Abdelhamid Sayed Hassan, Nourhan
(2026)
Cultural norms and economic behavior: essays on nudging with proverbs, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna.
Dottorato di ricerca in
European doctorate in law and economics, 37 Ciclo.
Documenti full-text disponibili:
Abstract
Promoting socially desired behavior in environments where monitoring is limited,
incentives are imperfect, and legal sanctions may be costly or ineffective represents a
challenge. This dissertation examines whether culturally embedded proverbs can function
as injunctive normative nudges to promote socially desirable economic behavior where
formal regulation falls short. Grounded in the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and
Goal Framing Theory, it investigates proverbs as an unexplored category of normative
cues, distinct from conventional descriptive and injunctive messages, and tests their
behavioral effects through three controlled laboratory experiments conducted across three
domains: cooperation, trust, and tax compliance. It explores: a) the effect of an injunctive
proverb encouraging cooperation on contributions in a one-shot public goods game; b) the
effect of a proverb encouraging trustworthiness on trust and reciprocity in a standard trust
game; c) the effect of proverbs framing honesty positively or dishonesty negatively on
compliance in an income-reporting game. Across all three studies, exposure to an
injunctive proverb significantly increases the targeted behavior. These findings
demonstrate that proverbs can serve as low-cost, non-coercive normative nudges. By
bridging behavioral economics, law, and cultural psychology, this dissertation introduces
proverbs as a novel tool for behaviorally informed policy design.
Abstract
Promoting socially desired behavior in environments where monitoring is limited,
incentives are imperfect, and legal sanctions may be costly or ineffective represents a
challenge. This dissertation examines whether culturally embedded proverbs can function
as injunctive normative nudges to promote socially desirable economic behavior where
formal regulation falls short. Grounded in the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and
Goal Framing Theory, it investigates proverbs as an unexplored category of normative
cues, distinct from conventional descriptive and injunctive messages, and tests their
behavioral effects through three controlled laboratory experiments conducted across three
domains: cooperation, trust, and tax compliance. It explores: a) the effect of an injunctive
proverb encouraging cooperation on contributions in a one-shot public goods game; b) the
effect of a proverb encouraging trustworthiness on trust and reciprocity in a standard trust
game; c) the effect of proverbs framing honesty positively or dishonesty negatively on
compliance in an income-reporting game. Across all three studies, exposure to an
injunctive proverb significantly increases the targeted behavior. These findings
demonstrate that proverbs can serve as low-cost, non-coercive normative nudges. By
bridging behavioral economics, law, and cultural psychology, this dissertation introduces
proverbs as a novel tool for behaviorally informed policy design.
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Autore
Abdelhamid Sayed Hassan, Nourhan
Supervisore
Co-supervisore
Dottorato di ricerca
Ciclo
37
Coordinatore
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
Proverbs; injunctive norms; normative nudges; cultural norms; social norms; cooperation; trust; trustworthiness; reciprocity; tax compliance; tax evasion; public goods game; trust game; income reporting game
Data di discussione
14 Settembre 2026
URI
Altri metadati
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Autore
Abdelhamid Sayed Hassan, Nourhan
Supervisore
Co-supervisore
Dottorato di ricerca
Ciclo
37
Coordinatore
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
Proverbs; injunctive norms; normative nudges; cultural norms; social norms; cooperation; trust; trustworthiness; reciprocity; tax compliance; tax evasion; public goods game; trust game; income reporting game
Data di discussione
14 Settembre 2026
URI
Gestione del documento: