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DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA FROM THE 1960s to 2010s: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA

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ABSTRACT

Persistent food insecurity and famines have continued to significantly shape the development policies of Ethiopia for decades. Over the decades, frequent famines caused not only the death of hundreds of thousands of victims but also significantly contributed to two revolutions that swept away the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes, as well as significantly taxing the legitimacy of the incumbent regime. As a result, agriculture and food security have become increasingly the top policy priorities for all political regimes in Ethiopia. However, the development policies of the ruling elites of Ethiopia have consistently failed to transform backward agriculture and ensure food security.

The failures of the development policies of the Ethiopian governments over the years were attributed to several factors. Ethiopian authoritarian politics, centralized rule with a lack of transparency and accountability; the isolation of peasants from the development and governance process, and the lack of coherent agricultural development strategies that invest in peasant agriculture and create synergy among sectors are identified as key issues that have contributed to the persistence of food insecurity in the country. These factors were studied by growing and large literature covering climate change and rainfall, food science and technical agricultural studies, individual-level studies, large-scale land acquisitions and land grabs, natural resource management and water, social services and policy, and vulnerability assessments and methods. The literature on the failure of Ethiopia's political regimes to address food insecurity and famine has two major gaps that this study aims to fill. First, the cumulative and path-dependent food security and agricultural development policy environment were not adequately considered. Second, the strategy of extraversion by subsequent political regimes to use external support as a relief to prevent the famine-induced political crisis.

This study used a mixed approach to collect data and present the evolution of the interplays of development policies and food security in three regimes within the context of international food security discourses. From a historical perspective, successive governments in Ethiopia have used the policy narratives of 'agricultural modernization', 'development', and 'food security' as their development objectives in one way or another. Drawing on dominant international development discourses and strategies, Ethiopian ruling elites frame the ideas of agriculture and food security development in line with the international development discourse. While framing their development strategies in line with the dominant international discourse helps the ruling regime to receive aid from the international donor community, its contribution towards strengthening food security for the food insecure group, particularly for peasants has been limited. This thesis also examined the characteristics of the political and economic changes in Ethiopia in the three political regimes and how they have shaped agriculture and food security. This study found out how the historical patterns of approaches to development and governance of Ethiopia's regimes pushed the country towards the creation of frequent famines and persistent food insecurity, particularly, in peasant agriculture.

KEY ACRONYMS

ADDP	Adaa District Development Project
ADLI	Agricultural-Development-Led Industrialization
AMC	Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC)
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARDU	Arsi Rural Development Unit
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CADU	Chilalo Agricultural Development Units
CAPP	Comprehensive Agricultural Package program
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CPSC	Central Planning Supreme Council
CSA	Central Statistical Authority
DLDP	District (Woreda) Level Decentralization Program
ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
ENC	Ethiopian National Corporation
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPTP	Economic Policy for the Transition Period
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FFHC	Freedom from Hunger Campaign
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HE-HI	high commodity imports and export-dependent countries (
HE-LI	high commodity-export and low-commodity-import dependent countries
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative
HLPE	High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PADETES	Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region Sub-Saharan
TAHADU	Tahtai Adi Abo and Hadegti Agricultural Development Unit
TPLF	Tigray People's Libation Front
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNICEF	the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WADU	Wolaita Agricultural Development Unit
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Ethiopia is one of the states where persistent food insecurity and famines have continued to significantly shape development policies. Over the decades, frequent famines caused not only the death of hundreds of thousands of victims but also significantly contributed to two revolutions that swept away the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes, as well as significantly taxing the legitimacy of the incumbent regime. As a result, agriculture and food security were increasingly given top policy priorities by all political regimes in Ethiopia. In line with the contemporary international development and food security paradigm, each political regime adopted or devised policies and strategies to address frequent famines and critical food shortages.

Ethiopia has adopted and implemented international and regional food security initiatives and policies since the 1960s and recently designed and implemented a series of development plans and policies to become a middle-income country by 2025 and to eventually reduce poverty and food insecurity. However, the aim of achieving food security and preventing social, political, and economic consequences of famine failed ostensibly. The country has been repeatedly affected by famines and severe food shortages, with particularly marked crises in 1972-1974, 1984-1985, 1991, 2002-2003, 2015, and 2021-2022. Both the 1972-1974 and 1984-1985 famines resulted in a depletion of household assets and savings and caused excess mortality. These crises contributed to the overthrowing of political regimes. Famines and their impacts on political regimes have shaped the commitments of the country to increase agricultural and food production.

Furthermore, according to the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) report (WFP 2019) report, about 20.5 percent

of households or 26 million people were estimated to be food insecure in 2015/16 without including approximately 18 million people covered by the productive safety net program. Even though targeting the production of more food is one significant dimension in the way to food security, more production may not be translated to more food security. For example, small farmers, who are the main food producers in Ethiopia, are also ironically the most food-insecure social class.

The failures of the development policies of the Ethiopian governments over the years were attributed to several factors. Ethiopian authoritarian politics, centralized rule with a lack of transparency and accountability; the isolation of peasants from the development and governance process, and the lack of coherent agricultural development strategies that invest in peasant agriculture and create synergy among sectors are identified as key issues that have contributed to the persistence of food insecurity in the country. These factors were studied by a growing and large body of literature covering climate change and rainfall, food science and technical agricultural studies, individual-level studies, large-scale land acquisitions and land grabs, natural resource management and water, social services and policy, and vulnerability assessments and methods. The literature on the failure of Ethiopia's political regimes to address food insecurity and famine has two major gaps that this study aims to fill. First, the cumulative and path-dependent food security and agricultural development policy environment were not adequately considered. Second, the strategy of extraversion by subsequent political regimes to use external support as a relief to prevent the famine-induced political crisis.

To fill these gaps, this study presents a historical analysis of Ethiopia’s agriculture and food security, focusing on the processes that include the evolution of global food security policies, development discourses, Ethiopia's development strategies, and the forces that have shaped Ethiopia’s agriculture and food security. From a historical perspective, successive governments in Ethiopia have used the policy narratives of 'agricultural modernization',

'development', and 'food security' as their development objectives in one way or another. Drawing on dominant international development discourses and strategies, Ethiopian ruling elites frame the ideas of agriculture and food security development in line with the international development discourse. While framing their development strategies in line with the dominant international discourse helps the ruling regime to receive aid from the international donor community, its contribution towards strengthening food security for the food insecure group, particularly for peasants has been limited. This thesis also examines the characteristics of the political and economic changes in Ethiopia in the three political regimes and how they have shaped agriculture and food security. This study found out how the historical patterns of approaches to development and governance of Ethiopia's regimes pushed the country towards the creation of frequent famines and persistent food insecurity, particularly, in peasant agriculture.

The methodology of this study incorporated both primary and secondary data. I first collected relevant policy documents and programs related to global agriculture and food security programs, second, data collected related to development and agricultural development in Africa, and finally, data related to Ethiopian agriculture and food security since the 1950s collected and analyzed. The primary data sources included: Universal declarations, resolutions, FAO data, initiatives, and text of speeches by leading UN officials, state officials, and Ethiopian constitutions since 1931, legal frameworks, proclamations, institutional documents, policy documents, regulations, and official data. Secondary data sources included historical books, multilateral agency official statistics and publications, including FAO, WB, WFP reports, scientific articles, government publications, and working papers.

Although the initial objective of this study was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between government policies and food security in Ethiopia, two major unforeseen developments severely hampered data collection. The first was the global COVID-19 pandemic that hampered data

collection travel. The second major development was political unrest in Ethiopia since June 2020 which made data collection an impossible task. Attempts were made to obtain data through interview questions developed and distributed through emails to experts and government officials. The responses were not encouraging.

This study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter presents the research puzzle and a conceptual basis for the subsequent chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 present the evolution of thoughts and policies on food security globally and in Africa. The fourth chapter presents the development policies and strategies of the Haile Selassie regime and the state of food security in the country from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Following the revolution of 1974, there were fundamental transformations in Ethiopia's land use rights and the role of the state in the agrarian economy. The fifth chapter covers this period from 1974 to 1991 under a socialist regime, called the Derg. The period of the EPRDF regime since 1991 was the period when failures of the previous regimes were attempted to be resolved through policies that placed the peasantry, in general. and small-holder farmers, in particular, are at the center of national development and food security through a strategy known as ADLI. Failures of the policies of the EPRDF regime in the 1990s led to the reintroduction of large-scale agriculture as a policy priority in the 2000s. These policies and strategies of the EPRDF regime are presented in chapter six. The seventh chapter specifically deals with the problem of persistent famine in Ethiopia and its relationship with development policies and food security.

The continued support, encouragement, and mentoring of my supervisor, Prof. Arrigo Pallotti, have been critical for me to be able to do my work in the context of the trying times of the COVID-19 pandemic and national crisis in my country, Ethiopia. I am very grateful to Prof. Daniela Giannetti and I am also thankful to the University of Bologna.

1.2 The Concept of Food Security

Food security is a multidimensional concept, which has changed over time, following changes in perspective among scholars, policymakers, governments, international agencies, and others (Pinstrup-andersen 2009). Food (in)security[1] first emerged in the international development agenda in the mid-1970s, at a time of turmoil in global grain markets, rising hunger, and importantly, the height of the Cold War (Clapp 2014; Maxwell 1996).

The first official definition was put forward at the United Nations World Food Conference in 1974. In that context, food security was defined as "the availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices"(World Food Summit quoted in FAO 2006, 1).

As Simon Maxwell noted, in the years since the 1974 World Food Conference, the concept of food security has "evolved, developed, multiplied, and diversified"(1996, 155). Definitions for the term have been developed by high-level international experts, world summits, and scholars to understand food security. The most widely accepted definition of food security derived from the 1996 World Food Summit is: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life"(FAO 2009).

Pinstrup-Andersen defined food security in its narrowest form as, "enough food is available, whether at the global, national, community or household level" Pinstrup-Andersen (2009, 5). He further explains on, when we talk about enough, "is it enough to meet economic demand and if so, at what price, or is it enough to meet energy and nutrient requirements? Barrett (2002, 2106), on his part, highlights that food security comprised of "access by all people at all times

[1] FAO (2012) Food insecurity is the state of being without reliable access to a sufficient quantity of affordable and nutritious food

to enough and appropriate foods, then 'food insecurity' reflects uncertain access to enough and appropriate foods". Maxwell (1996, 159) defines food security by including the food system:

> "a country and people are food secure when their food system operates in such a way as to remove the fear that there will not be enough to eat. In particular, food security will be achieved when the poor and vulnerable, particularly women and children and those living in marginal areas, have secure access to the food they want".

The complexity of the concept of food security has led to multiple definitions, various indicators, and measurements. Whether explored from natural science or social and political science perspectives, some argued that food security is inherently unobservable and difficult to define, but both intrinsically and instrumentally important (C. B. Barrett et al. 2009). They emphasized that despite much current research focusing on improving food security, however, measurement and intervention in the existing food security system is not a simple matter, even, the concept is still elusive and remains difficult to address (Ibid). Candel (2016) conceptualizes food security as a 'wicked problem', a coexistence of policy problems with multiple resolutions and state commitments.

As the definitions above indicated, food security is commonly conceptualized as resting on four key pillars: availability, access, food utilization, and stability. These pillars have been important in shaping policy (Clapp et al. 2022). The nutritional dimension is also integral to the concept of food security. The first pillar, food availability refers to the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports, including food aid (FAO 2006).

Availability requires, on the one hand, food should be available from natural resources either through the production of food, by cultivating land, or through other ways of obtaining food. On the other hand, availability refers that food should be available for sale in markets (UNHR 2010, 2)

The availability dimension plays a prominent role in food security because for all people to have 'sufficient' food, there must be adequate availability. But availability of food does not ensure universal access to "sufficient, safe and nutritious food"(C. B. Barrett et al. 2009).

The second pillar of the concept of food security is access. It refers to the access of individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet (FAO 2006). Entitlements are characterized as the set of all commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, political, economic, and social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such as access to common resources) (FAO 2006, 1).

The issues of inter-and intra-household food distributional practices may also analyze through access dimension. From the human rights approach accessibility requires economic and physical access to food to be guaranteed. More importantly, individuals should be able to afford food for an adequate diet without compromising on any other basic needs. The right to access agricultural inputs and resources is significant in the way to food security.

The third pillar, food utilization refers to the utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met (FAO 2006,1). The utilization dimension addresses the importance of non-food inputs in food security, in addition to the supply of food.

The final pillar, food stability dimension refers to the importance of availability of food at all times. According to FAO (2006, 1) to be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food because of sudden shocks (e.g., an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g., seasonal food insecurity). The concept of stability can, therefore, refer to both the availability and access dimensions of food security.

The other important concept that is closely related to food security is the right to food. The right to food is a human right for all people everywhere, and it is articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and other several international instruments. Ensuring freedom from hunger and malnutrition is not only a moral duty or a policy choice, but it is also a 'legally binding human rights obligation'(UNHR 2010, 1). This right evolved from the concept of 'freedom from want', first declared by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1941 (Kent 2005).

In the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to food was recognized as part of the right to a standard of living.

> "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control" (UN 1948 Art 25).

Hence, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 is a foundational framework for the right to food. This right has been highlighted again in subsequent international agreements, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

In the international framework, states have the duty, obligation, and responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill human rights, including the right to food, under international law, as outlined in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966), which states that, the States Parties to this Covenant, recognized the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, and they are committed to taking appropriate steps to ensure the realization of the right to food(UN 1966).

Governments reaffirmed the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger in the Rome Declaration on World Food Security adopted at the World Food Summit in 1996 (FAO 1996). Furthermore,

FAO adopted the Right to Food Voluntary Guidelines in 2004, to provide practical guidelines to member states in their implementation of the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. The FAO's Voluntary Guidelines suggests that the development of food security strategies, polices, program and activities should consider 'universal human rights principles such as participation and inclusion, accountability and rule of law, equality and non-discrimination, transparency'(FAO 2005).

A human rights approach to food security considers the human right to adequate food and freedom from hunger. The right to food is not a right to be fed, but primarily the right to feed oneself in a dignified way. The right to food requires states to provide an enabling environment in which people can use their full potential to produce or procure adequate food for themselves and their families. It needs to establish specific institutional arrangements that will ensure accountability for the realization of human rights (Kent 2005). However, when people are not able to feed themselves by their own means, for instance, because of an armed conflict, natural disaster, or because they are in detention, the state must provide food directly.

The human rights approach seeks to empower the world's poorest and most vulnerable groups to claim their rights. It also reinforces the obligation of governments to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food. Moreover, it encourages the integration of rights into food security policies, as well as to ensure the accountability of governments and other actors for their promises to eradicate hunger (Kent 2005; Tura 2019). Hunger will be solved by creating the conditions in which all human beings can live a decent life, providing for themselves with adequate control over local resources or opportunities to engage in productive work (Kent 2005).

Food security is increasing, though not universally, treated as a basic human right. Ethiopia is one of the poorest and most food insecure countries in the world with millions waiting for food aid from the donor community and has experienced frequent devastating famines. While famine and food insecurity in

Ethiopia is largely explained by the absence of government accountability, but the country has not yet adopted sufficient legislative measures to enforce the right to food (Tura 2019). Hence, approaching food security in Ethiopia from the human rights perspective is important to encourage the government and other relevant actors to promote the integration of the right to food into the design and implementation of food security policies. Furthermore, it empowers vulnerable groups to claim their rights. Ensuring food security at the national and local also reinforces the improvement of human rights, and empowerment of vulnerable groups and reduces the political vulnerability of these groups. This contributes to the strengthening of accountability and enforcement mechanism to ensure the right to food and food security in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY: HISTORICAL, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY APPROACHES

This section presents a brief review of the historical and conceptual evolution of food security, governance, and policy approaches. The evolution of food security has been influenced by the role of international institutions (UN) and the innovative ideas of key actors in the institutions. Since the 1940s the concept of food security and approaches have been progressively evolving due to changes in development perspectives, changes in the nature of food problems, crises, changes in perspectives about food security, and globalization pressures.

The changing ideas, policies, and application of food security have evolved roughly into three phases. From the period 1930s to 1980, policy thinking was dominated by a production-oriented paradigm. The focus was centered on increasing food production and availability at the global level with global efforts to tackle food insecurity. From 1980 to 2000, the conceptualization of food security evolved to contain multiple dimensions at multiple levels, the importance of economic, social, and physical access to food (food entitlement) was recognized, the broader arena of poverty, vulnerability, and development became part of food security analysis.

From the early 2000s and particularly after the 2008 food crisis, the global focus was again on the acceleration of agricultural production to ensure global food security. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank have expressed concern that food production in developing countries must double by 2050 to feed the projected world population (Zoomers as cited in Batterbury and Ndi 2018). Moreover, state and non-state actors are engaged in global food security governance. Global challenges accompanied by social movements in relation to land and food sovereignty, civil society organizations and the engagement of peasants at the global level's are shaping the food security policy and analysis frameworks.

2.1. The Earliest Evolution of The Discourse of Food Security Based on Availability, From the 1930s to 1980

The negative effects of the First World War followed by the devastating effects of the Great Depression on the depression on agriculture, consumer purchasing power, and the incomes of primary producers opened an opportunity for concerted international collective action with regards to food and agricultural policies. As a result, the League of Nations provided platforms in the 1930s wherein agendas related to food issues were discussed. Because of initiatives of states like Yugoslavia that proposed the importance of diffusing the necessity of food for health through the Health Division of the League of Nations and individual proponents like Boyd Orr the world food problem was successfully pushed onto the international political area (Shaw 2007a).

Policymakers during the early 1930s were challenged by understanding the contradictions and the coexistence in the world of widespread malnutrition and starving people with global over availability of food. Tom Scott-Smith (2020) observes, there was vast wealth in the world, but also great poverty; there were low prices, but mounds of produce; grain was accumulating in warehouses, yet the unemployed were unable to purchase it.

Hence, "hunger in the midst of plenty" (Scott-Smith 2020, 117) had, indeed, become evident by the 1930s, and the League of Nations had entertained acrimonious debate about how to address it (McKeon 2015). Due to this global problem, new advances in nutrition science were widely propagated and nutritionists in the League of Nations began to challenge the economic views surrounding the great depression and the solutions proposed by economists.

Whilst economists proposed decreasing in production[2] in order to solve the contradictions of hunger in the midst of plenty, the proposal by economists was to restrict production drastically, create scarcity, and wait for prices to rise, whereas nutritionists proposed to focus towards increasing consumption by

[2] https://www.fao.org/70/1945-55/en/

individuals, arguing that it was ludicrous to reduce production when people were still starving (Scott-Smith 2020). The League considered malnutrition during times of agricultural surplus to be irrational (Sparks 2017). The nutritionist argued that it made no humanitarian sense, to try and raise food prices when people could not even afford the food that was stockpiled, thus, the key issue, should be people, not the market (Scott-Smith 2020).

In one of the first concerted efforts, a survey was conducted by the Health Division of the League of Nations in 1935, and subsequently, a report entitled "Nutrition and Public Health" was submitted. The report showed that there was an acute food shortage in the poor countries, which was the first account of the extent of hunger and malnutrition in the world. After reviewing the report, the Assembly of the League of Nations held discussions on nutrition and nutrition policies and the need for coordinated nutrition policies in several countries, as a result, a committee was established the following year, tasked with finding practical answers to the problem of malnourishment.

The Assembly established two bodies, a technical commission on nutrition to consider, inter alia, human physiological food requirements, and a mixed committee to report on nutrition in relation to health and agriculture and on the economic aspects of the subject. The Commission produced a report on The Physiological Bases of Nutrition (League of Nations, 1936)[3], and the Mixed Committee a report on The Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agricultural and Economic Policy (Phillips 1981).

Since nutrition had long been the site of a battleground between the left and right political spectrum, the mixed committee appealed to reach across the political spectrum (Scott-Smith 2020). Whilst those on the right were attracted by the idea that good nutrition would promote vitality, stability, and community well-being, those on the left liked the idea that good nutrition would improve

[3] League of Nation Health Organization (1936) Report to the Council on the Work of the Twenty-Third Session of the Health Committee. Geneva

worker's rights, leveraging higher wages and giving substance to the idea that all humans were of equal worth.

Moreover, there was also a different point of view towards the cause of hunger, while the right-wing narrative suggested that hunger was caused by the ignorance and conceit of the Western working classes and that education was a solution, but against this view stood a left-wing narrative, which argued that hunger was the result of poverty rather than behavior or ignorance, solutions thus are the provision of welfare, subsidies, and equality. Therefore, the mixed committee of the League attempted to represent both of these perspectives simultaneously to reach across the divide and emphasized that both poverty and ignorance were the causes of malnutrition (Ibid.).

During the 1930s, the rise of international organizations concerned with food policy put pressure on colonial administrators and scientific experts to address famine (Slobodkin 2018). Influenced by new discoveries in the science of nutrition during the 1920s and 1930s, and under pressure from the League of Nations, colonial administrators in Africa sought to use that new knowledge to improve the nutrition of their citizens and subjects (Sparks 2017). The backlash to the famine of 1931 in Niger forced the administration to confront the problem of colonial famine just as nutritional concepts were gaining currency (Slobodkin 2018).

The French colonial administration accepted food security as their most basic responsibility to their territories overseas and incorporated nutritional concepts into their famine policies (Ibid). French scientists and administrators applied nutritional insights first to "individuals in the fight against deficiency disease, then to races in an attempt to increase labor productivity, and finally to colonial populations as a whole" (Slobodkin 2018, 52).

Thus, between 1900 and 1939, the French empire devoted increasing attention to the problems of hunger and famine in the colonies. But despite increasingly sophisticated new ideas of nutrition and public health that influenced colonial administration, science and administrators remained at a loss

as to how to transform knowledge into policy. The lack of feasible proposals stood in stark contrast to the soaring rhetoric celebrating a global techno-administrative utopia at international conferences. Hence, it became clear that the lofty promises of nutrition science were empty in a context in which famine, shortages, and seasonal hunger were routine and subjects struggled to achieve minimum subsistence. Thus, the inability of the French empire to fulfil its responsibilities undermined the ideological justification for colonialism (Ibid).

Similarly, as observed by Sparks (2017) in the mid-to-late 1930s, the scientific inquiries into the causes and consequences of colonial malnutrition pointed to both economic factors and ignorance as the twin causes of malnutrition. While the League of Nations urged its members to make healthy food affordable to all their citizens and subjects, the British state enacted economic policies that benefited British producers and consumers at the expense of colonial ones and hesitated to alter a food system that favored the wallets of British grocery shoppers. Therefore, since changing the agricultural and economic systems was off the table, the colonial administration focused on education.

Nutrition science education emerged in colonial administrators' thinking as the most important intervention in preventing malnutrition. The state blamed women's ignorance about how to prepare nutritious food and used the women's education project as the most important intervention in preventing malnutrition in Nigeria (Sparks 2017). While administrators heralded nutrition science education as the best solution, it did not significantly intervene in reducing malnutrition. Rather, Nigerian women took advantage of the state's attention to their education by demanding the kind of education they wanted for their advancement. Elite southern Nigerian women used pedagogical ambiguity to insert their desire into the debate over their education to achieve their own goals (Ibid).

Even though the League of Nations urged the colonial administration and governments to consider the provision of nutritious food, the colonial

administration and governments did not respond by changing the structural problems rather they tried to solve them through some specific projects. Despite the growing concern on nutrition, the threat of World War II and, soon thereafter, its outbreak, halted these promising activities, although their influence was felt in some countries during the war period, and they helped to set the stage for the Hot Springs Conference and the subsequent formation of FAO (Phillips 1981).

Discourses and policy actions about the international food problem before the outbreak of the Second World War exhibited three main trends, according to Shaw (2007a). The first trend was the beginning of national nutrition policies based on the spread of newer knowledge of nutrition and promoted by international cooperation. The second trend, which was partly in conflict with the first trend, was the growth of market rigidities, national price and production controls, and trade restrictions. The final trend was the growing interest in intergovernmental commodity arrangements (Shaw 2007a).

2.2. The Post-World War II Global Agriculture and Food Security

The deleterious effects of the Second World War on global agriculture and food production further increased the impetus for further development of the need for concerted action with regards to food security. As a result, even before the end of the War, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a United Conference on Food and Agriculture in 1943 on global food problems. This conference led to the creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). As stated above, the need for some form of multilateral world food security arrangement had already been recognized by the League of Nations before the Second World War to rationalize food production, supply, and trade for the benefit of both producers and consumers, in both developing as well as developed countries (Phillips 1981).

The United Nations conference on food and agriculture was organized to consider the goal of freedom from want in relation to food and agriculture. It was recognized that ‘freedom from want means a secure, an adequate, and a

suitable supply of food for every man' (UNCFA 1943, 11). Whilst the 1943 conference was held at the time of World War II, it indicated freedom from want in relation to food as well as security. The opening sentence of the declaration adopted at the conference stated that:

> This conference, meeting in the midst of the greatest war ever waged, in full confidence of victory, has considered the world problems of food and agriculture and declares its belief that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for the health and strength of all peoples can be achieved (UNCFA 1943, 11).

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was established in 1945. In the preamble of the FAO constitution (1945), later amended in 1965 (Phillips 1981), it was stated that:

> The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purpose of raising the levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective jurisdictions.... and ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger (Fao 2017, 3).

FAO was initially focused primarily on the availability pillar of food security, with activities centered on ways to increase food production through the "modernization and improvement of agriculture" (Clapp 2018, 709). The early conception of food security reflected the dominant thinking at that time that food insecurity and hunger were predominantly the product of a lack of availability of sufficient food supplies at the global level and of international price instability.

The first generation of famine theorists conceptualized famine as a result of the disruption of supply and demand of food due to natural or demographic factors. Increasing food surplus and expanding high-technology early warning systems and establishing relief systems and other technical methods were provided as a solution (Devereux 2006). This supply and demand failure analysis of the food system has led to huge investments in green revolution technologies designed to increase food supplies for both national self-sufficiency and exports (Yaro 2004).

(McKeon 2015) notes the role of scientists in building the paradigms on which decision-making about food was based. With the Asian crises the industrialized world responded with a large technology transfer program that led to the so-called 'Green Revolution', Private US institutions, the US government, and the World Bank supported the focus on food production over the years through the promotion of 'Green Revolution'. The Norman Borlaug–Rockefeller Foundation was entered the global food governance as actors with the start-up of the Green Revolution in 1944 (Clapp 2018; McKeon 2015).

Hence, the idea of producing more food to resolve food insecurity was a dominant discourse at the global level in the 1930s and became a policy paradigm in post-World War 2 reconstruction (Lang and Barling 2012). This agricultural productivism approach was based on the application of science and technology (McKeon 2015). Another important factor during the 1940s that have influenced the discourse was United States President Harry S. Truman's speech and his Point Four program. In his inaugural speech, he suggests that: "Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge" (Truman 1949). The main idea of this President Truman speech which linked the greater production using modern technology for prosperity and peace, was the summation of the post-World War II period food security discourse. Moreover, despite conceptual developments over time, this production-oriented paradigm to food security is still dominated the policy debate, the policy thinking is still shaped by the perspectives that centered on raising production as the core answer to under-consumption and hunger (Lang and Barling 2012).

The call for food production was in fact partially due to the effects of war on agriculture. In spite of a significant difference among regions since the impacts of the global conflict differed widely across regions, agriculture suffered massive war devastation throughout Europe, in the USSR, in large areas of Asia and the Pacific, and in North Africa (FAO 2000). Besides, sharp falls in agricultural production in those regions, coupled with a widespread inability to

finance food imports, resulted in acute food shortages. These problems were compounded by a series of droughts between 1946 and 1947 in the USSR, North Africa, and large areas of the Far East.

In sharp contrast, excess food supplies were abundant in several large producer countries that had been relatively spared by the conflict, i.e., Argentina, Canada, Australia, and the United States (FAO 2000). Those countries took the role of food supplies for other countries. Few Western countries dominated the global food governance decision-making at the time, while much of the global South countries, was still under colonial rule (McKeon 2015).

The post-WWII, especially for North America's agriculture was a period of expansion and prosperity as agricultural production in the region increased and net cereal exports rose from about 5 million tons in 1938 to an annual average of 17.5 million tons in 1946-48, whereas Europe's net annual cereal imports rose from 9.5 million to 14 million tons during the same period, both Asia and Africa turned from having a surplus to a deficit in cereals (FAO 2000).

Although in the 1940s, international concern focused on Asia, as the problems of Asia were called as an almost 'unsurmountable nature' (FAO 2000). By contrast, Africa, received relatively less attention, as the continent was recognized as the least economically advanced region, but one for which economic and social development and improved welfare were just a matter of time (FAO 2000).

In 1952 FAO conducted the world food survey to find out whether there was enough food and more specifically enough energy or macronutrients (calories) for the global population, as a result, it found that the average calories supply per person had fallen to below pre-war level and alarmingly, the gaps between the better and worse-fed nations had widened (Shaw 2007a).

Following the FAO world food survey data together with the effects of war experience and food shortages, emphasis was given to the importance of maintaining an adequate domestic food supply and avoiding excessive dependence on imports.

Food self-sufficiency became a common feature of most national development plans, even in cases where such an objective was clearly out of reach, except at extremely high costs and in situations of ample food supplies in world markets. The policies of increasing food production through state-led modernization and industrialization of the agricultural sector were so successful that quickly the production exceeded the consumption hence creating surpluses, which later led to the development of the idea of using surplus food commodities to alleviate food emergencies and promote development, also 'surplus disposal', gained ground and led to the introduction of food aid as a form of development assistance (FAO 2000).

Since the food distribution dimension gained more attention in the 1950s and 1960s, a number of key donor countries, including the United States, Canada, and the European Community (EC; later European Union, EU), institutionalized programs for international food aid (Clapp 2018). Food aid was considered as a key policy tool in the fight against world hunger (McKeon 2015). Nevertheless, it has been criticized for its politicized nature and perceived that donors used it for their benefits, besides it served to contain communist overtures to countries of the South as they attained independence at the time (Patel 2012 as cited in McKeon 2015) The UN World Food Program (WFP) established in 1963 and provided a multilateral delivery channel for international food aid, as observed by Clapp, in the 1960s, food aid made up around one-quarter of all international development assistance (Clapp 2015).

2.1.1. Food Self-sufficiency versus Industrialization: 1950-1970

At the end of World War II, the western world was confronted with the challenge of rebuilding countries that had been devastated by war. They pressured alongside the process of rebuilding western countries, arose a tradition of theorizing about the special challenges facing backward regions and countries, and how these challenges could be met in such a way as to put these areas on sustainable paths to industrialization (Rapley 2007).

The period was dominated by a growing political and economic bipolarism, with a widened gap between rich and poor countries and societies. While the Marshal Plan and reconstruction activity contributed to boosting the post-war economy in western Europe, whereas many economies in the developing world suffered from instability in agricultural markets and acute shortages of foreign exchange (FAO 2000).

Two dominant discourses characterized the post-World War II period. Industry-led growth, at one level and self-sufficiency in food at another level. Industry-driven growth, already the cornerstone of many Latin American countries' development strategies, became the orthodox development paradigm during the 1950s.

The favored strategy of industry-led growth was based on the assumption that, for an economy to develop, it had to grow rapidly, and to do so it had to industrialize. Thus, the phenomenon of 'urban bias-agricultural discrimination' gained ground. There was direct discrimination against agriculture through policies, widely implemented by parastatal marketing boards, which drove a wedge between prices received by farmers and border prices of tradable commodities; and indirect discrimination arising from currency overvaluation that tended to depress prices of exportable and import substitutes, together with policies that protected industry and favored industrial import substitution, thereby raising the prices of non-agricultural goods while reducing farmgate prices (FAO 2000, 114).

On the other level governments' development plans called for self-sufficiency in food. Consequently, governments in developed countries emphasized increasing food production, managing markets in the planning of production, and the allocation of resources through state intervention. Therefore, the emphasis on increased food production and self-sufficiency, clearly at odds with the anti-agricultural bias of industry-driven development strategies, created ambiguous policy settings in many countries (FAO 2000).

Despite the prominence of the industrialization strategy at the time, most developing countries were largely agricultural countries. Thus, development economists began to examine the contribution of agriculture to economic development (Kay 2009). Badiane and Makombe (2014) observe early development theorists viewed the agricultural sector as a source of 'surplus labor' whose share in the economy declined during the course of development.

More importantly, the agricultural sector is expected to supply raw materials and provide tax revenues that could finance other development. Dominant paradigms of this time include dual economy theories (Lewis 1954), emphasized the importance of surplus labor transfer from the traditional (rural) agriculture sector to a modern (urban), industrial sector, also highlighted the importance of agriculture in the expansion of the modern industrial sector. It was assumed that generated income in the industrial (capitalist) sector trickles down to the rest of the economy and stimulates overall growth (Badiane and Makombe 2014, 2).

Thus, in general, the agricultural sector was not seen as a source of growth per se, but as a playing a supporting role in the industry-led growth strategy (Badiane and Makombe 2014; Sassi 2018). Indeed, neglecting the role of agriculture in economic development has been associated with a deep pessimism about the potential for gains in agricultural productivity and adequate demand for agricultural products. Gains in industrial productivity and output, in contrast, could be achieved by increased capital investment and technical change (P. A. Dorosh and Mellor 2013).

Whilst the 1950s and 60s were the heyday of modernization theory, the concepts of capital accumulation, technical progress, and mass consumption, industrial development received priority over agricultural development. In terms of food and agriculture, the most important line of thought in modernization theory was the rise of the concept of 'diffusion of innovation'. Since development was viewed as a trickle-down process, proponents of this model assumed that progressive 'high-status' farmers would be the first adopters of agricultural

innovations until smallholders would eventually accept them (Kracht and Schulz 1999).

In the early 1960s, signs of the first 'paradigm shift' were becoming apparent (Ellis and Biggs 2001). Smallholder farmers were now considered vital for growth and development (Badiane and Makombe 2014). The idea of agriculture-led growth strategy was influenced by the works of (B. B. F. Johnston and Mellor 1961) on the role of agriculture in economic development and on transforming traditional agriculture, others who emphasized the role of smallholder farming in spurring overall economic growth and development (Badiane and Makombe 2014).

Generally, idea of increasing agricultural production which started in the early 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s led to the spread of high-yield seed and intensive agriculture known as the green revolution in the global south. Asia is one example, regarding the Green Revolution, where efforts have been made through intensive agricultural production, using modern agricultural inputs (FAO 2000). Thus, the Green Revolution consisted of modern inputs packages, supported by public investments and polices favorable to agriculture that aimed at bringing about the massive increase in food production (Badiane and Makombe 2014). As part of the broader Green Revolution initiative, various regional and crop-specific agricultural research centers were established in the 1960s and 1970s (Clapp 2018).

In the process, the government has played an important role in creating an enabling environment through polices and investing to stimulate agricultural productivity growth. Investments included those in agricultural research and development (R&D), irrigation, rural roads, and providing credit to farmers (Badiane and Makombe 2014). As a result during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the yields of major food crops (rice, maize, wheat) showed impressive improvement in Asia, and able to effectively deal with rising hunger levels in the region, it lifted many out of poverty and contributed to economic growth in the region (Badiane and Makombe 2014; FAO 2000). It served as the foundation

for economic growth, especially in China and Southeast and South Asia (FAO 2000). Although there is an argument, despite the impressive success in increasing yields and in improving food availability, the Green Revolution polices failed to reduce rural poverty and inequality, because these polices prioritized producers with the most land and capital, and access to infrastructure, rather than the poorest farmers living on the most marginal lands and relying on family labor (Gaarde 2017, 6).

Thus, advocating for high-quality seeds and fertilizers, and mapping out the world's soil landscape were all priorities set in that period as a contribution to the overall strategy of increasing agriculture productivity. Furthermore, various campaigns and programs have been launched, for example, in 1957, to push for the use of high-quality seeds of improved varieties, FAO launched a world seed campaign which culminated in the world seed year of 1961. Moreover, as of all the crop inputs needed for better farm performance, fertilizers provide the most far-reaching results. FAO also established a fertilizers program in 1961 under the umbrella of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign[4]. The trends of modernization at the time emphasized the growth of new markets for processed food and industry.

