 27.04.1934 FO 371/18078, NA

[64] New York to Paris, 08.08.1933Série Asie 1918-1940, Sous-Série Chine Finances, Vol.848, ADLC, cited Hungdah Su, *The Father of Europe in China*, p.16

d'Orsay, "*a été considérée comme incitant les financiers japonais à coopérer à la reconstruction de la Chine".* It was formulated under Monnet's insistence[65]. However, other banks and their financiers still hesitated to sign on to Monnet's plan. The French minister of Finances, advised the Quai d'Orsay to adopt a prudent attitude to Monnet's proposal. According to the French Legation in China, Monnet's "*projet était en contradiction avec les principes établis et les règles du Consortium*", and it was "*difficile de croire que les puissances européennes adopteront une politique de reconstruction chinoise avec laquelle le Japon ne sera pas associé*"[66]. The London Office of the China Consortium gave the same advice to its participating banks. "*Our obligations to our Japanese associates are considered to be a bar to our participation in the proposed new international organisation for operation in China from which the Japanese are excluded*"[67]. Failure in convincing the Japanese to agree even to this revised project proved its undoing. Under these circumstances, "*none of the leading European financers approached by Monnet between July and August 1933 agreed to participate in the proposed consultative committee"*[68]. Sir Charles Addis, now governor of the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, declined Monnet's invitation on July 27, 1933[69]. Thomas W. Lamont, by then the president of J.P. Morgan, who had once hesitated in supporting Monnet's projects, decided not to participate no later than August 28[70].

3.5 The China Development Finance Corporation (CDFC)

After this failed attempt, accompanied by David Drummond, son of Eric Drummond, Monnet and Sir Arthur Salter arrived in Shanghai on November 21, 1933, who was immediately received by Soong

[65] *ibid*
[66] *ibid*
[67] FO 371/18078, NA,
[68] Su, *The Father of Europe in China,* p.20
[69]Addis to Kindersley, 27.07.1933. FO, 371/18078, NA
[70] Y. Miyashita, *Jean Monnet e l'Asie,* pp.57-58.

in his private residence[71]. Salter had been asked by the League to draft a report on the Chinese economy[72]. A few weeks before, the Kuomingtang had been reshuffled; Soong had resigned and was nominated junior minister, with instructions to concentrate on economic reconstruction. He arranged to house Monnet and his colleagues in the city's French enclave. The area, with its restaurants and cafes, reminded the Frenchman of "*l'atmosphère d'une ville provincial française"*[73].

Monnet's own experience in international finance, combined with advice from his Chinese contacts, made it clear to him early that it would be impossible to invest foreign assets in the reconstruction of China without involving Chinese capital. In a conversation with a member of the British legation on February 27, 1934, he proposed the idea of organising a purely Chinese financing corporation, with which any international financial group could cooperate, came into existence. Monnet was reported to be convinced that "*it was necessary to form here some kind of financial corporation to be organised by a combination of the principal banks themselves. This was to be a body to deal with finance as opposed to banking --- a body with which financial interests in London, Paris, New York, Tokyo etc. could deal when it came to any question of large scale of operation in China*"[74].

In brief, Monnet's new idea was based upon two principles "*which might be termed Chinese self help and freedom for any foreign interests to collaborate in the economic reconstruction*"[75]. He intended to create a financial house in China such as Morgans or Kuhn Loeb's in America, or Lazard and Schroeder in London[76].

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[71] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 52.
[72] Salter, *Memoirs*, p. 223
[73] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 145
[74] Ingram to Foreign Office, 06.04.1934, FO 371/18078, NA
[75] *ibid*
[76] Dodd to Cadogam, 08.05.1934, FO, 371/18078, NA

On March 6, Monnet presented this idea to the British commercial counsellor in Shanghai, Sir Louis Beale[77]. He told the British diplomat that four banks in Shanghai[78] and Mr. Ming Li, the largest Chinese financier,[65] had agreed to support his project. Within one or two weeks, Monnet believed, the Chinese banks and financiers "*will come into the fold*"[79]. Even though Monnet was also alerted about rising Japanese pressure that threatened to bring his plan to a premature end, he made up his mind to "*be retained in China sufficiently long to finish the proposition of his plans regarding the Finances Corporation and Railway Reform*"[80].

To dispel Japanese hostility, on March 10, Monnet and Drummond invited Yakichiro Suma, the Japanese general consul in the city, to dinner, at which Monnet tried to explain his plan[81].

Suma refused Monnet's ideas categorically and concluded that Monnet's plan to modernize China with the help of international financing would lead to colonization of China[82.] This put an end to any possible entente between Monnet and Suma as the latter was convinced from the very beginning that Monnet's plan was but a part of the international plot to exclude Japan from China[83].

Japan remained a severe obstacle to Monnet's plan because its officials were hostile to any foreign penetration of China that rivalled their own. Although he arrived in Shanghai as a private individual, Monnet's association with Rajchman, who was known to be hostile to Japan, made it hard for the Japanese to believe Monnet operated independently of the Polish doctor. They mistrusted Monnet's repeated assurances to Suma that he was not working as a League representative nor was he anti-Japanese. Suspicions of Monnet and his efforts to stimulate Chinese development also came from his

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[77] Su, *The Father of Europe in China*, p. 23

[78] The 'Big Four' governmental banks of the period were the Central Bank of China, the Bank of Chi- na, the Bank of Communications, and the Farmers Bank of China. *Cfr.* Yishiguro Miyashita, *Jean Monnet e l'Asie,* p. 66

[79]AMD 6/1/2, FJME

[80] Minister on tour to Foreign Office, 10.03.1934. FO 371/18078, NA

[81]AMD 6/1/5, FJME

[82]Drummond to Foreign Office, 21.05.1934. FO 371/18098, NA

[83] Dodd to Foreign minister, 12.06.1934. FO 371/18078, NA

close association with Soong, whom the Japanese intensely disliked because he wanted to exclude the Japanese from certain investments in China[84].

Fully aware of the problem, Monnet careful to keep Suma informed at every stage. However, Suma and the Japanese government remained of the same opinion and insisted on having a say on matters such as how the Chinese should manage their debt. They continuously demanded that the other powers recognise their imperialistic claim in China, that the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek sign a preferential trade agreement with them, and that in any loan agreement they have the lion's share of the business[85]. On April 17, 1934, the head of Japan's Foreign Ministry's Information Section issued a declaration that "*we oppose . . . any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance*"[86] The Japanese not only worried about Monnet's and Soong's activities but also feared that the United States wished for a prominent role in China and believed that behind Monnet laid US financial power[87].

The statement, as mentioned above, "*startled the world as Japan explicitly condemned all cooperation between China and other powers and the League. Afraid of infuriating the Japanese, Western powers decided to react individually and discreetly, though they had consulted each other"*[88].

Although, from the very beginning, Monnet had kept Rajchman well informed of all his activities in China, the Pole omitted the paragraphs relating to Monnet's efforts in China from the published

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[84] FRUS, 1934, VOL. 3, pp. 403-405

[85] *ibid*

[86] Secretary of State for Dominion affairs to the secretary of State for External affairs Canada, the Prime minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, etc., 21.04.1934. FO 371/18097, NA

[87] Lindsay to Foreign Office, 24.04.1934 FO 371/18097, NA; Foreign Office to Lindley, 23.04.1934, FO 371/18097, NA; Aide-Memoir from the U.S., 04.05.1934, FO 371/18097, NA; Simon to Foreign Office, 04.05.1934 FO 371/ 18097, NA;

[88] Su, *The Father of Europe in China,* p. 24

version of the report as presented at Geneva on May 9, 1934, lest the League be regarded as engaged in Monnet's financial activities in China and upset the Japanese[89].

After his failure in bringing about the Japanese, his plan was viewed with suspicion also by officials representing the French and British governments in Nanking and Shanghai. French diplomat and Asia expert Henri Hoppenot, who distrusted Rajchman, feared China could not make the reforms necessary for Monnet's scheme to work[90]. With the approval of the secretary-general of the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, Philippe Berthelot, Hoppenot ordered Philip Baudet, the French consul in Nanking, to talk to Monnet in Shanghai and report on his activities. Baudet informed his government that the Frenchman's plans were adventurous, illusory, fragile, and had little chance of being implemented[91]. Baudet warned that, while private Chinese banks underwrote Monnet's project with much disposable capital, the sums were insufficient and would, therefore, prevent foreign investors from obtaining the necessary guarantees on their investment. The consul also expressed his doubts about the willingness of the Chinese to pay their outstanding debts and whether Japanese resistance could be overcome, if the Japanese allowed Monnet's proposed bank to he created, Baudet argued, there was the possibility that there would be pressure by the Chinese financiers not to repay and thus cause their guarantees to foreigners to evaporate[92].

Even Drummond's dispatches defending and explaining his colleague's scheme to the British Foreign Office were met with suspicion. Foreign Office official Alexander Cadogan wrote that he believed "*the reports that Monnet's plan existed only on paper and that its author, while being a capable financier, had no sense of political realities"*[93]. Other British officials held the view that the

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[89] Baliska, *Luwig Rajchman*, p.124
[90] Hoppenote to ministry, 18.05.1934, Série SDN, Sous-série Chine Finances, Vol.2034, ADLC
[91] Note, 15.06.1934Série SDN, Sous-série Chine, Vol.2034, ADLC
[92] *ibid*
[93]Cadogan to Foreign Office, 18.06.1934, FO 371/18097, NA

Frenchman was elusive, bothersome, and adventurous. They also complained about the unwillingness of Monnet's financial sponsor, Soong, to disclose his dependence on British financial institutions.

However, defying his competitors and sceptics, Monnet kept his word. With a capital of $10 million, the C.D.F.C., China Development Finance Corporation, was created "*to assist and to cooperate with the Government organs, foreign and Chinese banks and other organizations in supporting various public and private enterprises, developing agricultural, industrial and commercial interests, handling loans for the benefit of the above, and executing such business as handled by trust concerns*"[94].

Monnet and T.L. Soong, on behalf of the C.D.F.C., signed a contract on July 3, 1934. Monnet was appointed by the latter as the 'exclusive representative' of the C.D.F.C. in Europe and the United States, where his mission was to establish and maintain relationships with main financial markets there for the corporation[95]. All deals with the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Italy would be reviewed and endorsed by the C.D.F.C. case by case. The contract came into force on July 1, 1934, for three years and was renewable. In order for Monnet to be able to execute his work, he was authorised to appoint representatives in Europe and the US for the C.D.F.C. In return, Monnet was to be paid an annual salary of C$ 50,000 plus "*a proper and fair share"* of profits of the business. Monnet would also have rights to 7.5% of the C.D.F.C.'s profits or the right to profits from syndicating businesses, which "*are alternative and not to be effective concurrently*"[96].

3.6 Monnet, Murnane & Co.

[94] Article 11 of the Statute of the C.D.F.C. AMD 2/1/1, FJME
[95] Hungdah Su, *Jean Monnet e la Chine,* p. 22
[96]AMD 6/1/1, FJME

Nonetheless, in 1934-35, Monnet was in need to restore his credibility and trust within Western financial circles. Documents at the National Archives show Foreign Office officials' contempt and even mockery about his attempt to create a centralised coordinating effort in China without the Japanese controlling it. Seizing this opportunity to forward his financial ambitions, after leaving China on July 1934, Monnet began reactivating his badly damaged network in the US and Europe to try and exploit any possibilities in financing Chinese investments via the C.D.F.C. On February 18, 1935, Monnet and announced the formation of a partnership to be known as Monnet, Murnane & Co. under Canadian law. George Murnane was a partner in Boston's investment bank of Lee, Higginson and Co, and an old friend of John Foster Dulles. He had already met Monnet during World War I since he was deputy commissioner for the US Red Cross in France in 1917. Murnane had been a casualty of the Kreuger empire's collapse because his bank had invested heavily in the Swede's ventures.

Having joined the Transamerica board, he, like Monnet, had lost his investment and was removed from the board. In addition to the two partners, the new consulting firm consisted of David Drummond in London, Pierre Denis in Paris, and Henri Mazot in Shanghai, also victims of the Chinese shipwreck. "*This network affords me*", Monnet wrote to Robert Brand of Lazard in London, "*a basis which will enable me to carry on my work in an organised way*"[97]. After all, the firm of Monnet, Murnane, and Co. could not have been created without the financial help of the Dulles brothers, John and Allen, to the future head of the CIA. The highly respected New York lawyer was always concerned about the well-being of his French friend, whom he considered one of the most brilliant men he knew. Dulles had persuaded his senior partner, William N. Cromwell, a name partner at Sullivan and Cromwell, to join him in investing in the small corporation. Dulles argued it "*should produce a large amount of*

[97]ADS 4/1/1, FJME

legal business for us" and personally invested $25,000 while asking his firm to invest $50,000. Dulles, who had confidence in the business talents of Murnane and Monnet, wrote Cromwell that he had "*taken the initiative to bring the two men together because he felt they would make an ideal combination and that they would be exceedingly successful*"[98]. Although Cromwell had doubts about the venture, he wrote Dulles that he would join him. However, he added, "*My motive is solely to help the firm and yourself*." He added that his consent rested upon Dulles's reassurance that this corporation "*will not constitute a partnership with us*." Cromwell explained that he was concerned that "*both Monnet and Murnane had reached middle age and neither has been able to accumulate but meagre personal assets.*" Moreover, he argued that "*their death, retirement or incapacity would inevitably result in loss of all our investment unless you somehow protect us by life insurance."*[99] Dulles and Cromwell finally agreed to invest $100,000 each donating $50,000------in Monnet, Murnane, and Co., which was incorporated in Prince Edward Island, Canada.

Monnet did not forget the commitments signed with Soong and the CDFC. They were honoured in the years 1935-36. In December 1936, a contract was signed between the CDFC and the Franco-Chinese Bank for Commerce and Industry, to collaborate in investment projects in China. The Banque de Paris would lead this group, and in addition, the Lazard Bank and the Indochina Bank would participate[100]. Monnet also established a partnership between the CDFC and the Belgian Railway Company in China in 1937. Loans were issued to finance various railway lines. Monnet and Murnane are specifically assisted the CFDC with the Chengdu-Chungking line and the 600-km East-West Lunghay line from the coast to Xian. For strategic reasons, Chiang Kai-shek and T. V Soong were determined to establish the best possible communications between China and Burma and French Indochina. To facilitate financial transactions in China, probably also for tax reasons, in July 1937

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[98] Dulles in Paris to Cromwell, cable, January 30, 1935, Murnane Files, John Foster Dulles papers, PUL
[99] Cromwell to Dulles, cable, February 2, 1935, Murnane Files, John Foster Dulles papers, PUL
[100] Draft Agreement (37.04.22), note handwritten by Monnet : *Final signed text*. AMD 2/2/14, FJME, Cited in Miyashita, *Jean Monnet et l'Asie,* p.256

Monnet set up a new company, which kept the name Monnet and Murnane but was autonomous from the former, Monnet, Murnane Limited, registered in Hong Kong with a capital of $ 10,000. Jean Monnet was its president until February 1940[101].

However, by the end of 1935 and early 1936, Monnet's interest in the CDFC started to decline. Its ventures had not proved to be very profitable, and Soong had reneged on some promised payments to him. Consequently, Monnet decided to leave China for good in January of 1936 and brought his family back to New York. He rented a comfortable apartment overlooking Central Park, from which he could run the company's New York offices although business in Europe kept him mostly in Paris. Murnane was vice-president of another holding company, United Continental Corporation, established to administer the holdings of foreign investors in Germany. Its first president was again John Foster Dulles. At Dulles's initiative, Murnane and Drummond negotiated the sale of most of the industrial fortune, mainly coal mines, of the Petschek family to prominent German interests. The sale was completed in 1938 in order to rescue part of this Czechoslovakian Jewish family's assets to prevent its confiscation by the Germans after the family fled to the United States. The Petschek family obtained $6.25 million, only a fourth of their worth. The firm earned $250,000 from the sale, the largest commission they ever received. The Murnane firm also undertook, in the event of war, to protect the assets of American Bosch, a subsidiary of the German electrical engineering firm run by Robert Bosch. Duchene states that Monnet was not involved in these arrangements, as Murnane sensed that "*indirect contact*" with Bosch headquarters "*might have been distasteful*" to his French partner[102]. It is quite certain, as it will be proven in following chapters, that this deal led many in the US to suspect Monnet during the Second World War, especially Henri Morgenthau, Roosevelt's

[101] Hackett, *A Jean Monnet chronniogy*, p. 132
[102] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 67

Secretary of War, that would start an investigation in 1941 to ascertain the specifics of the "*devious bankers"* relationship with the Germans.

Once back in New York in early 1936, Monnet did not abandon his Chinese interests entirely, the firm's work with the CDFC in China continued for several more years through a local agent. However, due to the civil war, which made the political and economic situation precarious in China in the late 1930s, the transactions did not generate the income that the two partners and their investors anticipated. Neither the Chinese nor European endeavours proved very successful. Moreover, relations between Monnet and T. L. Soong, the manager of CDFC who had earlier replaced his brother T. V. Soong as finance minister, had reached a crisis. The new manager claimed he had no obligation to Monnet.

Moreover, the two Soong brothers quarrelled over Monnet's repeated requests in 1939 for compensation for Murnane's work with CDFC and ignored his pleas. Discouraged by the lack of continued financial success in China, Monnet spent more time in Paris than New York during his four years with the firm. As a result, he turned his focus to Europe and ended his active role in the partnership with Murnane late in 1939. His transition to public life at the service of his government in September 1939 changed his relationship with his partner in M., M. and Co. (New York), that would end officially in 1949.

3.7 Conclusion

During these sixteen years, Monnet had become an international banker with a keen interest in monetary and infrastructural affairs. This is reflected by the event that involved him during the sixteen years he spent outside public service. In these pages, there is no plan for a united Europe, and there is nothing in the archives suggesting that he took part in any debate about the Brian Plan of 1929.

However, his extreme sensitivity for international issues kept him on the centre stage of global finance, although a certain naiveté accompanied his actions regarding the realities of geopolitics. Indeed, at this time, his experience proves how private interests were strongly intertwined with public interests. Monnet was indeed entirely at ease in this "grey area" between national interests and supranational projects, between unofficial approaches and official diplomacy, linked to the reconstruction of the economies devastated by the First World War, as well as to the question of the significant reparations that the defeated must pay to the victors.

Another fascinating characteristic of Monnet was his ability to bounce back after the failure of the Transamerica and his determination to succeed in what had been started despite the obstacles. In Monnet's view, this determination is justified by the value of the objective pursued: the economic reconstruction of China using all the means of inventive business capitalism. The mind goes immediately to the implementation of another modernisation plan, that of France, starting in 1946. This chapter proves that Monnet was an international banker on a mission, who earned a great deal of money, without being able to hold him back from public service afterwards. The personality of Monnet which appears here complements that of the father of Europe, and it still intrigues. The transition from private to the public began in 1938 and finally "making Europe United" slowly replaced the goal of "doing business". His 16-year-old fascination with the City system, "a gigantic galaxy", with intricate wheels, gave him a taste for organising the world, something that would translate into his European plans. The sources although do not respond to the *enigma of Monnet,* as Roussel calls it[103]. Why did Monnet not continue his life as a private banker? The *official* answer is in the French government's call for the purchase of American aircraft. However, why did Monnet take the risk of continuing this adventure of public service during the war? Did his position of influencing political decision-makers offer it a more satisfactory horizon than that of an international

[103] Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, p. 34

banker? Was the exercise of influence the fundamental reason behind his destiny as the father of Europe?

4. Monnet, the Americans and the Atlantic triangle

October 1939. Forty-five days have passed since the French and British declaration of war against Germany. A worried French prime minister, Eduard Daladier, sends a letter to his counterpart in Downing Street, Neville Chamberlain. "*Mon cher Premier Ministre, Nous nous sommes entretenus* à *Brighton de la question si importante de la coordination de l'effort économique de guerre de nous deux pays, et nous avons convenu que toutes les dispositions utiles devaient être prises non seulement pour établir cette coordination mais aussi pour aboutir dans la plus grande mesure possible à une action commun. Monsieur Jean Monnet m'a rendu compte des conversations qu'il a eues au cours des dernières semaines avec les différents ministères britanniques et sur la base de ces échanges de vues, je vous propose que nos deux Gouvernements se mettent d'accord pour adopter immédiatement les propositions suivantes*"[1]. It follows an outline of the *mecanisms pour coordonner l'effort de guerre Franco-Britannique en metière économique"*.

