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Foreign Aid to the Balkans 1990-2005: Who Gave Aid, to Whom, and Why: Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows to the Region of the Balkans in the Period of Transition

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Presentata da: **RISTO KARAJKOV**

Coordinatore Dottorato

Prof. Andrea Segrè

Relatore

Prof.r Stefano Bianchini

Esame finale anno 2009

To Paola Ferrario, a colleague and a friend. You will be missed.

Table of Contents

Table of contents	3
List of Acronyms	5
Introduction	6
Chapter 1 Foreign Aid, Motives and Factors: Review of Major Theoretical Views	11
Chapter 2 Foreign Aid in the 90s: Changes in the Foreign Aid Regime After the Cold War	42
Chapter 3 Motives and Factors of Foreign Aid to the Balkans: Review of Donor Policies	85
Chapter 4 Motives and Factors for Aid to the Balkans: Review of International Media	110
Chapter 5 Who Gave Aid to Whom? Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans 1990-2005	141
Chapter 6 Sectoral Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance to the Balkans	198
Chapter 7 Who Gave Aid for What – Exactly? Review of CRS Microdata on Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans	264
Conclusion	301
References	308

Annexes

Annex to Chapter 5

Annex to Chapter 6

Annex to Chapter 7

List of Acronyms

BOS	Business and other services
BFS	Banking and financial services
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EI	Economic infrastructure
ECHO	European Commission Office for Humanitarian Aid
ESAF	Enhanced structural adjustment facility
GCS	Government and civil society
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIS	New independent states
OA	Official Aid
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Aid for Reconstructing of the Economy
SAA	Sector allocable aid
SAF	Structural adjustment facility
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SEED	Support for Eastern European Democracy
SIS	Social infrastructure and services
WB	Western Balkans

INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the transition in the Balkans turned the region into a strong recipient of foreign assistance. The dramatic dissolution of Yugoslavia caused intensive international involvement in this part of the world and made the Balkans a visible issue on the international agenda. The Yugoslav wars of secession produced dramatic humanitarian emergencies and called up on the world to step in and relieve pain and suffering. The wars' ends raised the question of post-war reconstruction and the need of bringing life back to normal.

Simultaneously, the Balkans was part of another more global process, that of transition from socialism towards democracy and market economy. This transition was made even more complex in former Yugoslavia with the fact that it was combined with complicated processes of state disintegration and conflict. The transition to democracy in the countries of former Yugoslavia was by no means smooth or straightforward and it was an important item on the agenda of international efforts in the region.

Foreign assistance has been a consistently strong aspect of the international involvement in the Balkans ever since the beginning of transition. In the past 18 years the region has received massive amounts of foreign aid, and it has become one of the most assisted parts of the world. In addition, this process coincided with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the bipolar world, which in its own right produced the most fundamental changes in the foreign aid regime ever since its institution after the end of WW II.

Close to two decades after the start of this process, a retrospect of the phenomenon of foreign aid to the Balkans seems a well-timed effort. Over this period of time foreign aid has become an important aspect of international presence in the region, and of the political, economic, and social reality of the countries in the Balkans. Logically, this gives rise to many questions, such as: what have been the characteristics, principles, or drives of this process? Or what were the major outcomes, or results of foreign aid to the Balkans?

However the questions concerning aid impact and effectiveness are preceded by another set of more basic questions. They include: how much aid has the region received over the past period? How was this aid distributed across the Balkans? Who were the major donors and major recipients of this foreign assistance? In addition to this, why was this aid given, and given in the way it was, and what were the final goals of such assistance?

The summary of these important questions produced the title of this essay: *who gave aid, to whom, and why?* The title itself is a homage. It is a replica of the title of the influential Alesina and Dollar (1998) article *Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why*.¹ The other remaining aspect, excluded from the title for reasons of brevity is

¹ The first version of the title was a homage of a much older article with a similar title: *Foreign aid. For What and for Whom* by Samuel Huntington (1970).

“for what”, or, in other words what was foreign assistance to the Balkans exactly spent on.

These questions produce the central points of inquiry of this text: *who gave foreign assistance to the Balkans, who received it, what motivated it, and what was it allocated for exactly*. In this sense, the questions the text will look into are quite similar to those from Alesina and Dollar (1998), with the fact that the sample is limited to one region – Alesina and Dollar look into global flows – and the methodology is completely different. Whereas Alesina and Dollar use the quantitative economic methods, this text relies on the methods of qualitative research.

A note is due at the very outset concerning the motivation for this text. This text is *intentionally broad* in its research scope, and that represented a serious challenge. It made the text rather lengthy and it made the research of the numbers extensive. The author recognizes that a more narrowly based research topic from within the overall realm of foreign aid to the Balkans would have produced a more tightly structured and concisely discussed argument. Such as for example, comparison of just European Union vs. United States foreign aid flows to the region, or even to one country; or a discussion of just one type of aid, for example, democracy assistance to just one or a few countries in the region, for example Serbia and Croatia; or for example, only post-conflict reconstruction aid through a Bosnia vs. Kosovo perspective. Instead of this, a deliberate choice was made to pursue an inquiry into *all aid to all the countries in the Balkans*. There is a reason for this. Namely, the early stage of research of the literature for this endeavor came to an interesting conclusion: very few titles could be identified which have addressed this issue. It turned out that despite the fact that foreign aid to the Balkans has been a strongly relevant process in the region over the past 18 years, relatively little scholarly attention has been dedicated to the issue. First, there was little material on the Balkans in the scholarly writing on foreign aid proper, and second, there was little on foreign aid in the tremendous amount of literature produced on the Balkans in recent times.²

This point should be clarified further. There is writing, even though perhaps not much, on specific aspects of foreign assistance to the region, such as for example, microcredit in Bosnia, gender projects in Kosovo, assistance to media in the region, or US democracy assistance to Serbia, etc., but the more specific they are, naturally the less relevant they become for the overall perspective of foreign assistance to the

² One of few the titles concerning foreign aid to Eastern Europe, but which is only of more distant relevance to the Balkans (it focused mostly on the countries in Central Europe, and particularly on Poland) is Janine Wedel's *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe* (2001). A few shorter essays that have been identified through the review of the literature include for example, Kekic Laza, Aid to the Balkans: Addicts and Pushers, in Veremis Thanos and Daianu Daniel (eds.) *Balkan Reconstruction* (2001); Bartlet William, European Economic Assistance to the Post-Socialist Balkan States, in Bianchini Stefano and Uvalic Milica (eds.), *The Balkans and the Challenge of Economic Integration. Regional and European Perspectives*(1997); Kotios Angelos, European Policies for the Reconstruction and the Development of the Balkans, in Petrakos George and Totev Stoyan (eds.), *The Development of the Balkan Region* (2001). Among the few titles which have been written in local languages, the research managed to identify for example, Milardovic Andjelko, *Zapadni Balkan: Pojam, ideje, i dokumenti o rekonstrukciji Balkana u procesu globalizacije*(2000).

Balkans.³ As a result of this situation, the research found out that there is generally very little knowledge of the basic features of this phenomenon. In this sense, the answers to the central questions from the title do appear unknown, un-synthesized at present. This is, in short, the basic motivation for the treatment of this issue.

The central tenets of this inquiry, that is, the basic questions such as “who”, “for whom”, etc., are further integrated in a framework which structures the discussion around the basic question of - *why*? The question “why” is the question which concerns the motivations for foreign aid to the Balkans? The question of motives is one of the central issues in foreign aid theory which has been extensively explored over the years. This question asks: why have donors given aid to the Balkans? What has motivated them to such an action? This is naturally related to the general question of: *why donors give aid in general*? It is to expect that the same or similar motives which drive foreign assistance allocations to other parts of the world are also at work in the Balkans. In a sense, the questions of “who”, “for whom”, and “for what”, can be explored as functions of the question “why”.

For example, the motives determine the actual donors of foreign assistance. The extensive research of the numbers shows that whereas some donors had strong presence in the Balkans, other donors, which have strong presence in other parts of the world, were by and large absent from the region. The explanation for this should be sought in the motivation of those donors to give as opposed to not to give aid to the Balkans. Or in other words, it is the question of “why” which has determined the question of “who”. The same applies to the other two questions of “for whom” and “what”. The text will show that whereas some donors gave huge quantities of aid to some countries in the region, they gave substantially less to others. The answer should again be sought in the motivations for such a choice. And the same is valid for the question of “what” that is, what were the exact ends foreign assistance was allocated for. The text will also show that often there was an obvious correlation between the donor motivation and the types of operations they chose to support in the Balkans. In this sense, *the issue of donor motivation to give foreign assistance will be a persistent lens of the inquiry into development assistance to the region*. The issue of motivation will be explored through the review of the theory (Chapter 1); it will be discussed vis-à-vis the donor official policy texts (Chapter 3) and the political reality of foreign aid to the Balkans explored through an extensive review of international media (Chapter 4). It will subsequently be discussed through the extensive research of the numbers of foreign assistance to the region.

Given the fact that the text is broad in scope, it is perhaps useful to define its boundaries also by noting what this text is not. For example, this text will not be a discussion of impact and effectiveness, which are major issues in scholarship of aid. Some arguments will nevertheless be made indirectly through the close review of the numbers. However, this text will not try to give an answer to the question of: what was the impact of foreign assistance in the Balkans. First, the position of this writing is that that question can only be asked after this first set of basic questions has been answered. Second, another position of this writing is that the issue of impact cannot

³ A good example of writing on specific aspects of foreign assistance, or particular types of project are for example some of the essays in Siani-Davis Peter (ed), *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995* (2003);

be discussed in an aggregate, in the sense of “what was the overall impact of all foreign aid to the Balkans”, but only through a process of disaggregation and separate discussion of the impact of different types of aid. Another item which will not be covered will be private assistance, that is assistance originating from private donors, organizations, or individuals. This text will primarily be concerned with official development assistance (ODA) which is the foreign assistance given by donor governments to recipient countries. This is not to imply that this aid is given directly to the recipient governments. Private aid is by definition a small fraction in total foreign assistance (comprising official and private), but the bigger challenge for looking into private aid is the lack of organized data which represents a serious challenge. Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that private aid is a small share in the total. Next, this text will address but will not thoroughly discuss the related phenomena of emergence of NGOs, aid conditionality, democracy assistance, operation of multilateral agencies in the Balkans and so forth. All of these phenomena are directly related to the functioning of foreign assistance but they also have a life of their own which is not necessarily part of the foreign aid discourse. They will nevertheless be introduced and discussed, but they are not issues of central interest for this text. In essence, this text will be a study of the numbers of foreign assistance to the Balkans.

Overall, the writing ahead comprises two larger parts. The first one (Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) explores the available literature, official policy texts of major donors, and conducts a review of the major international media for the purpose of investigating the political dynamics surrounding the delivery of foreign aid to the Balkans. The second part (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) conducts an extensive inquiry into the numbers of foreign assistance to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005. Even though the text relies on sources from the literature, policy documents, and media, it is still by and large *based on the analysis of statistical data*. The three last chapters, combined with extensive annexes, provide in dept review of the numbers concerning development aid supply to the region. In addition, it is the numbers which serve as the major instrument for producing the findings on the “who”, “for whom”, “for what”, and “why”, of foreign assistance to the Balkans. This extensive study of the numbers has been motivated by the awareness that this is essentially the type of information which has been lacking concerning foreign aid to the region.

Chapter 1 which follows provides the theoretical introduction into foreign aid through a review of the major theoretical views on the motivations to give development assistance. Some of the major scholars and positions are represented in a historic perspective.

Chapter 2 discusses the great changes which have taken place in the foreign aid regime after the end of the cold war; it reviews the possible factors behind those changes, and it identifies the major new features of foreign assistance in the post-cold war of the 90s on global scale.

Chapter 3 brings the focus on the Balkans and it conducts a review of the official policy texts, documents, and declarations of some of the major donors to the region. It identifies the major declared goals of foreign assistance as declared by these donors, and it discusses the similarities and differences between them.

Chapter 4 shifts the focus to the political dynamic surrounding the supply of foreign assistance to the region, by conducting a review of the major international media in the 1990-2005 period. Through analysis of statements of relevant political officials, developments in the donor community, and facts concerning aid to the Balkans as recorded by the international press, it identifies factors of relevance for the supply of foreign assistance to the region and it categorizes them according to their common features. Chapter 5 commences the investigation of numbers and it reviews the general amounts of foreign aid to the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period. It starts the answers to the questions of “who” and for whom” concerning aid to the region. Chapter 6 continues the exploration of numbers through an extensive sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance to the region. It introduces the major sectors of allocation of aid, and it reviews sectoral allocation of ODA across donors and recipients. Chapter 7 continues the exploration of the numbers of aid through a review of the descriptions of the major allocations in order to obtain information on the final exact ends of foreign assistance. The Conclusion synthesizes the major observations and findings which have emerged throughout the discussion.

As it has already been mentioned, this research endeavor relied on the combination of several approaches for the production of its findings. Extensive review of the literature on foreign assistance has been conducted in order to acquire the theoretical material on the issue. Review of official policy texts of donor governments has been conducted for the purpose of assessing the officially stated goals of their foreign assistance efforts in the Balkans. Extensive review of the coverage of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005 in major international media has been conducted in order to grasp the real political dynamic surrounding the process, but also in an attempt to compensate for the lack of scholarly sources. Extensive analysis of statistical data has been conducted for the purpose of identifying the amounts and composition of foreign assistance to the region. In this process the research relied strongly on the two databases maintained by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These databases serve as global registry for data on foreign assistance and are the prime reference for all scholarly writing on aid. Due to specific challenges concerning the inquiry of aid to the Balkans, other data sources have been consulted when deemed necessary. Material from interviews with donor representatives has been used only by exception.

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CHAPTER 1

Foreign Aid. Motives and Factors: Review of Major Theoretical Views

1. Introduction to Motivations for Aid: The State of the Debate

The study of motivations of foreign assistance represents a significant part of the international scholarship on aid. This writing which has as its core interest the process of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period of transition starts off with a general discussion about the motivations of donor countries to provide development assistance.

The discussion opens with a review of the major theoretical views to be found in the literature on foreign aid. The major recent contributions have been consulted, as well as classical writings on the topic.

Several notes are in order in the beginning. Substantial part of the scholarly literature on motives for aid concentrates on bilateral aid, or more precisely, on the bilateral official development assistance (ODA). That is, it mostly analyses the motivations of donor governments to give aid to recipient governments. The focus on bilateral ODA is one marked feature of the debate on aid motivations. Naturally, related issues, such as the essential differences between bilateral and multilateral aid, or the role of private aid (aid provided by private organizations) are addressed in the scholarly debate, but nevertheless, the body of thought dealing with motivations of foreign aid is primarily concerned with official, bilateral assistance. This reflects the realities of aid. Aid in its present form historically originated as bilateral, government-to-government form of cooperation, and bilateral aid still accounts for around 70% of total ODA. Private aid (which is not part of ODA) is significantly smaller and stands at around 8-10% of ODA.⁴

Another important aspect of the discussion on aid motivations, and what more, aid in general, is that it often focuses on aid by very few countries. In this sense, as it has rightfully been noted, the debate suffers from a certain degree of “Americanization”.

Scholarship on aid is visibly dominated by writing which focuses on the aid practices of the United States. In addition, the literature is predominantly populated by titles and authors from the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

Many studies of aid focus primarily on the several largest bilateral donors, the US, UK, Japan, Germany, and France. This again reflects the reality of aid whereby these 5 big bilaterals account for over 80% of total ODA.

⁴ Private organizations, of which most prominent the NGOs, in addition to providing assistance which comes from private sources (individual contributions or mass public campaigns, etc.) have over the years, become an important channel for ODA. This trend became especially pronounced in the 1990s. Chapter 2 discusses this phenomenon in detail.

In addition, bilateral ODA has essentially been instituted and for great many years absolutely dominated by the US. Beyond the 5 largest bilateral donors, the discourse on aid usually focuses on the practices of the countries which are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.⁵ The DAC aid definitely accounts for the bulk of ODA globally.

At closer look, two sub-discourses can provisionally be identified in the body of academic writing on the subject. The first has the already mentioned focus on ODA by the biggest bilaterals, biased towards the US.

The second, coming largely from Scandinavian scholars, centers on the development cooperation practices of the Scandinavian countries. These donors, although accounting for a much smaller absolute share of aid, have been widely recognized to provide aid of better quality, guided by the “right” sets of motivations, and to be closest to reaching the UN quota of 0,7% of GDP. Nevertheless, although aid from the Scandinavian (or Nordic) countries is nominally smaller, compared to the ODA provided by the US or Japan, it is quite bigger when considered as percent of their GDP. The active engagement of Scandinavian countries in the field of development cooperation has also resulted with considerable literature on the topic, produced by authors from these countries.

Finally, and in a similar vein, Japanese aid can provisionally be considered a separate focus of interest, often of Japanese scholars.

This state of the debate definitely offers less insight into foreign aid which falls out of the principal focus of interest. At least two issues should be mentioned. The first is a) the assistance from Arab (oil producing, OPEC member) countries, and the second, b) past aid from socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. These two types of aid, although at present a less relevant reality - OPEC aid small and going to a limited number of recipients; Russia transformed from a donor into a large recipient in the 1990s - have had periods of historic significance. Soviet Union aid was for a certain period of time during the cold war a relevant competitor to US aid, in the struggle for global dominance (Guan-Fu, 1983; Lawson, 1988; Heymann, 1960; Horvath, 1970; Lumsdaine, 1993; Beim, 1964). Assistance from oil producing countries had peaks especially in periods of time when due to high oil prices, assistance from the West had declined (Neumayer, 2003; Lumsdaine, 1993). Aid from some oil producing countries was present during the Balkan wars in the 1990s, when it went to countries which had Muslim population (Bosnia and Kosovo).

Another observation concerns aid by the European Union (EU). The EU enlarged and deepened over the past decade and a half, and that definitely transformed profoundly its assistance programs. There is the impression that literature on aid lags behind in giving the proper attention to EU assistance, which is still often considered as just one more type of multilateral aid. The EU has been the largest donor to the Balkans since the beginning of the transition, and thus it will be discussed in detail further in the text. In this sense, the situation is a bit paradoxical. EU ODA will receive less attention in the theoretical discussion on motives; from the simple reason that there

⁵ The DAC is composed by 23 member countries. The DAC members web page is available at http://www.oecd.org/linklist/0,3435,en_2649_33721_1797105_1_1_1_1,00.html

are still fewer titles in the scholarly writing on aid which have dealt with the issue of EU development assistance. Yet, the EU aid will be quite centrally positioned in the later chapters of the text which will extensively draw on the numbers and amounts of ODA allocated into the Balkans, and which were seriously dominated by the aid provided by the European Commission (EC).

After these notes on the limits of the debate, the review follows of the theoretical debate on the motivations of donor government to provide foreign aid, as a broad, general introduction to the topic of foreign aid to the Balkans.

2. The Two Poles of Motivations of Aid: Self-Interest vs. Altruism

There is hardly a more highlighted topic in literature on aid than that concerning motivations for foreign assistance. Why do donors give aid? What motivates the volume, allocations, and type of aid donors choose to give?

It is a matter of convention, of common understanding, that the overarching universal goal of aid is - development. Whereas there can be a multitude of different, specific objectives of any particular aid effort, there can be no doubt that the final goal of any aid is to - promote development. Although not exclusively, ever since the very beginnings of foreign aid development has been seen mostly in economic terms. Aid is given to lift people out of poverty and produce economic growth⁶. As such aid is given to those who need it, who demonstrate the need of foreign assistance.

Nevertheless analysis of foreign aid has observed rather soon after the establishment of foreign assistance programs that allocation is not always proportionate to need. Some poor (who clearly demonstrate great need) can receive a lot whereas others equally poor, very little; similarly, the less poor would often get a lot more than the more needy. The reason for such mismatch between human need and aid allocations has been identified by scholarly thought to rest with - donor motivations to give aid.

Put succinctly by McGillivray (2003: 1):

"why do some poor countries receive so much aid and other so little? The explanations of most studies turn on the perceived motives of donor countries."

Aid is always allocated for the achievement of certain nominal goals, such as reducing poverty, improving governance, promoting democracy, strengthening civil society, helping gender equality and so forth. Alongside these nominal goals, theory on aid argues, donor countries have additional sets of motivations and reasons which influence the amounts of aid going to recipients. Donor motivations strongly influence aid decisions.

⁶ Nevertheless, one of the earliest foreign aid endeavors did not aim at reduction of poverty but reconstruction. It is commonly accepted that the Marshall Plan represents the very beginning of foreign aid in its present meaning. The objective of the Marshall Plan was to help the reconstruction of post-war Europe.

The exploration of factors influencing aid allocation has produced a significant body of literature. Overall, scholarship on aid recognizes two general views on why aid is given.

According to the first, so-called idealist view, aid is given out of a pure inclination to help. Foreign aid as an instrument of pure altruism derives from the philosophic idea that - there is a *moral obligation* to help. This view argues that there is a moral obligation to help to the poor and disadvantaged, and relates the appearance of foreign aid to the evolution and maturation of ethical standards in Western democracies.

Extensive analysis of the moral obligation to give would be beyond the scope of this writing. The most comprehensive treatment of this issue can be found in the classic work of Roger Riddell "*Foreign Aid Reconsidered* (1987)."⁷

⁷ Riddell (1987: 17-26) analyses the ethical argument for aid, by exploring the views on the moral obligation to help from the early scriptures of Christianity to the more recent pertinent philosophical discourses. He suggests that the idea that there is an obligation to help the weaker has existed from the very onset of Christian faith, and that it has grown and evolved inside theological thought over centuries. Riddell refers to some of the writings of Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*, to discern the distant antecedents of today's debate on the moral argument. Aquinas held that:

"according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material goods are provided for the satisfaction of human need. Therefore the division and appropriation of property, which proceeds from human law, must not hinder the satisfaction of man's necessity for such goods. Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, the poor for their sustenance... (cited by Riddell, 1987: 17)."

Interestingly studying more recent theological discourses, papal pronouncements from the 1960s in particular Riddell has also traced very specific arguments that states have the obligation to help "*the problems of underdevelopment* (1987: 17)."

Moving to the exploration of the philosophical narratives on moral obligation, Riddell divides them into several streams. The first, which he discusses through the work of Paul Streeten and Nigel Dower, builds on the basic premise that the simple fact of being human implies certain obligations (Streeten), and that "*being human is what is needed for human well-being* (Dower)". These views, according to Riddell, impel the obligation to eradicate evils such as extreme poverty stems from here.

Another theory about the obligation to help, which has often been used in development, derives from the idea of utilitarianism promoted by Jeremy Bentham. According to this view, expressed succinctly in the words of the DAC Chairman, in the 1980 DAC Review:

"the core rationale of development assistance remains the profound intuition most people have that unrequited transfers from the averagely richer people of rich areas to the averagely poor people of poor areas usually add more utility to the latter than they inflict disutility on the former (cited by Riddell, 1987: 20)."

Or in the words of Streeten, (cited by Riddell, 1987:20):

"the distributional argument for aid can be justified on a variety of philosophical grounds. Perhaps the most common is the utilitarian argument that a dollar distributed from a rich to a poor man detracts less utility than it adds, and therefore increases the sum of total utility."

In the second, realist view, the motive for giving aid is *the self-interest of the donor*. Primarily, this view sees *foreign aid as a tool of the foreign policy*, which is in turn considered to be driven primarily by interests of national security.

Aid as it is known today began in the aftermath of World War II, with the United States Marshall Plan for Europe. From the altruistic point of view, the motive for the Marshall Plan would be the desire of the US to help Europe which was devastated by the war. In the “realist” point of view, the US move was motivated by its own self-interest - to help its own national security by helping European security, containing the spread of communism, and by promoting the market for its exports. In the political circumstance of that period of time, the national security interest probably by far exceeded any commercial interest the US may have had in rebuilt Europe.

The notion of self-interest has been consistently present in policy making circles ever since the very emergence of the foreign aid regime, and what more; it was often present in what would at present be considered a “self-conscious” way.

For example, discussing the US foreign aid regime in the 50s, Hjertholm & White (2000: 11) note that “*most US aid was released under the tellingly named Mutual Security Act...aid was quite consciously used to stop countries ‘going communist.’*” Opeskin (1996: 21) starts his essay on the moral obligation to give with a reference to a statement by US President Richard Nixon that the purpose of aid is “*not to help others but ourselves.*” In much recent times, in his testimony before US Congress in 2004, Radelet (2004) has identified three motivations for US aid in the post 9/11 period: national security, promotion of American values, and humanitarianism.

The influential *Theory of Justice* of John Rawls has also been invoked to contribute to the discussion on the moral obligation to give aid. Riddell (1987: 23) suggests that according to Rawls’s theory of justice:

“not only people have rights to life but also they have rights to the resources necessary to create the conditions for basic life, even if acquiring these resources entails the extraction of these resources acquired legitimately by others.”

According to Riddell, this is the point where Rawls surpasses the utilitarian idea which he considered not to go far enough; to be in a manner of speaking, permissive(1987: 21).

A more recent short essay by Opeskin (1996), on the moral foundations for aid, distinguishes between two types of obligations; the first based on the idea of humanity and the second, on the idea of justice. The idea of humanity requires “*to relieve human suffering and distress, irrespective of state boundaries, whenever we can do so without great personal sacrifice* (Opeskin, 1996: 23).”

The idea of justice comprises two types of justice. These two types, according to Opeskin(1996: 23), correspond “*with the Aristotelian notions of corrective and distributive justice*”:

. “Global transfers of resources may be called for as rectification of the wrongs committed by developed states against developing states in the past, or they may be called for by way of global redistribution of wealth or income, according to some criterion of need or desert (Opeskin, 1996: 23).”

For scholars who subscribe to the realist view, foreign aid is a product of the cold war and the bipolar world, and it is nothing else but another tool of foreign policy. According to Hopkins:

“there has never been a pure economic development assistance regime...until 1990, cold war concerns provided the core motivation for aid...the institutionalisation of foreign aid after the Second World War occurred in a context of the cold war. Strategic political considerations were the major force shaping aid allocations, at least bilateral ones. While moral concerns underlay aid, especially emergency relief, this motivation was never paramount, certainly not in a sustainable fashion (Hopkins, 2000: 425).”

In their influential *Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows*, Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998), add a third view on motivations for aid. They contend there are essentially three paradigms in scholarly thinking on what motivates foreign assistance: *realist, idealist, and neo-Marxist*.

According to the *realist* paradigm, the major motivation for giving aid is national interest. It is determined by strategic interests of the donor country. Classical realists concentrate only on security interests whereas neo-realists also take into account economic ones. In the *idealist* view, although other factors come into play, altruism is considered the primary motive of foreign assistance. Perhaps the best known recent proponent of this view is David Halloran Lumsdaine (1993) with his *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989*. The third view represents the so-called *neo-Marxist* argument, which insists on a division of the world between a rich centre and a poor periphery, whereby aid is merely one of the instruments for maintaining that status quo. By suggesting that aid is a function of the donor interest, in this case, the interest to maintain the status quo between a rich North and poor South, between a centre and periphery, the neo-Marxists thinking does essentially come back into the realist camp. The neo-Marxist argument has at least in part originated from scholarly views promoted in aid recipient countries.⁸

Whereas the Neo-Marxist discourse has almost completely lost relevance over the last decades, the dynamic between the realist and idealist paradigm suggests that the realist view has prevailed over the idealist one. In reality no scholar would propound an exclusively realist or idealist point of view, and it has come to be accepted that both positions have a stake in the decision making on foreign aid. In addition, in the minds

⁸ Huntington for example has referred to the positions of Latin American intellectuals, such as Vincent Sanches and Ivan Illich, to describe the opposition to aid in recipient countries. according to Huntington, : “these expressions range from the argument by the Chilean psychiatrist, Vincent Sanchez, that U.S. aid is creating ‘cultural psychosis’ in Chile to that elaborated by Ivan Illich that the export of Western concepts, aspirations, and techniques of mass production and consumerism induces “chronic underdevelopment” in poor countries from which the latter can escape only by evolving some fundamentally different alternatives unknown to developed Western societies (cited in Huntington, 1970: 187).” In his classic *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, Robert Wood (1986) has referred to the work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) as proponents of the dependency theory which had essentially claimed that the rich North keeps the poor south in a state of dependency.

of policy makers the different conceptual views are often fused (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe, 1998: 68). Nevertheless, the predominant view in aid theory (and wider) still is that foreign assistance is strongly motivated by donor interests. The argument of course does not end there. Self-interest can not be considered a monolithic category:

“The notion that self-interest pervades the aid calculations of industrialized states has become axiomatic in scholarly literature.. But this notion begs the question of which of many potential self-interests are at play in the execution of aid policy (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998:295).”

The *trichotomy* comprising the realist, idealist, and neo-Marxist view is already to be found in a title which actually precedes the influential *Foreign Aid Puzzle*. Steven Hook, who co-authors the *Foreign Aid Puzzle*, refers to these three views as: *realist, idealist, and structuralist* (Hook, 1995).

In his *National Interest and Foreign Aid*, Hook (1995: 34) argues the premise that foreign aid can be seen as a microcosm of states' behavior in foreign affairs, goes on to produce an analysis of the aid flows of the same four donor states, the US, France, Sweden, and Japan, by exploring the different aspects of their national interests as inductors of aid giving. In doing this, Hook gives a good overview of the theoretical argumentations and the policy positions of the realist, idealist and structuralist view.

Discussing the realist view, Hook notes that it perceives foreign aid as an almost “exclusive” property of national interest. In the realist view:

“foreign aid should primarily, if not exclusively, be designed to facilitate donor interest. Humanitarian objectives are deemphasized; aid is viewed as minimally related to recipient economic development. If an effect is identified, it is significant only to the extent that it increases the donor’s political influence, military security, trade programs, and foreign investment (Hook, 1995: 34).”

The following excerpt from Hook (1995) is instrumental in introducing the views and arguments of the “old school” of realists from the 60s, starting with their founder, Hans Morgenthau. As such, it merits to be cited fully:

“Many realists have questioned the assumed linkages between the transfer of foreign assistance, recipient economic development, and subsequently harmonious relations between a donor and recipient. Morgenthau (1963:79) for example, found these assumptions to be ‘borne out neither by the experiences we have had nor by general historic experience.’ In this view, US foreign assistance should be better understood as bribes from rich to poor countries. Similarly Banfield (1963: 26-27) criticized the ‘fog of moralizing’ that often accompanies foreign aid rhetoric. ‘The most influential writings about aid doctrine are full of clichés and sweeping statements that turn out on close examination to be meaningless or else entirely unsupported by evidence.’ Moralists’ analysis, he argued, ‘tells us how we ought to act in a world which is not the one in which we must act.’ Ten years later Knorr (1973:166) dismissed notions of ‘genuine philanthropy or humanitarianism’ and added that ‘merely a small fraction of foreign economic aid can safely be attributed to a plane sense of human solidarity or to sincere feeling that the wealthy ...have the responsibility to share with the destitute two-thirds of the mankind.’”

In addition to presenting the theoretical premises, Hook discusses the policy positions which emanate from the realist and the idealist view. For the realists, “*prescriptions range from the elimination of aid programs which have little bearing on the donors’ interests to qualified support for aid based on demonstrable benefits to the donor (Hook, 1995: 34).*”

Alternatively, “*In the view of most idealists, national interests should be minimized or eliminated from aid calculations, which should instead be guided by transnational humanitarian concerns (Hook, 1995: 36).*”

Structuralists, or neo-Marxists contend that “*aid policies further encourage the dependent development of the peripheral states (Hook, 1995: 38)*”, and have been inclined to call for abolition of foreign aid.⁹

⁹ Quite a few critics of aid have argued for its elimination, even though from different positions. The extent of the criticism varies and not all critics of aid have called for the cancellation of all aid under all circumstances. A good overview of the different critiques of aid is presented in Riddell’s *Foreign Aid Reconsidered*.

Riddell starts off by dividing the critics into those who deny the moral obligation to give, and those who do not deny the obligation but who doubt that aid is the proper means for fulfilling that obligation.

In the first group Riddell places Peter Bauer, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick. Bauer has challenged the moral obligation to give by arguing that economic differences between people are deserved and justified if they stem from just processes. Hayek is not a direct critic of aid but he dismisses the idea of social justice as threat to other values in free society. Nozick’s theory of entitlements produces a “*rejection of any theory of justice based on needs or egalitarian principles (Riddell, 1987: 29).*”

In the second group Riddell places theorists who do not challenge the moral case, but who doubt, for one reason or another, that foreign aid can promote development. This ensemble comprises on the right: Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer, and Melvyn Krauss; and on the left, Lappe’ et al, Teresa Hayter, Willem Zeylstra, Tibor Mende, Gunnar Myrdal, and Dudley Seers.

According to Riddell, Friedman, Bauer, and Krauss, have argued that foreign aid interferes with market forces, and that in some cases it causes more harm than good. For Lappe’ et al, aid cannot help because it cannot reach the poor and powerless (since being siphoned by corrupt governments). For Hayter it is irrelevant whether aid can help or not because its principal aim is to maintain the capitalist status quo. Zeylstra considers aid to have failed because it rests on the flawed assumption about the universal applicability of the Western model of development. Mende holds that the mobilization of domestic resource in favour of the poor, rather than turning to external resources, is the answer to underdevelopment. Myrdal and Seers have argued that aid is good for development and the more of it the better, but have criticised its waste and inefficiency due to corruption, or lack of political commitment to fighting poverty in recipient countries (Riddell, 1987: 45-60).

3. The Realist View: Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy

Hans Morgenthau is the intellectual founder of the contemporary realist theory. In his classic article *Political Theory of Foreign Aid* (1962), he pioneered the argument that foreign aid could not be seen as anything else but a tool of foreign policy, and that its only possible rationale could be to serve the national interest.

Morgenthau was not a critic of foreign aid per se and disagreed with those who saw it as a "gigantic boon-doggie, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations (1962: 301)."

Writing specifically with regards to the United States experience, Morgenthau holds that it is not necessary to doubt the need for aid policy; aid should exist, however, it needs to serve the national interest:

"it is in fact pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy of foreign aid – as much as to ask whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not be supported at all (Morgenthau, 1962: 301)."

Morgenthau thus concludes, that the question is not "if" the United States should have a foreign aid policy, but "what kind" of foreign aid policy it should have (Morgenthau, 1962: 301).¹⁰

¹⁰ Morgenthau considered the foreign assistance policy of the United States at the time to be "fundamentally weak" and "conceived as a self-sufficient technical enterprise, covering a multitude of disparate objectives and activities, responding haphazardly to all sorts of demands, sound and unsound, unrelated or only by accident related to the political purposes of [US] foreign policy". He saw six types of foreign aid: humanitarian, subsistence foreign aid, military assistance, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and finally, economic development aid. Of these six types, Morgenthau considered only humanitarian aid to be non-political but to still be able to serve political purposes (1962: 301). According to him, a lot of the foreign assistance given is nothing else but bribes: "much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs ...the function of a price paid for political service rendered or to be rendered." A paragraph in the *Political Theory of Foreign Aid*, discusses what can be considered a distant forerunner of today's policy of conditionality, which will be a separate focus of discussion further in this text. If Foreign aid is seen as bribe, what is called conditionality today, can be the modality to obtain the optimum from the bribe:

"bribes proffered by one government to another for political advantage were until the beginning of the nineteenth century an integral part of the armoury of diplomacy. No statesman hesitated to acknowledge the general practice of giving and accepting bribes...thus it was proper and common for a government to pay the foreign minister or ambassador of another country a pension, that is, a bribe...the Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed up well the main rule of this game when he reported to his government in 1802: 'Experience has taught everybody who is here on diplomatic business that one ought never to give anything before the deal is definitely closed, but it has only proved that the allurements of gain will often work wonders (Morgenthau, 1962: 302)."

Another realist of the old school is Samuel Huntington. Huntington was asked to contribute to the inaugural issue of *Foreign Policy* in 1970, which resulted with his landmark article *Foreign Aid for What and for Whom*. Yet a tractate which is quite dated, at closer look one finds that some of the propositions of today are essentially re-worked, revived premises from the 60s – 70s. It also invites the conclusion that some of the aid dilemmas of present day are the same as 30-40 years ago.

“Foreign Aid: Billions in Search for a Good Reason” – is how Huntington opens his argument, referring to a 1963 “*Fortune*” article by Charles J.V. Murphy,¹¹ in order to posit the dilemma of what should be the motivation for US foreign assistance and what kind of aid system should derive from it.

Paying regard to the altruistic argument for aid, Huntington accepts that the US as the wealthiest country in the world “has a moral obligation to help (1970: 188).” He does not dispute the moral obligation to relieve suffering but he does not agree that foreign aid for economic development can logically derive from a moral obligation:

“the moral obligation to feed the hungry in India is fairly obvious. The moral obligation to insure that India's economy grows at 6 percent per annum is considerably less obvious ...The moral argument is thus persuasive when it comes to providing minimum economic well-being for individuals, but much less so when it comes to promoting optimal economic growth of societies (Huntington, 1970: 188).”

Thus, he accepts moral obligation but only with regards to relief aid; he contends that other aid for economic development should be channeled multilaterally; and that finally the US should give greater bilateral assistance to states “*where the US has special, political, economic or security interests (Huntington, 1970:189).*”

Hence, alike Morgenthau, Huntington sees foreign aid as a tool that needs to serve US interests abroad. He contends that the *moral argument alone is not strong enough a motive* for US foreign assistance. One of the reasons, he argues, why US foreign aid has been in decline, after the initial boost in the late 40s and 50s, is because the altruistic argument of the “purists”, as he refers to the proponents of the idealist view, is not compelling to policy makers:

“French official economic assistance has consistently been fifty to almost a hundred percent higher than U.S. assistance as a ratio of Gross National Product (GNP). One reason for this may well be that French aid has had the very consciously defined political purpose of maintaining French influence in its former colonies and that it has been almost exclusively concentrated in those former colonies. Such purposes make sense to chief executives and legislatures. In a somewhat similar fashion, the rapidly increasing Japanese aid has been directly tied to the efforts of the Tokyo

¹¹ Recently, Burnell (1997: 46), in his *Foreign Aid in a Changing World*, used the same approach to introduce the perplexing question of “Why Give Aid”. He used a title of an article from *The Economist* to introduce the same question of what should be the underlining motivation for aid. “*Needed: a Case for Giving*”, was the title of the article; clearly another way to address the same issue as in “*Billions in Search for a Good Reason.*” Obviously, in 1997, the issue had the same timeliness as in 1970.

government to extend Japanese commerce and investments in Asia (Huntington, 1970: 169)."

Yet a convinced realist, Huntington does not oppose aid per se but he sees it as a foreign policy tool which should correspond to national interest, and along this he considers five criteria for choosing the countries to be helped: a) economic performance - the country should demonstrate its ability and commitment to use the aid effectively, b) security relevance of that country to the US, c) political democracy, d) historic association with the US, and e) global importance (Huntington, 1970: 182).

4. The Idealist View: Humane Internationalism

The full ideological counterweight to the realist view is the argument that foreign aid is essentially a result of belief in the principles of justice and solidarity. The idealist view holds that aid is and should be given out of altruism and care for the poor and disadvantaged, and it sees foreign assistance as extension of the concept of welfare in international relations.

The major proponent of the idealist view is David Halloran Lumsdaine. The basic argument of Lumsdaine's widely quoted *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989*, is that foreign aid is in a final analysis a product of idealist concern about humanity:

"foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of economic and political interests of the donor countries alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of the donors countries, and in their implicit belief that only on the basis of a just international order in which all states had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible (Lumsdaine, 1993: 30)."

Lumsdaine does not reject realism. He does not deny the existence of self-interest of various kinds but he minimizes its importance. He argues that a small share of aid is affected by donor selfishness; that the larger part of aid goes to those who need it, and that overall aid quality has been improving over the years. In support of his argument that aid is a result of gradual maturation of ethical standards, Lumsdaine claims that the sudden appearance of aid after the second World War cannot be explained on a case by case basis:

"looking only at French aid, one could hypothesize that it sprang from France's unique pride in disseminating its cultural traditions; looking just at Swiss aid, one could argue it showed the special place of Switzerland's international banking industry; US aid alone could be attributed to US hegemony or to American exceptionalism in foreign policy; and Japan's aid might have been a tool of its export promotion strategy. But explanations of this kind do not explain why aid policies arose in all these industrial democracies at once, in a single decade, and have remained for nearly half a century (Lumsdaine, 1993: 36-37)."

Lumsdaine does take into account the political explanations for the appearance of aid after the World War II. He analyzes factors such as the Cold War or the end of the colonial system, but only in order to dismiss them in a final analysis:

“If the interest in aid was a response to a bipolar world, the support for aid ought to have varied as the cold war thawed and refroze. But instead the period of the detente was the period in which aid rose the most, as a percentage of GNP, in most of the donors’ countries. Had aid been an artefact of the cold war, one would also expect a rapid falling off of aid after the end of the cold war; but that has not happened... (Lumsdaine, 1993: 110)”

Explaining aid with the cold war has two more flaws according to Lumsdaine. It does not explain why the two superpowers had different attitude to aid (Soviet aid was much smaller and directed to a much smaller number of allies), and why on the recipient side, countries which were in dissimilar position strategically, received similar levels of aid (Lumsdaine, 1993: 225).

The explanation related to the end of the colonial system as the cause for the emergence of aid, whereby new poor states were created, and since they were not in a patron-protégé relationship with a dominion, could thus receive support from elsewhere, does not hold in his view either, because, Lumsdaine points out, there were poor countries which existed before the dismantling of the colonial system.

Lumsdaine’s conclusion is that *“the bases of support for aid lie in increased sensitivity to human need and not in calculations of strategic advantage (1993: 154).”*

Lumsdaine’s ultimate conclusion is that foreign aid is an international extension of social welfare. Welfare was first introduced in the national states, some 50-70 years before foreign aid appeared. As general awareness and sensitivity to human need increased in the countries of the industrialized West, Lumsdaine argues so matured ideas and mechanisms for its alleviation internationally. The same factors which promoted welfare, stemming from the social-democrat forces in society, are the strongest supporters of foreign aid. Countries with more generous welfare systems are also the most generous donors of foreign assistance, in GDP per capita terms.¹²

Few scholars would subscribe to Lumsdaine’s argument in its ardent form. Most analysts of aid allocation agree that foreign assistance is strongly influenced by the self-interest of donor states. Albeit even Lumsdaine cannot deny the realism of allocation, he downplays its importance. According to him, the various forms of national self-interest cannot explain how aid appeared at the same time in many countries after the World War II. That can only be explained through evolution of ethical standards and concerns about humanity.

The realist and the idealist view on motivations for aid represent the two distinct theoretical poles in the scholarship on foreign assistance.

¹² A similar view concerning the relationship between welfare and foreign assistance has been argued by other scholars, notably by Brian Smith (1990). According to Smith, before being taken up by states, welfare at national level was provided by private associations, originally churches. The same applies to foreign aid; the public assistance provided by governments which appeared after the WW II had been preceded by the activities of private organizations, most notably church missions in what came to be known as the Third World. Smith’s *More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid (1990)* is an excellent account of the interrelationship between private foreign aid and official development politics.

Yet, there is agreement in the scholarship that no donor disburses assistance solely according to self-interest or sheer altruism. There is vast space which occupies the middle ground between the realist and idealist pole. A lot of this space is taken up by the concept of the so-called *enlightened self-interest*.

5. The Middle Ground: Enlightened Self-Interest and Mutual Advantage

There are said to be three aspects to the “allocational pattern of aid” (Hjertholm & White, 2000; Hjertholm & White: 2000a; McGillivray, 2003). The first deals with the question - is aid properly allocated among recipients, in the sense, is it proportionate to needs? This is the so-called the descriptive aspect. The second aspect analyzes why donors allocate aid they way they do; this is called explanatory analysis. The third aspect is the so-called prescriptive as it tries to prescribe how aid should be allocated; or what should be the proper criteria for just allocation of aid (Hjertholm & White, 2000: 39).

The discussion so far has employed the descriptive and explanatory perspectives, that is, it has reviewed and analyzed the motives of aid as it is given. The question posed by “The Economist”, and much earlier by “Fortune” asks what should be the motive, the right motive (if any), to give aid? It asks for a prescription on how foreign assistance should be distributed.

Writing in a prescriptive way, that is, not describing and analyzing the motives which shape donor aid allocations, but advocating a valid motive for aid instead, Burnell (1997) sees it in the principle of mutual advantage for both donors and recipients. This is the concept of the so-called “enlightened self-interest” as motivation for development assistance.

The mutual interest argument, was originally proposed by the Brandt Commission report, “*North-South: A Program for Survival*”, by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (1980), otherwise known as the Brandt Commission.

This argument tries to reconcile the concepts of altruism and self-interest. The logic is that the enlightened self-interest of donors should go beyond the straightforward moral case for giving, which is nevertheless taken as valid, and accept the obligation to give as a way to contribute to long-term mutual interest. In Burnell’s words:

“among donor countries, enlightened understanding would recognize that national self-interest can be pursued effectively only through taking account of mutual advantages (1997: 62).”

The Brandt Commission report, Burnell suggests (1997: 63), came against the backdrop of the major oil crisis in the late 70s, when it became more than clear that the world was interdependent; that a rich North cannot isolate itself from a poor South, and that events taking place in one part of the world, affect the other parts and the world as a whole. This heightened acknowledgment of the risks of global interdependence prompted the view that aid should be seen as more than just a tool for

narrow self-interest; but an instrument for an enlightened, long-term mutual interest of nations.

The notion of the enlightened self-interest has been widely reviewed in aid literature. Hook, similar to Burnell, has also subscribed to the concept of the enlightened self-interest as a motive which supersedes the conventional national interest of states, and which provides universal validity for aid.

Hook argues that in an ever greater interdependence of states, transnational regimes such as aid advance simultaneously both collective and individual state interests. The restraining of nuclear proliferation, preservation of rain forests, or fight against AIDS, as much as they are collective interests, or in other words “public goods”, can not be said to be excluded from the self-interest of any state (Hook, 1995: 184).

Hook makes the very interesting observation that the emergence of the idea of the enlightened self-interest, as a new, reformed platform for international cooperation, is actually not new. It is at least as old as the ideological basis for the realist view – the Hobbesian state of nature - the view of international relations as an anarchical arena of *bellum omnium contra omnes* where states have no choice but to strictly pursue their self-interest if they want to survive.

Hook points out that about the same time Thomas Hobbs wrote the *Leviathan*, which provided the original framework of realist thinking and the emergence of the concept of national interests of states, the writing of *Hugo Grotius*, a Dutch lawyer, set the original postulates of the idealist paradigm by identifying the need for cooperation among states:

“Grotius foresaw states conforming to a corpus of international law, anticipating that their adherence to transnational norms of behavior would be based not upon the acceptance of universal moral codes but upon the enlarged definition of states’ self-interests (Hook, 1995:34).”

The idea of the enlightened self-interest is an appealing one. It easily fits as middle ground between crude realism and pure idealism. Yet, some scholars consider it a component, or a milder stream of the concept of humane internationalism. That is perhaps visible in Lumsdaine himself, who suggests that only on the “*basis of a just international order in which all states had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible* (1993: 30).”

Similarly, Olav Stokke (1996) is even more specific in seeing the enlightened self-interest as an ingredient of the humane internationalism. He contends that the realist paradigm cannot be used to explain the altruistic features of aid in the development policies of the small and middle powers (such as the Nordic countries) and suggests that humane internationalism is a more appropriate lens for analysis (Stokke, 1996: 22). The point that the classical concept of national interest as pertinent to the aid policies of great powers, especially the United States, has not been useful in explaining the foreign assistance of the so called “like minded donors”, is well known in aid scholarship.

Stokke suggests in addition to being a moral obligation, the responding to the needs of the poor, is in the long term national interest of donor countries. That is in his view the basic premise of the concept of the enlightened self-interest:

“the core of humane internationalism is the acceptance of the principle that citizens of industrial nations have moral obligations towards peoples and events beyond their borders...within the context of North-South relations, humane internationalism implies, in particular, responsiveness to the needs of the South as regards social and economic development, ...such ethical obligations are combined with what is considered to be in the best long- term interest of the Northern countries concerned... (Stokke, 1996: 23).”

Stokke distinguishes three forms of internationalism: liberal internationalism, which combines the values of solidarity with faith in open markets; radical internationalism, which he relates to the neo-Marxist tradition; and reform internationalism, which derives from both Christian and socialist, values such as brotherhood and solidarity, but which *“is also based on an enlightened self-interest”* In Stokke’s view:

“a more just international order, and economic development and improvements of the social and political conditions in the South will also in various ways be of benefit to the North. (Stokke, 1996: 24).”

Stokke concludes that the concept of the enlightened self-interest both reconciles the classical realist and idealist view and transcends the nation state as the natural arena for the intermediation of interests and ethical norms:

“[through] presentation of humane internationalism and its main expressions it becomes clear that an ethical thrust is combined with, and considered to be instrumental for the promotion of longer term, overall interests of rich countries... this mix of ethical values and national interests varies for the main expressions identified. In this way a bridge with the realist approach is established; whereas that approach, in its extreme form, starts out from naked political (security) and economic national self-interest, humane internationalism, in its extreme form, starts out from predominant values and norms. And contrary to the classical realist paradigm: these values and norms are not necessarily confined to the national system, and, to the extent that interests are involved, these transcend those of the nation state (Stokke, 1996: 25).”

The review of the concept of the enlightened self-interest concludes the general contouring of the framework for discussing motivations for foreign assistance. The playing field is composed of two opposite poles and a vast space in-between. The realist view, the idealist view, and the enlightened self-interest as the prescriptive middle ground, provide the ideological frame for discussing the allocation of foreign aid.

Departing from this level of concept, the text will further go into exploring the specific factors that influence donor aid decisions. Some of these factors operate within the realist and some within the idealist paradigm. Sometimes it is not easy to conclude if an aid decision is motivated by self-interest or altruism. Often an aid decision will be naturally motivated by both, but even in such cases these motivations can enter into different balances and produce complex dynamics. Chapter 3 which provides a lengthy discussion of motivations for ODA to the Balkans, using among

other sources, an extensive media review, will show in more detail how intricate these processes can actually be.

6. Additional Factors Shaping Aid Allocation

6.1 Recent Views on the Motives and Factors of Aid Allocation

The three paradigms, realism, idealism, and enlightened self-interest, discussed in the preceding sections, provide the overall ideological framework for the discussion about foreign aid. They were discussed as ideological constructs but it was nevertheless pointed out that first, they themselves are not monoliths, and second, and that in reality they often become fused.

In addition, in reality each philosophic framework is always applied on a complex situation which involves many other variables. Some of these variables exist on the side of the donor whereas others on the side of the recipient. These variables or factors enter into numerous and complex inter-relationships. Sometimes even the most altruistic of donors must mind their own self-interest, whatever it may be in any given situation. The opposite is also true: even the most self-interested donor will feel compelled to respond altruistically to certain events. The foreign assistance policies donors have make them respond differently to different contexts. The decision to give aid will in reality depend on the interaction of many different variables.

One of the most influential recent writings on the factors shaping aid allocation has been the seminal article by Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (1998), *Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why*.

By using a large data set covering many donor countries, but with an emphasis on the US, Japan, France and Germany, who together account for 70% of total aid (Alesina & Dollar, 1998:6) , the authors offer a comprehensive analysis of the relative importance of the various factors affecting foreign assistance allocation. These factors include security interests, colonial ties, altruism, level of political freedom (the fact whether the recipient country is considered democratic or not), whether the recipient pursues good economic policies and so forth.

Alesina & Dollar (1998) find “*considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipient.*”

The two authors argue that even though recipient need, good policies and political freedom count as determinants of aid, they are outweighed by strategic and political considerations of the donor country:

“ *an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged, non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more aid than another country*

*with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without past as a colony (Alesina & Dollar, 1998:1)."*¹³

The study confirms the widely assumed link between foreign aid and democratization: *"countries which have democratized have received a 'surge' in foreign aid, immediately afterwards (Alesina & Dollar, 1998: 2)."*

Although the article concludes that motives of self-interest regularly prevail over altruism, Alesina & Dollar do identify relevant differences in motives for aid allocation between donors:

"Certain donors (notably the Nordic countries) seem to respond more to the 'correct' incentives, namely income levels, good institutions of the receiving countries, and economic openness. Other countries (notably France) give to former colonies tied by political alliances, without much regard for other factors, including poverty levels or choice of politico-economic regimes. The United States' pattern of aid giving is vastly influenced by that country's interests in the Middle East (Alesina & Dollar, 1998:2)."

Another influential writing on the motivations and factors shaping aid decisions from the same period of time is the already mentioned *Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle* by Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor.

Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998) do an empirical analysis of aid flows of four major donors, the US, Japan, France, and Sweden over the 80s and the result of their research *"rejects the rhetorical statements of policymakers within the industrialized North who publicly assert that foreign aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998: 319)."*

The authors nevertheless, confirm some of the findings of the vast qualitative literature that these four largest bilateral donors are essentially motivated by different factors.

¹³ Alesina & Dollar provide an insight into the relative importance of different factors influencing aid, and their interrelation :

"ceteris paribus a country that is relatively open receives 17 per cent more aid. A country that is relatively democratic receives 36 per cent more aid; a country that has relatively long colonial past receives 72 per cent more aid ; a country that voted relatively often with Japan in the UN receives 177 per cent more aid. Finally Egypt and Israel receive much more aid than other countries with similar characteristics. Egypt receives 481 per cent more and the value for Israel is basically of the scale. (1998: 9)."

They confirm the importance of democratization as a factor but indicate that it is much lesser than the presence of other factors, such as for example, presence of historic links:

"more democratic countries receive a bit more than less democratic ones, but these differences are trivial compared with the difference between colonies and non-colonies. A non-democratic former colony receives almost 25 dollars per capita, a democratic non-colony about 14 dollars per capita" (1998: 12).

The authors conclude that the US is largely driven by strategic and ideological concerns related to the Cold War; Japan's key motivation is economic self-interest, with its foreign aid going into countries where it has strong trade interests. French aid goes largely to its former colonies and francophone countries, although strategic interests do also play a role. Sweden's aid goes to a smaller number of countries (given that Sweden is a small country and its aid is small in absolute amounts), which share the same ideological views as Sweden (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998).¹⁴ Some additional analytical insights into how national self-interest is being pursued through foreign aid come from the work of international relations theorists.

Trying to analyze the difference in US aid during and after the cold war, Meernik, Krueger, & Poe (1998) invoke three theoretical lenses of foreign policy behavior of states, the *system – level, societal, and statist approach*. According to the three authors:

“The system-level approach, locates the primary determinant of state behaviour in the nature of the international environment... its anarchic, and self-help qualities induce states to be primarily concerned with their survival.... self-interested states act first and foremost to protect their national interests (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998: 64).”

Obviously, what the authors refer to as “system – level” approach is identical with what other scholars have termed “national interest”, in its versions which is concerned solely with preservation of national security.

The second approach Meernik, Krueger, & Poe identify is the so-called “societal” one. Referring to work done by Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno (1988), the former define the societal approach as a view of American policy as:

“either reflecting the preferences of the dominant group of class in society, or as resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place among various interests.”

They also refer to Krasner (1978), according to whom the societal view *“rejects the notion of the state as an autonomous actor and rejects a view of the national interest as distinct from societal and individual interests.”*

The novelty of this view is that it seeks to deconstruct what is usually referred to as “national interest”, and to analyze factors which contribute to its definition. Thus, the national self-interest is not a “given” and determined by the state as an actor in its own right, but it takes shape through the interaction of social groups and the interests they represent, and which find expression in the policies of the government.

Meernik, Krueger & Poe go on to conclude that what follows from the societal view is that interests of business and industry are critical in the making of U.S. foreign policy and that *“if the societal level approach can forecast state behavior, we ought to find the United States pursuing a liberal, free market-oriented foreign policy (1998: 65).”*

¹⁴ The research looks into aid flows to Africa.

This view corresponds somewhat adjacently to what Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor call “neo-realist” approach, but it also goes further.

According to neo-realists, the national interest pursued by donor governments goes beyond the strict security interest, and it entails economic considerations. Thus foreign aid serves to promote exports, access to raw materials, promote trade, and related commercial interests of the donor country.

Meernik, Krueger, & Poe conclude that the influence that business and industrial lobbies have on foreign policy and foreign aid as its exponent, goes beyond simple promotion of economic interests of US companies through the foreign aid industry, and translates into ideological norms. One such norm is pertains to the promotion of liberal free market capitalism.

Finally, according to the third, statist approach, the state has aims which are “*separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group (Krasner, 1978: 10).*”

Meernik, Krueger, & Poe cite Krasner who regards “*the pursuit of ideological goals as the most important*” and who argues that if a state has a lot of power, it would be inclined to “*remake the world in its own image (1998: 66).*”

This leads the three authors to conclude that the United States has continuously positioned itself as a promoter of moral values in international relations:

“the history of American foreign policy before and during the Cold War, [offers] ample evidence of the attention given to ideological concerns. Whether sincerely intended or not, presidents have continually made reference to the unique role of the United States as a moral force in world politics, particularly in the promotion of democracy and human rights (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998: 67).”

Meernik, Krueger, & Poe’s analysis offers some interesting, albeit perhaps cynical conclusions about the international foreign assistance regime.

Some of the arguments they make reveal possible additional angles in explaining certain traits of foreign aid. For example, unlike scholars who are inclined to consider the positive effect of democracy and democratization on foreign aid levels as a factor which is good in of itself, in the sense that aid rewards good policies in recipient countries, Meernik, Krueger, & Poe consider it as another “concealed” facet of “self-interest”. In their interpretation, the interest is an “emotional” one; it consists in promoting an ideology by the state seen as an autonomous actor. The state which remodels the world in its own image uses foreign assistance as a tool to reward followers. Naturally, the fact that aid is used as a reward is nothing new; it is the fact that it is used as a reward for a very specific achievement which attracts interest.

The chapter on the *Political Economy of Foreign Aid* by Raymond Hopkins, in Finn Tarp’s seminal *Foreign Aid and Development (2000)*, is another significant contribution to the recent debate on factors and motives of foreign assistance.

Using the conceptual framework of “political economy”, which he defines as analysis of policy choices through the political and economic goals which have motivated

them, whereby the goals are “*products of culture, institutions, power distribution and the dynamics of competitive interests*”, Hopkins (2000) draws on three approaches which according to him can be useful in explaining aid. In the first, aid is an effort to maximize benefits to donor states; in the second, foreign aid is determined by the economic interests of powerful groups within donors; and in the third, aid is the outcome of bargaining between units, such as aid bureaucracies, multilaterals, and other actors in the process.

The first approach is essentially another version of the concept of self-interest of a donor state which is seen as an autonomous actor; the second approach sees state policy (in this case on foreign aid) as an outcome of competition of various groups (firms, NGOs, sectors, parties, etc) within the state, or basically what Meernik, Krueger, & Poe would call a societal approach. In the third view, the outcome results from the process of negotiation between the different actors in the process, inclusive of donors, intermediaries, recipients, and so forth: “*producers and consumers of foreign aid set terms (prices) by bargaining (Hopkins, 2000: 425).*”

What this view brings in is the notion that foreign aid also depends on facts existing on the side of or recipient. This is of course implicit in the work of some of the scholars mentioned already – Alesina & Dollar show the effect of good policies, etc., - but Hopkins accentuates the moment of active exchange between a donor and recipient with regards to foreign aid. Recipients will attempt to achieve certain objectives requested by the donor in order to get aid, or to get more aid; sometimes recipients will try to have a say in the terms under which aid is awarded; it can happen that recipients reject aid or certain types of aid.

The discussion in Chapter 3 will pin down this moment in the Balkans. In situations when donors agreed the terms of foreign assistance with the recipient countries, usually by signing cooperation agreements or memorandums, recipients had a say in defining the goals of ODA. Some recipients in the Balkans shied away from certain types of aid, such as democratization aid for example.

6.2 Latest Additions to the Debate on Factors and Motives of Aid Allocation

Two most recent volumes by senior scholars on aid have made a timely contribution to the discussion on motivations and factors of aid giving. The first is *Does Foreign Aid Really Work* by Roger Riddell (2007), and the second, *Foreign Aid* by Carol Lancaster (2007).

Riddell’s telling title “*Does Foreign Aid Really Work*” restates a dilemma which is old as foreign aid itself, and represents probably the core question in the study of foreign assistance – that of its effectiveness and impact.

In Riddell’s view, the nominal motives for aid alone, that is, those officially provided, yield a far incomplete picture of why governments give aid. Giving aid, in his view, has always been an essentially political decision (Riddell, 2007:90).

Riddell considers six “clusters of motives [which] have historically influenced donor decision to allocate aid: These are 1) to help address emergency needs, 2) to assist recipients achieve their development (growth and poverty-reducing) goals, 3) to show solidarity, 4) to further their own national political and strategic interests, 5) to help promote donor country commercial interests, and 6) because of historic ties (Riddell, 2007:90).”

He also adds two additional motives which have, in his view, appeared more recently; strengthening global public goods, and respect for human rights by the recipient government.

In weighing the realist vs. idealist motivations for aid, Riddell suggests that “the vast majority of donors have allocated aid on the basis of a mix of these different factors, the particular mix differing, often sharply, between donors and over different time periods (2007:91).” In his view, it cannot be denied that aid is influenced by self-interest, but, there are two additional questions. One is how strong is that influence, and second, how much does the fact that aid is influenced by donor self-interest matter?

Concerning the strength of the influence, he contrasts, on one side, the views of Sogge (2002:43) - who says that “ideology and pursuit of commercial advantage are the main determinants”, and of Browne (2006), according to whom “expansion of aid has been due primarily to geopolitical, commercial, and other interests, (Riddell, 2007:92), - to those of Lumsdaine (1993) as the main proponent of the idealist paradigm, according to whom, self-interest is not sufficient in explaining foreign aid giving and who argues that the principal motivation is in a final run altruism.

Riddell (2007:93) summarizes some of the main arguments in the debate of how important the “non-developmental” factors actually are, thereby concluding that there is a consensus that they are important, but no consensus on how important exactly. He quotes the widely referenced, pioneering study by Maizels and Nissanke (1984:891) according to which, “United States, British, French German, and Japanese aid allocations were made ‘solely in support of donors perceived foreign economic, political and security interests’ (Riddell, 2007:93).” Providing reference to more up to date work, he refers to the Alesina and Dollar study which has already been consulted above.

Finally, Riddell points to another aspect of the difficulty of precise assessment of non-altruistic influence on aid by suggesting that developmental and non-developmental motives can essentially overlap. For this he refers to recent work done by McGillivray.

McGillivray (2003a) has rightfully observed that “there can often be methodological problems in trying to separate out developmental from non-developmental allocations of aid, particularly when geopolitical factors lead countries to allocate more aid to very poor countries (cited by Riddell, 2007:93).”

Something along the same line has been pointed out also by Lumsdaine (1993:84) who argued that the fact that aid goes to a former colony which is at the same time a poor country, is not in itself enough to claim that donor self-interest is involved, if there was not particular benefit for the donor.

Finally how much does the influence of the donor self-interest matter for aid effectiveness? This is an entirely different question from that of how strong the influence actually is. One may conclude for example that French aid is strongly motivated by national self-interest, but does this mean that because of this French aid will be ineffective in reaching its developmental goals? Does the fact that aid is motivated by donor self-interest definitely deprive it of developmental effect? Riddell lends the critical point of view of Browne (2006), according to whom, "*when aid is allocated for the wrong reasons, it becomes largely a vain pursuit to measure its effectiveness (Riddell, 2007:92).*" In other words, according to Browne, the motive of donor self-interest is a strong factor hampering the effectiveness of aid.

A similar argument can be found in the work of Stokke, who has suggested that the real motivation behind aid was the prime standard for measuring its effectiveness:

"Motives and justifications for aid, more than even the stated objectives at various levels, constitute the standards against which the successes and failures of aid should be measured. Ideally, objectives are derived from motives and justifications; however they also give content and precision to them. Motives – more than justifications, which sometimes may even disguise the real motives - drive the activity (Stokke, 1996: 18)."

The suggestion is that aid which is driven by donor self-interest will be ineffective, or in other words- will do little good to the recipient.

The opposite point of view has been independently (not in direct opposition to the argument made by Stokke and Browne) suggested by Burnell. According to Burnell: "*there is no a priori reason to suppose that transfers cannot assist the recipients just because they are offered on grounds which include self-interest*". In addition, Burnell quite forcefully argues that, to the contrary, "*the best of intentions can produce action that is so misguided or badly executed that it wreaks havoc on intended beneficiaries (1997: 3).*"

Burnell makes a fair point. Donor motivations alone would often not be a sufficient indicator of how and for what exactly aid monies were spent, and in this sense if they were well and effectively spent. Donor self-interest can mean for example, that aid went to a country which is of strategic importance to the donor, but without any prejudice as to how those resources were employed. Alternatively it can also be that aid really did address a very particular issue which is primarily of interest to the donor, and without relevant impact on the recipient country population. However, that cannot be claimed without a specific disaggregation of the aid effort, and solely on the basis of the motivation.

What is usually considered is that self-interest reduces the quality of aid because it is directed to countries, which yet strategic allies or friends, do not need aid as much. That is, that aid does not go to the poorest countries. To this extent, aid loses potential effectiveness. But this is only one dimension of analysis. The second one is – how effective was aid in the actual phase of implementation? It is perfectly plausible that the donor which directs aid to poorer countries spends that aid less effectively than donor which gives its aid to strategic allies or friends. This question would require an in-depth case study analysis, and there should not be a reason to

preclude that motivations alone would constitute an ultimate ex-ante indicator of aid effectiveness

In addition to Riddell's *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, Carol Lancaster's (2007) most recent writing, titled simply *Foreign Aid*, is a fine contribution to the discussion on development assistance. Being uniquely well placed, as an aid practitioner and insider into the senior policy making circles of the US aid administration, she offers a convincing historic narrative about the evolution of aid motivations over the last half a century.

The basic argument in Lancaster's *Foreign Aid* is straightforward: at its emergence aid was a tool of the cold war; however, once it has come into existence, other motivations developed, and gradually an international norm of humanism took hold:

“aid (for purposes other than humanitarian relief) began as temporary expedient of Cold War diplomacy. It was not primarily an expression of altruism on the part of the aid-giving countries. Nor was it driven mainly by commercial interests or desire to spread capitalism. If there had been no Cold War threat, the United States - the first, and for most years, the largest aid-giving country - might never have initiated programs of aid or put pressure on other government to do so (Lancaster, 2007:5).”

In Lancaster's view, the US created the aid regime as it exists today, and exerted pressure on their allies to join it. She discusses the strong pressure the US put on Germany, which was well on the road to recovery and a growing economic power, to start providing aid, with the ultimatum of asking compensation for the US troops stationed on German territory, had Germany refused (2007: 171):

“Without the Cold War, aid would likely not exist today - or if it did, it would be much smaller than the \$100 billion in aid provided by all governments in 2004. Aid is, in short, a child of hardheaded, diplomatic realism (Lancaster, 2007: 25).”

Writing in historic terms, Lancaster even suggests that the very beginning of foreign aid as it is known today can be specifically pinpointed in time - to a particular Friday afternoon in February 1947:

“on a Friday in late February 1947, the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, informed the Department of State that the British government would no longer be able to support Greece in resisting a communist led insurgency or to support Turkey to modernize its military in the face of pressures from its Soviet neighbor. It was clear immediately to Secretary of State George Marshall and President Harry Truman that the United States would have to act to help these countries maintain their independence and territorial integrity (Lancaster. 2007: 63).”

However, overtime, Lancaster argues, an international norm gradually emerged suggesting *“that the governments of rich countries should provide public, concessional resources to improve human condition in poor countries. [This norm] did not exist in 1950. By 2000 it was widely accepted and uncontested (Lancaster, 2007).”*

What “*commenced as a temporary diplomatic expedient*”, says Lancaster, “*by the year 2000 ... became a common, and expected, element in relations between better off and poorer states (2007: 5).*”¹⁵

A common thread can be identified between the work of Lumsdaine and Lancaster. They both agree that the foreign aid regime is result of *gradual emergence and maturation of norms of international solidarity*. However, whereas in Lumsdaine’s view that norm has already matured by the 50s, which he sees in the fact of foreign aid appearing almost simultaneously in just over a decade, in many industrialized countries, in Lancaster’s view, the norm has only started to develop in that period of time, by virtue of the US first instituting foreign aid policy to serve its cold war interests, and subsequently urging its allies to do the same. In Lumsdaine’s view, the norm has originated and progressed from the social democrat milieu fermenting ideas of humane internationalism and solidarity; Lancaster, in her historic observations, contends that in the beginning there was nothing more than realist national interest.

6.3 Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid

The theoretical discussion of self-interest vs. altruism is primarily relevant to bilateral aid; the assistance awarded from the government of one country to another. Most of what is written on motivations for aid looks into the motivations of governments and states.

The situation is different when multilateral aid is considered. This is assistance provided by multilateral organizations such as the UN; international financial institutions (IFI’s) as the World Bank, or the IMF; regional development banks, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); or the European Union (EU).

Scholarly thought on aid has observed early that multilateral aid works differently from bilateral aid and that the composition of factors shaping it is different than that for bilateral assistance. Discussing aid motivations in the theoretical framework of recipient need (RN) vs. donor interest (DI), Maizels & Nissanke (1984) have argued that multilateral aid follows the RN model whereas bilateral aid follows the DI model. (Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006: 1).Or in other words, multilateral aid is more sensitive, responsive to need, whereas bilateral aid is more closely guided by national self-interest.

Alesina & Dollar (1998) subscribe to the widely held point of view that “*determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid are quite different*” and cannot be explained together.

¹⁵ This norm “*evolved in significant measure because of domestic politics of aid-giving in donor countries, the imperatives of governments gaining domestic support for annual aid expenditures, the creation and professionalization of aid agencies (which in effect became lobbies within their own governments for aid for development), and the rise of development - oriented NGOs, which created the domestic constituency for aid’s development purpose (Lancaster, 2007: 5).*”

Doing a comparison between bilateral and multilateral aid across many indicators of performance, including responsiveness to poverty, good policies, population size in recipient countries, etc., Canavire et al (2005) find one of the “pronounced differences” between bilateral and multilateral aid, together with many “minor discrepancies” to be the fact that multilateral aid is much less influenced by exports from the donor to the recipient countries. Export interests, as a subset of donor commercial interests, weigh substantively more on bilateral aid:

“the exports of donor countries to recipient countries did not affect the allocation of multilateral aid, whereas the export-related self interest of DAC countries provided a fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid. In 2001, for example, 50 per cent higher average donor exports were associated with more than US\$ 30 million additional aid disbursements..(Canavire et al, 2005: 18).”

Radelet has also pointed out that bilateral aid is more prone to succumbing to economic interests in the donor country than multilateral aid (2006: 6), and according to Knack & Rahman (2004), the very reason nations form multilaterals is to make them (and the aid they provide) less susceptible to political pressure.

Along the same line, Birsdall has suggested that pooling resources in multilaterals reduces aid fragmentation at recipient country level (2005: 9).

Making the case that donors who are more concerned about poverty are also more keen to reward good policies of recipient countries, Dollar & Levine (2004) find multilateral assistance to rank better on both good policies and poverty than bilateral aid. Hjertholm & White (2000: 46) refer to work done by Rodrik (1996) who has pointed out that multilateral aid agencies are less influenced by political considerations than bilateral ones.

There are however certain, if fewer, studies which represent a voice of dissent with the mainstream position that overall, multilateral aid is less dependent on donor self-interest, and by virtue of this fact, also of greater quality. Referring to work by McGillivray & White (1993), on bilateral and multilateral performance in the period 1974 – 1990, Hjertholm & White remind of a certain shade of doubt concerning multilateral aid performance:

“one would have expected the political and commercial considerations of bilateral donors to have rendered their performance inferior to that of multilateral agencies. This was not the case, however, leading to speculations about the legitimacy of the notion of multilateral aid being relatively more poverty-oriented and needs-based than bilateral aid (2000: 52).”

With a comprehensive analysis of the differences between bilateral and multilateral aid being beyond the scope of this writing, the short scan of scholarly thought above suffices the purpose – of pointing to the fact that these two types of aid essentially work differently.

In addition, multilateral aid is not a generic term either. The types of assistance provided by the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan arm of the World Bank, aid from the UN agencies such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Program

(UNDP), or World Food Program (WFP), and aid from the European Commission (EC), have in common the fact of being multilateral aid. Nevertheless, they will be separate worlds of their own in terms of how they operate. The fact that these different types of multilateral aid had varied engagement across Balkan countries is of relevance to the further discussion.

In addition, a lot of the literature on aid (some of it being of older date too, which is likely the reason for the point of view it employs) often considers aid from the European Commission as one more type of multilateral aid. A note of differentiation, or disclaimer, in this regard is important.

In this regard, simply placing it in the general club of multilaterals can be outdated, also because the EC is one of the largest donors to the other multilaterals, such as the World Bank or the United Nations. Over the past decade and a half, the EC aid has definitely transformed and become aid *sui generis*.

It could perhaps be argued that over the years, with transformation of the European Union from an economic club to a political union, the EC aid has also been transforming; if in the beginning of the 90s EC aid was more similar to multilateral aid, at present times, it is in some veins more similar to bilateral assistance. Thus discussing it in the generic terms for analyzing multilateral aid is not sufficient. This distinction is of special pertinence for the Balkans where EC aid has been the single largest contributor. In addition, EC aid to the Balkans, especially over the last 10- year period, has been increasingly related to the process of EU enlargement. This will be discussed in more detail further in the text.

6.4 Summary of Factors Shaping Foreign Aid

The discussion up to this point reviewed the general framework for deciding the allocation of foreign aid. This frame is structured by the motivations of donor countries to provide aid and all the additional factors which affect that decision. These factors are in a dynamic flux and what more, as scholarly debate has recorded, it is not always simple to determine with precision the composition of factors shaping aid allocation. For purposes of summarizing, the major variables which affect the allocation of foreign assistance include:

- a) Level of need. Poor countries need more aid than countries which are less poor. This is one of the core issues in aid research which has received a tremendous amount of attention. Donors are ranked in terms of quality of the aid they provide depending on how much of it goes to the poorest countries and peoples.¹⁶ The poorer a country is, the more it should be entitled to

¹⁶ Assistance to a country and its people is not one at the same. Sometimes donors will be disinclined to provide aid to a certain country because of its government's record in human rights for example, but they will nevertheless recognize the need of its people of aid. The experiences in practice can vary and this will be discussed further in this writing. One of the perhaps most highlighted examples from the Balkans is the "Energy for Democracy" project

receive. Different donors position themselves vis-à-vis this issue in different ways. Need should naturally not only be defined in terms of poverty. Emergencies, natural or manmade, are the basis of humanitarian and relief aid, whereby need is defined in terms of alleviating imminent human suffering. Reconstruction aid often follows after relief aid and its aim is to restore the conditions for life, disrupted by a natural or manmade disaster. Poverty is not a necessary condition for either relief or reconstruction aid. Both of these types of ODA were supplied to the Balkans in large quantities.

- b) Population size of the country. It is widely confirmed that small countries get more aid in per capita terms than large countries; a phenomenon which is known in aid literature as “small country bias”. If aid would be allocated on the basis of need alone, and be proportional to a country’s population, than practically all aid should go to two countries alone: India and China (White, 2004: 241).
- c) Geo-strategic location of the country. The part or the region of the world where the country is located, that is, its geo-strategic importance, strongly influences the amounts of aid it could receive. Most of the aid to the Balkans comes from European countries. The Balkans is getting disproportionately a lot of aid from the EC in per capita terms, compared to much poorer parts of the world. Further, it is widely known that 1/3 of all US aid goes to two countries in the Middle East alone: Egypt and Israel. This factor of geo-strategic or geo-political position of the country will influence not only the amount, but also the type of aid the country is getting from different donors.
- d) Historic, political, economic, cultural, and other ties. The different ties which exist between the donor and recipient country act as a strong determinant of aid. Colonial ties have been proven to be a strong predictor of allocation.
- e) Recipient country policies. The policies which donors consider important in assessing a country’s eligibility, or worthiness for receiving aid, such as democracy and human rights record, promoting of good economic policies, overall good governance, fight against corruption, are all relevant factors of aid allocation.

To summarize further:

- different donor countries will be more or less motivated by different sets of interests, ranging from strategic and security interests, economic benefits, to ideological or cultural goals;
- these different interests can display with different intensity depending on the specific situation and some will prevail over others in different settings;

of the European Commission, to supply heating oil only to opposition run municipalities in Serbia in the winter of 1999. The major concern in the donor community was to make sure that the Milosevic regime does not in any way benefit from the aid. This case will be analyzed later in the text.

- different types of donors (bilateral vs. multilateral) will essentially be driven by different types of motivation;
- different types of aid will correspond differently with different motivations. For example, humanitarian aid which aims to relieve imminent suffering would be less influenced by donor self-interest than soft loans for balance of payments, but the probability for and the extent of that interrelationship would always depend on who stands on the side of donor and recipient.

The preceding discussion on motivations of foreign aid has already lent significant insight into the wider factors of allocation of development assistance. Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998) and Alesina & Dollar (1998) have discussed the factors which shape the aid allocations of the largest bilaterals, whose combined aid allocations have always represented the bulk of foreign aid globally; in addition Alesina & Dollar have provided relevant insights into their relative weight.

The short list of factors above is by no means exhaustive. There are many other factors that influence aid allocation. For example, according to Lai (2003:105) one of the strongest predictors whether a country will receive aid, is whether it received it in the previous year. He relates this to bureaucratic decision making. The OECD (2005: 46) subscribed to this point of view, providing a somewhat more value neutral observation according to which:

“in most DAC member countries, radical changes to ... distribution patterns are rare, with established commitment tending to continue and changes generally occurring by making small adjustments regularly (OECD 2005: 46).”

Mosley (1985: 380) has noted the same quite earlier also by concluding that aid disbursements by almost all donors (he finds the US and Sweden to be exceptions to this) are determined in upward direction predominantly by two factors: past disbursements; and disbursements by other donors, which “encourage” or “shame” the other “members of the club”, that is of the donor community. Peer pressure as factor of aid has been observed and discussed by quite a few scholars. For example, Round & Odedokun (2003: 20) have found strong evidence to confirm the influence of peer pressure through empirical analysis. Other authors have nevertheless, considered this influence not to be substantial. Riddell (2007: 91) for example, thinks that, still, for the vast majority of donors, separate decision making is the rule. Thus, although there may not be a consensus on how important peer pressure is, it can definitely be concluded that it exists as a factor of aid allocation.

In conclusion, after having provided the framework, composed of the poles of self-interest vs. altruism, and the middle ground of enlightened self-interest, the section above discussed the many potential variables existing both on the side of the donor and the recipient, known to influence aid allocation. The list of items was by no means exhaustive. The discussion merely referenced some of the more common issues present in scholarship on aid. Note was made thereof of the difference between bilateral and multilateral donors. Summary was given on some of the relatively more important variables.

6.5 Fusion of Justifications for Aid

The literature on aid, some of which was reviewed above, has pointed out that the motives and factors of aid enter into many interrelationships with different dynamics. It can be said that in the reality of foreign assistance there is a certain interconnectedness and substitutability of motivations and justifications for aid. This essentially means that the different rationales for foreign assistance can often be mixed and interweaved. In addition, rationales, as well as their interrelationships, are subject to change over time.

At present for example, the argument which looms large in the donor community is that aiding democracy abroad can strengthen national security at home; the US has been a strong proponent of this view. Although support for democracy promotion has long been a consistent priority of US foreign policy, according to some scholars, this recent “remake” of the argument, which reinforces the relevance for national security as opposed to democracy as an end in itself, has been related to research which has indicated that democracies rarely wage wars on one another.¹⁷

In addition, the issue of the link between democracy and development has long been thoroughly studied and there are variety of views; from the older argument that democratic political system is not conducive to development, to the revived ideology that it does actually provide the best framework for robust economic growth. In turn, it has also been argued that economic growth is a prerequisite of democracy.¹⁸

This endless availability of possible causalities has proven to provide a fair combination of motivations and justifications for foreign aid. Sometimes these justifications have the purpose of convincing legislatures to approve aid appropriations, or to mobilize the support by public opinion, but sometimes they are definitely an expression of sincere faith in, be it ideologically or scientifically supported propositions.

This does not pertain to motivations and rationales for aid alone, but also to modalities in implementation of the aid effort. The practice and scholarship of aid have gone through several phases since the appearance of foreign assistance in the 50s. If the final expected goal was always defined in terms of economic growth, the proposed and attempted ways to achieve it have definitely gone through transformations. Chapter 2 on foreign aid in the 1990s discusses in more detail the changes in “thinking about development” which led to substantial transformation of foreign aid practices after the end of the cold war.

A digression to older, yet not dated arguments is perhaps insightful. Discussing the doctrines and ideas about development in the US policy community, Robert

¹⁷ See for example, Weart Spencer R, *Never at War. Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another?* Yale University Press, 1998; Rummel Rudolph J., Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 29 ,September 1985 p. 419-455. In addition, for see for example bibliography on the topic collected by Rummel Rudolph J., available at <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MTF.BIBLIO.HTM>

¹⁸ These views will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Packenham, in his *Liberal America and the Third World* (1973) has long time ago argued that the essential belief that one good thing leads to another – democracy leads to economic growth; economic growth reduces poverty, less poverty lessens the propensity for violence (terrorism?), and so forth- is typical of American liberal thinking about development.

The idea originally belongs to Huntington. In his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), Huntington called it “unity of goodness”; a term he used to explain that blessed by their happy history Americans tend to think that change and development were easy.

The fusion of rationales for aid, based on ideological, or evidence based convictions in desirable developmental causalities is a matter of reality, and what more it is a commonly observed practice in policy documents. Differing views can be found on the “motivations” for the fusions as well, that is, why such fusions are created.

For example, Meernik, Krueger, & Poe (1998: 67) have suggested that the framing of the aid effort in moral, value based terms increases its appeal to the public. Their argumentation is that the rhetoric of “ethics” is utilized in garnering public support, for what is essentially pursuit of national self-interest. However, the preposition exists that the opposite can also be true, that is, that governments would sometimes feel compelled to justify with self-interest an aid effort essentially motivated by moral sentiments, in order to persuade legislators to support it.

In conclusion, whatever the direction of the desired sequence of causality, justifications for aid are often fused, especially by policy makers. This of course reflects the reality of the aid process and more generally social change, but it also corresponds to donor views and thinking about the role of aid in development.

7. Conclusion

The preceding pages reviewed the major strands in the long-running debate on motivations of foreign aid. The discussion tried to reference some of the most well-known and influential views on the topic.

The conclusion is that most views concur that donor self-interest is the dominant factor of aid allocation, although there is understanding that no donor is either completely realist or altruist.

In addition to the ideological poles and the middle ground occupied by the concept of the enlightened self-interest, the discussion outlined the numerous factors that have been proven to influence aid decisions, and which align to, or actually derive from the basic ideological view supporting the decision on aid.

The discussion also served as an introduction into some the basic concepts in foreign assistance which will be further discussed in the next chapters.

Chapter 2 which follows steers the focus to the profound changes that took place inside the international system of aid after the end of the cold war. This gradually sets the stage for the focus of the discussion – the region of the Balkans, whose emergence as an important aid recipient, coincided with these changes.

CHAPTER 2

Foreign Aid in the 1990s: Changes in the Foreign Aid Regime After the Cold War

1. Introduction

The 1990s of the last century brought about the biggest changes in the foreign aid regime ever since its creation with the Point Four of US President Harry Truman¹⁹, and the institution of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. The single most important factor for this transformation, by a wide consensus, was the end of the cold war and subsequently, the dismantling of the bipolar world.

Chapter II, as already evident by its title, focuses on the foreign aid regime after 1989, the year which marked the end of the cold war. The decade of the 90s is important because it was the period of greatest change in the foreign aid regime since its creation. Its other very specific importance of interest to this text is that it was the period of time in which the region of the Balkans became a strong recipient of foreign assistance. These two processes coincided. The great changes in the international aid system started taking place about the same time the Balkans emerged as a strong recipient of ODA²⁰. What more, although not directly, they were interrelated. They were related in the sense that they were, in a general sense, instigated by the same events. The fall of the Berlin Wall opened Eastern Europe as the grand new frontier for foreign assistance; the change of the global geopolitical circumstance also changed some of the ways in which aid operated. It is important to note these changes as they provided the overall framework for foreign aid to the Balkans.

Chapter I on motivations for aid discussed in length the interest of donor governments as a factor in the shaping and maintenance of the international foreign aid system. The predominant voice in the debate on motives relates foreign aid to the national interest of donor states, and subsequently sees it as a tool of foreign policy. In addition, there is wide consensus that in the 40- year period from 1950-1990, foreign aid was under strong dominance of cold war politics. Thus, in the aftermath of the cold war, the

¹⁹ Point Four was the “US policy of [technical assistance](#) and economic aid to underdeveloped countries, so named because it was the fourth point of President [Harry S. Truman’s](#) 1949 inaugural address.” See Encyclopaedia Britannica at

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/466343/Point-Four-Program> . Point Four is considered as the beginning of official foreign aid programs in today’s sense of the word.

²⁰ Official Development Assistance (ODA) covers: “Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.” See DAC’s Glossary available at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html

essential question was - what will happen with aid once this major reason for its existence was gone?

Scholarly writing on foreign aid over the 90s has widely promoted the conclusion that, contrary to some expectations, the end of the cold war did not bring as big a change in aid as expected (Hjertholm & White, 2000; Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998; Hook, 1995). Or in other words, it proved wrong the numerous forecasts and expectations that foreign assistance would actually disappear once the cold war was over. This conclusion looms large in the writing on foreign aid in the 90s.

For example, Hjertholm & White (2000: 84) observe that the end of the cold war did not actually change the aid system as much as it was expected, in the sense that it did not bring about its final dissolution:

“the end of the cold war may be expected to have heralded great changes for aid. There have been less (and different) changes than many expected however.”

In identical manner, and somewhat earlier, Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998: 294) have suggested that *“contrary to the expectations of many, the global network of foreign aid has outlasted the end of the cold war.”*

The same conclusion is also evident in earlier work done by Hook (1995: 3):

“contrary to widespread expectations that foreign aid flows would weaken or disappear with the demise of the cold war ...the scope and complexity of aid relations has only increased in the 1990s.” Further in the same title (*National Interest and Foreign Aid*,) Hook (1995: 32) repeats that *“the end of the cold war did not produce the end of the aid regime, as many had predicted...”*

In his latest contribution, Riddell (2007:2) echoes the same conclusions from an even safer time distance:

“...as the cold war drew to an end, aid levels experienced their sharpest and most prolonged period of contraction in four decades. This led some to question whether foreign aid would survive in our new, emerging and globalizing world. Some thought it would wither, and eventually disappear, as another relic of the cold war.”

Previsions of the end of foreign aid as such derived from the strict understanding of aid as a tool of foreign policy pursuing national security objectives:

“the dismantling of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the East-West divide and hence, for some, the end of the need for aid. (Riddell, 2007:38).”

A dose of contentment is evident in the conclusions of scholars that aid did as a matter of fact manage to survive the end of the cold war. Riddell (2007: 38) suggests that the expectation of the end of foreign aid proved not truer than that of the “end of history”²¹:

²¹ Riddell refers to Francis Fukuyama’s renowned *The End of the History and the Last Man* (1992), (Fukuyama originally promoted the idea in the foreign policy journal, the *National*

“Such was the extent and the dept of the fall in ODA as the 1990s progressed that, from the early 90s to well into the new century, a dominant theme in the aid literature was that we were witnessing the end of official development aid as we had known it. Understandably prominent among the explanations for this dramatic fall-off in aid-giving was the ending of the cold war- assertions that we have reached ‘the end of political aid’ sat comfortably alongside those proclaiming ‘the end of history’. Both proved to be mirages.”

Nevertheless, if aid did not disappear with the end of the cold war, it did definitely experience the strongest decline ever since its very appearance, making predictions not completely unfounded. Predictions which foresaw the end of foreign aid, held aid as an instrument serving national security interest of states. Two points are important to mention in this regard. First, national security interests did not disappear completely; they merely modified. Second, national security was not an equally strong motive for all donors active in foreign assistance

2. Decline of Foreign Assistance in the 1990s

Global aid flows reached a peak in 1992 and started plummeting from there on until the late 90s, when they returned to an ascending trajectory. The decline of foreign assistance in the 1990s was by and large due to the reduced aid contributions by the world’s largest donors led by the US.

The following passage from Riddell (2007: 94) is instrumental in describing this trend and the motivation behind it:

“One-quarter of all ODA and 30 per cent of all official bilateral aid²² is provided by the United States...the end of the cold war afforded the United States what turned out to be a relatively short break from the pressure to allocate aid according to clear geopolitical aims, but instead of refocusing aid to the poorest countries, deep cuts in the overall level of aid were made. In real terms, the total amount of United States official aid fell by half between 1990 and 1997.”

A similar description of global trends in foreign assistance made by Radelet, which has a particular focus on the changes in the 1990s, conveys the same point. Chart 1 below, taken from Radelet provides a visual description of the global trends in ODA

Interest in 1989). He argued that Western liberal democracy emerged as the “last man standing” from the cold war, and that it posited itself as the only alternative for a post-cold war model of political organization of states.

²² Bilateral aid comprises “flows [which] are provided directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country. See DAC’s Glossary available at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965442.

The DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2007) provide a more elaborate definition of bilateral aid. According to this definition: “bilateral transactions are those undertaken by a donor country directly with a developing country. They also include transactions with national and international non-government organisations active in development and other internal development-related transactions such as interest subsidies, spending on promotion of development awareness, debt reorganisation and administrative costs (OECD, 2007: 6).”


allocation over a 30 year period (1975-2004). Radelet comments the trend and analyzes some of the principal causes for shifts in aid trajectories:

“Global ODA increased steadily from the 1960s until it reached a peak of \$68 billion in 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, and then declined sharply to just under \$55 billion in 1997. Aid flows began to rebound in the late 1990s following calls for greater debt relief²³ and increased aid to new democracies, and accelerated very sharply after the attacks of September 11, 2001, reaching \$92 billion in 2004... (Radelet, 2006: 4)”

Radelet points out that *“In real terms, total ODA in 2002 was about the same as in 1992, and by 2004 was about 12 percent higher (Radelet, 2006: 4).”* Chart 1 below shows the decline in ODA (in nominal and real amounts, and a percent of donor GDP) in the beginning of the 90s, after a steady, continuous growth over the previous two decades.

²³ Debt relief or debt forgiveness is one form of what the DAC terms as debt reorganization, which includes: “Any action officially agreed between creditor and debtor that alters the terms previously established for repayment. This may include forgiveness (extinction of the loan), or rescheduling which can be implemented either by revising the repayment schedule or extending a new refinancing loan.” See DAC’s Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965500 .

Chart 1: Global ODA 1975 – 2004



Source: OECD/DAC; from Radelet (2006)

The landmark World Bank report *Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn't, and Why?*, points to the lowest point of foreign aid decline in the 1990s, by looking at aid as share of donor GDP:

“In 1997 OECD donors gave the smallest share of their GNPs in aid since comparable statistics began in the 1950s-less than one-quarter of 1 percent. It would take roughly a 50 percent increase even to restore aid to its 1991 level (World Bank, 1998: 2).”

After the all-time low in 1997 aid started recovering in the late 1990s and reassumed a fast upward trend in the beginning of the 21st century. There is a consensus in the literature²⁴ that the critical moment was marked by the 9/11 attack on US soil and the ensuing war on terror.

Riddell has highlighted the fact that after the slump in the 1990s, foreign aid reached an all-time record high in the first years of 2000s, noting however that most of the aid increase accounted for on a few specific types of aid:

“In the year 2005, the total quantity of aid provided by the rich countries of the world topped the \$ 100 bn mark for the first time ever, nearly doubling the amount of official aid given in 2001 (\$52 bn).” “Careful analysis of the massive jump in aid – from \$ 80 bn in 2004 to over \$100 bn in 2005 - showed that the additional aid provided was absorbed almost entirely in debt relief, emergency aid²⁵, and other special purpose grants... (Riddell, 2007: 2-3)”

In conclusion, aid did survive the end of the cold war, but it also suffered its sharpest decline ever. It started falling from 1992, stayed low throughout the 90s, to start slowly to resume towards the end of the decade. The 9/11 attack on the United States and the ensuing war on terror have marked the beginning of a new era in international relations and have definitely brought aid as an instrument of national security interest back into the fore.

As already noted, it was exactly in this redefining period for foreign aid that the Balkans appeared as strong aid recipient. The global decline of foreign assistance efforts can not be observed in the Balkans, as shall be discussed further. The region received massive assistance flows over the 1990s.

²⁴See for example Radelet (2006); see also Moss Todd, Roodman David, and Standley Scott, *The Global War on Terror and US Development Assistance: USAID Allocation by Country, 1998-2005*, Centre for Global Development, Working Paper, No. 62, July 2005; Burnell Peter, *Foreign Aid; Resurgent: New Spirit or Old Hangover?* Research Paper 2004/44, UNU WIDER, July 2004.

²⁵ The term emergency aid in this sense is used to denote the category of *humanitarian aid*. According to the DAC definition: “Within the overall definition of ODA, humanitarian aid is assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (OECD, 2007a).” The composition of humanitarian aid will be discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

The last dramatic events of relevance to foreign aid dynamics, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the severe humanitarian crisis, the subsequent ousting of President Slobodan Milosevic and democratization of Serbia in the autumn of 2000, both happened before 9/11. This time dimension should be underscored as it of importance for the priority and attention that the international community could at the time dedicate to the Balkans.

3. Factors for the Decline of Aid in the 1990s

What were the reasons for such a radical decline of foreign aid in the 1990s? As already discussed above, the reductions of aid amounts of the largest donors have been largely explained through the *end-of-the-cold war paradigm*. The profound and far-reaching geopolitical changes produced with the collapse of the bipolar world have been by a wide consensus accepted as the principal factor. If the end of the cold war did not manage to dissolve foreign aid completely, it did definitely and effectively change it. The declined levels were only one, if most pronounced aspect of that change.

Geopolitics was not, as this chapter will further discuss, the only factor, although it was definitely held to have been the most influential one. The compelling logic is that the end of the cold war lifted the direct threat to national security of major donor states, primarily the United States, and with it, eliminated a strong factor for giving aid. The most austere version of this view considered the realist-political motivation for aid as a sole rationale for aid as such, and saw the end of political need for aid as the end of need for aid overall.

For Hopkins (2000), it is logical that the sharpest declines in aid therefore took place with donors which were most engaged in the global ideological clash, the United States and its closest allies:

“the end of the cold war both reduced support for aid and loosened constraints on its use. From 1948 until 1991, the great risk to security from a war between two large alliances caused each side to mobilize and use aid as a tool to shape relations with other states (2000:428)...in donors most engaged in the cold war struggle, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, domestic support for aid evaporated with the end of the global ideological clash. Predictably, among OECD members, the largest declines in aid since 1992 are reported for the United States, followed by close military allies, Germany, Japan, Australia (2000:426).”

The argument concerning Japan as put forth by Hopkins is nevertheless countered by observations of aid trends made by other scholars. White (2002, 2004) for one has pointed out (this chapter) that Japan became the single largest bilateral donor in the early 1990s. This was possibly in part made possible by the falling levels of US aid.

Table 1 below, adapted from White (2002) shows the trends in the shares of bilateral donor in total aid in the period 1966-2000. From the table it is clear that the biggest change concerns the share of the United States which steadily declines from 35% in the 1970s, 25% in the 1980s, to 18% -17% in the 1990s. Contrary to Hopkins’s

argument, [Table 1](#) does not demonstrate decline of Japanese aid.²⁶ On the other end, the strongest growth is marked by the Nordic countries whose share in total global volumes of ODA has grown steadily over the decades.

Taking into account factors that go beyond the (substantial) US influence on overall aid flows, White (2004: 237), gives a relevant cross-national overview of the trend in development assistance, over a longer time period (see [Table 1](#) below):

“The most striking change is the falling share of the United States, from over half in the 1960s to well under a fifth by the end of the 1990s. The largest rise is that of Japan, which became the largest single donor in the early 90s, accounting for just over one fifth of all DAC bilateral aid. However, the United States remains the second largest donor in absolute terms, with a program just over double that of the next rank of donors (France, Germany, and the UK with shares in 1990-2000 of 11%, 11%, and 7%, respectively). Whilst the shares of the former colonial donors, France, Germany, and the UK, have not changed greatly since the 60s, the share of the new European donors has risen. That of the Scandinavians grew most quickly from the 60s to the early 70s: collectively, their share rose from 4% in 1966-1969 to 16% in 1996-2000. The programs of southern European donors grew in the 80s, continuing its growth in the next decade, dropping back slightly with the drastic cut in Italian aid in the late 90s (White, 2004: 237).”

Table 1: Bilateral donor shares in total aid, 1966-2000; (period averages; per cent)

	1966- 1969	1970- 1979	1980- 1989	1990- 1995	1996- 2000
France	13	11	12	14	11
Germany	8	12	11	12	11
Denmark, Finland, the Netherl., Norway, and	4	12	13	14	16
Japan	5	10	16	20	22
Italy, Portugal, and Spain	2	2	6	8	7
United Kingdom	7	8	6	5	7
United States	54	32	25	18	17
Others	7	13	11	10	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Source: adapted from White (2002)

²⁶ It should be borne in mind that the table displays period averages, thus a decline over a 1-2 year period can be concealed by a subsequent rise in the ensuing years, with no change in period averages as a final result.

However Hopkins (2000: 430) concedes that “*some political uses of aid to promote stability continue*”. Therefore, he confirms the fact that the end of the cold war did not mean final disengagement between aid and politics. He supports this assertion with the fact that aid is still being used as a tool for maintaining political stability: “*aid still goes to help stabilize countries or regions such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or Southern Africa (Hopkins, (2000: 430).*”

Riddell (2000) fine-tunes the argument and makes a very relevant conclusion in pointing out that the end of the cold war did not eliminate the political motivation for aid but that it instead changed the relationship between politics and foreign assistance. According to him, politics still remains central to understanding aid:

“the end of the cold war...led some to believe that the political influences on aid and the impact of aid would decline. In practice, however, the political dimensions of aid remain central to understanding both the giving of aid and its impact on the recipient end. It is the nature of some of the relationships between aid and politics which have changed (Riddell, 2007:7).”

With the end of the cold war threat to national security of (great donor) states declined but it did not disappear. Rather, as it has been pointed out by many scholars (Lai, 2003; Hopkins, 2000), it transformed. The standoff by two major blocks was replaced by small, but numerous local and regional conflicts, which were both a cause and consequence of failed states, many of which were created in the process of dissolution of the geopolitical blocks. These failed states were not a direct and imminent threat to the national security of great powers, in the sense threat was perceived during the cold war, but they produced refugees, threatened regional security balances, and proved a breeding ground for the threat of the coming century- terrorism.

This new aspect of the national security interest has been well observed by Lai (2003: 106):

“given that the current distribution of power is somewhat unilateral, especially in terms of military strength, threats to US security are likely to be regional....while none of these regional foes threatens the continental United States like the Soviet Union did, they still threaten vital US interests across the world...with the end of the Soviet threat it has been argued that the US has switched its focus to containing ‘rogue states.’ “

The same argument can be found in the work of Hopkins. He suggests that the transformed security interest sets new goals for foreign policy, and subsequently for foreign assistance:

“Now that the cold war is over, foreign policy is more geared towards international public goods, including containing international ‘bads’ (Hopkins, 2000: 425).”

One direct consequence of this modified international environment on allocation of foreign assistance has been - its withholding from traditional allies from the time of the cold war. National allies could no longer expect to aid get under the same terms as during the bipolar freeze. Until 1990 allies often received aid without questions asked as long as they stayed military allies and rejected communism. It was not important

whether they spent aid effectively and efficiently; nor was much attention paid to their human rights record, economic policies, or the democratic standards they pursued. The end of the cold war brought changes to that system. Donors started linking aid to protection of human rights, democracy, and the “correct” economic policies.

This led to greater aid selectivity, the rise of political conditionality, and democracy assistance. The change in the global aid regime in the 1990s did not comprise only the reduction of aid flows, but also a rather profound shift in the themes, priorities, and methods of aid. Some of these changes did come into effect as a result of the declining geopolitical rationale, but not all of them.

Some of the changes were a result of processes that had been gradually unfolding in the preceding decades. One such change is the increasing role of NGOs which will be discussed further in this chapter. Others were result of ideological shifts which have occurred prior to or independently from the end of the cold war. An example for such a change is the withdrawal of aid away from production sectors²⁷.

Lessened threat to national security was one of the major factors for falling aid levels, but it was not the only one. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the geopolitical rationale never had the same importance for the aid programs of the middle powers as it had for the US and the Soviet Union.

Discussing the factors for the changes in the aid regime post-90, Hopkins has suggested as many as six reasons for the declining aid flows over the 1990s:

“First, the end of the cold war made it less important. Second, globalization attenuated aid tied to colonial interests. Third, growing budget pressures squeezed donor resources. Fourth, disappointment with the effectiveness of aid weakened popular support. Fifth, donor country specific interest coalitions supporting aid unraveled. Finally, neo-liberal philosophies challenged some of the intellectual foundations of aid (Hopkins (2000: 426).”

Given that it accounts for a huge share of global allocations, foreign assistance by the United States has traditionally occupied the center-stage in scholarship on aid. In addition to the widely discussed reasons for the fall-off in US aid, several scholars (Hopkins, 2000; Hook, 1996) have discussed the specific factors of decline of European aid in the 1990s, at regional as well as country basis. Some of these factors are again in a final analysis connected to the end of the cold war, such as German unification, or enhanced European integration, but their influence on foreign aid does not essentially follow the same national security logic as it is the case with US foreign assistance.

Hopkins (2000:431) has, among others, pointed to the effect of the preparation for the adoption of the European single currency on aid allocations by EU countries in the

²⁷ Production is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, according to the classification of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC. The sector of production contains aid allocated for: agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mineral resources and mining, construction, trade policy and regulations, and tourism. The CRS is available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

1990s. He notes though that the effect of this process was not equally distributed across European economies:

“Among European countries, the decision to meet the Maastricht’s treaty criteria for entering the Euro-currency arrangement required substantial shrinking in budget deficits in the years leading up to January 1999. Slow economic growth made the fiscal cuts required particularly painful. Some were dramatic. In Italy, for example, after large increases in aid, budget pressures in the nineties, combined with disappointment about fraud and waste in projects, brought about a fall in Italian aid over 50 per cent (Hopkins (2000:431).”

Hook (1996) has pointed out to the after-effect of another major change made possible by the end of the cold war – the unification of Germany - on European foreign aid. Hook suggests that the slowed economic growth in Germany, caused by the enormous cost of unification, has had significant impact on the wider European economy:

“Germany fell into a protracted economic slump after covering the enormous cost of unification and its restrictive monetary policies dampened economic growth across the European Union (EU). Economic strains provoked nationalistic uprisings in major German cities and across France and Great Britain, where sluggish growth and high unemployment were increasingly blamed on unfair trade practices and foreign laborers. Scandinavian leaders, long the leading foreign aid donors on qualitative terms, scaled back aid commitments after conservative parties rose to power and demanded deep cuts in government spending (Hook (1996: 2).”

Nevertheless, Hook goes beyond Europe per se, and points out to the wider, global character of fiscal constraints in the 1990s:

“even the government of Japan, the world’s largest donor since 1989, temporarily curbed many aid programs as it struggled to overcome recession and political crisis (1996: 2).”

The logic is corroborated by Riddell (2007), a decade later. Riddell however points out that the fiscal crisis of the 90s was not the first one to affect foreign aid historically:

“sharp falls in ODA were also linked to a (short) period of large fiscal deficits in leading donor countries (as they had been in earlier times), and to rising concerns about the environment, to which (falling) aid funds were additionally directed (Riddell, 2007: 38).”

The phrase “earlier times” refers to the two major oil crises from the 1970s which at the time had a profound impact on foreign aid. This impact resulted with declining flows in most donor countries (except for OPEC countries whose aid flows surged) and with the paradigmatic shift towards macro-economic stabilization and adjustment as new goals for ODA, in the sense that aid was redirected to maintaining macroeconomic stability and regular repayment of debt to donor countries, over the 1980s.

According to Hook (1996), fiscal strictness was also accompanied by reduction in the quality of aid, in the sense that donor self-interest played a greater role in deciding which aid will endure:

“the euphoria surrounding the cold war’s demise gave way to a new era of fiscal austerity and economic competition in the industrialized world. Without influential domestic constituencies to promote aid on a humanitarian basis, and in absence of the geopolitical rationales that had driven U.S. and Soviet aid flows for decades, many long-standing aid programs were reduced or eliminated outright. Those that survived were often those that most benefited the donor countries... (Hook (1996: 227))”

An analysis coming from White (2004), and which is of particular relevance for this writing concerned with foreign aid to the Balkans, as a part of the wider Eastern Europe, makes a very relevant point by suggesting that *at least some* of the global decline of aid flows in the 1990s is relative or ostensible in character. This is because aid flows to Eastern Europe have not been counted by the OECD as ODA but instead as OA (Official Aid). In this sense, at least a part of the decline of ODA is result of the increasing OA to post-communist countries (Table 2):

“Why has aid fallen in the 1990s? One reason maybe thought to be diversion to other uses. In particular, rather than realizing a peace dividend from the end of the cold war, funds have been taken up by the needs of the former Communist countries. To the extent that these countries do not qualify as ODA recipients then ODA will fall. Whilst this is part of the story, the data do not bear out the view that it is the whole picture. In 2000, OA was US \$7.8 billion. Since total ODA in that year was US \$49.5 billion, then OA “accounted for” about 60% of the “shortfall” in ODA compared to its nominal peak in 1992. But, between 1993 and 2000, OA rose by \$2 billion, compared to the fall in ODA of US \$6 billion, suggesting that increased OA explains an even smaller part of the fall in ODA. Hence, additional reasons for the fall in ODA have to be sought (White, 2004: 236).”²⁸

Table 2 below comprises the major recipients of OA and their share in total OA flows over the 90s.

The issue of ODA vs. OA as it pertains to the Balkans will be revisited in Chapter 5 which will start the exploration of numbers on foreign assistance to the region.

²⁸ The DAC originally produced the Part II list of recipients, or recipients of OA – to distinguish transition from developing countries. White observes that most OA, with the exception of Israel, went to countries in Eastern Europe:

“Predominant in the list of recipient of OA are those of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries. Such countries constitute, with one exception, the top 12 recipients of OA with the largest two, Russia and Poland, getting just under 20% each in the total in 2000. ...most notable is Israel accounting for 10% of OA. (White, 2004: 242).” The special position of Israel (together with Egypt) as recipient of US aid has already been mentioned in the previous chapter. In 1997 Israel was graduated from the list of ODA and was moved to Part II, list of OA recipients. White notes that, *“the graduation of Israel off Part I of the DAC list thus badly hit the volume of U.S. ODA since the money has continued to flow to Israel, rather than be reallocated to countries eligible for ODA. (2004: 236).”*

Table 2: Major recipients of official aid (OA), 1991-2000, (USD million)

	1991	1995	2000	Share in 2000 (%)
Russia	563.5	1,610.1	1,564.6	19.5
Poland	2,508.3	3,790.4	1,396.2	17.4
Israel	na	na	800.0	10.0
Ukraine	368.3	319.1	541.0	6.7
Czech Republic	230.6	147.9	438.2	5.5
Romania	321.1	275.6	432.1	5.4
Bulgaria	316.1	113.7	311.1	3.9
Hungary	626.0	-244.0	252.2	3.1
Slovak Republic	114.5	98.2	113.1	1.4
Lithuania	4.0	179.6	99.0	1.2
Latvia	3.4	63.6	91.1	1.1
Estonia	15.4	58.2	63.8	0.8
Cyprus	na	na	54.5	0.7
Belarus	187.0	222.9	39.6	0.5
Bahamas	na	na	5.5	0.1
Singapore	na	na	1.1	0.0
Brunei	na	na	0.6	0.0
Qatar	na	na	0.5	0.0
Other	1,316.0	1,782.0	1,816.0	22.6
TOTAL	6,574.2	8,417.3	8,020.2	100.0

Source: adapted from White (2002)

Riddell (2007) includes the so called “development -based rationale” among factors that have influenced the reduction of aid in the 1990s. In other words, increasing recognition emerged that too much aid was as bad as no aid. This is the argument that points to the very real threat of aid dependence:

“.. too much aid, it was argued, was detrimental to development as it encouraged recipients to depend continually on aid as a source of finance (Riddell, 2007:38).”

Thorbecke (2000) has pointed out to the same phenomenon, using the term “aid fatigue”. According to him: *“the decade of the 1990s was marked by a strong and lingering case of ‘aid fatigue’”*, which in his view is one factor of the declining aid flows: *“...fatigue was also influenced by the rising fear that foreign aid was generating aid dependency (Thorbecke, 2000: 44).”*

In simple terms, donors became replete with giving aid and waiting for tangible effects, which aid scholarship is well aware, are often difficult to identify. In addition, donors realized the potential counterproductive effect of aid. It should be borne in mind however, that the coincidence of these argumentations, such as fatigue and

attempt at avoiding aid dependency, with the demise of the geopolitical rationale, does make them, at least to some extent, seem rhetorical exercises for withdrawal of aid on political grounds. Especially given the fact that disappointment with aid is not a new awareness, typical of the 1990s; it goes way back to the very beginning of the aid regime.

4. Changes in the Structure and Composition of Foreign Assistance

The decline of ODA in the 1990 was not a homogeneous trend. Not all forms of aid went through an identical trend of decline; some, to the contrary, experienced an opposite trajectory, even if it was concealed by the overall downward movement of the aid flows.

Humanitarian aid experienced a strong expansion, as well as aid for promotion of democracy and good governance. Technical cooperation²⁹ declined, and so did program aid³⁰. The grants vs. loans³¹ balance shifted toward the former; aid shifted

²⁹ According to the DAC's Glossary, technical cooperation "includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and (b) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries, (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme expenditures, and not separately identified as technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows." See DAC's Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965653. The DAC Statistical Reporting Directive (2007) define technical cooperation as "provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs... Used without qualification, the term technical co-operation (sometimes referred to as technical assistance) is a generic term covering contributions to development primarily through the medium of education and training. There is, however, a distinction that is relevant to the compilation of statistical data, between free-standing TC (FTC) and investment-related TC (IRTC) (OECD, 2007)."

³⁰ General program aid or assistance (which goes combined with commodity aid) "includes contributions for general development purposes without sector allocation, with or without restrictions on the specific use of the funds (and irrespective of any control by the donor of the use of counterpart funds). Funds supplied on the general condition that they be used for capital projects at the recipient's choice, but not subject to agreement by the donor, are also to be included here (OECD, 2007:45)."

³¹ According to the DAC: "grants are transfers in cash or in kind for which no legal debt is incurred by the recipient. For DAC reporting purposes, it also includes debt forgiveness, which does not entail new transfers; support to non-government organizations; certain costs undergone in the implementation of aid programs; and "grant-like flows", i.e. loans for which the service payments are to be made into an account in the borrowing country and used in the borrowing country for its own benefit ... Loans are transfers in cash or in kind for which the recipient incurs a legal debt. Official loans are those with fixed maturities made by governments (central and local) or official (non-monetary) agencies, for which repayment is to be made by the recipient country. This includes loans repayable in the borrower's currency whether the lender intends to repatriate the repayments or to use them in the borrowing country (DAC, 2007: 10-11)." In order to be able to count as ODA, according to the DCA rules, the loan has to have at least 25% of grant element. The grant element, according to the

away from production sectors into services. Bilateral ODA mildly declined in the 90s at the expense of the rising share of multilateral³² ODA. Table 3 below shows the changes in the grant vs. loan ration, and in bilateral vs. multilateral ODA in the period 1973-1996. The important point is that whereas the overall trend in global ODA in the 90s was that of decline, the composition of aid flows underwent many additional changes.

DAC's Glossary :” reflects the financial terms of a commitment: interest rate, maturity (q.v.) and grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan, in the form of the present value of an interest rate below the market rate over the life of a loan. Conventionally the market rate is taken as 10 per cent in DAC statistics. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 percent; it is 100 per cent for a grant; and it lies between these two limits for a soft loan. If the face value of a loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the grant equivalent of that loan. (cf.concessionality level) (Note: the grant element concept is not applied to the market-based lending operations of the multilateral development banks.)The extent of concessionality can be measured either as the benefit to the borrower, or the opportunity cost to the lender. Both benefit and opportunity cost depend on the interest rate and duration of the loan. In a benefit calculation, concessionality would be calculated from the difference between the interest charged and the market rate of interest which the borrower would otherwise have had to pay. In an opportunity cost calculation, the concessionality would be calculated from the difference between the interest charged and the return that the lender could have expected from the next most profitable means of investing the capital. DAC statistics generally measure costs to donors, and consideration of opportunity costs played an important part in determining a reference rate of interest for calculating grant elements. For practical purposes this was set as 10%.” See DAC's Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965544

³² Multilateral assistance is that which is given to a “recipient institution which a) conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development; b) is an international agency, institution or organization whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency; and c) pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets (OECD, 2007: 6).”

Table 3: Net ODA disbursements, by type and donor; all donors; 1973-1996 (%)

<i>ODA type</i>	<i>Aver. share 1973-80</i>	<i>Aver. share 1981-90</i>	Aver. share 1991-96
ODA grants	61.6	71.1	77.4
ODA loans	38.4	28.9	22.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
Donor			
Bilateral ODA*	77.2	75.4	70.1
Multilateral ODA	22.8	24.6	29.9
<i>of which</i> IBRD & IDA	5.6	7.7	8.3
IMF (SAF & ESAF)	0.0	0.1	1.3
United Nations Agencies	7.5	8.6	9.6
European Commission	3.4	4.4	7.2
Other	6.3	3.8	3.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

* including Arab donors

Source: adapted from Hjertholm & White (2000a)

As evident from the first part of Table 3, the share of grant aid in the total rose from an average 61, 6 % over the 70s to 77, and 4% in the first half of the 90s. The second part of the table shows that descending trajectory of bilateral aid, from 77, 2% in the 70s to 70, 1 % in the first half of the 90s, at the expense of the rise of multilateral assistance. As it can be seen from the table, this is due to rise in ODA by all major multilaterals, IBRD and IDA, the UN agencies, and the European Commission.

Emergency and relief aid has multiplied in the decade of the 1990. Riddell (2007) has dully observed the ascending trend in humanitarian aid and analyzed the factors thereof:

“The deep falls in ODA in the 1990 masked a trend of even greater magnitude for emergency and humanitarian aid – but precisely in the opposite direction. While ODA funds for development contracted, ODA funds for humanitarian assistance doubled. If emergency funds from non-governmental sources are included, the 1990 saw a four-fold expansion in overall emergency aid funds (Riddell, 2007: 38-39).”

In Riddell’s view, two factors in particular, converged to this end: *“the expanding number of people affected by natural disasters, and the expanding number of post-cold war local conflicts... (2007: 39).”*

Another change concerns humanitarian and emergency relief. Aid allocated for containing, relieving, or ending conflict, which comprised but was not limited to assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and development, reconciliation and stabilization, experienced a strong rise in the 1990s. On the European continent at least, the central place for this type of aid effort in the 1990s was definitely the Balkans. Table 4 below presents the changes across types of aid in the period 1973-1997. The strong rise of emergency assistance is evident. The table also shows the rise of debt forgiveness and the general decline of program aid. In addition, the changes in the sectoral composition of ODA can be observed. The sectoral composition of ODA with specific focus on the Balkans will be the subject of extensive treatment in Chapter 6.

Table 4: ODA commitments by sector and purpose; DAC donors, 1973-1997 (%)

	<i>Av. share 1973-1980</i>	<i>Av. share 1981-1990</i>	<i>Av. share 1991-1997</i>
Soc. infrastructure and services ³³	20.8	25.0	26.2
Ec. infrastructure and services ³⁴	13.9	18.7	21.8
Production sectors	22.0	19.7	12.0
Multisector (crosscut)	2.2	3.0	4.7
General program aid	14.2	16.2	10.0
Action relating to debt	3.7	4.3	8.8
Emergency assistance	1.1	1.7	5.3
Admin. cost of donors	NA	3.8 a*	4.3
Support to NGOs	NA	2.2 a*	1.3
Unallocated/unspecified	22.1	7.1	5.7
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: a* - Average numbers refer to 1984-1990

Source: adapted from Hjertholm & White (2000a);

³³ Aid for social infrastructure and services is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, according to the classification of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC. The CRS is available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW> . This sector will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

³⁴ Aid for economic infrastructure is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, according to the classification of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC. The CRS is available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW> . This sector will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

Emergency aid rose up because of the multiplied local conflicts. In addition, there was political will on part of the international community to contain such conflicts. Foreign assistance followed the focus of the new foreign policy which shifted toward controlling regional risks to security. In this sense, the already discussed new priority of containing “*international bads*” and “*rogue states*” often naturally went hand in hand with the objective of containing and ending conflict. This was definitely the case in the Balkans. Many scholars (Hopkins, 2000) have pointed out that the 1990s witnessed the (re)emergence of the terms “humanitarian intervention” and humanitarian war.

Hopkins (2000: 441) tends to explain even humanitarian aid as motivated by security reasons:

“the involvement of the UN in Somali, Cambodia and Southern Africa, and of NATO in the Balkan wars, suggests that containing armed conflict is a rising goal of Western states, especially when refugees threaten to destabilize surrounding states.”

The rising share of humanitarian relief in total assistance flows is only one aspect of the transformation of aid in the 1990s. The decade saw disaffection with technical cooperation (Arndt, 2000: 162), and subsequently its decline in the overall flows; shift of aid from production sectors into social services; decline of program aid; rise of grant aid; and among other, further stable expansion of multilateral assistance. Bigger paradigmatic shifts included the rise of the themes of sustainable development and democracy promotion. Increased efforts for political development were combined with the expanded and widespread use of political conditionality. Scholars (Hook, 1996) have observed with concern that flows shifted away from the poorest, in favor of middle income countries. The aid system became more diffused. Donor proliferation, which has been observed as a trend ever since the 1970s, has also become a source of increasing concern. NGOs have risen to prominence.

In his topical *Foreign Aid Towards the Millennium (1996)*, Hook discusses the changes in the aid regime after the end of the cold war. He notes the great hope present in the donor community in the early 1990s for a shift towards care for the environment as the possible new *raison d’être* for aid in the absence of the cold war scare, which also calls for preserved involvement of governments in an era of renewed faith in the operation of market forces:

“The cold war’s collapse prompted ...a shift toward sustainable development as the guiding principle of the aid regime...although market factors received growing emphasis in development aid, leaders recognized that ‘environmental protection is one area in which government must maintain a central role. Private markets provide little or no incentive for curbing pollution (Hook, 1996: 8-9).”

Belonging to the minority of aid scholars who actually expected aid to rise in the aftermath of the cold war, as a result of the so-called “peace dividend”, Hook does acknowledge that the expectation of a great new momentum for aid in the post-1989 period did not come about. Sustainable development has become an increasingly important issue in international cooperation, but still far from the expectation that it would become the axis of a new world order, which was perhaps expected in the beginning of the decade.

The following passage from Hook's *Foreign Aid Towards the Millennium* is instrumental in conveying that momentum, and thus merits to be cited in entirety:

“The end of the East-West was also expected to bring overdue relief to North-South relations, subordinated for nearly half a century to the cold war rivalry. The United Nations declared sustainable development the centerpiece of its post-cold war mission. At the 1992 UN Conference of the Environment and Development, the largest assembly of world leaders in history confronted transnational problems such as rapid population growth, global warming, habitat destruction, AIDS, and terrorism. To pay for the expensive remedies to these problems, along with a growing list of UN peace keeping missions, wealthy governments pledged higher levels of foreign aid. The impoverished regions of Africa, Latin America, and South Asia were to receive more support, as were the transition states of Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. For a fleeting moment it appeared that foreign aid, for so long contaminated by the cold war, would finally achieve its vast potential. As subsequent events have demonstrated, however, these expectations of a new world order were unfounded. Global collaboration in the mid-1990s instead succumbed to the domestic priorities of wealthy governments, to intensifying economic cooperation, and to the resurgence of ethnic and religious violence. Rather than growing, as widely expected, economic aid flows decreased in absolute terms between 1992 and 1994, and the percentage of donor states’ income devoted to aid fell to its lowest levels in two decades (Hook, 1996:1).”

Discussing the changes in the international aid regime Hook (1996) notes the growing complexity of foreign assistance over the last decades, a fact which has increasingly come to be seen as impediment to the effectiveness of ODA:

“The foreign -aid regime became more diffused, involving the OECD, IMF, World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and a network of regional development banks, each of which brought discrete institutional biases to the table. As a result, the proclaimed ends and executed means of foreign aid were increasingly disconnected, resulting in compromises that undercut the efficiency of aid strategies (Hook, 1996: 229).”

Last but not least, Hook (1996: 233) points out to the diverting of foreign aid from the poorest to less needy countries:

“In general, we have witnessed a paradoxical pattern among recipient of foreign assistance in the post-cold war period. Foreign aid has increasingly been directed towards more affluent LDCs and middle-income countries...less support is available to those in greatest need....economic polarization of the developing world is likely to widen...”

Hjertholm & White's (2000a) essay on *“Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective”* is one of the more relevant recent texts on the trends in the foreign aid regime, since its beginning and through the 1990s. Some of the changes they observe in ODA in the decade of the 1990s include the rise of multilateral aid, shift towards social services, decline of program aid, and the falling share of tied aid.

A change which has actually materialized over a longer period of time, and does not just concern the 90s is the increasing share of multilateral aid and grant aid. Hjertholm & White note that *“the share of multilateral aid has risen from about 23 percent in the 1970s to nearly 30 percent in the 1990s (2000a: 17).”*

In an earlier, discussion version of the paper, White (2002) explains some of the reasons for this rise of the share of multilateral aid:

“The impetus for this increase in the 1970s and 1980s was the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in financing the response of developing countries to first the oil price shocks and then the debt crisis...it reinforced in the 1970s by the expansion of the World Bank under the presidency of Robert McNamara. For European countries, an additional factor has been the increase in the size of the aid program of the European Union, which has gone from just over three per cent of total aid in the 1970s to nearly nine per cent in the most recent years; for EU members this share rose from 11 to 20 per cent from 1989-90 to 2000. But a further factor underlying the rising multilateral share in the 1990s has been the shrinking aid programs³⁵ (White, 2002: 7).”

Another change in the composition of foreign assistance has been the decline of ODA loans, combined with the rising share of ODA grants. This trend has been observed by Hjertholm & White (2000a):

“more than three-quarter of total ODA had been in the form of grants in the period 1991-1996, compared to just over 60 per cent two decades earlier (2000a: 17).”

Hjertholm & White (2000a: 25) also note the shift of ODA toward the field of social infrastructure and services and economic infrastructure:

“There has been a marked switch toward more aid for social infrastructure and services (e.g. education, health, water supply and sanitation), in particular after 1992, a reflection of the strengthened emphasis by donors on the developmental role of human capabilities. In recent years more than a quarter of ODA has been committed to this sector. Likewise, economic infrastructure and services (e.g. energy, transport, and communications) has received increased attention and flows (rising to over 20 per cent 1991-1997).”

Thorbecke (2000) has indicated to the same moment of the rise of aid going to social infrastructure and services, but he offers a different rationale. He shares the quite widely accepted view that the shift was due to the resurgence of neo-conservative faith in the markets, which resulted with diverting of aid from sectors of production:

³⁵ White notes a negative correlation between a country's shrinking aid budget and rising share of multilateral aid. He provides the example of Italy which had the *“largest increase in multilateral share...and the largest fall in aid”*. White suggests that: *“it thus seems that the multilateral component appears as a fixed cost in the aid program, whose share rises as volume falls. This finding may be partly explained by the fact that multilateral contributions are calculated by some formula for burden sharing (e.g. IBRD and EU). But this argument does not apply to all contributions; many of those, such as to parts of the UN system, are voluntary (2002: 8).”*

“the sectoral composition of foreign aid switched towards a significantly larger proportion channeled to social infrastructure and services...and economic infrastructure and away from productive sectors. The above trends reflected the strong faith in the operation of the markets and skepticism regarding governments’ (both aid donors and recipients) involvement in productive sectors... (Thorbecke, 2000: 44)”

This point is highlighted in a landmark report on aid by the World Bank:

“evidence suggests that rapid development is possible, and should be based on markets and on effective states playing an economically important facilitating, but not dominant, role (World Bank, 1998: 10).”

In addition, Hjertholm and White (2000a: 26) observe the downscaling of *program aid* over a longer term, commencing in the decades preceding the 1990s:

“Program assistance (including food aid), after having played important role in the 1970s and 1980s, has been scaled down considerably (only 10 per cent in 1991-97) “

Finally, the two scholars point to the continued progress in the untying of aid³⁶, by noting that the share of *“total untied DAC aid has increased steadily from 40-5 per cent in the early 80s to about 70 per cent in 1995-6, and even 88 per cent in 1997...”* (Hjertholm and White, 2000a: 35).

In conclusion, the overall decline of foreign assistance flows conceals a complex transformation of the structure and composition of aid.

To say that aid declined in the 90s only begins to explain all the changes in the foreign aid regime in that decade of profound change. Not all aid decreased. Relief went up, as did grant aid, and aid channeled multilaterally. In addition, aid shifted away from production and went into social infrastructure.

Even more significant was the expansion of aid for political development, that is, good governance and democracy, although because of the way aid statistics is collected it is difficult to say exactly how big this increase was.³⁷ The rise of NGOs definitely left a relevant imprint on the decade of the 90s. Although the phenomenon of international civil society exceeds the boundaries of the foreign aid debate, it is a fact that its rise has been closely related to trends in channeling of aid. All of these changes unfolded contemporaneously, and were in many ways influenced by the profound political changes of the 1990s.

Three of these aspects will be discussed in more detail in the next sections of this chapter, since considered of special relevance for the theme of interest. They are the

³⁶ According to the DAC’s Glossary “untied aid is Official Development Assistance for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.” See DAC’s Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#m

³⁷ The DAC does not have an aid expenditure category of “democracy assistance”.

rise of NGOs; the expansion of democracy assistance and political conditionality; and the emergence of Eastern Europe as aid recipient.

5. The Rise of NGOs

Another marked change, which after having gradually unfolded for decades, has climaxed in the 1990s, was the rise of NGOs. The last decade of the 20th century witnessed the prominence of nongovernmental organizations as new actors on the international stage. Although the expansion of the so-called “international civil society” can be relevantly studied within the framework of foreign aid, it definitely exceeds the aid debate per se, and it concerns many other disciplines. What more, it has probably become a discipline in its own right.

A longer treatment of this issue would be beyond the scope of this writing, although a shorter introduction is relevant to the discussion about the trends in the foreign aid regime in the 1990s, and definitely, for the ensuing review of the aid phenomenon in the Balkans.

In the 1990s it became increasingly clear that NGOs have come to be actors of growing influence in international relations; an integral part of ever more tightly interconnected and multilateral world; counterparts, watchdogs, and sometimes opponents of states.

Many scholars (Matthews, 1997; Salamon, 1994) have reflected on the genealogy of this phenomenon.

The view espoused by Jessica Matthews in her classic *“The Power Shift (1997)”*, is that the rise of NGOs is an aspect of a process of redistribution of power in the world:

“the end of the cold war has brought no mere adjustment among states but a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society.... They are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (Matthews, 1997: 50).”

Matthews has suggested that the world with states as the major power players was over, and that NGOs were the natural exponents of what was essentially a new world order. She argues that the *“steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while (1997: 50).”*

Yet, Matthews explains this essentially political change with apolitical factors. According to her, *“the most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of non state actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution (1997: 51).”*

Still, she does nevertheless concede that political requirements, such as the existence of political freedom are preconditions for the growth of civil society:

“[except] where culture or authoritarian governments severely limit civil society, NGOs' role and influence have exploded in the last half-decade(1997: 53).”

Matthews also points out the financial aspect of the power of civil society:

“Their financial resources and—often more important—their expertise, approximate and sometimes exceed those of smaller governments and of international organizations (1997: 53).”

Matthews subscribes to the widely known comparisons, which essentially see NGOs as part of the foreign aid regime, to indicate to the financial strength of civil society: *“today NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire U.N. system (1997: 53), and concludes that “increasingly, NGOs are able to push around even the largest governments (1997: 53).”*

Likely among the first to indicate to the “associational revolution” taking place in the 1990s, Lester Salamon suggests in his classical *“The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector (1994)”* that the scope of this trend is enormous, and potentially its significance epochal:

“A striking upsurge is under way around the globe in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or non-governmental organizations... The scope and scale of this phenomenon are immense. Indeed, we are in the midst of a global "associational revolution" that may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth. The upshot is a global third sector (1994: 109).”

For Salamon, at least in part, the exponential growth of civil society in the 1990s is owed to the political dynamics in Eastern Europe, and the struggle of Eastern Europeans against authoritarianism:

“Well before the dramatic political events that captured world attention in 1989, important changes were taking place beneath the surface of East European society, and voluntary organizations were very much at the centre of them. Indeed, a veritable "second society" had come into existence, consisting of thousands, perhaps millions, of networks of people who provided each other mutual aid to cope with the economy of scarcity in which they lived. By the late 1970s, these networks were already acquiring political significance. This process has only accelerated since the overthrow of the communist governments. As of 1992, several thousand foundations were registered with governmental authorities in Poland. In Hungary, 6,000 foundations and 11,000 associations had been registered by mid-1992 (1994: 110-111).”