For example, one outgrowth of efforts under FFHC was the former FAO/Industry Cooperative Program, approved by the Thirteenth Session of the FAO Conference in 1965 and operated under a Trust Fund to which participating industries contributed.

The Special Fund was to concentrate on large projects in the fields of resources, including assessing and developing manpower in various industries such as handicrafts and cottage, agriculture, forestry, transport, and communications, building and housing, health, education, statistics, and public administration. It was designed to help accelerate agro-industrial expansion in developing countries through closer cooperation among FAO, industries, and governments. In 1977 it was decided that this activity should not be continued

[4] https://www.fao.org/70/1955-65/en/

as a part of the structure of FAO, and it was terminated on 30 June 1978 (Phillips 1981).

However, an agriculture-led strategy and the notion of small-scale farmer focus dominated development thinking in the 1960s and 1970s, it was largely disconnected from development practice in Africa (Badiane and Makombe 2014). African farmers did not benefit from the 1960s and 1970s development policy.

2.1.2. Agricultural Productivity and Freedom from Hunger Campaign

One common feature of the 1960s was its high expectations of rapid growth in agricultural productivity to alleviate rural poverty and support economic and social development while reducing the incidence of hunger. Reducing hunger is not only about distributing food to people, rather it is also required an overall increase in investment in agriculture and farmers' know-how and access to technology[5].

Food aid remained important, but technical assistance and improvement in overall agricultural production became increasingly important as a key strategy to support the fight against hunger and malnutrition[6]. Elimination of hunger become considered as an important target of development assistance, indeed due to China's dramatic food shortages following the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' program which caused between 20 and 30 million deaths during the 1958–1961 period (Sassi 2018). Greater production of food, and higher purchasing power of the rural masses in developing countries were the major objectives (Shaw 2007a).

At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the then FAO director-general, B.R. Sen, started a new approach to fight against world hunger. The idea of a Freedom from Hunger Campaign was first mentioned by Sen in a speech to ECOSOC in July 1958 and officially launched on 1 July 1960. Sen's

[5] https://www.fao.org/70/1955-65/en/
[6] https://www.fao.org/70/1955-65/en/

ideas were approved by the FAO Conference in its resolution 13/59 on 27 October 1960, which authorized an international campaign extending from 1960 through 1965 (later extended to 1970s and then 80's) under the leadership and general coordination of FAO (Phillips 1981).

At the World Food Congress Sen proposed the advancement of technology and modern agriculture as a key instrument to reaching substantial increases in food production especially in development countries. Moreover, Sen mentioned the ambitious aim of the campaign was 'to eradicate hunger in the world once and for all'. The main emphasis at the time was that:

> "governments agreed that the persistence of hunger and malnutrition is unacceptable morally and socially, is incompatible with the dignity of human beings and the equality of opportunity to which they are entitled, and is a threat to social and international peace; placed on record its conviction that a peaceful and democratic world cannot be ensured so long as hunger and malnutrition remain the scourge of millions" (quoted in Shaw 2007a)[7].

2.1.3 The 1970s World Food Crises and the Emergence of the Global Food Security in the Policy Context

In the early 1970s, the world was in the middle of food crisis and a series of shocks that introduced elements of instability in the international order under which steady economic growth, relatively predictable markets, and prices, and large international food stocks especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the presence of large stocks of cereals in North America was taken for granted throughout the planet.[8] As ODI has stated:

> from 1945 until the early 1970s, US food surpluses had, in effect, been the guarantor of world food security. The massive food aid to India during its drought crisis of 1965–66 is a good example. Then the US abdicated this solo role by its prioritization of commercial sales to the then USSR and its explicit use of food as a political weapon. By 1974 … there was a considerable institutional gap to be filled (ODI 1997 as cited in Maxwell 2001, 24).

[7] [7] https://www.fao.org/70/1955-65/en/
[8] https://www.fao.org/70/1965-75/en/

According to FAO's report, various factors shaped the unstable environment including a sharp increase in the price of petroleum; the devaluation of the US dollar; and, in the area of agriculture, large grain production shortfalls and soaring prices of food, agricultural inputs, and petroleum-based energy (FAO 2000). Moreover, the unfavourable weather conditions led to a global food production decline, especially in 1972 and 1974.

The food production declines resulted in a sharp depletion of stocks, especially in the traditional cereal-exporting countries: world stocks of wheat were drawn down from 50 million tons in 1971 to 27 million tons in 1973, the lowest level in 20 years. A doubling of international grain prices, caused largely by harvest failure in, and grain imports by, the Soviet Union was another feature of the crisis at the time (Maxwell 2001).

Furthermore, a dramatic food crisis erupted in Africa following two catastrophic droughts. One was the prolonged drought in the Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal), which reached its peak in 1973. The other drought caused the Ethiopian famine which lasted from 1972 to 1974. Due to delayed international aid response between 50 000 and 200, 000 lives were lost in a population of 27 million (FAO 2000).

By the early 1970s, major global governance initiatives to improve global availability and distribution to food were in place, however, these initiatives were soon revealed to be inadequate in the face of the major food crisis that erupted in the mid-1970s (Clapp 2015,709). The crises revealed that the global food system was fragile and inadequate provided that the major disruptions that could result in a spike in levels of hunger around the world.

The crises as a result of a combination of famine in some parts of Africa, the rise in the cost of oil and combined with the food crises shaken the post-war interventionist approach and opened the way to the emergence of the neoliberal promoters. The 1970s was seized by the growing body of neoliberal advocates as an occasion to argue that "the world's food system was overly dependent on subsidies and states and to push for market liberalization and privatization as the

way forward" (McKeon 2015, 16). The 1970s challenges were conceived as an issue of global food security and needed global response, which led to the organization of the world food conference and other related initiatives.

2.1.4. The World Food Conference of 1974

In the face of a mounting world food crisis in the 1970s, the convening of a world meeting on food was discussed at the Conference held in Algiers from 5-9 September 1973. The conference urged that in the context of the serious food crises confronting vast areas and populations of the world, an emergency joint conference of FAO and UNCTAD should be convened at the ministerial level in order to formulate a program of international cooperation to overcome the increasing shortages of food and other commodities and maintain stable prices (FAO 1975). In addition, the issue of food problems was raised again by the Secretary of State of the US, Henry Kissinger, during the UN General Assembly, in September 1973, he noted:

> the growing threat to the world's food supply, and he announced the United States proposal that a World Food Conference be organized under United Nations auspices in 1974 to discuss ways to maintain adequate food supplies and to harness the efforts of all nations to meet the hunger and malnutrition resulting from natural disasters.(quoted in FAO 1975, 44).

Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly convened a World Food Conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The World Food Conference, held in Rome from 5 to 16 November 1974, was one of the major actions within the United Nations system to reorient the approach to economic and social development and to review international economic relationships with the principal objectives of securing better use of the world's resources and the attainment of social justice (FAO 1975).

The stated aims of the conference were to secure international consensus on policies and programs to increase food production and productivity, especially in developing countries, to improve the consumption and distribution of food, to achieve a better system of world food security, and bring about a more orderly

system of agricultural trade and adjustment (FAO 1975). Thus, by recognizing the global problem, the conference gave due attention to the question of hunger and malnutrition but focused attention on global production, trade, and stocks (Maxwell 2001). Also, the World Food Council was created to monitor world agricultural and food supplies.

The 'Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition was adopted, in which the world food conference 'solemnly proclaimed' that:

> Every man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties. Society today already possesses sufficient resources, organizational ability, and technology and hence the competence to achieve this objective. Accordingly, the eradication of hunger is a common objective of all the countries of the international community, especially of the developed countries and others in a position to help (UN 1975, 2).

The adopted declaration recognized that the grave food crises that have been afflicting the peoples of the developing countries was not only fraught with grave economic and social implications but also jeopardizes the most fundamental principles and values associated with the right to life and human dignity enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, it highlighted the historical circumstances especially social inequalities, which included colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, and neo-colonialism in the situation of peoples afflicted with hunger and malnutrition (UN 1975). Moreover, the declaration proclaimed that:

> The well-being of the peoples of the world largely depends on the adequate production and distribution of food as well as the establishment of a world food security system which would ensure adequate availability of, and reasonable prices for, food at all times, irrespective of period fluctuations and vagaries of weather and free of political and economic pressures, and should thus facilitate, amongst other things, the development process of developing countries (UN 1975, 1)

Therefore, the 1974 World Food Conference developed a definition of world food security based on food supply, moreover as a consensus was reached about the need to increase food security as a common responsibility of the entire

international community to ensure the availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs by way of appropriate reserves, including emergency reserves, and the declaration also called on all countries to cooperate in the establishment of an effective system of world food security by participating in and supporting the operation of the global information and early warning system on food and agriculture; cooperating in the provision of food aid for meeting emergency and nutritional needs as well as for stimulating rural employment through development projects (UN 1975).

As food security was conceptualized as an adequate supply to meet food requirements at global, regional, and national levels, the concern was predominantly focusing on increasing food production, world food stocks, or import and import stabilization scheme (Yaro 2004). Maxwell (2001) noted, the measures served to set in place an international regime in which the supply of food, and the ability of countries to acquire it, were essential features.

Accordingly, the first resolution adopted by the world food conference declared that

> "all governments should accept the removal of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition, which at present afflicts many millions of human beings, as the objective of the international community as a whole, and should accept the goal that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will fear for its next day's bread, and that no human being's future and capacities will be stunned by the malnutrition" (UN 1975, 4).

In order to solve the food problem, the highest priority was given to policies and programs for increasing food production in developing countries and agriculture was aimed to grow at the rate of 4 percent per year. Generally, the notion of food security throughout the 1970s was still emphasized on the supply-side dimension. It recognized the engagement of the rural population in the development process. Moreover, the conference also stressed the need for lowering the population growth rate and reducing rural unemployment and underemployment by diversifying agriculture and expanding on-farm and off-

farm income-generating activities. The conference played a significant role by identifying prioritized areas.

Hence, a production-oriented paradigm, a dominant policy approach in post WWII, which focused primarily on raising production through improved technology has influenced the 1974 world food conference and shaped the 1970s discourse of food security, definitions of food problems, and its solutions. The conference affirmed that:

> All countries, and primarily the highly industrialized countries, should promote the advancement of food production technology and should make all efforts to promote the transfer, adaptation, and dissemination of appropriate food production technology for the benefit of the developing countries and, to that end, they should inter alia make all efforts to disseminate the results of their research work to Governments and scientific institutions of developing countries in order to enable them to promote a sustained agricultural development (UN 1975, 2).

2.2. Food Security Approach, From 1981 to 2000

The decade of the 1980s was largely dominated by the prolonged economic decline that affected many countries, especially the poor, structural adjustment crises, and severe famine in most countries in Africa. These macroeconomic crises brought structural weakness into the open in many developing countries, but when structural adjustment issues came to the fore, "little attention was paid to the effects on the poor" (Jolly 1991, 1807). Scholars criticized structural adjustment policies, for its overemphasized focus on a monetary term's definition of poverty, which failed to capture fully the multiple manifestations of poverty, including hunger.

A work by UNICEF in its work on 'Adjustment with a Human Face' and other analyses led to a greater focus on households' economic constraints in accessing the available food. Richard Jolly (1991, 1807) notes,

> While UNICEF was taking its initial steps, important changes of thinking and policy were stirring in the World Bank and in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), made possible by the initiative

> and commitment of a number of key individuals in different parts of these institutions. The same was true within the organizations of the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations were beginning to speak out and provoke rethinking.

At the same time, a significant shift emerged in academic thinking and policy approaches toward the concept of food security. In 1983, FAO analysis focused on food access, leading to a definition based on the balance between the demand and supply side of the food security equation: *"Ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food that they need"*(FAO 1983).

As noted by Maxwell (2001), the second half of the 1980s has been characterized as "the golden age" of food security. In addition to that, in 1986, the highly influential World Bank policy study on Poverty and Hunger (World Bank 1986) focused on the temporal dynamics of food insecurity released.

The report introduced the distinction between chronic food insecurity and transitory food insecurity. While the former is associated with problems of continuing or structural poverty and low incomes, the latter involved periods of intensified pressure caused by natural disasters, economic collapse, or conflict.

Moreover, the World Bank report (World Bank 1986, 1), provided a definition of food security that puts access at the center: 'access of all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life'. The report highlighted since there was sufficient food available worldwide so that countries that did not produce all the food, they needed could import it, if they could afford to do so. Hence, what is important is the purchasing power of the countries and/or people.

While there is abundance globally, millions suffer from a lack of food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power. Therefore, lack of purchasing power, or poverty, was 'likely to be relieved by economic growth, which would ultimately provide most households with enough income to acquire enough food (World Bank 1986, 6). Such growth should, therefore, continue to be a primary goal of economic policy The World Bank policy study has merely seen the food security problems resulted more from a lack of purchasing power

among the poor, and ignore another dimension of food security. While economic growth takes time and the purchasing power of large numbers of poor people would increase only slowly, and some would remain in poverty, the Bank's policy study suggested that to resolve the latter problems, the international community could assist.

Hence, the report stressed that the international community in supporting food security should be guided by the four most important points (World Bank 1986, 49):

> first, lack of food security was usually caused by lack of purchasing power of people and nations, thus, the objectives of poverty alleviation and food security are converged; second food self-sufficiency, or a rapid increase in food production, would not necessarily increase food security in a country, although these goals may be desirable for other reasons, third food security in the long run is a matter of achieving economic growth and alleviating poverty, but in the shorter run, it is a matter of redistributing purchasing power and the food itself towards the undernourished could help. And finally, transitory food insecurity could be best reduced through measures that facilitate trade and income relief to afflicted people.

2.2.1. Amartya Sen's Food Entitlement

Increasing understanding of the various dimensions of food insecurity has led to multiple theoretical formulations and reformulations of the causes and how they should be identified and analyzed. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the assumption that famines were caused by a shortage of food, the Malthusian logic of 'too many people, too little food', challenged by the ideas of Sen entitlement approach (Adelphi Papers and Adelphi Series 2013). In the early 1980s, the concept of access entered the general debate on the quest for food security (Shaw 2007a).

While until the early 1980s, famine theorists were preoccupied with explaining failures of food supply, but from the early 1980s theoretical dimensions of food insecurity have proceeded in a way linear fashion from Malthusian well-known explanation of population growth versus earth's

capacity to provide sufficient food analytical framework that involves shortages of food availability, expanded to involves theories of poverty, access and affordability, the role of conflict and health including livelihoods framework, sustainable development, human right, and politics, agency and sustainability that contains multiple dimensions in its concept.

Thus, Amartya Sen's pioneering work on poverty and famines (Sen 1981) shifted the focus of food security discourse from lack of food availability to the inability of people to gain access to food. Sen applied the concept of entitlements to food security and noted what we can eat depends on what food we are able to acquire. He described the contradictions of the widespread availability of food at the global or national level, with the existence of famines and food insecurity at the local, household, or individual level due to people's lack of access to food.

His works showed that availability is only one dimension of the broader picture of why hunger persists and stresses a person's ability to access food is extremely important. The framework showed that there are several factors, such as market conditions, employment and livelihood viability, and ownership of assets that help to explain why some of the world's most vulnerable people have been unable to access food even in situations of abundant food supply.

Therefore, Sen's approach to entitlement challenged the dominance of the food availability dimension and resulted in the reappraise of the concept of food security. Sen's major finding in the 1970s Ethiopian famine was:

> The Ethiopian famine took place without noticeable food availability decline, while the food output in Wollo was substantially reduced in 1973. The famine was the result of a "collapse of income and purchasing power and the ability of the Wollo population to attract food from elsewhere in Ethiopia". Ironically, there were reports of some movements of food out of Wollo through the famine period, and a remarkable feature of the Wollo famine is that food prices did not go up very much, people starved to death without there being a substantial rise in food prices. Thus, the phenomenon can be understood in terms of extensive entitlement failures of various sections of the Wollo population (Sen 1981, 94).

Therefore, the presence of food in the economy or marketplace does not entitle a person to consume it, what is also important is the entitlement to food. In a situation where food entitlement declines (due to insufficient purchasing power and limited resources to enable entitlement through production, purchase, and exchange, or due to an increase in food prices in relation to income) famine or hunger is likely to occur, therefore, the entitlement approach to starvation and famines concentrates on the ability of people to command food through the legal means available in the society, including the use of production possibilities, trade opportunities, entitlements vis-a`-vis the state, and the other methods of acquiring food. A person starves either because he/she does not have the ability to command enough food, or because he/she does not use this ability to avoid starvation (Sen 1981). According to Amartya Sen's entitlement approach, people can acquire food through production (what one grows), labor (what one works for), trade (what one buys), and transfers (what one is given) (Sen 1981).

Sen's entitlement approach explains famines from economics perspectives, and the approach viewed famines as a result of the collapse in purchasing power or poverty and market failures. This helps to analyze food insecurity at the household and individual level. However, the approach is less able to explain famines that are triggered by government policies, war or failures of the international relief system (Devereux 2007).

While Sen analyzed the 1974 Ethiopian famine more from economics perspectives, studies indicated otherwise. The fact that economic collapse were one factor but not the main factor. Because the Ethiopian famine was a byproduct of extractive institutions, and biased government polices that marginalized agriculture and isolated farmers for over half a century. Moreover, multiple factors including government polices, the political weakness of peasants, conflict, extractive economic systems, war and war strategies, failures of accountability and other factors have been mentioned as a factor for Ethiopian famines (Africa Watch Report 1991; Patrick Webb and Braun 1994). Besides the economic problems, constrains to improvements in human capital, poor

health and sanitation environments have been identified as a cause for the Ethiopian famines (P. Webb, Von Braun, and Yohannes 1992).

2.2.2. Food security in the 1990s

The beginning of the 1990s coincided with one of the most important moments in the world political change, the end of the cold war, and the emergence of a new political, economic, and trade order. For many developing countries the decade was a period of recovery from the disastrous performance of the 1980s. However, this period also registered a sharp increase in the number of crises especially in many countries in Africa (FAO 2000; Sassi 2018).

Countries in Africa witnessed a dramatic increase in the number and length of civil wars and ethnic conflicts, a boom in the incidence of AIDS, and a notable decline in the level of capital inflows, both in terms of official development assistance and foreign direct investments (Shivji 2009). Hence, the analysis of famine included the role of war. In the absence of war, some countries did manage the consequences of drought, however, it was the combination of drought and war that led to a large-scale suffering and death, in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Southern Sudan, and Rwanda. This created the relevance of "managing food supplies in complex political emergencies characterized by social and policy breakdown, and in the process the issue of food security policy have neglected" (Maxwell 2001, 26).

Despite the idea of food security in the 1990s, the focus was more of about codes of conduct for relief, linking relief and development, and rehabilitation, usually in war zones. Thus, food security became linked with relief, development, and emergency food aid was the major form of food security intervention.

Another work by Alex De Waal in his book (Famine Crime 1997), considered food insecurity from the perspectives of politics. The book highlighted that how politics and associated power distributions within society contributed to famine and food insecurity. De Waal argues that the interaction

of natural factors like climate change and manmade factors (transactional politics) could shape the creation of famine. The rise of transactional politics or 'political marketplace', a governance system characterized by the exchange of political services and loyalties for material resources in a competitive manner, overwhelming any institutional forms of government, could lead to creating famine. In such a system, private interest prevails over public goods and human lives are valued only in so far as they contribute to political gain. Humanitarian action became subordinate to political bargaining.

Vulnerability becomes another important aspect in understanding food security. Watts and Bohle, suggests applying a combination of three different analytical approaches to examine the vulnerability of the poor to food insecurity and hunger: it includes the entitlement approach (dealing with a decline in access to food), the empowerment approach (dealing with institutional failure in securing the basic right to food security) and a political economy approach (dealing with inequalities that lead to food insecurity). Further explained vulnerability arises from a complex web of economic, political, and social conditions, through the intersection of three causal powers: command over food (entitlement), state-civil society relations seen in political and institutional terms (enfranchisement/ empowerment), and the structural-historical form of class relations within a specific political economy (surplus appropriation/crisis proneness) (Watts and Bohle 1993). Moreover, economic capability, property relations, and class power are key aspects to understand and explain famine and deprivation.

This indicated how hunger is not only about too many people and too little food, but it is also about power. Its roots lie in inequalities in access to resources and opportunities. Hence, the 1990s international initiatives for reducing poverty coincided with changes in nature of famine in many African countries made poverty reduction the focus of development polices.

As a result of multiple critiques against SAPs, the World Bank recognized the need to include the social dimensions of development and modified the

programs by targeting poverty reduction. Consequently, some programs in the form of poverty reduction, debt relief, moderately subsidized primary education, and AIDs funds were granted.

Changes in the World Bank programs followed by a requirement to prepare a country-specific Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by each developing country to gain access to the credit provided by the World Bank and IMF. In the PRSPs, the promotion and achievement of households' food security often became a focus and directed agriculture, and rural development played a key role in the poverty reduction process.

According to Maxwell (2001, 26) observation, in the 1990s, poverty reduction initiatives "brought poverty reduction back to the front of the development stage and displaced the focus of food security". He further noted that despite the strong degree of overlap between poverty and food security, many donors abandoned or down-graded food security studies and programs in favor of poverty assessments and poverty reduction programs (Maxwell 2001). However, in the mid-1990s, the record-low levels of global food reserves contributed to concern about the issue of food security and the ability of the world to feed itself. Despite donors lack of interest to invest in food security, food security became increasingly viewed from multiple perspectives (Ibid).

Kracht and Schulz (1999) discussed the evolution of nutrition and food security in light of the development theories starting from the 1950s onward. From the 1990s onward globalization and post-modernism have also framed the food security policy debate. Certain global institutions, most notably the United Nations and the World Bank, have played a large role in defining the paradigms and the debates.

Maxwell noted, in the broadest sense, the history of thinking about food security since the World Food Conference in 1974, can be conceived as having evolved through three overlapping paradigm shifts. According to Maxwell (1996), the three shifts are:

I. From the global and the national to the household and the individual level

II. From a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective; and

III. From objective indicators to subjective perception.

Gradually, emphasis has shifted towards food security at the level of households and individuals, giving greater attention to physical and economic access to adequate food. Thus, food security can be defined and discussed at the individual level, at the household level, and at the regional and national level concerning national economic policy (FAO 1999).

2.2.3. The World Food Summit of 1996

Major international development was made in 1996 regarding food security, twenty years later after the 1974 World Food Conference. Convened by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, a World Food Summit was held in Rome, in November 1996[9]. Shaw notes that the world summit on food security was called following the election of the new FAO director-general, Jacques Diouf (Shaw 2007).

The World Food Summit adopted the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action. The Rome declaration on world food security reiterates the previous declaration of the World Food Conference (1974), which stated, 'every man, woman, and child has the right to be free from hunger and malnutrition and set the goal of eradicating hunger in the world 'within a decade' and the Rome declaration recognized that the goals of the 1974 conference were not achieved; therefore it emphasized:

> It was considered intolerable and unacceptable that more than 800 million people throughout the world, particularly in developing countries, do not have enough food to meet their basic nutritional needs. Thus, the declaration adopted by the World Food Summit reaffirmed 'the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious

[9] The Rome Declaration on World Food Security (1996)

food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.

Moreover, the declaration stated objective was to reduce the number of undernourished people by half no later than 2015, a commitment later reaffirmed in the first target of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. The Rome declaration recognized the dimension of access, and it highlighted that, despite increasing food supplies, constraints on access to food, and continuing inadequacy of household and national incomes to purchase food, instability of supply and demand, as well as natural and man-made disasters, prevent basic food needs from being fulfilled. It added the problems of hunger and food insecurity have global dimensions and are likely to persist, and even increase dramatically in some regions, unless urgent, determined, and concerted action is taken, given the anticipated increase in the world's population and the stress on natural resources.

In the 1996 Rome declaration, poverty was identified as 'a major cause' of food insecurity, and sustainable progress in poverty eradication was considered 'critical' to improve access to food. Conflict, terrorism, corruption, and environmental degradation were also listed as contributing 'significantly' to food insecurity. Increasing food production was proposed to address the food problem, but this needs to be done within the framework of sustainable management of natural resources, elimination of unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries, and stabilization of the world population.

It affirmed the complexity and multifaceted character of food security and stressed the significance of concerted national action including the primary responsibility of government to develop an enabling environment and have policies that ensure peace, as well as social, political, and economic stability and equity and gender equality, and effective international efforts to supplement and reinforce national action.

As a result, the 1996 World Food Summit adopted an action plan with several commitments:

> Ensuring an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to create the best conditions for the eradication of poverty and for durable peace; implementing policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving access to food by all, at all times; pursuing participatory and sustainable development policies and practices; striving to ensure that food, agricultural trade, and overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all through a fair and market-oriented world trade system; endeavoring to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements; promoting optimal allocation and use of public and private investments to foster human resources, and sustainable development; and implementing, monitoring, and following up this Plan of Action at all levels in cooperation with the international community. [10]

2.3. Food Security in the 2000s: Reverting to More Production Paradigm

In 2008, the world witnessed a significant increase in the prices of food commodities reached their highest levels, after a low and stable level was reached at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s. The prices of basic food commodities such as rice and vegetable oil increased slowly from 2003 to 2006 and then surged upwards in 2008. The food crisis in the 2000s led to increased concern over the ability of the world food economy to adequately feed billions of people, now and in the future (FAO 2011).

For low-income and highly import-dependent countries, higher food prices have become a major challenge, especially for poorer households with a larger share of food in their total expenditures are suffering the most from high food prices, due to the erosion of purchasing power, which has a negative impact on food security, nutrition and access to school and health services (Demeke 2009).

Most of these poor and food importer countries were in Africa. They were exposed to higher international prices for food commodities, were typical without sufficient stocks, and did not have the budgetary resources to adequately protect the food security of the poor. The consequence was a dramatic increase

[10] reference

in the number of undernourished people, which exceeded 1 billion in 2009 (FAO 2011; Demeke 2009).

Many observers highlighted the limitation of free market to protect the food security of low-income countries. McKeon argues that the "interlinked crises have jolted neoliberal paradigms, and the free market has clearly failed to guarantee the food security of developing countries, particularly those that succumbed to World Bank advice to sell their commodities on the world market and purchase 'cheap' food in exchange" (McKeon 2015, 181). However, instead of analyzing the complex causes of the food crises and developing a policy options based on a full and deep analysis, most governments responded by engaging in agricultural commercialization(Lang and Barling 2012).

Even though the world produces more food than the total global population requires, yet millions suffer from hunger, while vast volumes of food go to waste, an overview of recent studies on global food loss and waste magnitudes shows a range from 27 percent to 32 percent of all food produced in the world (IFPRI 2016; Petrikova 2017; Shepherd 2012). According to FAO's study, roughly one-third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted globally, which amounts to about 1.3 billion tons per year, and much more food is wasted in the industrialized world than in developing countries. The estimation indicates that the per capita food waste by consumers in Europe and North-America is 95-115 kg/year, while this figure in sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia is only 6-11 kg/year (FAO 2011).

Although most African countries experienced shortages of food production but resolving food problem in the continent requires the policy inclusion of all dimensions. However, Lang and Barling argues that the policy response to food security are 'fractured and contested', because different actors, interests offer competing analysis. Some emphasize "markets, others citizens, some see the state's role as facilitative, others as oppressive, some see food security as about developing countries, others as a challenge to the world's food system" (Lang and Barling 2012, 9).

Though acceleration of production to food problems has been in a policy focus since the end of World War II, yet countries specially in Africa struggled to feed their population. In spite of conceptual developments in understanding food security, the mainstream policy agenda for addressing hunger still prioritized production over other aspects of food security (Clapp 2014). This created the marginalization of complex agenda analysis in the food system (Lang and Barling 2012).

The global changing patterns in food consumption in developing countries, urbanization, and population growth, demand for food as projected to outstrip the capacity of local production due to the diminishing arable land led a global concern about the limitation of global food availability in the coming decades. As millions of people in China, India and other rapidly economically growing countries shift from low to middle incomes, their demand protein-rich foods including meat and fish will grow (Petrikova 2017). These multi-factor challenges pushed the policy recommendation towards increasing global agricultural production to resolve food problems now and in the future (Ibid).

In line with that, global leaders and agencies such as the United Nations, World Bank, and African governments, businesses, and other development partners have taken initiative to ensure global food security through investing in agriculture. It was believed that large-scale investments in agriculture will lead to growth in food production, "create avenues for the use of new technology, contribute to employment creation, and increase the GNP of most developing countries" (Batterbury and Ndi 2018, 576).

Thus, the rising in global demand for food combined with the liberalization of trade and investment regimes led to private, foreign investors, and governments to invest in large-scale agriculture to ensure food security. Countries such as India, China and Brazil, and their engagement in agriculture was framed in the intention to build their relationships with Africa in a sprit of South-South Cooperation (Cheru and Modi 2013).

These three countries have been considered as an important source of finance, technology and infrastructure, for boosting the productivity of African agriculture, thereby increasing domestic food security and exports of world markets (Cheru and Modi 2013). The South-South cooperation has been promoting to explore the existing expertise, skills, capacities and solutions, in developing countries to reach food insecure people. Thus, South-South cooperation is viewed as an important means for achieving progress in food security and advancing nationally-owned efforts to realize a world without hunger (WFP 2015, 4).

African governments showed their support for foreign investments by providing huge tracts of land to grow commercially viable agricultural products, such as such as cut flowers, biofuel crops, cotton and some edible produce(Cheru and Modi 2013). This investment has been implementing with different interests though. For China and India, the concerns were about their own domestic food security, for most of the African governments, the concerns were about increasing exports and generating foreign earnings(Cheru and Modi 2013). This process was contributed to the marginalization of the need of domestic food security.

Batterbury and Ndi (2018, 573) note that:

> Many Africa governments, some with weak land tenure regulations and others needing to balance their budgets, breach existing customary and communal land tenure arrangements to reallocate land and forests to firms, foreign governments and speculative investors – particularly for agricultural development.

Therefore, most foreign investments in African agriculture were aimed to meet their own national food security needs at home not to address African food problems (Batterbury and Ndi 2018). Consequently, since the mid-2000s rich industrialized countries including their investors from North America, Europe, China, India, the Middle East, Brazil and South Africa, embarked on the purchase and/or lease of millions of hectares of arable land in Madagascar, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana, and Sudan (Ibid).

These large-scale agriculture investments by foreign investors have been criticized by land rights advocacy, food sovereignty advocacy, and scholars by indicating their impacts on small-scale farmers. Furthermore, they have criticized the very concept and frames of food security.

It has been argued that food security used to legitimize the securing of rights over agricultural lands, which one of the African scholars describes as 'a dubious way to solve the food security conundrum in Ethiopia', noting that it seems

> "paradoxical that one of the most vulnerable countries in the world is handing over vast land and water resources to foreign investors to help food security efforts in their home countries (Shepherd 2012, 198).

The concept of food security has been critiqued by food sovereign advocates for lacking guidance on how food should be produced where it should come from (Clapp 2014). Some argued that while the concept of food security clearly indicates access to food to all, it remains "agnostic about the production regime, about the social and economic conditions under which food ends up on the table" (Rajeev Patel, Balakrishnan, and Narayan 2007, 90).

Benjamin Shepherd suggests that food security is framed in a passive way and it does not indicate any actors with agency that might be responsible for providing food security (Shepherd 2012, 197)). Because it is agnostic about the production regime, food security is subject to competing positions and it is compatible with, and has become widely employed as a way of pursuing particular agendas and legitimizing particular actions, especially those of powerful actors, but at the expense of others (Dunford 2015; Lang and Barling 2012; Shepherd 2012). Today, there are very different and quite polarized discursive frames on how to address the problems in the food system (Clapp 2014).

A consequence of conceptualizing food security as an availability problem is that actors use food security language to "legitimize competition over increasingly scarce food-production resources" (Shepherd 2012, 197). Actors attached meaning and used food security to justify agricultural production by

investing in large-scale farms even if it is sometimes contributed to the eviction of small farms, or pastoralist, also at the expense of them(Dunford 2015). However, the investment in agriculture which do not incorporate the local dynamics might bring about higher global food production, but it is not likely to improve local food security (Petrikova 2017).

Rather it might contribute to creating the circles of poverty and food dependency, "as farmers are 'driven off the land' and forced into 'deepening poverty', 'migrant streams' and 'urban slums', a cycle of 'food dependency' is instigated" (Dunford 2015, 252).

As a result of these global changes, rural people began to mobilize at a different level to protect their land and resources. At the global level the social movements and civil society organization engaged in the policy spaces. McKeon argues that these global changes have opened up a window of political opportunity for rural people by 'subjecting dominant paradigm and governance to unprecedented level of questioning" (McKeon 2015,177). With the reform of the Committee on World Food Security, as a global policy forum, rural social movements exploit the opportunities and participated as a policy player. As a response to the devastating effects of the 1980s adjustment on agriculture and rural livelihood, and as an alternative to the dominant neoliberal, production-oriented paradigm, from the mid-1990s the peasant movement, right to food, food sovereignty, and agro-ecology were championed by civil society actors entered the global governance scene for the first time (Ibid).

During the 1996 World Food Summit, the concept of food sovereignty was first introduced by La Vía Campesina, an international movement that coordinates peasant organizations of small and medium-sized producers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities from Asia, America, and Europe. The expanded definition of food security by governments at the Summit was in fact influenced by the introduction of the term food sovereignty (Patel 2009). According to La Vía Campesina:

> "Food Sovereignty is the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict the dumping of products in their markets; and to provide local fisheries-based communities the priority in managing the use of and the rights to aquatic resources. Food Sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples to food and to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production"[11]

The food demand and the demand for land by different countries and private actors and it effects on peasant agriculture hit the headlines, La Via Campesina, developed a comprehensive alternative proposal for restructuring food production and consumption at the local, national and global levels, called 'food sovereignty' (Rosset 2006).

Due to the limitations in mainstream policy, scholars, civil society and social movements proposed different alternatives to the food problems and its policy approaches. Dunford (2015, 240) suggested "contextually grounded accounts of emancipation in general and notions of collective rights-based emancipation in particular by identifying a form of emancipatory politics in which collectives demand rights for themselves." Social movements such as the Landless Workers Movement (MST) and la Via Campesina are mentioned to support the idea of collective, rights-based emancipation. While there is an emancipatory action performed on behalf of victims of oppression as well as emancipatory action performed by the victims themselves, Dunford argues,

> practices of active citizenship and democratic organizational structures, built through the grassroots and transnational struggles through which peasants raise their demand for human rights, are vital in enacting rights to food sovereignty. In instances where victims are not entirely silenced and powerless, this combination of a demand for human rights and the development of practices of citizenship that enable people to demand and secure rights for themselves provides a contextually grounded emancipatory alternative to interventionist politics that, however well intentioned, risk reinforcing the dependence of purportedly powerless victims (Dunford 2015, 240).

[11] https://viacampesina.org/en

While some argue for the replacement of food security with food sovereignty to solve the issue of food problem, but this may not necessarily address the problem. While a core strength of food sovereignty is its emphasis on the democratization and localization of food-producing resources and distribution of production, however, a substantial weakness is that the concept is equally open to usurpation by powerful players in the global food regime. Governments are now starting to use food-sovereignty language to legitimize their efforts to secure control over food supplies and food-producing resources (Shepherd 2012).

Jennifer Clapp (2014) suggests, instead of replacing food security with food sovereignty, it is important to consider both concepts to support policy thinking and formulate polices to address the most pressing issues of hunger and inequality in the global food system today. Because both the food security conceptualization of 'access to adequate food' and a food sovereignty description of a more explicitly 'political agenda' for how to address inadequate access to food and land rights is important to food policy (Ibid).