It is a document of several pages, the original of which is archived within the papers of the Prime Minister's Office. This letter can also be found at the archived of the *Fondation Jean Monnet Pour L'Europe* in Lausanne and not by chance. On 17 October, Daladier had received an urgent report from Jean Monnet, reviewed by his collaborators Hervé Alphand and Emmanuel Monick, the French financial attaché in London, now filed as *Projets pour la letter de Daladier à Chamberlain*[2].

The memo already outlined what Daladier then urged the British Prime Minister to approve, the establishment of permanent executive committees overseeing various areas of coordinated economic effort: supplies, armaments and raw materials, oil, aeroplanes production and purchases, maritime transport. Chamberlain's reply on October 22 was favourable. He was glad "*to hear that Mr Monnet*

[1] Letter by Eduard Daladier to Arthur Neville Chamberlain, 18 October 1939, AME 2/3/1 FJME
[2]AME 2/2/23-24. FJME

was so satisfied with the discussion which he had with the Departments in London"[3]. On November 29, Daladier wrote to Jean Monnet asking him to accept the post Chairman of the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee. The tone was very cordial. Thus, the AFCOC was to be set up, which, under the chairmanship of Jean Monnet, was to give a real impetus to economic cooperation between Paris and London, although with varying results. Among the most urgent issues, the inter-allied aircraft purchasing missions in the United States was the main priority. The United States ambassador in London had made clear the absolute need for close Franco-British coordination. It was necessary during a time when the administration of Roosevelt was trying to obtain from Congress a modification of the neutrality law of May 1937[4]. Monnet, as he did during World War I, was again inspirator and *chairman* of a Franco-British coordinating logistics unit. During the next eight months, the Committee managed supplies for both countries maybe to far greater effect than the British had bargained for, taking away from both government sovereignties over a crucial aspect of the war effort. The AFCOC lost, of course, any reason to exist with the fall of France on 22 June 1940, after Marshal Petain signed the armistice. Monnet sent his letter of resignation to the new British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill: "*In view of the recent events in France it is obvious that it is no longer possible for the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee and the Allied Organization, both here and in the USA, to remain in existence and I have therefore no alternative but to place my resignation in your hands […]. I place my services at the disposal of the British Government in such capacity as they can be most useful"*[5].

Churchill replied with an invitation to "*proceed to the United States of America and there continue, in association with the head of the British Purchasing Commission, those service in connection with supplies from North America*"[6]. Monnet was on the move once again, to a yet another job he had had

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[3] Letter by Arthur Neville Chamberlain to Eduard Daladier, 22 ottobre 1939, AME 2/3/2, FJME
[4] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1939, vol. II, pp. 1519-24
[5] Letter by Monnet to Winston Churchill, 2 July 1940. HAEU, JMDS-42
[6] Letter by Winston Churchill to Monnet, 16 July 1940. HAEU, JMDS-42

to invent for himself. Monnet's contribution to the British and American war effort has been deeply analysed by the literature. This chapter will, on the other hand, analyse this period in-depth through the story of the Frenchman American network, the crucial connections he made, the influence he asserted and the enemies he created along the way, using new material from American and British archives.

However, let us first take a step back. How is it that an investment banker, financial broker, working for a transatlantic banking group, with a disputed reputation within the British Foreign Office and, in 1938, not many connections inside the French government, became Daladier's pick for Chairman of the AFCOC, head negotiator on behalf of his government in the United States, man of trust, for the same job, of Winston Churchill during the *darkest hour* of the British war effort? Duchene does not give a definitive answer, neither does Roussel, Brown Wells or Elizabeth du Rèau[7]. What is certain is that the first meeting between Daladier and Monnet took place in early 1938 at a friend's informal dinner party. Pierre Comert, a former colleague at the League of Nations, where he worked at the Cultural and Information Section together with Henri Bonnet, future French ambassador to the United States, invited the Cognac seller. There is no record of what happened during the dinner, or if Daladier and Monnet made contact, but it is entirely possible that the latter made his way into the former's entourage because of his ideas about the supposed military industrial gap between Germany and France. Indeed, Duchene states that during the same year, well before Munich, he was helping to draft a paper called "*Notes sur la creation d'un potential industriel aéronautique à l'étranger situé hors de portée des attaques ennemies"*[8]. Rene Pleven describes how "*Je ne l'ai jamais mieux senti et*

[7] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, Wells, *Jean Monnet*, Elisabeth du Réau, *Jean Monnet, le comité de coordination économique franco-britannique,* in Bossuat (ed.), *Jean Monnet, l'europe e le chemins de la paix,*., pp 77-96

[8] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 65. Elisabeth Du Réau, who is the author of an article about French air production during the 1930s does not mention Monnet's role in drafting this paper. It is possible that Duchene relied on

autant admire que dans les années qui précédèrent immédiatement 1939"[9]. He was "*from January 1938 in a position to observe his desperate effort to close our gap in airpower"*[10] with the Germans. Monnet tells a slightly different story in his memoirs. He recalls that it was American Ambassador William Bullitt to introduce him to the group set up by Guy La Chambre, the young French Air Minister, working on aeroplanes production[11]. Bullitt was a Francophile, who had campaigned for President Roosevelt re-election and had been appointed US ambassador in Paris in 1936 after serving in the same capacity in Moscow. Daladier had him in high regards, thinking of him to be "*as French as the best of Frenchmen"*[12]. Fluent in French, Bullitt enjoyed the company of the burly, dark-complected French leader even before he became Prime Minister, in March 1938. Therefore, is it possible that an American initiated Monnet into French public service? Indeed, it was again Bullitt who recommended Monnet to be sent to negotiate personally with Roosevelt, he who accompanied the Frenchman to the United States, he who helped him to mediate with Henri Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury. It would seem that without Bullitt, but the same could be said about Felix Frankfurter, Harry Hopkins and George Ball, there would not have been a Monnet story to tell in these crucial years which prepared the Frenchman for his role in Washington during the war and consequently for post-war French and European reconstruction. Therefore, it is necessary to put this relationship in context. It all started because of a divorce.

Pleven's recollection of those years during the 1980s. Elisabeth Du Réau, *Edouard Daladier et le role des forces aériennes, 1933-1940,* in *Revue Historique des Armées*, n. 1, 1997, pp. 43-54

[9] René Pleven, *Temoignage,* in *Témoigrages à la memoire de Jean Monnet*, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne, 1989, pp. 389 - 394

[10] René Pleven as cited in Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 65

[11] Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 234

[12] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 84

4.1 William Bullitt and Monnet's Marriage, a transatlantic transaction

Monnet does not tell much of his romantic life, neither in the documents he left to the Fondation in Lausanne, nor in his Memoires. His wife Silvia was, however, a central character of his political experience, long-time companion and purpose of perhaps the most crucial personal transaction of his life. He met her in 1929 at a dinner in Paris, "*nous oubliames les autres invités*"[13]. She was the daughter of the Italian publisher De Bondini, editor of a French-language weekly, *La Turquie*, produced in Istanbul in the years before World War I. Intelligent, forceful and beautiful; she grew up trilingual in Italian, French and Greek. John McCloy thought she was the most beautiful he had met[14]. There was only a problem. She was already married. His husband was Francesco Giannini, whom she had wed the same year, a senior representative of Blair & Co in Italy, therefore an employee of Monnet. There is no evidence that he was related to Amedeo Giannini, the already mentioned founder of the Transamerica group. Although a Dr Francesco Giannini is mentioned as a member of the Programme Committee of the AMTC, and again it reappears on the staff list of the secretariat of League of Nations in 1923[15]. There is no proof that they are the same person, but it would not be a surprise since Monnet tended to employ familiar faces.

He mentions in his Memoirs that shortly after the first meeting they decided to marry, provided she could divorce Giannini. Divorcing during the 1930s was a far cry from the routine affair it has since become. Italy did not recognise it at all. In France, it was permitted but nearly impossible for a foreign citizen. A first attempt of annulment from the Catholic Church failed because in the meantime Silvia became pregnant of her first daughter, Anna. Monnet, in 1934, now impatient and increasingly upset

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[13] Jean Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 152

[14] *Interview with John J McCloy,* Oral History Fund, 15 July 1981, FJME

[15]*League of Nations Secretariat (1919-1946),* Staff List, R1458/29/15762, ALON; Francesco Giannini was an expert on minorities' status in Eastern Europe, and is the author of a paper for the League titled "*La situazione giuridica delle minoranze in Estonia,* LON/BPC/MIN/117, ALON

because of what Salter called "*a courtship by cable and transatlantic phone lasted five years"*[16], started to look for a country that would permit a quick divorce and especially allow Silvia to retain custody of Anna, something impossible under French law. He rejected the United States as he believed that a Reno, Nevada-style divorce lacked dignity[17]. His network then came to the rescue. Rajchmann wrote to him that the Soviet Union had minimal residency requirements and that once sworn in, new citizens could divorce and remarry immediately after that[18]. Monnet decided to investigate the option, and we can assume that he did it after learning that his old Versailles acquaintance, William Bullitt had become US ambassador to the USSR.

In July 1934, after the CDFC had been established, Monnet left Shanghai for Moscow by travelling across the Soviet Union on the Trans-Siberian Railway. He planned his own marriage like he was negotiating among great powers. He contacted William Bullitt and the French ambassadors in Moscow, Charles Alphand, respectively, and asked their help in paving the way for his marriage. He did not know Alphand as he did Bullitt. Rajchman and the Soviet ambassador in China had also contacted the Soviet government on his behalf[19]. Monnet arrived in Moscow ill from the ride and stayed with Bullitt a week in order to recover[20], delaying the whole process. Nonetheless the necessary forms and plans were completed without difficulty, surely because his friend's machinations had made the Soviets willing to cooperate. In later years, Monnet suggested that the Russians had helped him because it might prove to be good for public relations, since he was well-known in international circles[21]. Of course, some narcissism played a part in this assessment.

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[16] Lord Salter, *Memoirs,* p.246
[17] Wells, *Jean Monnet,* p. 33
[18] Duchene, *Jean Monnet,* p. 55
[19] Wells, *Jean Monnet,* p. 34
[20] *ibid*
[21] Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 109-111

At the end of July 1934, he returned to Paris. It was his intention to spend the rest of the summer with Silvia and Anna. The rest of the story seems to come from a second-rate action book. Since Giannini strongly opposed his wife's plans for divorce, mother and daughter had to hide until Jean would return with the necessary papers from the USSR. His sister, Marie-Louise, was a nun living in a convent just outside Paris. She hosted them clandestinely while they were waiting. When Monnet arrived, they went straight to the Soviet embassy, where both were sworn in and became citizens

At the end of August, Monnet sailed to New York and visited Washington. He had an appointment with the State Department's Head of the Division for Far Eastern Affairs, Stanley Hornbeck. The purpose of the meeting was to update de office about the situation in Shanghai[22]. He had kept these officials informed, through Bullitt, of his CDFC activities in Shanghai and tried, again without success, while in the United States, to obtain additional loans for China[23]. In October 1934, he and Drummond were in London to assist in the CDFC negotiations with the Bank of Shanghai and Hong Kong for further additional loans[24].

Jean and Silvia received their marriage licence and visas in Novembre that year. They were in different countries, so they headed for Moscow separately. . Since she was now a Soviet citizen, she was granted a divorce from her Italian husband on November 13. She and Monnet married in a civil ceremony immediately after. This was attended by the French and American embassy officials, although Bullitt had written Monnet that he regretted not being able to attend the wedding because of a trip to Japan and China but had instructed his embassy colleagues to assist his friend[25].

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[22] FRUS, 1934, The Far East, Volume III, p. 771
[23] *ibid*
[24] *ibid*
[25] Wells, *Jean Monnet*, p. 35

Silvia had been swiftly initiated into Monnet's life of constant travelling between countries and continents. In December they were in Washington, in March 1935 in Shanghai. They stayed just nine months before moving back to New York on January 1936. Francesco Giannini made several attempts to regain custody of his child, but he was never reunited with her. Although Silvia won custody in New York in 1937, the ruling was not recognized for many years either in France or in Italy. After the death of Silvia's first husband in 1974, the Monnets celebrated the religious wedding they had always wanted in the cathedral at Lourdes.

This Russian adventure cemented Monnet's relationship with William Bullitt, who he regularly met every time he was in Paris during the years 1936-1938[26].

4.2 The transatlantic triangle. Bullitt, Monnet, Roosevelt

Monnet and his wife, Silvia, were visiting Paris at the time of the Munich conference, in September 1938. As we mentioned before, during the months before the conference Monnet had been introduced by William Bullitt to Guy La Chambre and had met Daladier at a dinner at Pierre Comert's. The Monnet's close friends, Anne Morrow Lindbergh and her husband, the famous

[26] Monnet's diary 1935-39, AMG 1, FJME

aviator Charles Lindbergh, arrived in Paris on September 30, the day after the Munich Conference. Morrow recorded in her diary that they went straight to the US embassy and were met by "*two close friends*" who were very distraught about Munich. Bullitt appeared "*white and tired*" and Monnet "*rather grey*" She wrote that Bullitt "*wants Charles to help in organising some kind of air rearmament for France ... in the USA*" and Monnet to "*organise it*". They discussed with La Chambre, who joined them for lunch, Bullitt's idea of France building aircraft factories in Canada with both US technology and skilled labour. "*The French ... are very depressed*" she wrote. "*They do not trust Germany*," and Monnet and Lindbergh "*never seem to agree*"[27]. On October 1, Monnet and Lindbergh met with La Chambre at his ministry office, along with Roger Hoppenot, a French government economist, to discuss opening aircraft factories in Canada. Two days later, Bullitt hosted a luncheon meeting at the US embassy for Daladier with Monnet, Lindbergh, and La Chambre. At the end of the meal, Daladier asked Monnet to go to Washington for urgent secret talks with Roosevelt about the French government's plan to purchase US warplanes. This initiative was sparked by the prime minister's hope that the US president would support his rearmament campaign[28]. Daladier's government was pursuing two lines of policy—while still hoping that Hitler was ready for détente, the government redoubled its efforts to arm France for a war that might come within months—and Monnet 's mission was a critical part of this strategy[29].

The Lindbergs dined at Monnet's' Paris apartment several times in the week before Jean's departure for the United States on October 11. That same day Lindbergh left for his third trip to Germany, this time to discuss the possibility of France buying German aircraft engines. Monnet thought his idea was pure folly. Lindbergh had toured Germany's all bases and factories on a previous

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[27] Diaries of Anne Morrow Lindbergh, cited in Hackett, *Jean Monnet Chronology*, pp. 112-116

[28] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 117-118, De Raou, *Jean Monnet*, p.78

[29] Ernest R. May, *Strange Victory*, New York, Hill and Wang, 2000, pp 27-37

visit at the invitation of the German General Hermann Goering and told the French air staff they were underestimating German capabilities. Anne Morrow recorded in her diary some of their conversations. She described Silvia as charming and wrote, "*Nice talk with Silvia ... about women's struggle between husband and children*." She noted, Monnet "*is such a rare person, true balanced wisdom into life itself. And he has that wonderful French quickness and lightness that makes communication with him such a joy. He thinks it is very much overrated that children need their mothers all the time. Yes, I say, it is true, neglected children always turn out well. While, says Jean, neglected husbands do not!*". In December, Monnet invited the Lindberghs to Cognac where Anne found Monnet's father "*a wonderful old man—gay, quick, full of love, and humor. Much joking between him and Jean".*[30]

Daladier chose Monnet to meet with Roosevelt, mainly because of Bullitt's strong recommendation. The ambassador had kept his president apprised of France's severe shortage of airpower, and, in his September 28 cable, he wrote that France had 600 warplanes, Germany 65,000, and Italy 2,000. Bullitt told Roosevelt that La Chambre had asked him for advice on who could help France immediately find the badly needed additional military aircraft. He reported he had suggested. Monnet because he believed that his friend was the man best qualified to organise this effort on behalf of France. He explained that the Frenchman was "*an intimate friend of mine, whom I trust as a brother.*" Daladier was persuaded to follow Bullitt's advice because Monnet brought additional advantages to the task: "*anonymity, negotiating skills, and extensive knowledge of America."*[31] Monnet was pleased to have been asked to undertake this purchasing mission he deemed extremely important to French national interests. Always enjoying

[30] Anna Lindbergh's Diaries, cited in Hackett, *Jean Monnet Chronology*, pp. 112-116

[31] May, *Strange Victory*, pp. 146, 179; Du Reau, *Daladier*, pp. 345-346; Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 167, 172-173; Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 65; Hackett, *Jean Monnet Chronology*, p. 112.

being close to the corridors of French power, he also relished the opportunity to meet the US president whom he admired for his handling of the depressed US economy.

Having travelled in secret by ship to the United States, Monnet, accompanied by Bullitt, met with Roosevelt at his family home in Hyde Park on October 1938. Seated in his wheelchair, the president extended his hand and warmly welcomed Monnet. Isolationism was the widespread sentiment in the country, he explained, and his hands were tied legally by the Johnson Act of 1933, which prohibited loans for arms to any country that had failed to pay its World War I dollar debts, which included France. The president added that the Neutrality Act of 1935 forbade sales of complete weapons to belligerents. Roosevelt told Monnet he had already asked the Air Corps for expanded aircraft production and directed the State Department to study the removal of the arms embargo from the Neutrality Act. He said he believed that the Germans could produce 40,000 planes a year, Britain together with Canada 20,000, and France 15,000. He declared that 20,000 to 30,000 aircraft "*will be needed to achieve decisive superiority over Germany and Italy: and they will have to be found here in the United States.*"[32] He argued that the Neutrality Act could be circumvented if the French set up assembly plants near Montreal with the Americans shipping parts across the frontier, and even pointed to possible locations on a map. The president's charm and intelligence seduced Monnet. Roosevelt's sincere tone, his "*exceptionally wide-ranging mind*," and belief that the dangers amassing in Europe also threatened the New World deeply impressed the Frenchman. "*So much attention to detail showed the importance he attached to the problem*," concluded the emissary from France.[33]

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[32] Monnet to Bullitt, Telegram. AMD, 2/3/2, FJME

[33] Monnet, *Memoirs*, pp. 118-119; Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 67; Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, p. 170; Jean-Louis Mandereau, *Temoignage*, in *Temoignages a la memoire de Jean Monnet*, pp. 335-346.

Before Monnet's meeting with Roosevelt, the French had made direct contact with Roosevelt in January 1938 through French Senator Francois Amaury de La Grange[34]. From an aristocratic family with economic interests in the United States, the senator had been president of the *Fédération aéronautique internationale*, and in 1938 had joined as chairman *la commission de l'air* of the French Senate. He had already met Roosevelt before World War I. His marriage to Emily Sloane, daughter of the businessman Henry T Sloane, guaranteed him access to the gilded community of the Upper East Side in New York. He had kept in touch with Roosevelt and visited him several times at Hyde Park after he became president. In early 1938, La Grange drew Roosevelt's attention to France's aeronautical weakness and reported to his government that Roosevelt understood France's dilemma[35]. Therefore, when the president sent Monnet to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., his treasury secretary, the matter had been already discussed at length, contrary to what Monnet's biographers say.

When Monnet and Bullitt met Morgenthau on October 22, Morgenthau was sceptical that the French could cover the cost of the planes. At the meeting, Bullitt suggested that they try to repatriate some of the French capital that had been exiting the country for several years at that point. In his diaries, Morgenthau outlines how this could have been done, "*Under the cloak of the tripartite agreement"* they could introduce currency controls and make it a "*jail offence"* not to repatriate sheltered money[36]. The following days Monnet and the Treasury Secretary helped by Bullitt concluded that there were at least half a million dollars that could be available to finance the plan. Bullitt wrote Daladier that the negotiations with both Morgenthau and Roosevelt had gone well[37].

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[34] André Vignon, *Amaury de La Grange, 1888-1953: Un Combat Pour l'aviation*, Paris: Editions de l'Officine, 2003, p. 167

[35] De Reau, *Daladier*, p. 57

[36] Memorandum by Bullitt, AMD, 2/3/6, FJME

[37] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 67-68; Du Reau, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 80-81; Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 175-176.

Monnet returned to France at the end of the month. In a report on November 14, he stated that if orders were placed for existing types of aircraft by the end of 1938, 1,000 US planes could be delivered by July 1.939 and another 1,500 by February 1940. Canadian assembly plants could be built outside Montreal, staffed with US skilled labour, and the United States could help France build more engines. Daladier faced stiff opposition to this idea[38].

French Air Ministry experts were sceptical that the US planes would meet French standards, and Paul Reynaud, the new minister of Finance, refused to allow the use of private French funds deposited in the United States to be used as payment. Nevertheless, Daladier was encouraged by Roosevelt's goodwill. He remained convinced that this purchase of US planes was necessary and sent Monnet back to Washington on December 9 to purchase the aircraft.

Monnet arrived in the US capital with authorisation to buy 1,000 planes for up to $65 million and set up a Canadian corporation. When the details of the plan hit the press, there was opposition from the US military and isolationists, but Roosevelt ignored the protests and proclaimed the. French orders good for the aircraft industry, US defence, and its workers because they provided jobs. The president overcame the opposition of the Army Air Corps to the release of its new models of planes to the French and the clash in Congress. The French mission received support from US editorial writers across the country because many believed the Europeans needed help to preserve democracy against Hitler.

In February 1939, the French purchasing team, which included Monnet and two future French prime ministers, Rene Pleven and Rene Mayer, then representing the armaments industry, placed firm orders for 555 combat planes and trainers and another 1,000 in 1940. The French invested

[38] Du Réau, *Daladier,* p. 89

heavily in the expansion of US plants because they remained secure from German bombardment[39]. By May 10, 1940, when the Germans attacked France, the plants in Canada had produced only several hundred planes. The French orders benefited the Allies, argues Duchene, by quadrupling "*American monthly production capacity in less than a year*." Most significantly, they "*laid the foundations for the gigantic later expansion of the US aircraft industry*"[40]. As Daladier's biographer Elisabeth Du Reau argues, Monnet's mission was fruitful because "*a dynamic was born, a real dialogue had been established, and relations had been forged.*"[41] This initial joint action led to greater Anglo-French cooperation and the establishment of an Atlantic triangle of Paris-London-Washington.

Until September 1939, although technically allies, Britain and France did little to coordinate their economic strategies for mobilisation. Whereas the French were working hard to mobilise American industry in the form of aeroplane manufactures, the British limited themselves to their own mobilisation.

When Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, followed two days later by declarations of war from Britain and France, he significantly clarified the relationship between the two allies.

Monnet's response was immediate. On 3 September, the same day that war was declared, he sent a note to Daladier laying the groundwork for the creation of a new interallied coordinating organisation[42]. He introduced the subject with references to the World War I machinery he had been instrumental in establishing, and on the need for central controls: "*Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que pendant les années 1917-1918, l'approvisionnement des armées et de la population civile n'a été*

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[39] Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 16-17; see also John M. Haight, Jr., *American Aid to France, 1938-1940*, New York: Atheneum, 1970

[40] Duchene, *Jean. Monnet*, pp. 70-71

[41] Du Réau, *Daladier*, p. 383

[42], Jean Monnet to Daladier, AMD, 4/6/5, FJME

assuré que grâce à ce système de pouvoirs quasi dictatoriaux [de l'organisation interalliée]. La force de ce système est venue de l'acceptation par la France et l'Angleterre de la mise en commun de leurs ressources et de l'unité d'action qui avait été assurée pour l'exécution des décisions[43]

In this initial memorandum, Monnet proposed that a general accord be drawn up between the two governments, following the accord of 3 December 1917. Besides, a French importation organization would be created and Anglo-French "Councils" and "Executives" established, beginning with aviation, transport, and finance. "*Le reste*" Monnet concluded, **"***sera mis en place progressivement*"[44].

Monnet's proposal was forwarded to the British, who welcomed the initiative for closer cooperation with the French, mainly because Daladier's sponsorship of Monnet as "*a friend of President Roosevelt"*[45]. In the course of the next few weeks, a stream of letters and notes travelled back and forth between London and Paris. Monnet was the centre of this correspondence. On October 18, for instance, Daladier sent a letter to Chamberlain that had been drafted almost entirely by Monnet[46]. In that letter he repeated the need for cooperation and expressed the desire that three years not be needed, as in the last war, before France and Great Britain would establish an effective allied organisation.

The letter highlighted, above all, the difficulties posed by the transport of American troops in 1918[47]. The goal of the Franco-British organisation, as Monnet explained on 18 September[48], was first to optimise the use of raw materials and manufacturing capacity, and second to organise import of materials that were lacking. How to do this, Monnet wrote, was for each country to create a balance sheet of its resources and needs, updated daily. Besides, they should optimise their existing resources,

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[43] *ibid*
[44] *ibid*
[45] Du Reau, *Daladier*, p. 383; Duchene, *Jean. Monnet*, p. 71; Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 126
[46] Jean Monnet to Sir Edward Bridges, letter, October 1,1939, AVIA38-1171, NA
[47] Letter by Eduard Daladier to Arthur Neville Chamberlain, 18 October 1939, AME 2/3/1 FJME
[48] Monnet to Daladier, 18 September 1939, AME 2/3/1 FJME

so as finally to make the best use of imports from out- side the two-country bloc. An additional point in this memo stands out: "*En ce qui concerne les États-Unis . . . Cela a moins à voir avec les opérations d'achat comme telles qu'avec l'organisation d'une sorte de mobilisation industrielle, pour augmenter la capacité de production américaine dans certains domaines, et dans bien des cas pour créer de nouvelles industries. Avant l'abolition de la Loi sur la neutralité, il serait dangereux de s'attaquer au problème des achats aux États-Unis*"[49].

Monnet, therefore, was hoping to use the Franco-British organisation to alter the industrial policy of the United States. Given the similarity of views he shared with Roosevelt, he was hoping to organise Allied purchasing in such a way as to begin industrial mobilisation, at least in crucial sectors, without having to wait for the mood of Congress and country to change. In this way, he was hoping to aid Roosevelt in his efforts.

Monnet's designs were not intended to benefit the United States, however. Most of Morgenthau's reservations about Monnet's schemes can be attributed, as well, to the secretary's concern that the United States was not left paying the economic cost of the French schemes. Furthermore, Monnet was trying to give the new Franco-British organisation a limited monopoly on world trade in specific sectors, which would give them the ability to purchase on a credit basis, even from the United States. In a letter to Edward Bridges, the secretary of the British War Cabinet, Monnet wrote: "*In many countries, the establishment of joint purchasing organizations might lead those organizations to become the agent of neutral countries for their own purchases particularly of food and raw materials, with the result that the allied purchasing organization would thus become the principal factor in many markets and, in certain cases, the only purchaser of certain products"*[50].

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[49] *Ibid*

[50] Jean Monnet to Sir Edward Bridges, 18 September 1939, AVIA38-1172, NA

Monnet was clearly building on his observations of the role that J.P. Morgan had played in World War I in the United States, and the arrangements he the negotiated between the Hudson's Bay Company and Canada, only this time he was hoping to reserve for the Allied government the power that had been placed in private hands during the previous war.

As the negotiations over the structure of the organisation continued, it became clear that the British would not accept Monnet's proposal for a ministerial council at the top of the Franco-British organisation. Among the factors influencing this was that, as in World War I, any form of Allied cooperation implied more of a contribution from the British than the French[51]. Monnet was disappointed, but not so much so that he did not still seek the job as chair of the newly created Franco-British Coordinating Committee, which he secured[52]. There had been some debate regarding the appointment, which the British sought for one of their officials. Morgenthau had also expressed reservations about the appointment of Monnet, who was also being considered for the Washington office of the Committee. "*While I am not crazy to have Monnet come over here . . . I suppose I get along with him as well as I can with any other Frenchman*"[53].

Finally, however, Monnet was appointed, and at his request, this was done jointly in letters by Chamberlain on 29 November and Daladier on 2 December. On 6 December 1939 at the first meeting of the Coordinating Committee, Monnet declared that based on his dual appointment, he was an Allied official. Monnet extended this same Allied status to his counterpart in the United States, the Canadian Arthur Purvis, who was setting up their offices in New York: "*The French as well as the British Government . . . regard you as charged with negotiations with the United States Government on their behalf, with a high degree of effective authority, in other words . . . in your capacity of*

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[51]Eliot Janeway, *The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951, p. 140.

[52] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 87

[53] Cited in a letter by Ambassador Bullitt to FDR, Presidential Secretary's File, Bullitt, Box 30, FDRL

Chairman of the Anglo-French Purchasing Committee in the U.S.A., you have the status of an Allied representative in the same way as myself as Chairman of the Anglo-French Coordinating Committees"[54]

As in World War I, the Allied machinery Monnet established got off the ground, however already in June 1940 the fall of France interrupted its work. As it is clear from a note written on March 1940, however, Monnet was trying to establish the same kinds of collegial relationships among the officials that he had experienced during the previous war. He hoped that by "*officials of different nationalities . . . developing exactly the same personal relation with each other, and the same methods of discussion, as in national inter-departmental committees*," they would be able to look at problems from a *common perspective and influence their governments early in the policy-making stage*."[55] This would avoid the "*loss of prestige*" that too often determined policy in these cases.

Although there was plenty of evidence that the kind of cooperation Monnet sought would have been beneficial to the Allied effort, the actual achievements were not considerable. The lessons of the previous war, though they were stored in some men's minds and even written down in books, had not yet come vividly alive to the new men of 1939. For this reason, the record of the six months from late December to early tune contains a good deal of frustration and poor performance.

Many of Monnet's actions before the June 1940 fall of France point to his conviction that, if war began, France might well fall. This is evident in his efforts to build production facilities out of reach of German bombers already in 1938. In 1940, he began as early as 19 May to call on Churchill and Reynaud to begin another attempt to spur on American war production potential.

When France fell, it had outstanding American orders (mostly planes) for over $600 million. In order to prevent tremendous confusion and a drawn-out conflict with the new French government over their

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[54] Hackett, *Jean Monnet*, pp. 33-35; Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 83.
[55] Hand-written note by Monnet, AMD, 4/7/1, FJME

ownership, it was essential to transfer them to Britain. On 15 June Monnet telegrammed Purvis that they may need to conduct a transfer. On 16 June he telegrammed again to say that he was trying to finalise French authorisation from the European end. In order to prevent the transfer from wrecking the British balance of payments with the United States, they also proposed transferring $500 million in French assets in the United States to Great Britain and exchanging them for corresponding Canadian credits.' Five hours before the Treasury froze French assets, Purvis signed the papers authorising the transfer.

After tidying up some loose ends, on 2 July, Monnet sent a letter to Churchill resigning from the Franco-British Coordinating Committee. In his letter, he reiterated his understanding of himself as a supranational official: "*I have hitherto acted in an Allied capacity, serving the two countries equally.*" He went on to state his view that the future of France lay with the success of Britain in the war, and that he would like to serve the British government, as the best way to continue to "*serve the true interests of my country.*"[56] Churchill responded two weeks later, asking Monnet to "*proceed to the United States of America and there continue . . . those services in connection with supplies from North America which have been so valuable to us.*"[57] At the end of August Monnet and his family left for the United States. In his memoirs he tells the story of how he was stopped by a British customs official in Bermuda who was suspicious of his French passport. Upon seeing Monnet's orders, signed by Churchill himself, the guard exclaimed, "*It just doesn't make sense for a Frenchman to hold a British job at this point."* Monnet commented that *"this man was right from his point of view. My administrative position was, in reality, insolent, and even more so than he could have believed*."[58]

4.3 Monnet and the Americans

[56] Letter by Monnet to Winston Churchill, 2 July 1940. HAEU, JMDS-42
[57] Letter by Winston Churchill to Monnet, 16 July 1940. HAEU, JMDS-42
[58] Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 178

When Monnet returned to the US capital in September 1940 with his wife and daughter, he faced opposition on several fronts. Canadian and British BPC officials complained because they were not consulted about his appointment. Some of the British were suspicious of this Frenchman at the centre of Allied war planning while others feared he was a disciple of de Gaulle. Among the US opponents, the isolationists loudly proclaimed their nation could avoid European involvement and advocated staying clear of Britain's cause. The country was also distracted by a divisive political campaign over Roosevelt ‘s third term for, who ran on the theme that his experienced hand would keep the United States out of war.

Once the president won reelection in November 1940, Monnet knew his efforts to secure supplies for the Allies had strong support from the White House. He believed he had forged a working relationship with Roosevelt when he delivered Daladier 's request for airplanes two years earlier. Monnet also thought he understood to a large degree the difficult task facing the president in the years 1939-1941. Roosevelt had to balance his nation's desire to stay out of war with the contradictory need to defeat the Germans. "*Roosevelt's solution was not to intensify the conflict by choosing one goal over the other but rather to weave the two goals together*," the president repeatedly urged the nation to believe that "*the surest road to peace ... was material aid to the Allies.”*[59]

Monnet was very much persona grata in the inner circle of the British military staff in Washington, the circle around Sir John Dill, chief military representative to Washington from 1941 to 1944. In the crucial early period of the war, Dill helped coordinate the military policies of the United Kingdom and the United States, and his friendship with US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall did much to cement Anglo-American solidarity. Brigadier Vivian Dykes, the British secretary of the

[59] Joyce P. Kaufman, *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2017

Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington during the war, had a positive relationship with Monnet. He wrote in his diary in early January 1942, "*Went out with [Brig] Ian [Jacob] to dine with Monnet. Monnet is a very shrewd fellow. He stresses the importance of the Dill-Marshall liaison. I think he is right that the Yanks won't work to organizations—they deal only in personalities.*"[60] Monnet and Dykes regularly consulted about tactics in their efforts to obtain supplies for Britain and the Allies, and Dykes kept Dill informed.

Unruffled by any opposition, Monnet moved smoothly into the centre of the Washington policymaking and social circles soon after his arrival because of his many American contacts. His close relationship based on "*total trust*" continued with journalist Walter Lippmann, who had a formidable influence on public opinion in the US capital. Nevertheless, perhaps the most crucial acquaintance that Monnet would eventually make was with the all-powerful Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

Frankfurter, the leading educator of a generation of US jurists with a reputation as an aloof intellectual[61], became a trusted and useful friend. He operated in Washington through his network of former students and was in frequent contact with the White House. Frankfurter's real preoccupation "*was with power ... and he gloried in a power which was personal and exercised over the elite at close quarters,*" writes historian Eliot Janeway[62].

The Supreme Court Justice was indeed a peculiar presence in Washington, and the fact that Monnet did not waste a day before making contact with him is proof of Frankfurter's reputation at the time. He was like a key-holder of rooms of power during the Roosevelt era, a broker himself that moved

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[60] Vivian Dykes, diary entry of January 11, 1942, in Alex Danchev, *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes*, London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, Ltd. 1990, p. 89. See also Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941-1944*, London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986.

[61] Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis-Frankfurter connection*, Oxford University Press, 1982

[62] Eliot Janeway, *The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II*, p. 142.

nimbly around the Washington Mall creating connections, recommending his students for crucial posts, advising the President on matters of domestic and foreign policy. An interventionist, he had helped the administration to go through the problematic negotiations behind the deal with Great Britain in September 1940, for which the United States promised to send fifty destroyers in exchange of several British sea bases[63].

In Europe, however, the outcome of the war was very uncertain. England, along with its distant dominions, was dependent on American shipping to avoid a collapse against the might of German warfare. The Luftwaffe had just begun a mass bombing of the country in order to prepare for the much-dreaded invasion. Churchill rightly spoke of England's finest hour. When Monnet saw Roosevelt again for the first time in early September, he, too, was concerned about the possibility of a German landing in England. "*At what moment*", he asked, "*will the fog come down on England?"*[64]. Monnet, in his new American environment, found it hard to come up with a winning attitude against widespread pessimism.

In those critical weeks, the US was engaged in a bitter campaign for President Roosevelt's third term. The collapse of France had certainly startled the public. The majority, of course, wished for England's victory, but certainly not at the cost of their own country intervening in the war. There was also an influential isolationist minority in public and Congress, which rejected any indirect involvement of America in the European conflict. Their country should not again bleed for foreign causes, as it was supposed to have done in the First World War. Monnet feared, and expressed this feeling in many letters[65], that many isolationists were prepared to accept Britain's defeat for the sake of US neutrality. The Atlantic, they hoped, would protect the United States from Hitler.

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[63] Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis-Frankfurter connection*., p. 146
[64] Jean Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 187
[65]AMD, 7/6/3, FJME

Roosevelt had long been committed to defeating the German dictator — preferably, without with United states having to fully commit to the conflict. However, he has always been aware that, in order to ensure a victory over Germany, his country had to intervene economically in the military struggle. Whether and when he realised that Hitler's Germany could only be defeated by an immediate military American intervention in the war is still controversial among his biographers. In 1940, when he was again a presidential candidate, he certainly had to be very careful in addressing the issue. He had to prepare the nation for war without giving the appearance of actually pursuing the objective.

Frankfurter was already working with Secretary of War Henry Stimson, also his former student at Harvard, to secure assistance for belligerent countries. On September 1940 he had sent a memorandum to FDR about the need to send food supplies to Finland, at the time defending itself against a Soviet invasion[66]. When the Senate refused to approve the before-mentioned deal with Great Britain, Frankfurter convinced the President to instruct Benjamin Cohen, who had also met Monnet in at the Paris Peace Conference and had also attended Harvard Law, to draft a memorandum justifying the legality of a unilateral presidential action without Congress's consent. The Justice then asked Cohen to work with Dean Acheson on the matter. Acheson at the time had been out of government for seven years[67]. According to a memorandum, to be found in the Frankfurter papers at the Library of Congress, the Justice had also proposed to the President to set up a base in Ireland to help stabilise the political situation of the island and to provide further assistance to the UK[68]. Indeed, Frankfurter, close contact of the British ambassador in 1940, Lord Lothian, also one of Monnet's acquaintances, was kept informed about the rapidly depleting financial resources of Great Britain

[66] Frankfurter to FDR, November 29, 1940, included "*Memorandum from Lord Lothian"*; FDR phone message for Frankfurter, minutes, December 2, 1940, President's secretary's' File, Box 150. FDRL

[67] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, New York, Norton, 1969. This move would then prove fortuitous for both Acheson and his former professor. For the latter it proved a step forward his eventual re-entry into the administration in 1941 as Assistant Secretary of State. Frankfurter then found in him a very useful access to the administration once Truman became president in 1945

[68] Letter to FDR, December 30, 1940, President Secretary's File, Box 140, FDRL

available for purchasing supplies from the United States. However, to overcome the isolationist attitude in Washington he needed an ally who could provide ideas, contacts and fresh mentality. Curious enough, he was neither British nor American.

His network was undoubtedly less organised than Monnet's circle of friends, who were systematically mobilized when needed, but the members were closely connected, especially with the British and American political elite, because of education, family and personal interests. Some like Lewis Douglas, the future ambassador to Great Britain, as William Clayton (founder of Anderson, Clayton and Co., a significant cotton exporter), had strongly supported the commercial policies of Cordell Hull, so Frankfurter's regular contacts with the White House were essential[69].

Monnet had already met the Justice in 1927 at a dinner party given in Washington by George T. Rublee, the US member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. At Rublee's party, Frankfurter introduced Monnet also to Dean Acheson. From a letter sent by the journalist Joe Alsop[70], we learn that it was him who introduced the Frenchman to Frankfurter. The dinner was a way for Acheson to stage a meeting between his Harvard Law School mentor and his current bosses, the senior partners in Covington, Burling, and Rublee, the prominent international firm with which also Blair & Co conducted affairs in Europe (hence Monnet's presence at the party).

Once renewed their acquaintance, again during a dinner, this time at Frankfurter's Washington mansion, Monnet's relationship with Acheson's proved essential for the Frenchman's influence in the US capital. When the American layer was appointed by Roosevelt as assistant secretary of state for economic affairs in February 1941, this meant that he participated in all Lend-Lease arrangements with countries receiving US military and civilian aid. The work and social life of both Acheson and Monnet during these war years brought them into frequent contact and resulted in

[69] John Lamberton Harper, *American Vision of Europe*, Cambridge, 1994, pp 70-71.
[70] Joe Alsop to Monnet, January 1965, Monnet, Alsop Papers, LOC

mutual, lifelong respect for one another's ideas and dedication. "*Both shared a profound and single-minded devotion to international cooperation,*"[71] writes historian Douglas Brinkley. "*Monnet must have been an inspiration to Acheson as to what could be accomplished by sheer dint of personality, persuasion, and connections.*[72]" Acheson called Monnet "*one of the brilliant men of his generation,*" and admired his "*action-oriented, no nonsense, get-the-job-done approach to every assignment or project he undertook.*" Brinkley also notes that Acheson compared Monnet to General George Marshall because "*each had a global reputation as a prestigious statesman of great consequence while usually managing to remain above the fray of partisan politics"*[73].

Because he possessed the requisite skills, Monnet once introduced, became a powerful catalyst for securing government action. Perhaps he is better described using Frankfurter's own words, from a conversation he had with another of his former students, Milton Kats. "*Monnet is a man with a ruthless clarity of mind who will not deviate from seeing and describing things as they are and following the facts as he finds them. He never deludes himself"*[74]. The Frenchman has a gift for working on issued with an entrepreneurial attitude, something that the Americans much appreciated and that is revealed by the sources. After having studied an issue, Monnet would make a list of all the stakeholders, trying to find a solution that would satisfy all the parts involved without showing any ideological affiliation.