Salamon also acknowledges that fact that the boom of civil society is related to the fact that NGOs were increasingly accepted as preferred implementers of development operations:

“Official aid agencies have supplemented and, to a considerable degree, subsidized these private initiatives...even the World Bank, which had traditionally given only sporadic support to private voluntary organizations, recently acknowledged the ‘explosive emergence of nongovernmental organizations as a major collective actor in development activities’ (Salamon, 1994: 114).”

It is evident that even though both Salamon and Matthews indicate to deeper social, political, and technological changes, as factors for the growth of civil society, they both pay a reference to the fact that the financial strength of NGOs does have to do with foreign aid and their role as implementers of ODA.

The explosion of civil society in the 90s became a topic that exceeded scholarly debate. The growing power of NGOs came to concern governments and big international actors from the World Bank to big multinational companies. Analyses of the so called “third sector” and its relations with the first two sectors, government and the economy, have multiplied.

Tracing the roots of modern international civil society way back in history, in an influential article, The Economist has tried to explain the expansion of NGOs in the 1990s with the tremendous social, political and technological changes:

“Although organizations like these have existed for generations (in the early 1800s, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society played a powerful part in abolishing slavery laws), the social and economic shifts of this decade have given them new life. The end of communism, the spread of democracy in poor countries, technological change and economic integration - globalization, in short - have created fertile soil for the rise of NGOs (The Economist, 11 December 1999).”

Yet elsewhere, The Economist has presented views which simplify the civil society phenomenon by boiling it down to its financial basics:

“the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western governments finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of privatization: many ‘non-governmental’ groups are becoming contractors for governments. Governments prefer to pass aid through NGOs because it is cheaper, more efficient - and more at arm's length - than direct official aid (The Economist, 29 January 2000).”

Without entering too deep into the complex discourse of how social and political changes propelled the growth of civil society in the 90s, the point needs to be made that one of the factors which contributed to the NGOs’ growing economic power was the fact that over the preceding years they had gradually come to be seen as the preferred deliverers and implementers of aid.

Delusion with the ineffectiveness of government-to-government aid, the convenience of subcontracting aid through private organizations for both political (avoidance of direct official government presence in certain compromising settings) and economic (cheaper delivery) reasons; flexibility of setting up an NGO operation as opposed to the slow, overregulated government administration type of management; growing multilateralism in international relations and, among other, especially the role of the

UN system in promoting work through NGOs; have all contributed to the growing reputation of NGOs in the decades preceding the 1990s.

Overtime, references to the superiority of NGOs to other actors in the foreign aid industry, have multiplied. This superiority was not only seen as in operational terms. Overtime NGOs have come to be seen as *morally superior actors*, not just in delivery of foreign aid, but as regards conduct in the international arena overall.

For example, when Brian Opeskin (1996) doubts the capacity of foreign aid to do good, he excludes aid channeled through NGOs. Relying on the arguments provided by Hancock (1991)³⁸, which he analyses thoroughly, Opeskin excuses NGOs from his harsh critique of the foreign aid regime:

“Aid is bad because the poor in developing countries suffer the most abject miseries not in spite of aid but because of it... One may surmise that if different world institutions could be created, foreign aid might then be worthwhile. This is clear from Hancock’s introductory disclaimer that his attack is focused on donations channeled through official aid organizations. The foreign aid undertaken by voluntary agencies such as Oxfam and Save the Children Fund is worthwhile because ‘they rarely do significant harm [and] sometimes they do great good’ (Opeskin, 1996: 24).”

The view supporting the ethical and operational superiority of NGOs as actors in the foreign aid industry became quite popular in the 1980s. Burnell (1997: 15) for example, makes a reference to a speech by Chris Patten from 1989, who back then had argued that all aid channeled through NGOs is of better quality.

In addition to their popularity as development operators, especially in situations when emergency relief is necessary, NGOs were identified with civil society, and given that civil society was considered an essential ingredient of democracy, NGOs came to be seen as both the means and ends of democracy promotion activity.³⁹

Another factor which contributed to the rise of NGO power was the increased interest in direct intervention in political development and the rising popularity of the concept of democracy promotion.

In a recent retrospective for example, The New York Times has tied the rise of NGOs to the growing international interest in democracy: *“in the early 1990’s, as the West tied aid to democratization, the independent organizations began flourishing... (Onishi, 22 March 2002).”*

Hulme & Edwards (1997: 4) refer to a report by the International Commission on Global Governance (1995) which notes that the *“176 ‘international NGOs’ of 1909 had blossomed into 28,900 by 1993.”* They also note that the explosion of numbers of NGOs has been paralleled by the expansion in size of individual NGOs (1997: 4).

³⁸ See Hancock Graham, “Lords of Poverty”, Mandarin, 1991.

³⁹ In this sense, a vibrant civil society was considered a relevant indicator for the health of democracy; the indicator for this very often was the sheer number of registered NGOs. Thus, developing civil society was considered an important item of the democracy promotion agenda. At the same time, the actors charged with this task were most often NGOs themselves.

Hulme & Edwards have also pointed to the clear link between foreign aid and NGOs. According to them, the rise of NGOs is not accidental, *“nor is it solely a response to local initiative and voluntary action. Equally important is the increasing popularity of NGOs with governments and official aid agencies (1997: 5).”*

They suggest that this process is an outcome of the re-consolidation of the concepts of neo-liberal economy and liberal democracy as the universally valid blueprint for development. In economic terms this has meant that government intervention should be reduced, since private initiative is the most efficient mechanism for growth. In terms of political development, NGOs and civil society have come to be considered a vital element of democracy (Hulme & Edwards 1997: 5-6).

In their *“NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (1996)”*, Gordenker & Weiss (1996: 24-25) have identified three major factors for NGO expansion in the 1990s: the end of the cold war, technological development, and the growth of available resources. They have pointed to some interesting financial indicators to describe the scope of the trend, by using data concerning foreign aid:

“in 1994 over 10% of public development aid (\$8 billion) was channeled through NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined UN system (\$ 6 billion) without the Washington-based financial institutions. About 25% of US assistance is channeled through NGOs (Gordenker & Weiss, 1996: 25).”

According to Gordenker & Weiss, the main reason donor governments have been increasingly opting for NGOs as implementers of development operations - is their cost-effectiveness.

Antonio Donini (1996) has also resorted to data on foreign assistance to give another account of the strength of the presence of NGOs in ODA delivery:

“In terms of net transfers, NGOs collectively represent the second- largest source of development and relief assistance, second only to the bilateral governmental donors...public grants represented 1, 5% of NGO income in the 1970, 35% in 1988, and, with the explosion of humanitarian relief programs in recent years, probably over 40% today (Donini, 1996: 88).”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ According to Donini, *“One explanation of this shift is that it represents a lasting legacy of Reaganism- Thatcherism in the sense that it is an application of laissez-faire and anti-state ideology to international relations. A similar view holds that it is a manifestation of the North’s loss of patience with the perceived ineffectiveness of UN organizations as conduits of international assistance and of the corresponding faith in the operational superiority of the ‘hands-on’ NGOs. In any event, the end of the cold war seems to have accelerated a process that was already underway – the emergence of political conditionality. The Northern NGO community benefited collectively from the fact that, with the end of superpower confrontation, the need for political state-to-state North-South support has all but disappeared (Donini, 1996: 89).”*

Donini is perhaps the first to outline the famous “oligopoly theory” suggesting that very few big NGOs control the humanitarian relief market, In his view the situation *“... is tantamount to an oligopoly, where eight major families of federations or federations of international NGOs have come to control almost half an \$8 billion market...they are CARE...World Vision*

Scholars (Paul, 2000; White, 2002) have also pointed out that the net-rise of NGOs was at the expense of the net-fall of other actors in the aid industry, that is, that NGOs took “market share” from other actors in international development:

“In the 1990s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees expressed alarm that governments were increasingly channeling funds for humanitarian assistance to their own national NGOs rather than to multilateral agencies. The agencies were losing their capacity to coordinate relief in large scale emergencies, as dozens of NGOs appeared on the scene (Paul, 2000).”

An important distinction has to be made concerning the composition, or the character of the funds controlled by NGOs. For example, looking into total official and private flows over a three-decade period, White (2002: 3) notes that “*grants from NGOs have been remarkably stable at about 4 per cent of total flows.*” This is apparently at odds with the preceding argument about the growing financial strength of civil society organizations (CSOs). It needs to be underscored that this is 4% of total flows, not just ODA. Hence, White (2002: 3) further explains:

“if they were to be included with ODA, they would be about 8 per cent of the resulting total. This figure represents the funds which NGOs raise themselves. They also act as a channel for ODA. DAC data have a line ‘support to NGOs’, which has been stable at 1.5 per cent of total ODA for the last two decades ...), so that aid through NGOs is about 10 per cent of the total of ODA... However, this line covers direct flows from agencies to NGOs to spend on their own programmes, and does not capture cases when the NGO is the implementing agency for a project funded by that agency. Whilst data are not available on the latter, it is generally believed to have increased quite substantially since the mid-1980s.”

Operating with more recent data Riddell has noted that “... in 2004 NGOs were responsible for some \$ 23 bn of aid money; equivalent to over 30 per cent of all ODA (2007: 48).”

Riddell (2007) also makes one very important observation concerning the transformation of ODA in the 90s and its effect on NGOs. Namely, he points to the fact that the decline of aid in the 1990s did not affect the growing role of NGOs:

“The post-1990 has seen further changes and consolidation in the status and importance of NGOs as aid donors. The steep falls in ODA which marked the early 1990s were not mirrored in NGO income, which continued its steady increase throughout the decade... (Riddell 2007: 47-48)”

International, ...the Oxfam federation,...the MSF group,...Save the Children Federation,...and CIDSE, ARDOVE, and Eurostep. (Donini, 1996: 91).”

The similar argument is put forward in the same volume, by another veteran of development aid, former USAID director Andrew Natsios (1996). . According to Natsios “*ten US NGOs received 76% of all cash grants to NGOs for relief purposes from the US government in fiscal year (FY) 1993 and over 87% of all food aid for relief purposes in FY 1993. The European Union gave 65% of all relief grants to 20 nongovernmental organizations in FY 1994 (Natsios, 1996: 69).*”

But the argument does not end here. According to some scholars, such as Omaar & de Waal (1994), not only that the rise of NGOs was not affected by the fall of aid. It was caused by it. Referring to the work of the former, Gordenker & Weiss (1996: 25) have also put forward the argument that the reduction of ODA and the increasing funding for NGOs were “two sides of the same coin”. This relates to the point made earlier in the discussion concerning the cost-effectiveness as reason for donor preference of NGOs as aid operators.

This is a relevant, yet not sufficiently discussed finding in the scholarly thought on aid.⁴¹ Basically, the fall of ODA did not hinder but rather it spurred the growth of NGOs.

A longer discussion on the rise of civil society in the 90s would exceed the scope of this writing. It was however important to note, a finding which is corroborated by conclusions produced independently by different scholars (some of who are not scholars on foreign aid per se) that the rise of NGOs in the 90s was related to trends in foreign assistance.

The end of the cold war definitely had a role to play – donors were no longer bound to go with state-to-state aid as they no longer needed to prop up friendly regimes. The space created by this new political flexibility was quickly filled by a dynamic industry of private aid organizations. However, as the previous discussion suggested, there were many additional factors involved.

Quite before the 90s NGOs have already built the aura of morally superior agents of aid. This popularity definitely had to do with the disillusion with other types of implementation of foreign assistance, such as through government bureaucracy. The increasingly multilateral world was a factor – ever since its very beginning, the UN system relied on NGOs for different types of operational work. Then, in the 80s there was the Reagan-Thatcher ideology of privatization. Governments shed competences and handed them over to private organizations. Salamon’s reference to the example of Eastern Europe bears a lot of relevance for the understanding of the base of ideological support for the idea of civil society. The Polish dissidents such as Adam Micnik and Jacek Kuron invoked civil society as a form of resistance to government oppression. The ensuing democratization of Poland led by the worker’s union Solidarnost, greeted with a lot of enthusiasm in the West as the Wall started to crumble, was a strong factor for the revival of the old ideal of civil society as the essential natural environment for the growth of democracy.⁴²

⁴¹ Carothers for example has suggested developing civil society is much cheaper than other types of democracy promotion work; Burnell has advanced a similar idea considering political development in general.

⁴² An influential title appearing in the early 1990s, Robert Putnam’s *Makings Democracy Work? Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993)*, reverberated on the waves of Solidarnost’s achievement in Poland and contributed to the comeback of another classic, *Democracy in America* of Alexis de Tocqueville, (often referred to as the greatest book on America ever written). Foley & Edwards (1996) for example, suggest that a basic dichotomy of concepts on civil society is: civil society as civic culture, or as counterweight to state power. Whereas the first notion of civil society is usually referred to as “Tocquevillean”, the latter is considered as “Lockean”. Putnam, with his concept of “social capital” is considered the most recent proponent of the Tocquevillean view. De Tocqueville’s description of civil society in

These were all the factors which made the 90s the decade of civil society. Foreign aid in the Balkans has been closely and inseparably linked to the NGOs phenomenon.

6. The Rise of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality

6.1 Democracy Assistance

The other marked change in the foreign aid system in the 1990s was the rise of democracy assistance. Although democratic development has featured as a theme in international cooperation long before the decade of the 1990s, and it has had a small yet gradual consolidation as a concept in international aid efforts, it achieved unprecedented expansion in the 1990s. Relevant amounts of aid were directed to programs which aimed at promoting democratization, through support for civil society, political parties, independent judiciaries, free and fair elections, government administration reform and so forth. A lot of this aid was going to countries from the former communist block as they started their transition to democracy and market economy. Democracy, as the argument goes, became both an end and condition of foreign aid. Countries, which over the period of the cold war were automatic aid recipients simply by virtue of being friendly states, were increasingly conditioned to improve their democratic record as a precondition for getting foreign aid.

The rise of democracy assistance went in hand with the increasing popularity of the concept of “good governance”, and both of these concepts have been brought into close correlation with yet another tool for state -building which caused enthusiasm in the donor community in the 1990s – political conditionality.

Often, due to their intrinsic connectedness, they are discussed together in scholarship on aid. Democracy assistance and good governance can overlap to a large extent in aid parlance and practice, and many discussions consider them as two aspects of what is essentially a single process of political development. Nevertheless, at closer analysis they have two distinct poles. The expansion of the concept of democracy promotion in the 1990s has been closely related to ideological values which have their origin in the United States efforts in the international arena; the concept of good governance, it could be argued, in its original form has been conceptualized as more apolitical quality in managing economic and political affairs, and it has only over time entered into a romantic partnership with democracy promotion.

In practice, as pointed out by Carothers (1999) below, even if the promotion of good governance and democracy could often come down to the same types of project activities, some donors would still prefer to term as the one or the other. For example, an activity on increasing government accountability and transparency can by some donors considered either as democracy promotion or good governance work, whatever their rhetoric is. Nevertheless there are types of activities, such as election work, which do essentially fall into the camp of democracy promotion. However,

America, which he finds in the ubiquitous forms of associational life, as the great school of democracy, is considered one of the great classic works on civil society.

even though certain actors would have strong and consistent engagement in election work, they would not necessarily define it in terms of democracy promotion.

In his topical *Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democratization* (2000), Burnell provides a comprehensive discussion of the expansion of aid for democratization toward the end of the 20th century. He highlights the fact of the rapid expansion of this type of aid effort:

“the growth of international democracy assistance efforts in the 1990s has been dramatic in terms of number and variety of organizations, the resources involved and the range of projects and programs (Burnell, 2000: 34).”

Burnell provides an analysis of the historic development of democracy assistance in order to point out that the origins of the concept emerged much before the 1990s. Burnell however finds the rhetoric about the importance of promoting democracy both to precede and outstrip actual practical action:

“between 1976 and 1979 Congress passed 25 pieces of legislation linking foreign policy and human rights...for most donors the policy rhetoric did not translate into much practical substance at that time... (Burnell 2000: 37)”

Essentially even at present day, according to scholars (Burnell, 2000; Carothers, 1999), the actual amounts of aid invested into promoting democracy do not keep pace with the overpowering rhetoric about the importance of democratization.

Burnell’s wider thematic focus on democracy assistance also documents facts which are important for the study of foreign aid in Eastern Europe. He correctly observes that, even if partly, the increased effort in democracy assistance, at least by the United States, was related to developments in Eastern Europe:

“in 1989 the Congress passed the Support for East European Democracy Act, primarily with Poland and Hungary in mind. In the next year Secretary of State James Baker declared the promotion and consolidation of democracy to be a foreign policy priority (Burnell, 2000: 38).”

Burnell (2000) sees four factors crucial for the rise of democracy assistance in the 1990s:

- a) *“new opportunities became available as a result of the end of the cold war and decline of Soviet power. Governments in the West could now bring forward on their diplomatic agenda issues that previously they would not have dared to raise in such a forthright way...”*
- b) *“democracy assistance offered a relatively low-cost means of boosting the image of foreign aid....”*
- c) *“in contrast to the ‘push’ factors..., there were the ‘pull’ factors..., namely domestic pressures for political reform in a growing number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe...”*
- d) *“a sea-change in the [thinking] about the relationship between economic development and political development... (Burnell, 2000: 39-40)”*

In addition, he discerns a sort of spontaneity in the expansion of democracy promotion, in the sense that it has in his view, rather inadvertently emerged from the application of political conditionality. According to Burnell (2000):

“what started out as a willingness by international donors to attach political requirements and political conditionalities to development aid (a seemingly logical extension of economic conditionalities, which was the leitmotif of North-South cooperation in the 1980s) turned increasingly to democracy assistance (Burnell, 2000: 26).”

The four factors identified by Burnell provide an accurate analysis of the expansion of democracy assistance in the 1990s. With some variations, they are discernible in the wider body of thought on democracy promotion, such as for example in the influential work of Carothers (1999) which be discussed below.

Two of these factors are closely related to end of the cold war and the opening of Eastern Europe. The third essential factor is what Burnell terms a “sea change” in thinking about the relationship between economic and political development.⁴³ In summarized terms, the concept which traditionally held economic development to be primary to political development was abandoned. The interest in other possible interdependencies between the two gained currency.

The usually surprising aspect when discussing the factors which gave way to aid for democratization in the 1990s is the one about the cost of democracy assistance. Burnell has suggested there is a moment of “political economy” in the donor’s rapidly increasing interest in democracy assistance, and that is – because it costs less than other, more traditional, types of intervention. Some of this argument is definitely a matter of simple logic. The types of actions related to democracy assistance are much less costly than for example, investment in infrastructure. Carothers has pointed out to the same moment discussing the support to civil society as part of the efforts to promote democracy. In his words, part of the shift towards civil society was driven by the desire to “do more with less” (1999:208-209). This should be taken into account

⁴³ Because of its relevance the passage merits to be cited fully. Burnell, alike Carothers (1999) below, points to the fact that the 1990s brought about new ideas about the interdependence between political and economic development:

“...for many years two major doctrines held sway and were mutually reinforcing. The one, originating...[from] Seymour Martin Lipset ...argued that social and economic progress are requisites for stable democracy...the second doctrine, advanced by economists like Jagdish Bhagwati, indicated there is a cruel choice: developing countries cannot both develop their economies and democratize at the same time. This is primarily because capital investment is essential for economic development...unfortunately, in this regard, competitive political regimes such as multi-party democracy ...place a premium on offering voters instant gratification....by the late 1980s neither the notion that that economics drives politics nor the crude derivation of development from capital- formation...held sway any more...towards the end of the 1980s the World Bank identified the problem as failure of governance. An increasing umber of economists...came to view that primary responsibility lay in the political sphere...this revised intellectual paradigm implies there are circumstances in which an essential precondition for a lasting uplift in development fortunes is political reform (Burnell, 2000: 40-42).”

as a very relevant observation, and as such not isolated in scholarship on aid, especially against the backdrop of the falling aid levels in the 1990s.⁴⁴

Tracing the origins of the idea about democracy promotion in United States foreign aid policy, Thomas Carothers opens his seminal *“Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve”* (1999), with the remark that democracy has been consistent theme in American foreign policy for generations:

“President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that America was fighting World War I ‘to make the world safe for democracy’..., US officials...framed the emerging cold war as a struggle to preserve ‘the Free World’..., in the early 1960s President John Kennedy embraced the idea of a noble campaign to foster democracy in the developing world..., in the 1990s Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton asserted that democracy promotion was a key organizing principle of US. foreign policy after the cold war (1999: 3).”

Reviewing the other foreign policy measures the US government has used for achieving the goal of promoting democracy, including diplomacy, conditionality, and even military means, Carothers points out that, *“the most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy assistance (1999:6).”*

Carothers provides a historic account of democracy promotion efforts by the US, and alike Burnell, makes the point that prior to the 1990s, democracy aid was not a significant part of the overall foreign assistance effort:

“prior to the 1980s, the United States did not pursue democracy aid on a wide basis. In the past two decades, such aid has mushroomed, as part of the increased role of democracy promotion in American foreign policy. It started slowly in the 1980s then expanded sharply after 1989 (Carothers, 1999: 6).”

Carothers writes primarily about the US democracy promotion effort. He does acknowledge however that democracy assistance has become a wide, internationally accepted trend. Nevertheless Carothers suggests that the case study of US democracy aid is valid for making broader conclusions, given that: *“...the United States moved into democracy assistance earlier than most other actors and has been the largest single democracy donor (1999: 12).”*

Carothers also points to another well observed fact concerning aid for political development– that the different conceptual frames, paradigms, or defined priorities of different donors, do as a matter of fact come down to the same types of interventions. He notes that the different theoretical concepts, such as “good governance” and “democracy promotion” can in practice entail very similar interventions:

“the recent surge of democracy assistance is by no means exclusively or even principally a US story...almost every major country that gives foreign assistance now includes democracy programs in its aid portfolio...the international financial

⁴⁴ Such strategy actually seems much less peculiar to practitioners than to scholars. Faced with shrinking budgets, organizations instinctively turn toward more cost-effective types of intervention. Such a move is for example, from big capital intensive investments in education, such as renovating schools, to work on educational policies (interview with Open Society Foundation representative, 2006).

institutions have begun committing resources to promoting good governance, which, although theoretically distinct from democracy promotion, often substantially overlaps with it in practice (1999: 8.)”

In Carothers’s view, there are three major factors for the surge of democracy assistance in the 1990s: “*the global trend toward democracy; the end of the cold war, and new thinking about development (1999: 44).*”⁴⁵ The end of the cold war and the “new thinking” were already discussed with respect to Burnell. The “global trend towards democracy” which Carothers identifies as a factor, builds on the enthusiasm which appeared in the Western hemisphere in the 1980s, that a new “third wave”⁴⁶ of democracy was unfolding and that the future held the rosy prospect of global democracy, of democratic government in each and every state on the planet.⁴⁷

More recent work by Burnell & Morrissey (2004) echoes the same and very similar conclusions derived by Carothers and Burnell. They note the shift toward intervention aimed at direct political change in the 1990s (as opposed to indirect one, through economic reform, which was the standard in the past); the appeal of such political change both as an end in itself and conductor for economic reform. The authors relate this policy to the constant aspiration for greater aid effectiveness; and conclude that this was made possible by the end of the cold war:

“...a growing number of interventions (albeit comparatively modestly funded) intended to influence directly political change. The rationales – that political reforms consonant with liberal democracy and what has come to be known as ‘good governance’ are both desirable in themselves and conducive to improved economic management – seemed to promise a more effective use of effective use of development aid. The trigger for this development was the end of the cold war... (Burnell & Morrissey, 2004: introduction; xvi).”

Some of the argumentation about the exponential growth of democracy assistance inevitably goes back to the relationship between aid and (realist) politics. Meernik,

⁴⁵ Carothers chronologically precedes Burnell with his explanation of the “new thinking”; According to him:

“during most of the 1970s and 1980s, aid providers from the United States and elsewhere conceived of development largely in social and economic terms. Consideration of a country’s form of government was conspicuously absent. This was because most developing countries were dictatorships...in the latter half of the 1980s, however, the accumulated economic consequences of the corrupt, stagnant, often incompetent dictatorial regimes in many countries...prompted donors to begin considering the economic value of openness, accountability and transparency....in the 1990s, the donor community accepted the idea that a country’s political development could have major impact on its socioeconomic development (Carothers, 1999: 46).”

⁴⁶ An influential theoretical underpinning for this was provided by Samuel Huntington in his *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991)*.

⁴⁷ This enthusiasm waned in the 1990s, with the apparent backsliding of many, former communist, and new would be democracies, into “semi” or outright authoritarianism. See for example Ottaway Marina, “Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi- Authoritarianism”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

Krueger, & Poe (1998) relate the increased interest in democracy to the fact that the United States could simply relax the national security concerns in the post-cold war international arena:

“Many foreign policy analysts argue that the end of the Cold War has released the U.S. government from the need to orient every international action toward the pursuit of national security, and that policymakers may devote greater attention and resources to the international promotion of U.S. ideological values, such as democracy and human rights(Meernik, Krueger, & Poe , 1998: 64).”

According to Richard Haass (1995) for example, the Clinton administration in the early 1990s reached for democracy promotion as a replacement paradigm, when the previous long-standing paradigm of “containment” from the period of the cold war was no longer valid in the new circumstance:

“Its principal attempt was National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's September 1993 statement that "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies (Haass, 1995: 44).”

And finally, whereas Haass sees democracy as replacement for the politics of containment; Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, as giving emphasis to ideological values in a situations when national security concerns are lesser; Diamond (1995) has reconciled the ideological need to “have a purpose” in the new world, with the realist, national self-interest. According to Diamond:

“Now, when new threats are rising and chaos looms on many fronts, the U.S. government is mired in debt, its foreign operations are being cut back sharply, and doubt grows both at home and abroad that the United States has "any purpose in the world beyond promoting its own interests.”

For Diamond (1995), promoting democracy is inherently good as an end in itself and at the same time it benefits the United States national security interest:

“Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another.”

In conclusion, the promotion of democracy grew into a new paradigm in international cooperation. Many donors redefined the mission statements of their foreign aid programs so as to include a reference to the importance of democracy. Aid went to promote democracy, but as already discussed in the chapter on motives and factors, democracy became a factor and condition for receiving aid. Countries which democratized got more aid for all purposes. At the same time, countries that did not

fare so well with democracy did not get more democracy aid, in order to expedite the process.⁴⁸

The substance of democracy assistance was only briefly mentioned until this point. The discussion mostly concentrated on the reasons for the emergence and popularity of the concept in the 90s. Democracy assistance work can include a variety of different activities including but definitely not limited to support for elections, civil society, local government, trade unions, media, judiciary, public administration reform, and a plethora of other actions. The supply of possible types of activities and goals which can be framed within the philosophical framework of democracy assistance is practically unlimited.

The opening of Eastern Europe was definitely a strong factor for the growth of enthusiasm about democracy promotion in the West, and subsequently the expansion of democracy assistance programs worldwide.

In the Balkans, aid for promoting the transition to democracy ranked high on the donor agenda. The countries that were seen by the donor community to lag in this process had their assistance levels reduced and suspended. The case of Serbia is particularly instructive in this regard and it will be discussed in more detail further. The ousting of Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic in October of 2002, in what came to be known as the "velvet revolution", and the country's democratic breakthrough, came to be considered a textbook example of the potential success of democracy assistance programs. Democracy promotion activity was a constant priority in all of the countries of the region, and these programs continue as of the writing of this text as the process is not considered to be completed. Chapter 3 continues the discussion on motives and justifications for aid to the Balkans through a review of the policy documents of some of the major donors to the region. The review shows that promotion of democracy was one of the most often invoked goals for supply of foreign assistance to the Balkans.

6.2 Political Conditionality

The other novelty in foreign aid in the 1990s, which according to scholars (Burnell, 2000) is merely another aspect of democracy assistance, or in more generic terms, an intricate aspect of the expansion of aid for political development, was the rise of political conditionality.

Positively defined, conditionality involves an award for compliance; negatively - punishment, sanctions for non-compliance (Hughes, 2003). Some of the well known definitions include the one provided by Schmitter (1996:41-42):

"conditionality, especially when practiced through multilateral diplomacy and international organizations ...[is about] fulfillment of stipulated political obligations, as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most-favored-nation

⁴⁸ In such a situation more aid would usually go to opposition groups but would generally be withheld from the undemocratic government.

treatment, access to subsidized credit, or membership in coveted regional or global organizations."

Stokke (1995:11-12) has observed that the defining conditionality "is itself controversial":

"the key element is the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient. Foreign aid is used as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor which the recipient government would not otherwise have agreed to. The donor may set the pursuit of such objectives, by the recipient, as a condition for entering into an aid relationship (ex ante conditionality); or expectations of the recipient's progress towards meeting those objectives may be expressed beforehand and followed up afterwards (ex post conditionality)."

Geoffrey Pridham (1999: 62) has defined it as *"specifying conditions or even preconditions for support, involving either promise of material aid, or political opportunities"*.

Discussing conditionality with respect to the process of EU enlargement, Kubicek has noted that the policy of conditionality has been "most clearly enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria for membership" into the EU. Kubicek's (2003: 7) definition of conditionality focuses on the *"linking of perceived benefits (e.g. political support, economic aid, membership in an organization) to the fulfillment of a certain program...in the target state"*.

Its widespread application in the 1990s has given conditionality⁴⁹ (at least for a while) the aura of the most effective "vehicle of democratization and state building". Schmitter (1996: 30) referred to it as *"the most recent ...and rapidly expanding sub-context for the exercise of international influence."* Similarly, it has been termed as:

"the most developed of all approaches relating to international aspects of democratization... the most visible and proactive of all policies explicitly designed to promote democratic convergence (Kubicek, 2003:7)."

Schimmelfennih et al (2002: 1).have also seen as "the core strategy of international organizations to induce non-member states to comply with fundamental rules of statehood."

Political conditionality in its present form is definitely a product of the 90s.As such, it should be observed in sink with the other major changes in aid of that period of time. It is a fact that aid has always been given with strings attached, with conditions of one type or another. However, it was only in the 90s that the idea that the mechanism of the carrot and the stick can be purposely steered in order to produce a democratic and

⁴⁹ Parts of this section pertaining to definitions of conditionality were originally produced by the author for the purpose of his paper on *State Building and Democratic Reform in the Balkans: All the Faces of Conditionality*, Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Belgrade, 2006.

state building effect. Stokke does note that aid has come with strings attached, often of political nature,⁵⁰ ever since its invention, and that thus conditionality is nothing new (1995: 5)⁵¹; one novelty according to him is that the conditions have become “open and transparent (1995: 7).” Many scholars have observed that political conditionality came about as a logical extension of the economic conditionality that was invented and applied by the IFIs in the 80s.

Discussing political conditionality in terms of the wider concept he calls “the new policy agenda”, and which combines under the rubric of political development aid the thematic trio of human rights, democracy, and good governance, Gordon Crawford identifies three major factors for its intensified use in the beginning of the 1990s: the end of the cold war, the so called “new thinking” about the relationship between economic and political development, and the need for new justifications for aid before the public in donor countries (2001: 12-14).

Political conditionality, also referred to as “second generation” conditionality has been considered to be a “natural” step further from the classical days of economic conditionality devised by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Whereas under the rules of engagement of economic conditionality countries needed to comply with certain economic conditions in order to obtain or maintain the status of aid recipient, political conditionality represents “the tying of policy responses to political objectives (Schimtter, 1996: 42).” According to Stokke (1995: 1):

“in the 1990s, aid donors have increasingly made [ODA] conditional of political and administrative reform in recipient countries. The stated objectives for this second generation conditionality have been to promote democratic reform, human rights, and administrative accountability...while the first generation aimed at reform of the economic policy of the recipient country, the second aimed, above all, at political reform involving both systemic and substantive aspects.”

Suggesting that the rise of this new policy which made democratic reform both a goal and condition for aid, was almost simultaneous with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Crawford (2001: 4), suggests that major European states were the ones to jump-start its extensive use. Crawford traces its early beginnings in the 1990s in policy statements by British and French officials:

“the British and the French government were the first to declare this linkage. In perhaps the first public statement indicating the policy shift, British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, spoke in June 1990 of the need for ‘good government’ and political pluralism, and stated that ‘aid must go where it will do good’ (IDS Bulletin, January 1993: 7)...later that same month,...President Mitterand declared that France

⁵⁰ He refers to the work of Edward Clay (same volume) who has pointed out that the Marshall Plan had had both economic and political conditions.

⁵¹ Chapter 1 noted Hans Morgenthau’s remarks about the “allurement of gain” in 19th century diplomatic affairs and the effect it had on the success of deal-making. Yet a more specific reference to the fact that money has always come with strings or conditions attached among states themselves can be found in Misha Glenny’s “The Balkans. Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (2001). Glenny notes that when the great Western powers made loans to the declining Ottoman Empire, they made the loans conditional on certain political concessions.

'will link its financial efforts to the efforts made towards liberty' (cited in Uvin, 1993:66)."

Stokke subscribes to the point of view that the end of the cold war and the opening of Eastern Europe triggered the 2nd generation conditionality, by giving the West more freedom in pursuing the goals of political development. However, according to him *"although the new emphasis given to political reform as a condition for aid coincided in time with this revolution, the causalities involved are probably indirect (1995: 9)."* In his view, other factors, especially the legacy of economic conditionality, combined with the "new thinking" about development, were equally if not more important than the end of the cold war:

"there are inter-linkages between the first and the second generation aid conditionality. After years, the structural adjustment programs have produced few results in terms of economic recovery...this led to a growing recognition...that the main cause had to be sought...[in] reform of the political and administrative systems (Stokke, 1995: 9)."

It is interesting that some scholars (Baray, 1992) have related the rise of conditionality to the opening of Eastern Europe, in order to pursue the argument that Western donors have invented conditionality in order to produce an excuse for taking aid away from traditional recipients, such as Africa and Asia. This argument suggests that the donors' motive was to redirect foreign aid to Eastern Europe, where, it was widely believed in the beginning of the 1990s, aid could be more productive.

This argument can be found in Baraya (1992, cited by Sorensen, 1995: 393-394), who identifies three purposes for the new conditionality in the post-cold war world: the definite de-legitimizing of socialist ideology, creation of a "new credible source of legitimacy for hegemony", and three "justification for the impending decline in Africa's share of global assistance as resource flows to Eastern Europe begin to mount." This point of view was denied by further developments in foreign aid dynamics over the course of the 90s.

Conditionality, as applied by the principal actors in international relations today, is used to keep countries from straying from the path of democratic reform. The conditions that countries need to meet are political, ranging from free and fair elections, respect for civil and political rights, legal and public administration reform, and so forth.

Besides the favorable climate for application of political conditionality after 1989, it is a fact that its roots lie in the macro-adjustment policies promoted by the IFIs in the period of the 1980s. The basic "carrot and stick" mechanism which was previously applied only with respect to financial matters, such as control of inflation, public spending, or budget deficits, came to be extended over matters such as fairness of elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, fight against corruption and so forth. A recipient government's poor record of achievement in meeting these and similar standards of democracy and good governance could lead to suspension, reduction, or withdrawal of aid.

Conditionality has been much applied in the international intervention in the Balkans and it is by and large the principal framework of communication between the region and the international community. It has definitely been a guiding principle of EU assistance to the region (COFR, 1999); in addition, the US involvement in the region has often assumed the stance of intense conditioning.

In its essence as a policy lies the belief on the part of the donors that the mechanism of combined incentives and disincentives can successfully guide constructive political change in recipient countries. Conditionality as such exceeds the realm of foreign aid and becomes a more generic principle of relationships in the international sphere. In the Balkans for example, as it will be discussed further in the text, aid is not as relevant level of conditionality compared to other benefits of good conduct in international relations, and especially with regards to EU accession, such as for example visa liberalization, or eventual full entry into the EU.

In addition some countries in the region of the Balkans were, due to different political circumstance, subject to more intense conditioning than others. This will be discussed in more detail further in the text.

7. The Emergence of Eastern Europe

Last, but for this writing of particular relevance, the end of the cold war redefined the foreign aid regime by opening up an entire new and uncharted land for allocation of foreign assistance. This was caused by the fall of the iron curtain and the opening of Eastern Europe and the countries from the former Soviet Union. This entire part of the world on the other side of the iron curtain was not recipient of development assistance in the sense know today. As a matter of fact, many of those countries acted as aid donors throughout the years of the cold war. The countries from the Soviet block, under strong guidance and mentorship from the Soviet Union, acted as donors to Third World countries. Most importantly, they were not recipients of foreign assistance.⁵²

The exception to this was Yugoslavia. Being a non-aligned country, Yugoslavia was a recipient of generous Western assistance in the years to 1991. Some scholars have referred to it as the “World Bank’s favorite Eastern European son (Tammen, 1990).”

The end of the cold war changed all this. This entire part of the world disappeared as a donor and reemerged as a strong recipient of foreign aid.

Vicky Randall (1997)⁵³ for example, has suggested that even at conceptual level, the appearance of Eastern Europe as aid recipient changed the ideological postulates of the aid regime, in the sense that it reshaped the relationship between the so called First and Third World. According to Randall:

⁵² A good description of Soviet aid can be found in Lumsdaine (1993).

⁵³ Preface to Burnell Peter, *Foreign Aid in a Changing World* (1997).

“from the later 1980s we have witnessed the disintegration of most of the ‘Second World’ of state socialist societies – where does that leave the First and the Third World (Randall, 1997)?”

In Randall’s view that division of the world into developed and undeveloped; North and South; First and Third; functioned as a myth, and that the end of the cold war, transformed that myth:

“writers both on the Right and on the Left have suggested that the notion of a Third World functions primarily as a myth: for the former is a projection of the guilt of the First World liberals while for the latter it evokes for the West a reassuring image of its own opposite, all that it has succeeded in not becoming.” Thus, Rendall suggests in her preface to Burnell’s *“Foreign Aid in a Changing World”*, *“the dissolution of the Second World.....leaves the confrontation and contrast between the First and the Third World starker than ever ...on the other hand the countries of the old Second World will not be transformed overnight into members of the First and there is a case for retaining a Second World category to refer to countries only recently emerged from a prolonged period of communist rule.”*

Stokke (1996) has analyzed the grand changes in the system of international relations over a longer period of time and the effects these changes have had on foreign assistance. He compares the opening of Eastern Europe to the process of decolonization which took place 30 years earlier. Back then the “opening” of the former colonies acted as a strong factor for allocation of development aid:

“...a change in the international environment, - the decolonization process, which represented a new international balance of power of a magnitude similar to that of the revolution in the East some 30 years later - constituted a precondition [for aid] to take place (Stokke, 1996: 27).”

The fact that the process of decolonization and creation of new states has been a strong impetus for the foreign aid regime has been noted in aid scholarship. Stokke’s comparison goes along this line. However, it is a fact that after a peak in 1992 foreign aid suffered its greatest decline in the 1990s. In this sense, the opening of the Second World did not have the same effect on aid levels as the process of decolonization. Rather the opposite. However, it did have a lot to do with the changes on the aid agenda, which were discussed above.

Together with the decline in overall flows and the changes inside the structure of foreign aid in the 1990s, Hjertholm & White (2000: 14) consider *“the disappearance of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union as aid donors and their re-emergence as recipients”*, as one of the *two additional major changes* in aid in the 1990. The other additional major change they observe consists in the appearance of increased concerns about governance, or in other words, the increasing popularity of the concept of good governance.

As already mentioned above, the opening of Eastern Europe diverted significant aid flows away from Africa. According to White (2004), this was by and large a result of the change in priorities for European donors:

“Overall, the fall in sub-Saharan Africa’s share matches the rising share of Europe. For European donors in particular, European recipients feature among the top 10 recipients, whereas they did not do so ten years earlier. For example, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia - Herzegovina are now among the top recipients of aid from Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (all of whom have seen a reduction in their share of aid going to Africa of more than 10%) whereas they did not feature 10 years ago.” (White, 2004: 241).

Table 5 below presents the regional allocation of ODA over the period 1980-2000. The increased receipts of Europe are especially visible in aid per capita terms, although Europe’s total share in global ODA has also risen substantially. At the same time the decline especially of Africa’s share is obvious.

Table 5: Regional allocation of net ODA, 1980-2000 (share and per capita)

	Share (% of total aid)			Per capita (USD)		
	1980	1990	2000	1980	1990	2000
North Africa	8.1	12.4	4.3	42	68	18
Sub-Saharan Africa	22.5	30.9	25.3	27	38	22
South America	2.4	3.6	4.7	5	8	8
Middle East	15.9	8.2	4.6	76	40	16
South & Central Asia	16.7	10.6	11.5	8	5	4
Far East Asia	7.8	12.1	15.4	3	5	5
Other	26.7	22.2	34.3	66	60	72
<i>of which</i> Europe	3.6	2.5	7.4	19	16	43
TOTAL	100	100	100			
Memo item						
Real ODA (USD billion; 1999 prices)				46	60	56

Source: adapted from White (2002)

The reduction of flows to Africa and their redirection to middle income countries elsewhere has been encountered with criticism in some of the scholarship on development assistance. According to scholars (Hyden, 1996; White, 2004), a major factor to this end was the new geopolitics and the lesser importance of certain African states as strategic partners. The popular argument from the early 90s, riding on the wave of disillusion with the impact of 40 years of foreign aid to Africa, that aid could work better in Eastern Europe, probably has some of the credit. This view has been criticized by Hyden (1996):

“the argument that Africa can be placed on the back-burner because it is of little strategic value to donor countries is extremely short-sighted and dangerous. So too is

the argument, unsupported by any evidence so far, that foreign aid money can be better used in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Hyden, 1996: 197)."

Foreign aid to Eastern Europe became more complex with the painful dissolution of Yugoslavia. Whereas aid to the countries of Central Europe comprised the standard package of activities for supporting the transition to democracy and market economy, the wars in the Balkans created an enormous need for humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction. Because of this, aid to the Balkans had to be very different and essentially more complex as a process than aid to Central Europe. At the same time, the transition to market economy, but above all, the transition to democracy in the Balkans was, as a matter of common knowledge, much more difficult and protracted in time than in Central Europe. This was a strong factor for the final definition of the overall framework of development assistance to the region.

More recently, White (2004) has suggested that aid would shift back to the poorest countries of the Third World with the end of political crisis in the Balkans:

"...the increase [of aid] to Europe reflects response to emergencies in the region; so that aid to the region will fall back should the emergencies not continue (2004: 240)."

This is only part of the story. The other major aspect is the EU enlargement. The impact of the process of EU enlargement on levels of aid allocation is of strong importance as amounts generally increase as the countries move ahead in their accession process. This is a complex topic in its own right and addressing it in full is beyond the scope of this writing. It is important to underscore however that given the fact that the EU was the single largest donor to the region of the Balkans, its policies overall and its enlargement policy in specific were of major importance to the aid phenomenon in the region.

In conclusion, the opening of Eastern Europe was a tectonic change in the global foreign aid regime. It was an intrinsic aspect of the end of the cold war (and enlargement), but what more, it was the essence of that process. It was not a consequence but a cause. In this sense, some of the changes in the foreign aid regime did come about because of certain processes that took place in Eastern Europe. For example, the rise of the ideal of democracy, and the rebirth of the idea of civil society which strongly shaped the foreign aid regime in the 90s, were inspired in large part by the success of Solidarnost in Poland.

In this sense, it can be argued that the opening of Eastern Europe had an important and complex influence on how foreign aid developed and changed over the 1990s. It reshaped the relationship between the First and Third World; it took away aid flows from the Third World; it became the new battleground for the novel concepts in aid in the 1990s. It did a lot to spur the enthusiasm with democracy and civil society.

The ensuing wars and tragedies in the Balkans made that region one of the strongest recipients of foreign aid in the world over the 90s. Because of the multitude of changes it was undergoing – from one country into several, from autocracy towards democracy, from planned towards market economy, and all of these changes accompanied by the presence of violent conflict – the Balkans received many types of aid from many different sources, and which had a variety of purposes, over the

past decade. As already mentioned earlier, the more complex transition in the Balkans compared to Central Europe, also conditioned the greater complexity of the aid process.

In a final run, although the trends discussed earlier in this chapter, such as the growing popularity of NGOs, the interest in democracy & good governance aid, and the emergence of political conditionality, had started to emerge long before the 90s, it was the global geo-political change which essentially enabled them in the last decade of the 20th century. In this sense, all of these aspects of the foreign aid system at present should be looked in their entirety.

8. Conclusion

The preceding discussion looked into the transformation of the foreign aid regime after the end of the cold war and consulted some of the major scholarly views on the causes and dynamic of this transformation. The major changes in foreign assistance in the 1990s were discussed, including the global decline of aid flows; rise of democracy assistance and political conditionality; and global prominence of NGOs.

There is an overwhelming consensus that the end of the cold war was the major factor for the changes in aid in the 1990s. However, other factors were also discussed, not all of which derive their existence directly from the end of the cold war.

The rise of political conditionality was enabled by the new freedom the West had to promote its values, but it was at the same time an extension of the first generation economic conditionality.

The strong appeal of civil society in the 1990s, when it came to be seen as a magical panacea for a wide range of socio-political challenges, was definitely promoted by the fight for democracy in Eastern Europe. But if Solidarnost produced the ideological momentum for the prominence of NGOs in the 1990s, the preconditions had been gradually put in place with NGOs making their way in the aid industry for decades earlier.

The popularity of good governance came from within the foreign aid system, with the so-called “new thinking” about development gradually gaining foothold overtime.

Nevertheless, it is true that had it not been for the tectonic geo-political change, foreign aid in the 90s would have looked probably different.

The factors discussed above entwined and converged into producing the framework for the delivery of foreign aid to the Balkan region from the beginning of the 1990s. They have been, and as of the writing of this text, still are major features of ODA supply to the region. Given the significance aid has had for the Balkans in the period of transition, and the fact that ODA has been a relevant aspect of the overall relations between the region and the international community, these features have exceeded the realm of aid per se and become characteristics of the region’s “internationalisation” as well as of the overall socio-economic and political circumstance.

CHAPTER 3

Motives and Factors of Foreign Aid to the Balkans: Review of Donor Policies

1. Introduction

Following the general theoretical discussion on motives for foreign aid, Chapter 3 turns the focus to the central interest of this writing, which is foreign assistance to the region of the Balkans in the period of transition.

The 1st chapter on motives provided the general frame for discussing motives and factors of ODA. The 2nd chapter on aid in the 1990s gave an overview of the huge changes which have taken place in the field of development assistance after the end of the cold war.

The preceding discussion served as a necessary introduction for understanding the general framework for foreign assistance in the Balkans, as the region became a strong aid recipient practically simultaneously with these changes in development aid taking place.

The general discussion on motives of foreign assistance is framed between two distinct poles which are represented by donor self-interest on one and altruism on the other end. The vast middle ground between these poles is occupied by a very dynamic and diversified reality where numerous possibilities exist for combinations of motives and factors shaping ODA allocations. No author has ever denied the strong role of donor self-interest in development aid. Even strong proponents of the ideas of moral vision and altruism as factor of ODA, such as Lumsdaine (1993), have limited their argument to the point that aid cannot be explained *only* by donor self-interest.

The Chapter 2 which followed, in a manner of speaking continued to paint the picture of foreign assistance. It introduced the great changes which took place in the foreign aid regime in more recent times, but by doing that, it also made references to what aid looked like before the end of the cold war. Whereas Chapter 1 provided the overall frame, Chapter 2 provided the additional elements of the present portrait of ODA: the strong role of NGOs, rise of democracy assistance, good governance, and political conditionality.

The inquiry into the motives and factors of aid now zooms into the process of foreign assistance to the Balkans and the discussion becomes time and context specific.

There are several levels for discussing motivations for aiding the Balkans. The first and most general is produced by the general perception of the Balkans by the West, or the “international community”. At this broadest level, the Balkans has been perceived as a troubled place, a region defined by common circumstance, the most dramatic of which is of course the former Yugoslav wars. Huge part of the aid which went into the Balkans was conflict and post-conflict related assistance. This included

emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction aid which as its very name suggests aimed to relieve suffering and help societies get back on their feet after wars had ended. A lot of the aid which went into the region was motivated by the images of war and suffering donor constituencies in the West were exposed to. The demonstration of tremendous humanitarian need produced by the wars and the destruction is what made the Balkans one of the most highly assisted regions in the world over the 1990s.

This is only a generic description. A lot of the assistance the region has received was not conflict related. In addition, not all countries in the Balkans were affected by conflict. Of those affected, not all were affected in the same way. The conflict had different duration in different countries. There was close to *4 years conflict-free period* between the signing of the Dayton agreement which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995 and the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 which produced the second major humanitarian crisis in the region.,

At this most general level, the other major denominator of the Balkans as an aid recipient in the 1990s is the fact it is part of the Eastern European block. In this sense, the two major goals of foreign assistance for Eastern Europe, a) democratization and b) promotion of market economy, held equally strongly for the Balkan countries. These two overarching goals which motivated aid to Eastern Europe overall, were in the Balkans complemented by one additional major goal – humanitarian relief. This is one major difference between assistance to the Balkans as opposed to the rest of CEE.

In addition to provoking tremendous suffering, the Balkan wars also delayed and complicated the achievement of the goals of democracy and free market reform. The challenges to democratization in the region were of particular concern to donors and the international community as a whole. Aid to promote democracy constituted a substantive part of the foreign engagement in the region. In addition, progress with democratization was one of the major conditions to receive foreign development aid.

A second level to discuss motivations for aid is the level of the relationship between the particular bilateral or multilateral donors vs. *the region as a whole*. Some of the major donors to the region, such as the European Union (as a multilateral), the United States, the World Bank, UN, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) define their policies in regional terms. This of course does not preclude them from having country specific policies, in the sense that they fine-tune their country approaches. Nevertheless for many of the donors their effort has been regionally defined. Most comprehensive in this regard is the aid policy of the EU which is to a great extent defined by its enlargement policy. The amounts and types of aid to individual countries change as they progress in the process of accession and enter subsequent phases. Although countries are assessed individually, this is in essence a complex, regional approach. Quite a few of the bilateral donors also had regional aid policies for the Balkans. The understanding (or belief) that the countries of the Balkans shared some common characteristics and problems, which could best be addressed regionally, has given life to quite a few regional mechanisms and approaches. The most notable of these, particularly as concerns foreign assistance, is the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.

The third level for discussing motives for aid is at the *bilateral donor-recipient level*. This is the level between any bilateral donor and recipient country, such as for

example Italy and Albania, UK and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Netherlands and Macedonia, and so forth. At this level, the aid commitment of a particular donor to a particular recipient is defined by factors specific to that relationship. The previous two dimensions, West - Balkans, and individual donor – Balkans, have a strong influence on this bilateral relationship as donors; naturally conform to certain internationally coordinated policies. Such example is the aid embargo on Serbia which was in force until the fall of the Milosevic regime in late 2000. Further, donors can definitely be expected to react similarly to certain situations, such as for example, the humanitarian crises in Kosovo or Bosnia. In this regards, the specific demonstration of need by a recipient country is what determines the aid response.

At this bilateral donor-recipient level aid allocations can depend on the specific circumstances of the relationship between two countries. One such example would perhaps be Italy's special rapport with Albania, which received the lion's share of Italy's aid effort in the Western Balkans. Other examples could perhaps be the Taiwan - Macedonia cooperation over a short period at the end of the 90s. Similarly, the United Kingdom – Serbia relationship in the immediate period after the fall of the Milosevic regime could be considered, whereby Serbia received huge assistance from the UK, at a level quite higher than UK's previous aid commitments to other countries in the region. The motive is, as in the previous cases, of bilateral nature. The UK had been a strong creditor to former Yugoslavia in the past. A huge part of that foreign debt to the UK was overtaken by Serbia in the succession of Yugoslavia. The UK assistance to Serbia was for the most part debt relief that is forgiveness of this old debt, made possible with the lifting of the sanctions after the fall of Milosevic.⁵⁴ In the Italy – Albania case, security concerns related to uncontrolled migration were certainly a factor of the aid effort⁵⁵; in the Taiwan-Macedonia case aid was a reward for Macedonia having recognized the former. Macedonia recognized Taiwan in 1999 in exchange of a clear offer of massive economic assistance.⁵⁶

These levels: West-Balkans; individual donor – Balkans; and donor country – recipient country, are provisional by nature and serve to indicate the multi-dimensionality of the discussion of motives and factors of foreign assistance. They do not exist as firm, given platforms but permeate and entwine instead.

⁵⁴ This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.

⁵⁵ This issue will be revisited further in the text during the discussion of political dynamics in Chapter 4, and also later during the review of the individual allocations in Chapter 7. See for example: Orizio Riccardo, Gli aiuti all'Albania: venti miliardi sospetti, *Corriere della Sera*, 17 October 1992; Santevecchi Guido, Martino: Via agli aiuti, ma bloccate i clandestini, *Corriere della Sera*, 13 September 1994; Haver Flavio, Il Pollo: adesso basta aiuti all'Albania, *Corriere della Sera*, 25 July 2000; Cianfanelli Renzo, Tirana, dissidio Bonino Dini, *Corriere della Sera*, 31 October 1998.

⁵⁶ Casella Alexander, Macedonia: Taiwan's Lost Gambit, *Asia Times*, 11 July 2001, available at <http://www.atimes.com/china/CG11Ad02.html> ; Editorial: Ensuring the Wise Use of Foreign Aid, *Taipei Times*, 13 February 2001, available at <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2001/02/13/73493> ; Tupurkovski Puts Hope in Taiwan Economic Aid, *Taipei Times*, 19 January 2000, available at <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/01/19/20464> ; Foreign Aid Promises are a Thorny Issue for MOFA, *Taipei Times*, 21 April 2000, available at <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/04/21/33101>.

The discussion which follows will provide an extensive review of the different motivations and factors which have shaped and steered the foreign aid allocations to the countries and the region of the Western Balkans. These factors and motivations changed over time and with respect to recipients in response to the changing circumstances.

The general framework of motivations for foreign assistance to the Balkans was produced by several overall goals, such as to promote democracy, free markets, and peace and stability. A complex dynamic of factors which have shaped aid allocations, has developed within this general framework. These factors existed both on the side of donors and recipients. In addition, these factors on the donor and recipient side communicated between each other. In discussing these various factors of ODA in the Balkans, the central question of motivation, posited between the poles of self-interest and moral altruism will be kept constantly in mind. The goal is naturally not to answer the question how much of the aid to the Balkans was motivated by self-interest as opposed to altruism, but to explore, in qualitative terms, the interaction of motives and factors in the overall process.

It is important to note that the overarching goals of democracy, free markets, peace and stability were not static and universally agreed concepts of common interpretation. On the contrary, different donors had different ideas of how these should be achieved, and these concepts communicated with one another, transformed through this process of communication, and sometimes also competed with each other,

Each of these principal goals had many correlated objectives, which often depended on particular developments on the ground, and different donors often differed in thinking as to which was the right way to react toward achieving the final goals. Goals in themselves had different meanings to different parties. For example, the goal of “stable and peaceful Balkans” had a different meaning to the European Union as opposed to the United States. Review of the political discourse surrounding the Balkan crises makes that conclusion quite clear. To the European Union stable Balkans meant, among other, peace of mind at its outer borders. To the United States, as much as it meant stability in the wider European area, it also meant – possibility for disengagement from a part of the world which was not of critical priority for its national interests. This particular point will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Each stakeholder had a specific point of view. The agglomeration of all these views, interests, and motivations provided the basis for the entirety of foreign assistance to the Balkans. The full disaggregation of ODA allocations which will be conducted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will discuss this process in detail and offer a full “deconstruction” of foreign aid to the Balkans to its smallest constituent components.

This stage in the discussion will provide a detailed review of the motives and factors which shaped donor aid commitments to the Balkans. The first part of this discussion is the subject of this chapter, whereas the second will be the subject of Chapter 4.

The first approach (this chapter) consists of a *review of the official policy statements* of major donors to the region. This review comprises legislative texts, policy documents, and relevant reports concerning aid to the Balkans, as well as donor aid agencies’ websites. The second approach (Chapter 4) consists of an extensive review of major international media since 1990/1991, and analysis of texts relevant for the study of foreign aid to the Balkans. The review of legislation and policy documents

(this chapter) will reveal the overall intended goals and concepts underpinning and guiding the foreign assistance effort. The media review (Chapter 4) will offer insights into the political discourses and considerations concerning aid delivery to the Balkans, and it will provide analytical content which can regularly not be found in official documents.

2. Review of Donor Aid Policies for the Balkans

The following section will review the declared goals of foreign aid of several major bilateral and multilateral donors to the region of the Balkans. The review is not exhaustive in character, in that it does not aim to provide a comprehensive listing of all the goals of each and every donor active in the region. The purpose is to indicate to the commonness of the general motives for aid to the Balkans as declared by the donors in their official policies. Because of this, some donors are omitted, same as not each and every nuanced motivation for aid to the region is included. It is important to mention that the selection of donors to review has also been influenced by the availability of sources. Nevertheless, some of the major donors to the region have been included, such as, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, and the European Union.

Terminologically, the word “goal” of foreign aid will be used more often than previously in the text, as practitioner’s vocabulary operates with terms such as goals, objectives, rather than motives.

From the point of view of this writing, at a declarative, nominal level, the goal of aid is largely synonymous with the motive for aid. When the donor states “the goal is to promote economic development”, this means exactly what is being said; it indicates the selfless motive to promote economic development. Since the section explores the official statements of donors concerning the purposes of their aid to the Balkans, the stated, nominal goals are by and large one and the same with the motives for development assistance. The donors are reviewed in no particular order.

2.1 Germany

Germany has been the single largest bilateral donors to the Balkans overall since 1990 (see Chapter 4), and consistently a top donor to the individual recipients in the region. German ODA to the Balkans has by and large been provided by and delivered through its two major actors of development cooperation, the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The review of donor aid policies starts with a discussion of the policy texts and declarations of the German BMZ and GTZ.

An examination of the official websites of these two development cooperation institutions finds that the most often referenced goal of development cooperation with the countries in the Balkans is - economic *development*. In addition to economic

reform, references to other major goals include *democracy* and *preparation of countries for accession into the EU*. For example, the webpage of the GTZ reads that:

*“GTZ has been supporting the countries in South-Eastern Europe since 1992 in establishing a competitive market economy. The promotional measures of German Development Cooperation aim to bring economic policy in these countries closer to the European Union (EU).”*⁵⁷

The review of the German policy texts finds evidence about the dynamic character of donor aid policies concerning the Balkans, and the transformation of the aid process overtime. This is observable from the policy positions of the BMZ and GTZ. Where applicable the subsequent phases in the foreign aid process are referenced, starting from emergency relief, through post-conflict reconstruction, economic reform, stability, and democracy promotion. For example BMZ notes with regards to Bosnia:

*“After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, German cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina concentrated initially on emergency aid measures, especially assistance for returning refugees. Thereafter, the focus of cooperation shifted to rebuilding the country and securing peace and democracy.”*⁵⁸

The similar sequence can be found also with regards to Macedonia, even though it should be underscored that in the first years into its independence Macedonia did not have the same need of emergency aid as BiH:

*“During the first few years after Macedonia’s independence, GTZ mainly implemented emergency aid and income creation projects.”*⁵⁹

One relevant observation from the review of BMZ and GTZ policy texts concerns the already discussed democracy assistance. It is interesting that whereas the priority areas for cooperation with some countries explicitly reference democracy, for other countries they are omitted. This is not a coincidence and the reason is the position vis-à-vis this issue of certain recipient countries, given that the goals of cooperation are set in a cooperation agreement. For example, Bosnia and Macedonia both appears as recipients of democracy aid in BMZ and GTZ policy documents:

*“(GTZ) The priority areas of cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are economic reform and the promotion of democracy.”*⁶⁰

The similar policy position can be found with respect to Macedonia:

⁵⁷ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/2623.htm>; accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁵⁸ BMZ, http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/bosnien_herzegowina/cooperation.html, accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁵⁹ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/658.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁶⁰ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/1186.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

“GTZ’s role in German-Macedonian cooperation focuses on the following priority areas: economic reform and development of the market system, promotion of democracy and civil society.”⁶¹

But at the same time, democracy promotion does not appear as a priority area of German ODA for the other countries in the region (at the time of review of the policy texts placed on the organizations’ web pages). Such as for example Albania:

“GTZ’s current projects in Albania focus on economic reform. The main aim is to enhance the competitiveness of the Albanian economy and [bring it] more into line with EU standards.”⁶²

The same is the case with Montenegro. Economic and financial goals populate the list of priorities for cooperation, but there are no references to democracy promotion. The section on cooperation with Montenegro specifically notes that the selection of goals is done on the basis of an agreement between the two governments:

“As agreed by the German and Montenegrin Governments, Technical Cooperation concentrates on the following areas: promoting the economy and employment, structural reforms and reorganizing the financial sector”⁶³

The same is the case with Croatia, where the goals “defined in 2000, are ‘Economic promotion/promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’ and ‘Regional development’”⁶⁴; and with Serbia which also benefits only from assistance for economic development.

This invites the conclusion that the reason some of the countries in the region have democracy promotion as a cooperation priority, and others do not, is the cooperation mandate which in the case of Germany is set with a bilateral agreement. It is important to note that this conclusion is provisional as it is based on relatively little available evidence. Or in other words, this chapter *assumes* that the reason for the omission of references to democracy work in some of the countries in the region is a result of the disinclination of recipient countries to accept it as a goal of foreign assistance. There is no other logical explanation why it should be a priority in the cases of BiH and Macedonia, but not for the others. Nevertheless, the research did not result with clear, written evidence that this is as a matter of fact the reason.

In conclusion, the review of the policy declarations of the two major German actors of development cooperation, the BMZ and the GTZ, suggests that the nominal motives of German assistance to the Balkans comprise the standard topics of economic development, democracy (only with respect to some recipients), and rapprochement with the EU. The evolution of the assistance follows the logical sequence from emergency aid toward measures for long- term development.

⁶¹ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaucasus-zentralasien/1244.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁶² GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaucasus-zentralasien/1164.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁶³ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaucasus-zentralasien/18825.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁶⁴ GTZ, <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaucasus-zentralasien/1204.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

2.2 Sweden

A review of the priority goals of the major Sweden's actor of development cooperation, the official Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), for the Balkans, demonstrates, similarly to Germany, strong commitment to the process of European enlargement. This major goal of Swedish ODA to the region is combined with some of the "traditional" development goals of poverty reduction. Accession into the EU and poverty are to be identified as major goals of Swedish foreign aid for all the countries in the region. Commitment to peace, stability, democracy, and human rights also rank high on the list of goals. According to a SIDA regional policy text from 2001:

*"The objective of Sweden's development co-operation in the Western Balkans is to create conditions for a sustainable peace in the region and to facilitate the long-term integration of the new states into European co-operation... Sweden's long-term development co-operation started after the peace agreement in Bosnia in 1995. Since then the main aim has been to build sustainable institutions... A vital part of Swedish aid aims at furthering human rights and democracy (SIDA, 2001: 3)."*⁶⁵

The foreign assistance goals for individual countries stay within the frame of the regional goals defined by SIDA. The SIDA strategy for Albania, similar to the strategies for the other countries in the region, places the focus on bringing the country closer to the EU:

"The focus of development cooperation with Albania is to support reforms that help the country develop closer ties with the EU... (SIDA, 2001:8)"

The strategy lists the same or similar priority "areas of activity" for all the countries in the region. For Albania for example, they comprise: "democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, gender equality, sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment, economic growth, social development and security (SMFA, 2004: 8)."

The actual allocation of funding is always a good indicator of the priorities on the ground. The strategy for Albania observes that: "*just under half the funds [in the period 2001-2003] went to rural development and local administration projects, chiefly in the Korça region, while a third was allocated to measures to promote human rights, democracy and health...(SMFA, 2004: 5)*"

A review of SIDA's policies on Macedonia suggests it is consistent with that on Albania. SIDA's country strategy for Macedonia lists similar priorities as the ones valid for Albania. The foremost goal of Swedish ODA in Macedonia is the country's eventual EU integration:

"The EU accession process lies at the heart of Swedish development cooperation with Macedonia (SMFA, 2006: 8)."

⁶⁵ italics added.

Guided by its own (based on in-house produced assessments), strategic development reflection, SIDA has been inclined to focus its intervention on fewer areas of intervention over the midterm. In this sense, it has set a single priority area – agriculture - for Macedonia for 2006-2010. This means that most of the funding is to be allocated in this area, with occasional, smaller funding available for other fields. This is a policy change compared to SIDA's strategy for the country for the previous period. According to a recent SIDA's policy paper on Macedonia:

“The previous country strategy for Macedonia covered the years 2003-2005 and focused on three sectors: democratic governance, economic development and environment....support has contributed to the overall goal of peace, stability and European integration (SMFA, 2006: 6).”

According to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (SMFA, 2006:6) a total of 48 % of aid in that period has gone for democratic governance.

In addition to its policy of narrowing the focus of intervention, and the fixed priorities of EU integration and poverty reduction, SIDA regularly underscores that it sets its country priorities based on the priorities sets by the recipients themselves. The description of the agency's priorities for Bosnia is a good example of this aspect:

“The goal of Swedish development assistance is to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's development plan, the Mid Term Development Strategy (MTDS), which focuses on accession to the EU and the fight against poverty. In order to achieve this goal, and to promote concentration in the Swedish program, development assistance is to target two main sectors: the building of a sustainable state, and economic development (SMFA, 2006a: 1). “

An assessment of SIDA's policy documents on Croatia reveals the same pattern; the focus of Sweden's intervention in Croatia is also placed on one big issue, EU integration:

“The focus of development cooperation with Croatia is to support reforms that help the country develop closer ties with the EU (SMFA, 2004a: 7).”

Nevertheless the list of priority areas for intervention is afterwards quite expanded and it includes: *“democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, gender equality, economic growth, sustainable use of natural resources and environmental concern, social development and security (SMFA, 2004a: 8).”*

Although they demonstrate strong resemblance, SIDA's country strategy papers produced for the Balkan states nevertheless take into account their separate realities. In this sense for example, the strategy for Kosovo rightfully underscores the priority of securing peace & stability:

“The aim of Swedish development cooperation with Kosovo is to contribute to the development of peace and stability by strengthening Kosovo in its efforts to achieve closer integration with the rest of Europe. The two principal sectors for the cooperation are democracy and good governance, and sustainable economic development (SMFA, 2005: 1).”

Finally, SIDA's priorities for Serbia and Montenegro are quite similar to the rest of the Western Balkans. According to a policy document by the SMFA from 2004:

“Focus for development cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro is to support equitable and sustainable reforms that help the country develop closer ties with the EU and its integration in European cooperative structures (SMFA, 2004b:1).”

The documents comprises the following priority areas for intervention : *“democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, gender equality, economic growth, sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment (SMFA, 2004b: 8).”*

In conclusion, the poles of *EU integration* and *poverty reduction* represent the declared priorities of Swedish foreign aid to the countries of the Balkans. The rhetoric concerning democracy assistance operates with the term “democratic governance” more often than just democracy. Nevertheless, the three major overall goals are easily discernible: *the economy, democracy, and the European Union.*

Nevertheless, specific donor priorities can be discerned through the review. For example, the study of SIDA's policy documents indicates that human rights are a consistent priority, and gender equality ranks high on the list of foreign assistance goals. The rhetoric of *environmental protection* also indicates the importance of this goal in Swedish development cooperation. Thus, SIDA's overall goals, such as democracy and the EU can be taken to be similar with Germany's, but there are nevertheless differences. How much these differences in rhetoric actually translate into differences in operational strategies and the final ends of development assistance will be the subject of Chapter 6 which will explore the sectoral composition of ODA to the Balkans, and especially by Chapter 7 which will look into the micro data on individual allocations.

2.3 The Netherlands

A review of the goals of Dutch foreign assistance to the Balkans displays strong general similarity with the goals of other DAC bilateral donors. The standard range of notions comprising democracy, accession into the EU and stability interweaves the official texts of Dutch foreign assistance policy for this part of the world.

A policy memorandum by the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation from the period immediately after the end of the Kosovo war outlines the major priorities of Dutch cooperation with the region of the Balkans:

“In the coming years the main priorities of Dutch policy in the Balkans will be institution building, good governance and democratization of the state and society as a whole, promoting cooperation within southeastern Europe, and integrating the nations of the region into Europe and the world economy. This will improve the

*standard of living for the people of the Balkans while promoting stability in southeastern Europe - and indeed of the whole continent (MDC, 1999: 1)."*⁶⁶

This excerpt is an excellent example of a sublimation of the traditional goals of foreign assistance, such as increasing wellbeing ("the standard of living"), with the new trends of the 90s, such as institutions and governance, and the common priorities for the Balkans as democracy and European integration.

A policy document of more general application, in that it discusses the Dutch global aid policies, produced by the Dutch Directorate General for Development Cooperation in 2003 also references the major goals of Dutch development policy for the Balkans. According to the document:

"In the Balkans, the Netherlands will focus on sustainable stability and economic development (DGDC, 2003: 6)."

Following this general outline of stability and economic development as policy priorities, the policy paper adds that:

"The Netherlands supports accession [of the Balkan countries] to the EU. Development cooperation can contribute to conflict management, stability and sustainable development in the region by providing specific support for the transition process (DGDC, 2003: 18)."

The Balkans is one of three parts of the world where Dutch development cooperation is implemented with a regional approach:

*"The Netherlands works with other countries on the basis of bilateral agreements. Sometimes, however, agreements need to be made with more than one country, as in the case of cross-border conflicts or in post-conflict reconstruction. In such cases, we adopt a regional approach... The Netherlands takes a regional approach in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Western Balkans."*⁶⁷

The rhetoric of Dutch foreign aid operates more frequently with the term "governance" rather than democracy, and governance is defined to involve aspects of both good economic, administrative, as well as political management. This is evident for example, from the following excerpt outlining Dutch development cooperation policy on Macedonia:

*"The Netherlands and the Macedonian authorities have agreed to streamline the development cooperation program...the basic principles of Dutch development cooperation policy are now: the cross-sectoral theme of good governance (public finances, inter-ethnic relations, and decentralization), private sector development, and basic education."*⁶⁸

⁶⁶ italics added.

⁶⁷ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/regional_approach, accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁶⁸ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ.Macedonie.html#a5>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

A review of Dutch development priorities for BiH shows that the choice of priorities which Dutch aid has supported in Bosnia is similar to those in Macedonia. The website of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads that:

*“The Netherlands is among the five biggest donors [to Bosnia], and is the biggest donor to activities in the field of governance, human rights and peacebuilding...”*⁶⁹

With regards to Albania, the webpage of the Dutch Development Cooperation refers to two priority areas: good governance and “sound public service”, placing them in the context of the need for stability, the care for the environment, and EU integration.⁷⁰

In addition to having a regional approach, the Netherlands development cooperation has a policy of building closer relationship with select recipient countries. Such recipient in the Western Balkans is Macedonia:

“Apart from the case of Macedonia, we do not intend to build up long-term development cooperation programs with each country bilaterally... (MDC, 1999: 3)”

This type of donor behavior has been observed by aid scholarship, particularly with respect to mid- size and smaller donors, who can not afford to cover, or be present in every country of the world which demonstrates need of assistance. Because of this, and in order to maximize the impact of aid (through longer term, sustained, consistent intervention), they sometimes tend to focus on fewer selected recipients with whom they build special relationships.

In conclusion, the review of Dutch foreign assistance policy to the Balkans finds great similarities with the aid policies of the other donors active in the region. Democracy, governance, and European integration feature as major policy priorities, combined with the classical goals of development assistance, such as economic development and poverty.

Given the Balkans specific circumstance, reference is paid to stability, conflict management, and peace building. The theme of governance is used extensively, and as a cross-sectoral category.

2.4 Switzerland

Switzerland has also been a relevant donor to the region of the Balkans in the transition period, ranking as the 10th largest bilateral donor in the period 1990-2005 (see Chapter 5, Annex). A review of the goals comprised in the Swiss development cooperation policy vis-à-vis the Balkans comes across the similar range of issues and priorities to be found in the policies of other donors present in the region.

⁶⁹ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ,bosnie_herzegovina.html accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁷⁰ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ,Albani-.html>, accessed on 19 August 2008.

Albania has been a strong recipient of Swiss foreign aid directed to the Balkans. According to official policy declarations by Switzerland's official development cooperation agent, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Swiss assistance to Albania seeks "to contribute to the *stabilization, security and democratization*" of the country.⁷¹

More specifically, "*the cooperation strategy focuses on supporting the country in strengthening a social and free market economy and in realizing democratic principles for enhancing the regional and European integration.*"⁷² To this end, the areas of Swiss development intervention in Albania include: democratization and decentralization, development of the private sector, and basic infrastructure and social service.

The review of the goals of Swiss development aid for BiH, similar to the cooperation policies of other donors, notes the succession from emergency relief to reconstruction and development:

*"During and after the war (1992 to 1995), Switzerland provided emergency aid and reconstruction assistance to the tune of 365 million CHF to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1999, the focus shifted to long-term support for market-economy and democratic reforms and to reconciliation among the ethnic groups."*⁷³

The SDC does note that the the stability of BiH is a particular foreign policy priority for Switzerland. According to SDC policy texts, this is related to the presence of Bosnian refugees in Switzerland:

*"Participation in international efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina became a Swiss foreign policy priority owing, in no small measure, to the large number of Bosnian refugees in our country."*⁷⁴

SDC defines its goals in BiH in terms of: self-determined reform of political institutions, sustainable development of the economy; and an equitable and participatory society. To this end it chooses to operate in the three major areas: social domain, private sector development, and governance and basic services.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Albania ,
accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁷² Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.swisscooperation-albania.ch/en/Home/Swiss_Cooperation_Fund , accessed on 19
August 2008.

⁷³ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina

⁷⁴ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina , accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁷⁵ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
<http://www.sdc-seco.ba/> , accessed on 19 August 2008.

Similarly, the goals of Swiss foreign assistance to Serbia, as featured on SDC's official Serbia webpage, are defined in terms of "alleviating poverty, enhancing democratisation and enabling a successful international, economic and social transition process respecting human rights."⁷⁶

More recently SDC has produced strategies or country programs for some of the countries in the Balkans. The cooperation strategy for Serbia defines as the overall goal of Swiss assistance:

"...the social, economic and political transition of Serbia, including its regional, European and international integration... the programme is consolidated in four domains, each of which continues to be essential in the overall transition context: education, public infrastructure, local governance, and private sector development... (SDC & SECO, 2006: 6)"

Kosovo has been one of the strongest recipients of Swiss assistance in the Balkans, particularly in the emergency period, which is observable from the huge, tenfold rise in Swiss assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999. In that period of time Serbia was under sanctions and could not receive aid, except humanitarian assistance. SDC's aid policy on Kosovo places a noticeable accent on stability. Understandably the notion of integration of Kosovo is, as in the case of other donors, carefully phrased:

"Humanitarian actions and programmes to assist the return of persons displaced by the war were soon complemented by reconstruction and development activities. Switzerland is one of Kosovo's major donor countries. It aims to promote political stability as well as economic and social development, to strengthen local authorities and civil society, and to encourage regional integration."⁷⁷

Similarly to the Netherlands, Swiss development cooperation also pursues the policy of building special relationships with select beneficiary countries. Same as in the Dutch case, Swiss development assistance policy for the Balkans singles out Macedonia as a priority recipient since 1996⁷⁸, which is noted also in the recent policy paper for the country jointly produced by SDC and the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO):

"in 1996 the Swiss government decided to give Macedonia the status of a priority country (SDC&SECO, 2005: 6)."

The analysis of the donors' choice of Macedonia as a special recipient in the Balkans would require additional analysis which exceeds the scope of this chapter. One reason could likely be the fact that throughout the 1990s Macedonia was seen as an

⁷⁶ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
<http://www.swisscooperation.org.yu/> , accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁷⁷ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Kosovo ,
accessed on 19 August 2008.

⁷⁸ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Macedonia ,
accessed on 19 August 2008.

exception to the Balkan turmoil. It was frequently referred to as the “oasis of peace”, as it managed to stay conflict-free until 2001. Nevertheless, this is only an assumption. The research did not produce evidence for a definite conclusion on this issue.

However, it should be noted that the declarative status of a special recipient does not always translate into increased aid amounts, and this is evident from the case of Macedonia, which is actually the second smallest recipient of Swiss aid to the Balkans, after Croatia (see Chapter 5, Annex).

The SDC & SECO country program for Macedonia specifies the priority goals for the 2005-2008 period:

“In 2000, the first CP [country program] established for a four-year duration, was approved with the overall objective of supporting an effective, equitable, and market oriented economy and the further transition to a democratic system...the overall goal of the CP [for 2005-2008] is to contribute significantly to the sustainable enhancement of the quality of life of all Macedonian citizens, governed by democratic institutions (SDC&SECO, 2005: 7).”

According to the SDC & SECO program, Swiss support concentrates on: governance, basic infrastructure and social services, and sound economic development (SDC&SECO, 2005: 7).

In conclusion, the standard notions relating to market economy, democracy, governance, and stability apply also in the case of Swiss foreign aid to the Balkans.

SDC’s terminology operates with stronger references to more specific goals such as service supply and intervention in infrastructure. This does not necessarily mean that other donors at level of operations invest less in infrastructure, but that the goals of Swiss cooperation are defined more specifically, with reference to particular operational ends.

This issue will be taken into closer consideration further in the text, when donors’ particular projects and programs on the ground are to be discussed (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).

2.5 Italy

The official web page of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE) has a particular section dedicated to development cooperation. The region of the Balkans features as geographic area of interest for Italian development cooperation, and this section states the priorities for such cooperation.

According to MAE the general goals of development cooperation with the Balkans include “support for the process of economic transition and political democratisation in the region with the goal of encouraging stabilisation.”⁷⁹

Going into the more specific objectives promoted in the region MAE states that:

*“Italian Cooperation is concentrated in the sectors of infrastructure, energy, the environment, health, education, public administration, support for the private sector (SMEs in particular) and protection of cultural heritage.”*⁸⁰

The text also indicates the legal basis for provision of bilateral foreign assistance: “Italian financing is provided for by Law 49/87, and Law 180/1992; many projects have been facilitated by Law 84/2001 and Law 212/1992,”⁸¹ indicating that relevant part of the cooperation effort is channeled also through multilateral initiatives.

The section also makes a reference to the different channels of cooperation, noting that big part of the effort has been channeled through Italian NGOs, but also that:

*“Bilateral agreements have also been signed in the sector of cultural cooperation for scholarships, inter-university cooperation, research programs, projects and initiatives to create libraries, museums and cultural centers.”*⁸²

MAE also states the objectives and priorities for Italy’s development cooperation with individual countries in the region. The text notes that cooperation with Albania has started in 1992 and that “600 million euro in aid to development has been earmarked for Albania”⁸³ since. The major goals of Italy’s assistance to Albania, according to MAE, are to help:

*“Albania’s process of association with Europe, fostering its economic development and the restoration of stability in the country.”*⁸⁴ As main sectors of cooperation MAE lists “infrastructure, energy, healthcare, institution building and support to the private sector (SMEs).”⁸⁵

With regards to Croatia, the section reads that “Italian Cooperation was formerly engaged in reconstruction interventions in the areas struck by the Serbo-Croatian conflicts of 1991-1995, particularly in Eastern Slavonia, with projects in the socio-healthcare sector, the reconstruction of buildings and the restoration of essential facilities.”⁸⁶

The goals of development cooperation with the rest of the countries in the Balkans are similar. According to MAE “cooperation policy [with Serbia] aims at supporting

⁷⁹ Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 March 2009.

⁸⁰ *ibid*

⁸¹ Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 March 2009.

⁸² *ibid*

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ *ibid*

⁸⁵ *ibid*

⁸⁶ *ibid*

*Serbia's process of association with the European Union... with the intention of encouraging institution building, economic development, and the restoration of security conditions...*⁸⁷

According to MAE, Italy has been the second strongest donor to Serbia since the year of 2000:

*"The commitments undertaken by the Italian government beginning in 2000 have evolved into a substantial financial commitment estimable at approximately 155 million euro, 97.7 million of which has already been distributed. Italy is currently Serbia's second largest bilateral donor country, after the United States."*⁸⁸

In Bosnia, according to MAE *"Italy's intervention is concentrated on support for sustainable development, institution building and protection of the weaker segments of the society."*⁸⁹ MAE divides the goals of Italian ODA to BiH into three categories: *"a) emergency; b) reconstruction and institution building; c) socio-economic development."*⁹⁰

With respect to Macedonia, MAE states that Italian Cooperation has been active in the country since 1992, *"supporting the economic transition and development ... [and] sponsoring various humanitarian and emergency programs."*⁹¹

The development cooperation section of MAE's official webpage succinctly states the major goals of Italian foreign assistance to the Balkans, and it is obvious that they are by and large similar to those of the other major bilaterals active in the region.

The section of development cooperation is placed together with three other policy sections discussing Italy's a) political relations, b) economic relations, and c) military presence in the region. The section on political relations provides perhaps the most succinct definition of the goals of Italian engagement with the region, which have obviously translated into the priorities for development cooperation:

*"Following the crisis of the 1990s, we are now engaged in the broad-based support of democratic institutions there and the transition toward free-market economic systems."*⁹²

The conclusion is the following: the official texts concerning Italian foreign assistance to the Balkans operate with the standard range of goals, common also for the other bilaterals active in the region, including democracy, market economy, peace & stability, and accession into the European Union.

⁸⁷ *ibid*

⁸⁸ Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE),

http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 March 2009.

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ *ibid*

⁹¹ *ibid*

⁹² *ibid*

2.6 United States

Consistent with its role of one of the largest bilateral donors globally, the United States has had strong donor presence in the Balkans since 1990, and it has been the 2nd largest bilateral donor to the region in the period of transition (see Chapter 5).

The policy framework for US aid to the Balkans has been set up by the US overall legal framework for foreign assistance to Eastern Europe – the Support to Eastern European Democracy (SEED) bill from 1989.⁹³ The title of the act itself is self-explanatory and it clearly indicates the primary motivation for US assistance to the region - support to democracy.

The SEED act declares two succinct goals of the assistance to Eastern Europe:

*“(1) to contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political pluralism... [and] (2) to promote the development of a free market economic system”*⁹⁴

These two major goals are further specified in detail in the normative part of the law. The “*development of democratic institutions and political pluralism*” is characterized by:

- *“the establishment of fully democratic and representative political systems based on free and fair elections,*
- *effective recognition of fundamental liberties and individual freedoms, including freedom of speech, religion, and association,*
- *termination of all laws and regulations which impede the operation of a free press and the formation of political parties,*
- *creation of an independent judiciary, and*
- *establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces.”*⁹⁵

The second goal, defined as “*development of a free market economic system*” is characterized by:

- *“ privatization of economic entities,*
- *establishment of full rights to acquire and hold private property, including land and the benefits of contractual relations,*
- *simplification of regulatory controls regarding the establishment and operation of businesses,*
- *dismantlement of all wage and price controls,*
- *removal of trade restrictions, including on both imports and exports,*
- *liberalization of investment and capital, including the repatriation of profits by foreign investors;*
- *tax policies which provide incentives for economic activity and investment,*
- *establishment of rights to own and operate private banks and other financial service firms, as well as unrestricted access to private sources of credit, and*

⁹³ Support to Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act, Pub. L. 101-179, Nov. 28, 1989

⁹⁴ SEED Act, paragraph b

⁹⁵ SEED act, paragraph b

- *access to a market for stocks, bonds, and other instruments through which individuals may invest in the private sector.*⁹⁶

It is interesting to observe that the goals concerning the promotion of free economy in particular, are very specific and detailed in describing the economic system the US considered desirable for the countries of Eastern Europe immediately after the fall of communism. The PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstructing the Economy) act⁹⁷ which established the European Union aid, originally to Hungary and Poland, in that same year, was quite less specific and more concerned with humanitarian ends.

Review of the introduction to the 2003 SEED Implementation Report gives additional insights into the motives and factors of US assistance to Eastern Europe:

*“By helping move the Central and Eastern European countries in the direction of democracy and market-based economies, these programs promote long-term stability in the region and contribute to U.S. national security.”*⁹⁸

Clearly, democracy and economic reforms are brought in connection with the region’s stability and, importantly, US national security. This logic in the motivations for foreign aid has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. Explicit formulations of this type leave little room for arguing against the motive of self-interest as factor of US foreign assistance, when it is succinctly cited by US official documents. Nevertheless, the later phases of the review will look into how this declared self-interest translates into operational strategies.

The report makes a reference to the standard range specific objectives of foreign aid, including the need to: *“fight corruption, strengthen civil society and the independent media, enhance market reforms, create economic opportunity, mitigate conflict, fight disease, reduce threats of weapons of mass destruction, prevent trafficking in persons and contraband, and promote the rule of law and human rights throughout the region.”*⁹⁹

With assistance to the CEE countries already phased out, and aid to the second tier of countries, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania, declining, the report notes that the bulk of effort under the SEED Act by that point in time has been focused on the Western Balkan countries:

*“Of the 15 countries covered by the SEED Act, three are NATO members already, with another seven scheduled for membership in spring 2004. Eight of the 15 are slated to join the EU at about the same time. As a result, the program’s focus has shifted predominantly to Southeastern Europe.”*¹⁰⁰ The report further states that:

⁹⁶ SEED Act, paragraph b

⁹⁷ Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE Regulation).

⁹⁸ US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/36985.htm>, accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.

⁹⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

*“The overarching goal of SEED assistance to such countries as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro is to help them stand completely on their own feet, politically, economically, and socially, and with reasonable prospects for eventual full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.”*¹⁰¹

In conclusion, the review of the major legislative document guiding US assistance to the region, combined with an examination of goal statements in a recent SEED report offer sufficient insight into the motives and factors of US aid to the Balkans. It should be reminded that full review of motives and factors is beyond the scope of this chapter. Longitudinal review over a ten year period would definitely reveal the evolution of goals of assistance as the circumstances in the Balkans were changing. Motives were changing also due to circumstances on the part of the donor. The post 9/11 period saw a significant re-incorporation of security considerations in foreign aid, thus the 2003 report notes that “SEED countries have proven valued partners for the United States in the war on terrorism.”¹⁰²

The relevant conclusion is that which concerns the consistency, with the understandable presence of necessary differences, of the motives of foreign assistance to the Balkans across donors. From the review of the US policy priorities for development cooperation with the Balkans, it is clear that with the acceleration of the process of enlargement, accession into the EU became also a goal of US foreign assistance to the region.

Obviously there are notable differences in the rhetorical importance of certain goals of foreign aid. For example, whereas democracy is enshrined in the title of the 1989 act setting up the US foreign aid program to Eastern Europe, it was completely absent from the original EU PHARE document¹⁰³. Over the years the EU joined the democracy discourse¹⁰⁴ and references to democracy are much more present in the OBNOVA and CARDS programs, as goal but also precondition of aid, yet still not at the rhetoric level democracy had in US policy texts.

Interestingly, although the SEED act is short for “*support to Eastern European Democracy*”, the bigger part of the legislative documents is concerned with issues of economic development. The fact of the intensity of certain rhetoric, as scholarship has well noted and as mentioned earlier, does not necessarily translate into aid allocations.

2.7 European Union

The European Union has been the single largest donor to the Balkans in the period of transition. EU development assistance has been channeled through the different instruments and programs set up over the years by the European Commission (EC), and has gone through various phases. The CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization) program of the European

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² *ibid*

¹⁰³ PHARE Democracy was introduced several years later.

¹⁰⁴ The 2nd chapter discussed the rise of democracy assistance in the 90s.

Commission for assistance to the Western Balkans was introduced in 2000¹⁰⁵, replacing or amending the previous EC acts which regulated this matter, namely OBNOVA and PHARE.

The goals of the CARDS program are defined in accordance with the enlargement policy of the EU and the preamble of the CARDS regulation asserts that the overall objective of the European Council vis-à-vis the Western Balkans is “*the fullest possible integration of the countries in the region in the political and economic mainstream of Europe and that the stabilization and the association process is the centerpiece of its policy in the Balkans*”.¹⁰⁶ The CARDS regulation also reasserts that the countries from the region are seen as potential candidate countries.¹⁰⁷

By the year of 2000 the overall goal of EC assistance to the Balkans has already become the integration into the EU. In this sense the CARDS regulation provides that aid to the Balkans should “contribute to the stabilization and association process and increase responsibility of recipient countries and entities in relation to that process.”¹⁰⁸

As regards the more specific objectives of Community assistance, the CARDS regulation foresees that:

*“... Community assistance will be focused mainly on building up an institutional , legislative, economic and social framework directed at the values and models subscribed to by the European Union and on promoting a market economy, with due regard for priorities agreed with the partners concerned.”*¹⁰⁹

Article 2 of the CARDS regulation specifically(in 6 paragraphs) defines the purposes of assistance to the Balkans, ranging from reconstruction and humanitarian aid, through institution building, “market-economy oriented economic reform”¹¹⁰, social development, regional cooperation, and so forth.

The discourse of “democracy promotion” *is not accentuated* in the CARDS regulation but there is nevertheless a strong reference to the goal of democratization, indirectly through institution building whereby the goal of aid is “*the creation of an institutional and legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law and human and minority rights, reconciliation and the consolidation of civil society...*”¹¹¹

Democracy features as a goal of foreign assistance, though not as strongly as in the United States aid rhetoric, but it also features as a *condition* of receiving assistance. According to the preamble to the CARDS regulation:

¹⁰⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 (CARDS regulation)

¹⁰⁶CARDS regulation, preamble article 3

¹⁰⁷ preamble art 4

¹⁰⁸ preamble art 5

¹⁰⁹ preamble art 6

¹¹⁰ art. 2, par c

¹¹¹ art. 2 par b

“A precondition for receiving assistance is that the recipients respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human and minority rights, fundamental freedoms and the principles of international law.”¹¹²

The “conditionality clause” already exists in the previous act which guided EC assistance to the Balkans through the framework of OBNOVA, whereby award of assistance was *“based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms....”¹¹³*

These general conditions are combined with more specific ones for individual countries. The OBNOVA regulation provides that:

“The specific conditions laid down by the Council for the implementation of cooperation with former Yugoslavia are also an essential part of this Regulation.”¹¹⁴ One such condition was and still is the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The commitment to *conditionality* is also stated in the preamble to the OBNOVA regulation, whereby the Community *“intends to make its support contingent on adherence to the political and economic terms of the peace agreements signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, notably respect for human rights”¹¹⁵*

The goals of EC aid to the Balkans as defined by the OBNOVA regulation are similar to those listed for CARDS four years later

: *“The aim of the projects, programs and cooperation schemes shall be to underpin the reconstruction process, to encourage the return of refugees, reconciliation and regional economic cooperation, and to create the economic and social conditions that will lay the foundations for the development of the recipient countries.”¹¹⁶*

It is interesting to review the full listing of goals of foreign assistance as presented in paragraph 2 of article 4 in the OBNOVA regulation:

“The projects, programs and schemes referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover the following fields, in particular:

- regional cooperation and good neighborliness projects, and transborder projects;*
- rebuilding of infrastructure and other individual or collective facilities damaged in the fighting;*
- the consolidation of democracy and civil society;*

¹¹² preamble art. 7, CARDS regulation

¹¹³ art 2, Council Regulation (EC) no 1628/96 of 25 July 1996 (OBNOVA regulation)

¹¹⁴ OBNOVA Regulation, article 2

¹¹⁵ OBNOVA Regulation, preamble

¹¹⁶ OBNOVA Regulation, article 4, paragraph 1

- *return of refugees;*
- *integration or reintegration of refugees, displaced persons and former soldiers into working life;*
- *preparation of the production apparatus for economic recovery;*
- *development of the private sector, notably small businesses, and promotion of investment;*
- *the strengthening of non-governmental organizations, cultural institutions and educational establishments”¹¹⁷*

Full analysis of the goals exceeds the purpose of this chapter, nevertheless it is noticeable that *humanitarian and reconstruction goals are highlighted*, which is logical given the time-period of the regulation, shortly after the end of the war in Bosnia, and the immense humanitarian and reconstruction needs. “Consolidation of democracy” already features as a goal in hand with consolidation of “civil society”. Another interesting observation is that “strengthening of nongovernmental organizations” exists in parallel with the need to consolidate civil society.

Given that OBNOVA is from 1996 when the prospect of Balkan accession in the EU was practically non-existent, the goal of enlargement or accession does not exist as a factor of EC assistance to the region in this act regulating EC development aid to the region.

However, the prospect of EU integration of the Balkans has clearly become much clearer by the time of the institution of the CARDS mechanism.

In addition, from the review of the aid policies of some of the major bilateral donors, it is clear that the goal of the Balkan’s EU integration has fully permeated the development assistance priorities of other European but also of non-European bilaterals.

Beyond EU integration as a goal of foreign assistance to the Balkans, whose origin is clearly the EU enlargement policy and from there it has been translated into the EU development policy, it can be concluded that the *same and similar overall goals*, comprising governance, institutions, democracy, as well as stability, guide the EC foreign aid to the region of the Balkans.

3. Conclusion

The purpose of the preceding review was to provide a general overview, rather than a full scan, of the goals of the foreign assistance as declared in the *official documents* of the major donors to the region of the Balkans. Not all the donors to the Balkans were included, nor was the analysis of texts a fully comprehensive one. As already mentioned, the limits of the discussion were also dictated by availability of sources. The aim was to observe the similarities rather than to identify all the differences, which are inevitably plenty.

¹¹⁷ OBNOVA Regulation, article, 4 paragraph 2

The main conclusion is that there is a *standard range of declared goals* which have motivated foreign assistance to the Balkans in the transition period. These goals relate to the overall vision of the Western world for the post-communist countries, including democracy and market economy as the major perimeters. In addition they have been strongly defined by the Balkan's unique circumstance which produced an immense humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction need.

Another strong factor in defining the goal of foreign aid has been the EU enlargement policy. Enlargement has not only impacted the aid policies of the EU member states, but also non-EU donors, such as Switzerland and the US, which have also included integration of the Balkans into the EU as a goal of their aid policies. Further, the goals correspond with the general trends of foreign assistance in the post-cold war world, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This is evident from the numerous references to *democracy, governance, institutions, and civil society*, in the policy documents of donors.

Some notes of caution are perhaps well warranted when discussing donors' official aid rhetoric. Some of these have already been hinted in the text during the discussion of the particular aid policies. Such as for example, the frequent use of certain rhetoric or the underscoring of certain goals does not necessarily mean that they would be equally strongly supported by actual aid disbursements. The intense democracy promotion rhetoric does not always translate into specific democracy promotion projects, or at least the actual financial commitments are not at the level of the rhetorical one. This can also apply to other declared policy goals.

Related to this, the question is how much are such development assistance declarations real policy positions as opposed to mere rhetorical exercise? And how consistent are the donors' operational strategies with their policy statements? How can a donor ensure the commitment to goals which a) range over entire sets of issues, such as poverty, institutions, stability, and b) which are defined at such generic level, such as for example "stability" which can often mean a variety of different things?

In this sense, the valid question which emerges is how relevant an exercise the review of aid policy actually is, especially if done at the level of donor statements? Logically, the actual inspection of what a donor actually chooses to do is a much more relevant insight into what the donor's policy priorities really are.

These dilemmas open a debate which is as complex as it is extensive. At this point, the intention is not to fully elaborate on these issues, but simply: to caution to certain realities of the foreign aid process. Chapter 6 and especially Chapter 7 will look into what have donors in reality chosen to support in the Balkans

At the same time, the raising of such dilemmas is not done with the purpose to indicate hidden or ulterior agendas, but simply to test the achievability of certain declarative goals in practice. For example, the stated goal of EU integration of the Balkans, for example by Switzerland, should be supported by certain operational modalities which further that specific goal. What if such specific measures are not to be found in Swiss ODA to the Balkans, for example? Is the declaration of such a goals still a worthy statement?

An overall framework can nevertheless be discerned, regardless of how broad it is. This framework can be defined in the following way:

Eastern Europe equals free market economy plus democracy.

Balkans equals free market economy plus democracy plus peace.

In the simplest of terms, these are the major points of reference for foreign aid to the Balkans, as they emerge from the review of the policy texts of the major donors to the region. Overall, foreign aid to the Balkans was motivated by the desire to: promote democracy and market economy, and ensure stability and peace.

CHAPTER 4

Motives and Factors for Aid to the Balkans: Review of International Media

1. Introduction

Following the review of official policy texts in Chapter 3, this chapter continues the examination of donor motivations with a review of international media. The media review is done in order to get insight into the dynamic political reality of Western assistance to the Balkans and to analyze moments and contexts which are often not part of official rhetoric.

The review of the international media coverage of foreign assistance to the Balkans reveals a lot of interesting material about the theme of inquiry. This material consists of a) political discourses, and especially statements by senior political officials concerning the process of international intervention in the Balkans, and b) information on a range of situations and circumstances which have acted as factors of aid allocations to the region in one way or another. It is instructive to review some of these situations and factors and to discuss the more particular among them. This is important in order to underscore the versatile and complex dynamic of the process of foreign assistance to the region.

An additional note of clarification is perhaps due concerning the choice of media review as a method of exploration of motives and factors of aid to the Balkans. One reason is definitely the fact that the review of the media reveals information which is usually not comprised in official development assistance documents. In this sense, statements by senior politicians, reports of international dynamics and trends, or of arguments or disagreements concerning foreign aid between donor governments, or between donors and recipients, are critical items of evidence in the exploration of the reality of motives and factors of aid.

The second reason is produced by necessity. As already noted earlier, the extensive review of the existing academic literature produced little on the topic of foreign assistance to the Balkans, in particular as it concerns the focus of this inquiry. The issue of foreign aid to the Balkans has been to date quite under-explored in the scholarly debate on aid. Apart from occasional references, and a few shorter contributions, there has not been to date a comprehensive treatment of the subject. In this sense, the intensive use of media reports, in addition to being a reliable source of factual information, is used as a substitute for the deficiency of scholarly sources.

All of the factors which the review of international press discloses have been in some way relevant to the foreign aid operation in the Balkans. Some of them have been of much greater importance than others. Any particular aid decision is a result of many intertwined factors. Often these factors are *mere notions* in the process of making an aid decision, and sometimes they have a particular significance to only one or a few donors. In addition, some of them can be considered to be more general principles in foreign aid, whereas others are individual responses to particular situations.

The review of international media uncovers a) numerous cases in which foreign aid was considered as a *response to a certain situation*, and b) many nuanced uses of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Many different situations and circumstances have made governments resort to aid as a tool and in this way acted as factors of foreign assistance.

For the purpose of this chapter, the more relevant of those cases documented from the international press were collected and provisionally categorized. The review has produced 12 situations which have acted as factors of foreign assistance in one way or another. All of these situations are positioned in between the two distinct poles of self-interest and altruism, which explain the motivation for giving foreign aid in broadest possible terms.

2. Review of International Media

2.1 Moral and Historic Duties, Concerns and Responsibilities

The feeling of altruism and compassion invoked in response to war and humanitarian emergency was a strong factor of foreign assistance to the Balkans. There is no doubt that it was the images of horror and human suffering from the Balkan wars that made the region one of the strongest aid recipients in the world over the past decade and a half. Aid for humanitarian purposes is what generally distinguishes the Balkans from the rest of Eastern Europe. In addition to economic and democracy aid, the region also received huge amounts of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, altruism, or in other words, the feeling of moral duty, was an important motivation for aid to the Balkans.

Altruism in itself is not a firmly bound and homogeneous category. It would represent a range of moral sentiments. In addition, it would combine with and engage in exchange with other both philanthropic and political impulses. For the purpose of this text it is interesting to outline several situations where moral duty either acted as a factor of aid commitment, or was invoked as a motive to provide aid.

It is important to note that the selection of cases is random, from what has been registered by international media. Nevertheless, the research effort for this text comprised an extensive and comprehensive examination of possibly relevant coverage in all of the media included in the review.

What emerges as a relevant observation from the analysis of the situations is the existence of what can be termed *interweavement and substitutability of motivations for foreign assistance*, whereby motives of self-interest and moral duty *easily exchange places* in the political rhetoric surrounding aid giving. What more, in of themselves they are not firm categories. Moral duty can be a generous impulse to help, but it can also be fear of reprimand for not having helped. Self-interest can and in reality often is a *composite of many different, often unrelated, self-interests*.

An interesting example which is an excellent case study of the use (and abuse) of moral concern as factor of foreign aid is the famous Energy for Democracy project of the European Commission to opposition governed municipalities in Serbia in 1999. Energy for Democracy is one of the most highlighted cases of foreign aid to the Balkans.

The Energy for Democracy project designed by the EC, provided heating oil to opposition governed municipalities in Serbia in the winter of 1999, in the aftermath of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, and in a last critical period of the Milosevic regime.

Serbia's oil refineries had been destroyed by the NATO bombing earlier that year and the country was facing a severe energy crisis and a humanitarian catastrophe with the coming winter. The EC proposed a project to give heating oil, but only to municipalities which were controlled by the Serbian opposition. The United States initially strongly opposed the project. The reason for the opposition, from what can be gathered from the press review, was primarily the fear that aid would be abused by the Milosevic regime. The US worried that the Milosevic run government could manage to divert the assistance to his loyalists. In the end, the US conceded and supported the project. The reason for the yielding was the fear of possible moral blame from the consequences of withholding aid. As the New York Times notes:

*"The Clinton administration, worried that it could be blamed if Serbs freeze to death in the winter, has decided to support a European-run pilot program to send millions of dollars worth of heating oil to Serbia..."*¹¹⁸

It is obvious from the excerpt that motivation was not an altruistic desire to help but fear from moral blame. It should be however taken into consideration that both the EU and the US conduct in this particular situation can not withstand a closer ethical scrutiny. The EU did not have a problem tying essentially humanitarian aid (heating oil in winter) to political ends. The US on the other hand initially objected the whole project also because it felt that *"by alleviating the hardships of a cold winter, the oil might diminish public protests against his government."*¹¹⁹

Basically, as it appears from the media review, the US did not primarily worry about people freezing. The EU did, but only about people with the correct political affiliation. In the end, the US conceded and supported the project, not because of a sudden altruistic reawakening, but because it feared moral rebuke. In this case, both actors played with moral concerns, but in essence for both of them it was political ones which prevailed.

Another interesting case which operates with the *sense of duty* to help is Italy's aid to Albania in 1991. Albania was the first country in the Western Balkans to start receiving substantive amounts of foreign aid, largely on humanitarian grounds. The opening of its long sealed borders produced a strong wave of migration, mostly towards Italy and Greece in the beginning of the 90s.

Explaining the decision to commit substantive amounts to Albania in June of 1991, then Italy's Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis resorted to a combination of motives which comprised *fear of migration* and *"historic and geographic duty"* to help:

"We surely hope this aid will discourage the pressure of immigration," Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis said at a news conference...*"Europe must help Albania,"* Mr. De Michelis said. *"Italy has a special duty for historic and geographical reasons."*¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ New York Times, *U.S. Backs European Effort To Send Heating Oil to Serbs*, November 2, 1999.

¹¹⁹ *ibid*

¹²⁰ New York Times, *Italy Pledges \$50 Million in Aid for Albania*, June 14, 1991. See more on fear of migration as factor of Italian foreign aid to Italy below in the respective section of this chapter.

This is a good case study of an aid decision motivated by a combination of factors. The notion of “historic duty” refers to former colonial ties, to Albania’s past as Italian colony, a motive for aid already discussed in the theoretical part; the “geographic duty” can be extensively interpreted to include fear from migration, related security issues, and “real” feeling of duty on account of geographic proximity which definitely contributes to the intensity of the perceptions of need in a neighbouring country. Fear from migration probably outweighed other concerns, but they were nevertheless present. Whatever factor taken as dominant in deciding Italy’s assistance to Albania in the early 90s, it has decided almost half of its assistance to the Balkans over the entire 1990-2005 time period. Half of all Italian development aid to the Balkans over the 15-year period has gone to one country, Albania, in only a few years in the beginning of the 90s (see Chapter 5).

Finally, a third case evoking moral concern as grounds for aid decision involves the interesting example of Israeli aid to the Balkans. Israel’s assistance to the region of the Balkans has been overall marginal. Yet, the reports of human suffering particularly related to prison camps in the war zones of former Yugoslavia prompted Israel to offer urgent humanitarian aid in the beginning of the 90s. According to news report from the time:

“Reports of atrocities in detention centers set up in what was once Yugoslavia have struck a sensitive nerve in Israel, evoking memories of Nazi concentration camps and leading many people to say that their country has a special moral obligation to send help.”

In the words of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres:

*... “The reports of murder and suffering of those detained in Bosnia can only cause everyone in the world, and especially Jews, to feel revulsion to the depths of their souls.”*¹²¹

Clearly, the feeling of moral duty in this case arises from the similarity of the human suffering in former Yugoslavia with the tragedy of Jewish people during WW II. Israel felt called upon, even if this moral impulse did not translate into massive inflows of Israeli aid.

Nevertheless, as an evidence in support of the claim that no aid decision is driven by a single motive, which is essentially the nature of human (and likely government) behavior, even this very particular sense of moral obligation was combined with other inclinations. In the words of Aryeh Barnea from head of the group Movement for Remembering the Lessons of the Holocaust, which was actively involved in this project:

“This has a moral element of course, but also a political element...After we do something like this, we should say to the United States: ‘We the small ones, have done our part and saved 500. Now you should do your part and save 50,000.’ ”

¹²¹ New York Times, *Shuddering at Camp Reports, Israel Plans Aid*, August 9, 1992.

This statement relates to the moment of peer pressure as a factor of aid, which was discussed in the theoretical part in Chapter 1, and which will be further encountered in some of the following examples.

Peer pressure itself is also not a simple category and it can exist in a plentitude of modalities. In this particular case it simply follows the strong ethical drive which is of primary importance. In this sequence thus: 1) aid is motivated by a strong feeling of duty, 2) the donor desires or hopes that the act would also serve as an impelling example for others.

There are other cases where the intention to press peers is much bigger constituent part of the decision to give aid. Such a case is discussed further in this chapter, in the section on donor rivalry, with regards to US and EU squabbling over assistance to Kosovo.

2.2 Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy I: Reward and Punishment, Isolation of Opponents and Help to Allies

The use of foreign assistance as an instrument of foreign policy can take many different forms. In addition, the function of aid as an instrument of foreign policy is in reality often fused with its other functions, such that it is sometimes difficult to say where the role of aid as a tool of economic development stops, and where its role as an instrument of foreign policy begins. This being said, it should be noted that the very incipient moment of award of aid for economic development, is also (to a lesser or greater extent) subject to foreign policy considerations. This would also naturally depend on the extent to which the particular donor country considers, or wants to use foreign aid as an instrument in its foreign policy.

Review of the process of foreign assistance to the Balkans finds evidence of aid allocation, or its withholding being used as a tool for the achievement of different foreign policy goals, such as:

- a) reward for reformers,
- b) punishment for non-reformers,
- c) isolation of opponents (or simply tool against opponents), and
- d) helping allies

Uses under a) and b) are usually part of a politically more neutral process of meritocratic assessment, whereas uses c) and d) imply a clear-cut political function of foreign aid. Uses a) and b) are not analogous with uses c) and d) and they can hypothetically be opposed: laggards can receive aid if they are political allies, and the opposite can also be true. The theoretical discussion on motives for aid in Chapter 1 covered that issue in detail. Several cases will be reviewed for the purpose of exploring these dynamics.

Although by no means immune to political influences, the process of distribution of the EU development assistance has by and large been subject to regular assessments of progress against certain parameters which have occasionally had the power to influence the distribution of aid. Such value judgments on the progress vs. lack of progress by certain recipients are regularly found in the EC progress reports. The

following excerpt from a European Voice coverage from 1999 refers to a situation when aid was withheld on account of such a meritocratic assessment about lack of progress with democratic reform:

“According to the Commission's report, Albania and Macedonia are the Balkan region's success stories compared to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where EU governments had hoped for the return of western-style democracy and respect for minority rights in the wake of the Bosnian war... Croatia's failure to make progress on democratization has prevented it from benefiting from the EU's Phare program...”¹²²

Croatia was for example, at one point excluded from the EU PHARE program on account of insufficient progress with democratization; Serbia was (and it still is) under continuous monitoring and the flow of aid was subject to periodic approvals of the country's progress, particularly with respect to its full cooperation with the ICTY; Macedonia never had its aid halted but in the immediate period after the end of the 2001 conflict, it was several times warned that the flow of assistance was contingent on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA).

The case of Croatia's exclusion from PHARE shows that the borderline between purely merit-based and political decision can be blurred.¹²³ Whereas it can be argued that Croatia's exclusion from PHARE (the country was receiving funding from other donors and funding mechanisms) was a result of the EU's technical assessment that the country had failed to meet certain criteria, the case of neighboring Yugoslavia, which was under a complete aid and trade embargo, was a case of complete isolation of a regime which the international community considered a pariah, an enemy.

Yugoslavia reached a state of total embargo because the whole international community saw it in complete disrespect of democratic standards. Overtime, a strong international consensus emerged against Yugoslavia, which was not the case with Croatia, or the other countries in the region.

In this sense the two functions of aid can be seen as posited along a continuum whereby technical or merit-based (reward-punishment) actions, by gaining in weight and intensity overtime, can turn into intense political acts. The same is possible in reverse. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this cannot only depend on the non-performance of the recipient. A non-performing recipient with a strong position in the “international community” will not likely be isolated.

The withholding of aid from Serbia under Milosevic demonstrates instances of not just withholding aid from someone who is not worthy, but actually consciously using aid as a political instrument to politically isolate an opponent. This aspect can be isolated from the following moment registered by the New York Times:

¹²² European Voice, *Report Reinforces Need for Balkan Stability Pact*, Vol. 5 No. 20: 19 May 1999.

¹²³ A good example of a purely merit-based decision to use aid to punish non-reformers is the case of Bulgaria, which is taking place at the time of writing this chapter (June – July 2008). The EU has decided to suspend around 500 million Euros of regional funds to Bulgaria because of the country's failure to address corruption, in particular related to the use of the very European funds.

“...Gerhard Schroder, the German Chancellor, said of Serbia that, ‘Reconstruction aid, reestablishment of economic structures and reincorporation into Europe need democratization, and that is not possible with Mr. Milosevic’... Michael Steiner, the chief diplomatic adviser to Mr. Schroder, said that money would be used as a political weapon to isolate Mr. Milosevic. Aid would be channelled to Kosovo, Montenegro and even perhaps areas of Serbia itself run or controlled by opposition parties...”¹²⁴

This statement expresses a clear intent that foreign assistance be used a tool to isolate and harm a political enemy. In such a particular case also the surrounding strategic partners are in a position to receive more aid than they otherwise would. They benefit not by criteria of merit or need, but reasons of political manoeuvre:

“the leaders gathered here [at the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo] are seeking to avert future conflicts in the Balkans through longer-term economic reconstruction... But they also pointedly wanted to try to isolate President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, who was not invited... The leaders said that as long as Mr. Milosevic remained in power, they would not contribute to rebuild Serbia.”¹²⁵

The function of aid as reward for political allies in the Balkans is quite evident in the position of the international community towards Montenegro, in the period after the Kosovo war and before the fall of Milosevic. In this particular period of time the West feared that Montenegro could be the stage for the next Balkan crisis caused by the Milosevic regime, and felt the imperative to support the fledgling pro-Western republic:

“The West essentially needs to subsidize Montenegro until Mr. Milosevic leaves power. Given the republic's size, this is not that difficult.”¹²⁶

Generous foreign assistance was both a handy and much appreciated way of helping:

“In the past few months, Montenegro has adopted the German mark as its currency, an act of economic audacity that infuriated Milosevic. In retaliation, Milosevic imposed a blockade between Serbia and Montenegro, but Djukanovic has overcome many of its effects, in part through a generous and largely unconditional infusion of Western aid.”¹²⁷

Montenegro did earn credit with the West for its actions opposing Milosevic, and in this sense it was not just a protégé but a worthy ally:

“Mr. Djukanovic matters to the West. He has provided shelter to Serbian opposition figures who were afraid for their lives, both during the war and afterward, as well as to Serbian draft dodgers during the war. And he has provided a platform for

¹²⁴ New York Times, *Reform Urged as Condition For Yugoslavia to Get Aid*, June 21, 1999.

¹²⁵ New York Times, *World Leaders Join in Pledging Effort to Rebuild Balkans*, July 31, 1999.

¹²⁶ New York Times, *The Next Balkan Crisis*, April 21, 2000.

¹²⁷ Washington Post, *Montenegro Seen As Beacon of Hope*, May 24, 2000.

broadcasting anti-Milosevic material into Serbia. In return, he has received Western adulation and millions of dollars in aid."¹²⁸

As already discussed in the first chapter on motives and factor of foreign aid, political alliance is a strong predictor of foreign assistance. There are many other instances in the aid process to the Balkans which were directly motivated by political allegiance and political interest.

Political interest is the strongest, but also the broadest possible denominator of foreign aid, as it can include everything ranging from fear of migration, positioning in the international arena, to support for a particular political platform, party, or politician. In this sense, the West did not just support Montenegro, but a specific political option represented by its leader Milo Djukanovic.

Changes of government in the Balkans were definitely a factor of foreign assistance. The West rewarded the political options it favored by increasing aid. The replacements of the Tadjman government in Croatia and Milosevic in Yugoslavia in the early and late 2000 respectively, were the two most prominent examples. Naturally, in these two cases the changes in power were not only seen as entering of more friendly or cooperative governments, but as historic democratic breakthroughs.

In line with the same principle, the international community was always reluctant in giving aid to governments it did not favor. Such was also the case with the nationalist government in the Republic of Srpska, part of the Bosnian Federation.

Argumentum al contrario, to the extent that shifting of power did not cause changes in the foreign aid flow to a country, the West did not "have an issue" with the political choices in the country. An example would be changes of governments in Macedonia.

The Western support to the Djukanovic government in Montenegro through strong supply of foreign aid is a good case study of aid as instrument of foreign policy. The democratic opposition in Serbia also received significant amounts of aid, and it was also seen as an important ally against Milosevic, but here the moment of foreign policy interest was fused with the notion of support to democracy. It can be argued that democracy promotion is also a foreign policy interest, but it should nevertheless be borne in mind that states have foreign policy interests which outweigh their interest in the spread of democracy.

¹²⁸ New York Times, *The Trouble With Democracy. NATO's Friends Can't Win Every Vote*, June 18, 2000. This particular citation should come with a note of consideration. Namely, it is not clear on what basis the article claims that Western aid came as reward for broadcasting anti-Milosevic material, or any other specific activities. This cannot be excluded to be true, also given the fact that it comes from a very reliable and credible source. However, because the article does not cite a government official making an official statement, it could also be the interpretation of the journalist. The situation is different when an article uses a direct statement by an official, especially high-ranking government representative. Naturally, official statements are also not taken at face value and they can be subject to analytical interpretation, but nevertheless the analytical lens is positioned differently, i.e. the question is what was the aim of a certain political statement. In analyzing a journalist comment, the issue is also whether the interpretation corresponds to the factual situation.

2.3 Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy II: Aid Suspension as Reaction to Wide Range of Political Situations

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 pointed to the fact that aid is a relevant tool of foreign policy. As such it is used as in many different situations in international relations. The award or suspension of assistance is a political reaction of the donor to a number of political developments. In this sense the act of suspension is the active response, an act of doing. The supply or the regular flow of aid is the state of regularity. Foreign aid programs are ongoing. Suspension occurs when the donor disapproves of certain political development and reacts by cutting off aid.

This type of aid decision is broader in scope than the reward vs. punishment function described earlier. Reward and punishment could be seen as a *subset* of the broader dimension of flow vs. suspension. Reward understands acknowledgement of achievement by the recipient; on the other hand, the regular aid flow can be unconcerned with achievement. Punishment, as an antithesis to reward, should recognize disapproval of the failure of the recipient to achieve certain goals. Suspension is not necessarily related to a failure to achieve something. It is merely a foreign policy decision. Aid suspension is one of the first tools diplomacy reaches for in international relations. A tool which actually precedes the aid suspension is the threat of aid suspension.

The functions of (and motives for) aid as punishment for laggards, isolation of opponents, and the generic suspension can be similar. Every withdrawal of aid is a suspension, but not every suspension is a) sanction for a certain failure, or b) done with the intention to isolate, politically hurt an opponent. The difference is produced by the motivation for the suspension and the intensity of the political position. The generic act of suspension subsumes withdrawal of aid on account of a number of different motives.

The process of foreign aid to the Balkans involved numerous instances of threats of suspension, aid suspension, and resuming of aid flows. Some of the major cases have already been mentioned, but there have been many other instances in the region where aid was one of the first tools of foreign policy.

The reasons for aid suspensions or threats of suspension varied over time and across countries; they involved concerns of human rights violations, pressure to cease hostilities, non-implementation of peace deals, political choices the West did not approve of, and so forth.

As early as 1991, before the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia had actually begun, the US resorted to aid suspensions on grounds of human rights violations. The first such suspension which happened in May 1991 was lifted after only 20 days, but with a threat of more specifically targeted suspensions for the future:

“The Bush Administration announced today that it was resuming economic aid to Yugoslavia after a 20-day suspension... Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d coupled the announcement with a rebuke to the leadership of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia for its ‘intensified repressive measures’ against the rights of the 1.7 million ethnic

Albanians in Kosovo... He also said... that all economic assistance to Yugoslavia would be conducted 'on a selective basis.'"¹²⁹

The reference to economic assistance on "selective basis" was a warning to Serbia, over its conduct in Kosovo. This meant, at the time when Yugoslavia was still one state, in simple terms that US aid could be targeted to other republics, while Serbia could be excluded.

Just a few months later the US came to reconsider aid sanctions against Yugoslavia, together with other measures such as arms embargo, on grounds of the rapidly unfolding crisis:

*"Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said today that Yugoslavia could be on the brink of "a full-fledged civil war," that its army appeared to be out of the central Government's control and that the United States and its allies were considering imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and suspending all financial assistance.....Mr. Baker said the United States and its allies nonetheless 'should give consideration to the suspending of aid and assistance to Yugoslavia' and mentioned the prospect of an arms embargo..."*¹³⁰

The US installed sanctions in December of 1991. The European Community had already preceded it by installing its economic sanctions on 11 November (Bohr, 1993).¹³¹ Other major bilateral donors moved in the same direction:

*"Chancellor Helmut Kohl toughened his position toward Yugoslavia today, threatening to cut off all German aid if the Belgrade Government again sent troops against the independence-minded republics of Slovenia and Croatia. ...German aid to Yugoslavia last year totalled about \$550 million, according to official figures."*¹³²

The US subsequently lifted sanctions in 1992 from the new states it recognized. The lifting was conditioned for Serbia and Montenegro, which by that time had become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY):

*"The Bush statement said that as a result of American recognition, the Administration would lift sanctions against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. The sanctions, involving both economic aid and trade benefits, were applied to all of Yugoslavia last December. The Administration said these sanctions would be lifted from Serbia and Montenegro as soon as those two republics ceased blockading commerce with Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina."*¹³³

The European Community also agreed on focusing its economic sanctions, including "scientific and technical cooperation", on the FRY in the period April-May 1992. On 30 May 1992 the UN Security Council installed full economic sanctions against FRY which also included aid (Bohr, 1993: 261). By mid 1992 FRY came to be perceived by the international community as the principal culprit for the war. Sanctions which were initially put in place against Yugoslavia, on the grounds of being a threat to international peace, were narrowed down to the FRY.

¹²⁹ New York Times, U.S. Resumes Aid It Suspended to Yugoslavia, May 25, 1991.

¹³⁰ **New York Times, War in Yugoslavia Feared by Baker, July 4, 1991.**

¹³¹ Bohr, Sebastian, Sanctions by the United Nations security Council and the European Community, European Journal of International Law, p. 256-268, 1993.

¹³² New York Times, Kohl Threatens to End German Aid to Yugoslavia, July 2, 1991.

¹³³ New York Times, U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent, April 8, 1992.

Sanctions against the FRY stayed during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and were suspended with a UN Resolution¹³⁴ after the signing of the Dayton peace agreement, but they were not entirely lifted.

Another country which was also in between threats of suspension and actual suspensions in the post-Dayton period was Croatia. As reported by the New York Times:

*“Signalling mounting frustration with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, the Clinton Administration said today that the United States would try to block the World Bank from considering a \$30 million loan for Croatia... Madeleine K. Albright has repeatedly warned Croatia and Serbia that they would face economic punishment if they did not do more to comply with the peace accords.”*¹³⁵

The threat of sanctions against Croatia in the post-Dayton period was also in relation to extradition of criminals of war, same as with FRY:

*“Because of Croatia's failure to cooperate with the tribunal, the United States abstained earlier this year from an International Monetary Fund vote approving an economic-reform loan for Croatia.”*¹³⁶

Macedonia did not reach a point to have its aid suspended but it was several times threatened with the possibility. In the post-conflict period in 2001 the West several times conditioned aid with the implementation of the peace accord:

*“The European Union is expected to warn Macedonia that it risks having aid and bilateral relations frozen, unless it moves quickly to implement fully the peace deal signed in August. In a draft statement due to be approved later today, EU foreign ministers say the parliament in Skopje must endorse a constitutional amendment improving the rights of the country's ethnic-Albanian minority, and pass an amnesty for rebels who have laid down their arms.”*¹³⁷

A milder form of withdrawal of aid is the postponement of aid until certain conditions have been met, or as in this case with Macedonia, the postponement of a donor conference:

“The European Union has postponed an international donors' conference for Macedonia, saying the country's government has failed to give ethnic Albanians more rights. The EU's External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, said the meeting

¹³⁴ More on the issue of aid sanctions against former Yugoslavia see for example in, Delvic Milica, Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia, *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1998; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Yugoslavia*, 1 January 1992. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca581e.html>; Kreutz Joakim, *Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981 – 2004*, paper 45, Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005; Woehrel Steven, Conditions on US Aid to Serbia, *CRS Report for Congress*, 5 January 2006.

¹³⁵ *New York Times*, U.S. Seeks Delay of Loan To Croatia, June 25, 1997.

¹³⁶ *New York Times*, Nationalists in Croatia Turn Away From West, April 27, 1997.

¹³⁷ BBC, *EU Warning to Macedonia*, Monday, 8 October, 2001.

*could not go ahead until Macedonia implemented reforms to improve the rights of the ethnic Albanian minority”.*¹³⁸

Further flow of money from donor conferences was also conditioned to the implementation of the peace deal:

*“Macedonian leaders say they hope for more than 250 million euros (\$220m) in pledges from more than 40 countries at the conference, which is backed by the European Commission and the World Bank... Officials from donor countries say provision of the money will be tied to the implementation of the peace accords.”*¹³⁹

Montenegro for example, came under threat to have its aid suspended back in 2001 because of its plans for secession from the FRY. Back at that time the West was not yet supportive of the idea of Montenegrin independence:

*“Montenegro has abandoned plans for an early referendum on whether to break away from Yugoslavia and will wait until it has completed a 'dialogue' with Serbia, the Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic, said in London yesterday.... In an oblique reference to western threats to cut aid if Montenegro seceded, he complained that 'direct and indirect influence from outside' reduced his coalition's chances of getting a better result.”*¹⁴⁰

In conclusion, *aid suspension was one of the most often used foreign policy tools* of bilateral donors and the international community as a whole, in their involvement in the crises of former Yugoslavia. This tool was applied with different intensity, ranging from postponement, conditioning, threats of sanctions, to actual imposition of sanctions. Sanctions themselves were bilateral or multilateral in nature.

Aid sanctions were a relevant factor influencing the flow of aid to the Western Balkans. Serbia (FRY) which was in-and-out of sanctions for most through the 90s, and under a complete embargo since the 1998 until the fall of the Milosevic regime, could not receive any aid except basic humanitarian assistance (and some donors denied it even that right) and it was in a position not to receive any relevant ODA until the year 2000. Even after that, the flow of aid was (and it is still) subject to periodic checks and approvals, pending cooperation with the ICTY.

2.4 Influence of Historic Myths

Ever since its becoming a myth, the Marshal Plan which rebuilt Western Europe after the WW II, has been invoked numerous times in situations where foreign assistance was needed. Its symbolic value being that of revival, reconstruction, rebirth, the Marshal Plan has been used as reference on many occasions of similar character. The idea of a Marshal Plan has definitely been brought in connection with the Balkans

¹³⁸BBC, *Macedonia Donors Postpone Meeting*, Friday, 5 October, 2001.

¹³⁹BBC, *Aid Hopes for Macedonia*, Tuesday, 12 March, 2002.

¹⁴⁰The Guardian, *Independence Referendum Delayed in Montenegro*, May 24, 2001.

numerous times. This reference was particularly recurrent at occasions of ends of wars and beginnings of post-war reconstruction, that is to say, after the Dayton agreement, and after the end of the Kosovo crisis. The Stability Pact which was established after the end of the Kosovo war was at the time nothing less than an attempt at revival of the idea of the Marshall Plan:

*“Throughout the Kosovo campaign, NATO promised a new Marshall Plan for the Balkans, reminiscent of the effort made at the end of World War II in reconstructing Europe.”*¹⁴¹

The revival of the idea naturally, was promoted by the historic equivalence of the opportunity. According to a comment by the Washington Post:

*“The reconstruction of Kosovo has been likened to the Marshall Plan. Indeed, the plan to repair the devastation caused by World War II in Europe was a huge investment of money, but it also brought formerly warring nations together.”*¹⁴²

In addition, a notion which has always been inseparable with the Marshall Plan is that of the grandness, of the sheer magnitude of the effort:

*“The phrase ‘Marshall plan’ is not being used, but it is clear that key figures in the project - including the World Bank president James Wolfensohn and the EU’s economic commissioner Yves-Thibault de Silguy - are beginning to think in these grandiose terms.”*¹⁴³

The fact that the Stability Pact was promoted in those terms definitely affected expectations on both the donor and the recipient side, and it clearly affected commitments and allocations in many ways. The press review shows evidence of concern on the side of donors about the possibility to meet such great expectations. US President Clinton was a supporter of increased aid spending and repeated the well known argument that sustaining peace through foreign assistance would preclude the US from engaging in future wars. Nevertheless, he beware not to scare off legislators and public opinion with the amounts that might be needed:

*“‘The costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war.’..... In particular, [President Clinton] called for spending to rebuild Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign over the situation in Kosovo. But he said that it would require nothing ‘as ambitious as the Marshall Plan,’”*¹⁴⁴

The enormous expectations from the Stability Pact, particularly because of its comparison with the Marshall Plan, led to a serious delusion a few years since its creation, when it became clear that the Stability Pact could not produce the resources imagined. There were many attempts to point to differences from the original Marshall Plan:

“What of the big Marshall Plan promise? Officials wriggle at the analogy and say it really isn’t at all like Germany after the war when an astounding Dollars 88bn (at present day prices) rebuilt the country from nothing to super-prosperity within 10

¹⁴¹ BBC, *Reconstruction: Myth and Reality*, Thursday, July 29, 1999.

¹⁴² Washington Post, *Europe Wants Lead in Rebuilding Effort*, June 13, 1999.

¹⁴³ The Guardian, *Divvying up the Bill: Reconstructing the Balkans Will Cost at Least Dollars 30 billion. Western Financial Institutions Can’t Provide it All*, May 17, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ New York Times, *Increasing Foreign Aid Would Help Prevent Wars, Clinton Tells V.F.W. Convention*, August 17, 1999.

years. *It's all much more difficult, with no proper political or free market institutions in place.*"¹⁴⁵

A similar comment can be found in the Washington Post:

*"Some have called for a Marshall Plan, but Western Europe had functioning institutions before World War II and thus the U.S. role was reconstruction."*¹⁴⁶

A lot has been written comparing the Balkans post-conflict reconstruction effort with the Marshall Plan. Another major difference which can be noted is that the Marshall Plan had one big donor, the US, whereas the Stability Pact tried to coordinate a multitude of bilateral and multilateral donors. It was somewhat vainly hoped that the many donors would re-channel their resources from their national instruments through the Stability Pact. However, the original ambition that the Pact could somehow come to "own", control, and coordinate all the resources flowing into the Balkans proved impossible.

The major point is that *historic myths had strong influence on aid commitments* to the region. Once aid to the Balkans was framed in the terms of the Marshall Plan, that definitely had serious influence on many donors. It definitely increased aid commitments as donors tried to live up to the expectations. However, it also produced a sense of delusion over the failed expectations over the mid term.

Overall, the myth of the Marshall Plan was a relevant factor of donor commitment to the region. It should be noted that the same theme was invoked as early as 1989, when the opening of Eastern Europe originally started. It was again called upon after the end of the major Balkan wars, in 1999.

2.5 Nexus to Military Intervention

Humanitarian aid regularly follows situations of armed conflict. Some of the many local or regional armed conflicts also provoke different types of international military intervention. In such a context humanitarian motives come to interweave with military logic. Military logic becomes a factor of foreign assistance and vice versa. Humanitarian aid and military intervention have come to be closely entwined throughout the process of international intervention in the region over the 90s. Armed conflict was the strongest generator of need for humanitarian relief in the Balkans. Aid flowed from all sides to help alleviate human suffering. At points in time the armed conflict also acted as a factor of suspension of aid. As already discussed in the preceding sections, aid suspension was one of the first tools of foreign policy.

The nexus between foreign humanitarian aid and military concerns has been noted to produce several different causalities in the Balkans. They have included situations whereby:

- a) foreign assistance was used as an argument to engage militarily,

¹⁴⁵ The Guardian, *It's Not Easy to Buy Peace. But We Could at Least Try: The Cost of Kosovo's Reconstruction Scares Us More Than War Ever Did*, July 14, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Washington Post, *Rebuilding the Balkans*, November 22, 1999.

- b) foreign assistance was used as an argument not to engage militarily,
- c) armed conflict acted as a generator of aid, and
- d) armed conflict was a reason to stop the flow of aid.