Food security conceptualization as stated by FAO 'access to sufficient food for all people at all times' is absolute and indeed the ultimate goal, but it is difficult to use the definition to provide a framework to measure the success of policy projects, especially ones that seek to address the problem of hunger as a product of complex structural arrangements (Shepherd 2012).

Accordingly, Shepherd suggests rethinking food security in 'emancipatory' terms. Hunger is one of the most basic oppressions that people must be secured against. Hence, food security can be framed in terms of securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger (Shepherd 2012, 206). Because thinking about food security in this way centralizes the hungry and those at risk of hunger as the focus of food-security activity.

Shaw (2007, 384) has suggested that food insecurity needs to be seen in the 'eye of the storm' through the interlocking national and global concerns to which it contributes and whose solution lies in tackling those concerns holistically.

Shaw (2007a) has described framing food security in this interlocking context led to a problem of institutional incoherence: with so many multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organizations and international institutions involved, food security has tended to become everybody's concern and so, in reality, no one's concern. This has made it difficult to develop and implement common and coherent policies, priorities, and programs to attain world food security.

2.3.1. Food Security and Global Governance

At the international level, there is a wide range of established specialized institutions, legal and governance arrangements to end global hunger. Nevertheless, food insecurity is still a global challenge. The recent global crisis revealed the limits of the existing governance framework and a global policy vacuum and pointed to the need for further refinements (Clapp 2018; McKeon 2015; Lang and Barling 2012). Moreover, it was highlighted that the existing food security governance framework was not empowered enough to fully address the complex contributors to the crisis (Clapp 2018).

Because even though the global food governance framework recognized the existence of multiple factors and its effects on food security, and linkages between the global economic situation and food security, but the existing food governance agencies have little authority to address broader economic arrangements that affect food security. The governance challenge in the food system is the most significant for the persistence of hunger (Paarlberg 2002; FAO 2011).

Global challenges such as climate change, financial crisis, and a rapid rise in world food and fuel prices have been generated largely by the rich countries, its effects is global though, but it hits the poorest countries hard and their effects may be compounded into challenges for long-term development strategies (Haddad 2012).

Moreover, poor countries are the most vulnerable to sudden volatility in the international market, including trade policy, declining agricultural investment,

and increased diversion of food crops into biofuel production. However, the UN food governance agencies are not authorized to address these global factors in any direct way (Hulme and Turner 2013).

Although the global food institutions can recommend policy direction for their member governments on these important issues, it is ultimately national governments that have the most control over these broader forces. Food governance institutions do not have the authority to hold these governments to account on economic issues (Clapp 2018; Paarlberg 2002).

It is not surprising that the global governance architecture which covered an array of functions for addressing different aspects of hunger and food insecurity including food aid, assistance to improve agricultural production, and interventions to improve nutrition, the institutions and actors as well as the legal and normative frameworks that shape the global response to food insecurity is also highly complex (Clapp 2018).

Starting from the League of Nations initiatives in the 1930s to the recent initiatives for engaging civil society organizations in the response of food insecurity, the global food security governance architecture has changed and grown over the years has "reflected the evolution in our understanding of food security from one based primarily on food availability to one that recognizes multiple dimensions" (Clapp 2018, 708)

Therefore, the recent decades' multiple global challenges that affect hunger and malnutrition raise a question about whether the commonly used four pillars of food security is adequate to capture the full range of dimensions that matter for food security. Consequently, it has been argued that "it is time to update our conceptual understanding of food security to encompass the broader dynamics that affect hunger and malnutrition"(Clapp et al. 2022).

The High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) Food Security and Nutrition: Building a Global Narrative Towards 2030 (2020) report proposed the incorporation of two key dimensions such as "agency and sustainability" in the conceptualization of food security policy thinking

alongside the four commonly used food security dimensions (HLPE 2020). The assumption was that this framework "will better ensure that everyone on the planet is food secure, not just today, but into the distant future"(Clapp et al. 2022).

The HLPE report emphasized that the food policy needs to embrace a sustainable food systems framework, underpinned by the wider conceptualization of food security with the right to food as a guiding principle (HLPE 2020). While agency and sustainability have each been used in the scholarly literature as being relevant to food security, however, the four dimensions of the food security framework has continued to dominate in the policy context. This contributed to the policy limitation and that ultimately hampered the transformation of the food system in the direction needed to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The common understanding of food security has been widely embraced, but it fails to grasp the larger issues underpinning food insecurity in the developing world. Hence, by including the agency dimension in the food security policy and analysis framework, the government's policy includes the importance of empowerment, the ability of people to actions to improve their livelihoods and influence the broader policy and governance framework. Additionally, incorporating the sustainability dimension into polices encourages governments to establish the food system that considers sustainable food security system for today and future (HLPE 2020). Table 1 highlights the six dimensions of food security.

Table 1: The Six Dimensions of Food Security (HLPE 2020)

Dimensions	**Definition**
Availability	Having a quantity and quality of food sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from

	adverse substances and acceptable within a given culture, supplied through domestic production or imports.
Access (economic, social and physical)	Having personal or household financial means to acquire food for an adequate diet at a level to ensure that satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised; and that adequate food is accessible to everyone, including vulnerable individuals and groups.
Utilization	Having an adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.
Stability	Having the ability to ensure food security in the event of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic, health, conflict, or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity).
Agency	Individuals or groups have the capacity to act independently to make choices about what they eat, the foods they produce, how that food is produced, processed, and distributed, and to engage in policy processes that shape food systems. The protection of agency requires socio-political systems that uphold governance structures that enable the achievement of FSN for all.
Sustainability	Food system practices contribute to the long-term regeneration of natural, social, and economic systems, ensuring the food needs of the present generations are met without compromising the food needs of future generations.

2.4. Food (in)Security as Global and African Problem

Global food insecurity has been a growing problem since the 1970s, although progress has been made in understanding food security and supporting policy formulation. Multiple global summits and commitments have been made since the mid-20th century, these theoretical commitments have generally not translated into sustainable global action though (Petrikova 2017). Approximately two billion people suffer from micronutrient deficiencies, impeding human and socio-economic development (World Food Program 2016).

According to FAO (2021) report, 2.37 billion, nearly one in three people in the world did not have access to adequate food in 2020. Nearly 820 million people in the world faced hunger in 2020/19 (Global Nutrition Report 2021). Furthermore, these global challenges of hunger are reflected in specific and enduring consequences for children (Leahy 2019).

Globally a large number of people are still affected by malnutrition, compiled data in the state of global nutrition (2021) indicated that worldwide, of all children under 5 years of age, one in five are stunted (149.2 million), 45.4 million (6.7%) are wasted, and 38.9 million are overweight. Over 40% of all men and women (2.2 billion people) are now overweight or obese.

More than 66 million primary school-age children attend classes hungry across the developing world, with 23 million in Africa alone (World Food Program 2016). Even so, these problems of malnutrition has been declining in every region, but Africa has lagged significantly behind. While in Asia the number of children who were suffering from stunting declined from 190 million in 1990 to 91 million in 2014, whereas in Africa, the number of children suffering from stunting increased over the same period from 47 million to 58 million (IFPRI 2016; Leahy 2019).

The 2018 Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition (FAO) states that in 2017, about 20.4 percent of Africa's population are undernourished

in 2016. According to the United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2020) estimation by 2030 more than 433 million undernourished people would live in Africa, 412 million of whom would be in sub-Saharan countries. There are now nearly 230 million undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 192 million in 2005.

Table 2: Undernourishment in the World, Africa and its Subregions, (2005-2017).

Prevalence (%)						Number (Millions)				
Region/Year	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017
World	14.5	11.8	10.6	10.8	10.9	945	820.5	784.4	804.2	820.8
Africa	21.2	19.1	18.6	19.7	20.4	196	200.2	222	241.3	256.5
Northern Africa	6.2	5.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	9.7	8.5	18.1	19.5	20
Sub-Saharan Africa	24.3	21.7	21.1	22.3	23.2	176.7	181	203.9	221.9	236.5
Central Africa	32.3	27.8	24.1	25.7	26.1	36.2	36.5	37.1	40.8	42.7
Eastern Africa	6.5	31.3	30.5	31.6	31.4	113.5	119.1	121.4	129.6	132.2
Southern Africa	12.3	7.1	7.9	8.2	8.4	3.6	4.2	5	5.2	5.4
Western Africa		10.4	11.4	12.8	15.1	33.0	31.9	40.4	46.3	56.1

Source: (UNECA and FAO 2018)



Source: (UNECA and FAO 2018)

CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES, AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA

3.1. Modernization Theory and Agriculture and Food Security in Postcolonial Africa

The first generation of African leaders, who took office after the Second World War was immediately challenged by what can be termed as the great expectation-minimal capabilities paradox. Upon assuming office from departing colonial powers, these leaders had to contend with popular expectations that the fruits of independence, most notably higher wages and better living conditions, would be quickly and widely shared (Ake 1996).

On the other hand, the inherited colonial state apparatus had been ill-designed to fulfill the post-colonial demands of the universally enfranchised population. For the colonial state apparatuses were designed mainly to extract surpluses with cost minimalization, the branches of the state that were expected to provide social services were either totally missing or too underdeveloped to matter (Frank 1966). On the contrary, the extractive and coercive branches were overdeveloped and were ready to continue exploiting the populace and crush popular demands.

Rempel (2018, 570) notes that European imperial governments were a crucial external source of development ideas and practices in Africa. However, concerning European imperial rule in Africa, Rempel (2018, 593) argued that factors such as "shoe-string administrations, desperation triggered by global war and recession, and the depth of European racism vis-à-vis Africans" all played a role in the European rule in Africa. Thus, despite the rhetoric of imperialists, there were few resources and little for transformation. Ruth Rempel (2018, 592) suggests about colonialism and development in Africa that:

> The institutions the European imperial rule bequeathed were more effective at extraction and coercion than the promotion of well-being. Nevertheless, development became one of the catchwords of the twentieth century in Africa. It was far more than a neo-colonial ploy. It was a core demand of peoples seeking independence from empire and from an international system conditioned by empire; it was both a reason for independence (genuine development could only occur with an indigenized state and economy) and a reason for continued sacrifices afterward.

Besides, due to the economic legacy of colonialism, monocrop and mono-mineral integration of the economy with departing colonial masters, and perverse infrastructural development that favored export to the metropole, the first-generation leaders were constrained in making economic-related policies. Even where they had some policies and strategies of overcoming the negative colonial inheritances, the lack of educated manpower made their execution a practical impossibility (Onimode 2003).

To overcome this great expectation-minimal capabilities gap, most of the new African leaders redefined their liberation ideology to that of development as an ideology of the state (Ake 1996). Using the state to accumulate capital and industrialize the economy was the mainstay of modernization goals and development discourses. With exception of a few visionary leaders like Seretse Khama of Botswana who has patiently built inclusive politics, a redistributive economy, and development of social institutions like education, most African leaders were obsessed with the idea of catching up through rapid industrialization at the expense of the welfare of the populace and their food security. Cheru (2009, 275) described the post-independence conceptualization of development as "something to be organized from above and from outside instead of a process of unleashing people's energies for their self-improvement from below".

African leaders were determined that their countries would catch up with the developed world, *"We must run while the others walk"* (Mkandawire 2011, 9) captures the spirit of the post-independence period. A world commodity boom coincided with the urgency to development among a newly independent states that "encouraged an optimistic belief that Africa could follow Europe with a 'big push' towards modernization and industrialization" (Havnevik et al. 2007, 14). Industrialization was seen as the road to modernity and development for countries emerging from colonialism and described at the time as backward (Kay 2009, 105).

This optimistic belief was shared with the donor community, and they provided substantial resources in terms of technical and financial support. Planning for development started during the 1940s, when the United Nations member countries that identified with the Third World were concerned about issues of anti-imperialism and development (Rempel 2018). At the time a group of experts led by W. Arthur Lewis, produced a report called Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, which proposed

economic growth with a big push through external aid. This idea was still remained in the 1960s and accepted by most economists and national leaders (Ibid).

Based on the assumption that states in the developing world could act as engines of development and therefore donors could be funded to enable investments and generate growth (Fritz and Menocal 2007). Although some concerns were raised concerning the distribution of aid, because of some multiple and sometimes conflicting rationales at the time due to the intensification of the Cold War, and economic theory was often an after-the-fact justification (Rempel 2018).

Moreover, African leaders were influenced by Latin American industrialization strategies and considered rapid industrialization as a key strategy to transforming traditional economies (FAO 2000). These African leaders who equated industrialization with development were uncritically internalizing the then-dominant development paradigm of modernization theorists like Rostow who theorized development in a linear stage. According to Rostow and other early modernization theorists, all societies inevitably engage in the modernization process and pass through a predetermined sequence of developmental stages: traditional economies, transition to takeoff, takeoff, drive to maturity, and age of high consumption (Rostow 1971).

Modernization theory, with criticisms and consequent variants and its underlying neo-colonial prescription of Westernization, had significantly affected first-generation African leaders who wanted to answer or seem to answer the popular demands for development and well-being. However, rather than contextualizing the assumptions of the theory and dynamically interacting and adapting it to their specific historical, social, and environmental contexts, the majority of them tried to jump into the industrialization process by appropriating the state apparatuses appropriated from the departing colonial masters (Ake 1996).

Where conditions for industrialization lacking including the capital, human resources with technical proficiency, and legal and bureaucratic systems that could enable innovation and sustainable economic development and social advancement, they settled for replacing the departing colonial masters to continuing exploitation of their people and violently cracking down on opposition. Instead of building state apparatuses conducive for broad-based development and food security, they Africanized the state apparatus and built patron-client networks radiating from the palace of the head of state.

Departing administrative positions were replaced by African politicians and civil servants. As the state was the largest employer and considered the most lucrative source of employment and privileges, positions were carefully doled out to the kin of the president/head of state and key individuals to be co-opted from ethnic, religious, and other key groups to silence any opposition. Instead of building schools, hospitals, and other critical infrastructures for agricultural development that were supposed to lead to take off in the parlance of modernization theory, more salaried positions were created to get approval from the population.

Besides, key opposition political leaders like Oginga Odinga of Kenya and leaders of civil society organizations, like leaders of the Mecha-Tulama Association of Ethiopia who refused to be co-opted were neutralized through physical and character assassination, imprisonment, and other disempowering mechanisms. Over 100 leading community leaders including leaders of Mecha-Tulema Association, were arrested, tortured, sentenced to death (Africa Watch Report 1991).

Development was securitized as the sole ideology of the majority of the postcolonial African states in the context of the Cold War while in practice it had nothing to do with modernization or development of the population. A few non-profitable and monopolistic import substitution industries were built with members and families of the patron-client network run in support of their lavish and modern lifestyles on par with the elites of the developed capitalist states.

Under the guise of nation-building, elite bureaucrats and party loyalists, far removed from the reality of life on the ground, began to dictate what peasants could and could not produce, at what price they should sell their outputs, and even where they should cultivate. Those actions were justified by governments on the grounds of advancing the "national interest" (Cheru 2009, 275). Fantu Cheru (2009, 275)observed that:

> Not only were these top-down development polices anti-peasant and anti-poor, but also even projects financed by the donors ended up marginalizing the poor. The familiar cry from the poor became 'Please don't develop us!'.

Both power and wealth were progressively concentrated in the hands of the head of state and his networks with corresponding deterioration of the condition of development and food security of the populace. As a result, disenchantments set in due to the failure of the modernization project and inapplicability assumptions of modernization theory became apparent, the reactions were violence in practice and revision or changing of assumptions

theoretically, from the mid-1960s on there was a dramatic rise in coups, insurgencies, secessionist movements, civil wars, political assassinations including in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Libya, and the like.

Where modernization theorists expect evolutionary development with revolutionary results including peaceful transfer of power and gradual development from traditional to an industrial society, the reality was at times overwhelmingly contradictory.

For instance, Ethiopia which was probably the most spectacular failure in terms of modernization was the extreme case of reactions to both the non-inclusive practice of development and the theory of modernization. Emperor Haile Selassie built an absolutist state with him and his family at the center of the Patron-client network that owned all the factors of production including the land, industries, commercial farms, and services including hotels and transport. The emperor owned private enterprises including the Saint George Brewary, the Addis Ababa metropolitan bus company, the mineral-water factory in Ambo to name a few (Kapuscinski 1983).

No one could own property, rise to a position of influence or social esteem without his permission in Ethiopia. For Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, modernization was lavish lifestyles and parasitic extravaganza of his kin and sycophants and misery of the rest. For instance, in the year 1973/1974 death toll from famine was over 200,000 while one of Haile Selassie's princes was flying a 10,000-wedding cake from London (Tareke 2009, 14–15). While there was a famine in the country, Haile Selassie, emperor of Ethiopia was renowned for his lavish lifestyle and feeding pets on silver plates and spoons.

In less than a year the prince who gave the affronting banquet along with most of the exalted members of the privileged who monopolized the benefit of the development including the emperor were eliminated. Their properties were nationalized, and the state was proclaimed an Afro-Marxist ideologically. In general, even if not as extreme as Ethiopia, much of the first-generation African leaders were overthrown and replaced by military dictatorships, including political heavyweights like Lumumba and Nkrumah, and with new ideologies.

Although in the case of Ethiopia, the 1974 revolution was directed not against a colonial power, unlike other countries of the continent, since Ethiopia was never fully colonized, but it was against an indigenous ruling class and the imperial dynasty that had existed since the middle of the nineteenth century. While the Revolution was led from above by a bureaucratic

and military elite, but its consisted the causes of was a prolonged agrarian crisis that drove an increasing proportion of the peasantry into destitution and which culminated in the early 1970s in a series of famines and mass starvation (Griffin 1992, 2).

3.2. Neo-Marxist Development Paradigms, Lagos Plan of Action and Food Security Agenda in Africa

The oil crises and the drought shocks of the 1970s and the vagaries of the international primary commodities market robbed whatever growth that African economies have exhibited and forced the African development discourses that had been premised on assumptions of modernization theory to be replaced by development assumptions based on neo-Marxist assumptions.

Faced with reduced global demand for primary commodities, and declining terms of trade, Africa's production of export's started contracting. This crisis engendered an increasing balance of payments problem for the poor non-oil producing countries of the African continent and over-valued exchange rates (Havnevik et al. 2007). Smallholder peasant agriculture was seriously challenged by the oil crises of the 1970s. On the one hand, the problems of rising in transport costs undermined the competitiveness of smallholder production, on the other hand, the state agencies' inability to cope with the rising costs of crop transport resulted in missed payments for farmers crops (Havnevik et al. 2007, 14).

Up until the end of the 1970s, the governments in Africa had played a dominant role in the economic system, with developing consecutive five-year development plans and invested in large state-run core industries, and enacted pervasive regulations to control prices, restrict trade, and allocate credit and foreign exchange (Heidhues et al. 2004). Governments' stress was laid on accelerated projects to develop infrastructure, hence major investments were made in telecommunication, infrastructure, ports, roads, education, health, and power generation and supply. These post-independence economic proposals were generally motivated by the "desire (at least rhetorically) to surmount what were regarded as problems emanating from the legacy bequeathed by colonialism" (Taylor 2005, 18).

As the 1970s advanced, however, African counties began to stumble; by the mid-1970s, their performance had fallen below that of other parts of the developing world. At the end of the decade, much of Africa was no longer experiencing 'the golden days' of the immediate post-independence period (Taylor 2005). Sub-Saharan African countries were facing

surprisingly widespread problems: high rates of population growth, low levels of investment and saving, inefficient resource use, weak institutional and human capacity, and a general decline in income and living standards (Heidhues et al. 2004). As a result of overall socio-economic development crises, employment, social development, agricultural development, and food security and self-sufficiency emerged as the core tools of development discourse both at the national and regional levels.

Meanwhile, scholars working on Latin America and Africa begun to criticize the modernization paradigm and sought an answer to the development crises. Even though both the "ahistorical" and "neutral" prescriptions of modernization theory were proven untenable both empirically and theoretically, it was the works of neo-Marxist thinkers that dethroned it as the dominant development paradigm. The key argument of the neo-Marxist paradigm, often divided into Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory was that the underdevelopment of the so-called third world countries has been the outcome of exploitation by the developed countries.

Underdevelopment, poverty, and backwardness of the peripheral societies were the price paid for the development, prosperity, and advancement of the societies of the core (Frank 1966; Santos 1970). Starting with key thinkers like Baran and Prebisch in the 1950s, Dependency Theory was further refined and developed by other Latin American structuralists like Furtado, dos Santos, and Cardoso and popularized by Andre Gunder Frank in the 1960s.

Soon, African and Africanist scholars like Samir Amin and Walter Rodney argued on 'how Europe underdeveloped Africa'(Rodney 1973; Samoff, Amin, and Pierce 1976). Even though Dependency Theory itself has been criticized, refined, and branched overtime including being eclipsed by the twin neo-Marxist World Systems Theory of Wallerstein who refined the idea of the transfer of surplus from the peripheral societies to the metropoles mediated by semi-peripheral societies, at multiple levels, the idea that African and other developing societies have been underdeveloped by the metropoles have penetrated the policy circles (Wallerstein 2011). Although dependency theory highlighted global inequalities and the primacy of cultural contextuality of developing countries, it suffered from over-generalizations and ethnocentrism in assessing underdevelopment against western criteria.

Kracht and Schulz (1999, 14) suggested that:

> A radical consequence of dependency theory is the proposal for some sort of dissociation from the world market or at least protection from its supposed detrimental influences. The attempted goal was to attain self-reliant and self controlled development. It assumed that agriculture is able to provide food for attaining self-sufficiency and supplies a growing internal consumer market, stressing the importance of local and regional distribution.

Thus, the policy implication of delinking or bargaining for better terms of trade and economic relations from and with the core and to develop self-sufficient development mechanisms were openly entertained.

One of the key manifestations of that was the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to further the interests of the underdeveloped states with Raul Prebisch, the prominent Dependency theorist, as its Secretary-General in 1964. In the context of the Cold War, UNCTAD, and related networks of underdeveloped states like Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement in tandem demanded a new international economic order (NIEO) wherein demands for improved terms of trade and bring an end to the idea of "unequal exchange"(Giovanni Arrighi 2002).

With the temporal sense of empowerment and conviction in full sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and economic activities as exhibited with regards to the oil prices by OPEC members countries collectively in 1973, developing states pushed for the declaration of the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order at the UNGA in 1974.

Although from economic perspective UNCTAD failed to support developing countries in improving their positions in international markets, however, at the end of the 1960s, from a political perspective, UNCTAD emphasized issues that are still key aspects in developing countries, including access to primary commodities to developed countries' markets; the volume, terms, and conditions of development aid; the trade expansion, economic cooperation and integration among developing countries; and the world food problem (FAO 2000; Sassi 2018).

It was in these multilateral platforms of developing states that the idea of food security and terms of trade with regards to the prices of primary commodities were discussed and promoted. The advocators of dependency theory viewed the agricultural sector as an important base for development in contrast to strategies which promote industrialization first (Kracht and Schulz 1999).

For five or six more years after the declaration of NIEO, agricultural development, and food security became relatively higher on the agenda of African states. Particularly, following the appointment of Adebayo Adedeji as the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission of Africa in 1975, economic self-sufficiency, agricultural development, and food security were put on the continental agenda. In the absence of continental political giants like Nkrumah and Haile Selassie, policy and norm entrepreneurship with regards to continental economic agenda were voluntarily taken up by Adedeji and his fellows at the ECA and OAU. Adedeji was to become a leading figure behind the push for both the Monrovia meeting and the later Lagos Plan of Action (Taylor 2005).

In line with ideas developing over the years, human development, technological capacity building, infrastructural development, sovereignty over own natural resources, intra-African trade, and economic relations, and agricultural development and food security were brought up as the top continental agenda under the themes of self-sufficiency. These ideas were officially accepted by the African head of states/governments at Monrovia in 1979 and officially drafted as a collective continental common policy position in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 (OAU 1980).

On the other hand, in the early 1980s international institutions such as World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for African economic crises based on the neoliberal understanding of economic development. Unfortunately, the Lagos Plan of Action was opposed, undermined, and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions (Onimode 2003), and the food security agenda has become secondary, and Africa was forced to accept the conditionalities of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).

Kracht and Schulz (1999, 15) commented that:

> Even though development without integration into the world market appears inconceivable in the present-day discussion of globalization, certain aspects of dependency theory still deserve attention, notably the focus on the local and regional levels in a development strategy, the search for food security by including subsistence economy, the attempts to arrive at more self-reliance, above all, the necessary linkages growing between various productive sectors during the development process.

3.3. Agriculture and Food Security in Africa

To date, agriculture has remained the largest economic sector in Africa, with more than two-thirds of the share. Although agriculture is the main economic activity in Africa, it has ostensibly failed to bring about a general structural transformation and ensure food security. The explanations provided for these failures vary both over time and in relation to the path-dependent cumulative impacts of development and agricultural policies over time. Initially, first-generation African leaders in the 1950s and 1960s inherited colonial economic structures that were biased toward cash crop production for metropole markets against the production of food for consumption by citizens. Without changing these linkages, African governments almost universally adopted import substitution industrialization (ISI) to reduce dependence on imports of consumer goods from colonial powers (Benin 2016; Chang 2009; Seife Ayele et al. 2020).

To realize the ISI, these governments followed agrarian policies with two major objectives according to Moyo (2011, 77):

> 1) enable state accumulation from agricultural surplus values, and 2) deepen the extroverted focus of African agriculture by expanding export cropping to increase foreign exchange earnings so as to pay for a growing import substitution industrialization (ISI) process.

In their attempts to shift from agricultural commodity-based economies to industry and manufacturing ones, thus governments adopted policies that seek to divert resources from their 'traditional' economic sectors to 'modern' or developing sectors (Bates 1981). To achieve this, the post-independence governments of Africa relied on the inherited mechanism of surplus extraction through marketing boards, wherein the state parastatals purchase all agricultural exports and keep prices paid to farmers below world market value, which allowed them to accumulate surplus for the ISI and other sectors and functions (Bates 2005, 12).

Marketing boards also called State Agencies, played a crucial role in subsequent African development. These State Marketing Agencies had their genesis when the British government made cocoa purchasing in West Africa a state monopoly in 1939. Consequently, by the early 1950s, marketing boards had been established in all African colonies of Britain and they ended up controlling between 66 and 100% of the colonies' main exports (Rempel 2018, 586).

This state-controlled export-oriented policy intensified in the postwar period when trade and taxation of trade became central to postwar reconstruction plan and economic development. In Africa, in addition to the role of state actors, nonstate actors were involved in the economies at the end of the war. Thus, multinational corporations were more involved in African economies, as they took advantage of wartime technological incentives and a good post-war policy climate (Rempel 2018). However, the policy climate did not benefit indigenous farmers and laborers (Ibid.).

As did departing colonial powers, post-independence African elites also forced or incentivized African peasants to grow cash crops for export, primarily to provide raw materials for industrial production in urban areas, this resulted in a shift from the production of food by peasants towards the production of cash crops dominated by largely large-scale farms, supported by state agencies (Benin 2016). Governments have intervened in the market to transfer resources from the producers of cash crops to other sectors of the society such as the state, the new industrialists, and manufacturers; and the bureaucracies that administer the market and manipulate the prices paid to farmers (Bates 2005).

From the late 1960s and 1970s, African governments sought to promote agricultural modernization and development by implementing bimodal farming strategies (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013). This new farming strategy entails, on the one hand, the policy that sought to nurture middle- and larger-scale capitalist agricultural production systems, and on the other hand, it sought to promote a degree of increased productivity among subsistence farming farmers by directing their produce to state marketing boards so that a portion of the profits could go towards developing national infrastructure and industrialization in the name of modernization (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013, 41).

As a result of these export-oriented policies by the African states, the production of sugar, tobacco, coffee, cotton, and copper were favored as the main source for earning of foreign exchange at the expense of peasant farming. Rempel notes that:

> African economies were, overall, more monetized and more strongly oriented toward commodity exports by the war's end, though peasant agriculture and pastoralism were still the basis for most Africans' livelihoods (2018, 584).

To that end, Africa was developed essentially as an agricultural-exporting economy, most countries were being the top global cash crop producers. The contradictory and optimistic assessment by African governments and international organizations were prominent before and after independence.

Large-scale farming comprised a few state and privately owned estates, some inherited nationalized colonial agricultural estates (e.g. in Tanzania, Malawi), and others created through land redistribution (e.g. in Kenya) or alienation of customary lands (Patnaik and Moyo 2011). Governments first try to increase production by subsidization of farm inputs (like seeds, fertilizers etc). Ultimately, however, the strategy did little to increase much of anything and instead just creates a new rural elite (in the form of large-scale mechanized farms) at the expense of the small-scale farmers—a politically fruitful venture (but not an agriculturally fruitful one) (Bates 2005).

However, due to the participation of transnational agribusiness corporations, the competition was difficult for the national agrarian capitalist. For African peasantries, "the surplus extraction continued to be at the expense of peasantries (Patnaik and Moyo 2011, 77; Shivji 2009). In some cases, governments also engage in state-run farms, entering as rivals to peasant farmers. These state farms (bankrupt *kenkey* Ghana project is used as an example) sell their products below market price (at stunning losses), doing this also made peasant farmers vulnerable who cannot compete (Bates 2005).

Even in non-colonial Ethiopia, surpluses were appropriated from the agricultural sector and reallocated to priority sectors or goals while pushing the peasant and pastoral down the priority list. Struggling regimes also use both the state apparatus and armed forces to squeeze revenue from the peasant and reinvest it into war economy and patron-client networks that help the regime consolidate power. Christopher Clapham argued about Ethiopia in the 1980s as follows:

> resources are extracted from the economy and distributed according to the priorities of the government - mostly, of course, for the maintenance of the state itself; and a group of people who, because they manage the state, acquire a special interest in its maintenance and power, as well as personal interests in acquiring benefits from it.(Clapham 1988, 101)

Between the 1950s and 1970s marketing boards were critical to collect revenues from export crops (Bates 1981). The control of the Board was very important for governments' because, they provided a means of controlling the marketing of strategic food and export cash crops, as well as subsidizing food prices for urban consumers and producers (Badiane and Makombe 2014, 3). In principle, the marketing boards should stabilize prices but most often governments fail because they take the profits that could be used for stabilization and use them in other sectors (Bates 2005). Therefore, governments controlled not only the

export revenues but also development assistance to finance the domestic manufacturing activities and development of the urban sector (Lawrence cited in Benin 2016).

Besides, part of inducing the economy in line with the perverted colonial infrastructural development was the trend toward infrastructural investment targeting the movement of cash crops from the interior to the coastal ports as well as the flow of manufactured goods imported from the city centers into the interior. Infrastructural developments perverted as the government's policy priority was industry-led growth and infrastructural investments in urban sectors, while neglecting the agricultural and rural areas. Furthermore, to increase the production of marketable products, African governments also invested in farm support, research, extension, and marketing infrastructure directed at those commodities for export (Benin 2016).

The limited investments in the rural sector and peasant agriculture on the one level and the infrastructure investments in some cities on the other level created an isolation of rural areas and peasant farmers from the development process. Moreover, due to the concentration of investments in few urban areas, rural workers migrated to cities in search of employment; however, the urban economy was not large enough to absorb the rural migrants. By failing peasant agriculture and also failing to create a link among economic sectors and between urban and rural areas, governments in the 1970s witnessed multiple socioeconomic crises, including uprising and military coups.

To solve these urban crises created by urban-biased policies, the African governments shifted their policies to agricultural-led growth in 1970s. Agricultural policy is thus derivative; it is devised to cope with political problems whose immediate origins lie outside of the agricultural sector. By a similar view, Bate's in his study on food policy in Africa, he defines food policy as a derived policy, that developed in an effort to solve the political and economic problems of persons other that farmers" (Bates 1981). Hence, the 1960 and 70s food policy analysis were centered on the stability of food supplies in the urban areas and bypassed the rural majority and, also a producer in the countryside.

By not investing in peasant agriculture, when the oil crises in combination with drought hit the economies in the 1970s, African states became unable to expropriate agricultural surplus and they became dependent upon development assistance and loans from international financial institutions and donors. This latter influenced the policy independence of African states and shifted the accountability of African states to the

international financial institutions and donors rather than to their people. This lack of control over financing their development polices might actually affected their capacity for innovation in terms of development polices and regional initiatives (Signé and Gazibo 2010).

3.4. Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Food Security Agenda

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for the economic development of Africa had been formulated for 1980-2000 to promote African integration and cooperation to forestall a general collapse of regional trade (OAU 1980). The plan begun by critically assessing African agricultural and food crises during the 1960s and 1970s and indicated that Africa was the only continent in the world where per capita food production had declined and increased in the gap between food production and population growth over the same period (OAU 1980, 8).

It emphasized on the concern of the continent's rapid growth in population and urbanization on the one hand, and the deteriorated food and agricultural situation of Africa on the other hand. It highlighted the structural weaknesses of African agriculture and indicated the internal and external challenges to the sector.

The Lagos of Plan of Action (LPA) expressed in the preamble (OAU 1980, 4):

> The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed, rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialized countries. Thus, Africa is unable to point to any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of general well-being, in the past 20 years. Faced with this situation and determined to undertake measures for the basic restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance.

The LPA identified priority areas for implementation with defined long, and medium-term (1980-85) development objectives and strategies. It focused on measures that gave priority to achieving immediate improvement of the food situation, while at the same time working towards the long-term goal of food self-sufficiency

> Over the period 1980 to 1985, the objective should be to bring about an immediate improvement in the food situation and to lay the foundations for the achievement of self-sufficiency in cereals and livestock and fish products.

> Priority action should be directed to attaining a markedly higher degree of food security, and bringing about a large and sustained increase in the production of food, especially of tropical cereals, with due emphasis on the diversification of agricultural production. Urgent measures are recommended in each of these areas (OAU 1980, 8).

The plan called for collective self-reliance at the sub-regional and regional level for food self-sufficiency and overall development. It urged the member states to 'achieve the goals of rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic grow' (OAU 1980, 4).

LPA affirmed that:

> it is necessary to put into practice in the 1980s the concept of collective self-reliance at sub-regional and regional levels, especially in the field of self-sufficiency in food, trade, industry, and financing development. Thus, it's intended that for the 1980s emphasis should be given to the development of agriculture and agro-based industries, development of socio-economic infrastructure, co-operation, eradication of mass poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and the satisfaction of basic needs (OAU 1980, 95).

Generally, the plan focused on the importance of improvement in the agriculture and food situation in Africa, outlined a political direction for African governments, and provided a precise framework for restructuring and transforming the African agricultural and food sectors. However, the development strategies of LPA were not implemented as planned, as another competing strategy burst onto the scene and dominated all others, the urgency of agricultural development and food security agenda were hibernated on arrival as neo-liberal conditionalities resurfaced with vengeance in 1981 and Africa entered what was termed as the "lost decade" (Giovanni Arrighi 2002).

Furthermore, while the LPA's conclusions were a classic dependency interpretation of the Africans condition, in the early 1980s, however, with the election of pro-neoliberal governments in the United States and Britain, the development paradigm was already in favor of the neo-liberal approach (Havnevik et al. 2007; Taylor 2005). Hence, the Lagos Plan of Action based on the dependency approach, were advanced a "vision at sharp variance with the gathering thrust of global capitalism and the views of key elites in the developed world" (Taylor 2005, 23). Accordingly, the early 1980s international financial institutions and major donors initiated a drive towards 'aid coordination', and aid conditionality were imposed (Havnevik et al. 2007).

While the World Bank, Berg Report analysis of Africa's development crises were more emphasized on Africa's internal administration problem, whereas the LPA analysis of Africa's development crises focused more on external sources of Africa's economic problem. As a result, LPA failed to generally consider the broad issues of misgovernance and accountability within African countries (Taylor 2005). In the process, both WB report and LPA analysis failed to resolve Africa's agricultural and food crises.