Frankfurter was convinced that the law was the guarantor of democracy, and he continued to be for Monnet a moral reference and a close friend even after the war had ended, something that did not happen with others who were merely instrumental to the Frenchman during a particular time: "*Often,*

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[71] Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson and Jean Monnet*, in Clifford Hackett, *Monnet and the Americans,* pp. 74-76.
[72] *idem*
[73] *ibid*
[74] Letter to Milton Katz, dated 1941, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

in the past, in times of difficulty, a moment of success, I was encouraged and inspired by my friend Felix Frankfurter, by his firmness, his deep optimism, his sharp sense of common sense"[75]. The diaries of Frankfurter[76] indeed show that their families became very close friends, taking every opportunity to get together and seek each other's opinions.

However, during the war, the Justice, closely linked to Roosevelt, was primarily fa valuable intermediate through which directly reach the president. "*Monnet and Frankfurter also loved both be close to the source of power. They were there, in a way, for a common goal. They were so intimate that they met at any time either in one or in the other*"[77].

Frankfurter introduced Monnet to many prominent personalities that were part of his networks, such as Katharine and Phil Graham, who later became the owners and publishers of the *Washington Post.* Many mornings Graham strolled with this Frenchman through Rock Creek Park, a vast wooded area closed to Monnet's' large rented 2415 Foxhall Road home. They had moved from a hotel suite to this comfortable but not elegant house in this prized suburban neighbourhood with their daughter. Monnet loved Rock Creek Park and treated it like his own garden. The influential newspaper magnate compared Monnet to Benjamin Franklin because of the power of his intelligence and his competence[78].

The entrepreneur from Cognac wined and dined with the social elite that included old friends with whom he corresponded for many years as well as future influential foreign policy players and advisers who lived in or frequently travelled to Washington. Among them were the already mentioned journalist Joseph Alsop and his brother Stewart, James Reston, reporter for the *New York*

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[75] Cited in Éric Roussel, *Jean Monnet,* p.255.
[76] Felix Frankfurter Diary, 1943 Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[77] Interview with John J. McCloy by Leonard Tennyson (15/07/81), Oral History Fund, FJME
[78] Katharine Graham, *Personal History,* New York: Vintage Books, 1998, p. 128.

Times, and his wife, Sally; Foster Dulles and his wife, Janet; the Dean Achesons; poet and writer Archibald Macleish and his wife; Averell Harriman, the railroad magnate; as well as the Walter Lippmanns[79]. Katharine Graham later captured in her memoirs the views of many of the Frenchman's American friends:

"Monnet was proof positive that if someone is brilliant, political, and concentrated, he can make a power base where none exists. His mode of operation was to know the right people—those who had the knowledge, the power, and the will to move things—then to learn what made things move and to be constantly pushing the levers of power. He was very selective about whom he saw and how he used his time. He never made small talk, and he always kept to the point in his discussions, at meetings, or even at dinners"[80].

As she also remembers clearly in this precious interview retrieved in the oral history archive in Lausanne: "*Monnet had no power base at that time* (1940) *except the power of his brain and his personality, and his ability to get things done. The little circle of personal friends with whom Jean and Sylvia were close included the Frankfurters, the MacLeishes and Achesons. Moreover, the Bonnets, the French Ambassador—we joked about the Bonnets and the Monnets*"[81].

Pressing issues were always discussed before dinner, never during or after, because Silvia maintained that "*good food and politics do now mix well*"[82]. In 1940-1941, members of this group were almost in daily communication with each other, supporting a collective effort to convey the needs of Europe to the administration and formulating a way to address them. They were among the most influential political players in Washington before Pearl Harbour, although they did not have any official role in

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[79] Monnet, *Memoires,* pp. 154-155; Monnet to Walter Lippmann, letter, April 29, 1926, Walter Lippmann Papers, YUL; Joseph Alsop to Monnet, letter, February 26, 1965, and Monnet to Alsop, letter, March 4, 1965, Joseph Alsop Papers, LOC; Roussel, *Jean Monnet,* pp. 155-156.
[80] Katharine Graham, *Personal History,* p. 128.
[81] Interview with Katherine Graham by Leonard Tennyson (28/07/81), FJME Oral History Fund
[82] Letter by Monnet to Frankfurter, January 1941, AMD 8/9/4, FJME

the administration. Getting closer cooperation from the Americans was after all the job Monnet was supposed to do for the British government.

In November 1940, according to the diary of Henry Stimson[83], the secretary of the Navy Frank Knox asked Justice Frankfurter's advice regarding a possible summit between FDR and other leaders of democratic nations, among others Winston Churchill. The problem was that the president was having trouble finding the right words to convince an American public still recalcitrant in taking responsibilities on the world stage. Frankfurter had the idea to send the president a letter introducing Monnet (although the president had already met him in the past) and enclosing a memorandum the Frenchmen had given him at dinner days before, describing the deteriorating situation of British supplies. He advised Roosevelt to deliver a public speech on the need of helping democratic nations to defeat the Germans[84]. A week later, the Justice heard again Monnet say to their group of friends, gathered again at Foxhall road for dinner, that America had to become a "*great arsenal, the arsenal of democracy*". They both realised that this was a memorable, or catchy, phrase capable of conveying the message to the public. Monnet promised not to use the words again, and Frankfurter sent a further letter to the president suggesting adding them to a "Fireside Chat", delivered then by Roosevelt on December 29th. By then, it was clear that the presidential strategy was to convince the public that Britain could be helped by merely "lending" and "leasing", without direct American intervention.

The problem was that the British government was not convinced that this could be enough. Churchill was of the idea that the USA had much to lose should Hitler and Stalin be allowed to control continental Europe. By then the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, had died, so FDR decided to send an envoy to London to try and establish a closer communication channel between the War Cabinet and the White House. The choice fell on Harry Hopkins, one of the closest foreign policy advisers to

[83] Henry Stimson Diary, November 25, 1940, Henry Stimson papers, YUL
[84] Letter from Felix Frankfurter to FDR, December 19, 1940, Frankfurter papers, LOC

the president, one of the architects of the New Deal and the man who would lead the Lend-Lease program in the years ahead.

Monnet was informed by Dean Acheson and instantly wrote to Frankfurter about the need for preparation because, in his words, "*neither side is correctly assessing the importance of this conference*"[85]. Frankfurter then had the idea of inviting both Monnet and Hopkins at his house for dinner. As it should be now clear, this was the pattern of their political technique. Letters, memoranda, direct telephone calls and then dinners were the ways this group worked through the issues of international politics at the time, ignoring the formal structures of democratic government and the traditional channels for international relations. Once identified an issue, the strategy was not to be entangled with bureaucracy and protocols, but to create a network, in this case transatlantic, of influential people capable of access and direct communication with the public officials in power, all linked by a common interest. Very quickly, everyone in Washington at the time realised what it meant to be invited at dinner by Monnet or Frankfurter. Especially being part of the latter's circle meant to acquire status and a high recommendation for one's ideas from one of the most influential figures in town, as this case shows. Jean Monnet told Hopkins at dinner that there was no need to meet many people in London to convey Roosevelt's message and assess British intentions regarding the war, that Churchill was enough. "*Churchill is the War Cabinet, no one else matters*". However, Hopkins did not know the Frenchman at the time and had he been alone, and his advice would have had little or no impact. Hopkins later, in a conversation with the Justice, dismissed Monnet's words. Frankfurter replied, "*Harry if you are going to London with that chip on your shoulder, like a damned little small-town chauvinist, you may as well cancel your passage right now*"[86]. Hopkins came around.

[85] Letter by Monnet to Frankfurter, January 1941, AMD 8/9/4, FJME
[86] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948, p. 232

Of course, the same thing had to be done with his British counterparts. Being informed of Hopkins's importance inside the White House, hence the fundamental nature of meeting him was the key to achieve success from the summit. Frankfurter informed Monnet of a well-connected contact, the Australian ambassador to the United States, Richard Casey. According to Casey's memoirs[87], the ambassador cabled the Australian High Commissioner in London that a "*highly placed and important person…who is a great friend of the President*"[88] had a message for Churchill before he met Hopkins. It followed a description of Hopkins' nature and personality, the weight his voice carried in the White House and the surer way to reach his "interest and heart". Days later Casey cabled back to Frankfurter that Churchill had read the message and would certainly "*act on it*". The meetings between the British prime minister and Harry Hopkins were a success, ad Hopkins would admit later, and helped much to improve the relations between the two nations.

Moreover, as the later British ambassador Sir Arthur Frank said, Monnet had '*realized that… the first meeting between Hopkins and Churchill… would be of immense importance and he took a great deal of trouble with immense skill, in making Hopkins combustible with a fire that could seize him as soon as he saw Churchill"*[89].

Perhaps among the most compelling testimony of the degree of trusteeship and friendship between the Monnets and the Justice are the papers, at the Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, regarding a letter Anna Monnet, the Frenchman's stepdaughter, sent to President Roosevelt in 1941.

Jean Monnet, his wife Silvia and Anna attended personally Roosevelt's inaugural parade on January 21st, 1941 on the National Mall. The Frankfurters then joined them for dinner the day after[90]. Anna,

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[87]A draft of Casey's memoirs was sent to Frankfurter for corrections, October 25, 1960, Frankfurter Papers, Box 244, LOC

[88] Letter from Casey to the Australian High Commissioner, January 6, 1941. A copy was sent to Frankfurter with the response, Frankfurter papers, box 195, LOC

[89] Cited in Richard Mayne, *The Father of Europe,* Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, p. 77

[90] Monnet's Diary, January 1941, AMD, FJME

at the time nine years old, had "*violently fall in love with the President on inauguration day"*[91]. Her mother had told about it to the Justice during dinner, also mentioning the child's intention to write a letter to the President for his birthday on January 30th. Silvia Monnet and Marion Frankfurter were active in the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, the organisation set up in 1938 by the President, therefore convinced Anna to include a mention of the matter in the letter, combined with a donation of ten dimes (one dollar).

The Justice wrote to Marguerite Lehand, Roosevelt's personal secretary, on February 3rd[92]. It accompanied a letter, dated January 27th, 1941, handwritten by Anna Monnet. "*Dear Mr. President, I was at the inaugural parate* (sic.), *and heard everything over the radio in the morning, it was very nice, I liked it so much, didn't you? In this letter are ten dimes, for infantile paralyses* (sic.), *it is very little, but it is all I have, and I hope they will help. Happy birthday Mr. President, and lots of luck. Your freind* (sic.) *respectfuly* (sic.), *Anna Monnet*"[93]. It was very unusual for of Justice of the Supreme Court to introduce a letter to the President by a nine years old child, but it guaranteed that the secretary put the letter on Roosevelt's desk on the same day. It could be speculated that the *illustrious introduction* also assured a written response from the Oval Office "*the President has personally written a little note of approval to her"*[94]. The letter was sent directly to Monnets house in Foxhall Road, acknowledging Frankfurter courtesy in delivering the initial note by Anne.

This unusual channel of communication with the White House had been tested on December 1940, and Jean Monnet used it again during 1941. With the Victory Programme agreed in December, it was urgently necessary to set up an organisation better suited to carry it out. Monnet had been brooding on this problem for many weeks in late 1941. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbour, he discussed

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[91] Felix Frankfurter to Marguerite LeHand, Telegram, President's Secretary's File, Box 2, Contributions, 7365, FDRL

[92] *idem*

[93] *idem*

[94] Marguerite LeHand to Frankfurter, President's Secretary's File, Box 2, Contributions, 7365, FDRL

it at length with Felix Frankfurter. They agreed that in mobilising for war the United States had much to learn from the French and British experience; this seemed so important it deserved the President's attention. True to his habits, Monnet had drafted a note on the subject; but he hesitated to send it to Roosevelt himself. The Justice proposed to have a look at the draft and send it to the President himself. Frankfurter's memorandum, citing Monnet as a source for the idea, presented the need for Allied coordination on supply and production's long-term goals. "*The agencies dealing with production are many, but each was under a different authority with none responsible for the over-all objective. Someone capable of acting for the President must see the Victory Program carried out*"[95]. The President saw the memo a few days later. However, both military branches and many in the State Department opposed civilian control of their weapons production. Robert Sherwood wrote later that "*the formation of the Munitions Assignment Board provoked more heated argument than any other topic at the Arcadia Conference"*[96].

Another crucial connection Monnet created because of Frankfurter was, of course, John McCloy. Monnet once said that in his experience, "*friendship... is the result of joint action rather than the reason for it.*"[97]. Monnet and McCoy's first "*action commune*" came during the bleak autumn of 1940. McCloy had just become assistant secretary of war under Henry Stimson, who introduced the two men at a dinner at Frankfurter's. They already knew each other from their banking activities during the 1920s, but now they had the chance to enhance their relationship. From the Frenchman's tiny office on the eighth floor of the old Willard Hotel, Monnet, in McCloy's words, was becoming the "*great, single-minded apostle of all-out production, preaching the doctrine that ten thousand tanks too many are far preferable to one tank too few*"[98] Monnet argued that the United States and Britain were still approaching the task of production in a piecemeal fashion, and that this approach led to the

[95] Letter from Felix Frankfurter to FDR, December 22, 1941, Monnet, Frankfurter papers, LOC
[96] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948
[97] Jean Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 76
[98] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 278

under-utilization of America's enormous Industrial capacity. Calling for an approach that put needs first before resources, Monnet insisted on an Anglo-American balance sheet of present and future production. The problems of mobilizing America's industrial power consumed the attentions of Monnet and McCloy throughout 1941. McCloy spoke with Monnet almost daily, either over the telephone or in McCoy's office, as the two men discussed and lamented the status of America's production effort. Robert Nathan, one of the young economists who worked with the two men, recalled that Monnet's persistent demands for more American production could irritate Americans, as the Frenchman dismissed their concerns that "*highly excessive goals would almost certainly result in chaos in the armament industries*."[99] McCloy, however, supported Monnet's calls for a more significant American effort. After President Roosevelt's declaration of an Unlimited National Emergency, McCloy and Monnet, along with the Nathan and fellow economist Stacy May, worked together to prepare war department orders for "a comprehensive Anglo-American balance-sheet" comparing American and British resources with estimates of German strength. The balance sheet showed that American production was lagging Britain and Canada and that there were severe deficiencies in the number of heavy bombers and tanks. These conclusions led Roosevelt to give his approval on September 25, 1941 to the decisive Victory Program for the army and navy. Monnet noted that this meant an "*immense increase in American strength and, by implication, a decisive American impact on the future course of the war*"[100]. After Pearl Harbor Monnet and McCloy continued to work together on America's Victory Program, a collaboration that was both business and social. McCloy and his wife Ellen dined regularly with the Monnets, often accompanied by the Frankfurters or the Stimsons, they celebrated New Year's Eve together in 1942. (Ellen McCloy and Silvia Monnet became particularly close, as both worked as volunteers in various wartime

[99] Robert Nathan, *An Unsung Hero of World War II*, in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, *Jean Monnet*, p.83
[100] McCloy Diary, January 20 1942, ACL

organisations.) McCloy even intervened in a personal matter for Monnet. When Monnet's Italian brother-in-law was arrested because of suspected involvement with fascist circles, the assistant secretary helped him obtain a furlough from prison[101]. However, McCloy's admiration for the role Monnet played Washington was most influential when Monnet's tendency for pulling wires behind the scenes caused again problems with diplomatic and intelligence community of both Great Britain and the United States.

4.4 New enemies. The British investigation on Monnet and Frankfurter's rescue

Even if in 1940 Monnet seemed to find himself at home in Washington, encountering old and new friends who were helping him to climb the ladder of power, he was not always warmly welcomed. On the contrary, at times his position in the American ruling circles was even at risk. Even among the British employees of the BPC, without exception, the Frenchman appeared to be the outsider. The fact that Churchill had given him general authority as an all-around advisor, and his alleged closed connection with De Gaulle, did not make him more popular. Conversely, over time, British Prime Minister Monnet's exaggerated distance from de Gaulle's Committee for a Free France". Even doubts about his loyalty arose.

His opponents and opponents were mainly in the highest ranks of the Roosevelt administration itself. Apart from Dean Acheson, Monnet had no friends in the State Department. One of his main opponents was the Secretary of State Cordell Hull – an old party stallion from the ranks of the Southern States. He resented Monnet's distancing from the representatives of the Hitler-dependent French Vichy government. These continued to reside in Washington, as the Roosevelt government maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy. This behaviour was in line with Hull's official American French

[101] McCloy Diary, February 23 and 27, 1942, ACL

policy, which was backed by Roosevelt, and which saw French Head of State Petain as a potential opponent of Hitler, which should be strengthened. Monnet, on the other hand, considered this calculation to be I and unrealistic and revealed this through the letters he sent to Frankfurter. However, he also avoided the American admirers of de Gaulle and the French resistance, which he considered to be hopeless. The State Department was not impressed by this and repeatedly threw him his allegedly too close to de Gaulle.

Even more than Hull and the State Department, Monnet feared another high official who was one of Roosevelt's closest political advisor – Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, whom the Frenchman had already met. The secretary had already tried to thwart many of Monnet's plans regarding American assistance to France and Great Britain, and now he saw with high suspicion his rise within Washington progressive circles. Several factors explain Morgenthau's mistrust – first probably the rivalry that existed between him and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, over defence spending. Morgenthau was also a determined and eager reformer who saw the French banker as a symbol of a world, Wall Street, that he despised. At times, the Secretary even condemned him as an appeaser to Hitler, if not merely as an enemy spy.

New papers from the British Parliamentary Archives show the extent of Morgenthau attempt to oust Monnet from the Roosevelt administration.

Roosevelt's treasury secretary believed the Frenchman had questionable German connections because the firm of Monnet, Murnane, and Co. had worked to preserve the assets of German subsidiaries in America in 1939. It appears In July 1941 that the Secretary sent a formal request of investigation to the British Embassy in Washington, asking to carry a thorough probe into Monnet's finances and foreign activities. Morgenthau is mentioned more than once in the memorandum prepared by agents of the Secret Intelligence Service and sent to Noel Hall, a former professor and in senior position at the War Trade department at the British Embassy in Washington, and a close associate of Lord Beaverbrook, the all-powerful Minister of Aircraft

Production[102]. Noel Hall, after reading the papers, thirteen documents, dispatched them to Major John Meade, of the Military Intelligent Corp in London, for a review.

The Memorandum, accompanied by Major Meade observations, draw a full picture of the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding the Frenchman in the months before the American declaration of war against Germany. It composes of four documents. The first is a draft of what emerged from the investigation on Monnet's activities in Washington and his contacts abroad. Attached, two briefings about the Frenchman biography and his company Monnet, Murnane & Co. The memo is complemented with a comment by Major Meade.

The first element of suspicion raised by the memorandum regards Monnet's family situation and his accommodation in Washington. The fact that most of his family continued to reside in France is viewed as dangerous "*This fact might well be used to extract information from him"*[103]. The second point regards something that does not appear in any of the archives regarding Monnet's life in Washington. The Frenchman, his wife, daughters, cook and maid had moved on October 15, 1940, to a house in 2415 Foxhall Road, N.W., Washington, from a suite in the Wardman Park Hotel in the capital. Monnet in his Memoires tells how much he loved the house and Rock Creek Park, which he regarded as his own garden, taking constitutionals with Justice Frankfurter any time they could. Without further explanation, the memo attests that the house was *"given up by Baron Maximillian Hugo von Pagenhardt in order that Monnet might occupy it"*. The documents do not cite a source about this information, or about why the Baron would "*give up"* his house for an enemy official (Monnet at this time had a British passport) to use it.

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[102] Noel Hall to John Maude, marked as "Most Secret", BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA

[103] John Maude to Noel Hall, Memorandum on Jean Monnet, BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA. There is no proof that Monnet had reason to worry about the safety of his family or of their use by the Germans to extract information from him.

The Baron, a building contractor in the United States, after having married an American citizen, Marie Adams, was under surveillance by the Secret Service because of his connection with Vice-Admiral Emden, German Naval Attaché in Washington. John Maude asks, in his comment about the content of the memorandum, to investigate if there was some *"perhaps significant arrangement between Von Pagenhardt and Monnet"*. Without further documentation, we cannot say if there existed a *german* arrangement for Monnet to live in the house within the exclusive Georgetown suburb. Therefore this point remains an open question.