These situations can be observed on many different levels, ranging from the essentially humanitarian and field operations level, to the highest political one. At the basic field level a common situation in the Balkans (not different from anywhere else) has been the operational suspension of humanitarian aid until ceasefires would occur which would produce secure conditions for delivery, or situations of conditioning of the delivery of humanitarian aid with ceasefires.

However of much more essential importance has been the *general political connection between military intervention and humanitarian aid* in the Balkans. Namely, humanitarian aid has come to be used in the Balkans (and other places) over the 90s as a justification for intervention. In this sense, it can be observed that at a political level humanitarian aid has been used as *an argument both for justifying intervention and for justifying non-intervention*. David Reiff (2002:197) for example, has rightfully observed that humanitarian aid in the Balkans has been used as an argument not to intervene in Bosnia –in order not to impede the supply of humanitarian aid; and the same argument has been used for the opposite purpose concerning the NATO intervention in Kosovo – to make possible the humanitarian effort. This is of course not to understand that the supply of humanitarian aid was *the major motive* for intervening militarily. On the contrary, the argument is that it has been utilized as a sort of *an additional operational motive* as it seemed fit. Naturally, the much more compelling factors of intervention included grave human rights violations, prevention of ethnic cleansing, wider security interests, and so forth.

This practice has not been typical only of the Balkans. In the post-cold war world humanitarian motives have increasingly interweaved with political and military goals.¹⁴⁷ At this level, humanitarianism was used to justify the political decision to use military force. In this sense, it should be understood that humanitarian assistance was merely one aspect of the broader humanitarian concern for the safety and wellbeing of civilian populations.

¹⁴⁷ A detailed review of the connection between humanitarian aid and military intervention is beyond the scope of this chapter. The point of this section is only to indicate that there was a correlation between military intervention and humanitarian assistance in the 90s and that the need of humanitarian aid could (be used to) act a factor of military intervention. In addition to Reiff (2000), more on these nexuses as they have played out in the Balkans can be find for example in the following studies: Western Jon, Western Jon., Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 112-142, Spring 2002; Chandler David, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, p. 678 – 700, 2001; Morris Nicholas, Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans, in Welsh Jennifer M., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2004; Hoffmann Stanley, Humanitarian Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia, in Hoffmann Stanley, with contributions by Johansen Robert C., Sterba James P., Väyrynen Raimo, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, University de Notre Dame Press, 1996; Holzgrefe L.J., and Keohane Robert O. (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

For example, according to a report by the New York Times from the imminent period before the start of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, US President Clinton has justified the possible need to intervene with “*national and humanitarian interests in resolving the conflict in Kosovo.*”¹⁴⁸ To underscore again, intervention did not start only on the grounds of the imperative to deliver aid – in Bosnia the argument was different as the humanitarian aid was ongoing – but once intervention started, the two got intrinsically intertwined.¹⁴⁹

Similarly, Italy for example has sent its troupes to Albania twice over the 90s, on UN approved missions to secure humanitarian intervention, The first time was in 1991 when Albania’s borders opened¹⁵⁰; the second time it was in 1997, after the collapse of the pyramidal saving schemes which brought the country to the verge of collapse. Both times Italian troupes went there with a mandate to safeguard the humanitarian effort.¹⁵¹ According to a report by the New York Times at the time:

“...*the soldiers are to insure that aid sent to poor Albanians is not hijacked by armed gangs...*”¹⁵²

In the words of Jean-Marie Boucher, the World Food Program manager for the Balkans: “*The only way [the soldiers] could get their coming here approved by the United Nations was to say it was for humanitarian assistance.*”¹⁵³

The point is the following. This case is illustrative of the fact that there can be a different nexus between foreign aid and national security interest. The theoretical discussion on motives for aid elaborated in dept the relationship between national interest and foreign aid: donor countries give aid because it is in their national interest. In such a situation aid acts as a direct tool of their national interest. In this particular case, the sequence is somewhat different. Aid is not primary, but secondary to the deployment of a military mission. It is used as a justification for the deployment. Troupes go in first; some aid should follow in order to justify the troupes’ presence. That is, foreign aid is used as a justification, not only as a direct tool of national interest. It is in a final analysis still a tool, but a tool for different use.

In conclusion, given that considerable share of aid to the Balkans was conflict-related, there was at times a close nexus between aid and military intervention. Military intervention acted as a factor of foreign assistance with considerable power to shape aid allocations. Aid was at times used as a source of legitimacy for both military intervention and for non-intervention.

¹⁴⁸ New York Times, Clinton on Kosovo: A Humane Factor, 25 February 1999.

¹⁴⁹ New York Times, The Kosovo Refugees Emergency, 1 April 1999; New York Times, With NATO in Charge, Relief Looks Less Neutral, 10 April 1999.

¹⁵⁰ New York Times, *Ferryboat With Italian Relief Arrives in an Albanian Port*, September 19, 1991.

¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the objective of the description is not to assess if there was or there was not a real need of protecting the relief effort in this particular case. It is perfectly plausible that need existed and that the news reports (which the author could identify) were biased. The point is to indicate to the connection between relief aid and military intervention. A recent comprehensive treatment of the relationship between humanitarianism, politics and military intervention, with many references to the Balkan wars and humanitarian crises is David Rieff’s (2002) “A Bed for the Night”.

¹⁵² New York Times, Foreign Troops Protect Albania, but From What? April 21, 1997.

¹⁵³ *ibid*

2.6 Foreign Aid as Arena of Donor Rivalry

The review of the international political dynamics surrounding international involvement in the Balkans reveals evidence of instances of rivalry over the allocation of foreign assistance. Donor rivalry and the subsequent use of foreign aid as a tool of in that rivalry have been at periods present in the foreign aid process to the region. Most conspicuous in this regard have been the episodes of rivalry between the European Union and the United States.

One dimension of such rivalry could provisionally be termed “outbidding”. This is the process in which donors engage in a competition in making aid commitments. There are indications that in some cases certain donors deliberately “take the lead” by committing a big amount, in order to compel peers to match or raise that commitment. In other cases donors can criticize each other for what they feel is an insufficient commitment by a peer. This aspect has already been discussed in Chapter 1. According to some scholars (Mosley, 1985; Round & Odedokun, 2003) peer pressure acts as a strong factor of aid allocation. Riddell (2007) has tended to believe that its influence is smaller. Nevertheless scholarship on aid has registered the phenomenon. In this section evidence from the media review will show how such dynamics played out in the reality of international intervention in the Balkans.

An example of a deliberate and outspoken attempt to raise the stakes can be found in the approach of the Clinton administration with regards to the relief effort in the immediate aftermath of the war in Kosovo:

“President Clinton's national security adviser said today that the United States would pledge up to \$500 million in relief aid for Kosovo at a conference in Brussels this week... By announcing what is expected to be the largest donation at the conference ... the United States hopes to demonstrate that it will take the lead on aid..... The Clinton Administration calculated that by pledging a large sum before the conference began, the 49 other countries attending the session might reach deeper in their pockets. “We hope to raise the ante,” said Mike Hammer, a White House spokesman.”¹⁵⁴

The record of Trans-Atlantic relations over the Kosovo post-conflict reconstruction also reveals a different model of making aid commitments: there were instances when aid commitments were made conditional on the commitments by other donors. Close to a year after the NATO intervention, the US had got impatient with what it perceived as a slow response by the EU to meeting the needs of the Kosovars, and aid became a point of tension in European – American relations. The US made its contribution contingent on the contributions of European donors. As the Guardian has reported:

“No longer concealing its irritation, Washington is demanding that EU states put hard cash on the table when donor countries meet in Brussels later this month. It looks like being an important and highly public test of the gap between rhetoric and reality - and it is already ratcheting up transatlantic tensions. In a sharp private letter to EU foreign ministers last week, Madeleine Albright, the US secretary of state, pledged Dollars 350m (pounds 222m) for 'quick start' and 'first priority' projects and nearly Dollars 400m for next year - though those figures, she warned, would depend on what other countries were prepared to spend. 'We are keen on understanding more

¹⁵⁴ New York Times, *U.S. earmarks \$500 Million for Kosovo*, July 27, 1999.

clearly the exact commitments you are prepared to make,' Mrs Albright added tartly. Chris Patten, the EU's external relations commissioner, quickly cautioned that disagreements over money could 'poison or warp' European-American ties."¹⁵⁵

These dynamics with respect to making aid commitments, such as "taking the lead" and the "conditioning", were taking place in a general climate of disagreement between Europe and the United States over the financing of the post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans. This disagreement had a broader political pretext. The United States had taken the burden of leadership in the military intervention and expected Europe to carry the burden of the reconstruction effort. In such a climate, the US quickly became impatient and it considered Europe was not doing its share:

*"Mr. Clinton came to the conference armed with some concrete promises, including investment guarantees and tariff reductions. The Europeans, who have promised to take the lead in Balkan reconstruction, offered no such specifics. If the stability pact is to have any meaning, Europe will have to ante up, and soon. That means providing aid."*¹⁵⁶

Loud US criticism caused nervous responses by European representatives. In a letter to the Washington Post, John Richardson, Deputy Head of the European Commission to the United States, criticized the paper's coverage of European aid contribution to the Balkans:

*"News coverage following the Stability Pact Conference in Sarajevo was strikingly incomplete about the European Union's contributions. This was also true of The Post's Aug. 3 editorial, "Balkan Stability." As to what the Europeans have done for southeast Europe in 1999, the answer is: Much more than The Post gives us credit for.... The European Union may not be good at blowing its own trumpet, but in the case of southeastern Europe it is moving forward decisively within a broad framework of aid, trade, investment and institutional integration."*¹⁵⁷

There can be no doubt that such extent of political tension, expressed at such high political level, definitely had an impact on the amounts and dynamics of foreign aid in the immediate post-conflict period. Looked from a certain time distance, it is clear that the EU *did take the burden* of the reconstruction effort in the post-war Balkans. The European Commission has been the single largest donor to the region, with disbursements around double those of the US (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). It is nevertheless true, and supported by evidence that EC aid was slower in getting up to speed, and this is where lies the reason for the US impatience.

Nevertheless the point to be made is the following: foreign assistance can be a competitive realm, and the process of aid to the Balkans offers evidence of episodes of such donor competition. Default on commitments taken in the international arena expose donors to criticism by peers; donors with a particular interest in a certain context can engage in outbidding in order to influence peer behaviour, and so forth. This donor manoeuvring and positioning acts as a clear and relevant factor of foreign assistance allocations in a given situation.

¹⁵⁵ The Guardian, *Balkans Wait in Vain for Western Funds: Stability US Angry at EU's Foot-Dragging on Pact Pledges*, March 14, 2000.

¹⁵⁶ Washington Post, *Balkan Stability*, August 3, 1999.

¹⁵⁷ Washington Post, *EU's Commitment to the Balkans*, August 16, 1999.

2.7 Fear of Migration

Scholarship on aid has pointed to the link between foreign assistance and the prevention of migration as one particular facet of national interest. In this sense, aid is given to countries which represent a source of potential migrant threat. During aid negotiations the allocation of aid can actually be tied to commitment from the recipient government that it would invest in efforts to curb out-migration. The history of foreign assistance has also recorded examples of assistance which is tied to repatriation programs, whereby the award of aid is tied to repatriation of migrants from the donor to their native, recipient country. The evidence collected from the media review will point out to instances when this factor had a role in determining ODA allocations in the Balkans.

Italy's foreign assistance to Albania from the beginning of the 90s onward has been self-declaratively motivated by fear of migration. Some of the sources for this argument have already been cited in the previous chapter and in the section of historic responsibilities above. It would be useful to further corroborate this claim with additional evidence. For example, as reported by Corriere della Sera in 1994, the combined military and foreign assistance operation "Pellicano" was launched in 1991 in response to the mass exodus of Albanians from Albania into Italy. In the words of then Italy's foreign minister Antonio Martino, the aid of the foreign assistance was to create jobs in Albania and to subsequently reduce the migrant pressure.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, another report of Corriere della Sera from 1998 indicates to the presence of the same factor as driver of Italian foreign aid to Albania. The article cites then Italian foreign minister Lamberto Dini pledging support during a visit to Tirana:

*"We will help Albania if it helps us help her...the possibility to continue with the preferential acceptance of regular workers coming from Albania, says Dini, depends on the effective control of migrant flows by the Albanian government."*¹⁵⁹ The article further reads that *"in the future, says Rome, all of this financial support can continue only if the flow of migrants coming through the Adriatic is blocked."*¹⁶⁰

In addition to Italy's aid for Albania, there are other references to the migrant threat as a factor of foreign aid in the Balkans.

In the period around the creation of the Stability Pact in 1999, for example media reports indicate that France had become increasingly nervous over Germany's "expansion" in the Balkans:

*"Among western neighbors such as France, the new focus of Germany's attention and resources is viewed suspiciously as an attempt to expand the country's influence and penetration in the new markets in Eastern Europe."*¹⁶¹

Germany however, explained its motivation to offer strong assistance to the Balkans with the simple *fear of migration*:

"German foreign policy these days is driven by a simple priority: to prevent poor foreigners from swamping our prosperous country," said Michael Stuermer, a former adviser to Schroeder's predecessor, Helmut Kohl. "Given the dangers of right-wing

¹⁵⁸ Santevecchi Guido, Martino: Via agli aiuti, ma bloccate i clandestini, *Corriere della Sera*, 13 September 1994.

¹⁵⁹ Cianfanelli Renzo, Tirana, dissidio Bonino Dini, *Corriere della Sera*, 31 October 1998.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ Washington Post, *Germany Turns Its Gaze to Eastern Europe*, September 11, 1999.

extremism, the idea is to do whatever is necessary to keep would-be immigrants from leaving their homes and heading for Germany."¹⁶²

An additional example concerns the United Kingdom. In May of 2002 Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, suggested that conditionality be used on countries, including the ones from former Yugoslavia which are not effective in preventing the migrant flow to the EU and the UK. The idea was that "*Britain will cut off aid if [these countries] fail to crack down on illegal immigrants passing through their borders.*"¹⁶³ The UK asked and got the support of Spain to put the proposal high on the agenda of the June 2002 EU Summit in Seville, and thus make it EU policy. However, at the Summit, the proposal:

"was watered down ...in the face of opposition from some member nations. Prime Minister Goran Persson of Sweden called the proposal 'stupid', and British cabinet minister, Claire Short, labeled it 'morally repugnant'. Some countries, including Denmark and Germany, supported the idea of financial penalties for countries that persistently refused to take back illegal immigrants or that did little to stop trafficking in people. But British and Spanish officials, seeking a compromise, spoke of 'positive conditionality' -- making larger amounts of aid available to non- Union countries that cooperated."¹⁶⁴

Another example was provided by Switzerland. The review of the Swiss foreign assistance policy texts on the Balkans (section 2.4 in Chapter 3) showed that Switzerland very expressly relates the policy priority to help Bosnia with the presence of Bosnian refugees in Switzerland.

The conclusion to make is the following: *migrant threat was a factor of foreign aid to the Balkans.* There is documented evidence in the form of policy statements from high level officials that indicate that (some) aid was motivated by the fear of migration. Logically, the migrant threat worked as a factor of aid for donor countries which were traditional hosts of migrants from the Balkans, that is to say, particularly exposed to migration. Corroboration comes also from the review of micro data on aid allocations conducted in Chapter 7. For example, some of Italy's aid to Albania was allocated for constructing prisons. These were perhaps not large amounts, but were only found in Italy's allocations to Albania; not in Italian aid to the other countries of the Balkans.

At this point however, the purpose is to simply point to the link between the fear of migration and allocation of foreign assistance. This short section has already indicated the additional modalities in using aid to prevent migration: tying it to repatriation, and using it as lever of conditionality. It is reasonable to assume that foreign assistance motivated by fear of migration was, at least in some cases, also operationally designed to prevent migrant flows, by the particular modes and measures of intervention it financed. The case of aid for construction of prisons is one example.

2.8 Kin Solidarity

The Balkan wars caused an enormous feeling of international solidarity with the suffering of the people in the region. Solidarity itself was not homogeneous. It was

¹⁶² *ibid*

¹⁶³ The Guardian, *Blair Threatens to Aid Cut to Control Immigration*, 20 May 2002.

¹⁶⁴ New York Times, *Europeans Struggle to Find Agreement on Immigration*, 22 June 2002.

composed of many various acts of compassion. These acts responded to different impulses and were essentially performed by different constituencies which had greater or lesser sensitivity and attachment to some communities than others.

For example, the suffering of the Muslim population in the Balkans, first during the war in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, mobilized generous support in Muslim countries across the world. The Balkans was a recipient of foreign assistance from the Muslim world, primarily from rich Arab countries in the Middle East. This assistance was directed primarily to beneficiaries of Muslim religion, or to areas where Muslims lived. Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo were the relevant recipients of Arab aid for the Balkans (see Chapter 5).

Strong motivation for this foreign aid was the feeling of religious solidarity. In the words of the then Bosnian Prime Minister, Hasan Muratovic on the occasion of a visit to Iran:

*"the Iranian Government and nation offered humanitarian assistance to Bosnia at a time when its Islamic identity was jeopardized."*¹⁶⁵

Support from Muslim states ranged from emergency relief,¹⁶⁶ economic and reconstruction aid, to military assistance. Islamic countries urged military aid for Bosnian Muslims who due to the fact that Bosnia was under sanctions could not purchase arms.¹⁶⁷

Significant assistance was directed in both Bosnia and Kosovo to the construction or reconstruction of sacral objects, and according to many sources, for the promotion of specific religious views:

*"Saudi Arabia, for example, has spent more than \$500 million on humanitarian and religious projects. According to both Bosnian and foreign officials, the aim is to spread its rigid interpretation of Islam in a land where most Muslims are not conspicuously pious."*¹⁶⁸

This foreign assistance to kin Muslim countries can be considered an action of foreign policy, whereby Muslim states helped their allies. This is a fair argument. But it was essentially the feeling of solidarity that drove the foreign policy, not national interest understood in its security or economic dimension. In addition, aid went to kin people, not to kin states. In Bosnia aid went to its Muslim population, not the whole population of the Bosnian state. Evidence also points to the fact that this type of aid had as a goal the promotion of certain religious beliefs.

Although the media review (limited to major international newspapers only) did not display any other instances of kin solidarity, many other examples can fairly be assumed, including those on grounds of faith, ethnic affiliation, or other bonds of association.

¹⁶⁵ New York Times, *Bosnian Praises Iran's Aid*, March 4, 1996.

¹⁶⁶ New York Times, *Bosnian Croats Halt Convoy From Taking Aid to Muslims*, August 21, 1993.

¹⁶⁷ New York Times, *Islamic Nations' Leaders Urge More Aid for Bosnia*, December 16, 1994.

¹⁶⁸ New York Times, *Where Did All That Money in Bosnia Go?* February 16, 2003.

In conclusion, the point to make is that: solidarity which followed kinship was a factor of foreign aid to the Balkans. Its relative weight, as well as that of the other factors is not being assessed, but it is important that its existence as a factor is registered.

2.9 Economic Interest: Foreign Aid and Business Interests

With the fact that donor-self interest has been identified by the scholarship on aid as the predominant motive for giving, the economic aspect of that self-interest is definitely of strong relevance for the allocation of foreign assistance. Economic self-interest is however a broad topic and it can interweave with development aid in myriad of ways.

Scholarship has explored in detail the links between donor economic interest and aid allocation. One type of examination includes for example the study of trade volumes between the donor and recipient country as an indicator of the intensity of the donor economic interest in the recipient country. According to this logic the expectation is that more aid should go to bigger trade partners.¹⁶⁹

An additional approach should however take into account the fact that *foreign aid itself is an industry*. In this sense, aid does not only go to recipients who are relevant economic partners, but aid itself becomes the subject of economic interest. Hence, there can be two essentially different ways in thinking about the relation between aid and donor economic interest:

- a) aid is allocated to a country with the purpose of promoting certain economic interest of the donor, such as for example promoting exports from the donor country, or investing in the exploitation of certain strategic natural resources, or
- b) aid itself, which has been motivated by other factors, such as moral duty, or strategic interest, does represent an economic interest.

The media review has highlighted quite a few situations when economic self-interest of the donors was a relevant factor of aid in the region of the Balkans.

An interesting case from the Balkans, which had also incited some disagreement between donors, notably between Germany (and the EU) and the United States, concerned the reconstruction of bridges over the Danube in the post-Kosovo war period in 1999. NATO had destroyed bridges in Serbia during bombing campaign. This caused great damage to the Yugoslav but also regional economy. It also hurt business interests much beyond. Commercial boats could not sale because of the debris. Some big donors saw this as a priority issue of foreign assistance:

“Germany has its own reasons for getting the tangled steel debris of the Varadin bridge hauled out of the water. This and the collapsed Liberty bridge further along

¹⁶⁹ On the correlation between aid and trade see for example, Berthèlemy Jean-Claude and Tichit Ariane, *Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation Decisions – a Three Dimensional Panel Analysis*, *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Vol. 13, p. 253 – 274, 2004; Canavire et all (2005); Dollar and Levine (2004).

the river are blocking the Danube to commercial traffic from Germany, Austria and Hungary traveling to the Black Sea.”¹⁷⁰

Germany, and other countries whose trade interests were involved, wanted the bridges repaired immediately after the end of the Kosovo war. However, since Yugoslavia was under aid embargo, it could not receive any economic or reconstruction assistance, including for bridge repair. This stirred tension in the donor community:

“... a row is brewing between the European Union and the United States over whether to finance the rebuilding of a bridge at Novi Sad, one of three Yugoslav bridges over the Danube bombed during the Kosovo conflict.”¹⁷¹

In that period of time the Milosevic regime also impeded Western intentions.¹⁷² The central government run by Milosevic hindered the efforts of local authorities to work on repairing of the bridges with foreign help.

The very first foreign aid the German government allocated to FRY, practically three days after the fall of Milosevic on 5 October 2000, was to commit aid for the clearing of the Danube:

“The German government says it will grant Yugoslavia an immediate aid package of eight hundred and seventy thousand dollars. ...The money will go towards clearing the Danube river.”¹⁷³

A note of caution is perhaps needed at this point. This example should not serve to cause prejudice against the generous German assistance to the Balkans; Germany was the largest bilateral donor to the region and clearly not all that assistance was motivated by economic self-interest. Nevertheless, the episode is a qualitative insight into how different interests act as factor of foreign assistance.

Observing the second type of situation, whereby aid is as an *economic interest in of itself*, offers interesting material emerging from the Balkan experience.

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the impending Balkan reconstruction effort incited excitement in business circles in donor countries. The reconstruction implied serious financial commitment by Western governments, and huge business opportunities, in particular for the construction industry. Businesses in donor countries engaged their governments in lobbying for their interests:

“American engineering groups have created special Kosovo departments, and dispatched executives to the province. Britain's big engineering firms have banded together into a Balkan "task-force", backed by the government, in the hope,

¹⁷⁰ The Guardian: Serbs Thwarted in Attempts to Build Bridges With Europe: Novi Sad Finds Little Support at Home or Abroad for the Job of Reconstruction, July 30, 1999.

¹⁷¹ BBC, *Donors asked for Balkan Aid*, Wednesday, 29 March, 2000.

¹⁷² Austrian engineers hired by the municipality of Novi Sad to inspect the bridge were denied entry visas. The Guardian: *Serbs Thwarted in Attempts to Build Bridges With Europe: Novi Sad Finds Little Support at Home or Abroad for the Job of Reconstruction*, July 30, 1999.

¹⁷³ BBC, *German Aid for Yugoslavia*, Sunday, 8 October, 2000.

*presumably, that economies of scale might apply to lobbying. "We don't want to get the crumbs, like we did in Kuwait," says Nigel Thompson, the task-force's chairman... The Italians, also frustrated in Kuwait and Bosnia, are better organised this time. The country's government and industry federation have each set up an organization to help match firms with projects."*¹⁷⁴

News reports note that such business considerations gained intensity practically simultaneously with the suspension of military activities:

*"Three days after British troops led the NATO advance into Kosovo; British Government officials plan to meet Tuesday with business leaders to devise a strategy for securing reconstruction contracts in Kosovo. They will try to offset a widespread view that British companies lost out in the race to rebuild Kuwait after the Persian Gulf war eight years earlier."*¹⁷⁵

The media reports also show that business interests had been cited as an argument for stronger national involvement in the region, such as for example greater US involvement in Kosovo:

*"U.S. participation also would enable U.S. companies to play a significant role in the reconstruction of Kosovo by reducing the prospect that the Europeans would use some form of tied aid to benefit solely European companies and by ensuring that business contracts are awarded under an open and transparent process."*¹⁷⁶

The point is the following: big donor countries often did not have direct economic interest in the devastated Balkan region, but the aid they allocated was in itself a relevant interest. Big portions of the delivered aid were naturally tied to purchases from the donor countries. Economic interests of donor countries, and of the business communities in donor countries, acted as factor of foreign assistance to the Balkans.

2.10 Aid as Restitution of Damages

The review of the international press reveals another function of foreign assistance to the Balkans, the function of restitution of damages. This function should be differentiated from post-conflict reconstruction. Restoring damages in this sense is not the same thing as reconstruction of damages directly produced by the warfare, and it relates to the damages suffered (indirectly) by the surrounding countries. These damages were inflicted in different ways, such as through disruption of trade due to war activities (which was potentially the most serious damage to the economies of the countries adjacent to zones of conflict), hosting of refugees, securing infrastructure for the passage and operations by military forces, or other collateral damages cause by the military operations. According to a report by the New York Times:

¹⁷⁴ The Economist, Business: No Killing to be Made: Rebuilding the Balkans: Rebuilding Kosovo, July 31, 1999.

¹⁷⁵ New York Times, *British Industry Seeking a Share of Balkan Rebuilding Work*, June 15, 1999.

¹⁷⁶ Washington Post, *The Mistake of a Separate Peace*, August 9, 1999.

“The costs to the surrounding countries have been considerable, as trade was disrupted and as they absorbed thousands of refugees.”¹⁷⁷

In exchange for their cooperation (passage of troupes, using territories for military action, hosting refugees) and damages they have suffered, these countries were promised and given foreign aid. This assistance was not seen as “assistance” per se, but as a mode of restoring damages, and claimants insisted on it as to a rightful entitlement. Macedonia was one of the countries which offered its full support to the international community during the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Macedonia allowed NATO to use its territory for the military operations, and in addition, it hosted between 250-300.000 thousand refugees from Kosovo. When the intervention was over, as international media have noted, Skopje insisted on “being paid”:

“[former Macedonian prime minister] Kljusev, quoted by a Macedonian news agency, said the war against Yugoslavia had cost Macedonia 172 million dollars a month. ‘It is an insult to offer us credits for the damage we suffered. We want the damage to be paid for.’”¹⁷⁸

Albania, which was the country which hosted the greatest number of refugees, around 400.000, acted in a similar way. The aid that Albania and Macedonia wanted was not reward but, more like payment for services:

“Albania, NATO's steadfast ally during the air campaign against Yugoslavia, has a blunt message for the Western powers: Show me the money. Foreign Minister Paskal Milo said in an interview. ‘It is not enough to say good words about the Albanian contribution during the crisis. We have heard a lot of this. . . . We will ask our partners to prove, as we say in Albanian, that they are not dividing their words from their deeds.’”¹⁷⁹

Restoring of damages to surrounding countries affected by the wars was a significant motive for foreign aid. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia (during the war in Bosnia), Romania and Bulgaria all suffered damages caused by nearby conflicts.

It should be noted that in this case the motive for and the function of aid were essentially different from cases of post-conflict reconstruction. In post-conflict reconstruction aid essentially serves its original function of helping. When it is used for restitution of damages, it is more resembling to payment for rendered services, which can be observed also from the behavior of the countries that claimed it.

Additionally, countries which “cooperated” were obviously better positioned to claim such aid than countries which did not, which in a way conditions this aid to allegiance, in the case of the Balkans, to the international (donor) community.

¹⁷⁷ New York Times, *World Leaders Join in Pledging Effort to Rebuild Balkans*, July 31, 1999.

¹⁷⁸ BBC, *Reconstruction Race Hots up in Balkans*, Monday, June 28, 1999.

¹⁷⁹ Washington Post, *Albania Seeks Show Of Western Gratitude*, July 22, 1999

Hypothetically, a country whose “services” would be used, but which would not have the position of an ally, could be less eligible for aid for restitution of damages.

The concluding point overall is that: there is relevant evidence that foreign assistance in the Balkans also served the function of restoring damages and compensating for services rendered.

2.11 Concerns Over Aid Transparency, Effectiveness, Impact

Everything noted so far in this chapter on motives and factors for giving (or withholding) of foreign assistance, had to do with rationales which went beyond development aid per se. These rationales related to considerations which did not pertain to aid effectiveness, performance, or impact, or in simpler of terms, with how aid money is actually being spent, and what is its impact?

Bellow the political level, the development community has since the very beginning of foreign aid in the 50s of the last century been concerned with what are the actual results of development assistance. Interest in the effectiveness and impact of aid had given rise over time to an entire scientific field of evaluation of foreign assistance. Naturally, aid which has very little effect, or has even counter-effects, in the sense that it produces more damage than utility, does not fulfill its purpose and should better not be given. Similarly, a type of aid which works better should be preferred over a type of aid which does not work as well.

In addition to the technical or developmental aspects of the spending of foreign aid money, there is the issue of accountability and transparency of the aid effort. Aid has often been reported to have been misappropriated, stolen, mishandled, or eaten by corruption. Such practices, which can be blamed either on the donor or the recipient side, have had the potential to influence donor motivation to commit aid.

Going into full detail on such practices would be beyond the scope of this writing. It is important to note however that the issues relating to the transparency, effectiveness, and overall quality of the aid effort have been resurfacing in the Balkans over time, and they have had power over allocations of development assistance.¹⁸⁰

The media review discloses quite a few instances when concerns over the actual use of foreign assistance in the Balkans have been a cause for debate, criticism, and even political anguish. Such concerns have had the power at times to strongly influence aid flows, or to cause reductions and withdrawals of foreign aid.

For example, a high profile report on foreign aid to Bosnia in 1999 caused serious stir in the donor community. The report, which claimed serious amounts of aid to Bosnia had been misappropriated, hit a sensitive nerve with public opinion and caused political turmoil at high political levels in the United States. According to the writing of the New York Times:

“As much as a billion dollars has disappeared from public funds or been stolen from international aid projects through fraud carried out by the Muslim, Croatian and

¹⁸⁰ The already mentioned case of suspension of EU aid to Bulgaria is a case in point.

*Serbian nationalist leaders who keep Bosnia rigidly partitioned into three ethnic enclaves, according to an exhaustive investigation by an American-led antifraud unit.”*¹⁸¹

The report at stake had been produced by the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia (OHR), but its political effect was caused by the space given to it by The New York Times. Reactions came from the top levels of the US administration. The US State Department promptly discredited the report and said it hurt the country’s foreign aid effort in Bosnia:

*“James P. Rubin, the State Department spokesman, said yesterday that a New York Times article about corruption in Bosnia left readers with the misimpression that \$1 billion in foreign aid had been stolen... Mr. Rubin said that The Times article had hurt the Clinton Administration's efforts to gain support for foreign aid in Congress because people had drawn the conclusion that an enormous amount of foreign aid money had been lost in Bosnia.”*¹⁸²

A report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) a year later echoed some of the earlier observations:

*“The [GAO] report said that the United States has not recovered nearly \$900,000 in operating funds for the American Embassy and loan payments it had deposited in a Bosnian bank, BH Banka, which was involved in illegal activity. And the World Bank lost \$500,000 in 1997 in a sophisticated fraud scheme involving false government procurement documents, the report said. Three years later, no arrests have been made, the report added. The G.A.O. found no evidence that American or other international aid is 'being lost to large-scale fraud or corruption.' But it asserted that Bosnian authorities may be using the foreign donations to make up for income the government has lost to crime.”*¹⁸³

In 2003, an article at The New York Times titled “*A Nation Unbuilt. Where Did All That Money in Bosnia Go*” which criticized international aid to the country on the grounds of ineffectiveness prompted a reply from the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown. In a letter of response to the paper, he explained why the “*international investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been wasted*”¹⁸⁴

Concerns over serious large-scale abuse of aid are only one, if the gravest, type of apprehension concerning the justifiability of aid spending. The recent chronology of ODA in the Balkans has recorded more than a few such instances.

Beyond direct fraud however, there are a plethora of other concerns which have very relevant power to influence aid allocations. They comprise the standard issues relating to *effectiveness* (the ability of aid to achieve the stated goals); *efficiency*, or also called cost-effectiveness (the ratio between goals achieved and resources allocated); and *impact* (long term benefits, results of aid).

¹⁸¹New York Times, *Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal up to \$1 Billion*, August 17, 1999.

¹⁸²New York Times, State Dept. Disputes Times Article on Bosnia Graft, August 20, 1999.

¹⁸³New York Times, Congressional Report Says Corruption Is Stifling Bosnia, July 7, 2000.

¹⁸⁴New York Times, *Bosnia's Gains*, February 22, 2003.

The point of conclusion is the following: issues concerning the overall quality of aid and the ability of aid to achieve its stated goals are relevant factors of aid allocation everywhere, and they have been so also in the Balkans. It should be noted that considerations or concerns about the quality of certain type of aid, or a certain project would, in theory, produce consequences only for that type of aid or project, but not for other components comprising the overall aid effort. In this sense, the reach of the consequences depends on the level the concern had affected. Concerns of technical or programmatic nature (such as resulting from evaluations concluding that certain aid is ineffective) would produce consequences at corresponding levels, that is among development aid professionals. Concerns at high political levels, such as the ones registered with the media review, can be expected to have consequences at political levels.

2.12 Foreign Aid as a Promoter in the International Arena

Development assistance is subject to internationally agreed commitments by rich donor states. Donor performance in the realm of foreign aid is definitely a factor of credibility. Foreign aid can be an instrument for promotion of donor countries in the international arena.

The review of major international media finds some evidence of claims that in some instances foreign aid in the Balkans was used as an instrument for self-promotion in the international arena. A report by the International Herald Tribune makes that claim concerning Japan's role as a donor in the region. According to the report, Japan's aid commitments to the Balkan in the mid 90s were a check-book diplomacy motivated by grander national self-interest:

*"Japan has no vital interests in the Balkans ... So when Foreign Minister Yohei Kono begins a ... visit to Croatia ..., his objective will be as much to open a dialogue with leaders of the region's warring states as to demonstrate that Japan can be an active player on the global stage, deserving a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council."*¹⁸⁵

Another news coverage on Japan's engagement in Bosnia, a few years later, offers an explanation which essentially goes along the same line:

*"Japan is adopting a new, higher profile in Bosnia following criticism that it wasn't doing as much as other major economic powers."*¹⁸⁶

However, a note of caution is warranted. Comments, especially when they do not refer to statements by government officials, which can be taken as expressions of official policy, or do not refer to verifiable facts¹⁸⁷, should always be analyzed in their political dimension.

¹⁸⁵ International Herald Tribune, *Japan's Diplomatic Blitz in Balkans*, 25 April 1995.

¹⁸⁶ BBC, *Japan Aid for Bosnia*, Saturday, 4 April, 1998.

¹⁸⁷ For example a fact which is verifiable is whether Japan was criticized for not doing enough; where did criticism come from; how was it exactly expressed and so far.

The remark that Nordic countries give aid as a way to have an active role in the international arena is essentially an expression of opinion. It should also be observed that this opinion does not come from Nordic scholars. Similarly, a Japanese newspaper probably would not comment the visit of Japan's Foreign Minister to Bosnia in the same way as the International Herald Tribune. Nor would for that matter British aid to the Balkans be commented (at least by Western media) in view of Britain's desire to "*be an active player on the global stage*".

Nevertheless, the purpose of this writing is only to identify this *particular aid factor* in the framework of foreign assistance to the Balkans, and not to speculate on the real reasons for the visit of Japan's Foreign Minister.

Some of the cases discussed previously in this chapter, relating to peer pressure and donor rivalry, do bear resemblance to this particular aspect too. The political dimension of the foreign aid process is naturally unavoidable. What the Western press would call "seeking an active role"; Japan's press could easily call "peer pressure" by Japan to Western donors to play their part. Whereas from the US point of view, the Nordic countries are big donors in order to "play an active role", from the Nordic point of view, the US aid is too deprived of moral vision in its foreign assistance programs. Overall the point to make is that this interaction in the international arena can and does act as a relevant factor of aid allocations.

3. Conclusion

The preceding pages attempted to give an overview of the motives and factors which guided the foreign aid process in the Balkans in the years of transition. The chapter relied on an extensive review of major international media in order to explore the political reality of the foreign aid process to the Balkans. The media review produced evidence of many different situations which acted as determinants of the foreign aid process in the region.

An important point to underscore is that the approach used in the previous chapter - review of official policy statements, and the approach used in this chapter - review of international media, complement each other in the sense that the former provides the overall framework for discussing the motives and factors of development aid to the region, whereas the latter fills in this framework with the dynamic, political reality of the aid process.

The preceding discussion presented numerous examples reported in the international press, which this text argues, had the power to shape aid allocations to the Balkans in different ways. In addition, the review of such examples offered a realistic view inside the conglomerate of foreign assistance to the Balkans. It is important to caution nevertheless, that the examples used were not selected according to their relevance or strength to shape allocations, but according to what had been at times recorded by the international media. As such, they can not be considered the most important, or the only motives and factors of foreign assistance, nor can there be speculation of their

relative weight as a factor¹⁸⁸. There should be no doubt however, that some of the cases covered in this review had tremendous impact on foreign aid to the Balkans.

The situations which were produced by the review of the international media were divided in 12 provisional categories according to their distinct characteristics. The categories were the following:

1. Moral and Historic Duties, Concerns and Responsibilities
2. Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy I: Reward and Punishment, Isolation of Opponents and Help to Allies
3. Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy II: Aid Suspension as Reaction to Wide Range of Political Situations
4. Influence of Historic Myths
5. Nexus to Military Intervention
6. Foreign Aid as Arena of Donor Rivalry
7. Fear of Migration
8. Kin Solidarity
9. Economic Interest: Foreign Aid and Business Interests
10. Aid as Restitution of Damages
11. Concerns Over Aid Transparency, Effectiveness, Impact
12. Foreign Aid as a Promoter in the International Arena

The major factor for describing a situation as a separate category was whether that situation represented a distinct factor of foreign assistance. As already said in the introduction to this chapter, all of these situations lie along the axis connecting the two opposite poles of aid motivations, self-interest and moral altruism. Whereas some of them are more closely posited to the pole of self-interest, others are in closer proximity to the pole of moral altruism. Many of them are in the vast middle ground where different motivations interweave. The simple exercise of reading the titles describing these situations indicates to the prevalence of the motives connected to self-interest. As provisional as this observation may be, it should be underscored that is in accord with the dominant view in theory, which is that foreign aid as a tool of donor country national self-interest. It has already been discussed that most scholars do agree on the fact that national self-interest is a strong determinant of foreign assistance. Even the strongest proponent of moral altruism, Lumsdaine (1993) has not denied it. National self-interest, as it has also been discussed, is not a monolith category, but is composed of many different national self-interests. The discussion in Chapter 1 has introduced the differences between national interest understood in the classical terms of national security, and the national interest understood in its economic dimension. The twelve situations described contain examples of situations whereby foreign aid was considered as a tool in service of both foreign policy interest widely understood, and in service of the economic interest of the donor country. Understandably, these two categories can not be strictly differentiated either.

A point which is important to underscore however is that: this analysis is not to understand that the situations described above are the real factors of foreign assistance, replacing the officially stated motivations explored in the previous chapter.

¹⁸⁸ The relative weight of different donor motivations was discussed in chapter one, in reference to Alesina and Dollar (1998) masterful study on the topic.

This would not be accurate. This text holds the position that the motivations stated in the official policy texts of donor countries are the real general motivations for aid to the Balkans. Aid was given in order to promote democracy, market economy, and to ensure peace and stability. When Western policy makers designed their ODA policies for the region, that is exactly what they had in mind: to promote democracy and the transition to market economy, and to make the Balkans a more stable place. These statements were not just empty rhetoric, whereas the real factors would be those which emerge through the political dynamics observed through the media review. This text argues that those statements were the real political intentions for helping the Balkans. In a final analysis, those desired outcomes of foreign aid to the Balkans (and wider Eastern Europe) were in alignment with the interests of the West vis-à-vis the East. This should be taken as common knowledge and should not be further elaborated. However, with this being said, the question is –what is the relation of the situations and the political dynamics described above, with the stated goals of ODA to the region? The simplest answer, even though not a satisfying one would be that they coexist. They are all part of the foreign assistance regime, of the foreign aid phenomenon. The overall framework is still defined by the trinity of democracy, market economy, and political stability, but that framework is filled with a live and dynamic matter of the myriad of factors, motives, and impulses which shape the final outlook of foreign assistance.

CHAPTER 5

Who Gave Aid to Whom?

Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans 1990-2005

1. Introduction

The process of intensive supply of foreign assistance to the countries in the Balkan region begun around 19 years ago, with the beginning of transition itself. In what is today still referred to as the Western Balkans region (countries of former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania) the process of aid started earlier and with greater intensity in Albania, with its “opening” after the end of the country’s isolation created by the communist regime. It has from there soon shifted to the space of former Yugoslavia where the beginning of the wars had caused grave humanitarian crises and strong need of emergency humanitarian aid.

Since first appearing on the donor maps, the Balkan countries have remained strong beneficiaries of ODA over the past 18 years, and the process of foreign aid to the region is at present not yet finished.

The preceding chapters have discussed both the overall framework for foreign aid to the Balkans as part of post-communist Eastern Europe, and its particular circumstance which distinguishes it from the other transition countries in the wider region, that is, the wars, humanitarian crises, and post-conflict reconstruction needs.

Close to two decades from the beginning of this process, - and with the most turbulent period in Balkan recent history hopefully over - the question of foreign assistance to the Balkans is timely and appropriate. The aim of this text is to provide *an overall account of the process of foreign assistance to the Balkans*, and to discuss the major determinants and characteristics of this process. This necessarily has to start from a bird-eye perspective and to provide answers to some of the very general questions concerning foreign assistance.

Some of these general questions are: *how much aid did the region actually receive?* As simple and straightforward as it is, at least on the surface, the answer to this question is not, as one should expect, common knowledge. Was the amount the Balkans received a little or a lot, compared to needs, or compared to other recipients? *Who were the major providers of foreign aid to the Balkans? Who were the major recipients?* In addition, why did aid go to those major recipients as opposed to others? Why did some donors decide to give to certain recipients as opposed to others? What were the time dynamics and the forms of such assistance and so forth? These are only the first in the series of questions to be answered in order to obtain the general picture of foreign aid to the Balkans. The ultimate question of impact or effect of such assistance can not be separated from the question of the quantity of aid, its goals, the motives behind it, or the mode of supply. As such, these questions go to the core of the aid issue and have overarching importance.

As an illustration to this argument, an article at The New York Times¹⁸⁹ from 2003 estimated foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1996 – 2003, not counting relief and reconstruction, to be between USD 5 and 15 billion. The almost USD 10 billion in difference in this estimate, on a country whose GDP in the early 2000s was around USD 11 billion is indicative as to the specificity of the public debate surrounding aid to the Balkans. The presumed difference in impact of an amount of USD 10 billion is substantive.

The opening question in this discussion therefore is – how much foreign assistance did the Balkans receive in the last 19 years of transition?

2. Aid to Eastern Europe: ODA vs. OA

Before moving to discuss the specific aid numbers concerning the Balkans, it is important to introduce some of the basic definitions and distinctions important to the debate.

When discussing the aid flows to the countries of the Balkans, for purposes of comparison, this text will make occasional references to aid to other Eastern European countries. These countries will be divided into two groups. The first one comprises Romania and Bulgaria; countries which are immediate neighbors to the countries of the Western Balkans. The second group comprises the four Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The focus of the text is the Western Balkans; nevertheless comparisons with the other post-communist transition countries are important in order to understand the specificities of foreign aid to the countries of former Yugoslavia (plus Albania).

The important distinction to understand is that the development assistance given to the Western Balkan countries has been registered by the DAC as Official Development Assistance (ODA), whereas aid to countries from the two other mentioned groups has been counted as Official Aid (OA). This distinction is important to note for methodological purposes.

Until 1993 the DAC of the OECD had a single list of developing countries which were eligible for ODA. Aid to these countries was registered by the DAC as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The changes brought about with the dismantling of the communist world prompted the question of how to count the aid which started to flow to the former communist countries. For this purpose the DAC introduced a second list of countries, called “Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (Official Aid)” in 1993. This list included the other countries from Eastern Europe this text will occasionally refer to. The DAC abolished the Part II list and it went back to a single list of aid recipients in 2006.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ New York Times, *Where Did All the Money in Bosnia Go?* 16 February 2003.

¹⁹⁰ The following excerpts from the section of the OECD website dedicated to the “History of the DAC lists of recipients”,
http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3343,en_2649_34485_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html
explain in detail the shift from only ODA, to ODA/OA, and back:

Since Yugoslavia was eligible for ODA in the years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was already on the ODA list. Albania was added to the ODA list in 1989. Slovenia, which was in its own right completely absent from the “Balkan transition” stayed on the Part I list until 2003, when it progressed to the Part II list.

The creation of the Part II list did not happen easily and it was subject to debate inside the DAC. As early as 1989 big bilateral donors such as the United States and Japan wanted extension of ODA rules to the new transition countries, in order to have aid allocated to these countries count as ODA:

“DAC Members fail to reach agreement on the appropriate recording of aid to Poland and Hungary. Japan, backed by the United States seeks agreement to use ODA funds for these countries. Other countries, especially France and the Netherlands, wish DAC aid presentations and work to remain concentrated in the ‘traditional development countries (Fuhrer, 1996: 54)’”.

Reporting was introduced on CEE countries in 1990 and extended to the Newly Independent States (NIS) in 1992 (Fuhrer, 1996: 58). In 1993 the Part II List was introduced.

Why is this important and why is this particularly important for this text? There are several reasons.

A lot of the scholarly writing on aid focuses only on ODA, as the “real” or “traditional” form of development assistance. For example, even the publications of the DAC in discussing aid to Europe, talk frequently only in terms of ODA and

“The end of the Cold War signaled the emergence of new economic and political realities. New aid requirements arose in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, while rapid progress in East Asia reduced aid needs there. A new list was devised to reflect these developments...This new ‘DAC List of Aid Recipients’ was introduced in 1993. It was divided into two parts. Only aid to ‘traditional’ developing countries on Part I of the List counted as ODA, for which there is a long-standing United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of donors’ national income. Aid to the ‘more advanced’ developing and eastern European countries on Part II of the List was recorded separately as ‘official aid’....The List of Aid Recipients was reviewed every three years. Countries above the World Bank High Income Country threshold (per capita annual income around USD 9 000 at the time) for three consecutive years progressed to Part II of the List at the end of a three-year notice period. Other countries could also be transferred to Part II after a notice period if they were above the World Bank lending limit (around USD 5 000 annually) for three consecutive years, following consideration by the DAC of their development and resource status...The List of Aid Recipients was reviewed every three years. Countries above the World Bank High Income Country threshold (per capita annual income around USD 9 000 at the time) for three consecutive years progressed to Part II of the List at the end of a three-year notice period. Other countries could also be transferred to Part II after a notice period if they were above the World Bank lending limit (around USD 5 000 annually) for three consecutive years, following consideration by the DAC of their development and resource status....Data on aid to the following CEEC/NIS countries in transition, first collected in respect of 1990 flows, were recorded against Part II of the List of Aid Recipients (as “official aid”) until and including 2004: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine. Flows to Moldova were recorded against this category up to and including 1996.”

discuss only ODA (but not OA) recipient countries. Framed in these terms, the data regularly place the four Western Balkan countries, BiH, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro), Albania, and Macedonia, *among the top 5 recipients of ODA in Europe*. The writing on aid to Eastern Europe which is framed in this way, that is only in terms of ODA, disregards the Official Aid (OA), which has been given to Romania, Bulgaria, and the four CEE countries in substantial quantities. The WB countries rank top 5 among recipients of ODA, but the listing will be (if slightly) different when looking into recipients of ODA/OA. Some of the DAC statistical publications, which are core reference for any writing on aid, operate only with ODA whereas others with ODA/OA amounts. For example, the DAC annual statistical publication “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2000; OECD, 2001; OECD, 2002; OECD, 2003; OECD, 2005; OECD, 2006, OECD, 2007) considers as ODA recipients in Europe, the Western Balkan countries, Slovenia until 2004; Moldova starting with 1996; and Turkey, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus (leaving the list at the same time with Slovenia). Ukraine and Byelorussia are counted starting with 2005, after having left the Part II list at the end of 2004. Most of the other recipients from that list became members of the EU in that year. OA recipients are presented but separately.

Another DAC statistical publication “Development Aid at a Glance”¹⁹¹ with a focus on Europe, lists as main ODA recipients on the continent for the period 2002-2004, in the following order: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Turkey, and Macedonia. This is of course accurate as far as ODA is concerned. But if one looks into the DAC Annual Report Series (OECD, 1998; OECD, 1999a; OECD, 2001a; OECD, 2002a; OECD, 2003a; OECD, 2004; OECD, 2005a; OECD, 2007a; OECD, 2008a) which operates with combined ODA/OA amounts, the picture will be different. The top recipient (of OA) in Europe for several major donors is consistently Poland. For example; Poland has consistently been *the biggest recipient of European Commission aid globally* (OECD, 1998: 96; OECD, 1999a: 107; OECD, 2001a: 108; OECD, 2002a: 100). This particular point is being underscored *in order to avoid misperceptions* which can easily occur. Many scholars will write in terms of ODA only, and this will produce a distorted picture about aid flows to Eastern Europe. When writing on FA to this part of the world, it makes logical sense to compare across the country groupings. Analyzing ODA and OA separately does not make this possible.

Aid to Eastern Europe (CEE + Romania & Bulgaria+ Western Balkans) and particularly aid to SEE (Romania & Bulgaria + Western Balkans) was shaped by factors which relevantly influenced the allocations across the different country groupings. What happened in the WB influenced aid to Romania & Bulgaria; what happened in CEE influenced the former, and so forth.

Along this line, as already mentioned earlier in the theoretical discussion (see Chapter 2; White, 2004), one of factors for the fall of ODA in the 1990s was the actual rise of OA. Scholars have been used to write about ODA, and scholarly thought on aid has for decades been focused on the Third World, so that the introduction of OA has not

¹⁹¹ The statistical publication does not feature a date of publication, or publisher, thus it is listed in the references without this information. The source of the publication is nevertheless the DAC web page.

even received a lot of attention in scholarly work on aid. Comparisons and research are often done solely within the frame of ODA without including OA. This approach is not suitable for this text. The research of aid to the Balkans needs to draw on relevant comparisons with the region's closer and wider neighbors, and for this purpose it will have to discuss in parallel both ODA and OA. References nevertheless will be made to reports and publications which discuss foreign assistance in terms of ODA (most of them) and subsequently omit the OA countries from the discussion. Whenever possible this text will try to clarify the differences. Some of this is actually helpful in writing on aid to the Balkans, but there is also a downside to it. For example, the many DAC data analyses discuss aid to Europe only in terms of ODA and this makes the WB countries accounting for 80% of this aid. In this sense, all the research on the trends of aid to Europe, concerning for example sectoral composition, sector-specific allocations such as for education, or civil society and government and so forth, can be taken to be relevant for the Balkans, as it represents 80% of the sample. Unfortunately, this approach disables such important comparisons with the OA countries. This is a serious setback. The analysis of the data done specifically for this text will try to correct for this as much as possible.

3. How Much Aid Did the Balkans Need?

The issue of what was the Balkans's need of foreign assistance received particular attention especially on occasions such as ends of wars, when talk of reconstruction would gain currency. There were two such major occasions in the region: the period after the signing of the Dayton peace accords which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, and the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. The need of reconstruction as a precondition for restoring life back to normal and to securing peace, on both occasions gave rise to debates concerning the need of assistance. Such estimates generally derived from assessment of direct and indirect damages caused by the war. What is observable from the review of the political debate on this issue is that *such estimates varied substantially*. Different actors produced different estimates by using different methodologies; the scope of the assessments differed – some estimates were concerned only with direct damages of war, or direct reconstruction needs, whereas others took into consideration the effects of sanctions, etc., The result was that *there was no agreement on the actual needs of foreign assistance*. This dissonance of views on the need of reconstruction assistance is observable both in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo. As reported by the New York Times at the time:

"Nobody is certain of the price tag for Bosnia's recovery, only that it will be high. World Bank officials visiting in October [1995] identified \$3.7 billion of urgent reconstruction needs in land controlled by the Bosnian Government and its Croatian allies. If areas under Bosnian Serb control were included, the team reported, reconstruction could cost \$4 billion to \$5 billion for just the next few years. And Christine Wallich, the economist heading the mission, said that only includes "what we think the priorities are." ¹⁹²

The political dimension of such estimates of reconstruction assistance needs can not be overlooked; neither can the obvious tension between estimates on the donor and

¹⁹² New York Times, *The G.I.'s Don't Carry a Marshall Plan*, 17 December 1995.

the recipient side pass unobserved. According to then Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic, Western estimates of reconstruction needs were inadequate. In his view Bosnia needed at least USD 12 billion to meet its reconstruction needs.

*“‘Four billion dollars is not enough,’ he told reporters who asked him to comment on diplomats’ estimates for rebuilding Croatia and Bosnia, which were given in Rome on Friday. ‘We need at least three times that if we want to talk about reconstruction, for Bosnia alone.’”*¹⁹³

The situation was similar was with the different estimates from the time after the Kosovo war:

*“Estimates of the total cost of rebuilding the Balkans, including aid to Albania and Macedonia, vary widely from Dollars 20bn (pounds 12.5bn) to Dollars 100bn (pounds 62.5bn).”*¹⁹⁴ All major donor agencies had produced some estimates of what the reconstruction needs would be. In a view of the European Investment Bank (EIB):

*“... the cost of reconstruction in the Balkans [could reach] 25-30 billion euro over the next three to five years. Bank officials say the amount represents the bare minimum needed to get the region’s economy working again.”*¹⁹⁵

Similarly, another major financial institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had its own estimate. According to the IMF:

*“helping Montenegro and Kosovo, both part of Yugoslavia, and Albania, Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria could reach \$1.25 billion to \$2.25 billion a year for several years.”*¹⁹⁶

The general conclusion is that *there was no exact or commonly agreed estimate* on how much the reconstruction of the Balkans would require:

*“The exact amounts involved in Balkan reconstruction are still vague. The European Union has pledged \$500 million a year for the next three years for Kosovo alone; Western officials say as much as \$30 billion over the next five years may be needed for the region as a whole.”*¹⁹⁷

In addition all of these different assessments were based on different criteria, and took different types of costs into account. The criteria for the cost-assessment depended not only on the methodology employed but also on the political point of view:

*“A group of private Yugoslav economists recently estimated that NATO allies inflicted about \$4 billion dollars of damage on Serbia during the Kosovo war, while they put the cumulative financial impact of sanctions at \$30 billion.”*¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ New York Times, *Bosnia Says It Will Need \$12 Billion in Aid*, 8 October 1995.

¹⁹⁴ The Guardian, *'Marshall plan' for Balkans: Reconstruction EU and US Braced for Multi-Billion Dollar Bill*, 11 June 1999.

¹⁹⁵ *European Voice*, *EU Moves Swiftly to Create Agency for Rebuilding Balkans*, Vol. 5 No. 23, 10 June 1999.

¹⁹⁶ New York Times, *World Leaders Join in Pledging Effort to Rebuild Balkans*, 31 July 1999.

¹⁹⁷ New York Times, *Reform Urged as Condition For Yugoslavia to Get Aid*, 21 June 1999.

¹⁹⁸ New York Times, *Easing of Some Restrictions By West Could Happen Soon*, 8 October 2000.

Some round figures appeared to be more resounding than others (and the rounder the figure the more easily it resounded) but the obvious conclusion is that a) there was no consistent and commonly agreed estimate of how much reconstruction aid the region would need, and b) that probably such an estimate was difficult (if not impossible to produce).

One symbolic way of discussing the amount of aid the region would need was to frame it in terms of *peace vs. war*. Assessments of the amounts of aid that went into the region included the regular comparisons of the cost of peace over war. In a letter to the Washington Post from 29 July 1999, just before the Stability Pact summit, the most engaged private philanthropist in this part of the world, George Soros, suggested that the cost of rebuilding and integrating the Balkans would “hardly exceed those of the humanitarian intervention but (that) the benefits would be incomparably greater.”¹⁹⁹ The expression “humanitarian intervention” as used here denotes the NATO military operation. Nevertheless, there were assessments which went in the opposite direction. According to a joint study by BBC and Jane’s Defence Weekly:

*“The war in Kosovo cost more than £30bn ... The study... found that while the costs of waging war against the Serbian military machine were massive, the bill for rebuilding the shattered Balkans will be far higher...The BBC/Jane’s research does not include the costs of environmental damage following bombing raids on oil refineries and industry.”*²⁰⁰

Similar observations resound in a study produced by Serbian experts:

*“According to a preliminary estimate by Yugoslav economists, the Nato air strikes caused damage worth some 29.6 billion dollars, not counting damage to military installations, residential areas in Kosovo and the ecological impact.”*²⁰¹

Nevertheless, although the round figure is similar, the two estimates refer to essentially different types of damages. Whereas the Serbian estimate refers to direct damages by the NATO bombing, the BBC& Jane’s Defense Weekly also considers, for example, damages to Bulgaria and Romania from the closure of the Danube.

There are some additional angles to the discussion concerning the price of peace vs. war. According to relevant estimates, the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia cost between USD 2, 5 and 4 billion alone, or that is to say, comparably less than the aid amounts granted to the region.²⁰² However, as recently as several years ago, the cost of the military peace keeping presence in the region has been estimated at around USD 8,1 billion annually (6 billion Euros), (UK Parliament, 2002). This amount easily outstrips the ODA allocation to the region in any single year since 1990, and even the peak year of 2002 when the overall ODA to the Balkans reached an all time high of USD 5, 4 billion. This fact has occasionally been used to argue in favour of more aid, or at least for countering the demands for less ODA to the Balkans. This is an interesting comparison, however it is only apparent. The research of the micro data

¹⁹⁹ Washington Post, *Balkan Opening*, 29 July 1999.

²⁰⁰ BBC, *Kosovo War Cost £30bn*, 15 October 1999.

²⁰¹ BBC, *Reconstruction: Myth and Reality*, 29 July 1999.

²⁰² Washington Post, *Europe Wants Lead in Rebuilding Effort*, 13 June 1999.

on aid allocations to the Balkans in Chapter 7 reveals that not seldom the *finance for the military operations in the Balkans was registered as foreign assistance*. In essence however, this only further underscores the conclusion that the funds spent for the military operation easily exceeded development aid.

A conclusion which emerges from these comparisons and the review of these estimates is that: under the condition that these estimates were correct, or realistic, although the Balkans did receive a lot of aid, it was not at the level of the damages caused by the wars. Further, and more specifically, the cost of foreign military presence in the Balkans outweighed the amounts of allocated ODA.

In addition, the argument that “aid for peace” will cost less than the war, can (somewhat cynically) be considered an idealistic view propelled by moral vision of committed individuals, but not necessarily accurate in technical terms. As much as it true that the “costliest peace is cheaper than the cheapest war”,²⁰³ this is only valid, in realist terms, that is, before the war had actually taken place. Once the war has taken its toll, the cost of post-war restoration in technical terms proves to be much higher than the cost of destroying something. For example as noted by news reports at the time:

*“According to figures from the Danube Commission and others, the cost of replacing all eight bombed bridges over the vital river will be at least £80m - perhaps up to ten times more than the cost of destroying them.”*²⁰⁴

Another comparison which was very common in the public debates concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans was that of aid to the Balkans as compared to assistance to Western Europe under the Marshal Plan.

The myth of the Marshal plan interfered often in the debate surrounding Balkan reconstruction (see Chapter 4, section on influence of historic myths). One consequence of such comparisons has been the lament over the lack of donor commitment, compared to that from the time of the Marshal Plan, and subsequently, the sense of delusion with the foreign aid effort. Another consequence has been the fear in the donor community of what the word “Marshal Plan” brings in terms of financial expectations. The frequently heard logic has argued that foreign aid in the Balkans did not repeat the miracle of the Marshal Plan because aid commitments to the Balkans (in current prices) were much smaller than commitment to Western Europe within the Marshal Plan: “... *questions over the scale of the financial provision ... mean the [Stability Pact] cannot compare with America's 1947 plan to reconstruct western Europe after the second world war.*”²⁰⁵

This argument could quite frequently be encountered in foreign aid related discussions in the Balkans, and as such it relied on the fact of insufficient awareness of the total size of the aid effort to the Balkans. As data presented in the following

²⁰³ Reference has been made earlier to US President Clinton’s comparisons between the cost of peace and war (chapter 3); in the sense that the costliest peace is cheaper than the cheapest war.

²⁰⁴ BBC, *Kosovo War Cost £30bn*, 15 October 1999

²⁰⁵ The Guardian, ‘Marshall plan’ for Balkans: Reconstruction EU and US Braced for Multi-Billion Dollar Bill, 11 June 1999

pages easily demonstrates, this argument is incorrect. The level of donor commitment in the Balkans *easily matches that of the Marshal Plan*. The Marshal Plan supplied aid in the amount around of USD 90-100 billion in today's prices²⁰⁶ to Western Europe in the period 1947-1951. The Western Balkans has received roughly half of that, that is, around *USD 43 billion in the period 1990-2005*. However the population of the Western Balkans (around 24-25 million people) is much smaller than the population of Western Europe after WWII²⁰⁷, which automatically makes *aid receipts per capita much bigger than what Western Europeans had received with the Marshal Plan*.

Finally, the answer to the question "did the Balkans get a lot of aid" cannot be divorced from the realities of international relations. At different points in time this issue had the power to raise tensions and cause disagreements in the donor community.

As already discussed in Chapter 4, in the period after the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the establishing of the Stability Pact, the US repeatedly criticized the EU over its small funding commitments.²⁰⁸ The somewhat implicit deal between the Euro-Atlantic partners regarding the intervention in Kosovo was that the US would bear most of the cost of the military operation, whereas Europe would cover most of the reconstruction bill²⁰⁹. In the view of the US, the EU didn't live up to this commitment in the immediate period after the end of the Kosovo crisis.

At the same time, however, some EU member states felt that the Balkans was receiving far too much (EU) aid compared to needier places. The most vocal criticism in this regard was coming from the UK. Its view usually was that aid EU aid to the Balkans was motivated by political concerns rather than levels of poverty and human need,²¹⁰ and that the EU was reducing its badly needed assistance elsewhere in order to have stronger presence in the Balkans.

Disagreements similar to those from the aftermath of the Kosovo war can also be found in the immediate period after the end of the war in Bosnia. The following

²⁰⁶ This is the most realistic estimate of what would be today's scope of the Marshall Plan, although in more relative terms, different authors have pointed out that it could be much larger. For example, Behrman (2007: 4) agrees that in today's prices the Plan would weigh around USD 100 billion, but he adds that as a share of US GNP that amount today would exceed USD 500 billion. An older title edited by Elwood (1988: 23) refers to the fact that President Ronald Reagan at the 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan estimated its value in 1988 dollars at USD 60 billion. The commentator (Leonard Silk) nevertheless, argues that in relative terms (compared to the size of the economy) and the fact that a big share of modern aid is military assistance, would be three times bigger, that is around USD 180 billion.

²⁰⁷ In 1950 Italy had a population of 46, 8 million, Germany – 50, 8 million, France – 41, 8 million, etc. See for example Tacitus Historic Atlas at <http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/>.

²⁰⁸ Washington Post, *EU's Commitment to the Balkans*, 16 August 1999; The Guardian, *Balkans Wait in Vain for Western Funds: Stability US angry at EU's Foot –Dragging on Pact Pledges*, 14 March 2000.

²⁰⁹ Washington Post, *Europe Wants Lead in Rebuilding Effort*, 13 June 1999.

²¹⁰ The Guardian, *Black Need but Only Whites Receive: Race Appears to be Skewing West's Approach to Aid. Look at Kosovo. Then Look at Africa*, 12 August 1999; The Guardian, *Short Labels EU Worst Aid Agency in the World*, 18 May 2000.

excerpt from international news reports is instructive in demonstrating the bargaining in the donor community over the sharing of the cost of assistance to the region:

*“President Clinton asserted recently that for peace to survive, Bosnians ‘must have the food, the medicine, the shelter, the clothing so many have been denied for so long’ and that ‘roads must be repaired, the schools and hospitals rebuilt, the factories and shops refurbished and reopened.’ Nevertheless, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the House International Relations Committee that the United States would contribute a mere \$200 million a year for three years...By contrast, President Jacques Chirac of France has said the European Union expects the United States to assume one-third of the reconstruction costs -- 10 times what Washington offered -- and the 15-nation European Union another third, with other wealthy countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia being asked to pay the remaining third. President Clinton’s national security adviser, Anthony Lake, has dismissed this formula as ‘exorbitant for us.’ The Administration’s preferred plan: international institutions like the World Bank finance half of the reconstruction, with the European Union and other countries paying the rest.”*²¹¹

As evident from this news report, the cost of the post-war reconstruction in Bosnia was a subject of intense negotiations in the international community. The huge amounts of numbers which will be reviewed further in the text will provide the answer on the outcome of these negotiations.

In conclusion, these were some of the big issues which pervaded the public debate concerning the overall supply foreign assistance to the Balkans²¹² : how much was needed, the cost of war vs. peace, the revival of the myth of the Marshall Plan, the bargains over the cost of reconstruction, and so forth.

The short preceding outline lends several conclusions: a) there was no common or clear idea of how much aid the Balkans needs, b) the figures of aid to the Balkans, thrown into the public debate were often imprecise and general, c) symbolic comparisons, such as the one to the myth of the Marshall Plan, and the cost of peace vs. war were common but often resulted with the wrong conclusions, d) the supply of aid to the region was not a coordinated and harmonious donor effort; donors often had strong disagreements over their financial roles in the endeavor.

4. How Much Aid Did the Balkans Receive?

The data kept by the OECD DAC give a specific answer on the question of “how much” aid the Balkan countries received in the period of transition. In the period 1990-2005, the region has received a total of USD 42, 8 billion (in constant 2006 dollars). The biggest part of this amount has been contributed by DAC bilateral donors - USD 26 billion; multilateral donors have contributed USD 15, 9 billion; and the rest of USD 840 million has been allocated by other bilateral donors who are not members of the DAC (Table 1). Chart 1 below presents visually the shares of different types of donor in the total ODA to the region.

²¹¹ New York Times, *The G.I.'s Don't Carry a Marshall Plan*, 17 December 1995.


²¹² There were naturally many specific issues which caused issue-specific debates.

Table 1: All ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements²¹³

Type of Donor	Amount (USD million)
DAC bilateral	26 036,73
multilateral	15 950,81
non-DAC bilateral	840,39
all ODA net	42 827,93

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Chart 1: All ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; shares by type of donor



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

This is a substantive amount of foreign assistance. In order to get a better perspective of the magnitude of the support, the total aid flows to the Balkans can be compared to the other two groups of recipients in Eastern Europe; the first constituted by Romania & Bulgaria, and the second by the four CEE countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia.

The total net ODA flows to Romania and Bulgaria have amounted to USD 11, 9 billion in the period 1990-2004; 2004 is the last year data is available for. This is presented in Table 2 below.

²¹³ According to the DAC's Glossary a disbursement is "the release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost of the donor." See DAC's Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965478. The other unit measure of ODA flows is the commitment. According to the DAC a commitment is "a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multilateral organizations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the year reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments and (ii) expected disbursements in the following year." See DAC's Glossary at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965457.


Table 2: All ODA to Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004; constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Type of Donor	Amount (USD million)
DAC bilateral	4 720,15
multilateral	7 028,26
non-DAC bilateral	163,85
all ODA net	11 912,26

(source: DAC online statistical database)

In addition, [Chart 2](#) below gives a visual overview of the shares of ODA by type to Bulgaria and Romania.

Chart 2: All ODA to Bulgaria and Romania



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Even at this most general level of comparison, the difference between the countries of the Western Balkans vs. Romania & Bulgaria is quite obvious. Although much smaller in terms of population (est. 22 million people), the Western Balkans has received almost four times as much aid than the grouping composed by Romania & Bulgaria (est. 30 million people).

The other observation which emerges clearly from this level of comparison is the inverted roles of bilateral and multilateral assistance; 61% of the total ODA to the Balkans was DAC bilateral, that is provided by governments which are members of the DAC, as opposed to 37% of the assistance which came from multilateral donors. This ratio is inverted for Romania & Bulgaria; 40% of the total aid was DAC bilateral, as opposed to 59% which was multilateral.

[Table 3](#) and [Table 4](#) below provide full account of total ODA to the countries in the Western Balkans in the period 1990-2005, to Romania & Bulgaria 1990-2004, and the four CEE countries (Poland, Check Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) for the same 1990-2004 period. The tables provide full information on receipts per country and over time, in a way that the time-dynamic of the ODA flows can be monitored and analyzed. Such analysis can produce relevant insights into the factors which determined the supply of foreign aid. These aspects will be a subject of detailed analysis with respect to the countries of the Western Balkans. Romania & Bulgaria and the CEE countries will be subject of occasional references, mostly for comparison purposes.

Table 3: All ODA net to Western Balkans 1990-2005, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	14,7	426,36	510,89	401,01	202,44	204,09	264,3	211,21	346,68	644,48	445,6	386,56	408,09	406,29	314,93	327,27	5514,9
BiH	14,13	56,88	535,31	1041,6	998,01	1107,6	1162,7	1364,4	1067,8	912,2	765,59	621,39	717,27	569,15	10934,1
Cro	0,01	..	138,81	60,45	145,24	56,21	58,85	64,6	92,08	159,95	171,05	141,75	130,29	131,62	1350,91
Mac	4,59	134,01	85,62	120,22	120,9	132,04	354,18	353,43	351,72	377,37	306,04	263,92	234,67	2838,71
FRY/Ser ex Yu	63,94	106,16	75,19	122,62	142,12	957,58	1690,5	1932,5	2550,5	1533,5	1235	1161	11570,48
unspec.	61,38	205,2	1751	3354	1326,7	520,13	380,19	98,35	145,62	580,32	461,96	211,82	1217,8	138,79	105,73	59,82	10618,83
total	76,08	631,56	2276,1	3816,5	2401,2	2018,1	1983,2	1716,9	1988	3965,6	4111,4	3954,7	5490,4	3147,7	2767,1	2483,5	42827,93

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Table 4: All ODA net to CEE, and Bulgaria and Romania, 1990-2004, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	total
Cz. Rep.	19,37	323,33	168,16	133,08	190,75	166,53	147,5	148,63	584,03	436,3	675,32	485,78	226,44	308,83	291,8	4305,85
Hun	94,21	874,34	284,07	217,28	256,28	-293,9	230,86	220,56	304,31	350,24	380,81	641,12	226,55	289,95	316,6	4393,3
Pol	1823,7	3419,9	1758,6	1362,9	2285	3929,8	1353,4	1126,8	1154,9	1617,9	2131,3	1490,1	1272,5	1409,9	1606,4	27742,89
Slo. Rep.	9,67	160,51	82,11	68,71	100,89	113,9	115,08	90,72	200,81	428,93	170,65	251,72	215,76	187,98	243,28	2440,72
total	1947	4778,1	2292,9	1782	2832,9	3916,3	1846,9	1586,7	2244	2833,4	3358,1	2868,7	1941,3	2196,7	2458	38882,76
Bul	19,03	439,95	189,97	150,27	199,84	126,14	206,74	279,16	306,11	343,32	416,24	488,15	436,67	481,59	643,48	4726,66
Rom	337,43	432,64	296,94	224,42	196,76	342,79	269,8	281,57	474,56	510,62	625,6	980,99	570,49	687,02	953,97	7185,6
total	356,46	872,59	486,91	374,69	396,6	468,93	476,54	560,73	780,67	853,94	1041,8	1469,1	1007,2	1168,6	1597,5	11912,26
total	2303,4	5650,7	2779,8	2156,7	3229,5	4385,3	2323,4	2147,4	3024,7	3687,3	4399,9	4337,8	2948,4	3365,3	4055,5	50795,02

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Further to the east, the four countries from the CEE have received a total of USD 38,8 billion in constant 2006 dollar prices, or by type of ODA (Table 5).


Table 5: All ODA to CEE 1990-2004, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Donor Type	Amount (USD million)
DAC bilateral	22 337,6
multilateral	16 469,13
non-DAC bilateral	76,03
all ODA net	38 882,76

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Chart 3 gives the shares of ODA by sources in the total flows to CEE countries in the period 1990-2004, the year when the entered the EU, and the last year data is available for.²¹⁴

Chart 3: All ODA to CEE



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Again, the conclusion, even at this most general level of inspection of the numbers is that *the Balkans was comparably more assisted*, relative to its population size, than the region of CEE. However, the ratio of bilateral vs. multilateral ODA of the CEE region, as observable from Chart 3, is similar to that of the Balkans, rather than that of Romania and Bulgaria. The reasons for the different bilateral vs. multilateral ODA ratios will be discussed further in the text.

The combined receipts of the three country groupings bring the total net ODA to these countries in Eastern Europe in the period 1990-2005 (2004 for Romania & Bulgaria, and the CEE countries) to USD 93,6 billion (see Table 6 below).

²¹⁴ The ODA to CEE does not take into account the category from the DAC database referenced as “ODA to CEE unspecified”, but only the ODA with specific country allocation. This is because “ODA to CEE unspecified” includes also the unspecified share already counted for the ex-Yu region. Including in the total aid flows to Eastern Europe also the unspecified ODA to CEE would further raise the amount.


Table 6: All ODA to Eastern Europe 1990-2005 (2004), constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Region	Amount (USD million)
CEE	38 882,76
Romania & Bulgaria	11 912,26
Western Balkans	42 827,93
Eastern Europe total	93 622,95

(source: DAC online statistical database)

In addition, [Chart 4](#) below presents the shares in total ODA of the Western Balkans, Romania & Bulgaria, and the CEE respectively.

Chart 4: Shares in all net ODA to Eastern Europe



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

The data presented above provide the overall framework for discussing foreign aid to the region. The figure as it is registered with the DAC database should be taken as the *definite amount* of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005. The region has received an exact total of USD 42, 8 billion in the period of transition. However, it is important to underscore that this is only the overall nominal amount. This figure is only the tip of the iceberg in the exploration of the process of foreign aid to the Balkans. The major purpose of this writing, as already stated, is to provide the complete information on: how much, for what, for whom, from whom, and why, concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans. The nominal amount of aid the region has received is only the point of departure in this inquiry. Nevertheless, this explorations has to start from an initial overall amount, and in the case of the Balkans, this amount is USD 42, 8 billion.

The nominal levels of assistance to the different sub-regions of Eastern Europe are already indicative of the differences concerning the levels of ODA allocation. It is already clear from the tables and charts presented above that the Balkans was *substantially more assisted* than the regions/groupings of comparison. This picture can be further enhanced by using additional measures of the levels of foreign aid. There are two other measures of development assistance that help clarify this fact; *aid per capita*, and *aid as percent of GDP*. When these indicators are compared across countries, they also represent an additional indicator of the considerable relative differences between countries from the same region. [Table 7](#) below gives the values of aid per capita and aid as percent of GDP for the Balkan countries, Romania & Bulgaria, and the countries from the CEE region.

Table 7: Aid per capita and as percent of GDP; WB, Romania and Bulgaria, and CEE

Country	Aid per capita, (USD) (1990-2005 average)	Aid as % of GDP (2003-2005)
Albania	100,90	4,50
BiH	180,34	6,90
Croatia	22,11	0,36
Macedonia	105,78	4,80
Serbia	87,78	5,20
	(1990-2004 average)	(2002-2004)
Bulgaria	36,95	2,50
Romania	20,90	1,10
	(1990-2004 average)	(2002-2004)
Hungary	27,66	0,32
Czech Republic	27,02	0,29
Poland	46,48	0,62
Slovakia	29,87	0,66

(source: data combined from various sources, primarily from UNECE; source for data on ODA is the DAC)

Table 7 clearly demonstrates the strong differences in aid receipts across the different regions. As it can be observed, with the notable exception of Croatia, aid to the Balkans as percent of GDP is, in some country by country comparisons, *more than 20 times greater* than to the CEE, such as for example between the Czech Republic and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In terms of aid per capita, the single largest aid recipient is Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose per capita average for the period 1990-2005 stands at USD 180, 34. This is around 9 times more than the least assisted country in per capita terms – Romania, whose 16 years average is USD 20, 90. This does come as a surprise because Romania was among the poorer countries in the region. The bias is in part result of the huge size of its population, but nevertheless Romania is quite less assisted in per capita terms even compared to larger countries from the CEE, such as Poland, which stands at USD 46, 48 in per capita terms. Some of this is accounted for by differences in the type of aid received – Poland received huge amounts of debt relief.

At this point the inquiry focuses only on how much the Balkans received in nominal an real terms. The answer concerning nominal aid is straightforward; how much that actually is in real terms, can be observed from the comparisons with the two other groups of recipients in Eastern Europe. With the exception of Croatia, both in per capita terms and in terms of aid as percent of GDP, the Western Balkan countries received substantially more foreign assistance than Bulgaria & Romania, and the CEE countries.

5. Who Received Aid? Country Shares of ODA to the Balkans

The fact that the Balkans was a strong recipient of aid clearly does not mean that this assistance was equally distributed across the region. Obviously not every country in


the Balkans was assisted at the same level, which logical because not every country displayed the same level of need.

One aspect of the country levels of assistance is already observable in Table 7 displaying the values in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP. Provisionally, three sub-groupings can be identified within the Western Balkans according to amounts of ODA received. The first sub-grouping is represented by Bosnia alone, which easily tops the list, both in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP; the second sub-grouping includes Macedonia, Albania, and FRY/Serbia which have receipts per capita around the USD 100 mark (range between USD 87, 78 and 105, 78), and as percent of GDP between 4, 50 and 5, 20 percent. The third sub-grouping is represented by Croatia. Both in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP Croatia received ODA in amounts much smaller than the rest of the region. Its receipts are obviously *smaller compared even to the receipts of the CEE group*. It is fair to note that in terms of development assistance received, *Croatia does not fit the profile of a Balkan recipient*. Although obviously Croatia is part of the region geographically and politically, and in terms of participation in its recent turbulent history, Croatia was not part of the Balkans when it came to distribution of foreign aid. The only available explanation is its quite higher level of economic development. GDP per capita in Croatia is substantially higher compared to the rest of the Western Balkan countries.²¹⁵ This indicates that a strong factor determining the allocation of foreign assistance was the level of economic development of the recipient countries. Even though Croatia suffered from war, had refugee crises, needed post-war reconstruction, and experienced problems with democratization, the fact that it had higher level of economic development made it either ineligible or less qualified for receiving development assistance for many of the donors who were active in the Balkans.

Table 3 above presented the nominal country shares of aid to the Balkans. This is displayed visually by Chart 5 below.

²¹⁵ For example, according to data presented by the Balkan Observatory of the Vienna Institute for International Economic, in 2003 Croatia had a GDP per capita (at PPP) of Euro 9,930; Macedonia – Euro 5,330; Serbia – Euro 5,530; Montenegro – Euro 4,990; Bosnia and Herzegovina – Euro 5,460; and Albania – Euro 3,940. See for more The WIIW Balkan Observatory, <http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/reports07.html> .


Chart 5: Country shares of ODA to Western Balkans



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Chart 5 is very revealing as to who within the Balkans actually received the largest share of the Western assistance. The ranking is different from that based on per capita and percent of GDP criteria. Although Macedonia and Albania were relevant recipients in real terms, their participation in the total ODA to the region is rather modest. Together they account for 20 % of the total ODA to the Western Balkans. Croatia's share is obviously even smaller. The bulk of the Western ODA to the Balkans went to two countries, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia, which together share over half (52 %) of total aid flows into the region. Aid to the region "unspecified" accounts for 26%, that is, more than a ¼ of the total aid to the region. If aid to "ex-Yu unspecified" would be removed from the chart, and only country specific allocations are taken into consideration, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia would account for even a larger share(70 %) of foreign assistance to the Balkans (Chart 6).

Chart 6: Country shares of net ODA to Western Balkans (without ex-Yu unspecified amount)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

At this point it is important to underscore another important issue which poses a significant methodological problem, and that is the disaggregation of foreign assistance to FRY/Serbia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro since 2003, until Montenegro's secession in 2006) had three distinct sub-


entities: Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. These three entities differed in terms of foreign aid they received. Kosovo was clearly a strong recipient of foreign assistance after the NATO military intervention; Montenegro gradually developed a status of aid recipient different from Serbia, through the process of its political differentiation from the Milosevic regime. Serbia on the other hand was under an aid embargo largely through the 90s, and aid sanctions were only dropped (they had been partially dropped in the period after Dayton in 1995 and subsequently reinstalled) after the fall of Milosevic on 5 October 2000. Given these circumstances, the specific allocations across Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, cannot be obtained through the DAC database because the DAC records data at the level of countries. Some idea about the shares of these entities in the total aid to FRY/Serbia can be obtained from looking into the data for individual donors and comparing those with the DAC total, and from the time dynamics of foreign assistance to FRY/Serbia. This disaggregation will be a subject of a separate section further in this chapter.

6. When? Time-Dynamic of ODA Flows to the Balkans

Important aspect for understanding the process of foreign aid to the Balkans is its time-dynamic. A static picture of foreign assistance to the Balkans is incomplete. The time -dynamics of aid supply is important for understanding the trends in foreign assistance overtime and the motivations behind them, but also its effectiveness and impact. Obviously, a billion dollar ad-hoc injection of aid over a single year can not have the same effect as a steady flow over a period of a decade and a half.

An inquiry into the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans shows, expectedly, that *each country in the region received development assistance with a different dynamic*. Chart 7 below displays the general trend of all ODA to the entire region of the Balkans overtime, divided by major sources of supply, that is, DAC bilateral donors, multilaterals, and non-DAC bilaterals. The chart shows three major spikes, that is, strong upward movements in the aid flows in three particular years over the entire 1990-2005 period. The first one is in 1993, the second in 1999, and the last in the period 2001-2002. These three spikes, observable at regional level, are a result of strong upward trends in both DAC bilateral and multilateral ODA, whereas the non-DAC, which is a small contributor to the total, as can be seen from Chart 7, does not follow suit. The movements of the bilateral and the multilateral flows around these three periods of time do not have the same elevation, but nevertheless it is clear that they both respond in the same way. For example, from Chart 7 it is clearly visible that the 1993 rise in total ODA is strongly influenced by the rise in multilateral assistance, whereas DAC bilateral aid follows suit but with a milder ascendance. This essentially indicates to a difference in the response (to a certain event acting as factor of ODA) by governments (bilateral donors) vs. multilateral organizations (multilateral donors).

Chart 7. Time-dynamic of net ODA to Western Balkans
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Additional inquiry into the composition of multilateral ODA around the period of time of the 1993 spike is necessary in order to determine the direct factor for the strong rise in foreign assistance. Table 8 below²¹⁶ shows that this particular rise in the period 1991-1994, with the peak year being 1993, is mostly the result of the strong infusions of assistance by three multilaterals, the European Commission, UNHCR, and WFP. The very character of two of these three major donors, that is, the UNHCR and the WFP already clearly indicates the character of this spike in ODA to the Balkans. UNHCR is the UN agency in charge of care for refugees, and WFP operates emergency food supply. This rapid increase in aid was a response to the unfolding war in Croatia and Bosnia and the humanitarian emergency they had produced.

Table 8: Selected multilateral donors to Western Balkans 1990-1995, constant prices (2006 USD millions) disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
EC	1,63	16,10	368,30	827,66	400,74	253,48
IDA	0	0	2,55	32,88	91,46	93,43
UNHCR	4,04	7,08	373,45	678,44	287,92	199,28
WFP	0	0	23,1	238,28	183,91	102,07

(source: DAC online statistical database)

²¹⁶ See complete information in Annex, Table 9.

The same exercise can be repeated with bilateral ODA. A closer look into the composition of bilateral foreign assistance around that period of time can help determine the direct source of the surge in ODA. Table 9 below²¹⁷ show the biggest rises in bilateral ODA in the period 1990-1995.

Table 9: Selected bilateral donors to the Western Balkans 1990-1995, constant prices (2006 USD millions) disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Germany	0,1	61,64	756,9	635,32	364,15	412,04
Italy	40,81	442,85	204,91	262,87	65,11	86,45
Netherl.	2,45	6,62	55,75	255,35	151,78	167,46
Norway	-1,11	3,48	6,58	66,17	178,7	118,02
Sweden	0	5,87	114,53	155,38	127,68	61,69
UK	0,02	0,68	8,33	168,2	161,73	65,13

(source: DAC online statistical database)

As evident from, the bulk of this rise comes from a big jump of German aid. Italian ODA is also at very high levels, but its destination is different. Whereas the German ODA is directed to “ex-Yu unspecified”, most of the Italian ODA is allocated to Albania.²¹⁸

The second big spike in ODA to the Balkans is in the period around 1999. Chart 7 above shows that this rise is mostly a result of the *rapid increase of bilateral aid*; multilateral ODA follows suit but with a milder ascendance. The Annex²¹⁹ shows that 1999 is a year with a big rise in ODA from practically all the bilateral donors present in the Balkans. The rise in multilateral ODA is a result of rising allocations by only two donors; the EC and UNHCR (see Table 10 below).

Table 10: EC and UNHCR ODA to Western Balkans 1998-2000, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1998	1999	2000
------	------	------	------

EC	419,16	993,08	1443,44
UNHCR	2,17	1,12	148,01

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Most of the rise should logically be a response to the Kosovo emergency. Most of the EC increase went to ex-Yu unspecified; there is an increase in EC aid to Macedonia and Albania (which hosted huge number of refugees); there is almost a doubling of the aid to Bosnia, which is not related to the refugee crisis.²²⁰ However the years 1999 and 2000 should be separated. In late 2000 there were events in Serbia proper which called for a strong donor response, thus it can be assumed that at least a part of the EC USD 1, 4 billion to FRY in 2000 is already a response to the democratic breakthrough in Serbia and the dropping of the sanctions against Belgrade.

²¹⁷ See complete information in Annex, Table 1.

²¹⁸ Annex, Table 20.

²¹⁹ Annex, Table 1.

²²⁰ Annex, Table 11 – Table 16.

Another major factor for the rise in 1999 is expectedly the creation of the Stability Pact, which definitely solicited some of the response. The Stability Pact marked a symbolic beginning of a huge effort to reconstruct the Balkans and it definitely had impact on aid allocations.

To go back to the point, the ODA rise in 1999 was largely a result of bilateral increases, which could be interpreted to mean that bilateral aid was more quick to respond to the 1999 emergency, or at least more engaged compared to the period from the early 90s and the response to the war in Croatia and Bosnia, where stronger bilateral response came from just a few donors. Nevertheless, to answer this question in full, one needs to look into the actual country destination of the allocations (with the already mention disaggregation problem between Serbia and Kosovo), and the composition of the ODA.

The third big rise in ODA to the Western Balkans, when foreign aid to the Balkans reaches *an all-time high*, is the year of 2002. This is, as Chart 7 very clearly demonstrates, again caused by a surge in bilateral aid; multilateral ODA is actually declining by this period of time. Although quite a few DAC bilateral donors have a rise of their allocations in this particular year, the rise is a result of a *strong response by just a few big bilaterals*. This can be seen from Table 11 below²²¹ which comprises the bilateral donors with a major increase in ODA in 2002 compared to the previous year.

Table 11: Selected bilateral donors to Western Balkans 2001-2003, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	2001	2002	2003
Austria	68,34	150,24	52,87
Germany	211,69	820,73	208,72
UK	75,26	657,45	42,23
Canada	65,02	190,68	29,92
France	44,65	163,11	258,52
US	516,11	820,08	475,73

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Table 11 shows that the rise of Western bilateral ODA to the region has gone from doubling of allocations in some cases, to *almost 10-fold increases, such as in the case of UK* aid to the region which jumps from USD 75, 26 million in 2001, to USD 657, 45 million in 2002, to go back to USD 42, 23 million in the next year.

It is reasonable to argue the single factor of this massive increase of Western bilateral ODA to the Balkans in 2002 was the extradition of former Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY at The Hague.²²² Immediately after 5 October 2000


²²¹ See complete information in Annex, Table 1.

²²² This has been confirmed by the extensive review of the media coverage on the international political dynamic at the time and on the role foreign assistance has played in the process, and has been discussed in Chapter 4. For additional sources corroborating this conclusion see for example: The Economist, Who is in Charge? The Yugoslavia Milosevic Leaves Behind: The Milosevic Effect Continues to Trouble Serbia and Montenegro, 7 July 2001; The Guardian, Hague is Not the Place to Try Milosevic: The Tribunal is Effectively the

when Milosevic was brought down from power, sanctions on Serbia were dropped and aid started to flow in. Nevertheless, aid was made conditional on full cooperation with the ICTY and the first big condition to be met already by 2001, was the extradition of Milosevic. Milosevic's extradition on 28 June 2001 caused a strong response in the donor community.

In conclusion, the third and biggest rise in ODA to the Balkans was a response to events unfolding in one (but the biggest) country in the region, the extradition of Milosevic. Hence, the big rise in ODA to the region is accounted for by *only one country* – Serbia (FRY). This can be further corroborated by Chart 8 below, displaying the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans, by individual country.

Chart 8: Time-dynamic of all ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; by countries (vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Chart 8 complements the picture of the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans by breaking it down by countries. From the chart it is clear that the biggest rises account for on ex-Yu unspecified ODA and aid to Serbia. Along the line of discussing the 2002 peak of ODA to the Balkans, Chart 8 shows that it is also supported by a big spike of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, which is identical to the spike produced by the bilateral surge to Serbia (FRY). There can be little doubt that the factor of this big rise is something else than the extradition of the former Serbian president. The Annex²²³ reveals that most of this increase to ex-Yu unspecified is a result of a big outpouring

Legal Arm of NATO in the Balkans, 2 August 2001; The Guardian, Huge Aid Promise Prompted Handover, 29 June 2001; The Guardian, Milosevic Extradited: Donations: pounds 1bn aid rewards Serbia: Relieved west stumps up cash to rebuild economy, 30 June 2001; New York Times, The Handover Of Milosevic: The Overview. Milosevic Is Given To U.N. For Trial In War-Crime Case, 29 June 2001; Evans Gareth, Belgrade Needs Help, but the Aid Must Have Firm Conditions, International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2001; Washington Post, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic For Trial by War Crimes Tribunal Extradition Sparks Crisis in Belgrade, 29 June 2001.

²²³ Annex, Table 16.

of aid from one donor, the European Commission. EC aid to ex-Yu unspecified jumps from USD 71, 86 million in 2001 to USD 751, 78 million in 2002, that is to say, more than 10-fold.²²⁴

In somewhat simplified terms perhaps, it can be argued that the entire, general story of foreign aid to the Balkans is told by Chart 8. The big changes in the dynamic of aid supply are result of war and emergency (ex-Yu unspecified trajectory) in the period 1992-1994; war and post war reconstruction (Bosnia); and democratic opening and ousting of a dictator (FRY/Serbia). In this overall framework, assistance to Croatia is a rather consistent, monotonous line; the supply to Macedonia jumps in 1999 (due to the Kosovo refugee crisis), and keeps a higher level in the ensuing years; Albania rises in the early 90s, primarily due to strong inflows of Italian ODA, and in 1999, as a result of the Kosovo refugees crisis. This is of course the most general regional account; the story as it appears on the surface. An insight into the aid stories of the individual countries will definitely reveal *in-country specific dynamics*. However, in all of its simplicity, the big picture presented by Chart 8 gives the factors and motivations for most of the aid to the Balkans.

A note of digression is due on the case of Serbia. There is the following question: as the big surge of aid reward for democratization, or reward for final elimination of what the West has come to perceive a relevant political enemy in this part of the world? There is a substantial difference. In the first case, the supply of aid would be motivated by the ideological drive of faith in democracy. In the second case, it would be a more pragmatic tool of foreign policy which aims to deal with political opponents.

At this point a closer look is due into the time-dynamic of ODA to individual countries in the Balkans, in order to be able to observe their specific realities.

²²⁴ Unfortunately this particular allocation from the EC to the category of ex Yu unspecified in 2002 is a subject of strong discrepancy between the two DAC databases, the online statistical database and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The CRS will be explained and used extensively in the next chapters. Even though the CRS is not a full account of aid allocations, as it will be explained further in the text, it is very relevant for the inquiry as it contains micro data on ODA which is useful in determining the final ends of the aid allocations (see Chapter 7). The DAC online database and the CRS do not normally coincide and this is the reality in aid research which has to be accepted. However in this particular case, the discrepancy between what is reported by the DAC online statistical database (Annex, Table 16) and what is reported by the CRS is huge. Whereas the DAC online statistical database has reported an allocation of USD 751,78 million to ex Yu unspecified in 2002, the CRS has reported an amount of only USD 203,1 million (constant 2006 prices). A difference of around USD 550 million is unfortunately unaccounted for because of the reporting imperfections.


6.1 Albania

Chart 9 below ²²⁵ displays the time-dynamic of all ODA to Albania in the 1990-2005 period. The chart presents in much greater detail what is already observable from the overall time-perspective of ODA to the Balkans. There are two major spikes in the flow of ODA supply to Albania. The first is caused by a bilateral surge in the very beginning of the 90s; the second is in 1999 and is caused by the response to the Kosovo refugee crisis. The second rise begins already in 1997 and it is probably at least in part a response to Albania's domestic crisis related to the collapse of the pyramidal saving schemes which caused a situation of serious political instability in the country.

The strong bilateral rise in the early 90s is quite specific in that it is by and large caused by the *massive increase of ODA by one single bilateral – Italy*. Italy's development assistance to Albania jumps from USD 7, 08 million in 1990 to USD 369, 55 million in 1991.²²⁶ Some of the motivations for Italy's behaviour have already been discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 on motives and factors of aid to the Balkans.

Nevertheless, for Chart 9 is evident that multilateral ODA soon follows Italy's reaction; it rises from USD 2, 91 million in 1991 to USD 251, 87 in 1992.²²⁷ The lion's share of this aid flow came from the EC which contributed USD 246, 06 million.²²⁸ In this sense it can be argued that Italy was the first country (from obvious reasons) to react to the humanitarian circumstance in Albania, immediately after its opening, and that the EC soon followed suit.

Chart 9: Time-dynamic of all ODA net to Albania, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

²²⁵ Chart 9 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 29 in the Annex. Chart 9 is a copy of Chart 31 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

²²⁶ Annex, Table 3.

²²⁷ Annex, Table 11.

²²⁸ *ibid*

Another moment worth mentioning is the visible rise in non-DAC bilateral ODA in the period 1991-1993. This assistance goes from USD 11, 48 million in 1991 to USD 56, 53 million in 1993, in order to plummet down already in 1994.²²⁹ Part of this assistance has been provided by Arab countries. Aid from Arab countries to Albania rose from USD 0, 71 million in 1992 to USD 13, 53 in 1993, and it dwindled already in 1994.²³⁰ This is bilateral ODA provided by countries which are not members of the DAC. In addition, Albania was a relevant recipient of ODA from Arab agencies, which are included in the total multilateral receipts. Albania is *the only country in the region where Arab agencies (AA) rank on the top-5 multilateral donors.*²³¹

In conclusion, *the dynamic of ODA to Albania overtime was by and large factored by crises: humanitarian (and migrant) immediately after the opening; the political turmoil of 1997; and the 1999 Kosovo crisis.* The first two of these crises were domestic, the third, which produced the high point of ODA to Albania in 1999, was a regional spillover – it was not a crisis in Albania but hosting of refugees from Kosovo.

6.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

Chart 10 below ²³² describes the time-dynamic of ODA to Bosnia and Herzegovina. ODA marks a strong upward trend starting in 1993 and ending in 1995, which is the year of the end of the war and the Dayton peace agreement. From there on it marks a small decline, which from 1997 onwards changes into a new gradual rise, logically, produced by the reconstruction effort. *The peak year of ODA to Bosnia is 1999.*

It is observable that the trend is dictated by the bilateral DAC ODA whereas multilateral aid pursues its own, more linear trend. ODA to BiH goes up and down as bilateral supply directs it. The peak in 1999, four years after the end of the war in the country, was most probably produced by the historic occasion of the creation of the Stability Pact, which impelled donor countries to make additional aid pledges. From that point on, ODA to BiH has a rather linear descending trend, with a smaller rise from multilateral aid in 2004.


²²⁹ Annex, Table 29.

²³⁰ This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database.

²³¹ Annex, Table 36.

²³² Chart 10 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 30 in the Annex. Chart 10 is a copy of Chart 33 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

Chart 10: Time-dynamic of ODA to BiH, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

The trend of non-DAC ODA is completely independent from the rest. Part of it is aid from Arab countries. Bosnia was the strongest recipient of ODA from Arab countries in the region with a total of USD 231, 85 in the period of 1990-2005.²³³

In addition, it should be noted that the rise of ODA to BiH corresponds with the decline of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified. The logic should be sought in the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia. By the time the new successor states had been recognized, ODA to the region was registered as aid to ex-Yu unspecified. This is nevertheless only part of the story. This issue will be encountered also further in the text. The review of the micro data on aid allocations in Chapter 7 will show that there are considerable differences in reporting “habits” among donors, and not always it is possible to say why a certain donors registers the allocation to the category of “ex Yu” even though the description contained in the micro data indicates that the allocation has a country-specific outcome.

6.3 Croatia


Chart 11²³⁴ displays the flow of the different types of ODA to Croatia in the 1990-2005 period. The total ODA Croatia received in the transition period was substantially smaller compared to the rest of the countries in the region, and the dramatic trajectories of the trend-lines are at least in part a result of this state of facts. Some of the spikes are a reflection of increase in ODA by a single donor. For example, the strong upward rise in 1993, similar to Bosnia, corresponds to the decline of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, and it is probably a result of the international recognition of the two countries which took place in 1992. Whereas the first big surge, in 1994 is a result of the combined effort of both bilateral and multilateral

²³³ This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database.

²³⁴ Chart 11 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 31 in the Annex. Chart 11 is a copy of Chart 35 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

ODA, the bilateral spike in 1996 is caused by a single donor, Germany, and its aid injection of USD 95,46 million in that particular year.²³⁵ There is no relevant change in the behaviour of any other donor.

Chart 11: Time-dynamic of ODA to Croatia, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

After the surge in 1994, multilateral ODA stays low with only a very mild ascendance over the years. The next bilateral rise, after 1994 and 1996, is in the period of 1999-2001. This is again a *result of the increase in allocation of just two donors*, in this case Norway and the US. This is visible from [Table 12 below](#).

Table 12: US and Norway ODA to Croatia, 1998-2001, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001
US	2,08	12,65	13,89	32,49
Norway	24,93	6,82	8,72	31,53

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Nevertheless, their individual dynamics differ. Norwegian ODA decreases towards 1999, to rise again in 2001. US assistance marks a significant rise from 1998 into 1999. A relevant assumption as to the factor influencing these trends is the democratic breakthrough in Croatia in early 2000, after the death of President Franjo Tudjman in December of 1999. In its last years the Tudjman regime came to be increasingly perceived by the West as non-democratic. It is fair to assume that, given the very strong US engagement in democracy promotion, the rise of US assistance was related to the prospect of a democratic opening in Croatia. The flow of US aid over the years supports such an assumption; US ODA receives new, consistently higher levels compared to the pre-2000 period.²³⁶ Nevertheless, the same assumption could probably not be used concerning Norway. For one, Norway's reaction was not consistent in the similar case of Serbia; there its assistance actually decreased after the democratic breakthrough. Thus, the reason for Norway's injection of aid in that

²³⁵ Annex, Table 5.

²³⁶ Annex, Table 5.

particular year needs further exploration, but that is beyond the scope of the present discussion. The final ends of (some of the allocations comprising) the Norwegian assistance to Croatia will be studied in Chapter 7.

Finally and curiously enough, the rise of non-DAC bilateral ODA to Croatia in 2001 and 2002 is again the result of actions by a single donor, in this case the distant Korea, which in 2001 gave Croatia USD 19,45 million, and in 2002 USD 26,06 million.²³⁷ These allocations are loans, but which nevertheless meet the criteria to count as ODA. Given the small totals of other ODA to Croatia, these allocations by Korea obviously do make a difference on the chart of aid flows.

It could be argued that this is a trade deal of some sort which nevertheless was registered as ODA. This could be argued from the fact that apart from these loans (and an USD 8, 61 million loan to Albania in 2004) Korea does not have a relevant donor presence in the Western Balkans. However, the registration of Korean assistance to Croatia is not an isolated example of registering such financial arrangements as foreign aid. It is the first one to be observed because of the fact that it strikes out given its relative size to other ODA flows Croatia has received. The analysis of the micro data in Chapter 7 will identify other similar cases. This type of financial arrangement is nevertheless ODA, because it meets the criteria to be registered as ODA. Nevertheless it is also obvious that it strikes out from the mainstream of foreign assistance flows to the Balkans.

6.4 Macedonia


The time-dynamic of ODA to Macedonia is presented in Chart 12 below.²³⁸ Similarly to the takeoff of ODA in Bosnia and Croatia, ODA to Macedonia only picks up in 1994; before that period of time whatever assistance the country had received; it was as part of ex-Yu unspecified. The original rise of ODA in 1994 is a result of multilateral action and in particular of aid infusions by two donors, the EC (USD 48, 12 million) and the IDA of the World Bank (USD 48, 85 million).²³⁹ After the initial spike, multilateral (due to regular IDA allocations) and bilateral flows have a rather consistent trajectory until the year of 1999 when there is a strong peak in total ODA primarily caused by a bilateral surge, but also relevant rise in multilateral ODA. The factor for this rise is external to Macedonia; it is the Kosovo refugee crisis.

²³⁷ This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database.

²³⁸ Chart 12 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 32 in the Annex. Chart 12 is a copy of Chart 37 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

²³⁹ Annex, Table 14.

Chart 12: Time-dynamic of ODA to Macedonia, 1990 – 2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Macedonia hosted between 200.000-300.000 refugees for a period of a couple of months in 1999, and this was the major factor for the huge increase in ODA funding.

After the rise in 1999, the bilateral trajectory descends a little, only to rise further in 2001 as a response, this time, to Macedonia's confined war and humanitarian emergency in that year. Multilateral ODA does not follow this trend and marks a consistent decline from 2000 onward. This is a result of the decreasing aid supplies from two major donors, the EC and IDA.²⁴⁰ Macedonia's peak year is 2002, from which point ODA starts to decrease.

An interesting observation is that the 1999 Kosovo crisis established a stronger presence of some bilaterals also in Macedonia. Whereas some big donors had a strong aid response only to the 1999 emergency and withdrew immediately afterwards, others maintained their more relevant presence in the country. One such example is the US, which *before 1999 had a very small, almost negligible presence in Macedonia*. Starting with 1999 Macedonia becomes a strong recipient of continuous US assistance.²⁴¹

6.5 FRY/Serbia

The time-dynamic of ODA to FRY/Serbia in the 1990-2005 period is presented on Chart 13 below.²⁴² Flows to the country are rather dormant all the way to 1999. Serbia was in between sanctions for most throughout the 90s in which period it could not receive anything but basic humanitarian assistance. This is the major factor for the absence of more relevant assistance flows until 1999. The first big rise of ODA

²⁴⁰ Annex, Table 14.


²⁴¹ Annex, Table 6.

²⁴² Chart 13 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 33 in the Annex. Chart 12 is a copy of Chart 39 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

happens in 1999, and from the chart it is visible that is exclusively a result of bilateral flows. Without a doubt this is the response to the Kosovo humanitarian emergency.

Multilateral ODA rises only in 2000 and 2001 during which year bilateral receipts remain on the level from 1999. Multilateral ODA dramatically collapses in 2002 whereas bilateral flows skyrocket to produce the peak of ODA receipts in the Balkans in the entire period of transition (see Chart 13 below).

Chart 13: Time-dynamic of ODA to FRY/Serbia, 1990-2005 (vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

As Chart 13 indicates, the time-period 1998-2003 is the time of dramatic explosion in aid supply to FRY/Serbia. This invites closer inspection of the composition of that strong rise. [Table 13](#) below gives in greater detail the trends in bilateral and multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia in the period 1998-2003.

Table 13: DAC bilateral and multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia 1998-2003, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
------	------	------	------	------	------	------

DAC bil.	124,55	950,3	871,3	894,01	2539,3	987,08
mult.	16,4	3,78	818,36	1030,3	4,52	519,31

(source: DAC online statistical database)

At a closer look, the big oscillations of multilateral aid are produced by two donors only, the EC and UNHCR ([Table 14](#)), whereby the bulk of the difference is produced by the trend dictated by the EC.

Table 14: EC and UNHCR assistance to FRY/Serbia, 1998-2002, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
------	------	------	------	------	------

EC	16,4	0	729,14	956,13	0
UNHCR	0	0	87,03	65,85	0

(source: DAC online statistical database)

A closer look is also necessary to get a better idea of the sources of the bilateral rise both in 1999 and 2002. The exponential rise of ODA to FRY/Serbia in the 1999-2002 period is obviously a result of two distinct and unrelated factors; the first is the Kosovo crisis, and the second is the democratic changes in Serbia proper which started in October of 2000.

The following, Table 15 presents the response of some of the major bilaterals and demonstrates which donors responded more strongly to events in 1999 and which to events in 2000/2001.

Table 15: Selected DAC bilaterals to FRY/Serbia, 1998-2002, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
UK	0,28	1,52	40,21	24,88	625,61
US	7,68	43,91	125,54	239,31	554,23
Germany	40,95	148,2	142,94	115,33	733,54
Switzer.	8,73	95,00	41,18	47,9	30,99
Norway	19,49	171,24	124,18	62,48	34,85
Nether.	8,96	90,47	113,71	80,45	88,3
Italy	2,09	51,99	31,22	51,29	5,47

(source: DAC online statistical database)

It should be mentioned that a full account of aid to Serbia as opposed to aid to Kosovo and Montenegro *cannot be produced solely from the DAC dataset*. In order to get a clearer picture, this data has to be cross-referenced with data from other sources which operate a breakdown of allocations by Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. On the other hand, the sources of the bilateral big-bang in 2002 are evident; UK ODA jumps from very low levels to USD 625, 61 million in 2002; German aid jumps from USD 115, 33 in 2001 to USD 733, 54 in 2002. There is a substantial rise also in ODA from the US. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Germany and the UK are the major culprits of the biggest rise in ODA to the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period. The question is naturally – why? The answer will be provided later in this chapter.

6.6 Disaggregation of FRY

Disaggregation of the aid flows to FRY represents a special methodological problem. The DAC only registers data by countries, which given the perplexity of the political situation in the Balkans over the last period and the (still) unresolved status issues, cannot provide the definite answer on the final destinations of aid supply. FRY was one country but had three distinct entities which had completely different relationship with the donor community. Serbia proper was under complete sanctions until October 2000, and in this period it could only receive humanitarian aid; Kosovo was the playing field of the biggest humanitarian emergency in Europe after WW II; over the years Montenegro had broken off with the Milosevic regime and had become an ally to the West. Because of these factors it is logical to expect relevant differences in the status of Ser/Kos/Mon as aid recipients.

Full disaggregation of the aid flows to FRY is *probably not possible*. Many donors have registered their flows, for example in response to the Kosovo crisis, as aid given to the Balkans as a region, that is to say “ex Yu unspecified”. Whereas some donors do keep some sort of account of which allocations were made where (even if perhaps they were not reported to the DAC), other simply registered the flows as aid to the region. Because of this, comprehensive disaggregation of flows to FRY (even under the assumption that it would be theoretically possible) of each and every bilateral and multilateral would be beyond the scope of this inquiry. Instead, a partial review of some of the major donors, for whom (partial) data could be collected and compared from different sources, could be presented. The presentation will concentrate on two major donors, the EC and the US, given that they are some of the biggest donors to the region. The EC is the biggest donor overall, whereas the US is the second biggest bilateral. In addition to their relevance, it has to be underscored that the choice was supported by the *availability of data*.

6.6.1 United States Aid Flows to FRY

In addition to what is reported as US assistance to FRY in the DAC database, USAID maintains a separate database of US economic assistance, called the US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook)²⁴³. This database does actually include a disaggregation of flows between Serbia & Montenegro on one side, and Kosovo on the other. This is presented on Table 16 below.

Table 16: US assistance to Serbia & Montenegro vs. Kosovo 1997 – 2005 constant prices (2006 USD millions)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Ser& Mon	2,00	12,90	167,1	372,0	427,7	291,4	276,0	266,9	233,0
of which			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kosovo	0,10	0,10	16,10	191,1	186,9	78,10	100,1	116,5	127,4
Kosovo (%)	5,00	0,78	9,63	51,37	43,70	26,80	36,27	43,65	54,68

(source: USAID Greenbook)

The data extracted from the Greenbook, as can be expected, does not correspond with the data reported under the US with the DAC. This is regularly the case when data from different sources are compared. As this inconsistency is the rule rather than the exception in data comparisons, the intention should be to use it as analytical tool rather than lament over it as hindrance. For purposes of comparison, Table 17 below, an excerpt from the DAC records reminds of US aid disbursements to FRY/Ser and ex-Yu unspecified in the pertinent period.

Table 17: US assistance to FRY/Ser and ex-Yu unspecified 1997-2003, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
FRY/Ser	0	7,68	43,91	125,54	239,31	554,23	229,74
ex Yu unspec.	0	0	59,51	0	0	0	0

(source: DAC online statistical database)

²⁴³ Available at <http://qsdb.usaid.gov/gbk/>.

What the two tables together confirm despite the utter discord of the data could be summarized as follows: a) US aid to the FRY clearly skyrocketed in 1999, from a very low level in the previous 1998, b) Kosovo represented a *huge portion* of the total aid to FRY in the 1999-2001 period. This is visible from Table 16 according to which Kosovo stood for 51, 37 % of total US aid to FRY in 2000, and 43, 70% in 2001. Actually, after a decline in 2002 ad 2003, as portion of the total, its share rises again in the 2004-2005 period.

Unfortunately, the Greenbook does not provide a breakdown of aid allocations between Serbia and Montenegro either. Another official source, a report to the US Congress from 2001 produced by the Congress Research Service (CRS, 2001) gives additional insights into this dimension (Table 18). The insight is partial because the table only operates with USAID data, and does not take into account aid amounts coming from other US government agencies – for example, most of the emergency aid for the refugees came through BPRM (Bureau for Population, Migration, and Refugees) of the State Department.

This data is also in dissonance with other previously provided data, but nevertheless, the table is very useful for the inquiry: it demonstrates that the bigger, in some years the *much bigger* share of USAID assistance to FRY in the period before the fall of Milosevic, actually went to Montenegro. Given the huge difference in population size between the then two republics of FRY, the only conclusion to make is that - *Montenegro benefited from very generous US assistance* in this period of time.

The already mentioned fact that data from different sources seldom correspond however, naturally raises the doubt of *how relevant that data actually is?* Unfortunately, these are constraints which cannot be avoided in discussing aid to FRY.

In favour of Table 18 below, it can be said that it contains data which was part of an official report for US Congress, thus its credibility can in no case be doubted. Nevertheless, the data is only partial.

Table 18: USAID assistance to Serbia and Montenegro, 1998-2001 (USD millions)

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Ser	7,3	6,5	25	99,8
Mon	4,9	41	35,1	72,3
	12,2	47,5	60,1	172,1

(source: CRS, 2001: 3; note: figures for 2001 are estimates)

A relevant point of conclusion which can be made based on the disaggregation of the aid flows to FRY with the help of additional data sources is that *very little ODA went to Serbia before October 2000* and the removal from power of the Milosevic regime. Given the specific challenge presented, this is a significant induction. It should be mentioned that the review of the micro data in Chapter 7 can *generally* be of additional help in this problem – although it cannot provide definite precision either – however that would always depend on the particular donor and the level of detail it has reported to the DAC. In the particular case of the US unfortunately, also the micro data are not of much help for obtaining more information on the final destination of

the allocations (in terms of Serbia, Montenegro, or Kosovo) because the US is one of the donors who regularly not providing much additional detail on its ODA commitments.

6.6.2 European Commission Aid Flows to FRY

The EC was the prime donor to the region of the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period, and subsequently to FRY. Disaggregation of the EC aid flows to FRY is hence of particular importance to the inquiry. The point of departure for the closer exploration into ODA flows to FRY is naturally the data registered by the DAC. Table 19 below presents the data on EC ODA supply to FRY/Serbia and the category of ex Yu unspecified in the period 1998-2002.

Table 19. EC aid to FRY/Ser and ex Yu unspecified 1998-2002, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
FRY/Ser	16,4	0	729,14	956,13	0
ex Yu unspec.	68,55	370,07	124,27	71,86	751,78

(source: DAC online statistical database)

Even if the DAC only registers data at country level, the amount of USD 370, 07 to “ex Yu unspecified” as opposed to zero assistance to FRY/Ser in 1999, is already indicative. Nevertheless, this is not to understand that Serbia did not receive absolutely any aid in 1999. The humanitarian emergency also involved Serb population from Kosovo which fled to Serbia. Under UNHCR rules they were not considered refugees in the legal sense of the definition of a “refugee”, since they moved in another part of what was legally the same country, and instead had the status of IDPs (internally displaced people).

An EC publication on assistance to Kosovo provides additional insight into what was Kosovo’s share of what the DAC registers as aid to FRY/Ser. Table 20 below gives the amounts of EC aid to Kosovo alone in the period 1998-2000.²⁴⁴

Table 20: Total EC aid to Kosovo 1998-2000, (Euro millions)

	1998	1999	2000	total
	7,50	505,27	360,00	872,77

(source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4)

notes: the amount of Euro 505, 27 million in 1999 is composed of: a) Euro 127 million of reconstruction assistance (Kosovo only), b) Euro 378, 27 million humanitarian aid (to the whole region).

²⁴⁴ The table is presented in its original format in the sense that the amounts are in Euro. No effort is made to convert the amounts in USD, which is the currency used for all data taken from the DAC throughout this text. The purpose of the data from the additional sources is to allow comparisons, and these general comparisons are possible even across currencies. In addition, conversion would not be of much help also because it is not known whether the data taken from EC sources are in current or constant Euros.

As the notes to the table already explain, the amount for 1999 is composed of reconstruction aid for Kosovo proper, and the amount of Euro 378, 27 as a regional response to the Kosovo crisis. This means that this amount benefited all the countries in the region that were affected by the humanitarian crisis.

The next Table 21, provided by the same source, gives an additional breakdown of the amount of Euro 378, 27 allocated regionally, by recipient countries.

Table 21. EC 1999 humanitarian aid in response to the Kosovo crisis, breakdown by countries/entities (Euro millions)

Kos	111,70
Ser	70,30
Mon	17,57
Mac	39,81
Alb	97,07
BiH	2,50
regional	39,32
total	378,27

(source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4)

As can be observed from Table 21, most of this amount also went to Kosovo, followed by Albania and Serbia.

In addition, Table 22 presented below, benefit of the same source, provides further insight into the composition of the ODA to Kosovo in the period 1998-2000.

Table 22. Total EC assistance to Kosovo 1998-2000, breakdown by categories, (Euro millions),

	1998	1999	2000	total
reconstruction assistance	7,50	127,00	275,00	409,50
humanitarian aid		378,27	50,00	428,27
EFA			35,00	35,00
total	7,50	505,27	360,00	872,77

(source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4)

notes:

1. efa = exceptional financial assistance,
2. amount of Euro 127 million in 1999 is from OBNOVA²⁴⁵,
3. amount of Euro 378, 27 million is regional “response to Kosovo crisis”.

²⁴⁵ (source: The European Commission's Reconstruction Programme in Kosovo (OBNOVA), available at http://www.seerecon.org/kosovo/ec/obnova_1999.htm).

The study of data is further complicated by the fact that EC reconstruction aid and humanitarian assistance are regularly provided from different budgets and distributed by different agencies. EC humanitarian aid is executed by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) whereas reconstruction aid is part of the EC development assistance programs, such as PHARE, OBNOVA, and subsequently CARDS and IPA. The research for this chapter could not identify a single, integral source which would provide a full breakdown of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to the entities within FRY over the entire time-period under study (1990-2005).²⁴⁶ Thus, the option was to use data collected from several various sources. This produces inconsistencies but also provides alternatives to data which would be collected from a single source, which in lack of choices, would have to be accepted as the only valid one.

Table 23 presented below, has been compiled from ECHO's annual reviews and reports from the period 1999-2003, and it displays the EC allocations of humanitarian assistance to the Balkans, as reported per different years.

Table 23. ECHO allocations 1999-2003, (Euro millions)²⁴⁷

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	total
ex Yu	351,5					351,5
WB/Balkans		98,7	83,5		7,66	189,86
Serbia				37,5		37,5
Mac/Kos				5,5		5,5
	351,5	98,7	83,5	43	7,66	584,36

note: the term Western Balkans or Balkans as used in the ECHO reports and annual reviews comprises a different set of countries in different years, i.e. countries which at that point were still affected by the refugee crisis.

Finally, Table 24 below is extracted from the CARDS mid-term evaluation and presents CARDS aid flows to FRY in the period 2001-2003.

Table 24. EC CARDS to FRY 2001-2003 (Euro millions)

	2001	2002	2003	total
Kos	139,87	121,64	17,4	278,91
Mon	17,13	12,55	8,37	38,05
Ser	197,24	160,38	142,79	500,41
total	354,24	294,57	168,56	817,37

(source DRNC, 2004)

The data disaggregated in this way is unfortunately still incomplete. There is no comprehensive disaggregation by Ser/Kos/Mon for the whole range of years under inspection. Yet, what is available is still more than having to rely on the DAC register alone. The DAC database is the prime source for study of ODA globally, and it is the central register all countries and multilaterals report to. However, due to the specific

²⁴⁶ This is not to say that such an integral source does not exist; only that the extensive research of different EC sources did not produce it.

²⁴⁷ (source: ECHO, 1999; ECHO, 2000; ECHO, 2001; ECHO, 2002; ECHO, 2003; CEC, 2003) data extracted from ECHO annual reviews and reports.

circumstances of the FRY case, data from the DAC alone gives a far incomplete picture. The peak years of 2000 and 2001, according to DAC data are still insufficiently explained with the data collected from additional sources. The DAC registers an amount of USD 729, 14 to FRY in the year of 2000. When compared with data from EC sources, the conclusion is that at least half of this amount went to Kosovo; Table 22 shows that in 2000 Kosovo received a total of Euro 360 million, the big share of which was for reconstruction. The next year of 2001, according to the DAC is the peak with USD 956, 13. This can be compared against Table 24 above which provides the CARDS allocations in 2001 for Ser/Kos/Mon. There is a huge difference from the DAC reported data which is unaccounted for. One possible explanation for at least some of the difference – data discord can be charged for the rest ²⁴⁸ – is the additional aid to Serbia, due to the political changes – which did not come from the CARDS, primarily in the form of micro-financial assistance.

Despite the data challenge, the following conclusions are possible: a) in 1999 the largest share of the aid went to Kosovo; Serbia received some but proportionately little of the total ODA for FRY, and with respect to its population size, b) in 2000 the balance changed; from the data available it is obvious that at least a half went to Kosovo; humanitarian assistance is on the decline, and reconstruction aid rises; c) by 2001 Serbia becomes a strong recipient of EC assistance.

6.7 Ex-Yu Unspecified

According to DAC guidelines, “Unallocated/Unspecified [is the] aid which cannot be assigned to another part of the table, and in the case of project or sector assistance, commitments for which the sectoral destination had not been specified. Includes aid to non-governmental organizations and administrative costs (OECD, 2006: 11).”


A similar explanation can be found in the DAC statistical reporting directives, according to which, code 998 (unallocated/unspecified) should be used “only for forms of aid which cannot be assigned to another part of the table, and also, in the case of project or sector assistance, to record contributions for which sectoral destination remains to be specified by or in agreement with the donor (DAC, 2007: 47).”

A quarter of all ODA to the Western Balkans in the 1990-2005 period has gone to “Sts. of ex-Yu unspecified.” The bulk of it was in the period 1992-1994, as can be observed from Chart 14²⁴⁹ below.

²⁴⁸ It can be expected that at least some of the data discrepancies are due to the timing of their reporting. Due to delays in reporting to the DAC, what the European Commission registers as allocated in for example 2000, the DAC will perhaps only register a year later. In addition, the DAC keeps records of both commitments and disbursements of ODA (the DAC data used in this writing refer to disbursements unless specifically specified otherwise). Other data record extracted from sources other than the DAC will sometimes make the difference between commitments and disbursements, but most often they will not.

²⁴⁹ Chart 14 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 34 in the Annex. Chart 14 is a copy of Chart 41 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the chapter.

Chart 14: ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

ODA to ex-Yu unspecified reached its peak in 1993 as a result of *equal contribution of bilateral and multilateral flows*. From then on it has declined and stayed small, with two subsequent rises; a smaller one in 1999, caused by a multilateral increase; and a bigger one in 2002, again a *result of a multilateral surge*, with a smaller bilateral contribution.

The 1993 spike of ODA to states of ex-Yu unspecified is, assumedly, a result of the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, and the wars and humanitarian emergencies in Croatia and Bosnia. A lot of the humanitarian effort was regional and subsequently reported without a specific geographic allocation. This has an additional dimension: huge shares of humanitarian assistance are channelled through NGOs, and this type of aid, according to the DAC guidelines, comprises the category of geographically “unspecified” assistance.

The 1999 and 2002 rises were by and large result of supply of EC aid, which again was implemented as a regional effort. This rise is mostly accounted for by the amount of USD 751, 78 millions from the EC. Unfortunately, because data on this aid allocation in made by the EC in 2002, is not available in the CRS system, as already explained, the final destination of this ODA, both geographically and thematically cannot be discussed in more detail.

7. Who Gave Aid to the Balkans?

Following the discussion on how much aid the Balkans received in the 1990-2005 period, who were the major recipients of ODA in the region, and what was the time-dynamic of aid supply over the years, it is time to turn the attention to who were the major donors to the Balkans in this period of time.

Of the total USD 42, 8 billion the Balkans received in the 16-year period under scrutiny, USD 26 billion (61%) was DAC bilateral money, and USD 15, 9 billion (37%) was multilateral ODA. Very small portion of USD 840, 39 million accounted for on non-DAC bilateral ODA.

It is important to disaggregate these amounts further in order to get a clear picture of *who gave aid, to whom, and when*. This will help to further clarify the process of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period of transition, to identify the specificities of the donor-recipient relationships, and to draw conclusions about the motives and factors of aid, its priorities, and possible impact.

The Annex (Table 35 - Table 40) provides listings of the top 10 donors to the region (bilateral, multilateral, and combined) and listings of top 5 donors (bilateral, multilateral, and combined) to individual countries. The exploration of the major donors to the region, and subsequently per individual countries starts from these rankings.

As evident from Table 35, the top donor to the region in the transition period has been the European Commission with a total of around *USD 10 billion, or roughly 1/4 of all the ODA the Balkans received. The largest bilateral donors to the region have been Germany and the United States, with USD 4, 6 and USD 4, 3 billion respectively.*

The contributions from the top 10 biggest bilateral and multilateral donors combined²⁵⁰ total USD 33,3 billion, or 77,8 % of all the ODA to the region, out of the 22 DAC bilaterals, and the 14 multilateral donors (or groups of donors) active in the Balkans in the observed period.

At even a closer focus, *the contributions from the top 3 donors to the region, the EC, Germany and the US, total USD 19 billion, or 44,4% of all the aid receipts of the region in the period of transition.*

This calculation has the purpose to underscore the important point that: foreign aid is agglomerated and that *most of the aid giving (in nominal terms) originates from several largest donors*. This issue has been noted in the theoretical discussion with regards to foreign aid globally.²⁵¹ Clearly, the same is the case with the Balkans.

Table 35 shows that with exception to the US, all the other donors listed on the top 10 list of largest bilaterals to the Balkans are European countries, and seven of them, with the exception of Norway and Switzerland, are EU member states.²⁵² The conclusion is that *the largest share of aid to the Balkans has come from within Europe.*

The European Commission dominates the multilateral donor group by contributing 63, 3% of all the multilateral supply.


²⁵⁰ Annex, Table 35.

²⁵¹ AUTHORS

²⁵² If the list would be further extended, the next countries are also EU members, Spain and Greece, and only after them comes Japan and Canada (Annex p. 1).

Given that the EC was the single largest donor to the region, it is relevant to look into the in-region distribution of its ODA. Chart 15 below presents the country shares of EC ODA to the Balkans.

Chart 15. Country shares of EC ODA to Western Balkans, 1990-2005




(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Predictably, FRY/Serbia and BiH have received the largest shares, but it is noticeable that a big part of the EC ODA, 27% has been allocated to ex-Yu unspecified. If this item would be removed, Serbia's and Bosnia's share would further rise. The conclusion is: the largest share of EC assistance to the Balkans is accounted for by FRY/Serbia and BiH.

Nevertheless, this is a static observation. It is also important to understand the time-dimension of EC ODA to the region. Chart 16 shows the time-dynamic EC foreign assistance to the region, and Chart 17 follows the time-dynamic by individual countries.

Chart 16: Time-dynamic of EC ODA to Western Balkans, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)




(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

The look at the charts of the time-dynamics confirms some of the previously made observations concerning the trends of ODA in the Balkans. EC aid jumps in 1993, declines and stays stable for a few years and then it reaches its peak in the 1999-2001

period. After 2002 it visibly declines, getting close to the level from around 1995-1996. The political events which acted as factors behind these trends have already been discussed earlier in this chapter: the wars in Croatia and Bosnia; the war in Kosovo; Milosevic's fall from power which marked Serbia's democratic breakthrough; and subsequently, Milosevic's extradition to International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague.

Chart 17: Time-dynamic of EC ODA to countries in Western Balkans, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Chart 17 presents interesting information concerning the in-country time-dynamic of EC ODA to the Balkans. The spikes in the ex-Yu unspecified trajectory are quite interesting, as they repeat successively in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. Their origins can however be assumed to be different; 1993 – humanitarian aid combined with legal succession issues; 1999 – regional response to a humanitarian crisis (huge humanitarian aid channeled through NGOs, which is usually registered as geographically unspecified); 2002 – non-humanitarian (development) aid by the European Commission (in part attributable to the CARDS regional cooperation component). It is important to underscore that this is an informed assumption only, based on the data and other information available.

The tables with the detailed numbers and the charts on the other major (top 10) bilateral donors to the Balkans are presented in the Annex (Table 17- Table 26). There are many consistencies in donor behavior, but there are also differences to be observed. Some of these will be noted in no particular order:

The bigger part of the top 10 donors have a considerable portion of the ODA allocated to ex-Yu unspecified. However, *the US is not part of this pattern*; only a very small fraction, 2%, of its ODA to the Balkans goes to ex-Yu unspecified. The answer (or at least a part of it) could lie in the time-dynamic. The US becomes a relevant donor to the Balkans relatively later than most of the European donors, in any case, effectively after 1993, when the bulk of the bilateral ex-Yu unspecified has been allocated to the region. This fact further confirms the assumption that it is the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia, in connection with the international recognition of the new states, and in combination with the regional character of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, to produce relevant share of aid allocated to ex-Yu unspecified. Nevertheless, for some of the bilaterals, allocations to ex-Yu unspecified rise again around the 1999 period.

Some of this can be assumedly accounted for by the renewed rise of humanitarian assistance, which is largely distributed through NGOs, caused by the Kosovo crisis.

Another observation is that: most of the major bilaterals fit in the pattern whereby FRY/Serbia and Bosnia are the major recipients of their assistance to the Balkans. The notable exceptions are Italy, the UK, and France.

Italy is perhaps the most specific case. *Entire 50% of its total ODA to the Balkans went to Albania.* In addition, the chart displaying the time-dynamic²⁵³ shows that most of this ODA was allocated in the very beginning of the 90s.


The charts of UK ODA to the Balkans²⁵⁴ demonstrate another donor behavior sui generis in the Balkans. *Entire 45% of UK aid went to only one country, FRY/Serbia, and the bulk of this of in one single year, 2002.* Another 43% went to ex-Yu unspecified. Beyond this, the UK gave very little aid to anyone else in the region.

The third specificity concerns France. Entire 52% of its ODA went to Serbia alone; most of it in 1999 (indicating it was for Kosovo), and then in 2002 and 2003. At least, in the case of France, Bosnia did receive some aid, 25%, (in the case of Italy – 16%); unlike in the case of UK which allocated only 4% of its aid to Bosnia.

An interesting exercise is to compare the allocations and allocation trends of some of the major donors to the region. Chart 18 displays the time-dynamic of ODA by the *three largest donors* to the Balkans, the EC, Germany, and the US.

Chart 18: Time-dynamic of EC, German, and US ODA to the Western Balkans, 1990-2005

(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

²⁵³ Annex, Table 20.


²⁵⁴ Annex, Table 22.

The chart reveals some similarities but also differences among the three biggest donors to the Balkans. Germany and the EC are both engaged in the Balkan crises ever since the beginning; this is not the case with the US which gradually increases its aid after the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, which it helped broker. The EC engagement in the region is mildly stronger than that of Germany and the US until 1999; at that point it radically outstrips the other two. Germany and the US have an almost identical pattern in the 1999-2004 period; it could be argued that the EC trajectory is similar in that it radically declines after 2002; but it does not slump and rises again between 1999 and 2002.