In addition to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, African states and scholars have attempted to provide a framework for African development crises including the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), and UNECA's African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs. Most African governments signed the documents, and, to date, none of these governments has publicly dissociated itself from the ideas espoused in them (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998, 139).

However, since the World Bank opposed the plan and attacked those documents, every African government that hoped to have successful debt rescheduling or aid negotiations distanced itself from the principles in them (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998, 139; Shivji 2009). African scholars argue that:

> ….what is not often appreciated is that most of what appears today as new insights about the imperatives of poverty reduction, investment in infrastructure and education, the requirements of rapid industrialization, and the structural and institutional bottlenecks of Africa's underdevelopment are nothing but the rehearsal of old but disparaged ideas of African scholars and policymakers (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998, 139; Onimode 2003).

3.5. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), Disoriented Development Paradigm, and Lost Decade in Africa

The decade of the 1980s was characterized as a "lost decade" for many developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America. This period was largely dominated by the prolonged economic recession that affected many countries, with negative effects on their overall agricultural development. In developing countries, the spiral deterioration of macroeconomic conditions impeded progress in agricultural trade, food security, and development assistance (FAO 2000).

Up until the early 1980s, the international economic environment was characterized by abundant liquidity in financial markets and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in

many developing countries. However, in the early 1980s crisis emerged following a sudden and unexpected change in the international economic situation including the oil shock in 1973 and 1979 which led developed countries to tighten their monetary and fiscal policies that resulted in a severe slowdown in their economic activity and a reduction in their primary commodity import demands from developing countries (Mkandawire & Soludo 1998).

International credit and capital inflows from developed countries to developing countries had suddenly diminished. Many countries in the developing world had borrowed heavily in the 1970s and they had invested the funds in low-productivity projects, as a result, the loans could no longer be repaid (Sassi 2018; Shivji 2009). By the early 1980s, the debt crisis began with Mexico and then evolved into a deep recession in Latin America and African countries.

In the early 1980s, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a policy framework to address the late 1970s economic crises. Accordingly, in 1981, the World Bank introduced its own action plan for Africa, commonly know as the 'Berg Report', for the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

The World Bank (1981) report highlighted the deepening of Africa's economic crises, and identified internal structural constrains as well as external challenges including the oil crises and changes in the world economy as contributing factor. Hence, the central premise of the report was that Africa's shortcomings in domestic policies had resulted in "overvalued exchange rates, unsustainable budget deficits, foreign exchange shortages, and biases against agricultural production"(Badiane and Makombe 2014, 6).

Although the report highlighted the external factors for the economic crises, emphasis was given to Africa's domestic policy deficiencies and administrative problems. It was one of the critics of the World Bank report. Observers note that:

> The report viewed the stagnated and deteriorated economic conditions in Africa, as a product of distortions in local economies brough about by inappropriate government policy intervention, and failed to provide a balanced or honest criticism of previous strategies as well as the role of financial institutions and donors in promoting it (Havnevik et al. 2007, 15).

Meanwhile, the action plan by international institutions took concrete form in the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), with their emphasis on macroeconomic stability, elimination of market distortions, subsidies, and price controls, trade liberalization, reduction of government, and elimination of parastatal activities, and encouragement of the

private sector (Williamson 2000). Provided that the Berg Report's analysis of Africa's administrative problems, and the need for financial aid and advice on the development strategies from the international development agencies, most African governments recognized the necessity of adopting SAPs and stabilization polices to solve their countries' development crises (Heidhues et al. 2004).

Accordingly, SAPs began to sweep across Africa in the 1980s and continued to operate throughout the 1990s. To reduce poverty, food insecurity, as well as generate foreign exchange, Africans countries advised increasing their economic growth at least by 4 to 5 percent. This policy framework has greatly influenced both strategies and programs for food security in Africa and the framework for overall economic development (Heidhues et al. 2004). According to Oya the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by "the dominance of agrarian neoliberalism and the concomitant agricultural adjustment reforms" promoted by international financial institutions and major donors in Africa (Oya 2007, 275).

The World Bank recommendation for agricultural policy reforms was popular with market-integrated farmers and dependent on market-determined prices, but there was much less focus for food crops and the subsistence sector (Kracht and Schulz 1999). Within this framework, the agenda of food security became secondary (Heidhues et al. 2004). Since SAPs promoted economic output based on direct export and production of cash crops to generate foreign currency earnings to pay back debts (Benin 2016; Kracht and Schulz 1999) and the failure of the state to promote food security and agricultural production, its exclusive focus on export-led agriculture has, in reality, created a disarticulated economy and has increased the dependence of African countries on food aid and expensive food imports (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013).

Although the extent of implementation of policy reforms and their overall effects of have been debated at length (Kracht and Schulz 1999), scholars criticized the adjustments by stating the devastating effects of SAPs on the decline of education, health, nutrition, and other social indicators (Shivji 2009). Some cash crops production in some countries for example, cotton in Benin and Mali, Coffee in Uganda experienced some positive supply responses as liberalization moved price incentives in favor of tradable rather than food crops (Badiane and Makombe 2014). However, the removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs, food commodities, and low-income households particularly net food buyers were negatively

affected by the reforms (Ibid). It was exacerbated the lack of attention on the rural sector, smallholder farmers, and food crops (Benin 2016).

It has been widely criticized that the SAPs, often called the 'Washington Consensus', paid insufficient attention to the social aspects of development, the institutional weaknesses of developing countries, and were more focused on economic dimension and characterized by excessive conditionality as well as the absence of genuine ownership by the recipient countries (Heidhues et al. 2004). The dual implementation of liberalization and privatization was a precondition for aid, as a result, Shivji argues that as the 1980s was perceived as a "lost decade" for many developing countries, it was also the transition decade, which marked the "beginning of the decline of developmentalism and the rise of neoliberalism, euphemistically called, globalization" (Shivji 2009, 10).

While agriculture and food security within the concept of structural adjustment is seen through market-oriented production and right prices, the adjustment failed to understand the embedded informal institutions in the rural areas and the role of this informal transaction in food crops (Havnevik et al. 2007; Oya 2007). Mkandawire & Soludo (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998, 139) suggest that " for more than a decade, most Africa has spent time and resources 'adjusting' non-existent or defective markets". Neo-liberal global economic conditionalities hampered agrarian transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa thereby alienating farmers (Oya 2007, 291).

3.6. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)

Africa spent most of the 1980s and 1990s trying to cope with its composite crises, implementing structural adjustment programs, and searching for strategies. In this process, smallholder farmers were the most vulnerable groups. From the 1970s throughout the 1980s, are often associated with the beginning of the chronically poor performance of African agriculture. Between 1971 and 1980, for example, agricultural output in Africa south of the Sahara grew by only 1 percent per year on average, compared with 3 percent in Asia and other developing regions of the world (Benin 2016). With the policy focus on getting the 'prices right' and removal of smallholder farmers' input subsidies in the 1980s, "the state failed and the African farmer had been cheated, and they was now left to fend for themselves" (Gaarde 2017, xvi). African scholars expressed the deepening of the crises "

…at the threshold of a new millennium, Africa may be graduating from being a region with "lost development decades" to becoming the world's "forgotten continent" (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998, xi).

As the 1990s approached there were increasing calls for renewed attention to the social dimensions of development from multiple actors including bilateral donors, UN agencies, NGOS, and scholars. The idea of widening the development dimension was strengthened by a series of UN conferences throughout the 1990s that dealt with such issues as gender equality, human rights, population, social development, and the environment (Heidhues et al. 2004). In the late 1990s as a response to concerns about the deleterious impacts of SAPs on socio-economic developments, the World Bank and donor community considered the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a balanced development strategy for African crises.

In 1999, the then-new World Bank Group President, James Wolfensohn, initiated a process for establishing a new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), affirmed that it is necessary to move beyond measuring development in terms of pure economics (Wolfensoh 2000). It was suggested that development was not merely about balance of payments, or reserves or trade figures or GDP growth, it was also about transforming whole societies. Furthermore, it was stressed that it is necessary to make a balance between the country's macroeconomic and financial aspects on the one side and structural, social, and human considerations on the other (Ibid).

The CDF framework stated the importance of including all development agencies, governments including local governments, multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society in all its forms, private sector, domestic and foreign. Hence, development agencies called for their role to play a part in poverty reduction and equitable, sustainable development (Wolfensoh 2000).

More importantly, it was recognized that individual countries must be in the driver's seat, and they should set the course because 'ownership' was considered as an essential component. Thus, the international development community accepted both the CDF and PRSP as the approach to development, which complements the necessary macroeconomic growth strategy without which poverty reduction cannot be achieved.

The World Bank and IMF endorsed CDF principles as the basis for poverty reduction strategies for developing countries seeking Bank or IMF assistance, or debt relief under the

Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). Fundamentally, the World Bank, CDF considered as a means of achieving greater effectiveness in reducing poverty, and based on the principles such as ownership by the country, partnership with state and non-state actors, a long-term vision of needs and solutions, and structural and social concerns are treated equally and contemporaneously with macroeconomic and financial concerns (Wolfensoh 2000).

As a result, the program of Bretton Woods institutions-World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) was refined and extended to include governance, poverty reduction, social safety nets elements and 'rebranded' as the 'post-Washington Consensus' (Williamson 2000).

While some observers argued that the approach of the World Bank shifted from its narrowly focused economic only prescriptions to some broader aspects of society which included the social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental (Zafarullah and Shafiqul Huque 2021). Whereas others argue that the World Bank had repackaged neo-liberalism in a new form with vague calls for poverty alleviation but devoid of clear economic development polices (Havnevik et al. 2007). Under the poverty reduction strategy, countries acknowledged the role of agriculture and food security in accelerating 'pro-poor' growth, however, the agricultural policies of the SAP era have largely been maintained (Badiane and Makombe 2014). Besides, despite the stated focus of agricultural development by the strategy, there was little attention to agricultural investment comparing to health and education (Havnevik et al. 2007).

The Bank reconsidered its stance about the role of the state and called for a stronger state with effective institutions to support economic efficiency and growth. New Institutional Economics (NIE) provided a theoretical explanation to incorporate institutions into economics. While it was an expansion of neo-classical economic theory, NIE has had a strong influence on development policy.

Since the neo-classical policy prescriptions have been criticized, NIE attempted to indicate the necessity to design favorable growth-inducing institutional settings (Lepenies 2014).

Thus, the state, after having been viewed as an obstacle to the functioning of competitive markets, since the 1990s, it was identified as an important facilitator of favorable institutional arrangements (Lepenies 2014). In the contemporary approaches to governance,

Francis Fukuyama stressed the significance of the state, he argued that both academics and the policy community have placed too much emphasis on the role of regime type, institutions of accountability, and the rule of law and not enough on state autonomy and capacity (Fukuyama 2013). The rethinking the role of the state in public policies became a dominant discourse again.

The discourse changed from minimal state to the role of efficient and effective states as well as the focus became the capacity of to implement development polices. Fukuyama defines governance as "a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not" (2013, 350).

State intervention was recognized for its role in economic growth and poverty reduction. After observing the record of economic growth in developing countries since the 1950s, Timmer argued that even in countries with relatively low levels of per capita income, government interventions to enhance food security can lift the threat of hunger and famine (C. Peter Timmer 2005).

Thus, it was suggested that growth that reached the poor- what is now termed as 'pro-poor growth' should be a component of the food security strategy. The typical approach that reduces the numbers of population facing daily hunger is by raising the incomes of the poor, while simultaneously managing the food economy in ways that minimize the shocks that might trigger a famine. Improved food security stems directly from a set of government policies that integrates the food economy into a development strategy that seeks rapid economic growth with improved income distribution with pro-poor economic policies economic growth and food security are mutually reinforcing (C. Peter Timmer 2005).

3.7. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was officially adopted at a July 2001 summit meeting of African heads of state (Harsch 2011). The socio-economic and political crises that have stunted tangible development in Africa triggered the establishment of NEPAD, which aimed to provide an 'African solution to African problems' (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016).

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was the continent's premier framework for economic, social and political advancement (Harsch 2011). It was thus, a

'vision and strategic framework for Africa's renewal (Taylor 2005). This African vision to the development recovery plan has been enthusiastically pushed by the G-8 and the United Nations as a means to stimulate what has been termed the 'African Renaissance' (Taylor 2005), also various donor agencies pledged to extend their support (Harsch 2011).

Taylor (2005) observes that NEPAD's strategic framework arose from the mandate granted to five African heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) to develop a development program to spearhead Africa's renewal. In line with that South African President Thabo Mbeki and other African political leaders advocated for "the African renaissance development strategy, aimed at resuscitating pan-Africanism and formulating a road-map for sustainable economic progress through NEPAD" (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016).

The promoters of NEPAD present it as:

> "a pledge made by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and political life" (AU 2001, 1).

It expressed the determination of Africans to "extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world" (AU 2001, 1) (NEPAD 2001, 1). It has been stated that strategies such as the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which were introduced by "developed countries to 'bail' the continent out of its economic malaise have proven to be unsuccessful, therefore, this called for the development initiatives pioneered by Africans" (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016).

Thus, in the early 2000s African leaders claimed the driver's seats and lead Africa's development agenda under the NEPAD. Ibrahim Mayaki (chief executive officer of the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD)), identifies the absence of appropriate development strategies as the main problem for Africa's development, Mayaki, suggests that searching for development strategies and solutions from other continents may weaken Africa's ability to influence its own destiny thus, development strategies to resolve Africa's problem should emerge from the continent.

Thus, promoters of NEPAD had been projected as an African development strategy initiated by Africans for African development. The NEPAD differs in its approach and

strategy from all previous plans and initiatives in support of Africa's development, although the problems to be addressed remain largely the same (AU 2001, 14).

However, despite NEPAD's promoter's arguments about its innovative strategies to resolve Africa's socio-economic crises, (Signé and Gazibo 2010, 319) suggests that NEPAD introduced "limited innovation", particularly in terms of diffusing new ideas, but also in terms of dominant development discourses and strategies. They supported their arguments by highlighting two arguments:

> Innovation is limited above all by its dependence on the path previously traced by international financial institutions in particular, dependence that stems from the diffusion of ideas and the rigidity of institutionalized political structures and norms, and which implies continuity with past policies, thus, the plan does not upset the dominant paradigms carried by international financial institutions. Additionally, it is limited by the instrumental strategies of African leaders who, responding to the call of external partners, "play the game" by adopting the dominant ideas, discourses, and strategies in order to receive resources subject to this conformist attitude.

Promoters of NEPAD stated that since its formulation NEPAD registered a number of accomplishments including (Harsch 2011, 16) in an interview with Richard Mkandawire,

> The establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), by which African governments voluntarily agree to allow their political, human rights and economic policy performance to be scrutinized by panels of prominent Africans; and The elaboration of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), designed to help African governments, farmers and business people better plan and coordinate efforts to promote agricultural productivity and food security, in an environmentally sustainable way.

Even though NEPAD identified good governance as one of its goals, and established a mechanism to monitor African states progress in addressing governance issues in line with the principles of democracy, peace and security, and ethical leadership, but the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), has been widely criticized as it was lacking the binding or institutional mechanisms to ensure that the recommendations of APRM assessment towards ensuring good governance are implemented, hence, they were criticized as they lacking the capacity to promote good governance (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016; Signé and Gazibo 2010).

Some scholars highlight, 'the birth of NEPAD in Africa has heralded hope of Africa's economic and social integration with the hope of addressing its myriad problems such as mal- governance and poverty (Kang'ethe and Chivanga 2014). However, others still question the accomplishments of the NEPAD in addressing Africa's bad governance and

poverty. NEPAD supports the integration of Africa into the world economy, the fact that Africa cannot develop in isolation, and since African economies are already integrated with those of developed countries, hence, a 'delink is almost impossible. It intended to combine African initiatives and ownership of the development process with neoliberal theory (Heidhues et al. 2004).

While it is clear that strengthening relations between Africa and the industrialized world is not entirely bad on its own, but NEPAD has been criticized by its failures to specifically address the mode of those relations (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016). Africa's full integration into the global economy while still depending on aid and production of primary commodities will not serve Africa (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998). The top officials in AU like Ibrahim Mayaki (2019) suggests for the path to collective emancipation, and regional integration, and urged Africa's gradual integration into globalization.

The financial issues have clearly influenced the NEPADs development policies. Some observed that the development vision of NEPADs focus on the global economic order to further the interests of the entire African people, tied to the viability of international financial institutions and their willingness to bail Africa out of her economic challenges; hence the "conditionality of liberalization (commercialization, deregulation and privatization) of African economies under the guise of good governance" (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016, 47).

> NEPAD relinquished too much of its authority to the West, due to its reliance on G8 and OECD donor assistance, and through diversion from dependency scholars' prescriptions and its overt alignment to Western ideologies. As a result the NEPAD initiative is 'talking from the South and governing from the West'; this has stunted the initiative's potential to generate meaningful economic development rather than superficial economic growth (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016, 47).

More importantly, NEPAD has succeeded in placing the question of Africa's development on the international table and has managed to obtain a fairly high profile and awareness, particularly in Western capitals (Taylor 2005). However, some perceived NEPAD as an African version of the Marshal Plan. For example, the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, during a visit in 2002 to some African countries, Algeria, Ethiopia, Niger, and South Africa asserted that NEPAD has been modelled on the Marshal Plan. For this Wade responded by saying that: 'in post-war Europe, bombs had destroyed everything, but the people were there, the human resource was there, but Africa has not the human

engine, but as for the Marshal Plan Africa need massive investment (Wade as cited in Onimode 2003, 240).

African state actors and international institutions have been provided numerous plans and programs to address African problems. However, most of Africa's development strategies, plans and programs have been formulated and implemented with little consultation. The promoters of NEPAD stated that NEPAD is African-grown, and represents the voice of Africa, however "aside from the ruling elites, many African have little or no knowledge of NEPAD's existence and activities" (Lesufi 2002 cited in Akinola and Ndawonde 2016, 43). With similar practices, there has been little consultation on NEPAD's development agenda, however NEPAD "lacks an African face" (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016, 43). Also, from the very beginning, there were limited participation in the formulation of NEPAD. Because according to Taylor (2005), NEPAD arose from the work of leaders from five countries, this may have indicated its limitation in terms of its inclusivity (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016).

Generally, by accepting NEPAD's policy framework, African leaders jointly took responsibility for eradicating poverty and placing their countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus halting the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process. In July 2003, African heads of state at the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union launched the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in Maputo, Mozambique. The initiative was aimed at promoting agricultural growth, reducing poverty and improving food security in the continent (AU 2003).

From the early 2000s, the global changes and concerns of urbanization, demand for food, shortages of land, population growth, climate change and related factors led to food security and agricultural issues have risen rapidly up the international development policy agenda. As a result, international development agencies, and national governments acknowledged the improvement of African agriculture, particularly smallholder farming systems as a key to overcoming the problems of rural poverty, the problems of food security, and lagging rural economies. Accelerating agricultural growth in Africa became considered as a core strategy for overall development in the continent, mostly because of agriculture's central role in the continent's economy (Dercon and Gollin 2014; B. B. F. Johnston and Mellor 2016; Mellor and Dorosh 2010).

The World Bank's 2008 World Development Report affirmed the role of agriculture in development, in the 21st century, agriculture continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable development and poverty reduction, especially in low-income countries where about 75 percent of the population is involved directly or indirectly in farming and related employment, agriculture and its associated industries are essential to growth and to reducing mass poverty and food insecurity (Moyo 2016). Hence, the WDR 2008 suggests that agriculture is key to poverty alleviation, for African smallholder farmers (WB 2007). It was noted that after 20 years of neglect by international donors, agriculture is now again in the headlines because higher food prices are increasing food insecurity and poverty (Dethier and Effenberger 2012).

Over the past decades, a different mechanism to address Africa's agriculture and food problem has been proposed by multinational organizations, governments, and scholars, with a varying success. From the early 2000s, increasing public spending on agriculture has proposed by the international development community and African governments as a mechanism to end hunger and ensure the right and access to food for the continent's population (Fontan Sers and Mughal 2019; Petrikova 2017).

Many observers argued that the persistent problem of African agriculture and food security may rests partially in the lack of consensus on the most appropriate mechanism (Petrikova 2017). Africa is the world's biggest battleground in the fight against hunger (Fontan Sers and Mughal 2019).

Petikova (2017, 3) notes that:

> "… some assumed that food security can be best improved through increasing agricultural expenditures in developing countries, which would raise agricultural productivity and, in turn, farmers' income levels. Others believes the imperative to focus on improving social and economic infrastructure. Still others highlight the importance of social transfer programs that would bring about a more equal distribution of food available at the national level".

Since 2003, African heads of state formalized their commitment to invest 10 percent of their total expenditures in the agriculture sector. This level of investment was deemed essential in order to achieve an average 6 percent annual agricultural growth rate and attain the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating extreme hunger and poverty by 2015 (AU-NEPAD 2003).

This commitment to ending hunger and halving poverty in Africa through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation by the year 2025, was reaffirmed in the 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods adopted at the African Union summit at Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (AU 2014). Since the launch of Maputo declaration in 2003, 13 countries have surpassed the CAADP 10 percent target in any year: Burundi, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Benin and Yu 2013). Even though African countries have committed to increase their investment in agriculture, balancing their budgets has been a problem. Thus, development aid has been provided to countries to fill these financial gaps (Petrikova 2017).

Fontan Sers and Mughal (Fontan Sers and Mughal 2019) argue that countries which have allocated greater proportions of their budgets to agriculture have witnessed greater reduction in undernutrition prevalence. Their observation indicates that for the majority of African countries public spending on agriculture over the past quarter of a century has remained below the levels which would significantly contribute to the diminution of undernutrition. Furthermore, increasing the allocation of public spending on agriculture has been recommended, but the focus and direction of the spending should be improved and targeted towards expenditure items that can reach the segments of the population in the most need.

While the spending on agricultural research and development has shown a positive impact on Africa's food security, but governments spent far less in agricultural research and development (R&D). A study by Benin and Yu (2013, 56) indicates that, although agricultural R&D is acknowledged to be a major factor in agricultural development, most countries spent far less than the targeted 1 percent of agricultural GDP, set by NEPAD.

Neglect of agriculture by international donors and continued underinvestment by national governments in agricultural research, technology and infrastructure further aggravates the productivity decline in African agriculture and contributed for the increasing food insecurity and poverty (Cheru and Modi 2013; Dethier and Effenberger 2012). Low productivity has contributed to persistent poverty and deteriorating food security, resulting in a projected increase in the number of undernourished people from 240m in 2015 to 320m by 2025 (ADB 2016, iii).

Petrikova argues that while public spending and development aid has a positive impact on food security, but the effect of aid on food security is determined by the quality of the recipients' governance (Petrikova 2017). To strengthen African agriculture and food security, NEPAD and African governments should therefore pay more attention to the quality of resource governance.

3.8 Food Insecurity Today: The Paradox of Economic Growth and Food Insecurity

After recovering from the economic stagnation of the 1980s and 1990s, African countries achieved impressive economic growth rates over the last two decades, which exceeded an average of about 5 percent (Hassan Al-Baguri 2014). This economic growth have taken place in the liberalization of trade and markets, in the strengthening of institutions and policies, and in investments in human and social capital and infrastructure (John Dixon, Dennis P. Garrity, Jean-Marc Boffa, Timothy Olalekan Williams 2020).

The economic growth has contributed to poverty reduction in the continent. Economic expansion and the corresponding increase in employment and wages played a role, but it has been argued that this economic expansion is mostly in the extractive production of mineral resources, with diminishing contributions from agriculture (Leahy 2018).

Many observers argued that the growth has not trickled down to the large number of rural people experiencing chronic and crises-driven hunger and poverty (John Dixon, Dennis P. Garrity, Jean-Marc Boffa, Timothy Olalekan Williams 2020). About 90 per cent of Africa's poor live in rural areas and about 80 per cent derive their living from rainfed farming (John Dixon, Dennis P. Garrity, Jean-Marc Boffa, Timothy Olalekan Williams 2020).

While agriculture remains the main source of livelihoods for the rural population, it is also a place where hunger and poverty are most clearly manifested and where so-called food sovereignty is far from being achieved (Martín, Darias, and Fernández 2019).

Today, the persistent agrarian crises and food insecurity are one of the most urgent problems facing sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where more than half the population is dependent on subsistence farming as their only source of livelihood (Cheru and Modi 2013). Samar Hassan Al-Baguri (2014, 26) describes the current coexistence of high rates of economic growth with the problem of food security in the African continent as, "the weak

relation between the past two decades high rates of economic growth and the poor state of the continent's population".

This paradox indicates the inability of African countries to take advantage of this growth in improving the living conditions of the population to meet even their basic needs (Hassan Al-Baguri 2014). It reflects the limitation in the government's development policy to target and resolve the problems in the continent.

The current conceptualization of development as a transition away from traditional subsistence agriculture into a globalized commercial agriculture has been at the center of mainstream policy discourse over the past decades (Leahy 2018). The growth-centred development is a broadly macro approach which focuses on increases in national wealth as measured by GDP. It is a mainstream economics approach supported by many development economists, as it favors the liberal market economy. This approach argues that economic growth will lead to a reduction in national poverty levels, and reduce the income gaps (Clarke 2002, 2).

The suggested policy directions has been focused on increasing the incomes of the poor to purchase food (Leahy 2018). However, despite the policy recommendation, the Africa is still struggling to feed its citizens. Since the economic growth has projected to happen elsewhere in other sectors, not in African peasant agriculture, the agricultural development policies were limited to tackle food insecurity in the peasant sector.

The recent decades' paradox of economic growth and food insecurity in Africa, particularly among the small-scale farmers, led scholars, civil society, and social movements engaged in searching for alternatives to large-scale commercial agriculture. Despite the prominence of large-scale commercial farms as a policy priority in Africa, it has been argued that the intervention to commercialization have not actually improved the lot of the rural African underclass, thus, Leahy (2018) proposed that Africa needs 'feeding the farmers first' strategy. By arguing that:

> the aim of feeding the farmers first strategy is not to prevent farmers from growing a crop to get some cash. In today's economy everyone needs money. After what is 'first' has been sorted out – feeding the farmers and their families – then it would clearly make sense 'second' to go on to grow a cash crop.

In contrary to one size-fits all policy recommendation, tackling food insecurity in Africa needs a coherent development policy that identifies the needs of farmers and provides a policy framework that should consider their differences and address them accordingly.

Hunger in developing countries occurs in a number of different economic contexts, failing to take into consideration of the different economic context of farmers, accompanied with the policy limitation to identify the needs of farmers and address them with appropriate strategies has been affected African agriculture and its inhabitants. Leahy notes that:

> In one situation, rural smallholders have sufficient land on which to grow their family food needs but are still hungry. In a second, the poor do not have access to land and their problem is that they have insufficient money to buy food. In a third, they may be tenant farmers. The money they are getting for their produce is insufficient to pay rent to the landholder and also buy food. These differing contexts may be joined together in various ways, but they need to be considered separately (Leahy 2018, 18).

African food insecurity is deep, structural and has multiple dimensions.African small-scale farmers are the most vulnerable to food insecurity. It is also clear that this sector is the least to benefit from the past two decades Africa's impressive economic growth, however, without resolving the structural agrarian challenges, it could be more difficult for small-scale farmers to be comitative and benefit from the global market. Many observers argue that the agrarian question in Africa is not yet resolved, rather, the agrarian reforms initiated since the 1980s has facilitated "to increase unequal property structures in favor of very large properties and at the expense of customary land, and force peasant expropriation and the subsequent increase in the number of landless peasants. the acceleration of land grabbing in Africa" (Martín, Darias, and Fernández 2019, 586).

Under the current market economy, while the global changes have created new avenues for farmers and the potential to lower food prices for consumers, farmers face greater competition in local and international markets. In the global commodity markets, Africans smallholder producers have been losing market share (Havnevik et al. 2007). In fact, Africa was a net food export during the 1960s, however, from a share of 7 to 8 percent in the 1960s, Africa's agricultural exports fell to about 2 percent by the beginning of the 1990s, driven by a predominantly poor policy environment (World Bank 2013). Today Africa has become the net importer of food that is expected to grow from US$ 35 billion in 2015 to approximately US$ 110 billion in 2025 (Africa Development Bank 2016, iii). The comparative advantage that African smallholders held in the crops Africa's traditional export has been undermined by far more efficient producers elsewhere (Havnevik et al. 2007).

The Committee on World Food Security recognizes the structural causes of the food crisis and that the primary victims are small-scale food producers (McKeon 2015). The 500 million smallholder farms in the developing world provide an estimated 80 percent of the food produced in Asia and Africa south of the Sahara (IFPRI 2016). Yet smallholders are a vulnerable and often neglected group, who account for most of the world's poor and hungry (Ibid). Smallholder farmers usually have little or no influence over agricultural and food-related policies, even though they dominate the sector. By generalizing Africa's food security problem as a shortcoming in food supply only, the policies missed considering the other deep factors such as the inability of government practice and its institutions to deal with or solve the food security problem (Hassan Al-Baguri 2014).

The marginalization of the sector at the policy level and practice is established in African history. From a historical perspective during and after colonization, African agriculture, particularly small-scale agriculture was not a policy priority for most African states, hence, the governments did not invest in this sector. When most Africans governments did turn their attention to agriculture in the late 1960s and 1970s, their priority was given to commercial rather than to peasant agriculture. This was aimed to generate foreign exchange and support their import substitution polices. They employed state-led agricultural development to implement their industrialization polices (De Schutter 2013). They imposed extractive agriculture polices on small-scale agriculture. This, resulted to mass poverty, food insecurity, and famine, in some cases. As a response to the multiple crises, in the early 1980s structural adjustment program (SAPs) provided by international financial institutions. The adjustment on agriculture which included a removal of subsidies to farmers affected the already structurally weak peasant sector. During this period agriculture and food security remained a low-priority item in the policy agenda (Fontan Sers and Mughal 2019), while macroeconomic issues seemed pressing and many expected that there would be a rapid transition to new growth paths (Jolly 1991).

Today small-scale farming is under massive threat from population growth, land scarcity and worsening ecological degradation (Cheru and Modi 2013; Wang 2019). Study shows that population growth will be the leading cause of food insecurity and widespread undernourishment across Africa in the coming futures (Hall et al. 2017). Hence, strategies such as increasing agricultural production and imports through trade and aid are considered critical to preventing catastrophic future food insecurity (Hall et al. 2017, 24), but without considering its effects on small-holder farmers.

Climate change is also another critical challenge to ensuring food security. Food insecurity can be directly exacerbated by climate change due to crop production-related impacts and, also efforts to mitigate climate change may also negatively affect food security, due to its indirect impacts on prices and supplies of key agricultural commodities (Hasegawa et al. 2018). The study suggests that by 2050, "stringent climate mitigation policy, if implemented evenly across all sectors and regions, would have a greater negative impact on global hunger and food consumption than the direct impacts of climate change". The negative impacts would be most prevalent in vulnerable, low-income regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where food security problems are already acute (Hasegawa et al. 2018, 699).

Concerning the role of climate change in Africa's food security, Pickson and Boateng, reveals that since rainfall plays a deceive role in Africa's food security, extreme temperatures impede food security, with varying magnitudes across countries. Thus, given the risks associated with rain-fed agriculture, they suggest that African countries need to limit their dependence on rain-fed agriculture to boost food production (Pickson and Boateng 2022, 4387).

Without adequate state support and sufficient investment, the sector became more vulnerable to multiple global and national changes. However, government policy is still unable to resolve the contradiction between small farms and large farms, as well as unable to create as synergy between the two, and land tenure security. Due to the government's policy limitation to tackle food security of peasants, some proposed for 'farmers feeding strategy'. Leahy argued that, instead of merely emphasizing on development projects that attempts to move farmers out of 'traditional subsistence' farming and into commercial farming, as a solution to food problems, the strategy of feeding the farmers first, is a more applicable in Africa, where food security can come from household production (Leahy 2018).

Due to its difference, developing African agriculture and its producers requires sustainable investment and a contextual approach to differentiate and target different investments responsive to the needs of different farming systems (John Dixon, Dennis P. Garrity, Jean-Marc Boffa, Timothy Olalekan Williams 2020). Contextualizing policy and unpacking the diversity of African agriculture and area of investment is necessary first step. The design and implementation of agricultural development policies, investment programs

and agricultural research needs to target the diversify and broad farming system zones and ascertain priority strategic interventions for each system (John Dixon, Dennis P. Garrity, Jean-Marc Boffa, Timothy Olalekan Williams 2020). Besides analyzing food security in terms of poverty or lack of income, the development policy should also emphasize understanding the wider social, economic, and political factors that may give rise to food insecurity.

CHAPTER IV
HAILE SELASSIE REGIME MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1. Introduction

State formation in nineteenth-century Ethiopia involved two essential processes. First, expansion of territorial claim and possession; the bringing of various previously autonomous and semiautonomous groups and polities on the southern periphery under the centralized rule; the predominance of the use of force; and the imposition of tribute on the newly incorporated. Second, state formation in Ethiopia, took place in a process of collision with European expansion (Tibebu 1995, 31).

Consequently, the Ethiopia imperial state was founded in the centralization of power at the center and expansion of territories. In this dual process of centralization and expansion of territorial claim, the imperial state encountered with opposition and resistance, especially from the newly incorporated territories (Tareke 1991). Hence, to break the resistance the state imported army weapons and paid for it by the sale of "primary products mainly collected from the newly incorporated regions" (Tareke 1991,37).

Although some of the nineteenth-century African states and non state actors did not necessary use terms like 'modernization' and 'development', some of their initiatives were considered as a program of social change(Rempel 2018). Some of 'their organized intervention' was an explicit response to or tool of imperialism"(Rempel 2018, 570). In its formation of the Ethiopian imperial state since the second half of the nineteenth century the successive Emperors Tewodros II (1855-68), Yohannes IV (1872-89), and Menelik II (1889-1913), did reconstruct the Abyssinian Kingdom and considerably expand the material base of a revived monarchical power (Tareke 1991). They provided initiatives to change as well as expand the Abyssinian empire (Zewde 2001).

Emperor Menelik II (ruled 1889-1913), and then Emperor Haile Selassie sought to centralize the state, build enabling infrastructure and institutions, acquire key European technologies, and promote manufactures and expand agricultural production (Zewde 2001). This historical factor of Ethiopia's initiatives to centralization, and consideration to use

European technologies and institutions for its own modernity and, or development has been analyzed as 'defensive modernization' a response to European imperialism, "though defense of the empire against European encroachment was only one reason for change"(Rempel 2018, 571). 'Defensive modernization', "which has long led the country's ruling elites to draw lessons from 'frontrunner' countries in the hope of defusing political pressures from below and military defeat by more 'modern' foreign powers" is deeply rooted in Ethiopian history (Wehler 1989 cited in Fourie 2015, 296).

Therefore, the process of centralization and territorial expansion of the empire, resistances from the newly incorporated areas, and use of forces by the state to repressed resistances were mentioned in Ethiopian modern state formation. Some Ethiopian intellectuals at the time were called for developmental changes such as expansion of education, and administrative modernity in conjunction with, and occasionally at odds with the Ethiopian emperors of the day. "To the extent these intellectuals considered the condition of conquered peoples like the Oromo, they expressed sentiments and suggested solutions similar to those of contemporary Europeans writing about European empires" (Rempel 2018, 570).

At the same time the imperial states were needed to ensure state legitimacy and secured the loyalty of its subjects, in the newly incorporated areas, and define national identity (Markakis 2011). By subjecting all citizens to Amhara-Tigrean domination they also initiated a process of "Abyssinianization," an imperial ideal that was only partially realized during the long reign of Haile Selassie I (1916-74) (Tareke 1991). Nevertheless, the initiatives to assimilate the entire population to the Abyssinian culture aborted. After the fall of the imperial regime, the Derg shifted the ideology of the country towards socialism, and since 1991, Ethiopia shifted towards federalism. Rempel (2018, 572) suggests that:

> "Modernity, reform, and civilization were not static; neither were the 'traditional' institutions they sought to supplant. All were tools for a variety of individuals and groups seeking betterment, or at least security, whether in empires or other kinds of state…. Developmental initiatives were not desired by all involved in them. Sanction and violence were needed to ensure the participation of the unwilling, often people with less power".

4.2. Haile Selassie and Political and Economic Changes (1930-1974)

On 2 November 1930, under the title of Haile Selassie I, "the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, Tafari Makonnen was crowned as the Negusa Negast, the King of the Kings of Ethiopia"(Asserate 2015, 86). As Emperor of Ethiopia, Tafari Makonnen- the name by which he was first known, took the name of Haile Selassie (his baptismal name), which literally means 'the Power of the Trinity' (Henze 2000). For over half a century Haile Selassie I dominated Ethiopian life.

Haile Selassie's coronation ceremony was well planned with the intention to make it a grander occasion than any in previous Ethiopian history, and the Emperor intended to impress the world with his power and determination(Asserate 2015; Henze 2000). According to Henze (2000, 205–6) observations:

> Haile Selassie scheduled the coronation ceremony for early November 1930, a time when Ethiopia normally enjoys splendid weather. He sent invitations to emperors, kings and presidents throughout the world. Addis Ababa underwent months of cleaning, painting and polishing…… No emperors or kings came for the lavish and colorful festivities but all who had been invited sent high-level representatives who were sometimes accompanied by large parties.

Asserate (2015, 99), suggests that there were two main objectives behind the pageantry and hospitality of the coronation; first, the Emperor wished to impress his countrymen, and particularly the Rases (regional princes/nobility), that he was accepted by the Royal Families of Europe. Secondly, the Emperor wished to impress his European visitors with the fact that Ethiopia was an up-to-date, civilized nation.

Accordingly, Ethiopia acquired its first written constitution in 1931. Th 1931 constitution was an important part of the newly crowned Emperor's plan for the future (Henze 2000). It set up the juridical framework of 'emergent absolutism' (Zewde 2001, 250). Thus, the constitution provided the legal and ideological framework of absolutism and, as such, it was the ultimate expression of "royal supremacy over feudal autonomy"(Tareke 1991, 45).

The 1931 constitution(IGE and Imperial Government of Ethiopia 1931), Article three declared that:

> The law determines that the imperial dignity shall remain perpetually attached to the line of His Majesty Haile Selassie I, descendant of King Sahle Selassie, whose line descends without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of

King Solomon of Jerusalem and the Queen of Ethiopia, known as the Queen of Sheba.

The ruling Solomonic dynasty was traced its origin back to ancient times; in fact, it traced its decent directly from a union of King Solomon of Jerusalem and the Queen of Sheba of ancient Ethiopia, sometimes referred to as Abyssinia. In line with that Haile Selassie was proclaimed a descendent of King Solomon and Queen of Sheba and became called the 'Lion of Judah' in 1930 (Erlich 2019).

The constitution ascertained his absolute power. It confirmed the emperor's divine right to rule by declaring 'the person of the emperor is 'sacred', his dignity is 'inviolable', and his power 'indisputable' (Article 5). Thus, in the Ethiopian Empire supreme power rests in the hands of the emperor (Article 6).

John Markakis(2011, 109) comments that "a modern instrument designed to limit a ruler's power was enlisted by a traditional ruler in pursuit of absolute power". Haile Selassie was not the first Ethiopian ruler to claim divine appointment. The difference between him and his predecessors was though that "he had created a military arm of the state with which to support the religious and juridical basis of royal authority" (Tareke 1991, 46).

Since the constitution was partly intended for foreign consumption, to impress on Europeans for Ethiopia's political modernity, it included a few articles which were obviously only of paper value. Furthermore, the Emperor used the constitution to reduce the power struggle between centralism and regionalism. Hence, the main theme that the constitution dealt with was the regulation of the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility (Zewde 2001, 251).

Hence, Haile Selassie I, first as the regent (1916-30) and then as Emperor (1930-74), aimed to create a unified apparatus of power directly controlled by himself and uncurbed by any law (Henze 2000). The Emperor had become the centralizer of resources and power, and, also the sole distributer of wealth and privilege to the provincial elites as well as to the rest of the people(Tareke 1991). The constitution legalized his absolute powers in administrative and executive functions, justice, and the granting of land and honors. Thus, he instituted essential instruments of authority.

The emperor hired foreign advisors and he was to able introduce such innovations as:

a national currency, a state bank, a postal, telephone and telegraph system, and the training of Ethiopian soldiers in the use of modern weapons. In the early 1930s, the central

government was revamped. New ministries were added, the customs service was reorganized, new tax regulations were introduced, and a new currency was issued in 1933. Road constructions and other public works began to change the rustic image of Addis Ababa, motor cars made their appearance in the capital's streets, and a police force was assembled (Markakis 2011, 109).

Bahru Zewde (2001, 250) comments that "it was to be the major historical achievement of Haile Selassie that he finally succeeded in realizing the unitary state of which Emperor Tewodros (1855-68) had dreamt. According to Erlich (2019, 2) Haile Selassie saw centralization of his control as a way to "ensure independence in facing foreign ambitions-mainly Italian". However, Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, and in 1936 emperor Haile Selassie went abroad.

In May 1936 the Emperor managed to appear before the League of Nations in Geneva to deliver a memorable and prophetic speech (Markakis 2011). His speech at the League of Nations, warning of what was to be expected from appeasing aggressive dictators, 'earned him a place in world history'(Erlich 2019, 2).

In 1940, when Mussolini entered World War II on the side of Germany, the British called upon the exiled King to organize guerrilla fighters inside Ethiopia (Erlich 2019). Also, inside Ethiopia, a resistance movement was a major problem for the Italians(Markakis 2011). Hence, as the symbol of uniting all Ethiopians against the enemy, Haile Selassie was transported from his state of 'exile to the theatre of war'(Zewde 2001, 307).

Immediately after liberation from Italian occupation in 1941, emperor Haile Selassie I restored his imperial order and regained control over the country's social, economic, and political aspects and planned to modernize Ethiopia. The end of the Italian five-year occupation and the return of Haile Selassie's government brought an era of reconstruction, not in repairing wartime damage, but in recasting prewar institutions into new forms, and led to the restoration of the imperial government under the emperor, within a markedly changed domestic and international political order (McCann 1995; Clapham 2019).

The Ethiopian-Italian wars of conquest and liberation between 1935 and 1941 had destroyed the old provincial nobility, and much of the domestic autonomy of local authorities, Haile Selassie had become the undisputable ruler (Erlich 2019). The Italian occupation had strengthened the position of the central government in respect to regional

lords, as a result, it had enabled the center to exercise far greater control than previously over the territories that it ruled (Henze 2000; Clapham 2019).

Britain had helped restore Haile Selassie to his throne and re-established his authority. British advisers helped the Emperor lay the groundwork for a national army so that "he would no longer be dependent on the armies of regional lords" (Henze 2000, 237). They also helped reorganized and equipped the army and police forces and helped reform the administrative structure in the 1940s (Henze 2000; Markakis and Ayele 1986).

While, on the one hand, ambitious nobles raised the banner of rebellion, rallying the peasants in their side to stop centralism. On the other hand, southern peasants, fearful of the resurrection of northern domination and oppression, resisted the re-establishment of the Ethiopian administration. For example, in northern Ethiopia resistance took place in Gondar, Gojjam, and Tigrai provinces, in the southern, resistance took place in Bale, Harer, and Sidamo (Tareke 1991, 48).

Despite the resistance, the Emperor was able to survive this major crisis because "the opposition remained fragmented and the British provided much-needed economic and military support" (Tareke 1991, 49). Thus, the Emperor's control was implemented through an expanded administrative structure, backed by improved communications and a national army. Although feudalistic and extractive administrative structure, through the empire making it possible for tax collection (Diriba 2018).

The 1931 constitution was revised in 1955, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Haile Selassie's coronation, however, the revised constitution once again declared the concentration of power in the hands of the emperor. Similarly, the revised constitution of 1955 was, like that of 1931, issued by the emperor at his own discretion. This placed a very high emphasis on leadership, and its primary goal was to maintain imperial control over the large and disparate territory that it claimed (Clapham 2019).

At the end of the 1940s, Britain relinquished its role to the United States(Markakis and Ayele 1986). In the 1940's Britain had extensive control over Ethiopia's finance, administration, and territorial integrity. This was a disappointment for Haile Selassie, because, according to Bahru Zewde's (2001, 31) observations:

"What Haile Selassie aspired to was the reconstitution of his autocratic powers on an even more solid base, in partnership with the British, but not through subservience to them.

What the British sought was apparently to drag the country back to its pre-1935 level, depriving it of even the few benefits of Italian colonial rule".

Haile Selassie managed to release Ethiopia from Britain's sphere of influence and strengthened his country's connections to the United States (Erlich 2019, 2). Internationally, Ethiopia was able to take its place within a global order orchestrated by the United Nations, and allied itself with the United States, similarly, therefore, Ethiopia's foreign policy stance was closely aligned with the major trading powers in the international economy, in a way that encouraged external aid and investment, while the emergence of 'development' as a key goal of global economic management helped the country to benefit from external aid funds and expertise (Clapham 2019).

With the emergence of the Middle East as an area of paramount concern to the great powers after the end of the Second World War, Ethiopia's strategic importance was greatly enhanced (Markakis and Ayele 1986). In the 1950s the United States expanded towards the Red Sea area and provided Ethiopia with military aid and substantial economic aid, also the United States became Ethiopia's most important trading partner, taking the bulk of its coffee exports ((Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971; Markakis and Ayele 1986; McCann 1995).

By 1970, Ethiopia had come to absorb some 60% of US military aid to the whole of Africa (Zewde 2001). US military aid in the period between "1946 and 1972 came to over $US 180 million" (Zewde 2001, 320). In the 1960s Ethiopia had substantially the largest armed forces in black Africa (Clapham 1988). America's assistance was not only in the military, but was also in education, communications, and road infrastructure. Also, private investors were active in the country. By the late 1960s more than 200 Americana firms were active in Ethiopia (Markakis and Ayele 1986).

After World War II and particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when numbers of African territories achieved independence, the emperor and his government developed a strong interest in external affairs, especially in African matters, and these led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and its establishment of its headquartered in Addis Ababa. Haile Selassie's effort in the process reinforced Ethiopia's diplomatic standing (Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971).

However, beginning from the early 1970s, Haile Selassie's regime began to lose its most powerful and steadfast ally. While in the early 1970s, anti-Americanism grew in Ethiopia, especially among students, the United States pursued a policy of disengagement

from Ethiopia. Also, the pro-Western shift in Egyptian policy might have contributed to the diminished value of Ethiopia for American strategy in the Middle East (Zewde 2001, 325).

Finally, as Acemoglu and Robinson described the state of affairs of the Solomonic dynasty in Ethiopia lasted until it was overthrown by a military coup in 1974.

> the emperor was frozen in some earlier century, a historical anachronism. The emperor Haile Selassie would start his day by arriving in the courtyard at the Grand Palace, outside the palace would be a crowd of dignitaries anticipating his arrival, bowing and desperately trying to get his attention. The emperor would hold court in the Audience Hall, sitting on the imperial throne. Haile Selassie presided over an extreme set of extractive institutions and ran the country as his own private property, handing out favors and patronage and ruthlessly punishing lack of loyalty. There was no economic development to speak of in Ethiopia under the Solomonic dynasty" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 358)

On one level Haile Selassie had used the constitution, and other legal and institutional frameworks to justify his divine authority, on the other level he employed the terms like 'modernization' or 'development' in line with the international development discourse to secure his throne and prestigious. Some developmental initiatives during the imperial government of Ethiopia were hindered by entrenched feudal institutional landscape founded on "predatory state that lived by the appropriation of peasants"[12]. Due to inappropriate policy and governance problems, Ethiopia missed the opportunity to improve the well-being of its citizens. For Haile Selassie, the long road to "civilization did not require democracy, it just required him" (MCVETY 2008, 382). With the vision of building Ethiopian development by adopting high modern technology, the emperor detached from reality on the ground and failed to resolve the poverty and food insecurity in his country. As James C. Scott described in Seeing like a State, "where the utopian vision goes wrong is when it is held by ruling elites with no commitment to democracy or civil rights and who are therefore likely to use unbridled state power for its achievement" (Scott 1998, 89).

4.3. Development Plans and Economic Development

Ethiopia was the first African country to develop a policy of planned national economic development. In the early 1940s, Ethiopia had developed various sector programs and plans.

[12] Tibebu 1995, 32

Among the first was a ten-year industrial plan for industrial development that began in the fiscal year 1944/45. Besides government elaborated plans to cover agriculture, forestry, education, roads and highways, and communications. Nevertheless, the implementation of the plans was hindered by a lack of organizational, human, and other capacities (Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971).

Therefore, the first integrated national planning was prepared and implemented after the establishment of the National Economic Council in 1954/55. The Emperor hired foreign specialists to assist in the design and implementation of the plans (Henze 2000). Consequently, the country's first, second, and third five-year plans were prepared and implemented under this arrangement (Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971).

The planning of development and modernizing policies was designed to remould the Ethiopian state into a modern nation, to assert and tighten its control over the country as well as to gain foreign aid and loans (Ponsi 1983). Because in the 1950s, development planning was served as a framework for development by providing technical assistance and creating opportunities for infrastructure building, increasing agricultural production, industrial financing, community development, and programs in education and health (Zafarullah and Shafiqul Huque 2021).

The Ethiopian imperial regime recognized development planning as a framework to 'improve and raise the level of the Ethiopian economy and administration and to raise people's standard of living and economy' (Berhane, Selassei, and Sharifan 2011), in line with the international development discourse. Clapham (2019) notes that the imperial government accepted the 'development agenda' because and insofar as this reinforced its own power.

Revenue from trade and external aid was the main financial source for the emperor to sustain his aim to industrialization and infrastructure development. In 1950, Ethiopia was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to obtain a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for the construction of a highway network, in collaboration with West Germany and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Fantini and Puddu 2016) Indeed, this contributed to the regime's outward-oriented development policy, and it also had a considerable influence in policy formulation from international donor agencies, the World Bank, and USAID.

The planning of economic development and modernization in Ethiopia was associated with indicative three five-year development plans that covered the period from 1957 to 1973. Although the government proposed the fourth five-year development plan, the implementation of the plan was superseded by the outbreak of the 1974 revolution, which deposed the emperor and radically restructured the socio-political order (Ponsi 1983).

The first five-year development plan, which covered the period from 1957 to 1962, laid major emphasis on the development of the country's infrastructure. Priorities in investments were given to urban infrastructure; housing for the growing urban bureaucratic class, transport, communication, and energy; service posts and education also got considerable support.

Agriculture in general was at the lowest end of the scale of priorities. Total investment during the period reached $839.6 million. 60 percent of this sum, however, went into two sectors: urban transport and communications, and housing and construction. In the Second Five Year Development Plan (1963-1968), the government made a decisive turn in favor of agricultural modernization. The plan's primary focus, however, was to stimulate exports and invest in import substitution industrialization (McCann 1995).

Industrialization, manufacturing, and exploration of natural resources were seen as essential pathways to 'catch up'. There were hopes that the country would prove to have exploitable mineral wealth (Henze 2000). For example, during the second plan period only, Ethiopia invested $2,000,000 in building a dam and made an oil-finding survey on the red sea coast; negotiated with private firms to discover oil, surveyed the discovery of copper and iron ore, and others (M. Berhane, Selassei, and Sharifan 2011).

The major objectives of the second plan were diversification of production, the introduction of modern processes and methods, and the expansion of the economy's productive capacity to bring about an increased rate of growth. Total expenditures on the second plan amounted to $2,670 million (M. Berhane, Selassei, and Sharifan 2011).

The main objectives of the plan were:

1. Achieving great economic results through the rational utilization of available capital and labor.
2. Using different means of development in order to narrow the economic divergence between Ethiopia and the economically advanced countries.

3. Economizing money as much as possible and investing it on some useful project in order to bring about an independent growth of the Ethiopian economy.
4. Obtaining balanced and uninterrupted economic growth in order to raise the standard of living of people.
5. Improving and expanding education, public health, fine arts, and industrial projects more intensively.
6. Encouraging every citizen to be a participant in the endeavors for the economic and social development of their country

The third development plan (1968-1973), shifted its interest with some commitment to agriculture, and reflected the market for international aid, that is, wider international, multilateral interests in agriculture as a means to economic growth in developing countries (McCann 1995). However, even in the late 1960s, when international development discourse shifted in favor of small-scale farms, ideologically the imperial period decision-makers considered peasants as irrelevant to development planning and management, and viewed smallholder agriculture as backward and which held Western-style, technology-driven, and large-scale agriculture to be the only alternative (Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a).

As in previous plans, however, agriculture received the lowest investment allocation relative to the other major sectors, but once again the distribution of investment within agriculture itself was heavily weighted in favor of commercial farms which received 58 percent of development allocations and the peasant sector only 10 percent (Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971; Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a). Of the 10 percent of the total national budget invested in agriculture, the lion's share went to tax exemptions for tractors and plant protection chemicals. Overall, the plan allocated only 1 percent of the budget to small-farm agriculture, which still made up over 95 percent of total production (McCann 1995).

Comparing with the previous two plans the third plan recognized the problems of agricultural administration, it outlined two problems in the rural sector - the problem of production and the problem of the peasantry and called for improvements (Diriba 2018). The idea that agricultural growth should also bring about improvements in the rural populations' nutritional and living standards, and the goal of social equity through expanded employment and redistribution of wealth emerged in full only on the eve of the fall of the

regime, at the time the fourth development plan was being drafted (Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a).

The overall development policy was inconsistent, and it was biased against the peasant. Despite the absence of institutional support for peasant agriculture, the sector continued to provide food for urban areas, the imperial army and state revenue and export income for the Empire. Indeed, stimulated by high world grain prices and a shortage of food grain in the world market following World War II, the country boosted its grain exports in the second half of the 1940s. Cereal export ranged from 32,992 tons in 1944 to 85,078 thousand tons in 1952, (Diriba 2018).

For the development of industrialization through the regime's policy of import substitution, government set up a series of parastatal organizations which controlled the country's foreign trade. The first such organization was the Ethiopian National Corporation (ENC) created in 1941 by the Minister of Commerce and of Agriculture, to control the export of cereals to war-torn Europe. Ethiopian Society for Commerce and Transport created and controlled the import of cotton goods by monopoly. the National Coffee Board, Livestock and Meat Board and the Grain Corporation could be viewed as the successor organization to the ENC, designed to control the three most important export commodities: coffee, hides and skins, and grain (Zewde 2001, 335).

Coffee was mainly exported to the United States, on the contrary, luxury commodities and other machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, chemicals, and related products, petroleum and petroleum products were imported from highly industrialized countries (Kaplan, Mclaughlin, and Nelson 1971). This was explained as a disarticulation between the structure of production and the structure of consumption, "what is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced" (Shivji 2009, 60). Exported primary products and imported consumer goods for the narrow urban and elite markets catering for their internationalized consumption patterns.

Expenditures in the budget on agricultural development have never exceeded 5% of total expenditures and more often varied between 1% and 2% (IBRD/WB 1963). Concerning the role of agriculture in economic development, economic development theory attests that agricultural transformation passes through four stages: as Timmer (1988) identifies, the first phase is "getting agriculture moving" as described by Arthur Mosher's; the second phase is about making agriculture a key contributor to the overall economy as described by Johnston

and Mellor's; the third phase involves integrating agriculture into the macroeconomy as described by Schultz-Ruttan's and the fourth phase is about when agriculture is in the industrial economies as described by D.G. Johnson environments.

Mosher's environment entails that, resources extracted from agriculture must be invested in agriculture to stimulate growth. At the earliest stage, a significant share of a country's investable resources may well be extracted from agriculture, since the rest of the economy is so small. While Haile Selassie established extractive system, but ignore the sector and its inhabitants. When the regime appropriate resources from agriculture and neglected to reinvest in the sector, Timmer (1988) characterized it as a "jump strategy". Thus, the strategy was pursued as the process was started from the "Johnston-Mellor environment" which emphasized mobilization of resources from agriculture to enhance growth in the non-agricultural sectors (Timmer 1988). In Ethiopia, resources were mobilized from agriculture in the form of discriminatory investment policies, invested in other sectors, and unproductive sectors. The agriculture sector was the most neglected one, of the total of USD 352 million of foreign loans that the country was able to utilize up to 1974, less than eight percent went to agricultural development (CSO 1975 as cited in (Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a).

4.4. Agricultural development policy and its implication to Peasant agriculture

In Ethiopian history, agriculture has had a dominant role in the country's economy. Despite the growth and expansion of a number of towns and the establishment of few industries in the post-1941 period, Ethiopia remained a predominantly rural society. Agriculture engaged more than 80% of the population and accounted for about 60% of the gross domestic product in the 1960s. Over 90% of the value of exports was derived from agricultural commodities, of which perhaps 60% came from coffee. Internally, however, grain constituted the most important agricultural product, followed by pulses and oilseeds (Zewde 2001, 325).

Even though concern for development of industry took priority, the role of trade, industry and manufacturing in the national economy was insignificant (Henze 2000; Zewde 2001). In addition to that, the service sector was underdeveloped. In the 1960s, trade constituted a mere 7% of the gross domestic product; the industry’s part was even less than that. This implies a rather low rate of circulation of goods, as well as revealing the infant

stage of industrialization in Ethiopia. The trade pattern, too, reflected the predominantly agricultural character of the country (Zewde 2001, 334).

Some scholars associated the beginning of Ethiopian states' commitment to the transformation of agriculture, with the announcement of the Point Four technical assistance program by United States President Harry S. Truman in the early 1950s. Point Four Program was considered as a foundation for Ethiopian agricultural development (Diriba 2018).

The genesis of the program was a technical assistance program for developing countries announced by President Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address in 1949, in which he stated as follows:

> "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas" .

In 1951 the imperial Ethiopian government (IEG) and representatives of the United States in Addis Ababa, signed an agreement promising "to cooperate which each other in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills and related activities formulated to contribute to the development of Ethiopia" (MCVETY 2008, 371).

The implementation of Point Four programs in Ethiopia started in 1952 when the two countries signed an agreement to begin construction on the Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts. The program was aimed to "build up Ethiopia's major potential contribution to the economic strength of the free nations of the world, in the hope that the more than 80 percent of its population engaged in agriculture would be able to vastly improve production in order to provide foodstuffs to the food-short countries in the Middle and Near East" (MCVETY 2008, 387). The program called for the Ethiopian and the US government to share the cost of modernizing the agricultural sector, initially both of them contributed $400,000 (MCVETY 2008).

With the additional assistance from the Agricultural and Mechanical Arts College of Oklahoma (later Oklahoma State University), it provided the foundation, training, and philosophical directions to Ethiopia's agricultural development infrastructure (McCann 1995). Moreover, the institutional and scholastic foundation of Ethiopia's agricultural and economic development was laid, by establishing the first agricultural schools in Jimma and

Haramaya both of which have become the country's preeminent universities in 21st century Ethiopia (Diriba 2018).

The program was emphasized utilizing American agricultural technology to improve Ethiopian farmers' productive capabilities, but the gap between American agricultural scientists and Ethiopian scientists and administration, as well as Ethiopian farmers, were identified as a challenge. As a result, the implementation of extension services provided as an essential link to narrow the knowledge gap (McCann 1995). However, peasant agriculture was not a priority concern of development for the imperial government of Ethiopia.

While the emperor was more concerned about expanding and maintaining his control over the country's resources and population, and he needed military assistance as well as massive developmental projects. Haile Selassie's interest in development and modernization was primarily derived by his interest to secure both his throne and his regional prestige. The assistance through the point four program was not adequate enough to the emperor's vision of modernization. Although, Rempel argues that despite the prominence of the Point Four program, "Africa received only six percent of the Point Four funds; the bulk of the money went to Asia" (Rempel 2018, 569).

Thus, contrary to "the idea of ending Ethiopia's underdevelopment through a large number of small, grassroots projects at the time", the imperial Ethiopian government plan called for a large-scale, centralized approach that would attack numerous development issues all at once" (MCVETY 2008, 394). The government revealed its lack of interest to develop peasant agriculture. This was clearly reflected in its successive five-year development plans. The government had interested to invest in urban infrastructure and housing for the urban bureaucratic class and large-scale plantations for export production.

Because the regime's economic development was revolved around the construction of an urban economy, "Haile Selassie was viewed Ethiopia's massive peasant class representing about 90 percent of the population, as the premier impediments to modernization". (MCVETY 2008, 394). Generally, the period 1941 to 1974 represents a summation of contradictory development policies of Ethiopia. Particularly, as far as agriculture concerned Ethiopia witnessed the imperial regimes' lack of interest to develop peasant agriculture on one level, and the government's provision of a policy framework for the expansion of commercialization in agriculture by private sectors and foreign direct investment on the other level.

In the late 1960s, when the government had shifted its attention to agriculture, priority was given to commercial agriculture rather than to peasant agriculture. This reflected the government's eagerness to increase agriculture's export potential and boost foreign earnings, as well as its own class interests since it was the big landlords who stood to gain from commercial farming (Zewde 2001). Moreover, it was aimed to facilitate the industrialization policy. By replacing agriculture with the expansion of industry in the urban areas, the government assumed that industry would absorb rural migrants and the massive peasants would be transformed from backwardness to modernization, and from a subsistence economy to a monetary one.

Accordingly, the last decade of the regime thus saw extensive commercialization and mechanization of agriculture. Some observers even began to speak of the birth of an agrarian bourgeoisie (Zewde 2001). This agrarian transformation had three agents: private Ethiopians, expatriate concessionaires and the government. The first, landlords turned entrepreneurs or enterprising professionals leasing out the land, were particularly active in southern Shawa and Satit Humara in north-western Bagemder. Of the foreign-owned plantations, the Italian Elaberet farm in Eritrea and the Tandaho cotton plantation in the Awash River valley, run by the British Mitchell Cotts Company, also the sugar-manufacturing industry monopolized by the Dutch firm, Handelsvereeninging Amsterdam (HVA), were the most important one. Finally, a government agency, the Awash Valley Authority, was set up in 1962, to act as an umbrella organization, sponsoring a host of agricultural, agro-industrial and hydroelectric enterprises (Zewde 2001, 331-2).

The policy focus was large-scale agricultural investment based on commercial principles and favored production was predominantly cash and export crops (Berhanu and Poulton 2014). Among the policy measures adopted were tax concessions, low taxes on land use and tax-free import of heavy machinery and equipment (Demeke, Guta, and Ferede 2006). Although large-scale mechanized commercial farms required extensive areas of land under cultivation and the use of modern agricultural inputs, the policy objectives to expand the farms were to in part to meet the food demands of the larger cities, in part for export (Markakis and Ayele 1984). Therefore, the government took some measures to encourage the expansion of these farms.

The selected location for commercial farms was the valley of Awash River which flows in a north-easterly direction below Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The region was the

key location, conveniently placed to take advantage of access to the sea through the port of Assab which became Ethiopian territory following the federation with Eritrea in 1952, offered the additional attractions of irrigation from the water of the river, road, and rail transportation directed to the city (Clapham 2019; Markakis and Ayele 1986).

Although the government's primary consideration of farm expansion towards the southeastern region was the availability of unused land, but the projects were implemented at the expense of the evicted pastoralist from their land (Markakis and Ayele 1986) 'Virgin lands' schemes of this kind were to become a staple of the Ethiopian development enterprise, situated in politically peripheral parts of the country, and introduced with little concern for the interests of their indigenous inhabitants (Clapham 2019, 4).

A bimodal strategy for agricultural development was adopted in the late 1960s, encompassing large-scale mechanized commercial farms and the establishment and development of package projects for peasant agriculture. A 'package' approach to agricultural development was introduced in high potential areas, mainly in the central provinces, to provide high-quality seeds and fertilizers to poor peasants (Zewde 2001; Demeke, Guta, and Ferede 2006). This reflected the government's change in its policies toward agriculture and the application of empiricism to Ethiopian peasant agriculture. The shift in favor of smallholder farms and peasant enterprises reflected the dominant ideology in the international development of the late 1960s and 1970s. The approach prescribed a package to enhance production on small farms, including agricultural inputs, rural infrastructure development, small-farm credit, local marketing cooperatives, and extension services (McCann 1995).

The first Comprehensive Agricultural Package program (CAPP) approach, was initiated in 1967, initially, Chilalo Agricultural Development Units (CADU) project was introduced in one of the high-potential areas of the country, Arsi, south of Addis Ababa, and later on expanded to cover the entire Arsi province, Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU) (Keeley and Scoones 2014). Arsi were ideal for producing highland cereals, especially wheat and barley, which complemented the teff-specialized areas around Addis Ababa and found ready and accessible urban markets along Ethiopia's best road networks.

The CADU's strategy might have contributed to the improvements in production but it contributed to the eviction of peasants by urban landowners. Between 1967 and 1974 average farm size increased from 2.5 to almost 3 hectares per household, a reflection of

evictions and mechanization of larger farms rather than success in transforming production on small ox-plough farms (Markakis and Ayele 1986; McCann 1995). This further exacerbates the vulnerability of farmers by creating inequality.

According to Bahru Zewde's observation:

> Ostensibly designed to benefit the poor peasants, CADU ended up by enriching the rich landlords, who contrived ways of circumventing the prerequisites of eligibility for the extension facilities. Further, the programme accelerated the process of mechanization of agriculture and the eviction of tenants, as landlords found it more profitable to work the land themselves or to lease it out to commercial farmers (2001, 332).

The second comprehensive package project was initiated in Wolaita province in 1970 under the Wolaita Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) supported by IBRD/WB. Also Adaa District Development Project (ADDP) was supported by USAID, Southern Region Agricultural Development Project (SORADEP) was supported by France, TAHADU (Tahtai Adi Abo and Hadegti Agricultural Development Unit) was supported by the World Bank in 1970 all of which were designed to provide agricultural inputs such as credit, marketing, applied research, crop and animal husbandry, resettlement, road construction, water provision, forestry, women's extension and other activities directed to rural development in the specific project areas (Diriba 2018).

The (WADU), was relatively more successful in easing land congestion through its settlement scheme. However, the comprehensive package project appeared to be too expensive, in terms of both finance and availability of skilled personnel to replicate the projects in other regions of the country (Demeke et al. 2006).

Moreover, the policy did not consider the unfavorable land tenure regime, poor infrastructural and market development as well as the feasibility of the strategies. The selection of the model was more on aspirations, rather than feasibility. Agriculture was given priority, without modifications to the overall growth strategy and structural problems (Alemu, Oosthuizen, and van Schalkwyk 2002).

Therefore, the introduction of modern technologies and promotion of commercial agriculture in high potential areas was generally felt that the major beneficiaries were members of the ruling class and a few elite individuals who owned land and had access to government finance and incentives (Demeke et al. 2006. P.37).

4.5. The right to Land

The Ethiopian economy is dominated by the role of agricultural economic activity. The absence of natural resources (minerals and oil) in the country, meant that the surplus would come almost exclusively from agriculture. Because of this dominant role of agriculture, the issue of land and its ownership has been at the center of the Ethiopian political economy. Up to the 1975 revolution, the land was controlled by the imperial state and feudal lords, and in which people were using land under different tenure arrangements (Ambaye 2013). Due to geography and historical factors, it has been a common approach in literature to view the Ethiopian land tenure arrangements in terms of North/South divide.

In northern Ethiopia, the kin-based communal system was prevalent. Two basic kinds of rights such as rist and gult were superimposed over the same area of land (Tareke 1991; Markakis and Ayele 1986). These two rights were regulating agrarian production and surplus extraction. Rist right were 'land use' rights. It is land held and transmitted hereditarily. In principle, rist rights is hereditary, inalienable and inviolable, hence, it was highly valued. Rist rights were land use rights claimed by a member of a kin from members of his/her generations of same ancestor (Ambaye 2013).

For all practical purposes, rist land was like private ownership except the holder lacked the right to sell the land. The peasant could be able to use, rent, and inherit the land to family members. In exchange, peasants were obliged to make payments for variety land related taxes. Selling the land to non-family members was prohibited. The land was then transferred in the form of inheritance from family to children for generations, which over time reduced the size of the farmlands.

Gult (fief) on the other hand was a tribute appropriation right granted by the emperor to the 'local rulers, members of the royal family, the nobility, or priesthood as well as to religious establishments (Tareke 1991). Gult rights were acquired through a formal grant from the emperor, or from provincial rulers who were empowered to make such grants to members. Gult grants were attached to state office and granted to members of the mekwanent (nobility) for service and loyalty in lieu of salary, to warriors. This could also be a 'temporary gult right', because the right could be revoked by the emperor at any time and be given away to others. Gult grants to religious institutions were given permanently in the form of rist-gult, i.e., gult held as rist. Moreover, permanent gult was granted to members of the aristocracy and higher clergy for their maintenance, to churches and monasteries for

the living of their members, and to retired officials as a reward for services (Markakis and Ayele 1986).

The Church also received gult grant from the emperor in return for prayer for the continued reproduction of his rule through his descendants, for the health, well-being, and redemption of the soul of the gult grantor. The popular notion that lands in Ethiopia is divided into three domains- *siso laarash*, *siso laqadash*, and *siso laangash* (one-third for the tiller, one-third for the prayer, one-third for the Crown (Tibebu 1995).

Tareke (1991, 65) notes that:

> Grantees kept a good part of wealth obtained from the direct producers; they were also exempted from tax on their own holdings. Gult thus provided the administrative framework within which the imperial domain was organized for surplus extraction. The domain was divided into many units that were governed by a hierarchy of quasi-military feu-holding officers. The lower officials secured their positions from the governors to whom they owed allegiance in a patron-client relationship.

The southern, southeastern and southwestern provinces of Ethiopia were brought under Emperor Menelik's rule during the last third of the nineteenth century Immediately after the conquest, the northern rulers divided the southern lands into three, theoretically equal, parts according to a traditional principle known as sisso, meaning one-third. They confiscated two-thirds outright, leaving the last third to the indigenous population. The unconfiscated one-third was divided between the indigenous population and the local chief who was known as balabat (gentry). Most lands of the southern people was confiscated to northerners (Ambaye 2013).

Territorial acquisition made it possible to reward loyal servants and troops with grants of land, to provide a much-needed agrarian surplus, and to increase the taxable revenue of the imperial state considerably (Tareke 1991). While the traditional mode of production in northern Ethiopia is of ancient vintage and the result of gradual evolution, that of the southern region came into being during the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the result of conquest and spoliation (Markakis and Ayele 1986). The majority of the southern population lost the rights to land and their produce and became tenants to the new landlords.

The big portion of land taken by the new settlers was shared between the church and the military based on the same principle applied in the Northern provinces. The amount of land distribution was 1 to 3 gasha (1 gasha is 40 hectares) for a soldier, 10 gashas for hamsa-

aleqa (commander of fifty), 20 gashas for meto-aleqa (lieutenant), 30 gashas for shamble (captain) and so on (Ambaye 2013).

After the Ethiopian-Italin war, the process of privatization of land accelerated. While in the northern provinces, the prevailing old communal kinship system of land tenure resisted to the implementation of privatization, private tenure increasingly became the norm in the southern provinces (Zewde 2001). According to his observation the privatization process in the south had three facets:

Firstly, northern settlers who had acquired tributary rights over southern peasants, the *gabbar*, ended up by owning the land altogether, through purchase from the distressed *gabbar* or through forcible seizure. Secondly, *madarya* land given to those in government service in lieu of salary was made convertible to freehold. Thirdly, and this appears to have been the most prevalent pattern, the government made extensive land grants from its large reserve, which came under the conveniently vague rubric of government land (*ya mangest maret).*

Even though the land tenure arrangements made the indigenous population landless, and they became tenants of the new landlords, it suited both the state and northern settlers. It was suitable for the state because, by granting only proprietary rights to its military and civil servants, it was able at least for the short term to forestall the formation of a landed class capable of challenging its hegemony. It was suitable for the settlers because it provided them with a permanent and cheap labor force (Tareke 1991).