The memorandum goes on raising a third severe matter of suspicion. During June 1940, the Secret Service had intercepted a letter from Hervé Alphand, De Gaulle advisor and ex French Financial Attaché in Moscow and Washington, to an unnamed official within the Vichy government. Monnet, as we mentioned before, knew Alphand from the time the attaché had helped him in the matters regarding his wife's divorce in Moscow. The letter cannot be found in Alphand's papers at the Archives Diplomatiques at the French ministry of foreign affairs in Paris. The memo mentions Monnet as a "*source of information which Alphand is sending to Vichy on such subjects as aeroplanes production, present and potential deliveries to England and other statistics*". The original document, quoted by the memo, reads as follow "*this is the opinion of M. MARLIO (sic) who has just made a tour of the States, and it is also the opinion of Jean Monnet who, after having directed the Anglo-French Executive Committee during the war, actually collaborates in English and American armament plans. He thinks that the Air programme will be carried out, and that the enormous credits to be voted by Congress will allow war production of a size unknown to the world before*"[104]. Follows, exact estimates of American monthly aircraft production that only someone inside the British Purchasing Commission could have access to.

[104] John Maude to Noel Hall, Memorandum on Jean Monnet, BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA, p.4

The fact that the letter quotes Monnet as a source of information does not explain how these data were communicated to Alphand, whether directly or indirectly by Monnet. However, the presence of a direct quotation, in inverted commas, saying that "*Jean Monnet observed that up till now the English armament programme had progressed more or less normally, since actual production was only about 15% lower than estimated production"*[105], would suggest a direct conversation between the two Frenchmen regarding American air production. Of course, it does not appear clear if Monnet had been passing on accurate information whether carelessly or deliberately. Major Meude, commenting this point, asks for the British Embassy's opinion on the matter.

The memorandum now comes to the most damming piece of information of the dossier, and it regards Monnet's relationship with Murnane. During the same months, British intelligence, co-adjuvated by American intelligence and the FBI, was trying to counter German influence in South America[106]. After an operation against one of the foremost German agents in South America, the businessman Fritz Fenthol, all his notes and correspondence were seized by the British. Among them was the following: "*George Murnane, 30 Broad Street, New York City, is connected with the Directors of the Reichsbank and with Dr. Schacht, friend of Diehn, General Manager of Potash Syndicate. Murnane arranged for the first temporary credit of United States to Germany"*[107]. Fenthol visited Murnane on July 18, 1940, to discuss the German war situation. The dossier quotes Murnane making no secret of his belief that the United States would soon enter the war should peace not be restored shortly. The note by Fenthol continuous. "*Murnane's partner, Mr. Monnet, who is now in England, has written a detailed letter about the situation there (*underlined in the document*). (...) Monnet believes England can still resist for a considerable time, at least a year*

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[105] *idem*

[106] Cole Blasier, *The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946)*, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Feb., 1972), pp. 26-54

[107] John Maude to Noel Hall, Memorandum on Jean Monnet, BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA, p.5

and a half". Murnane then asked Fenthol to give his best regards to Schacht and Diehn in Berlin. To the dossier is attached a short history of Monnet's relationship with Murnane. The comment by Meude shows his great anxiety at the idea of such information being given the to Germans. Even if Monnet believed in Murnane's honesty, there was a danger of being used as a source of inside information by German intelligence.

The same level of anxiety is shown at the news that Monnet had been talking about British policies regarding war material with Marcus Wallenberg, of Enskilda Bank in Stockholm, visiting Washington in May 1941. The dossier includes a note from the banker's diary, without saying if it had been Wallenberg to have given it to British intelligence. The note includes Monnet's thoughts about British situation in the Mediterranean, the Anglophone sentiments within the Vichy government, and most importantly about the chances of success of a "*Swedish claim for war material"*, which Monnet regarded as very small if "*it came up before the British Purchasing Commission"*. The Frenchmen suggested that the matter could be settled by the State Department in Washington instead. "*Could the equipment of Sweden be considered as being helpful of Germany?"* asks Wallenberg. Monnet responded presenting British reasons of warry about Swedish intentions of acquiring war material. "*if the Mediterranean were successfully purged (*by the German and Italian fleet.) *Sweden would have no chance to resist German claims"*. Wallenberg then replied that *there is the possibility that we could negotiate with them, if it comes to that",* since "*iron ore has lost importance now that Germany controlled Alsace-Lorraine"*[108]. The note ends with Monnet promising to introduce the Swedish banker to Purvis, at the British Purchasing Commission.

[108] John Maude to Noel Hall, Memorandum on Jean Monnet, BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA, p.8

Of course, nobody can say if Monnet was giving exact information regarding BPC position on the Swedish trade situation. Analysing the note from Monnet's perspective, it could be the case that he was using this information in good faith, trying to picture himself to Wallenberg as the one who held the key of the BPC, and that could recommend him to Purvis.

The note is accompanied by a note by Morgenthau himself declaring, "*It is strange that there is no Englishman available to do the job and I cannot understand why they take the risk with any Frenchman, and particularly one whose family is still in France"*[109]. Meude sees this remark as an indication that the anxiety as to Monnet's position vis à vis the British Government did not exist only within the British Embassy, but also amongst the members of the American Administration.

Meude catches perfectly Monnet's profile, saying that "*he is a man with a preference for working behind the scenes and who likes pulling wires. He appears to be the person who makes the decisions and not Purvis"*.

Even Monnet's decision to have an English woman as secretary is put under scrutiny in the memorandum, because "*the man who was determined while working for the German Government to make the best show he possibly could in order to produce an atmosphere of confidence in himself might do such as Monnet has done"*[110]. The comment by Meade continues by stating that people he had spoken to, close to Monnet, had guaranteed for his integrity. "*I am sufficiently well-informed to be able to say that an entirely reliable source has given me considerable assurances that Monnet is a man of no Vichy tendencies whatsoever"*. This source is not named, but Meade ends by stating that even if this is true "*it is not very likely that he would indicate anything other*

[109]*Idem,* p. 13

[110] John Maude to Noel Hall, Memorandum on Jean Monnet, BBK-D-402, Lord Beaverbrook's papers, PA, p.2

than devotion to the British cause to those persons on the British side with whom he came in contact"[111].

We do not know how the investigation was carried through after the British Embassy in Washington received this memo in July 1941. What emerges from the source is a prompt request, in November 1941, from Lord Halifax, the new British ambassador in Washington to Frankfurter to put on paper the view taken here of Jean Monnet and his services. Halifax's request was likely prompted both by the effort of British intelligence which likely had sent him the dossier and by the concerted efforts of treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau to get Monnet fired. He distrusted Monnet's interwar connections to the Republican law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, John Foster Dulles's firm.

Frankfurter, who considered Monnet "*a teacher to our Defense establishment*" assembled a vigorous defence of Monnet to present to Halifax. He spoke with numerous officials, including Harry Hopkins, Henry Stimson, Robert Lovett, and McCloy, all of whom praised Monnet's efforts. Frankfurter's letter to Halifax contains a long quote from the letter he solicited from McCloy: "*On reflection I think [Monnet] has been responsible more than anyone connected with the British mission ... for the orientation of the men with whom he comes in contact in the War Department to the primary task which the United States must perform if it is to act effectively in the war. For one reason or another – perhaps because of diffidence, perhaps because so many are compelled to respond so continuously to the motivation of the last cable from London the result is that Monnet is the only one from their shop who talks and presses to the point almost of irritation the broad picture of the United States obligation. He spares himself no indignity or rebuff but before long he has the Army officers repeating his arguments. He thinks on the basis of a wide experience and wide contacts with the men of influence in three different governments, all of whom struggled with the problems of supply in war, not only in this war but in the last, and the quality and plane of his thinking shows it. Monnet has the advantage*

[111] *idem*

of knowing both the British and Americans well, but he contributes his own method of thinking and working which neither the British nor the Americans seem to be able to duplicate for its effect. You know the regard in which he is held among those in high place. I see his influence on the hewers of wood and I repeat, in my judgment no one in the British mission, capable as so many of them are, is near the equal of Monnet, measured in terms of influence on the War Department's approach to British supply needs"[112]

McCloy although concluded his evaluation with a comment that Frankfurter chose not to pass along to Halifax: "*As for [Monnet's] national loyalties, they are unimportant whatever they are. I know you can depend on his loyalty to the main task*."[113] McCloy's letter is worth quoting at length because his assessment of Monnet's influence and style changed little over the next forty years. Not surprisingly, the self-made man in McCloy admired some of the qualities he was known for, such as extraordinary tenacity and persistence in the face of overwhelming obstacles. McCloy and Frankfurter both recognised in Monnet a man who combined vision with pragmatism in a manner that was rare in wartime Washington. Monnet's willingness to repeat the same arguments over and over, to be the "*apostle of all-out production*," and to suffer indignity and rebuff in this role, impressed McCloy. He also admired the cosmopolitan character of Monnet's approach and experience, the "wide plane" of his thinking that contributed historical perspective and authority to his arguments. With a man of such qualities it was unimportant what his national loyalties were, though Morgenthau's suspicions had planted this doubt among some leaders in Washington and London.

[112] Felix Frankfurter to Lord Halifax, letter, November 14, 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[113] John McCloy to Frankfurter, November 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LOC

4.5 Conclusion

Assignments from the prime ministers of France and Great Britain between 1938 and 1942 catapulted Monnet into the governing circles of Paris, London, and Washington and earned him a reputation as a man of both strategic vision and action. He demonstrated that he could, with foresight, identify a problem in the rapidly changing international situation, design a solution, and then implement it. Monnet utilised his World War I experience and the French and British wartime predicaments in 1939-1940 to coordinate the Allied supply effort. He had understood earlier than many the extent of Allied dependence on the United States as a source of supplies and war materials and that the fate of Europe would be determined by the industrial and agricultural power of the United States. Because of his knowledge, persistence, and persuasive abilities, first Churchill and then US officials listened to him. He incessantly propagated his belief in the ability of the US economy to expand almost without limit. Moreover, because Roosevelt found many of the Frenchman's views compatible with his own, he was encouraged by Monnet to take bold and dramatic steps to increase US wartime production and thereby helped spur mobilisation of the US economy. By becoming the wartime supplier for the Allies, the United States helped the Allies hold the line against Germany until it could join the effort.

During these diplomatic missions, Monnet forged relationships and gained knowledge and contacts in London and Washington that would assist him in his later post-war efforts to reconstruct the French economy and restore France to a position of influence in Europe. Having established close relations with Hopkins, Stimson, and McCloy, and having won the respect of many influential US and British officials, he helped to lay the foundation for a lasting transatlantic relationship that was needed to beat the Germans.

Moreover, his success at winning respect and trust of the US president as well as Hopkins enabled him to utilise this access to influence Roosevelt in 1943 and gain an assignment from him that proved beneficial to his own divided country, which was suffering from a humiliating defeat.

5. The road to Algiers, 1943. Transatlantic networks and informal diplomacy

Jean Monnet remains in Washington, serving within the British Supply Council and Shipping Commission, until February 1943. That year is pivotal not only for the war effort but also for the emergence of the post-war order. Monnet's network played a role in both, as an instrument of foreign policy and most importantly as an active study-group, producing visions of which place France and Europe would occupy in a world dominated by the United States.

This chapter will analyse the place Monnet had within Roosevelt's strategy regarding France and how his network became a buffer between Gaullist ambitions and American pragmatism in the subtle geopolitical game played by the allied diplomatic circle in Algiers after Operation Torch and the Casablanca Conference.

5.1 Which France, which Europe. De Gaulle, Roosevelt and Monnet

The end of the phoney war, on May 10th, 1940, brought by the German blitzkrieg through the Ardennes, prompted an even more accelerated change in power relationships in the era of mass politics. Whereas even during the 1920s and 1930s, ambassador and foreign ministries had been the prime vectors of communication and implementation of foreign policy, during the War, and certainly after the Fall of France on June 1940, the key players were without any doubt the statesmen themselves and their advisors. This is understandable in the context of war when decision had to be made swiftly without the luxury (and the advantages) of peacetime policymaking. Roosevelt and Churchill communicated directly or through a few key advisors, Hopkins and Averell Harriman from the American side, Halifax and Eden from the British. The American ambassadors in London, Kennedy senior first and John Winant later were sidelined, as was the secretary of state Cordell Hull.

The French instead were not in the position to be part of any discussion about the future order of Europe. Many exiled officials, both in London and in America, were forced to hope that General de Gaulle could occasionally get access to any of the statesmen making the decisions about the war effort. The lack of this kind of access is something that the General resented bitterly during the war.

The role of Charles De Gaulle and the same could be said of Monnet himself, reflects the effort of both Great Britain and the United States to imagine a future relationship with a prostate France, something influenced by the Frenchmen they met. This is a critical input in trying to understand how a low-ranked general, or a less known cognac seller, managed to captivate, and sometimes irritate, several generations of statemen on both sides of the Atlantic for many decades after 1940. De Gaulle, of course, merits to be mentioned. Carolyne Davison has written that "*dealing with De Gaulle"* was a problem, "*a disproportionate and unanticipated one"*. The general represented a continuous "*onslaught on US strategy for decades to come"*[1].

In London he had found a more cordial reception than he had hoped for[2]. Churchill became an interlocutor at a time when the General, like Monnet, had no country, barely any armed forces and was dependant on British aid and funds. This was a strange alliance brought by the necessity of war and masked a feeling of Anglo-French resentment that mirrored the hostility between the two countries during the two previous decades. Although the Franco-British alliance was an apparent inevitability in any post-war European future balance, there was no consensus on both sides of the Channel on what it would entail. Moreover, if in London De Gaulle had to rely on Philip Noel-Baker, another veteran of the League of Nations, to act as liaison with the War Cabinet, in Washington the situation was even more compromised by the President's view that there was no key voice of "France"

[1] Carolyne Davison, *Dealing with de Gaulle*, in Garrett Martin (eds), *Globalising de Gaulle*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2010, p. 115

[2] F. Kersaudy, *Churchill and De Gaulle*, London, Collins, 1981

to whom to speak. De Gaulle was certainly not one that Roosevelt would easily consider a reliable interlocutor.

The President and his secretary of state often referred to "*the so-called Free French"* and refused to allow France equal standing in post-war planning in any of the Big Three Conferences (Moscow, Tehran and Yalta). De Gaulle represented much of what FDR saw as dysfunctional about France since the 1930s – undemocratic, conservative in its political, economic and social views. In his own words, written to William Bullitt's predecessor Jesse Strauss, "*In more pessimistic moments I have of necessity come to believe just as you do about France and the French future—yet always say to myself that in previous parties France has always 'snapped out' of it. This optimism, I must frankly confess, has little foundation because of several well-known incidents in the past one hundred fifty years where revolution or its equivalent and the emergence of some strong individuals have proven the only salvation"*[3]. FDR is quoted by his son Elliott as saying: "*de Gaulle is out to achieve one-man government in France. I can't imagine a man I would distrust more*"[4].

Significantly, it was Roosevelt's wartime policy that would be remembered for years to come as being responsible for plunging the bilateral relationship to depths that presumably would never have been plumbed had a less *stubborn* chief executive been at the helm in America[5]. Crucial marks on that descent were many, the most important of which being Washington's decision to recognize the Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain as France's government from July 1940 until November 1942[6], the attempt the following year to promote General Henri Giraud as at least co-equal to de Gaulle among Free

[3] Elliot Roosevelt, ed. *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947, vol III, p 555.
[4] Elliot Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, New York, 1946
[5] André Béziat, *Franklin Roosevelt et la France (1939–1945): La diplomatie de l'entêtement*, Paris, 1997
[6] See William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble*, New York, 1947; Louis Gottschalk, *Our Vichy Fumble*, Journal of Modern History 20 (March 1948): 47–56; and Julian G. Hurstfield, *America and the French Nation, 1939–1945*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1986

French military leaders[7], and the very late recognition of de Gaulle as legitimate leader of France following the country's liberation[8].

As David Haglund says, "*So troubled were the relations between, on the one side Roosevelt (and it should be added, Winston Churchill) and on the other, de Gaulle, that it is easy to claim, as many have, that a better personal rapport between the allies would not only have enhanced their wartime operational cooperation but would have set the future of the France-U.S. relationship on a path much different, and therefore much improved, from the one it would take"*[9].

There is some evidence, as Andrew Williams shows, that FDR and Bullitt would have preferred someone like Léon Blum[10]. Bullitt, as on some many other occasions, was in disagreement with Hull, and sympathised with Blum as a potential future leader of France, someone who could establish a fruitful relationship with the President and that Roosevelt had already met in 1938. It is true that the former French prime minister would prove an essential interlocutor in the future, after he almost miraculously emerged from a German concentration camp in 1945. He was an instrument of Monnet's plan for the modernization of France, but in 1940 there was no chance of him as the man who could save the country. Even Pierre Laval, Prime minister in 1930 and again, now of the Vichy Republic in 1940, seemed like a better candidate for leadership than De Gaulle. The initial toleration, even support, for Petain and Laval, whom Roosevelt had already known from the early 1930s, reflected an almost desperate search for an able French leader that could be trusted by the administration without the intermediation of the British.

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[7] Maurice Ferro, *De Gaulle et l'Amérique, une amitié tumultueuse*, Paris, 1973
[8] André Kaspi, *La Libération de la France, juin 1944–janvier 1946*, Paris, 1995
[9] David Haglund, *Roosevelt as 'Friend of France'—But Which One?*, Diplomatic History, vol. 31, no. 5, 2007, pp. 883–907
[10] Andrew Williams, *Failed immaginations*, Manchester, Machester University Press, 1992

Another complicated relationship to fully grasp is the one between Monnet and the General[11]. They met on June 16th, after De Gaulle arrival in London, after Monnet, together with Arthur Salter, who was the vice-chairman of the AFCOC, had drafted a declaration for an Anglo-French Union in a desperate attempt to keep France from signing an armistice with the Germans. The General had accepted an invitation to dinner at Monnet's apartment where these men had their first encounter. When Silvia asked him how long his mission would last, de Gaulle replied, " *Je ne suis pas ici en mission, Madame. Je suis ici pour sauver l'honneur de la France"*[12]. In a brief morning meeting of June 16, de Gaulle, accompanied by Monnet and Pleven, asked Churchill to relay this proposal to unite the two nations to Prime Minister Reynaud immediately. Churchill agreed and asked de Gaulle to telephone Reynaud in Bordeaux where the French government had relocated. Both Churchill and de Gaulle had approved the text of the Declaration of Union as each wished to encourage France to continue fighting in North Africa, to bolster Reynaud, and to avoid a rupture between the Allies. The "*Constable of France*" as Churchill nicknamed de Gaulle, flew to Bordeaux the night of June 16 to convince the French cabinet to accept the offer of the Declaration of Union and personally deliver the text. However, he was too late. The proposal had failed in the French cabinet moments before. Reynaud had resigned, and Marshal Philippe Petain replaced him as head of the Vichy government that capitulated to the Germans. Monnet had persuaded Churchill to send him on a British plane to Bordeaux that same day, accompanied by Pleven and Marjolin, with an offer to transport members of the Reynaud cabinet to North Africa if they wished to continue the fighting. Nevertheless, upon arrival, they found the French leadership in disarray and unwilling to move, so Monnet's group returned to London[13].

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[11] Gérard Bossuat, *Monnet et De Gaulle*, Paris, Fayard, pp. 56-67

[12] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 23-24

[13] Fransen, *Supranational politics of Jean Monnet*, pp. 40-46

Monnet's several discussions in London with de Gaulle in June and July 1940 demonstrated how concerned they each were for their nation's future but how different were their approaches[14]. They both were determined to restore France's independence as a sovereign nation and to prevent it from abandoning the struggle against the Germans. However, they disagreed on how to achieve this. Monnet believed resistance ought to be 177ecogniza in North Africa, on *French* soil, under the authority of French leaders who were not under German control. He opposed de Gaulle's efforts to set up a French 177ecognizable in London, which might appear in France "*en tant qu'autorité établie sous la protection britannique* "[15]. Monnet understood de Gaulle's "*sa 177ecogn conception du 177eco historique qu'il se sentait appelé à jouer*". The imposing military figure passionately proclaimed over BBC radio on June 18 that France would remain in the war and that French people should rally around him. The Vichy government declared de Gaulle outside the law and sentenced him to prison for refusing to obey an order from Petain to return to France. Monnet wrote de Gaulle on June 23 about his disagreement with the general's idea to set up a French authority in Britain. In replying to Monnet, the next day, de Gaulle wrote, "*Mon cher ami, Dans un moment comme celui-ci, il serait 177ecogn pour nous de nous croiser, parce que notre objectif 177ecognizabl est le même, et ensemble peut-être nous pouvons faire de grandes choses. Venez me voir, où vous voulez. Nous serons d'accord"*[16].