In continuation of this exercise, [Chart 19](#), displays the behavior of the donors whose allocations in the region were found to differ from the standard pattern found in the top 10 bilaterals. It presents the time-dynamics of Italy, France, and the UK, all of which in a different way were found to have allocated their ODA to the Balkans in a specific way.

Chart 19: Time –dynamic of Italian, French, and UK ODA to the Western Balkans, 1990-2005

(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

[Chart 19](#) is particularly interesting to analyze. Italy’s ODA reaches (as already observed) its peak in the very early 90s (destination country being Albania); it shows a small rise in 1999 (Kosovo refugee crisis), and it declines from that point on, displaying no particular interest in subsequent events in Serbia. French ODA is very modest during the crises in the first half of the 90s; it peaks in 1999 (allocation of USD 155,51 million to Bosnia, and USD 43,03 million to ex-Yu unspecified) and then again in 2002/2003 (allocations of USD 148, 82 million and USD 244,17 million to FRY/Serbia). The UK allocations have already been mentioned above; practically all of its aid to the Balkans went only to FRY/Serbia, in the single year of 2002, and to ex-Yu unspecified.


Finally, [Chart 20](#) displays the behavior of the so called “like-minded” donors in the Balkans. The like-minded donors is a term often used to describe the generous donors from Northern Europe, such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and eventually the Netherlands. Due to the smaller size of these countries, their ODA is smaller in nominal terms compared to ODA from the major global donors; however, in terms of

ODA as percent of GDP, the Nordic countries are the world's most generous providers of foreign aid.

Since Finland and Denmark have had more modest allocations in the region, the chart focuses on the other three, *Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands*, who were very strong donors in the Balkans.

Although all three donors display consistency, Sweden's trajectory is the most stable one, with smallest oscillations. None of the donors has a big climax in 2002, as is the case with most of the other donors featured above, with a minor exception of the Netherlands, which marks a smaller rise. The peaks are obviously in 1993 and 1999. This is consistent with most other donors, apart from the lack of enthusiasm in 2002.


Chart 20. Time-dynamic of Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch ODA to the Western Balkans, 1990 - 2005 (vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Finally, in this section, it is important to make a closer examination of the allocations of the two other (second and third) biggest multilateral donors to the Balkans, IDA/World Bank, and UNHCR. [Chart 21](#) below, presents the country shares of IDA assistance to the region, whereas [Chart 22](#) displays its time-dynamic. In addition, [Table 9](#) to [Table 16](#) in the Annex; offer a detailed presentation of the major multilateral donors to the region of the Balkans in the period 1990-2005.

Chart 21: Country shares of IDA ODA to the Balkans




(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

It is evident from Chart 21 that most of the assistance provided by IDA went to Bosnia (40%) and Albania (29%). Macedonia and FRY/Serbia received quite smaller shares, whereas Croatia was not eligible for IDA funding.²⁵⁵ Logically, no IDA assistance was allocated to ex-Yu unspecified.

One major observation from Chart 22 is that the time-dynamic of IDA assistance is ostensibly different from that of the other major donors.

Chart 22: Time-dynamic of IDA ODA to the countries in the Western Balkans, 1990-2005

(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)


²⁵⁵ IDA eligibility is assessed based on level of economic development expressed in GDP per capita. The DAC records, register only one exception to Croatia's non-eligibility for IDA funding. One small grant allocation is registered by the CRS. This will be revisited in Chapter 7.

Albania is the first country in the region to start receiving IDA funding, followed by Macedonia; Bosnia joins only after Dayton and FRY-Serbia only after the cancellation of the sanctions. The oscillations in IDA assistance to the countries in the Balkans are notably different from the other trends in trajectory discussed previously as they can not be easily explained with the major political events in the region. Such is for example the sharp rise in IDA assistance to Bosnia in 2004. This rise is obviously a result of a new major loan from IDA to Bosnia, but it is not directly motivated by an obvious factor in the way ODA from other donors is. In addition, it is only logical that IDA assistance is related to political stability and it only kicks in after political turbulence has ended.

The other major multilateral donor to the Balkans has been the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN agency in charge of refugees. [Chart 23](#) presents the country shares of UNHCR aid to the Balkans, whereas [Chart 24](#) the time-dynamic of UNHCR allocations.

The charts are quite self-explanatory. *Most of UNHCR's assistance to the Balkans (69%) was registered as allocated to ex-Yu unspecified*, and most of it was actually allocated in the 1992-1993 period, during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The motivation which underlay this assistance does not need particular explanation: this was humanitarian relief and help for the hundreds of thousands of refugees produced by the Croatian and Bosnian war. In addition, this helps further explain the phenomenon of the massive assistance which was allocated to “ex Yu unspecified”.


Chart 23: Country shares of UNHCR ODA to the Western Balkans



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

UNHCR aid re-emerges during the crisis in 1999 but with much smaller intensity compared to the Croatian and Bosnian war. The last big crisis in the Balkans was primarily addressed by the EC and the other big bilaterals.

Chart 24: Time-dynamic of UNHCR ODA to countries in the Western Balkans, 1990-2005
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)


The strong UNHCR presence in the Balkans is a distinct feature of the foreign aid phenomenon to the region. The Balkans did receive a lot of aid, but huge share of the total was directed at emergency relief, it aimed to help alleviate suffering. This was not assistance which supported economic development in the region. This additional dimension of the aid disaggregation process should be borne in mind in eventual considerations of impact of ODA to the region. Impact can not be assessed on the basis of the overall aid the Balkans received. There can not be such a thing as overall impact of USD 42, 8 billion. There can be separately, impact of humanitarian assistance – assessed on basis of its goal to help suffering; impact of reconstruction aid – assessed against its goal to reconstruct, to restore the physical and social infrastructure, and so forth.

8. Composition of ODA to the Balkans: Grants, Loans and Debt Relief

One final aspect to take into consideration at this point, when disaggregating foreign assistance to the Balkans, is the composition of aid with respect to shares of grant aid, loans, and debt relief.

Not counting the small share of non-DAC bilateral ODA, the ratio of grants vs. loans in the total foreign aid to the Western Balkans (DAC bilateral + multilateral) is in the order of 91% grants vs. 9% loans. [Chart 25](#) below presents the shares of grants vs. loans, whereas [Chart 26](#) displays the time-dynamic of grant aid vs. aid in loans over the 1990-2005 period.


Chart 25: ODA grants vs. loans to the Western Balkans



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

The time-dynamic of the supply of grants and loans clearly shows their completely different trend over the years. Whereas grant aid goes up and down and produces the spikes in total ODA flows in the period around 1993 and 1999-2002, the supply of loans has a completely different trajectory, seemingly completely independent of major development in the Balkans which acted as strong factors of grant aid.

Chart 26: Time-dynamic of ODA grants and loans to the Western Balkans (vertical axis: USD millions)




(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

There are two major conclusions to be drawn from these charts: a) ODA to the Balkans was by and large grant aid, and that subsequently, b) the *factors of aid in the Balkans influenced primarily grant aid*, whereas loans had their own trend which shows no reaction to major events in the region in the transition period. Most of the ODA loans to the region were extended by IDA; however, there was also a number of bilaterals which gave ODA in the form of loans.

In order to explore this aspect even further, the grants vs. loans ratio will be explored separately for DAC bilateral and multilateral aid.

Chart 27 displays the time-dynamic of DAC bilateral grants and loans. The chart is very similar to the previous one. Contrary to the dramatic trajectory of the ODA in the form of grants, the loans have a completely “horizontal” trajectory.


Chart 27. Time-dynamic of DAC bilateral ODA grants and loans to the Western Balkans
(vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

In addition, [Chart 28](#) presents the shares of DAC bilateral grants vs. loans, which further clarifies the picture: bilateral ODA is almost exclusively (98%) grants, with only 2% accounting for on loans.


Chart 28. DAC bilateral ODA share of grants vs. loans



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)


Finally, the charts presenting the share of grants and loans of multilateral ODA ([Chart 29](#)), and the time-dynamic of the DAC bilateral grants vs. loans ([Chart 30](#)), are predictable.

Chart 29. Time-dynamic of multilateral ODA grants and loans to Western Balkans (vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Chart 30. Share of grants vs. loans in multilateral ODA to Western Balkans.




(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Obviously, loans are quite larger share of multilateral ODA than bilateral one. Whereas *bilateral ODA to the Balkans was mostly in the form of grants*, 19% of multilateral ODA was in the form of loans. A deeper look clarifies this picture further. Of the total multilateral loans to the Balkans, in the amount of USD 3, 1 billion, the lion's share of USD 2, 5 billion was provided by the IDA. Basically, most of the ODA in the form of loans in the Balkans was given by the IDA/World Bank. The biggest share of this type of aid went to Bosnia (USD 1 billion), followed Albania (USD 762, 44 million), then Macedonia (USD 410, 38 million), and finally FRY/Serbia (USD 368, 72 million). Some of the ODA provided by the EC however also took the form of loans. Additional information on this issue will be provided in Chapter 7.

Finally, perhaps the most interesting observation comes from looking into the share of net debt relief in total ODA to the Balkans. *Debt relief is considered grant aid* and it is share of the total grant ODA supplied in the region. The DAC statistics reveals that debt relief in the Balkans was exclusively a *bilateral action*. All the debt forgiveness in the region was done by bilateral donors; multilateral donors did not do any debt forgiveness.

Chart 31 below presents the time-dynamic of grant ODA to the Balkans, but as its sub-dimension it shows the trend of debt relief as a component in grant aid.

Chart 31: Time-dynamic of ODA grants and net debt relief to Western Balkans (vertical axis: USD millions)



(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database)

Debt relief amounted to USD 3, 1 billion of the total USD 25, 4 billion or 12, 2 percent of the DAC bilateral grant ODA to the region. Chart 31 above clearly demonstrates that a big share of the big bilateral ODA rise in 2002 was actually produced by - *forgiveness of debt*. It was not supply of fresh assistance; a big part of this outpouring of ODA (something over USD 2, 0 billion as visible from Chart 31) was write-off of old debt.

Given that this was the absolute peak of ODA supply to the Balkans, it is necessary to make a closer examination of the composition of this debt relief.

Of the total debt relief in the amount of USD 3, 1 billion, the largest share of USD 2, 5 billion, or 80, 91 percent was provided by the top 5 debt forgivers (Table 25) below. Of the total USD 3,1 billion in debt relief, USD 2,0 billion was provided in 2002.

Table 25. Top 5 debt forgivers to Western Balkans

top 5 debt forgivers	
Germany	720,86
UK	701,14
France	549,04
US	376,85
Canada	168,82
total	2516,71

(source: DAC online statistical database)

This observation adds a new dimension to the picture of foreign assistance to the Balkans. *The big rise of ODA to the Balkans in 2002 was for the most part debt relief.* The previous discussion indicated this big spike was overall produced by the rise of ODA to FRY. A closer look into the beneficiary countries of the top 5 debt forgivers above confirms this conclusion: FRY got 78% of Germany's debt relief; 99% of UK's debt relief; 68% of French debt relief; and 82% of the US debt relief.²⁵⁶ Canada, which ranks top 5, has reported 93% of its debt relief, all in the year of 2002, to ex-Yu unspecified.

Given this state of facts established by the statistical data available from the DAC, additional research was made in the preparation work for this chapter, mostly through the method of media review, in order to collect more information on the factual situation concerning FRY/Serbia's financial debt and the process of relief of this debt around the year of 2002. This research lent the following information.

Throughout the 90s Serbia's debt to the Paris Club had remained un-serviced and at the time of the end of Milosevic regime it amounted to USD 4, 5 billion.²⁵⁷ The extradition of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal opened the way for further support from the international community and in November of 2001 Serbia negotiated a deal with the Paris Club for 66% write off of Yugoslavia's USD 4,5 billion debt. According to the deal:

"51 percent of the debt (\$2.362 billion) is to be written off immediately, in combination with a medium-term arrangement to be signed between Yugoslavia and the International Monetary Fund.... the rest, \$648 million (15 percent) , [is to] be written off at the expiry of the IMF arrangement..."

Yugoslavia also got favorable conditions for the repayment of the remaining USD 1, 8 billion. In the words of then Serbian Minister of Finance Bozidar Djelic, that was the *"largest debt forgiveness for a moderately developed country the Paris Club has granted in the past 45 years."*²⁵⁸

The deal reached in Paris on 16 November 2001 had received its blessing during the visit of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic to Washington, earlier that month.²⁵⁹ The debt to the US was also discussed at that occasion, as well as aid allocation for the

²⁵⁶ This claim is produced based on data from the DAC online statistical database.

²⁵⁷ Web Site of Serbian Government, *Paris Club Writes Off Two-Thirds of Yugoslavia's Debt*, 16 November 2001, <http://www.arhiva.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/16/320989.html>; According to the news: "Yugoslavia's total foreign debt was estimated at around \$12.2 billion. One fourth of the total debt is owed to multilateral organizations, approximately the same to commercial banks at the London Club, and the largest part, some 45 percent was owed to the Paris Club. The remaining roughly four percent is a recently made debt to the Russian federation. The majority of the country's debt was accumulated during the communist leader Tito era, and was not serviced in the past ten years."

²⁵⁸ *ibid*

²⁵⁹ Invest in Serbia webpage, *Paris Club: US to Support Bid for Paris Club Mark-Down*, 7 November 2001, Washington, , <http://www.invest-in-serbia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=categories&op=newindex&catid=59&pagenum=3>

next fiscal year.²⁶⁰ The United States, the UK, and France were the largest creditors to Serbia in the Paris Club.

The review of the media from that particular period of time reveals at least some of the additional political motivation, or rather additional political conditioning for the generous debt write-off. In October of 2001 Prime Minister Djindjic stated that the Paris Club had offered a 2/3 debt write-off if Belgrade encouraged the Serbs in Kosovo to vote at the upcoming elections.²⁶¹ A statement coming from such a high ranking political official should be considered a credible source. Debt-relief to FRY/Serbia was conditioned with certain political concessions. Nevertheless, a note of caution is warranted at this point. This is not to understand that the debt write-off was only connected to the local elections in Kosovo. That was merely one additional step in the process of ongoing political conditioning. The outpouring of aid to FRY/Serbia in the 2001-2002 period, including the debt-relief, was primarily connected to the extradition of former president Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague. That fact is absolutely established. What these news report excerpts suggest is that also after that each successive step in the supply of ODA was conditioned with new concessions.

To underscore again the major conclusion concerning the inquiry into the numbers of foreign assistance: big part of the ODA FRY/Serbia received in 2002 was debt-relief. Specifically, of the total USD 2, 5 billion ODA to FRY in 2002,²⁶² USD 1, 8 billion was debt relief.²⁶³ Additional USD 145 million was loans.²⁶⁴ This leaves around USD 500 million of "other" grant monies. This information is important for understanding the full picture of foreign aid to the Balkans. The year of 2002 marked the absolute peak of ODA to the Balkans, with USD 5, 4 billion. However, USD 2, 0 billion of this amount accounted for on debt relief. Most of the debt relief was given to FRY.

Although the huge debt relief was definitely a tremendous support to Serbia, it was not completely additional to aid, but it does seem to have been in serious part a replacement for aid. Mid 2001, soon after Milosevic's extradition to The Hague, the media have registered discontent on the part of Serbian government with Western aid promises. For example, according to reporting by the BBC:

²⁶⁰ Invest in Serbia webpage, *Paris Club: Two Thirds Debt Off, Says Pitic*, 9 November 2001, Washington, <http://www.invest-in-serbia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=368>; In the words of former Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic after the meeting, *"Beside support with our foreign debts, a very important solution for us was found - payment of a part of our debts to America in the amount of \$43 million won't be covered from the assets planned as aid to Serbia in 2002,"* In addition, he made a reference to the agreed allocation of US ODA to FRY for the next 2002: "...[the] House of Representatives and the Senate agreed that \$115 million from the aid package to Yugoslavia worth 145 million in the next fiscal year go to Serbia".

²⁶¹ Web Site of Serbian Government, *Paris Club Writes Off Two-Thirds of Yugoslavia's Debt*, 16 November 2001, <http://www.arhiva.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/16/320989.html>

²⁶² Annex, Table 33.

²⁶³ The remainder of USD 216, 3 million to the total 2002 debt relief of USD 2, 0 billion was written off to ex Yu unspecified. As already mentioned, the biggest part of this write-off came from Canada.

²⁶⁴ DAC online statistical database

“The day after Slobodan Milosevic was extradited to The Hague last month, Belgrade’s cooperation seemed all worthwhile. That’s when the international donor conference in Brussels agreed \$1.3bn in aid for the Yugoslav federation. But now it seems generosity is not as straightforward as Belgrade would like. Serbia’s prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, this week called Western aid a farce, saying delays threatened the whole reform process in Yugoslavia. He said the EU had promised a quick payment of €300m for August but that three-quarters of that money had to be used to pay back debts and the rest wouldn’t arrive until November.”²⁶⁵

The same source registers EC Commissioner Chris Patten’s responses to Prime Minister Djindjic’s criticism of Western aid.²⁶⁶ This information should be considered of particular importance for understanding the political dynamic surrounding the foreign aid process. It is obvious that foreign assistance is far from being a process which is motivated by sheer altruism and detached from political reality. Some of it is, but there is also another domain in ODA which is closely related to international politics.

This final part discussing the debt relief issue and its relevance for the ODA to the Balkans and FRY in particular, concludes the aspect of disaggregation of foreign aid flows to the Balkans concerning *donors and recipients, bilateral and multilateral aid*, and the principal division of *grant aid vs. loans*. In addition the preceding discussion provided relevant observations concerning the time-dimension of foreign aid to the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period.

9. Conclusion

The preceding discussion offered an extensive disaggregation of the aid flows to the Western Balkans in the period 1990-2005. The tables and charts presented tell the story of the amounts of ODA the region has received and indicate the major donors and recipients of that assistance. In addition, they describe the time-dimension of the ODA phenomenon in the Balkans since the beginning of transition. The analysis of

²⁶⁵ BBC World Service Radio, Interview with Rt Hon Chris Patten, 19 July 2001 (transcript).

²⁶⁶ *ibid*; Commissioner Patten’s response is instructive for understanding the reality of aid negotiations between FRY and the international community in that particular period of time:

“... we’ve already committed €200m and spent most of it. We’ve already committed €240m and spent a lot of that. So that’s €450 [*sic*] for starters. There is then the €300m for macro financial assistance. What’s that going in for? It’s going in largely to relieve Yugoslavia of its international debts so it can start borrowing again from the European Investment Bank.... what Mr Djindjic is actually talking about isn’t help with his balance of payments, isn’t macro financial assistance, it’s budgetary assistance. What Mr Djindjic has in the short term is a problem in his third quarter in actually paying for things like salaries, in paying for things like pensions... But there is hardly a donor around who will agree. I mean, there are some bilateral donors who will agree to provide assistance to pay of a country’s salaries or to pay for a country’s pensions, but there aren’t many and people aren’t going to allow the European Commission to do that.”

the major trends in the foreign aid supply, provided indications of the major factors and events that have influenced the supply of that assistance.

Most of the conclusions have already been presented next to the data. The Balkans has been a recipient of tremendous foreign assistance in the past decade and a half. It has received much more aid compared to other places in need, and Eastern Europe in particular. The data also confirms that contrary to common belief, the amounts of aid given to the Balkans by far exceed the assistance delivered under the mythical Marshall Plan.

Nevertheless, the Western Balkans is not homogeneous in terms of ODA received. The levels of aid to Croatia are much lower compared to the other countries in the region, and they are low even compared to the receipts of the CEE countries. Although politically part of the region, Croatia was not a “Balkan” country in terms of foreign aid received. This is an important finding for the inquiry of the factors of aid to the region. It shows that a major factor for receiving ODA was the level of economic development of the country. The bulk of the aid to the region went to two countries, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia. Nevertheless, the closer disaggregation of Serbia shows that Kosovo accounted for a huge part of this assistance, and that debt relief constituted a big part of the aid to Serbia proper after the fall of Milosevic.

The picture is quite versatile on the donor side as well. What emerges as a conclusion is that the *major European donors had very different roles in foreign aid to the Balkans*. Germany was the top bilateral donor to the region; the UK and France had much lesser interest in the region and although they had strong donor presence, big part of it accounted for on debt relief; Italy had a relatively strong presence but by and large defined by its special relationship with Albania. The European Union was the strongest donor to the region overall.

The trend of ODA overtime indicates the events which had strong influence on the supply of aid to the Balkans. Aid hiked several times in the period 1990-2005, and it had an all- time peak in 2002. The biggest increases were caused by humanitarian crises (1993 and 1999), post-conflict reconstruction need (1995 and 1999/2000), and democratic opening/ deposing of an autocrat (2000) followed by an extradition to an international court (the ICTY). The data presented above also suggest that different donors were to a different extent responsive to these different events.

CHAPTER 6

Sectoral Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance to the Balkans

1. Introduction

After the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the review of official donor policy statement in Chapter 3, and the review of the political reality surrounding the aid process in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 commenced the exploration of the numbers concerning delivery of foreign aid to the Balkans. Albeit not sufficient, the quantitative aspect of the ODA process is, naturally, essential for the research into foreign assistance to the Balkans. Actually, as stated in the very beginning, *one of the major incentives for this text has been the realization that there has been to date very little systematic treatment of the numbers concerning aid to the Balkans* in literature on ODA. Logically, the many issues or dilemmas relating to the process of aid to the region can only be discussed after the (basic) numbers have been ascertained.

Chapter 5 opened some of the basic issues, such as *how much, when, and who were the major donors and recipients*. It discussed the basic distinction between grants, loans, and debt relief, and in addition, it discussed the particular challenge of assessing the aid process to Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, separately.

Chapter 6 ahead continues the exploration of the numbers on aid by looking into the sectoral composition of ODA to the Balkans. The largest share of foreign assistance to the region was sector allocable aid (SAA), that is, it was allocated to one of the four major sectors: *social infrastructure and services (SIS)*, *economic infrastructure (EI)*, *production*, and *multisector*. In addition to the sector allocable aid (SAA), relevant share of ODA to the Balkans has been channeled into the category of *humanitarian aid*. Each of these sectors and categories is further composed of sub-sectors or sub-categories, which will be discussed further in the text. The allocations to the recipient countries and the regional category of “ex Yu unspecified” can be fully disaggregated by sector and sub-sector which allows for a full insights into which donor assisted which sector and sub-sector, in which country, when, that is in what period of time, and so forth. This produces additional interesting observations concerning the inquiry on the factors of foreign aid to the Balkans.

2. Note on the Creditor Reporting System (CRS)

A note which is relevant for the methodology has to be made at the outset. The DAC of the OECD maintains two major databases of global aid flows. The first is the DAC online statistical database, which was extensively used in Chapter 5. The second is the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The difference is that while the DAC database registers aid only according to few general parameters, the CRS allows aid allocations to be registered according to much more comprehensive criteria. These

criteria include for example sectors and sub-sectors (50 categories available), types of aid (9 categories available), channels (7 categories available), policy objectives (9 categories available), regions of the world, income groups (7 categories available), purpose codes (195 categories available) and so forth. As such, the CRS can provide a lot of detailed information on the final destinations of aid allocations.

There is nevertheless a problem with the coverage ratio of the CRS. That is to say, *the CRS is not a comprehensive account of donor activity* because not all ODA activity has been reported to the CRS. In other words, the CRS data is partial. The DAC nevertheless notes that reporting to the CRS has gradually improved over time:

“The completeness of CRS commitments for DAC members has improved from 70% in 1995 to over 90% in 2000 and reached nearly 100% starting from 2003 flows.”²⁶⁷

It should also be borne in mind that the ratio differs by donors. Whereas some donors have reported most of their ODA to the CRS as far back as 1995, others have reported much smaller shares, or have not reported at all.

This is unfortunately the challenge that each inquiry into ODA, including this one, has to deal with. This should be kept into consideration when studying the numbers on sectoral allocation in the Balkans. Nevertheless, it is comforting that the coverage ratio was over 90% by the year of 2000. This however means that the data for the decade 1990-2000, which is most of the period under exploration, is of lesser quality.

The other important note which also relates to a challenge presented by the CRS database concerns the shifting from disbursements to commitments. Chapter 5 operated with disbursements, as more accurate information on aid allocations. However, Chapter 6 will have to operate with ODA commitments. The reason for this is simple. Whereas the CRS registers commitments starting from 1995, data on disbursements is only available starting with the years 2002-2003. The DAC itself does not recommend it, but even if an effort was attempted, the database does not have data on disbursement basis before 2002:

“As to the analysis on CRS disbursements it is not recommended for flows before 2002, because the annual coverage is below 60%, while it is around and over 90% since 2002 and is continuously improving”²⁶⁸

Hence, study of data on commitment basis is the obvious choice. This logically means that data in Chapter 6 will not be consistent with data used in Chapter 5. Partly this comes from the difference between commitments (amounts the donor has pledged) to disbursements (amount the donor has actually distributed in a given period), and in part from the smaller coverage ratio of the CRS system compared to the DAC statistical database. This is of course a limitation, but (for an optimist researcher) it

²⁶⁷ CRS User’s Guide Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34469_17728989_1_1_1_1,00.html

²⁶⁸ Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34469_17728989_1_1_1_1,00.html

can also be an additional source of information Overall however, these are the limitations any research into aid volumes has to encounter.

3. Sectoral Disaggregation of Aid Flows to the Balkans

CRS data offer incisive insight into the specifics and patterns of ODA to the Balkans. It allows the sectoral analysis of aid which is an additional important level of scrutiny of the foreign aid process to the Balkans. If the DAC database provided the general conclusions concerning the questions “who gave aid to whom”, and “when”, the CRS data gives an answer to the question “who gave aid for what”. This dimension of the exploration is essential to the inquiry.

The following pages will review the *sector allocable aid (SAA)* and the category of *humanitarian aid*.

A relevant portion of all ODA to the Balkans has been SAA.²⁶⁹ The exception to this is FRY/Serbia where a much smaller part of the total assistance can be allocated to sectors, compared to the other countries in the region.²⁷⁰ The major reason for this is the much greater share of debt relief in total ODA receipts.

The category of *humanitarian aid* which is also not sector allocable, has also contributed to this end in the case of FRY/Serbia but also Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both countries humanitarian aid has accounted for about 1/5 of the total assistance they have received in the period 1990-2005. Most of the sector non-allocable aid in the case of FRY/Serbia nevertheless accounts for on debt relief. As discussed in the previous chapter, FRY/Serbia was a strong recipient of debt relief ODA in the period after the fall of the Milosevic. The discussion will first focus on SAA and its sub-sectors, whereas the last section in the chapter will deal with humanitarian aid.

The CRS operates with four sectors comprising the sector allocable ODA:

1. social infrastructure and services (SIS)
2. economic infrastructure (EI)
3. production sectors, and
4. multisector

These sectors are further subdivided into additional sub-sectors in the following way. The SIS sector comprises: 1. education, 2. health, 3. population, 4. water and sanitation (watsan), 5. government and civil society, and 6. other SIS (henceforth “other”).

The EI sector contains: 1. transport and storage, 2. communications, 3. energy, 4. banking and services, 5. business and other services.

²⁶⁹ For detail see Annex to this chapter.

²⁷⁰ See section on FRY/Serbia in Annex to Chapter 5.

The production sector contains: 1. agriculture, 2. forestry, 3. fishing, 4. industry, 5. mineral resources and mining, 6. construction, 7. trade policy and regulations, and 8. tourism.

Last, the multisector category contains the sub-sectors: 1. general environmental protection, and 2. other.

A glance at the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkan region reveals much interesting information. The major conclusion emerging from a review of the four sectors is that there is *clear and consistent pattern in the sectoral distribution of ODA* across all countries in the Balkans (Table 1).

Table 1 below presents the data on the sectoral distribution of ODA to the countries of the Balkans. The table shows that around half of the sector allocable aid in all of the countries in the region was invested in support for social infrastructure and services (SIS). The share of this ODA in all sector allocable aid (SAA) ranges quite precisely between 50 % and 53 % for all countries in the Balkans. Even the ODA registered by the DAC as going to ex Yu unspecified, in the sense that it cannot be attributed to a specific country – some of the factors for this were discussed in Chapter 5 – follows the pattern and has 45 % of the sector allocable assistance into the category of SIS.

Table 1: Sectoral distribution of ODA to countries in the Balkans (%).

	soc. infr. & ser (%)	ec. infr. (%)	production (%)	multisector (%)	total (%)
Alb	50	27	7	16	100
BiH	52	28	5	15	100
Cro	53	21	4	22	100
Mac	53	17	9	21	100
FRY/Ser	50	27	5	18	100
ex Yu.	45	42	6	7	100

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

The second largest sector is economic infrastructure (EI); the share of aid to the EI sector ranges between 17 % (Macedonia) and 28 % (BiH) for the countries in the region. Noticeably, the range is a bit more extensive compared to the category of SIS, but nevertheless quite consistent across countries. The exception is aid to ex Yu unspecified, where aid to EI is quite larger compared to the country recipients and it stands at 42 percent. A look into the sub-sectors comprising the sector of economic infrastructure reveals that this is mostly accounted for by aid to the sub-category of transport and storage (Table 2). This is an interesting finding but it should nevertheless be borne in mind that SAA to ex Yu unspecified is also an exception to the rule, and it represents a small share, around 1/4 of all ODA charged to ex Yu unspecified.

The situation is similar also with respect to multisector aid, which ranks third in terms of size, with country shares ranging from 15 % (BiH) to 22 % (Croatia).

Finally, the smallest amount of SAA has gone into the production sector. This is in compliance with the global trends in aid allocation discussed previously, whereby aid for direct assistance to the economy (production) which was substantial in past

decades, has declined in recent times.²⁷¹ Given its small size, the sector of production will not be analyzed in this chapter.

Nevertheless, the major finding concerning the overall distribution of SAA to the Balkans concerns its consistency across countries. The shares of the four sectors in total sector allocable aid are largely consistent across countries. In all of the countries of the region assistance for SIS is about half of all SAA. This means that controlled for the size of debt relief and emergency and reconstruction assistance, whereby the latter in the region depended on the presence and intensity of conflict, *the largest part of foreign aid to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS.*

What would be of particular interest in the analysis of the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans would be to understand – how did this come about? What are the factors of this sectoral consistency across the countries in the region? This will be discussed further in this chapter.

The sector of SIS is broadly defined; it comprises the 6 sub-sectors listed above in this sense, observing that the largest share of aid to the Balkans had gone into this sector still keeps things rather general. It is relevant to find out how was ODA distributed across the 6 sub-sectors comprising the SIS sector. Table 2 below displays the shares of the 6 sub-sectors and it allows for identification of additional patterns in the allocation of foreign assistance to the region.

What is clearly visible from Table 2 is that the entire SIS sector is dominated by one category – government & civil society (GCS).

Table 2: Composition of the SIS sector (%)

	edu. (%)	health. (%)	population (%)	watsan (%)	govt. & civ. soc. (%)	other (%)	total (%)
Alb	16	8	2	21	46	7	100
BiH	12	7	0	9	52	20	100
Cro	21	1	2	10	53	13	100
Mac	13	6	1	20	45	15	100
FRY/Ser	10	6	1	6	66	11	100
ex Yu.	14	6	0	6	65	9	100

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Aid for GCS ranges in between 45 % (Macedonia) and 66 % (FRY/Serbia), and it clearly dominates the sector in all of the countries of the region. The regional category of ex Yu unspecified is not an exception in this regard.

The second category in terms of size is the sub-sector of education and considerable consistency is observable also here; country shares range from 10 % (FRY/Serbia) to 21 % (Croatia). Third in terms of size is water & sanitation, ranging from 6 % (FRY/Serbia) to 21 % (Albania). Follow health with modest receipts as share of the total, and population which has had almost negligible ODA receipts. The category of “other” is nevertheless substantial and it indicates that a relevant share of aid is

²⁷¹ See Chapter 2 on foreign aid in the 90s.

lumped in this generic basket. As evident from Table 2, allocations to the sub-sector of “other” range between 7% in the case of Albania, to entire 20% in BiH.

The major conclusion emerging from the disaggregation of aid to the SIS sector is that: *it is dominated by ODA to GCS. With the fact that SIS ODA is about half of all SAA, it is easy to reach the conclusion that a great share of foreign aid to the Balkans went for support to GCS.* Quite less went for education and water & sanitation, and even less to health or population. As much as this is still rather generic, it is a relevant observation: most of the foreign assistance in the Balkans, roughly a quarter of all sector allocable aid, went for support to government & civil society.²⁷²

There are at least two critical questions which derive from this observation. The first is - why is this so? Or, what are the factors of this predominance of aid for government & civil society? Is this a result of the priorities of a few strong donors, or a common policy of all donors? Further, is this outcome a result of coordination among donors or it is a simple aggregation of separate individual actions?

The second question, which is equally important is – what does this mean? What kind of aid does the category government & civil society entail, especially in view of the fact that a very tiny portion of ODA goes for “support to NGOs” per se?

The second largest sector of ODA to the Balkans is economic infrastructure (EI). The sector comprises five sub-sectors: 1) transport & storage, 2) communications, 3) energy, 4) banking & financial services (BFS), and 5) business & other services (BOS). (Table 3).

The disaggregation of the EI sector indicates to new interesting patterns. The first major observation is that the composition of the EI sector is different from that of the SIS sector. If consistency of sector shares across countries was a major characteristic of the SIS sector, it is lack of consistency which marks the EI field. Sector receipts across countries range from small to very large. For example, in the sub-sector of transport & storage they range from 9 % in FRY/Serbia to 46 % in Croatia; energy allocations range from 6 % in Macedonia to 48 % of total receipts in EI in Albania; similarly business & other services account for 16 % of EI allocations in Albania but they reach 70 % of total EI receipts in Macedonia (Table 3). *The conclusions obviously is that contrary to the consistency of shares of the sub-sector in the SIS sector, the sector of EI is defined by the large fluctuation of the sizes of its sub-sectors.*

The constant category in EI ODA is the commitments for communications; they stand at 1-2 % for all the countries and for ex Yu unspecified, or in other words there was no donor interest in supporting communications in the region. Similar to the case with the category “population” in the SIS sector, communications is also a field where practically no donor allocated any assistance.

²⁷² It should be borne in mind that the category “support to NGOs” is at the same time very small. This description of aid is used when support to NGOs was an end in of itself, and not when NGOs acted as a channel for assistance which essentially had other goals.

Table 3: Composition of the EI sector (%).

	transport & storage (%)	comm. (%)	energy (%)	banking and fin. ser. (%)	business & other ser. (%)	total (%)
Alb	26	2	48	8	16	100
BiH	20	2	22	16	40	100
Cro	46	1	9	5	39	100
Mac	12	2	6	10	70	100
FRY/Ser	9	2	33	15	41	100
ex Yu unsp.	69	1	10	2	18	100

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

In addition, the sub-sector of banking & financial services (BFS) has received a rather consistent level of support across countries, ranging between 5 and 16 % (2 % for the category of ex Yu unspecified).

Overall, in the EI sector there is no clear aid predominance of one sub-sector as is the case of GCS in the SIS sector. The three sub-sectors transport & storage, energy, and business & other services (BOS), represent the largest part of ODA to the EI sector, with the fact that their country shares can vary considerably.

As already mentioned, *the sector of production, given its small share in total SAA is not a subject of disaggregation in this chapter.*

Finally, the last sector, the so called multi-sector aid is, composed of two categories, general environmental protection (GEP) and the category of “other”.

Again, in this sector the consistency of the sector composition across countries (and in ex Yu unspecified) is its most obvious feature. In all of the countries in the Balkans, GEP ODA represents a tiny portion of multi-sector aid (between 2 and 12 %) whereas the generic category of “other” accounts for the bulk of aid registered as multi-sector (Table 4).

Table 4. Composition of multisector ODA (%).

	GEP (%)	other (%)	total (%)
Alb	10	90	100
BiH	2	98	100
Cro	7	93	100
Mac	7	93	100
FRY/Ser	7	93	100
ex Yu unsp.	12	88	100

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

This can be interpreted in the following way: this ODA is allocable by sector, but nevertheless lacks specific characteristics which would tie it to one particular sector. This can understandably often be a case in reality, with projects often comprising many components aiming to reach goals relating to different sectors, such as for example one goal relating to education, other to health, etc.

Following the general overview of the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans, the major question is, as already mentioned earlier - *what are the factors of this distribution?* Such as for example, why is the sub-sector of GCS so predominant over other categories in the SIS sector? Is this a result of a common behavior by many donors, just one, or a few big aid suppliers to the region? Or for example, what are

the factors for the inconsistent sub-sector shares across countries in the EI sector? Does this relate in any particular way to donor-recipient relationships, in the sense that it is caused by the stronger presence of certain donors in some countries as opposed to others?

The following pages will provide a disaggregation of ODA sectors by recipient country, using the format of *top-10 donor rankings*. This will provide a clear insight into who are the major donors to certain sectors in the respective countries. The rankings are also combined with calculation of the share of a sub-sector allocation (for example education) of the sector concerned, i.e. SIS or EI, and a share of the allocation of the total SAA aid of the respective donor to the recipient. This permits analysis on several levels. The ranking gives an overview of major donors to certain sub-sectors; with the fact that a donor consistently ranks high in a certain sub-sector across countries, the conclusion can be drawn that is that it is that donor's policy choice to allocate support to projects in that sub-sector. That is to say – the ranking indicates to the existence of a certain donor policy. Such policy can be consistent across countries or in some cases, when for example there are strong allocations to some countries but not to others, it can be result of a) ad hoc decisions, or b) results from policy choices which are not sector-driven, such as for example the policy of “regional champions”, that is the policy of some donors to forge special (often longer term) relationships with some countries from a certain regional setting.

The disaggregation will start from the sector of SIS. It need not be comprehensive; the interest is to review the substantive sub-sectors and those sub-sectors which can provide conclusions about donor policies. In this sense, the sub-sectors of “other” (in both SIS and multisector) offer less analytical space as they do not lend information about the final ends of the assistance and thus they will not be taken into account. Nevertheless, they will be revisited during the analysis of the micro data in Chapter 7. At that level (of individual allocations) of analysis information can be distilled from the micro data which allows conclusions about the final ends of ODA allocated into the categories of “other”.

The disaggregation of the SIS sector will include the sub-sectors of education, health, water & sanitation, and GCS. The sub-sector “population” will not be reviewed due to its minor significance in terms of allocations received.

In the EI sector all of its five sub-sectors, transport & storage, communications, energy, banking & financial services, and business & other services will be reviewed.

The sector of “production” given its small size will not be subject to scrutiny, and neither will the “multisector” which albeit not insignificant in terms of size, is dominated by the residual category or “other”.

To summarize, the review will concentrate mostly on the SIS and EI sectors, whereby the SIS sector will be reviewed partially, with the categories of “population” and “other” omitted, whereas the EI sector will be reviewed in its entirety.

4. Donor Ranking: Social Infrastructure and Services (SIS)

4.1 Education

It has already been pointed out in Chapter 5 that the overall picture of foreign assistance is dominated by a handful of biggest donors. For example, 44, 4 % of the total ODA to the Balkans has come from the 3 largest donors, the EC, Germany and the US. This is also true for in-country situations, and it naturally applies to the sector allocable ODA.

The discussion and the analysis in the following pages will be based on an extensive review of statistical data. As already mentioned, the top-10 rankings format will be followed in order to ensure that the most relevant donors are included in the discussion. These rankings, differently from the rankings in the previous Chapter 5, are based on the (partial) data contained in the CRS, and only serve the purpose of understanding donor behavior within sector allocable aid (SAA), which is nevertheless the largest share of aid overall. However these rankings, this should be kept in mind, concern a shorter period of time (1995-2005) compared to the rankings in Chapter 5 (1990 – 2005), and are produced from data which is essentially partial in character. As such, these rankings are only provisional in character.

The bulk of the data produced in the preparation of this chapter, has been put in the Annex (see Annex to Chapter 6). The large amount of data in the Annex provides a complete sectoral disaggregation of all sector allocable aid (SAA) registered with the DAC. The most pertinent data has also been systematized and sorted into tables which serve as basis for discussion and analysis in this chapter. The ensuing discussion is completely based on the analysis of the data contained in the tables with donor rankings below.

Allocations to education (sub-sector of SIS) in the countries of the Balkans, are ranked in Tables 5-7 below (for complete information see Tables 31-37 in Annex), in combination with the percentage share of allocations in the respective donor's total SIS and total SAA aid to the recipient country. This format allows the discerning of interesting observations and comparisons.

From the analysis of Table 5 , Table 6, and Table 7, it appears that the sub-sector of education – and this lends itself as a conclusion concerning all other sub-sectors – is overall framed by a) donors' sector- based policies, and b) donors' country policies.

The review of the tables shows that some of the major donors to the Balkans had strong and consistent across countries presence in education. For example, such donor would definitely be Austria, whose presence in the sub-sector of education definitely outweighs its general presence in ODA to the region. Such donors are also Germany and the EC. With perhaps some minor exceptions, these donors have had consistently strong allocations in education across the region, and thus they significantly influenced the composition of ODA to education in the Balkans. Albeit with considerable variations, allocations to education represent a relevant percentage share of Austria and Germany's aid to SIS and their total SAA. They are much greater in

the case of Austria, but nevertheless represent a relevant portion also of German SAA. For example, in the case of Austria allocations to the sub-sector of education represented: 35,57 % of its SIS and 33,06 % of all its SAA for Albania (Table 5); 55,73% of its SIS and 51,58% of all its SAA to BiH (Table 5); 87,96% of its SIS and 84,43% of all its SAA for Croatia (Table 6); 34,75% of its SIS and 32,27 of all its SAA for Macedonia (Table 6); 43,01 % of its SIS and 40,60 % of all its SAA for FRY/Serbia (Table 7). In the case of Germany allocations to the sub-sector of education represented: 12,00% of its SIS and 6,20 of all of its SAA for Albania (Table 5); 47,41 % of its SIS and 27,09% of all its SAA for BiH (Table 5); 37,27 % of its SIS and 32,40 % of all its SAA to Croatia (Table 6); 20,91 % of its SIS and 10,94% of all its SAA for Macedonia (Table 6) ; and 29,09 % of its SIS and 12, 92 % of all its SAA for FRY/Serbia (Table 7).

It is fair to argue that such policies are not always fully sector based but that the final allocation is a resultant of the interaction of donor sector and country based policies. However, it is clear that for example in the case of Austria and Germany the choice to support education was a matter of consistent policy.

On the other end, the tables show that there are donors who have strong presence in, for example, one country and thus significantly shape the education sub-sector in that country, but they are by and large absent from other countries in the region. Such is definitely the example of Dutch education ODA to Macedonia - USD 43, 22 million, and a large portion of Dutch SIS allocation (58, 81 %) and all SAA (30, 63 %) to Macedonia. The Dutch generous contribution to education in Macedonia is however country-specific, in the sense that the Netherlands has not extended the same kind of support to education in the other countries in the Balkans, as it can be seen from Tables 5-7. This is an indication that the Dutch foreign aid policy was, at least with regards to this domain, more country than sector based. It has already been pointed out in the previous text, during the review of Dutch policy documents on foreign aid, that the Netherlands considers Macedonia its regional champion in the Balkans.

Italy seems to have a similar, yet a bit relativized, stance concerning education. It has given USD 53, 92 million for education in Bosnia, which was huge portion of Italy's allocation to SIS (57, 45 %) and of all its SAA to Bosnia (39, 20 %). In addition it ranks as a second largest donor to education in Albania, with USD 29, 18 million – their special relationship has already been discussed – but that practically concludes Italy's relevant allocations to education in the Balkans. The other countries in the region have received much smaller allocations: FRY/Serbia - USD 2, 03 million (not on top 10 lists), Croatia – USD 1, 42 million, Macedonia - USD 1, 01 million (not on top 10 lists). This of course does not conclude the discussion on the factors that shaped Italy's support to education in the Balkans²⁷³, but it can reasonably be concluded that Rome did not have a consistent policy of support to education in the region.

²⁷³ It is clear that Italy's relevant contribution to education in Albania is a result of the overall huge amounts of ODA Tirana received from Rome. The huge allocation to Bosnia invites further thinking and analysis, also given the fact that it represents much bigger share of Italy's SIS ODA and all SAA to that country. One assumption, valid also for other similar cases, is that the allocation was a result of Italy's commitment to a particular large scale project (as opposed to a generic support to the sub-sector or many smaller projects) which required big resources. This is of course only an assumption and it needs further testing.

The review of allocations to education further shows, for example, that a) the US had a considerably steady presence (minus Bosnia) in nominal amounts, which are of course a small share of the US total commitments in both SIS and all SAA; b) IDA funding for education was steadily present in the region.

In addition, similar to Austria, France had a strong and consistent, if varied by countries, presence in education in the region, which is at the same time sizeable share of total French commitment in both SIS and of its SAA. The conclusion from this is that education ranked high on the list of priorities for French ODA to the Balkans. This inquiry will be resumed in Chapter 7 when the analysis of the micro data will try to provide answers concerning the final ends of the individual sub-sector allocations, including the sub-sector of education.

Table 5: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country

Alb	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA	BiH	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA
1 Greece	106,09	71,36	65,42	1 Austria	93,28	55,73	51,58
2 Italy	29,18	12,13	6,68	2 Germany	54,86	47,41	27,09
3 Germany	25,51	12,00	6,20	3 Italy	53,92	57,45	39,20
4 France	18,25	64,26	56,35	4 IDA	44,64	10,15	4,33
5 IDA	15,45	7,38	2,34	5 Japan	17,49	16,69	7,56
6 Austria	13,29	37,57	33,06	6 EC	15,50	3,54	1,47
7 EC	13,24	4,76	2,13	7 France	9,95	54,02	31,24
8 Switz.	11,38	39,28	21,11	8 Switz.	9,17	13,14	6,35
9 US	8,66	4,33	2,05	9 Canada	6,74	5,00	4,56
10 Spain	7,88	52,62	47,45	10 Finland	5,59	11,70	8,78
248,93				311,13			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 6: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country

Cro	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA	Mac	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA
1 Austria	50,77	87,96	84,43	1 Netherl.	43,22	58,81	30,63
2 Germany	41,75	37,27	32,40	2 EC	24,63	12,45	4,91
3 EC	33,67	14,09	5,59	3 Germany	18,86	20,91	10,94
4 US	9,26	7,17	3,32	4 US	15,39	7,97	3,62
5 France	8,21	47,92	39,42	5 Switz.	9,18	34,07	14,69
6 Italy	1,42	31,61	5,69	6 Austria	9,06	34,75	32,27
7 Sweden	0,93	2,44	2,35	7 IDA	6,20	5,22	2,33
8 Spain	0,77	11,51	11,06	8 France	5,68	50,59	47,09
9 Japan	0,46	18,26	10,75	9 Norway	3,75	7,81	5,70
10 Norway	0,39	0,69	0,43	10 UNICEF	1,62	33,60	32,48
147,62				137,58			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 7: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA	ex Yu	EDU (USD millions)	EDU as % of SIS	EDU as % of SAA		
1	Germany	96,46	29,09	12,92	1	Germany	9,31	49,10	32,17
2	EC	75,47	6,93	2,57	2	Austria	7,88	90,32	89,94
3	Austria	72,54	43,01	40,60	3	Italy	5,18	31,82	10,85
4	France	29,57	71,77	46,20	4	Switz.	4,37	33,34	18,83
5	IDA	23,00	20,45	4,41	5	Norway	1,72	1,85	1,37
6	Canada	22,10	25,23	20,07	6	France	0,96	15,75	7,32
7	Finland	13,78	27,25	22,36	7	Netherl.	0,77	11,13	4,34
8	Norway	11,94	6,40	4,76	8				
9	Switz.	11,69	7,55	4,92	9				
10	US	6,56	0,78	0,45	10				
363,11					30,19				

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

4.2 Health

ODA receipts for in the sub-sector of health in the Balkans were overall quite small, second only to population, with a general conclusion being that most of the biggest donors to the region did not consider support to health to be a strong priority. The three biggest donors to the Balkans, the EC, Germany, and the US, have sporadic, inconsistent presence in the field of health in the region (see Tables 8-10; for complete information see Tables 38-44 in Annex). For example, the EC only made a relevant contribution to FRY/Serbia; the US biggest contribution of USD 6,35 million to Albania was only 8,17 percent of its SIS to that country; in the case of FRY/Serbia although the US ranks as 9th largest donors, its allocation is only 0,88 percent of its SIS respectively. Germany follows a similar pattern.

Although there are donors who have one-off presence in health in the region, such as for example Canada's aid to Bosnia of USD 33, 82 million, the *major consistent donors to the sub-sector of health in the Balkans are Japan and IDA*. IDA has relevant contributions in all the countries of the region minus Croatia, which was generally ineligible for IDA funding. Nevertheless it needs to be reminded that IDA finance is generally in the form of loans. These loans are negotiated with the recipient countries, and in this sense the sectoral denomination is also determined by the recipient which overtime will have to repay that loan. It could be argued that the recipient also has a say in determining the sectoral allocation of grant ODA; as already mentioned during the review of the donor official policies (see Chapter 3) some of the donors determine the country priorities with bilateral agreements with the recipient government. Nevertheless, this text stands at the position that the recipient has much smaller possibility to influence the allocation of foreign assistance in the case of grant monies as compared to loans.

What appears as relevant observation from Tables 8-10 is that Japan has relevant although not fully consistent – Albania has a small contribution and Croatia none at all – presence in the field of health in the region. For example, Japan has given USD 58, 05 million for health in BiH (ranked as top donor to Bosnia), which is 55,39% of its SIS and 25,09 % of all its SAA to that country (see Table 8); its contribution for health in Macedonia stands at USD 32,65 million (ranked as top donor), which is 26,42% of its SIS and 22,55% of all its SAA (Table 9); Japan similarly has a relevant contribution in FRY/Serbia (ranked as 4th top donor). Overall, in the countries of the Balkans where Japan had stronger activity as a donor, the sub-sector of health was a consistent priority for its ODA. Albania is a bit of an exception to this; its relatively modest receipts in health (USD 5,13 million) from Japan are a big share of Japan's SIS (75,61%) to the country, but a small share of its overall SAA to Albania (8,47%) which indicates that Japan chose to channel its support to Albania into other sectors.

Overall it can be concluded that given the small share of health in SIS ODA to the Balkans, it is by and large produced by *Japan's niche interest, IDA loans, and sporadic and hoc presence of other donors*, which can be assumed to be more a result of their country-based rather than sector-based policies.

Table 8: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country

Alb	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA	BiH	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA
1 Italy	27,71	11,52	6,34	1 Japan	58,05	55,39	25,09
2 IDA	21,41	10,22	3,24	2 Canada	33,82	25,06	22,87
3 US	16,35	8,17	3,88	3 IDA	31,80	7,23	3,09
4 Greece	11,66	7,84	7,19	4 Switz.	18,70	26,81	12,96
5 Sweden	8,65	26,12	18,93	5 Sweden	7,48	3,69	2,75
6 Switz.	7,92	27,33	14,69	6 Netherl.	6,22	4,72	3,42
7 UK	6,89	21,28	16,55	7 Italy	5,41	5,76	3,93
8 France	6,73	23,69	20,77	8 Spain	4,98	2,73	2,09
9 Germany	5,94	2,80	1,44	9 Austria	3,88	2,32	2,15
10 Japan	5,13	75,61	8,47	10 UK	3,67	7,07	5,48
118,39				174,01			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 9: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country

Cro	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA	Mac	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA
1 Norway	2,06	3,63	2,28	1 Japan	32,65	26,42	22,55
2 Sweden	1,27	3,34	3,22	2 IDA	19,50	16,42	7,32
3 Netherl.	1,04	16,77	7,04	3 Norway	5,15	10,73	7,83
4 Canada	1,00	19,91	14,83	4 Italy	1,68	8,39	7,10
5 UK	0,93	8,70	7,73	5 Germany	1,56	1,73	0,91
6 US	0,41	0,32	0,15	6 UNICEF	0,73	15,16	14,65
7 France	0,25	1,45	1,19	7 Spain	0,47	4,16	2,12
8 Italy	0,13	2,94	0,53	8 France	0,42	3,71	3,45
9 Spain	0,12	1,81	1,73	9 Greece	0,24	0,33	0,31
10 Germany	0,02	0,02	0,01	10 US	0,20	0,10	0,05
7,23				62,60			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 10: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA	ex Yu	Health (USD millions)	Health as % of SIS	Health as % of SAA
1 EC	76,51	7,03	2,60	1 Norway	7,58	8,14	6,01
2 IDA	30,19	26,84	5,79	2 Netherl.	2,92	41,97	16,35
3 UK	22,27	15,16	14,30	3 Italy	1,76	10,82	3,69
4 Norway	17,69	9,48	7,05	4 Luxemb.	0,52	23,29	22,65
5 Japan	11,71	58,12	35,88	5 Austria	0,47	5,37	5,35
6 Netherl.	9,32	8,24	5,23	6 Japan	0,27	36,48	1,52
7 Canada	8,52	9,73	7,74	7 Switz.	0,23	1,79	1,01
8 Spain	8,38	4,73	4,62	8 Finland	0,12	1,95	1,91
9 US	7,40	0,88	0,51	9			
10 Luxemb.	6,13	26,22	15,86	10			

198,13

13,87

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

4.3 Water & Sanitation

Tables 11-13 rank the top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation in the countries of the Balkans. As in the previous sub-sectors, the composition of the water & sanitation field results from sector-based and country-based policy decision of the donors.

The analysis of Tables 11-13 presented below (for complete information see Tables 45-50 in Annex) shows that Germany, the strongest bilateral donor in the region, has a *consistent policy of support to water & sanitation* in all of the countries in the Balkans. Germany's support to water & sanitation varies as percentage share of its allocations to SIS across the countries in the region, from 19, 70 percent in Bosnia to entire 72, 50 percent in Albania, but overall the contributions are relevant in all the recipient countries.

For example, Albania has received USD 154,12 million , which was entire 72,50 % , of SIS and 37,43 % of all of Germany's SAA to that country (Table 11); in Croatia Germany has allocated USD 50,62 million, which represented 45,19 of its SIS and 32,29 % of its SAA to Zagreb (Table 12); Macedonia received USD 48,67 million of German aid for watsan, which was 53,97 of German SIS and 28,25 % of its total SAA to Skopje (Table 12). Germany also ranked as top donor to watsan in FRY/Serbia with a commitment of USD 105, 94 million, which represented 31, 95 % and 14, 19 % of its SIS and SAA to that country respectively (Table 13).

In addition, the review of Tables 11-13 demonstrates that the US is quite obviously absent from water & sanitation, whereas the EC has certain consistency and relevant nominal amounts even if at small percentage shares of its SIS allocations. The EC nevertheless ranks second in BiH with a contribution of USD 51,60 million (11,78 % and 4,88 % of its SIS and SAA to the country respectively; Table 11); in Croatia with USD 15,73 million (yet only 6,58 % and 2,61 % of its SIS and SAA to the country respectively, Table 12); and in FRY/Serbia with USD 53,09 million (only 4,88 % and 1,81 % of its SIS and SAA to Belgrade respectively).

An additional observation concerns the consistent Norwegian presence in the sector, and the considerable IDA funding. Country-based choices, as in other sub-sectors, complete the composition of the field, such as Italy's traditionally strong contribution to Albania, Japan's support to Macedonia (entire 70, 66 percent of its entire SIS allocations to the country), and curiously, Portugal's ODA to the same country. Macedonia is evidently the only country in the Balkans which has received relevant Portuguese aid in the SIS sector. The discussion in Chapter 7 will use the micro data stored in the CRS to provide explanations concerning the strong and isolated ad-hoc contributions from donor countries with very small general presence in the region.

Overall, it can be concluded that: the field of water & sanitation has been heavily dominated by the strong and consistent presence of one large bilateral - Germany. It can be noted that German's domination of the sub-sector of watsan is even stronger than for example Japan's domination of the field of health. EC presence was to some extent relevant even if it represented small share of its SIS and SAA ODA to the region.

Table 11: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country

Alb	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA	BiH	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA		
1	Germany	154,12	72,50	37,43	1	IDA	68,00	15,46	6,60
2	Italy	74,52	30,97	17,06	2	EC	51,60	11,78	4,88
3	IDA	51,05	24,38	7,72	3	Norway	38,66	21,69	16,55
4	Austria	18,76	53,02	46,66	4	Germany	22,79	19,70	11,25
5	Norway	10,80	20,56	15,83	5	Switz.	16,08	23,05	11,15
6	EC	9,82	3,53	1,58	6	US	15,19	4,96	1,66
7	Luxemb.	7,41	100,00	100,00	7	Austria	15,00	8,96	8,29
8	Sweden	3,56	10,76	7,80	8	Spain	9,98	5,47	4,19
9	Switz.	1,70	5,88	3,16	9	Finland	8,13	17,00	12,76
10	Greece	1,10	0,74	0,68	10	Netherl.	3,39	2,58	1,87
332,85				248,81					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 12: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country

Cro	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA	Mac	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA		
1	Germany	50,62	45,19	39,29	1	Japan	87,33	70,66	60,32
2	EC	15,73	6,58	2,61	2	Germany	48,67	53,97	28,25
3	Norway	1,40	2,46	1,54	3	Portugal	18,88	63,92	63,92
4	Italy	0,93	20,84	3,75	4	IDA	17,70	14,90	6,64
5	US	0,79	0,61	0,28	5	Austria	16,09	61,74	57,34
6	France	0,66	3,86	3,17	6	Italy	9,73	48,55	41,09
7	UK	0,12	1,13	1,01	7	Spain	9,34	82,69	42,13
8					8	Denmark	5,43	99,14	99,14
9					9	Norway	3,18	6,64	4,85
10					10	Switz.	3,07	11,41	4,92
70,26				219,42					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 13: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA	ex YU	watsan (USD millions)	watsan as % of SIS	watsan as % of SAA		
1	Germany	105,94	31,95	14,19	1	Norway	5,49	5,90	4,35
2	EC	53,09	4,88	1,81	2	Switz.	3,02	23,00	12,99
3	Norway	17,40	9,32	6,93	3	France	2,31	38,07	17,70
4	Switz.	13,02	8,41	5,48	4	Luxemb.	1,51	68,19	66,31
5	Netherl.	11,30	9,98	6,34	5	Netherl.	0,58	8,41	3,28
6	US	10,25	1,22	0,71	6				
7	Austria	9,42	5,58	5,27	7				
8	IDA	8,00	7,11	1,53	8				
9	Japan	6,66	33,06	20,41	9				
10	Sweden	6,11	5,15	3,07	10				
241,18				12,91					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

4.4 Government & Civil Society

The GCS sub-sector is of special importance for the sectoral analysis of ODA to the Balkans because of its substantial share in total foreign assistance commitments. As already observed, it accounts for roughly half of all aid to the SIS sector, which in turn is around half of all SAA to the region. In other words, aid *allocated for GCS is roughly 1/4 of total SAA to the Balkans*.

Logically the question is - why? What are the factors of such strong predominance of GCS ODA? Tables 14-16 presented below (for complete information see Tables 59-65 in Annex) provide an overview of the allocations to GCS to the countries in the region by listing the rankings of top 10 donors to GCS in each individual country in the Balkans.

As Tables 14-16 demonstrate, the strong position of GCS ODA is by and large determined by the policies of two major donors to the region, the European Commission and the United States.

In all of the countries of the region (minus the category ex Yu unspecified) these two donors consistently rank as top two donors to GCS, substantially outstripping the contributions by any other donor. In addition, this consistency of the EC and US support across countries is an indicator that support to GCS is a result of their coherent policies.

The EC support to GCS ranges from 66, 95 % of its total assistance in the SIS sector in the case of FRY/Serbia, to 90 %, and 92 % of SIS in the case of Albania. The US support to GCS ranges from 48, 61 % of its SIS to Croatia, to 93, 61 % in the case of FRY/Serbia. In the case of US assistance for GCS, it is observable that Croatia, which is at the far lower end (in terms of share of SIS; the US nevertheless ranks second with USD 97, 67 million; Table 15), is the exception; all the other countries in the region have much higher GCS ODA as share of SIS from the US, with Macedonia being lowest at 77, 57 %. It is fair to conclude that no other sub-sector has such consistently high percentage shares across countries.

The conclusion is that in addition to being among the strongest donors to the region in absolute amounts, as discussed in Chapter 5, *the EC and the US are the top donors to the GCS sub-sector*. What more, GCS aid consistently accounts for large shares of their SIS allocations. The fact that two of the top donors to the region donate most of their SIS aid to GCS is the *single strongest factor* determining the predominance of GCS aid to the countries of the Balkans.

Other donors, as observable from Tables 14-16 also have supply of GCS ODA as a consistent priority item in their SIS sectors. Such is the case with Norway, whose GCS ODA ranges from 51, 96 % as share of its overall SIS allocation to BiH, to 72, 58 % of its SIS to Croatia (the exception category of ex Yu unspecified stands at 74, 05 %); and with the Netherlands whose GCS allocations range from 31, 87 % as share of SIS in the case of Macedonia, to 85, 55 % in the case of Albania. Sweden is a similar case in the sense that it is a constant provider of GCS ODA. For example, Sweden ranks 8th as GCS contributor to BiH with USD 63,85 million, which represent 31,45 % and 23,43 % of its SIS and SAA to the country respectively; its contribution for GCS in Croatia stands at USD 12,02 million (31,64 % and 30, 46% of its SIS and SAA respectively, Table 15);

and its commitment for GCS in Macedonia has been USD 19,33 million (entire 85,54 % of its SIS, and 44,18% of its SAA to the country; [Table 15](#)).

Another interesting observation concerns Spain which ranks very high as a supporter to GCS only in the cases of BiH and FRY/Serbia. Given that its presence is not consistent across all the countries, but only in the countries which suffered emergency crises, it is reasonable to assume that Spanish GCS assistance was more driven by humanitarian motives or by factors otherwise related to the humanitarian emergencies. It is obvious that in the case of FRY/Serbia, Spanish GCS aid represented 91, 22 % of total SIS aid, and entire 89, 16 % of the total SAA. In other words almost all of the SAA which Spain donated to FRY/Serbia was registered as GCS assistance. The analysis of the micro data in Chapter 7 will offer additional interesting information concerning Spanish foreign aid for GCS in the Balkans.

Another observation of donor specific behavior concerns Germany. Although Germany has been the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans, it does not feature as strong supporter to GCS; it is listed as 4th largest donor to GCS in Croatia ([Table 15](#)), 7th largest to Macedonia ([Table 15](#)), and 5th largest to FRY/Serbia ([Table 16](#)), where it has also made the most substantial contribution as percent of SIS – 32, 77 %. In other words – *smaller share of German ODA has been allocated for GCS in the Balkans*. Germany supplied less support for this category.

In conclusion, the absolute predominance of the GCS sub-sector, which stands at half of all SIS aid and amounts to a quarter of the entire SAA ODA to the Balkans, is a result of the consistent behavior of the major donors to the region, including the US, EC, and to some extent also the Netherlands and Norway.

It is fair to argue that this is a clear indicator where most of the foreign aid to the region went, and which donors allocated it there.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that saying that aid was given in support to government & civil society still does not completely answer the question what was actually this ODA spent on. It is more difficult to derive a conclusion about the ends of aid given to GCS as opposed to aid allocated for health, water & sanitation, or education, as the latter are more “specific”. In this sense, it could also be argued that the fact of the GCS’s predominance is a result of its lesser specificity: the field has strong receipts because its more generic definition incorporates ODA with a broader set of goals. This issue will be revisited in Chapter 7, which will provide additional useful information about the final ends of the allocations into the sub-sector of GCS in the Balkans.

Table 14: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country

Alb	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA	BiH	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA
1 EC	252,66	90,92	40,64	1 EC	303,46	69,31	28,72
2 US	162,03	80,91	38,42	2 US	283,97	92,75	31,05
3 Italy	81,27	33,78	18,60	3 Spain	154,55	84,74	64,95
4 IDA	76,98	36,76	11,64	4 IDA	116,50	26,48	11,30
5 Netherl.	30,32	85,55	44,28	5 Netherl.	101,57	77,16	55,83
6 Norway	27,49	52,31	40,29	6 Norway	92,59	51,96	39,65
7 Greece	26,11	17,56	16,10	7 Canada	71,46	52,95	48,32
8 Denmark	22,41	80,75	80,48	8 Sweden	63,85	31,45	23,43
9 UK	19,82	61,22	47,60	9 Austria	52,88	31,59	29,24
10 Sweden	17,98	54,28	39,34	10 UK	29,87	57,55	44,61
717,08				1270,69			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 15: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country

Cro	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA	Mac	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA
1 EC	169,57	70,96	28,13	1 EC	150,07	75,85	29,92
2 US	97,67	48,61	35,03	2 US	149,77	77,57	35,22
3 Norway	41,29	72,68	45,60	3 Greece	70,55	94,97	89,05
4 Germany	14,27	12,74	11,08	4 Norway	27,66	57,69	42,09
5 Sweden	12,02	31,64	30,46	5 Netherl.	23,43	31,87	16,60
6 UK	7,11	66,20	58,82	6 Sweden	19,33	85,54	44,18
7 Austria	6,45	11,18	10,73	7 Germany	11,76	13,04	6,83
8 Canada	3,86	76,92	57,28	8 Portugal	10,65	36,07	36,07
9 Netherl.	3,56	57,19	24,02	9 Switz.	9,56	35,48	15,30
10 Spain	1,75	26,31	25,27	10 UK	9,41	96,64	60,00
357,56				482,17			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 16: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA	ex Yu	GCS (USD millions)	GCS as % of SIS	GCS as % of SAA
1 US	787,30	93,61	54,62	1 Norway	68,92	74,05	54,65
2 EC	728,75	66,95	24,81	2 Greece	27,54	99,98	99,97
3 Spain	161,67	91,22	89,16	3 Germany	9,65	50,90	33,34
4 UK	118,16	80,45	75,86	4 Sweden	8,67	99,81	99,27
5 Germany	108,64	32,77	14,55	5 Finland	6,19	98,05	96,18
6 Switz.	108,10	69,82	45,47	6 Italy	5,12	31,44	10,72
7 Norway	105,66	56,63	42,08	7 Switz.	4,52	34,45	19,46
8 Greece	102,57	89,12	72,94	8 Netherl.	1,84	26,55	10,34
9 Netherl.	80,53	71,12	45,18	9 Portugal	1,59	99,83	99,83
10 Austria	78,32	46,44	43,83	10 Spain	1,02	75,52	75,52
2379,69				135,06			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

5. Donor Ranking: Economic Infrastructure (EI)

5.1 Transport & Storage

The second largest sector in foreign assistance to the Balkans has been the sector of economic infrastructure (EI). The following pages will discuss the commitments of major donors to the EI sector, using the statistical data from the CRS.

The first sub-sector under review from the EI sector is that of transport & storage. The review of the Tables 17-19 presented below (for complete information see Tables 73-79 in the Annex), demonstrates that the sub-sector of transport & storage is dominated by multilateral ODA, with the EC and IDA clearly being the two strongest and most consistent donors across the countries in the region.

The case of EC aid to transport & storage is particularly interesting when observed as percentage share of total EC allocations to EI. As can be seen from Tables 17-19 in all the countries of the Balkans, including also the regional category of ex Yu unspecified, with the exception only to FRY/Serbia *almost all of the EC aid to EI went to transport & infrastructure*: Albania – 98,38 % ; BiH – 71,28 %; Croatia – 91,49 %; Macedonia – 90,38 %; ex Yu – 80,95 %. Practically, with the exception to FRY/Serbia, and to a lesser extent BiH, *almost everything that the EC financed in the Balkans in terms of EI was transport & storage*.

Worth noting in this regard is the observation that EC aid to transport & storage does not seem proportionate to specific country needs. This observation should be considered generally valid for many other similar situations. No particular effort will be made at this point to prove it by providing additional evidence of the state of need in the different countries, but it would rather be taken as statement of the obvious. For example, the EC aid for transport & storage to Croatia by far exceeds its support to Albania (and as a matter of fact all the other country recipients and the amount spent regionally. Thus the conclusion is that allocations are not factored (only) by the presence of need, but also by other considerations. This is again a statement of the obvious, but it nevertheless deserves attention. Chapter 7 will shed additional light on this finding.

The IDA assistance to transport & storage in the region is considerable, with the exception to Croatia. For example, in the sub-sector of transport & storage IDA has allocated: USD 148,15 million to Albania (ranks first; Table 17); USD 102,23 to BiH (ranks first, Table 17); USD 11,98 million to Macedonia (ranks second; the amount is a small share of IDA EI and SAA to the country; Table 18); USD 57,64 million to FRY/Ser (ranks second; the allocations represents small share of its EI and SAA respectively; Table 19). It should nevertheless again be reminded that this is not grant aid but concessional lending, and that it also depends on the willingness of recipient governments to take the IDA loans.

The *US absence from transport & storage is more than obvious*. The US has channeled some small funding in this field, but as can be seen from Tables 17-19, this is a rather symbolic share of the US commitment in EI in the region. In perhaps rather simplified

terms, the US was not interested in building roads (and other transport infrastructure) in the region.

Macedonia's receipts are obviously much smaller than everybody else's, in part due to the quite smaller IDA commitment to this sub-sector. In addition, in the case of Macedonia and Croatia there were not enough donors to compile a top 10 ranking.

Finally, in addition to the EC and IDA, a few other major donors appear as ad-hoc supporters, such as Germany to Albania (USD 32, 94 million), or Japan to BiH (USD 48, 42 million). The case of Portuguese aid to BiH is also quite particular. Portugal has allocated USD 57, 51 million for transport & infrastructure in BiH, which is 100 percent of Portugal's commitment to EI in Bosnia. In addition to that, it is 100 percent of the entire Portugal's commitment to EI in the Balkans overall. This can be observed from Tables 74 – 79 in the Annex (see Annex to Chapter 6); presenting all allocations to the sub-sector of transport & storage (Table 75 is BiH). This issue will be revisited in Chapter 7, where the analysis of the CRS micro data will try to give the specific answer concerning the final end of, among other, Portuguese EI aid to Bosnia.

Again, one of the major observations concerning the sub-sector of transport & storage is that it has by and large been supported by multilateral ODA.

Table 17: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country

Alb	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA	BiH	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA		
1	IDA	148,15	45,85	22,41	1	IDA	102,23	23,96	9,92
2	Germany	32,94	21,89	8,00	2	EC	73,76	71,28	6,98
3	EC	18,60	98,38	2,99	3	Portugal	57,51	100,00	81,56
4	Italy	15,41	9,56	3,53	4	Japan	48,42	46,33	20,92
5	US	6,49	4,38	1,54	5	France	4,08	32,86	12,80
6	Canada	2,01	100,00	22,16	6	Netherl.	3,25	11,15	1,78
7	Sweden	1,57	51,96	3,43	7	Austria	1,68	27,71	0,93
8	Netherl.	1,02	40,82	1,48	8	Sweden	1,67	4,37	0,61
9	Greece	0,75	33,79	0,46	9	Finland	1,63	11,08	2,56
10	Austria	0,24	12,00	0,59	10	US	1,57	0,31	0,17
227,17				295,78					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 18: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country

Cro	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA	Mac	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA		
1	EC	124,37	91,49	20,63	1	EC	14,87	90,38	2,96
2	Italy	1,83	67,27	7,34	2	IDA	11,98	11,37	4,49
3	France	0,97	50,21	4,65	3	Japan	6,50	96,78	4,49
4	Norway	0,76	5,00	0,84	4	Greece	2,59	77,18	3,27
5	Canada	0,43	80,91	6,41	5	US	2,44	1,79	0,57
6	US	0,28	0,28	0,10	6	Netherl.	1,75	5,98	1,24
7	Spain	0,01	7,15	0,10	7	Germany	0,31	1,64	0,18
8					8	Switz.	0,01	0,10	0,02
9					9				
10					10				
128,64				40,44					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 19: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA	ex Yu	trans. & storage (UDS millions)	trans. & storage as % of EI	trans. & storage as % of SAA		
1	EC	61,27	8,69	2,09	1	EC	115,43	80,95	80,95
2	IDA	57,64	17,57	11,06	2	Japan	15,17	98,82	86,27
3	Netherl.	18,47	44,06	10,36	3	Norway	4,33	17,25	3,43
4	Greece	16,09	88,06	11,44	4	Switz.	1,34	36,95	5,75
5	Germany	12,44	4,61	1,67	5	France	0,50	7,98	3,81
6	Sweden	7,17	13,64	3,60	6	Italy	0,09	27,29	0,19
7	Norway	5,29	14,30	2,11	7	Netherl.	0,01	0,20	0,08
8	France	5,15	27,37	8,04	8				
9	US	2,72	0,52	0,19	9				
10	Switz.	1,94	4,48	0,81	10				
188,18				136,87					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

5.2 Communications

As can be observed from the statistical data, the sub-sector of communications is the least supported field in EI and beyond, and thus it does not offer much material for analysis. There is an obvious absence of major bilaterals, which in combination with no IDA support, leaves the field with very little support overall.

There are just a few allocations which can actually be considered relevant by exceeding the amount of few million. Review of Tables 20-22 presented below (see also Tables 80-86 in Annex for complete information), which contain the numbers on donor commitments to this sub-sector, shows that many of the allocations are smaller than USD 1 million.

The overabundance of Italian aid to Albania produces the largest allocation in the field of communications in the region, of USD 12, 25 million (Table 20). Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain have registered modest contributions to Bosnia (Table 20), and the EC to FRY/Serbia (Table 22).

It is interesting that some additional conclusions, which extend beyond the sub-sector of communications, can be derived from the fact of the smallness of the allocations to this field.

For example, one observation concerns the *almost complete French absence from the EI sector*: even though its contributions (minus FRY/Serbia which stands at USD 1, 20 million) are around a few hundred thousand USD, they still represent (in Macedonia and Albania) 80-90 % of French support to EI. The situation is somewhat different in BiH and FRY/Serbia.

Overall, the sub-sector of communications was clearly the least supported field of ODA in the Balkans. Italian aid defined the receipts in Albania; Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain accounted for most of communications ODA to BiH; and the EC and the Netherlands were the strongest donors to FRY/Serbia.

Table 20: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country

Alb	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA	BiH	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA		
1	Italy	12,25	7,60	2,80	1	Sweden	9,32	24,41	3,42
2	Greece	1,21	54,78	0,75	2	Switzerl.	9,06	30,38	6,28
3	Switzerl.	0,78	14,56	1,45	3	Spain	8,07	17,62	3,39
4	UK	0,46	76,94	1,11	4	US	2,67	0,53	0,29
5	Netherl.	0,43	17,47	0,63	5	Netherl.	2,39	8,22	1,32
6	EC	0,31	1,62	0,05	6	EC	1,63	1,57	0,15
7	France	0,30	86,18	0,93	7	Norway	1,29	3,88	0,55
8	Germany	0,19	0,13	0,05	8	France	0,44	3,51	1,37
9	Sweden	0,01	0,46	0,03	9	Finland	0,41	2,81	0,65
10					10	Canada	0,37	3,32	0,25
15,96				35,66					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 21: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country

Cro	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA	Mac	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA		
1	US	0,92	0,93	0,33	1	US	2,78	2,05	0,65
2	France	0,63	32,44	3,00	2	EC	1,58	9,62	0,32
3	Japan	0,18	35,92	4,28	3	Germany	1,20	6,40	0,70
4	Germany	0,07	1,01	0,05	4	Netherl.	0,67	2,29	0,48
5	Norway	0,05	0,33	0,05	5	Greece	0,57	17,02	0,72
6	Netherl.	0,02	0,63	0,14	6	Italy	0,24	14,23	1,01
7					7	France	0,18	91,36	1,52
8					8	UK	0,18	5,87	1,13
9					9	Norway	0,10	1,05	0,16
10					10				
1,87				7,51					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 22: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA	ex Yu	comm. (USD millions)	comm. as % of EI	comm. as % of SAA
1 EC	11,17	1,58	0,38	1 France	1,46	23,35	11,15
2 Netherl.	7,33	17,48	4,11	2 Netherl.	1,12	15,10	6,29
3 Norway	3,52	9,52	1,40	3 Norway	0,18	0,71	0,14
4 US	2,61	0,50	0,18	4 Finland	0,12	100,00	1,91
5 Sweden	1,71	3,25	0,86	5 Italy	0,09	27,23	0,19
6 UK	1,21	14,56	0,78	6 Japan	0,03	0,23	0,20
7 France	1,20	6,38	1,88	7			
8 Canada	0,87	25,84	0,79	8			
9 Germany	0,61	0,23	0,08	9			
10 Switzerl.	0,58	1,35	0,25	10			
30,82				3,01			

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

5.3 Energy

Review of the Tables 23-25 presented below (Tables 87-93 in Annex) demonstrates that the sub-sector of energy received substantial amounts of the EI ODA to the Balkans. As it can be observed from the statistical data, support was not proportionately distributed across countries, and the largest shares of the support for energy went to *Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia*, whereas Croatia and Macedonia received very small amounts. This calls for additional analysis. One line of logic is that it has to do with the presence of conflict which produced the energy needs, in the sense that a lot of infrastructure needed reconstruction (for example the oil refineries and the related energy infrastructure in Serbia). In Macedonia the conflict was confined, and to some extent in Croatia too and this resulted with smaller ODA for energy. In addition to that, another factor was presented by the strong energy needs in Albania which are (still at present) much greater than in the rest of the region, due to much poorer energy infrastructure.²⁷⁴

As evident from Tables 23-25, the energy field is quite strongly dominated by IDA funding, which is consistently and strongly present in all of the countries in the region. As a curiosity, the CRS has even registered presence of IDA funding (USD 8, 0 million) to Croatia, which is (generally) ineligible for IDA money. This USD 8 million allocation is clearly a one-off exception to this rule. For example, IDA allocations to the sub sector of energy included: USD 133, 22 million to Albania (IDA ranks second; Table 23); USD 132, 25 million to BiH (IDA ranks first; Table 23); USD 54, 25 million to FRY/Ser (IDA ranks thirds; Table 25).

Some of the patterns already discerned in other sub-sectors are also observable in energy. Italy is a strong donor to Albania; *the only relevant EC contribution for energy has gone to FRY/Serbia*, whereas everybody else in the region (with minor exception of BiH) has received no EC support. For comparison, EC energy ODA to FRY/Serbia amounted to USD 339,61 million (the EC ranks first; Table 25); the second largest EC commitment to energy in the Balkans was to BiH in the amount of USD 15,57 million (the EC ranks 6th, after Switzerland; Table 23). There has been no EC support for energy to any other of the countries in the Balkans. The conclusion is quite straightforward: this was a country-based policy urged by the particular situation in Serbia. Table 92 in the Annex shows the time-dynamic of EC energy ODA to FRY/Serbia. As it can be seen from the table, the relevant allocations start in the year 2000. Before that Serbia was ineligible. Nevertheless, it least a part of this accounts for on the Energy for Democracy project which was discussed in Chapter 4. This will also be corroborated by the micro data in Chapter 7.

As evident from Tables 23-25, Germany, as in other fields, has contributed a lot in Albania and in FRY/Serbia. For example, its energy commitment to Albania was USD 92, 89 million (or 61, 73 % of its EI aid to the country; Table 20); the commitment to FRY/Serbia was USD 173, 42 million (64, 26 % of its EI to the country). This practically concludes Germany's relevant contributions for energy in the region (Bosnia received USD 9, 30 million; which ranked Germany as the 9th strongest donor to the field in BiH; Table 23).

²⁷⁴ The fact of the particular challenge of energy supply in Albania will be taken as common knowledge and it would not be substantiated with specific evidence.

The strong Japanese support for energy in Albania and BiH should also be mentioned. Japan has allocated USD 32,27 million for energy to Albania and it ranks as 4th largest donors (the allocation represents entire 99,81 % of Japan's EI assistance to the country; Table 20); and USD 55,69 million to BiH (ranks 2nd; the allocations is 53,30 % of its EI ODA to the country; Table 20). As it can be seen from Table 88 in the Annex, Japan's energy assistance to Albania was allocated in only two years, 1995 and 1996. Table 89 in the Annex shows that Japan's contributions for energy to BiH took place the two subsequent years, of 1997 and 1998. Tables 88-93 in the Annex show that Japan did not make any other bigger contributions to energy in the region. This lends the conclusion that these allocations were a result of country-based decisions, and that Japan did not have a policy of supporting energy in the Balkans.

Spain has also made a relevant contribution to its regional champion – Bosnia. Its allocation for energy to BiH is USD 36, 93 million and it represents entire 80, 60% of Spanish EI ODA to BiH.

Norway appears as a consistent donor to energy throughout the region. In addition to the relevant nominal amounts, energy support represents huge percentage share of Norway's EI allocations in the Balkans. For example Norway has committed: USD 14,42 million to Albania (99,96 of its EI aid to the country); USD 25,08 to BiH (75,15% of its EI aid); USD 13,78 million to Croatia (90,81 % of its EI assistance to the country); USD 6,50 to Macedonia (65,04% of its EI aid) USD and 22,85 million to FRY/Serbia (61,75% of its EI allocations to the country). It can be concluded that this was a result of consistent policy choice. Norway has chosen to channel from 2/3 to almost all its EI ODA to the sub-sector of energy.

In conclusion: the sub-sector of energy has been consistently dominated by IDA; the EC (as usual) has made a big contribution only to FRY/Serbia. Most of the energy ODA in the region went to three countries: Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia.

Table 23: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country

Alb	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA	BiH	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA		
1	Italy	133,36	82,72	30,52	1	IDA	132,25	31,00	12,83
2	IDA	132,22	40,92	20,00	2	Japan	55,69	53,30	24,07
3	Germany	92,89	61,73	22,56	3	Spain	36,93	80,60	15,52
4	Japan	37,27	99,81	61,51	4	Norway	25,08	75,15	10,74
5	Norway	14,42	99,96	21,13	5	Switzerl.	18,30	61,34	12,69
6	US	6,82	4,60	1,62	6	EC	15,57	15,05	1,47
7	Switzerl.	2,41	44,80	4,47	7	Finland	12,65	86,11	19,86
8					8	Canada	10,76	96,68	7,28
9					9	Germany	9,30	17,47	4,59
10					10	Austria	4,36	71,95	2,41
419,39				320,91					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 24: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country

Cro	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA	Mac	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA		
1	Norway	13,78	90,81	15,22	1	Switzerl.	9,89	98,14	15,82
2	IDA	8,00	100,00	100,00	2	Norway	6,50	65,04	9,90
3	US	2,14	2,17	0,77	3	Austria	1,80	91,22	6,41
4	UK	0,11	8,23	0,89	4	US	1,78	1,31	0,42
5	Canada	0,10	19,09	1,51	5	Germany	0,19	0,99	0,11
6	Japan	0,07	14,41	1,72	6	Japan	0,02	0,36	0,02
7	Belgium	0,03	100,00	1,57	7				
8	Italy	0,01	0,28	0,03	8				
9					9				
10					10				
24,24				20,18					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 25: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA	ex Yu	energy (USD millions)	energy as % of EI	energy as % of SAA		
1	EC	339,61	48,14	11,56	1	Norway	9,07	36,13	7,19
2	Germany	173,42	64,26	23,22	2	Netherl.	6,30	84,70	35,29
3	IDA	54,25	16,54	10,41	3	France	4,28	68,67	32,79
4	Switzerl.	32,71	75,68	13,76	4	Japan	0,06	0,39	0,34
5	Sweden	28,76	54,69	14,43	5				
6	Norway	22,85	61,75	9,10	6				
7	Japan	11,14	97,49	34,13	7				
8	France	11,04	58,72	17,25	8				
9	US	10,23	1,96	0,71	9				
10	Spain	2,85	100,00	1,57	10				

686,85

19,71

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

5.4 Banking & Financial Services

The sub-sector of BFS was the second least assisted field in sector of economic infrastructure, after communication, as can be seen from Tables 26-28. The major receipts in the field of BFS were collected by two countries only, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia . As in other cases, it is obvious that just a few major donors determined the situation in the sub-sector: *IDA, the US, and Germany*. The single largest donor to the Balkans, the EC was conspicuously absent from the field.

IDA has obviously been the most consistent donor to BFS in the region. For example, IDA allocations to BFS included: USD 42, 72 million to Albania (ranks first; [Table 26](#)); USD 33, 32 million to BiH (ranks second; [Table 26](#)); USD 201, 91 million to FRY/Serbia (ranks first; [Table 28](#)).

Most of the US support went to BiH; the US has committed USD 133, 02 million to the country (ranks first; [Table 26](#)). For comparison, Albania received only USD 7, 08 million, and Croatia USD 8, 60 million for support to BFS from the US. Beyond this, the US made no other allocations to the sub-sector. Germany relevantly supported FRY/Serbia (USD 54, 73 million), BiH (USD 29, 15 million), and Albania (USD 15, 27 million). Sweden had a sizeable contribution to BiH (USD 23, 54 million); the Netherlands made its only relevant allocation to its regional protégé Macedonia.

Except for IDA, no other donor seems to have pursued a consistent policy of support to BFS. Clearly, some donors, such as the EC had a clear policy not to support this field. The rest was a result of country-based policy choices, such as, Dutch aid to Macedonia (USD 25, 14 million).

Overall, beyond IDA, the US, and Germany, it is clear there was not much interest in the wider donor community to support BFS. Even amounts as small as USD 0, 05 million had to be registered in order to populate the top 10 rankings, but even that for example did not complete the list in the case of Macedonia. Even donors who are traditionally absent from the Balkans, such as Belgium or Ireland, entered the ranking as a result of the scarcity and the small size of the contributions.

The EC has been absolutely absent from the field and it is obvious that this is a clear policy choice.

In conclusion: the sub-sector of BFS is by and large determined by IDA and a few bigger allocations by some of the major bilaterals. Clearly, there was not much interest in the donor community to support BFS in the Balkans, which resulted with the fact that the field is the second least assisted sub-sector after the sub-sector of communications.

Table 26: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country

Alb	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA	BiH	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA		
1	IDA	42,72	13,22	6,46	1	US	133,02	26,30	14,55
2	Germany	15,27	10,14	3,71	2	IDA	33,32	7,81	3,23
3	US	7,08	4,78	1,68	3	Germany	29,15	54,74	14,39
4	Switzerl.	2,18	40,64	4,05	4	Sweden	23,54	61,67	8,64
5	Sweden	1,39	45,94	3,03	5	France	5,02	40,45	15,77
6	Belgium	0,90	100,00	76,78	6	Norway	2,33	6,99	1,00
7	Greece	0,20	8,96	0,12	7	Switzerl.	1,81	6,07	1,26
8	UK	0,14	23,06	0,33	8	Belgium	1,56	100,00	10,18
9	Ireland	0,08	100,00	3,71	9	UK	1,53	10,16	2,28
10	Italy	0,06	0,03	0,01	10	Italy	1,27	42,26	0,92
70,01				232,55					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 27: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country

Cro	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA	Mac	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA		
1	US	8,60	8,69	3,08	1	Netherl.	25,14	85,87	17,82
2	Netherl.	3,29	99,33	22,18	2	Norway	2,61	26,14	3,98
3	UK	1,19	91,77	9,88	3	Sweden	2,43	98,94	5,56
4	France	0,33	17,16	1,59	4	Germany	2,01	10,70	1,17
5	Italy	0,31	11,34	1,24	5	Italy	1,10	65,34	4,65
6	Norway	0,27	1,76	0,30	6	UK	0,59	19,56	3,77
7	Germany	0,26	3,87	0,20	7	Belgium	0,57	100,00	20,41
8	Spain	0,09	92,85	1,24	8	Japan	0,05	0,77	0,04
9	EC	0,06	0,04	0,01	9				
10	Japan	0,05	9,43	1,12	10				
14,44				34,51					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 28: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA	ex Yu	BFS (USD millions)	BFS as % of EI	BFS as % of SAA	
IDA	201,91	61,54	38,73	1	Norway	2,51	10,01	1,99
Germany	54,73	20,28	7,33	2	Switzerl.	1,70	46,98	7,32
Switzerl.	7,77	17,97	3,27	3	Germany	0,37	100,00	1,29
EC	7,52	1,07	0,26	4	Italy	0,09	27,65	0,19
Sweden	6,23	11,84	3,12	5	Japan	0,05	0,35	0,31
Netherl.	5,96	14,20	3,34	6				
UK	5,41	64,82	3,47	7				
Luxemb.	2,46	89,38	6,37	8				
Norway	2,11	5,69	0,84	9				
Belgium	1,89	100,00	7,08	10				
					4,73			
295,96								

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

5.5 Business & Other Services

A lot of the support channeled into the EI sector in the Balkans went into the sub-sector of business & other services (BOS). . With the exception of Albania, in all other countries in the region receipts for BOS were a strong share of total EI allocations.

What is interesting about the sub-sector of BOS is that practically *no other field of ODA in the Balkans has been so strongly dominated by only one donor*. In the case of BOS the dominant donor is the US. As evident from Tables 29-31 (complete information in Tables 101-107 in Annex), not only that the US ranks consistently as top donor to BOS in all the countries in the region, but in addition to that, its allocations represent a very high percentage share (from 72, 42 % in BiH to 96, 80 % in FRY/Serbia) of total US ODA spending in the EI sector.

In simple terms, *the BOS sub-sector in the Balkans is by and large defined by the consistent US policy to support business development in the region*. The high percentage shares of BOS preclude the US presence in the other sub-sectors in EI.

In addition to the US, *IDA is consistently strong in BOS across the region*. For example, IDA has committed: USD 158, 83 in BiH (Table 29); USD 93, 35 million in Macedonia (Table 30); and USD 14, 30 million to FRY/Serbia (Table 31).

Germany has been present with more modest amounts but has nevertheless been consistently present (USD 9, 19 million to Albania; USD 14, 78 million to BiH; USD 6, 34 million to Croatia; USD 15, 08 million to Macedonia; and USD 28, 67 million to FRY/Serbia).

The Netherlands has made relevant contributions only to BiH (USD 20, 12 million) and FRY/Serbia (USD 10, 17 million). The EC, almost by the definition, has given the most of its BOS assistance to FRY/Serbia (USD 285, 86 million).

In regional terms nevertheless, as well as in each individual country, the sub-sector of BOS is an *exclusive domain of US aid*.

Table 29: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country

Alb	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA	BiH	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA		
1	US	127,83	86,24	30,31	1	US	366,22	72,42	40,05
2	Germany	9,19	6,11	2,23	2	IDA	158,83	37,23	15,41
3	Netherl.	1,04	41,71	1,52	3	Netherl.	20,12	69,11	11,06
4	UNDP	0,38	100,00	17,93	4	Germany	14,78	27,77	7,30
5	Italy	0,13	0,08	0,03	5	EC	12,39	11,97	1,17
6	France	0,05	13,30	0,14	6	UK	11,47	76,22	17,14
7	Sweden	0,05	1,64	0,11	7	Sweden	3,48	9,11	1,28
8	Japan	0,02	0,04	0,03	8	Norway	3,15	9,44	1,35
9					9	Italy	1,08	35,97	0,79
10					10	Spain	0,69	1,51	0,29
138,68				592,22					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 30: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country

Cro	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA	Mac	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA		
1	US	87,05	87,94	31,22	1	US	128,80	94,85	30,29
2	EC	11,52	8,47	1,91	2	IDA	93,35	88,63	35,03
3	Germany	6,34	95,12	4,92	3	Germany	15,08	80,27	8,75
4	Italy	0,57	21,10	2,30	4	UK	2,25	74,57	14,37
5	Norway	0,32	2,10	0,35	5	Netherl.	1,71	5,86	1,22
6	Japan	0,21	40,24	4,79	6	Norway	0,78	7,78	1,18
7					7	Italy	0,34	20,43	1,45
8					8	Greece	0,19	5,80	0,25
9					9	Switzerl.	0,18	1,76	0,28
10					10	Austria	0,17	8,78	0,62
106,00				242,86					

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 31: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA	ex Yu	BOS (USD millions)	BOS as % of EI	BOS as % of SAA		
1	US	505,90	96,80	35,10	1	EC	27,16	19,05	19,05
2	EC	285,86	40,52	9,73	2	Norway	9,01	35,90	7,14
3	Germany	28,67	10,62	3,84	3	Switzerl.	0,58	16,06	2,50
4	IDA	14,30	4,36	2,74	4	Italy	0,06	17,84	0,13
5	Netherl.	10,17	24,26	5,71	5	Japan	0,03	0,21	0,18
6	Sweden	8,72	16,58	4,37	6				
7	Norway	3,24	8,74	1,29	7				
8	Greece	1,61	8,82	1,15	8				
9	Canada	1,08	31,97	0,98	9				
10	UK	0,43	5,11	0,27	10				

859,97

36,84

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6. Disaggregation of Sector Allocations per Donor

Following the review of top donors to countries – per sector, the remainder of the chapter continues with the exercise of sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance to the Balkans. Additional insights in this process can be obtained through another angle of refraction – disaggregation of the allocations to a sector by donor. Whereas the previous review provided information on top donors to a specific sector per country, i.e. top donors to education in Albania, this one provides a full sector breakdown per donor for the fields of SIS and EI, for example, all allocations made by the EC in education, health, BFS, and all other sub-sectors in the recipient countries.

The exercise is similar to the previous one but it nevertheless allows observations which were either not possible, or were more difficultly obtainable through the previous review.

This phase of the review will encompass the major donors to the region. For this purpose it will consult the original ranking in Chapter 5 based on data for the period 1990-2005. The exercise will involve the top 10 bilaterals plus Japan, and the top two multilaterals, the EC, and IDA. The third strongest multilateral donor, UNHCR, which ranks the top 10 combined list of biggest donors to the region (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5), is not included, as the ODA provided by UNHCR is not sector allocable aid (SAA).

Although Japan is not on the top 10 list of major bilaterals, the closer review of Japan's commitments of SAA over the previous pages clearly showed that Japan was a relevant donor in the Balkans. For comparison, although the UK and France rank higher than Japan on the overall listing (the UK is 6th and France is 9th; Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5), as already observed, their volumes of aid have been created by debt relief to FRY/Serbia. Because of this, the choice is made to also extend the review to Japan.

The goal of this exercise is, to continue the exploration into the sectoral allocation of foreign assistance to the Balkans, to look for patterns and to analyze how donors made their decisions on aid allocation to the region.

Overall, the sectoral commitments of *13 major bilateral and multilateral donors* will be examined.

6.1 European Commission

The review begins with discussion of the foreign assistance flows of the largest donor to the Balkans, the European Commission. Table 32 presented below contains the allocations made by the EC to the countries in the Balkans in the sectors of SIS and EI. Some of the more interesting observations which can be discerned from Table 32 include:

- a) as already pointed out, the EC demonstrated consistency across countries in support of education. All Balkan countries received support for education;

- b) in sub-sectors where the EC was active only by exception, such as the sectors of health, or energy, the *exception was usually made in favor of FRY/Serbia*;
- c) the EC was consistent in supporting transport & storage (mostly funding for road infrastructure); although as a rule the EC did not charge allocations to ex Yu, logically, there has been a substantial amount for transport & storage allocated to the category of ex Yu (as assumedly some of the infrastructure was constructed regionally);
- d) *FRY/Serbia received the lion's share of EC support in the major sectors of SIS and EI*;
- e) fields where the EC had more consistent presence were GCS (its major realm of activity) and education in SIS; and transport & storage in EI;
- f) as already observed most of the EC assistance for EI in the Balkans was for transport & storage;

Table 32: EC allocations to the SIS and EI sectors (USD 2006 millions).

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	13,24	15,50	33,67	24,63	75,47	0,00
health	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	76,51	0,00
watsan	9,82	51,60	15,73	1,33	53,09	0,00
population	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	252,66	303,46	169,57	150,07	787,30	0,00
other	2,17	67,28	20,01	21,81	154,61	0,00
	277,90	437,84	238,99	197,85	1146,99	0,00

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	18,60	73,76	124,37	14,87	61,27	115,43
communications	0,31	1,63	0,00	1,58	11,17	0,00
energy	0,00	15,57	0,00	0,00	339,61	0,00
BFS	0,00	0,13	0,06	0,00	7,52	0,00
BOS	0,00	12,39	11,52	0,00	285,86	27,16
	18,90	103,48	135,94	16,45	705,43	142,59

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.2 Germany

Germany was the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period of transition. German aid to the Balkans in the sectors of SIS and EI is presented in [Table 33](#) below. Analysis of the statistical data contained in the table lends some of the following observations:

- a) Similar to the EC, Germany was consistent in supporting education in the region; all countries in the region received relevant support for education;

- b) German ODA consistently supported water & sanitation. Germany has been the single strongest donor in the field of water & sanitation to the point that it can be termed its niche interest in foreign aid to the region;
- c) *relative to its size, Albania received the biggest share of German aid in SIS and EI;*

Table 33: Germany's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions).

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	25,51	54,86	41,75	18,86	96,46	9,31
health	5,94	0,09	0,02	1,56	5,23	0,00
watsan	154,12	22,79	50,62	48,67	105,94	0,00
population	6,87	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	10,32	27,93	14,27	11,76	108,64	9,65
other	9,81	10,06	5,36	9,34	15,28	0,00
	212,59	115,72	112,02	90,18	331,55	18,95

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	32,94	0,00	0,00	0,31	12,44	0,00
communications	0,19	0,01	0,07	1,20	0,61	0,00
energy	92,89	9,30	0,00	0,19	173,42	0,00
BFS	15,27	29,15	0,26	2,01	54,73	0,37
BOS	9,19	14,78	6,34	15,08	28,67	0,00
	150,49	53,25	6,66	18,79	269,86	0,37

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.3 United States

The US has been the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans, second to Germany. The major specificities of the US support to the region have already been pointed out in the previous review of top donor rankings, that is, strong presence in primarily two sub-sectors, GCS and BOS.

Table 34 presented below corroborates this finding. The US has had some presence in practically all the other sub-sectors, but that presence is absolutely minor to its activity in its two major sub-sectors of interest. As already mentioned earlier, the US had been obviously absent from the sector of transport & storage, which can also be observed from Table 34.

In addition, it does appear that the US overall commitments across countries are rather balanced, relative to country size, with a minor exception to BiH which appears to be the recipient most generously assisted by the US in the region.

Table 34: US allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	8,66	0,77	9,26	15,39	6,56	0,00
health	16,35	0,55	0,41	0,20	7,40	0,00
watsan	0,84	15,19	0,79	0,63	10,25	0,00
population	8,79	0,00	9,47	0,19	7,05	0,00
GCS	162,03	283,97	97,67	149,77	787,30	0,00
other	3,58	5,68	11,42	26,91	22,51	0,00
	200,25	306,15	129,01	193,08	841,06	0,00

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	6,49	1,57	0,28	2,44	2,72	0,00
communications	0,00	2,67	0,92	2,78	2,61	0,00
energy	6,82	2,24	2,14	1,78	10,23	0,00
BFS	7,08	133,02	8,60	0,00	1,17	0,00
BOS	127,83	366,22	87,05	128,80	505,90	0,00
	148,22	505,71	98,99	135,79	522,62	0,00

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.4 IDA

IDA has been the 4th strongest donor to the region in the period of transition. Table 35 presented below shows that, with the exception to a few sectors, and one country – Croatia, IDA has had varied yet consistent presence in the Balkans.

The country which has received the largest share of IDA's support to the region has been Bosnia.

IDA's absence from Croatia relevantly contributed to the status of Croatia as one of the least assisted countries in not just the Balkans, but also wider Eastern Europe.

Table 35: IDA allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	15,45	44,64	0,00	6,20	23,00	0,00
health	21,41	31,80	0,00	19,50	30,19	0,00
watsan	51,05	68,00	0,00	17,70	8,00	0,00
population	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	76,98	116,50	0,00	0,00	12,78	0,00
other	44,51	179,00	0,00	75,41	38,52	0,00
	209,41	439,94	0,00	118,81	112,48	0,00

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	148,15	102,23	0,00	11,98	57,64	0,00
communications	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
energy	132,22	132,25	8,00	0,00	54,25	0,00
BFS	42,72	33,32	0,00	0,00	201,91	0,00
BOS	0,00	158,83	0,00	93,35	14,30	0,00
	323,09	426,63	8,00	105,32	328,11	0,00

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.5 Netherlands

The Netherlands has been the 3rd strongest bilateral donor to the region in the period of transition, right after Germany and the United States.

The distribution of Dutch ODA in the SIS and EI sectors in the Balkans is presented on [Table 36](#) below. Analysis of the data contained in the table allows several interesting observations:

- GCS is the sector where the Netherlands has allocated most of its aid; in many other fields the Netherlands has quite a symbolic presence;*
- in more than one case only one country in the region has received the bulk of the funding in a field: the case of education to Macedonia was already pointed out earlier; similar is the case of transport & storage to FRY/Serbia or to some extent BFS to Macedonia.*
- evident is the absence of support to Croatia ; the Netherlands belongs to the group of donors which chose not to support Croatia;*

Table 36: Dutch allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	0,28	1,35	0,00	43,22	3,06	0,77
health	0,81	6,22	1,04	0,00	9,32	2,92
watsan	0,09	3,39	0,00	0,00	11,30	0,58
population	1,59	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,66	0,59
GCS	30,32	101,57	3,56	23,43	80,53	1,84
other	2,35	19,10	1,62	6,85	7,36	0,24
	35,44	131,63	6,23	73,50	113,23	6,95

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	1,02	3,25	0,00	1,75	18,47	0,01
communications	0,43	2,39	0,02	0,67	7,33	1,12
energy	0,00	3,35	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,30
BFS	0,00	0,00	3,29	25,14	5,96	0,00
BOS	1,04	20,12	0,00	1,71	10,17	0,00
	2,49	29,12	3,31	29,28	41,93	7,43

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.6 Italy

Italy was 4th largest bilateral donor to the region and it ranks 7th on the combined list of both bilateral and multilateral donors (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). As already discussed in the previous chapter, Italy was a donor sui generis in that its ODA to the Balkans has been strongly defined by its special relationship with one recipient – Albania.

Even though Table 37 below is only a partial picture, as it only comprises two sectors in the realm of SAA, Italy's position of a donor of particular profile is also visible from here. First and foremost, Italy's approach is defined by its special tie to Albania. In only one case, in the sub-sector of education, another country (BiH) received a bigger allocation than Albania. In all the other fields it is obvious that there is one policy for Albania, and another policy for the rest of the region. For example, from Table 37 it can be observed that:

- Croatia received very little from Italy, even less than from the Netherlands; Italy was also in the group of donors which chose not to support Croatia;
- there is a strong disparity between allocations to SIS and allocations to EI; with the exception to Albania, Italy is almost absent from the EI sector;
- in line with what said above, as many other donors, Italy is almost completely disengaged, or only symbolically present in some fields, such as BFS, BOS, or population;

Table 37: Italy's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	29,18	53,92	1,42	1,01	2,03	5,18
health	27,71	5,41	0,13	1,68	5,60	1,76
watsan	74,52	1,94	0,93	9,73	0,52	0,00
population	3,20	2,61	0,02	0,00	0,10	0,00
GCS	81,27	13,45	1,06	2,92	15,08	5,12
other	24,74	16,52	0,92	4,70	9,00	4,22
	240,61	93,84	4,48	20,04	32,33	16,29

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	15,41	0,50	1,83	0,00	0,00	0,09
communications	12,25	0,11	0,00	0,24	0,37	0,09
energy	133,36	0,04	0,01	0,00	0,00	0,00
BFS	0,06	1,27	0,31	1,10	0,00	0,09
BOS	0,13	1,08	0,57	0,34	0,16	0,06
	161,21	3,00	2,72	1,68	0,53	0,34

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.7 Norway

Norway was the 5th largest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005. From what appears in [Table 38](#), Norway was a donor active in all the sub-sectors under exploration, even if in some of them it had merely a symbolic presence. For example, from [Table 38](#) it can be observed that:

- as with many other donors, *most of Norway's aid went to the sub-sector of GCS*;
- Norway had relevant interest in water & sanitation;
- Norway acted as a *strong supporter to the field of energy*, consistently across the region;
- Norway is not in the group of donors who recognizing that Croatia was economically ahead of the other countries in the region withheld aid from Croatia. Croatia's receipts from Norway in both SIS and EI are larger than both Albania and Macedonia's.

Table 38: Norway's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	3,50	3,75	0,39	3,75	11,94	1,72
health	4,77	3,52	2,06	5,15	17,69	7,58
watsan	10,80	38,66	1,40	3,18	17,40	5,49
population	0,03	1,26	0,74	0,93	1,06	0,32
GCS	27,49	92,59	41,29	27,66	105,66	68,92
other	5,96	38,42	10,93	7,28	32,82	9,04
	52,56	178,20	56,81	47,94	186,58	93,08

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,00	1,52	0,76	0,00	5,29	4,33
communications	0,00	1,29	0,05	0,10	3,52	0,18
energy	14,42	25,08	13,78	6,50	22,85	9,07
BFS	0,00	2,33	0,27	2,61	2,11	2,51
BOS	0,00	3,15	0,32	0,78	3,24	9,01
	14,42	33,38	15,18	10,00	37,01	25,10

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.8 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom ranks as the 6th largest donor to the Balkans in the period 1990 -2005 ([Table 35](#); Annex to Chapter 5). Nevertheless, as it has already been discussed in Chapter 5, big part of UK's ODA to the Balkans has been in the form of debt relief, primarily to FRY/Serbia. This is why the UK was not much represented in the preceding discussion on sectoral disaggregation. [Table 39](#) presented below offers the following observations:

- the only sub-sector where UK had relevant presence is GCS; actually the UK seems quite absent from all other sub-sectors, with some exception to health, and the allocations charged under "other";
- Macedonia is conspicuously under-assisted by the UK; in the SIS sector it has received even less aid than Croatia;
- the UK belongs to the group of donors which have been regularly inactive in the EI sector in the Balkans; Bosnia is a minor exception;

Table 39: UK's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	0,27	0,62	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
health	6,89	3,67	0,93	0,00	22,27	0,00
watsan	0,00	0,00	0,12	0,33	0,00	0,00
population	0,04	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	19,82	29,87	7,11	9,41	118,16	1,14
other	5,36	17,75	2,57	0,00	6,44	1,93
	32,38	51,90	10,74	9,73	146,86	3,07

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
communications	0,46	0,00	0,00	0,18	1,21	0,00
energy	0,00	2,05	0,11	0,00	1,29	0,00
BFS	0,14	1,53	1,19	0,59	5,41	0,00
BOS	0,00	11,47	0,00	2,25	0,43	0,00
	0,60	15,05	1,30	3,02	8,34	0,00

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.9 Austria

Austria ranked 7th on the list of largest bilateral donors to the Balkan in the period of transition (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). The preceding discussion particularly underscored Austria's consistent support in the sub-sector of education. Table 40 below presents Austria's overall allocations to the sector of SIS and EI. The first observation which comes from Table 40 containing the numbers on is that:

- Austria is *almost completely absent from the entire EI sector*. This is clearly a deliberate policy choice to work primarily in SIS. Hence, Austria belongs to the group of donors who in the region of the Balkans were as a rule not active in the EI sector;
- In the SIS sector, as already mentioned, it is obvious that Austria has strong and consistent (if varied) presence *primarily* in education,
- Austria registered also some activity in GCS and water & sanitation.
- The bulk of Austria's aid went to FRY/Serbia and BiH; Croatia was favored to both Albania and Macedonia.

Table 40: Austria's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	13,29	93,28	50,77	9,06	72,54	7,88
health	1,88	3,88	0,01	0,00	0,22	0,47
watsan	18,76	15,00	0,00	16,09	9,42	0,00
population	0,00	0,08	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	0,25	52,88	6,45	0,71	78,32	0,38
other	0,58	2,26	0,48	0,21	8,15	0,00
	34,76	167,38	57,72	26,06	168,65	8,72

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,24	1,68	0,00	0,00	0,07	0,00
communications	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
energy	1,74	4,36	0,00	1,80	0,00	0,00
BFS	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00
BOS	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,17	0,02	0,00
	1,98	6,06	0,00	1,97	0,11	0,00

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.10 Sweden

Sweden ranked top 8th bilateral donor to the Balkan in the period of transition (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5) The preceding discussion on sectoral disaggregation of ODA highlighted the characteristics of Swedish SAA. Review of Table 41 presented below offers several more relevant observations concerning Swedish ODA in the SIS and EI sector. As can be seen from Table 41:

- most of Swedish ODA in the SIS sector was allocated to the sub-sector of GCS;
- substantial amount of Swedish ODA was allocated to the category "other";
- most of the aid in SIS and EI went to BiH and FRY/Serbia, and these are the only recipients who benefited from relevant allocations in the EI sector;
- Sweden was conspicuously absent from the sub-sector of education;

Table 41: Sweden's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	0,00	2,54	0,93	0,76	0,98	0,00
health	8,65	7,48	1,27	0,00	1,53	0,00
watsan	3,56	0,00	0,00	0,40	6,11	0,00
population	0,85	1,14	0,00	0,84	1,67	0,00
GCS	17,98	63,85	12,02	19,33	59,94	8,67
other	2,08	127,99	23,77	1,26	48,35	0,02
	33,13	203,00	37,98	22,60	118,56	8,68

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	1,57	1,67	0,00	0,00	7,17	0,00
communications	0,01	9,32	0,00	0,00	1,71	0,00
energy	0,00	0,17	0,00	0,00	28,76	0,00
BFS	1,39	23,54	0,00	2,43	6,23	0,00
BOS	0,05	3,48	0,00	0,03	8,72	0,00
	3,02	38,17	0,00	2,46	52,58	0,00

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.11 France

France ranked 9th on the list of top 10 bilateral donors to the Balkans in the period of transition (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). In addition to the highlights from the preceding discussion, Table 42 below offers several more observations emerging from the statistical data on French ODA in the sectors of SIS and EI. As can be seen from Table 42:

- France's ODA in the SIS sector, as already observed previously, was mostly allocated for education;
- some amounts of French ODA to SIS were allocated to the category "other";
- the only countries which benefited from French aid in the sector of EI were BiH and FRY/Serbia;
- the biggest French allocation in the sector of EI supported the energy needs in FRY/Serbia;

Table 42: France's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	18,25	9,95	8,21	5,68	29,57	0,96
health	6,73	2,13	0,25	0,42	1,36	0,00
watsan	0,00	0,00	0,66	0,05	1,57	2,31
population	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	0,96	0,83	1,12	0,77	2,00	0,22
other	2,46	5,51	6,90	4,32	6,70	2,58
	28,41	18,42	17,14	11,23	41,20	6,07

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,00	4,08	0,97	0,00	5,15	0,50
communications	0,30	0,44	0,63	0,18	1,20	1,46
energy	0,00	2,87	0,00	0,00	11,04	4,28
BFS	0,00	5,02	0,33	0,00	1,41	0,00
BOS	0,05	0,01	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,00
	0,35	12,41	1,93	0,20	18,80	6,24

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.12 Switzerland

Switzerland ranked as 10th largest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005 (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). In addition to the conclusions concerning Swiss assistance from the preceding discussion, Table 43 below suggests a few additional observations concerning Switzerland's ODA to the SIS and EI sectors. From what can be seen from Table 43:

- Switzerland appears to have had varied presence across most sub-sectors in SIS and EI, with the exception of "population" which was avoided by most donors, and the field of BOS; in all the other sub-sectors, some, if modest, Swiss presence can be identified;
- Switzerland belongs to the groups of countries which felt that Croatia was too rich to receive assistance; it gave very little to Croatia (USD 0,96 million) in SIS and zero in EI; the total Swiss SAA to Croatia is USD 4,86 million;

Table 43: Switzerland's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	11,38	9,17	0,21	9,18	11,69	4,37
health	7,92	18,70	0,00	0,00	2,59	0,23
watsan	1,70	16,08	0,00	3,07	13,02	3,02
population	1,67	0,06	0,00	1,71	0,73	0,00
GCS	2,69	15,34	0,72	9,56	108,10	4,52
other	3,61	10,41	0,03	3,42	18,70	0,97
	28,97	69,75	0,96	26,95	154,82	13,11

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,01	1,94	1,34
communications	0,78	9,06	0,00	0,00	0,58	0,00
energy	2,41	18,30	0,00	9,89	32,71	0,00
BFS	2,18	1,81	0,00	0,00	7,77	1,70
BOS	0,00	0,66	0,00	0,18	0,22	0,58
	5,38	29,83	0,00	10,08	43,23	3,61

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

6.13 Japan

The preceding discussion revealed Japan's active role in several field of SAA. In addition, several interesting observations emerge from Table 44 which groups the data on Japan's commitments to the SIS and EI sectors. Some of the observations which emerge from the review of Table 44 concern the following:

- unlike most other donor's, *Japan gave small portion of its aid to the Balkans to FRY/Serbia;*
- following BiH which received most of Japanese SAA aid, Macedonia received a lot relative to its size;
- most of the Japanese aid to Macedonia in the sectors under review results from one big allocation to water & sanitation (USD 87,33 million);
- Japan is in the group of countries which did not give, that is, gave only symbolic ODA to Croatia; total Japan's SAA to Croatia is USD 4,31 million;
- as already observed previously, Japan was active in the sub-sector of health; health was the niche domain of Japanese ODA in the Balkans.

Table 44: Japan's allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)

SIS	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
education	0,47	17,49	0,46	0,22	0,84	0,00
health	5,13	58,05	0,00	32,65	11,71	0,27
watsan	0,17	0,12	0,00	87,33	6,66	0,05
population	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
GCS	0,90	26,13	0,30	0,24	0,20	0,35
other	0,11	3,02	1,77	3,15	0,74	0,06
	6,78	104,82	2,54	123,59	20,14	0,73

EI	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu
trans. & storage	0,00	48,42	0,00	6,50	0,00	15,17
communications	0,00	0,04	0,18	0,00	0,08	0,03
energy	37,27	55,69	0,07	0,02	11,14	0,06
BFS	0,05	0,22	0,05	0,05	0,04	0,05
BOS	0,02	0,14	0,21	0,14	0,16	0,03
	37,34	104,50	0,51	6,72	11,42	15,35

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

7. Humanitarian aid

Following the extensive analysis of the major sectors of the sector allocable aid (SAA), the last section of this chapter focuses on the category of humanitarian aid. This category is not part of SAA and it represents a separate category in the CRS. Its importance for the sectoral, or thematic (in the sense that the word sector does not denote only sectors in the SAA registered by the CRS) analysis of ODA to the Balkans is given by its share in total CRS registered aid to the region. [Table 45](#) below presents the total commitments the field of humanitarian aid to the countries in the region, and it also presents them as share in the total ODA (registered by the CRS) commitments to the Balkans. After the SAA which accounts for the largest share of ODA (with the exception of the category of ex Yu), the allocations for humanitarian aid represent the next largest item in the region. The situation is to some extent different in FRY/Serbia because of the large share of debt relief, discussed earlier in the text.

Table 45: Humanitarian aid as share of all assistance, by recipient country

	Alb	BiH	Cro	Mac	FRY/Ser	ex Yu	total
all assistance	3973,85	8329,08	1636,68	2769,43	13737,49	2125,65	32572,18
hum. aid as % of all ass.	415,77	1785,05	194,03	270,06	2498,53	1438,88	6602,32
hum. aid as % of all ass.	10,46	21,43	11,86	9,75	18,19	67,69	20,27

source (based on data from the DAC CRS)

The category of humanitarian aid is itself divided into three sub-categories of:

- a) emergency response;
- b) reconstruction relief & rehabilitation, and
- c) disaster prevention & preparedness.

A review of the DAC CRS however shows the largest share of the commitments is by definition charged to the sub-category “emergency response”²⁷⁵ Most of the humanitarian aid to the Balkans has been registered in the category of “emergency response” which accounts for over 90% of the humanitarian aid category. A small share of commitments by a very small number of donors has been charge to the sub-category of “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”, whereas the sub-category of “disaster prevention & preparedness” is for the time being completely unpopulated, that is, no donors registers commitments in that category. In addition, the review of the individual allocations (Chapter 7) absolutely no structural difference between the allocations in “emergency response” as opposed to “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”. For this reason, the category of humanitarian aid will be reviewed in its entirety, and it will not be further disaggregated.

As evident from Table 45, three provisional grouping can be made based on the share of humanitarian aid in total assistance registered by the CRS. The first grouping comprises the three countries where the share of humanitarian aid in total aid receipts is smaller, that is Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. In these countries humanitarian aid moves around 1/10 of total (CRS registered) ODA. The second grouping is composed by BiH and FRY/Serbia where the share of humanitarian aid is around 2/10 of overall assistance. Finally, the third grouping consists of the category of ex Yu where humanitarian aid allocations represent 2/3 of the total. This distribution of humanitarian aid allocations can be said to fall into the overall logic of ODA to the Balkans. The first group comprised of Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, can be argued to have suffered lesser emergency and thus to have needed less humanitarian aid; the second group comprised of BiH and FRY/Serbia (strongest recipients of ODA overall) definitely had the right to claim most of the emergency assistance in the region; and finally, the third group represented by the residual category of ex Yu unspecified was in essence, as already discussed earlier a major “register” for allocated ODA in the circumstance of secessions, successions, and convoluted status issues in the Balkans. In addition to the status issues the other aspect of humanitarian aid commitments to ex Yu is also the fact that a lot of emergency aid was delivered through NGOs, and aid delivered through this channel has also often been registered as “unspecified”.

As with the analysis of the SAA commitments in the previous sections of the chapter, the exploration of humanitarian aid is also done through a close review of the statistical data stored in the CRS. The full statistical data concerning humanitarian aid commitments is contained in Tables 122 -127 in the Annex, whereas Tables 46 – 48 below in the chapter present the major donors to the category of humanitarian aid, by recipient countries.

As evident from the tables, the strongest donor to the region, the EC, has been one of the strongest donors to the field of humanitarian aid in practically all of the countries in the region. The EC ranks consistently first or second; its major contribution of USD 744,25 million has been made to the category of ex YU (representing 83,23 % of EC’s total commitments to ex Yu); FRY/Serbia

²⁷⁵ See DAC CRS database at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

has received USD 553,59 million (Table 48); BiH - USD 501,72 million (Table 46); then follow Albania with USD 87,12 million (Table 46); Croatia with USD 60,24 million (Table 47); and Macedonia with USD 55,67 million.

The US has had consistent yet varied presence across the region. Contrary to the EC and in consistency with its allocation policy, the US had not allocated any ODA to the category of ex YU. The US has made a major commitment of USD 705, 84 million to FRY/Serbia; a relatively smaller (by US standards) commitment to BiH of USD 110, 77 million; whereas the other countries in the region have received much smaller amounts (by US standards). The data shows that except in the case of FRY/Serbia where the commitment represents entire 27, 80 % of total US (CRS registered) allocations to that country, US allocations for humanitarian aid have regularly represented a small share of its overall ODA.

Germany's largest commitment in the humanitarian aid category has been made to FRY/Serbia, in the amount of USD 139,28 million; Bosnia has received USD 110,20 million; and the others (including ex Yu) have received relatively less.

The Netherlands's behavior in the field of humanitarian aid is interesting for observation. *Netherlands has made a huge commitment to one country in the Balkans, BiH*, in the amount of USD 540,89 million, which represented entire 64,81 % of total Dutch (CRS registered) ODA to Bosnia. Everybody else has received considerably less; FRY/Serbia has received USD 183, 18 million (46% of total Dutch aid to the country); USD 45, 45 million has been allocated to ex Yu; and Croatia and Macedonia have received quite less.

The UK has had relevant presence in the humanitarian aid field with several strong commitments, such as: USD 234,89 million to ex Yu (entire 92,78 % of its total to the category of ex Yu); USD 221,79 to FRY/Serbia (ranks third; 19,94 % of its total ODA to the country); USD 56,30 to Albania; and USD 46,40 million to Macedonia. What is interesting is that *the UK has not made a relevant humanitarian aid commitment to BiH; it does not rank the top 10 list.*

Switzerland in another bilateral which has been consistently present in the humanitarian aid field in the Balkans. The major Swiss commitments have been made to FRY/Serbia - USD 174, 49 million; and BiH – USD 130, 43 million. Albania has received USD 27, 37 million, whereas Macedonia and Croatia have received less (but Switzerland nevertheless ranks top 10). It can be observed that for Switzerland the allocations to humanitarian aid are regularly a relevant share of its total ODA. The conclusion from this is that *Switzerland had a consistent policy to support this field.*

Another major bilateral which has registered relevant commitments in the field of humanitarian aid is Norway. Consistent to its policy to register a relevant share of its aid to the region to the category of ex Yu, Norway has made its biggest humanitarian aid allocation to this category, in the amount of USD 225,96 million (representing 59,93 % of total Norwegian ODA to ex Yu). Follow: FRY/Serbia with USD 143, 48 million; BiH with USD 55, 56 million; and Croatia with USD 37, 44 million. Macedonia and Albania have received quite smaller humanitarian aid allocations, but they were also a smaller share of Norwegian ODA to these countries.

Italy also joins the list of bilaterals with consistent presence in the humanitarian aid field. In accordance to its overall ODA policy, Italy's strongest commitment has been made to Albania, in the amount of USD 132, 28 million. Follows FRY/Serbia with USD 70, 55 million; and then BiH with USD 41, 02 million. Croatia and Macedonia have received less, as well as ex Yu. The conclusion nevertheless is that Italy has been consistently present in the field of humanitarian aid. In addition, Sweden has made relevant contributions to BiH, FRY/Serbia, and ex Yu, and Canada appears on the top ten lists in FRY/Serbia and ex Yu, but also in Croatia and Macedonia. Spain has made a relevant contribution to BiH (Table 46), and a smaller one in Albania (Table 46). IDA was only present in BiH and Macedonia. One relevant donor which has been conspicuously absent from the humanitarian aid field is Japan. It only ranked the top 10 list in the case of ex Yu where it had allocated USD 34, 89 million, representing 54, 02 of its total ODA to that recipient.

The conclusions which can be drawn from the preceding review include the following:

- a) almost all the major bilaterals had relevant and relatively consistent presence in the humanitarian aid field;
- b) from the multilaterals, the EC had strong and consistent presence, whereas IDA was only present in BiH and Macedonia. One important note to make in connection with the previous chapter is that: UNHCR is not included in the CRS database. Chapter 5 shared the information that UNHCR is one of the major multilateral donors to the region, ranking 3rd among the multilaterals (slightly behind IDA), and 6th on the combined list of largest donors to the region. UNHCR is by definition a donor which is closely involved in emergency operations. Thus, it is important to remember that the *data on humanitarian aid allocations stored in the CRS do not include the ODA delivered by UNHCR*;
- c) *most of the biggest allocations were registered to FRY/Serbia and BiH*; the exception to this rule are Norway, which regularly charges a lot of its aid to ex Yu, and the UK.

Overall, the category of humanitarian field was a relevant share of total ODA to the Balkans. Based on the CRS registered data it amounted to about 1/5 of the total assistance the region has received. If the amounts allocated by the UNHCR would be added to this, the share would rise substantially. The field was defined by the strong and consistent presence of all the major donors to the region. Most of the commitments were made to FRY/Serbia, BiH, and ex Yu, whereas Macedonia and Croatia accounted for a very small share of this type of ODA. Chapter 7 will continue the discussion of humanitarian aid through an allocation-level review of the major commitments.

Table 46: Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country

Alb	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.	BiH	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.		
1	Italy	132,28	638,65	20,71	1	Netherl.	540,89	834,57	64,81
2	EC	87,12	754,74	11,54	2	EC	501,72	1598,08	31,40
3	UK	56,30	99,01	56,86	3	Switzerl.	130,43	285,15	45,74
4	US	27,75	474,78	5,84	4	US	110,77	1171,65	9,45
5	Switzerl.	27,37	89,40	30,61	5	Germany	110,20	438,73	25,12
6	Austria	23,59	66,44	35,51	6	Sweden	87,30	362,76	24,06
7	Spain	16,02	32,75	48,92	7	Spain	67,11	314,09	21,37
8	Germany	14,77	440,79	3,35	8	Norway	55,56	330,32	16,82
9	Norway	8,73	86,35	10,11	9	IDA	41,28	1161,03	3,56
10	France	6,24	45,34	13,75	10	Italy	41,02	239,55	17,12

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 47: Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country

Cro	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.	Mac	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.		
1	EC	60,24	666,78	9,03	1	IDA	61,87	410,80	15,06
2	Norway	37,44	145,95	25,66	2	EC	55,67	604,55	9,21
3	US	26,89	313,86	8,57	3	UK	46,40	72,41	64,08
4	Germany	22,42	237,79	9,43	4	Netherl.	24,75	321,64	7,69
5	Switzerl.	12,99	18,39	70,65	5	Germany	18,49	216,10	8,56
6	Netherl.	8,67	25,21	34,39	6	US	17,43	471,22	3,70
7	Belgium	6,06	8,47	71,52	7	Canada	15,20	18,98	80,11
8	Italy	5,51	33,80	16,30	8	Italy	10,49	55,94	18,75
9	Canada	3,60	10,35	34,76	9	Norway	5,87	83,19	7,05
10	UK	3,55	15,64	22,71	10	Switzerl.	4,99	71,28	6,99

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

Table 48: Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country

FRY/Ser	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.	ex Yu	hum. aid (USD millions)	all ass. (USD millions)	hum. aid as % of all ass.		
1	US	705,84	2539,03	27,80	1	EC	744,25	894,19	83,23
2	EC	553,59	3742,91	14,79	2	Norway	225,96	377,02	59,93
3	UK	221,79	1112,11	19,94	3	UK	234,89	253,16	92,78
4	Netherl.	183,18	398,23	46,00	4	Canada	48,37	59,55	81,23
5	Switzerl.	174,49	425,38	41,02	5	Netherl.	45,48	82,85	54,90
6	Norway	143,48	478,88	29,96	6	Japan	34,89	64,59	54,02
7	Germany	139,28	1638,46	8,50	7	Sweden	32,17	40,90	78,66
8	Italy	70,55	201,14	35,08	8	Germany	20,48	64,21	31,90
9	Sweden	65,25	275,06	23,72	9	Italy	15,17	73,84	20,55
10	Canada	56,95	167,66	33,97	10	Finland	9,61	16,31	58,95

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)

8. Conclusion

The preceding pages have provided an extensive review of donor behavior in the two major sectors, social infrastructure and services (SIS) and economic infrastructure (EI) of all sector allocable aid (SAA) to the Balkan. In addition, they have reviewed the relevant commitments to the category of humanitarian aid, which after the SAA was the most relevant category of ODA to the region. The extensive treatment of the SIS and EI sectors provided a thorough scan of donor activity in the two largest, most assisted sectors of aid in the Balkans. The ranking exercise showed which donors gave most aid to which recipients and in which fields. The sectoral disaggregation overall provided a complete information on how donors behaved across fields in the countries they assisted. In addition, the review of the humanitarian aid category presented its composition and the allocation patterns of the major donors to the region.

The conclusions to be drawn from these reviews provide a relevant picture of donor behavior and bring a step closer to answering the question on what were the factors of FA to the Balkans.

At a most general level it can be concluded that the final architecture of foreign aid to the Balkans has been defined by the *interweaving of donors' sector-based and country-based policies*.

Sector-based means a strategic decision by the donor to allocate a relevant portion of its aid to a certain sector; country-based means a strategic decision by the donor to establish a particular donor-recipient relationship with one or a few countries, and to channel to them a relevant share of its aid. In the first case, the sector orientation can weigh influence which exceeds the donor interest in assisting a particular recipient country. In the second, the interest in supporting a country outweighs the interest in supporting a certain sector. The sector-based and country-based categories are naturally provisional and not firmly delineated, as no donor is completely either sector or country oriented. As a matter of fact, *many of the donors active in the Balkans pursued a policy of giving some aid to all the recipients*. Nevertheless special donor-recipient relationships did also exist, as already discussed in this and the previous chapter. Some donors were more engaged in such relationships than others.

What comes across quite clearly from the review of donor activity in SIS and EI is that omission, that is, the decision not to assist a country or a sector, is a sharper defining line than actual action.

For example, *quite a few donors pursued a policy of supporting everybody in the Balkans except Croatia*. This was one of the starkest axes of difference between the major bilaterals. One group of major bilaterals had a position to give symbolic, or no assistance to Croatia, and the reasoning behind such policy is clear: it most probably follows or is similar to the allocation policy of the IDA, that is, countries with level of GDP above a certain threshold are not eligible for foreign assistance. Opposite to this policy stance there was a group of major bilaterals which donated substantial amounts to Croatia, and which actually favored it to other recipients in the region.

The other obvious omission concerns certain sectors. *For some donors it was obviously a matter of policy position not to be active in certain sectors*. This emerges clearly from the fact the no recipient country had any allocations in that particular sector. The most obvious case of such policy is the sub-sector of population where most donors chose not to be active in. Health is

another example of a field where most donors, with the exception for example of Japan, did not channel much of their assistance. This list is quite longer: Germany avoided GCS; the US avoided transport & storage; unlike most others Sweden stayed out of education the EC was completely absent from BFS, and so forth. The review of humanitarian aid on the contrary, showed that most of the major donors to the region had relevant presence in this category. Japan is the only major bilaterals which has had smaller (compared to the other sectors) presence in the humanitarian aid category (as registered by the CRS).

The reviews have disclosed many cases of *country-exceptions to what were sector-based policies*. These are cases when a donor would by definition not be active in a field, but there would be an the exception with respect to one country. Such is for example the EC activity in the field of energy; *the only exception to EC's policy not to allocate assistance in energy is FRY/Serbia; similar is also its behavior in the sector of health*. Dutch support to education in Macedonia is a case in point, as it is also Japan's support to water & sanitation to the same country. Quite a few donors have displayed such behavior in the Balkans. It could be concluded that in such cases, when a donor would make a country-exception to a sector-based policy, the exception was usually made in favor of a regional protégé.

Further, what has already been pointed out earlier but also reemerges from the reviews is that *the foreign aid picture is by and large defined by a few, usually 2-4 strongest donors*. The first review in the chapter provided rankings of 10 largest donors in sectoral terms, but it is obvious from the tables that the biggest contributions usually come from just the few top ranked donors. In quite a few cases a top-10 donor ranking could not even be compiled for certain sectors in some countries. It is the policies of a few major donors, such as the EC and US policy to allocate huge quantities of aid to GCS, that have determined in large part the picture of foreign aid to the Balkans.

On the other hand, smaller donors, or donors with smaller presence in this part of the world, such as for example Portugal or Spain, obviously had a policy of sporadic big allocations usually to one country, rather than smaller, proportionate contributions to more recipients in the region. Such are the examples with Portuguese aid to transport & storage in BiH, or similarly to Macedonia with the ODA for GCS and water & sanitation. The reasons for this type of behavior will further be examined in Chapter 7.

Another point emerging from the tables under review is that *donors' policies were not consistently either sector or country based, but they differed across sectors*. For example, in the field of education the donor would have the policy of allocating aid to all the countries in the region, and this is a real sector-based policy. But in the next field of health the same donor would give support to just one or two countries. This is observable in quite a few donors. At a more general level, from comparing donor behavior in SIS and EI, it emerges that *quite a few donors concentrated most of their activity in SIS and had smaller, and in some cases only symbolic presence in EI*.

Finally, as already pointed out before, the reviews offer the conclusion that *aid allocations were not always proportionate to need*. The discussion on what defines need and how need affects allocations is quite extensive in aid literature, and as such is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the argument is that aid in many cases obviously seemed not proportionate to needs. The example was offered earlier of EC allocations to the sub-sector of energy: the only

country to get it was FRY/Serbia. While FRY/Serbia's need was undeniable, with the fact that NATO bombing had destroyed infrastructure, Albania's need of energy is also undeniable. The fact that FRY/Serbia got substantial amounts and Albania received nothing can not be explained with the presence or extent of need alone. Naturally, many other factors come into consideration: a) the fear from humanitarian catastrophe in Serbia, b) the political imperative, c) not just the intensity of the need but its urgency and political momentum, and so forth.

The similar argument can be made concerning EC support to transport & storage. What can for example explain the significant difference in EC allocations to Croatia vs. Albania? Certainly not the extent of need. Some of the answers will come in Chapter 7 which will supply additional information concerning this issue.

However, examples of this kind are numerous and they to one extent or another include all donors (yet some more than others). For example, a big allocation to one recipient and no support to anyone else does not mean that this recipient has demonstrated tremendous need, as opposed to everybody else who did not demonstrate such need. This is common sense. But also the opposite is true. For example, the policy of consistent and similar in size allocations to all the countries in the region, whereby the countries are quite different in terms of population size, offers the same conclusion.

This of course is not necessarily incorrect in of itself. Given the fact that needs are always infinite, and in the region they are considerable (yet smaller compared to other parts of the world) it should not be pretended that a proportionate, scientifically measured response is always the preferred mode. A situation where a donor decided to allocate funding for the renovation of, for example, a 100 schools per country, even in a situation where the number of schools per country will naturally differ (but all the countries would have many more than 100) is not an example of unreasonable decision. Nevertheless, this is a matter of extent. After a certain level, such disproportionateness would be bound to reduce the quality of allocated aid. A situation where the needy consistently get very little and the better-off receives a lot defies the logic of foreign assistance.

In conclusion, the extensive treatment of the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans, which after the introduction, concentrated primarily on the major sector of SIS and EI, and in the last section reviewed the category of humanitarian aid, produced a number of relevant conclusions concerning the supply of foreign assistance to the Balkans. Some of the more interesting findings which have emerged during the sectoral analysis of ODA to the Balkans have been summarized below. They include the following:

- there is a consistent pattern in the sectoral distribution of ODA across all countries in the Balkans;
- a large part of foreign aid to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS;
- the SIS sector has been dominated by ODA for GCS; it accounts for roughly half of all aid to the SIS sector, which in turn is around half of all SAA to the region. In other words, aid allocated for GCS is roughly $\frac{1}{4}$ of total SAA to the Balkans;
- a great share of foreign aid to the Balkans went for support to GCS;
- consistency of sub-sector shares across countries is major characteristic of the SIS sector,

- a lack of consistency of sub-sector shares across countries marks the EI field;
- ODA receipts in the sub-sector of health in the Balkans were overall quite small, second only to population; the general conclusion is that most of the biggest donors to the region did not consider support to health to be a strong priority;
- major consistent donors to the sub-sector of health in the Balkans are Japan and IDA.
- given the small share of health in SIS ODA to the Balkans, it is by and large produced by Japan's niche interest, IDA loans, and sporadic and hoc presence of other donors;
- Germany, which was the strongest bilateral donor in the region, had a consistent policy of support to water & sanitation in all of the countries in the Balkans;
- German's domination of the sub-sector of watsan is even stronger than for example Japan's domination of the field of health;
- the EC and the US have been the top donors to the GCS sub-sector. What more, GCS aid consistently accounts for large shares of their SIS allocations. The fact that two of the top donors to the region donated most of their SIS aid to GCS, is the single strongest factor determining the predominance of GCS aid to the countries of the Balkans;
- almost all of the EC aid to the sector of EI went to transport & storage;
- The US was completely absent from the sub-sector of transport & storage;
- the sub-sector of transport & storage has by and large been supported by multilateral ODA;
- the sub-sector of communications has been the least supported field in EI and beyond;
- French ODA has been almost completely absent from the EI sector;
- the largest amounts of energy ODA have been allocated to Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia, whereas Croatia and Macedonia received very small amounts;
- the only relevant EC contribution for energy has been made to FRY/Serbia, whereas no one else in the region (with minor exception of BiH) has received any EC support for energy; the EC was conspicuously absent from the field;
- the sub-sector of energy has been consistently dominated by IDA;
- there is practically no other field of ODA in the Balkans which has been so strongly dominated by only one donor. as the sub-sector of f BOS has been dominated by the US; the BOS sub-sector in the Balkans has been by and large defined by the consistent US policy to support business development in the region;
- FRY/Serbia has received the lion's share of EC support in the sectors of SIS and EI;
- relative to its size, Albania received the biggest share of German aid in SIS and EI;
- The country which has received the largest share of IDA's support to the region has been Bosnia;
- IDA's absence from Croatia relevantly contributed to the status of Croatia as one of the least assisted countries in not just the Balkans, but also wider Eastern Europe;
- GCS is the sector where the Netherlands has allocated most of its aid; in many other fields the Netherlands has quite a symbolic presence; nevertheless, the Netherlands has had very strong presence in the field of humanitarian aid;
- most of Norway's SAA aid has been allocated to the sub-sector of GCS;
- the only SAA sub-sector where UK had relevant presence is GCS; the UK has been quite absent from all other sub-sectors, with some exception to health, and the allocations charged under "other"; on the other hand, the UK has had more relevant presence in humanitarian aid;

- Macedonia is conspicuously under-assisted by the UK; in the SIS sector it has received even less aid than Croatia;
- Austria has been almost completely absent from the entire EI sector;
- most of Swedish ODA in the SIS sector has been allocated to the sub-sector of GCS; substantial amount of Swedish ODA has been allocated to the category “other”;
- the only countries which benefited from French aid in the sector of EI were BiH and FRY/Serbia;
- unlike most other donor’s, Japan has given a small portion of its aid to the Balkans to FRY/Serbia;
- following BiH which received most of Japanese SAA aid, Macedonia received a lot relative to its size;
- all the major bilaterals had relevant and relatively consistent presence in the humanitarian aid field;
- most of the biggest allocations in the humanitarian aid field were made to FRY/Serbia, BiH; and ex Yu.

In conclusion, the previous discussion provided substantial amount on data on *who gave aid to whom and for what* in the Balkans in the period of transition. The disaggregation of the major components of ODA to the region has supplied detailed information on the sectoral and thematic priorities for development assistance to the Balkans. The extensive treatment of the topic identified trends and patterns in donor behavior and made possible some general conclusions concerning donors, sectors, and countries, such as that some sectors are dominated by certain donors; that some types of ODA, such as humanitarian aid, went primarily to certain countries, and so forth. This may seem as simple findings, but they should be assessed against the point of departure: the complete lack of any specificity concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans. At this point foreign aid to the Balkans is no longer a large, fuzzy bundle of money allocated to a “region”. The shapes and the structure of the phenomenon have been studied, and it can be seen that foreign aid had different patterns in trends across the countries in the region. Most of the disaggregation was done on the donor side and the discussion identified relevant findings concerning *the behavior of donors across sectors and across countries*. Nevertheless, the conclusions were also possible concerning the recipients, such as that all of them half of all SAA was SIS, and half of all SIS was aid for GCS, and so forth. Even though Chapter 6 produced many conclusions, many questions, as already indicated during the discussion, are still unanswered. The next, Chapter 7, will go yet a step deeper in the exploration, and it will provide some additional layers of understanding of aid to the Balkans.

One niche that has been consistent throughout the text has been the continuous reassessment of aid to the Balkans in the overall framework of motives and factors for foreign assistance. This framework, as already discussed, is posited between two distant poles of self-interest and moral altruism, and a vast middle ground in between; its specific configuration in the region has been produced by the general policy goals of democracy, market economy, and stability; and the inside of this framework has been filled by the political reality of aid and the factors of that political reality, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The question at this point is – how do the findings in this chapter relate to this framework? How can the sectoral disaggregation from the previous pages for example be put in a perspective vis-à-

vis the motives of self-interest vs. altruism? Can a conclusion be made that a certain type of aid was more motivated by self-interest than another type of aid? Again, the argument would not be to conclude that aid was motivated by self-interest, nor is it possible to express that in quantitative terms, in the sense of “how much was it motivated by self-interest”? The statement that self-interest is a strong factor of aid is already widely accepted in the literature on foreign assistance, and this text makes no effort at refuting it. On the contrary, it subscribes to the point of view. In this sense, and for the qualitative exploration which has been pursued so far, the question would hence not be “whether aid was motivated by self-interest” or “how much it was motivated by self-interest as opposed to altruism”, but perhaps “where and how can such motivations be identified?” The central effort of this writing is the exploration of who gave aid, to whom, for what, and why, in the Balkans. In this sense, the idea would be to also look into the motivations for these who, for whom, what, and why and to identify potential causalities.

Some of the factors of determination of aid supply to the region have nevertheless been identified throughout the preceding pages. For example, some of them are defined by the special donor-recipient relationships, such as in the case of Italy’s special relationship with Albania (and the reasons and motivations of the such relationship); in other cases they have been defined by certain foreign policy goals which have at times been considered a priority. Arguably, had aid not been directly used to oust and extradite Milosevic in the case of Serbia, that country would have received much less aid than it did. And of course these defining lines are never straightforward; they always interweave with many other factors of possible influence.

Based on the findings from the sectoral disaggregation certain assumptions can nevertheless be made. For example, it has been observed that most of what the EC had allocated in EI was for transport infrastructure. On the contrary, the US was almost completely absent from the field. The question is naturally, how come two of the biggest donors to the region had such opposed policies? Comparing them around the motive of self-interest does seem to provide a logical answer. Good roads are in Europe’s interest much more than in the interest of the US. And it should be borne in mind that they are an incredibly expensive type of intervention. Similarly, the US was also almost completely absent from the sub-sector of energy. The same logic can apply: the US did not have a direct strategic interest in the issues. But in this case, also the EC was almost completely, except in the case of Serbia. Can the same argument be put forth: that the EC did not have a direct interest in supporting the field of energy in the region? A look into the sub-sector of energy (Tables 23-25) shows that the biggest consistent allocations in the field came from IDA (loans); Germany, to some extent Japan, and Italy (only for Albania). The question would logically be: what was their motivation to support this field?

Similar questions can be asked concerning the other sectors. For example, most donors were absent from communication, but also from health; other donors, such as France and Austria, were almost completely absent from the entire EI field for example. Some donors were less active in other sub-sectors because they had concentrated all of their support in one sub-sector mostly, such as the case of US support to the field of BOS. And so forth. On the other hand, *most donors had strong presence in the field of humanitarian aid*, which going back to the theoretical discussion was the field of aid usually and naturally tied to moral concerns.

Whereas some assumptions in this direction can be made based on the sectoral disaggregation in this chapter, it is instructive to proceed to the next, Chapter 7, which through a process of allocation-level review of donor commitments will be able to provide some additional answers. The task of Chapter 6 has been concluded by presenting a detailed account of the sectoral composition of ODA to the Balkans.

CHAPTER 7

Who Gave Aid for What – Exactly? Review of CRS Database Micro Data on Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans

1. Introduction

Chapter 7 ahead continues and concludes the extensive review of statistical data concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans which commenced in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 opened the investigation into amounts of aid to the region, by analyzing the general flows, directions, and types of aid registered in the DAC online statistical database. Chapter 6 proceeded with a sectoral disaggregation of the foreign assistance flows, by analyzing allocations from and to countries across the major sectors, sub-sectors, and categories. This chapter will go a step further and it will analyze the actual individual ODA allocations, or more precisely, the *descriptions and the final ends of these allocations*.

The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC of the OECD contains micro data on a *substantial* number of foreign assistance flows, which *not always but often* contain additional information on the final ends of certain ODA commitments. By analyzing this information, additional relevant insights are collected on what was in some situations foreign aid given for *exactly*. These insights, as hopefully this chapter will manage to demonstrate, can be valuable in providing a more comprehensive picture of foreign aid to the Balkans.

A few more words are due to explain the need for this exercise. Chapter 6 went deep into sectoral analysis of foreign aid to the region; it showed which donors were active in which sectors and sub-sectors in the countries of the Balkans. In addition to the four major sectors of sector allocable aid (SAA), that is, social infrastructure and services (SIS), economic infrastructure (EI), production, and multisector, the chapter extensively analyzed the sub-sectors comprising these sectors of SAA. In addition, the chapter explored the donor behavior in the field of humanitarian aid which has accounted for about 1/5 of all (CRS registered) ODA to the region. That review offered a well structured idea of where foreign aid to the Balkans went. Nevertheless, the conclusion was unavoidable that this did not give a full account of the matter. For example, Chapter 6 demonstrated that the biggest part of SAA to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS, and that the SIS sector itself is dominated by the category of government and civil society (GCS). The category of GCS is so dominant that it accounts for roughly half of all SIS aid, or 1/4 of all SAA. In other words, most aid to the Balkans was for support to government & civil society (GCS).

As much as this can be a potentially interesting piece of information, it does not tell the whole story. The question which naturally arises is – *what were the final ends of aid allocated into the GCS field?*

The CRS offers an additional sub-categorization of GCS into “GCS general” and “GCS conflict, peace and security” but this is also insufficient. Therefore, the effort was necessary to engage in an even closer inspection of the allocations comprising the GCS sub-sector in an attempt to:

- a) potentially discover the final ends of aid to the Balkans, and
- b) discern additional patterns of donor behavior.

Thus, Chapter 7 provides a sort of a *thick description* of the foreign assistance allocations to the Balkans, for the period data is available for. The largest part of the data for this analysis is stored into the Annex to Chapter 7. The text will use these data, and in addition it will refer to other information from the CRS database, and other sources when possible of appropriate.

The Annex contains tables with data on the *major years and major allocations* of foreign assistance from donors to recipients and across sectors.

Several important notes are due at the outset:

- a) The range of years covered is 1995-2005, as this is the period the CRS has coverage of. This was already mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 6. The previous chapter also discussed the fact that the coverage of the CRS improved over the years, that is to say, records from more recent years have higher rate of coverage than records of less recent years. However, it has to be underscored again that *the CRS is not a comprehensive record of aid data*. In addition, the coverage, but also the level of description vary across donors. The extent or the level of detail depends exclusively on how donor countries report their allocations to the DAC. As the analysis in this chapter will show, and as it is very visible from the tables in the Annex, there can be a big difference in the specificity of descriptions across donors.

An older DAC publication based on CRS data titled *Aid Activities in South-East Europe 1990-1998* (OECD, 1999) can serve as a source of additional data for the period 1990-1994, which is at present not included in the CRS database. Unfortunately, the publication registers data according to categories compared to the ones used by the CRS at present, which somewhat reduces its utility.

- b) *Amounts are presented in commitments*, again for reasons of coverage. The reason for this is technical and needs to be explained in detail. Whereas the CRS contains data on commitments starting with 1995, data on disbursements are only available for the past several years, starting with 2003/4. Naturally, given the time-period of interest for this research (1990-2005), the choice was to use the category of commitments. Another important note concerns the type of amounts: the CRS database contains the option of using constant 2006 USD, and this was the type of amount used, in consistency with previous chapters. However, *the micro data on individual allocations was only available in current USD*. In order to give *as accurate idea as possible* of the relevance of certain allocations, *the tables in the Annex provide the amount in both constant 2006 USD (on the left) and in current USD for the respective year (on the right)*.

- c) The tables in the Annex provide a detailed account of allocations of foreign aid but they are *not a complete list of all allocations*. This is important to remember. The purpose of this aspect of the analysis is not to account for all the amounts; this has already been done in Chapter 5. The purpose is to research the final ends of the major foreign aid allocations and to describe the purposes of aid. Hence, the Annex contains the bigger more relevant allocations for the inquiry. In reality, the Annex contains a *substantive number of all registered allocations above USD 0, 5 million*. In addition, when relevant, or appropriate, even quite smaller allocations have been reviewed, going as low as USD 0, 2 million. This was done in order to produce comparisons or underline certain patterns in donor behavior. For example, such an exercise could occasionally demonstrate that the major, big allocations were sometimes part of a consistent pattern of allocations for ends which were arguably, motivated by donor self-interest or even a particular kind of donor self-interest, whereas on the opposite end, donor self-interest was less evident in the smaller allocations. In addition, *for all donors except IDA, the allocations presented in the Annex are grant money except when specified otherwise; on the contrary, for IDA, allocations are loans, except when specified otherwise*.
- d) The Annex contains data from the sectors of SIS, EI, multisector, and from the field of humanitarian aid which also accounted for a relevant share of overall ODA. *The production sector, in view of its small size, has not been a subject of inquiry*. Given its size and relevance, the SIS and the EI sectors were broken down to their constituent sub-sectors. The sub-sector of *population as negligible has not been looked into*, consistent with the approach taken in the previous chapter. The multisector, as smaller compared to the SIS sector, was taken in its entirety, that is, it was not broken down to its sub-sectors. However, in contrast to Chapter 6 which did not break down the multisector aid because most of it was placed in the generic category of “other”, this chapter does produce detailed analysis of the content of the multisector category. The motive is the same with what said above concerning GCS aid – *to try to find as specific and accurate as possible descriptions of the final ends of foreign assistance*. The category of humanitarian aid also has three sub-categories; however most of the aid is registered into one of these sub-categories called “emergency response”, and only a small share in the second called “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”, whereas the third one titled “disaster preparedness” is dormant. Because of this the Annex follows the commitments to the field of “emergency response” and where the commitments are relevant, introduces also the second sub-category of “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”. Nevertheless, as the section on humanitarian aid below will show, the descriptions in this category unfortunately do not have strong analytical value.
- e) Allocation descriptions are presented in their original form, including also the language they were reported in. Translation is provided where needed and or/possible.²⁷⁶

The analysis goes by sectors, thereby trying to identify and describe patterns in donor behavior. Correlations will in continuity be made with Chapter 6. Whereas Chapter 6 identified trends and patterns at the level of sector and sub-sector, Chapter 7 dives inside sectors and reveals

²⁷⁶ In some cases translation was not needed, as in the view of the author, the descriptions was comprehensible in the language it was reported.

information that are not available at the level of sector or sub-sector, but only at level of allocations.

2. Allocation-Level Review of the SIS Sector

2.1 Education

Section 4.1 of Chapter 6 provided sector-level observations concerning donor contributions to the sector of education. In particular, the consistent presence of Germany and Austria has been noted, across all countries in the region of the Balkans; strong EC presence has also been observed. Among other more relevant donor activity in the sector of education, the section has also registered the case of Italy's aid to Bosnia, and Dutch aid to Macedonia, thereby discussing sector vs. country-orientated donor behavior.

Given that Austria is one of the strongest donors to the sub-sector of education across countries in the Balkans, it is interesting to start this part of the review by looking into the final ends of Austrian allocations for education in the region.

The Annex to this chapter contains the tables with Austria's major allocations in the sub-sector of education: Austria to BiH (Table 6); to Croatia (Table 12); to FRY/Serbia (Table 19). The Annex does not have a table with Austrian allocations for education to Albania and Macedonia; the reason for this is the lack of bigger Austrian allocations for education to these counties.²⁷⁷

The first pattern to be discussed concerns Austria's presence in education. Namely, the tables in the Annex convincingly show that significant parts of Austria's contributions for education, across countries and years have been consistently made for *imputing student costs*. Imputed student costs represent the costs for students from these countries who study in Austria.

Below is a short listing of a few of the major Austrian allocations for imputed student costs as share in Austria's total commitments to education:

- in BiH in 1996, USD 4,1 million (current prices) out of USD 7,2 million (current prices);
- in BiH in 1998, USD 4,0 million (current prices) out of USD 6,7 million (current prices);
- in BiH in 2003, USD 8,7 million (current prices) out of USD 9,1 million (current prices);
- in Croatia in 1996, USD 5,7 million (current prices) out of USD 6,0 million (current prices);
- in FRY/Serbia in 2003, USD 5,1 USD (current prices) out of USD 5,6 million (current prices);

It is observable that allocations for imputed student costs represent a significant share, *always more than half and in some cases more than 90%* of Austria's ODA for education in the region.

²⁷⁷ This is also visible from Table 5 in chapter 5; Austria's contribution for education to Albania (USD 13, 24 million over a 10-year period) is substantially smaller compared to the contributions to other countries in the region.

What can be said in conclusion is that: there is a *strong systematic pattern of imputing student costs in Austria's assistance to education in the Balkans*. This is the single strongest factor for Austria's heavy presence in the sub-sector of education.

The situation with German aid to education is practically identical, as can be seen from the tables in the Annex: to BiH ([Table 7](#)); to Croatia ([Table 13](#)), to Macedonia ([Table 16](#)); to FRY/Serbia ([Table 21](#)). Even more than in the case of Austria, German allocations in the sub-sector of education have been committed to the purpose of imputing student costs.

An easy comparison lends the conclusion that this is not the case with other donors, with the potential exception to the case of Italy's generous assistance for education to BiH of USD 36, 5 million (current prices) in 1996, of which entire USD 33, 5 (current prices) was registered as "experts and scholarships" (Annex, [Table 8](#)).

Unlike Austrian and German assistance which is consistent across years, Italian contribution to BiH was in one single year – 1996. At this level of description, with no more data available (there is no additional description in the macro data), it is difficult to conclude what was the final end of that allocation; it is possible that substantial part of that contribution has gone for a large scholarship program that was initiated in that particular year. Big part of Italy's education aid to Albania in 1995 is also registered as "scholarships" – it is possible that money is committed in a single year for a program which will unfold over the next several years – but *there is not sufficient data to conclusively argue* that Italy had a similar practice as Germany and Austria.

Overall however, the conclusion from the allocation-level review is that *the strong German and Austrian presence in the sub-sector of education is by and large accounted for with the registration of imputed student costs*. This naturally legitimately raises the question - have Austria and Germany been hosting more students from the Balkans compared to other countries in Europe? A substantiated and researched answer to such a question would be clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. However, at the level of common public knowledge, there is no indication to support such a claim. Taking that logic even further, compared for the size of the country, Austria's contributions to education far outweigh Germany's (see respective tables in Annex) even though Germany is a much larger country and it would be logical that it hosts more students from the region.

The conclusion is that their strong presence in education, quite stronger than that of many other strong donors to the region is due to how they calculated their contributions to education, and foreign assistance overall. They belong to the group of donors who regularly impute student costs as ODA in support of education. This is a legitimate practice with the DAC but it does need to follow the statistical directives for reporting. DAC reviews of both Austria and Germany's development have at times expressed concerns or made recommendations for improving the reporting of imputed student costs. For example, a DAC peer review of Austrian development cooperation, from 1999 notes the practice of Austria's over-reporting of imputed student costs and recommends changes: "According to the DAC Statistical Directives, imputed student costs are eligible for inclusion in ODA if they are part of a conscious policy of development co-operation which includes specification of the costs in official budgets. However, Austria seems to use a retroactive method by totaling the running costs of Austrian universities and higher education

establishments, dividing it by the total number of students to obtain the unit cost per student, and then multiplying it by the number of students from developing countries. (By law, students from developing countries are exempted from paying tuition fees.) In other words, any student originating from a developing country who is studying any subject, irrespective of developmental objectives, could be included and counted under ODA. Austria needs to modify its treatment of this component, as well as to make information more transparent.”²⁷⁸

DAC official publications from the subsequent years have regularly been underscoring the fact that Austria’s mode of calculating imputed student costs is not in line with DAC statistical directives (OECD, 2002:). “Past Reviews have criticized this practice as its share of total ODA disbursements has been high compared to other DAC Member countries. Hitherto, Austrian authorities have not modified their practice in calculating imputed student costs despite the suggestions by the DAC (OECD, 2000:19).”

According to a more recent DAC peer review on Austria (OECD, 2004) Austria has responded to the concern about the reporting of imputed student cost expressed by the DAC in 1999, and it has brought its reporting in line with the DAC statistical directives since (OECD, 2004: 68). The review notes that “Austria was among the first DAC members to record as ODA the cost to its taxpayers of providing education to developing country nationals (OECD, 2004: 78).” The review explains the reasons for the concerns expressed in 1999: “The 1999 Peer Review noted that Austria used a retrospective calculation method that effectively counted the value of subsidized education for any student from a developing country, regardless of the developmental focus of the studies concerned. The Peer Review urged Austria to modify its procedures in this respect and make its methodology more transparent. ... The main ground for objection to Austria’s reporting was the lack of developmental focus in the selection of courses. The Austrian authorities therefore agreed to eliminate from their reporting a range of courses considered to have less developmental relevance, including historical, linguistic and artistic studies, as well as philosophical and theological subjects. The statistical impact has only been minor, reducing the item by a few per cent compared to the previous methodology (OECD, 2004: 78).”

A recent DAC peer review of German development aid (OECD, 2006) notes that “close to 70% of the aid to the education sector consists of the imputed costs of subsidized tertiary education (OECD, 2006: 32). This, according to the document “is a relatively significant portion of ODA that does not contribute to strengthening education systems in developing countries and may have a limited impact on capacity development in the education sector (OECD, 2006: 32).” The review also notes that “Germany is among the few DAC members to include significant amounts of imputed student costs in ODA (OECD, 2006: 32), and that the share of this type of ODA has increased from 6% in 2000 to 9% of German ODA in 2004 (OECD, 2006: 32). In addition, the documents notes that as “recommended by the last DAC Peer Review, Germany revised the reporting procedures for these costs in 2002. Reporting no longer includes the costs for students in certain disciplines (e.g. language, culture, art and sport) and excludes students who stay in Germany after graduation on an ‘IT Green Card’ (OECD, 2006:33)” The reviews suggests that “Germany will need to exclude from its reporting of imputed student costs the students who stay in

²⁷⁸ Austria: Development Cooperation Review 1999, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34603_2412638_1_1_1_1,00.html)

Germany on a permit issued according to a new immigration law that came into force on 1 January 2005 (OECD, 2006: 33.” The review reiterates this recommendation again in the document: “Given the increased scope for foreign students to stay in Germany upon completion of their studies, it is important for the government to continue to monitor closely the reporting of such costs (OECD, 2006: 35).” In essence, the DAC review acknowledges the fact that Germany has improved the reporting of imputed student cost since 2002, but it recommends that “Germany will need to maintain close monitoring of such costs which have more than doubled since 2000 (OECD, 2006: 75)”.

The conclusion pertaining to the imputing of student costs was the first interesting finding from the allocation-level review of foreign assistance. Moving further in the review, the tables in the Annex provide additional information about donors activity in this sub-sector of ODA in the Balkans. For example, Austria was quite engaged in helping higher education institutions; a few donors were interested in supporting vocational education, and so forth. Unfortunately, little can be concluded on the final ends of big part of EC aid to education because of the generic descriptions of its allocations. The US aid is consistent, as noted already in Chapter 6, but it is only a small share of overall US aid commitments; IDA had relevant contributions in the form of loans.

Finally, another interesting observation concerns France. Chapter 6 noted that French presence in education was rather consistent and in addition to that, represented a relevant share of French total SIS commitments. The tables in the Annex nevertheless only capture French education allocations to FRY/Serbia, because only in this country they exceed the threshold of around USD 2 million in a single year, that was taken as a criterion for registering the allocations (the tables register “major years and allocations”). Nevertheless, detailed review was anyway conducted of the final ends of French contributions for education in the region. The most frequent descriptions, that is, which repeated the most, and which were also quite consistent across countries comprised some of the following²⁷⁹:

1. FRANCAIS : FORMATION ENSEIGNANTS (Alb),
2. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SECONDAIRE (Alb),
3. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SUPERIEUR (Alb),
4. APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS DANS LE SECONDAIRE (BiH)
5. APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS A L'UNIVERSITE DE SARAJEVO (BiH)
6. RELANCE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS DANS LE SYSTEME EDUCATIF CROATE (CRO)
7. CREATION SECTION BILINGUEFRANCO CROATE SANS UN ETABLIS. SCOLAIRE (CRO)
8. SOUTIEN À L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANÇAIS EN MILIEU (CRO)
9. ASSOC. D'ENSEIGNANTS DU FRANCAIS (FRY/SER)
10. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : PRIMAIRE (FRY/SER)
11. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SECONDAIRE (FRY/Ser)²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

²⁸⁰ Translation: a) French: formation of education process (Alb); b) teaching French – high school (Alb); c) teaching French – university (Alb); d) support to teaching of French in high school (BiH); e) support to teaching of French in university (BiH); f) re-introduction of French classes in the Croatian education system (Cro); g) creation of bilingual French-Croatian classes (Cro); h) French classes in the community (Cro); i) association of teachers of French (FRY/Ser); j) teaching French: primary (FRY/Ser); k) teaching French: secondary (FRY/Ser).

All of these allocations evidently contribute towards the promotion of French language in education in the Balkans. It is important to note that these are not the only type of French allocations to education in the region. Actually, usually the largest allocations are titled “EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION”, and the CRS database would have many smaller allocations of the type described above, combined with fewer, or a single “TECHNICAL COOPERATION” budget line. Nevertheless, this does not distract from the conclusion that a *large share of French ODA to education in the Balkans has been spent for the promotion of the French language*. With the fact that French aid to education was at the same time a large part of total French SIS and SAA - roughly around half of its SIS commitment and in the case of FRY/Serbia over 70 % - it can be concluded that – a *big, relevant part of French aid to the Balkans in the years of transition went for the promotion of French language*.

2.2 Health

As already discussed in Chapter 6, the sub-sector of health represents a small share of the sector of SIS. This is naturally a result of the fact that many donors have chosen to have small presence and activity in this field. As Chapter 6 concluded, the sub-sector of health has by and large been defined by the presence of IDA and Japan, which were the donor with most consistent presence in the field. In addition, the strong Canadian contribution to only one country, Bosnia, was observed.

The tables in the Annex provide an interesting description of the very diverse purposes of health allocations in the Balkans, ranging from building of a hospital, maintenance of a medical helicopter, emergency medical needs, and so forth (see respective tables in Annex). *IDA does not provide specification of its contributions* beyond a generic description, but nevertheless *IDA money is of lesser interest for this inquiry* because it is loan money. The assumption is that IDA would lend for a purpose defined by recipient governments themselves, or a purpose agreed between governments and IDA.

Japan’s behavior on the other hands is rather interesting to observe. In addition to occupying a niche position in the sub-sector of health, by being the sole donor with sustained, consistent presence, Japan is also specific in terms of the type of contributions it makes. Namely, Japan’s foreign assistance by and large has taken the form of *equipment donation*. This is also true for the other sectors Japan is present in but it is perfectly visible in the health sub-sector. It is consistent both across countries and over years (for example Table 31 – Japan to BiH; Table 34 – Japan to Macedonia; Table 36 – Japan to FRY/Serbia).

Japan is not equally present in all the countries of the region, as already pointed out in the previous chapter, but when present, it supplies its assistance in the form of equipment.

In addition to IDA and Japan, Canada is a donor with a strong contribution to health in the Balkans. Since Canada has not been considered a major donor to the region, it has not been included in the Annex. It is hence analyzed separately from data taken directly from the CRS.

Canada has had consistent supply of aid to the health sector in BiH starting with 1996, until the last year of interest, 2005. The amounts vary over the years; the smallest annual contribution is in 2003 - USD 0, 2 million (USD 0, 1 million in current prices), the largest is USD 9, 6 million (USD 7, 9 million in current prices) in 2004. The descriptions of individual allocations include²⁸¹:

1. CARE REACH PROGRAM - 1.3125 (1996)
2. UNICEF EXPANDED IMMUNIZATION PROG - 0.4399 (1996)
3. QUEEN'S FAMILY MEDICINE - 2.0765 (1997)
4. FAMILY MEDICINE/PRIMARY HEALTH PROJECT - 1.7480 (2000)
5. HEALTH: PHC REFORM FM DEVPT - 3.8185 (2001)
6. HEALTH PLAN (ALSO BASIC) - PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 7.6852 (2004)

Unfortunately, not much can be concluded from the micro data on Canadian health ODA to BiH. The channels of delivery are identified in such cases, such as CARE, or UNICEF. The rest of the information can be of use for analysis of specific programmatic priorities, such as primary or family health, and so forth.

Overall, given the fact that the field of health is small, the allocation-level review does not reveal much new information. Apart from IDA, the sub-sector of health is defined by Japan's donations of equipment, and Canada's commitment to health reform in Bosnia. The rest accounts for on smaller allocations for very diverse ends by different donors.

2.3 Water Supply and Sanitation

The sub-sector of water & sanitation is overall clear-cut in terms of the final ends of ODA allocations. There is a standard range of purposes which populate the list of descriptions, and there is not much difference between the different donors as concerns allocation purposes. The allocation descriptions registered with the CRS most commonly indicate activities such as:

1. REHABILITATION OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS;
2. WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION;
3. CLEAN-UP (WASTE MANAGEMENT);
4. WATER TREATMENT OF PLANTS;
5. HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM;
6. WASTE RECYCLING; etc. (see respective tables in Annex)

These descriptions are *consistent across donors and regularly repeated*. This suggests that activities which can be charged to the sub-sector of watsan are *specific in nature and limited in range*. Most of the ODA to the watsan sector has been allocated for ends related to water supply and waste management. It is important to mention also that most of this ODA is obviously capital investment oriented, since all of these operations involve relevant infrastructure work.

As already discussed in Chapter 6, Germany was the strongest donor to the sub-sector of water & sanitation in the region, with contributions which were both nominally relevant, and in addition to

²⁸¹ Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

that, represented a relevant share of Germany's SIS aid. In terms of description of purposes there is strong consistency between the final ends of Germany's allocations with those of other donor countries. What only became more clearly visible in this chapter is that a *relevant share of German watsan allocations are loans*. The tables in the Annex contain notes in brackets for the allocations that represent loans (for example, see Table 43 – Germany to Albania; Table 49 – Germany to BiH; Table 57 – Germany to Macedonia; Table 59 – Germany to FRY/Serbia).

At this point it is worth mentioning that fewer donors have been opting for giving ODA loans. Most of the allocations are grant aid, and many donors do not have the policy option of operating ODA loans. Just a few of them use loans as a form of ODA, and these allocations are clearly marked in the Annex. Germany appears to be the bilateral donor which has most extensive use of loans as a form of aid.

What is nevertheless absolutely visible is that loans are usually related to bigger allocations. Smaller allocations would by rule be grants; bigger contributions, as the micro data in the CRS demonstrate, can occasionally be loans. This is completely the case for example with Italy's watsan allocations for Albania. Table 44 in the Annex presents the major years (the years with biggest flows) and the major allocations in Italy's water & sanitation ODA to Albania. They are all, without exception loans. Germany's loan vs. grant portfolio in watsan is more varied; many of the biggest allocations are loans, but there are also quite a few which are grant money. Germany clearly used an approach which insisted on stronger recipient commitment to the project, by accepting a share of the burden in financing the project, even if with concessional loans.

The observation concerning German and Italian loans to the watsan sub-sector is one of the most interesting in the allocation-level review of ODA. Tables 1-6 below present all the loans in the sectors and categories under review in this chapter. ODA loans (not counting the loans by IDA) are overall a small portion of total ODA to the region. But what is apparent from the tables is that in some sub-sectors more than others, donors preferred the loan to the grant option. This was usually the case, as evident from the descriptions in the micro data, with the interventions which involved larger scale investment.

Another marked moment in water & sanitation is Japan's huge contribution to Macedonia of USD 81, 0 million (84, 1 in current prices) in the single year of 2003. It is obviously huge share of Japan's total ODA contribution to the country and even to the region. This is *Japan's investment in one big water project in Macedonia, the construction of the Zletovica dam*. It is naturally, an ODA loan.

Phrased in rather simple terms, the conclusion is that whenever an allocation clearly strikes out in terms of size from the allocation pattern of that particular donor, it is most probably a loan.

Nevertheless, this should not be taken in an strict axiomatic sense; for example, it is visible from the tables in the Annex (Table 43 in comparison with Table 59) that relatively smaller share of German watsan aid to FRY/Serbia was a loan compared to Albania. As even better evident from Tables 1-6 below, both FRY/Serbia and Albania received sizeable German grants in the water & sanitation sector, but in addition to that, Albania also received a sizeable loan.

Without going into general hypotheses which cannot be fully supported with the data available, it is sufficient to concentrate on the documented cases and carefully conclude that a *relevant number of the bigger individual (usually investment oriented) allocations to watsan in the Balkans were loans*. Nevertheless, it should be kept in consideration that the share of loans (minus IDA) in ODA to the Balkans was overall small; only in some sub-sectors the loan was the preferred form of assistance.

Table 1: All loans to Albania by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

ALB		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
Sector														
Germany	SIS/watsan	4,45	1,43	..	6,52	15,85	8,65	17,09	..	6,16	60,15	93,97
Italy	SIS/watsan	6,97	18,22	40,56	7,66	73,42	1,10
Italy	SIS/health	6,49	6,49	5,94
Germany	EI/TS	..	32,94	32,94	0,00
Italy	EI/comm.	11,56	11,56	0,69
Germany	EI/energy	23,73	3,33	..	49,05	16,78	92,89	0,00
Italy	EI/energy	..	7,12	16,75	..	41,55	55,81	121,24	12,12
Japan	EI/energy	12,98	24,26	37,25	0,03
Germany	EI/BFS	4,83	6,80	3,28	14,91	0,35
Germany	EI/BOS	3,45	3,39	6,84	2,35
Germany	Multisector	2,66	2,96	5,62	24,67
													463,31	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

Table 2: All loans to Bosnia & Herzegovina by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

BiH		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
Sector														
Germany	SIS/watsan	6,36	..	6,36	16,43
Spain	SIS/watsan	7,74	7,74	2,24
Portugal	EI/TS	5,47	..	42,47	9,58	57,51	0,00
Spain	EI/comm.	3,51	3,60	7,11	0,96
Sweden	EI/comm.	5,23	5,23	4,09
Japan	EI/energy	31,72	31,72	23,95
Spain	EI/energy	31,24	31,24	5,70
Sweden	EI/BFS	1,21	1,21	22,33
													148,12	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

Table 3: All loans to Croatia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

Cro		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
	Sector													
Germany	SIS/watsan									48,22			48,22	2,40
EC	EI/TS								108,64				108,64	15,73
													156,85	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

Table 4: All loans to Macedonia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

Mac		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
	Sector													
Germany	SIS/watsan								8,65				8,65	40,02
Japan	SIS/watsan									80,57			80,57	6,75
Portugal	SIS/watsan						18,88						18,88	0,00
Spain	SIS/watsan										9,34		9,34	0,00
													117,44	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

Table 5: All loans to FRY/Serbia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

FRY/Ser		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
	Sector													
Germany	SIS/watsan						6,83						6,83	99,11
France	EI/energy											10,89	10,89	63,53
Germany	EI/energy							67,46	4,55	37,87	109,88	0,15
													127,60	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

Table 6: All loans to ex Yu unspecified by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: comparison to grants)

ex Yu		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total	grants
	Sector													
EC	EI/TS								115,43				115,43	0,00
EC	EI/BOS								27,16				27,16	0,00
													142,59	

(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database)

2.4 Government and Civil Society (GCS)

The sub-sector of GCS has been one of the major reasons to pursue a review of ODA to the Balkans at allocation- level. As it has already been stressed earlier, GCS represents a substantive part, around half, of all SAA, that is to say, of the largest segment of development assistance to the region, and around ¼ of total receipts. However, concluding a sectoral review of ODA by saying that roughly a quarter of all aid was given for GCS falls short of answering the question what was this ODA actually allocated for. This question is the one that impels the investigation of the allocations comprising the sub-sector of GCS.

Chapter 6 has already concluded that the strong position of GCS aid to the Balkans was result of the coherent policies of a few major donors, primarily the EC and the US. Both of them acted as strong donors the GCS sub-sector in all of the countries in the region. In addition to these two, Chapter 6 pointed out the consistent contributions by the Netherlands and Norway, and made a mention of the case of Spanish GCS aid to FRY/Serbia and BiH.

The review resumes from where Chapter 6 has left it off, by closely scrutinizing all the bigger allocations in the sub-sector of GCS. It has to be admitted though that even at this level of scrutiny, there are limitations in determining the final ends of the allocations. This limitation can simply not be overcome. A major factor for this is the lack of detail in the descriptions supplied by certain donors. This is definitely the case with US allocations.

The examination of the descriptions of US allocations (Table 72- Albania; Table 82 – BiH; Table 86 – Croatia; Table 94 – Macedonia; Table 105 – FRY/Serbia in the Annex) to GCS does convey a certain idea of the purposes of the allocations, even though their generic character prevents more conclusive analysis.

Some of the more common descriptions of US allocations to GCS include:

1. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES (Alb);
2. CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING (Alb);
3. INCREASE INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL SOCIETY ECONOMIC/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING (Alb);
4. LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT BETTER SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & MARKET REFORMS (Alb);
5. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (Alb);
6. RULE OF LAW (Alb);
7. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE (Alb);
8. HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: CIVIL SOCIETY (BiH);
9. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: HUMANITARIAN (BiH);
10. STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY (BiH);
11. REDUCED HUMAN SUFFERING AND CRISES IMPACT -- DEMOCRATIC REFORM (BiH);
12. A MORE PARTICIPATORY, INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (BiH);
13. SUSTAINABLE MINORITY RETURNS (BiH);
14. ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED (BiH);
15. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (Cro);
16. MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE (Cro); (see respective tables in Annex)

In addition, some of the more specific descriptions include:

1. ANTI-CRIME TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (Alb);
2. DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION: MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION (Alb)
3. INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (Alb);

4. INDEPENDENT MEDIA (BiH);
5. DEMINING (BiH);
6. POLICE TRAINING (BiH);
7. TREASURY ADVISORS (Cro);
8. EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY ASSISTANCE (Cro); (see respective tables in Annex).

The descriptions differ in their explanatory strength. Some more easily point to the purpose of the allocation and the character of the program financed, whereas others are simply too generic to provide clearer idea of the allocation goals. For example, a description such as “rule of law” even though general, suggests that the intervention has to do with some kind of legal reform; on the other hand, a description such as “more effective citizen participation and improved governance” is just too generic to give a closer hint of the final end of the allocation.

On the other hand, the descriptions of GCS allocations as a whole give a fairly good idea of the philosophy, or ideology driving US foreign assistance. The *key words* used include: *civil society, citizen participation, democracy, democratic governance, private enterprise, market reform*, and the like. It is true that the final end is often lacking or it cannot be identified through the descriptions, but they are (at least) effective in describing the ideological underpinnings of US assistance.

The descriptions of EC allocations for GCS provide (compared to the US ones) on the average more information about the final ends of EC GCS ODA. The list below comprises the most common or most often repeated descriptions, whereas the tables in the Annex (Table 73 – Albania; Table 83 – BiH; Table 87- Croatia; Table 95 – Macedonia; Table 106 – FRY/Serbia) contain all the major EC allocations for GCS in the region. The list presented below provides a synthesis – description of the most common ends of EC allocations, whereas the tables in the Annex also provide the amounts and thus present the full picture which also indicates the shares of certain allocations in the total commitment.

Quite a few interesting observations emerge from the review. For example, the tables in the Annex show that many of the biggest EC allocations for GCS in the Balkans were *for covering the cost of international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo*.

A review of the GCS allocations in Bosnia and FRY/Serbia shows that *repeatedly the biggest allocations are for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH, and UNMIK in Kosovo (Table 83 and Table 106)*. This is an important observation concerning both EC’s strong presence in GCS, and the share of GCS in total ODA to the region overall.

The list presented below contains some of the most common (most often repeated) descriptions of EC allocations to the sub-sector of GCS:

1. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION (Alb);
2. CBC ALBANIA/ITALY (Alb);
3. ALBANIA COP 98 CUSTOMS (Alb);
4. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (Alb);
5. JUDICIAL REFORM (Alb);
6. ASYLUM & MIGRATION (Alb);
7. POLICE (Alb);
8. INTERAGENCY CO-OPERATION IN FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING (Alb);
9. GENERAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF ALBANIAN STATE POLICE (Alb);
10. POLICE ASSISTANCE MISSION (Alb);
11. SUPPORT BORDER POLICE AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES (Alb);

12. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING IN BIH (BiH);
13. CUSTOMS PROGRAMME 2000 (BiH);
14. SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BiH);
15. SUPPORT FOR THE OHR (BiH);
16. SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA (BiH);
17. ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 - TAXATION AND CUSTOM (BiH);
18. REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (BiH);
19. SUPPORT TO BIH POLICE FORCE (MANAGEMENT, ORGANISATION, PREMISES) (BiH);
20. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT: BORDER CROSSING (BiH);
21. ASYLUM AND MIGRATION (BiH);
22. SUPPORT TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES (BiH);
23. SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE (BiH);
24. CUSTOMS AND TAXES (BiH);
25. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (BiH);
26. PUBLIC FINANCE (Cro);
27. MODERNISATION OF JUSTICE (Cro);
28. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (Cro);
29. POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME (Cro);
30. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM (Cro);
31. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING (Cro);
32. SUPPORT FOR TRANSPORT AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN KOSOVO (FRY/Ser);
33. SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COST FOR UNMIK (FRY/Ser);
34. PROVISION OF TECH. ASSIST. IN THE FIELDS OF CUSTOM & TAXATION (FRY/Ser);
35. SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF THE EU PILLAR OF UNMIK 2002 (FRY/Ser);
36. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - FORMULATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (FRY/Ser);
37. ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - TAX & CUSTOM (FRY/Ser);
38. BORDER POLICE REFORM (FRY/Ser);²⁸²

It is easy to observe that there is a (natural) difference between the final ends of EC allocations and the US allocations discussed previously. Some of the most frequent descriptions pertain to *border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, and customs and taxes reform*. These ends are naturally combined with the already mentioned *costs for international administrations*, and with many other allocations, such as pertaining to economic development or human rights.

These ends, it is fair to argue, can be interpreted to be in connection with security interests related to movement of people and goods across borders. It can also be naturally argued that these final ends are part of the agenda of bringing the countries in the Balkans closer to the European Union. That should also be a fair argument. However, the indications to the obvious domination of the security aspects of such “accession” can not be overlooked. Related to this, the review of the allocation descriptions identified potentially similar strategic concerns in the delivery of Italian aid, particularly to one country – Albania. For example, as evident in Table 68 – Italian GCS ODA to Albania (and also from Table 108 – Italian “other” SIS ODA to Albania, some of Italy’s foreign assistance was used for construction of prisons in the country. It does appear that in this particular case (concerning small share of Italian ODA to Albania) foreign assistance was, at least in part, guided by strategic security interests.

²⁸² Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

To go back to the final ends of EC GCS aid, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that *allocations for borders, customs, police, and related have been the most common allocations in EC ODA to the sub-sector of GCS*. A review of the tables in the Annex also demonstrates that these are allocations of *considerable financial weight*. It is easy to observe (at the level of detail recorded by the CRS) that these allocations easily outweigh in size the, also quite less numerous, commitments for example democracy or human rights promotion.

The further review of the Annex reveals that *quite a few of the sizeable allocations of other donors also go for the cost of maintaining the international administration and international forces in the region*. This is evident in the case of Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway. For example, some of the bigger allocations from Austria to BiH (Table 74), were charged for:

1. SFOR: UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION - 10.0039, and
2. UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION EUFOR - 4.4733

The case is the same with Austria's GCS ODA for FRY/Serbia (Table 96), with some of the major allocations including:

1. UN PEACE MISSION: INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO - 4.2443
2. UN PEACE MISSION UNMIK - 5.6163
3. UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION KFOR - 7.5466

Although its descriptions are formulated differently, the same is obvious for Italy's aid to BiH (Table 75), where the cost for:

“OBSERVERS UN MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 2.8453”²⁸³

is one of the major allocations, and for Italy's GCS ODA to FRY/Serbia (Table 98), where one of the major allocations is for:

“PROVISIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO RECONSTRUCTION - 2.2011”

The same is the case with Portugal's ODA to BiH (Table 79) where a major budget line is for:

“UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 6.8533”

and Spanish aid to both BiH (Table 80) and FRY/Serbia (Table 101).²⁸⁴ The same can be found in Swiss commitments to FRY/Serbia (Table 103), where some of the biggest budget lines were for the cost of KFOR:

1. SWISSCOY [KFOR] - 25.9845
2. SOUTIEN À LA KFOR - 24.4079²⁸⁵

²⁸³ Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW>

²⁸⁴ The descriptions of Spanish allocations for GCS to FRY/Serbia are written for some years in Spanish and other years in English, although it is evident that the allocations names repeat.

²⁸⁵ Translation: Support to KFOR.

A review of Norwegian allocations displays the same situation. In addition to Norway's strong commitment to mine action in BiH (Table 78), Croatia (Table 85), and FRY/Serbia (Table 100), within its GCS ODA, some of the bigger lines are for the cost of Norway seconded police forces in the region.

1. UN INTERIM POLICE TASK FORCE - 1.4821 (BiH);
2. POLICE SECONDMENT - 1.4184 (BiH);
3. SECONDMENTS 12 POLICE OFFICERS - 1.1445 (BiH);

This point will be further discussed in the final conclusions to the text, but what emerges as a relevant conclusion is the following: the cost of military presence (and in addition to that, international civilian administrations) *was not separate or additional to ODA, but it was actually a part of ODA*. This finding comes in contrast to some discussions from international reports which were cited in earlier chapters, arguing that aid to the region was smaller than the cost of military presence in the region. What appears from the allocation-level review is that *they were often (for some of the donors) one and the same*.

The DAC rules of what can be reported as ODA do not completely exclude allocations which finance activities conducted by military or police agencies. There is a rather complicated set of rules which decide under what circumstances these exceptions can be made. For example, a DAC document explain when and for what exactly aid to military, for peacekeeping, or civilian police work can be reported as ODA. According to the DAC :

“The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. On the other hand, additional costs incurred for the use of the donor's military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services is ODA-eligible (OECD, 2001).”

Similarly:

“The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilization of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal.(Net bilateral costs means the extra costs of assigning personnel to these activities, net of the costs of stationing them at home, and of any compensation received from the UN.) Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code. But activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, and are not reportable as ODA (OECD, 2001).”²⁸⁶

The DAC also stipulates a provision concerning what can be reported as ODA in the realm of civilian police work:

“Expenditure on police training is ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as counter-insurgency work. The supply of the donor's police services to control civil disobedience is not reportable (OECD, 2001).”

²⁸⁶ See for example *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, pages 19-20, (OECD, 2000a).

An extensive treatment of this issue would be beyond the scope of this chapter which essentially focuses on disaggregation of foreign assistance to the Balkans. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the issue of expanding the definition of ODA to allow the reporting as ODA of more security and military related expenses has recently loomed large in the donor community.²⁸⁷ A DAC meeting from March 2005 has also allowed the inclusion of “non-military security sector reform, control of small arms and light weapons, and conflict resolution”²⁸⁸ Some donor countries have advocated for an even more flexible definition.²⁸⁹ A wide network of development NGOs has advocated against such an expansion of the ODA definition.²⁹⁰ There is no need to go much in depth into this issue. The point is to indicate that it has recently been dominating the DAC agenda. The argument of this writing however is that, even under the previous more restrictive definition of ODA, it is quite obvious that military, security related costs, and costs of the functioning of the international administrations in the Balkans accounted for a very large share of all GCS ODA, and in that sense, of ODA overall. Again, it is not under dispute that these expenses are legitimate if and when reported according to the DAC statistical directives. Going into the issue if this was the case in the Balkans would exceed the scope and the capability of this (individual) research effort. However, the argument is underscored that *this aid accounted for a large share of total ODA to the Balkans*.

A review of the allocations in the Annex also evidences that some of the other major bilateral allocations, such as Dutch contribution to BiH or Swiss to FRY/Serbia, are for *programming commitments towards major multilaterals*. One of the Dutch major contributions to Bosnia:

“ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 22.5963(THROUGH WB)”

is for a program implemented through IDA. Similarly, one of the biggest Swiss contributions to FRY/Serbia, registered by the CRS DAC as:

“ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING [EBRD] - 16.3487”

was, as already discussed in Chapter 6, for the country’s membership fees to the EBRD:

At this point it is important to underscore once again that the preceding discussion, is nevertheless not *an exhaustive treatment of each and every allocation* in the GCS sub-sector.

²⁸⁷ For more on this issue see for example: Michael Brzoska, Analysis of and Recommendations for Covering Security Relevant Expenditures Within and Outside Official Development Assistance (ODA), paper 53, Bonn International Center for Conversion; Michael Brzoska, Extending ODA or Creating a New Reporting Instrument for Security-related Expenditures for Development, Development Policy Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 133-150, 2008; Marie Söderberg, ODA: a Tool for Poverty Reduction or Managing Security Relations, The European Institute of Japanese Studies at Stockholm School of Economics; The Reality of Aid Management Committee, The Reality of Aid 2006. Focus on Conflict, Security, and Development, Ebon Books & Zed Books, 2006.

²⁸⁸ Canadian Coalition to End Global Poverty, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Security, Available at : http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2006-05_oda_security_criteria.pdf

²⁸⁹ *ibid*

²⁹⁰ See for example a letter from CONCORD to the DAC chair, Richard Manning, from 2006, urging among other, against the further expansion of the ODA definition to include security and military spending, Available at http://www.concordeurope.org/Files/media/internetdocumentsENG/1_Home/2_CONCORD_Latest_documents/Letter_from_European_NGOto_the_Development_Assistance_Committee_DAC_November_2006.pdf

The purpose of the discussion so far has not been to cover and include all allocations (nor is this practically possible, given that the CRS itself does not provide 100% coverage) but *to look into the major contributions* in an effort to understand the main features of the GCS field. Some of this work was done in the previous chapter, by understanding the donor composition of the field, that is, by showing who are the major donors to GCS. Chapter 7 takes the effort further and engages in an allocation-level review of the sub-sector.

It is fair to argue that some interesting observations did emerge from the effort to explore the GCS sub-sector. They would include some of the following:

1. the contributions of the two major donors to the sub-sector of GCS, the US and the EC, *differed markedly from one another*;
2. relevant share of EC's allocations to the field went for actions pertaining to *border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, customs and taxes reform*;
3. some of the bigger allocations by the EC and some of the other EU donor countries - from the available data there is no evidence that this was the case with the US - *went for the cost of the international civilian administration and the military presence in the region*;
4. some of the big bilateral allocations were channeled to/through multilateral organizations;
5. the factor for such a huge share of the GCS sub-sector in total ODA to the Balkans was the fact that it "hosted" the substantial cost of the international civilian administration and the military presence in the region.

2.5 Other

As already pointed out, the sub-sector of "other" was not a subject of review in Chapter 6. The reason for this was its generic character. Chapter 6 explored the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans in an effort to understand which fields received how much aid and by which donors. Given its generic description, the category of "other" could not help this purpose. This is the reason why it was not included in the sectoral analysis of foreign aid to the region. Nevertheless, the sub-sector of "other", its full name being "other social infrastructure and services" was by no means small and it accounted for between 7% in Albania and 20% in BiH of total SIS (see Chapter 6). It was, for example, substantially larger than the sub-sector of health and a bit smaller compared to the field of water & sanitation.

However, whereas the category of "other" had lesser explanatory value at the sector and sub-sector level review, the situation changes when the review is done at the level of allocations. In this sense, it is worth the effort to review the descriptions of the allocations to the sub-sector of other social infrastructure & services.

The descriptions pertaining to the major years and major allocations to the sub-sector of other SIS are contained in [Table 108](#) to [Table 132](#) in the Annex.

As the name of the category itself already points out, the allocations registered with the sub-sector of other have been made for a variety of different purposes.

A review of the tables indicates that Sweden was one of the donors with more consistent presence in the category, and in addition to that Swedish allocations also show consistency across countries.

Some of *the most common descriptions* of Swedish allocations to the category of “other” include:

1. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.5233 (BiH)
2. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT. :CARITAS RECONSTRUCTION - 2.0051 (BiH)
3. RECONSTRUCTION OF 320 HOUSES IN FIVE COMMUNITIES IN NORTH EAST BIH - 4.6610 (BiH)
4. SANSKI BRIDGE - RECONSTRUCTION OF 350 HOUSES FOR RETURNEES - 5.5971 (BiH)
5. LOW-COST HOUSING - 5.7937 (BiH)
6. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.2640 (Cro)
7. RECONSTRUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 500 HOUSES FOR MINORITY RETURNEES - 3.6384 (Cro)
8. HOUSING : KOSOVO - 2.5741 (FRY/Ser)
9. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.9660 (FRY/Ser)

The conclusion is not difficult to make: *most of Sweden’s allocations in the sub-sector of other SIS have been made for housing*. Some allocations as it can be observed were made for the purpose of support to employment, and even several allocations have been made for culture, however, by and large the Swedish presence in the category of “other” has served the purpose of housing reconstruction in the Balkans. Along this line, it is easy to observe that BiH and FRY/Serbia were the major recipients of this type of assistance, which is logical, given that those two countries would have been expected to demonstrate the most serious need in this respect.

This model has been followed by the Netherlands which has registered several bigger allocations to BiH, for the same final end of housing ([Table 112](#)).

Norway has had some moderately relevant presence in the sub-sector of “other”, mostly in BiH ([Table 113](#)) and FRY/Serbia ([Table 126](#)). The allocations have been made for a variety of ends such as for example:

1. MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 3.4658 (BiH)
2. MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: HOUSING - 3.0698 (BiH)
3. WAR VICTIMS & EMPLOYMENT - 1.5391 (BiH)
4. EMPLOYMENT: STABILITY PACT SOUTH EAST EUROPE [through World Bank] - 1.8530 (BiH)
5. CHILD ALLOWANCES PROJECT - 6.2873 (FRY/Ser)

It is evident that also in the case of Norway there are several allocations made for housing, but the list of descriptions is nevertheless also populated by other purposes.

The EC is easily the strongest donor to the category of “other” ([Table 116](#) – BiH, [Table 119](#) – Croatia, [Table 125](#) – Macedonia; and [Table 130](#)- FRY/Serbia). The list of common descriptions comprises:

1. ECONOMIC REGENERATION + SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIH - 18.3059 (BiH)
2. EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 8.2981 (BiH)
3. HOUSING REPAIR&RELATED ACTIVITIES - 22.0289 (BiH)
4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALISATION - 16.9453 (Cro)
5. INTEGRATED REHABILITATION PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO - 34.9335 (FRY/Ser)
6. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA IN 2001 - 40.5696 (FRY/Ser)

Again, there are strong references to housing, and in addition, to employment as specific purposes. Nevertheless, there is no clear domination of one type of activities or programs over all others, which means that ODA went, as the name of the category itself indicates, for various different purposes.

In conclusion, it can be said that the sub-sector of “other” often comprised the activities which could not be registered under the other sub-sectors in SIS, such as education, health, watsan, or GCS. Some of these major purposes, such as for example housing and employment, have fairly logically emerged during the review.

3. Allocation-Level Review of the Sub-Sector of Economic Infrastructure

Tables 133 - 238 in the Annex list the descriptions of the major allocations to the EI sector, comprising its sub-sectors of transport & storage, communications, energy, banking & financial services (BFS), and business & other services (BOS).

Chapter 6 already discussed some of the major features of the EI sector. This discussion continues in this chapter through the process of allocation-level review of donor commitments to the sub-sectors comprising the field of EI.

3.1 Transport & Storage

The previous chapter produced the observation that *the sub-sector of transport & storage has been strongly shaped by the presence of two major multilaterals, the EC and IDA*. Chapter 6 further observed that most of the EC presence in the EI sector has been concentrated in this particular field; IDA on the other hand has significant presence in the other sub-sectors of EI as well. In addition to the consistent presence of EC and IDA, Chapter 6 noted the ad-hoc, country-oriented activity of some bilaterals such as Germany, Japan, and interestingly, Portugal. The sector-level review of ODA could not offer explanations of these activities. The commitments of these donors will in this stage of the discussion be reviewed at the level of allocation.

The descriptions listed in Table 136 - Albania, Table 141 – BiH, Table 143 – Croatia, Table 145 – Macedonia; Table 152 – FRY/Serbia, and Table 156 – ex Yu, present the final ends of the EC allocations to the sub-sector of transport & storage. The exact amounts to recipient countries were discussed earlier in the text (Chapter 5), - the CRS does not offer a complete coverage – but the tables nevertheless can again serve to reiterate some earlier observations.

It is visible from the tables that *Croatia, Bosnia, FRY/Serbia, and ex Yu received the bulk of the commitments, whereas the amounts pledged to Albania and Macedonia were quite smaller*. This pattern of distribution has been commented in Chapter 6 with respect to how it corresponds to the needs in the different countries of the region. It was observed that Croatia which is economically quite ahead than the rest has received disproportionately large share of the assistance compared to level of need.

The allocation-level review corrects this picture by showing *that the largest allocations for Croatia, which were made in the year 2002 were loans*. Table 143 fortunately²⁹¹ describes the specific ends of these allocations which pertain to the:

²⁹¹ Fortunately because many of the descriptions of EC allocations are generic in nature and it is not possible to conclude the final ends or purposes of the ODA flows. In this case however, they are absolutely specific.

1. RIJEKA-ZAGREB MOTORWAY [loan] - 56.5450
2. ZAGREB-AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL [loan] - 18.8483

The case is the same with the large allocation to the category of ex Yu ([Table 156](#)) for “RAILWAYS REHABILITATION [loan] - 80.1055”. The description reveals that this is also a loan. The point is the following: it was these substantial allocations which have determined the size of the EC assistance for transport & storage and indirectly to the whole of EI. The question is logically asked why should Croatia which is so much economically ahead compared to Albania or Macedonia, receive such abundant ODA? The fact that these allocations are actually loans completely changes the picture. These loans since given under concessional terms qualify as ODA, but they are nevertheless financial resources which have to be repaid. Logically, since Croatia was not eligible for concessional lending from IDA, it was cheaper for it to lend from the EC.

In addition, in terms of their final ends of the allocations are straightforward. They comprise roads, railroads, ports, and related items of transport infrastructure. IDA commitments consistently through the text, and as already explained, are not given much attention on account of being loans.

Moving to the bilateral donors, Chapter 6 indicated the relevant German presence in transport & storage. Review of the tables shows that this was *strongly country-based and that Albania was the only country in the region which benefited from large German ODA for transport & storage*. However, the review of the tables in the Annex demonstrates this was again *loan money for rehabilitation of Tirana airport in 1996*. Essentially, Germany financed, with a loan qualifying as ODA, the modernization of the main Albanian airport (see [Table 133](#)).

The second strong bilateral commitment in the sphere of transport & storage concerns Japan’s activity in BiH ([Table 139](#)). The major observations are that this was a) grant money, and b) allocated over longer period of time (not a single-year allocation). The descriptions comprise items such as:

1. REHAB. PUBLIC TRANSPORT SARAJEVO - 7.7190
2. ROAD CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT - 12.2383
3. PROJECT FOR REHABILITATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN MOSTAR - 6.3292
4. THE PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ BRIDGE AND MODRICA BRIDGE - 9.4634

Whereas the final ends are clear-cut, including roads, public transport, bridges, and in addition, the standard element in Japan ODA – equipment donation is visible, *a relevant conclusion is that Japan had sustained, over years, development operations in Bosnia*.

In addition, Japan had a sizeable contribution to the category of ex Yu in 2002 ([Table 154](#)). The description reveals that this was for “REHABILITATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY IN BELGRADE CITY - 14.7763”. In this sense it is not clear why it was charged to ex YU rather than to FRY/Serbia. The explanation should probably be sought in the rules which donors follow when making their reports to the DAC. Norway is another of the very few donors which consistently reported relevant allocations to the category of ex Yu.

Finally the third bilateral which registered relevant commitments to transport & storage is, interestingly, Portugal, and its activity concerns only BiH. [Table 140](#) presents Portugal’s allocations to BiH in the major years of 2002, 2004, and 2005. The major conclusion is, again, that *they are loans* (see also [Tables 1-6](#) in this chapter). The descriptions comprise:

1. SUPPLY OF FREIGHT WAGONS [loan] - 3.6754
2. DELIVERY OF FREIGHT WAGONS TO FEDERATION RAILWAYS [loan] - 39.7564
3. SUPPORT TO IMPORTS FROM PORTUGAL [loan] - 9.2180

The descriptions demonstrate that the case of large Portuguese ODA to BiH is a loan for Bosnian railways, most of which was spent on buying freight wagons from Portugal. Because of the favorable terms of the project, it qualified as ODA. This however explains why Portugal had such sizeable allocations to only one country in the region and it was almost completely absent from others. This is the case when a commercial venture, due to the favorable terms of the deal, can be registered as ODA. Several such examples have been identified during this review.

3.2 Communications

As already discussed in the previous chapter, the sub-sector of communications was the least assisted field in the EI sector. Tables 157 – 164 display the major years and allocations in this economic sub-sector in the Balkans.

Beyond the fact that allocations were overall small, again, some of the major ones were also nevertheless loans. This was the case with the single biggest allocation in the field, made by Italy to Albania in 1995 (Table 157). The CRS generically describes it as “loan for telecommunications”.

Even some of the quite smaller allocations, such as for example from Spain to BiH (Table 158) and Sweden to BiH (Table 159) are in the form of loans. Switzerland (Table 160) is a sort of exception with a relatively sizeable allocation to BiH of USD 8, 3 million (in constant 2006 prices). Tables 1-6 (this chapter) also allow a comparison of these loans against the grants the donor countries have committed in the same sub-sectors. This comparison, for example allows to speculate whether the loans were additional to the grants, or the donor preferred ODA loans for the respective sub-sector.

A few of the other more relevant allocations, such as from the Netherlands, Norway, and the EC, all of which have been made to FRY/Serbia, were for the purpose of support to the media. This is a final end which arguably stands at the crossroad between support to communications and democracy aid.

Overall, the only conclusion which is additional to the ones already made in Chapter 6 is that a *large share of the yet small allocations made to the sub-sector of communications, was in the form of loans.*

3.3 Energy

Tables 165-196 in the Annex present the major years and allocations to the sub-sector of energy in the Balkans.

The preceding review in Chapter 6 has concluded that *IDA was one of the strongest donors to the sub-sector of energy* in the region, followed by the EC and several bilaterals. Given that IDA allocations are of lesser interest for this discussion, the focus will be placed on the other donors.

Chapter 6 also observed that the largest share of the energy funding in the Balkans was allocated to Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia, whereas Croatia and Macedonia received substantially less ODA for energy.

Germany was one of the bilateral donors with strongest presence in the sub-sector of energy. The Annex shows that German energy ODA went mostly to two countries, Albania and FRY/Yugoslavia. Whereas the final ends for these allocations are straightforward in the sense that their purposes are *energy production or transmission*, the descriptions demonstrate that, *once again, some the major allocations were loans*. Some of them comprise:

1. HYDRO ELEC. SUPPLY FINANCE: SOUTH [loan]- 19.0662 (Alb)
2. TRANSMISS. LINE TIRANA-PODGORICA [loan] - 47.9301 (Alb)
3. HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 12.4285 (Alb)
4. UNTIED FINANCIAL CREDIT FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR [loan] - 45.7896 (FRY/Ser)
5. REHA. OF BAJINA BASTA HYDRO POWER PLANT [loan]- 37.2856 (FRY/Ser)

While it is important to point out that *not all German energy allocations were loans*, it is evident that the major ones were.

The same is the case with Italy. Italy features as a strong donor in the sub-sector of energy only with respect to Albania, but as evident from Table 166, the largest share of Italian energy aid is in the form of loan. The same is the case with Japanese energy ODA to Albania (Table 167) and the BiH (Table 174), as well as with Spain's energy ODA to BiH (Table 177) and even France's ODA to FRY/Serbia (Table 185). Tables 1-6 in the body of the chapter also put these allocations in perspective.

Overall, the conclusion from the allocation-level review of the commitments to the sub-sector of energy is that some the major contributions into this field, especially the ones involving major capital investment, were in the form of loans. On the other hand, the final ends of the energy related allocations were clear and they pertained to production, transmission, distribution, and consumption of energy.

3.4 Banking & Financial Services

Tables 197-214 in the Annex present the descriptions of the major allocations to the sub-sector of banking & financial services (BFS) to the region. As already pointed out in Chapter 6, the BFS field was a small recipient of ODA, larger only from the least assisted sub-sector of communications. The field has been strongly determined by IDA presence, followed to a smaller extent by several other donors.

The review of the descriptions provides a standard range of purposes, or final ends of the BFS allocations to the region. They comprise:

1. CREDIT FOR NOO'S I RURAL A.URBAN REGIONS [loan] - 3.2314 (Alb)
2. COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 3.439 (Alb)
3. MICROCREDIT – 12.0 (Alb)
4. DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND - 4.5789 (BiH)
5. CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND (CGF) - 4.5789 (BiH)
6. PRIVATISATION FEDBH BANKS - 0.6273 (BiH)

7. BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE - 110.086 (BiH)
8. INFORMAL/SEMI-FORMAL FIN. INSTITUT. - 4.4998 (Mac)
9. CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION OF SME IN SERBIA - 5.0841

Evidently, the BFS sub-sector contains allocations made in support of economic and financial development, for program activities ranging from micro credit, support to banks, guarantees for credits and insurance funds, privatization, and so forth.

The field has registered *some extent of loans* although not as much as in the sub-sector of energy for example, and there are also examples of *equity investment*, such as in the case of Swiss allocations for FRY/Serbia ([Table 211](#)).

Overall, beyond an insight into the final ends of the contributions, the allocation-level review does not reveal much new material for analysis beyond what has already been observed at sector-level.

3.5 Business & Other Services

[Tables 215-238](#) in the Annex present the major allocations in support of business & other services (BOS) in the region. The sector-level observations were presented in the previous chapter; the field is strongly dominated by the US; there is relevant IDA presence; and Germany has also been active in the field. The EC ODA was relevant only in the case of FRY/Serbia and to smaller measure in BiH.

One major hindrance for more detailed review of the final ends of the allocations in the BOS sub-sector is the *insufficient information provided by one of its major donors, the United States*. The US has been the top donor to BOS in all the countries of the region, but the descriptions it has supplied of its BOS ODA are overall very generic. They do convey a general idea of what the assistance had been dedicated for, but unfortunately they do not provide any additional detail. Some of the descriptions, which are in addition very repetitive, as can be observed from the Annex, comprise:

1. PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT- 1.868 (Alb)
2. PRIVATE MARKETS - 13.513 (Alb)
3. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 2.019 (Alb)
4. GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 6.56 (Alb)
5. PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 24.457 (BiH)
6. PRIVATE MARKETS - 51.986 (BiH)
7. HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 6.635051 (Cro)
8. PRIVATE MARKETS - 7.833 (Cro)
9. GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 8.245 (Cro)
10. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 13.273 (Mac)
11. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.429 (Mac)
12. PRIVATE MARKETS - 102.428 (FRY/Ser)
13. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 12.259 (FRY/Ser)

Essentially, *several generic descriptions repeatedly describe the final ends of the large and numerous US allocations to the BOS sub-sector*. This unfortunately does not provide enough information for more substantiated analysis.

The situation is not much different in the case of the EC. Its major allocation in the BOS sub-sector, which was made to FRY/Serbia in 2001 in the amount of USD 128, 5 million, was simply described as “SUPPORT FOR SERBIA 2001” (see [Table 235](#)).

Some of the descriptions of the allocations made by the other donors present in the field comprise items such as:

1. BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 3.4891 (Germany to Albania)
2. PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.9066 (Germany to BiH)
3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 1.8642 (Germany to BiH)
4. HARMONISED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISE SECTOR RECOVERY - 6.2142 (Netherlands to BiH)
5. SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF SREBRENICA - 6.5309 (Netherlands to BiH)
6. TRUST FUND-BANK REFORM AND PRIVATISATION - 1.2344 (Sweden to BiH)
7. ECONOMIC REFORM: CORPORATE GOV... REGIONAL FUND. TRADE & INSURANCE SECTOR - 11.8027 (EC to BiH)
8. BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 6.9783 (Germany to Macedonia)
9. TOURISM SECTOR - 0.6868 (Germany to FRY/Serbia)
10. FINANCING OF SALES AGENTS - 2.0481 (Netherlands to FRY/Serbia)
11. MIER BUSINESS INCUBATOR TRAINING - 1.7499 (Norway to FRY/Serbia)
12. MIER RESTRUCTURING OF JAT AIRWAYS - 0.5812 (Norway to FRY/Serbia)
13. BUSINESS SERVICES: TRANS-BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 5.0731 (Norway to ex Yu)

The descriptions provided by the different donors are quite diverse. They include a number of final ends ranging from business startup programs, employment, to tourism, and reconstruction of an airline.

Unfortunately the data concerning this sub-sector remains somewhat scarce. For example, Macedonia received 70% of its EI ODA in the BOS sub-sector. Large part of this came from a big IDA loan, described in the CRS with the generic line “ENTERPRISE SECTOR – 85.0” ([Table 202](#)). Even a larger part came from the US, but given the generic descriptions of US allocations it is not possible to determine more closely the final ends of that assistance. This is naturally, hypothetically possible through an extensive review of the final reports on the IDA and US ODA for these purposes, pending that those reports are public.

4. Multisector Allocation-Level Review

The last sector to be reviewed at allocation-level within the scope of SAA is the so-called “multisector”. [Tables 239-267](#) in the Annex present the descriptions of the major allocations donors have directed to this sector. Unlike the other sectors which were reviewed above, *this one will be reviewed in its entirety and it will not be further disaggregated to its sub-sectors*. The reason for this is the fact that the multisector comprises only two sub-sectors, a) general environmental protection (GEP) and b) other, whereby more than 90% of allocations to the countries in the Balkans (88% for ex Yu) have been registered to the generic category of “other” ([Table 4](#) in Chapter 6).

Especially because of this reason the multisector was not object of inquiry in Chapter 6, as was neither the sub-sector of “other” in the SIS sector.

The reason, it should be reiterated, was the fact of their generality. To say that 90% of the allocations to the field called multisector (which stood at between 15-22 % of total SAA for the countries in the Balkans) went into its sub-sector called “other” does not have great explanatory power. However, this is what made even more relevant, and actually called for review of these fields at the level of allocations.

One of the major donors to the “multisector” was the EC. The EC made consistently large multisector allocations to all the countries in the Balkans

These allocations comprise items such as:

[Table 245: EC to Albania]

1. COP ALBANIE 1996 - 35.9695²⁹²
2. MULTISECTOR AID - 34.4934
3. ALBANIA COP 1998 - 26.9116
4. MULTISECTOR AID - 19.5374
5. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR ALBANIA IN 2001 – CARDS - 29.5618

[Table 251: EC to BiH]

1. 1999 EC REFUGEE PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 73.8242
2. 2000 INTEGRATED RETURN PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 46.4543
3. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 36.6957
4. REFUGEE RETURN AND HOUSING SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 33.4050
5. ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 FOR BOSNIA & HERZEG. - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - 56.3970

[Table 255: EC to Croatia]

1. RETOUR DES REFUGIES CROATIE - 9.2157²⁹³
2. REFUGEE RETURN PROGRAMME FOR CROATIA IN 2001 - 20.7774
3. ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2002 FOR CROATIA - 52.7754
4. ACCREDITATION SYSTEMS; PLANT HEALTH. VETERINIARIAN SYSTEM - 2.8242
5. MULTISECTOR AID - 30.3443

[Table 259: EC to Macedonia]

1. COP FYROM 1996 /MA9602-05 - 13.653
2. COP FYROM 1997 - 16.9990
3. NATIONAL PROGRAMME 2000 - 14.9294

[Table 265: EC to FRY/Serbia]²⁹⁴

1. RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIQUE AU KOSOVO - 66.5956
2. EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROG. SERBIE - 163.1186
3. RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 129.020

²⁹² The micro data on EC allocations is sometimes reported also in French. The translation of this item in English is “COP Albania”.

²⁹³ Translation: “Refugee return Croatia”

²⁹⁴ Translation: “1. Economic reconstruction in Kosovo; 2. Emergency assistance program Serbia; 3. Reconstruction of Kosovo; 4. Reconstruction of Infrastructure and Economic Development.”

4. RECONSTRUCTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES ET DVL T ECONOMIQUE - 157.5892
5. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO IN 2001 - 39.8531

EC allocations have strongly shaped multisector aid, and in turn, a big share of EC aid has been channeled through the multisector category. [Table 265](#) shows that USD 758, 4 million (constant 2006 prices) of EC ODA to FRY/Serbia in the critical year of 2000 was registered as multisector aid. The descriptions of the allocations differ in specificity and character across countries. They generally – not in all cases - manage to convey the purpose of the contribution, although they do not supply additional detail..

Several other donors have had a consistent presence in multisector aid. Although their share is quite smaller compared to the dominant position of EC aid, their allocations are nevertheless significant.

Germany has had steady presence in multisector ODA across the region, as demonstrated by [Table 239](#) – Albania; [Table 247](#) – BiH; [Table 256](#) – Macedonia; and [Table 261](#) – FRY/Serbia.

The descriptions of some of the major German allocations registered as multisector ODA comprise items such as:

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNAL INFRA. - 6.9745 (Alb)
2. URBAN DVPT:SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND - 3.2685 (Alb)
3. STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.1557 (Alb)
4. EQUITY INVESTMENT - 9.9080 (Alb)
5. SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND [loan] - 1.9272 (Alb)
6. MULTISECTOR AID - 5.0237 (BiH)
7. EQUITY INVESTMENT - 12.4285 (BiH)
8. MULTISECTOR EMERGENCY AID TO SERBIA- 4.7119 (FRY/Ser)
9. STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4136 (FRY/Ser)
10. EQUITY INVESTMENT - 19.2642 (FRY/Ser)

Some of the descriptions repeat across countries and they give additional insight into the types of contribution that Germany registered as multisector ODA, such as *equity investment, study and expert funds, etc.*

The US was another bilateral with a relevant consistent presence in multisector ODA, as shown by [Table 244](#) – Albania; [Table 250](#) – BiH; [Table 254](#) – Croatia; [Table 258](#) – US to Macedonia; and [Table 264](#) – FRY/Serbia.

The descriptions of some of the major US allocations registered as multisector ODA, as registered by the CRS micro data comprise:

1. IMPROVED PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL SVCES - 3.0860 (Alb)
2. MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 3.1700 (Alb)
3. CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.6410 (Alb)
4. U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.1480 (Alb)
5. CHEMICAL AGENT ELIMINATION TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT - 6.7570 (Alb)
6. MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 3.1600 (BiH)
7. BOSNIA MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE / SERVICES - 60.6010 (BiH)
8. URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE - 7.5000 (Cro)
9. SETTLEMENT: HUMANITARIAN - 15.8710 (Cro)
10. SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.9900 (FRY/Ser)
11. ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 13.0580 (FRY/Ser)

The descriptions suggest that a *variety of different ends motivated the allocations registered as multisector ODA*. The environmental ends are naturally present, given that general environmental protection is a sub-sector of the category, but in addition, there is a combination of diverse purposes ranging from private enterprises, the Peace Corps, municipal infrastructure and services, settlement, and so forth.

In addition to the US and Germany, some of the other bilaterals which have had relevant amounts registered as multisector ODA include Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, etc. Some of their major allocations comprise items such as:

1. MULTISECTOR AID - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 1.8501 (Italy to Albania)
2. TIR PORTO ROMANO [CLEAN UP OF THE PORTO ROMANO HOT SPOT]- 6.0877 (Netherlands to Albania)
3. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 5.0524 (Switzerland to Albania)
4. RURAL LIVELIHOODS - 4.3209 (UK to Albania)
5. SUPPORT GROUP BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA [through MGI] - 14.7447 (Italy to BiH)
6. MULTISECTOR AID - 2.3698 (Switzerland to BiH)
7. MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor] - 2.3712 (Switzerland to BiH)
8. TOPOLA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (TRDP) - 2.8047 (Sweden to FRY/Serbia)

Evidently, *allocations went for a variety of different ends, which is essentially consistent with the description of the sector itself* – multisector aid, that is aid which crosses sectors, can not be determined to belong to only one sector and so forth.

The analysis of allocation descriptions unfortunately has its limitations presented by the level of detail supplied by donors. One should nevertheless bear in mind that *even this level of detail is a relative novelty in the practice of donor reporting to the DAC*, and that it is only of recent date. The review of multisector ODA has been for example hampered by the inability to secure more detail on the dominant allocations by the EC. Some general ideas are possible, such as that a lot of it was related to the crisis situations in the Balkans, and the needs of refugee populations, reconstruction, and so forth, but this is as deep as the discussion can go based on the information contained in the DAC CRS.

5. Humanitarian Aid: Allocation-Level Review

Section 7 in Chapter 6 introduced the category of humanitarian aid and it included it in the sectoral disaggregation of overall foreign assistance. The sub-components of the category were introduced, but the additional disaggregation has not been conducted because, as already explained, the largest part of all commitments have been registered in the first sub-category of “emergency response”, only a small share has been reported into “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”, whereas the third one titled “disaster preparedness” is dormant in the case of the Balkans, that is, there are no registered commitments in this sub-category.

The major findings Chapter 6 suggested were that all major donors had relevant and consistent presence in humanitarian aid (UNHCR is not listed in the CRS), and that the largest share of all humanitarian aid, logically, has been allocated to two countries in the region, BiH and FRY/Serbia.

The exploration of humanitarian aid continues in this section through a discussion of the descriptions of individual donor allocations. The overall conclusion however is that: the allocation-level review of humanitarian aid does not have much relevant analytical usefulness. The reason is the by and large generic, standardized descriptions *used by most donors* in identifying the final ends of their allocations. An occasional specific description appears, but that is usually an exception. Some of these descriptions will be presented and discussed; however, the overall conclusion is that the CRS data concerning the category of humanitarian aid does not offer much additional material for analysis.

Tables 268 – 347 in the Annex list the descriptions of major years and allocations in the category of humanitarian aid. Most of the allocations are registered in the sub-category of “emergency response”; the occasional descriptions in the sub-category of “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation” are presented in continuation (next) to the ones in “emergency response” and are appropriately marked, but they are not placed in a separate section. *The level of detail presented in the descriptions does not allow for much differentiation between the two.* One major factor of distinction, as the name of the category itself indicates, is that the second, “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation” by definition should involve construction or rehabilitation work, and because of this is it logically related to housing and shelter programs.

The key words used repeatedly in the descriptions of humanitarian aid allocations include some of the following: *Kosovo refugees, humanitarian aid, emergency food aid, aid to refugees, emergency/distress relief, aid to refugees in recip. countries, reconstruction relief, rehabilitation of houses, return of refugees, Kosovar refugees.*

Practically, these several words, in a variety of different combinations represent most of the descriptions available. This unfortunately tells very little about the final ends of the allocations which account for a relevant share of ODA to the Balkans. It does convey the idea, the general sense of what humanitarian aid was used for, but it does not go beyond that. Some conclusions are possible, such as for example an idea of how big a share of those commitments was given for Kosovar refugees, or for example, insight into the allocations which were channeled for the specialized agencies which dealt with the refugee crises. An additional idea emerges concerning some of the program goals by the frequency of the key words, such as shelter, food, repatriation, and so forth.

Overall, most of the conclusions concerning humanitarian aid came from the sector level review: that most donors had relevant and consisted presence, and that most of this aid went to BiH and FRY/Serbia (roughly 1/5 of their total ODA receipts). All of this is grant aid; a lot of it is channeled through specialized multilaterals and NGOs. Some of the, yet generic, final ends are observable from the key words which have been used in the descriptions.

6. Conclusion

The preceding pages provided an extensive review of the individual allocations made in the major sectors and categories of foreign assistance to the Balkans. The review allowed a real micro perspective of the foreign assistance amounts committed and it is fair to say that it supplied new and relevant information concerning the final ends of ODA to the region. Not all the descriptions have been equally useful however, both by donor and by sector. For example some donors, such as the US, or IDA, have generally supplied very generic descriptions of the final uses of their foreign

assistance. On the other hand, the descriptions by practically all donors in the humanitarian aid category have been very generic and could not serve as a source of much relevant information.

Overall however, it can be assessed that the inquiry conducted in this chapter did produce some interesting findings concerning the final ends of individual ODA allocations in the Balkans. Some of these findings which have been identified in the review included the following:

1. Significant share, always more than half and in some cases more than 90% of Austria's ODA for education in the region has accounted for on imputing of student costs; there is a strong systematic pattern of imputing student costs in Austria's assistance to education in the Balkans. This is the single strongest factor for Austria's heavy presence in the sub-sector of education; the situation with German aid to education is practically identical; even more than in the case of Austria, German allocations in the sub-sector of education have been committed to the purpose of imputing student costs. An easy comparison lends the conclusion that this is not the case with other donors;
2. Large share of French ODA to education in the Balkans has been spent for the promotion of the French language. With the fact that French aid to education was at the same time a large part of total French SIS and SAA - roughly around half of its SIS commitment and in the case of FRY/Serbia over 70 % - it can be concluded that - a big, relevant part of French aid to the Balkans in the years of transition went for the promotion of French language;
3. The final ends of foreign assistance in the sub-sector of watsan are specific in nature and limited in range. Most of the ODA to the watsan sector has been allocated for ends related to water supply and waste management;
4. As already discussed in Chapter 6, Germany has been the strongest donor to the sub-sector of water & sanitation in the region, with contributions which were both nominally relevant, and in addition to that, represented a relevant share of Germany's SIS aid; What only became more visible in this chapter is that a relevant share of German watsan allocations are loans;
5. The US was one of the major donors to the sub-sector of GCS. The key words used to define the final ends of UC GCS allocations include: civil society, citizen participation, democracy, democratic governance, private enterprise, market reform;
6. Some of the most frequent descriptions of EC allocations to the sub-sector of GCS include words like: border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, customs and taxes reform;
7. Sizeable allocations by the EC and other European bilaterals to the sub-sector of GCS went for the cost of maintaining the international administration and international forces in the region. This is evident in the case of Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway;
8. Most of Sweden's allocations in the sub-sector of other SIS have been made for housing.
9. Some of Italian foreign assistance to Albania was used for construction of prisons; that is to say, it seems to have been directly motivated by security concerns. There is no evidence that Italian ODA in other countries of the region was used for the same purpose;
10. The largest EC allocations in transport & storage for Croatia, which were made in the year 2002 were loans;
11. Albania was the only country in the region which has benefited from large German ODA for transport & storage. However, the review of the tables in the Annex demonstrates this was loan money for rehabilitation of Tirana airport in 1996;
12. Large share of the yet small allocations made to the sub-sector of communications, was in the form of loans;

13. IDA was one of the strongest donors to the sub-sector of energy in the region, followed by the EC and several bilaterals;
14. One major hindrance for more detailed review of the final ends of the allocations in the BOS sub-sector is the insufficient information provided by one of its major donors, the United States;
15. EC allocations have strongly shaped multisector aid, and in turn, a big share of EC aid has been channeled through the multisector category
16. A variety of different ends motivated the allocations registered as multisector ODA. Allocations served a variety of different ends, which is essentially consistent with the description of the sector itself;
17. Most donors had relevant and consisted presence in humanitarian aid, and most of their aid went to BiH and FRY/Serbia (roughly 1/5 of their total ODA receipts).

Chapter 7 and its findings have to be looked in connection with Chapter 6 and the conclusions which came out of the sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance. The two are in a close logical nexus, and Chapter 7 offers further clarification to the findings produced by the sectoral disaggregation. For example, at the level of sectors Austria and Germany have ranked as the strongest donors to the sector of education; the review of the individual allocations however showed that the reason for this has been the calculation of imputed student costs. An interesting finding was also produced with regards to French commitments for education, which at the same time represented a sizeable share of all French assistance to the Balkans: namely, that a large share of those commitments has been used for the promotion of French language.

In addition, the allocation level review showed (this could also be obtained at the level of sector) that relevant part of the sizeable allocations which involved capital investment, be it in the sector of water & sanitation, energy, transport & storage – have been in the form of loans. This is an important finding. It can further be disaggregated by pointing out that some donors, such as for example Germany; have used loans as a form of ODA more extensively than other donors. However, what appears valid as a general conclusion is that *donors were more inclined to supply investment type ODA in the form of loans*. This is not to say that there were no grants in investment type ODA; that would not be accurate. However, a relevant share of such types of intervention has been in the form of loans. In addition, whereas some donors were more or less regularly involved in such types of projects, others were obviously not or were very little present. For example, the US was almost completely absent from types of activities which involved large scale investment (the sub-sectors of transport & storage, energy, water & sanitation); some of the bigger bilaterals such as France or Austria were by and large absent from EI, and so forth.

As underscored previously, the sub-sector of GCS provided a major incentive for the allocation-level review of ODA to the Balkans. GCS represents ½ of SIS, and respectively ¼ of total SAA, or in other words a large share of all aid to the Balkans. It was important to look into this sub-sector and try to understand the final ends of the allocations. Chapter 7 has produced some relevant information in this respect. The allocation-level review has shown that a relevant share of GCS aid (as registered by the CRS) has been used for the cost of military and civilian administrations in the Balkans. Evidence of this has been found in the descriptions of the allocations primarily by the EC, but also of some of the major bilaterals such as Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway. Unfortunately a precise breakdown cannot be provided (an estimated one would be possible) but it needs to be reminded that the CRS is not an all-inclusive register of data on aid. Either way, this is a major conclusion. It dismantles some of the popular comparisons between the cost of aid vs. the cost of peace keeping operations, as it shows that often they were not separate but were one and the same. In addition, this is a *major factor of inflation of foreign aid to the Balkans*. If the cost for the

civilian and military presence in the region would be subtracted from the total, foreign aid to the Balkans would amount to considerably less. In addition, the fact that the allocation-level review finds that this was a practice for some of the donors to the region, does not automatically exclude the others. For example, the US has been the other major donor to the GCS sub-sector, together with the EC. Unfortunately, US allocation descriptions are far too generic to offer an idea if the US has been calculating aid costs together with its share of the cost for the international civilian and military administration in the region.

Another interesting conclusion concerns for example the difference of the final ends between the two major donors to GCS, the EC and the US. The analysis has been hampered by the lack of information provided by the US, but nevertheless some conclusions are possible based on the comparison of the key words in the EC and the US terminology. The final conclusion is that the EC key words indicate most often to institutional reform which is primarily concerned with security ends. Such key words repeatedly used by the EC in the titles of its programs are, as already suggested: *border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, and customs and taxes reform*. This clearly suggests that a lot of the EC funding for GCS went for the security of the borders, control over the movement of people and goods across borders, and related. On the other hand, the US rhetoric was completely different and it included the standard terms such as democracy, and markets which have already been identified during the review of the policy texts.

It is fair to argue that the self-interest, in the form of classical security interest (for the EU borders) *is clearly discernible in a large portion of EC commitments in the GCS sector*. In this sense, some of Italy's allocations to Albania indicate to the presence of the same type of self-interest in Italy's foreign aid allocation. For example, some of Italy's allocations to Albania in both GCS and the sub-sector of "other" clearly indicated that they had been used for reform of the penitentiary and specifically for construction of prisons.²⁹⁵ This indicates to the existence of a clear security goal in Italian foreign aid to Albania.²⁹⁶ At the same time, Albania is the only country in the region where Italy had supported this type of programs. It should be underscored that these programs do not appear to be a large part of the total.

Another finding which emerges from the review of individual allocations, and which could not be made based on the sectoral review alone, concerns the sporadic relevant commitments by donors which overall had very limited presence in the region. Such is the example of Portuguese aid to BiH in 2002-2005 or to Macedonia in 2000. This has almost exclusively been in the form of loans.

Going back to the very incentive for commencing the allocation level review, which is the question of the composition of the GCS sub-sector, it can be concluded that a relevant part of this ODA went for the cost of civilian and military administrations in the region. If it is accepted that this cannot be considered development aid by definition, and this text argues that position, the conclusion is that its calculation as aid relevantly inflated the amount of total ODA to the Balkans.

In addition to this, but also stretching beyond, there is evidence which indicates to the presence of clear security interests in the final goals of foreign assistance to the region. This is primarily the case of EC GCS ODA to the Balkans.

²⁹⁵ This could hypothetically mean something else, for example that the activity served the purpose of improving the conditions in the prisons, however, but then the analysis would have to go with the assumption that the description misstates what it says, which is that, the allocation went for "construction of a prison".

²⁹⁶ The overall context and the fact of presence of security risk would be taken as common knowledge and it would not be specifically elaborated.

However, the security interest was not the only form of self-interest observed. For example, the strategy of French foreign aid for education clearly served the promotion of French cultural interests. On the other hand, other bilaterals such as Germany and Austria have inflated their ODA commitments to education by consistently imputing student costs.

Finally, the chapter came to the conclusion that the donors which supplied aid for capital investment committed a relevant of it in the form of loans. Many other donors did not support capital investment in the region at all, or did it in very small amounts.

In a final analysis, this last phase of the inquiry can be argued to have identified relevant presence of donor self-interest, and in connection with this, practices of “inflation” in the supply of foreign aid to the Balkans.

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages attempted to answer the basic questions of *who gave aid to the Balkans, to whom, for what and why*. As explained in the very beginning of this writing, these questions have been invited by the understanding that the phenomenon of foreign assistance to the Balkans had been generally under-researched in the scholarship on aid. Even though the region of the Balkans has been a very strong aid recipient over the past 18 years, it appears that this process has attracted rather little scholarly attention. Foreign aid to the Balkans has been an inseparable part of the region's painful transition and of the extensive and intensive international intervention over the past two decades. But whereas these other aspects have been thoroughly researched and discussed, the foreign aid to the Balkans has somehow remained insufficiently explored. This was the key motivation for this work.

This should be specified a bit further. The particular aspect of foreign assistance to the Balkans which has remained under-explored is the overall, regional one, which looks at the process in its entirety. Many thematic, sectoral, in-country, and other related studies have been produced over the years on particular sides of this phenomenon, for example, on democracy assistance in Serbia, gender work in Kosovo, micro credit in the Balkans, civil society promotion, NGO development across countries or regionally, and so forth. However, there has not been a work of synthesis which would explore the process as a whole. This has been the focus of this writing. In essence, the central inquiry of this research has been the one used in the title - *who gave aid to the Balkans, to whom, and why*. The title itself is homage to the seminal article by Alesina & Dollar (1998) *Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why*, and even the topic of the inquiry is essentially the same. Alesina & Dollar have looked into the global patterns of distribution of foreign assistance and discussed the underlying motivations. This writing has done practically the same, only on a much smaller sample – the region of Balkans. Nevertheless, the approaches are absolutely different. Whereas the Alesina & Dollar work rests on econometric methodology, this writing has used qualitative methods (the ones the author can command) and essentially worked on a detailed (as possible) disaggregation of the foreign assistance effort to the Balkans. In this sense, the focus was not on stipulating a thesis which would then be confirmed or falsified, but on exploring the phenomenon inside-out. The research managed to produce relevant findings concerning the supply of ODA to the Balkans in the period of transition. It is fair to say that the basic questions have been answered. The extensive statistical data used in Chapter 5, 6, and 7 have provided detailed answers on who gave aid to the Balkans, to whom, but also for what. In addition, a lot of attention has been paid to the essential question of why. In essence, the question “why” has been the overall framework for the discussion. This is the question which searches for the motivation to give foreign assistance. This has been a steady, consisting niche throughout the entire text, starting with Chapter 1 which has discussed the major streams in the theory, through Chapter 3 which reviewed the official policy texts of some of the major donors to the Balkans, Chapter 4 which attempted to capture the political reality of the supply of foreign assistance to the region, and finally Chapter 7 which looked at the level of individual allocations to answer the question what has ODA to the Balkans been allocated for exactly. It can be said that the discussion on motives for aid managed to shed a lot of light on what were some of the factors which influenced the supply of foreign assistance to the region.

As a result, the picture of foreign aid to the Balkans, previously an undefined whole, has obtained its contours, structure, dynamic, logic, and in addition to that, it has been finalized with a substantial amount of detail.

Some of the common myths have been dismantled, such as the one that the aid to the Balkans could not match the grand Marshall Plan for post- World War II Europe. An easy comparison of the receipts per capita proved that is a misconception. The Balkans has received a lot more in per capita terms than Western Europe during the Marshall Plan. In addition, the detailed review of allocations in Chapter 7 has revealed that the comparisons between foreign assistance on one side and the costs of military intervention on the other do have the tendency to appear misguided.

The analysis of the numbers on foreign assistance has shown that neither was the Balkans homogeneous as a recipient, nor was the donor community unanimous in its ODA policies towards the region. The countries in the region differed substantially between each other in terms of ODA receipts. In this regard, the most drastic difference identified has been the one between Croatia and the rest. The research of the numbers showed that in terms of ODA received Croatia was not a “Balkan country”, and what more, it showed that Croatia received even less aid than most of the CEE and SEE countries. This logically invited the conclusion that the level of economic development of the recipient was a major factor determining the supply of ODA in the Balkans. This was the only factor which distinguished Croatia from the other countries in the region: Croatia had also experienced war, humanitarian emergency, and difficulties with democratization. And yet, the amounts of aid it has received were substantially smaller compared to everyone else. The factors for this outcome have also been explored. The research has further shown that this was not been a result of a consistent pattern in donor behavior. Whereas on one side there was a group (the larger one) of donors which preferred to give very little, or essentially not to give foreign aid to Croatia, there was also a group of donors which actively supplied relevant amounts to the country.

The exploration of the question of who gave aid to whom in Chapter 5 also presented some of the other particular donor - recipient relationships in the region, and overall it produced the information on who were essentially the major donors to the Balkans. Chapter 6 further disaggregated this by sectors, and finally Chapter 7 produced interesting information concerning the exact final ends of ODA allocations.

The largest share of the foreign assistance to the region has essentially gone to two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which has subsequently been (transformed and) renamed into Serbia and Montenegro. The text presented the particular challenge in disaggregating ODA within FRY/Serbia and tried to provide some indications about the possible distribution based on comparisons of data from several sources. The research confirmed the assumption that until the year of 2000 a significant share of the aid receipts has gone to Kosovo. The data comparison has also shown that Montenegro has been a significant beneficiary of the ODA registered to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period before the dropping of the sanctions against Serbia.

In addition Chapter 5 has reviewed the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans and discussed it against the backdrop of political developments in the region. The conclusion has been that the major factors of supply have included: war, humanitarian emergency, post-conflict reconstruction, and the democratic breakthrough in Serbia combined with Milosevic’s extradition to The Hague.

Chapter 6 provided an extensive sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance to the region, taking into account the most assisted sectors in SAA, which has been the largest part of aid to the Balkans, and including also the category of humanitarian aid which was also a substantial part of total ODA to the region. Whereas Chapter 5 provided the information on the total amounts of aid and its breakdown by donors and countries, Chapter 6 has started to paint the picture of what has this ODA essentially been allocated for? The sectoral disaggregation for example showed that half of all SAA

(consistently across countries) has been allocated to the sector of social infrastructure & services (SIS), and that within this sector half of all aid has gone for support of the sub-sector of government and civil society (GCS). Essentially, ODA for GCS has accounted for the largest share of total foreign assistance to the Balkans. This naturally invited the question – what for? The answer to this question has subsequently been produced by Chapter 7.

Chapter 6 has provided a lot of relevant information about the structure of foreign assistance to the Balkans. It has shown for example, that here has not been an even representation of donors across sectors. What Chapter 6 has shown was that donors have had their preferred sectors and sub-sectors of operation, and that this sum of different donor preferences has produced the total picture of aid to the Balkans. The conclusions to Chapter 6 contain all of the major findings to this end, but just as a remainder, the sectoral analysis has shown: that the sub-sector of GCS has been dominated by two major donors to the region, the EC and the US; that quite a few relevant donors to the Balkans had very small to irrelevant presence in the EI sector; that almost all of the EC ODA for the EI sector has been allocated for building transport infrastructure; that most of the donors to the region did not want to work in health, and so forth.

Yet, as much as Chapter 6 has produced relevant information about the allocation of ODA across sectors, that still did not explain what aid has been allocated for exactly. This was the topic of the subsequent chapter. Chapter 7 undertook an extensive review of the descriptions of the major allocations by sectors and across countries and has shown, through a close-up of available data, what have been the final ends of these allocations. This inquiry had its limits: the descriptions by the US have been far too generic to yield any relevant information about the final ends of aid commitments, except to provide a sense of the rhetoric used for the different programs. In addition, the descriptions by all other donors have been generic concerning the allocations in the category of humanitarian aid, and very little relevant information could be obtained from the extensive review of the allocations in this category which accounted for around 1/5 of all aid to the Balkans. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 has managed to supply a lot of pertinent information concerning the supply of ODA to the Balkans. Things which could not be seen based on the sectoral analysis in the previous chapter, have become much clearer after the allocation-level analysis. For example, the inquiry has pointed to the fact that a relevant share of GCS ODA has been allocated towards the cost of operation of the military and civilian administration in the region. The discussion also paid reference to the DAC rules according to which this is a legitimate practice under specified conditions, and in addition to that pointed to the recent debate concerning the further relaxation of the DAC rules to allow even greater flexibility in reporting these types of costs as ODA. This discussion, as already pointed out, does not enter into the question of the legitimacy of the practice of reporting these types of costs – as ODA in the Balkans. That would be beyond the scope of this research, and it would possibly constitute a separate research topic in its own right. However, as it is visible from the Annex to Chapter 7, these types of costs represented a substantial share of all GCS reported ODA, and for quite a few of the smaller donors to the region, such as Portugal or Spain, they represented most of the foreign assistance from these donor countries to the region. Essentially, these donors did not make any contribution, or made very little (grant) contribution, beyond what they have given to the military and civilian administrations in the Balkans, and beyond their engagement in humanitarian aid. To this extent the argument is firmly based in fact. In addition, it is evident from the tables in the Annex to Chapter 7 that these allocations were by definition made to these bilateral donors' segments or units in these administrations. Again, this text does not (have any evidence to) dispute the assumption that these allocations were in line with DAC rules for reporting of ODA – although obviously there is a movement in the development community which considers these rules to be – too flexible – however, the fact remains, that some

donors (with smaller presence in the region) have made very little contribution beyond this type of allocations.

Beyond just the sub-sector of GCS, Chapter 7 offered other interesting findings, such as for example concerning the reasons for the strong Austrian and German presence in education, that is the imputing of student costs, or the priority of a large part of French ODA in the region, that is, the promotion of French language.

An interesting question for the conclusion of this text definitely concerns how the findings which have emerged from the statistical data correspond with the findings from the policy texts of the major donors to the region. Or in other words, do the numbers of foreign aid to the region correspond with the declared priorities of ODA? Did donors allocate the resources for the achievement of goals they declared as priority ones? The analysis of the policy texts has indicated that most of the major donors to the region have operated with a standard range of goals for their foreign assistance to the region. These goals have included, in the shortest possible summary, promotion of democracy, market economy, and peace & stability. In addition to these, the goal of European integration has over time emerged as a goal for both EU and non-EU countries. These of course are the ultimate mission statements for ODA to the region, and as such they have been preceded by many prior and action-oriented goals, such as emergency relief in the situations of humanitarian crisis, or post-conflict reconstruction with the immediate task of restoring conditions for life in the aftermath of war. The strong commitment to humanitarian goals, including also post-conflict reconstruction, has been visible in many of the sectors, sub-sectors, and categories. Starting from humanitarian aid which accounted for a huge share of the total and has been mostly concerned with emergency relief and relief reconstruction (housing etc.), through the multisector which has comprised many of the commitments for reconstruction, and the respective sub-sectors, such as for example energy (restoring destroyed capacities in FRY/Serbia).

Nevertheless, reflection on the relationship between the general policy declarations and the actual commitments of foreign assistance is to some extent possible. A note of caution is perhaps necessary. This can only be done provisionally: it is not possible to make a specific breakdown of amounts of aid for democracy, market economy, and peace & stability. This should be considered as self-evident and no particular effort will be made to explain why it is this so. However, it should be understood that this is the limitation. This text cannot argue with certainty a statement of the type: "this much has been allocated for democracy." That is not possible. However, this being said, it is possible to make some approximate, rough notes on the basis of the findings from the sectoral and allocation-level analyses. For example, the sectoral analysis gives *an idea* which sub-sectors could possibly contain the allocations for support to the goal of promotion of market economy. It is only logical to seek them primarily in the sub-sector of BFS and BOS, then in the GCS, and to extend the search, perhaps also in the multisector. It is more difficult to expect that these allocations could be contained in humanitarian aid, water & sanitation, education, or related. The same exercise could also be done with the goals of democracy, and peace & stability. In doing so, the exercise would also give ideas about which donors were more engaged in pursuing these goals than others. For example, if a donor was completely absent from the sub-sectors which were more pertinent to democratic development or economic transformation, that it could be argued that such a donor had less input into the democracy and market economy promotion project. It is again important to note that this text cannot argue in terms of absolutely precise amounts or specific correlations, and this is why it resorts to the use of formulations such as "a large share", "the most", "much more", "by and large", "possibly", "a relevant share", and so forth. It is also for example perfectly plausible, and to be expected, that donor priorities would change over time.

In addition to the sectoral analysis, this exercise could also be pursued through a review of the major allocations in the Annex to Chapter 7. However, also here the descriptions are only a limited tool; the challenge is the lack of accurate descriptions by some of the major donors. For example, it is obvious that some donors are much more than others engaged in the sub-sectors which more closely correlated with the goal of promoting market economy. This can be observed from the tables with the rankings in Chapter 6, and in addition, the same observation can be derived from the review of the allocation descriptions. The same argument could be made with respect to democracy. At the level of sub-sectors these allocations would logically be sought in GCS ODA, and perhaps the search could be extended to the multisector. As already pointed out several times, the sub-sector of GCS is vast. One observation here, limited to the two major donors to GCS, that is, the US and the EC, would be that the rhetoric of democracy promotion is much more evident in the US allocation, even though, the issue of the generic US descriptions should nevertheless be kept in mind as a limitation. In the EC allocations it can be fairly argued, it is much less frequent compared to the goals of customs reform, police reform, and the like. The allocations of some of the Nordic donors do have frequent use of terms such as “human rights. This observation, it should be reminded, is not new. In his *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*, Carothers (1999)²⁹⁷ has noted that the rhetoric of democracy promotion by far exceeded the actual allocations made for the same purpose in the foreign assistance operations of the US. This exercise actually agrees with this at a general level, even though it points out to the difference between the US and the EC, whereby in this comparison the US does seem more committed to the goal of democracy compared to the EC. One possible observation concerning this issue can be that the US was probably the first donor which set the goals of democracy and market economy as foreign assistance priorities for the entire Eastern Europe, with the Balkans included. The comparison of the provisions of the US SEED Act and the original PHARE regulation of the then European Community lends that conclusion (Chapter 3). The first PHARE did not operate with the term “democracy”; it has been only subsequently complemented with PHARE Democracy which aimed to reflect Europe’s growing engagement in the field as the 90s were unfolding. However, going beyond the EC and the US, it is observable from both the sectoral and allocation level analysis that some donors have been simply less involved with political development as well as with ideologically (capitalist) driven economic transformation. Looking at Japan’s engagement in the region for example, such an impression is obvious. Japan has preferred to work in health more than any other area, and even beyond health, its engagement has been focused on more classical (yet appreciated) work with equipment donation. In addition, Germany, which was the largest bilateral to the region, has been by and large absent from the GCS field, with the exception of FRY/Serbia, possibly related to Germany’s commitments under the Stability Pact whose promoter it was. As a note of clarification, Germany has some nominal presence in GCS, but its commitments are smaller compared to a) its own commitments to other sub-sectors, which is an indicator of priority, and b) the GCS commitments of other (also much smaller) donors; to the extent that Germany even rarely ranks on the top 10 lists in the field of GCS. This can be taken as a relevant indication that Germany, as a major bilateral was less interested in the theme of democratic development, again, in comparison to its other priorities. However, it should again be underscored that the goal of this discussion is not to find how much were democracy and market economy represented in the work of some donors compared to others. The text limits the argument to the point that although these goals were consistently present in the policy texts of all major donors, at the level of actual allocations, donors differed substantially in how much ODA they have contributed to these priorities. The situation can be said to be similar with the goal concerning peace & stability, with the fact that peace & stability is even more vaguely defined than the previous two. Many different types of activity can be considered to contribute to peace & stability; it is even less possible to have specificity in discussing allocations to the latter

²⁹⁷ See Chapter 2

compared to the former two goals. Starting with the emergency goals of humanitarian aid, through post-conflict reconstruction, and a variety of social and economic goals, everything can be said to contribute to peace & stability. Even the other goals relating to political and economic development can be argued to contribute to this end, or to be fused. In this sense, the task of discussing the relationship between policy declarations of peace & stability and the actual allocations towards this end does seem to become elusive.

One further angle of looking on this question of consistency between policy texts and actual allocations can be provided by the fact of the - consistency of allocations across countries. In other words, a donor which would be actively promoting the goals of democracy and market economy, would be expected to have consistency in the allocations supporting these ends, across the countries of the region. A mere look at the tables in Chapter 6 shows this is often not the case. For example (Table 32 in Chapter 6) the EC seems consistent primarily in the field of GCS and transport & storage, and with smaller nominal amounts in education. Germany (Table 33 in Chapter 6) seems most consisted in the sub-sector of education and water & sanitation, and so forth.

In this sense, what can be argued as a final conclusion is that: at the level of rhetoric the ideological goals of democracy and market economy did rank high in the policy statements of donors. However, they appear to have been used, by some donors more than others, as idealized statements of vision, without consistent reflection in donors' operational foreign assistance policies.

Finally one last question concerns the issue of motivations. The issue of motives for aid has been assigned a framework role in this discussion. The theoretical discussion of foreign assistance actually started with the question what motivates donors to give aid? In this sense, was aid just another tool of foreign policy, or it was an expression of genuine humane internationalism? This question equally applies to foreign assistance in the Balkans: was aid an instrument of foreign policy and donor interest, or was it a result of an altruistic desire to help? The answer concerning the Balkans does not differ from the answer concerning aid overall, or aid in other parts of the world. The answer is that aid to the Balkans was motivated by both: by donor self-interest but also by moral altruism. If the question is which of the two motives dominated, the answer could be sought in the scholarship of aid. There is a wide consensus in aid literature that national self-interest is by and large the strongest motive to give. A note of caution is due here: it was discussed early in the text that the same motives do not have the same importance for the same donors. Whereas for some donors self-interest is a strong determinant of their foreign assistance programs, for other donors (the Nordic countries are most often mentioned in this respect) humane internationalism appear to be a much stronger motive. Again, this text will not phrase things in specific quantitative terms. The role of this text was more oriented towards finding out where this self-interest could be identified in foreign aid to the Balkans? And in addition, what kind of self-interest it was? What emerges as a conclusion is that self-interest could be identified in many different forms. For example, for France it had to do with the promotion of French culture; Italy had direct security interests to take care of and this reflected in some specific operational ends of its ODA programs, but also in the special relationship which it had with Albania. A similar argument can be made concerning the final ends of some commitments of European Commission aid. When and where donor countries were obligated to support the maintenance of the military and civilian administrations in the Balkans, it can be argued that self-interest reflected in the channeling of assistance through their national units in these administrations, which also in a sense meant, covering the costs of these institutions. Controlling the cost of aid can also be seen as a donor-self interest, and in this sense, staying away from costly investment type intervention, or supporting it primarily through loans, can also, arguably, be considered to at least take into account donor interest. ODA loans are nevertheless ODA, but there should be little doubt that some isolated cases

registered as loans, such as between Portugal and Bosnia, or South Korea and Croatia, were at all a result of policy driven by the desire to help. Another way of controlling for the cost of ODA, or in other words, inflating the reported foreign assistance, is for example the imputing of student cost, a practice for which Austria has consistently been reminded by the DAC, until it made an effort to correct in and align it with the DAC reporting rules a few years ago. In addition, when generous contributions were eagerly expected and needed, a big part of them has been allocated through forgiveness of old debt, and so forth. In conclusion, the review of foreign aid to the Balkans does reveal many instances when aid functioned as a tool of or took into account the donor self-interest. The review of the political reality and political discussions which surrounded aid supply to the region has shown many instances when aid was considered as a tool of one type of interest or another. Probably the most emblematic example concerns Milosevic's extradition to The Hague. The numbers undisputedly show, and this is closely corroborated by other direct sources, that aid was probably the strongest tool utilized for the achievement of this political goal. And at the same time it was the currency to pay for it. However, this is only the most famous example. The review of the media has shown that foreign assistance was a frequently used foreign policy tool consistently over the years in the Balkans. But again, this does not mean that countries of concern to the foreign policy of donor countries automatically received more. The situation of Croatia makes that very clear.

This eventually brings to a conclusion the inquiry into foreign assistance to the Balkans in the period of transition. The central question of who gave aid, to whom, for what, and why, has been answered extensively. The largest part of the inquiry rested, and many of the answers have come, as intended, through the detailed analysis of the numbers on aid stored in the DAC global registers. This exploration of the numbers of ODA to the Balkans has been the persistent aim of this research endeavor from its very inception. The tables and charts in the chapters, and the extended statistical data stored in the annexes provide detailed information about the flows of foreign supply to the region. Foreign aid to the Balkans is no longer the undefined whole from the beginning of the text. The preceding chapters have revealed the donor structure, sectoral composition, time-dynamic, final ends, and major motivations for development assistance to the region.

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Introduction

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Chapter 1

Foreign Aid. Motives and Factors: Review of Major Theoretical Views

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Chapter 2

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CHAPTER 5 - ANNEX

DISAGGREGATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FLOWS TO THE BALKANS 1990-2005

Table 1: DAC bilateral ODA to the region of Western Balkans (by donor)*

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,01	0,24	0,03	1,29	1,84	4,18	4,7	1	0	73,7	9,5	1,33	0,18	0,5	0,6	0,32	99,42
Austria	14,11	49,8	192,62	174,98	175,75	136,42	126,64	80,67	80,45	128,86	94,7	68,34	150,24	52,87	60,31	76,72	1663,48
Belgium	0,01	0	2,8	0,33	2,96	2,68	5,6	8,49	7,52	19,7	15,46	18,55	78,24	5,78	2,49	4,09	174,7
Canada	0	0,01	0,03	37,18	14,91	15,3	39,99	13,47	25,01	73,44	65,9	65,02	190,68	29,92	22,94	19,88	613,68
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0,77	2,89	3,39	8,01	9,66	6,41	45,65	63,06	65,09	22,85	30,7	18,03	276,51
Finland	2,02	9,17	34,44	9,58	11,01	7,25	18,73	15,97	18,07	42,57	27,57	30,26	20,81	19,91	47,03	14,01	328,4
France	5,9	7,29	12,25	16,53	13,9	9,9	19,56	19,53	19,23	219,58	69,67	44,65	163,11	258,52	30,91	113,5	1024,03
Germany	0,1	61,64	756,9	635,32	364,15	412,04	67,85	103,61	122,34	250,51	320,95	211,69	820,73	208,72	165,3	162,87	4664,72
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,75	35,2	56,27	93,53	127,08	110,7	110,58	183,92	74,88	81,61	889,52
Ireland	0	0	0,95	3,87	1,74	5,75	8,92	3,67	4,04	10,92	5,03	3,84	4,98	4,24	3,31	4,68	65,94
Italy	40,81	442,85	204,91	262,87	65,11	86,45	131,13	50,7	42,17	166,55	127,34	110,32	64,72	60,66	61,18	32,63	1950,4
Japan	-0,21	0,9	0,91	0,62	7,22	7,76	28,76	50,64	74,78	98,05	41,22	39,54	38,34	95,05	44,06	157,37	685,01
Luxemb.	0	0	3,06	1,95	2,34	2,4	3,43	3,37	3,66	16,58	16,91	13,33	15,58	11,08	10,42	9,57	113,68
Netherl.	2,45	6,62	55,75	255,35	151,78	167,46	135,32	146,19	136,34	221,8	228,62	256,97	188,78	116,67	94,04	73,08	2237,22
New Zel.	0	0,06	0,05	0,25	0,08	0,28	0,03	0	0	1,24	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,99
Norway	-1,11	3,48	6,58	66,17	178,7	118,02	104,56	107,02	120,43	283,7	202,05	142,34	188,59	152,29	127,72	110,37	1910,91
Portugal	0	0	0	0	1,38	0,45	0	0,19	1,43	2,9	5,96	5,67	3,47	4,19	8,9	18,51	53,05
Spain	0,13	0,14	1,15	3,82	0,81	14,33	16,96	10,47	39,35	124,54	112,97	87,48	145,24	92,52	52,27	33	735,18
Sweden	0	5,87	114,53	155,38	127,68	61,69	66,42	80,06	40,07	89,85	82,96	120,55	99,91	100,46	97,72	111,1	1354,25
Switz.	0,22	3,32	25,29	39,56	34,15	48,37	46,28	25,61	34,18	148,86	113,22	114,93	89,73	97,36	90,28	84,65	996,01
UK	0,02	0,68	8,33	168,2	161,73	65,13	111,1	79,22	48,27	93,06	213,58	75,26	657,45	42,23	33,37	116,19	1873,82
US	0	0	39,13	65,95	36,16	103,78	207,41	237,02	289,42	443,35	334,99	516,11	820,08	475,73	407,27	348,41	4324,81
total																	26.036,73

*Western Balkans = Alb, BiH, Cro, Mac, FRY/Ser, and ex Yu unspecified.