The government used the land as an instrument to broaden its basis of support. Begun immediately after the end of the Italo-Ethiopian war, using land as a tool to buy supporters reached its peak during the last decade of Haile Selassie's life, as the regime became more and more desperate for political support in face of mounting opposition. The overall pattern of the land grant policy targeted patriots, exiles, soldiers and civil servants, however, by including some landless and unemployed Ethiopians, the policy of land granting was given an egalitarian and developmental façade (Markakis and Ayele 1986). Of the nearly 5 million hectares allocated after 1941, only a few thousands reached the landless or the unemployed (Zewde 2001).

The privatization process had changed the connotation of some important terms. For instance, rist, which originally refers the usufruct rights practiced under the kinship system, become denoted as absolute private property. Also, the term "*gebbar* lost its exploitative

associations and assumed the more respectable connotation of taxpayer" (Ibid). These changes accompanied by a remarkable growth in land sale, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Also, it was the time that government shows it's in expanding commercial farming and mechanization. Thus, the inevitable result of the land sale was the growing concentration of land in the hands of the few. This contributed to the creation of social stratification.

Large holdings were prevalent in the south, where the privatization process was most advanced. Holdings as big as 200,000 hectares were recorded for some areas. On the other hand, the privatization process resulted in the concomitant spread of tenancy. Some 50%-65% of all holdings were estimated to fall under this category. Understandably, the tenancy was most widespread in the southern provinces (for example, 75 % in Hararge, 67 % in Shawa and 62 % in Kafa), and less so in the northern provinces (15% in Bagemder, 20% in Gojjam and 25% in Tigre). Absentee landlordism, estimated at about 25% in the 1960s, constituted the other side of the coin.

Access to land and other means of production became more difficult and more complicated, and the subordination of the rural producer to the landed classes and subsequently, the imperial state grew more pronounced (Rahmato 2009). Any investment made by the tenant farmer belongs to his landlord, and out of any increment in gross production due to his efforts 25-50 % must go to the landlord, notwithstanding the fact that the farmer may have spent his own funds to induce this increment, for instance, the purchase of fertilizers. The relationships between the landlord and the tenant are quite often undefined without a legal basis, which adds to the insecurity of the tenant. Parallel with the privatization process, the other efforts of the government were to centralize and increase the extracted revenue for land. The emperor published numerous tax reforms in 1942, 1944, 1947, 1959, 1966, and 1967.

CHAPTER V
THE (MILITARY) DERG REGIME: 1974 TO 1991

5.1. Political and Economic Context During the Military Derg Regime (1974-1991)

The 1974 Ethiopian popular uprising led to the overthrow of the absolutist monarchy and the seizure of power by the military regime. The revolutionary military regime that overthrew the imperial government in 1974 and consolidated its control after a vicious struggle transformed itself into the Provisional Military Administrative Council (often called the PMAC, or the Military council, or the Derg) (Clapham 2019). The Derg was initially formed out of 108 representatives of different military units from all over the country (Giorgis 1989).

Derg started its job by adopting the slogan *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia First). The slogan was intended to indicate that guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the people and reforming the nation were the priorities and not adherence to a specific ideology (Zewde 2001). However, the Derg acted under the slogan 'Ethiopia First' and carried no specific political implications except a vague sense of nationalism" (Henze 2001, 285). Furthermore, most of Derg's economic policy was vague, and the regime lacked clear national economic policy.

The 1974 regime changes marked the end of the Solomonic dynasty and the beginning of the military regime in Ethiopia. The period has been referred to as a period of revolution. Revolution, as Clapham defines is

> "a fundamental and irreversible change in the organization of a society; the destruction, often rapid and violent, of a previous form of social and political organization, together with myths which sustained it and the ruling groups which it sustained, and their replacement by a new institutional order, sustained by new myths and sustaining new rulers" (Clapham 1988, 1).

Soon after the "Ethiopian First" slogan was redefined as "Ethiopian Socialism" (*Hibresabawinet*). *Hibresabawinet* was supposed to include a host of principles such as equality, the primacy of the collective will, the right of self-determination within the framework of a united Ethiopia, and non-alignment (Tiruneh 1990).

But the popular expression of Ethiopian Socialism soon gave way to personal dictatorship, Bahru Zewde comments that "the Ethiopian revolution delivered the country to the murderous regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam" (Zewde 2001, 385). Acemoglu and Robinson observe that:

> "..... Mengistu was the unchallenged leader of the Derg, ... he sat on a gilded armchair, just like the emperors of old.... official functions were now held once again at the Grand Palace, with Mengistu sitting on Haile Selassie's old throne. Mengistu started to compare himself to Emperor Tewodros, who had refounded the Solomonic Dynasty in the mid-nineteenth century after a period of decline" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 359).

In 1975 and 1976, the new regime adopted a series of socio-economic and political reforms and implemented them vigorously, in spite of the conflict among the elites over-controlling state power (Tiruneh 1990). In February 1975, Derg issued the first statement on economic policy entitled 'Declaration on the Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia', which in turn was incorporated into the comprehensively entitled Government ownership and control of the means of production proclamation issued (Markakis & Ayele 1986).

Thus, in the implementation of 'Ethiopian Socialism', the nationalization of private properties and all means of production was announced. Beginning with banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies, the government then nationalized seventy-nine industrial and commercial companies (many foreign-owned) and the state took a controlling interest in twenty-nine others. Also, the military proclaimed the nationalization of the enterprises owned by the emperor before the fall of the monarchy (Markakis & Ayele 1986; Clapham 1988).

It was explained that the nationalization of the financial institutions was in order to make them render equal service to the ordinary traders, farmers, and

workers (presumably meaning equal service with the other classes), as it was explained, the nationalization was consistent with Ethiopian Socialism (Markakis and Ayele 1986). This was followed by an overall shift in the economic policies of the country, in which state control of the economy was overextended. Centralized planning had expanded exponentially (Markakis & Ayele 1986; Tiruneh 1990).

In terms of ideological thinking, the Derg was in favor of socialist principles (Clapham 2019). By ideologically aligning the country with the Soviet Union and Cuba, Mengistu received a huge influx of weapons and troops. Mengistu used most of the weapons to eliminate his major opponents and effectively took charge of the regime (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

On 29 April 1975, proclamation 31 of 1975, provided for the public ownership of rural lands. Enacted one of the swiftest and sweeping land reform policies, first implemented the rural land reform, and, then urban land reform followed. Parallel with the nationalization of land a new rural institution called the Peasant Association was established. The Peasant Association encompassed an area of at least 800 hectares of land to carry out the land distribution and to administer tribunal justice. The rural transformation was one of the Derg regime's ambitious programs.

The national development campaign called 'Development through Cooperation' (*Edget Behebret)* envisaged the sending of students and teachers to the countryside in order to implement various programs of rural development under the philosophy of 'Ethiopia First' (Zewde 2001). Accordingly, University and high schools were closed, and 50,000 students were dispatched to the countryside on a zemecha (campaign) to help the farmers establish peasant associations (Henze 2001).

In 1984, the Derg emerged as a party state, during the tenth anniversary of the revolution, at which point the Derg formally gave way to the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), in which the members of the ruling Politburo, under its leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, largely replicated the

previous military regime (Clapham 2019; Tiruneh 1990). The formation of Derg as a party state came after having mobilized, organized, and armed the urban and rural populations, liquidated all other political organizations which aspired to monopolize or have a share in power, and established a Leninist vanguard party (Tiruneh 1990).

5.2. Land Reform

The 1974 popular uprising brought the question of land reform onto the government agenda. The most radical criticism of the land-tenure system of the imperial regime came from the student movement, which, from the middle of the 1960s, made the slogan "Land to the Tiller" its main rallying call and the attainment of land reform its main target (McCann 1995).

Until 1975 land and its produce were controlled by the emperor, and parallel to that the overwhelming majority of peasant households were subjected to an onerous extraction of rent, to crop shares of 33 to 67 percent, compulsory labor and to tribute in the form of cattle and honey. Most of the land was the property of the monarchy, the nobility, and the church. Therefore, kinship, community, patron-client political ties, or, in some areas, on the whims of a landlord shaped the agrarian relation (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994).

Therefore, one of Derg's thorough-going measures to dismantle the political and economic power and institutions of the old regime was the radical land reform of March 1975. As McCann (1995) described it, the land reform proclamation of 1975 was the revolution's most profound single act. According to the reform, the land was distributed to peasants.

The 1975 'proclamation to provide for the public ownership of rural lands' (Proclamation No. 31/1975), abolished all private rural land ownership, from the largest to the smallest holdings. It outlawed private ownership of land and land holdings over 10 hectares abolished rural wage labor, and guaranteed access to land to all claimants. Article (3) of the proclamation made all land used for agricultural or grazing purposes the collective property of the Ethiopian people.

Furthermore, the law mentioned that no compensation would be paid in respect of rural lands and any forests and tree-crops growing on such land, provision is made for compensation for movable properties and permanent works on the land though. The latter provision in effect nationalized the lucrative coffee estates owned by wealthy elites. The reform also abolished tenancy, agricultural wage labor, and other forms of peasant dependency on the landed classes. Large holdings were confiscated and turned into state farms, settlement schemes, or cooperatives (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994).

Article 7 of the proclamation 31/1975 (PMAC 1975), stated about large-scale farms and their transformation into state farms:

> "As of the effective date of this proclamation, any largescale farm shall be organized as a state or a cooperative farm or shall be allotted to tillers; provided that until the establishment of state or co-operative farms the government shall administer such farms in any manner it deems fit and provided further that until the Government decides upon the manner in which such farms are to be administered, the ex-owners of these farms shall have the responsibility to continue administering them…The Government shall pay fair compensation for movable property and permanent works on such farms; provided that compensation shall not be paid for the value of the land"

Initially, the Derg regime intended its radical land measures to bring about an end to the onerous tenancy patterns, absentee landowner practices, and large private estates found in the country in general and southern provinces. To solve the country's food problems dismantling the old unjust agrarian relations and replacing them with new ones was considered a solution.

The preamble of proclamation 31/75 clearly expressed this radical thrust:

> Whereas several thousand of land have been grabbed from the masses by an insignificant number of feudal lords and their families as a result of which the Ethiopian masses have been forced to live under conditions of serfdom; whereas it is essential to fundamentally alter the existing agrarian relations so that the Ethiopian peasant masses which have paid so much in sweat as in blood to maintain an extravagant feudal class may be liberated from age-old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty, disease, and in order to increase agricultural production and to make the tiller the owner of the fruits of his labor, it is necessary to release the productive forces of the

> rural economy by liquidating the feudal system under which the nobility, aristocracy and a small number of other persons with adequate means of livelihood have prospered by the toil and sweat of the masses;

Various proclamations spelt out, the reform of the land-tenure system was by far the most important undertaking of the government, in that it affected the lives of more than 90% of the country's population. The land system change was in fact more than reform, it was a radical transformation that was to change the social, economic, and political scene of the country substantially (Tiruneh 1990), also it was one of the most radical measures undertaken anywhere in the developing world at the time, and as the reform abolished all customary and formal rights to land and vested in the state the power to redefine property rights and access to land.

The rural land reform created an important base of support for the military regime among the southern peasantry, who had joined enthusiastically the popular movement in 1974 (Markakis & Ayele 1986). The land nationalization program was implemented almost everywhere, individual households could farm up to 10 hectares of land (in practice this was often less than 3 hectares) but had only usufruct right over the land they cultivated, a right they could not transfer by sale, lease, mortgage, gift, or inheritance (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994).

While tenants and landless benefitted from the land reform, on the contrary, the proclamation which emancipated the peasantry in the southern region, also destroyed the foundation of the landlord class, thus removing a powerful rival from the scene in 1974 (Markakis & Ayele 1986). The smallholding peasant thus came to constitute the sole element of the rural class structure (Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a).

5.3. Peasant Association

Another important dimension of agrarian reform during the Derg period was the establishment of peasant associations. Proclamation 31/1975 called for the

formation of peasant associations throughout the country, and Article (8) stated a peasant association shall be formed, in a manner suitable for development purposes, within a minimum area of 800 hectares.

Proclamation 31.1975, Article (9), limited the membership to:

> a tenants, a landless persons, a hired agricultural workers and a land-owners with less than ten hectares each were to become members of the association, but land-owners with more than ten hectares each had to wait until the land had been redistributed before they could become members.

Thus, membership was open to peasants only, and landlords have barred from participation. Initially, peasants' associations were considered genuine mass organizations, and it was welcomed by peasants (Griffin 1992). Land distribution took place among households organized in Peasant Associations (PAs) in each kebele (local administration). The government established a structure of peasant associations in the countryside and urban dwellers' associations in the towns, known as kebeles, through which individual plots of land would be allocated to their users (Clapham 2019). Over 20,000 peasant associations were formed as a part of the revolution program to group rural and urban populations into 'mass organizations' (Giorgis 1989).

Proclamation 31 assigned peasant associations responsibility:

> for implementing government land use directives, adjudicating disputes over land among members, conserving public property within the area, especially soil, water, and building schools, clinics, and rural roads, undertaking villagization schemes, and cultivating the holdings of persons who cannot farm their land by reason of old age, youth, illness, or widowhood.

In addition, Proclamation 71 of 1975 ("Peasant Associations Organization and Consolidation Proclamation") grants peasant associations the power to establish cooperative societies, and women's associations. They also served as forums for the airing of economic or social problems, practically their role increased to include educating and politicizing the people, and when necessary, arming and mobilizing them (Giorigis 1989). Control of peasants' associations thus became critical to local level governance, and they were rapidly brought

under the control of a hierarchy imposed from the center in line with the ideological tenets of the party, as a result, it was the main governance tool to control the countryside (Clapham 2019; Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a).

The land reform changed agrarian relations, for landless peasants, the reform provided access to land, and for tenants it removed the burden of exploitation by landlords, but the reform had some flawed in several respects and not all peasants benefited equally, for example, small owner-cultivators, which made up a quarter of all rural households, lost some of their lands during distribution (Dessalegn Rahmato 2009a). It has been argued that, since peasants have had only the right to use the land, that may affect peasants' innovative role in the process of agricultural development and limited their ability to benefit from the land (Tiruneh 1990).

Derg implemented a state control mechanism of agricultural marketing to extract resources from the peasants, forcible resettlement, collectivization and villagization or the relocation of peasant neighborhoods to new sites selected by government cadres. Rural dissatisfaction with these measures was to be one of the factors for the rallying of the northern peasantry behind the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in its campaign to bring Darg rule to an end (Zewde 2001).

Thus, popular land reforms which intended to improve the livelihood of the peasants have been limited by the inappropriate government policies that resulted in the further destitution of the peasants. In an underdeveloped country with a predominantly agricultural base like Ethiopia, the peasant producer must be compelled not only to maintain the non-productive sector but to pay also for the cost of any development that is to take place (Markakis and Ayele 1986; Tiruneh 1990).

Furthermore, the land was subjected to periodic reallocations by peasant associations to balance inequalities or to accommodate new claimants. It was also subjected to reallocation by agents of the party, which after 1984 came to play an increasingly prominent role in rural policy implementation, to make way

for or promote socialist programs (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994). While the land reform guaranteed access to land for the peasants, government polices limited farmers to exercise their right, to live on their land without the fear of eviction, jailed or executed. Farmers were vulnerable to forced resettlement, effects of drought and conflicts (Giorigis 1989). Tiruneh noted that the Derg had denied the peasants their basic democratic rights but granted land reform which was tantamount to giving meat and denying the knife with which to cut it up (Tiruneh 1990).

5.4. Agricultural Policy and Food (in)Security

During the early period of the reform, the language of the government was pitched to the 'popular masses' with a strong appeal to nationalism and justice for the poor (Rahmato 2009). From 1975 to 1978, the stated objectives of the Derg regime reform were mainly, freedom for the masses of the rural population from oppression and exploitation by the landed classes and to promote economic development (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994).

To that end, dismantling the old unjust agrarian relations was the first step, and then it was stated that development was to be based on a new agrarian order consisting primarily of independent smallholders liberated from the inequalities of wealth and status characteristic of the old regime (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994). This new agrarian relation was projected to bring the country to food self-sufficiency.

Soon after the reform, the regime replaced the 'freedom of rural masses' phrase with the ideological discourse of Soviet-style communism accompanied by hardline rural policies including agricultural socialization (Rahmato 2009). From 1978 to 1990, the Derg made significant changes in the objectives of its agrarian reform program (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994). Now the government proposed a new production system, thus, in addition to the private farms, Derg created two additional production structures such as producer

cooperatives and state farms. The government prioritized rural development and modernization based on large-scale, collective agriculture.

The socialization of agriculture, which earlier had proceeded at a moderate pace, was greatly accelerated and became the cornerstone of rural policy throughout the 1980s (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994). Thus, collectivization was "the linchpin of Ethiopia's socialist agricultural policy" (Giorgis 1989, 271). To achieve its resource extraction objective, the government's investment and agricultural supplies prioritized collective and state farms (Ibid).

In 1987, 97 percent of total farmland were under cultivation by individual families, only 2 percent was collectivized, though, the government planned to increase a percent of collectivized farmland by 50 percent in the early 1990s[13], with a simultaneous increase in production by collectives from 2 percent to 49.6 percent of the national total. The productivity of both state and collectivized farms were extremely low and almost no surplus was produced for the market, despite huge investments by the government (Giorgis 1989).

The pre-revolution commercial farms in many parts of Ethiopia particularly in the Rift Valley around Humera, Awash, and Mattema, were nationalized and placed under state management in 1976. While at the time, the farms contained approximately 70,000 hectares, eventually they were expanded in an attempt to counter the growing shortages of grain in urban areas, and by 1982 had grown to nearly 250, 000 hectares, 4 percent of all cultivated land in the country. In 1983 the production of state farms was 6 percent of the national total (Giorgis 1989, 271).

Multiple campaigns were conducted to expand collectivization in rural Ethiopia. Six annual development campaigns were carried out by the Central Planning Supreme Council (CPSC) between 1978-1984. The campaigns were primarily designed to instill socialist production ideology among rural farmers (Alemu, Oosthuizen, and van Schalkwyk 2002). Although collectivization requires a complete change of attitudes and values with massive government

[13] Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States (1984)

investment to convince peasants, the government planned to implement its program without adequate preparation. While campaigns did not penetrate rural Ethiopia as it was intended, the government utilized repression to force peasants to join the collective farms. Moreover, the difficult part was that peasants were not convinced to live their lives where there is no religious institutions such as churches or mosques or traditional community life, and without owning land or tools (Giorgis 1989).

One of Derg's regime's ministers, notes that;

> "Collectivization has been a terrible disaster in Ethiopia. Demoralization has been the biggest harvest. None of the "collectivized" peasants showed enthusiasm for their land or their work. They felt they had been snatched from their homes and herded into slave camps. Those who were allowed to remain on their individual farms also stopped working: the fear of being forced off their property at any moment made their work seem futile" (Giorgis 1989, 272).

In its effort to rapidly establish socialist production relations in rural areas government introduced marketing and pricing policies and established Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC). By penetrating the agricultural economy, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) controlled the farm-gate grain prices which imposed fixed prices and, peasants are forced to sell anywhere from 50 to 100 percent of their produce to the AMC, though they can sell the rest on the local private market, after 1979, peasants AMC quota has been increased, the volume of grain handled by the AMC has expanded rapidly from 120,000 tons in 1977 to 570,000 tons in 1983. While AMC marginalized private peasant farms, they paid state farms for their produce as much as 50 percent more than AMC paid to private farms (Giorgis 1989).

Despite the expansion of its role though, the AMC had neither the organizational capacity nor the storage facilities to handle this quantity of grain. Due to its lack of capacity to provide effective services and lack of private trade, the system affected the consumers. Giorgis recalled that "in March 1984 a mother of four killed herself at the Addis city gate when she was prevented from

bringing in 15 kilos of teff which she had bought from peasants" (Giorgis 1989, 276).

The pricing and quota police dramatically affected farm strategies, where farmers adjusted their cropping schemes to avoid controls. Since farmers were aware that the AMC preferred cereals with urban demand, they sowed food crops that are less demanded by urban areas (McCann 1995). While farmers could not avoid AMC price quotas directly, they responded by shifting their crop mix away from urban demanded cereals to food crops that are difficult to move from one area to another, what we may call them as 'resistant crops'.

Overall, the commitment to a socialist path of development has not shown any significant contribution to Ethiopian economic growth. The declined rate of growth, GDP drastically dropped from 5.5 in 1978/79 to -2.4 percent in 1983/84 mainly as a result of a drastic fall in agricultural output, which grew at a rate of -8.8 percent in 1983/84, alongside the catastrophic famine of 1984, among other things, brought a dramatic fall in per capita food production. This was also aggravated by the depression in world trade and particularly by the sharp deterioration in Ethiopia's external terms of trade since 1976 (Griffin 1992). Furthermore, the negative impact of agricultural policy had created resentment among the peasants, which led the farmers to support the rebel group, as a result, the country's had to operate a war economy since most of the resources had been allocated for military expenditure.

As a response to crises government formulated a Ten-Year Perspective Development Plan (1984/85). The plan targeted a growth rate of 7.5 percent a year over ten years. The aggregate target was broken down into three sectoral growth targets of 4.5 percent for agriculture, 13.6 percent for industry, and 7.5 percent for services. However, over 55 percent of investments during the plan period required foreign finance (Griffin 1992, 7).

The agricultural sector has been designated by the socialist government as a priority area within the ten-year development plan. The plan has acknowledged the need to increase and diversify agricultural output, achieve

self-sufficiency in the food supply, and raise rural incomes and living standards. To achieve this, substantial public investment in agriculture was of paramount importance (Belete, Dillon, and Anderson 1991). The plan upheld two objectives improving surplus extraction on the one hand, and self-sufficiency in food production on the other (Alemu, Oosthuizen, and van Schalkwyk 2002).

It emphasized the production of coffee, established a ministry of coffee and tea development, and the Ethiopian coffee marketing corporation planned an export target of 100,000 metric tons of coffee in 1984, up from the estimated 80-85,000 metric tons in 1982/83.[14] The plan also emphasized other agricultural products for export earnings such as hides and skins, oilseeds, pulses, and spices. Contrary to the pre-1975 public investment in agriculture, the socialist government in the ten-year development plan, allocated 22.1 percent of the total national investment for agriculture.

Out of the total agricultural budget, 10.8% was allocated for peasant farming, 6.1% for state farms, 22.4% for producers' cooperatives and settlement farms, 38.6% for irrigation farming on state farms, 9.8% for export crops, 4.2% for forestry, 7.8% for livestock and 0.3% for fisheries (Belete, Dillon, and Anderson 1991, 170).

Plans were redrawn and target set to intensify the organization of farmers into producer cooperatives, to enhance resource extraction objectives. In 1983/84, there were only 1 147 producer cooperatives throughout the country. Their number was planned to be increased to 15 344 by 1993/94.

Rural Institutions During the Derg Regime in Ethiopia, in 1990:

Organization	No.	Household Members (million)
peasant associations (PAs),	20,455	5.7
producers' cooperatives (PCs	3,732	0.3
service cooperatives (SCs)	4,052	4.5

Source: (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994, 6).

[14] Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States (1984)

Share of Farming Sectors in the Total Area Cultivated and Total Agricultural Output in 1984/85 and 1995/94 (percent)

	1984/85		1993/94	
	Area Cultivated	Output Cultivated	Area	Output
State Farms	2.9	3.0	6.8	9.8
Producers' Cooperatives	1.3	1.4	48.8	49.8
Private Peasant	95.5	95.4	42.8	39.2

Source: ((Belete, Dillon, and Anderson 1991; Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994)

In early 1990, pressured by civil war, a flagging economy, and the withdrawal of Soviet economic assistance, the Derg abandoned its attempt to socialize the rural economy and returned to smallholder agriculture. These changes were well received by peasants and merchants but came too late to save the Derg from defeat in 1991 (Bruce, Hoben, and Rahmato 1994). Generally, Derg's agricultural policy failed to improve the peasants' standard of living and was unable to restructure its economic base, moreover, the performance of both collectivization and of the state farms had been a total failure, production stalled, and farmers hopes of prosperity were dashed and Ethiopia plunged into another era of poverty, destitution, famine and fear.

CHAPTER VI
CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIA

6.1. Introduction to Ethiopia during EPRDF Regime

Ethiopia is a landlocked country with a total size of 1,126,829 square kilometers. Its neighbouring countries in East Africa include Sudan and South Sudan to the west, Djibouti and Eritrea to the north, Djibouti, and Somalia to the east, and Kenya to the south. The Ethiopian governance structures include five levels: federal government, regional states, zones, districts (woreda), and kebeles.

The great diversity of terrain in the country results in wide variations in climate, soils, natural vegetation, and settlement patterns. The agroecological environment in Ethiopia is highly diverse but generally divided into *wurch* (alpine), *dega* (highland altitude), *woyna-dega* (mid-land altitude) and *qola* (lowland). World Bank (2020, 214) defines Ethiopian agro-ecological zones into five;

> The drought-prone highlands (mainly eastern parts of Amhara and Tigray, but also north-eastern Oromia), the drought-prone lowlands (the lowland areas of Oromia and SNNPR and western parts of Afar), the moisture-reliable highlands (large parts of Oromia, SNNPR, Amhara), the moisture-reliable lowlands (overlapping largely with Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz), and the pastoral areas (Somali and almost all of Afar).



World Bank (2020)

Ethiopian agriculture is dependent on rain. Temperature and rainfall are the most important climatic factors that influenced agricultural production, the pattern of settlement, activities, and life of the rural population in the country. Mixed farming systems including both crop production and livestock are predominantly practised in midlands and highlands. The lowlands, particularly the east, southeast, and northeast, have much lower levels of precipitation. Over time extreme weather conditions, including drought, flooding, heavy rains, and strong winds, have been increasingly affecting Ethiopian agriculture. Drought is a recurrent threat to rural livelihoods and the economy as a whole (WFP 2019, 2).

Although natural endowments are significantly linked to agricultural suitability, the changing economic landscape is beginning to blur the boundaries between actually suitable areas and potentially productive locations. Access to input and output markets, expanding urbanization, and improved technologies

are transforming the landscape, as well as the activities and opportunities within previously constrained agroecological zones (Chamberlin and Schmidt 2012).

Ethiopia cultivates a variety of staple and cash crops while also having the largest livestock population in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country's agricultural production is dominated by smallholder farmers who manage over 90 percent of the agricultural land. Cereals comprise close to 70 percent of total crop production (CSA 2018) and nutrition-sensitive agricultural production is limited though.

With an estimated population of more than 109 million people, Ethiopia is the second-largest population in Africa, next to Nigeria. Close to 80 percent of the Ethiopian population lives in rural areas and subsists largely on agriculture.



Source: (UNECA, FAO 2018)

6.2. Economic Structure

Ethiopia registered relatively high economic growth, with an annual average real GDP growth rate of 10.8 percent since 2004/05, one of the fastest in the world (World Bank 2020). This growth was driven mainly by the public sector-led development strategy, with its focus on heavy investment in infrastructure as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. The investment

in the public sector includes the expansion of road networks, construction of hydroelectric power plants and transmission lines, airports, telecommunication systems, health and education facilities, and most recently railways (Ibid).

Since 2005/06, due to changes in the government's strategic directions, the major focus has been shifted towards growth with a particular emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture and enhancing private sector development, industry, and urban development and intended to achieve middle-income country by 2025 (MoFED 2010). Between 2011 and 2016 economic growth was mainly driven by services, which explained 42 percent of the expansion in GDP. Agriculture contributed 25 percent to the growth in GDP over the same period, while industry accounted for 34 percent.

The growth in the industrial sector was mainly driven by the construction subsector, which accounted for 77 percent of industrial growth contribution to the real GDP. Manufacturing contributed on average 22 percent to industrial growth contribution to the real GDP. Between 2011 and 2016, the contribution of manufacturing to real GDP growth doubled from a low base, increasing from 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points.



Source: (NPDC 2020; World Bank 2020)

The government assumed that the economic role of agriculture shall be declined in the process of economic development, therefore the focus will be towards structural transformation through the development of industry and service sectors. However, studies show that in practice industrialization, intended as the development of manufacturing and heavy industry, which was a major driver of structural changes in many Asian and Latin American countries is lagging in the late-transforming countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the strategic shifts towards service sector without considering the practical challenges may lead to a premature leaving of the labor force from agricultural sectors, and those leaving agriculture may not be moving into the industry in most cases, but rather into low-productivity informal non-farm activities, generally in the retail trade and services.

While the move from low productive agriculture to the service sector overcomes the seasonality of farm employment, it is not associated with higher productivity and is not producing substantial increases in household incomes (FAO 2017). The problems in the policy process may lead to weak structural transformation. In Ethiopia despite government strategic shifts towards commercialization, urban development, and service sectors, smallholder agriculture continued to account for approximately 46 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 33 percent in 2019/20, 80 percent of exports and employs an estimated 74 percent of the workforce.



Source: (NPDC 2020; World Bank 2020)

6.3. Political and Economic Changes During the EPRDF Regime (1991-2018)

Following the capture of state power, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) began the 1990s with a clear vision of reversing the socioeconomic crisis of the Derg period and a clear set of plans to rapidly transform the economy. The new government identified lack of a democratic system and a restrictive economic policy by the Derg regime as the major causes of the country's economic decline and introduced a new direction of the economic policy of Ethiopia for the transition period and beyond to lead the country to a more market-oriented economy and to pave the way towards the establishment of a permanent democratic order (EPTP 1992).

Accordingly, the government committed itself to three fundamental reforms: decentralization of the state based on a system of federalism; democratization of its politics under a multi-party electoral system; and liberalization of the economy (FDRE 1995; TGE 1991).

In 1991, the government published Economic Policy for the Transition Period (EPTP). It assessed the overall performance of the Ethiopian economy during the Derg period (1974 to 1991) and introduced a market-based economic

policy. In 1991 EPRDF inherited a country devastated by seventeen years of civil wars and a socialist command economy, which was even "poorer than it had been in the last years of the Empire" (Lefort 2015,359).

The assessment indicated the failure of agriculture to supply the country's food needs has made it necessary to depend on food imports, both in the form of aid and direct purchases. From 1974 to 1990 agricultural sector was unable to supply agricultural raw materials required by the manufacturing sector and failed to generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings for the procurement of operating inputs and spare parts, thereby affecting the productive capacity of all sectors[15]. Overall, the economy has been characterized by low agricultural productivity, a small industrial base, shortages of skilled manpower and weak infrastructure (Cheru 1992).

In 1991 Ethiopia has a predominantly agriculture-based economy, 40 per cent of GDP, 85 per cent of exports 85 per cent of total employment. The industrial and service sectors made up only 12 per cent and 23 per cent of GDP respectively. The private sector was tiny. 48 per cent of construction, 72 per cent of transport and communications, 89 per cent of industry and mining, and 100 per cent of electricity, banking and insurance companies were in the hands of the state, which had proved to be a very bad manager. The Ethiopian economy was characterized by low productivity, structural rigidities, and a large public sector. Infrastructure was poorly developed and inefficient with one of the lowest road densities in Africa. Nearly three-fourths of Ethiopia's farms were not easily accessed from all-weather roads (Cheru and Pausewang 1992; Lefort 2015).

Thus, the overall objectives of the economic policy for the transitional period were first to encourage growth by replacing the previous centrally planned economy with a market-based economy, and second to reduce poverty and create an enabling environment for economic development. Furthermore, the policy addressed sectoral policies in the areas of agriculture, industry, trade,

[15] Transitional Period Economic Reform Program In Ethiopia: 1991-93

finance, transport and communication, mining and energy, urban development and construction and social affairs.

The policy articulated the role of the state which was to: design economic policies and map out economic development strategies; provide basic public goods; create enabling conditions to encourage private production and investment expansion and provide opportunities for popular participation at household, community and co-operative level; and protect consumers and producers against price fluctuations and taking regulatory measures to prevent shortages of basic commodities[16].

In line with the reforms many of the previous government's policies were reversed, agricultural price controls were removed, state farm assets were privatized, and implemented adjustment policies (Alemu, Oosthuizen, and van Schalkwyk 2002; MoFED 2003; OECD/PSI 2020). However, the policy continued some of the Derg policies such as it retained land as public property, leaving it essentially in the hands of the state.

The Derg's land reform of 1975 was among the most radical that had ever been attempted in the world, in which land was confiscated from 'feudal landlords' and redistributed to peasant households (Lefort 2015). While advocates of land reform may favor the institution of western-style property rights, the commoditization of land would turn the clock back to the situation before the 1974 revolution without established legal enforcement mechanisms, it was assumed it would bring the former landlords back and open up for eviction of peasants on a large scale (Cheru & Pausewang 1992), thus government used the argument to maintain the land as a public property.

6.4. Decentralization and Political Reforms

The EPRDF took power in Ethiopia in 1991 following a decade and half of armed struggle that eventually overthrew the military regime of President

[16] Transitional Period Economic Reform Program in Ethiopia: 1991-93

Mengistu. EPRDF was a coalition of four ethnic-based parties that represent the four largest ethnic groups in the country - Tigray People's Libation Front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The TPLF, the creator of the coalition, represents the winning insurgency that militarily defeated the military Marxist regime of the Derg (194-1991) (Aalen & Muriaas 2017).

The TPLF was formally one of the four equal partners but had practically dominated the EPRDF, in addition to the four EPRDF member parties running their ethnic regions including Southern Nations, Nationalities and peoples Regional State, Tigray, Amhara, and Oromo respectively, affiliated regional parties, effectively controlled by the ruling party, have been running the five other administrations (Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali and Harar). Thus, the EPRDF and its affiliates have been in control of all levels within the federated and decentralized system for the last 27 years (Ibid).

In 1991 government introduced federalism that involved a redrawing of administrative and political boundaries in the country. The 1995 Ethiopian constitution granted all nations, nationality and people in Ethiopia the right to self-determination (including the right to secession) and the right to have their own administrations and self-governments in the territory that was established based on the federal system (FDRE 1995, Article 39), while the case to the willingness to multi-national based on language types of federalism with autonomous governance has been extremely limited in Africa, with many countries fearing that recognition of such claims would further push the country into disintegration (World Bank 2013). Federal decentralization, along with democratization, and socio-economic advancement were all seen as mechanisms for the resolution of conflict and removal of its deeply rooted causes (Vaughan 2015).

Ethiopia introduced a decentralization reform in 1991, and the transition to decentralization started with the regionalization of nine autonomous regional

states along "multinational" federalism (Ayenew 2002). Along with the decentralization process government introduced democratization of its politics under a multi-party electoral system, and liberalization of the economy, in a neo-liberal international climate (Vaughan 2015). The top political leaders in the EPRDF were highly influenced by socialist ideology, in the mid- 1980s, the late prime minister of Ethiopia and the leader of the EPRDF party, "expressed an admiration for Albania as the only authentic surviving socialist state; and though he was intelligent enough to drop the model very rapidly when faced by a changing global order and the improving prospects of military victory, and has since then officially adopted market liberalism as an economic ideology, his approach to politics is thoroughly Marxist" (Clapham 2006, 116).

Hence, the early 1990s climate of political conditionality for aid and the demise of the Soviet donor bloc meant that some form of "liberal democracy" seemed to emerge as the only viable option and led the government to quickly introduce a series of charter, constitutional, and legislative provisions for multi-party competitive politics, based on regular elections to a multi-level parliamentary system (Vaughan 2015).

Ethiopia's regional decentralization after 1991 was a big push for decentralization, with a dramatic commitment to devolution instead of de-concentration or delegation (Dickovick and Wunsch 2014; World Bank 2013). The changes included the election of local politicians, the transfer of the national budget to the regions starting in 1992, the transfer of expenditures in areas such as education, health, and agriculture, and the transfer of planning and administrative responsibilities in those expenditure areas (Ibid).