Monnet noted that de Gaulle "*a 177ecogniz ma 177ecogniz*" to go to the United States to secure the armaments and essential material resources the Allies "*à l'heure actuelle ils manquaient*," but " *il a respecté mon choix comme j'ai 177ecogn sa 177ecognizable177* "[17]. The man from Cognac understood it had taken "*grande force de caractère pour lui, un soldat traditionnel, de traverser la*

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[14] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 78
[15] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 24
[16] *Ibid*, p. 143; Charles Cogan, *Charles De Gaulle: a Brief Biography*, Boston, Bedford Books of St. Martin Press, 1996, p 41
[17] Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 144

grande ligne de division de la désobéissance aux 178ecogn d'en haut "[18]. Monnet added, "*Il était le seul homme de son rang avec le courage de le faire; et dans l'isolement douloureux ressenti par ces Français qui avaient décidé de poursuivre la 178eco alliée, le rare exemple de de Gaulle était une source de grande force morale*"[19]. But Monnet also came to realise that de Gaulle believed France's role and his own were indissolubly linked. He did not join Free France. He put himself at the service of the British Government in the United States.

He perhaps had sensed Roosevelt's dislike for the General already in 1940, after speaking with Bullitt[20], and thought it was best for his country and for him to stay in Washington rather than in London. What should be apparent now after these pages, is that Monnet appeared in the American capital at a time when the White House was looking for a trustworthy French interlocutor, someone who could be a buffer between Roosevelt's strategy and a 178ecognizable leadership of a truly free French republic in North Africa. The former Cognac seller, after years of patiently building his access to the Oval Office through the unexpected back door represented by Justice Frankfurter, was the obvious choice.

5.2 The Foxhall Road Group and American French Policy

When the Allied troops landed in North Africa on November 8, 1942, they were stunned to find that the French troops fought against them. As several of the senior French military leaders who were neither collaborationist nor Gaullist were competing to lead a French faction in North Africa, the Roosevelt administration had begun focusing on General Henri Honore Giraud, a general

[18] *ibid*
[19] *ibid*
[20] Monnet, *Memoires,* p. 41

who had made a dramatic escape from a German captivity (something he had also done during the First World War). The American relationship with the General was complicated by the events of November 1942. Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's representative in Vichy, was sent to negotiate with Giraud. The general was convinced, according to the other Frenchman in the room, Jacques Lamaigre-Debreuil, that the imminent invasion of North Africa was only the start of a much larger operation extending to the Provence coast and that he would be commander-in-chief. When it became clear that neither were going to happen, Giraud flew to Gibraltar, the Allied headquarters for the invasion, to press the case for his command directly with Eisenhower. The American General then sent him, with his personal emissary, Mark Clark, to Algiers, where Robert Murphy was unsuccessful, to negotiate with the French military officials in North Africa. By a strange coincidence, Admiral Jean Louis Darlan, Petain's provisional administrator in North Africa, was also in town, because of his son's hospitalisation. With Darlan present, the military command of the French forces in the region refused to act on their own. Clark then asked Eisenhower for the authority to negotiate directly with Darlan. The consequences were immediate. The admiral agreed to an armistice. Giraud had lost any leverage.

However, a month later, Darlan was assassinated. For the American high command and the French military establishment in North Africa, the choice fell once again on General Giraud, whom, despite events, finally had fallen into the job he was seeking from the beginning. Although North African forces accepted Giraud's leadership, De Gaulle and the Free French were willing to do nothing of the kind.

Once the troops had landed safely in North Africa, Churchill again considered de Gaulle as his ultimate choice for leading the French. When Hitler invaded Vichy after the landing in North Africa, the awkward problem of dealing with a collaborationist government was solved. However, France still had two champions: Giraud supported by the Americans, and de Gaulle relying on the British. The dispute between de Gaulle and Giraud revolved around three

problems. First was the issue of legitimacy. De Gaulle's authority was based on the growing support for the Free French among the citizens of the Metropole and the resistance. His was a moral and spiritual claim: he represented French independence. This did not, however, have any legitimacy based on the law.

Giraud, on the other hand, could claim this legitimacy based on an official appointment by the existing authorities in French North Africa. This legality, however, floundered on the crimes of the Vichy government. Giraud tolerated both legislation and administrative officials sympathetic to the former regime and had appointed as governor-general of Algeria Marcel Peyrouton, who had been a former Vichy minister of the interior. He also made little effort to purge North Africa of Vichy legal practices. In the minds of the Free French officials, these transgressions were more than enough grounds for dismissing Giraud as unworthy of the ideals of the nation. Whatever the reality of the internal workings of the Committee in London, de Gaulle and the Free French represented a liberal, republican France. Finally, there was the problem of personality.

On the one hand, de Gaulle felt crowded even in a room by himself. Because he understood the fragility of his authority, he was not willing to enter any compromise that left him sharing power with Giraud or anyone else. On the other hand, Giraud, with five stars, outranked de Gaulle's two. For this reason, Giraud felt it inappropriate to accept even a position of equality with de Gaulle. Since US Consul General Robert Murphy's adverse reports from Algiers on Gaullism had reinforced Roosevelt's dislike of the volatile French general in London, Giraud became a possible alternative French leader in the eyes of the US government.

The confusing situation in North Africa put France on the agenda of the Casablanca conference in January 1943 when Roosevelt and Churchill met to coordinate the Allied war effort. Churchill persuaded de Gaulle to fly to Casablanca for a brief meeting with Giraud and the Allied leaders on January 22. This meeting exposed the wide divergence of views between the two generals. It

underscored the urgency of the problem even though they publicly voiced agreement to work together to defeat the Axis powers and posed for a widely publicized photograph shaking hands. Talks with Giraud convinced Roosevelt that the general needed help if he was to play a useful role in the Allied North Africa operation. His lack of sound political judgment and his deeply entrenched military authoritarianism worried the British as well as the other Americans. Eisenhower had thought he had an exceptional ally in Giraud, one who could win him the cooperation of the French forces and the administration. However, he was disappointed to discover that Giraud received a cold reception by the French in Africa. Moreover, Giraud had poisoned the whole atmosphere by refusing to condemn Petain or his collaboration with the Germans. De Gaulle, who had served under Giraud's command in the late 1930s, regarded this military rival with a mixture of suspicion and condescension, he believed Giraud was not only unacceptable as a leader but had no political value since his command derived from US authorities. A few weeks later, de Gaulle wrote his personal representative in Algiers and close friend General Georges. Catroux, stating that only "*la France libre est capable de générer l'esprit de guerre*" to make the effort of the nation "*constant et résolu*" and to be "*l'espérance de la résistance*".

Monnet believed he could play a role in Algiers that was useful to the Allies, the US government, and France. Since his arrival in Washington from London in August 1940, his close friends Henry Stimson and John McCloy had shown him Murphy's dispatches to Roosevelt and had given him first-hand knowledge of the complicated situation in Algiers[21]. Both of these officials also regularly consulted him about the likelihood of some of the French officials, like general Waygand, disengaging from Vichy. They shared with many in Washington the same agitation about the nature of the post-war order that would be established in the region. Frankfurter brought up also another troubling issue, the fate of the Jewish population in French North Africa, which during the years of Vichy government,

[21], Henry Stimson to Monnet, 8 August 1940, McCloy to Monnet, 10 August 1940, AME 31, FJME

had lost certain rights they had long enjoyed in the region. Hence the team that had worked for the United States military aid to Great Britain and had achieved such success in the American "Victory Program" joined now for one last campaign.

The combination of Frankfurter's connections in the American government and Monnet's contacts with the many French factions in Algeria had long before given the two men a perfect vantage point from which to observe events and influence policy. On several occasions in fact, Frankfurter had forwarded to Stimson and FDR information he had received, usually from Jean Monnet, on the subject[22].

In a note dated 1 December 1940 and addressed to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Monnet outlined his understanding of German policy toward France and his recommendations on how to counter it. According to Monnet, Germany had two aims: to get France to accept the "*New European Order*," and to obtain from France the French fleet and the use of French naval bases in North Africa[23]. The risk that the French fleet and North African bases would be turned over to Germany had been of concern to the United States since the fall of France. In numerous exchanges, American officials in France had expressed this to Pierre Laval, the minister of state, and Pétain, without seeming to put the issue to rest[24]. Monnet saw Hitler as competing in the establishment of a unified Europe, which German propaganda hoped to show in a favourable light. Germany needed French acknowledgement of Hitler's "*New European Order*," Monnet argued, because "*French acceptance of the 'New Order' is indispensable for the appearance of a New Order*

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[22] Letter, FF to FDR, December 19, 1940 (containing a memorandum from Monnet on the "New Order" in Europe dated December 18, 1940 and an unsigned memorandum on Vichy France), in Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, pp. 567-73; Henry L. Stimson Diary, June 5, 1941, Henry L. Stimson papers, YUL; and letter, Stimson to FF (containing FF's views on the situation in Great Britain), June 19, 1944, Box 104, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

[23] Jean Monnet, memorandum, 1 December 1940 AME 18/4/4, FJME

[24] FRUS 1940, vol II, pp 377-435

of Europe, and for representing England as combating not Germany but the unity of Europe"[25]. Hitler's campaign for recognition not only sought to demonise England but also to befriend the United States. According to Monnet, Laval and George-Etienne Bonnet, a prominent supporter of appeasement, were arguing in France that American sympathy would lie with the new Europe because "*it would represent the European counterpart of the U.S.A.*" and Bonnet had given a speech arguing that the United States was "*traditionally in favour of a United Europe"*. In July, Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's envoy to Vichy France, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that "*Laval is convinced that Germany has no intention to crush France*". He believed that "*the Germans entertain no such notion, but that their plan contemplates a European federation of states"*[26]. In the face of this, Monnet, therefore, argued that the United States should issue a statement on Hitler's "New European Order" and should do so promptly. This statement was included in the so-called Arsenal of Democracy speech that Roosevelt gave on 29 December 1940[27]. According to Murphy "*the President's speech has struck France like a veritable bombshell (…) It should put an end to the effectiveness of the recent German campaign here designed to prove that our Government was wavering in its policy of aid to Britain*"[28].

Monnet wrote a second note in May 1941, this time on the issue of French North Africa. Given Monnet's later role in facilitating de Gaulle's leadership in the CFLN, it is interesting that in 1941 he envisaged a scenario for the invasion of North Africa as follows: "*An offer is made to General Weygand to assume complete authority in French Africa. If he accepts, the landing troops will place themselves under his orders. Weygand will become the head of the Free French State. General de Gaulle will place himself at his disposition. The United States and Great Britain will treat French*

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[25] Jean Monnet, AME 18/4/4, FJME

[26] FRUS 1941, vol II, p 372

[27] For the text of the speech, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, 4 January I941. 4:3-4. As we stated in previous chapters, Monnet's influence on this speech reached even to the phrase "Arsenal of Democracy" which he gave the President through Frankfurter.

[28] FRUS, 1940, vol 2, p 433

Africa, not as an occupied territory, but as an ally. French Equatorial Africa will resume its place in French Africa"[29].

Not only, according to this proposal, would de Gaulle take a back seat to Weygand, but Monnet insisted that the Allies should immediately recognize Weygand as the representative of an equal and sovereign France. Murphy was secretly in negotiations with Weygand regarding the latter's separation from Vichy and assumption of power[30]. They had Petain's tacit approval for these efforts. Here, too, lies one of the origins of de Gaulle's anti-Americanism[31].

It is therefore not surprising that by 1942, Frankfurter had come to be viewed by the Washington community as one of its resident experts on the "French problem". Nor is it surprising that when the question was raised in the administration in late 1942 whether General Eisenhower should try to strike a deal with Vichy officials in Algeria, Felix Frankfurter was one of those called in for advice. Secretary of War Stimson invited the justice, Henry Morgenthau, John McCloy, and Archibald MacLeish to his home in mid-November to discuss the problem[32]. Morgenthau became so disgusted by Frankfurter's compromising efforts in the conversation that he later derisively characterised the justice in his personal diary as "*Mr. Fixer*"[33].

Monnet shared with these men his concern that once the Germans were beaten, French unity would be at stake during the rest of the war and at its end. Since Allied policy tended to accentuate the quarrels and divisions among the French, Monnet saw that his task "*was to preserve the chances of bringing together all those who wanted to take part in their country's liberation*."[34] With

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[29], *The situation in Northern Africa*, 2 May 1941, AME 18/4/9 FJME, This is the note as originally written. Handwritten corrections include the deletion of the sentence "Weygand will become the head of the Free French State" and the replacement of "himself" with "his troops" in reference to de Gaulle submitting to Weygand's orders.

[30] Murphy's Diaris, Yale University Library, Murphy Papers, Box 87

[31] FRUS, 1940, vol 2, p 456

[32] Henry L. Stimson Diary, December 5, 1942, Henry L. Stimson papers, YUL

[33] Henry L. Morgenthau Diary, November 17, 1942, Henry L Morgenthau papers, FDRL

[34] Several of these undated memoranda and speeches are in Monnet file, Box 85 Frankfurter Papers, LOC

foresight, Monnet argued it was critical to look ahead "*to the moral and material reconstruction of Europe*". He was convinced that a stable, secure, and united France would be again a major power on the European continent and felt compelled to go to Algiers to influence the evolving political situation there and to help reunite the French. Therefore, early in 1943, the Foxhall road group engineered an assignment for Monnet to be Roosevelt's emissary in the Europeanized picturesque Mediterranean city of Algiers.

5.3 The African posting and Frankfurter's diary

On Christmas Eve, Monnet wrote Harry Hopkins and Felix Frankfurter a lengthy memorandum, intended for Roosevelt, to focus the president's attention on France before the January meeting with Churchill[35]. Monnet stressed the need to make the French army in North Africa part of the Allied forces and at the service of the French government that would be set up after the liberation of France. He argued that the French people had a right to determine for themselves what kind of government and leaders should replace the collaborationist Vichy regime. Great Britain and the United States, he stressed, ought to preserve the right of the French to self-determination after the liberation. He distinguished French support for de Gaulle as a symbol of the fight against Germany and support for de Gaulle as head of a post-war government. Monnet stressed that French sovereignty could not be usurped by any pretender to political authority inside or outside France. He proposed the formation of a governing body composed of both Free French and former Vichy supporters that would be placed under Allied supervision but limited to local administration. The main Allied effort would be focused on the creation of a French national army.

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[35] Monnet, *Memoires,* pp. 181-183; Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948, pp. 680-681.

While Harry Hopkins passed the message to the President, Frankfurter raised the topic during a meeting he had with the British Minister for the Middle East and former Ambassador to the United States, Richard Casey on January 6, 1943. During the two-hour long conversation, the first point of discussion was Anglo-American relations, *needlessly damaged* not only by the war conduct, but also by the view, in the minds of many in the American public, of a *"so-called British Empire, (…) an oppressor people and itself under the rule of fox-hunting, old school-tie, Buckingham Palace, George the Third society"*[36]. For the Justice Atlantic relation could be repaired if the British could embrace a more liberal ideal of the Commonwealth "*scattered members throughout the world of a cohesive whole expressing and making possible a democratic society"*[37]. Casey was sympathetic with the idea and asked the Justice to put on paper "*the kind of thing I would say to Churchill if I were talking to him"*. The second topic was France. Casey was complaining with Frankfurter about Cordell Hull. The Secretary of State had "*bewildered him with a harangue of more than twenty minutes against De Gaulle. (…) He grievously complaints against Great Britain for being responsible for De Gaulle*". The same distinction that Monnet had already stressed to the Justice was also mentioned by Casey.

"*We merely recognised that fact that when France collapsed De Gaulle did lift the standard against Hitler and has maintained it since"*. Frankfurter then acted as a mediator, explaining "*Hull's excessive sensitiveness about his Vichy policy"*. The problem for the State Department, according to the Justice, was to sell to the public the appearance of Darlan together with Eisenhower, helping them to adjust to the idea of Darlan (and then Giraud) as an ally after being a collaborator of the enemy. Moreover, the British support for De Gaulle made every effort in that sense much more complicated. Then he reiterated what Monnet had told him days earlier, that giving the freed French a say on their affairs meant "*the necessary steps for properly mobilising and equipping as large a French army as possible under a French Commander, subordinate to General Eisenhower*". Moreover, if the future

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[36] Frankfurter's diary, January 6, 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[37] *idem*

of France was under Anglo-American trusteeship, that also meant that the allies should not "*allow anything to be done to promote the interests of any contenders for political power"*. He passed along Monnet's idea of a civil administration for North Africa, leaving the issue of a Provisional French Government until after the Liberation of mainland France. Casey then agreed to have dinner the next day, at Adrian Tixier's house, the representative of the Free French in Washington. Frankfurter smartly did not invite Monnet, channelling his ideas for him instead and testing the waters with Tixier and two others unnamed "*de Gaulle representatives"*[38]. Together with Casey, Harold Butler was invited, another old acquaintance of Monnet from the time of the League of Nations (Butler failed to be elected as Director-General, instead he was elected Deputy Director of the International Labour Organisation), now head of the British Information Service at the British Embassy in Washington. Frankfurter collected now the French grievances against Cordell Hull and Giraud. Hull had told Trixier that the French had to "*forge all their political differences until the war is over",* something the De Gaulle representative found as *over-simplifying the situation*.

The Justice then asked Trixier what it would take to accept a compromise between the generals. "*Giraud is a prisoner of the Vichytes who surround him. Once he is freed, there would be no trouble in working out an arrangement between de Gaulle and him"*[39]. Frankfurter then tried to figure out whom De Gaulle had a problem with inside the State Department. "*Everyone and nobody,* replied Trixier *"Hull, Welles, Burle, Atherton… everybody"*[40]. It is at this time that the solution they come up with is to send to Murphy someone who really knows about France because the American representative's "*knowledge is derived from his relations with Weygand"*.

Frankfurter had surely time to discuss this meeting with Monnet since he and Silvia were guests at the Frankfurters' the very next day. Any rivalry between de Gaulle's London Committee and Algiers

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[38] *Ibid,* January 8, 1943
[39] *ibid*
[40] *idem*

had to be discouraged, Monnet would later add, and that the French fighting forces must be given resources produced by the *arsenal of democracy*.

Acutely aware of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's and Roosevelt's distaste for de Gaulle's presumption that he spoke for all Frenchmen, Monnet asked Hopkins, Roosevelt's adviser, whether he could be sent to Algiers on behalf of the Munitions Assignment Board to assist Giraud. Hopkins passed, after consulting with Frankfurter and John McCloy[41], the suggestion on to Roosevelt at Casablanca. "*I judged that my most useful role*," Monnet wrote, "*would be at the heart of French affairs'*"[42]. Roosevelt consulted Hull, writing, "*Apparently Giraud lacks the administrative ability, and the French army officers will not recognize de Gaulle's authority. Since there are no French civilians readily available in this area, what would be your opinion of having Jean Monnet come here? [to N. Africa] It appears he has kept his skirts clear of political entanglements in recent years and my impression of him is very favourable"*[43]. The president added, "*1 am particularly anxious that the mention of Monnet be kept completely secret as everything will be spoiled if there is any leak*."

Cordell Hull disagreed wholeheartedly with Roosevelt, Monnet's connections with the London banking circles, especially Lazards, and Pleven, Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, brought him too close to de Gaulle to be trusted.

Roosevelt talked nonetheless with Giraud on January 17 at Casablanca about the plan to form a three-man Committee for the Liberation of France with Giraud as the civil and military head, de Gaulle as military deputy, and a third man a civil deputy for administration. The president added that Monnet best represented France and the French spirit in North America. Meanwhile, Monnet, leaving no stone unturned, arranged for Giraud to cable Washington that he would welcome him. While the general did not know him personally, Monnet had provided his political advisor, Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil,

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[41] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* p. 685

[42] AME 34/9/5, FJME

[43] President Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, cable, January 16, 1943, in Sherwood, *Roosevelt,* pp. 678-679.

direct access to Hopkins in December 1942, which helped Giraud obtain arms for a new French army[44]. In Algiers Lemaigre-Dubreuil informed the General of Monnet's biography and the influence he had in Washington. A week later, a telegram arrived, signed by Giraud, expressing his wish for Monnet to come to Algiers. Frankfurter recalls this course of events in his diary. "*Jean Monnet told me of his talk with Harry Hopkins to whom he told of the cable from General Giraud asking him, Monnet, to come to North Africa*"[45]. As Hopkins told Frankfurter, it would have been useful to have a connection inside the new French administration in North Africa, someone who could also act as a link to the British. In fact, "*Monnet has also a duty to keep Halifax informed of all his doings inasmuch as he is an official of the British Supply Commission*". Hopkins, also aware of what that legally entailed, promised the two to "*take care of all these matters"*[46].