Source: all data in the Annex to Chapter 5 are taken from the DAC online statistical database

Table 2: DAC bilateral ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	11,95	411,97	238,12	140,86	84,59	84,94	138,44	145,67	122	339,47	196,56	210,82	232,94	269,46	173,67	187,66	2989,12
BiH	408,02	817,88	724,18	669,68	769,13	909,18	649,49	525,63	392,28	376,96	314,79	299,14	6856,36
Cro	64,22	47,37	137,15	33,46	41,56	36,65	59,21	104,1	103,17	93,13	94,88	65,6	880,5
Mac	35,75	26,21	28,06	35,94	39,06	169	150,17	227,38	243,79	204,9	171,78	169,52	1501,56
FRY/Ser	63,94	95,72	75,08	96,76	124,55	950,3	871,3	894,01	2539,3	987,08	617,95	828,34	8144,3
ex Yu unspec.	52,51	180,1	1221,6	1758,3	697,65	200,41	59,62	98,6	76,39	205,1	334,6	138	405,08	103,94	92,63	40,33	5664,89
total	64,46	592,07	1459,7	1899,2	1354,2	1272,5	1162,5	1080,1	1172,7	2609,7	2261,3	2099,9	3916,5	2035,5	1465,7	1590,6	26036,73

TOTAL DAC BILATERAL TO WESTERN BALKANS

(full overview of allocations by recipient countries)

Table 3: DAC bilateral to Albania

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,02	0,01	..	0	0,02	0,05
Austria	1,94	5,71	8,67	3,23	2,07	3,58	3,5	5,5	5,86	25,07	7,23	3,51	2,44	4,31	5,24	4,3	92,16
Belgium	0,18	..	0,32	0,68	0,09	0,21	..	4,11	1,37	0,01	0,39	0,53	7,89
Canada	0,13	..	0,06	..	0,55	0,64	0,3	1,99	3,86	2,09	2,22	1,36	0,67	13,87
Denmark	0,77	2,89	3,39	2,01	2,27	3,07	5,32	6,14	4,8	2,48	0,03	0,36	33,53
Finland	0,02	0,68	0,31	0,25	0,26	0,24	0,12	1,16	0,51	0,48	0,48	0,67	1,29	1,53	1,45	0,73	10,18
France	0	0,66	1,96	2,59	7,04	1,2	3,49	2,82	2,37	3,44	2,77	3,11	4,23	4,05	6,93	13	59,66
Germany	2,77	29,88	16	22,11	19,2	21,05	34,52	31,47	27,99	29,05	28,18	36,17	34,08	24,05	24,16	30,94	411,62
Greece	6,24	19,76	22,79	41,08	20,21	20,75	22,44	102,2	20,71	25,16	301,34
Ireland	0,15	0,02	0,16	0,21	0,27	0,36	0,86	0,1	0,43	0,5	0,68	0,72	4,46
Italy	7,08	369,55	161,79	61,45	13,97	18,96	35,3	42,48	18,78	103,86	29,34	34,63	35,43	24,74	19,19	8,88	985,43
Japan	0,1	0,18	0,39	0,34	6,95	2,97	2,28	10,08	2,71	13,51	6,08	6,58	4,13	10,28	8,92	16,53	92,03
Luxemb.	0,23	0,21	0,25	0,08	0,92	0,45	0,45	4,28	1,74	0,43	0,85	1,03	12,5
Netherl.	0	0,74	3,57	3,25	9,37	5,67	9,93	10,83	7,66	2,84	6	17,87	16,49	14,83	11,56	9,39	130
New Zel.	0
Norway	0	3,5	0,64	1,02	0,77	1,46	0,95	2,15	3,99	11,29	6,17	5,25	9,22	8,14	9,83	7,04	71,42
Portugal	0,01	0,01
Spain	0,01	0,14	0,72	0,18	0,01	0,32	1,62	17,05	2,64	2,47	2,14	2,23	1,76	8,23	39,52
Sweden	0	0,26	3,99	2,14	0,24	0,33	0,46	1,15	1,32	6,6	0,54	5,7	5,48	6,13	5,84	8,84	49,02
Switz.	0,03	0,67	1,88	4,43	7,5	12,04	13,09	5,21	4,48	22,85	9,88	8,12	12,09	11,63	7,41	9,66	130,97
UK	0	0	0,01	1,44	2,81	3,4	2,88	1,98	1,17	21,93	13,63	7,76	6,6	5,47	4,25	3,93	77,26
US	0	0	37,78	38,25	12,91	10,12	21,11	7,33	17,12	28,3	52,13	48,11	69,13	43,81	42,93	37,17	466,2
total	11,95	411,97	238,12	140,86	84,59	84,94	138,44	145,67	122	339,47	196,56	210,82	232,94	269,46	173,67	187,66	2989,12

Table 4: DAC bilateral to BiH

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0	..	0	0,02	0,02
Austria	0	0	0	0	149,66	113,75	106,15	56,78	49,21	37,88	33,92	21,63	15,53	17,84	19,46	26,67	648,48
Belgium	0,97	2,98	5,67	5,21	7,77	1,97	9,38	2,72	0,79	0,57	1,59	39,62
Canada	1,42	..	12,12	19,64	22,44	8,23	16,42	10,76	9,85	7,15	8,41	116,44
Denmark	5,33	3,37	2,96	4,25	12,34	0,62	2,27	2,89	1,18	35,21
Finland	2,11	16,93	11,01	11,13	10,46	6,19	6,92	6,33	7,96	6,18	4	89,22
France	0	0	0	0	0	2,92	8,23	6,38	6,61	155,51	30,5	3,25	3,43	2,43	3,54	29,41	252,21
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	331,32	41,16	39,22	52,3	80,95	132,59	39,84	26,81	24,82	30,62	26,51	826,14
Greece	9,33	14,26	31,27	2,81	10,33	14,65	8,72	6,51	7,74	1,32	106,94
Ireland	8,69	3,43	0,27	0,36	3,62	2,49	2,28	1,25	0,79	1,51	24,69
Italy	0	0	0	0	27,84	62,76	86,12	10,69	22,77	8,4	52,75	8,01	9,46	5,84	8,13	2,74	305,51
Japan	21,16	31,92	57,88	32,42	20,9	9,44	15,1	52,02	20,18	15,64	276,66
Luxemb.	0,44	1,11	1,97	2,11	1,78	1,46	0,98	0,54	0,81	0,39	0,21	11,8
Netherl.	0	0	0	0	60,72	93,18	109,9	117,97	108,01	110,38	68,91	82,45	53,25	29,29	26,09	21,71	881,86
New Zel.	0,08	0,04	0,03	0,15
Norway	0	0	0	0	107,78	52,99	75,02	69,79	51,24	56,22	53,47	29,45	37,61	29,38	20,9	19,13	602,98
Portugal	0,19	1,43	1,34	1,72	1,45	3,24	1,35	7,87	9,85	28,44
Spain	0,09	14,15	16,59	9,35	35,04	47,08	60,45	43,19	43,47	38,41	27,08	6,42	341,32
Sweden	0	0	0	0	61,85	42,79	31,29	36,34	29,61	37,57	32,38	43,53	37,45	40,08	34,88	48,22	475,99
Switz.	0	0	0	0	0	15,51	20,98	8,78	15,96	22,85	15,83	17,48	20,27	15,44	12,82	16,79	182,71
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,84	2,46	4,53	9,24	10,06	8,96	9,91	15,31	11,57	6,81	79,69
US	0	0	0	0	0	83,53	167,67	226,02	261,54	260,76	99,96	153,75	84,78	75,31	65,94	51,02	1530,28
total	0	0	0	0	408,02	817,88	724,18	669,68	769,13	909,18	649,49	525,63	392,28	376,96	314,79	299,14	6856,36

Table 5: DAC bilateral to Croatia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0	..	0,04	0,11	0,18	0,2	0,08	..	0,61
Austria	0	0	0	0	9,27	8,16	6,73	8,71	6,56	6,45	7,21	5,53	4,72	4,26	5,12	5,23	77,95
Belgium	0,29	..	1,65	1,41	1,25	1,14	1,62	0,17	0,19	0,13	0,02	7,87
Canada	0,06	..	0,56	1,65	0,39	0,91	4,31	1,73	2,02	0,92	0,42	12,97
Denmark	0,15	1,56	0,13	0,08	0,28	0,36	2,56
Finland	1,16	0,47	1,12	2,17	0,74	0,18	0,07	0,08	0,06	6,05
France	0	0	0	0	0	1,67	2,57	3,32	2,37	2,69	2,63	2,21	3,63	3,75	3,98	3,59	32,41
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	10,85	95,46	-4,46	-4,01	2,29	7,59	2,33	3,08	-3,38	2,49	7,2	119,44
Greece	0,08	0,06	0,21	0,2	0,08	0,03	0,31	0,09	0,28	1,34
Ireland	0,01	0,05	0,03	0,05	0,14
Italy	0	0	0	0	4,66	0,03	1,25	-3,49	-4,83	-4,35	-2,88	-2,97	-4,04	-0,69	0,7	-1,57	-18,18
Japan	0,31	0,1	-0,83	0,83	0,44	1,48	3,17	0,52	0,96	0,63	0,45	8,06
Luxemb.	0,06	..	0,1	0,15	0,04	0,74	0,39	0,13	0,53	2,14
Netherl.	0	0	0	0	2,03	2,38	1,09	0,84	0,95	0,34	6,72	4,61	2,31	3,21	2,45	0,35	27,28
New Zel.	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	7,51	5,72	8,89	15,26	24,93	6,82	8,72	31,53	20,82	19,32	18,28	16,76	184,56
Portugal	0,07	0,15	..	0,01	0,05	0,28
Spain	0,41	..	0,35	0,71	2	0,56	0,47	0,94	0,97	0,59	0,62	0,36	7,98
Sweden	0	0	0	0	26,13	4,12	3,57	3,48	1,99	2,38	3,98	9,3	7,58	7,95	7,09	5,78	83,35
Switz.	0	0	0	0	0	4,86	4,06	0,46	1,95	0,99	2,72	4,38	1,99	1,54	0,49	0,23	23,67
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,62	2,09	1,43	2,33	2,23	3,6	2,86	2	2,43	1,89	21,48
US	0	0	0	0	14,21	8,86	12,42	3,67	2,08	12,65	13,89	32,49	55,42	50,36	48,88	23,61	278,54
total	0	0	0	0	64,22	47,37	137,15	33,46	41,56	36,65	59,21	104,1	103,17	93,13	94,88	65,6	880,5

Table 6: DAC bilateral to Macedonia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0	..	0,04	0,04
Austria	0	0	0	0	4,88	0,12	0,26	0,28	1,62	5,12	3,92	2,79	3,2	3,82	3,25	4,55	33,81
Belgium	2	0,74	..	0,37	0,73	2,04	0,59	..	0,12	..	0,59	0,37	7,55
Canada	0,53	0,67	1,05	1,01	16,86	3,11	1,62	0,87	0,32	26,04
Denmark	0,36	1,57	0,35	1,98	0,61	1,39	3,12	0,56	0,23	10,17
Finland	0,5	0,02	0,05	0,71	1,46	0,41	3,15
France	0	0	0	0	0	0,78	1,64	3,05	1,13	10,87	12,61	1,5	2,84	2,35	4,5	3,1	44,37
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	5,79	8,44	3,69	5,11	17,27	9,65	18,02	23,22	30,37	18,62	29,34	169,52
Greece	0,18	0,32	0,44	2,68	2,26	4,57	71,21	2,32	1,92	3,85	89,75
Ireland	0,04	0,02	0,02	0,37	0,47	0,16	0,2	0,01	1,29
Italy	0	0	0	0	3,27	0,03	0,08	0	0,56	2,37	3,04	8,63	6,88	10,03	6,12	2,66	43,67
Japan	4,44	5,15	9,34	10,75	23,07	6,79	19,73	3,91	4,58	3,85	10,56	102,17
Luxemb.	0,22	..	0,37	0,3	0,59	..	0,27	1,75
Netherl.	0	0	0	0	14,98	8,15	0,63	10,54	10,76	17,77	33,28	68,36	25,12	36,67	29,93	30,57	286,76
New Zel.	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0,34	0,02	0	0,02	0,28	12,45	1,67	11,05	18,4	15,68	15,48	13,56	88,95
Portugal	1,56	4,24	4,1	0,07	1,53	..	0,06	11,56
Spain	0,01	..	0,06	0,95	..	0,03	0,03	..	2,53	0,89	4,5
Sweden	0	0	0	0	2,53	0,15	0,55	1,14	0,45	9,92	0,6	9,28	8,61	6,82	9,56	11,48	61,09
Switz.	0	0	0	0	0	2,86	3,1	5	2,73	6,65	12,94	7,92	7,99	5,39	12,66	9,36	76,6
UK	0	0	0	0	0	1,33	1,73	1,33	1,18	16,37	12,1	10,74	10,4	2,63	3,15	2,89	63,85
US	0	0	0	0	7,75	1,27	6,21	0	1	38,22	43,47	42,45	56,52	76,51	56,53	45,04	374,97
total	0	0	0	0	35,75	26,21	28,06	35,94	39,06	169	150,17	227,38	243,79	204,9	171,78	169,52	1501,56

Table 7: DAC bilateral to FRY/Serbia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	67,27	9,5	1,18	..	0,3	0,52	0,32	79,09
Austria	0	0	0	0	9,87	10,81	0,03	9,4	17,2	54,34	42,42	34,74	124,15	22,45	26,69	35,55	387,65
Belgium	0,64	0,17	4,53	10,39	7,55	75,23	4,79	0,81	1,58	105,69
Canada	13,23	..	0,24	2,41	47,66	..	0,44	..	14,21	12,64	10,06	100,89
Denmark	0,15	0,51	0,03	..	1,33	11,67	1,41	18,87	8,27	42,24
Finland	2,14	2,83	28,84	16,32	18,54	12,18	8,95	36,96	8,81	135,57
France	0	0	0	0	0	1,5	3,63	3,96	4,17	4,04	16,76	33,03	148,82	244,17	9,41	59,4	528,89
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	43,28	42,97	33,69	40,95	148,2	142,94	115,33	733,54	132,86	89,41	68,88	1592,05
Greece	0,78	1,71	46,75	91,67	70,25	8,16	72,58	13,26	51	356,16
Ireland	0,03	..	0,39	0,5	0,83	0,98	1	0,77	1,18	5,68
Italy	0	0	0	0	15,37	4,67	8,38	-0,01	2,09	51,99	31,22	51,29	5,47	15,86	-0,01	16,58	202,9
Japan	0,04	0,04	0,09	0,04	0,07	4,07	0,13	0,33	11,63	10,34	113,96	140,74
Luxemb.	10,26	12,97	10,91	12,51	0,64	7,9	6,83	62,02
Netherl.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,00	6	8,96	90,47	113,71	80,45	88,3	29,72	24,01	11,06	452,68
New Zel.	1,24	1,24
Norway	0	0	0	0	1,13	5,02	3,63	9,14	19,49	171,24	124,18	62,48	34,85	59,5	45,5	36,78	572,94
Portugal	0,05	0,22	7,75	8,02
Spain	0,09	0,63	58,26	2,26	40,83	38,27	17,95	20,26	17,1	195,65
Sweden	0	0	0	0	36,93	14,31	13,53	26,46	6,7	24,29	45,46	52,56	33,98	39,48	40,35	36,49	370,54
Switz.	0	0	0	0	0	2,86	2,81	3,55	8,73	95	41,18	47,9	30,99	63,24	56,89	48,59	401,74
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,06	1,05	0,28	1,52	40,21	24,88	625,61	16,6	10,16	96,58	816,95
US	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,68	43,91	125,54	239,31	554,23	229,74	192,99	191,57	1584,97
total	0	0	0	0	63,94	95,72	75,08	96,76	124,55	950,3	871,3	894,01	2539,3	987,08	617,95	828,34	8144,3

Table 8: DAC bilateral to ex Yu unspecified

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements


Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,01	0,24	0,03	1,27	1,83	4,18	4,62	1 ..		6,43 ..							19,61
Austria	12,17	44,09	183,95	171,75	0	0	9,97	0	0	0	0	0,14	0,2	0,19	0,55	0,42	423,43
Belgium	0,01 ..		2,62	0,33 ..		0	2,53	0,59 ..									6,08
Canada	..	0,01	0,03	37,05	14,91 ..		39,99 ..			1,6	53,76	23,13	172,99 ..				343,47
Denmark	0,01	0,38 ..		34,1	42,64	46,48	13,49	8,07	7,63	152,8
Finland	2	8,49	34,13	9,33	10,75	4,9	1,68 ..		3,11	1,62	2,41	3,39	0,83	0,69	0,9 ..		84,23
France	5,9	6,63	10,29	13,94	6,86	1,83	0	0	2,58	43,03	4,4	1,55	0,16	1,77	2,55	5	106,49
Germany	-2,67	31,76	740,9	613,21	344,95	-0,25	-154,7	0	0	-27,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	1545,95
Greece	2,41	0,4	0,02 ..		31,16 ..		33,99
Ireland	0,95	3,87	1,59	5,73	0,03 ..		3,49	9,74 ..			0,82	1,33	0,87	1,26	29,68
Italy	33,73	73,3	43,12	201,42	0	0	0	1,03	2,8	4,28	13,87	10,73	11,52	4,88	27,05	3,34	431,07
Japan	-0,31	0,72	0,52	0,28	0,27	0	0,03	0,04	2,57	28,54	1,9	0,49	14,35	15,58	0,14	0,23	65,35
Luxemb.	2,83	1,74	2,09	1,82	1,4	0,85	0,95 ..		0,74	1,07	1,06	7,8	0,97	0,15	23,47
Netherl.	2,45	5,88	52,18	252,1	64,68	58,08	13,77	0,01	0	0	0	3,23	3,31	2,95	0	0	458,64
New Zel.	..	0,06	0,05	0,25 ..		0,24	0,6
Norway	-1,11	-0,02	5,94	65,15	61,17	52,81	16,07	10,66	20,5	25,68	7,84	2,58	67,69	20,27	17,73	17,1	390,06
Portugal	1,38	0,44		0,01	1,31	0,8	0,8	4,74
Spain	0,12 ..		0,43	3,82	0,31	0,64	47,15	0,02	60,36	33,34	0,02 ..		146,21
Sweden	0	5,61	110,54	153,24	0	-0,01	17,02	11,49	0	9,09	0	0,18	6,81	0	0	0,29	314,26
Switz.	0,19	2,65	23,41	35,13	26,65	10,24	2,24	2,61	0,33	0,52	30,67	29,13	16,4	0,12	0,01	0,02	180,32
UK	0,02	0,68	8,32	166,76	158,92	60,4	104,97	70,31	39,68	41,67	135,35	19,32	2,07	0,22	1,81	4,09	814,59
US	0	0	1,35	27,7	1,29	0	0	0	0	59,51	0	0	0	0	0	0	89,85
total	52,51	180,1	1221,6	1758,3	697,65	200,41	59,62	98,6	76,39	205,1	334,6	138	405,08	103,94	92,63	40,33	5664,89

Table 9: Multilateral ODA to Western Balkans

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	0	0	0	0	2,62	3,92	4,88	5,54	13,69	2,47	3,18	9,19	8,18	11,35	7,63	11,44	84,09
EC	1,63	16,1	368,3	827,66	400,74	253,48	452,4	425,83	419,16	993,08	1443,4	1478,9	1105,9	687,94	669,84	513,34	10057,76
GEF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,19	0,04	0,12	1,4	2,23	2,37	2,56	2,39	11,3
GF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,43	3,07	4,49	9,99
IDA	0	0	2,55	32,88	91,46	93,43	214,67	140,46	285,21	239,6	189,14	149,79	252,11	269,32	464,11	187,86	2612,59
IFAD	0	0	0	0	0,95	2	9,71	1,09	8,65	16,89	6,88	4,7	7,59	8,48	8,35	7,84	83,13
IMF*	0	0	0	15,14	27,02	11,86	0	31,05	25,59	21,94	17,82	7,01	-5,25	-5,27	-5,98	-5,48	135,45
UNDP	3,68	2,58	1,21	2,04	2,37	1,96	7,58	7,18	11,58	14,09	2,96	5,92	4,03	6,47	5,96	6,24	85,85
UNFPA	0,55	0,67	1,14	0,34	0,78	0,8	1,03	0,6	0,91	1,15	0,53	2,8	3,17	1,91	0,61	0,77	17,76
UNHCR	4,04	7,08	373,45	678,44	287,92	199,28	3,41	2,57	2,17	1,12	148,01	118,74	94,4	60,79	42,56	35,52	2059,5
UNICEF	0	0,37	17,17	26,32	26,32	26,89	26,16	4,36	6,11	3,47	3,62	2,48	3,13	2,9	3,23	4,49	157,02
UNTA	1,72	1,17	0,9	1,46	1,41	1,7	2,35	2,29	2,66	3,16	2,58	3,19	2,63	3,34	4	4,38	38,94
WFP	0	0	23,1	238,28	183,91	102,07	48,81	-50,5	0,52	1,79	0,3	2,56	0,08	2,68	0,45	1,3	555,35
AA**	0	0	0,77	0	0,23	1,24	2,23	1,6	2,47	2,88	1,29	5,39	7,48	2,17	4,74	9,59	42,08

Chart 1: Composition of multilateral ODA to WB (top 5 donors)



total 15.950,81

notes:

*SAF+ESAF+PRGF

** Arab Agencies

Table 10: Multilateral ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	2,75	2,91	251,87	203,62	117,64	112,88	121,64	62,7	219,37	292,07	248,06	172,06	163,79	126,47	127,8	130,78	2356,41
BiH	44,62	118,37	183,43	230,68	376,27	364,67	431,66	393,94	358,71	344,25	235,49	368,44	242,83	3693,36
Cro	74,58	12,76	8,07	22,73	16,78	27,42	32,43	35,89	41,5	44,28	34,3	62,53	413,27
Mac	4,53	98,24	59,4	92,16	84,96	92,61	176,53	201,17	122,09	130,62	99,09	87,41	57,64	1306,45
FRY/Ser ex Yu	10,44	0,11	25,86	16,4	3,78	818,36	1030,3	4,52	519,31	592,21	288,34	3309,58
unspec.	8,87	25,06	536,72	1569,8	616,9	319,72	320,57	-0,45	69,08	370,22	125,91	73,07	801,02	32,24	0,97	2,05	4871,74
total	11,62	27,97	788,59	1822,6	1025,7	698,63	773,23	572,07	778,91	1301,7	1819,9	1792,1	1485,7	1056,9	1211,1	784,17	15950,81

Table 11: Multilateral ODA to Albania

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	1,35	2,38	0,58	0,35	6,53	-1,78	0,19	1,87	0,99	0,75	1,09	1,66	15,96
EC	246,06	151,36	41,49	45,02	73,54	32,86	111,32	156,75	134,83	100,47	44,12	39,9	46,41	80,02	1304,15
GEF	0,06	0,04	0,03	0,5	0,99	0,27	0,29	0,15	2,33
GF	0
IDA	2,55	32,88	42,61	47,59	37,28	23,45	79,04	99,79	82,87	46,29	102,55	67,92	67,38	30,24	762,44
IFAD	0,95	2	2,76	0,78	2,83	6,57	2,02	3,2	5,15	6,67	2,76	2,41	38,1
IMF*	15,14	27,02	11,86	10,06	21,94	14,9	7,01	-3,72	1,92	2,49	2,76	111,38
UNDP	2,1	1,68	0,94	1,84	1,77	1,04	2,47	0,87	3,41	3,18	3,08	2,09	1,79	1,79	2,1	1,49	31,64
UNFPA	0,39	0,51	1,1	0,33	0,79	0,65	0,45	0,3	0,71	0,75	0,28	0,61	0,48	0,38	0,36	0,41	8,5
UNHCR	0,01	..	0,26	0,24	0,32	0,52	0,77	0,41	6,43	3,31	2	1,39	0,65	1,24	17,55
UNICEF	..	0,37	0,48	1,17	1,06	1,26	2,25	1,31	1,44	0,61	1,56	0,7	0,92	0,77	0,69	1,08	15,67
UNTA	0,26	0,35	0,73	0,9	0,11	0,7	0,91	0,66	0,49	1,24	0,58	0,57	0,48	0,53	0,96	0,75	10,22
WFP	0,37	0,12	0,6	2,58	0,46	1,3	5,43
AA**	0,23	0,14	1,08	1,6	2,34	2,57	1,29	5,32	7,44	1,6	2,16	7,27	33,04
total	2,75	2,91	251,87	203,62	117,64	112,88	121,64	62,7	219,37	292,07	248,06	172,06	163,79	126,47	127,8	130,78	2356,41

Chart 2: Composition of multilateral ODA to Albania (top 5 donors)




Table 12: Multilateral ODA to BiH

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	0,86	2,59	5,05	3,44	0,74	3,02	2,39	1,19	0,27	0,82	20,37
EC	44,62	0,48	177,2	76,73	283,65	174,3	325,15	303,57	239,94	186,26	159,83	130,71	169,31	2271,75
GEF	0
GF	0
IDA	126,49	80,85	169,82	84,1	56,8	83,41	125,9	55,06	218,58	56,84	1057,85
IFAD	6,95	0,31	4,76	9,31	2,97	..	1,4	0,67	1,91	2,2	30,48
IMF*	0
UNDP	0,11	0,22	4,12	5,89	6,3	6,51	-2,94	0,28	1,38	1,84	0,84	0,87	25,42
UNFPA	0,45	0,3	0,2	0,36	0,17	0,08	0,08	0,4	0,25	0,35	2,64
UNHCR	117,59	31,01	30,1	25,61	14,87	11,48	8,36	239,02
UNICEF	4,51	13,24	2,02	2,98	1,98	1,21	0,59	0,7	0,64	0,83	0,96	29,66
UNTA	0,19	0,24	0,69	0,66	1,13	0,75	0,41	1,22	0,49	0,42	0,99	0,8	7,99
WFP	0,16	0,16
AA**	1,1	1,15	..	0,13	0,06	..	0,07	0,04	0,57	2,58	2,32	8,02
total	0	0	0	44,62	118,37	183,43	230,68	376,27	364,67	431,66	393,94	358,71	344,25	235,49	368,44	242,83	3693,36

Chart 3: Composition of multilateral ODA to BiH (top 5 donors)




Table 13: Multilateral ODA to Croatia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	0,01	0,18	1,6	1,67	1,78	0,57	0,28	1,46	1,64	0,76	0,93	0,8	11,68
EC	9,56	0,59	20,35	12,84	25,04	17,87	20,07	26,38	31,64	25,3	52,91	242,55
GEF	0,13	..	0,09	0,47	0,49	1,39	1,57	1,62	5,76
GF	1,26	0,39	1,94	3,59
IDA	0
IFAD	0
IMF*	0
UNDP	0,04	0,05	1,4	0,16	1,39	1,45	0,14	0,3	0,16	0,22	0,39	0,56	6,26
UNFPA	0,15	0,13	0,28
UNHCR	73,27	13,28	13,05	12,3	7,73	4,72	3,42	127,77
UNICEF	0,16	2,34	4	0,2	0,29	0,06	0,23	0,22	0,23	0,25	7,98
UNTA	1,1	0,48	0,35	0,35	0,35	0,3	0,54	0,54	0,53	1,06	0,77	1,03	7,4
WFP	0
AA**	0
total	0	0	0	0	74,58	12,76	8,07	22,73	16,78	27,42	32,43	35,89	41,5	44,28	34,3	62,53	413,27

Chart 4: Composition of multilateral ODA to Croatia (top 5 donors)




Table 14: Multilateral ODA to Macedonia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	1,26	1,36	1,84	0,93	0,33	0,24	0,33	0,37	1,69	4,85	2,05	1,32	16,57
EC	4,53	48,12	11,26	34,35	13,31	35,75	116,07	133,76	90,43	97,38	54,42	83,43	49,01	771,82
GEF	0,43	0,75	0,71	0,57	0,38	2,84
GF	1,3	0,63	1,93
IDA	48,85	45,84	50,9	36,16	36,35	55,71	49,47	20,09	23,66	37,58	..	5,77	410,38
IFAD	1,06	1,01	1,89	1,5	1,04	1,14	3,68	3,23	14,55
IMF*	31,05	15,53	..	2,92	..	-1,53	-7,19	-8,47	-8,24	24,07
UNDP	0,05	0,33	0,19	0,35	1,23	1,38	0,82	0,57	1,33	1,07	1,27	8,59
UNFPA	0,04	-0,01	0,01	0,04
UNHCR	2,92	1,88	1,2	0,56	10,26	6,43	5,38	4,56	2,28	2,23	37,7
UNICEF	0,66	1,57	0,83	1,4	0,82	0,62	1,03	0,81	0,72	0,73	1,09	10,28
UNTA	0,01	0,23	0,25	0,61	0,64	0,85	0,55	0,68	0,91	0,87	0,77	0,94	7,31
WFP	0,31	-0,04	0,1	0,37
AA**	0
total	0	0	0	4,53	98,24	59,4	92,16	84,96	92,61	176,53	201,17	122,09	130,62	99,09	87,41	57,64	1306,45

Chart 5: Composition of multilateral ODA to Macedonia (top 5 donors)




Table 15: Multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	1,26	1,47	3,8	3,29	6,84	16,66
EC	10,44	0,11	25,86	16,4	..	729,14	956,13	..	402,15	383,99	162,09	2686,31
GEF	0,13	0,24	0,37
GF	1,17	1,38	1,92	4,47
IDA	108,76	178,15	95,01	381,92
IFAD	0
IMF*	0
UNDP	1,72	1,3	2,43	..	1,29	0,59	..	7,33
UNFPA	0,09	2,11	2,61	1,13	5,94
UNHCR	87,03	65,85	23,43	20,27	196,58
UNICEF	0,16	0,7	0,55	0,75	1,11	3,27
UNTA	0,02	0,5	0,18	0,22	0,46	0,51	0,86	2,75
WFP	1,79	0,3	2,13	-0,48	..	-0,01	..	3,73
AA**	0,25	0,25
total	0	0	0	0	0	10,44	0,11	25,86	16,4	3,78	818,36	1030,3	4,52	519,31	592,21	288,34	3309,58

Chart 6: Composition of multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia (top 5 donors)





Table 16: Multilateral ODA to ex Yu Unspecified

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
EBRD	0	0	1,64	1,21	2,85
EC	1,63	16,1	122,24	627,15	310,65	0	267,08	49,8	68,55	370,07	124,27	71,86	751,78	2781,18
GEF	0
GF	0
IDA	0	0
IFAD	0
IMF*	0
UNDP	1,58	0,9	0,27	0,2	0,45	0,6	-0,74	0,07	0,13	0,13	..	0,97	2,05	6,61
UNFPA	0,16	0,16	0,04	0,01	-0,01	0,36
UNHCR	4,04	7,08	373,44	678,44	96,8	199,04	0,17	0,17	0,2	0,15	49,11	32,24	1440,88
UNICEF	16,69	25,15	25,1	18,12	5,1	90,16
UNTA	1,46	0,82	0,17	0,56	0	0,05	0,15	0,01	0,05	3,27
WFP	23,1	238,28	183,91	101,91	48,81	-50,5	0,15	545,66
AA**	0,77	0,77
total	8,87	25,06	536,72	1569,8	616,9	319,72	320,57	-0,45	69,08	370,22	125,91	73,07	801,02	32,24	0,97	2,05	4871,74

Chart 7: Composition of multilateral ODA to ex Yu unspecified (top 5 donors)



TOP 10 BILATERAL DONORS TO THE REGION OF WESTERN BALKANS

Table 17: German ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	2,77	29,88	16	22,11	19,2	21,05	34,52	31,47	27,99	29,05	28,18	36,17	34,08	24,05	24,16	30,94	411,62
BiH	0	0	0	0	0	331,32	41,16	39,22	52,3	80,95	132,59	39,84	26,81	24,82	30,62	26,51	826,14
Cro	0	0	0	0	0	10,85	95,46	-4,46	-4,01	2,29	7,59	2,33	3,08	-3,38	2,49	7,2	119,44
Mac	0	0	0	0	0	5,79	8,44	3,69	5,11	17,27	9,65	18,02	23,22	30,37	18,62	29,34	169,52
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	0	43,28	42,97	33,69	40,95	148,2	142,94	115,33	733,54	132,86	89,41	68,88	1592,05
ex Yu unspec	-2,67	31,76	740,9	613,21	344,95	-0,25	-154,7	0	0	-27,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	1545,95
total	0,1	61,64	756,9	635,32	364,15	412,04	67,85	103,61	122,34	250,51	320,95	211,69	820,73	208,72	165,3	162,87	4.664,72

Chart 8: German ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 9: Recipient country share of German ODA to WB




Table 18: US ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	0	37,78	38,25	12,91	10,12	21,11	7,33	17,12	28,3	52,13	48,11	69,13	43,81	42,93	37,17	466,20
BiH	0	0	0	0	0	83,53	167,67	226,02	261,54	260,76	99,96	153,75	84,78	75,31	65,94	51,02	1530,28
Cro	0	0	0	0	14,21	8,86	12,42	3,67	2,08	12,65	13,89	32,49	55,42	50,36	48,88	23,61	278,54
Mac	0	0	0	0	7,75	1,27	6,21	0	1	38,22	43,47	42,45	56,52	76,51	56,53	45,04	374,97
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,68	43,91	125,54	239,31	554,23	229,74	192,99	191,57	1584,97
ex Yu unspec	0	0	1,35	27,7	1,29	0	0	0	0	59,51	0	0	0	0	0	0	89,85
total	0	0	39,13	65,95	36,16	103,78	207,41	237,02	289,42	443,35	334,99	516,11	820,08	475,73	407,27	348,41	4.324,81

Chart 10: US ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 11: Recipient country share of US ODA to WB




Table 19: Dutch Oda to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions);disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	0,74	3,57	3,25	9,37	5,67	9,93	10,83	7,66	2,84	6	17,87	16,49	14,83	11,56	9,39	130,00
BiH	0	0	0	0	60,72	93,18	109,9	117,97	108,01	110,38	68,91	82,45	53,25	29,29	26,09	21,71	881,86
Cro	0	0	0	0	2,03	2,38	1,09	0,84	0,95	0,34	6,72	4,61	2,31	3,21	2,45	0,35	27,28
Mac	0	0	0	0	14,98	8,15	0,63	10,54	10,76	17,77	33,28	68,36	25,12	36,67	29,93	30,57	286,76
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,00	8,96	90,47	113,71	80,45	88,3	29,72	24,01	11,06	452,68
ex Yu unspec.	2,45	5,88	52,18	252,1	64,68	58,08	13,77	0,01	0	0	0	3,23	3,31	2,95	0	0	458,64
total	2,45	6,62	55,75	255,35	151,78	167,46	135,32	146,19	136,34	221,8	228,62	256,97	188,78	116,67	94,04	73,08	2237,22

Chart 12: Dutch ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 13: Recipient country share of Dutch ODA to WB




Table 20: Italian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	7,08	369,55	161,79	61,45	13,97	18,96	35,3	42,48	18,78	103,86	29,34	34,63	35,43	24,74	19,19	8,88	985,43
BiH	0	0	0	0	27,84	62,76	86,12	10,69	22,77	8,4	52,75	8,01	9,46	5,84	8,13	2,74	305,51
Cro	0	0	0	0	4,66	0,03	1,25	-3,49	-4,83	-4,35	-2,88	-2,97	-4,04	-0,69	0,7	-1,57	-18,18
Mac	0	0	0	0	3,27	0,03	0,08	0	0,56	2,37	3,04	8,63	6,88	10,03	6,12	2,66	43,67
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	15,37	4,67	8,38	-0,01	2,09	51,99	31,22	51,29	5,47	15,86	-0,01	16,58	202,90
ex Yu unspec.	33,73	73,3	43,12	201,42	0	0	0	1,03	2,8	4,28	13,87	10,73	11,52	4,88	27,05	3,34	431,07
total	40,81	442,85	204,91	262,87	65,11	86,45	131,13	50,7	42,17	166,55	127,34	110,32	64,72	60,66	61,18	32,63	1950,40

Chart 14: Italian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 15: Recipient country share of Italian ODA to WB (minus Croatia)




Table 21: Norwegian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	3,5	0,64	1,02	0,77	1,46	0,95	2,15	3,99	11,29	6,17	5,25	9,22	8,14	9,83	7,04	71,42
BiH	0	0	0	0	107,78	52,99	75,02	69,79	51,24	56,22	53,47	29,45	37,61	29,38	20,9	19,13	602,98
Cro	0	0	0	0	7,51	5,72	8,89	15,26	24,93	6,82	8,72	31,53	20,82	19,32	18,28	16,76	184,56
Mac	0	0	0	0	0,34	0,02	0	0,02	0,28	12,45	1,67	11,05	18,4	15,68	15,48	13,56	88,95
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	1,13	5,02	3,63	9,14	19,49	171,24	124,18	62,48	34,85	59,5	45,5	36,78	572,94
ex Yu unspec.	-1,11	-0,02	5,94	65,15	61,17	52,81	16,07	10,66	20,5	25,68	7,84	2,58	67,69	20,27	17,73	17,1	390,06
total	-1,11	3,48	6,58	66,17	178,7	118,02	104,56	107,02	120,43	283,7	202,05	142,34	188,59	152,29	127,72	110,37	1910,91

Chart 16: Norwegian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)




Chart 17: Country shares in Norwegian ODA to WB




Table 22: UK ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	0	0,01	1,44	2,81	3,4	2,88	1,98	1,17	21,93	13,63	7,76	6,6	5,47	4,25	3,93	77,26
BiH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,84	2,46	4,53	9,24	10,06	8,96	9,91	15,31	11,57	6,81	79,69
Cro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,62	2,09	1,43	2,33	2,23	3,6	2,86	2	2,43	1,89	21,48
Mac	0	0	0	0	0	1,33	1,73	1,33	1,18	16,37	12,1	10,74	10,4	2,63	3,15	2,89	63,85
FRY/Ser ex Yu unspec.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,06	1,05	0,28	1,52	40,21	24,88	625,61	16,6	10,16	96,58	816,95
total	0,02	0,68	8,32	166,76	158,92	60,4	104,97	70,31	39,68	41,67	135,35	19,32	2,07	0,22	1,81	4,09	814,59
total	0,02	0,68	8,33	168,2	161,73	65,13	111,1	79,22	48,27	93,06	213,58	75,26	657,45	42,23	33,37	116,19	1873,82

Chart 18: UK ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 19: Country shares of UK ODA to WB




Table 23: Austrian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	1,94	5,71	8,67	3,23	2,07	3,58	3,5	5,5	5,86	25,07	7,23	3,51	2,44	4,31	5,24	4,3	92,16
BiH	0	0	0	0	149,66	113,75	106,15	56,78	49,21	37,88	33,92	21,63	15,53	17,84	19,46	26,67	648,48
cro	0	0	0	0	9,27	8,16	6,73	8,71	6,56	6,45	7,21	5,53	4,72	4,26	5,12	5,23	77,95
Mac	0	0	0	0	4,88	0,12	0,26	0,28	1,62	5,12	3,92	2,79	3,2	3,82	3,25	4,55	33,81
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	9,87	10,81	0,03	9,4	17,2	54,34	42,42	34,74	124,15	22,45	26,69	35,55	387,65
ex Yu unspec.	12,17	44,09	183,95	171,75	0	0	9,97	0	0	0	0	0,14	0,2	0,19	0,55	0,42	423,43
total	14,11	49,8	192,62	174,98	175,75	136,42	126,64	80,67	80,45	128,86	94,7	68,34	150,24	52,87	60,31	76,72	1663,48

Chart 20: Austrian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 21: Country share of Austrian ODA to WB




Table 24: Swedish ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	0,26	3,99	2,14	0,24	0,33	0,46	1,15	1,32	6,6	0,54	5,7	5,48	6,13	5,84	8,84	49,02
BiH	0	0	0	0	61,85	42,79	31,29	36,34	29,61	37,57	32,38	43,53	37,45	40,08	34,88	48,22	475,99
Cro	0	0	0	0	26,13	4,12	3,57	3,48	1,99	2,38	3,98	9,3	7,58	7,95	7,09	5,78	83,35
Mac	0	0	0	0	2,53	0,15	0,55	1,14	0,45	9,92	0,6	9,28	8,61	6,82	9,56	11,48	61,09
FRY/Ser ex Yu unspec.	0	0	0	0	36,93	14,31	13,53	26,46	6,7	24,29	45,46	52,56	33,98	39,48	40,35	36,49	370,54
total	0	5,87	114,53	155,38	127,68	61,69	66,42	80,06	40,07	89,85	82,96	120,55	99,91	100,46	97,72	111,1	1354,25

Chart 22: Swedish ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 23: Country shares of Swedish ODA to WB




Table 25: French ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0	0,66	1,96	2,59	7,04	1,2	3,49	2,82	2,37	3,44	2,77	3,11	4,23	4,05	6,93	13	59,66
BiH	0	0	0	0	0	2,92	8,23	6,38	6,61	155,51	30,5	3,25	3,43	2,43	3,54	29,41	252,21
Cro	0	0	0	0	0	1,67	2,57	3,32	2,37	2,69	2,63	2,21	3,63	3,75	3,98	3,59	32,41
Mac	0	0	0	0	0	0,78	1,64	3,05	1,13	10,87	12,61	1,5	2,84	2,35	4,5	3,1	44,37
FRY/Ser	0	0	0	0	0	1,5	3,63	3,96	4,17	4,04	16,76	33,03	148,82	244,17	9,41	59,4	528,89
ex Yu unspec.	5,9	6,63	10,29	13,94	6,86	1,83	0	0	2,58	43,03	4,4	1,55	0,16	1,77	2,55	5,00	106,49
total	5,9	7,29	12,25	16,53	13,9	9,9	19,56	19,53	19,23	219,58	69,67	44,65	163,11	258,52	30,91	113,5	1024,03

Chart 24: French ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 25: Country shares of French ODA to WB




Table 26: Swiss ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,03	0,67	1,88	4,43	7,5	12,04	13,09	5,21	4,48	22,85	9,88	8,12	12,09	11,63	7,41	9,66	130,97
BiH	0	0	0	0	0	15,51	20,98	8,78	15,96	22,85	15,83	17,48	20,27	15,44	12,82	16,79	182,71
Cro	0	0	0	0	0	4,86	4,06	0,46	1,95	0,99	2,72	4,38	1,99	1,54	0,49	0,23	23,67
Mac	0	0	0	0	0	2,86	3,1	5	2,73	6,65	12,94	7,92	7,99	5,39	12,66	9,36	76,6
FRY/Ser ex Yu unspec.	0	0	0	0	0	2,86	2,81	3,55	8,73	95	41,18	47,9	30,99	63,24	56,89	48,59	401,74
total	0,22	3,32	25,29	39,56	34,15	48,37	46,28	25,61	34,18	148,86	113,22	114,93	89,73	97,36	90,28	84,65	996,01

Chart 26: Swiss ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)




Chart 27: Country shares of Swiss ODA to WB





Table 27: All ODA net to Western Balkans*

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	14,7	426,36	510,89	401,01	202,44	204,09	264,3	211,21	346,68	644,48	445,6	386,56	408,09	406,29	314,93	327,27	5514,9
BiH	14,13	56,88	535,31	1041,6	998,01	1107,6	1162,7	1364,4	1067,8	912,2	765,59	621,39	717,27	569,15	10934,1
Cro	0,01	..	138,81	60,45	145,24	56,21	58,85	64,6	92,08	159,95	171,05	141,75	130,29	131,62	1350,91
Mac	4,59	134,01	85,62	120,22	120,9	132,04	354,18	353,43	351,72	377,37	306,04	263,92	234,67	2838,71
FRY/Ser ex Yu unspec	63,94	106,16	75,19	122,62	142,12	957,58	1690,5	1932,5	2550,5	1533,5	1235	1161	11570,48
total	76,08	631,56	2276,1	3816,5	2401,2	2018,1	1983,2	1716,9	1988	3965,6	4111,4	3954,7	5490,4	3147,7	2767,1	2483,5	42827,93

Chart 28: Country shares of all ODA net to Western Balkans



* All ODA net = DAC bilateral + multilateral + non-DAC bilateral

Table 28: All ODA net to Western Balkans (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	64,46	592,07	1459,7	1899,2	1354,2	1272,5	1162,5	1080,1	1172,7	2609,7	2261,3	2099,9	3916,5	2035,5	1465,7	1590,6	26036,73
mult.	11,62	27,97	788,59	1822,6	1025,7	698,63	773,23	572,07	778,91	1301,7	1819,9	1792,1	1485,7	1056,9	1211,1	784,17	15950,81
non-DAC	0	11,52	27,75	94,75	21,26	46,92	47,39	64,69	36,44	54,17	30,22	62,7	88,15	55,39	90,28	108,76	840,39
all ODA	76,08	631,56	2276,1	3816,5	2401,2	2018,1	1983,2	1716,9	1988	3965,6	4111,4	3954,7	5490,4	3147,7	2767,1	2483,5	42827,93

Chart 29: All ODA net to Western Balkans (breakdown by type)




Chart 30: Shares of types of ODA to WB




Table 29: All ODA net to Albania (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	11,95	411,97	238,12	140,86	84,59	84,94	138,44	145,67	122	339,47	196,56	210,82	232,94	269,46	173,67	187,66	2989,12
mult.	2,75	2,91	251,87	203,62	117,64	112,88	121,64	62,7	219,37	292,07	248,06	172,06	163,79	126,47	127,8	130,78	2356,41
non-DAC	0	11,48	20,9	56,53	0,21	6,27	4,22	2,84	5,31	12,94	0,98	3,68	11,36	10,36	13,46	8,83	169,37
all ODA	14,7	426,36	510,89	401,01	202,44	204,09	264,3	211,21	346,68	644,48	445,6	386,56	408,09	406,29	314,93	327,27	5514,90

Chart 31: All ODA net to Albania (breakdown by type)




Chart 32: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Alb




Table 30: All ODA net to BiH (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	0	0	0	0	408,02	817,88	724,18	669,68	769,13	909,18	649,49	525,63	392,28	376,96	314,79	299,14	6856,36
mult.	0	0	0	44,62	118,37	183,43	230,68	376,27	364,67	431,66	393,94	358,71	344,25	235,49	368,44	242,83	3693,36
non-DAC	0	0	14,13	12,26	8,92	40,32	43,15	61,63	28,93	23,55	24,41	27,86	29,06	8,94	34,04	27,18	384,38
all ODA	0	0	14,13	56,88	535,31	1041,6	998,01	1107,6	1162,7	1364,4	1067,8	912,2	765,59	621,39	717,27	569,15	10934,10

Chart 33: All ODA net to BiH (breakdown by type)




Chart 34: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to BiH




Table 31: All ODA net to Croatia (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	0	0	0	0	64,22	47,37	137,15	33,46	41,56	36,65	59,21	104,1	103,17	93,13	94,88	65,6	880,50
mult.	0	0	0	0	74,58	12,76	8,07	22,73	16,78	27,42	32,43	35,89	41,5	44,28	34,3	62,53	413,27
non-DAC	0	0	0,01	0	0,01	0,32	0,02	0,02	0,51	0,53	0,44	19,96	26,38	4,34	1,11	3,49	57,14
all ODA	0	0	0,01	0	138,81	60,45	145,24	56,21	58,85	64,6	92,08	159,95	171,05	141,75	130,29	131,62	1350,91

Chart 35: All ODA net to Croatia (breakdown by type)




Chart 36: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Cro




Table 32: All ODA net to Macedonia (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	0	0	0	0	35,75	26,21	28,06	35,94	39,06	169	150,17	227,38	243,79	204,9	171,78	169,52	1501,56
mult.	0	0	0	4,53	98,24	59,4	92,16	84,96	92,61	176,53	201,17	122,09	130,62	99,09	87,41	57,64	1306,45
non-DAC	0	0	0	0,06	0,02	0,01	0,37	8,65	2,09	2,25	2,96	2,05	4,73	7,51	30,70
all ODA	0	0	0	4,59	134,01	85,62	120,22	120,9	132,04	354,18	353,43	351,72	377,37	306,04	263,92	234,67	2838,71

Chart 37: All ODA net to Macedonia (breakdown by type)




Chart 38: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Mac




Table 33: All ODA net to FRY/Serbia (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	0	0	0	0	63,94	95,72	75,08	96,76	124,55	950,3	871,3	894,01	2539,3	987,08	617,95	828,34	8144,30
mult.	0	0	0	0	0	10,44	0,11	25,86	16,4	3,78	818,36	1030,3	4,52	519,31	592,21	288,34	3309,58
non-DAC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,17	3,5	0,85	8,2	6,67	27,09	24,81	44,31	116,6
all ODA	0	0	0	0	63,94	106,16	75,19	122,62	142,12	957,58	1690,5	1932,5	2550,5	1533,5	1235	1161	11570,48

Chart 39: All ODA net to FRY/Serbia (breakdown by type)




Chart 40: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to FRY/Ser




Table 34: All ODA net to ex Yu unspecified (breakdown by type)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
DAC bil.	52,51	180,1	1221,6	1758,3	697,65	200,41	59,62	98,6	76,39	205,1	334,6	138	405,08	103,94	92,63	40,33	5664,89
mult.	8,87	25,06	536,72	1569,8	616,9	319,72	320,57	-0,45	69,08	370,22	125,91	73,07	801,02	32,24	0,97	2,05	4871,74
non-DAC	0	0,04	-7,29	25,9	12,1	0	0	0,2	0,15	5	1,45	0,75	11,72	2,61	12,13	17,44	82,20
all ODA	61,38	205,2	1751	3354	1326,7	520,13	380,19	98,35	145,62	580,32	461,96	211,82	1217,8	138,79	105,73	59,82	10618,83

Chart 41: All ODA net to ex Yu unspecified (breakdown by type)





Chart 42: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to ex Yu unsp.



TOP DONORS TO WESTERN BALKANS

Table 35: Top 10 donors to Western Balkans

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 10 bilateral		top 10 multilateral		top 10 combined	
1	Germany	4664,72	1	EC	10057,76
2	US	4324,81	2	IDA	2612,59
3	The Netherlands	2237,22	3	UNHCR	2059,5
4	Italy	1950,4	4	WFP	555,35
5	Norway	1910,91	5	UNICEF	157,02
6	UK	1873,82	6	IMF	135,45
7	Austria	1663,48	7	UNDP	85,85
8	Sweden	1354,25	8	EBRD	84,09
9	France	1024,03	9	IFAD	83,13
10	Switzerland	996,01	10	Arab Agencies	42,08
1			1	EC	10057,76
2			2	Germany	4664,72
3			3	US	4324,81
4			4	IDA	2612,59
5			5	The Netherlands	2237,22
6			6	UNHCR	2059,5
7			7	Italy	1950,4
8			8	Norway	1910,91
9			9	UK	1873,82
10			10	Austria	1663,48

Table 36: Top 5 donors to Albania

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 5 bilateral		top 5 multilateral		top 5 combined				
1	Italy	985,43	1	EC	1304,15	1	EC	1304,15
2	US	466,2	2	IDA	762,44	2	Italy	985,43
3	Germany	411,62	3	IMF	111,38	3	IDA	762,44
4	Greece	301,34	4	IFAD	38,1	4	Germany	466,2
5	Switzerland	130,97	5	AA	33,04	5	US	466,2

Table 37: Top 5 donors to BiH

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 5 bilateral		top 5 multilateral		top 5 combined				
1	US	1530,28	1	EC	2271,75	1	EC	2271,75
2	The Netherl.	881,86	2	IDA	1057,85	2	US	1530,28
3	Germany	826,14	3	UNHCR	239,02	3	IDA	1057,85
4	Austria	648,48	4	IFAD	30,48	4	The Netherl.	881,86
5	Norway	602,98	5	UNICEF	29,66	5	Germany	826,14

Table 38: Top 5 donors to Croatia

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 5 bilateral		top 5 multilateral		top 5 combined				
1	US	278,54	1	EC	242,55	1	US	278,54
2	Norway	184,56	2	UNHCR	127,77	2	EC	242,55
3	Germany	119,44	3	EBRD	11,68	3	Norway	184,56
4	Sweden	83,35	4	UNICEF	7,98	4	UNHCR	127,77
5	Austria	77,95	5	UNTA	7,4	5	Germany	119,44

Table 39: Top 5 donors to Macedonia

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 5 bilateral		top 5 multilateral		top 5 combined				
1	US	374,97	1	EC	771,82	1	EC	771,82
2	The Netherl.	286,76	2	IDA	410,38	2	IDA	410,38
3	Germany	169,52	3	UNHCR	37,7	3	US	374,97
4	Japan	102,17	4	IMF	24,07	4	The Netherl.	286,76
5	Greece	89,75	5	EBRD	16,57	5	Germany	169,52

Table 40: Top 5 donors to FRY/Serbia

constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements

top 5 bilateral		top 5 multilateral		top 5 combined				
1	Germany	1592,05	1	EC	2686,31	1	EC	2686,31
2	US	1584,97	2	IDA	381,92	2	Germany	1592,05
3	UK	816,95	3	UNHCR	196,58	3	US	1584,97
4	Norway	572,94	4	EBRD	16,66	4	UK	816,95
5	France	528,89	5	UNDP	7,33	5	Norway	572,94

CHAPTER 6 - ANNEX

SECTORAL DISAGGREGATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE BALKANS

Table 1: All ODA to Albania (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS*

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	198,76	222,61	193,16	278,46	806,41	430,57	266,54	413,34	429,49	394,85	339,65	3973,85
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	188,55	214,56	166,53	221,27	438,30	391,05	232,98	355,62	385,43	319,67	318,20	3232,17
social infr. & services (I)	54,80	29,87	104,05	104,75	209,74	248,20	129,62	123,49	243,73	168,49	195,49	1612,23
economic infrastructure (II)	88,33	128,37	0,20	44,24	110,13	81,95	10,82	148,79	101,45	96,26	62,53	873,07
production sectors (III)	23,71	11,91	10,34	18,44	66,90	12,33	27,64	15,44	17,48	19,06	16,88	240,13
multisector (IV)	21,72	44,42	51,94	53,85	51,53	48,57	64,90	67,90	22,76	35,85	43,30	506,75
comm. aid/gen. prog. ass. (of which) gen. budget support	4,46 ..	0,00 ..	1,07 ..	24,75 17,32	88,48 70,17	0,19 0,12	11,01 2,46	29,55 26,02	27,21 20,60	36,65 31,34	0,01 0,01	223,39 168,04
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	5,39	4,39	23,81	28,84	277,61	28,12	19,48	15,19	1,57	4,72	6,66	415,77
refugees in donor countries	0,07	0,15	0,53	0,19	0,82	0,18	0,94	0,19	10,64	3,10	9,92	26,73
support to NGOs	0,12	1,29	..	1,14	0,35	0,34	0,12	2,42	1,79	7,56
unspecified/unallocated	0,17	3,51	1,00	1,28	0,36	1,40	0,72	12,07	3,87	27,11	2,00	53,49
govt. and civil society (of which)	20,65	2,98	43,14	48,94	169,03	87,31	63,35	55,99	80,77	83,79	89,12	745,07
govt. and civil society - general	20,65	2,92	43,04	48,48	166,22	85,03	58,13	46,10	71,83	79,90	80,14	702,45
govt. and civil society -cps**	..	0,05	0,10	0,46	2,81	2,28	5,22	9,89	8,93	3,89	8,98	42,63

notes:

CRS = Creditor Reporting System

*cps = conflict, peace and security

Chart 1: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Albania




Chart 2: Shares of SAA to Albania





Table 2: All ODA to Albania, by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	102,45	158,49	18,02	20,99	55,50	63,06	16,99	95,54	132,14	98,28	79,49	840,96
only SP	19,50	1,88	0,08	6,14	27,60
only TC	23,31	7,61	26,65	19,42	173,39	108,03	91,38	76,91	165,75	88,61	92,58	873,64
IP & SP	41,55	41,55
IP & SP & TC	55,81	55,81
IP & TC	2,73	0,66	..	0,05	..	3,29	56,05	46,40	109,18
SP & TC	0,74	0,33	1,07
other	73,00	56,52	148,49	235,32	576,86	259,48	158,11	179,84	70,62	151,09	114,71	2024,04
total	198,76	222,61	193,16	278,46	806,41	430,57	266,54	413,34	429,49	394,85	339,65	3973,84

Chart 3: All ODA to Albania; shares of types of aid



note:

there is a slight difference between the total by type of aid (3973,84) and the total in the previous table (3973,85). The difference results from the DAC database.

Table 3: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	8,83	2,26	1,80	5,04	12,42	35,14	17,87	17,09	103,10	32,64	22,96	259,17
health	0,92	1,77	1,30	29,14	15,47	19,93	8,35	9,23	8,13	11,25	24,13	129,61
population	3,85	3,02	..	1,50	1,26	3,61	5,05	0,87	2,59	3,12	0,94	25,82
water and sanitation	16,03	19,50	26,53	19,55	1,67	92,11	17,15	25,45	38,96	26,24	51,61	334,80
govt. and civil soc.	20,65	2,98	43,14	48,94	169,03	87,31	63,35	55,99	80,77	83,79	89,12	745,07
other	4,52	0,33	31,27	0,57	9,90	10,10	17,86	14,86	10,19	11,45	6,73	117,76
total	54,80	29,87	104,05	104,75	209,74	248,20	129,62	123,49	243,73	168,49	195,49	1612,23

Chart 4: SIS ODA to Albania; sub-sectors




Chart 5: SIS ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares




Table 4: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	17,49	62,69	0,10	21,42	33,48	17,88	3,80	22,55	32,84	9,95	4,97	227,17
communications	11,56	0,25	0,09	1,18	0,21	0,37	0,80	0,42	0,18	0,55	0,34	15,96
energy	24,14	65,43	0,00	0,00	23,95	35,38	3,12	86,19	59,40	76,71	46,82	421,13
banking and fin. services	11,60	0,00	0,00	6,98	16,64	8,54	0,16	20,86	0,29	0,87	4,14	70,07
business & other services	23,54	0,00	0,01	14,66	35,85	19,78	2,95	18,78	8,73	8,19	6,26	138,74
total	88,33	128,37	0,20	44,24	110,13	81,95	10,82	148,79	101,45	96,26	62,53	873,07

Chart 6: EI ODA to Albania; sub-sectors




Chart 7: EI ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares




Table 5: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP*	0,00	0,06	0,00	4,58	0,43	8,92	4,21	0,34	4,88	15,47	11,23	50,12
other	21,72	44,36	51,94	49,27	51,11	39,66	60,68	67,56	17,88	20,38	32,07	456,62
total	21,72	44,42	51,94	53,85	51,53	48,57	64,90	67,90	22,76	35,85	43,30	506,75

Chart 8: Multisector ODA to Albania; sub-sectors





Chart 9: Multisector ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares



*GEP = general environmental protection

Table 6: All ODA to BIH (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	312,46	575,92	895,51	977,55	1475,02	1005,35	784,43	646,65	559,20	631,17	465,83	8329,08
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	31,52	359,20	350,03	765,28	792,47	500,24	616,79	540,48	403,85	569,04	378,66	5307,56
social infr. & services (I)	15,06	151,88	138,23	268,55	261,89	281,00	303,85	255,87	322,91	453,32	298,46	2751,03
economic infrastructure (II)	0,00	67,78	182,72	356,72	303,84	103,60	147,98	149,16	42,89	91,94	45,81	1492,46
production sectors (III)	0,00	15,15	28,33	53,09	30,61	17,41	24,41	44,23	27,23	15,44	15,29	271,19
multisector (IV)	16,46	124,39	0,74	86,92	196,13	98,23	140,55	91,21	10,82	8,33	19,09	792,87
comm. aid/gen. program ass. (of which) gen. budget support	1,12 ..	11,14 1,85	15,79 11,58	35,62 30,25	106,50 91,73	17,94 ..	39,29 ..	7,09 ..	46,48 39,67	9,08 ..	0,19 0,19	290,24 175,28
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	273,27	102,78	451,46	138,73	309,54	140,28	113,13	89,64	71,98	41,93	52,31	1785,05
refugees in donor countries	5,16	81,72	37,53	34,15	2,08	0,16	8,78	0,80	10,46	3,17	28,30	212,32
support to NGOs	1,39	0,00	..	0,02	..	0,05	5,37	5,54	1,61	2,76	1,26	18,01
unspecified/unallocated	..	21,07	11,67	0,87	15,28	1,63	0,14	2,04	2,84	3,18	3,29	62,01
govt. and civil society (of which)	1,51	49,86	19,95	175,56	115,03	144,36	163,61	145,66	209,87	236,50	164,81	1426,73
govt. and civil society - general	1,46	39,06	8,97	146,68	51,90	85,93	108,90	108,85	158,71	178,83	123,14	1012,42
govt. and civil society - cps	0,06	10,81	10,98	28,88	63,13	58,42	54,71	36,81	51,16	57,66	41,67	414,31

Chart 10: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to BiH




Chart 11: Shares of SAA to BiH




Table 7: All ODA to BiH, by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	2,13	101,23	156,33	125,71	43,91	34,59	72,34	139,44	178,07	143,84	117,07	1114,65
only SP	27,02	59,22	3,01	89,45	8,12	186,82
only TC	66,34	111,59	36,86	42,23	301,02	154,83	142,54	118,04	165,73	160,86	131,40	1431,46
IP & TC	0,18	6,02	0,48	24,31	12,62	43,62
SP & TC	0,04	1,08	1,13
other	243,98	363,10	702,14	803,59	1130,10	815,93	542,04	329,95	212,39	212,67	195,53	5551,40
total	312,46	575,92	895,51	977,55	1475,02	1005,35	784,43	646,65	559,20	631,17	465,83	8329,08

Chart 12: All ODA to BiH; shares of types of aid




Table 8: BiH, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	1,83	55,83	23,31	12,16	21,56	33,68	35,35	38,84	30,15	40,37	33,22	326,27
health	0,22	7,44	34,04	10,75	36,99	12,70	12,62	9,49	2,11	30,69	28,95	185,98
population	0,03	..	0,91	0,24	1,58	1,35	0,08	1,97	6,15
water and sanitation	0,74	3,36	49,47	22,90	14,64	17,78	24,42	36,02	19,60	43,34	18,59	250,87
govt. and civil soc.	1,51	49,86	19,95	175,56	115,03	144,36	163,61	145,66	209,87	236,50	164,81	1426,73
other	10,76	35,39	11,46	47,16	73,67	71,58	67,62	24,28	59,83	102,35	50,92	555,02
total	15,06	151,88	138,23	268,55	261,89	281,00	303,85	255,87	322,91	453,32	298,46	2751,03

Chart 13: SIS ODA to BiH; sub-sectors




Chart 14: SIS ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares




Table 9: BiH, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00	1,78	116,25	37,85	7,64	0,93	22,37	44,47	4,92	51,56	10,17	297,93
communications	0,00	4,97	1,33	15,61	5,93	0,75	0,14	3,66	2,53	0,91	0,04	35,87
energy	0,00	59,67	62,63	122,47	13,16	13,34	50,09	0,54	1,87	6,75	1,13	331,64
banking & fin. services	0,00	0,31	1,81	150,20	2,46	5,76	44,53	8,64	6,39	5,21	8,38	233,69
business & other services	0,00	1,06	0,71	30,59	274,64	82,82	30,85	91,86	27,19	27,52	26,08	593,33
total	..	67,78	182,72	356,72	303,84	103,60	147,98	149,16	42,89	91,94	45,81	1492,46

Chart 15: EI ODA to BiH; sub-sectors




Chart 16: EI ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares




Table 10: BiH, Sector Allocable ODA - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	0,39	0,54	1,38	0,46	0,01	1,58	0,59	6,31	3,36	0,37	14,99
other	16,46	124,00	0,20	85,54	195,66	98,22	138,97	90,62	4,51	4,97	18,72	777,88
total	16,46	124,39	0,74	86,92	196,13	98,23	140,55	91,21	10,82	8,33	19,09	792,87

Chart 17: Multisector ODA to BiH; sub-sectors




Chart 18: Multisector ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares




Table 11: All ODA to Croatia (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	36,62	110,33	58,82	76,85	61,50	132,39	200,16	311,02	238,63	201,26	209,09	1636,68
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	19,22	15,31	14,70	43,35	52,03	109,22	169,57	290,36	226,08	172,87	201,61	1314,33
social infr. & services (I)	13,43	9,36	13,77	22,10	40,65	58,45	54,35	55,87	169,74	129,41	128,92	696,04
economic infrastructure (II)	5,07	0,72	0,09	7,48	9,30	28,12	14,06	129,80	34,34	15,14	31,07	275,19
production sectors (III)	0,04	4,88	0,55	0,98	1,39	1,57	14,76	6,32	5,64	12,81	4,93	53,86
multisector (IV)	0,68	0,34	0,30	12,80	0,70	21,07	86,40	98,37	16,36	15,51	36,69	289,22
commodity aid/gen.program ass. (of which) general budget support	6,46	0,24	0,86	7,56
	0,00
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	10,41	8,51	42,55	17,53	8,93	19,54	26,82	17,89	9,87	26,94	5,04	194,03
refugees in donor countries	0,50	0,11	0,27	14,08	0,46	0,29	3,38	0,04	0,67	0,20	0,56	20,56
												0,00
support to NGOs	1,87	0,01	0,44	0,43	0,76	3,51
unspecified/unallocated	0,03	0,34	0,24	0,02	0,07	0,35	0,38	2,49	1,44	0,20	0,23	5,82
												0,00
govt. and civil society (of which)	1,76	0,42	4,42	10,61	16,55	29,22	26,41	28,75	56,27	97,67	93,10	365,18
govt. and civil society - general	1,76	0,42	1,40	9,97	13,41	22,38	20,75	23,27	49,14	89,13	82,77	314,41
govt. and civil society - cps	3,02	0,64	3,13	6,84	5,66	5,49	7,12	8,54	10,33	50,77

Chart 19: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Croatia




Chart 20: Shares of SAA to Croatia




Table 12: All ODA to Croatia, by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	0,02	4,80	0,89	2,26	0,62	8,22	12,16	0,49	88,94	46,21	129,16	293,78
only SP	0,20	0,43	9,05	9,68
only TC	3,82	8,96	10,41	11,54	44,05	65,72	62,36	83,00	66,34	65,51	52,93	474,66
IP & TC	0,01	0,78	0,21	..	1,26	..	1,01	3,27
other	32,77	96,58	47,50	62,27	16,82	58,45	125,43	227,53	81,89	89,11	16,94	855,30
total	36,62	110,33	58,82	76,85	61,50	132,39	200,16	311,02	238,63	201,26	209,09	1636,68

Chart 21: All ODA to Croatia; shares of types of aid




Table 13: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,10	7,14	6,59	6,68	19,19	19,22	14,77	15,89	24,56	21,00	13,09	148,24
health	1,13	0,12	0,08	0,42	0,02	1,02	1,71	0,49	1,11	0,08	1,08	7,27
population	9,42	0,02	0,16	4,48	0,05	0,05	14,18
water and sanitation	1,24	0,07	0,09	0,39	1,10	0,10	50,40	..	16,85	70,26
govt. and civil soc.	1,76	0,42	4,42	10,61	16,55	29,22	26,41	28,75	56,27	97,67	93,10	365,18
other	1,02	1,68	1,43	4,29	4,80	8,59	10,36	10,48	32,92	10,61	4,74	90,92
total	13,43	9,36	13,77	22,10	40,65	58,45	54,35	55,87	169,74	129,41	128,92	696,04

Chart 22: SIS ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors




Chart 23: SIS ODA to Cro; sub-sector shares




Table 14: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,79	0,23	0,00	0,01	0,17	1,83	0,00	108,75	0,00	0,00	16,87	128,64
communications	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,17	0,69	0,52	0,11	0,11	0,00	1,87
energy	0,00	0,10	0,00	3,76	..	0,31	2,93	4,05	8,96	1,69	2,45	24,24
banking and fin. services	4,28	0,39	0,09	1,04	0,02	..	3,44	0,08	4,27	0,43	0,40	14,44
business & other services	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,44	9,08	25,81	7,00	16,40	21,00	12,91	11,35	106,00
total	5,07	0,72	0,09	7,48	9,30	28,12	14,06	129,80	34,34	15,14	31,07	275,19

Chart 24: EI ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors




Chart 25: EI ODA to Croatia; sub-sector shares




Table 15: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,03	0,26	0,04	6,11	0,43	7,05	6,05	0,46	20,44
other	0,68	0,34	0,29	12,76	0,44	21,04	80,30	97,94	9,30	9,46	36,23	268,79
total	0,68	0,34	0,30	12,80	0,70	21,07	86,40	98,37	16,36	15,51	36,69	289,22

Chart 26: Multisector ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors




Chart 27: Multisector ODA to Cro; sub-sector shares




Table 16: All ODA to Macedonia (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	151,42	57,11	154,82	134,22	443,56	328,75	346,21	359,06	345,68	266,39	182,22	2769,43
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	139,99	57,05	85,10	121,86	184,23	260,46	235,86	294,97	308,44	234,34	157,88	2080,18
social infr. & services (I)	25,89	21,09	29,86	77,07	62,30	98,88	102,65	173,29	228,56	166,03	114,27	1099,90
economic infrastructure (II)	112,15	1,13	0,44	14,69	63,16	33,56	15,52	31,02	37,77	16,03	20,30	345,77
production sectors (III)	0,00	18,55	23,42	8,30	11,14	42,64	11,33	19,91	14,53	31,57	5,96	187,34
multisector (IV)	1,94	16,29	31,38	21,79	47,63	85,38	106,37	70,75	27,58	20,70	17,36	447,16
comm. aid/gen. program ass. (of which) gen. budget support	11,33	..	44,39	3,87	108,70	50,51	42,83	28,08	22,36	19,98	17,19	349,25
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	0,05	0,04	0,85	1,49	145,98	13,28	64,77	34,11	7,38	2,04	0,06	270,06
refugees in donor countries	0,05	0,02	0,05	0,10	2,01	2,23	1,37	0,55	4,02	1,17	2,75	14,33
support to NGOs	0,91	..	0,29	..	0,02	0,48	1,21	1,29	4,21
unspecified/unallocated	4,14	0,54	0,64	1,26	0,32	0,89	1,93	1,10	2,23	13,05
govt. and civil society (of which)	5,46	0,59	15,87	22,77	26,11	40,45	35,59	121,92	68,45	89,95	67,98	495,14
govt. and civil society - gen	5,46	0,53	14,91	22,77	25,15	36,20	25,54	41,47	58,10	86,63	64,69	381,46
govt. and civil society - cps	..	0,06	0,96	..	0,96	4,24	10,05	80,45	10,35	3,33	3,29	113,69

Chart 28: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Macedonia




Chart 29: SAA ODA to Macedonia; sector shares




Table 17: All ODA to Macedonia, by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	108,92	9,40	6,57	10,17	16,47	62,02	34,88	42,67	149,81	67,86	51,64	560,40
only SP	0,12	12,77	..	1,15	14,04
only TC	8,49	2,34	27,90	21,66	80,90	87,22	83,37	119,38	117,70	85,06	86,68	720,71
IP & TC	0,93	0,91	1,62	2,39	0,66	18,19	..	24,70
SP and TC	0,00
other	33,09	45,36	120,34	101,48	344,56	179,51	227,96	194,51	64,75	95,28	42,74	1449,59
total	151,42	57,11	154,82	134,22	443,56	328,75	346,21	359,06	345,68	266,39	182,22	2769,43

Chart 30: All ODA to Macedonia; shares of types of aid




Table 18: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,04	0,43	8,49	7,97	7,74	17,45	24,93	11,72	33,06	17,05	12,31	141,18
health	4,25	19,50	4,58	6,73	6,24	0,96	8,59	1,80	3,43	5,11	1,46	62,65
population	0,51	0,06	0,06	1,40	0,45	4,94	1,44	8,86
water and sanitation	0,05	..	0,37	1,49	5,97	36,44	26,12	16,33	95,69	35,66	6,46	224,55
govt. and civil soc.	5,46	0,59	15,87	22,77	26,11	40,45	35,59	121,92	68,45	89,95	67,98	495,14
other	16,10	0,56	0,56	38,12	15,74	3,52	7,36	20,12	27,50	13,32	24,62	167,52
total	25,89	21,09	29,86	77,07	62,30	98,88	102,65	173,29	228,56	166,03	114,27	1099,90

Chart 31: SAA ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors




Chart 32: SAA ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares




Table 19: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	16,15	13,47	6,51	0,00	0,00	0,42	3,87	40,44
communications	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,18	4,11	0,34	0,00	0,11	0,50	1,76	7,51
energy	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,87	0,87	0,33	0,56	4,12	11,47	1,25	0,71	20,26
banking & fin. services	0,00	0,00	0,36	6,47	0,00	4,51	2,57	9,47	9,70	1,08	0,35	34,51
business & other services	112,15	1,13	0,00	6,81	45,95	11,15	5,54	17,44	16,49	12,78	13,62	243,04
total	112,15	1,13	0,44	14,69	63,16	33,56	15,52	31,02	37,77	16,03	20,30	345,77

Chart 33: EI ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors




Chart 34: EI ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares




Table 20: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	0,00	0,14	0,81	2,86	15,61	0,95	0,29	1,40	4,76	5,40	32,21
other	1,94	16,29	31,24	20,98	44,77	69,76	105,42	70,46	26,18	15,95	11,96	414,95
total	1,94	16,29	31,38	21,79	47,63	85,38	106,37	70,75	27,58	20,70	17,36	447,16

Chart 35: Multisector ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors




Chart 36: Multisector ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares




Table 21: All ODA to FRY/Serbia (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	29,66	20,21	60,30	149,13	1876,81	2314,87	1432,74	3403,51	1708,77	1284,11	1457,38	13737,49
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	0,89	3,11	8,85	47,19	479,67	1650,80	1169,05	1018,88	1206,20	1067,72	1005,61	7657,97
social infr. & services (I)	0,89	2,67	7,67	41,36	261,08	440,85	632,01	518,66	751,69	660,20	571,38	3888,46
economic infrastructure (II)	0,00	0,24	0,97	4,68	95,47	386,90	379,85	357,09	326,07	254,61	263,70	2069,58
production sectors (III)	0,00	0,01	0,21	0,25	13,98	21,39	31,45	29,10	53,67	105,79	100,17	356,04
multisector (IV)	0,00	0,18	0,00	0,90	109,14	801,66	125,74	114,03	74,77	47,11	70,36	1343,88
comm. aid/gen. program ass. (of which) gen. budget support	0,40 ..	2,77 ..	3,87 3,59	3,86 2,23	9,92 0,32	30,38 7,62	65,10 35,97	226,65 226,65	108,29 104,05	124,70 124,70	56,45 56,24	632,38 561,36
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	13,48	1,70	39,95	73,73	1152,27	563,55	167,07	282,01	74,64	37,92	92,21	2498,53
refugees in donor countries	14,79	12,62	7,49	13,08	232,13	42,31	23,40	10,22	34,76	21,43	63,33	475,58
support to NGOs	0,09	0,80	0,09	6,06	5,37	2,64	0,96	1,20	1,66	18,88
unspecified/unallocated	..	0,01	0,13	3,16	0,71	12,95	2,57	18,61	5,93	8,18	3,82	56,07
govt. and civil society (of which)	0,29	0,55	0,50	26,91	141,55	272,81	406,18	350,03	506,71	474,88	409,98	2590,39
govt. and civil society - gen.	..	0,55	0,30	26,70	52,11	124,67	315,87	278,62	344,83	409,87	292,02	1845,55
govt. and civil society - cps	0,29	..	0,19	0,20	89,45	148,14	90,31	71,41	161,89	65,01	117,96	744,84

Chart 37: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to FRY/Serbia




Chart 38: All SAA ODA to FRY/Serbia; sector shares




Table 22: All ODA to FRY/Serbia, by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	0,29	..	0,02	1,40	14,57	85,05	152,24	95,01	484,14	381,31	439,68	1653,69
only SP	148,09	97,28	0,42	23,82	269,61
only TC	0,60	1,86	8,02	17,18	300,37	477,80	427,41	368,66	391,35	352,72	325,38	2671,35
IP & TC	0,00	0,30	..	2,13	0,34	1,34	1,93	49,87	87,08	142,99
SP & TC	1,63	0,01	0,07	1,70
other	28,77	18,35	52,26	130,25	1561,87	1749,90	852,75	2790,41	732,44	499,79	581,35	8998,15
total	29,66	20,21	60,30	149,13	1876,81	2314,87	1432,74	3403,51	1708,77	1284,11	1457,38	13737,49

Chart 39: All ODA to FRY/Serbia; shares of types of aid




Table 23: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,60	0,72	7,02	10,65	31,62	45,73	49,79	79,12	69,31	51,73	44,07	390,38
health	..	0,71	..	1,70	19,89	39,47	17,15	18,63	67,86	44,75	16,37	226,52
population	0,60	2,46	5,01	5,00	5,42	2,63	2,70	23,81
water and sanitaion	0,02	0,69	13,00	54,78	35,87	26,91	29,28	45,18	42,80	248,53
govt. and civil soc.	0,29	0,55	0,50	26,91	141,55	272,81	406,18	350,03	506,71	474,88	409,98	2590,39
other	0,00	0,70	0,13	1,42	54,42	25,60	118,01	38,98	73,11	41,02	55,46	408,84
total	0,89	2,67	7,67	41,36	261,08	440,85	632,01	518,66	751,69	660,20	571,38	3888,46

Chart 40: SIS ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors




Chart 41: SIS ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares




Table 24: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,37	26,40	12,05	10,66	13,18	91,16	33,44	188,25
communications	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,80	3,90	7,56	1,66	3,06	9,38	0,60	4,38	31,86
energy	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,75	11,46	63,69	101,33	131,15	134,24	99,15	146,40	688,16
banking & fin. services	0,00	0,24	0,46	0,24	5,53	4,54	23,00	121,10	112,28	17,18	15,91	300,49
business & other services	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,89	73,21	284,72	241,82	91,11	56,99	46,51	63,57	860,82
total	0,00	0,24	0,97	4,68	95,47	386,90	379,85	357,09	326,07	254,61	263,70	2069,58

Chart 42: EI ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors




Chart 43: EU ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares




Table 25: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	2,01	15,00	5,40	10,55	32,81	5,88	17,63	89,30
other	0,00	0,18	0,00	0,88	107,12	786,67	120,34	103,48	41,95	41,23	52,74	1254,58
total	0,00	0,18	0,00	0,90	109,14	801,66	125,74	114,03	74,77	47,11	70,36	1343,88

Chart 44: Multisector ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors




Chart 45: Multisector ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares




Table 26: All ODA to ex Yu unspec. (selected categories)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
all assistance	267,37	497,45	96,53	27,20	385,60	183,06	124,26	356,67	80,51	79,35	27,65	2125,65
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)	19,05	12,74	6,76	9,54	13,78	26,75	29,91	228,70	46,44	68,96	15,88	478,52
social infr. & services (I)	8,35	12,14	6,61	9,54	12,43	12,49	14,82	46,57	37,05	49,59	5,99	215,58
economic infrastructure (II)	7,15	0,57	0,00	0,00	0,00	10,98	7,67	172,67	1,69	0,29	0,13	201,15
production sectors (III)	2,62	0,04	0,00	0,00	1,27	3,29	5,89	8,32	1,16	4,42	0,11	27,11
multisector (IV)	0,93	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,08	0,00	1,54	1,13	6,53	14,66	9,66	34,67
comm. aid/gen.program ass. (of which) gen. budget support	0,01	3,69	30,52	23,81	14,50	0,63	0,24	73,41
	0,01	3,69	15,20	12,08	30,99
emerg. ass. and reconstruction	245,88	474,46	87,95	6,68	334,36	131,31	78,62	66,62	3,43	7,05	2,52	1438,88
refugees in donor countries	2,25	5,53	1,82	10,98	..	0,16	0,00	..	0,15	..	2,47	23,36
support to NGOs	0,04	0,01	1,71	2,84	4,59
unspecified/unallocated	0,18	1,03	6,93	1,01	1,09	1,84	30,25	1,42	3,83	47,58
govt. and civil society (of which)	3,00	4,22	5,09	9,41	11,37	6,36	3,96	28,78	22,66	40,95	2,25	138,06
govt. and civil society - gen	2,95	4,16	5,09	9,41	5,23	4,51	3,96	28,38	15,71	40,02	1,30	120,72
govt. and civil society - cps	0,05	0,07	6,14	1,86	..	0,40	6,95	0,93	0,94	17,34

Chart 46: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to ex Yu unspec.




Chart 47: All SAA to ex Yu unspec.; sector shares




Table 27: All ODA to ex Yu unspec. by type of aid

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
only IP	10,66	0,54	15,43	1,92	16,13	..	19,33	0,70	64,72
only SP	11,78	11,78
only TC	1,27	11,25	1,59	..	0,00	23,73	11,48	5,02	39,36	8,24	8,03	109,97
IP & TC	0,85	4,77	..	5,62
other	255,44	486,20	94,94	27,20	385,05	143,90	110,01	335,52	41,15	47,02	7,14	1933,56
total	267,37	497,45	96,53	27,20	385,60	183,06	124,26	356,67	80,51	79,35	27,65	2125,65

Chart 48: All ODA to ex Yu unspec.; shares of types of aid




Table 28: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,55	7,24	0,52	0,02	0,46	0,13	5,11	2,32	10,78	2,73	0,65	30,52
health	2,60	0,44	0,16	..	0,14	0,66	0,17	4,32	0,96	3,67	0,75	13,87
population	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	..	0,66	0,25	0,00	0,91
water and sanitation	0,27	1,72	2,29	5,14	0,92	0,40	2,23	12,96
govt. and civil soc.	3,00	4,22	5,09	9,41	11,37	6,36	3,96	28,78	22,66	40,95	2,25	138,06
other	1,93	0,24	0,83	0,11	0,46	3,61	3,29	6,01	1,08	1,59	0,12	19,27
total	8,35	12,14	6,61	9,54	12,43	12,49	14,82	46,57	37,05	49,59	5,99	215,58

Chart 49: SIS ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors




Chart 50: SIS ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares




Table 29: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,01	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,50	1,34	134,46	0,47	0,09	0,00	136,87
communications	0,84	0,57	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,46	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,09	0,03	3,01
energy	6,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,28	8,31	0,80	0,00	0,02	19,71
banking & fin. services	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,70	2,51	0,43	0,09	0,00	4,73
business & other services	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,02	0,35	27,38	0,00	0,02	0,07	36,84
total	7,15	0,57	0,00	0,00	0,00	10,98	7,67	172,67	1,69	0,29	0,13	201,15

Chart 51: EI ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors




Chart 52: EI ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares




Table 30: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector

Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,46	0,00	2,00	1,64	0,02	4,12
other	0,93	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,08	0,00	1,08	1,13	4,53	13,02	9,64	30,55
total	0,93	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,08	0,00	1,54	1,13	6,53	14,66	9,66	34,67

Chart 53: Multisector ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors




Chart 54: Multisector ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares




Table 31: Western Balkans

DISAGGREGATION OF SECTORS BY COUNTRIES

Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	8,83	2,26	1,80	5,04	12,42	35,14	17,87	17,09	103,10	32,64	22,96	259,17
BiH	1,83	55,83	23,31	12,16	21,56	33,68	35,35	38,84	30,15	40,37	33,22	326,27
Cro	0,10	7,14	6,59	6,68	19,19	19,22	14,77	15,89	24,56	21,00	13,09	148,24
Mac	0,04	0,43	8,49	7,97	7,74	17,45	24,93	11,72	33,06	17,05	12,31	141,18
FRY/Ser	0,60	0,72	7,02	10,65	31,62	45,73	49,79	79,12	69,31	51,73	44,07	390,38
ex Yu unspec. unspec.	0,55	7,24	0,52	0,02	0,46	0,13	5,11	2,32	10,78	2,73	0,65	30,52
total	11,95	73,62	47,73	42,52	93,00	151,36	147,81	164,98	270,96	165,53	126,30	1295,76

Chart 55: Education ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 56: Country shares in education ODA




Table 32: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,57	0,71	1,85	1,45	1,76	1,17	1,35	1,50	1,45	1,48	13,29
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,57	0,06	0,63
Denmark	3,28	3,28
Finland	..	0,01	0,07	0,41	0,09	0,24	0,82
France	..	0,24	0,21	0,56	1,93	2,14	2,32	2,27	2,67	2,76	3,15	18,25
Germany	0,43	..	2,74	3,58	3,58	3,99	5,04	5,26	0,89	25,51
Greece	4,22	80,95	10,54	10,36	106,09
Ireland	0,00
Italy	5,55	1,44	0,15	1,04	2,70	2,24	4,08	1,78	5,78	2,32	2,10	29,18
Japan	0,22	0,14	0,12	0,47
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,02	0,26	0,28
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,72	..	2,12	0,16	0,50	3,50
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,39	0,38	1,65	0,83	0,68	1,42	1,02	1,50	7,88
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,17	2,69	2,59	..	1,65	3,18	1,10	11,38
UK	0,23	0,04	0,27
US	0,48	3,06	2,52	2,58	0,02	..	8,66
EC	2,59	3,50	5,87	1,28	13,24
IBRD	0,00
IDA	15,45	15,45
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,39	0,12	0,11	0,08	0,08	0,22	1,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	8,83	2,26	1,80	5,04	12,42	35,14	17,87	17,09	103,10	32,64	22,96	259,17

Table 33: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	7,91	8,94	8,54	8,20	6,50	8,26	8,25	10,71	12,02	13,95	93,28
Belgium	0,00
Canada	5,02	0,06	0,58	..	1,08	6,74
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,20	0,01	2,58	2,80	5,59
France	..	0,10	0,09	0,27	1,37	1,42	1,41	1,37	1,28	1,35	1,28	9,95
Germany	8,57	8,58	8,95	8,65	9,39	10,34	0,40	54,86
Greece	0,15	..	0,18	0,09	0,41
Ireland	0,33	0,18	0,51
Italy	1,83	46,61	0,13	2,06	0,22	0,07	0,18	1,41	0,37	0,94	0,10	53,92
Japan	7,99	8,91	0,11	0,02	0,46	17,49
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,42	0,21	0,57	0,03	0,00	0,02	0,03	0,07	1,35
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,51	0,87	0,08	0,11	1,00	0,50	0,55	0,15	3,75
Portugal	0,00	..	0,00
Spain	0,12	0,16	0,74	0,39	0,46	0,15	0,43	0,88	0,86	4,19
Sweden	0,16	..	0,31	0,34	0,48	..	1,24	2,54
Switz.	1,16	2,53	2,01	2,50	0,10	0,83	0,04	9,17
UK	..	0,59	..	0,03	0,62
US	0,77	0,77
EC	3,24	3,19	6,00	3,07	15,50
IBRD	0,00
IDA	13,64	13,65	7,13	10,23	44,64
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,09	0,09
UNICEF	0,14	0,18	0,23	0,22	0,12	0,03	0,92
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,83	55,83	23,31	12,16	21,56	33,68	35,35	38,84	30,15	40,37	33,22	326,27

Table 34: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	6,55	5,91	6,21	5,90	5,67	5,05	3,87	4,03	3,59	3,96	50,77
Belgium	0,00	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	..	0,17	0,15	0,34	0,94	0,90	1,14	1,39	1,39	1,28	0,51	8,21
Germany	8,72	6,65	5,84	6,22	6,51	6,40	1,42	41,75
Greece	0,03	..	0,03	0,09	0,14
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,10	0,42	0,07	0,11	0,31	0,04	0,05	0,13	0,00	0,01	0,17	1,42
Japan	0,14	0,04	0,28	0,46
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,03	0,36	..	0,39
Portugal	0,06	0,12	..	0,01	0,05	0,23
Spain	0,01	0,02	0,12	0,10	0,10	0,08	0,10	0,08	0,16	0,77
Sweden	0,45	0,48	0,93
Switz.	0,08	0,08	0,06	0,21
UK	0,00
US	3,19	3,53	2,53	9,26
EC	2,28	..	4,06	11,81	9,13	6,40	33,67
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,04	0,04
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,10	7,14	6,59	6,68	19,19	19,22	14,77	15,89	24,56	21,00	13,09	148,24

Table 35: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,15	0,24	0,42	0,70	0,59	1,03	1,31	1,80	1,34	1,48	9,06
Belgium	0,01	0,03	0,05
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,02	0,21	0,19	0,23	0,40	0,72	1,05	0,95	0,32	0,79	0,81	5,68
Germany	0,19	2,29	4,28	2,36	2,59	4,15	2,87	0,11	18,86
Greece	0,39	0,20	0,67	0,13	1,39
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,02	0,07	0,02	0,01	0,07	0,05	0,36	0,03	0,35	0,03	..	1,01
Japan	0,14	..	0,08	0,22
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,56	7,02	0,76	5,70	9,20	0,44	14,92	1,49	3,13	43,22
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,10	..	0,00	1,59	0,40	0,06	0,74	0,86	3,75
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,02	0,06	0,17
Sweden	0,58	0,18	..	0,76
Switz.	1,28	1,38	1,00	1,40	1,16	1,52	1,45	9,18
UK	0,00
US	3,49	4,56	7,33	15,39
EC	3,92	9,71	7,17	3,84	24,63
IBRD	0,00
IDA	6,20	6,20
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,17	0,42	0,25	0,23	0,23	0,32	1,62
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,04	0,43	8,49	7,97	7,74	17,45	24,93	11,72	33,06	17,05	12,31	141,18

Table 36: FYR/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,04	6,98	7,88	8,02	9,47	8,87	9,26	6,63	7,34	8,06	72,54
Belgium	0,01	0,04	0,01	0,06
Canada	1,06	11,62	0,03	..	7,22	2,17	..	22,10
Denmark	1,57	4,89	6,46
Finland	2,38	4,02	4,35	0,13	2,86	0,04	13,78
France	..	0,48	..	0,75	2,88	3,24	7,34	3,69	3,62	3,71	3,87	29,57
Germany	17,86	12,68	17,25	16,10	13,59	16,14	2,84	96,46
Greece	0,46	0,44	0,71	0,84	2,45
Ireland	0,28	0,33	0,94	0,42	0,91	2,87
Italy	0,59	0,17	0,01	0,30	0,04	0,00	0,21	0,36	0,35	2,03
Japan	0,59	..	0,24	0,84
Luxemb.	1,25	1,65	0,65	0,45	0,46	4,45
Netherl.	0,48	1,68	0,08	..	0,82	0,00	3,06
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,59	0,01	0,71	0,54	..	2,68	1,19	5,21	11,94
Portugal	0,04	0,01	..	0,01	0,01	0,07
Spain	0,03	0,13	0,18	0,45	0,22	0,91	0,15	0,17	0,56	2,81
Sweden	0,53	0,44	0,98
Switz.	0,83	1,47	1,44	2,78	1,60	2,94	0,63	11,69
UK	0,00
US	0,75	2,69	2,91	0,14	..	0,04	0,03	6,56
EC	2,12	21,02	24,59	12,39	15,35	75,47
IBRD	0,00
IDA	13,00	5,14	..	4,86	23,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,03	0,10	0,51	0,37	0,17	1,18
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,60	0,72	7,02	10,65	31,62	45,73	49,79	79,12	69,31	51,73	44,07	390,38

Table 37: Ex Yu Unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	7,02	0,14	..	0,65	0,05	0,03	7,88
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,44	0,52	0,96
Germany	9,31	9,31
Greece	0,01	0,01
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,08	..	0,00	..	1,45	0,54	0,11	2,39	0,62	5,18
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,11	..	0,11
Netherl.	0,55	0,22	0,77
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,02	0,46	1,06	..	0,18	..	1,72
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00	0,01	..	0,20	0,21
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,13	3,52	0,72	4,37
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,55	7,24	0,52	0,02	0,46	0,13	5,11	2,32	10,78	2,73	0,65	30,52

Table 38: Western Balkans
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,92	1,77	1,30	29,14	15,47	19,93	8,35	9,23	8,13	11,25	24,13	129,61
BiH	0,22	7,44	34,04	10,75	36,99	12,70	12,62	9,49	2,11	30,69	28,95	185,98
Cro	1,13	0,12	0,08	0,42	0,02	1,02	1,71	0,49	1,11	0,08	1,08	7,27
Mac	4,25	19,50	4,58	6,73	6,24	0,96	8,59	1,80	3,43	5,11	1,46	62,65
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,71	0,00	1,70	19,89	39,47	17,15	18,63	67,86	44,75	16,37	226,52
ex Yu unspec. unspec.	2,60	0,44	0,16	0,00	0,14	0,66	0,17	4,32	0,96	3,67	0,75	13,87
total	9,12	29,98	40,16	48,73	78,73	74,73	48,58	43,96	83,60	95,55	72,75	625,89

Chart 57: Health ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 58: Country shares in health ODA




Table 39: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,86	..	0,21	0,04	0,31	0,24	0,01	..	0,21	0,00	1,88
Belgium	0,00	0,00
Canada	..	0,10	0,19	0,29
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,08	..	6,48	0,03	0,04	0,06	0,02	0,01	6,73
Germany	5,53	0,20	0,22	5,94
Greece	0,81	1,43	2,08	7,34	11,66
Ireland	0,40	0,42	0,82
Italy	0,20	..	0,73	0,05	8,42	7,80	0,34	0,52	1,62	0,78	7,24	27,71
Japan	3,12	0,05	1,96	..	5,13
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,81	0,81
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,36	0,02	0,04	0,49	1,55	0,01	1,34	0,97	4,77
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,09	0,32	0,02	..	0,41	0,34	1,19
Sweden	0,55	..	3,00	0,02	..	0,95	4,13	8,65
Switz.	2,55	0,29	1,95	0,51	1,39	1,22	7,92
UK	0,72	..	0,47	2,69	..	1,19	0,57	0,26	0,99	6,89
US	1,46	0,89	0,03	2,87	3,37	3,29	2,00	2,42	16,35
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	21,41	21,41
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,77	0,10	0,16	0,17	0,12	0,15	1,46
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,92	1,77	1,30	29,14	15,47	19,93	8,35	9,23	8,13	11,25	24,13	129,61

Table 40: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,00	..	1,43	1,51	0,38	0,31	0,23	..	0,03	..	3,88
Belgium	..	0,59	0,66	0,45	1,70
Canada	..	2,59	4,64	2,51	1,20	4,62	6,03	1,52	0,20	9,61	0,90	33,82
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,44	0,44	0,87
France	1,64	0,12	0,12	0,04	0,05	0,05	0,06	0,04	2,13
Germany	0,03	0,05	0,01	0,09
Greece	0,47	0,05	1,00	0,33	1,85
Ireland	0,15	0,02	0,10	0,28
Italy	0,22	..	0,39	0,53	0,52	0,30	0,20	0,33	0,01	1,63	1,27	5,41
Japan	24,71	..	10,49	4,85	0,05	12,61	5,34	58,05
Luxemb.	0,08	..	0,08
Netherl.	..	1,49	1,42	1,17	1,02	1,13	6,22
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,07	1,86	0,22	0,20	0,45	0,14	0,20	0,11	0,28	3,52
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,41	..	1,39	0,79	0,60	0,30	0,21	0,50	0,78	4,98
Sweden	1,76	1,12	1,47	1,51	1,16	0,45	0,01	7,48
Switz.	6,19	2,87	3,27	0,64	0,73	4,86	0,13	18,70
UK	..	2,75	..	0,04	0,49	0,36	0,02	3,67
US	0,55	0,55
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	12,37	19,43	31,80
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00	0,00
UNICEF	0,24	0,05	0,06	0,05	0,18	0,32	0,91
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,22	7,44	34,04	10,75	36,99	12,70	12,62	9,49	2,11	30,69	28,95	185,98

Table 41: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,01	0,00	..	0,01
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,97	0,03	1,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,02	0,08	0,08	0,07	0,25
Germany	0,02	0,02
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,01	0,11	0,02	0,13
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,16	0,12	..	0,13	0,63	1,04
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,08	..	0,04	0,56	..	0,38	..	1,00	2,06
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,08	0,02	0,02	0,12
Sweden	0,05	..	0,10	0,79	0,33	1,27
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,86	..	0,07	0,93
US	0,34	0,07	0,41
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,02	0,02
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,13	0,12	0,08	0,42	0,02	1,02	1,71	0,49	1,11	0,08	1,08	7,27

Table 42: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,05	0,05
Finland	0,00
France	0,02	0,40	..	0,42
Germany	0,18	0,63	..	0,11	0,64	1,56
Greece	0,16	0,02	0,02	0,05	0,24
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,50	..	0,19	0,57	0,21	0,18	0,04	0,00	1,68
Japan	4,25	..	4,58	6,21	6,05	..	7,27	..	1,04	3,07	0,18	32,65
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,58	1,07	1,39	1,01	1,10	5,15
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,47	..	0,47
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,13	0,07	0,20
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	19,50	19,50
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,14	0,12	0,13	0,10	0,11	0,13	0,73
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	4,25	19,50	4,58	6,73	6,24	0,96	8,59	1,80	3,43	5,11	1,46	62,65

Table 43: FYR/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,07	0,02	0,03	0,05	0,05	0,01	0,22
Belgium	0,01	0,01
Canada	..	0,71	3,18	3,52	1,12	..	8,52
Denmark	0,83	0,83
Finland	2,15	3,32	5,47
France	0,04	..	0,07	1,12	0,05	0,01	0,03	0,05	1,36
Germany	0,68	1,20	1,62	1,16	..	0,57	..	5,23
Greece	0,14	0,21	0,04	0,12	0,52
Ireland	0,28	0,32	0,61	0,29	0,19	1,69
Italy	0,68	0,02	0,19	..	4,70	5,60
Japan	11,58	..	0,13	11,71
Luxemb.	5,16	0,01	0,96	6,13
Netherl.	0,24	..	6,30	0,04	2,75	9,32
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,11	2,82	4,01	3,12	0,21	2,99	0,39	3,04	17,69
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,95	2,64	1,01	1,32	1,65	..	0,83	8,38
Sweden	1,50	0,03	1,53
Switz.	0,08	0,02	0,92	1,08	0,40	..	0,04	0,05	2,59
UK	0,23	10,91	5,87	0,56	1,48	1,78	1,45	..	22,27
US	2,38	0,93	3,08	1,00	7,40
EC	1,45	14,27	..	6,79	12,63	30,51	10,87	76,51
IBRD	0,00
IDA	22,85	7,34	..	30,19
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,01	..	0,32	0,38	0,09	0,81
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	2,55	..	2,55
total	0,00	0,71	0,00	1,70	19,89	39,47	17,15	18,63	67,86	44,75	16,37	226,52

Table 44: ex Yu unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,47	..	0,47
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,12	0,12
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,16	..	0,03	0,83	0,74	1,76
Japan	0,25	..	0,01	0,27
Luxemb.	0,52	..	0,52
Netherl.	2,60	0,31	2,92
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,10	0,59	..	4,32	0,71	1,85	..	7,58
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,07	0,17	0,23
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	2,60	0,44	0,16	0,00	0,14	0,66	0,17	4,32	0,96	3,67	0,75	13,87

Table 45: Western Balkans
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION (watsan)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	16,03	19,50	26,53	19,55	1,67	92,11	17,15	25,45	38,96	26,24	51,61	334,80
BiH	0,74	3,36	49,47	22,90	14,64	17,78	24,42	36,02	19,60	43,34	18,59	250,87
Cro	0,00	0,00	1,24	0,07	0,09	0,39	1,10	0,10	50,40	0,00	16,85	70,26
Mac	0,05	0,00	0,37	1,49	5,97	36,44	26,12	16,33	95,69	35,66	6,46	224,55
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,69	13,00	54,78	35,87	26,91	29,28	45,18	42,80	248,53
ex Yu unspec. unspec.	0,27	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,72	2,29	5,14	0,92	0,40	2,23	12,96
total	17,08	22,87	77,64	44,69	35,37	203,23	106,95	109,95	234,85	150,82	138,52	1141,96

Chart 59: Water & Sanitation ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 60: Country shares in watsan ODA




Table 46: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 total	
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,59	0,63	3,96	1,01	5,25	0,38	0,80	0,73	2,50	2,92	18,76
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,71	0,71
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,11	0,11
France	0,00	0,00
Germany	8,97	..	25,89	15,57	0,07	32,70	15,85	11,97	20,05	7,04	16,01	154,12
Greece	0,51	0,38	0,21	1,10
Ireland	0,00	0,00
Italy	6,97	18,22	..	0,02	0,35	40,56	0,03	..	0,43	0,11	7,83	74,52
Japan	0,17	0,17
Luxemb.	6,48	..	0,93	..	7,41
Netherl.	0,09	0,09
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,23	..	0,03	5,57	0,10	2,31	2,57	10,80
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	..	0,70	0,02	0,01	0,58	0,07	2,19	3,56
Switz.	1,70	1,70
UK	0,00
US	0,28	0,56	0,84
EC	9,82	..	9,82
IBRD	0,00
IDA	12,88	17,14	3,14	17,89	51,05
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,01	0,01
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	16,03	19,50	26,53	19,55	1,67	92,11	17,15	25,45	38,96	26,24	51,61	334,80

Table 47: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	2,72	3,11	3,61	3,79	..	0,65	0,32	0,58	0,06	0,17	15,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	7,20	..	0,92	8,13
France	0,00
Germany	4,99	..	17,80	0,00	22,79
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00	0,00
Italy	0,74	..	0,00	..	0,54	0,03	0,02	0,34	0,26	1,94
Japan	0,07	..	0,05	0,12
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,65	0,07	1,19	..	0,71	0,78	..	3,39
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,60	18,08	2,51	0,20	8,40	4,00	1,86	1,59	1,41	38,66
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,02	..	0,38	0,55	0,15	8,06	0,34	0,48	9,98
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	2,15	1,02	..	2,82	..	1,80	8,29	16,08
UK	0,00
US	0,39	..	14,80	15,19
EC	38,48	..	4,34	8,77	51,60
IBRD	0,00
IDA	15,45	..	23,40	..	20,96	8,18	68,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,74	3,36	49,47	22,90	14,64	17,78	24,42	36,02	19,60	43,34	18,59	250,87

Table 48: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,66	0,66
Germany	49,50	..	1,12	50,62
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,58	0,04	0,31	0,93
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,39	..	0,10	0,90	1,40
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,03	0,09	0,12
US	0,79	..	0,01	0,79
EC	15,73	15,73
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	1,24	0,07	0,09	0,39	1,10	0,10	50,40	0,00	16,85	70,26

Table 49: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,73	4,72	0,95	1,49	0,39	2,12	2,08	3,61	16,09
Belgium	0,37	0,74	0,54	1,64
Canada	0,00
Denmark	5,43	5,43
Finland	0,00
France	0,05	0,05
Germany	0,38	14,34	6,75	14,84	0,66	11,70	..	48,67
Greece	0,43	0,22	0,08	0,03	0,76
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,03	0,01	3,89	5,52	0,28	9,73
Japan	81,02	6,30	..	87,33
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,66	1,01	0,63	0,88	3,18
Portugal	18,88	18,88
Spain	9,34	..	9,34
Sweden	0,02	..	0,38	0,40
Switz.	1,42	1,65	3,07
UK	0,33	0,33
US	0,47	0,16	0,63
EC	1,33	1,33
IBRD	0,00
IDA	17,70	17,70
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,05	0,00	0,37	1,49	5,97	36,44	26,12	16,33	95,69	35,66	6,46	224,55

Table 50: FYR/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	2,37	2,00	1,90	..	2,17	0,98	9,42
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,22	0,22
Denmark	0,96	0,96
Finland	2,47	..	0,63	3,10
France	0,39	0,71	0,47	1,57
Germany	6,31	33,76	16,84	11,72	4,56	19,45	13,31	105,94
Greece	0,26	0,05	0,31
Ireland	0,42	0,02	0,44
Italy	0,18	0,35	0,52
Japan	6,66	6,66
Luxemb.	0,12	..	0,09	0,21
Netherl.	0,21	..	3,17	4,84	3,08	11,30
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	6,14	0,89	1,41	..	1,38	4,44	3,15	17,40
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,02	0,02
Sweden	0,74	0,04	..	0,17	0,87	4,29	6,11
Switz.	0,48	0,17	0,80	0,49	0,87	10,21	13,02
UK	0,00
US	10,25	10,25
EC	9,99	..	6,79	14,23	18,25	3,84	53,09
IBRD	0,00
IDA	8,00	8,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,69	13,00	54,78	35,87	26,91	29,28	45,18	42,80	248,53

Table 51: ex Yu unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,76	0,85	0,70	2,31
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,04	..	0,01	0,05
Luxemb.	1,51	1,51
Netherl.	0,27	0,32	0,58
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,11	..	4,42	0,56	0,40	..	5,49
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,86	1,44	0,72	3,02
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,27	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,72	2,29	5,14	0,92	0,40	2,23	12,96

Table 52: Western Balkans
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	3,85	3,02	0,00	1,50	1,26	3,61	5,05	0,87	2,59	3,12	0,94	25,82
BiH	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	0,00	0,91	0,24	1,58	1,35	0,08	1,97	6,15
Cro	9,42	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,16	4,48	0,05	0,05	14,18
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,06	0,06	1,40	0,45	4,94	1,44	8,86
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,60	2,46	5,01	5,00	5,42	2,63	2,70	23,81
ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,66	0,25	0,00	0,91
	13,27	3,02	0,00	1,56	2,36	7,04	10,36	9,00	14,95	11,06	7,11	79,73

Chart 61: Population ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 62: Country shares of population ODA




Table 53: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,40	0,40
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	3,45	2,06	1,37	6,87
Greece	0,01	0,04	0,05
Ireland	0,00
Italy	..	0,96	..	0,26	0,36	0,40	0,92	0,29	3,20
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	1,59	1,59
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,03	0,03
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,84	0,01	0,85
Switzerl.	1,67	1,67
UK	0,04	0,04
US	1,21	0,89	0,08	1,82	..	2,09	2,11	0,58	8,79
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,09	0,12	0,10	0,10	0,08	0,21	0,70
UNAIDS	0,08	0,08	0,15
UNFPA	0,61	0,48	0,39	1,48
GFATM	0,00
total	3,85	3,02	0,00	1,50	1,26	3,61	5,05	0,87	2,59	3,12	0,94	25,82

Table 54: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,08	0,08
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,03	..	0,76	..	1,11	0,71	2,61
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,27	0,26	..	0,74	1,26
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	1,14	1,14
Switzerl.	0,06	0,06
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,06	0,16	0,01	0,01	0,24
UNAIDS	0,07	..	0,08	0,08	0,22
UNFPA	0,08	0,07	0,38	0,54
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	0,00	0,91	0,24	1,58	1,35	0,08	1,97	6,15

Table 55: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,02	0,02
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,11	0,63	0,74
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switzerland	0,00
UK	0,00
US	9,42	0,04	9,47
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,05	0,05	0,10
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	3,84	3,84
total	9,42	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,16	4,48	0,05	0,05	14,18

Table 56: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zea.	0,00
Norway	0,03	0,33	0,25	0,32	0,93
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00	0,84	0,84
Switzerl.	0,51	1,20	1,71
UK	0,00
US	0,11	0,08	0,19
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,06	0,06	0,10	0,06	0,02	0,12	0,43
UNAIDS	0,07	0,05	..	0,08	0,20
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	4,56	..	4,56

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,06	0,06	1,40	0,45	4,94	1,44	8,86
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Table 57: FRY/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	1,52	2,01	1,31	4,85
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,21	0,21
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,10	0,10
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	1,65	0,01	1,66
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,68	0,19	0,20	1,06
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	1,67	1,67
Switzerl.	0,21	0,36	0,15	0,73
UK	0,00
US	0,60	0,93	0,34	2,52	..	2,13	0,54	7,05
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,14	0,44	0,32	0,07	0,97
UNAIDS	0,06	..	0,23	0,29
UNFPA	0,12	0,35	1,66	2,12
GFATM	3,11	3,11
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,60	2,46	5,01	5,00	5,42	2,63	2,70	23,81

Table 58: ex Yu unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,59	0,59
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,07	0,25	..	0,32
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switzerl.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,66	0,25	0,00	0,91

Table 59: Western Balkans
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	20,65	2,98	43,14	48,94	169,03	87,31	63,35	55,99	80,77	83,79	89,12	745,07
BiH	1,51	49,86	19,95	175,56	115,03	144,36	163,61	145,66	209,87	236,50	164,81	1426,73
Cro	1,76	0,42	4,42	10,61	16,55	29,22	26,41	28,75	56,27	97,67	93,10	365,18
Mac	5,46	0,59	15,87	22,77	26,11	40,45	35,59	121,92	68,45	89,95	67,98	495,14
FRY/Ser	0,29	0,55	0,50	26,91	141,55	272,81	406,18	350,03	506,71	474,88	409,98	2590,39
ex Yu unspec.	3,00	4,22	5,09	9,41	11,37	6,36	3,96	28,78	22,66	40,95	2,25	138,06
total	32,67	58,62	88,97	294,21	479,64	580,51	699,11	731,14	944,72	1023,74	827,24	5760,58

Chart 63: Government & Civil Society ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 64: Country shares of GCS ODA




Table 60: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,23	0,02	0,13	0,27	..	0,10	0,08	0,04	0,87
Belgium	0,25	..	0,25
Canada	0,41	0,14	..	0,00	0,48	..	1,03
Denmark	2,17	19,88	0,37	22,41
Finland	0,16	0,31	1,59	0,52	0,41	0,76	0,90	4,65
France	0,04	0,07	0,10	0,13	0,20	0,11	0,14	0,17	0,96
Germany	1,97	1,58	1,02	2,00	0,54	1,14	2,08	10,32
Greece	14,50	8,04	3,00	0,56	26,11
Ireland	0,01	..	0,20	0,34	0,28	0,31	1,14
Italy	..	0,05	12,46	13,32	34,94	2,93	12,89	0,69	0,82	2,13	1,05	81,27
Japan	0,05	0,82	0,02	0,90
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,40	2,65	0,14	1,12	..	11,79	8,58	3,46	0,42	0,86	0,91	30,32
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	2,85	3,34	2,69	1,54	10,72	1,21	2,75	2,39	27,49
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,10	0,51	1,02	0,47	0,37	0,18	0,21	0,29	0,50	3,65
Sweden	..	0,05	0,46	0,39	0,78	0,12	1,60	3,31	1,05	2,07	8,15	17,98
Switz.	0,71	0,41	0,39	0,30	0,89	2,69
UK	0,46	1,71	0,12	2,36	6,63	0,62	2,79	1,59	3,53	19,82
US	4,59	5,13	27,50	35,42	22,70	17,22	15,52	15,98	17,97	162,03
EC	13,03	..	29,82	23,88	23,83	6,46	5,07	1,39	48,73	50,84	49,62	252,66
IBRD	0,00
IDA	54,45	22,53	76,98
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	1,12	1,12
UNICEF	0,11	0,20	0,04	0,02	0,04	0,41
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	20,65	2,98	43,14	48,94	169,03	87,31	63,35	55,99	80,77	83,79	89,12	745,07

Table 61: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	1,34	3,75	5,40	18,22	5,56	4,92	1,05	1,42	4,11	7,10	52,88
Belgium	2,36	1,27	2,46	1,49	0,74	0,78	0,38	9,47
Canada	..	9,98	1,44	10,48	2,15	6,22	5,89	1,31	0,65	19,15	14,18	71,46
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,08	..	0,84	1,63	1,54	6,96	1,50	3,97	4,43	2,22	23,16
France	0,14	0,03	0,10	0,16	0,12	0,09	0,09	0,10	0,83
Germany	0,06	5,90	2,96	7,03	4,63	5,40	1,95	27,93
Greece	7,76	6,17	6,27	0,13	20,34
Ireland	0,57	0,79	0,92	1,00	0,56	0,82	4,66
Italy	1,18	1,42	1,74	1,58	0,52	0,22	5,13	0,16	0,66	0,79	0,04	13,45
Japan	..	19,42	2,96	3,31	..	0,44	26,13
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	5,69	0,71	7,89	1,85	9,34	6,59	2,58	52,24	4,50	10,20	101,57
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,05	18,35	10,88	10,11	6,46	14,73	10,32	10,87	10,80	92,59
Portugal	1,44	0,84	1,50	1,45	..	0,12	7,36	0,26	12,97
Spain	8,04	12,88	25,04	32,39	23,62	21,37	17,97	10,90	2,34	154,55
Sweden	0,33	3,27	3,18	10,11	1,13	3,38	3,76	9,98	3,13	15,35	10,23	63,85
Switz.	0,07	0,34	2,47	..	0,35	..	2,43	4,32	5,36	15,34
UK	0,97	0,37	4,25	2,65	7,58	3,60	5,65	0,98	3,82	29,87
US	17,87	38,55	28,91	64,58	41,44	36,37	30,00	26,25	283,97
EC	8,53	4,02	31,73	19,94	30,45	58,82	81,88	68,09	303,46
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	8,66	..	79,33	28,51	..	116,50
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	1,02	1,02
UNICEF	0,17	0,18	0,25	0,12	0,73
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,51	49,86	19,95	175,56	115,03	144,36	163,61	145,66	209,87	236,50	164,81	1426,73

Table 62: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,15	0,15	..	0,00	0,30
Austria	2,98	0,61	0,51	0,39	0,25	0,05	0,24	1,18	0,23	6,45
Belgium	0,15	..	0,18	..	0,19	0,77	0,18	0,12	..	1,60
Canada	0,02	0,65	1,12	0,35	1,72	3,86
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,08	0,28	0,14	0,15	0,08	0,17	0,06	0,96
France	0,01	..	0,09	0,14	0,25	0,21	0,20	0,22	1,12
Germany	0,47	5,49	1,57	1,63	1,85	1,76	1,50	14,27
Greece	0,15	0,02	..	0,17
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,01	0,45	0,60	..	1,06
Japan	0,03	0,28	..	0,30
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,53	0,36	0,19	0,07	1,42	0,73	0,26	3,56
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	3,15	0,49	3,01	3,00	6,84	7,25	8,82	8,73	41,29
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,26	0,30	0,15	0,57	0,46	1,75
Sweden	0,04	0,42	0,19	2,67	0,14	0,06	0,04	0,03	0,76	1,63	6,03	12,02
Switz.	0,51	..	0,13	..	0,07	..	0,01	0,72
UK	0,56	0,57	1,21	1,84	1,15	1,13	0,04	0,61	..	7,11
US	1,71	3,31	10,30	10,77	17,98	15,49	9,07	14,47	14,56	97,67
EC	0,30	5,66	0,70	..	34,33	67,08	61,50	169,57
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	1,39	1,39
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,76	0,42	4,42	10,61	16,55	29,22	26,41	28,75	56,27	97,67	93,10	365,18

Table 63: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,11	0,03	0,03	0,20	..	0,20	0,14	0,71
Belgium	0,12	0,43	0,55
Canada	0,99	..	0,48	0,08	0,50	0,05	2,09
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,25	1,95	..	0,87	0,02	3,10
France	0,07	0,01	0,08	0,20	0,06	0,09	0,11	0,14	0,77
Germany	0,69	1,37	1,61	2,61	0,36	0,87	4,26	11,76
Greece	69,42	0,78	0,16	0,18	70,55
Ireland	0,07	0,04	0,20	0,01	0,32
Italy	0,02	2,82	..	0,02	0,05	..	2,92
Japan	0,15	..	0,09	0,24
Luxemb.	0,26	0,26
Netherl.	0,40	0,06	0,82	9,61	1,82	3,69	2,71	0,61	3,69	23,43
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,69	1,78	0,93	3,99	4,91	4,74	4,57	5,04	27,66
Portugal	0,74	4,24	4,09	0,07	1,44	..	0,06	10,65
Spain	0,06	1,22	0,01	..	1,29
Sweden	0,11	0,23	0,08	0,42	0,33	0,67	1,46	3,03	1,12	2,86	9,01	19,33
Switz.	0,96	0,18	4,95	..	0,51	..	0,85	0,66	1,46	9,56
UK	0,12	0,59	0,74	0,91	1,11	5,93	9,41
US	4,95	4,57	5,75	15,85	16,06	33,38	26,62	25,15	17,44	149,77
EC	14,83	14,60	10,27	6,45	1,99	0,69	22,20	53,45	25,58	150,07
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,17	0,17
UNICEF	0,12	0,11	0,17	0,16	0,56
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	5,46	0,59	15,87	22,77	26,11	40,45	35,59	121,92	68,45	89,95	67,98	495,14

Table 64: FYR/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,02	..	0,16	0,27	0,15	0,60
Austria	0,87	3,29	18,26	16,16	7,95	9,45	12,45	9,88	78,32
Belgium	0,08	0,01	2,12	6,40	6,99	4,63	3,39	0,30	0,37	24,28
Canada	..	0,00	..	0,29	5,17	22,55	8,03	2,04	6,60	5,18	0,45	50,32
Denmark	2,54	0,93	3,47
Finland	1,38	3,79	6,25	9,04	4,82	1,29	0,04	26,62
France	0,02	..	0,10	1,49	0,02	0,06	0,15	0,15	2,00
Germany	0,71	6,07	13,95	32,40	33,87	15,47	6,18	108,64
Greece	0,15	67,68	0,08	34,65	102,57
Ireland	1,09	0,66	0,38	0,35	0,62	0,57	3,67
Italy	0,29	..	0,01	0,39	10,88	0,07	2,21	..	1,23	15,08
Japan	0,03	0,16	0,20
Luxemb.	0,07	0,21	0,45	0,74
Netherl.	0,18	0,91	4,02	22,73	18,44	12,88	10,80	7,33	3,24	80,53
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	16,13	15,93	18,36	16,35	0,73	9,04	10,64	18,47	105,66
Portugal	0,76	1,31	0,22	7,74	10,02
Spain	38,16	35,58	28,54	25,50	22,71	9,84	1,34	161,67
Sweden	..	0,55	0,23	1,02	0,92	2,31	6,55	6,54	6,51	8,07	27,23	59,94
Switz.	31,28	14,63	1,54	3,66	30,08	26,90	108,10
UK	0,00	34,87	31,02	14,79	8,08	17,35	4,60	7,44	118,16
US	7,25	5,51	49,69	210,22	141,91	133,09	156,28	83,35	787,30
EC	18,60	22,77	38,34	95,22	174,39	211,58	167,85	728,75
IBRD	0,00
IDA	12,78	12,78
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,08	0,17	0,17	0,58	1,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,29	0,55	0,50	26,91	141,55	272,81	406,18	350,03	506,71	474,88	409,98	2590,39

Table 65: ex Yu unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	..	0,25	0,00	0,26
Austria	..	0,07	0,31	0,38
Belgium	0,45	0,11	0,56
Canada	0,10	0,10
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,01	0,12	2,70	..	0,83	0,70	0,89	0,94	6,19
France	0,22	0,22
Germany	9,65	9,65
Greece	0,01	..	27,53	..	27,54
Ireland	0,00
Italy	1,86	2,79	0,47	5,12
Japan	0,17	0,15	0,03	0,35
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,22	1,57	0,05	1,84
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,48	0,06	0,08	9,41	10,77	2,36	..	26,93	10,03	8,79	..	68,92
Portugal	0,79	0,80	1,59
Spain	0,60	0,21	0,20	1,02
Sweden	1,85	2,16	4,66	8,67
Switz.	0,16	3,86	0,50	4,52
UK	1,14	1,14
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	3,00	4,22	5,09	9,41	11,37	6,36	3,96	28,78	22,66	40,95	2,25	138,06

Table 66: Western Balkans
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	4,52	0,33	31,27	0,57	9,90	10,10	17,86	14,86	10,19	11,45	6,73	117,76
BiH	10,76	35,39	11,46	47,16	73,67	71,58	67,62	24,28	59,83	102,35	50,92	555,02
Cro	1,02	1,68	1,43	4,29	4,80	8,59	10,36	10,48	32,92	10,61	4,74	90,92
Mac	16,10	0,56	0,56	38,12	15,74	3,52	7,36	20,12	27,50	13,32	24,62	167,52
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,70	0,13	1,42	54,42	25,60	118,01	38,98	73,11	41,02	55,46	408,84
ex Yu	1,93	0,24	0,83	0,11	0,46	3,61	3,29	6,01	1,08	1,59	0,12	19,27
total	34,33	38,90	45,68	91,67	158,98	123,00	224,50	114,72	204,62	180,35	142,59	1359,33

Chart 65: Other to Western Balkans




Chart 66: Country shares in other ODA




Table 67: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,03	0,03
Austria	0,03	0,03	0,03	0,02	0,03	0,03	0,06	0,34	0,58
Belgium	0,01	..	0,01	0,02
Canada	0,00
Denmark	1,41	0,20	..	0,06	..	1,67
Finland	0,02	0,02	0,15	0,16	0,15	0,50
France	0,19	0,20	0,20	0,17	0,12	0,15	0,18	0,32	0,31	0,21	0,42	2,46
Germany	0,28	3,69	0,28	1,63	1,44	2,03	0,47	9,81
Greece	0,44	0,67	1,50	1,03	3,65
Ireland	0,02	0,01	..	0,03
Italy	0,07	0,19	8,11	2,43	0,15	5,27	2,88	3,64	2,01	24,74
Japan	0,03	0,09	0,11
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,13	1,78	..	0,43	2,35
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,59	0,44	3,21	1,60	0,13	5,96
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,16	0,17	0,52	0,06	0,70	0,50	0,15	..	2,26
Sweden	0,03	0,00	..	0,38	0,05	..	1,62	..	2,08
Switzerl.	1,81	0,12	1,68	3,61
UK	1,22	0,42	3,72	5,36
US	2,90	0,02	0,02	0,28	0,00	0,35	3,58
EC	0,87	0,03	..	1,28	2,17
IBRD	0,00
IDA	31,00	13,51	44,51
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,29	0,29
UNICEF	0,08	0,32	0,36	0,38	0,40	0,46	2,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	4,52	0,33	31,27	0,57	9,90	10,10	17,86	14,86	10,19	11,45	6,73	117,76

Table 68: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,02	0,02
Austria	..	0,84	0,33	0,26	0,10	0,09	0,03	0,20	0,02	0,27	0,12	2,26
Belgium	0,39	..	0,51	..	0,34	1,23	0,04	0,03	0,04	2,59
Canada	5,51	1,82	1,61	4,62	0,03	9,33	..	22,93
Denmark	0,02	..	0,02
Finland	..	0,47	3,71	..	0,47	1,75	1,52	0,17	0,45	1,51	..	10,05
France	2,15	0,11	0,11	0,26	0,31	0,44	0,42	0,38	0,33	0,49	0,50	5,51
Germany	0,89	0,23	0,01	0,31	1,24	6,43	0,95	10,06
Greece	0,03	0,03	0,02	..	0,08
Ireland	0,82	0,66	..	0,02	1,50
Italy	3,09	0,18	0,29	0,42	2,92	6,94	0,14	0,52	1,78	0,03	0,21	16,52
Japan	0,61	0,28	2,13	3,02
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,21	0,65	12,85	0,83	0,46	1,60	1,20	..	0,01	1,28	19,10
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	13,23	14,64	8,01	0,41	0,25	0,31	0,80	0,75	38,42
Portugal	0,01	0,01	0,03
Spain	0,29	2,67	0,09	0,53	0,73	1,58	0,89	0,75	1,16	8,68
Sweden	..	2,26	2,73	9,06	7,39	11,14	11,01	16,40	13,28	12,09	42,62	127,99
Switzerl.	1,36	0,09	1,94	3,07	2,52	1,27	0,16	10,41
UK	..	0,65	..	0,04	9,29	1,14	0,51	0,49	3,27	1,93	0,44	17,75
US	0,02	0,03	3,51	2,05	0,08	5,68
EC	3,65	24,86	12,85	25,92	67,28
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	28,85	4,95	23,89	47,29	..	8,00	66,03	..	179,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	4,44	4,44
UNICEF	0,21	0,40	0,22	0,13	0,27	0,47	1,71
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	10,76	35,39	11,46	47,16	73,67	71,58	67,62	24,28	59,83	102,35	50,92	555,02

Table 69: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,04	..	0,02	0,06
Austria	0,02	0,05	0,08	0,07	0,12	0,01	0,11	0,02	0,48
Belgium	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,04
Canada	0,05	0,11	..	0,16
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	1,02	0,92	0,90	0,56	0,13	0,61	0,61	0,66	0,20	0,62	0,66	6,90
Germany	0,78	0,12	0,00	0,00	1,18	2,24	1,04	5,36
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	..	0,76	..	0,03	..	0,01	0,07	0,04	0,92
Japan	0,34	0,38	0,36	0,38	..	0,29	..	0,03	1,77
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,56	0,31	0,75	..	1,62
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,57	0,62	2,07	2,32	1,98	1,75	0,52	0,09	10,93
Portugal	0,00	0,03	..	0,00	0,00	0,04
Spain	0,53	1,69	..	0,22	0,27	0,44	0,31	0,36	0,20	4,01
Sweden	0,78	4,42	4,36	3,89	4,27	3,72	2,31	23,77
Switzerl.	0,03	0,03
UK	0,08	..	0,54	1,22	0,69	0,04	2,57
US	1,50	..	1,02	2,66	4,27	1,93	0,03	11,42
EC	20,01	20,01
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,14	0,21	0,23	0,24	0,83
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,02	1,68	1,43	4,29	4,80	8,59	10,36	10,48	32,92	10,61	4,74	90,92

Table 70: Macedonia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,02	0,02	0,08	0,04	0,02	..	0,00	0,02	0,21
Belgium	0,01	0,01
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,72	0,56	0,56	0,32	0,13	0,26	0,35	0,40	0,17	0,49	0,34	4,32
Germany	0,33	0,92	0,19	7,52	0,37	9,34
Greece	0,71	0,39	0,22	0,04	1,35
Ireland	0,00
Italy	4,43	0,27	4,70
Japan	0,40	..	0,00	0,03	2,72	3,15
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,02	0,34	0,82	4,65	0,33	0,70	6,85
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,46	0,10	0,52	3,64	2,56	7,28
Portugal	0,00	0,00
Spain	0,03	..	0,03
Sweden	0,05	..	0,51	0,04	0,19	0,22	0,25	1,26
Switzerl.	0,19	1,98	0,85	..	0,34	0,05	0,01	3,42
UK	0,00
US	2,64	..	0,64	6,88	8,60	0,59	7,56	26,91
EC	11,97	..	9,85	21,81
IBRD	0,00
IDA	15,37	37,78	12,37	..	3,38	6,50	75,41
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00	0,00
UNICEF	0,26	0,38	0,21	0,21	0,20	0,20	1,47
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	16,10	0,56	0,56	38,12	15,74	3,52	7,36	20,12	27,50	13,32	24,62	167,52

Table 71: FRY/Serbia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,03	0,03
Austria	0,02	0,08	0,64	3,13	0,38	1,52	0,74	1,64	8,15
Belgium	0,00	0,01	0,30	..	0,02	0,33
Canada	0,50	0,50	0,58	1,58
Denmark	2,00	2,05	4,05
Finland	0,45	0,87	..	0,27	1,59
France	..	0,70	..	0,59	0,13	0,04	1,64	0,88	0,36	1,29	1,08	6,70
Germany	0,76	0,81	4,91	0,00	2,64	4,89	1,27	15,28
Greece	0,33	1,82	4,90	1,99	9,04
Ireland	0,36	0,63	..	0,14	0,06	0,24	1,43
Italy	0,00	..	0,02	0,04	0,62	1,85	6,46	9,00
Japan	0,40	0,08	0,14	0,12	0,74
Luxemb.	2,58	7,96	1,08	0,22	11,84
Netherl.	0,04	0,19	0,42	0,41	3,23	1,78	0,74	0,54	..	7,36
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,62	2,29	13,55	6,78	0,46	3,99	2,12	3,01	32,82
Portugal	0,00	0,01	0,01
Spain	0,54	0,79	0,67	0,79	1,20	0,35	4,34
Sweden	3,28	8,09	12,66	10,44	3,55	2,99	7,34	48,35
Switzerl.	0,09	0,67	14,95	1,31	0,15	..	1,53	18,70
UK	1,41	0,29	4,74	6,44
US	0,59	14,32	2,63	1,66	3,31	22,51
EC	47,44	..	63,10	..	29,62	13,04	1,41	154,61
IBRD	0,00
IDA	7,71	5,24	25,56	38,52
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,19	0,72	1,79	1,14	1,61	5,44
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,70	0,13	1,42	54,42	25,60	118,01	38,98	73,11	41,02	55,46	408,84

Table 72: ex Yu unspecified
 Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	1,91	..	0,67	2,58
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,16	0,36	3,29	0,13	0,04	0,18	0,06	4,22
Japan	0,01	..	0,06	0,06
Luxemb.	0,08	..	0,08
Netherl.	..	0,24	0,24
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,11	0,46	1,17	..	4,97	1,03	1,30	..	9,04
Portugal	0,00	..	0,00
Spain	0,09	..	0,03	..	0,12
Sweden	0,02	0,02
Switzerl.	0,90	..	0,07	0,97
UK	1,19	..	0,74	1,93
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,93	0,24	0,83	0,11	0,46	3,61	3,29	6,01	1,08	1,59	0,12	19,27

Table 73: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	17,49	62,69	0,10	21,42	33,48	17,88	3,80	22,55	32,84	9,95	4,97	227,17
BiH	0,00	1,78	116,25	37,85	7,64	0,93	22,37	44,47	4,92	51,56	10,17	297,93
Cro	0,79	0,23	0,00	0,01	0,17	1,83	0,00	108,75	0,00	0,00	16,87	128,64
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	16,15	13,47	6,51	0,00	0,00	0,42	3,87	40,44
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,37	26,40	12,05	10,66	13,18	91,16	33,44	188,25
ex Yu unspec.	0,01	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,50	1,34	134,46	0,47	0,09	0,00	136,87
total	18,29	64,70	116,35	59,30	58,81	61,00	46,06	320,88	51,41	153,17	69,32	1019,30

Chart 67: Transport & Storage ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 68: Country shares in T&S ODA




Table 74: Albania
 Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,23	..	0,01	0,24
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,02	1,99	2,01
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	..	32,94	32,94
Greece	0,22	0,07	0,17	0,29	0,75
Ireland	0,00
Italy	10,10	1,50	3,39	..	0,21	..	0,21	15,41
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	1,02	1,02
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	..	0,67	0,10	0,80	1,57
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	2,13	3,16	0,41	0,22	0,58	6,49
EC	4,34	9,78	4,48	18,60
IBRD	0,00
IDA	16,47	28,85	..	21,41	16,89	10,43	..	22,10	31,99	148,15
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	17,49	62,69	0,10	21,42	33,48	17,88	3,80	22,55	32,84	9,95	4,97	227,17

Table 75: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	1,68	1,68
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	1,63	1,63
France	3,52	0,55	4,08
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,02	0,02
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,35	0,15	0,50
Japan	10,80	12,37	5,46	..	6,20	..	4,92	8,60	0,07	48,42
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	1,78	0,01	0,37	0,61	0,10	0,38	3,25
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,02	0,49	1,52
Portugal	5,47	..	42,47	9,58	57,51
Spain	0,13	0,13
Sweden	0,02	1,24	0,05	0,33	0,03	..	1,67
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,35	..	0,76	0,46	..	1,57
EC	51,85	21,91	73,76
IBRD	0,00
IDA	48,36	14,86	39,00	102,23
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00

total	0,00	1,78	116,25	37,85	7,64	0,93	22,37	44,47	4,92	51,56	10,17	297,93
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Table 76: Croatia
 Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	..	0,05	0,38	0,43
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,79	0,18	0,97
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	1,83	1,83
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,76	0,76
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,01	0,01
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,17	..	0,00	0,11	0,28
EC	108,64	15,73	124,37
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,79	0,23	0,00	0,01	0,17	1,83	0,00	108,75	0,00	0,00	16,87	128,64

Table 77: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,31	..	0,31
Greece	2,59	2,59
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	6,50	0,00	6,50
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,03	0,97	0,75	1,75
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,01	0,01
UK	0,00
US	1,59	0,74	0,11	0,00	2,44
EC	13,59	1,28	14,87
IBRD	0,00
IDA	11,98	11,98
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,03	16,15	13,47	6,51	0,00	0,00	0,42	3,87	40,44

Table 78: FYR/Serbia
 Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,03	0,03	0,01	..	0,07
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,22	3,78	1,14	5,15
Germany	0,71	1,14	7,35	0,65	2,59	12,44
Greece	0,32	..	5,38	10,39	16,09
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	17,80	..	0,67	18,47
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,34	0,37	..	2,76	0,83	..	5,29
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	1,36	2,66	0,06	1,12	1,95	0,02	7,17
Switz.	0,44	0,98	0,52	1,94
UK	0,00
US	0,79	0,70	1,23	..	2,72
EC	8,15	5,98	24,12	23,02	61,27
IBRD	0,00
IDA	57,64	..	57,64
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,37	26,40	12,05	10,66	13,18	91,16	33,44	188,25

Table 79: ex Yu unspecified
 Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,50	0,50
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,09	..	0,09
Japan	15,14	0,03	15,17
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,01	0,01
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	3,89	0,43	4,33
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	1,34	1,34
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	115,43	115,43
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,01	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,50	1,34	134,46	0,47	0,09	0,00	136,87

Table 80: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	11,56	0,25	0,09	1,18	0,21	0,37	0,80	0,42	0,18	0,55	0,34	15,96
BiH	0,00	4,97	1,33	15,61	5,93	0,75	0,14	3,66	2,53	0,91	0,04	35,87
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,17	0,69	0,52	0,11	0,11	0,00	1,87
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,18	4,11	0,34	0,00	0,11	0,50	1,76	7,51
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,80	3,90	7,56	1,66	3,06	9,38	0,60	4,38	31,86
ex Yu unspec.	0,84	0,57	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,46	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,09	0,03	3,01
total	12,40	5,78	1,94	18,32	10,27	14,42	3,65	7,68	12,29	2,76	6,55	96,07

Chart 69: Communication ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 70: Country shares of communication ODA




Table 81: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,05	0,05	0,02	0,11	0,06	0,01	0,30
Germany	0,04	..	0,08	0,08	0,19
Greece	0,32	0,17	0,46	0,27	1,21
Ireland	0,00
Italy	11,56	0,69	12,25
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,09	0,34	0,43
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,01	..	0,01
Switz.	0,78	0,78
UK	..	0,25	0,17	0,04	0,46
US	0,00
EC	0,30	0,01	0,31
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	11,56	0,25	0,09	1,18	0,21	0,37	0,80	0,42	0,18	0,55	0,34	15,96

Table 82: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,02	0,02
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,37	0,37
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,05	0,36	0,41
France	0,08	0,12	0,13	0,02	0,02	0,01	0,04	..	0,44
Germany	0,00	0,01	0,01
Greece	0,03	..	0,03
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,11	0,11
Japan	0,00	..	0,03	0,04
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	1,33	0,01	0,72	0,32	0,01	2,39
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,04	..	0,02	1,18	0,05	..	1,29
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,69	3,51	0,27	..	3,60	8,07
Sweden	..	3,61	0,13	5,45	0,11	0,00	9,32
Switz.	0,77	8,30	9,06
UK	0,00
US	1,86	0,00	0,01	0,01	..	0,79	..	2,67
EC	0,30	1,33	1,63
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	4,97	1,33	15,61	5,93	0,75	0,14	3,66	2,53	0,91	0,04	35,87

Table 83: Croatia
 Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,04	0,04	0,08	0,08	0,17	0,11	0,11	..	0,63
Germany	0,07	0,07
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,18	0,18
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,02	0,02
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,05	0,05
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,03	0,59	0,30	0,92
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,17	0,69	0,52	0,11	0,11	0,00	1,87

Table 84: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	..	0,03	0,02	..	0,07	0,06	..	0,18
Germany	1,02	0,06	0,11	1,20
Greece	0,38	0,19	0,57
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,24	0,24
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,25	0,33	..	0,03	..	0,06	0,67
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,10	0,10
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,02	0,15	0,18
US	0,03	2,75	2,78
EC	0,30	1,28	1,58
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,18	4,11	0,34	0,00	0,11	0,50	1,76	7,51

Table 85: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,87	0,87
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,04	0,94	0,11	0,10	0,01	..	1,20
Germany	0,26	..	0,18	..	0,08	0,09	0,61
Greece	0,57	0,57
Ireland	0,00	..	0,00
Italy	0,37	0,37
Japan	0,08	0,08
Luxemb.	0,01	..	0,01
Netherl.	0,51	0,76	3,90	2,03	0,00	0,13	..	7,33
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	3,32	0,20	3,52
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,22	..	1,46	..	0,01	0,02	1,71
Switz.	0,17	0,42	0,58
UK	0,68	0,36	0,17	1,21
US	0,17	..	0,77	1,30	0,36	0,01	2,61
EC	7,98	..	3,20	11,17
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,80	3,90	7,56	1,66	3,06	9,38	0,60	4,38	31,86

Table 86: ex Yu unspecified
 Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	0,12	0,12
France	1,46	1,46
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,09	..	0,09
Japan	0,03	0,03
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,68	0,45	1,12
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,16	0,01	0,18
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,84	0,57	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,46	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,09	0,03	3,01

Table 87: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	24,14	65,43	0,00	0,00	23,95	35,38	3,12	86,19	59,40	76,71	46,82	421,13
BiH	0,00	59,67	62,63	122,47	13,16	13,34	50,09	0,54	1,87	6,75	1,13	331,64
Cro	0,00	0,10	0,00	3,76	0,00	0,31	2,93	4,05	8,96	1,69	2,45	24,24
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,87	0,87	0,33	0,56	4,12	11,47	1,25	0,71	20,26
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,75	11,46	63,69	101,33	131,15	134,24	99,15	146,40	688,16
ex Yu unspec.	6,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,28	8,31	0,80	0,00	0,02	19,71
total	30,43	125,20	62,71	127,85	49,44	113,05	162,31	234,36	216,74	185,54	197,53	1505,15

Chart 71: Energy ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 72: Country shares in energy ODA




Table 88: Albania
 Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,13	0,16	..	1,45	1,74
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,00
Germany	23,73	3,33	..	49,05	16,78	92,89
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	5,66	7,12	0,21	20,36	..	42,49	57,29	0,14	0,09	133,36
Japan	12,98	24,26	0,00	..	0,03	37,27
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	14,42	14,42
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,01	1,41	0,99	..	2,41
UK	0,00
US	0,47	1,71	1,50	1,95	0,32	0,88	6,82
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	5,49	34,05	38,87	..	26,20	27,61	132,22
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	24,14	65,43	0,00	0,00	23,95	35,38	3,12	86,19	59,40	76,71	46,82	421,13

Table 89: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	4,36	4,36
Belgium	0,00
Canada	..	3,26	7,51	10,76
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	7,62	1,44	2,33	1,27	12,65
France	2,87	2,87
Germany	0,10	..	2,70	6,50	..	9,30
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,04	0,04
Japan	23,90	31,72	0,07	55,69
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	3,35	3,35
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,81	20,95	..	0,05	0,11	..	1,16	..	1,01	25,08
Portugal	0,00
Spain	31,24	3,78	0,67	..	0,54	0,46	0,24	..	36,93
Sweden	0,17	0,17
Switz.	6,51	11,79	18,30
UK	1,88	0,17	2,05
US	1,29	0,83	0,07	..	0,05	2,24
EC	15,57	15,57
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	41,09	12,40	31,48	47,29	132,25
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	59,67	62,63	122,47	13,16	13,34	50,09	0,54	1,87	6,75	1,13	331,64

Table 90: Croatia
 Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,01	0,01	0,03
Canada	..	0,10	0,10
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,01	0,01
Japan	0,07	0,07
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	3,65	..	0,30	2,91	3,79	..	1,20	1,92	13,78
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,11	0,11
US	0,26	0,88	0,49	0,52	2,14
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	8,00	8,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00

total	0,00	0,10	0,00	3,76	0,00	0,31	2,93	4,05	8,96	1,69	2,45	24,24
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Table 91: Macedonia
 Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 total	
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,54	0,87	0,38	1,80
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,08	0,08
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,04	0,08	0,07	0,19
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,02	0,02
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,02	3,68	1,58	1,22	..	6,50
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	9,89	9,89
UK	0,00
US	0,33	..	0,29	0,46	0,37	0,00	0,03	0,30	1,78
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,87	0,87	0,33	0,56	4,12	11,47	1,25	0,71	20,26