Decentralization in Ethiopia had two phases; the first phase also called, mid-term (1991-2001), decentralization involved the devolution of power and authority from the national government to regional states and, the second was after 2001 when the government devolved powers and responsibilities to more than 450 districts (woreda) through District (Woreda) Level Decentralization Program (DLDP). The aims of the reform were ensuring good governance,

increasing local participation, and democratic decision-making (FDRE 2002). Overall, on the African continent, Ethiopia was considered the country that has gone farthest in the constitutional devolution of power to subnational governments based on federalism (World Bank, 2013; Aalen & Muriaas, 2017).

The impact of decentralization reforms has been understood on the architecture of repression of the EPRDF regime through the massive expansion of the local government structures and mass mobilization heavily dependent on the party apparatus, in effect extending the controlling presence of the ruling party to the grassroots (household) level and service's it provided (Harald, Lie, and Mesfin 2018) (Lie & Mesfin, 2018).

The EPRDF built subnational governments at the regional, woreda and kebele levels. In addition to woreda (districts) and kebele structures, particularly after the contested 2005 elections, in which opposition parties won nearly a third of parliamentary seats, the other local level structures took place in the country, when various administrative and political units were established below the kebele level (Aalen and Muriaas 2017; Arriola and Lyons 2016). The very local structures were established at the level of every five (5) households, each one headed by a ruling party member (Human Rights Watch 2010) Food aid extension packages and other public services were linked with party membership.

The process of decentralization has made new mechanisms for greater governmental control in and of the periphery, which resulted in , at the grassroots level, with everything is organized according to the EPRDF ideology, which made a country steered by a powerful party-driven government in which the distinction between party and state is almost impossible to define (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Vaughan, 2011; Aalen & Muriaas, 2017; Lie & Mesfin, 2018).

Concerning the decentralization reform in Ethiopia, there is a mix of two parallel political processes. On the one hand, there has been the adoption of a formally decentralized federal system granting regional and local governments and subsidiary bodies greater autonomy, with the right to self-governance and

representation at the federal level, all in a bottom-up political structure. Parallel to processes and the rhetoric of decentralization, the current government has developed structures of central control and top-down rule that can be used to dwarf local initiatives and autonomy (Lie & Mesfin, 2018)

6.5. Ethiopian Developmental State Paradigm

Initially, in terms of ideology, the EPRDF leadership was a convinced Marxist-Leninist (de Waal 2013), which was common not only to the generation of the 1970s Ethiopian young students, who had embraced the orientation of Marxism-Leninism, to create a transformed, modern socialist, and has played a key role in bringing about the revolution, but also to rural guerrilla movements throughout the world (Clapham 2018; Waal 2015).

Despite the ideological orientation of socialism, the EPRDF officially adopted market liberalism as an economic ideology. In the early 2000s, the narrative of the "developmental state" paradigm emerged, and the government committed to creating "developmental capitalism" (*lematawi habt*) (Vaughan 2015). At the same time, international development thinking shifted away from conventional neo-liberal demand for a noninterventionist 'night-watchman' state towards recognizing the need for a capable state to lead development (de Waal 2013). Since the late 1990s, there has been a growing awareness among development practitioners as well as academics that the orientation and effectiveness of the state are the critical variables explaining why some countries succeed whereas others fail in meeting development goals (Fritz and Menocal 2007).

Alex De Waal in one of his interviews with Meles Zenawi, the late prime minister of Ethiopia, notes that:

> within Ethiopian context was defined and shaped by the ideas and polices of the Meles agreed with the neo-liberals that the 'predatory state' of Africa's first post-colonial decades was one dead end but argued that allowing the market to rule was a second dead end. 'You cannot change a rent-seeking political economy just by reducing the

> size and role of the state. The neo-liberal paradigm does not allow for technological capacity accumulation, which lies at the heart of development. For that, an activist state is needed, that will allocate state rents in a productive manner (Waal 2012, 152)[17]

The developmental state concept late Prime Minister and ruling EPRDF party leader Meles Zenawi, who died in 2012. The 'developmental state' should, he argued, be obsessed with value creation, making accelerated and broad-based growth a matter of national survival. If Ethiopia could sustain its growth levels – which have been running at close to 10 percent per annum for most of the last decade – it could achieve middle-income status and escape from its trap. To succeed in this, a third element was needed, namely the hegemony of developmental discourse, in the Gramscian sense that it is an internalized set of assumptions, not an imposed order (Lefort 2015).

Accordingly, Ethiopia rapidly positioned itself among a group of emerging African states, along with Rwanda, and Uganda, that were seen as leading a process of reform designed to rectify the all-too-evident political and economic failures of the first three decades of African post-colonial independence (Clapham 2018).

Chinigò and Fantini (2015) described the Ethiopian case as the process of insertion of post-revolutionary Ethiopia into the neoliberal globalization that has been shaped by a selective adhesion to the model of the liberal democracy and free market. They analyzed the agrarian transformation in the context of global and local changes in Ethiopia's post-revolutionary historical trajectory by adopting the Thermidorian paradigm, developed by Jean-François Bayart as " a paradigm to analyze the historical trajectories of post-revolutionary elites consolidating their power in the context of the neoliberal global economy through selective and original strategies of political and economic liberalization" (Bayat 2008 as cited in Chinigo and Fantini 2015, 2).

Ethiopia managed to receive aid without compromising its policy dependence, and convincing donors that governance was 'technocratic' and

[17] Discussion, Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister's Office, Addis Ababa, 26 February 2011.

'developmental' and thus unrelated to rights (Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). Although the EPRDF regime distanced itself from the democratic ideals and policy prescriptions of neoliberal institutions and western donors, the government nonetheless became one of their most popular partners (Allo 2017). In contrast to what was termed the neo-liberal preference for a noninterventionist state, Ethiopia's political leaders argued the case for the state to actively lead the development process (Feyissa 2011; World Bank 2013). The process has known remarkable features, like significant economic growth, as indexed by GDP and foreign direct investment, and infrastructural overhaul of the country (large dams for hydroelectricity, roads, railway lines, emerging industrial parks, and large-scale agrarian plantations).

Ethiopia has been among the largest recipients of international development aid since 1991 (Human Right Watch, 2010; Feyissa, 2011; Allo, 2017; Human Right Watch 2018; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). Over the last two decades, the EPRDF government has received USD 26 billion in development aid from donor agencies, recently, it has been receiving approximately USD 3 billion in funds annually, more than a third of its annual budget (Feyissa, 2011). The Ethiopia case is often quoted as paradigmatic of the role of international ODA in sustaining the authoritarian exercise of power" (Fantini & Puddu 2016).

Much of this success has to do with Ethiopia has performed quite well on international indicators of poverty reduction and the MDGs writ large (Allo, 2017; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). These results, combined with Western geopolitics, sharing an interest in the anti-terrorism activity and the global war on terror, and regional security concerns, seem to have warranted continuous external support despite the government's less impressive performance in other areas central to the western aid discourse, such as human rights, good governance, and democratization (Feyissa, 2011; Arriola & Lyons, 2016; Human Right Watch; 2018; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). The emergence of major new actors in Africa, most notable China, has proven to be another significant factor in shaping Western donors' attitudes towards political conditionality in the region (de Walle 2016).

Hence, the political economy of contemporary Ethiopia has been shaped by the architecture of state federalism with the EPRDF's twin commitments to revolutionary democracy and the developmental state (Vaughan 2015). The EPRDF's version of a revolutionary democracy was founded on the idea that "a vanguard party should rule on the basis of representing the people, knowing their concerns and needs, and engaging these based on the party's own overarching ideology with obscure boundaries between the governing party and the state" (Lie & Mesfin 2018, 1). Lefort (2015) argued as the EPRDF retained the image of a "vanguard party", it made the party the one and only organization with the legitimacy and capacity to take the fundamental decisions in any field, including that of the economy.

The expansion and fusion between the state and party over the years has resulted a country steered by a powerful party-driven government in which the distinction between party and state is almost impossible to define (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Vaughan, 2011; Aalen & Muriaas, 2017; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). the Ethiopian government holds the main role or a monopolistic position in key economic sectors like finance, telecommunication and energy, and retains control of the agricultural inputs (land, fertilizers, credit). Though the regime stated at its inception that the economy should be "driven by market forces", in reality, these "market forces" have been led and operated by one force, the party-state. After the "command economy" of the Derg, a kind of "party-state led economy" was put in place (Lefort 2015).

6.6. Economic Policy as Related to Agriculture and Food Security

In the 1990s Ethiopian government laid out a key strategic vision, designed and executed macro-economic reform along with changes in development strategy. The changes were aimed to ensure coherence between overall macroeconomic reform and agricultural development strategy for the realization of poverty reduction and economic growth. The initial reform was based on the theoretical assumptions of the 'Food Policy Approach' (Timmer, Falcon, and

Pearson 1983), as it shows the importance of change in macro-economic and sectoral policies and its results on the decision-making process of food producers, food consumers, and food marketing agents in order to further social objectives (MoFED 2003).

The macroeconomic reform involved some changes in market orientation, privatization, and devaluation of exchange value. Parallel to that government designed food security strategy and agricultural extension system. Thus, in line with the changes in economic policy, agriculture was identified as the main pillar of Ethiopia's economy, to provide the country with employment, foreign exchange, raw material for industry and food for the population. The government emphasized the significance of achieving agricultural development for overall economic development and poverty reduction in rural areas. Hence, development strategy known as Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy was devised to provide an all-embracing framework for attaining the given objectives of development.

The adoption of ADLI provided a long-term development framework for economic transformation that changed the country's development strategy from industry-led growth to agriculture-led growth. ADLI was also an overarching and rolling developmental framework that underpins agricultural development and advances industrialization strategy, a two-wheeled vehicle (Diriba 2018; Ohno 2009).

According to Ohno, Ethiopia's ADLI was defined as the development strategy that aims to achieve initial industrialization through robust agricultural growth and close linkage between the agricultural and the industrial sector (Ohno 2009). Agriculture and industry are brought into a single framework of development, wherein the development of agriculture is viewed as an important vehicle for industrialization by providing a market base and not simply as a source of raw material and capital accumulation.

A series of development plans and programs have been designed and implemented since 2000: The Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction

Program (SDPRP) which was implemented from 2001 through to 2004 (including Interim Poverty Reduction Program); this was followed by the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) implemented from 2004/5 to 2009/10; and the two successive Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I and II), that lasted from 2010 to 2020. Although the PRSP process started in 2000 as a process largely between government and donors, the government of Ethiopia remarked that it has evolved beyond that, and the PASDEP and successive GTP I and II have been considered as a national development plan to guide all development activities since 2005. For the most part, all of the national development plans and programs were guided by the ADLI framework (OECD/PSI 2020) (OECD), thus ADLI was considered as an evolving development strategy subject to pragmatic experimentation and adjustment rather than an immutable principle (Ohno 2009).

6.7. Policy Priority: Smallholder Agriculture and Food Self-sufficiency (1990s until early 2000s)

The EPRDF regime came to power with the peasantry as its principal political alliance, hence, the regime was strongly committed to the improvement of smallholder agriculture. This commitment was spelt out in the policy framework issued in the 1990s and early 2000s. The government highlighted the limitation of the previous regime's export-led and import substitution strategies and emphasized its policy focus towards the improvements of peasant farms (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2003).

Therefore, considering the former regime's policy failure, the government moved Ethiopia's development vision away from the previously centrally planned industrial development and towards a new agricultural-led development approach. In the 1990s government policy document, peasant agriculture recognized as a key to poverty reduction, food self-sufficiency and Ethiopia's development. The focus of the strategy was a "broad-based growth process

involving smallholder farmers" (MoFED 2000,7). This targeted to ensure food security of peasants, collectively and individually.

According to official data in 1995/96, an estimated 45.5 percent of the population at the national level, 47 percent in rural areas and 32 percent in urban areas were below the poverty line measured in terms of food consumption, set at a minimum nutrition requirement of 2,200 calories per adult per day, and also including non-food consumption requirements (MoFED 2000). Hence, the EPRDF government designed a national development strategy called Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) to address the stated chronic food security problem in Ethiopia.

Trends in Food Poverty Head Count Indices (%)

Location	**1995/96**	**1999/2000**
Rural	47	41
Urban	32	47
Total	45	42

(FDRE 2002)

The EPRDF government have maintained that the increase in agricultural production and economic growth, provided the only solution for Ethiopian food and development challenges. Accordingly, ADLI asserted that Ethiopia's economic development and structural transformation should be initiated through robust agricultural growth, and peasant farmers and pastoralists should be the main agents of agricultural transformation and economic growth.

The main justification for ADLI was that Ethiopia's main and abundant resources are labor and land, and that the bulk of the population (over 85%) lives in rural areas earning a livelihood from the land and agriculture. On the other hand, since there was not adequate capital and technology, therefore, Ethiopia's rural development strategy was aimed to utilize the combination of land with intensive labour efficiently and effectively in order to generate rapid and

sustainable development.[18] Within agriculture, the predominant focus was on smallholder farmers with more emphasis to crop production.

The EPRDF government affirmed that the only sustainable solution for Ethiopia's national food self-sufficiency and household-level food security should emerged from agricultural growth, except in drought years. Accordingly, *"the medium to long-term target is to reduce the absolute size of the food insecure rural population substantially as to exit from aid"* (MoFED 2000,9). While food aid and relief considered as a temporary solution, as it stated, in the short run, the objective was to rely on the fiscal transfer of resources to support relatively small numbers of food-deficit households (FDRE 2000).

Furthermore, the policy aimed to address food insecurity at the household level, it was indicated that *"for the country as a whole, tackling food insecurity at the household level is, arguably, the most effective and direct way of poverty reduction"* (MoFED 2000,9). This was reaffirmed in the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) in 2002,

> "for some countries, economic growth is the primary policy goal, and poverty reduction is to be achieved through measures complementary to growth. This is not the approach of the Ethiopian government. Economic growth is the principal but not the only means to this objective" (FDRE 2002, 1).

ADLI was aimed to serve as the policy framework for overall development, thus both ADLI and rural development policy asserted their objectives which involved; the attainment of national food self-sufficiency, productivity enhancement of smallholder agriculture and agriculture-based industrial development using raw materials and labor-intensive technology for structural transformation. Also, ADLI embraced market orientation as an important driver of agricultural development. The 2002 Ethiopia food security strategy was designed to ensure food security at the household level within the ADLI policy framework. The 2002 Ethiopian food security strategy included three basic pillars namely: increasing the availability of food through increased domestic

[18] An Economic Development Strategy for Ethiopia (1994) Amharic version

production; ensuring access to food for food-deficit households, and to strengthening emergency response capabilities.

Hence, under the ADLI framework, peasant agriculture was expected to provide the country with food self-sufficiency, and also serve as the engine of growth for the whole economy (Rahmato 2013). The government of Ethiopia was to enhance these efforts by providing new technology packages and improved farming practices, which were to be disseminated through extension systems and a network of development agents established at kebele level throughout the rural areas.

To that end, the program under ADLI entailed three main strategies: expansion of agricultural technologies; investment in agricultural infrastructure, including inputs; and boosting rural non-agricultural sectors. The government of Ethiopia (GoE) heavily invested in extension programs and introduced the Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES). PADETES was used to distribute fertilizers, seeds, and credit, as well as to spread information on better agricultural practices, to smallholder farmers (OECD/PSI 2020).

According to the first poverty reduction program document prepared by the government in 2002, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP 2002, v), the agricultural development program involved:

> provided menu-based extension packages to enhance farmers' choice of technologies; expansion of borrowers' coverage of micro-financing institutions; establishing an institute for diploma-level training of extension agents and expand agricultural Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET); measures for the improved functioning of markets for agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seed) and outputs; organize, strengthen and diversify autonomous cooperatives to provide better marketing services and serve as bridges between small farmers (peasants) and the non-peasant private sector; increased agricultural research, water harvesting, and small-scale irrigation).

This government's investment in the development of smallholders won the regime initial support from smallholder farmers who hoped to get preferential access to agricultural inputs and other related services (Berhanu and Poulton 2014).

Lefort notes that the government based its development policies on the "13 million smallholders involved in subsistence farming and, in particular, the 'poor farmers' who made up the vast majority"(Lefort 2012, 681). While poor farmers were viewed as the political power base of the regime, it is not surprising that EPRDF's major policy framework was putting the peasantry at the center. By supporting the peasant class government assumed to establish a strong economic and pollical base. Many observers argued that the regime's motivation was perhaps more political than economic. In a country where "the industrial proletariat had always been a tiny minority", the EPRDF could not base its rule on anybody but the most numerous and poorest class in the country, the class which had been most exploited, and which had given its blood to overthrow the Derg, the peasant class ((Lefort 2015, 363; Diriba 2018).

6.8. Ethiopian Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program

Although the ADLI strategy was formulated in the mid- 1990s, a series of implementations has been started especially in the 2000s. The first expression of ADLI in the form of a medium-term economic program was made in 2002 when the government incorporated the main ideas of ADLI into the poverty reduction strategy paper, or the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) 2002/03-2004/05. With the initiatives of the World Bank and the IMF, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), were prepared for reducing poverty in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Thus, integrating with the World Bank poverty reduction strategy, and the Millennium development goals, the SDPRP was designed as a pro-poor strategy with poverty reduction as the core objective of the government (FDRE 2002)(FDRE 2002, 26). The overarching objective was to reduce poverty by

enhancing rapid economic growth while at the same time maintaining macroeconomic stability.

SDPRP (FDRE 2002, 26) articulated that at the most general level, pro-poor can be defined as a strategy which: *a) rejects a 'growth is sufficient' approach in which all emphasis is placed on economic growth and poverty addressed through so-called safety nets (if at all); and b) replaces this with a strategy explicitly designed to change the distribution of the gains from growth. Growth with equity is the optimal strategy for Ethiopia.*

The SDPRP consisted of four strategic pillars namely: Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), the justice system and civil service reform, decentralization and empowerment, and capacity building in public and private sectors. Such a four-pronged approach was believed to be effective in the fight against poverty and ensure sustainable development (FDRE 2002).

The major emphasis was given to ADLI, the agricultural sector being the primary source of the country's livelihood. Furthermore, the policy indicated that the agricultural sector had the potential to generate a primary surplus to fuel the growth of the industrial sector as well as other sectors of the economy. By the end of the plan period, agriculture investment accounted for 10 % of the government's annual expenditure, which conforms to CAADP's commitment. The most significant expenditure allocation, however, was to the education sector which grew from 14% at the beginning of the plan to 20% at the end of the plan year. This was followed by health and water sanitation expenditure (Diriba 2018, 244).

6.9. Policy Priority: Economic Growth and Agricultural Commercialization: Since 2005

In 2005/06 government released a new plan document that indicated a shift of policy in favor of large-scale agriculture and foreign investment. A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/06-2009/10) represents the second round of the poverty reduction strategy program

(PRSP) process since 2002. PASDEP was built on the foundation laid by the SDPRP. PASDEP carried forward important strategic directions that had been pursued under the previous plan (SDPRP), relating to infrastructure, human development, food security program, and capacity building but also pursued some new directions. PASDEP asserted the priority of the government's policy to capture the private initiative of farmers and support diversification and commercialization.

It states that one of the eight pillars of the government's development strategy is 'a massive push' for accelerated growth. The growth acceleration initiative was grounded on two main thrusts: "commercialization of agriculture and accelerated private sector development" (MoFED 2006, 46).

Now government prioritized economic growth with a particular emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture and the enhancement of private sector development, industry, and urban development. The fundaments of the agricultural strategy included a direction to provide a major effort to the intensification of marketable farm products, both for domestic and export markets, the shift to produce high valued crops, promoting niche high-value export crops, a special focus on selected high-potential areas, facilitating the commercialization of agriculture, supporting the development of large-scale commercial agriculture where it is feasible, and better integrating farmers with markets, both locally and globally (MoFED 2006).

The (PASDEP) document notes that:

> Development of agricultural products for export will be identified and promoted and utmost efforts will be made to penetrate into the international market by producing products that meet the standards of international trade. The government identified the main agricultural products that will receive special focus and follow up during the plan period that include cereals, oilseeds, pulse, fiber crops, fruits, vegetables, coffee, tea, and spices crops (MoFED 2006, 47).

Since large-scale agriculture became at the center of policy, the government provided different initiatives to support them. The first measure was the initiative

to strengthen the institutional framework to attract foreign capital and to enable them to engage in agriculture. Incentives are provided for investors to encourage the flow of investment into the country. This was supported by the provision of the investment proclamation of 2002 (amended in 2003), and regulations. Any investment project that exported more than 50 percent of its output, was eligible for income tax exemption for five years or more, also, investors were allowed to import all capital goods, construction materials and free of customs duty (Rahmato 2013).

Foreign capital was expected to benefit the country's agricultural development through (Rahmato 2013, 97):

i) enable the country to produce export crops and hence increase the country's foreign earnings, and to expand production of crops needed for agro-industry such as cotton and sugar cane; ii) create employment opportunities in the localities concerned; iii) benefit local communities through the construction of infrastructure and social assets such as health posts, schools and access to clean water; iv) provide the opportunity for technology transfers; and v) promote energy security. Though there was no evidence that many of these objectives have been met (Diriba 2018).

Although ADLI remained a general policy framework, the strategy shifted its focus towards the expansion of industrialization. The GTP I, document prepared by the government indicated the direction, "*the agricultural sector continues to be the major source of economic growth. Industrial growth will be given particular focus. Industrial expansion will be promoted based on both export-oriented and import-substituting industries*" (MoFED 2010,8).

To achieve the development objectives, the government planned to increase the share of exports to GDP from 10.5 in 2009/10 to increase between 31.2 to 35.8 percent by the end of 2014/15 (MoFED 2010). Hence, the government's large-scale agriculture policy was driven by the priority of exports and foreign earnings, and agriculture to serve for industrialization (Rahmato 2013).

The focus on industrialization and the role played by the innovative, model farmers, and private sector in agriculture have replaced the mass smallholder, and peasant farming. While targeting to increase agricultural production and the "smallholder agriculture will continue to be the major sources of agricultural growth" (MoFED 2010, 20) but "the agricultural strategy will direct on placing major effort to support the intensification of marketable farm products both for domestic and export markets, and by small and large farmers, and the commercialization of small farming will continue" (MoFED 2010, 8).

The early 1990s target to bring food security and self-sufficiency to the peasants individually and collectively now became secondary. Thus, the first growth and transformation plan prepared by the government (GTP I, 9) stated that "*agriculture will be transformed to high growth path in order to ensure the food security challenge of the country".*

The First and Second Growth and Transformation Plan GTP I & II (2010/11-2014/15; 2015/16-2019/20)

The first Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I) followed PASDEP. It was implemented from 2010-2014/15 and carried forward strategic directions laid out during the prior planning phase. The GTP I document reiterated that since 2003/04, the economy had shifted to a higher growth trajectory and the growth momentum has been sustained during the PASDEP period (2005/06-2009/10).

Government documents indicated that infrastructure development and social services have expanded, and the involvement of private investors and the community, in general, has reached its encouraging level. Thus, the Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I) was directed towards achieving Ethiopia's long-term vision of becoming middle-income economy by 2025 and sustaining rapid and broad-based economic growth.

GTP I was committed to building an economy which had a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector that played a leading role in the economy. It was to sustain economic

development and secure social justice, increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach the level of those in middle-income countries through sustained rapid and broad-based economic growth, building on best practices and resolving the challenges of previous planning phases (MoFED 2010).

The major objectives of the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I), included:

> "Maintaining at least an average real GDP growth rate of 11% and meet the Millennium Development goals, expanding and ensuring the qualities of education and health services thereby achieving the MDGs in the social sectors, establish favorable conditions for sustainable state-building through the creation of stable democratic and developmental state; ensure growth sustainability by realizing all the above objectives within a stable macroeconomic framework" (MoFED 2010, 7).

Similarly, the overarching objective of the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) was the realization of Ethiopia's vision of becoming a lower-middle-income country by 2025. Thus, GTP II aimed to achieve an annual average real GDP growth rate of 11 percent within a stable macroeconomic environment while at the same time pursuing aggressive measures towards rapid industrialization and structural transformation.

The second Growth and Transformation Plan (2015/16-2019/20) was also considered to be an important vehicle for Ethiopia's development. Modernization in the development of the agriculture sector, expansion of industrial development with a primary focus on light manufacturing, and a significant shift in export development were at the core of GTPII. GTPII was an important milestone towards realizing Ethiopia's vision of becoming a lower-middle-income country by 2025.

6.9.1. Agricultural and Rural Development Policy Since the 2000s

The EPRDF government development policy was aimed to achieve accelerated and sustained economic growth with the vision to achieve middle income-countries by 2025. To achieve the objectives government introduced three areas of agricultural development that included smallholder agriculture

development, pastoral development and the private sector for agricultural development. The first was to help farmers to transform from the traditional to commercialization sector, to realize this "*extension system will be strengthened"* (MoFED 2010, 20).

The focus of the plan for smallholder agriculture development was, increasing productivity of smallholder farmers within a short period of time by utilizing smallholders' labour, land and improved agricultural practices and technologies, this implemented through the scaling up strategy. The scaling up strategy have been focused on "the transfer of improved agricultural technologies that proved to be valuable, after being tested by model farmers, to other farmers in the shortest possible time" (MoFED 2010, 20).

Within the smallholder commercialization plan, priority was given to successful smallholders, it was aimed to capture the private initiative of farmers so as to intensify marketable farm products (MoFED 2006). This reflected the official division of the smallholder farming population into two unequally sized groups, on the one side is the small elite of farmers, who have to be recruited as a "model farmer", and as a ruling party member (Lefort 2012, 681). The support of the public authorities and extension packages was focused on them (Berhanu and Poulton 2014; Planel 2014). On the other side are the mass poor peasants (Lefort 2012).

The Food Security Program (FSP) was designed for the majority of less successful smallholder farmers and most food insecure people. The GTP document highlighted that the implementation of the Food Security Program (FSP) has started to yield results, thus "the implementation will be continued in the moisture deficit areas because the areas are known for their food insecurity problems" (MoFED 2010, 23). The program is composed of four main components: the Productive Safety-Net Program (PSNP); the Household Asset Building Program (HABP); the Complementary Community Investment (CCI); and the Resettlement component. The safety net program was considered to implement jointly with the household asset building program to address the

natural resources degradation problem. Agricultural extensions to these areas are provided through this food security program.

Every year more than 8 million peasants depend on safety nets, despite governments plan to progress towards graduation, in 2008, only 56, 895 households had graduated from the PSNP scheme (Ministry of Agricultural Development 2009).

> "By targeting those safety net beneficiaries who are involved in the household asset building component and by giving them support for business plan preparation, training, technology supply, credit and extension they will be able to ensure them food security" (MoFED 2010, 23).

This reflected that the only option for less successful and food insecure farmers could be to join non-farm activities in rural and urban informal sectors. Farmers and pastoralists were encouraged to shift gradually from the production of low-value to high-value products, taking into account of geography differences and the existence of favourable market and infrastructural factors. Livestock development was promoted to benefit the pastoralist (MoFED 2010).

For the private sector, agricultural and rural development policy explicitly stated that the *"private investors can participate in the nations agricultural development endeavors"* (MoFED 2010, 25). As a result of those efforts, floriculture has become one of the export earners. In the "private sector, the investment to develop agriculture will be directed as situations of various land permits2 (Ibid).

Accordingly, since the 2000s, the EPRDF's development strategy was based on a hybrid model that kept together the notion of a developmental state with the neoliberal logics of market efficiency, which the dichotomy of geographical patterns that entrenched in the country's historical development program's implementation (Fantini & Puddu 2016).

The land policy was an important instrument in the process of promoting commercial farms as a way of modernizing and transforming the agricultural sector of the country (Alemu 2018). The agrarian policy proposed two strategies,

in the lowland areas where land is believed to be idle or inefficiently exploited, the government is directly undertaking or indirectly encouraging large-scale investments in commercial agriculture to increase the production of food crops and raw materials (Ayele et al. 2020; Lavers 2013). The farms focused on three areas; export-oriented food crops including rice and maize; biofuel crops including palm oil and caster beans; and industrial crops, notably sugar cane and cotton (Dessalegn Rahmato 2014).

On the contrary, polices recognized the role of smallholder farmers in the highland regions, where smallholders constitute the main power base of the ruling party, the regime deeply committed to the welfare or peasantry, on whose support its own triumph in the war against the Derg rested (Chinigo & Fantini 2015; Clapham 2019).

In the GTP document it was stated that;

> In the highlands and areas close to major cities, the private investment activities will be centered on high value horticulture products that can be produced on limited land, using abundant labor, thus generating large employment as well as supply for export. Such type of agricultural private investment requires tremendous basic infrastructure expansion and supply of labor. Such agricultural development can be integrated with farmers' agriculture, through out growers scheme. This provides sustainable markets for the smallholder farmers (MoFED 2010,25).

The focus was to bring rural and agricultural transformation within a small holding system and food security through the implementation of the Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) program which entailed extension system and distribution of modern agricultural packages.

While the government intended to attract investors to invest in the countryside, commercial investors in crop and animal husbandry did not pursue putting their capital in remote Ethiopia (Diriba 2018). Large-scale commercial agriculture by means of involving the private sector was promoted on what the government defines as "unused land", while the notion of "unused land is largely constructed (Chinigo & Fantini 2015).

Diriba argued that farmers were removed from the land and their property taken over by the elites at auction prices in millions of dollars. The EPRDF and its elites had become the new 'feudal landlords' of 21st-century Ethiopia (Diriba 2018). Under the Ethiopian land policy land is state property and land users have only use rights over the land, this guaranteed the government to remove landholders from the land If it decides that the land is needed for 'public purposes or significant projects.

In the GTP document, the government stated that,

> "over 3 million hectares of land will be identified, prepared and, ensuring it will be used for the desired development purpose, will be transferred to investors and in so doing tangible support will also be given to private investors to enhance their investment in commercial agriculture (MoFED 2010, 26).

As a part of the government plan (GTP), multifaceted and integrated support was offered to investors with landholdings as high as 100, 000 hectares out of the 3.1 million hectares of land suitable for investment. Nevertheless, some agreements and projects were not successful (Baye 2017).

Baye (2017, 427) observes the case of one investment in Ethiopia,

> "…Karuturi Global, an India-based agricultural company, had taken out on 100,000 acres of farmland in 2010. The company sought to invest in palm oil and food crop production, it promised jobs, technology transfer and new infrastructure to the local communities. However, these promises were reported to have gone largely unfulfilled. Hence, it failed to meet the agreement. It paid a low rental rate to the government for the lands used, and many of the peasants that occupied the land were not compensated for the land they lost. Karuturi developed only 1200 acres of land and hence the

> Ethiopian government cancelled its agreement, similarly the license of other investors also cancelled".

Fantini comments that the economic transformation promoted by EPRDF development strategies may have an impact in "increasing diversification and stratification within Ethiopian society, once traditionally divided between an overwhelming majority of rural poor and a tiny economic elite connected to the political power" (Fantini 2013,6). This contributed to neglecting the need for food security at the policy level and practices. While the government emphasized on promoting large-scale commercial farms with limited success, smallholder farmers were facing increasing land constraints due to a growing population and poor land governance. The agricultural policies in Ethiopia were constantly limited to its lack of strategies to transform peasant farms, and to establish a synergy between peasant farms to commercial large-scale farms. Even though Ethiopian development policies committed to commercialization and encouraged the farmers to seize the market opportunities, they did not give adequate attention to the improvements of land tenure security for peasants, access to roads and proximity to cities or towns, and access to finance and agricultural inputs.

6.9.2. Agricultural Extension Program and Ethiopian Peasants

The success of ADLI's strategy was to be dependent on the continued and expanded use of agricultural packages by farmers. Under ADLI's framework extension system remained a critical tool, and it was considered as the main vehicle for the transformation of peasant agriculture. Hence, over the past 20 years, Ethiopia has invested in smallholder agriculture and agricultural extension services (Berhanu and Poulton 2014).

Ethiopia was one of only four African countries to have met its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) commitment to allocating ten percent of annual government expenditures to the agricultural sector (G. Berhane et al. 2018b). The evident goal of the agricultural

extension was to help farmers to overcome agriculture-related constraints by persuading them to adopt/adapt and use innovations (Leta et al. 2017, 1) .

With approximately 21 development agents (DAs) per 10,000 farmers, and even more in the high-potential areas, according to government data, Ethiopia has considered a leading country globally in the provision of extension services to farmers and has the highest extension agent to farmer ratio of any country (Abebe and Hailemariam 2018).

The National Strategy for Ethiopia's Agricultural Extension System (2014, iii) states that:

> "The government of Ethiopia firmly believes that an effective and efficient extension system must play an important role in bringing about agricultural growth and transformation by facilitating adoption and utilization of yield- and quality-increasing agricultural technologies".

Initially, the government's extension program targeted food crops, and however from the early 2000s extension packages have prioritized high-value crops, with the support of donors. While the government claimed that Ethiopia witnessed an improvement in agricultural output because of the implementation of extensions program (Berhanu and Poultan 2014). Some argued that the improvements in production was not the direct benefit from the extension program, rather it was attributable to the expansion of the areas of cultivation and good weather (Abbink 2017; Rahmato 2008).

In the 1990s the ADLI policy framework asserted peasant agriculture to be a provider of agricultural surplus for industry, national self-sufficiency in food, commodities for domestic and export markets, and a foundation for overall national economic growth. For the achievement of these national development objectives government employed dissemination of technological packages, however, the peasant sector failed to bring structural transformation in the country, and this contributed to the replacement of the mass peasant farmers with the promotion of innovative private sectors. The result of the policy in terms of

ensuring food security and improving the wellbeing of the smallholder farmers has been limited.

This neoliberal policy and a desire to reduce development to a technique, accompanied with the government's commitment to transform peasant agriculture into commercialization through technology dissemination did not envisage structural changes to the rural economy (Planel 2014; Rahmato 2013). While the success of the strategy was depended on the uptake of new technologies by peasants and the increased effort of farming households, hence immense expectations were placed on the shoulders of smallholders, "most of whom were burdened with deep poverty, persistent food insecurity and tiny and uneconomic landholdings" (Rahmato 2013, 94).

The policy emphasized addressing the persistent food problem in Ethiopia, by disseminating of technological inputs and increasing agricultural output, but without addressing structural challenges, linking industrial development to agriculture, and without providing incentives for smallholder famers. Diriba (2018) argues that the policy objective that aimed to make agriculture products competitive on the international markets has been inherently contradictory as ox-plough agriculture and thinly sprinkled use of chemical fertilizer and seed packages were not able to compete with the productivity of agriculture elsewhere in the world. How to expect Ethiopian peasant farms to become internationally competitive and benefited from the market is still a question. By endorsing the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's approach to market-orientation, government viewed the Ethiopian peasants as a market competitor sector without adequate investments (Rahmato 2013).

The main traction power for farmers in Ethiopia, such as farm oxen were not evenly distributed in the rural areas, some data showed that more than a third of farmers did not own any farm oxen at all, and another third owned only one ox per household (Rahmato 2008). Furthermore, in order to access agricultural inputs farmers needed cash, and credit service from microfinance institutions, however, farmers' access to both financial institutions and inputs required them

to provide assets and collateral, which farmers in Ethiopia were challenged to provide. These farmers' limited access to credit, impeded technology adoption by resource-poor farmers (Leta et al. 2017). Even though the challenges needed investment, the government did not provide incentives or any form of price subsidy for new technology inputs or other financial mechanisms (Rahmato 2013). Some observers notes the limitation of government incentives for smallholder farmers, and the policy gap to benefit the sector as well as governments limitation to bridge smallholders and agribusinesses, and encouraging smallholder to engage in agribusinesses (Seife Ayele et al. 2019).