The president had a chance to talk to the Justice about the meeting he had with the two French Generals in January. "*The president liked Giraud very much (...), on the other hand he found De Gaulle very difficult indeed. De Gaulle said that he is now become the instrument of a great political movement to which he owes all responsibility"*. Hopkins, talking to Monnet about the same meeting, reported that the general added: "*Such a situation is now new in French history, there was Joanne d'Arc"*[47].

The problem for Monnet was now "*whether to throw in his lot completely with Giraud"*, because "*he had no doubt such would be the issue presented to him by Giraud"*. Frankfurter, during another dinner at Foxhall Road, on February 8, stressed instead the need for him to remain as neutral as possible in Algiers. "*Precisely because you want a liberated France with the position in a New Europe to which her historic position entitled her, (...) and because such restoration of France is part and parcel of*

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[44] Fransen, *The supranational politics of Jean Monnet*, p. 83
[45] Frankfurter's Diary, January 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[46] *Idem* , 7 January 1943
[47] *Idem*,

the whole Allied cause, it is your duty not to male any commitments that would make you inevitably a partisan of one of the contending forces in the pull of French politics"[48]. He suggested to go not as an advisor to Giraud, but on behalf of the American and British government as a liaison for the French army. This solution would take care of every confusion with Giraud about his position even before departing. Monnet then resolved to put everything "*in writing with Halifax and Hopkins"*. On February 10 Monnet organised a dinner with the two statesmen to get through the details, which included a notification by the two officials to Giraud, stressing the terms "*under which he is being sent"*[49].

Roosevelt shared some of Monnet's concern about French unity and France's political future, as he told him through Hull in a meeting on February 9[50]. In a February 12, 1943, speech to White House correspondents, Roosevelt commented on the need to safeguard French sovereignty and the right of the French to self-determination after the war. Monnet listened to the speech at Archibald MacLeish's house, together with the Achesons and Frankfurter[51]. On February 20, following the advice of Hopkins, Stimson, and McCloy, and ignoring Hull, the president officially asked Monnet to go to Algiers as his emissary, *nominally on behalf of the Munitions Assignment Board chaired by Hopkins, to manage the rearmament of the French forces by handling Lend-Lease supplies*".[52] On the same day, Frankfurter was meeting Sir Arthur Salter in Foxhall Road, together with Monnet's friends Robert Brand[53] and Benjamin Cohen. The subject was something they all remembered, the Versailles

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[48] *Idem*, 8 January *1943*
[49] *Idem*, 10 January 1943
[50] Sherwood, *Roosevelt*, p. 678
[51] FRUS, 1943, vol 2, p 231
[52] Frankfurter's Diary, 20 February 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[53] Frankfurter took him aside after the dinner, because he wanted to talk about Lord Lithgow's, viceroy of India, reticence in releasing Gandhi after his hunger strike. Brand's comments were related to President Roosevelt the day after at dinner, the same dinner where they discussed about Monnet, when Eleonor Roosevelt raised up the topic, for the annoyance of her husband. Frankfurter would have a meeting with Sir Girjia Bajpal, the Agent General for India, the very next day, to relate Roosevelt's thought about the *Gandhi situation*.

treaty and what could be expected from a peace settlement after Germany's defeat. "*The discussion developed to one agreement – that 'it's going to be a hell of a mess'"*[54].

Roosevelt's line of reasoning is revealed in part in a conversation he had personally with Frankfurter on February 21 at the White House, and in his February 22 message to Eisenhower, which Monnet was entrusted to give to the General. On both occasions he stated that Monnet would be suitable for Giraud for two reasons. First, he was in "*close touch with the activities of all our combined boards. "I have discussed all arms matters"* with him. Second, while Monnet *"has never been identified with the Free French or any other faction, he has devoted himself exclusively to war"* and *"can be useful to Giraud*,"[55] Murphy, and Harold Macmillan, a junior member of the British government, sent by Churchill as a representative to Algiers, together with his assistant, Roger Makins, future British ambassador to the United States.

Monnet, after receiving the letter, called Frankfurter on the telephone, thanking him and telling him that "*everything worked out as he had wished and even better"*. He remarked that "*I am not a modest man, but I would never have written such a letter for myself as the President had given me"*[56]. The Frenchman, who would leave for Algiers the day after, recommended the Justice and his wife to entertain Silvia while he was gone.

After Monnet's arrival, six days later, Eisenhower replied that he was delighted by Monnet's presence and had been impressed by his character and his account of the situation in Algiers since his arrival[57].

The president sent Monnet to Algiers to bolster Giraud by serving as his political adviser and to help end the divisions among the French. This meant acquainting the general with US views, assisting in rearming the French forces there, and trying to reconcile Giraud and de Gaulle. Monnet, remarked a

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[54]Frankfurter's Diary, 20 February 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[55] Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 22 February 1943, President Secretary's File, FDRL
[56] Frankfurter's Diary, 22 February 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[57] FRUS, 1943, vol 2, p 456

Frankfurter with a smile, was in fact "*entrusted with the task of being Henri Giraud's thinker*."'[58] Always planning, Monnet personally telegrammed Giraud that he had been assigned "*a special mission in North Africa by the Mutual Assignments Board*" to assist "*the rearming of French forces*." To maximize his leverage with the general and to facilitate his difficult task, he stressed, "*Cette mission m'a été confiée avec l'assentiment du président et du gouvernement britannique*."[59]

On February 28, Monnet told Murphy that he had "*come to Algiers not so much to serve Giraud as to seek a solution which would create unity among all French factions*."[60] But Murphy learned only later that Monnet's idea of French unity challenged even Roosevelt's conception of it.

5.4 Algiers, Macmillan and the Jews

The ten months Monnet spent in Algiers are analysed by all his biographers and in much more depth by the work of Andre Kaspi[61] during the 1970s. However, even if his role in ending the *caesarean* struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle and creating the CFLN is well documented, it is worth looking at some of his fringe activities in North Africa through the lenses of his network, which was profoundly instrumental in achieving much more than merely unity at the top of French military and political establishment, as the diaries of Frankfurter, Macmillan and Roger Makins show. The shared experience in Algiers cemented this transatlantic community in forging a liberal anchor for the post-war order.

In this delicate mission, Monnet benefited initially from the observations, actions, and advice of John McCloy. The US official had been sent to Algiers on behalf of the War Department two weeks earlier

[58] Frankfurter's Diary, 23 February 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[59] Monnet to Giraud, 23/February 1943, AME 34/2/5, FJME
[60] Monnet to Murphy, 28 February 1943, AME 34/8, FJME
[61] Andre Kaspi, *La mission de Monnet à Alger,* Fayard, Paris, 1972

to ensure the creation of a well-equipped French army to assist the Allies in liberating mainland Europe. McCloy pressed on Giraud the need to purge his administration of Vichy collaborators and paved the way for Monnet by arranging for the two of them to meet with Giraud. McCloy also informed Eisenhower he would get "*real help in Monnet*" and urged the US general to keep in touch with the French adviser. McCloy's wife, Ellen, had volunteered, while Monnet was in North Africa, to look after Silvia, Anna, and their new baby daughter Marianne, born in November 1941, together with Marion Frankfurter. The diary of the Justice mentions many times dinners and meetings in Foxhall Road, as well as events to which Monnet's wife was always invited.

If Fransen says that Monnet arrived in Algiers in complete anonymity[62], the sources tell another story. Roger Makins extended the exchange of letters with William Strang, at the time still under-secretary of state for Europe, reveal much of how the British establishment looked at the French struggle for regaining their sovereignty. As he tells his friend in a letter on February 19th, in a quintessentially British way, the fight for leadership between Giraud and de Gaulle resembled almost a cricket match, rather than an epic *caesarean* moment, like the French sources like to describe it. "*On the one side we have honourable relatively competent, narrowminded reactionaries, whom we will call Old Etonians, and on the other side, faintly disreputable adventurers, whom we will call the Old Harrovians. The former will not produce the measures*". The referees of the match were the British and the Americans, which were struggling on the strategy to apply, "*whether to go for 'men and not measures' or 'measures and not men'"*. The Old Harrovians, the adventures Gaullists, had "*the object of getting into power with our assistance"*, and because of that they would produce both *the measures* and *the men*, since the Old Etonians were being *obstructive about internees, Jews, etc.*"[63]. The news of the arrival of Monnet, which was communicated to Algiers through Halifax, was not well received.

[62] Fransen, *The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet*, p. 156
[63] Roger Makins to William Strang, 19 February 1943, Box 520, Sherfield Papers, BL

"*The Americans are sending Monnet here, but I do not much care about it"*[64]. The British were of the impression that Roosevelt was "*sending to Algiers every Frenchman he can get his hands on to counter us on de Gaulle"*[65]. The only way they would accept an arrangement between the two French generals was for Giraud to get new liberal credibility, "*to find somebody with a liberal tag on him"*.

In Algiers, therefore, the first mission the Americans entrusted Monnet with, was to press reforms on Giraud. Describing his first meeting with the general, Macmillan wrote, "*His blue eyes, his noble stature, his fluent and almost classical French, his obvious sincerity- all these struck me forcibly. But they could not conceal ... his unsuitability for the difficult and complex task which he had assumed*."' He found Giraud "*a horse very much in the second class*." Rene Pleven, in Algiers in 1943 with Monnet, noted that Giraud was purely a military man who was not politically astute. Maurice Couve de Murville, a French statesman and supporter of de Gaulle, observed that because Giraud lacked political judgment, he was not the calibre of person needed to lead the French. As a result, it was *an unequal battle between the two generals.*' Alphand noted, "*No possible comparison with de Gaulle, that furious, violent, unrestrained force, that figure which breaks with the whole of the past, that explosion against mistakes, faults, and betrayals.*"[66].

Monnet liked and respected Giraud's character and ability and found him courageous and upright. But as he noted to Frankfurter, this general was stubborn, vain, conservative, and naive in politics—"*a man with a fine bearing and clear and empty eyes, aware of his great standing as a heroic officer, unyielding on military problems, hesitant on others. I shall give no opinion upon his intelligence, which was that of a general long schooled in desert affairs and inclined to simplify things.*" Monnet discovered Giraud was "*incapable of rejuvenating the army—it had 185 generals—or of eradicating*

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[64] *ibid*
[65] *ibid*
[66] Monnet to FF, 6 March 1943, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

the men of Vichy." He had "*neither the inclination nor the ability to run the large-scale administration that we had to prepare for post-war France*."[67]

Moreover, Monnet reported, Giraud had little knowledge of the world and of global relations. "*I have tried to give him general principles and to dispel his suspicions of the United States and Britain*," he wrote. "*In egocentricity, Giraud had nothing to learn from de Gaulle.... Each believed that he had a sacred mission. Both were obsessed by the need for France to be independent; and I can testify that Giraud felt no more committed to the Americans than de Gaulle to the British. Each exploited the main Power which seemed likely to bring him and France to the top.*"' Giraud, in turn, saw Monnet only as the one who could obtain the necessary military supplies. He maybe did not realise how much the Frenchman was manipulating him in doing precisely what the British and the Americans expect him to do.

Roger Makins makes it clear in another letter he sent to William Strang, in March 1943, after the much-appreciated speech Giraud made on the 14th, embracing reforms and a severe cut from Vichy policies. "*The Eton and Harrow match had finally ended in a draw. In the end the Wykehamists led by Colonel de Linares, with the able assistance of an old boy (M. Monnet), carried the day, persuading Giraud to return to the traditions of the old liberal school (Harrow). I shall be sending you a fairly account (...) and try and explain the sudden change in General Giraud's policy"*. It was perhaps without the General completely realising it, but "*it was brought about the arrival of Monnet with an array of arguments, and envied first-hand knowledge of United States opinion and, I suggest, clear and precise directions from the White House*"[68].

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[67] *ibid*

[68]Letter to William Strang, 20 March 1943, BOX 520, Lord Sherfield Papers, BL. Makins makes a clear reference to British cricket university tournaments traditions. The Wykehamists are students from Winchester College. Before 1855 Winchester was one of the schools competing in a trilateral cricket tournament with Eton and Harrow on Lord's grounds in Marylebone. Reading these documents led to an enjoyable and enthusiastic travel through the history of college cricket. For more information, Robert Titchener-Barrett, *Eton and Harrow at Lord's: Since 1805*, published by the author, 2005; WR Lyon, *The Elevens of Three Great Schools, 1805–*

The British knew where the General drew his negotiating power. In April 1943, after the negotiations entered their most difficult hour, it was clear whom Macmillan had to talk to, to ease Giraud positions and try to reconcile it with de Gaulle's. "*I knew Commander Poniatowsky* (a member of Giraud's cabinet) *was uncapable of writing a memorandum or a letter, so I at once got hold of Monnet. It seems that, thanks to the stimulating doctrines of Mssrs Monnet, Giraud intends to send a much more friendly memo in reply to de Gaulle's. Nevertheless, since Monnet will write it, it will be very long (*in italics in the text), *and very pedantic"*[69]. It is the famous note, only signed by Giraud, but orchestrated by Monnet, Macmillan and Murphy, citing the *loi Tréveneuc*, a forgotten law passed shortly after France's defeat in 1870. Frankfurter had already urged the essence of the law in January in a letter to Monnet[70]. It allowed councils in unoccupied *départments* to form a provisional government. This was going to be the legal base of the CFLN legitimacy on the international stage.

Monnet kept informed the British minister of every development of Giraud's position. At times, Macmillan would talk to Giraud, or Catroux, one the crucial negotiators representing de Gaulle, already knowing what they were about to say, since Monnet had anticipated the topics earlier, as he acknowledges in the diaries[71]. The 1943 work-relationship between the future Prime Minister and the future Father of Europe is one of the least explored stories of World War II. Dining together, talking until midnight became a routine and Macmillan diaries mention this continuously. "*Dinner with Monnet and the same talk as usual until 11 p.m. Talk, talk, talk and so to bed"*[72]. Monnet operated from four main bases in North Africa. He had a six-room flat in Algiers, 129 rue Michelet, provided for him by the American military at McCloy's request, an office in a former girls' school requisitioned by the Giraud administration overlooking the port of Algiers, a small refuge at Sidi Ferrush, west of

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1929: Being All Recorded Scores of Cricket Matches Played Between Winchester, Eton and Harrow, With Memoirs and Biographies of the Players, Spottiswoode & Ballantyne, 1930

[69], London, Macmillan London Limited, 1984, p. 72

[70] Frankfurter to Monnet, 12 January 1943 AME 31/4/2, FJME

[71] Harold Macmillan, *Macmillan War Diaries*, p. 68, 84, 121, 137, 144

[72] *Ibid*, p. 74

the city, and his favourite, a small *hotel* at Tipasa, fifty miles from Algiers on the road to Oran[73]. Macmillan and Monnet loved to go there. It was a chance to talk away from the diplomatic rooms of the French provisional capital. "*You will find Monnet there, in shorts, with American shoes and socks, talking, thinking aloud, dictating, playing a different part with each of his colleagues"*[74]. It was in this small mansion that Macmillan and Monnet wrote the agreement that ended the cricket match.

On May 9, Monnet had written to Hopkins again. Collective responsibility on the Comité was vital before France's liberation, and the loi Tréveneuc gave a robust legal base. "*This [last) question will really decide whether personal power or democratic institutions are going to govern France after the war. There can be no compromise. If de Gaulle agrees, there will I hope be unity. If he does not agree, then there will be a break.*"[75] Monnet and Macmillan now prepared a short text to nail down the underlying issues and make them as striking as possible for public opinion. "*Whatever else was clear about the document*", Macmillan wrote in his diary, "*it was soon apparent that Giraud was not to be allowed to write it*". On Sunday, May 9, "*Monnet and I motored off to Tipasa along the coast. We had a delicious bathe in a little cove which we found... We bathed naked, but it was a deserted spot; and we sunbathed afterwards. Then we had a picnic lunch. After lunch we drove on to a little town called Cherchell, where there is a dear little wooden town, and a lovely little harbour also many fine ruins of a large Roman city. We stayed the night in the hotel*". Then "*I went out on Wednesday afternoon (the 12th) to Tipasa with Monnet to talk it all over quietly. It was quite lovely out there hot but not too hot and we walked in the old Roman city and bathed and talked. I came back on Thursday in time for lunch*". And yet again on Tuesday, May 18, by which time the tone has become quite possessive: "*At 5.30 I went off with Monnet to Tipasa, to our little quiet hotel, our beautiful little secluded bay, and our Roman city (nota)...Wednesday May 19. Up at 7 a.m.; bathed; and breakfasted;*

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[73] Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 113
[74] Hervé Alphand, cited in Duchene, *Jean Monnet*, p. 114
[75] Monnet to Hopkins, 9 May 1943, AME 33/8/1, FJME

took the car up a mountain road; walked with Monnet till noon; bathed; car back to the hotel; Lunch. A very delightful morning; and quite a useful one. Monnet is still the éminence grise here, and if I can persuade him of the wisdom of some plan or other, he can generally put it over Giraud in time"[76].

The diaries tend to imply that Macmillan told Monnet what to do. However, since they describe the latter's priorities in precisely the terms of his successive notes, Macmillan may have influenced Monnet less than he thought. The result of the Macmillan-Monnet collaboration was the final set of terms for the creation of the committee of French union. The text was pared down to the bone, and on May 17 Giraud reluctantly endorsed it. De Gaulle should come to Algiers. In return, the familiar principles of Monnet's letter of May 9 were reasserted: the merged committee had to work under rules of cabinet responsibility and, on the freeing of France, be limited by the loi Tréveneuc. Giraud and de Gaulle could each choose two members and the Council, once formed, co-opt three more. The Vichy Governors-General still in their seats and Giraud's combination of military and civil powers were not mentioned.

Frankfurter, the Zionist movement and the Algerian Jews

Among the mush needed reforms Giraud was pressed to implement during those months, to achieve a clean break from his previous and toxic political experience, there was the issue of the Jewish population in French North Africa, which Duchene and Roussel mention only briefly, but that demonstrate an informal joint coordination within Monnet's network in Algiers and Washington for using Giraud to take care of a problem that especially Frankfurter cared for.

[76] *Macmillan War Diaries*, p. 82, 83, 86, 87. Macmillan later brought de Gaulle to Tipasa for a swim. At least Macmillan swam, de Gaulle sat on the beach in full uniform. Julian Jackson, *The life of Charles de Gaulle*, Penguin Random House, London, 2018

The Justice, together with his colleague Brandeis, was a prominent member of the Zionist movement, and the even after the latter's retirement, the issues regarding the future and especially the presence of the Jewish people remained of interest for him. One of his primary sources of information on the matter was an old friend, David Niles, at the time serving as FDR's fourth administrative assistant. With his unique expertise on the problems of Palestine and the Middle East, Niles, whom one law clerk remembers as a frequent visitor to the justice's chambers[77], was able to keep Frankfurter informed regarding White House intentions in this area. Because of Niles's political style—he preferred to rely more on phone conversations than on letters—there is little documentary record detailing the nature of their discussions or of their relationship at this time. However, a letter from Niles to Frankfurter that ended up in the personal papers of Charles C. Burlingham indicates that their relationship proved to be somewhat of an embarrassment to them and the administration on occasion. It seems that certain anti-Semitic groups were aware of the contacts and used them to fuel a character-assassination campaign, portraying both men as having too much of a "*communistic*" influence on FDR[78]. Frankfurter had other sources of information as well. An entry in Henry L. Morgenthau's personal diary shows that the justice discussed with the secretary of the treasury on June 3, 1941 the question of whether the Palestinians should be enlisted in the British Army[79]. Then, entries in Frankfurter's own diary for 1943 indicate that periodically he would chat in his chambers with men such as Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, Richard Casey, then-British minister of state for the Middle East, and various officials from the fund-raising Jewish Agency in Palestine, for the purpose of keeping himself informed on what all sides were thinking[80]. Frankfurter involvement however did

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[77]Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection,* p. 288

[78]Letter, Niles to FF, February 28, 1940, Charles C. Burlingham papers, Box 5, Folder 2, Harvard Law School Archives; untitled reports by David Niles, April 12, 1943 and April 30, 1943, David Niles papers and Lash, Frankfurter Diaries, entry for May 12, 1943, LOC

[79] Henry Morgenthau's diary, June 3, 1941, Volume 404, Henry L. Morgenthau papers, FDRL; Frankfurter's diary, entries from January 9, 1943, March 2, 1943, March 5, 1943, March 11, 1943, May 20, 1943, Frankfurters papers, LOC,

[80] Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection,* p. 289

not exceed gathering information, especially after the death of Brandeis in 1941, except when Monnet mentioned him the problem of Vichy's treatment of Jews in Algeria.

When Monnet arrived in Algiers, he discovered a very fluid political situation. Though Giraud was a fine military leader, he vacillated in dealing with civil matters. Being thus open to influence, he had been induced to retain the aides to Admiral Darlan, continuing uninterrupted the anti-Semitic policies of the Vichy regime. Monnet realized that this government's treatment of its Jewish population and political prisoners, as well as its repressive laws, were causing severe criticism in America. A complete "*exorcism*" of the spirit of the Vichy regime, he came to believe, was a prerequisite to receiving more American assistance. In addition, Monnet believed, this would be a first step in purging all Frenchmen of the taint of collaboration with the Germans, leading to the eventual uniting of the various factions. To facilitate this change, Monnet convinced Giraud to deliver a progressive speech advocating a move toward democracy. The already mentioned address, written by Monnet, Murphy and Macmillan, and delivered by Giraud on March 14, 1943[81], served to bridge the gap between his faction and that of de Gaulle. At the same time, the Algerian government nullified nearly all the Vichy laws[82]. Despite these accomplishments, Monnet's mission had only been Partly successful so far. There was still one Vichy action he had been unable to convince Giraud to reverse, the abrogation of the Cremieux Decree. In 1870 the French had passed a decree granting Jews in North Africa full French citizenship while denying the same to the Muslims in the area. Arguing publicly that the act was racially discriminatory, Giraud continued the Vichy policy, as he told Monnet, it was his fear of public riots by the Muslims that induced him to keep the abrogation in force. Seeking a decisive turn in American public opinion and a stronger commitment to the French, Monnet realized it was " *urgent d'abolir les lois contre les Juifs*"[83]. From a public relations relations

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[81] Kaspi, *La mission de Monnet à Alger*., p. 67
[82] *Ibid,* Monnet, *Memoires,* pp. 182-92
[83] Ibid., p. 190

standpoint, Monnet knew that it was courting the contempt of the American public to leave in effect a Vichy action aimed against the very group that was being so brutally persecuted wherever the Germans had invaded. However, Giraud could see the problem from only one side—that of balancing the rights and privileges of Jews and Muslims in the area he was trying to administer. Moreover, the ranking American diplomat in the area, Robert Murphy, who was struggling to conjugate his support for the General and the need to counter de Gaulle, was siding with Giraud on this issue. Monnet knew that restoring the Cremieux Decree would require enlisting the American government in the plan to apply pressure on Giraud. Since the formal diplomatic channels favoured a policy different from his own, the situation called for working with someone outside normal official channels. Monnet could see that the job was tailor-made for that one-man Department of State, Felix Frankfurter, whose interest would no doubt be heightened by the fact that he was Jewish himself. Because of the military situation, the only means by which Monnet could reach the justice was through official communiques from Robert Murphy to his superiors in Washington.

Furthermore, the effort required discretion in that Monnet would be undercutting Giraud, with whom he wished to continue negotiating. Any messages to whom Frankfurter would have to be very cleverly disguised. Indicative of the fact that Monnet had been correct in his assessment of the importance Jews placed on the failure to re-establish the Cremieux Decree, an article appeared in *The New York Times* on March 19, 1943 which was highly critical of Giraud. The piece was sent to Monnet by Walter Lippmann through Frankfurter, and contained a statement by Baron Edouard de Rothschild, a leader of the Algerian Jewish community, expressing his "*grief and indignation"*, against a policy that gave "*rise to a feeling of anxiety among all those who have been victims of the racial laws and among the miserable human beings tortured by the Nazis"*[84].

[84] *The New York Times*, March 19, 1943, p. 5. There is no evidence that Monnet was indirectly responsible for the writing of this article, but based on his character and previous actions, it is not beyond the realm of possibility.

This was precisely the specter that had compelled Monnet to seek a reversal of Giraud's decision. Asked by the State Department to comment on the statement, Robert Murphy termed it in a cable from Algeria dated March 21, 1943 "*a patently false interpretation*" and offered a point-by-point refutation of the charges[85]. Murphy argued that this policy was only a minor infringement of Jewish rights and was limited only to Algerian-born Jews. Moreover, a procedure would be established soon, whereby these Jews, like the Muslims, could acquire French citizenship if they so desired. Fully satisfied, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles used Murphy's data to answer Rothschild's charges in a letter released to the public. It was a very cleverly constructed response, concentrating on the many Vichy laws that had been repealed to the benefit of the Jews, rather than on the one at issue[86]. Monnet was prepared for this move, however. Knowing that only a full restoration of these Jewish privileges would be satisfactory, he brought Frankfurter into the fray with this cryptic request cabled via the State Department: "*I am shocked at the incomprehension shown by certain interpretations in the United States of the measures taken by Giraud wiping out all discrimination against Jews and also by the harmful interpretation of the abrogation of the Cremieux Decree. The telegraphic reply sent by Algiers to the Department. . . represents an accurate statement made after consultation with an unbiased and best qualified legal specialist. I hope that you can help in straightening out any possible misunderstanding. If any points remain doubtful to you, please cable me through Murphy*"[87]. The statement is a masterful deception. Murphy transmitted it in another cable to the secretary of state, written on March 22, 1943, thinking that the "*harmful interpretation*" in Monnet's view was the one having been made in the Rothschild article, and that Frankfurter, as a leader of the Jewish community, was being asked by Monnet to *quiet the Jews down*. But because Murphy and Monnet defined the goals differently, each saw the attendant "*harms*'" very differently. The misunderstanding

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[85] Cable, Murphy to "Secretary of State," March 21, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC; also, in Frankfurter Diaries, entry for March 25, 1943, LOC.

[86] *The New York Times*, March 28, 1943, p. 15.

[87] Cable, Murphy to "Secretary of State," March 22, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

Monnet really wanted the justice to "*straighten out*" was the one created by the first Murphy cable[88]. As expected, Frankfurter understood Monnet's request perfectly and began his work to undercut the American diplomat on his side or Atlantic. Though the normal avenues in the State Department were unavailable, the justice had never been limited by protocol. With Dean Acheson now serving as assistant secretary of state, Frankfurter was able to have this cable forwarded to Monnet: "*Greatly appreciate your message. Have neither knowledge nor concern for deRothschild. For my own understanding should like to be clear about scope and implications of abrogation of Cremieux Decree. Does it deprive of French citizenship anyone who possessed it prior to Vichy Decree? If so, how many and what is the justification for such deprivation?"*[89].

The question seems to be almost naive but given the nature of the diplomatic channels available to him, Frankfurter had a particular purpose. Already aware of the extent of the deprivation, he was clearly trying to begin the process of having the State Department realize and correct its own misinterpretations when faced with additional contradictory evidence. The response to Frankfurter's inquiry came in two parts: one public and the other by private channel. On April 4, The New York Times printed a new letter by Rothschild that renewed charges that Giraud's action was a "*vicious discrimination*" against the Algerian Jews[90].

Through diplomatic channels Monnet thanked Frankfurter for his letter and called attention to a new cable sent by Murphy to the secretary of state on April 17, 1943, in which the American diplomat admitted that General Giraud, by abrogating the Cremieux Decree, had "*deprived Frenchmen [Jews] for the second, third or even fourth generation of their citizenship*."[91] Still unaware of what was really

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[88] Any doubts that this is the correct interpretation of Monnet's message are quickly removed by the account in his Memoirs of his reasons for advocating the restoration of the Cremieux Decree. See Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 190.

[89] Letter, FF to Acheson, March 27, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

[90] *The New York Times*, April 4, 1943, p. 7.

[91] Cable, "Memorandum from 'Wiley' to Secretary of State" April 17, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC Also contains the memorandum from Monnet to Frankfurter).

happening, Murphy recommended that all this information, even though it was marked secret, be passed along to the justice[92]. More than a week later it became obvious to Frankfurter that the State Department was not going to press Giraud for change on its own, so he began to use Dean Acheson more directly. In a letter to his friend, written on May 3, 1943, the justice first pointed out that Acheson should compare the different cables from Murphy because they were "*in rather important details, different*."[93] Then, feeling the necessity to make his own views plain, Frankfurter recommended that Murphy be asked to respond to a recent letter by the famed neo-Thomist professor, Jacques Maritain, president of the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, that had just been published in the New York Times. Maritain had charged that the abrogation was "anti-Semitic," "*unjust in itself. . . [and| contrary to all the traditions of French law because it penalises retroactively persons who are in no wire guilty of any offence…"* He went on to argue that the action *"deprived of their citizenship men who are French by birth*," a group that over 100,000[94]. Maritain's extremely detailed refutation of the State Department's position also offered a solution to the alleged treatment of Algerian Jews and Muslims: provide the Muslims French citizenship as well. An undated memorandum discovered in Frankfurter's papers indicates that the justice had also drafted a comprehensive response to Murphy's argument, one substantially like Maritain's, but, for reasons of his own, chose not to send it[95]. Rather, in closing his letter to Acheson, Frankfurter gave this article a rousing recommendation.

"I attach importance to what Professor Maritain has written. Let me add a redundant thought-that I naturally attach importance to the views expressed by one of the most distinguished of living French men, a thinker esteemed as much for the seriousness of his intellectual contributions as for the disinterestedness of his spirit.''[96]

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[92] Memorandum, Ray Atherton to Dean Acheson, April 23, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[93] Letter, FF to Acheson, May 3, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[94] The New York Times, April 25, 1943, sect. IV, p. 10.
[95] Undated memorandum, Monnet file, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC
[96] Letter, FF to Acheson, May 3, 1943, Box 85, Frankfurter Papers, LOC

The justice's message could not be put more strongly-listen to the Catholic philosopher, who was supporting the Jewish position rather than to a diplomat, such as Murphy, who seemingly lacked both expertise and a sense of objectivity. In time, enough pressure was placed on Giraud, and the Cremieux Decree was restored by the newly formed CFLN in September.

5.5 A brief assessment

Andre Kaspi had already investigated at length the months of negotiations that led to the Giraud-de Gaulle agreement and to the creation of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale. Monnet had a crucial role in bringing together the positions of both the *Etonians* and *Harrovians* in Algiers, betraying his original mission, for which he was sent by Roosevelt, to help to make Giraud the sole voice of a French administration in exile. The Americans did not forgive or forget Monnet's change of hearts about de Gaulle, especially when it became clear that the flamboyant General out shadowed Giraud in every way inside the Comité. The struggle for recognition of the CFLN by the White House was one of the most significant failures by the Frenchman, and maybe the main reason he was not on the list of ministers of the Provisional Government created in Paris after the Liberation of the country in 1944.

His biographers focused almost exclusively on his role in bridging London and Algiers and creating the CFLN. Perhaps the reason was that a Monnet embracing finally French public service in a more traditional way was much more reassuring for a French reader than a controversial international banker moving behind the American scenes with a British passport and an Italian-Soviet wife. Becoming a proper Frenchman, no more an extracurricular one is after all one of his main achievements in 1943. From 1944 onwards his primary objective would be reconstructing his country's industrial potential and making it the economic base of a Pan-European trade area. He gained a place inside the Panthéon because he finally decided to be French, after a lifetime of being a wandering transatlantic entrepreneur.

Conclusion

November 1952. The setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community is underway, the project of ending the millennia old feud over the valley of the Rhine creating a unified market for raw materials of war is reality. France is once again a dominating force on the continent, with the help of the United States and with the silent consent of the United Kingdom. It is true, as Milward problematically put it, that European Integration is not the coming true of a utopian ideal, around the spirit of Ventotene, but the way western European nation-states found to save themselves, together with their crumbling empires, thanks to the genius of a few individuals that found in logistics the answer to the Franco-German dilemma.

Jean Monnet is maybe the most problematic of them all. Replying to a telegram sent by the Secretary of State to be John Foster Dulles, congratulating him for the enormous achievement of the ECSC and the appointment as President, the Frenchman sent a note accompanied by a bottle of cognac[97]. It seems ironic, after all those years of serving in various positions for which he was deeply underqualified, but the constant behind all his actions has been always the French amber liquor.

At the end of this long story regarding his early career and transatlantic network, can we quickly give a response to the question that nobody has never managed to answer: *what did Monnet do for a living?*

These is the question that guided this work of research and thesis and presented many theoretical and methodological challenges.

In the title we decided to use the word *brokers* to describe the actual role of the members of Monnet's network within the fields of International Institutions, Transnational Finance and Foreign policy. A broker is usually defined by his/her abilities to mediate between different interests, to create channels

[97] FJME, AMG 59/2, Jean Monnet to John Foster Dulles, 22 November 1952

of communication between actors, to weave a web of relationships between stakeholders. If seen through these lenses, we can comprehend much better what's the role of Jean Monnet and his accomplices in the story we told in these pages. They were not leaders or recognisable personalities. James McGregor Burn distinguished between *transactional* and *transforming leadership*[98], and Duchene tries to imply that Monnet belongs to second, identifying in the Frenchman characteristics that Burn usually associated with figures like Gandhi, or Roosevelt. This represents only part of the story, and maybe the biographer, in this imitated by Roussel and Wells, let the image of Monnet as Father of Europe influence and inspire the storytelling about his formative years.

Another word we decided to use is *political entrepreneur*, as defined by Christopoulos. In his definition, the Greek political scientist, maybe inadvertently since he does not mention it, was applying to politics the features of business brokerage. From selling cognac to selling supranational cooperation, one could summarize Monnet's experience. Indeed, the most curious and compelling feature of the Frenchman's career is how, as an unknown cognac seller, he managed to be one of the most significant grey eminences of XX century European and Atlantic history.

Monnet has been hailed as a political theorist where we can see he was not. He has been described as a statesman, however even he never regarded himself as being one. In fact, he was something far more consequential.

Monnet quit school to enter the family brandy business. The experience taught him consistency of method and the importance of proper handling of a complex process, like selling good aged liquor.

The brandy merchants thrived or failed because of fierce competition, but also depended on cooperation to broaden a market for the benefit of all. An environment were vigorous trade could thrive was a common good. That was a thinking that suited Monnet. In his memoirs he describes his

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[98] James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York: HarperCollins, 1978

home town as place where "*on a fait une chose, lentement et avec concentration*"[99]. That could have been his motto. To bring lasting peace to Europe there was the need of cultivating and marketing a grand plan. The objective was to fill the gap left by the decline of French foreign policy and internationalist thinking, being the voice of France when the country ceased to exist, a bridge of cooperation between Western Europe and the United States. All this through a carefully and tirelessly built network of likeminded political entrepreneurs, part of the second tier of politics, banking and law on both sides of the Atlantic.

The second question this dissertation was trying to answer was even more complicated. *Is therefore Monnet's network an Atlantic one?* The word itself of course relates to a concept that is both spacial and ideological. Therefore, it could be better put as: *is a group Atlantic just because its action and scope happen to be placed on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean?* This is an issue that has triggered a broad historiographical effort to methodologically define transatlantic studies, with various intriguing results. The point is to consider *Atlanticism* as a construct that is both cultural and political, the outcome of an effort to *invent* it by certain identifiable historical forces. Mariano cleverly says, "*is the sense of 'we-ness' based on shared traditions and value a mere rhetorical device aimed at legitimizing interests and policies or is it rather a constitutive part of these interests and policies?"*[100]. Analysing Monnet's network gives us a chance to try to add an answer to the question. The reading of the archive sources reveals that in the construction of the Atlantic space rational considerations about national, as well as private, interests, security, commercial stakes and long-term strategy were accompanied often by *transnational* symbols and metaphors utterly integral to those considerations. The cultural and personal approach to this network allows us to picture these groups, born within the growing and young bureaucracy working for the foreign ministries of England, the United States and partially France, educated in the corridors of Versailles and the League of Nations, as small

[99] Jean Monnet, *Memoires*, p. 46
[100] Marco Mariano (ed.), *Defining the Atlantic Community*, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 3

communities where the transatlantic ideal is formed, nurtured and invented. Transatlanticism was a state of mind. Being part of a network like Monnet's meant to act and think with a specific mindset, broadening and widening the possibility of solutions to problems related to the national sphere. It was quite straightforward for Monnet to think in Atlantic terms about the question of French sovereignty in 1943, as well as the problem of financially rescuing Austria in 1923. The same mindset was shared by many, especially in the United States, part of the generation that Priscilla Roberts identifies as the third generational unit of foreign policy *influencers*, the one in power during the 1940s, groomed by a previous generation converted by World War I to a long-term belief in the importance of either Roosveltian or Wilsonian internationalism. Especially the generational approach is another key element of the analysis as unfolded in these pages. Transatlantic elites are of course a very small and specialised sub-unit of the generation of 1914. They were largely male elite groups, with people drawn from Oxbridge and Ivy league universities. After having served in the war, they worked for East Coast law firm, New York and London banks, academic institutions and media. They were thought and groomed by people like Frankfurter and Brandeis, "*white patricians with a certain admixture of assimilated German Jews"*[101]. Monnet did not share the same background of these people, of everyone part of his network as the matter of fact. They were upper-class, wealthy and educated. Therefore, his greatest success in his early experience was to get accepted as part of this world for the pure merit of his achievements and experience during World War I and the time he spent working for Wall Street. Moreover, the absence of an active French voice in this political international space gave him the opportunity of a lifetime to become everyone's *favourite Frenchman*. For this generational unit to realise its potential it became, in the corridors and rooms of American law firms and British banks, a self-conscious group which took the chance of the war to transform the world making it at its own image. Perhaps this is also the root of its historical limits.

[101] Priscilla Roberts, *The Transatlantic American Foreign Policy Elite: Its Evolution in Generational Perspective, Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, no. 2 (1 June 2009), p. 164

These men went to exercise a disproportionate influence upon the conduct of especially United States foreign policy. It is not a coincidence after all that Monnet was a close friend of every single *Wise Man* from the 1940s[102]. The public, during the following decades, in both Europe and the USA, was to be offered a choice between alternative policies only on occasions when members of this inner circle disagreed among themselves. The technocratic nature of European integration is another example of this predicament.

In conclusion, the use of the word *Atlanticism* leads to a final reflexion. The recent trend of transnational, area and Atlantic studies owes much, as Bernard Baylin so cleverly states, to contemporary political imperatives. It would be true also of this work if the story of Monnet's network was to be related to recent events in politics that in some ways, betrayed the spirit of cooperation those people aspired to. However, this was not the purpose of this research. Moreover, the word *Atlanticist* sometimes used only to describe pro-American European initiatives, or Europhile temptations in US foreign policy does not fully grasp the tone and texture of one of the most exceptional products of XX century life. The Atlantic is not merely a space behind the clash between the new and old world. It is a unique community, where not only past and future encounter, but also national, regional and global realms of power, internationalism and nationalism, instances of preservation of falling empires and supranational temptations. This imaginary is recalled in many of the documents cited in this work, but mostly in an address by John Foster Dulles from 1948. "*What is that Americans want? Not world mastery, a place to dump our surplus goods. American hopes as regards to Europe are precisely the opposite of those which unfriendly sources impute to us. We want Europe to have so much political strength that neither the United States nor any other power whatsoever will ever be able to use Europe for purposes alien to the free development of Europe itself. We want Europe to be sufficiently united so that, practically, we can work with it. We want a*

[102] Walter Isaacson, Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men, six friends and the world they created*, Simon&Schouster, New York, 1986

Europe which will again produce great literature, music and art and such religious movements as have in the past, inspired and enriched the world"[103]. What Dulles here is describing is not only an alliance but something that resembles very closely the kind of relationship established within the knitted network grown around Jean Monnet.

This group can be easily framed inside what Kenneth Wiesbrode calls the "*again fashionable concept of transformations in history and politics"*[104]. These people made possible an exceptional moment of transformation in the history of Western Civilization and succeeded in their post-war projects of international cooperation mainly through the lessons learnt from the formative years between the two great wars. The first of these was that grand strategies were better left to politicians and leaders, generals and presidents, looking at maps of too small a scale, paraphrasing Lord Salisbury. Diplomats, bankers, lawyers, brokers knew that the world would always remain a complicated, large, intricate place. Even if it was, and still is, growing smaller, a fully global unified space of politics was long to come, probably never. Therefore, the lesson was not to proclaim, not even recognise at times, the extent of accomplishments and goals. Being part of the second tier always meant that there was another problem to manage, a party to assuage, a job to do, aeroplanes to produce, legislation to rebuke, a conflict to fix. In the end, for these people the only goal had always been the same: not to commit the greatest sin for a broker, as for a diplomat, to presume of having the privilege to confuse means and ends. Their objective and drive were instead simple: to serve their country, their self-interest and, using instruments of cooperation that strangely mirrored the way their personal transatlantic networks worked, to preserve peace.

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[103] Address before the American Club of Paris, November 18, 1948, BOX 26. John Foster Dulles Papers, PUL. A Copy of the address was sent to Jean Monnet before the event for a review, AMG 63/7/3, FJME

[104] Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America's Vital Alliance with Europe*, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009, p. 4

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