Table 92: FYR/Serbia
 Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,02	0,02
Finland	0,00
France	0,04	0,08	..	0,03	10,89	11,04
Germany	0,23	12,99	85,67	28,76	..	5,30	40,46	173,42
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	5,71	5,36	..	0,06	11,14
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	7,63	..	6,57	0,35	2,02	2,64	3,66	22,85
Portugal	0,00
Spain	1,39	0,85	0,26	0,20	0,16	2,85
Sweden	6,21	5,38	1,57	11,72	..	3,87	28,76
Switz.	2,88	15,13	2,07	12,63	32,71
UK	0,75	..	0,36	0,19	1,29
US	6,99	..	0,01	0,17	1,18	1,87	10,23
EC	0,72	22,00	..	74,69	113,00	67,79	61,40	339,61
IBRD	0,00
IDA	6,50	1,71	22,01	24,03	54,25
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,75	11,46	63,69	101,33	131,15	134,24	99,15	146,40	688,16
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Table 93: ex Yu unspecified
 Economic Infrastructure - ENERGY
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 total	
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	4,28	4,28
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,04	..	0,02	0,06
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	6,30	6,30
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	8,31	0,76	9,07
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	6,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,28	8,31	0,80	0,00	0,02	19,71

Table 94: Western Balkans
 Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	11,60	0,00	0,00	6,98	16,64	8,54	0,16	20,86	0,29	0,87	4,14	70,07
BiH	0,00	0,31	1,81	150,20	2,46	5,76	44,53	8,64	6,39	5,21	8,38	233,69
Cro	4,28	0,39	0,09	1,04	0,02	0,00	3,44	0,08	4,27	0,43	0,40	14,44
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,36	6,47	0,00	4,51	2,57	9,47	9,70	1,08	0,35	34,51
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,24	0,46	0,24	5,53	4,54	23,00	121,10	112,28	17,18	15,91	300,49
ex Yu unspec.	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,70	2,51	0,43	0,09	0,00	4,73
total	15,88	0,94	2,71	164,94	24,65	23,35	75,39	162,65	133,36	24,86	29,18	657,93

Chart 73: Banking & Financial Services ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 74: Country shares in BFS ODA




Table 95: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,39	0,51	0,90
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	4,83	6,80	0,09	3,55	15,27
Greece	0,07	0,13	0,20
Ireland	0,08	0,08
Italy	0,03	0,03	..	0,06
Japan	0,04	..	0,01	0,05
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,03	1,29	0,07	1,39
Switz.	1,79	0,04	0,36	..	2,18
UK	0,14	0,14
US	6,77	0,17	0,13	..	0,00	7,08
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	14,85	8,37	..	19,50	42,72
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	11,60	0,00	0,00	6,98	16,64	8,54	0,16	20,86	0,29	0,87	4,14	70,07

Table 96: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,28	1,29	1,56
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	5,02	5,02
Germany	1,36	1,88	13,49	7,32	5,10	29,15
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,39	0,40	0,79
Italy	0,61	0,65	0,01	..	1,27
Japan	0,17	..	0,05	0,22
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,21	0,85	0,28	2,33
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,60	5,87	0,89	2,18	1,31	0,71	0,33	4,60	7,05	23,54
Switz.	0,20	1,29	0,33	..	1,81
UK	..	0,31	0,22	0,27	0,74	1,53
US	133,02	133,02
EC	0,13	0,13
IBRD	0,00
IDA	6,30	27,02	33,32
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,31	1,81	150,20	2,46	5,76	44,53	8,64	6,39	5,21	8,38	233,69

Table 97: Croatia
 Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,29	0,04	0,33
Germany	0,00	0,12	0,13	0,26
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,31	..	0,31
Japan	0,04	..	0,01	0,05
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	3,29	3,29
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,22	0,05	0,27
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,09	0,09
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	..	0,35	..	0,82	0,02	1,19
US	3,99	3,44	0,08	0,84	..	0,26	8,60
EC	0,06	0,06
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	4,28	0,39	0,09	1,04	0,02	0,00	3,44	0,08	4,27	0,43	0,40	14,44

Table 98: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,57	..	0,57
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	1,93	0,06	0,02	2,01
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,37	0,37	0,35	0,01	1,10
Japan	0,04	..	0,01	0,05
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	6,33	..	3,64	0,32	7,62	7,23	25,14
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,41	0,41	0,69	0,40	0,45	0,25	2,61
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	1,48	0,80	0,08	..	0,07	2,43
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,36	0,14	..	0,09	0,59
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,36	6,47	0,00	4,51	2,57	9,47	9,70	1,08	0,35	34,51

Table 99: FYR/Serbia
 Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,47	0,47
Austria	0,02	0,02
Belgium	0,69	1,20	1,89
Canada	1,42	1,42
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	1,41	1,41
Germany	0,68	0,03	14,50	5,88	19,00	1,13	13,50	54,73
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00
Japan	0,04	0,04
Luxemb.	1,39	1,07	2,46
Netherl.	4,56	..	1,40	5,96
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,30	0,88	0,00	..	0,92	2,11
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,30	4,29	1,43	0,03	0,09	0,10	6,23
Switz.	1,06	6,70	..	7,77
UK	..	0,24	0,46	0,24	..	0,02	1,37	1,15	0,79	1,05	0,09	5,41
US	0,05	1,06	0,05	1,17
EC	7,52	..	7,52
IBRD	0,00
IDA	110,51	91,40	201,91
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,24	0,46	0,24	5,53	4,54	23,00	121,10	112,28	17,18	15,91	300,49

Table 100: ex Yu unspecified
 Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,37	0,37
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,09	..	0,09
Japan	0,05	0,05
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	2,51	2,51
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	1,70	1,70
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,70	2,51	0,43	0,09	0,00	4,73

Table 101: Western Balkans
 Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	23,54	0,00	0,01	14,66	35,85	19,78	2,95	18,78	8,73	8,19	6,26	138,74
BiH	0,00	1,06	0,71	30,59	274,64	82,82	30,85	91,86	27,19	27,52	26,08	593,33
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,44	9,08	25,81	7,00	16,40	21,00	12,91	11,35	106,00
Mac	112,15	1,13	0,00	6,81	45,95	11,15	5,54	17,44	16,49	12,78	13,62	243,04
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,89	73,21	284,72	241,82	91,11	56,99	46,51	63,57	860,82
ex Yu unspec.	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,02	0,35	27,38	0,00	0,02	0,07	36,84
total	135,69	2,18	0,72	57,40	438,73	433,31	288,50	262,97	130,41	107,94	120,94	1978,78

Chart 75: Business & Other Services ODA




Chart 76: Country shares in BOS ODA




Table 102: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,05	0,00	0,05
Germany	3,45	3,39	..	1,48	0,76	0,11	9,19
Greece	0,01	0,04	..	0,05
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,00	0,13	0,13
Japan	0,02	0,02
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,06	0,75	..	0,02	0,04	0,17	1,04
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,01	0,04	0,05
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	20,09	14,56	32,08	19,78	0,71	18,78	8,66	7,35	5,82	127,83
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,38	0,38
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	23,54	0,00	0,01	14,66	35,85	19,78	2,95	18,78	8,73	8,19	6,26	138,74

Table 103: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,01
Germany	4,75	3,86	0,20	0,65	2,91	0,20	2,22	14,78
Greece	0,03	..	0,03
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,02	..	0,14	0,92	0,00	0,00	..	1,08
Japan	0,02	..	0,12	0,14
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,91	..	0,02	1,23	17,90	20,12
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,10	0,12	0,09	0,19	0,42	1,24	..	3,15
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,04	0,28	0,27	0,10	0,69
Sweden	0,69	0,10	..	0,02	0,20	2,02	0,44	0,01	..	3,48
Switz.	0,57	0,04	0,04	0,66
UK	..	1,06	..	0,87	1,16	4,23	1,47	1,55	0,36	0,77	..	11,47
US	29,55	205,34	74,59	0,65	16,28	22,71	11,38	5,73	366,22
EC	12,39	..	12,39
IBRD	0,00
IDA	61,87	..	26,75	70,21	158,83
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,28	0,28
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	1,06	0,71	30,59	274,64	82,82	30,85	91,86	27,19	27,52	26,08	593,33

Table 104: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,00
Germany	0,10	2,97	..	0,64	..	2,29	0,34	6,34
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,57	0,57
Japan	0,02	0,16	0,03	0,21
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,02	0,30	0,32
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	1,87	8,97	19,51	6,98	15,76	12,81	10,46	10,68	87,05
EC	3,34	8,18	11,52
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,44	9,08	25,81	7,00	16,40	21,00	12,91	11,35	106,00

Table 105: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,17	..	0,17
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,02	0,02
Germany	6,90	0,02	2,67	..	2,23	2,37	0,11	0,78	15,08
Greece	0,01	0,10	0,04	0,04	0,19
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,34	0,34
Japan	0,12	..	0,02	0,14
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,02	0,75	..	0,02	0,75	0,18	1,71
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,30	0,07	0,41	0,78
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,03	0,03
Switz.	0,18	0,18
UK	0,93	1,13	..	0,11	..	0,08	2,25
US	10,98	6,67	45,93	8,40	4,47	14,85	13,70	11,63	12,17	128,80
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	93,35	93,35
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	112,15	1,13	0,00	6,81	45,95	11,15	5,54	17,44	16,49	12,78	13,62	243,04

Table 106: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,02	0,02
Belgium	0,00
Canada	1,08	1,08
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00	0,00
Germany	1,71	3,99	6,84	3,35	9,25	3,53	28,67
Greece	0,04	1,20	0,38	..	1,61
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,16	0,16
Japan	0,16	0,16
Luxemb.	0,28	..	0,28
Netherl.	4,36	0,22	1,49	2,65	1,46	10,17
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,26	0,44	2,54	3,24
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,02	2,37	2,37	..	2,02	..	1,94	8,72
Switz.	0,08	..	0,13	..	0,01	0,22
UK	0,09	0,05	..	0,29	0,43
US	2,80	73,06	243,90	30,78	56,13	39,20	23,38	36,65	505,90
EC	35,67	199,90	13,58	9,31	10,13	17,27	285,86
IBRD	0,00
IDA	14,30	14,30
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,89	73,21	284,72	241,82	91,11	56,99	46,51	63,57	860,82

Table 107: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,02	0,04	0,06
Japan	0,03	0,03
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	8,81	..	0,20	9,01
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,21	0,35	0,02	0,58
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	27,16	27,16
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,02	0,35	27,38	0,00	0,02	0,07	36,84

Table 108: Western Balkans
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,00	0,06	0,00	4,58	0,43	8,92	4,21	0,34	4,88	15,47	11,23	50,12
BiH	0,00	0,39	0,54	1,38	0,46	0,01	1,58	0,59	6,31	3,36	0,37	14,99
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,03	0,26	0,04	6,11	0,43	7,05	6,05	0,46	20,44
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,14	0,81	2,86	15,61	0,95	0,29	1,40	4,76	5,40	32,21
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	2,01	15,00	5,40	10,55	32,81	5,88	17,63	89,30
ex Yu unspec.	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,46	0,00	2,00	1,64	0,02	4,12
total	0,00	0,44	0,69	6,83	6,02	39,57	18,72	12,19	54,45	37,17	35,11	211,18

Chart 77: GEP ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 78: Country shares in GEP ODA




Table 109: Albania
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,01	0,06	0,05	0,03	0,15
Germany	0,05	0,05	0,10
Greece	0,23	0,84	0,17	0,02	1,26
Ireland	0,01	0,01
Italy	0,12	0,08	1,49	1,69
Japan	0,02	..	0,15	0,18
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,06	0,85	..	3,34	7,17	0,06	11,48
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,03	0,06	0,03	0,03	..	0,15
Sweden	0,02	0,08	0,00	..	0,10
Switz.	0,85	..	7,13	1,20	9,18
UK	0,63	..	0,49	0,32	0,09	1,54
US	3,73	0,24	7,04	11,01
EC	1,71	4,59	3,84	10,14
IBRD	0,00
IDA	3,14	..	3,14
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
	0,00	0,06	0,00	4,58	0,43	8,92	4,21	0,34	4,88	15,47	11,23	50,12

Table 110: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,20	..	0,30	0,50
Belgium	0,01	0,01
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,16	0,17	0,00	0,33
Germany	0,00
Greece	0,29	0,06	0,03	..	0,39
Ireland	0,01	0,01
Italy	0,54	..	0,19	0,01	0,30	..	1,08	0,54	0,29	2,94
Japan	0,12	0,01	0,07	0,20
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,87	0,87
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,06	0,10	0,06	0,06	..	0,27
Sweden	..	0,39	..	0,84	0,03	0,03	0,88	..	2,17
Switz.	0,01	0,01
UK	0,00
US	0,00	..	0,01	..	0,02
EC	0,54	0,25	4,65	1,83	..	7,26
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,39	0,54	1,38	0,46	0,01	1,58	0,59	6,31	3,36	0,37	14,99

Table 111: Croatia
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,20	..	0,20
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,01	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,07
Germany	0,11	0,11
Greece	0,09	0,09
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,01	0,02	0,03	0,02	1,40	..	1,53	3,01
Japan	0,18	..	0,06	0,24
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	2,32	0,02	..	2,34
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,23	..	2,31	..	0,19	0,43	0,24	3,41
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,01	0,03	0,04
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,34	..	0,26	..	0,59
EC	0,05	0,07	5,05	5,14	0,04	10,34
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,03	0,26	0,04	6,11	0,43	7,05	6,05	0,46	20,44

Table 112: Macedonia
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	0,92	1,16	0,03	..	2,11
Greece	0,06	0,42	0,08	0,19	0,74
Ireland	0,50	0,50
Italy	0,17	0,47	0,65
Japan	0,07	..	0,17	0,23
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,08	0,03	0,45	0,32	0,85	..	0,11	1,84
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,01	0,82	..	0,83
Switz.	0,06	..	0,08	13,63	..	0,23	0,31	1,17	1,12	16,60
UK	0,00
US	0,60	0,96	..	0,09	0,04	..	1,70
EC	2,63	3,93	6,55
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,45	0,45
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,14	0,81	2,86	15,61	0,95	0,29	1,40	4,76	5,40	32,21

Table 113: FYR/Serbia
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	195	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,12	0,12
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	5,15	5,15
Finland	2,07	2,07
France	0,05	0,02	0,08
Germany	0,03	0,09	0,13
Greece	4,61	0,29	0,12	0,15	5,18
Ireland	0,02	0,02
Italy	0,02	0,15	0,13	0,69	0,99
Japan	0,11	0,11
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,02	..	0,07	0,70	..	0,02	0,03	..	0,83
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,56	..	4,25	1,51	1,14	7,47
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,06	0,09	0,06	0,05	..	0,26
Sweden	2,01	3,79	0,82	0,48	2,88	0,85	..	10,84
Switz.	11,12	0,88	0,07	12,07
UK	0,00
US	0,03	..	0,03
EC	0,11	..	24,59	3,26	16,01	43,97
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	2,01	15,00	5,40	10,55	32,81	5,88	17,63	89,30

Table 114: ex Yu unspecified
 Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 total	
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,00
Germany	1,40	1,40
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,46	0,46
Italy	0,29	1,64	..	1,93
Japan	0,31	..	0,02	0,32
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,00
Switz.	0,00
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,46	0,00	2,00	1,64	0,02	4,12

Table 115: Western Balkans
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	21,72	44,36	51,94	49,27	51,11	39,66	60,68	67,56	17,88	20,38	32,07	456,62
BiH	16,46	124,00	0,20	85,54	195,66	98,22	138,97	90,62	4,51	4,97	18,72	777,88
Cro	0,68	0,34	0,29	12,76	0,44	21,04	80,30	97,94	9,30	9,46	36,23	268,79
Mac	1,94	16,29	31,24	20,98	44,77	69,76	105,42	70,46	26,18	15,95	11,96	414,95
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,18	0,00	0,88	107,12	786,67	120,34	103,48	41,95	41,23	52,74	1254,58
ex Yu unspec.	0,93	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,08	0,00	1,08	1,13	4,53	13,02	9,64	30,55
total	41,73	185,16	83,83	169,43	399,19	1015,35	506,78	431,19	104,36	105,00	161,36	3203,38

Chart 79: Multisector Other ODA to Western Balkans




Chart 80: Country shares in Multisector other ODA




Table 116: Albania
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	1,95	..	1,95
Belgium	0,01	0,01
Canada	0,02	0,02	0,04
Denmark	0,09	0,09
Finland	..	0,12	0,54	0,66
France	0,28	0,69	0,60	..	0,00	..	0,12	0,04	0,02	0,31	0,06	2,12
Germany	6,90	4,10	5,14	0,55	4,69	6,39	1,03	11,45	40,25
Greece	1,55	1,30	1,07	3,92
Ireland	0,03	0,03	0,06
Italy	..	0,78	1,94	0,40	3,93	0,04	..	0,00	3,85	10,95
Japan	0,07	0,05	0,03	0,05	0,20
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	1,79	..	1,79
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,09	..	0,09
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00	0,02	0,03	0,05
Sweden	0,06	3,12	0,29	0,07	0,04	0,03	3,61
Switz.	4,02	0,17	..	0,78	0,06	5,02
UK	0,49	6,31	6,81
US	3,56	1,05	..	3,70	..	2,57	9,18	8,89	7,35	36,30
EC	..	42,77	45,14	35,14	40,96	30,25	45,98	59,72	0,63	4,17	..	304,76
IBRD	0,00
IDA	10,98	..	6,20	12,59	29,77
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	8,18	8,18
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	21,72	44,36	51,94	49,27	51,11	39,66	60,68	67,56	17,88	20,38	32,07	456,62

Table 117: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,67	0,03	..	0,00	0,70
Belgium	0,00
Canada	..	0,15	..	0,86	0,13	0,25	0,05	0,02	1,47
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,01	0,21	0,21
France	0,06	0,16	0,13	0,02	0,01	..	0,01	0,01	..	0,00	..	0,40
Germany	11,97	0,46	1,90	0,65	0,52	1,12	14,15	30,77
Greece	0,13	0,17	0,16	0,46
Ireland	0,98	0,28	..	0,03	1,29
Italy	0,36	18,84	0,07	2,82	0,13	1,65	..	0,79	0,00	24,64
Japan	0,71	0,31	0,62	1,69	0,84	0,03	4,21
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	0,15	..	6,57	0,47	0,80	0,90	3,22	12,09
New Zeal.	0,04	0,04
Norway	1,86	2,28	4,14
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,31	..	0,99	0,83	0,84	0,41	1,06	0,00	4,45
Sweden	0,01	0,65	0,06	..	0,01	0,47	1,19
Switz.	20,78	5,10	4,10	0,17	0,29	0,35	0,90	31,69
UK	0,00
US	16,00	74,56	0,03	1,91	2,89	1,47	3,01	99,88
EC	..	0,16	141,11	86,20	129,08	81,26	437,82
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	103,87	18,56	122,43
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	16,46	124,00	0,20	85,54	195,66	98,22	138,97	90,62	4,51	4,97	18,72	777,88

Table 118: Croatia
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00	0,03	0,02	..	0,03	..	0,08
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,01	0,01
Canada	0,08	0,18	0,05	0,31
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	0,17	0,33	0,29	0,01	0,04	0,01	0,08	0,06	0,04	1,02
Germany	0,11	0,02	..	1,62	2,33	0,85	1,04	5,97
Greece	0,03	0,04	0,04	0,11
Ireland	0,00
Italy	..	0,01	..	0,13	..	0,04	0,01	4,60	..	4,79
Japan	0,06	0,10	0,35	0,41	0,93
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,00
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	2,44	..	0,59	0,25	0,05	3,32
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,18	..	0,18
Sweden	0,01	0,08	0,09
Switz.	1,77	0,83	0,06	..	0,02	0,02	2,69
UK	0,04	..	0,04
US	0,50	10,19	19,78	3,54	0,79	3,11	37,91
EC	0,15	18,32	79,02	76,05	3,32	2,61	31,87	211,34
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,68	0,34	0,29	12,76	0,44	21,04	80,30	97,94	9,30	9,46	36,23	268,79

Table 119: Macedonia
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,03	0,03	0,05
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,00
France	..	0,11	0,10	..	0,01	0,00	0,22
Germany	3,56	16,71	0,07	1,79	8,93	0,62	3,43	35,10
Greece	0,11	0,21	0,20	0,53
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,18	0,18
Japan	0,32	0,23	0,20	0,61	0,17	0,06	1,60
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,07	0,00	0,02	0,09
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00	..	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,08	0,08
Sweden	0,01	0,03	..	2,51	0,01	..	0,03	2,61
Switz.	0,50	0,17	..	0,68	0,00	1,35
UK	0,00
US	1,18	1,10	0,48	29,68	0,83	18,80	15,45	6,20	4,96	78,67
EC	0,75	16,18	31,14	18,98	40,30	23,12	76,89	46,85	1,60	8,23	3,07	267,10
IBRD	0,00
IDA	27,02	27,02
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,16	0,16
UNICEF	0,17	0,17
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	1,94	16,29	31,24	20,98	44,77	69,76	105,42	70,46	26,18	15,95	11,96	414,95

Table 120: FYR/Serbia
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,10	2,07	2,17
Belgium	0,06	0,06
Canada	1,19	0,04	12,16	0,32	0,17	13,88
Denmark	12,54	12,54
Finland	2,25	0,34	2,58
France	..	0,18	..	0,00	0,01	..	0,01	0,00	0,18	0,24	0,04	0,66
Germany	6,09	15,74	2,48	12,63	4,71	10,10	33,70	85,45
Greece	0,50	0,63	0,57	1,71
Ireland	0,40	0,76	..	0,09	1,24
Italy	0,11	0,03	0,03	0,16
Japan	0,46	0,00	0,46
Luxemb.	0,15	0,00	0,00	..	1,49	1,65
Netherl.	1,96	..	1,96
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,39	0,01	0,39	0,07	0,87
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,07	0,04	0,11
Sweden	0,03	2,39	4,52	0,02	0,28	7,24
Switz.	1,81	7,03	0,10	..	1,32	1,17	0,80	12,23
UK	0,54	0,54
US	0,88	..	1,17	..	17,36	27,57	4,33	9,03	60,33
EC	98,02	758,42	91,66	70,75	2,86	22,39	4,48	1048,58
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,16	0,16
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,00	0,18	0,00	0,88	107,12	786,67	120,34	103,48	41,95	41,23	52,74	1254,58

Table 121: ex Yu unspecified
 Multisector - OTHER
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	0,00
Belgium	0,00
Canada	0,00
Denmark	0,19	0,01	..	0,20
Finland	0,00
France	0,04	..	0,16	0,20
Germany	0,25	4,77	..	5,02
Greece	0,00	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	0,03	..	4,28	8,23	9,62	22,16
Japan	0,08	..	0,49	0,57	1,14
Luxemb.	0,00	..	0,00
Netherl.	0,84	0,84
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,00
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,05	0,05
Switz.	0,37	0,56	..	0,00	0,02	0,95
UK	0,00
US	0,00
EC	0,00
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB SF.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,93	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,08	0,00	1,08	1,13	4,53	13,02	9,64	30,55

Table 122: Albania

Humanitarian Aid

HUMANITARIAN AID

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,01	1,04	0,05	21,01	0,03	0,01	0,23	0,36	0,47	0,39	23,59
Belgium	0,69	4,11	1,36	6,15
Canada	1,07	0,52	..	0,65	..	0,06	2,30
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,24	0,24
France	0,16	0,12	0,44	0,04	5,47	6,24
Germany	0,06	0,17	1,35	4,33	7,01	0,42	..	0,54	..	0,38	0,51	14,77
Greece	0,36	..	0,06	..	0,42
Ireland	0,01	0,01
Italy	1,74	..	10,54	5,33	111,90	1,71	1,05	0,00	0,00	132,28
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,04	..	0,04
Netherl.	0,36	..	0,38	0,11	0,67	0,46	..	1,99
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,24	0,83	2,10	..	3,05	0,20	0,33	0,89	0,10	8,73
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,13	0,22	15,47	0,19	16,02
Sweden	3,69	3,69
Switzerl.	0,38	0,02	0,35	1,12	22,38	1,55	0,64	0,79	0,04	0,05	0,04	27,37
UK	0,26	0,24	0,66	..	45,00	9,69	0,40	..	0,06	56,30
US	0,04	..	7,61	11,03	9,07	27,75
EC	0,86	3,00	5,55	17,24	42,83	4,78	6,41	3,20	..	3,26	..	87,12
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,76	0,76
UNICEF	0,00	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	5,39	4,39	23,81	28,84	277,61	28,12	19,48	15,19	1,57	4,72	6,66	415,77

Table 123: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Humanitarian Aid

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	4,35	1,95	0,07	1,09	2,28	0,52	0,77	0,01	11,06
Belgium	0,97	2,38	0,92	0,54	..	0,70	6,57	12,08
Canada	1,42	0,97	12,12	4,64	0,69	4,73	5,41	0,05	0,73	30,77
Denmark	0,00
Finland	..	3,92	0,12	0,94	1,38	1,12	1,63	1,55	..	0,16	0,41	11,23
France	..	2,17	1,22	0,02	..	26,25	29,67
Germany	2,48	17,59	19,66	22,33	5,02	13,02	8,93	6,09	3,22	6,54	5,33	110,20
Greece	0,59	0,59
Ireland	0,21	0,01	0,21
Italy	18,56	12,76	5,66	3,09	0,27	0,09	0,16	0,43	41,02
Japan	..	1,51	..	0,91	2,42
Luxemb.	0,43	0,03	0,46
Netherl.	61,65	16,03	72,19	31,45	104,59	85,96	49,35	39,68	52,07	15,17	12,74	540,89
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	37,09	0,02	10,79	1,16	3,75	2,25	0,24	0,27	..	55,56
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,41	0,03	12,00	11,36	9,93	14,42	11,97	6,99	..	67,11
Sweden	12,94	16,73	14,79	13,26	5,10	9,60	7,98	5,93	0,27	..	0,69	87,30
Switzerl.	12,76	4,17	2,85	0,92	98,95	1,26	0,31	0,52	3,45	2,93	2,31	130,43
UK	0,23	0,05	..	0,28
US	31,76	14,72	29,78	..	16,93	17,51	..	0,05	0,02	110,77
EC	162,47	..	229,63	45,59	39,87	9,00	1,21	0,20	..	9,78	3,97	501,72
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	20,20	21,08	41,28
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,01	0,01
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	273,27	102,78	451,46	138,73	309,54	140,28	113,13	89,64	71,98	41,93	52,31	1785,05

Table 124: Croatia

Humanitarian Aid

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,01	..	0,00	0,00	1,15	..	0,67	0,04	1,87
Belgium	0,29	..	0,76	1,41	1,08	1,13	1,41	6,06
Canada	0,02	0,11	0,49	0,86	2,13	3,60
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,36	0,19	0,55
France	..	0,44	0,25	0,40	1,09
Germany	2,34	0,82	0,58	0,25	0,01	5,27	4,98	2,61	1,16	2,67	1,72	22,42
Greece	0,00
Ireland	0,00
Italy	2,93	1,61	0,89	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,03	5,51
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	..	1,21	0,34	0,30	..	6,37	0,45	8,67
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	9,86	..	4,05	1,47	4,65	4,96	4,94	4,66	2,86	37,44
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	0,85	1,01	0,60	0,42	0,10	0,17	3,15
Switzerl.	3,99	3,02	0,30	0,25	0,02	1,15	2,30	0,83	1,14	0,00	..	12,99
UK	2,05	..	0,14	..	1,36	..	3,55
US	1,22	3,46	10,91	8,69	2,59	..	0,02	26,89
EC	..	0,29	26,91	10,37	3,65	0,77	18,25	..	60,24
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	10,41	8,51	42,55	17,53	8,93	19,54	26,82	17,89	9,87	26,94	5,04	194,03

Table 125: Macedonia
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	1,69	0,15	0,01	1,85
Belgium	1,50	0,59	2,09
Canada	0,51	..	0,56	13,04	1,09	15,20
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,15	0,15
France	..	0,00	0,02	0,26	..	0,29
Germany	0,05	7,36	0,24	3,78	6,79	..	0,27	..	18,49
Greece	0,05	0,05
Ireland	0,37	0,42	0,78
Italy	3,97	0,08	2,20	4,11	0,09	0,03	..	10,49
Japan	0,00
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,41	..	14,25	9,98	0,10	24,75
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	2,74	..	2,09	0,66	0,29	0,09	..	5,87
Portugal	0,09	0,09
Spain	0,95	0,95
Sweden	0,36	..	1,12	0,82	2,31
Switzerl.	..	0,04	2,23	1,04	0,82	0,78	0,08	4,99
UK	30,40	4,82	9,78	1,39	..	46,40
US	0,98	..	3,94	9,60	2,82	0,08	17,43
EC	0,82	..	31,97	2,01	7,72	6,49	6,65	55,67
IBRD	0,00
IDA	61,87	61,87
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,37	0,37
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	0,05	0,04	0,85	1,49	145,98	13,28	64,77	34,11	7,38	2,04	0,06	270,06

Table 126: FRY/Serbia
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	7,04	0,07	7,11
Austria	3,65	8,56	8,56	1,38	0,01	0,03	22,19
Belgium	0,15	2,34	3,93	0,55	0,69	1,08	8,72
Canada	1,65	..	0,23	2,60	50,05	..	2,41	56,95
Denmark	1,13	9,60	10,73
Finland	0,72	2,08	7,34	2,16	1,55	4,62	0,37	2,55	1,88	23,26
France	..	0,00	0,19	0,21	0,14	47,68	48,22
Germany	8,93	15,71	34,72	33,89	18,57	10,88	5,88	6,15	4,55	139,28
Greece	1,48	0,33	0,64	1,50	3,96
Ireland	6,46	0,02	..	0,13	6,60
Italy	0,85	3,57	24,66	33,61	0,61	3,24	4,00	70,55
Japan	3,59	3,59
Luxemb.	3,49	0,20	3,69
Netherl.	1,07	6,37	73,46	62,16	14,83	3,96	14,52	6,13	0,68	183,18
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	8,67	..	110,83	9,13	5,83	..	2,29	1,53	5,21	143,48
Portugal	0,73	0,73
Spain	0,43	13,14	9,51	5,00	6,25	8,16	2,14	0,69	45,31
Sweden	0,04	0,13	0,72	9,22	26,64	19,08	6,80	0,74	0,97	..	0,91	65,25
Switzerl.	2,01	1,57	1,70	8,10	74,39	37,28	17,47	7,39	14,69	9,29	0,61	174,49
UK	0,46	4,50	137,02	77,84	0,69	1,28	..	221,79
US	2,65	581,34	68,75	17,27	11,89	11,94	8,05	3,95	705,84
EC	26,38	14,72	..	187,54	69,51	220,87	10,18	..	24,39	553,59
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	13,48	1,70	39,95	73,73	1152,27	563,55	167,07	282,01	74,64	37,92	92,21	2498,53

Table 127: ex Yu unspecified

Humanitarian Aid

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	..	1,08	..	0,10	0,02	1,20
Austria	..	0,08	0,02	0,09
Belgium	0,19	2,36	0,49	3,04
Canada	10,31	17,01	17,54	2,74	0,77	48,37
Denmark	0,08	..	0,08
Finland	5,35	1,30	0,96	..	0,46	0,45	1,09	9,61
France	0,11	0,03	2,47	2,60
Germany	20,48	20,48
Greece	3,63	..	3,63
Ireland	0,36	0,36
Italy	..	0,03	1,81	..	0,52	9,09	2,38	1,31	0,03	15,17
Japan	5,68	28,34	0,87	34,89
Luxemb.	0,25	0,08	0,33
Netherl.	45,23	0,24	45,48
New Zeal.	0,24	0,24
Norway	106,47	92,73	8,66	..	8,57	4,42	3,11	2,01	..	225,96
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,00
Sweden	15,37	11,22	5,58	32,17
Switzerl.	2,50	1,80	0,49	..	0,52	9,69	0,22	0,78	0,00	16,02
UK	60,22	104,82	69,84	234,89
US	0,00
EC	..	242,01	..	0,90	295,94	73,18	71,83	60,39	744,25
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,00
UNAIDS	0,00
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
total	245,88	474,46	87,95	6,68	334,36	131,31	78,62	66,62	3,43	7,05	2,52	1438,88

Table 128: Albania

ALL ASSISTANCE

ALL ASSISTANCE

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,03	0,03
Austria	..	3,23	2,73	6,54	23,66	7,91	2,29	2,52	3,30	6,94	7,31	66,44
Belgium	0,69	0,09	0,22	..	4,11	1,37	0,01	0,64	0,52	7,64
Canada	0,08	0,10	1,07	0,58	4,28	5,05	0,14	0,08	0,06	0,48	..	11,92
Denmark	7,26	19,88	..	0,09	1,02	..	0,06	..	28,30
Finland	0,12	0,13	0,48	0,02	0,02	0,46	2,83	0,61	0,70	1,70	1,16	8,24
France	1,30	1,25	1,45	1,03	2,17	8,99	3,16	3,00	3,35	4,27	15,36	45,34
Germany	31,13	37,91	27,77	26,83	56,44	51,71	23,20	30,13	35,82	67,26	52,57	440,79
Greece	22,44	102,20	24,41	25,35	174,39
Ireland	0,04	..	0,20	0,50	0,68	0,73	2,15
Italy	41,15	28,68	27,27	39,10	182,67	85,66	30,69	62,29	73,69	40,55	26,89	638,65
Japan	12,98	26,59	10,24	3,17	6,16	3,32	1,93	4,44	0,93	69,76
Luxemb.	6,48	..	1,03	0,07	7,58
Netherl.	8,58	3,80	8,16	1,65	0,38	14,31	14,68	3,52	6,06	10,39	1,48	73,03
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	1,27	0,86	2,17	3,99	11,51	19,53	3,46	19,57	7,02	9,84	7,12	86,35
Portugal	0,00
Spain	0,33	1,62	17,05	2,65	2,47	2,08	2,23	1,76	2,55	32,75
Sweden	0,03	1,41	0,58	0,42	5,04	1,62	9,13	6,10	1,33	5,54	20,45	51,66
Switzerl.	0,39	0,03	1,01	5,52	32,58	16,81	7,51	5,98	3,68	7,84	8,06	89,40
UK	2,45	0,61	1,37	5,25	45,35	14,55	14,57	4,60	4,67	1,91	3,68	99,01
US	37,92	33,90	78,37	78,42	59,75	53,48	48,22	42,30	42,41	474,78
EC	13,89	45,76	81,34	83,68	120,98	47,12	58,10	70,76	63,41	109,19	60,51	754,74
IBRD	0,00
IDA	39,54	72,13	37,20	68,31	171,58	69,66	26,89	113,76	69,69	52,40	52,66	773,82
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	16,91	8,18	25,09
UNDP	3,19	3,19
UNICEF	1,55	0,77	0,92	1,21	1,15	1,59	7,19
UNAIDS	0,08	0,08	0,15
UNFPA	0,61	0,48	0,39	1,48
GFATM	0,00
total	198,76	222,61	193,16	278,46	806,41	430,57	266,54	413,34	429,49	394,85	339,65	3973,85

Table 129: Bosnia and Herzegovina

ALL ASSISTANCE

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,02	0,02
Austria	..	105,22	54,19	50,78	35,67	184,09	15,10	10,92	13,83	16,91	22,06	508,77
Belgium	0,97	2,97	5,64	5,19	7,78	1,97	9,38	2,73	0,79	1,10	1,70	40,22
Canada	6,94	20,99	27,82	23,16	15,56	15,83	22,39	5,85	2,16	38,21	16,16	195,06
Denmark	0,02	..	0,02
Finland	..	13,49	12,54	6,09	6,54	4,42	10,75	6,50	7,55	6,15	2,63	76,67
France	2,21	2,69	5,08	10,35	153,31	28,06	2,78	2,17	1,79	3,19	54,86	266,50
Germany	2,76	17,72	19,90	22,58	50,32	141,57	40,14	36,03	28,03	54,52	25,17	438,73
Greece	8,72	6,51	7,73	1,32	24,28
Ireland	3,43	2,42	1,13	1,25	0,79	1,51	10,52
Italy	28,13	86,83	9,47	11,34	10,25	54,19	7,75	8,40	7,60	10,56	5,04	239,55
Japan	..	20,92	89,52	49,57	16,26	7,56	15,88	14,61	24,25	22,11	11,55	272,23
Luxemb.	0,43	0,03	..	0,39	..	0,85
Netherl.	61,65	54,96	104,71	95,53	110,08	98,89	66,92	46,87	125,70	23,01	46,25	834,57
New Zeal.	0,04	0,04
Norway	4,89	..	44,46	84,08	58,21	25,73	22,13	28,25	25,54	18,96	18,06	330,32
Portugal	1,44	0,84	1,50	1,45	5,47	0,12	49,85	9,85	70,52
Spain	9,35	48,10	47,50	47,97	43,11	46,66	41,60	23,38	6,41	314,09
Sweden	13,28	29,21	25,70	48,24	17,16	31,74	29,63	37,00	22,73	40,31	67,75	362,76
Switzerl.	13,12	4,27	6,00	12,39	146,06	28,85	14,76	11,79	7,83	18,79	21,29	285,15
UK	..	5,36	0,97	3,46	19,60	8,66	10,36	5,64	9,27	3,73	4,26	71,31
US	16,00	..	31,76	269,74	351,30	122,22	131,02	77,85	80,68	55,58	35,51	1171,65
EC	162,47	0,16	335,53	109,57	220,24	144,47	157,73	156,59	124,29	111,90	75,13	1598,08
IBRD	0,00
IDA	..	202,66	95,48	125,93	201,71	52,99	163,20	132,61	25,99	122,62	37,83	1161,03
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	..	8,46	17,36	16,21	42,03
UNDP	6,63	6,63
UNICEF	1,22	0,79	0,70	1,32	1,29	1,39	6,72
UNAIDS	0,07	..	0,08	0,08	0,22
UNFPA	0,08	0,07	0,38	0,54
GFATM	0,00
total	312,46	575,92	895,51	977,55	1475,02	1005,35	784,43	646,65	559,20	631,17	465,83	8329,08

Table 130: Croatia

ALL ASSISTANCE

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00	0,07	0,17	0,17	0,03	0,00	0,45
Austria	..	6,73	8,89	6,86	6,47	7,33	5,37	4,74	4,32	5,43	6,12	62,24
Belgium	0,29	..	1,64	1,41	1,25	1,15	1,62	0,78	0,20	0,13	0,02	8,47
Canada	1,02	0,42	0,59	1,11	0,73	1,30	2,53	1,73	0,15	0,25	0,51	10,35
Denmark	0,00
Finland	0,36	0,19	0,08	0,53	0,71	0,18	0,08	0,17	0,10	2,40
France	2,27	2,07	2,69	1,01	1,16	1,71	1,99	2,56	2,14	3,01	2,79	23,41
Germany	2,44	86,69	0,60	0,28	10,42	21,43	12,62	12,75	65,00	16,35	9,21	237,79
Greece	0,03	0,31	0,09	0,28	0,71
Ireland	0,00
Italy	3,04	7,76	1,75	1,82	0,36	1,95	2,19	1,99	3,94	8,60	0,40	33,80
Japan	0,53	0,44	0,46	0,73	0,41	1,28	0,91	1,18	5,94
Luxemb.	0,00
Netherl.	0,19	1,34	1,12	0,43	0,56	7,73	5,54	0,07	6,06	1,83	0,33	25,21
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,40	..	10,11	25,15	6,84	7,87	20,27	22,58	17,60	18,29	16,84	145,95
Portugal	0,06	0,15	..	0,01	0,05	0,26
Spain	0,71	2,00	0,45	0,47	0,94	0,97	0,59	0,62	0,36	7,11
Sweden	0,91	1,43	1,24	3,13	1,03	4,79	5,59	4,97	5,60	5,35	9,59	43,62
Switzerl.	4,11	3,26	0,44	0,25	0,73	2,92	3,41	1,25	1,43	0,47	0,11	18,39
UK	..	0,35	0,56	1,63	1,31	5,30	2,37	2,04	0,04	2,01	0,04	15,64
US	21,95	..	1,22	20,69	24,14	33,84	54,40	64,62	34,78	29,03	29,18	313,86
EC	..	0,29	26,91	10,37	4,11	33,38	79,77	189,03	82,88	108,39	131,66	666,78
IBRD	0,00
IDA	8,00	8,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	1,43	1,43
UNICEF	0,23	0,21	0,23	0,24	0,92
UNAIDS	0,05	0,05	0,10
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	3,84	3,84

total	36,62	110,33	58,82	76,85	61,50	132,39	200,16	311,02	238,63	201,26	209,09	1636,68
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Table 131: Macedonia

ALL ASSISTANCE

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	0,00
Austria	..	0,27	0,24	1,76	8,06	1,71	3,17	2,59	4,16	4,39	7,03	33,36
Belgium	0,37	0,74	2,04	0,59	..	0,12	..	0,59	0,47	4,91
Canada	0,08	1,57	0,03	2,42	13,12	1,62	0,14	18,98
Denmark	0,05	..	5,43	5,48
Finland	..	0,25	0,15	1,95	0,04	0,87	0,02	3,28
France	0,79	0,89	0,87	0,64	0,55	1,16	1,75	1,54	0,69	3,55	1,78	14,20
Germany	6,99	0,02	20,32	2,54	17,44	56,50	15,60	32,55	20,81	34,04	9,28	216,10
Greece	71,21	2,32	1,92	3,85	79,30
Ireland	0,50	0,37	0,48	0,04	0,20	0,01	1,61
Italy	0,02	0,07	0,02	0,94	23,74	1,01	7,48	9,67	5,29	6,61	1,09	55,94
Japan	8,11	..	8,44	12,71	18,02	0,20	19,37	4,83	83,43	9,99	4,16	169,25
Luxemb.	0,26	0,26
Netherl.	7,88	..	25,33	13,84	17,28	56,80	69,79	23,56	57,93	23,27	25,96	321,64
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	0,01	..	0,01	1,86	10,96	1,35	9,80	14,40	15,63	15,54	13,65	83,19
Portugal	0,74	23,12	4,10	0,07	1,52	..	0,06	29,62
Spain	0,07	0,96	0,01	0,04	10,82	1,33	9,87	0,06	23,15
Sweden	0,13	0,26	0,08	0,46	0,99	1,17	7,03	8,47	1,53	16,50	10,24	46,87
Switzerl.	..	0,04	2,30	0,68	9,19	22,89	3,60	4,19	14,26	6,08	8,06	71,28
UK	0,93	1,13	0,36	2,26	33,42	8,75	11,01	7,24	5,93	1,39	..	72,41
US	17,10	19,68	90,45	69,19	44,14	78,49	65,07	44,57	42,53	471,22
EC	0,75	16,18	46,80	36,70	134,10	32,59	86,68	58,39	59,04	81,25	52,07	604,55
IBRD	0,00
IDA	108,72	28,62	49,60	37,78	74,25	37,73	48,10	26,00	410,80
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	..	9,40	10,36	19,76
UNDP	1,21	1,21
UNICEF	0,68	1,03	0,81	1,03	1,20	1,57	6,32
UNAIDS	0,07	0,05	..	0,08	0,20
UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	4,56	..	4,56

total	151,42	57,11	154,82	134,22	443,56	328,75	346,21	359,06	345,68	266,39	182,22	2769,43
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Table 132: FRY/Serbia

ALL ASSISTANCE

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	67,80	9,26	0,73	..	0,16	0,27	0,15	78,36
Austria	..	0,04	9,16	18,40	55,34	44,82	36,15	122,54	22,11	29,74	35,01	373,30
Belgium	0,10	0,05	0,10	0,16	4,53	10,39	7,54	75,41	4,79	0,99	1,59	105,65
Canada	1,65	0,71	0,41	2,97	57,46	42,40	33,69	4,17	15,05	8,47	0,67	167,66
Denmark	20,97	52,32	73,29
Finland	0,72	2,38	8,73	18,30	20,69	22,40	10,96	11,52	1,96	97,65
France	..	1,35	..	1,50	3,62	10,29	14,82	142,60	240,50	6,85	112,37	533,90
Germany	23,72	12,62	5,32	22,76	145,12	154,78	189,14	729,89	98,93	132,42	123,75	1638,46
Greece	8,15	72,57	13,26	51,00	144,99
Ireland	8,72	2,59	1,06	2,33	1,64	2,44	18,78
Italy	1,73	2,24	0,02	5,92	64,47	34,36	6,40	17,51	25,65	..	42,84	201,14
Japan	4,05	..	6,11	18,61	2,26	120,03	151,07
Luxemb.	6,63	5,60	18,07	7,43	6,36	44,09
Netherl.	5,50	8,71	95,13	124,20	68,30	27,14	37,54	25,79	5,93	398,23
New Zeal.	0,00
Norway	8,67	19,49	184,08	54,84	50,55	1,76	59,45	45,61	54,44	478,88
Portugal	0,83	0,76	0,04	0,01	1,31	0,23	7,76	10,93
Spain	0,09	0,62	58,26	49,40	42,37	38,26	49,97	13,68	4,05	256,72
Sweden	0,04	0,68	0,95	10,23	34,20	48,15	44,97	27,66	39,64	20,70	47,83	275,06
Switzerl.	2,41	2,28	2,07	9,26	81,03	115,00	55,56	28,53	27,63	56,38	45,24	425,38
UK	..	0,24	0,92	17,61	182,85	126,17	19,75	637,50	19,92	8,38	98,77	1112,11
US	14,38	666,22	384,43	346,76	555,24	227,92	202,45	141,62	2539,03
EC	26,38	14,72	167,13	1074,48	464,74	619,70	473,24	500,86	401,65	3742,91
IBRD	0,00
IDA	278,56	233,92	189,70	149,03	851,22
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,09	0,23	1,03	3,66	2,92	2,67	10,61
UNAIDS	0,06	..	0,23	0,29
UNFPA	0,12	0,35	1,66	2,12

GFATM	3,11	2,55	..	5,65
total	29,66	20,21	60,30	149,13	1876,81	2314,87	1432,74	3403,51	1708,77	1284,11	1457,38	13737,49	

Table 133: ex Yu unspecified
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Australia	..	1,33	0,00	0,10	0,09	1,52
Austria	..	9,97	0,14	0,31	0,65	0,52	0,04	11,63
Belgium	0,64	2,47	0,49	3,60
Canada	10,32	17,01	26,15	5,26	0,81	59,55
Denmark	0,19	0,09	..	0,28
Finland	5,35	1,56	1,08	..	0,46	3,30	1,09	0,83	0,70	0,89	1,05	16,31
France	1,95	..	1,60	2,82	5,13	..	0,52	0,47	5,64	18,14
Germany	23,49	35,96	4,77	..	64,21
Greece	0,01	0,00	31,16	..	31,17
Ireland	0,82	0,82
Italy	..	0,77	2,21	..	0,55	9,45	12,89	1,18	6,69	22,37	17,72	73,84
Japan	5,68	28,42	0,87	12,58	15,71	0,95	0,15	0,24	64,59
Luxemb.	0,25	0,31	0,98	1,51	3,05
Netherl.	59,50	6,77	16,57	82,85
New Zeal.	0,24	0,24
Norway	109,36	95,55	10,57	20,52	28,46	13,21	..	64,48	17,74	17,14	..	377,02
Portugal	0,80	0,80	1,59
Spain	0,63	0,03	0,01	60,35	0,43	0,03	..	61,48
Sweden	17,28	13,38	10,24	40,90
Switzerl.	2,50	1,80	0,49	..	0,52	13,02	14,33	8,91	..	0,00	0,02	41,61
UK	60,22	104,82	69,84	17,53	..	0,74	253,16
US	23,28	23,28
EC	..	242,01	..	0,90	303,18	73,18	71,83	203,09	894,19
IBRD	0,00
IDA	0,00
IDB	0,00
IDB Sp.F.	0,00
IFAD	0,00
UNDP	0,00
UNICEF	0,63	0,63
UNAIDS	0,00

UNFPA	0,00
GFATM	0,00
<hr/>													
total	267,37	497,45	96,53	27,20	385,60	183,06	124,26	356,67	80,51	79,35	27,65	2125,65	

TOP FIVE DONORS TO THE WESTERN BALKANS

Table 134: EC to WESTERN BALKANS

Social Infrastructure & Services

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	13,03	0,00	29,82	23,88	24,69	6,46	5,07	3,98	52,26	66,53	52,18	277,90
BiH	0,00	0,00	38,48	12,18	33,22	44,58	19,94	33,69	96,71	87,87	71,16	437,84
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,30	7,95	0,70	4,06	66,14	76,20	83,63	238,99
Mac	0,00	0,00	14,83	14,60	10,27	6,45	1,99	4,61	45,20	60,62	39,27	197,85
FRY/Ser ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	67,49	47,02	103,57	129,82	255,46	285,76	199,31	1088,43
total	13,03	0,00	83,13	50,66	135,99	112,45	131,27	176,16	515,77	576,99	445,55	2241,00

Table 135: EC to ALBANIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	2,59	3,50	5,87	1,28	13,24
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	9,82	..	9,82
govt. & civ. soc	13,03	..	29,82	23,88	23,83	6,46	5,07	1,39	48,73	50,84	49,62	252,66
other	0,87	0,03	..	1,28	2,17
total	13,03	0,00	29,82	23,88	24,69	6,46	5,07	3,98	52,26	66,53	52,18	277,90

Table 136: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	3,24	3,19	6,00	3,07	15,50
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	38,48	..	4,34	8,77	51,60
govt. & civ. soc.	8,53	4,02	31,73	19,94	30,45	58,82	81,88	68,09	303,46
other	3,65	24,86	12,85	25,92	67,28

total	0,00	0,00	38,48	12,18	33,22	44,58	19,94	33,69	96,71	87,87	71,16	437,84
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Table 137: EC to CROATIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	2,28	..	4,06	11,81	9,13	6,40	33,67
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	15,73	15,73
govt. & civ. soc.	0,30	5,66	0,70	..	34,33	67,08	61,50	169,57
other	20,01	20,01
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,30	7,95	0,70	4,06	66,14	76,20	83,63	238,99

Table 138: EC to MACEDONIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	3,92	9,71	7,17	3,84	24,63
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	1,33	1,33
govt. & civ. soc.	14,83	14,60	10,27	6,45	1,99	0,69	22,20	53,45	25,58	150,07
other	11,97	..	9,85	21,81
total	0,00	0,00	14,83	14,60	10,27	6,45	1,99	4,61	45,20	60,62	39,27	197,85

Table 139: EC to FRY/Serbia

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	2,12	21,02	24,59	12,39	15,35	75,47
health	1,45	14,27	..	6,79	12,63	30,51	10,87	76,51
population	0,00
watsan	9,99	..	6,79	14,23	18,25	3,84	53,09
govt. & civ. soc.	18,60	22,77	38,34	95,22	174,39	211,58	167,85	728,75
other	47,44	..	63,10	..	29,62	13,04	1,41	154,61

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	67,49	47,02	103,57	129,82	255,46	285,76	199,31	1088,43
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Table 140: EC to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,00
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,00
other	0,00

total												0,00
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Table 141: EC to WESTERN BALKANS

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,00	4,34	0,30	0,00	0,00	0,01	9,78	4,48	18,90
BiH	67,43	21,91	0,00	0,30	0,00	0,00	1,46	12,39	0,00	103,48
Cro	0,00	3,34	0,00	108,64	8,23	0,00	15,73	135,94
Mac	13,59	0,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,56	16,45
FRY/Ser	0,72	57,68	199,90	96,42	136,27	109,57	104,88	705,43
ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	142,59	0,00	0,00	0,00	142,59

total	0,00	0,00	67,43	21,91	18,65	61,92	199,90	347,64	145,97	131,73	127,65	1122,79
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Table 142: EC to ALBANIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	4,34	9,78	4,48	18,60
comm.	0,30	0,01	0,31
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,00

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,34	0,30	0,00	0,00	0,01	9,78	4,48	18,90
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Table 143: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	51,85	21,91	73,76
comm.	0,30	1,33	1,63
energy	15,57	15,57
banking & fin. services	0,13	0,13
business & other services	12,39	..	12,39
total	0,00	0,00	67,43	21,91	0,00	0,30	0,00	0,00	1,46	12,39	0,00	103,48

Table 144: EC to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	108,64	15,73	124,37
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,06	0,06
business & other services	3,34	8,18	11,52
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,34	0,00	108,64	8,23	0,00	15,73	135,94

Table 145: EC to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	13,59	1,28	14,87
comm.	0,30	1,28	1,58
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,00

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	13,59	0,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,56	16,45
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Table 146: EC to FRY/Serbia

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	8,15	5,98	24,12	23,02	61,27
comm.	7,98	..	3,20	11,17
energy	0,72	22,00	..	74,69	113,00	67,79	61,40	339,61
banking and fin. services	7,52	..	7,52
business & other services	35,67	199,90	13,58	9,31	10,13	17,27	285,86
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,72	57,68	199,90	96,42	136,27	109,57	104,88	705,43

Table 147: EC to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	115,43	115,43
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking and fin. ser.	0,00
business & other ser.	27,16	27,16
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	142,59	0,00	0,00	0,00	142,59

Table 148: EC to WESTERN BALKANS

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,00	42,77	45,14	35,14	40,96	31,96	45,98	59,72	0,63	8,76	3,84	314,89
BiH	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,54	141,36	86,20	129,08	81,26	4,65	1,83	0,00	445,08
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,15	18,32	79,07	76,11	8,38	7,74	31,91	221,68
Mac	0,75	16,18	31,14	18,98	40,30	23,12	76,89	46,85	1,60	10,86	7,00	273,66
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	98,02	758,42	91,77	70,75	27,46	25,65	20,49	1092,55

ex Yu	0,00
total	0,75	59,10	76,28	54,66	320,79	918,02	422,80	334,70	42,72	54,83	63,23	2347,87	

Table 149: EC to ALBANIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	1,71	4,59	3,84	10,14
other	..	42,77	45,14	35,14	40,96	30,25	45,98	59,72	0,63	4,17	..	304,76
total	0,00	42,77	45,14	35,14	40,96	31,96	45,98	59,72	0,63	8,76	3,84	314,89

Table 150: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,54	0,25	4,65	1,83	..	7,26
other	..	0,16	141,11	86,20	129,08	81,26	437,82
total	0,00	0,16	0,00	0,54	141,36	86,20	129,08	81,26	4,65	1,83	0,00	445,08

Table 151: EC to CROATIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,05	0,07	5,05	5,14	0,04	10,34
other	0,15	18,32	79,02	76,05	3,32	2,61	31,87	211,34
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,15	18,32	79,07	76,11	8,38	7,74	31,91	221,68

Table 152: EC to MACEDONIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP
other
total

GEP	2,63	3,93	6,55
other	0,75	16,18	31,14	18,98	40,30	23,12	76,89	46,85	1,60	8,23	3,07	267,10	
total	0,75	16,18	31,14	18,98	40,30	23,12	76,89	46,85	1,60	10,86	7,00	273,66	

Table 153: EC to FRY/Serbia

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,11	..	24,59	3,26	16,01	43,97
other	98,02	758,42	91,66	70,75	2,86	22,39	4,48	1048,58
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	98,02	758,42	91,77	70,75	27,46	25,65	20,49	1092,55

Table 154: EC to EX YU INSPECIFIED

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 155: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS

Social Infrastructure & Services

GERMANY

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	12,41	2,06	26,33	15,57	10,58	42,92	20,73	19,79	27,06	15,47	19,67	212,59
BiH	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,51	14,74	11,97	20,99	15,25	39,97	3,30	115,72
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,97	12,27	7,43	7,85	59,03	10,39	5,08	112,02
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,19	3,88	21,54	10,71	20,15	6,00	22,97	4,74	90,18
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	26,31	54,51	54,57	61,38	54,66	56,53	23,60	331,55

ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	18,95	0,00	0,00	18,95
total	12,41	2,06	26,33	15,76	60,25	145,97	105,41	130,16	180,95	145,32	56,38	881,00	

Table 156: GERMANY to ALBANIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,43	..	2,74	3,58	3,58	3,99	5,04	5,26	0,89	25,51
health	5,53	0,20	0,22	5,94
population	3,45	2,06	1,37	6,87
watsan	8,97	..	25,89	15,57	0,07	32,70	15,85	11,97	20,05	7,04	16,01	154,12
govt. & civ. soc.	1,97	1,58	1,02	2,00	0,54	1,14	2,08	10,32
other	0,28	3,69	0,28	1,63	1,44	2,03	0,47	9,81
total	12,41	2,06	26,33	15,57	10,58	42,92	20,73	19,79	27,06	15,47	19,67	212,59

Table 157: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	8,57	8,58	8,95	8,65	9,39	10,34	0,40	54,86
health	0,03	0,05	0,01	0,09
population	0,00
watsan	4,99	..	17,80	0,00	22,79
govt. & civ. soc.	0,06	5,90	2,96	7,03	4,63	5,40	1,95	27,93
other	0,89	0,23	0,01	0,31	1,24	6,43	0,95	10,06
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,51	14,74	11,97	20,99	15,25	39,97	3,30	115,72

Table 158: GERMANY to CROATIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
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education	8,72	6,65	5,84	6,22	6,51	6,40	1,42	41,75
health	0,02	0,02
population	0,00
watsan	49,50	..	1,12	50,62
govt. & civ. soc.	0,47	5,49	1,57	1,63	1,85	1,76	1,50	14,27
other	0,78	0,12	0,00	0,00	1,18	2,24	1,04	5,36
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	9,97	12,27	7,43	7,85	59,03	10,39	5,08	112,02

Table 159: GERMANY to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,19	2,29	4,28	2,36	2,59	4,15	2,87	0,11	18,86
health	0,18	0,63	..	0,11	0,64	1,56
population	0,00
watsan	0,38	14,34	6,75	14,84	0,66	11,70	..	48,67
govt. & civ. soc.	0,69	1,37	1,61	2,61	0,36	0,87	4,26	11,76
other	0,33	0,92	0,19	7,52	0,37	9,34
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,19	3,88	21,54	10,71	20,15	6,00	22,97	4,74	90,18

Table 160: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	17,86	12,68	17,25	16,10	13,59	16,14	2,84	96,46
health	0,68	1,20	1,62	1,16	..	0,57	..	5,23
population	0,00
watsan	6,31	33,76	16,84	11,72	4,56	19,45	13,31	105,94
govt. & civ. soc.	0,71	6,07	13,95	32,40	33,87	15,47	6,18	108,64
other	0,76	0,81	4,91	0,00	2,64	4,89	1,27	15,28
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	26,31	54,51	54,57	61,38	54,66	56,53	23,60	331,55

Table 161: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
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education	9,31	9,31
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	9,65	9,65
	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	18,95	0,00	0,00	18,95

Table 162: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	8,28	32,94	..	6,80	27,13	0,00	1,48	3,36	0,00	49,98	20,51	150,49
BiH	0,00	0,00	6,21	5,73	16,39	7,98	8,01	6,70	2,22	53,25
Cro	0,00	0,10	3,04	0,00	0,64	0,00	2,41	0,47	6,66
Mac	6,90	0,02	3,73	0,08	2,30	4,30	0,54	0,92	18,79
FRY/Ser	1,62	16,12	111,52	42,31	24,94	15,76	57,58	269,86
ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,37	0,00	0,00	0,37
total	15,17	32,94	0,00	6,80	35,08	28,62	129,48	56,60	37,63	75,40	81,70	499,42

Table 163: GERMANY to ALBANIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	..	32,94	32,94
comm.	0,04	..	0,08	0,08	0,19
energy	23,73	3,33	..	49,05	16,78	92,89
banking & fin. services	4,83	6,80	0,09	3,55	15,27
business & other services	3,45	3,39	..	1,48	0,76	0,11	9,19
total	8,28	32,94	0,00	6,80	27,13	0,00	1,48	3,36	0,00	49,98	20,51	150,49

Table 164: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
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transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,00	0,01	0,01
energy	0,10	..	2,70	6,50	9,30
banking & fin. services	1,36	1,88	13,49	7,32	5,10	29,15
business & other services	4,75	3,86	0,20	0,65	2,91	0,20	2,22	..	14,78
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,21	5,73	16,39	7,98	8,01	6,70	2,22	..	53,25

Table 165: GERMANY to CROATIA

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,07	0,07
energy	0,00
banking & fin. service	0,00	0,12	0,13	0,26
business & other services	0,10	2,97	..	0,64	..	2,29	0,34	6,34
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,10	3,04	0,00	0,64	0,00	2,41	0,47	6,66

Table 166: GERMANY to MACEDONIA

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,31	..	0,31
comm.	1,02	0,06	0,11	1,20
energy	0,04	0,08	0,07	0,19
banking & fin. services	1,93	0,06	0,02	2,01
business & other services	6,90	0,02	2,67	..	2,23	2,37	0,11	0,78	15,08
total	6,90	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	3,73	0,08	2,30	4,30	0,54	0,92	18,79

Table 167: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,71	1,14	7,35	0,65	2,59	12,44
comm.	0,26	..	0,18	..	0,08	0,09	0,61
energy	0,23	12,99	85,67	28,76	..	5,30	40,46	173,42
banking & fin. services	0,68	0,03	14,50	5,88	19,00	1,13	13,50	54,73
business & other services	1,71	3,99	6,84	3,35	9,25	3,53	28,67
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,62	16,12	111,52	42,31	24,94	15,76	57,58	269,86

Table 168: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking and fin. ser.	0,37	0,37
business & other ser.	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,37	0,00	0,00	0,37

Table 169: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	6,90	4,16	5,14	0,55	4,74	6,39	1,03	11,45	40,35
BiH	11,97	0,46	1,90	0,65	0,52	1,12	14,15	30,77
Cro	0,11	0,02	0,00	1,62	2,33	0,85	1,15	6,08
Mac	4,48	17,87	0,07	1,79	8,93	0,65	3,43	37,21
FRY/Ser	6,09	15,74	2,48	12,63	4,71	10,13	33,80	85,58
ex Yu	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,65	4,77	0,00	6,42

total	6,90	0,00	0,00	0,00	26,81	39,24	5,00	21,42	24,53	18,54	63,98	206,41
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Table 170: GERMANY to ALBANIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,05	0,05	0,10
other	6,90	4,10	5,14	0,55	4,69	6,39	1,03	11,45	40,25
total	6,90	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,16	5,14	0,55	4,74	6,39	1,03	11,45	40,35

Table 171: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HEREGOVINA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	11,97	0,46	1,90	0,65	0,52	1,12	14,15	30,77
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	11,97	0,46	1,90	0,65	0,52	1,12	14,15	30,77

Table 172: GERMANY to CROATIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,11	0,11
other	0,11	0,02	..	1,62	2,33	0,85	1,04	5,97
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,11	0,02	0,00	1,62	2,33	0,85	1,15	6,08

Table 173: GERMANY to MACEDONIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,92	1,16	0,03	..	2,11
other	3,56	16,71	0,07	1,79	8,93	0,62	3,43	35,10

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,48	17,87	0,07	1,79	8,93	0,65	3,43	37,21
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Table 174: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,03	0,09	0,13
other	6,09	15,74	2,48	12,63	4,71	10,10	33,70	85,45
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,09	15,74	2,48	12,63	4,71	10,13	33,80	85,58

Table 175: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	1,40	1,40
other	0,25	4,77	..	5,02
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,65	4,77	0,00	6,42

Table 176: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

UNITED STATES

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	7,49	8,28	32,34	38,06	30,28	21,17	21,18	20,12	21,32	200,25
BiH	0,00	17,87	38,94	28,91	80,17	41,47	40,42	32,05	26,33	306,15
Cro	9,42	0,00	5,00	9,19	5,38	2,78	38,60	69,01	61,53	200,91
Mac	4,95	4,57	11,88	20,88	24,20	40,39	35,28	25,85	25,08	193,08
FRY/Ser	7,25	9,24	54,24	227,39	159,88	135,73	160,10	87,23	841,06
ex Yu	0,00
total	21,86	0,00	0,00	37,97	97,40	151,29	367,42	265,68	271,22	307,13	221,49	1741,46

Table 177: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,48	3,06	2,52	2,58	0,02	..	8,66
health	1,46	0,89	0,03	2,87	3,37	3,29	2,00	2,42	16,35
population	1,21	0,89	0,08	1,82	..	2,09	2,11	0,58	8,79
watsan	0,28	0,56	0,84
govt. & civ. soc.	4,59	5,13	27,50	35,42	22,70	17,22	15,52	15,98	17,97	162,03
other	2,90	0,02	0,02	0,28	0,00	0,35	3,58
total	7,49	0,00	0,00	8,28	32,34	38,06	30,28	21,17	21,18	20,12	21,32	200,25

Table 178: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,77	0,77
health	0,55	0,55
population	0,00
watsan	0,39	..	14,80	15,19
govt. & civ. soc.	17,87	38,55	28,91	64,58	41,44	36,37	30,00	26,25	283,97
other	0,02	0,03	3,51	2,05	0,08	5,68
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	17,87	38,94	28,91	80,17	41,47	40,42	32,05	26,33	306,15

Table 179: UNITED STATES to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	3,19	3,53	2,53	9,26
health	0,34	0,07	0,41
population	9,42	0,04	9,47
watsan	0,79	..	0,01	0,79
govt. & civ. soc.	0,30	5,66	0,70	..	34,33	67,08	61,50	169,57
other	1,50	..	1,02	2,66	4,27	1,93	0,03	11,42

total	9,42	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	9,19	5,38	2,78	38,60	69,01	61,53	200,91
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Table 180: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	3,49	4,56	7,33	15,39
health	0,13	0,07	0,20
population	0,11	0,08	0,19
watsan	0,47	0,16	0,63
govt. & civ. soc.	4,95	4,57	5,75	15,85	16,06	33,38	26,62	25,15	17,44	149,77
other	2,64	..	0,64	6,88	8,60	0,59	7,56	26,91
total	4,95	0,00	0,00	4,57	11,88	20,88	24,20	40,39	35,28	25,85	25,08	193,08

Table 181: UNITED STATES to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,75	2,69	2,91	0,14	..	0,04	0,03	6,56
health	2,38	0,93	3,08	1,00	7,40
population	0,60	0,93	0,34	2,52	..	2,13	0,54	7,05
watsan	10,25	10,25
govt. & civ. soc.	7,25	5,51	49,69	210,22	141,91	133,09	156,28	83,35	787,30
other	0,59	14,32	2,63	1,66	3,31	22,51
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,25	9,24	54,24	227,39	159,88	135,73	160,10	87,23	841,06

Table 182: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,00
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,00
other	0,00

total 0,00

Table 183: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	26,87	14,56	34,21	23,57	2,96	20,50	11,19	7,67	6,70	148,22
BiH	0,00	162,57	208,83	75,42	1,42	16,28	22,78	12,64	5,78	505,71
Cro	3,99	1,87	9,14	19,53	11,01	16,51	14,53	10,95	11,46	98,99
Mac	10,98	7,00	47,55	12,18	4,92	15,22	13,70	11,77	12,47	135,79
FRY/Ser	0,00	2,80	73,06	251,07	30,83	58,77	41,37	26,15	38,58	522,62
ex Yu	0,00
total	41,83	0,00	0,00	188,79	372,79	381,76	51,14	127,28	103,57	69,17	74,99	1411,32

Table 184: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	2,13	3,16	0,41	0,22	0,58	6,49
comm.	0,00
energy	0,47	1,71	1,50	1,95	0,32	0,88	6,82
banking and fin. services	6,77	0,17	0,13	..	0,00	7,08
business & other services	20,09	14,56	32,08	19,78	0,71	18,78	8,66	7,35	5,82	127,83
total	26,87	0,00	0,00	14,56	34,21	23,57	2,96	20,50	11,19	7,67	6,70	148,22

Table 185: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,35	..	0,76	0,46	..	1,57
comm.	1,86	0,00	0,01	0,01	..	0,79	..	2,67
energy	1,29	0,83	0,07	..	0,05	2,24
banking and fin. service	133,02	133,02
business & other services	29,55	205,34	74,59	0,65	16,28	22,71	11,38	5,73	366,22

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	162,57	208,83	75,42	1,42	16,28	22,78	12,64	5,78	505,71
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Table 186: UNITED STATES to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,17	..	0,00	0,11	0,28
comm.	0,03	0,59	0,30	0,92
energy	0,26	0,88	0,49	0,52	2,14
banking & fin. service	3,99	3,44	0,08	0,84	..	0,26	8,60
business & other services	1,87	8,97	19,51	6,98	15,76	12,81	10,46	10,68	87,05
total	3,99	0,00	0,00	1,87	9,14	19,53	11,01	16,51	14,53	10,95	11,46	98,99

Table 187: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	1,59	0,74	0,11	0,00	2,44
comm.	0,03	2,75	2,78
energy	0,33	..	0,29	0,46	0,37	0,00	0,03	0,30	1,78
banking & fin. service	0,00
business & other services	10,98	6,67	45,93	8,40	4,47	14,85	13,70	11,63	12,17	128,80
total	10,98	0,00	0,00	7,00	47,55	12,18	4,92	15,22	13,70	11,77	12,47	135,79

Table 188: UNITED STATES to FRY/SERBIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,79	0,70	1,23	..	2,72
comm.	0,17	..	0,77	1,30	0,36	0,01	2,61
energy	6,99	..	0,01	0,17	1,18	1,87	10,23
banking & fin. services	0,05	1,06	0,05	1,17

business & other services	2,80	73,06	243,90	30,78	56,13	39,20	23,38	36,65	505,90
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,80	73,06	251,07	30,83	58,77	41,37	26,15	38,58	522,62

Table 189: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,00
total												0,00

Table 190: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	3,56	0,00	0,00	4,77	0,24	3,70	0,00	2,57	9,18	8,89	14,39	47,30
BiH	16,00	0,00	0,00	74,56	0,03	0,00	0,00	1,91	2,89	1,49	3,01	99,89
Cro	0,50	0,00	0,00	10,19	0,00	0,00	0,00	20,12	3,54	1,04	3,11	38,50
Mac	1,18	0,00	0,00	1,70	1,44	29,68	0,92	18,80	15,45	6,24	4,96	80,38
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,88	0,00	1,17	0,00	17,36	27,57	4,35	9,03	60,36
ex Yu	0,00
total	21,24	0,00	0,00	92,11	1,71	34,54	0,92	60,76	58,63	22,01	34,50	326,43

Table 191: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	3,73	0,24	7,04	11,01
other	3,56	1,05	..	3,70	..	2,57	9,18	8,89	7,35	36,30
total	3,56	0,00	0,00	4,77	0,24	3,70	0,00	2,57	9,18	8,89	14,39	47,30

Table 192: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00	..	0,01	..	0,02
other	16,00	74,56	0,03	1,91	2,89	1,47	3,01	99,88
total	16,00	0,00	0,00	74,56	0,03	0,00	0,00	1,91	2,89	1,49	3,01	99,89

Table 193: UNITED STATES to CROATIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,34	..	0,26	..	0,59
other	0,50	10,19	19,78	3,54	0,79	3,11	37,91
total	0,50	0,00	0,00	10,19	0,00	0,00	0,00	20,12	3,54	1,04	3,11	38,50

Table 194: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,60	0,96	..	0,09	0,04	..	1,70
other	1,18	1,10	0,48	29,68	0,83	18,80	15,45	6,20	4,96	78,67
total	1,18	0,00	0,00	1,70	1,44	29,68	0,92	18,80	15,45	6,24	4,96	80,38

Table 195: UNITED STATES to FRY/SRBIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,03	..	0,03
other	0,88	..	1,17	..	17,36	27,57	4,33	9,03	60,33
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,88	0,00	1,17	0,00	17,36	27,57	4,35	9,03	60,36

Table 196: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 197: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS

Social Infrastructure & Services

IDA

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,00	0,00	31,00	21,41	54,45	50,86	13,51	0,00	17,14	3,14	17,89	209,41
BiH	0,00	37,51	13,64	79,33	17,32	52,99	47,29	23,40	8,00	122,62	37,83	439,94
Cro	0,00
Mac	15,37	19,50	6,20	37,78	12,37	0,00	21,08	6,50	0,00	0,00	0,00	118,81
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	13,00	43,70	12,58	43,20	112,48
ex Yu	0,00
total	15,37	57,01	50,84	138,52	84,15	103,85	81,87	42,90	68,83	138,35	98,93	880,63

Table 198: IDA to ALBANIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	15,45	15,45
health	21,41	21,41

population	0,00
watsan	12,88	17,14	3,14	17,89	51,05
govt. & civ. soc.	54,45	22,53	76,98
other	31,00	13,51	44,51
total	0,00	0,00	31,00	21,41	54,45	50,86	13,51	0,00	17,14	3,14	17,89	209,41

Table 199: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	13,64	13,65	7,13	10,23	44,64
health	12,37	19,43	31,80
population	0,00
watsan	15,45	..	23,40	..	20,96	8,18	68,00
govt. & civ. soc.	..	8,66	..	79,33	28,51	..	116,50
other	..	28,85	4,95	23,89	47,29	..	8,00	66,03	..	179,00
total	0,00	37,51	13,64	79,33	17,32	52,99	47,29	23,40	8,00	122,62	37,83	439,94

Table 200: IDA to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,00
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 201: IDA to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
--	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	-------

education	6,20	6,20
health	..	19,50	19,50
population	0,00
watsan	17,70	17,70
govt. & civ. soc.	0,00
other	15,37	37,78	12,37	..	3,38	6,50	75,41
total	15,37	19,50	6,20	37,78	12,37	0,00	21,08	6,50	0,00	0,00	0,00	118,81

Table 202: IDA to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	13,00	5,14	..	4,86	23,00
health	22,85	7,34	..	30,19
population	0,00
watsan	8,00	8,00
govt. & civ. soc.	12,78	12,78
other	7,71	5,24	25,56	38,52
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	13,00	43,70	12,58	43,20	112,48

Table 203: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,00
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 204: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total

Alb	21,96	62,90	0,00	21,41	31,74	18,80	0,00	80,48	31,99	26,20	27,61	323,09
BiH	0,00	41,09	60,76	37,78	61,87	0,00	115,92	109,21	0,00	0,00	0,00	426,63
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	8,00	0,00	0,00	8,00
Mac	93,35	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	11,98	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	105,32
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	131,31	93,11	79,65	24,03	328,11
ex Yu	0,00
total	115,31	103,98	60,76	59,18	93,62	30,77	115,92	321,00	133,10	105,86	51,64	1191,14

Table 205: IDA to ALBANIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	16,47	28,85	..	21,41	16,89	10,43	..	22,10	31,99	148,15
comm.	0,00
energy	5,49	34,05	38,87	..	26,20	27,61	132,22
banking & fin. services	14,85	8,37	..	19,50	42,72
business & other services	0,00
total	21,96	62,90	0,00	21,41	31,74	18,80	0,00	80,48	31,99	26,20	27,61	323,09

Table 206: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	48,36	14,86	39,00	102,23
comm.	0,00
energy	..	41,09	12,40	31,48	47,29	132,25
banking & fin. services	6,30	27,02	33,32
business & other services	61,87	..	26,75	70,21	158,83
total	0,00	41,09	60,76	37,78	61,87	0,00	115,92	109,21	0,00	0,00	0,00	426,63

Table 207: IDA to CROATIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
--	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	-------

transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,00
energy	8,00	8,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	8,00	0,00	0,00	8,00

Table 208: IDA to MACEDONIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	11,98	11,98
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	93,35	93,35
total	93,35	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	11,98	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	105,32

Table 209: IDA to FRY/SERBIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	57,64	..	57,64
comm.	0,00
energy	6,50	1,71	22,01	24,03	54,25
banking & fin. services	110,51	91,40	201,91
business & other services	14,30	14,30
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	131,31	93,11	79,65	24,03	328,11

Table 210: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,00
energy	0,00
banking & fin. service	0,00
business & other service	0,00
total												0,00

Table 211: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	10,98	0,00	6,20	12,59	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,14	0,00	32,92
BiH	0,00	103,87	0,00	0,00	18,56	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	122,43
Cro	0,00
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	27,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	27,02
FRY/Ser	0,00
ex Yu	0,00
total	10,98	103,87	6,20	12,59	18,56	0,00	27,02	0,00	0,00	3,14	0,00	182,37

Table 212: IDA to ALBANIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	3,14	..	3,14
other	10,98	..	6,20	12,59	29,77
total	10,98	0,00	6,20	12,59	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,14	0,00	32,92

Table 213: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
--	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	-------

GEP	0,00
other	..	103,87	18,56	122,43
total	0,00	103,87	0,00	0,00	18,56	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	122,43

Table 214: IDA to CROATIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 215: IDA to MACEDONIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	27,02	27,02
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	27,02	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	27,02

Table 216: IDA to FRY/SERBIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 217: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

GEP	0,00
other	0,00
total												0,00

Table 218: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS

Social Infrastructure & Services

THE NETHERLANDS

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	0,49	3,59	0,14	1,12	0,00	11,79	11,98	3,46	0,86	0,86	1,16	35,44
BiH	0,00	8,45	3,05	23,66	3,73	11,65	8,20	3,78	52,24	5,33	11,54	131,63
Cro	0,16	0,12	0,53	0,13	0,56	0,36	0,19	0,07	2,36	1,49	0,26	6,23
Mac	0,40	0,00	0,56	7,08	1,58	15,33	11,36	4,96	22,28	2,43	7,52	73,50
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,22	1,55	4,44	33,10	29,87	20,58	11,54	8,69	3,24	113,23
ex YU	3,65	2,35	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,96	0,00	0,00	6,95
total	4,70	14,51	4,49	33,54	10,32	72,22	61,60	32,85	90,22	18,79	23,72	366,98

Table 219: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA

Social Infrastructure & Services

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,02	0,26	0,28
health	..	0,81	0,81
population	1,59	1,59
watsan	0,09	0,09
govt. & civ. soc.	0,40	2,65	0,14	1,12	..	11,79	8,58	3,46	0,42	0,86	0,91	30,32
other	..	0,13	1,78	..	0,43	2,35
total	0,49	3,59	0,14	1,12	0,00	11,79	11,98	3,46	0,86	0,86	1,16	35,44

Table 220: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 Social Infrastructure & Services
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	..	0,42	0,21	0,57	0,03	0,00	0,02	0,03	0,07	1,35
health	..	1,49	1,42	1,17	1,02	1,13	6,22
population	0,00
watsan	..	0,65	0,07	1,19	..	0,71	0,78	..	3,39
govt. & civ. soc.	..	5,69	0,71	7,89	1,85	9,34	6,59	2,58	52,24	4,50	10,20	101,57
other	..	0,21	0,65	12,85	0,83	0,46	1,60	1,20	..	0,01	1,28	19,10
total	0,00	8,45	3,05	23,66	3,73	11,65	8,20	3,78	52,24	5,33	11,54	131,63

Table 221: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA
 Social Infrastructure & Services
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,00
health	0,16	0,12	..	0,13	0,63	1,04
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,53	0,36	0,19	0,07	1,42	0,73	0,26	3,56
other	0,56	0,31	0,75	..	1,62
total	0,16	0,12	0,53	0,13	0,56	0,36	0,19	0,07	2,36	1,49	0,26	6,23

Table 222: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA
 Social Infrastructure & Services
 commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,56	7,02	0,76	5,70	9,20	0,44	14,92	1,49	3,13	43,22
health	0,00
population	0,00
watsan	0,00
govt. & civ. soc.	0,40	0,06	0,82	9,61	1,82	3,69	2,71	0,61	3,69	23,43
other	0,02	0,34	0,82	4,65	0,33	0,70	6,85
total	0,40	0,00	0,56	7,08	1,58	15,33	11,36	4,96	22,28	2,43	7,52	73,50

Table 223: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,48	1,68	0,08	..	0,82	0,00	3,06
health	0,24	..	6,30	0,04	2,75	9,32
population	1,65	0,01	1,66
watsan	0,21	..	3,17	4,84	3,08	11,30
govt. & civ. soc.	0,18	0,91	4,02	22,73	18,44	12,88	10,80	7,33	3,24	80,53
other	0,04	0,19	0,42	0,41	3,23	1,78	0,74	0,54	..	7,36
total	0,00	0,00	0,22	1,55	4,44	33,10	29,87	20,58	11,54	8,69	3,24	113,23

Table 224: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
education	0,55	0,22	0,77
health	2,60	0,31	2,92
population	0,59	0,59
watsan	0,27	0,32	0,58
govt. & civ. soc.	0,22	1,57	0,05	1,84
other	..	0,24	0,24
total	3,65	2,35	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,96	0,00	0,00	6,95

Table 225: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	1,02	0,00	0,09	0,40	0,00	0,00	0,75	0,00	0,02	0,04	0,17	2,49
BiH	0,00	6,47	0,01	1,12	0,95	0,12	0,91	0,00	0,02	1,23	18,28	29,12
Cro	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	3,29	0,00	0,00	3,31
Mac	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,63	0,97	4,39	1,39	7,62	7,28	0,75	0,24	29,28
FRY/Ser	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,76	8,46	19,83	5,75	0,89	1,49	2,78	1,46	41,93
ex Yu	6,99	0,45	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,43

total	8,00	6,91	0,62	8,92	10,38	24,34	8,82	8,51	12,10	4,80	20,15	113,56
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Table 226: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	1,02	1,02
comm.	0,09	0,34	0,43
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,06	0,75	..	0,02	0,04	0,17	1,04
total	1,02	0,00	0,09	0,40	0,00	0,00	0,75	0,00	0,02	0,04	0,17	2,49

Table 227: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	..	1,78	0,01	0,37	0,61	0,10	0,38	3,25
comm.	..	1,33	0,01	0,72	0,32	0,01	2,39
energy	..	3,35	3,35
banking & fin. ser.	0,00
business & other ser.	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,91	..	0,02	1,23	17,90	20,12
total	0,00	6,47	0,01	1,12	0,95	0,12	0,91	0,00	0,02	1,23	18,28	29,12

Table 228: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA

Economic Infrastructure

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,00
comm.	0,02	0,02
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	3,29	3,29
business & other services	0,00	0,00

total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	3,29	0,00	0,00	3,31
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Table 229: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,03	0,97	0,75	1,75
comm.	0,25	0,33	..	0,03	..	0,06	0,67
energy	0,00
banking & fin. service	6,33	..	3,64	0,32	7,62	7,23	25,14
business & other services	0,02	0,75	..	0,02	0,75	0,18	1,71
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	6,63	0,97	4,39	1,39	7,62	7,28	0,75	0,24	29,28

Table 230: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	17,80	..	0,67	18,47
comm.	0,51	0,76	3,90	2,03	0,00	0,13	..	7,33
energy	0,00
banking & fin. services	4,56	..	1,40	5,96
business & other services	4,36	0,22	1,49	2,65	1,46	10,17
total	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,76	8,46	19,83	5,75	0,89	1,49	2,78	1,46	41,93

Table 231: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
transport & storage	0,01	0,01
comm.	0,68	0,45	1,12
energy	6,30	6,30
banking & fin. services	0,00
business & other services	0,00

total	6,99	0,45	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,43
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Table 232: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
Alb	..	0,06	0,00	0,85	0,00	3,34	8,97	0,06	13,27
BiH	..	0,15	..	6,57	0,47	0,80	1,77	3,22	0,00	0,00	0,00	12,96
Cro	0,00	2,32	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	2,34
Mac	0,08	0,10	0,45	0,32	0,85	0,00	0,11	0,00	0,02	1,93
FRY/Ser	0,02	..	0,07	0,70	0,00	0,02	1,99	0,00	2,79
ex Yu	0,84	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,84
total	0,84	0,20	0,08	6,69	0,92	1,18	6,49	3,22	3,46	10,97	0,08	34,14

Table 233: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	..	0,06	0,85	..	3,34	7,17	0,06	11,48
other	1,79	..	1,79
total	0,00	0,06	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,85	0,00	3,34	8,97	0,06	13,27

Table 234: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
gep	0,87	0,87
other	..	0,15	..	6,57	0,47	0,80	0,90	3,22	12,09
total	0,00	0,15	0,00	6,57	0,47	0,80	1,77	3,22	0,00	0,00	0,00	12,96

Table 235: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	2,32	0,02	..	2,34
other	0,00
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,32	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	2,34

Table 236: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,08	0,03	0,45	0,32	0,85	..	0,11	1,84
other	0,07	0,00	0,02	0,09
total	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,10	0,45	0,32	0,85	0,00	0,11	0,00	0,02	1,93

Table 237: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,02	..	0,07	0,70	..	0,02	0,03	..	0,83
other	1,96	..	1,96
total	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,02	0,00	0,07	0,70	0,00	0,02	1,99	0,00	2,79

Table 238: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED

Multisector

commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	total
GEP	0,00
other	0,84	0,84

total	0,84	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,84
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CHAPTER 7 – ANNEX

CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM (CRS) MICRO DATA OF MAJOR YEARS AND ALLOCATIONS

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES (SIS)

EDUCATION

Table 1: Germany to Albania

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(3.6) (2.5)	(3.60) (2.4)	(4.0) (2.9)	(5.0) (4.4)	(5.3) (5.1)
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.2356	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.0699	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.2450	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.4067	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.3118
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS- 1.9491		IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.2028	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.6044	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.4970
			IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.8627	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 3.5102

Table 2: Italy to Albania

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	2001	2003
(5.6) (3.9)	(4.1) (2.6)	(5.8) (4.9)
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES&PROFESS.TRAINING - 0.2983	COMMUNITY WORKS - 1.8501	PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEMALE MICRO ENTERPRISE - 0.2353
EXPERTS/SCHOLARSHIPS - 3.5366	UNIVERSITY & POST-UNIV. SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.1302	VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO TRUST FUND ETF - 0.5648
		VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO TRUST FUND ETF - 0.5648
		REMODELING OF EDUCATION FACILITIES LOCAL FUND - 2.6416
		DVPT OF THE ITALIAN LANGUAGE DEPARTMENT OF SCUTARI UNIVERSITY - 0.2545

Table 3: US to Albania

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(3.1) (2.6)
ACCELERATED DVPT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.4023
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.1628

Table 4: EC to Albania

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2004
(3.5) (3.0)	(5.9) (5.6)
EDUCATION - 1.6945	SUPPORT TO VET AND LIFELONG LEARNING - 3.7272
TEMPUS CARDS - 1.1297	TEMPUS CARDS - ALBANIE 2004 - 1.8636

Table 5: IDA to Albania

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(15.5) (12.0)
EDUCATION REFORM [LOAN] – 12.0000	

Table 6: Austria to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(7.9) (7.2)	(8.9) (7.1)	(8.5) (6.7)	(8.2) (6.2)	(6.5) (4.3)	(8.3) (5.4)	(8.3) (5.8)	(10.7) (9.1)	(12.0) (11.5)	(13.9) (13.6)
NATIONAL LIBRARY SARAJEVO - 0.6445	EQUIPMENT FOR SCHOOL - 0.3072	REHABILITATION SARAJEVO UNISVERITY - 0.4040	REHABILITATION UNIVERSITY SARAJEVO - 0.6124	SUPPORT FOR UNIVERSITIES - 0.4025	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.8656	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.1409	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 8.7292	SUPPORT OF UNIVERSITIES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 04/05 - 0.5673	SUPPORT TO THE HIGHER EDUCATION IN BOSNIEN UND HERZEGOVINA 2005-2007 - 0.9477
SUPPORT HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.6617	RENOVATION UNIVERSITY SARAJEWO - 0.4057	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.0827	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 1.7588	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 3.4472		SUPPORT OF UNIVERSITIES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 0.3817		INFORMATION & CONTACT POINT F. BOSN. UNIVERSITIES F. EC RESEARCH PROGR. - 0.4730	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 12.2766
IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.1489	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 3.8315	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR UNIVERSITIES - .3951	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 1.9793					IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 9.8461	
	ASSISTANCE UNIVERSITY SARAJEWO - 0.5535	SUPPORT PROGRAMME F. SARAJEVO UNIV - 0.5472	UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP - 0.0839						
	ASSISTANCE FOR UNIVERSITY SARAJEWO. - 0.3468	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR UNIVERSITIES - 0.5429	SUPPORT FOR UNIVERSITY SARAJEVO - 0.5231						
			SUPPORT BOSNIAN UNIVERSITIES 99/2000 - 0.5211						

Table 7: Germany to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(8.6) (6.9)	(8.6) (5.9)	(8.9) (6.1)	(8.7) (6.3)	(9.4) (8.2)	(10.3) (10.1)
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 6.7653	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 5.7752	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 5.7752	BASIC LIFE SKILLS FOR YOUTH & ADULTS - 0.4712	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.4406	REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL EDUCATION TRAINING SYSTEM IN BiH- 1.2424
			IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 5.4558	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.5648	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.5814
				IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 6.8880	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 7.7956

Table 8: Italy to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996
(46.6) (36.5)
EXPERTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS - 33.5062
SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.3240
SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.6157

Table 9: Japan to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999
(8.0) (8.2)	(8.9) (8.7)
PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF BASIC SCHOOLS - 8.1646	CONSTRUCTION OF BASIC SCHOOLS - 8.6911

Table 10: EC to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004
(3.2) (2.2)	(3.2) (2.7)	(6.0) (5.7)
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 – BIH - 2.2472	ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 2.7113	SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT - 2.7333
		TEMPUS CARDS - BOSNIE HERZEGOVINE 2004 - 2.9817

Table 11: IDA to BiH

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	2000	2004	2005
(13.6) (11.0)	(13.6) (10.6)	(7.1) (6.8)	(10.2) (10.0)
EDUCATION RECONSTRUCTION - 11.0000	EDUCATION - 10.6000	ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT/INSTITUTION BUILDING - 6.8000	EDUCATION RESTRUCTURING PROJECT - 10.0000

Table 12: Austria to Croatia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
(6.6) (6.0)	(5.9) (4.7)	(6.2) (4.9)	(5.9) (4.4)	(5.7) (3.8)	(5.1) (3.3)	(3.9) (2.7)	(4.0) (3.4)
IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.7689	MINISTRY OF SCIENCE SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.1044	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.6194	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 1.9041	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 3.4790	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 3.1405	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 2.4693	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 3.2377
	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.5729		IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 2.3050			MINISTRY OF EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.1425	

Table 13: Germany to Croatia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(8.7) (7.0)	(6.7) (4.6)	(5.8) (4.0)	(6.2) (4.5)	(6.5) (5.7)	(6.4) (6.2)
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 6.9679	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 4.4347	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 3.8668	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 4.1615	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 5.4602	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 6.0212
			ADVANCED TECH. & MANAGERIAL TRAINING - 0.1885		

Table 14: US to Croatia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001
(3.2) (2.7)	(3.5) (3.0)	(2.5) (2.2)
HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.2676	HIGHER EDUC.: CROSS-CUTTING - 3.0290	BASIC LIFE SKILLS: ACCEL. RETURN/SUST. REINTEGR. OF WAR-AFFECTED POP. - 0.5000
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.4123		BASIC LIFE SKILLS FOR YOUTH & ADULTS: CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 0.3000
		GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 0.7500
		BASIC LIFE SKILLS: MITIGATION OF ADVERSE SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND TRENDS - 0.2500
		HIGHER EDUC.: MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & IMPROVED GOV. - 0.4250

Table 15: EC to Croatia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004	2005
(4.1) (2.8)	(11.8) (10.0)	(9.1) (8.7)	(6.4) (6.2)
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 - CROATIE - 2.8168	SOCIAL COHESION PROJECTS. EDUCATION - 6.6087	SOCIAL COHESION - 3.7272	HIGHER EDUCATION - 6.2143
	ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 3.3891	TEMPUS CARDS - CROATIE 2004 - 4.9696	

Table 16: Germany to Macedonia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2003	2004
(2.3) (1.8)	(4.3) (3.0)	(4.2) (3.6)	(2.9) (2.8)
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 0.9821	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 1.1304	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.0967	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.5324
ADVANCED TECH. & MANAGERIAL TRAINING - 0.8171	HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.4578	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 0.3502	
	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 1.7905		

Table 17: Netherlands to Macedonia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(8.3) (5.3)
SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY - 5.067

Table 18: US to Macedonia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001
(3.5) (2.9)	(5.0) (4.4)
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 2.934	HIGHER EDUC.: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 3.0
	CONTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUC TO SUST. DVT INCREASED- 1.36

Table 19: Austria to FRY/Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(7.0) (5.5)	(7.9) (6.2)	(8.0) (6.0)	(9.5) (6.3)	(8.9) (5.8)	(9.3) (6.5)	(6.6) (5.6)	(7.3) (7.0)	(8.1) (7.8)
IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.5261	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.6385	SCHOOL REHABILITATION – KOSOVO - 0.3871	SUPPORT UNIVERSITY PRISTINA - 0.2007	CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOL - 0.2733	SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION INITIATIVES FOR MARGINALISED CHILDREN - 0.4509	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.1191	EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR YOUNG ASKHALI IN THE KOSOVO - 0.2361	REFORM OF UNIVERSITIES IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 2005-2007 - 1.5735
	SUPPORT PROGRAMME HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.2406	UNICEF CONTRIBUTION FOR SCHOOL BOOKS - 0.2710	SUPPORT UNIVERSITY MONTENEGRO - 0.2171	SUPPORT UNIVERSITIES IN SERBIA - 0.5212	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.0750	REORGANISATION UNIVERSITY KOSOVSKA MITROVICA - 0.1154	SUPPORT FOR UNIVERSITY PRISTINA - 0.3138	SUPPORT OF UNIVERSITY PRISTINA 2005-2007 - 0.5581
	SUPPORT PROGRAMME HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.1998	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 2.1396	SUPPORT UNIVERSITY MONTENEGRO - 0.2014	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.2147	SUPPORT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO - 0.8898		SUPPORT OF HIGHER EDUCATION SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO - 1.4120	IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 5.1113
		IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 2.7710	SUPPORT UNIVERSITY PRISTINA - 0.2123		SUPPORT FOR UNIVERSITY PRISTINA - 0.2822		ORGANISATIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF UNIVERSITIES IN KOSOVO - 0.2112	MANAGEMENT TRAINING - 0.1859
		MINISTRY OF SCIENCE – SCHOLARSHIP - 0.3460	MINISTRY OF EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.5536				IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.3997	
			IMPUTED STUDENTS' COSTS - 4.3130					

Table 20: France to FRY/Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2005
(3.2) (2.1)	(7.3) (4.7)	(3.7) (2.6)	(3.9) (3.7)
EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION - 1.7891	EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION - 1.8084	COOPERATION TECHNIQUE : EDUCATION POST SECONDAIRE - 2.0757	COOPÉRATION TECHNIQUE : EDUCATION POST SECONDAIRE - 2.8775
HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.2223	APPUI À LA RÉFORME DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR - 1.9121		SERBIE-BOURSES - 0.1066

Table 21: Germany to FRY/Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(17.9) (14.3)	(12.7) (8.7)	(17.3) (11.7)	(16.1) (11.9)	(13.6) (11.7)	(16.1) (15.8)
FED. STATES CONTRIBUTIONS: EDUCATION - 0.2996	STABILITY PACT IN SE EUROPE: EDUCATION - 0.3019	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.7049	TRAINING MEASURES IN CRISIS REGIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION - 0.6408	REHABILITATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND UPGRADING IN KOSOVO - 1.3556	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4137
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 14.0186	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 8.2886	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 1.5111	PROMOTING YOUNG PEOPLE TO PREVENT CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE - 0.3298	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 10.1744	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.2572
		VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.3647	REHABILITATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND UPGRADING IN KOSOVO - 0.9424		REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL/ EDUCATIONAL TRAINING (KOSOVO) - 1.8636
		VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 1.0074	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.9424		REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM IN SERBIA - 1.6151
		IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 7.4739	IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 8.0833		IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 10.7670

Table 22: Norway to FRY /Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(5.2) (4.8)
MIER ZAJECAR SCHOOLS - 1.6655
VOCATIONAL TRAINING. STUDENT ENT. - 0.3093
TEXTBOOKS FOR VOCATIONAL EDUC. - 0.3824
BACHELOR IN NURSING - 0.2880
KOSOVO INST. OF JOURNALISM AND COMM. - 1.5092

Table 23: EC to FRY/Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004	2005
(21.0) (14.6)	(24.6) (20.9)	(12.4) (11.8)	(15.3) (14.9)
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY - 5.1833	VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING - 14.6859	VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING - 2.4848	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 2.4857
SUPPORT TO VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION - 4.2409	ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 4.5188	VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND HR DEV. - 2.4848	VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 4.3500
TEMPUS III- CARDS 2002-FRY SERBIA - 3.7543	ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 0.5648	TEMPUS CARDS - KOSOVO 2004 - 1.2424	HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.6214
TEMPUS III- CARDS 2002 - FRY KOSOVO - 0.9407	ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 1.1297	TEMPUS CARDS - MONTENEGRO 2004 - 0.6212	HIGHER EDUCATION - 6.2143
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 - FRY MONTENEGRO - 0.4683		TEMPUS CARDS - SERBIE 2004 - 4.9696	HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.2429

Table 24: IDA to FRY/Serbia

Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2005
(13.0) (10.0)	(5.1) (4.5)	(4.9) (4.8)
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT - 10.0000	EDUCATION PARTICIPATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT [grant] - 4.5000	EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 0.7500
		EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 2.7500
		EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 1.2500

HEALTH

Table 25: France to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(6.5) (4.2)
REALISATION CLINIQUE - 4.2116

Table 26: Germany to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(5.5) (4.4)
EMERGENCY PROG. HEALTH SECTOR - 4.3580

Table 27: Italy to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2005
(8.4) (6.0)	(7.8) (4.9)	(7.2) (7.0)
TRAINING OF HEALTH PERSONNEL - 0.3755	HEALTH: HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE - 0.4474	PROGRAMME FOR FIVE POLICLINICS [loan] - 6.3137
BASIC HEALTH: PROVISION OF HEALTH EQUIPMENT - 3.8519	EVALUATION OF DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS - 0.3808	
BASIC HEALTH: PROVISION OF AMBULANCES - 1.3757	INFORMATIZATION PROGRAM - 0.4760	
	REHAB. OF HEALTH SYSTEM - 1.4519	
	BASIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURES - 0.8805	
	HEALTH PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4760	

Table 28: Sweden to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2005
(3.0) (2.0)	(4.1) (4.0)
HEALTH POLICY & ADM MGMT: STRENGTHEN THE MGMT AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEM - 0.7932	BASIC HEALTH: MAINTENANCE HOSPITALS EQUIPMENTS - 4.0148
MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS - 1.2091	

Table 29: US to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003
(2.9) (2.5)	(3.4) (3.0)	(3.3) (3.0)
IMPROVE SELECTED PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SERVICES AT TARGETED SITES - 2.5250	HEALTH- 0.1150	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 1.8150
	HEALTH - 1.9150	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 0.7000
	HEALTH - 0.9850	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.2500

Table 30: IDA to Albania

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998
(21.4) (17.0)
HEALTH RECOVERY - 17.0000

Table 31: Japan to BIH

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1999	2002	2004	2005
(24.7) (26.4)	(10.5) (11.8)	(4.9) (4.7)	(6.2) (6.8)	(5.3) (5.7)
IMPROVE HOSPITAL MED EQMT - 14.8017	PRIMARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTION EQPT - 11.7735	IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNITY BASED REHABILITATION CENTERS- 4.7326	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.6532	IMPROVEMENT OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS - 5.5223
MED EQMT FOR PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 11.6446			IMPROVE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS - 6.1887	

Table 32: Switzerland to BiH

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2004
(6.2) (4.9)	(3.3) (2.3)	(4.9) (4.8)
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.3966	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.1334	FAMILY MEDICINE - 2.7601
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.2928	BASIC HEALTH CARE - 0.1186	SOUTIEN AUX ONG - 1.4485
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.9183	BASIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE - 1.7784	
SECTEUR BUDGÉTAIRE: SOINS ET SERVICES DE SANTÉ DE BASE - 1.3309		
FAMILY MEDICINE PROGRAMME: BASIC HEALTH CARE - 0.3334		
FAMILY MEDICINE PROGRAMME: BASIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE - 0.5317		

Table 33: IDA to BiH

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2005
(12.4) (10.0)	(19.4) (19.0)
BASIC HEALTH - 10.0000	HEALTH SECTOR ENHANCEMENT PROJECT - 17.0000
	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT -2.0000

Table 34: Japan to Macedonia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1997	1998	1999	2001
(4.2) (5.8)	(4.6) (4.9)	(6.2) (6.1)	(6.1) (6.8)	(7.3) (7.4)
UPGRADING MEDICAL EQUIPMENT - 5.8448	EQUIPMENT SUPPLY FOR SKOPJE SURGICAL - 4.900	GENERAL HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT SUPPLY - 6.1497	BASIC HEALTH: HOSPITAL EQPT - 6.7954	PROJECT FOR IMPROVMT OF MEDICAL EQUIPMT FOR PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SERVICES - 7.4238

Table 35: Italy to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(4.7) (4.0)
REINFORCEMENT OF DIALYSIS CENTER - 3.9539

Table 36: Japan to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(11.6) (12.0)
IMPROVEMENT OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT - 12.0104

Table 37: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(6.3) (4.0)
KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 1.4930	
KOSOVO: EMERGENCY LABORATORY R. - 1.0974	
BASIC HEALTH: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY - 0.5437	
KOSOVO: DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATION - 0.6306	

Table 38: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(4.0) (2.3)
HEALTH: IFRC'S APPEALS 2000 - 0.2361	
MENTAL HOSPITAL KOSOVO - 0.2842	
BASIC HEALTH: ICRC APPEALS 2000 REHABILITATION - 0.3126	
NUTRITION: ICRC APP 2000 FOOD SANITARY EQUIPMENT - 0.8512	

Table 39: UK to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000
(10.9) (8.1)	(5.9) (4.1)
REHABILITATION OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 4.0447	STRENGTHENING & RATIONALISATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE - 1.5138
REHABILITATION OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 4.0447	HEALTH SCOPING MISSION & RECRUITMENT/MANAGEMENT - 0.7509
	MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH-UNIVERSITY CLINICAL CENTRE: BASIC HEALTH CARE - 1.8489

Table 40: EC to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(14.3) (9.2)	(6.8) (4.7)	(12.6) (10.7)	(30.5) (29.1)	(10.9) (10.6)
SYSTEME DE SANTE AU KOSOVO - 9.2157	CONSOLIDATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO'S HEALTH SYSTEMS - 4.7121	MINISTRY OF HEALTH CAPACITY BUILDING MEASURES - 10.7320	PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TERTIARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM - 9.6906	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 10.5643
			PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - DEV. OF HEALTH INFO SYSTEM FOR BASIC HEALTH - 9.6906	
			PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - IMPROVING PREVENTIVE HEALTH CARE - 9.6906	

Table 41: IDA to FRY/Serbia

Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2004
(22.8) (20.0)	(7.3) (7.0)
SERBIA HEALTH PROJECT - 20.0000	HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (MONTENEGRO) - 7.0000

WATER AND SANITATION

Table 42: Austria to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2000	2004	2005
(4.0) (3.1)	(5.2) (3.5)	(2.5) (2.4)	(2.9) (2.8)
WATER SUPPLY SHKODRA II - 3.0942	REHABILITATION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SHKODRA - 2.6115	WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SHKODRA - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4637	WATER SUPPLY & SEWAGE WATER DISPOSAL KOPLIK - 1.7276
	WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR 4 VILLAGES - 0.8707	WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SHKODRA - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.5105	WB PROGRAM: INTERCOASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND CLEAN-UP (WASTE MANAGEMENT) - 0.9943
		WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION FOR 4 VILLAGES SOUTH OF SHKODRA - 0.3727	

Table 43: Germany to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(9.0) (9.1)	(25.9) (21.8)	(15.6) (13.0)	(32.7) (22.6)	(15.9) (10.8)	(12.0) (8.7)	(20.1) (17.6)	(7.0) (6.9)	(2.9) (15.8)
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS REHAB. - 9.0668	WATER SUPPLY/ SEWERAGE REHAB. KORCA - 10.0917	WATER/SANITATION SYSTEMS REHABILIT. - 5.9679	ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAKE OHRID – SEWERAGE - 6.0548	PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DVPT THROUGH INVEST IN INFRA WATER SUPPLY. SEWAGE [loan] - 10.7606	WATER TREATMENT OF PLANTS - 2.4088	LAKE OHRID- SEWAGE /ACCOMP.MEAS - 0.8665	SEWERAGE KAVAJA - 6.8331	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST. - 6.2143
	BMZ TC:WATER SUPPLY/SANIT.-SMALL SYS - 7.9811	RURAL WATER SUPPLY. KAVAJA - 5.6838	WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE KORÇA - 5.4186		WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE KORCA [loan] - 6.2643	RURAL WATER SUPPLY KAVAJA - 1.7329		ENVIRONM.PR OTECTION LAKE OHRID/PROGR ADEC - 3.1071
	KORCA WATER SUPPLY/SEWERAGE [loan]- 3.7483	WATER SUPPLY/SEWERAGE REHAB..KRUJA [loan]- 1.1936	WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION: SEWERAGE KAVAJA - 6.5966			WATER SUPPLY CENTRAL ALBANIA [loan] - 12.7067		SEWERAGE POGRADEC - ACCOMP. MEASURES - 0.3729
			ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAKE OHRID – SEWERAGE [loan] - 4.4998			RURAL WATER SUPPLY KAVAJA - 2.3102		WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST - 6.0687

Table 44: Italy to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	2000	2005
(7.0) (4.9)	(18.2) (14.3)	(40.6) (25.4)	(7.8) (7.6)
WATER SUPPLY NETWORK EXT.. TIRANA [loan] - 4.9110	TIRANA DRINKING WATER SUPPLY [loan]- 14.2579	WATER PLANT IN TIRANA [loan] - 25.3213	PROGRAMME FOR SOLIDE WASTE MANAGEMENT OF TIRANA [loan] - 7.4571

Table 45: Norway to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2005
(5.6) (3.5)	(2.6) (2.4)
REHABILITATION AND UPGRADING OF EXISTING WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS - 3.5063	BURREL WSS REHABILITATION PROJECT - 2.2979

Table 46: EC to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(9.8) (9.4)
TACIS / WORK PROGRAMME - 1.2833
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM - 4.3484
VLORE - WASTE TREATMENT STABILISATIONS PONDS - 3.7272

Table 47: IDA to Albania

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2003	2004	2005
(12.9) (10.0)	(17.1) (15.0)	(3.1) (3.0)	(17.9) (17.5)
WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION - 10.0000	MUNICIPAL WATER AND WASTEWATER PROJECT - 15.0000	WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT - 3.0000	INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT & CLEAN-UP PROJECT - 17.5000

Table 48: Austria to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999
(2.7) (2.5)	(3.1) (2.5)	(3.6) (2.8)	(3.8) (2.9)
WATER SUPPLY[TRAVNIK] - 0.6610	REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [JAJCE II]- 0.4067	WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM KONJIC - 1.2928	SEWAGE WATER TREATMENT PLANT - 0.4628
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [JAJCE] - 0.6612	REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [BUSOVACA] - 0.4562	IMPROVING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION - 1.3413	WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN SRBAC - 1.3733
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [TESANJ] - 0.6613	REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [KAKANJ]- 0.4895		WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN LAKTASI - 0.7464
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [ZEPCE] - 0.4708	REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [MRKONJIC GRAD] - 0.5355		

Table 49: Germany to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2004
(5.0) (3.6)	(17.8) (17.4)
REHABILITATION OF WATER SUPPLY FOR CITY OF KAKANJ - 3.6142	REHAB.OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY - 11.1815
	REHAB.OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY [loan]- 6.2120

Table 50: Norway to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2001	2002
(18.1) (9.8)	(2.5) (1.4)	(8.4) (4.8)	(4.0) (2.5)
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: WATER - 0.7255	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 1.4108	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 1.2232	WATER: DELIVERIES - 1.0018
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 4.1400		WATER AND SANITATION REHABILITATION - 0.4737	WATER: DELIVERIES - 0.9392
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 4.0605		WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 0.8340	WATER CONSULTING SERVICES - 0.3131
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 0.9096		KRESOVO WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM - 1.1120	WATER CONSULTING SERVICES - 0.2505
		ODZAK POTABLE WATER TREATMENT PLANT- 1.1120	

Table 51: Switzerland to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2005
(2.8) (2.2)	(8.3) (8.2)
WATER PROGRAMME - 2.1840	WATER PROJECT [PRIJEDOR] - 8.0115

Table 52: US to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(14.8) (13.0)
WATER: REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 6.5000
WASTE MGT: REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 6.5000

Table 53: EC to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1999	2003
(38.5) (29.4)	(4.3) (3.2)	(8.8) (7.5)
WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER BIH - 25.9635	PROGRAMME FOR UNA-SANA CANTON - 3.1966	DEVELOPMENT OF WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT ON THE RIVER BASIN LEVEL - 4.5188
WATER AND SOLID WASTE BH - 3.4444		WASTE RECYCLING PILOT PROJECT - 2.9372

Table 54: IDA to BiH

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2002	2004	2005
(15.5) (12.0)	(23.4) (18.0)	(21.0) (20.0)	(8.2) (8.0)
WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION - 12.0000	SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT - 18.0000	URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT - 20.0000	SOLID WASTE MGMT SUPPLMT - 8.0000

Table 55: EC to Croatia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(15.7) (15.3)
KARLOVAC WATER AND WASTEWATER PROGRAMME - 15.2871

Table 56: Austria to Macedonia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2005
(4.7) (3.6)	(3.6) (3.5)
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM KRIVOGASTANI - 0.8238	SEWAGE WATER DISPOSAL CUCER-SANDEVO - 2.0507
WASTE WATER TREATM. MAKEDONSKI BROD - 1.5331	WATER SUPPLY VRAPCISHTE - CONSTITUTION & SUPPORT OF MUNICIPAL SUPPLY - 1.0564
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SENOKOS - 0.7033	

Table 57: Germany to Macedonia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2004
(14.3) (9.9)	(6.7) (4.6)	(14.8) (10.8)	(11.7) (11.4)
LAKE OHRID ENVIRONM.PROTECTION - 9.894	MUNICIPAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PROGRAMME - 4.578	IRRIGATION SOUTHERN VARDAR VALLEY - 1.4456	ENVIRONMENT SAFEGUARD PROGRAMME IN RADIKA RIVER AREA - 5.0490
		REHABILITATION WASTE WATER TREATMENT PLANT AND NETWORK - 2.3126	
		GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.4472	
		IRRIGATION SOUTHERN VARDAR VALLEY [loan] - 6.264	

Table 58: Japan to Macedonia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2004
(81.0) (84.1)	(6.3) (6.9)
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST. - 0.3998	THE PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY IN SKOPJE OUTSKIRTS - 0.4902
ZLETOVICA BASIN WATER UTILIZATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT [loan] - 83.5979	THE PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY IN SKOPJE OUTSKIRTS - 6.4477

Table 59: Germany to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(6.3) (5.1)	(33.8) (23.3)	6.8) (11.4)	(11.7) (8.5)	(4.6) (4.0)	(19.5) (19.0)	(13.3) (13.1)
URBAN WATER SUPPLIES REHABILITATION - 5.0662	WATER RESOURCES - 1.6492	REHABILITATION OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY AND SANITARIAN [NOVI SAD, NIS AND BELGRADE] - 9.1579	REHABILITATION OF WATER SUPPLY IN BELGRADE - 4.8186	INFRASTRUCTURE: SOLID WASTE SECTOR (KOSOVO) - 1.4686	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST. - 0.9939	REGIONALE WV UND AE VI (KOSOVO) - 8.4514
	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT [Kosovo] - 0.5112	WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM [Kosovo]- 1.2798	REHABILITATION IMPROVEMENT OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY - 2.4088	EXPERT SERVICE FOR ESTABL. WATER UTILITY - 1.1297	REHAB.URBAN WATER SUPPLIES - 4.9696	REGIONALE WV UND AE VI (KOSOVO) - 2.7343
	REHABILITATION. UPGRADING AND EXTENSION OF WATER AND SEWERAGE SECTOR [Cetinje, Montenegro]- 0.9424	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 0.6271	INFRASTRUCTURE: SOLID WASTE SECTOR (KOSOVO) - 0.4712	INFRASTRUCTURE: SOLID WASTE SECTOR (KOSOVO) - 0.7908	REHAB.URBAN WATER SUPPLIES - 0.6212	INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME WATER SUPPLIES/ SANITATION - 1.1807
	REHABILITATION OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY - 5.1831	WASTE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM - 0.3663	INFRASTRUCTURE: SOLID WASTE SECTOR (KOSOVO) - 0.4712		REHAB.OF URB.WATER SUPPLY & SEW.SYST. - 2.4848	DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE WATER TECHNOLOGIES - 0.7265
	REHABILITATION OF URBAN WATER SUPPLIES - 7.5390				REHAB.OF URBAN WAT.SUPPL. & SEW.SYST. - 9.9391	
	STABILITY PACT IN SE EUROPE: WATER - 0.4996					
	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST. - 1.4607					
	WASTE MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL - 0.6125					
	REHABILITATION. UPGRADING AND EXTENSION OF WATER AND SEWERAGE SECTOR [loan] - 4.7119					

Table 60: Japan to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005	
(6.7) (7.1)	
IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN BELGRADE CITY - 6.8483	
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST - 0.2110	

Table 61: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002
(3.2) (2.0)	(4.8) (3.1)	(3.1) (2.2)
WASTE MGMT: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER [Kosovo] . - 1.9906	WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 1.0693	KOSOVO: ENVIRONMENT - 2.1506
	KOSOVO: WASTE MANAGEMENT - 2.0276	

Table 62: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2004	2005
(6.1) (3.4)	(4.4) (3.6)	(3.1) (2.9)
CLEAN UP ACTIONS OF THE DANUBE RIVER- 0.2437	SIRIGOJNO - WATER SUPPLY- 1.4462	MIER REG SEWER COLLECTOR VRBAS KULA - 1.5525
WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT - 0.4489	SOUTH-SERBIA - INFRASTR./MUNICIPAL - 0.5935	LIFELONG LEARNING – LLL - 1.0926
PRISTINA WATER SUPPLY- 2.5138	MIER SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN GORNJ - 1.3491	

Table 63: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005	
	(4.3) (4.2)
DANUBE RIVER - 4.1700	

Table 64: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005	
	(10.2) (10.1)
WATER RESOURCES [Kosovo] - 9.3014	
RURAL WATER SANITATION AND SUPPLY - 0.6105	

Table 65: US to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	
	(10.2) (9.0)
HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES - 1.8300	
WATER: MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 0.5710	
WATER: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STANDARDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 2.1000	
HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES - 1.8300	
WASTE MGT/DISPOSAL: MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 0.5710	
WASTE MGT: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STANDARDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 2.1000	

Table 66: EC to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(10.) (6.5)	(6.8) (4.7)	(14.2) (12.1)	(18.3) (17.4)	(3.8) (3.7)
YS0004DEBLAIEMENT CHENAL DU DANUBE - 6.4510	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- SUPPLY OF CLEAN WATER - 4.7121	FUTHER DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO'S IRRIGATION SYSTEM - 2.4853	ENVIRONMENT - 17.3935	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT [Kosovo] - 3.7286
		ENHANCED SEWERAGE AND WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT [Montenegro] - 1.4686		
		PANCEVO CANAL REHABILITATION - 5.0836		
		ENHANCED SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT [Montenegro] - 3.0502		

Table 67: IDA to FRY/Serbia

Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(8.0) (7.0)
MONTENEGRO ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE TOURIST AREAS: SALID WASTE MGMT - 7.0000

GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)

Table 68: Italy to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
(12.5) (9.1)	(13.2) (9.7)	(34.9) (24.7)	(2.9) (1.8)	(12.4) (7.8)
PARTICIP. IN INTERNAT. INITIATIVES - 8.4850	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL ADM - 1.5835	STRENGTHENING ALBANESE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - TRAINING ACTIVITIES - 0.2751	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION - 0.4286	
	ORGANIZATION OF PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - 7.7747	TRAINING FOR MAGISTRATES AND PENITENTIARY PERSONNEL - 0.5502	RE-EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC CIVIL SERVANTS - 0.94954	
		LABORATORY FOR CUSTOM SERVICES - 0.6052	IMPROVING LIFE CONDITIONS FOR MARGINAL POPULATION IN KORCIA PROVINCE - 0.42845	
		CONSTRUCTION OF PRISON - 7.4286		
		AUTOMATION OF MINISTRIES - 1.1830		
		RE-ORGANISATION OF CUSTOMS - 2.7513		

Table 69: Netherlands to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	2000	2001
(2.6) (2.1)	(11.8) (7.4)	(7.0) (4.5)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION- 2.1143	PROJECT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4612	YOUTH AND THE LAW - 1.0728
	STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT - 0.4085	PARLIAMENTARY CAPACITY - 0.7048
	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 2.0905	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.2341
	CIVIL SOCIETY: PROGRESS THROUGH PARTNERSHIP - 1.7246	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.62869
	STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATISATION - 0.95935	
	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.4081	
	ELECTION: UNDP ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE - 0.4905	

Table 70: Norway to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2002	2004
(2.8) (1.5)	(10.7) (6.8)	(2.7) (2.2)
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 1.2028	LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROJECT - 0.8678	SECURITY SECTOR REFORM - 0.37095
	UNICEF/COMING OF AGE: INVESTMENT IN YOUNG PEOPLES'S PARTICIPATION/DEVPT - 1.3121	FIGHTING CHILD TRAFFICKING PROJECT - 0.5605
	CHILDRENS RIGHTS IN ALBANIA - 3.7567	INVESTMENT IN YOUNG PEOPLE `S PART. A - 0.45835

Table 71:Sweden to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2005
(3.3) (2.4)	(7.8) (7.6)
DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ALLEVIATE POVERTY - 1.3253	JUVENILE JUSTICE - 1.6059
CLEAN AND GREEN PROJECT: DECENTRALISATION, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL DVPT - 1.0232	REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS - 0.50192
	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.6059
	HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.0036

Table 72: US to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(27.5) (23.1)	(35.4) (30.4)	(22.7) (19.9)	(17.2) (15.4)	(15.5) (14.2)	(16.0) (15.0)	(18.0) (17.4)
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: GOV. ADMINISTRATION – USD 12M	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 2.8000	ECO. & DVT POLICY: GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIV. ENTERPRISES - 6.2970	ANTI-CRIME TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - 5.2000	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES - 4.6100	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 5.0650	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. ALL INL PROGRAMS - 5.1100
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: CIVIL SOCIETY- GENERAL – USD 7.1M	EFFECTIVE RESPONSIBLE ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 2.3470	RULE OF LAW & RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN/MEN STRENGTHENED - 3.4500	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 4.9470	INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 4.9040	LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT BETTER SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & MARKET REFORMS - 2.7490	INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF CIV SOC IN ECONOMIC & POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 4.6950
	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 1.8530	INCREASE INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL SOCIETY ECONOMIC/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 1.7500	RULE OF LAW - 1.2790	LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT BETTER SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & MARKET REFORMS - 2.9010	INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ECO/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 4.4470	DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION: MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION: EUR. ALBANIA - 2.8000
	OTHER GOVERNANCE - 12.0000	INCREASE INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL SOCIETY ECONOMIC/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 1.3500				INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) - 1.0000
	CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 2.0510	A MORE COMPETITIVE & MARKET RESPONSIVE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 1.2610				LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT BETTER SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & MARKET REFORMS - 2.1000
	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 6.9100					

Table 73: EC to Albania

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1997	1998	1999	2003	2004	2005
(13.0) (11.1)	(29.8) (22.8)	(23.9) (18.3)	(23.8) (17.5)	(48.7) (41.4)	(50.8) (48.5)	(49.6) (48.2)
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 11.1049	CBC ALBANIA/ITALY 1997 - 11.4549	ALBANIA COP 98 CUSTOMS - 4.9211	ALBANIA / CUSTOMS - 2.5040	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME- TAXATION - 3.3891	DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL AUDITING SYSTEMS - 1.2424	
	CBC ALBANIA/GREECE 1997 - 11.3327	CROSS BORDER COOPERATION ALBANIA/ITALY 1998 - 6.6547	CROSS BORDER COOPERATION ALBAINA - ITALY AL9913 - 7.4054	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 1.1297	UPGRADING OF MINISTRY OF FINANCE DISTRICT OFFICES - 1.2424	
		CROSS BORDER COOPERATION ALBANIA/GREECE 1998 - 6.7107	CROSS BORDER COOPERATION ALBAINA - GREECE AL9914 - 7.4587	JUDICIAL REFORM - 5.6484	INTERAGENCY CO- OPERATION IN FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING - 2.4848	
			MICRO DDH ALBANIA - 0.1758	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - 5.6484	UPDGRADE OF MINISTRY OF JUSTICE- DEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS - 6.0877	
				ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME - CUSTOMS - 3.8837	STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES FOR INVESTIGATION OF ORGANISED CRIME - 1.8636	
				ASYLUM & MIGRATION - 2.2594	JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN JUVENILE AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS - 3.1060	
				POLICE - 9.0375	GENERAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OT ALBANIAN STATE POLICE - 7.4543	
				LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - 8.4727	POLICE ASSISTANCE MISION - 4.7211	
				DEMOCRATIC STABILISATION - 1.1297	LOCAL COMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME - .3179	
					SUPPORT TO ALBANIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 2.4848	

					SUPPORT BORDER POLICE AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES - 4.9696	
					READMISSION AGREEMENT AND NATIONAL MIGRATION STRATEGY - 2.4848	

Table 74: Austria to BIH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2004	2005
(5.4) (4.2)	(18.2) (13.7)	(4.1) (3.9)	(7.1) (6.9)
UN PEACE MISSION UNMIBH - 2.2289	PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY/HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.2323	DONATION TO THE BOSNIAN COURT FOR WAR-CRIMES - 0.2485	SUPPORT FOR WORLD BANK COUNTRY PROGRAMME BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA - 0.8079
POLICE TRAINING - 1.3092	SFOR: UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION - 10.0039	SUPPORT OF THE CREATION OF A MODERN CADASTRAL REGISTER ADMINISTRATION - 0.9790	PEACE-BUILDING/POLICE TRAINERS - 0.3871
SUPPORT OF DEMINING ACTIVITIES - 0.2217	UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION UNMIBH - 1.4047	UN PEACE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - AUSLOG/SFOR - 1.5115	UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION EUFOR - 4.4733
ICG DISPLACED PERSONS PROJECT - 0.2009	UN PEACE-BUILDING. POLICE TRAINING - 1.3419	PARTICIPATION IN UN-ENDORSED EU-PEACE MISSION - EUFOR/ALTHEA - 0.4983	SUPPORT TO INTEGRATED COMMUNITY MINE ACTION PLANS - 0.6214
	MINE CLEARANCE PROGRAM - 0.4060	SUPPORT OF ITF MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN BOSNIA - 0.3469	

Table 75: Italy to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(5.1) (3.2)
OBSERVERS UN MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 2.8453
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - SUPPORT TO NGO - 0.2196

Table 76: Japan to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996
(19.4) (23.0)
PROMOTION OF THE ECONOMY - 22.9779

Table 77: Netherlands to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1998	2000	2001	2003	2005
(5.7) (4.6)	(7.9) (5.6)	(9.3) (5.9)	(6.6) (4.2)	(52.2) (44.9)	(10.2) (9.9)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 3.0342	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.4245	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 4.3827	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.0245	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 22.5963 (THROUGH WB)	SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF SREBRENICA - 4.8163
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 0.8967	ELECTIONS - 1.3646		FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 0.6681	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 21.4665	CLARIFYING THE FATE OF MISSING PERSONS THROUGH DNA IDENTIFICATION. - 2.4857
	POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 1.0214		LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 1.0281	ICMP ACTIVITIES IN 2003/II - 0.5649	DEMINEING STAB FUND BOSNIE HERCEGOVINA - 0.6210

Table 78: Norway to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(18.4) (10.0)	(10.9) (6.1)	(10.1) (5.8)	(14.7) (9.3)	(10.3) (7.6)	(10.9) (8.8)	(10.8) (10.0)
MISC DEMOC./HR SUPPORT: CIVIL SOCIETY - 4.6606	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 0.7695	UN INTERIM POLICE TASK FORCE - 1.4821	AID CO-ORDINATION - 0.6136	UNIPTF/EUPM SECONDMENT POLICE OFFICERS - 1.1692	INT. COMMIS. ON MISSING PERSONS - 0.3605	INT. COMMIS. ON MISSING PEOPLE - 0.3105
MISC DEMOC./HR SUPPORT: CIVIL SOCIETY - 1.5126	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 0.5130	MINE VICTIMS ASSIST - 2.0576	POLICE SECONDMENT - 1.4184	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE - 0.4239	ICTY WAR CRIMES CHAMBER WITHIN THE C - 0.3694	RESTORATION BIH-PARLIMENT - 0.5454
HUMAN RIGHTS: MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 1.2935	MINE CLEARING - 0.6156	MINE ACTION - 0.9094	SECONDMENTS 12 POLICE OFFICERS - 1.1445	MINE ACTION - 2.5229	HIGH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUT. COUNCIL - 0.4926	RECONSTR. OF PARLAM. BIH - AD. GRANT - 0.6640
	LANDMINE CLEARANCE: SLOVENIA TRUST FUND - 2.6393		PREVENTING TRAFFICKING, GENDER BASED VIOLENCE & HIV/AIDS - 0.6574		EUPM/POLICE SECONDMENT - 1.3015	GENDER BASED VIOLENCE - 1.0945
			MINE ACTION PROGME IN BIH - 1.8972		RESTORATION BIH-PARLIMENT - 0.5207	EUPM SECONDMENTS - 1.3274
					AID MINE ACTION PROGRAMME BIH - 2.4726	MINE ACTION PROGR. - 2.5558

Table 79: Portugal to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(7.4) (6.9)
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 6.8533

Table 80: Spain to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(12.9) (8.4)	(25.0) (16.1)	(32.4) (18.6)	(23.6)	(21.4) (13.7)	(18.0) (14.3)	(10.9) (10.0)
PROCESSUS DE PAIX POST-CONFLIT - 2.5070	PEACE BUILDING: HEADQUARTERS SFOR - 1.1346	OBSERVATEURS EN BOSNIE - 1.4538	RETOUR ET STABILISATION POPULATION DANS LES BALKANS - 0.8668	MATERIAL AMORTIZATION IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO - 1.1080	PROGRAMME. ACCESS TO JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM - 1.0509	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.2448
PROCESSUS DE PAIX POST-CONFLIT - 5.3800	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : BRIGADE ESPAGNOLE "SPABRI" - 2.1893	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 0.8267	GROUPEMENT ESPAGNOL EN BOSNIE OTAN - 1.4253	POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 0.6058	DMNSE MILITARY MISSION - 0.6280	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 5.0780
	PEACE BUILDING: INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF) - 3.1017	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 1.4667	OBSERVATEURS ONU EN BOSNIE - 1.4128	HQSFOR IN BOSNIA - 0.8445	OPERATIONS OF PEACE MAINTAINANCE. EUPM MISSION IN BOSNIA - 0.7330	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 0.6892
	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : CONSULTATION ET COORD. AVEC AUTORITES CIVILES - 1.6201	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 2.9300	AMORTISSEMENT DE MATERIEL EN BOSNIE ET AU KOSOVO - 4.2118	SPAGT BOSNIA - 1.1243	KFOR MILITAR MISSION - 1.0651	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 0.7186
	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SECURITE ET PROTECTION EN BOSNIE - 5.4622	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SECURITE ET PROTECTION EN BOSNIE - 4.6415	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SECURITE ET PROTECTION EN BOSNIE - 3.4825	ADVISING AND COORDINATION WITH THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN BOSNIA - 1.9314	TRANSPORT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 0.7635	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 1.1285
		AMORTISSEMENT DU MATÉRIEL - 3.6334		SECURITY PROTECTION IN BOSNIA - 6.5057	ADVICE AND COORDINATION WITH POLICE AUTHORITIES IN BIH - 2.0148	
		MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : CONSULTATION ET COORD. AVEC AUTORITES CIVILES - 1.3792			SECURITY AND PROTECTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 6.7866	

Table 81: Sweden to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2002	2004	2005
(10.1) (8.4)	(10.0) (7.2)	(15.3) (15.0)	(10.2) (9.9)
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 0.5793	LEGAL REFORM - 1.2447	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAND REGISTRY LAW IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 2.3820	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 2.2876
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT : RUNNING COSTS - 0.3964	GOVERNMENT AUDIT-INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 3.7289	GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY - 10.2087	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.6691
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT : POLICE ASSISTANCE - 0.4882	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.7718	THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY WITHIN THE MINE CLEARANCE STRUCTURES - 2.0417	REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS- 0.5019
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES: STATISTICS COOP. PROJ. - 1.1998	CIVIL SOCIETY: CARITAS YOUTH CENTRES AND SCHOOLS - 0.6172		GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.4529
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION : PERSONAL TO OHR - 1.5163			THE DAYTON PROJECT - 0.4015
ELECTIONS - 0.6163			STRENGTH. CIVIL SOCIETY: FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT OPIC - 0.5009
HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.4181			STRENGTH. CIVIL SOCIETY: OPC FRAME - 0.6043
			CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION - 0.7842

Table 82: US to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(17.9) (14.8)	(38.6) (32.4)	(28.9) (24.8)	(64.6) (56.7)	(41.4) (37.0)	(36.4) (33.2)	(30.0) (28.2)	(26.3) (25.4)
ECO RESTRUCT.: PARTICIPANT TRAINING - 3.4250	HUMAN SUFFERING & NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: GOV. ADM. - 2.8958	HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES ARE REDUCED - 2.0800	ECO. & DVT POLICY: ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.6670	TREASURY ADVISORS - 2.6800	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES - 2.5000	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 6.5700	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. ALL INL PROGRAMS - 1.4280
DEMO TRANSITION: POL./SOCIAL PROCESS - 4.3350	HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: CIVIL SOCIETY - 10.0968	HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES ARE REDUCED - 19.2190	ECO. & DVT POLICY: HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 9.7580	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: HUMANITARIAN - 11.3500	POLICE TRAINING - 1.0000	A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY - 15.8570	A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY - 10.0220
INDEPENDENT MEDIA - 6.1420	STATE - ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM - BOSNIA POLICE: CIVIL SOCIETY - 5.0000	OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES - 1.0590	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 3.2000	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 17.0400	CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM - 3.0000	SUSTAINABLE MINORITY RETURNS - 4.3030	A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY - 3.3560
	HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: ELECTION - 5.8941	DEMINEING - 1.5570	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 1.9590	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 3.7600	REDUCED HUMAN SUFFERING AND CRISES IMPACT -- DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 9.5220		INTERNAT'L. COMM. MISSING PERSONS (ICMP) - 1.0000
	DEMINEING - 5.4340		GVT ADMIN.: REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 9.7510		DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS - 1.2500		SUSTAINABLE MINORITY RETURNS- CREATION OF A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY - 0.8510
	DEMINEING- 2.3050		MORE TRANSPARENT & ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ENCOURAGED - 9.6100		A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY - 12.3940		INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINEING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) 3.3730
			A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOC. - 6.3290		A MORE PARTICIPATORY. INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY - 1.5380		
			DEMINEING - 5.1610		PUBLIC DIPLOMACY - 0.7680		

Table 83: EC to BiH

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(31.7) (20.5)	(19.9) (12.8)	(30.5) (21.1)	(58.8) (50.0)	(81.9) (78.0)	(68.1) (66.2)
PUBLIC BUILDING REHABILITATION IN BIH - 2.6726	SUPPORT FOR THE OHR - 12.0992	SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA - 12.5410	REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 1.7221	DEVELOPMENT OF STATE INSTITUTIONS - 11.8027	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 14.9142
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING IN BIH - 9.5844	MICROPROJETS 2001/4000 DELEGATION BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA - 0.4478	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 - TAXATION AND CUSTOM - 5.6920	SUPPORT JUDICIARY - 3.5895	SAP AWARENESS PROGRAMME - 2.4848	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 17.4000
CUSTOMS PROGRAMME 2000 - 2.5007		DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS MICROPROJECTS 2002 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 0.4712	SUPPORT TO THE CENTRES FOR JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING - 0.9293	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2004 FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - CUS - 9.3179	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286
SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 2.7952		HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.5655	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME - 11.2969	CUSTOMS AND TAXES - 5.5908	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 17.8971
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 0.8939		LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 0.7539	SUPPORT TO BIH POLICE FORCE (MANAGEMENT.ORGANISATION. PREMISES) - 3.9192	ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE - 12.4239	HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.0626
			INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT: BORDER CROSSING - 6.7781	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.8636	CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION (SUPPORT TO OHR) - 10.5382
			ASYLUM AND MIGRATION - 1.6945	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - 17.3935	
			SUPPORT TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES - 1.7292	SUPPORT TO THE RUNNING COSTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE - 16.6023	
			SUPPORT TO ASYLUM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES - 1.1297		
			TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: SUPPORT TO BLOOD COLLECTION TEAMS - 1.0167		
			HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.9415		
			SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE - 13.8216		

Table 84: Germany to Croatia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(5.5) (3.8)
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 0.7068
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.8246
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 0.4712
STATISTICAL SYSTEMS MODERNISATION - 1.4136

Table 85: Norway to Croatia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004	2005
(6.8) (4.3)	(7.2) (5.3)	(8.8) (7.2)	(8.7) (8.1)
LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME - 0.3131	FRESH WATER PROJECT - 0.9043	THE JUDGE 'S WEB - 0.9303	MODERNISATION OF SYSTEMS HHI - 0.5123
EMBASSY FUND - 0.3130	PROJECT FUND 2003 – CROATIA - 0.2119	EU HANDBOOK AND EU SUPPORT FOR CROAT - 0.4052	CAP BUILDING & PROPERTY REGISTRATION - 0.7134
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.2062	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4861	PROJECTFUND 2004 – CROATIA - 0.1993	ANTI TRAFFICKING PROJECT - 0.1934
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.2505	IOM - REINTEGRATION OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL - 1.4129	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (CRP) - 0.3919	REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE TO SEPARATED DEFERENCE - 2.1734
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4759	MINE ACTION - 1.9295	AID MINE ACTION PROGRAMME CROATIA - 1.8732	SCAN CENTRE EXTENSION - 1.8288
MINE ACTION PROG. IN CROATIA - 1.8972		CONV. OF ARCHIVE OF CROMAC - 1.3687	MINE ACTION PROGRAMME - 2.0619
		REINTEGR. ASSIST. SEPARATED DEFENCE - 0.9625	

Table 86: US to Croatia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(10.3) (8.7)	(10.8) (9.2)	(18.0) (15.8)	(15.5) (13.8)	(9.1) (8.3)	(14.5) (13.6)	(14.6) (14.1)
DECENTRALIZATION: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 2.7805	CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 2.6640	RULE OF LAW & RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN/MEN STRENGTHENED - 0.7500	TREASURY ADVISORS - 0.8700	MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 6.8810	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 2.0070	EUR DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS (INCL. DEMOCRACY COMMISSION)- 0.4600
BETTER-INFORMED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 2.1626	CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 0.4850	LEGAL & JUDIC. DVT: MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & IMPROVED GOV. - 2.1290	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 0.5300	NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS - 0.7500	MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 8.4020	MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 2.4670
BETTER-INFORMED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 0.6179	CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 1.6950	GVT ADMIN.: MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & IMPROVED GOV. - 1.9090	ANTI-CRIME TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - 1.5200		CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 0.4000	MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 6.1790
CITIZENS PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING: ELECTION - 0.6179	OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES - 1.6560	GVT ADMIN.: MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & IMPROVED GOV. - 1.2500	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 0.6600		NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS - 0.8500	INTERNAT'L. COMM. MISSING PERSONS (ICMP) - 0.5000
DEMINEING - 1.7260	DEMINEING - 2.4260	MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 4.8370	HUMANITARIAN - 0.5000		INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS - 1.3250	EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY ASSISTANCE - 0.5690
DEMINEING - 0.6000		DVT OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTED - 1.4700	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 9.1890			INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINEING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) - 2.3000
		DEMINEING - 2.6580	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.5200			

Table 87: EC to Croatia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2003	2004	2005
(5.7) (3.7)	(34.3) (29.2)	(67.1) (63.9)	(61.5) (59.8)
RENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS CROATIE - 2.7647	SUPPORT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING - 3.3891	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 11.3058	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 12.5938
MICRO-PROJECT DELEGATION CROATIE REGIE D'AVANCE - 0.8928	PUBLIC FINANCE - 3.1631	NATIONAL REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - 3.7272	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 6.2143
	MODERNISATION OF JUSTICE - 4.5188	PUBLIC FINANCE - 3.7272	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 2.8735
	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT - 5.6484	MODERNIZATION OF JUSTICE - 5.5908	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286
	POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME - 3.3891	POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME - 4.2241	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286
	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 6.7781	INVESTMENT CLIMATE - 7.4543	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 6.4193
	CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.2594	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT - 23.5433	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 16.3746
		CIVIL SOCIETY - 4.3484	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 6.2143
			HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.6157

Table 88 : Germany to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2005
(2.6) (1.9)	(4.3) (4.2)
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.471	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS - 1.8642
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.7162	INTRODUCTION OF EU-DIREKTIVES INTO MACEDONIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY - 0.9321
	IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF COMMUNAL SERVICES - 0.6214
	FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 0.4877

Table 89: Netherlands to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR

2000	2002	2005
(9.6) (6.0)	(3.7) (2.6)	(3.7) (3.6)
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 4.0833	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 0.3204	TWINNING CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION - 0.5194
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.4274	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.711	TWINNING COURT OF AUDITORS - 1.1581
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.501		TWINNING AND SUPPORT TO ZELS - 1.78574
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 0.555		

Table 90: Norway to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(4.0) (2.3)	(4.9) (3.1)	(4.7) (3.5)	(4.6) (3.7)	(5.0) (4.7)
CENTRAL SECURITIES DEPOSITORY - 1.223	STRENGTHEN LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT REFORM - 0.3067	MUNICIPALITIES, LOCAL ENTREPR. & BUS - 1.4126	EUPOL PROXIMA - 0.681	BILAT EUR INTEGRATION - 0.7657
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.25079	SECONDMENTS 6 POLICE OFFICERS - 0.5996	OSSE SECONDMENT 4 POLICE OFFICERS - 0.6580	OSSE - POLICE SECONDMENT - 0.3624	BILAT STRENGTHENING SEA - 0.45704
	UNHCR - 0.3756		LOCAL GOV. TRAINING - 0.5764	MAK - POLICE SECONDM., PROXIMA - 0.8229
			BILAT - POLICE STATION TEARCE - 0.464	LOCALIZING SUST. DEVELOPMENT - 0.3104
				MULTI-FUNCTIONAL LIBRARIES - 0.3104
				BILAT MEDIA DEVELOPMENT - 0.7682

Table 91: Sweden to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2004	2005
(3.0) (2.2)	(2.9) (2.8)	(9.0) (8.8)
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS- 1.8543	TO BUILD CAPACITY OF COMMUNITIES AND STRENGTHEN DECENTRALISATION PROCESS - 1.7131	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 0.8101
	FOR NETWORK OF MULTI ETHNIC ORGANISATIONS AND INCREASING INST. CAPACITY- 0.4696	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.5353
	HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4301	REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS - 0.5019
		GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.7701
		CADASTRE SUPPORT - 3.6132
		OPEN FUN FOOTBALL SCHOOLS - 0.3679
		HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4376
		HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.590

Table 92: Switzerland to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(5.0) (3.9)
PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION - 1.2357
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.330
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.330

Table 93: UK to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	
(5.9) (4.9)	
PUBLIC ADMIN REFORM - 4.8987	

Table 94: US to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(5.7) (4.8)	(15.8) (13.6)	(16.1) (14.1)	(33.4) (29.8)	(26.6) (24.3)	(25.2) (23.6)	(17.4) (16.9)
DECENTRALIZATION: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 0.6404	EFFECTIVE RESPONSIBLE ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - 2.3	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 1.325	ANTI-CRIME TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - 1.97	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES - 1.83	MITIGATE ADVERSE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE TRANSITION TO MARKET-BASED DEMO - 7.8	MORE LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 13.242
MORE EFFECTIVE, RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GVT & PUBLIC ADM - 1.19	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 7.005	GVT ADMIN.: MORE EFFECTIVE, RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 1.4	DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION - 10.994	DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION - MORE LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 14.971	MORE LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 10.533	
BETTER-INFORMED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 0.966622	CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 2.013	BETTER-INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - POLITICAL/ECO. DECISION-MAKING - 1.759	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 2.1	TRANSITION INITIATIVES: PEACE & DEMOCRACY IN KEY CONFLICT-PRONE COUNTRIES -5.92	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 2.425	
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: CIVIL SOCIETY- GENERAL - 1.2438			CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 1.924			
			PEACE & DEMOCRACY ADVANCED IN KEY CONFLICT-PRONE COUNTRIES - 9.952			

Table 95: EC to Macedonia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR

1997	1998	1999	2000	2003	2004	2005
(14.8) (11.3)	(14.6) (11.2)	(10.3) (7.6)	(6.4) (4.2)	(22.2) (18.9)	(53.5) (50.9)	(25.6) (24.9)
CBC FYROM/GREECE - 11.3327	CBC FYROM/GREECE - 11.18443	CROSS BORDER COOPERATION FYROM/GREECE MA9901 - 7.4587	BLACE BORDER CROSSING - 3.6862	CREATION OF A PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OFFICE - 1.694	PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 6.833	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.491
				REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY - 2.8245	REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY - 1.8635	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.242
				FIGHT AGAINST CRIME - 3.38944	DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 10.560	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.61
				BORDER CONTROL POINTS - 1.3557	FIGHT AGAINST CRIME - 9.9391	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 2.4857
				ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME - 2.2596	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT - 16.1510	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.864
				STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF THE GREEN BORDER - 3.163	INTER ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY - 3.7271	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.728
				IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM - 1.1298		GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 2.4857
				CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT - 1.3557		GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 7.4571
				EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIDHR) MICROPROJECTS - 0.5649		

Table 96: Austria to FRY/ Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(18.3) (12.1)	(16.2) (10.6)	(8.0) (5.6)	(9.4) (8.0)	(12.4) (11.9)	(9.9) (9.6)
UN PEACE MISSION: INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO - 4.2443	PEACE-BUILDING (UN) KOSOVO - 2.2176	PEACE BUILDING IN THE KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR - 2.8216	UN PEACE MISSION UNMIK - 2.3610	PEACE BUILDING IN THE KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR - 9.8847	UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION KFOR - 7.5466
UN-PEACE-BUILDING KOSOVO - 5.1257	UN PEACE MISSION UNMIK - 5.6163	PARTICIPATION IN "CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION" PROJECTS IN KOSOVO - 0.3608	PEACE BUILDING IN THE KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR - 3.0769	UN PEACE-B./POLICE TRAINERS - 1.2390	CIMIC: SUPPORT (PERSONNEL & LOGISTICS) FOR NGO PROJECTS - 0.3357
UN PEACE-BUILDING/POLICE TRAINERS - 2.1529	UN PEACE-BUILDING AND POLICE TRAINERS - 2.2245	UN PEACE MISSION/POLICE TRAINERS - 1.3166	UN PEACE MISSION/POLICE TRAINERS - 1.5912	UN-MISSION IN THE KOSOVO - UNMIK: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE - EXPERTS- 0.3727	UN PEACE-B./POLICE TRAINERS - 1.1339
					STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES - 0.3107

Table 97: Germany to FRY/ Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003	2004
(14.0) (9.5)	(32.4) (23.5)	(33.9) (29.8)	(15.5) (15.1)
SETTING UP A COURT OF AUDITORS - 1.1905	LEGAL REFORM (SERBIA) - 1.4136	LEGAL REFORM (SERBIA) - 1.1297	REFORM OF FISCAL ADMINISTRATION - 0.6212
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.7400	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 0.9047	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.1297	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.6684
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.2821	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 18.2509	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.2427	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 11.7729
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 2.7359	PROMOTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE (KOSOVO) - 0.4712	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 0.6457	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.7529
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 0.5748		FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 23.6082	
MINE CLEARANCE - 0.5972		GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.6748	

Table 98: Italy to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(10.9) (7.7)
PROVISIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOSVO RECONSTRUCTION - 2.2011
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 5.4933

Table 99: Netherlands to FRY/ Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(22.7) (14.3)	(18.4) (11.8)	(12.9) (9.0)	(10.8) (9.3)	(7.3) (7.0)
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.3109 [CONTR. TO MISSION IN KOSOVO]	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.8875	KOSOVO - 1.4551	KOSOVO: GOV - GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROGRAMME - 2.8240	BEL HELP PROJECT [REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES AND IDPS] - 0.4340
KOSOVO: ADVANCING RULE OF LAW - 0.8912	KOSOVO: CAPACITY BUILDING - 2.6303	KOSOVO: ASSEMBLEE - 0.4429	SUPPORT TO SERBIAN MOFE - 1.1920	BEL WAR CRIMES TRIALS - 0.3625
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 1.6117 [KOSOVO]	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: CAPACITY BUILDING FUND - 1.3299	CAPACITY BUILDING FUND - 0.6352	ONAFH.TV STATIONS - 0.4240	SPM IN SERB.DEP.PREMIER OFF. - 1.2065
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION [MONTENEGRO] - 1.8836	MONTENEGRO: PROMOTING LEGISLATION - 0.4836	KOSOVO MISSION - 2.4569	RADIO TELEVISION KOSOVO - 2.1542	BEL UMIER SMN - 0.4848
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 1.3617	RADIO B92 - 0.3090	POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 0.7539	KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING (KPSICB) - 1.2180	BEL-LFP BTD 2004 - 0.6212
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) - 1.1944	RADIO TELEVISION KOSOVO - 0.2293	KOSOVO: POLICE SERVICE ASSISTANCE - 0.7539		DZO FOCUS VOJVODINA 2003-II - 0.8259
DEMOBILISATION: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY - 1.9906	CONTRIBUTE OVSE MISSION IN KOSOVO - 3.6486			UNDP/MOLESF - 0.4431
	LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 0.3779			DVB SF KOSOVO IOM-PROJ - 0.4970
				DVB SF SENM PRISMA TRAINING - 0.8697

Table 100: Norway to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005
(16.1) (8.8)	(15.9) (8.9)	(18.4) (10.6)	(16.4) (9.4)	(9.0) (6.7)	(10.6) (8.7)	(18.5) (17.1)
MISC DEMOC./HR SUPPORT:CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.2227	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.4429	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4576	QUICK BUILD PRISON [Kosovo] - 0.5560	COVIC-PLAN SOUTHERN SERBIA - 0.9349	MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT - 2.0427	A MODEL FOR LEGAL REFORM IN SERBIA - 0.6929
MISC DEMOC./HR SUPPORT:CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.8971	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES [Montenegro] - 3.8477	ELECTIONS: SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMME FOR STUDENTS - 0.4757	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.6894	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.7065	OSSE/POLICE SECONDMENT - 0.5037	FORENCIC TECHNICAL CENTRE NIS - 0.4363
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 2.3266	KOSOVO POLICE ACADEMY - 0.6413	HUMAN RIGHTS: OSCE MISSION KOSOVO - 0.4597	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.4170	OSSE POLICE SECONDMENT 2003 - 0.3783	PROJECTS IN SERBIA - 0.4048	OSCE SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO - 0.6385
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 0.9940	HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.5036	DEMOBILISATION: KOSOVO OSCE POLICE ACADEMY - 0.6869	CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4448	POLICE COOPERATION 2003 - 0.8478	FORENCIC TECHNICAL CENTRE NIS- 0.3652	UNMIK KOSOVO - 3.1487
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 2.0060	MINE CLEANING - 0.6413	DEMOBILISATION: UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION KOSOVO (UNMIK) POLICE - 2.0658	TRANSPORT OF REFUGEES TO KOSOVO - 0.7790	MEDIA - 0.5652	SUPPORTING REAL ESTATE REGISTRATION - 1.1128	CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRAMME - 0.3056
		INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND MINE VICTIMS - 2.2736	HUMAN RIGHTS: RETURN OF REFUGEES - 0.4832		CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.6061	FORENSIC LAB. PODGORICA - 0.4037
		MINE DESTRUCTION PROGRAMME IN KOSOVO - 1.3073	ECONOMIC RELATIONS - CHILD SUPPORT - 1.4018		LOCAL MEDIA SUPPORT IN SERBIA - 0.5935	SECONDMD. LAWYERS HPD/UNMIK - 0.5476
			INDEPENDENT LOCAL MEDIA SUPPORT - 0.5560			SOUTH SERBIA COMMUNITY POLICY PROJECT - 0.9404
			MINE CLEARANCE PROGRAM - 1.5321			INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.5841
						CAPACITY BUILDING FACILITY PROJECT - 0.4657
						JUNO III – VOJVODINA - 0.5554
						ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME - 0.7762

Table 101: Spain to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(38.2) (24.5)	(35.6) (20.5)	(28.5) (16.6)	(25.5) (16.3)	(22.7) (18.1)	(9.8) (9.0)
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : OBSERVATEURS POLITIQUES AU KOSOVO (UNMIK) - 0.4142	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 0.6453	RETOUR ET STABILISATION POPULATION DANS LES BALKANS - 0.6476	UNMIK SPU - 4.1288	OPERATIONS OF PEACE MAINTAINANCE. UNMIK MISSION. KOSOVO COMPANY - 2.7023	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 0.4014
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : OPERATION "JOINT GUARDIAN" AU KOSOVO - 0.4470	FORCES SPÉCIALES DE POLICE AU KOSOVO - 0.4037	FORCES DE L'OTAN AU KOSOVO KFOR - 0.6271	MATERIAL AMORTIZATION IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO - 1.1080	TRANSPORT IN KOSOVO - 1.5999	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 6.6105
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : CONSULTATION ET COORD. AVEC AUTORITÉS CIVILES - 2.8816	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 0.5911	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : UNMIK - 3.9236	KFOR EN BOSNIA - 0.6590	ADVISE AND COORDINATION WITH POLICE AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO - 4.2220	POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) - 0.8684
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX: TRANSPORT DE MATÉRIEL - 1.1398	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 1.3293	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 0.5745	UN OBSERVERS IN KOSOVO (UNMIK) - 0.6697	SECURITY AND PROTECTION IN KOSOVO - 8.5329	
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SÉCURITÉ ET PROTECTION AU KOSOVO - 6.0706	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : CONSULTATION ET COORD. AVEC AUTORITÉS CIVILES - 3.5116	AMORTISSEMENT DE MATÉRIEL EN BOSNIE ET AU KOSOVO - 4.2118	ADVISING AND COORDINATION WITH THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO - 2.6372		
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : AMORTISSEMENT DE MATÉRIEL - 7.7803	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SÉCURITÉ ET PROTECTION AU KOSOVO - 7.0952	CONSULTATION ET COORDINATION AVEC LES AUTORITÉS CIVILES AU KOSOVO - 1.9216	MATERIAL TRANSPORT TO KOSOVO - 0.9993		
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX: TRANSPORT DE MATÉRIEL POUR DES ONG - 5.7632	AMORTISSEMENT DU MATÉRIEL - 3.6334	MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : SÉCURITÉ ET PROTECTION AU KOSOVO - 3.8862	PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO - 5.3298		
	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 2.9300	POST-CONFLICT PEACE- BUILDING (UN) - 0.7266			

Table 102: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(6.6) (4.4)	(6.5) (4.7)	(6.5) (5.8)	(8.1) (7.9)	(27.2) (26.5)
JUDICIAL TRAINING CENTER - 0.8705	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM- HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT - 3.4976	JUVENILE JUSTICE - 2.3520	CRIME PREVENTION IN SERBIA - 1.6918	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.6680
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: INFOSYSTEM - 0.5273	MINORITY AND YOUTH PROGRAMMING - 0.3086	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.3590	TO REFORM THE SYSTEM IN SERBIA TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY - 1.0889	DEMOCRATIC POLICING - 4.0148
HUMAN RIGHTS [micro credit in Montenegro] - 0.7738		CONSOLIDATE PEACE. SERBIA - 0.7427	STATISTICS IN SAM - 3.3904	CRIME INTELLIGENCE - 3.2118
HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTH SERBIA - 0.4836		AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS - 0.3892	STRENGTHENING OF MINISTRIES FOR COLLECTING AND ANALYSING DATA - 0.4352	STATISTICS KOSOVO - 1.9936
		SUPPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN SERBIA - 0.7427	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION [Cadastre Serbia] - 0.5445	REGIONAL PROGRAM STATISTICS - 1.5023
		REPORTER MAGAZINE - 0.3063		CADASTRE - 3.5825
				FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT OPIC - 1.3709
				STRENGTH. CIVIL SOCIETY: OPEN FUN FOOTBALL SCHOOLS - 0.4619
				BALKAN TRUST FOR DEMOCRACY - 0.3747
				FREE FLOW OF INFO.: FRAMEWORK - 1.5076
				HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.7986
				ROMA EXPERTS + NGO - 0.4791
				HUMAN RIGHTS [Ombudsman Kosovo] - 0.6531
				IOM REGIONAL ANTI-TRAFFIC - 0.4376
				FREE FLOW OF INFO.: SUPPORT TO UNIFEM. KOSOVO - 0.7093
				HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4015
				CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION - 1.3715

Table 103: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2004	2005
(31.3) (22.2)	(14.6) (10.5)	(30.1) (29.8)	(26.9) (26.6)
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING [EBRD]- 16.3487	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.6527	PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - 0.6196	SOUTIEN À LA KFOR - 24.4079
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 2.4291	ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 5.9280	MSP MUNICIPAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME - 1.2070	UN: GESTION CIVILE DES CONFLITS (POLICE CIVILE) - 0.7491
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT [Kosovo] - 0.5628	FRY-HARMONISATION OF FRY LAW WITH EU - 0.5750	SWISSCOY [KFOR] - 25.9845	
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION [Cadastre Kosovo] -1.6393	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES [UN Radio Kosovo] - 0.7114	PROJET DANS DOMAINE DE LA GEST. CIVILE DES CONFLITS (DÉMOCRATISATION) [UN] - 0.9326	
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION [Kosovo] - 1.1849			

Table 104: UK to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2003
(34.9) (25.9)	(31.0) (21.8)	(14.8) (10.1)	(17.4) (14.3)
KOSOVO DEMINING PROGRAMME - 21.3420	AID COORDINATION SERBIA - 0.6054	SHORT TERM CONSULTANCY INPUT TO THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS - 0.4304	SERBIA: STRENGTHENING MACROECONOMIC FISCAL ANALYSIS CAPACITY - 1.2705
KOSOVO DEMINING DECANE - 4.3456	SUPPORT FOR DVPT OF AN INTEGRATED PERSONNEL & PAYROLL SYSTEM: ECO & DVPT- 1.0279	DEV. OF PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE UN MISSION IN KOSOVO - 3.5964	SERBIA: CHANGE MANAGEMENT - 0.6557
	GOM'S PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME IN MONTENEGRO- 0.9471	SOCIAL POLICY REFORM: STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONSHIPS IN SERBIA - 4.6090	SSAJ JUSTICE SECTOR - 0.8497
	DEV. OF PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE UN MISSION IN KOSOVO- 0.4541		PUBLIC SERVICE LAW - 4.5902
	SUPPORT TO UN MINE ACTION AND COORD. CENTER MINE ACTION PROG. IN KOSOVO - 4.4656		SSAJ PROGRAMME COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND SAFETY - 1.2391
	KOSOVO DEMINING PROGRAMME - 6.2001		JUSTICE IN SERBIA - 1.8651
	KOSOVO HALO TRUST UNEXPLODED ORDONANCE CLEARANCE - 2.7914		COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND SAFETY SERBIA - 2.0248
	DEFENCE SYSTEMS MINE CLEARANCE CAPABILITY - 3.6073		COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND SAFETY - 1.1915

Table 105: US to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(49.7) (42.6)	(210.2) (184.7)	(141.9) (126.8)	(133.1) (121.5)	(156.3) (146.8)	(83.4) (80.8)
HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS ARE REDUCED - 0.5000	ECO. & DVT POLICY: ACCELERATED DVT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 26.7850	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 7.1790	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES - 1.1300	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 63.5000	EUR DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS (INCL. DEMOCRACY COMMISSION) - 1.8830
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 1.5630	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAM - 1.8000	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 29.9000	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES - 35.9390	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE - 3.6110	DEV & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE / FISCAL & ADMIN DECENTRALIZATION - - 0.9720
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 1.7230	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.0000	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 50.4320	LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS - 3.0150	MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE. AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 12.1050	MORE OPEN AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTING ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF LAW - 6.1850
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 0.5670	ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ECONOMIC POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK - 24.7000	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 25.0550	POLICE TRAINING - 5.0000	MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 5.3370	LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. ALL INL PROGRAMS - 6.4480
HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS ARE REDUCED - 1.0000	ECO. & DVT POLICY: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STANDARDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 4.6170	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.5900	CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM - 1.5000	INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ECO/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 48.0600	MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE. AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 1.5980
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 4.3980	ECO. & DVT POLICY: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 8.2910	PEACE & DEMOCRACY ADVANCED IN KEY CONFLICT-PRONE COUNTRIES - 7.0720	INCREASED. BETTER INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - 14.9810	INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ECO/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING - 12.3460	MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE. AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 7.4900
CROSS-CUTTING - 1.7340	ECO. & DVT POLICY: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 11.1920		INCREASED. BETTER INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - 51.7490		CIV SOC & GOVMT ARE MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERS IN ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE - 1.3000
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 11.7740	ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 2.2200		INCREASED. BETTER INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - 1.5000		PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EXCHANGES - 1.8800
HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.6000	ECO. & DVT POLICY:				CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN

	CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 2.9600				POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 31.8500
OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES - 4.4050	RULE OF LAW & RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN/MEN STRENGTHENED - 4.5000				CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 5.6980
OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES - 7.7890	GVT ADMIN.: ACCOUNTABLE & TRANSPARENT GOV. - 1.0000				CIV SOC & GOVMT ARE MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERS IN ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE - 7.8770
DEMINEING - 5.2740	BETTER-INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - POLITICAL/ECO. DECISION-MAKING - 7.0000				CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING - 3.3300
	GVT ADMIN.: MORE EFFECTIVE, RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 6.8580				INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINEING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) - 1.0000
	STRENGTH. CIVIL SOCIETY: CROSS- CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.0000				
	BETTER-INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - POLITICAL/ECO. DECISION-MAKING - 32.1350				
	BETTER-INFORMED CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION - POLITICAL/ECO. DECISION-MAKING - 5.0000				
	STRENGT. CIVIL SOCIETY: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 6.1990				
	DVT OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTED - 1.8050				
	DVT OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTED - 3.3250				
	ELECTIONS: CREDIBLE & COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PROCESSES				

	ENCOURAGED - 1.1000				
	RULE OF LAW & RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN/MEN STRENGTHENED - 4.0000				
	POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) : PROMOTE LOCAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP - 6.5740				
	POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING (UN) : SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC ELMTS IN SOCIETY- 10.1460				
	DEMNING - 1.9450				

Table 106: EC to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(18.6) (13.7)	(22.8) (14.7)	(38.3) (24.7)	(95.2) (66.1)	(174.4) (148.2)	(211.6) (201.6)	(167.8) (163.1)
SUPPORT FOR TRANSPORT AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN KOSOVO - 6.3932	KOSOVO - UNMIK (SOUTIEN AUX COUTS DE FONCTIONNEMENT) - 5.5294	SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COST FOR UNMIK - 9.8513	SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF THE EU PILLAR OF UNMIK 2002 - 18.5656	GENERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FACILITY - 5.6484	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - FORMULATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY - 7.1704	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 19.5128
AGENCE POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 5.3277	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 4.5157	PROVISION OF TECH. ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF CUSTOM&TAXATION - 0.8825	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 - GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTION BUILDING - 18.8484	GENERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FACILITY AND PROGAMME RESERVE - 2.2594	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - SUPPORT TO KOSOVO TRUST AGENCY - 7.1704	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.8643
PROCEDURE ECRITE - 1.5794	MICRO-PROJECT DELEGATION YUGOSLAVIE REGIE D'AVANCE - 1.0598	TEMPUS III - CARDS 2001 - FRY SERBIA - 3.3412	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO - 6.5969	SUPPORT PUBLIC FINANCE REFORM - 22.5938	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 8.6967	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 2.4857
	FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 3.0449	PROVISION OF TECH. ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF CUSTOMS&TAXATION - 3.4212	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - TAX & CUSTOM - 4.6233	CUSTOMS & TAXATION - 5.6484	PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - OVERALL ADM. & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS - 9.6906	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.2429
		PROVISION OF THECH. ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF CUSTOMS&TAXATION - 2.7581	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 9.1415	SUPPORT TO JUSTICE SYSTEM - 14.6859	CAPCITY BUILDING MINISTRIES, FINANCIAL SECTOR, AGENCIES.LOC.AUTH ORITIES - 63.9831	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 3.1071

		91 PROJETS DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE - 0.6493	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO - CUSTOMS & TAXATION - 2.3560	SUPPORT TO JUDICIAL REFORM - 1.1297	2004 ACTION PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO - CUSTOMS & TAXES - 1.8636	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.8643
		91 PROJETS DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE - 0.5969	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 FOR MONTENEGRO - TAX & CUSTOM - 0.7181	SUPPORT TO POLICE - 5.6484	2004 ACTION PROGRAMME FOR MONTENEGRO - CUSTOMS & TAXES - 1.2424	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 4.9714
		91 PROJETS DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE - 0.7351	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.6388	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION - 10.1672	2004 ACTION PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA - CUSTOMS & TAXES - 7.4543	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 3.7286
		91 PROJETS DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE - 0.5136	7 PROJETS RELATIFS AU RENFORCEMENT DE LA DÉMOCRATISATION - 0.7068	SUPPORT TO MUNICIPALITIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION - 39.5391	JUSTICE & HOME AFFAIRS - 8.0755	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 6.9600
			ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 AS A VIABLE AND INDEPENDENT PUBLIC SERVICE- 1.4136	BORDER POLICE REFORM - 2.2594	JUSTICE & HOME AFFAIRS - SUPPORT TO JUSTICE MINISTRY - 21.1206	LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 17.1514
				SUPPORT FOR DESCENTRALISATION TO THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL - 1.1297	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM FOR KOSOVO - 7.1704	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 4.3500
				MINISTRY OF STATE ADMINISTRATION- TRAINING OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT - 2.2594	PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - TO STATE UNION INSTITUTIONS & EUROPEAN INTEGRATION - 9.6906	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286
				SUPPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY - 2.2594	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 6.2120	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.8643
				PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM SUPPORT AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL - 2.2594	INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - 4.9696	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION [Kosovo] - 18.6428
				CUSTOMS & TAXATION - 2.2594	BORDER CROSSINGS COMMITTEE & REHABILITATION OF BORDER CROSSINGS - 2.4848	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 24.4842
				CIVIL SOCIETY/INCLUSION IN POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PROCESS -	SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY - CIVIL SOCIETY - 8.6967	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 6.2143

				1.1297		
				CIVIL SOCIETY - 1.1297	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 1.2424	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.4857
				INSITUTIONAL SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS- 1.1297	SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF THE EU PILLAR OF UNMIK 20 - 24.1396	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 1.2429
				PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION ANT INTER-ETHNIC DIALOGUE - 1.3876		STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.4857
				SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF THE EU PILLAR - 22.3284		POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (UN) [EU Pillar of UNMIK] - 31.2988

Table 107: IDA to FRY/Serbia

GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(12.8) (12.5)
ECONOMIC POLICY & PUBLIC EXP. MGMT TECHNICAL ASS. PROJECT [grant] - 5.5000
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT TA PROJECT [grant] - 7.0000

OTHER

Table 108: Italy to Albania

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2002	2003	2004
(8.1) (5.7)	(5.3) (3.6)	(2.9) (2.4)	(3.6) (3.5)
BSS SOCIO-CULTURAL COOP. AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALBANIA & CAMPANIA REGION - 1.6508	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [BUILDING OF A PRISON] 2.8840	PLANNING OF FIER-VLORE ROAD - 0.5242	ESSENTIALS SOCIAL SERVICES IN TIRANA - LOCAL FUNDS - 3.0034
REORGANISATION OF MINISTRY OF CULTURE - 1.1005		UNESCO TRUST FUND: ACTION PLAN IN SOUTH EAST-EUROPE REGION - 1.4121	
CENSUS OF CULTURAL GOODS - 1.3757			

Table 109: IDA to Albania

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	2001
(31.0) (25.0)	(13.5) (10.0)
HOUSING: REHABILITATION - 25.0000	SOCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT - 10.0000

Table 110: Germany to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(6.4) (6.3)
PROMOTION OF STRZUCTURES IN THE YOUTH SECTOR - 1.2424
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.2174
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN - 0.2510
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.6200
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4671
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN - 0.2609
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.6411
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4497
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4460
FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS - 0.6591

Table 111: Italy to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(6.9) (4.3)
BSS: VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO WB RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME - 4.2837

Table 112: Netherlands to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998
(12.9) (9.8)
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 4.2706
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.9942
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4837
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5049
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5543
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4550
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.0819

Table 113: Norway to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000
(13.2) (7.2)	(14.6) (8.2)	(8.0) (4.6)
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 3.4658	CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN - 0.5130	EMPLOYMENT: STABILITY PACT SOUTH EAST EUROPE [through World Bank] - 1.8530
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 0.6666	SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 1.1800	BUILDING PROGRAMME - 0.6792
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: HOUSING - 3.0698	SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.5900	HOUSING: REHABILITATING REPATRIATING - 0.6254
	SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.6413	LOW-COST HOUSING: RETURN AND REHABILITATION - 1.0231
	UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN PROGRAMME - 0.5130	
	WAR VICTIMS & EMPLOYMENT - 1.5391	
	EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 0.7054	
	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5900	

Table 114: Sweden to BIH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(9.1) (7.5)	(7.4) (6.0)	(11.1) (8.2)	(11.0) (7.3)	(16.4) (11.8)	(13.3) (11.7)	(12.1) (11.8)	(42.6) (41.4)
EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 0.5033	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.9002	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.3970	CARITAS RECONSTRUCTION - 0.9507	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.0253	CARITAS - 3.5484	RECONSTRUCTION OF 320 HOUSES IN FIVE COMMUNITIES IN NORTH EAST BIH - 4.6610	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.5828
EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 0.5033	HOUSING: RECONSTRUCTION - 2.6627	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT. : CARITAS RECONSTRUCTION - 2.0051	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.6067	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.2463	RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM - 2.8855	SANSKI BRIDGE - RECONSTRUCTION OF 350 HOUSES FOR RETURNEES - 5.5971	TUZLA RECONSTRUCTION - 3.5196
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.3376	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.2414	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.1656	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4836	HOUSES RECONSTRUCTION - 3.0856	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 4.7216	RECONSTRUCTION OF 120 HOUSES IN FOUR MUNICIPALITIES IN EASTERN BIH - 1.5245	CARITAS RECONSTRUCTION - 3.7605
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.5233		CULTURE WITHOUT BORDERS - 0.4367	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.7811	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.2931	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4246		HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 5.0988
CULTURAL HERITAGE - 0.5813							LOW-COST HOUSING - 5.7937
							LOW-COST HOUSING - 6.6283
							CARITAS HOUSING - 6.3948
							CULTURE AND RECREATION - 0.7628

Table115: UK to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	
(9.3)	(6.9)
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 1.2284	
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.3964	
SOCIAL SERVICES: OXFAM LOTOS - 0.3574	
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL WELFARE - 4.8536	

Table 116: EC to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2003
(24.9) (18.3)	(12.8) (8.3)	(25.9) (22.0)
ECONOMIC REGENERATION + SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIH - 18.3059	EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 8.2981	HOUSING REPAIR&RELATED ACTIVITIES - 22.0289

Table 117: IDA to BiH

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	2000	2001	2003	2004
(28.9) (25.0)	(23.9) (18.6)	(47.3) (35.0)	(8.0) (7.0)	(66.0) (63.0)
WAR VICTIMS REHABILITATION - 5.0000	SOCIAL PROTECTION - 3.5500	COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - 15.0000	SOCIAL INSURANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT - 7.0000	SOCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT - 51.0000
EMERGENCY HOUSING REPAIR - 15.0000	SOCIAL PROTECTION : LABOR REDEPLOYMENT PILOT - 15.0000	SOCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT - 20.0000		EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT - 12.0000
EMERGENCY HOUSING REPAIR - 5.0000				

Table 118: Sweden to Croatia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(4.4) (3.3)	(4.4) (2.9)	(3.9) (2.8)	(4.3) (3.8)	(3.7) (3.6)
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.2640	RECONSTRUCTION - 2.8921	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.4430	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.7746	RECONSTRUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 500 HOUSES FOR MINORITY RETURNEES - 3.6384
		DEVELOPMENT METADATABASE REPOSITORY/ PUB MACRODATABASE CBS. - 0.3513		

Table 119: EC to Croatia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(20.0) (17.0)
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALISATION - 16.9453

Table 120: Germany to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(7.5) (7.3)
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 6.336
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.2646
FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS - 0.2255

Table 121: Italy to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(4.4) (3.0)
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 2.827

Table 122: Netherlands to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(4.6) (4.0)
WORLD BLOAN FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - 3.9487

Table 123: Norway to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(3.6) (3.0)
EUR. INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC DEVELOP. - 0.55643
MUNICIPAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME- 1.235
BILAT - SAFETY & HEALT STAND. GARMEN - 0.6779

Table 124: US to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2005
(6.9) (6.1)	(8.6) (7.8)	(7.6) (7.3)
SOCIAL TRANSITION - 4.233	TRANSITION TO MARKET-BASED DEMOCRACY: MITIGATE ADVERSE SOCIAL IMPACTS - 6.744	MITIGATION OF ADVERSE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF TRANSITION TO MARKET-BASED DEMOC - 5.45
SOCIAL TRANSITION - 1.413		LABOR - 0.375

Table 125: EC to Macedonia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2005
(12.0) (10.2)	(9.8) (9.6)
IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 10.1683	MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 8.3271
	STATISTICAL CAPACITY BUILDING - 1.2428

Table 126: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(13.5) (7.8)
CHILD ALLOWANCES PROJECT - 6.2873
EMPLOYMENT: PROPERTY REGISTRY IN KOSOVO - 0.4547
REHABILITATION OF HOUSES IN KOSOVO - 0.5116
SHELTER PROGRAM IN KOSOVO - 0.2046

Table 127: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2005
(8.1) (6.0)	(12.7) (8.4)	(10.4) (7.5)	(7.3) (7.1)
EMPLOY. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT : CARITAS KOSOVO 2000 - 1.3223	EMPLOYMENT POLICY & ADM MANAGEMENT: SOCIAL PROTECTION FUND [WB and IMF] - 1.5815	CAPACITY BUILDING OF MINISTRY OF LABOUR COVERING INSTITUTIONAL - 0.5144	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 1.3294
HOUSING : KOSOVO - 2.5741	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 0.9992	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 1.3130	LOW-COST HOUSING [Kosovo] - 0.9753
HOUSING : KOSOVO - 1.7811	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.5533	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.9660	LOW-COST HOUSING [Kosovo] - 1.3361
	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.0607	HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.2147	CULTURE AND RECREATION - 3.2520
	ECONOMIC STATISTICS AN IT [Kosovo] - 0.8472		

Table 128: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(14.9) (10.7)
MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 1.7428
MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 5.0092
REFINANCING FUND FOR MONTENEGRO - 1.3931
REFINANCING FUND FOR SERBIAN - 2.0748

Table 129: US to FRY/Serbia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	
(14.3)	(12.8)
HUMANITARIAN: SOCIAL SERVICES in Kosovo - 12.2770;	
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 0.5190	

Table 130: EC to FRY/Serbia

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2003	2004
(47.4) (34.9)	(63.1) (40.6)	(29.6) (25.2)	(13.0) (12.4)
INTEGRATED REHABILITATION PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO - 34.9335	ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA IN 2001 - 40.5696	DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 12.7429	SOCIAL DEV. & CIVIL SOCIETY - SUPPORT MINISTRY OF LABOUR & EMPL. - 12.4239
		REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - 4.5188	
		ECONOMIC INITIATIVES FOR MINORITY COMMUNITIES [Kosovo] - 4.5188	
		EMPLOYMENT REGENERATION [Kosovo] - 3.3891	

Table 131: Italy to ex Yu

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	
	(3.3) (2.1)
INCOME GENETARING ACTIVITIES IN FAVOUR OF SERBIAN REFUGEES- 0.2097	
CONTRIBUTION TO ILO PROGRAMME - 1.8500	

Table 132: Norway to ex Yu

Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	
	(5.0) (3.1)
EMPOWE THE POOR AND VULNERABLE - 1.3714	
SAVE THE CHILDREN PROGRAMME - 0.3271	
NORWEGIAN KFOR - 0.2504	
CADASTRE SUPPORT PROGME - 0.6762	

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE (EI)¹

Transport & Storage

Table 133: Germany to Albania

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	
	(32.9) (31.9)
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT/ RINAS [loan] - 31.9000	

Table 134: Italy to Albania

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001
(10.1) (7.2)	(3.4) (2.1)
SUPPLY OF RAIL TRUCKS. TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS - 1.3481	WATER TRANSPORT: SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT - 0.2775
PROVISION OF BUSES AND RAIL MATERIAL - 2.4762	TRANSFERT DE 2 HÉLICOPTÈRES - 1.5262
REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY - 3.3016	

Table 135: US to Albania

¹ In the EI sector the allocations reported by some donors were expressed with figures with up to 15 decimal numbers. In such cases the number of decimals was reduced to up to four for reasons of simplicity and readability.

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000
(2.1) (1.8)	(3.2) (2.7)
RAIL TRANSPORT - 1.6	PRODUCTION/SWITCH TAMPER - 0.897
	PORT-RELATED EQUIPMENT - 1.4
	PORT OF DURRES INTERMODAL CONTAINER FACILITY - 0.318

Table 136: EC to Albania

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2004	2005
(4.3) (3.2)	(9.8) (9.3)	(4.5) (4.3)
ALBANIA 1999 COMPLEMENT TRANSPORT - 3.19659	ASSISTANCE TO MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS - 6.9573	ROAD TRANSPORT - 4.3499
	ASSISTANCE TO PORT OF DURRES AUTHORITY - 2.3605	

Table 137: IDA to Albania

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1998	1999	2000	2002	2003
(16.5) (15.0)	(28.9) (25.0)	(28.4) (17.0)	(16.9) (13.7)	(10.4) (8.1)	(22.1) (17.0)	(32.0) (28.0)
RURAL ROADS – 15.0	NATIONAL ROADS – 25.0	WATER TRANSPORT: DURRES PORT – 17.0	EMG ROAD REPAIR - 13.65	TRANSPORTATION : TRADE & TRANSPORTATION FACILITY IN SERVICES EUROPE - 8.1	ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT – 17.0	ROAD MAINTENANCE SUPPLEMENTAL CREDIT – 13.0
						SECOND COMMUNITY WORKS PROJECT – 15.0

Table 138: France to BiH

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997
(3.5) (2.7)
REHABILITATION VOIE FERREE SARAJEVO - 2.7409

Table 139: Japan to BiH

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999	2001	2003	2004
(10.8) (11.6)	(12.4) (12.2)	(5.5) (6.1)	(6.2) (6.3)	(4.9) (5.1)	(8.7) (9.6)
REHAB. PUBLIC TRANSPORT SARAJEVO - 7.7190	ROAD CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT - 12.2383	PUBLIC ROAD TRANSP.. LOCAL CITIES - 6.1281	PROJECT FOR REHABILITATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN MOSTAR - 6.3292	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.0318	THE PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ BRIDGE AND MODRICA BRIDGE - 9.4634
REHABILITATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT - 3.8429				THE PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ BRIDGE AND MODRICA BRIDGE - 0.3278	
				CONSTRUCTION OF OSANICA BRIDGE AND BOGATICI BRIDGE - 4.2364	
				ROAD TRANSPORT - 0.5105	

Table 140: Portugal to BiH

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2004	2005
(5.5) (3.7)	(42.5) (39.8)	(9.6) (9.2)
SUPPLY OF FREIGHT WAGONS [loan] - 3.6754	DELIVERY OF FREIGHT WAGONS TO FEDERATION RAILWAYS [loan] - 39.7564	SUPPORT TO IMPORTS FROM PORTUGAL [loan] - 9.2180

Table 141: EC to BiH

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998
(51.9) (39.6)	(21.9) (16.8)
RECONSTRUCTION TRANSPORT 97 PART 1 - 28.7851	1998 TRANSPORT PROGRAMME FOR B-H - 16.7766
RECONSTRUCTION TRANSPORT 97 PART2 - 10.8422	

Table 142: IDA to BiH

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	2001	2002
(48.4) (39.0)	(14.9) (11.0)	(39.0) (30.0)
TRANSPORT RECONSTRUCTION - 39.0	TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES - 11.0	ROAD MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY PROJECT - 30.0

Table 143: EC to Croatia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2005
(108.6) (75.4)	(15.7) (15.3)
RIJEKA-ZAGREB MOTORWAY [loan] - 56.5450	VINKOVCI TO TOVARNIK TO STATE BORDER RAILWAY REHABILITATION - 15.2870
ZAGREB-AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL [loan] - 18.8483	

Table 144: Japan to Macedonia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(6.5) (6.6)
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT - 6.6419

Table 145: EC to Macedonia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(13.6) (10.0)
BINIFICATION INTERÉTS PRET BEI FYROM - 10.0067

Table 146: IDA to Macedonia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(12.0) (9.3)
TRANSPORTATION : TRADE & TRANSPORTATION FACILITY IN SERVICES EUROPE - 9.3	

Table 147: France to Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(3.8) (2.5)
FINANCEMENT PONT DE MITROVICA - 1.3823	
TRANSPORT ROUTIER - 0.3225	
FINANCEMENT AEROPORT DE PRISTINA - 0.6266	

Table 148: Germany to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2003
(7.4) (5.0)	(2.6) (2.3)
REHABILITATION OF THE ROAD PODGORICA-KULA - 4.5789	REHAB. ROAD PODGORICA-KULA - 2.2596
ROAD AND INFRASTRUCTURES REORGANISATION - 0.4121	

Table 149: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(17.8) (11.2)
KOSOVO: TROJAN ROADS - 1.7313	
ROAD TRANSPORT: STABPACT MONTENEGRO - 1.8430	
URGENT ROAD - 7.6112	

Table 150: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	
	(2.8) (2.0)
RECONSTRUCTION NIS AIRPORT - 1.6951	

Table 151: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2004
(2.7) (1.8)	(2.0) (1.9)
REVIEW RAILWAY - 0.2418	TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ROAD SAFETY - 1.9057
RAILWAY WORKSHOPS - 1.4638	

Table 152: EC to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004	2005
(8.1) (5.7)	(6.0) (5.1)	(24.1) (23.0)	(23.0) (22.4)
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES - REHABILITATION OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE (ROADS) - 5.6545	FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR BELGRADE CITYPASS. BELGRADE TO MONTENEGRO ROAD - 5.0841	TRANSPORT - 3.1059	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 4.9714
		TRANSPORT - 19.8782	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 17.3999

Table 153: IDA to FRY/Serbia

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(57.6) (55.0)
TRANSPORT REHABILITATION PROJECT - 55.0

Table 154: Japan to ex Yu

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(15.1) (14.8)
REHABILITATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY IN BELGRADE CITY - 14.7763

Table 155: Norway to ex Yu

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	
	(3.9) (2.5)
CONSULT ASSISTANCE NIS AIRPORT - 0.1878	
RECONSTRUCTION OF NIS AIRPORT - 2.2540	

Table 156: EC to ex YU

Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	
	(115.4) (80.1)
RAILWAYS REHABILITATION [loan] - 80.1055	

COMMUNICATIONS

Table 157: Italy to Albania

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	
	(11.6) (8.1)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS [loan] - 8.1473	

Table 158: Spain to BiH

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2002
(3.5) (2.3)	(3.6) (2.3)
PUBLIC TELEPHONE INSTALLAT./MATERIAL [loan] - 1.13	SYSTEMS BY CABLE DESTINED TO RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TELEPHONIC NETWORK [loan] - 1.15
TELEPHONES REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEM / MAINTENANCE [loan] - 1.13	CELLULAR SYSTEMS DESTINED TO RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TELEPHONIC NETWORK [loan] - 1.15

Table 159: Sweden to BiH

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1998
(3.6) (3.5)	(5.5) (4.5)
TELESWITCH. SARAJEVO. AF - 3.4441	TELECOMMUNICATIONS [loan] - 2.1706
	TELECOMMUNICATIONS : CONCESSIONAL LOAN TELECOM [loan]- 2.1706

Table 160: Switzerland to BiH

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998
(8.3) (6.7)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS - 6.7269

Table 161: US to Macedonia

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(2.7) (2.4)
RAIL FIBER OPTIC CABLING - 2.178

Table 162: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(3.9) (2.7)
RADIO/TELEVISION/PRINT MEDIA - 2.7196

Table 163: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(3.3) (1.9)
COMMUNICATION: LOCAL MEDIA SUPPORT PROGRAMME 2000 - 0.7957
MEDIA DEPARTMENT - 0.9321

Table 164: EC to FRY/Serbia

Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2005
(8.0) (6.8)	(3.2) (3.1)
SUPPORT TO THE MEDIA SECTOR - 6.7788	COMMUNICATIONS POLICY & ADMIN. MGMT - 3.1071

ENERGY

Table 165: Germany to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2002	2004	2005
(23.7) (19.1)	(3.3) (2.4)	(49.1) (47.9)	(16.8) (16.5)
HYDRO ELEC. SUPPLY FINANCE: SOUTH [loan]- 19.0662	POWER SUPPLY SOUTHERN ALBANIA [loan] - 2.4088	TRANSMISS. LINE TIRANA-PODGORICA [loan] - 47.9301	HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 12.4285
			HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 4.0883

Table 166: Italy to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	2000	2002	2003
(5.7) (4.0)	(7.1) (5.6)	(20.4) (12.7)	(42.5) (28.9)	(57.3) (48.2)
EMERGENCY INTERV. - ELEC.NETWOR - 3.9901	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION REHAB. [loan] - 5.5735	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REHABILITATION - 2.2526	ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 0.5729	ASSISTANCE TO TOP MANAGEMENT OF KESH - 1.10474
		ELECTRICITY SECTOR [loan] - 10.4712	IMPORT OF ELECTRIC POWER FROM ITALY TO KESH (ALBANIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY) [loan] - 28.2725	TECHNICAL&MANAGERIAL RESTRUCTURE&STRENGTHENING OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM [loan]- 46.9190

Table 167: Japan to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996
(13.0) (17.9)	(24.3) (28.7)
HYDRO POWER PLANTS DEV. [loan] - 17.8639	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION [loan] - 28.7132

Table 168: Norway to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(14.4) (8.3)
ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 8.3002

Table 169: US to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2003
(1.7) (1.5)	(2.0) (1.8)
ENERGY: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 1.5	ENERGY RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION INCL. REGULATORY REFORM - 1.78

Table 170: IDA to Albania

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	2002	2004	2005
(5.5) (5.0)	(34.0) (29.5)	(38.9) (29.9)	(26.2) (25.0)	(27.6) (27.0)
POWER LOSS REDUCTION - 5.0	POWER TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUT. - 29.5	POWER SECTOR REHABILITATION AND RESTRUCTURING PROJECT - 29.9	POWER SECTOR GENERATION & RESTRUCTURING PROJECT - 25.0	ENERGY COMMUNITY OF SOUTH EAST EUROPE - 27.0

Table 171: Austria to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996
(4.4) (4.0)
POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK REHAB. - 3.5731
STUDY ON THERMAL POWER PLANT REHAB. - 0.4026

Table 172: France to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	
	(2.9) (2.2)
EQUIPEMENT / REHAB. LIGNES ELECTR. - 2.21563	

Table 173: Germany to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2004
(2.7) (1.8)	(6.5) (6.4)
REHABILITATION OF THE HYDRO POWER PLANT IN TREBINJE - 1.8315	REHABILITATION HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANT TREBINJE - 6.3523

Table 174: Japan to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998
(23.9) (25.6)	(31.7) (31.4)
REHAB. MAIN TRANSMISSION LINES - 25.5785	REHABILITATE POWER PLANT AND MINE [loan] - 31.3980

Table 175: Netherlands to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	
	(3.4) (2.7)
ENERGY - 0.21113	
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 1.1612	
GAS DISTRIBUTION - 0.8540	

Table 176: Norway to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998
(1.8) (1.1)	(20.9) (11.4)
POWER DISTRIB/TRANSMISSION - 0.7069	MISC. DEMO. & HR SUPPORT: ENERGY - 1.9880
POWER DISTRIB/TRANSMISSION - 0.3534	POWER DISTRIBUTION & TRANSMISS REHAB - 4.3089
	POWER DISTRIBUTION & TRANSMISS REHAB - 5.1041

Table 177: Spain to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999
(31.2) (20.5)	(3.8) (2.4)
HYDRO-ELEC. POWER PLANT RECONSTRUCTION. AF [loan] - 20.4615	RÉHABILITATION DU RÉSEAU ELECTRIQUE EN BOSNIE CENTRALE - 2.4307

Table 178 : Switzerland to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000
(6.5) (5.1)	(11.8) (8.4)
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 5.1241	HYDROPOWER PLANT REHABILITATION - 8.3535

Table 179: EC to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997
(15.6) (11.9)
1997 ENERGY PROGRAMME PART 1 - 11.8997

Table 180: IDA to BiH

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	2001
(41.1) (35.6)	(12.4) (10.0)	(31.5) (25.0)	(47.3) (35.0)
EMER. ELECTRIC POWER RECONSTR.- 35.6	EMERGENCY GAS REHAB. - 10.0	ELECTR. POWER - 25.0	ELECTRIC POWER - 35.0

Table 181: Norway to Croatia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2001	2002	2005
(3.7) (2.0)	(2.9) (1.7)	(3.8) (2.4)	(1.9) (1.8)
MISC. DEMO. & HR SUPPORT: ENERGY- 1.9880	REHAB. DISTRIBUTION NETWORK - 1.6679	45 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK REHAB.- 2.4043	FINANCIAL ENG. FOR CLEANER PRODUCTION AND ENERGY- 0.2199
			DISTR NETWORK REH IN WAR AFFECTED AREAS - 1.5446

Table 182: IDA to Croatia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(8.0) (7.0)
CROATIA - ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT [grant] - 7.0

Table 183: Norway to Macedonia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003
(3.7) (2.3)	(1.6) (1.2)
HEATING OIL DELIVERY TO FYROM - 1.2522	REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED CONDENSER BATTERY - 0.5542
RECONSTRUC ELECTRICITY SUPP. NETWORK - 1.0179	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 0.5646

Table 184: Switzerland to Macedonia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(9.9) (9.0)
EFFICIENT ENERGY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMME - 8.9962

Table 185: France to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(10.9) (10.5)
EXTENSION RESEAU DISTRIBUTION ELECTRIQUE [loan] - 10.5381

Table 186 : Germany to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2004	2005
(13.0) (9.0)	(85.7) (58.2)	(28.8) (20.8)	(5.3) (5.2)	(40.5) (39.8)
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4806	REHABILITATION OF THE DISTRICT HEATING SYSTEMS - 6.8684	REHABILITATION DISTRICT HEATING SYSTEM - 9.1791	REHABILITATION HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANT PERUCICA - 0.6708	REHAB. DISTRICT HEATING SYSTEMS PH. III - 2.4857
COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT: EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME ENERGY - 8.4813	EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME ENERGY PHASE II - 1.19053	REHABILITATION DISTRICT HEATING SYSTEM - 0.2450	REHABILITATION HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANT PERUCICA [loan] - 4.4477	REHA. OF BAJINA BASTA HYDRO POWER PLANT [loan] - 37.2856
	EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME ENERGY PHASE II - 4.3042	EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME ENERGY - 4.8157		
	UNTIED FINANCIAL CREDIT FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR [loan] - 45.7896	URGENT MEASURES ENERGY- 4.7120		
		EMERGENCY AID ENERGY - 1.8848		

Table 187: Japan to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003
(5.7) (5.6)	(5.4) (5.6)
REHABILITATION OF STORAGE HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT - 5.5750	REHAB OF THE BAJNA BASTA PUMPED STORAGE HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT - 5.5651

Table 188: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2003	2004	2005
(7.6) (4.3)	(6.6) (3.8)	(2.0) (1.5)	(2.6) (2.1)	(3.7) (3.4)
REHABILITATION AV ELECTRICITY KOSOVO - 0.8135284	EXTENSION TRANSFORMER STATION - 0.2792	ENERGY EFFICIENCY CAPACITY BUILDING - 0.3531	ENERGY EFFICIENCY - 0.3705	MIER ENERGY EFFICIENCY ASSISTANCE - 0.4450
REPAIR OR 420 KV LINES KOSOVO- 1.14571	PROCUREMENT HEATING OIL - 1.0003	METERING SYSTEM FOR ELECTRIC POWER - 0.3428	WATTOUR METER TEST EQUIPMENT GOR EPC - 0.3242	MIER DEREGULATION ELECTRICITY MARKET - 0.2702
ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 1.3466	REPAIR ELECTRIC LINES IN KOSOVO BORDER - 0.2779	ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS IN PODGORICA - 0.3792	ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SANDZAK. - 0.4088	MIER SANDZAK ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION - 1.1177
ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 0.9766	CETINJE DISTRIBUTION - 0.3571	ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION - 0.4079	ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION. - 0.5089	BILATERAL PROGRAM ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION - 0.4509
	TRANSFORMER- 1.7987		NATIONAL DISPATCHING CENTER. EPCG - 0.3397	BILATERAL PROGRAM ELECTRICITY DISTRIB - 0.4462
				HYDROLOGY RESEARCH BILATERAL PROJECT - 0.2608

Table 189: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2003	2005
(6.2) (4.6)	(5.4) (3.6)	(11.7) (10.3)	(3.9) (3.8)
DISTRICT HEATING - 4.5848	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.5476	POWER GENERAT./NON-RENEWABLE SOURCES - 3.9613	ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 3.7658
	STUDY DISTRICT HEATING - 0.3965	POWER GENERAT./NON-RENEWABLE SOURCES - 0.3713	
	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 1.5959	ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 5.8181	

Table 190: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002
(2.9) (2.3)	(15.1) (10.7)	(2.1) (1.5)	(12.6) (9.8)
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 2.2625	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 7.5833	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.4820	NATIONAL CONTROL CENTER REHABILITATION - 9.8278
	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.1399		

Table 191: US to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(7.0) (6.0)
ENERGY EFFICIENCY -6.0

Table 192: EC to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(22.0) (14.2)	(74.7) (51.8)	(113.0) (96.0)	(67.8) (64.6)	(61.4) (59.7)
OBNOVA - ENERGY FOR DEMOCRACY - 3.6129	KOSOVO-ASSISTANCE TO ENERGY PRODUCTION. TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION - 51.8330	EPS CAPACITY BUILDING MEASURES - 6.1010	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 49.6956	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.8642
ENERGY IMPORT 2000 - SUPPORT FOR DISTRICT HEATING PROGRAM - 10.5981		REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE ENERGY SECTOR - 2.2596	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 14.9086	ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 26.0999
		COMPUTERISED OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN KEK - 2.8245		POWER GENERAT./NON-RENEWABLE SOURCES - 31.6927
		DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES ELECTRIC BODY KEK.KOSOVO ELECTRICITY CORPORATION - 2.8245		
		REHABILITATION THERMAL POWER PLANTS - 71.8562		
		SUPPORT FOR COAL PRODUCTION AND POWER GENERATION - 10.16834		

Table 193: IDA to FRY/Serbia

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2004	2005
(6.5) (5.0)	(22.0) (21.0)	(24.0) (23.5)
EMERGENCY STABILIZATION OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO - 5.0	ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT - 21.0	ENERGY SECTOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 3 PROJECT [grant] - 2.5
		ENERGY COMMUNITY OF SOUTH EAST EUROPE (APL) PROGRAM - 21.0

Table 194: France to ex Yu

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(4.3) (2.8)
RESEAU REGIONAL ELECTRICITE - 1.2063
REHAB. DE 30 SOUS-STATIONS ELECTRIQUES - 0.6958
STATIONS ELECTRIQUES - 0.2283
FASEP 433-REHABILITATION RESEAU ELECTRIQUE HTE TE. - 0.6412

Table 195 : Netherlands to ex Yu

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995
(6.3) (5.2)
SETTING OF OIL PIPELINES - 0.7008
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 4.1861
GAS DISTRIBUTION - 0.3451

Table 196 : Norway to ex Yu

Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(8.3) (5.3)
EXTENSION TRANSF. STATION CETINJE - 1.2522
MIER – TRANSFORMATOR- 3.1761
TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR EMPLOYEES - 0.3255

BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES

Table 197 : Germany to Albania

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1998	2005
(4.8) (4.9)	(6.8) (5.7)	(3.5) (3.5)
FOUNDATION BANK I (SMI [loan] - 4.8848	FOUNDATION BANK [loan] - 5.6837	CREDIT FOR NGO'S RURAL A. URB. REGIONS - 0.2609 CREDIT FOR NOO'S I RURAL A.URBAN REGIONS [loan] - 3.2314

Table 198: US to Albania

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995
(6.8) (5.4)
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 3.439
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 1.913

Table 199: IDA to Albania

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2002
(14.8) (12.0)	(8.4) (6.5)	(19.5) (15.0)
MICROCREDIT – 12.0	FINANCE – 6.5	FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 15.0

Table 200: France to BiH

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	
	(5.0) (3.9)
IMPRESSION ET TRANSPORT DE BILLETS - 3.89870	

Table 201 : Germany to BiH

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003
(13.5) (9.2)	(7.3) (5.3)	(5.1) (4.5)
DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND - 4.5789	ADVISORY SERVICES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEPOSIT GUARANTEE FUND - 0.4712	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4676
CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND (CGF) - 4.5789	REFORM OF TAX LEGISLATION - 0.4712	DEPOSIT INSURANCE AGENCY - 2.8878
	CREDIT PROGRAMME IN CRISIS AFFECTED REGIONS - 4.2408	MICRO CREDIT FOR SMES - 1.1298

Table 202: Sweden to BiH

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2000	2004	2005
(5.9) (4.9)	(2.2) (1.6)	(4.6) (4.5)	(7.0) (6.9)
FINANCIAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT : PILOT CREDIT PROJECT - 0.7424	PRIVATISATION FEDBH BANKS - 0.6273	SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LOAN PRODUCTS THROUGH MICRO FINANCE - 2.5864	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4252
FINANCIAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT : LOCAL COSTS - 0.2437	MICROFINANCE GEN. - 0.9824	FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKET IN BOSNIA BY INCREASING LENDING POSSIBILITIES - 1.8785	CAPITAL FOR LENDING - 6.4236
FORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES : PRIVATISATION BANKS - 1.3026			
INFORMAL / SEMI-FORMAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES : AGRICULTURAL CREDITS - 0.9185			
MICROCREDITS - 0.5914			
FORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES [loan] -0.5033			
FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. INTERMEDIARIES [loan] - 0.5033			

Table 203: US to BiH

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998
(133.0) (110.1)
BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE - 110.086

Table 204: IDA to BiH

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2001
(6.3) (5.0)	(27.0) (20.)
FINANCE:PILOT CREDIT – 5.0	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT – 20.0

Table 205: Netherlands to Croatia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003
(3.3) (2.8)
HR/EBRD FINANCIAL FACILITIES SMM - 2.8245

Table 206: US to Croatia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	2001
(4.0) (3.2)	(3.4) (3.0)
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR – 3.15	BANKING & FIN. SERV.: GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 3.02

Table 207: Netherlands to Macedonia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2000	2002	2003
(6.3) (4.5)	(3.6) (2.3)	(7.6) (5.3)	(7.2) (6.2)
INFORMAL/SEMI-FORMAL FIN. INSTITUT. - 4.4998	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.2091	FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. INTERMEDIARIES - 5.3435	PRO CREDIT BANK - 6.2139
	FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. INTERMEDIARIES - 2.0617		

Table 208: Germany to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003	2005
(14.5) (9.8)	(5.9) (4.3)	(19.0) (16.7)	(13.5) (13.3)
CONSULTING SERVICES FOR PARTNER BANKS FOR LOCAL SME - 0.7784	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.4136	PROMOTION OF SME AND HOUSING - 2.8245	HOUSING MODERNIZATION LOAN PROGRAMME - 11.1856
REFINANCING OF SUB-LOANS TO LOCAL SME - 1.9689	CONSULTING SERVICES FOR PARTNER BANKS - 0.7228	CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION OF SME - 4.0673	HOUSING MODERNIZATION LOAN PROGRAMME - 1.2428
CONSULTING SERVICES FOR THE PARTNER BANKS: IMPLEMENT THE LOAN PROGRAMME - 0.6868	CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND FOR SME - 2.1204	CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND - 2.0788	FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. INTERMEDIARIES - 0.5884
REFINANCING OF SUB-LOANS TO LOCAL SME-6.4105		CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND - 2.0788	
		CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION OF SME - 0.5649	
		CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION OF SME IN SERBIA - 5.0841	

Table 209: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

	1999
	(4.6) (3.2)
MICRO ENTERPRISE BANK OF KOSOVO - 3.1813	

Table 210: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

	2001
	(4.3) (2.9)
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS KOSOVO - 2.0167	
MICROFINS MICRO CREDITS - 0.8411	

Table 211: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

	2004
	(6.7) (6.6)
SEAF SOUTH BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 4.8346	
REFINANCING FUND FOR SERBIAN - 1.8025	

Table 212: EC to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004	
	(7.5) (7.2)
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF COMMERCIAL BANKING - 7.1703	

Table 213: IDA to FRY/Serbia

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003
(110.5) (85.0)	(91.4) (80.0)
PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 85.0	PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 80.0

Table 214: Norway to ex Yu

BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(2.5) (1.6)
DEBT FORGIVENESS - 1.4744

BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES

Table 215: Germany to Albania

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1999
(3.4) (3.5)	(3.4) (2.7)
BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 3.4891	BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 2.7237

Table 216: US to Albania

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(20.1) (15.9)	(14.6) (12.0)	(32.1) (26.9)	(19.8) (17.0)	(18.8) (16.8)	(8.7) (7.9)	(7.3) (6.9)	(5.8) (5.6)
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 1.868	ECO RESTRUCTURING : ENTERPRISE FUNDS - 6.4	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 10.2812	PRIVATE MARKETS - 0.233	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 16.184	GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 7.907	GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 0.339	GROWTH OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN TARGET SECTORS - 0.714
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 4.669	BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.202	COMPETITIVE & MARKET-RESPONSIVE PRIVATE FIN. SECTOR - 1.4	PRIVATE MARKETS - 13.513	BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 0.6		GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 6.56	GROWTH OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN TARGET SECTORS - 4.931
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 0.934	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISES - 2.2	SPECIAL INITIATIVES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 14.4787	A MORE COMPETITIVE & MARKET-RESPONSIVE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 1.2				
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 0.934	PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 0.3	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.7752	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES -				

			2.019				
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 1.868	PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 2.944						
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 3.735							
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 1.868							

Tale 217: Germany to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2003	2005
(4.7) (3.8)	(3.9) (2.7)	(2.9) (2.6)	(2.2) (2.2)
BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.2723	PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS - 0.5654	BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 2.2596	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 1.8642
PRIVATE SECTOR STRUCTURES DEVELOPMENT. TUZLA - 0.8171	BUSINESS SERVICES - 1.2952	PARTNERSHIPS - 0.1609	
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.9066	SUPPORT FOR PRIVATISATION PROCESSES - 0.8010		
SUPPORT FOR PRIVATISATION PROCESSES - 0.8171			

Table 218: Netherlands to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(17.9) (17.4)
ECONOMIC SUPPORT - 0.8035
SUPPORT TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - 2.4370
SAR SREBRENICA REVITALIZATION - 1.2398
HARMONISED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISE SECTOR RECOVERY - 6.2142
SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF SREBRENICA - 6.5309

Table 219: Sweden to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(2.0) (1.5)
TRUST FUND-BANK REFORM AND PRIVATISATION - 1.2344

Table 220: UK to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(4.2) (3.0)
PRIVATISATION. ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING LABOUR & SOCIAL POLICY - 2.6945

Table 221: US to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(29.6) (24.5)	(205.3) (172.4)	(74.6) (64.0)	(16.3) (14.5)	(22.7) (20.7)	(11.4) (10.7)	(5.7) (5.6)
PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 24.457	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 12.0	PRIVATE MARKETS - 12.0	ACCESS TO ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE POOR EXPANDED - 0.7	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 19.65	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.686	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 4.97
	HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 160.3958	PRIVATE MARKETS - 51.986	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 13.845	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 1.08		ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 0.422

Table 222: EC to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004	
(12.4) (11.8)	
ECONOMIC REFORM: CORPORATE GOV.. REGIONAL FUND. TRADE & INSURANCE SECTOR - 11.8027	

Table 223: IDA to BiH

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2002
(61.9) (50.0)	(26.7) (19.8)	(70.2) (54.0)
ENTER & BANKING PRIV. – 50.0	PRIVATISATION – 19.8	PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT PROJECT – 10.0
		BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 44.0

Table 224: Germany to Croatia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004	
(2.3) (2.2)	
SUPPORT OF ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT - 2.2363	

Table 225: US to Croatia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(9.0) (7.5)	(19.5) (16.7)	(7.0) (6.1)	(15.8) (14.1)	(12.8) (11.7)	(10.5) (9.8)	(10.7) (10.4)
COMPETITIVE & MARKET-RESPONSIVE PRIVATE FIN. SECTOR - 0.25	PRIVATE MARKETS - 5.8	BUSINESS: GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 4.581	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 14.088	GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 11.292	GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 0.342	GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.149
HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 6.635051	PRIVATE MARKETS - 7.833	BUSINESS: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 1.55		ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.4	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 0.5	
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.65	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE DEVPT - 0.31				PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 0.67	
	PRIVATE MARKETS: FISCAL POLICIES - 2.79				GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 8.245	

Table 226: EC to Croatia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2003
(3.3) (2.2)	(8.2) (6.9)
CRO007 SME SUPPORT CROATIA - 2.1564	INVESTMENT CLIMATE. REGISTRATION MARITIME DOMAIN. FREE ZONES - 6.9483

Table 227: Germany to Macedonia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	2000	2002	2003
(6.9) (7.0)	(2.7) (1.8)	(2.2) (1.6)	(2.4) (2.10)
BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 6.9783	BUSINESS SERVICES - 1.1308	PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN MACEDONIA - 0.9424	BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 1.97717
	PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS - 0.7067	SUPPORT TO MACEDONIAN CONSUMER PROTECTION SERVICES (OPM) - 0.6745	

Table 228: US to Macedonia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(11.0) (8.7)	(6.7) (5.5)	(45.9) (38.6)	(8.4) (7.2)	(4.5) (3.9)	(14.9) (13.3)	(13.7) (12.5)	(11.6) (10.9)	(12.2) (11.8)
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 1.301	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISES - 1.5	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 22.0	PRIVATE MARKETS - 0.413	BUSINESS: ACCELERATED DVT & GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 2.954	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 13.273	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 12.505	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 0.4	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 11.8
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 1.301	PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 3.821	ACCELERATED DVPT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 9.513611	PRIVATE MARKETS - 1.27	BUSINESS: ACCELERATED DVT & GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 0.971			ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.429	
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT - 6.07		SPECIAL INITIATIVES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 7.048231	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 5.524					

Table 229: IDA to Macedonia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	
(93.3) (85.0)	
ENTERPRISE SECTOR – 85.0	

Table 230: Germany to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(4.0) (2.7)	(6.8) (5.0)	(3.3) (2.9)	(9.3) (9.0)	(3.5) (3.5)
PARTNERSHIPS - 0.4720	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 0.9424	PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND EMPLOYMENT (PSP) IN SERBIA - 1.0168	PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT IN MONTENEGRO - 3.1059	DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF TOURISM IN INTERIOR REGIONS OF MONTENEGRO - 1.2428
TOURISM SECTOR - 0.6868	PROMOTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT. FOCUS ON SME - 1.4136	BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 0.2847	BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 0.5917	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 1.6157
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & INSTITUTIONS - 1.5110	STRENGTHENING THE TOURISM SME SECTOR IN MONTENEGRO - 0.4712	ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 1.4687	PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND EMPLOYMENT (PSP) IN SERBIA - 4.9695	
	ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 1.4136			
	ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 0.3769			

Table 231: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2004
(4.4) (2.8)	(2.7) (2.5)
FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME FOR ENVIRONMENT - 0.26867	SUBS 2004 TO CBI - 2.5031
BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.4800	
FINANCING OF SALES AGENTS - 2.0481	

Table 232: Norway to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(2.5) (2.3)
MIER BUSINESS INCUBATOR TRAINING - 1.7499
MIER RESTRUCTURING OF JAT AIRWAYS - 0.5812

Table 233: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2003
(2.4) (1.7)	(2.4) (1.6)	(2.0) (1.8)
BUSINESS SERVICES : PRIVATE SECTOR - 1.7466	PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.5814	BUSINESS REGISTRY - 1.6092

Table 234: US to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(2.8) (2.3)	(73.1) (61.3)	(243.9) (209.2)	(30.8) (27.0)	(56.1) (50.2)	(39.2) (35.8)	(23.4) (22.0)	(36.6) (35.5)
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISES - 0.589	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 2.9	PRIVATE MARKETS - 15.0	BUSINESS: ACCELERATED DVT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 6.75	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 23.203	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 25.5	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 9.854	ACCELERATED DEVT. AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 2.103
PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 1.726	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 15.0	PRIVATE MARKETS - 11.0	BUSINESS: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 18.599	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 14.209	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 9.084	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 12.1	ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 12.997
	CROSS-CUTTING: BUSINESS SERVICES - 11.698	PRIVATE MARKETS - 16.508	BUSINESS: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED - 1.415	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 12.259	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 1.2		ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE - 5.875
	SPECIAL INITIATIVES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 25.097	PRIVATE MARKETS - 17.901					ACCELERATED GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 5.242
	HUMAN SUFFERING & NEGATIVE CONS. OF CRISES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 4.5	PRIVATE MARKETS - 5.699					IMPROVED POLICY AND INSTI. CLIMATE FOR PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT - 9.217
	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POL. & ECO. DECISION MAKING - 2.14608	PRIVATE MARKETS - 1.87					
		PRIVATE MARKETS - 102.428					
		PRIVATE MARKETS - 9.34					
		ACCELERATED DEVT. AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 22.1					
		PRIVATE MARKETS - 7.05					

Table 235: EC to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(35.7) (23.0)	(199.9) (128.5)	(13.6) (9.4)	(9.3) (7.9)	(10.1) (9.7)	(17.3) (16.8)
PROMOTION DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE DU KOSOVO - 23.0393	SUPPORT FOR SERBIA 2001 - 128.5151	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- SUPPORT TO ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT - 9.4241	PRE AND POST- PRIVATISATION RESTRUCTURING - 2.2596	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - TURN AROUND MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS ADVICE - 7.1703	PRIVATISATION - 2.4857
			FUTHER SUPPORT PRIVATISATION AGENCY - 5.6490	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - 2.4847	PRIVATISATION - 14.2928

Table 236: IDA to FRY/Serbia

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(14.3) (11.0)
PRIVATIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF BANKS AND ENTERPRISES – 11.0

Table 237: Norway to ex Yu

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(8.8) (5.1)
BUSINESS SERVICES: TRANS-BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 5.0731

Table 238: EC to ex YU

BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(27.2) (18.8)
GLOBAL LOAN [loan] - 18.8483

MULTISECTOR

Table 239: Germany to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1999	2000	2002	2003	2005
(6.9) (7.0)	(4.2) (3.3)	(5.1) (3.5)	(4.7) (3.4)	(6.4) (5.6)	(11.4) (11.3)
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNAL INFRA. - 6.9745	URBAN DVPT: SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND - 3.2685	STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 0.7068	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 0.9424	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.1557	EQUITY INVESTMENT - 9.9080
		URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT - 2.8271	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 0.5268	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4121	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.2429
			SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND [loan] - 1.9272	SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND [loan] - 2.5994	

Table 240: Italy to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(5.4) (3.4)
RESTORATION OF COUNCIL PALACE AND MINISTRY OF CULTURE - 0.7863
MULTISECTOR AID - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 1.8501
RURAL DVPT IN BLINISHT. DAIC. BUSHAT AND ZADRIMA REGION - SUPPORT TO NGO - 0.2257

Table 241: Netherlands to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(9.0) (8.5)
TIR PORTO ROMANO [CLEAN UP OF THE PORTO ROMANO HOT SPOT]- 6.0877
TIR MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT - 0.6791
TIR TIRANA URBAN PLAN - 1.6392

Table 242: Switzerland to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000
(4.0) (3.2)	(7.1) (5.1)
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.5306	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 5.0524
RENOVATION D'UN INTERNAT POUR REFUGIES:AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.3727	
RENOVATION ANCIEN BATIMENT POUR REFUGIES: AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.6655	
RENOVATION ECOLE: AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.3061	
RENOVATION ECOLE: AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.1996	

Table 243 : UK to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(6.9) (4.8)
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AGENCY - 0.4321
RURAL LIVELIHOODS - 4.3209

Table 244 : US to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2000	2003	2004	2005
(4.8) (4.0)	(3.7) (3.2)	(9.2) (8.4)	(8.9) (8.3)	(14.4) (13.9)
IMPROVED PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL SVCES - 3.0860	MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 3.1700	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 3.3370	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.0000	CHEMICAL AGENT ELIMINATION TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT - 6.7570
AUDIT, EVALUATION & PROJECT SUPPORT - 0.2650		CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.6410	TARGETED VULNERABLE POPULATIONS - 0.3390	MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND BIO-DIVERSITY - 0.0500
URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE - 0.6000		CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.2700	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 2.5070	U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN COUNTRY - 1.3120
		U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.1480	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 0.8000	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 2.3660
		ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 0.9800	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 2.1260	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.4000
			U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN COUNTRY - 1.5010	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 1.0000
				ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 1.2580
				ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.3940
				INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS (IIP) - 0.0500

Table 245: EC to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004
(42.8) (36.1)	(45.1) (34.5)	(35.1) (26.9)	(41.0) (30.2)	(32.0) (20.6)	(46.0) (29.6)	(59.7) (41.4)	(8.8) (8.3)
COP ALBANIE 1996 - 35.9695	MULTISECTOR AID - 34.4934	ALBANIA COP 1998 - 26.9116	MULTISECTOR AID - 30.1580	ENVIRONMENTAL RECONSTRUCTION - 1.1059	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR ALBANIA IN 2001 – CARDS - 29.5618	ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2002 ALBANIA - 40.4297	STRENGTHENING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SYSTEM - 3.1060
DELEGATION TIRANA - 0.1269				MULTISECTOR AID - 19.5374		ICMPD – ALBANIE - 0.4159	SUSTAINABLE AND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF TIRANAN-DURRES - 1.2424
						OIM ALBANIE - 0.5993	NEIGHBOURHOOD P - IT/ALBANIA - 1.2424
							NEIGHBOURHOOD P - GR/ALBANIA - 2.7333

Table 246: IDA to Albania

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1997	1998
(11.0) (10.0)	(6.2) (5.0)	(12.6) (10.0)
URBAN WORKS + MICROENTERPRISE - 4.0000	RECOVERY PROGRAM TECH ASSIST - 5.0000	URBAN DVPT: LAND DEVELOPMENT - 10.0000
RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 6.0000		

Table 247: Germany to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2005
(12.0) (9.6)	(14.1) (13.9)
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5829	EQUITY INVESTMENT - 12.4285
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.2169	MULTISECTOR AID - 1.3050
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.4238	
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 1.3619	
MULTISECTOR AID - 5.0237	
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: SETTLEMENT - 0.9490	

Table 248: Italy to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996
(18.8) (14.7)
SUPPORT GROUP BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA [through MGI] - 14.7447

Table 249: Switzerland to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001
(20.8) (16.4)	(5.1) (3.6)	(4.1) (2.9)
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.7247	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5688	MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor] - 2.3712
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6655	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6754	MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor]- 0.5572
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.3926	MULTISECTOR AID - 2.3698	
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.8447		
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5124		
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0648		
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.9157		
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0381		
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5856		
QUICK REACTION MECHANISM: MULTISECTOR AID - 0.3327		
REHABILITATION: URBAN DEVELOPMENT - 0.5523		

Table 250: US to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1998
(16.0) (12.6)	(74.6) (61.7)
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 3.1600	AUDIT. EVALUATION & PROJECT SUPPORT - 1.1060
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 1.2640	BOSNIA MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE / SERVICES - 60.6010
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 0.6320	
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 1.2640	
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 5.8140	

Table 251: EC to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
(141.4) (104.1)	(86.2) (55.7)	(129.1) (83.0)	(81.3) (56.4)	(4.7) (4.0)
HUTOVO BLATO WETLANDS - 0.1811	INTEREST RATE SUBSIDY ON EIB LOAN TO BIH (RE/BIH/05/00/00) - 6.4510	BIH SUPPORT PROGRAMME CARDS - 2.6867	ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 FOR BOSNIA & HERZEG. - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - 56.3970	SUPPORT TO SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT - 2.8249
TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUND (ATA) : RE/BIH/08/00/99 - 6.4280	2000 INTEGRATED RETURN PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 46.4543	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 36.6957		SUPPORT TO AIR MONITORING - 1.1290
PHARE COP 1999 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 23.6548	OBNOVA 2000 INTEGRATED RETURN PROGRAMME - 2.7647	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 9.2345		
1999 EC REFUGEE PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 73.8242		CARDS-SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA & HEZEGOVINA-REFUGEE RETURN PHASE II- 0.9672		
		REFUGEE RETURN AND HOUSING SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 33.4050		

Table 252: IDA to BiH

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1999
(103.9) (90.0)	(18.6) (15.0)
MULTISECTOR AID /COMP. NOT AVAILABLE - 90.0000	LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - 15.0000

Table 253: Italy to Croatia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(4.6) (4.4)
LOCAL SUPPORT: SMES DEVEL.. AGRICULTURE. ENVIRONMENT. SOCIAL PROMOTION - 4.3632

Table 254: US to Croatia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2002
(10.2) (8.4)	(20.1) (18.0)
AUDIT. EVALUATION & PROJECT SUPPORT - 0.9360	SETTLEMENT: HUMANITARIAN - 15.8710
URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE - 7.5000	HUMANITARIAN - 0.5770
	MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 0.9600

Table 255: EC to Croatia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(18.3) (11.8)	(79.1) (50.8)	(76.1) (52.8)	(8.4) (7.1)	(7.7) (7.4)	(31.9) (31.0)
ATA CROATIA - 0.3126	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR CROATIA IN 2001 – CARDS - 30.0274	ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2002 FOR CROATIA - 52.7754	ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES - 4.1798	ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES - 4.7211	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6214
CROATIA SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS - 0.3686	REFUGEE RETURN PROGRAMME FOR CROATIA IN 2001 - 20.7774		ACCREDITATION SYSTEMS; PLANT HEALTH. VETERINIARIAN SYSTEM - 2.8242	NEIGHBOURHOOD P - SLOVENIA/HUNGARY/CROATIA - 2.4848	MULTISECTOR AID - 30.3443
RETOUR DES REFUGIES CROATIE - 9.2157					
RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.8431					

Table 256: Germany to Macedonia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2003	2005
(4.5) (3.6)	(17.9) (12.3)	(8.9) (7.8)	(3.4) (3.4)
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 1.6342	STUDIES & EXPERTS FUND - 2.8271	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4122	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 2.1749
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 0.9805	URBAN DEVPT: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 7.538	SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 5.7767	MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0253
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: MULTISECTOR - 0.2451	URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT - 0.8481		

Table 257: Sweden to Macedonia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
2.5) (1.8)
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT: WATER SUPPLY, SEWAGE AND WASTE - 1.6047
UNIVERSITY COOPERATION - 0.20574

Table 258: US to Macedonia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(29.7) (25.5)	(18.8) (16.8)	(15.4) (14.1)	(6.2) (5.8)	(5.0) (4.8)
MULTISECTOR: CROSS-CUTTING – 22.0	SPECIAL INITIATIVES- 12.0	SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.6	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS – 2.0	U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN COUNTRY - 1.233
MULTISECTOR: EXPANDED ACCESS AND OPPORTUN NON- MICROENTERPRISE - 1.3	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 2.089	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 3.21	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS – 2.134	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.303
MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 1.35	PEACE CORPS - MISSION EXPENSES - 0.341	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 2.146	U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN COUNTRY - 1.542	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 2.248
MULTISECTOR: PEACE CORPS - 0.81	MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 2.18	U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.393		ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.359
		ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 2.15		

Table 259: EC to Macedonia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005
(16.2) (13.7)	(31.1) (23.8)	(19.0) (14.5)	(40.3) (29.7)	(23.1) (14.9)	(76.9) (49.4)	(46.9) (32.5)	(10.9) (10.3)	(7.0) (6.8)
COP FYROM 1996 /MA9602-05 - 13.653	COP II 1997 – FYROM - 6.7996	FYROM COP 1998 - 14.53976	BONIFICATION BEI PROTOCOLE FINANCIER FYROM - 13.6920	NATIONAL PROGRAMME 2000 - 14.9294	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN 2001 - 3.58230	CARDS 2002 - FYROM - ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME - 32.51342	PROGRAMME RESERVE-3.7271	MULTISECTOR AID - 2.4857
	COP FYROM 1997 - 16.9990		COP FYROM 1999 - 15.9829		SUPPORT PROGRAMME FYROM 2001 - 33.5814		NEIGHBOURHOOD P - BG/FYROM - 1.2423	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 2.4857
					ADDITIONAL PROGRAMME FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA - 10.7469		NEIGHBOURHOOD P - GR/FYROM - 2.2363	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 1.24285
					CARDS-SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR FYROM IN 2001 - 1.5224			

Table 260: IDA to Macedonia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(27.0) (20.0)
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURE – 5.0
MULTISECTOR AID – 15.0

Table 261: Germany to FRY/Serbia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
(6.1) (4.9)	(15.7) (10.9)	(12.6) (9.1)	(4.7) (4.1)	(10.1) (9.9)	(33.8) (33.3)
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.8553	MULTISECTOR AID [Kosovo] - 1.4418	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4136	INTEGRATED SPECIALIST - 0.6186	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.7951	EQUITY INVESTMENT - 19.2642
HUMANITARIAN/STRUCTURAL MEASURES TO SURVIVE OVER WINTER. KOSOVO - 2.7238	MULTISECTOR EMERGENCY AID TO SERBIA- 4.7119	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.8848	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.3954	REGIONAL PROJECT EX-YUGOSLAVIA - 2.4848	MULTISECTOR AID - 2.4857
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 0.8988	SMALL PROJECTS FUND FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF SE EUROPE [Kosovo and Montenegro] - 2.1203	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 2.9605	SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 0.8234	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 2.4848	SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 1.6157
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: SETTLEMENT - 0.4176	REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE. GREJCEVCE REGION - 2.5915	SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 0.5183	SMALL PROJECT FUND FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA - 1.1297	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 1.0772	SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 0.8700
		SMALL PROJECT FUND FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA - 0.9424	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.1297	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.5715	STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 0.6214
		STUDY AND EXPERT FUND ENERGY - 0.4712		SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 0.4061	SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 0.4971
		MODERNIZATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES - 0.9424		SMALL SCALE FONDS - 0.6212	REGIONALPROJEKT EX-JUGOSLAWIEN - 2.4111
				URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT - 1.2424	MULTISECTOR AID - 1.8643
					MODERNIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES - 1.1186
					MODERNIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES - 1.6779
					RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.6249

Table 262: Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	
	(7.4) (6.5)
MINISTRY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT (MPNRE) - 0.8665	
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 0.8655	
SUST. DEVELOPMENT S-M - 0.7675	
URBAN PLANNING MONTENEGRO - 0.7502	
DEVELOPMENT OF 4 DIFFERENT SECTORS IN TOPOLA. SERBIA - 0.4393	
TOPOLA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (TRDP) - 2.8047	

Table 263: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(18.1) (12.9)
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT [Kosovo] - 7.8796	
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FUND [Kosovo]- 0.6458	
PROJET EAU [Kosovo] - 2.9504	
MULTISECTOR AID [Kosovo] - 0.6932	
MULTISECTOR AID [Kosovo. cadastre] - 0.5925	

Table 264: US to FRY/Serbia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003	2004	2005
(17.4) (15.5)	(27.6) (25.2)	(4.4) (4.1)	(9.0) (8.8)
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.1040	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 13.0580	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8280	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States - 1.2370
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.9900	ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 5.5710	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8540	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States - 1.4710
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8730	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8330	INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS (IIP) - 0.3800	Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States - 1.5520
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.3330	CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.4150		International Information Programs (IIP) - 0.4100
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 1.5800	ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 1.5800		
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 3.4900	ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 0.7600		
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 0.7800	ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 0.7500		

Table 265: EC to FRY/Serbia

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
(98.0) (72.2)	(758.4) (489.8)	(91.8) (59.0)	(70.8) (49.1)	(27.5) (23.3)	(25.6) (24.4)	(20.5) (19.9)
PROGRAMME ATA FRY - COMMISSION DECISION 09/07/99 - 4.5285	EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROG. SERBIE - 163.1186	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO IN 2001 - 39.8531	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES FOR SERBIA - TECHINICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE - 2.8273	ENVIRONMENT - 5.6484	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 3.1060	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 3.7286
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.2894	COUTS DE FONCTIONNEMENT A.R. AU KOSOVO - 3.2255	SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR MONTENEGRO IN 2001 - 11.9112	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- TECNICAL ASISTANCE - 1.8848	ENVIRONMENT: CUSTOMS & TAXATION - 1.1297	GTAF ANFD RESERVE - 1.8636	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 11.8071
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.2324	RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 129.020	CARDS-ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR MONTENEGRO IN 2001 - 2.6867	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- 0.8482	ENVIRONMENTAL CAPACITY BUILDING - 9.0375	GTAF AND PROGRAMME RESERVE - 1.2424	MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6214
RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIQUE AU KOSOVO - 66.5956	PROG A2000 ENERGY & LOGEMENTS ET ENVIRONNEMENT - 36.8630	ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA IN 2001 - 4.4779	ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - REGIONAL INT. BORDER MANAGEMENT - 9.1415	INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT - 5.0836	GTAF AND RESERVE - 6.8331	MULTISECTOR AID - 3.7286
OBNOVA- FINANCING AGREEMENT MONTENEGRO - 0.5328	RECONSTRUCTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES ET DVLT ECONOMIQUE - 157.5892		ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 FOR MONTENEGRO - 10.8378	COMPTABILISATION DES INTÉRÊTS BANCAIRES - 2.4335	NEIGHBOURHOOD P - HU/SCG - 1.2424	
			ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME - 8.4818		NEIGHBOURHOOD P - BG/SCG - 1.2424	
			ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR KOSOVO- HOUSING SECTOR IN KOSOVO- 15.0787		NEIGHBOURHOOD P - RO/SCG - 1.7393	
					ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - SUSTAINABLE RETURN OF MINORITY COMMUNTIES - 7.1704	

Table 266: Germany to ex Yu

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004	
(4.8) (4.7)	
REGIONAL STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 3.727	
GRANT FACILITY FOR PREPARATORY STUDIES - 0.9317	

Tale 267: Italy to ex Yu

Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	2004	2005
(4.6) (3.8)	(9.9) (9.4)	(9.6) (9.4)
EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES BETWEEN ITALIAN AND BALKAN MUNICIPALITIES - 3.5981	REFUGEES SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN SERBIA - ACTION PLAN - 7.4042	REFUGEES SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN SERBIA - ACTION PLAN - 9.0741
	UTL AT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY OF BELGRADE - ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS - 0.2767	

HUMANITARIAN AID

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Table 268: Austria to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	
	(21.0) (15.8)
ATHUM/ALBA: AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 14.94397	
HUMANITARIAN AID TO KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.371663	

Table 269: France to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005	
	(5.5) (5.3)
AIDE D'URGENCE - 5.3	

Table 270: Germany to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999
(4.3) (3.6)	(7.0) (5.6)
SHELTERS FOR REFUGEES, KOSOVO - 2.84187	HUMANITARIAN AID - 4.8145
HUMANITARIAN AID - 0.77526	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.8171

Table 271: Italy to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999
(10.5) (7.7)	(4.8) (3.5)	(86.6) (61.3)
EMERGENCY AID TO ORPHANS AND WOMEN - 0.8807	EMERGENCY ROOM SERVICE - 0.6910	AID TO REFUGEES KOSOVO - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 1.6508
AGRO-ZOOTECHNIC PGM :EMERGENCY AID - 5.2847	EMERG. REHAB.:BASIC SOC./HEALTH SVCS - 0.5851	AID TO REFUGEES - 1.0437
EMERGENCY AID - 1.1227	EMERGENCY REHAB. OF BERAT HOSPITAL - 0.8638	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 55.3447
	EMERGENCY REHAB. OF SOCIAL SERVICES - 0.5759	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.6508

Table 272: Italy to Albania

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation ; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(25.3) (17.9)
REHABILITATION OF ROAD AND ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION PLANT - 17.6085

Table 273: Norway to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1999
(2.1) (1.2)	(3.1) (1.7)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 1.2284	HUMANITARIAN AID TO REFUGEES - 0.3187
	EMERGENCY AID TO KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.3719
	EMERGENCY AID KOSOVO: REFUGEES - 0.5386
	KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.4713

Table 274: Spain to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(15.5) (9.9)
AIDE D'URGENCE: COÛTS D'INSTALLATION DE CAMPEMENT - 9.3747

Table 275 : Sweden to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(3.7) (3.0)
EMERGENCY AID: SRSA-UNHCR/ALBANIA - 0.4693
EMERGENCY AID: TRANSPORTS - 0.6609
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.5128

Table 276 : Switzerland to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(22.4) (17.6)
SCHOOL RENOVATION: EMERGENCY AID - 0.63552
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 6.6546
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 1.5418
CRÉDITS PERSONNELS : AIDE D'URGENCE - 1.2943
CASH FOR SHELTER - 2.9234
LOGEMENTS POUR REFUGIES KOSOVARS - 0.9982
BUILDING SCHOOL REHABILITATION: EMERGENCY AID - 0.8551

Table 277: UK to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000
(44.9) (33.4)	(9.7) (6.8)
ISLAMIC RELIEF TENTS: EMERGENCY - 0.6241	AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 3.9358
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.9707	AMMUNITION DETERIORATION AND LOGISTIC DISPOSAL: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 0.6724
KOSOVO CRISIS AIRCHARTER: REFUGEES - 2.5203	UNDP WEAPONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DVPT PROGRAMME: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 0.9082
CONTR. NEEDS: AID TO REFUGEES - 2.0223	
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 8.0893	
DIRECT PURCHASE EQUIP.: REFUGEES - 3.2357	
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 2.0061	
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 4.044	
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 1.6178	

Table 278: US to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001	2002
(7.6) (6.5)	(10.4) (9.1)	(9.1) (8.1)
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: COMMODITY - 3.329	DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE - COMPLEX EMERGENCY - 3.701	FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID - COMMODITIES - 1.413
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: FREIGHT - 2.89	EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 1.179	FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID - COMMODITIES - 3.594
	EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 2.301	FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID - FREIGHT - 1.007
		FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID - FREIGHT - 1.62

Table 279: EC to Albania

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
(3.0) (2.5)	(5.5) (4.2)	(17.2) (13.2)	(42.8) (31.5)	(4.8) (3.1)	(6.4) (4.1)	(3.2) (2.2)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.53	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 4.24	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 13.2	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 31.54	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.09	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.31	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.22
					EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.6326	

Table 280: EC to Albania

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(3.3) (3.1)
DEMOCRATIC STABILIZATIONS - DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIRANAN-DURRES REGION - 3.10597

Table 281: Austria to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(2.3) (1.5)
REFUGEES REPATRIATION PROJECT/HOUSING - 0.2803	
REFUGEES RETURN & REINTEGR. PROGRAM - 0.8036	

Table 282: Austria to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996 ²	
	(4.1) (3.8)
HOUSING (REHABILITATION) IN SARAJEVO - 0.6579	
HOUSING (REHABILITATION) IN TRAVNIK- 0.65224	
HOUSING REHABILITATION - 0.6616	

Table 283: France to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	2005
(2.2) (1.9)	(26.2) (25.4)
FONDS D'URGENCE HUMANITAIRE - 1.9100	AIDE D'URGENCE - 25.41

² Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

Table 284: Germany to BiH³

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2004
(17.6) (17.0)	(19.7) (16.6)	(22.3) (18.7)	(12.6) (8.7)	(8.3) (5.6)	(6.1) (4.4)	(6.5) (6.4)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 17.0332	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.0760	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.189	HUMANITARIOAN AID, STABILITY PACT - 1.4074	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.373	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.9424	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 5.5935
	AID TO REFUGEES IN RECIP. COUNTRIES - 4.0245	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTR.) - 6.1441	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 1.3193	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.6315	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.3704	
	HUMANITARIAN AID - 9.3316	HUMANITARIAN AID - 9.18381	VARIOUS HUMANITARIAN AID INTERVENTIONS - 3.5248		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.0742	
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.1343		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.9727			
			AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.565424303821326			

³ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

Table 285: Italy to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1997
(18.6) (13.1)	(11.9) (9.3)	(5.7) (4.1)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 1.1933	LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT - 0.9662	WOMEN ASSISTANCE:EMERGENCY AID - 0.3085
EMERGENCY PROJECTS ADVISORS - 1.2093	EMERGENCY PROJECTS ADVISORS - 0.7161	LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT:EMERGENCY AID - 0.6502
ELDERLY ASSISTANCE - 1.5346	RELIEF FOOD AID&AID TO REFUGEES- 2.7219	EMERGENCY SUPPORT:LOCAL HEALTH SYST. - 0.7633
EMERGENCY SANITARY AID - 1.5346	BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES&SOCIAL REHAB. - 2.9812	EMERGENCY REHAB. PGM - 1.2918
AID TO REFUGEES- 1.2277	LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT - ITALIAN EMB. - 0.7297	
HUMANITARIAN TRANSPORTS&ELDERLY ASS. - 1.2277		
FOOD AID EMERGENCY - 1.1049		
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.9398		

Table 286: Netherlands to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2001	2005
(4.9) (3.5)	(5.1) (3.5)	(13.1) (8.4)	(9.5) (9.2)
BIJDRAGE ICRC APPEAL 1998 - 1.2597	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.8562	EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION - 2.0481	SUPPORT TO RETURN PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION - 1.16713
ICRC RENEWED EMERGENCY APPEAL - 1.2597	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7131	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 4.0963	SUSTAINABLE RETURN OF 60 FAMILIES TO NORTHWEST BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 1.03446
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.9685	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.2527	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY - 2.0481	FACILITATION OF SUSTAINABLE RETURN TO SREBRENICA AREA - 1.2428
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7252		SUSTAINABLE RETURN OF 87 FAMILIES TO SREBRENICA - 1.2428
			SUSTAINABLE RETURN TO FOCA - 1.23472
			RETURN & DEVELOPMENT STUDY - 0.61397
			SUSTAINABLE TRANSFER TO RETURN RELATED AUTHORITIES - 2.61235

Table 287: Netherlands to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996 ⁴	1997 ⁵	1998 ⁶	1999 ⁷	2000 ⁸	2001 ⁹	2002 ¹⁰	2003 ¹¹	2004
(61.7) (51.4)	(15.4) (12.4)	(72.2) (51.5)	(26.6) (19.0)	(99.5) (69.4)	(82.8) (52.0)	(36.2) (23.3)	(39.6) (27.8)	(50.8) (43.6)	(12.6) (11.9)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 51.3922	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 0.5930	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 14.6086	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 9.8261	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 14.5046	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.6254	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.6254	INTEGRATED RETURN PROGRAMME - 1.24776	SAR RETURN TO SREBRENICA AREA - 1.24148	RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE - 1.2400
	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 2.1546	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 21.0159			MINORITY RETURN - 0.6206	INTEGRATED RETURN OF MINORITIES - 1.373		SAR INTEGRATED RETURN ASSISTANCE - 1.23631	
					CONSOLIDATION OF CROAT MINORITY - 0.4621	RETURN OF DISPLACED ROMA FAMILIES - 0.8973			
					EMERGENCY REPAIR OF 70 HOMES - 0.52480				
					INTEGRATED RETURN OF MINORITIES - 1.3738				
					HOUSING SUPPORT FOR FAMILIES - 1.04782				
					MINORITY RETURN TO VELIKA Klad - 0.84542				

⁴ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

⁵ ibid

⁶ ibid

⁷ ibid

⁸ ibid

⁹ ibid

¹⁰ ibid

¹¹ ibid

Table 288: Norway to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1999
(37.1) (21.7)	(9.9) (5.5)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 21.5480	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7791
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.1896
	REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.1623
	REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.0444
	REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.0108

Table 289: Spain to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
(11.8) (7.6)	(10.9) (6.3)	(9.8) (5.7)	(14.4) (9.2)	(11.8) (9.4)	(6.7) (6.1)
RECONSTRUCTION, BOSNIE - 7.3704	RECONSTRUCTION, BOSNIE - 6.2643	RECONSTRUCTION EN BOSNIE - 4.70432	BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION - 8.7826	REORGANIZATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 9.16291	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 6.12588

Table 290: Sweden to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
(12.9) (11.6)	(16.7) (16.1)	(13.3) (11.0)	(5.1) (4.1)	(9.6) (7.1)	(8.0) (5.3)	(5.9) (4.3)
SEEDS, FOODSTUFF ETC... - 0.7709	EMERG.:MOBILE MOTHER/CHILD-CLINIC - 0.5859	EMERGENCY / DISTRESS RELIEF : FINANCIAL SUPPORT - 1.006	EMERGENCY AID: ICRC APPEAL - 0.8472	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.224	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.7034	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.8793
EMERGENCY: WOODEN HOUSES PRODUCTION - 2.8737	EMERG PSYCHOSOC CENTERS TUZLA/ZENICA - 0.9415	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.4470	EMERGENCY AID: CARITAS -0.9833	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.04320	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.6151	FLOODS PROGRAM - 0.9381
HOUSING PROJECTS BOSNIA - 1.6821	REPATRIATION PROJECT - 0.7068	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.2087	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.934	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.6563		
REHABILITATION IN CENTRAL BOSNIA - 1.1074	EMERGENCY: READY MADE HOUSES,KRIVAJA - 1.118	EMERGENCY / DISTRESS RELIEF : RECONSTRUCTION - 2.0927				
REHABILITATION PROJECT BOSNIA - 0.7709	EMERG. SOCIAL SERVICE PROJECT - 2.0873	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.107				
ICRC TRUCKS FOR BIH - 0.6987	REHABILITATION, KUPRES 2 - 1.0973					
EMERGENCY:HOUSE PROD. AT KRIVAJA BIH - 0.8410	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.282					
REHABILITATION IN BOSNIA - 1.2514	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.369					
	EMERG. POWER SUPPLY IN KUPRES - 0.7044					

Table 291: Sweden to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	
(13.2) (11.4)	
SALVATION ARMY REBUILDG PROJ, SIPOVO - 1.3884	
PMU, RECONSTRUCTION IN BOSNIA 1997 - 2.1350	
RETURNING AND REBUILDING PROJECT - 1.94836	
REBUILDING IN WAR DAMAGE VILLAGES - 2.4755	
REBUILDING OF WAR DAMAGE VILLAGES - 1.690	

Table 292: Switzerland to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1999 ¹²	2003
(12.8) (12.6)	(4.2) (4.0)	(99.0) (77.9)	(3.5) (3.1)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 12.6452	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.9578	BOARDING SCHOOL: EMERGENCY AID - 0.5589	CARITAS - 1.040
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.3309	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.46096
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.4839	
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.1978	
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 36.73387	
		HIGH SCHOOL: EMERGENCY AID - 0.7985	
		EMERGENCY PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT - 1.22180	
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 5.9892	
		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.1161	

¹² Due to extensiveness of list of allocations, combined with generic character of descriptions, only a reduced number of allocations is presented.

Table 293: US to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999	2001	2002
(31.8) (26.0)	(5.8) (4.8)	(29.8) (25.0)	(16.9) (14.9)	(17.5) (15.7)
EMERGENCY AID – 26.0	TRAUMA/SOC. WELFARE/HUMANITARIAN AID - 0.371	DRAWDOWN - HUMANITARIAN: EMERGENCY RELIEF – 25.0	REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM – 10.0EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 3.136	BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE ASSISTANCE THROUGH NGOS/PVOS - 8.688
	EMERGENCY AID - 4.47		EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 1.015	FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – COMMODITIES - 4.806
				FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – FREIGHT - 2.158

Table 294: US to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998
(8.9) (7.3)
BOSNIA EMERGENCY REHABILITATION - 7.342

Table 295: EC to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2005
(162.5) (138.5)	(229.6) (175.5)	(45.6) (34.9)	(39.9) (29.4)	(9.0) (5.8)	(4.0) (3.9)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 138.47	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 5.892	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 34.92	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 29.36	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 5.81	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.8528
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 167.43				
	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.6620				

Table 296: EC to BiH

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004
(9.8) (9.3)
RETURN OF REFUGEES - 9.3179

Table 297: IDA to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996
(8.7) (7.5)
EMER. LANDMINES CLEARANCE - 7.5

Table 298: IDA to BiH

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR

1996	(1997)
(11.5) (10.0)	(21.1) (17.0)
EMER. PUBLIC WORKS/ EMPLOYMENT -10.0	RECONSTR. ASST - 17.0

Table 299: Germany to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	2000	2001	2002	2004
(2.3) (2.4)	(5.3) (3.6)	(4.2) (2.8)	(2.6) (1.9)	(2.7) (2.6)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 2.3649	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.6024	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.1977	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.645	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 2.36325
	VARIOUS HUMANITARIAN AID INTERVENTIONS - 2.0942	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.64410		
	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.9423			

Table 300: Italy to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995
(2.9) (2.1)
AID TO REFUGEES - 1.08
AID TO REFUGEES - 0.920

Table 301: Netherlands to Croatia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	
	(6.4) (4.0)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.2876	
STABPACT ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION- 1.5318	
STABPACT ASSISTANCE TO RETURNED - 0.6013	

Table 302: Norway to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	2005
(9.9) (5.8)	(2.9) (2.6)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.7708	RETURN/RECONSTR. PROGR. CROATIA - 1.2419
	SUSTAINABLE RETURNS TO BANOVINI - 0.4967

Table 303: Norway to Croatia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
(3.8) (2.1)	(4.5) (2.6)	(5.0) (3.1)	(4.9) (3.6)	(4.7) (3.8)
REHABILITATION OF HOUSES - 1.0254	RECONSTRUCT. 190 HOUSES - 1.1119	RECONSTRUCTION MINORITY RETURN - 1.2522	STATE GEODETIC ADM. - 0.97823	HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION PROJECT CR - 1.48383
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 0.74156	RECONSTRUCT. MINORITY RETURN - 1.111	HOUSES OF DISABLED REFUGEES - 0.5076	RECONSTRUCTION FOR MINORITY RETURN - 1.3882	RECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES AND INFRASTR - 1.11287
	RESTORATION OF THE LIBRARY IN SKRADI - 0.05559	COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION - 1.2522	CROSS BORDER - COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION - 1.13008	

Table 304: Switzerland to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996
(4.0) (3.9)	(3.0) (2.9)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.9489	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.8649

Table 305: US to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	2001	2002
(3.5) (2.9)	(10.9) (9.6)	(8.3) (7.4)
TRAUMA/SOC. WELFARE/HUMANITARIAN AID - 2.342	ACCELERATED RETURN/SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION OF WAR-AFFECTED POP. - 8.347	BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE ASSISTANCE THROUGH NGOS/PVOS - 7.416
EMERGENCY AID - .52	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- 1.0	

Table 306: EC to Croatia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	1999
(26.9) (20.6)	(10.4) (7.9)	(3.7) (2.7)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.4997	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF- 7.94	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.69
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 15.32		
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.9870		

Table 307: EC to Croatia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2004	
(18.3) (17.4)	
RETURN OF REFUGEES - 17.3934	

Table 308: Germany to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2002
(7.4) (5.9)	(3.8) (2.6)	(5.2) (3.8)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 3.9129	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.0340	RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-DAMAGED HOUSES - 2.3560
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.999	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.5340	GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.9424

Table 309: Italy to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2002
(4.0) (2.8)	(4.1.) (2.8)
AID TO REFUGEES MACEDONIA - 1.6508	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.9424
AID TO REFUGEES - 1.1588	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.3853

Table 310: Netherlands to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	
	(3.4) (2.2)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.71646	
LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES - 0.4925	
REPATRIATION INFORMATION - 0.5328	

Table 311: Netherlands to Macedonia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001	2002
(10.9) (7.0)	(9.2) (6.5)
CONFLICT PREVENTION / RECONSTRUCTION - 6.966	INTERN. MANAGEMENT GROUP BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA - 4.3162
	UNHCR - 1.8848

Table 312: Norway to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001
(2.7) (1.5)	(2.1) (1.2)
RED CROSS APPEAL: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.34309	EMERGENCY ANIMAL FEED DISTRICT - 0.5559
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY - 0.6412	URGENT APPEAL UNHCR - 0.5169
REFUGEES: EDUCATION CHILDREN FROM KOSOVO - 0.4531	

Table 313: Switzerland to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	
(2.2) (1.8)	
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.45251	
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.64483	
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.65881	

Table 314: UK to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001
(30.4) (22.5)	(4.8) (3.4)	(9.8) (6.7)
COMMUNITY BASED WATER & SANIT. PROG: EMERGENCY - 1.1122	AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 3.0275	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.6007
KOSOVO CRISIS AIRCHARTER: REFUGEES - 1.6178		EMERGENCY: ASSESSMENT MISSION - 0.7489
CONTR. NEEDS: AID REFUGEES - 2.0223		ICRC APPEAL 2001 FYR MACEDONIA - 1.0802
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 8.0893		EMERGENCY: UNICEF - ED. CONFIDENCE BUILDING - 0.4320
DIRECT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT: REFUGEES - 3.23572		
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.50477		
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 1.6178		

Table 315: US to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001
(3.9) (3.4)	(3.3) (2.9)
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: COMMODITY - 1.625	DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE - COMPLEX EMERGENCY - 2.931
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: FREIGHT - 1.759	

Table 316: US to Macedonia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(6.3) (5.5)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF: SPECIAL INITIATIVES – 5.0

Table 317: EC to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2001	2002
(32.0) (23.5)	(7.7) (5.0)	(6.5) (4.5)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 23.54	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 4.5	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.85

Table 318: EC to Macedonia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2003	
	(6.6) (5.6)
RUNNING COSTS OF THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR RECONSTRUCTION - 5.649	

Table 319: IDA to Macedonia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	
	(61.9) (50.0)
EMERGENCY RECOVERY – 50.0	

Table 320: Austria to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000
(3.1) (2.4)	(8.6) (6.4)	(7.0) (4.7)
HUMANITARIAN AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.48481	HUMANITARIAN AID TO KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.77429	ADMIN. COSTS OF NGOS FOR RELIEF AID - 2.3440
AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.4848	IKRK: HUMANITARIAN AID (REFUGEES) - 1.5485	REPATRIATION OF KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.8050
HUMANITARIAN AID FOR KOSOVO - 0.5252	UNHCR: HUMANITARIAN AID (REFUGEES) - 1.5485	REPATRIATION PROGRAM KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.8050

Table 321: France to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005	
(47.7) (46.2)	
AIDE D'URGENCE - 46.16	

Table 322: Germany to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1998	1999	2000	2001 ¹³	2002	2003	2004
(8.9) (9.0)	(15.7) (13.1)	(34.2) (27.5)	(33.2) (22.9)	(18.2) (12.4)	(10.9) (7.9)	(5.9) (5.2)	(6.1) (6.0)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 9.0376	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.4209	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 4.4359	EMERGENCY AID: IMPROVING RETURNEES' LIVING STANDARDS - 1.9238	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.45840	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.6328	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 3.9848	STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.5205
	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTR.) - 1.1651	HUMANITARIAN AID - 19.5342	EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA - 2.3559	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.3650	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.91301		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 4.2917
	HUMANITARIAN AID - 6.1123	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 3.540	VARIOUS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES - 8.8027	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 4.699	FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 1.866		
	EMERGENCY FOOD AID- 4.4219		VARIOUS HUMANITARIAN AID INTERVENTIONS - 3.9115				
			AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 2.17547000895255				

¹³ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

Table 323: Italy to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999	2000	2002	2003
(3.6) (2.6)	(24.6) (17.4)	(33.6) (21.0)	(3.2) (2.2)	(4.0) (3.4)
EMERG./DISTRESS RELIEF IN KOSOVO - 1.0942	AID TO REFUGEES IN MONTENEGRO - 1.4202	EMERG./DISTRESS RELIEF IN KOSOVO - 1.8086	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.7035	VOL. CONTRIBUT.UNMIK - REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES IN PEC/PEJE MUNICIPALITY - 2.824
EMERG. PROG MONITORING-EMBASSY FUNDS - 1.0701	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 12.5724	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 19.03855		
	KOSOVO EMERGENCY - 1.10053			
	AID TO REFUGEES – KOSOVO - 1.1005			

Table 324: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998 ¹⁴	1999 ¹⁵	2000	2001 ¹⁶	2002	2003	2004
(6.2) (4.4)	(31.2) (21.7)	(7.8) (4.9)	(9.4) (6.0)	(3.2) (2.3)	(6.1) (5.3)	(5.9) (5.6)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7558	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.063	AID TO REFUGEES: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY - 1.0873	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.8443	REFUGEE HOUSING PROGRAMME - 0.4796	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.512	DZO TERUGKEER KOSOVO - 1.9606
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.5039	AID TO REFUGEES: KOSOVO - 2.2371	EMERGENCY FOOD AID: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY - 3.1741	REPATRIATION INFORMATION - 0.5328	KOSOVO - 0.9942	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.0253	DZO START II - 2.4248
	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 2.9913			SERBIA ENTERPRISE PROGRAMME - 0.4900	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.1298	DZO SUPPORT TO HPD - 2 - 1.2423
					EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 2.2596	

¹⁴ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ *ibid*

Table 325: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999 ¹⁷	2000 ¹⁸	2001	2003
(42.3) (29.5)	(54.3) (34.1)	(5.5) (3.5)	(8.4) (7.2)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 5.0969	KOSOVO: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - 6.1475	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.3093	UNICEF KOSOVO 1999 - 1.1279
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 15.7225	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 10.8732	KOSOVO REHABILITATION - 1.1929	UNICEF APPEAL'99 KOSOVO - 2.2045
	KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 8.4601		HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION CAT. IV EN V - 1.7687
	KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 1.990		RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.5954

Table 326: Norway to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1999 ¹⁹	2000 ²⁰	2001 ²¹	2005 ²²
(8.7) (5.1)	(110.6) (62.1)	(8.5) (4.9)	(3.1) (1.8)	(4.6) (4.3)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.07218	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.639677307647911	EMERGENCY: HEATING OIL TO SERBIA - 2.3594	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.8443	RETURN TO ROMA MAHALA, PHASE 2 - 0.9665
	ICRC APPEAL: AID TO REFUGEES - 2.0528	REFUGEES: HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME - 0.6820	REPATRIATION INFORMATION - 0.53286	IFRC APPEALS 2005 - DISASTER PREPAREDNS. - 0.2328
	KOSOVO REFUGEES- 2.56512203568085	EMERGENCY: ASPHALT FOR DEMOCRACY - 0.3410		REFUGEE SELF HELP SHELTER PROJECT - 1.1798
	EVACUATION REFUGEES KOSOVO TO NORWAY - 1.41081711962447			CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4657
	UN APPEAL KOSOVO: AID TO REFUGEES - 7.69536			
	EMERGENCY FOOD AID: 500 MT OF CANNED FISH - 1.7955			

¹⁷ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

¹⁸ ibid

¹⁹ ibid

²⁰ ibid

²¹ ibid

²² ibid

Table 327: Spain to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999
(5.7) (3.7)
KOSOVO - AIDE HUMANITAIRE ENVOI DIRECT EN ESPÈCES, CROIX ROUGE ESPAGNOLE - 1.0373
KOSOVO - CONTRIBUTION AU PROGRAMME VOLONTAIRE DES NU - 0.3360
CONTRIBUTION A L'ACNUR POUR AGIR CONTRE LA CRISE DU KOSOVO - 1.28070736028924
PREPARAT/DISTRIBUT DE REPAS CHAUDS A POPULATION KOSOVAR LA PLUS DEMUNIE - 0.31112

Table 328: Spain to FRY/Serbia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
(7.4) (4.8)	(9.3) (5.3)	(5.0) (2.9)	(6.3) (4.0)	(8.2) (6.5)
AIDE À LA RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 4.7770	AIDE À LA RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 5.3227	RECONSTRUCTION AU KOSOVO - 2.9119	KOSOVO RECONSTRUCTION - 3.9973	RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.9538

Table 329 : Sweden to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998 ²³	1999 ²⁴	2000	2001
(9.2) (7.7)	(26.6) (21.5)	(19.1) (14.1)	(6.8) (4.5)
EMERGENCY / DISTRESS RELIEF : CHILDREN'S PROJECT - 0.4026	EMERGENCY AID: KOSOVO DISTRICT HEAT - 1.2103	MINECLEARANCE KOSOVO - 0.24561	EMERGENCY: RAILWAY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT - 1.4509
REFUGEES UNHCR - 1.2583	EMERGENCY AID: RECONSTRUCTION KOSOVO - 1.4039	RAILWAY KOSOVO - 0.8733	ENVIRONMENT REMEDIATION PANCEVO - 0.9672
	EMERGENCY AID: ICRC APPEAL - 1.8154	DISTRIBUTION FERIZKOSOVO - 2.8382	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.6770
	EMERGENCY AID: FARM MECHANICS, KOSOVO - 1.2103	EMERGENCY SUPPORT SERBIA - 2.1832	DOW; TB PROGRAM YEAR 3 - 0.2340
	EMERGENCY AID: BASIC NEEDS - 1.7670	UNICEF - 1.0916	
		OSCE MISSION IN KOSOVO - 4.4215	

²³ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

²⁴ ibid

Table 330: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998 ²⁵	1999 ²⁶	2000 ²⁷	2001 ²⁸	2002	2003 ²⁹	2004 ³⁰
(8.1) (6.6)	(74.4) (58.5)	(37.3) (26.4)	(17.5) (12.5)	(7.4) (5.8)	(14.7) (13.4)	(9.3) (9.2)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.3793	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.3273	DEPLETED URANIUM [UNEP ASSES.] - 0.5035	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.5572	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.3128	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.35687	HOUSING OFFICE BELGRAD, OVERHEAD - 0.7435
EMERGENCY AID: ALBANIA & KOSOVO - 0.6897	KOSOVAR REFUGEES- 3.3273	EMERGENCY AID: DEMINING - 1.0664	BRJ: KOSOVO HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION - 1.6598	SHELTER PROGRAMME - 0.5100	WOMEN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - 0.5204	KOSOVO, VOCATIONAL EDUCATION SUPPORT - 0.820
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 0.6897	CASH FOR SHELTER- 1.919	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF- 1.777	BRJ: KOSOVO RECONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOL - 1.4820	KOSOVO HOUSING FOR MINORITIES - 0.6423		SERBIA: PANCEVO, SOCIAL HOUSING - 0.42649
	SDR-OFFICE PRISTINA, KOSOVO - 1.448	EMERGENCY AID: HOUSING SOCIAL CASES - 2.843	BRJ: KOSOVO CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGES - 0.592	MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMME - 0.5267		SERBIA: KRALJEVO, SOCIAL HOUSING - 0.42649
	KOSOVO SHELTER KITS - 4.2590	EMERGENCY AID: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS - 1.7773	KOSOVO FRY - DEMINING MIT EMERCOM - 0.8892	WFP - 0.8350		KOSOVO / CO-OF / MENTAL HEALTH HA - 0.8449
	REFUGEES RETURN KOSOVO - 3.3273					
	MILK PRODUCTS: EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.456511612430958					

²⁵ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ *ibid*

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ *ibid*

³⁰ *ibid*

Table 331: UK to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998	1999 ³¹	2000 ³²
(4.5) (3.3)	(136.8) (101.6)	(77.5) (54.5)
APPEAL FOR KOSOVO - 3.3134	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.3263	TRUST FUND: EMERGENCY - 3.4362
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 33.9750	KOSOVO MGMT OFFICE: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 10.5964
	UNICEF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - 3.2357	PRISTINA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL: EMERGENCY - 3.0154
	ISLAMIC RELIEF TENTS: REFUGEES- 1.5487	PROTEC. HUMANIT. ASS. TO RETURNEES & INTERN. DISPLACED PERSONS – KOSOVO - 4.2385
	PRISTINA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL: EMERG. - 12.9170	ICRC APPEAL: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 3.7844
	KOSOVO MGMT OFFICE: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 17.7964	CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 3.7844
	PRISTINA AIRPORT: EMERGENCY/DISTRESS - 4.8535	CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS UNMIK BUDGET: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 3.7844
	KOSOVO HEALTH ASSIST PROG: EMERGENCY - 5.1690	INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS APPEAL - 3.0275
		WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME APPEAL - 2.319
		UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND APPEAL- 1.5137
		EMERGENCY SUPPLY OF FIREWOOD - 0.7568

³¹ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

³² *ibid*

Table 332: US to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 ³³	2004 ³⁴	2005
(581.3) (488.1)	(68.7) (59.0)	(12.0) (10.5)	(11.9) (10.6)	(11.9) (10.9)	(8.0) (7.6)	(4.0) (3.8)
STATE - EMERGENCY REFUGEE & MIGRATION – 165.0	INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE - 22.392	DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE - COMPLEX EMERGENCY - 3.753	BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE ASSISTANCE THROUGH NGOS/PVOS - 3.227	INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION - 2.5	POPULATION REFUGEES AND MIGRATION PROJECT - 2.75	SUSTAINABLE RETURN TO NEEDY IDPS - 1.73
STATE - MIGRATION & REFUGEES – ABROAD- 266.0	EMERGENCY FOOD AID: COMMODITY - 15.513	HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES- 6.79	BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE ASSISTANCE THROUGH NGOS/PVOS - 5.33	AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITTEE - 1.875		
FOOD AID - EMERGENCY – FREIGHT - 22.8	EMERGENCY FOOD AID: FREIGHT - 21.071			UNITED METHODIST COMMITTEE ON RELIEF- 1.6		
FOOD AID - EMERGENCY – COMMODITY - 34.1				MERCY CORPS - 1.299		

Table 333: US to FRY/Serbia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2001
(5.3) (4.6)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF: SPECIAL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS - 4.03

³³ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

³⁴ Ibid

Table 334: EC to FRY/Serbia

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005
(26.4) (20.2)	(14.7) (1.3)	(187.5) (121.1)	(69.5) (44.7)	(40.9) (28.4)	(10.2) (8.7)	(24.4) (23.7)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 19.71	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 11.27	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 121.12	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 36.29	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 21.942	ECHO - EMERGENCY RELIEF - 5.869	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 6.2142
			EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 5.989	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 6.1888		EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 15.5356

Table 335: EC to FRY/Serbia

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002
(179.9) (124.9)
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND REFORM - 124.870

Table 336: France to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2005
(2.5) (2.4)
AIDE D'URGENCE - 2.39

Table 337: Germany to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000
(20.5) (14.1)
EMERGENCY COMMODITY AID: ELECTRICITY & SPARE PARTS IMPORTS - 14.1356

Table 338: Italy to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2000	2001
(9.1) (5.7)	(2.4) (1.5)
CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP PROGRAMME IN FAVOUR OF SERBIAN WAR VICTIMS - 0.9519	ENVIRONMENTAL RECLAMATION - CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP - 0.3237
EMERGENCY PROGRAMME - SERBIAN POPULATION - 4.5216	HEALTH ASSISTANCE - CONTRIBUTION TO WHO - 0.3237
	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP - 0.6937

Table 339: Japan to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1998 ³⁵	1999 ³⁶
(5.7) (5.6)	(28.3) (31.8)
EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 2.7043	EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 3.5820
	EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 8.5338

³⁵ Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

³⁶ *ibid*

Table 340: Netherlands to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	
	(35.9) (29.9)
AID TO REFUGEES THROUGH ICRC- 6.229	
AID TO REFUGEES THROUGH UNHCR - 4.983	
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 6.229	
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 8.7460	

Table 341: Netherlands to ex Yu

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	
	(9.3) (7.8)
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 4.9834	
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF- 1.8688	

Table 342: Norway to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995 ³⁷	1996	1997	1999
(106.5) (64.9)	(92.7) (57.8)	(8.7) (5.1)	(8.6) (4.8)
HUMANITARIAN AID - 4.521	HUMANITARIAN AID - 55.2383	HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.0692	AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 4.8096
HUMANITARIAN AID - 43.445	EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 2.5744		

Table 343: Norway to ex Yu

Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

2002	2003
(2.5) (1.6)	(3.0) (2.2)
SHELTER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES - 0.8139	UNMIK/UNDP RAPID RESPONSE FACILITY - 1.6491

Table 344: Sweden to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1997
(15.4) (13.8)	(11.2) (10.8)	(5.6) (4.8)
UNHCR: DHA APPEAL MAY 95 - 8.410	UNHCR: DHA APPEAL MARCH 96 - 6.7093	CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN ASSIST TO EX JUGOSLAVIA - 3.9294
WHO: DHA APPEAL MAY 95 - 1.331	EMERGENCY: WHO DHA APPEAL MARCH96 - 2.2364	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.654
IFRC ADDITIONAL REFUGEE APPEALS - 0.84109	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.8945	
UNHCR: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - 1.822		

³⁷Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the major and/or most representative ones.

Table 345: Switzerland to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	2000
(2.5) (2.5)	(9.7) (6.9)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.4811	EMERGENCY AID: HOUSING SOCIAL CASES - 2.3698
	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.5547

Table 346: UK to ex Yu

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1995	1996	1997
(60.2) (39.0)	(104.8) (69.5)	(69.8) (50.0)
OTHER EMERGENCY AND DISTRESS RELIEF - 39.02	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 69.48	EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE - 50.01

Table 347: EC to ex YU

Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS

1996	1999	2000	2001	2002
(242.0) (204.3)	(295.9) (217.9)	(73.2) (47.3)	(71.8) (46.2)	(60.4) (41.9)
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 204.27	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 217.91	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 47.26	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 46.18	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 41.91