Moreover, despite government commitment to transform smallholder subsistence agriculture to commercial agricultural, lack of land ownership, underinvestment in microcredit facilities, and a lack of competition in input provision and markets limit farmer's willingness to risk land improvements required for increased productivity did not consider though (Abebe and Hailemariam 2018). For famers in low-income countries as in the case in Ethiopia, the problem is not only about getting access to package technology to produce cash crops, but also about lack of rural infrastructure, and farmers access to the market. In Ethiopia despite the government's effort to expand physical infrastructure, it remained vastly limited and most smallholders remained outside of road networks. Throughout the country, the population is more concentrated along major road networks, although much of Ethiopia's population remains remote: "45 percent of the population lives more than five hours from a city of 50,000" (Schmidt and Kedir 2009 quoted in G. Berhane et al. 2018a, 3). In this case investing to increase the number of agricultural extension workers may less contributed to the improvement of agricultural and food security of the peasants. According to Berhane et al (2018) a large number of farmers within a given area continues to be difficult for development agents. While the market-oriented policies assumed that farmers are more likely to make an income from commercial farming if they live near in area with good markets, nevertheless they did not consider the fact that, these commercial options are not available for the majority of farmers.

The top-down, authoritarian approach which embedded in the Ethiopian policy formulation and implementation process has been another challenge for the improvement of the agricultural sector and farmers. Planel notes that small-scale farmers have traditionally had very little say in policy formulation and limited means of expressing their own priorities and preferences against a backdrop of a strong state presence at the local level (Planel 2014). At the local level the implementation of development policies in Ethiopia operated as an instrument of power that reinforces the local disempowerment of the most vulnerable peasants (Planel 2014).

Furthermore, the implementation of the extension program in Ethiopia is featured the classical model of technology transfer adopted in the past, farmers are compelled to adopt new practices recommended as 'one-size-fits-all' often with little consideration of socioeconomic and diversity of ecological and agronomic variations across the country (Leta et al. 2017, 1).Farmers in effect had no choice, nor did they have a say in the selection of technologies they were provided, as well as the procedure for distributing fertilizer to farmers lacks transparency (Rahmato 2008). This contributed to the vulnerability of farmers to unnecessary debt, and farmers could end up selling their assets to discharge the debt.

Although some argue that Ethiopia's major investment in an agricultural extension under the EPRDF government has been driven by twin objectives, the first was "to enhance the productivity and production" capacity of smallholder farmers so as to stimulate broad-based growth, the second unstated objective was to "extend the political control" of the EPRDF throughout the country, including mobilizing support around election time (Berhanu and Poulton 2014, 5197).

In the 2014 government document entitled National Strategy for Ethiopia's Agricultural Extension System, the government recognized the limitations of the system, despite efforts to make the extension system effective and efficient, the system is not producing the desired results. Many yield and quality improving technologies have been generated in the agricultural sector, but they are not

reaching smallholder farmers. Equally the agricultural sector is not reaching its full potential in terms of attaining food self-sufficiency and reducing poverty. The failure could be attributed, among others, to poor implementation and insufficient strategic interventions to overcome system-wide bottlenecks.

Study shows that access to the agricultural extension system increased the adoption of modern inputs such as chemical fertilizers (primarily), improved seeds, herbicides, and irrigation. Moreover, the use of these modern inputs, as well as row-planting, increased productivity levels significantly. However, it does not directly increase productivity levels other than indirectly through its effects on the increased adoption of modern inputs. These results are plausible, given that Ethiopia's AES system is geared toward conveying these inputs to farmers and has limited capability to convey critical knowledge-based support to farmers (Berhane et al 2018, 25). While the expansion of extension program is significant it should consider the overall historical environmental context of Ethiopian agriculture and peasants. Overall, Ethiopia has been implemented agricultural extension service since the imperial period with limited success. They intended to resolve historically and systematically marginalized sectors with the dissemination of technical inputs without altering the system. To be effectively utilized the extension system in Ethiopia, the design and implementation of the program should be contextualized and unpacked in the context of Ethiopian agriculture and peasants. Moreover, the peasants should be in the driving seat and owned the programs and engaged in the development and governance process.

CHAPTER VII
FAMINE AND FOOD INSECURITY IN ETHIOPIA

7.1. Introduction

Ethiopia possesses rich natural endowments including large size and relatively fertile agricultural lands in the western and southern parts of the country, water resources including the Blue Nile, and its human resources, over 80 % of its total population is engaged in agriculture. Theoretically, with the abundant resources, Ethiopia must have been the breadbasket of the horn of the Africa region.

Although it was not uncommon in the 1960s and 70s to speak of Ethiopia as having the potential to be the breadbasket of the Middle East (Desalegn Rahmato 1988). In one of his speeches, Emperor Haile Selassie stated Ethiopia's agricultural potential as follows:

> "……. our country capable of providing food grains not only for her own increasing population but also for the outside world…we have not the slightest doubt that Ethiopia will be able to produce sufficient and enough to provide many countries with food grains. This has been our strong belief all along" (Haile Selassie 1967, 658).

Despite the assumptions and indeed a country's abundant resources, however, Ethiopia is one of the poorest and most food insecure countries in the world with millions waiting for food aid from the donor community and experienced frequent devastating famines. The country's agricultural sector became unable to feed its rapidly growing population.

Food insecurity[19] is not new in Ethiopia, a country that has experienced frequent food shortages since the 1960s and large-scale famines[20] in both the 1970s and the 1980s, which resulted in a depletion of household assets and savings and caused excess mortality.

The estimated deaths from these famines vary, but commonly cited numbers are an estimation of 250,000 deaths in 1972–74 and 600,000 in 1984–85 (P. Dorosh and Rashid 2012; Dessalegn Rahmato, Pankhurst, and Uffelen 2013); De Wall 2018). Recently in 1999–2000, 2002–2003, and in 2015/2016, Ethiopia suffered wide-scale humanitarian crises, triggered in part by drought but ultimately caused by a variety of factors, both domestic and international (Devereux 2006).

Table 3. Major Famines and food Crises Events and Death Tolls in Ethiopia

Date	**Affected areas**	**National Population**		**Death toll**	**Attributed causes and severity**
1957-58	Tigray and Wollo	23.2 million		100,000	Rain failure in 1957. Locusts and epidemic in 1958.
1964-66	Tigray and Wollo	27 million		50, 000	Not properly documented, but some writers have argued that this crisis was worse than that in 1972–74.
1972-74	Ethiopia	31.5 million		200,000 and 50 percent of livestock lost in Tigray and Wollo	A sequence of rain failures.
1984-5	Ethiopia	40 million		600,000-1,000,000	A sequence of rain failures. Eight million affected; an estimated 1 million dead, and

[19] FAO defined food insecurity as a situation that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life. It may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution or inadequate use of food at the household level. Food insecurity, poorconditions of health and sanitation and inappropriate care and feeding practices are the major causes of poor nutritional status. Food insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory.

[20] FAO defines famine as extreme scarcity of food (FAO 2012)

					much livestock loss.
1990-92	Northern, eastern, and southwestern Ethiopia				Rain failure and regional conflicts. An estimated 4 million people suffered food shortage.
1993-94	Tigray, Wollo, Addis Ababa				Due to droughts, 4 million people required food assistance, including demobilized army and Somali refugees. New droughts.
1997-2000	Northern Tigray				Localized food shortages due to conflict.
1999-2000	Somalia region	69 million		19,900	Food security crisis due to rain failures and decline in prices of livestock, the main source of pastoralists' income.
2002-3	Ethiopia	71 million		Thousands	Drought-induced crop shortages; 12.6 million people were affected.
2008-09	Southern Ethiopia				Localized drought; 6.4 million people were affected.
2015-16		99 million		Near zero	El Nino effect (drought): more than 10 million people affected

Source: (Rahmato 2009 ; Dorosh and Rashid 2012; De Wall (2018); Graham, Rashid, Malek. 2012)

Thus, hunger[21] and food shortages have been endemic in rural Ethiopia for countless generations, nevertheless, it was until the mid-1970s, following the fall

[21] FAO defines hunger (synonymous with undernourishment): as a state, lasting for at least one year, of inability to acquire enough food, defined as a level of food intake insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements.

of the imperial regime and its replacement by the military government (Derg) that food security became a concern in public policy discourse, and a variety of program initiatives were put in place to tackle the problems of food shortages and hunger in Ethiopia (Rahmato et al., 2013:xxv).

The perpetual nutritional failures that have plagued Ethiopia since the early 1960s have significantly influenced regime survival. In the late twentieth century, major famines were a significant threat to government power. For instance, the 1973 mass starvation in Wollo led to a fatal loss of legitimacy by the monarchical regime that was then overthrown through a popular revolution in 1974.

Similarly, the famine of 1984/5 has also significantly undermined the Marxist regime by displaying its failures to the international community and subsequently contributing to its downfall in 1991. As a result, the EPRDF regime that replaced the Derg removed the condition of mass starvation and famine from the realm of human security to the high politics of national security.

To avoid a bad image that follows massive droughts that lead to a complete consumption and asset collapse leading to high rates of human (and livestock) mortality, the EPRDF came up with several strategies and institutions. In response to this historical pattern, key political actors within Ethiopia and beyond have focused their concerns on the acute phase of famine as a discrete event with clear political consequences.

Despite rapid population growth estimated at 23 million in 1958 to more than 109 million in 2018 (UNECA and FAO 2018) also the persistent food insecurity in the country, the government has managed to avoid large-scale famines and reduce the number of death due to food shortages. In 2003, following significant rains shortages, more than 13 million people required assistance and chronic malnutrition stood at approximately 52% (MoARD. 2009).

In the same year, the government launched a large-scale consultation process called the New Coalition for Food Security and adopted a food security

program (FSP) and subsequently incorporated it into its poverty reduction strategy. The international response has also focused on the salient fact that famines have led to the overthrow of governments in Ethiopia (Devereux 2006). Although this reduced the emergence of large-scale famines and their consequences, it limited the understanding of famine from a long-term process of deepening risk and vulnerability with its clear causal factors beyond the immediate triggers of an event. As a result, it shifted government policy focus from implementing sustainable development polices and understanding underlying problems, to focusing on disaster and famine prevention.

With the support of the World Bank and other major donors to tackle food insecurity, the government of Ethiopia established the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) for more than 8 million chronically vulnerable households. Before 2005, the typical response to this persistent food insecurity was emergency relief resourced through an unpredictable annual appeals process.

The safety net programs (PSNP) have contributed to notable improvements in the prevention of famine that could have led to the losses of significant life. But millions of smallholder farmers were permanently in food crises, receiving food aid. The primary assumption behind the PSNP was that every year, with effective social mobilization, the prevention of hunger, the encouragement of households to participate in productive activates and related investments and the expanded purchasing power of the population, many households would graduate out of the PSNP scheme.

However, the large number of PSNP participants were still unable to graduate as initially planned, moreover, households that were not initially considered for PSNP participation became members. Although the PSNP scheme contributed to avoid large-scale famines, “the agricultural and food problem in Ethiopia was not and is not addressed by the safety nets” (Diriba 2018, 311).

Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) (WFP 2019) findings show that a high number of Ethiopians are food insecure in

2015/16. The report indicated that the cause of food insecurity in the county has multiple and is related to all dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability. The report also reveals that:

The proportion of the population who lives below the food poverty line has declined over time but is still high, about 20.5 percent of households or 26 million people were estimated to be food insecure in 2015/16 without including about 18 million people covered by productive safety nets program. In terms of the geographic distribution of food insecurity, rural households were more food insecure than urban households, and a significantly higher prevalence of malnutrition is also found in rural areas compared to urban areas (WFP 2019).

The share of starchy staples in total calorie consumption remained very high in 2015/16 71.4 percent which shows a highly unvaried diet. Although the consumption of vegetables, fruits, meat, poultry, fish, eggs, milk, and dairy products showed a significant increase over the past two decades, it is still far below the level of consumption in most Sub Sahara African countries (WFP 2019).

Food insecurity in Ethiopia is usually related to poverty since chronic food insecurity is caused by the inability of households to produce, purchase or have access to food. According to CFSVA (WFP 2019) analysis, income and assets were found to be key determinants of food insecurity and demographic factors also were important drivers of food insecurity. Larger household sizes and lower educational attainment of the household head are significantly associated with household food insecurity. Equally important are the underlying factors of shocks, such as droughts, and rainfall variability with uneven rainfall distribution. In terms of livelihood, food insecurity is relatively high among households engaged in the informal sector, mixed agriculture, and casual labor. Thus, the WFP analysis proposes that resources should be targeted according to the level and dimension of food and nutrition insecurity.

The poverty assessment report released by World Bank also reveals that, in 2016, close to 90 percent of the poor lived in rural areas, and, also between 2011

and 2016, poverty became more concentrated in rural areas. While the rural population share decreased by three percentage points, from 83 percent in 2011 to 80 percent in 2016, the rural share of poverty increased by two percentage points (WB 2020). Despite Ethiopia's rapid economic growth, with an annual GDP growth rate of more than 9 percent, the growth did not translate to change the rural household consumption. Studies show that the majority of food insecure peoples reside in rural areas of Ethiopia, although with the recent urbanization, poverty is becoming both urban and rural problems.

The World Bank report notes that:

> Ethiopia has a traditional poverty profile. The poor tend to live in rural areas, in large households with high dependency rates, headed by an older and little-educated household head. They mainly engage in agriculture and casual labor for their livelihood. The poor are relatively isolated from key infrastructure and have worse access to services. Regional disparities in poverty are relatively low, meaning that the regional distribution of poverty largely reflects the regional distribution of the population. Differences in poverty rates are higher across agro-ecological zones, with the lowland parts of Oromia and SNNPR having the highest poverty rates (World Bank 2020, 64).



WB (2020)

7.2. Agriculture and Food Security in Ethiopia: Policy and Governance Approaches: A Historical Analysis

Over 80 percent of the Ethiopian population resides in the rural part of the country, and their livelihoods depend on agriculture directly or indirectly. Ironically at the policy level and practice successive governments in Ethiopia neglected peasants' agriculture and failed to invest in rural infrastructure and related rural industries.

By ignoring the development of the sector and isolating the rural areas and its people from the development process, Ethiopia failed to create synergies between sectors, and missed the opportunities to industrialization. Moreover, the imperial absolutism that persisted until 1974 had shaped the agrarian relations in the country.

By imposing *gult* (fief) rights, the emperor, nobilities, church, clergy, and the imperial army had controlled land and its produces. Taxes were imposed on everything that lived or grew on the land, and on many forms of activities engaged in by peasants. By systematically appropriating surpluses from producers, "who were reduced to living on the borderline of subsistence and under the menace of periodic famine" (Markakis and Ayele 1986, 23).

Acemoglu and Robinson discussed the extractive production system in Ethiopia and its production of poverty to the masses.

> "with absolutism came extractive economic institutions and poverty for the mass of Ethiopia, though of course the emperors and nobility benefited hugely. But the most enduring implication of the absolutism was that Ethiopian society failed to take advantage of industrialization opportunities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, underpinning the abject poverty of its citizens today., established the extractive production system through imposing gult on the peasants" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 238)

This contributed to the persistent food insecurity in the country. The failure of governments to develop inclusive economic systems that generate "sufficient real income for the poor to assure access to adequate food produced at home or

purchased in the market" (Eicher and Staatz 1985, 218) partially explained the widespread food insecurity in most African countries.

Hence, this extractive production system on one level, and the lack of creating a policy coherence among productive sectors played a part in the production of persistent food insecurity in Ethiopia. Theoretically, it has been suggested that the most successful development strategy is the one in which the state is able to exploit creatively the synergies between both sectors by developing their complementarities and enhancing their dynamic linkages (Kay 2009).

As Olivier De Schutter and Kaitlin Y Cordes(2011, 2) argued that:,

> "But hunger is not a natural disaster. It is a legacy of choices made in the past. It stems from a series of decisions that, in retrospect, appear short-sighted, and were based on a wrong diagnosis of the causes of hunger, leading to incorrect prescriptions to remedy it. The single most important proximate cause of structural hunger today is that developing countries have either not invested sufficiently in agriculture or have invested in the wrong kind of agriculture, with little impact on the reduction in rural poverty"

The policy process among public authorities in Ethiopia since the beginning of state-directed political and economic modernization in the 1940s has been to consider the rural people, poor and rich alike, as mere recipients of government policies and directives, with few opportunities given to them to voice their needs and priorities. In fact, Rahmato 2009b; Rahmato, Pankhurst, and Uffelen (2013) noted that the exclusion of the rural masses from political and economic spaces contributed to the failure of agricultural development and of modernization of the rural economy after half a century of public programs and considerable investment sources.

Similarly, Keeley and Scoones (2001) stated that despite political regime changes, from imperial, to Marxist military, to a democratic regime, a number of characteristics of the Ethiopian state have remained remarkably persistent over time. These include a tendency towards authoritarianism, hierarchy,

centralized rule and lack of transparency, and those characteristics shaped the agricultural policy process in Ethiopia (Ibid).

Established agrarian and food policies in Ethiopia centered on the acceleration of food production to resolve the county's food insecurity. The concern over production of food has both economic and political objectives, due to the country's repeated experiences with famines and its impacts in change of the political regimes. However, despite evolving views of food security in global food policy and governance, the patterns of agrarian and food policy in Ethiopia are still dominated by the policy trends of food production over the other dimensions of food security. Scholars suggest that the focus of government policy needs to shift from food availability to broader issues of food acquisition and particularly food affordability, which is mediated through food prices and waged employment (Johnston and Walls 2019).

From the 1940s until 1974, the Ethiopian imperial government targeted food production initially through the implementation of large-scale agricultural investment by governments, royal families and private actors and foreign investments. Beginning in the late 1960s government employed bi-modal strategies including large-scale farms and small-scale farms in high potential areas, and proximate to the cities. The large-scale farms had focused on the production of cash and export crops. Small-scale farms are supported by package programs to produce food crops. The beneficiary of the package program were members of the ruling class and urban elites who owned land and had access to government finance and incentives.

Thus, while the notion of food security in Ethiopian agrarian policy has been limited to productivism approach, policies created either the negligence to recognize the role and 'collective agency' of Ethiopian peasantry or as a by-product, it worked against the benefits of peasants and rural economy and contributed to the persistent food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. Productivism approach is defined in terms of increasing the overall availability of food by both improving agricultural yields (e.g, through intensification or synthetic

fertilizers) as well as by increasing the quantity of overall food production, with the hopes of a trickle-down effect on the accessibility to all and resolve food problems (Lambek 2018, 4).

Even though the Derg political regime initially changes its agricultural policies, the result had been the same for the Ethiopian peasants, even worse. The revolutionary military regime (1974-1991), which overthrew the imperial government in 1974, adopted a model borrowed from the Soviet Union to resolve the country's agricultural and food problems. Ethiopian agrarian policy provided two interrelated strategies to combat the country's food shortages, first implementing land reform and then introducing a new mode of production. Accordingly, the land reform in 1975, nationalized all land, rural and urban, and established a structure of peasants' associations in the countryside and urban dwellers' associations in the towns, known as kebeles, through which individual plots of land would be distributed to the peasants.

The new production mode included cooperatives, state farms and settlement farms. Large commercial farms were nationalized and converted into state and collective farms. Large-scale state farms and cooperatives continued to be promoted based on socialist ideology, whereby cooperative and collective-driven agricultural practices were enforced from above. The system favored large-scale and capital-intensive state-owned farming enterprises with credit, subsidies and fiscal incentives while neglecting smallholders. And "while all of them require the collective efforts of peasant farmers, they all discourage any individual strategy of maximization of self-interest", because it was believed that collectivization and a cooperative strategy will benefit everyone (Woldemeskel 1989). However, the outcome of such a policy was negative.

Ethiopia witnessed large-scale famines, death from famines, and widespread poverty. Government policies of forced villagization, involuntarily collectivization, controlled marketing system and civil unrest contributed to the stagnation of agricultural production in the country in general and the peasant

sector in particular. These multi-dimension crises led to the change of government in 1991.

In 1991, a new regime, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991-2018), came to power. The new government introduced a market-oriented approach to its economy, privatized collective farms and dissolved large state farms. As far as land policy is concerned, like the Derg, the EPRDF government made the land the property of the state and the people. Initially, the EPRDF agrarian policy supported the peasant sector, since the 2000s however, while the policy recognized the role of both smallholder and large-scale farms in food problems with some level of geographic distinction to resolve food shortages in the country, policy priority was given for large-scale farms, production of export commodities and private sectors, and the issue of small-holder farmers food security and development became secondary.

7.3. Peasant and Famine

It is a widely accepted view that enabling peasants to exercise a degree of control over their circumstances and to provide meaningful input into governance processes is a key component of advancing food security and equitable livelihoods in sustainable food systems. As the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Report on the World's Social Situation 2016 (UN 2016, 84) notes: "equal opportunity to participate in political life and an equitable distribution of power, voice, and agency in a society are key to ensuring that no one is left behind."

Theoretically, political, social, and economic factors have played a key role as either causal or contributing factors to food insecurity and made farmers vulnerable to drought and famines in the country. In Ethiopia, peasants are the first to be affected by food shortages. Lack of road access to the countryside, infrastructure, political vulnerability, access to land and inputs, drought, government policies and governance had been given as an explanation of the vulnerability of peasants to food shortages and famines in the country. It has

been argued that famine is primarily the result of political factors that marginalise the small farmers and poor through insufficient access to land, water, and credit; poor organization of local markets; lack of infrastructure; and lack of bargaining power against an increasingly concentrated agro-industrial sector (Kararach 2014).

Tareke defined Ethiopian peasants as rural cultivators who, by using family labor and simple implements, produce primarily for subsistence but also "for the fulfilment of obligations" to those who dominate them politically, economically, and ideologically (Tareke 1991, 2). Alike Rahmato identified the rurality of peasants under Ethiopian circumstances, as 'enduring poverty, voicelessness, and submission'. Until the 1975 land reform, peasants lived under the burden of feudal duties, with perpetual fear of eviction by the landlord or running out of food to feed themselves (Giorgis 1989). Even though the 1975 land reform guaranteed peasants an equal place in society, government policies were unable to improve peasants' standards of living and restructure its economic base.

Lefort described the deeply unequal relations of power between state/government and peasants in Ethiopia as, "a relations of command and subordination between dominators and dominated and, at least in past centuries, between exploiters and exploited" (Lefort 2012,699). According to him this relationship has, for ages, led peasants to do all they can to keep the state/peasants at a distance.

Moreover, Pausewang (1992, 29) revealed that

> "Ethiopian peasant experience with state interference in rural society has been only negative… They are disillusioned and skeptical and have learned to defend themselves against interference and economic pressure by withdrawing into self-sufficiency, as much as they could. This is a primary reason for the low productivity in agriculture during recent years."

Baye observes the extractive production system in relation to Ethiopian peasants:

> In the history of Ethiopia, it was common to the local nobilities and rulers and their soldier to move in mass during which they harassed

> and exploited the productive peasantry. The soldiers had forced the peasants to bring what they did not produce. Most of the sheep and goats of the peasants were consumed by the soldiers who had predatory nature during dynastic wars and conflicts. The nobility and their soldiers who had been non-productive class of the society extravagantly consumed what the peasants could have saved and accumulated for the future. There had never been payment to peasants for the provisions they had provided (2017, 423).

Thus, this political vulnerability of peasants in Ethiopia directly or indirectly contributed to the country's persistent food insecurity. According to (Paarlberg 2002) food security problems in most African countries, have come from an "absence of stable government and sound public policy" (Paarlberg 1999, 500).

Paarlberg argued that the governance problems that hinder sound policy in Africa emerged in part from the political weakness of the rural sector, and from the non-accountability of most African governments toward the rural sector. While African governments respond to the politically strong, better-organized groups and institutions such as the army, the bureaucracy, and urban-dwelling workers, students, and consumers, whereas the government they have become more non-accountable for the politically weak rural sector (1999, 500).

Urban biased policies (growing out of rural political weakness) were not the only political impediments to food security in Africa, rather the link between violent civil conflict and food insecurity is multiple and powerful (Paarlberg 1999). The conflicts, wars and uprisings in the history of Ethiopia, required large-scale recruitment of the peasantry into the war efforts by proving food for traditional and national arms as well as by engaging in the war as a soldier. During the Derg period, one of the responsibilities of the peasant associations was mobilizing a large number of farmers for the militia and collecting economic support from the peasants.

The heaviest burden of the many wars and conflicts in the country was on the shoulder of the peasantry and the agricultural sector. Especially during the Derg regime, since the government's target was to organize the rural society in the ideology of socialism, economic and social objectives were designed to achieve socialism, and institutions such as cooperatives and villagization were

created and/or reformed to serve this purpose. In primarily agricultural societies, the recruitment of young men into these militias will reduce family income and take labor away from food production, be it farming or herding (Diriba 2018; Girgis 1989).

Food availability and access to food have been diminished directly because of the predatory activities of both militias and regular armies in the field, which tend to subsist by eating whatever they can take from the unarmed population. These militias and armies have been motivated to destroy any food they cannot use immediately in contested areas, so as to deny it to their adversaries. Anticipating this destruction, farmers who remained on the land have lost their incentive to plant crops in the first place (Africa Watch Report 1991; Paarlberg 2002).

The main socio-economic and political factors that have always exposed the Ethiopian peasantry to various forms of natural disasters included the constant state of war and instability, the extreme exploitation of the peasantry by the ruling classes, and the unwillingness of the ruling classes to take prompt measures to prevent or minimize human casualties from the oppressive forces of nature. A combination of short-term and long-term causal factors can explain the trend towards increasing food insecurity in Ethiopia. Political and economic conditions fostered by the government's development policies were either causal or contributing factors to food insecurity in Ethiopia by making the rural majority vulnerable to drought and famines.

A study by Baye (2017, 420) shows that:

> "in Ethiopia, people have been dominantly agrarian society with subsistence way of living. Food production has been the most important activity of the peasants. Agriculture has remained more or less static for centuries and people have been indifferent to material wealth. Little has been done to transform peasant agriculture of the country. The failure and static nature of the Ethiopian peasant agriculture could be associated with interlinked historical, natural, religious and cultural factors. Though important it was, in the Ethiopian academics, peasant agriculture has never been recognized as an important development issue until the recent times. No attempt

has been made to bring internal transformation in the thinking and working habit of the people".

7.4. Drought and Government Policies

Extreme weather events, including rain failures and drought, have caused grave food shortages by reducing the production and productivity of food crops. Since the late 1950s rain failures and major droughts in Ethiopia occurred every 10 years, but almost every year since the 1980s at least some parts of the country have been affected by drought (Tesfai, Adugna, and Nagothu 2015). The percentage of people affected by drought has increased "from 4 percent to over 19 percent (i.e. ≥ 13 million people) between 1973 and 2003" (Lebeda et al ., 2010 in Tesfai, Adugna, Nagothu 2015, 148). Although the drought was never the only factor to cause famines and caused the death of more than one million people, climate change and the persistent occurrence of drought in the country have affected the productivity of food crops in the country. The effects of rain failures and drought have exacerbated in the country because:

First, the livelihoods of more than 80 percent of the population depend on rain-fed, traditional farming that is greatly susceptible to seasonal shocks and frequent climate changes. Second, despite the constitutional recognition of a right to sustainable development and a healthy and clean environment, Ethiopia could not in practice meaningfully adapt to climate change (Tura 2019, 1617).

To address the impacts caused by extreme weather events, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) designed Ethiopia's Program of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC), as a program of action aimed at building a Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE). But the practicality of the program has been limited.

7.5 The Paradox of Economic Growth and Food Insecurity

Over the past one and half decades Ethiopia has registered an average of 10 percent of GDP growth and made progress in agricultural production, expansion in the service sector, and industry. According to government sources, agriculture

productivity increased by double-digit figures, although the progress in agricultural production was due to partially good weather, expansion of areas under cultivation, and an increase in productivity (Abbink 2017; Heshmati et al. 2018). In fact, despite agricultural growth reports, high food insecurity occurred in the country affecting up to 15 to 20 percent of the population (Rahmato 2013).

In Ethiopia, the contradiction between economic growth and food insecurity especially in rural areas is not new and has been persistent since the 1950s. Some sectors benefited from the economic growth, while, other millions of people were in lives in destitution, poverty and in danger of famine. A contradiction government policy did not substantially alleviate. Since the mid-200s, road construction, and several new enterprises have been expanded in major cities, and these successes have been appreciated by donors, nevertheless, the successes were not for the average people and economic conditions in the countryside, where progress is slow and misery unabated (Abbink 2017b; Lefort 2015).

Although Ethiopia made a progress in some sectors and invested in the infrastructure and service sector in the city, the country is still far from solving the paradoxes of economic growth and food insecurity in the country, because it has been historical policy patterns which involved selected successful sectors and the majority neglected mass peasant. Abbink observed the recent contradiction of the process of economic growth coexistence with food insecurity in Ethiopia, and argued that these two processes ran on separate tracks: "development via massive donor funding of infrastructure projects and (land) investments, and failing support and opportunity for the roughly 13 million smallholders, because investments by foreigners, state/ party-affiliated persons, and rich domestic investors were made in large-scale commercial ventures, not in smallholder activities" (Abbink 2017, 167).

The governments did not establish an adequate mechanism to support smallholder farmers to benefit from economic growth that occurred in other sectors. Besides the number of landless people thus, increased by tens of

thousands and the rapid growth of the population has not been seriously considered and integrated with food security problems.

While the government have framed increasing agricultural outputs as a policy priority to achieve national and local levels of food security, but the policy did not give adequate consideration of the ability of food insecure populations to access food sustainably. Because they considered the hopes of a trickle-down effect on accessibility (Lambek 2019). However, guaranteeing food and nutrition security at the macro and micro level especially for the vulnerable groups require policymakers to go beyond the objectives of increasing agricultural production and consider the evolved dimension of food security and food sovereignty of peasants.

7.6. Famines and Lack of Accountability Mechanism

Successive governments in Ethiopia have always framed both food shortages and famines as a result of natural disasters, population growth and as an act of God. Drought has always been considered the principal cause of almost all the famines that Ethiopia has experienced (Kebbede 1992; Lemma 1985). One of the aristocrats in the imperial ruling circle told to Kapuscinski regarding the 1972/3 Ethiopian famine was that:

> "Death from hunger had existed in our Empire for hundreds of years, an everyday natural thing, and it never occurred to anyone to make any noise about it. Drought would come and the earth would dry up, the cattle would drop dead, the peasants would starve. Ordinary, in accordance with the laws of nature and the eternal order of things. Since the was eternal and normal, none of the dignitaries would dare to bother His Most Exalted highness with the news that in such and such a province a given person had died of hunger" (Kapuscinski 1983, 111).

The drought and subsequent famine in 1972-74, which claimed the lives of as many as a quarter of a million people and hundreds of thousands of domestic animals, received no timely response from the regime of Haile Selassie, and he was accused of ignoring the famine victims. Furthermore, the imperial government of Ethiopia had failed to provide any disaster relief for the famine

victims and, also denied the very existence of famine conditions until evidence was uncovered by the foreign journalist and press. Even after the existence of the famine was disclosed, top government officials continued to belittle the gravity and severity of the famine situation and refused to appeal for international relief aid (Kebbede 1992; Lemma 1985).

According to the Africa Watch report using documentation of famine conditions in July 1973 by UNICEF, it stated that:

> "in an official response to a documented report by UNICEF about the 1972– 74 famine, the Ethiopian official stated the description of the food security situation in the report was embarrassing for the country and that the government did not want any international assistance, the Vice-Minister of Planning responded:" "If we have to describe the situation in the way you have in order to generate international assistance, then we don't want that assistance. The embarrassment to the government isn't worth it. Is that perfectly clear?" (African Watch 1991, 60).

Instead of responding to the starved peasants, since the report of starvation by itself was considered a shame to the reputation of the emperor, the authorities preferred to ignore them. The pride and political calculation among the regime authorities could explain the reluctance of the regime to accept the severity of the crisis (Graham as cited in P. Dorosh and Rashid 2012).

The 1972–74 famine, which started with such a clear denial by the authorities including the vice minister of planning, ended up launching the modern response to famines in Ethiopia despite government authorities rather than because of them (Dorosh and Rashid 2012a). Due to political calculation of preventing political embarrassment and the non-accountability of the government to the peasants, the regime failed to respond to starved and deprived people.

Haile Selassie was detached from the peasants and his government demonstrated extraordinary callousness toward the suffering of the Ethiopian peasantry. Rather than attempt to respond to the most obvious signs of famine, officials at all levels deliberately suppressed the news that people in the countryside were suffering from famine. Furthermore, local police prevented

starving peasants seeking food in Wollo province from entering market towns (Koehn 1979; Markakis and Ayele1986).

In the meantime, Haile Selassie was renowned for his lavish lifestyle and feeding pets on silver plates and spoons. Haile Selassie wasted millions into his 80th birthday celebration "while famine victims watched the lives of their children drain away painfully. Indeed, his inevitable downfall came as no surprise" (Lemma 1985, 54).

When the report by journalist Jonathan Dimbleby, under the title of the unknown famine in Ethiopia released, it helped to instigate a heightened protest against the Haile Selassie regime, which culminated in its overthrow. African Watch Report (1991,155) stated it observation regarding the tragic end of the Ethiopia emperor;

> On September 11, 1974, the day before the emperor was deposed, excerpts from the film were shown interspliced with footage from the wedding of the daughter of a prominent government minister, for which the cake had been specially flown from Italy. The following day, as the Emperor was driven from his palace in the back seat of a Volkswagen beetle, the crowds shouted lieba! -- "thief!" (African Watch 1991).

The Derg seized power in 1974 during a wave of popular uprisings at the old extractive system of Haile Selassie's rule. One of the positive outcomes of the 1972–74 famine was the development of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) (Diriba 2018). The RRC was established to respond to and coordinate relief with the belief that the conditions that have led to the emergency and famine will be resolved.

Founded under the Derg regime in 1974, the RRC eventually grew to be arguably the largest and most powerful part of the Ethiopian government to prevent future famines, distribute relief to the victims of natural adversity, and rehabilitate those left destitute by the famines of 1972-4 (Africa Watch 1991; Dorosh and Rashid 2012a).

Furthermore, as we have seen, the Derg regime's agrarian policy implemented land reform which involved land distribution to the peasants and established a new mode of production which involved collectivization, villagization and resettlement.

It was optimistically hoped that the creation of the RRC, together with other land and new production measures, would banish famine from Ethiopia altogether. However, instead of solving the problem of food shortages, the strategies have actually made the food shortages worse, and the country experienced large-scale famine in the 1980s (Woldemeskel 1989). It is widely recognized that the agricultural and economic policies of the Ethiopian government contributed to the creation of the famine.

The Derg regime, similar to its predecessor, its economy was based on the extraction of the rural peasants. It needed to feed the cities, especially Addis Ababa, and the army. McCann (1995) observed that, although rural imagery, “land to the tiller" and the 1972-74 famine, dominated much of the literature on the 1974 revolution, the 1974 upheaval was fundamentally an urban phenomenon.

The unrest which brought Haile Selassie's government down was the cumulative disaffection of teachers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, high school students, and, ultimately, young military officers. The military regime and the urban bureaucracy which replaced Haile Selassie's government learned quickly that “urbanites' sense of well-being derived from stable food prices more than from perceptions of social justice. Consequently, the new rulers placed agricultural price control high on their list of priorities (Ibid).

Furthermore, supplying food to the rapidly growing army was another priority to the Derg regime, an army of 300,000 people consumes a minimum of 60,000 tons of grain per year (Africa Watch Report 1991; Clapham 1988) (African Watch 1991; Clapham 1988). To resolve the country’s food problem, the regime’s ultimate aim was the complete transformation of the Ethiopian peasant farmers into workers in state-run cooperatives. The Agricultural

Marketing Corporation (AMC), which was set up in 1976, had it powers dramatically expanded. The activities of the AMC were described by a peasant in Wollo as "robbing the poor to feed the rich."(Africa Watch Report 1991, 157).

Generally, the combination of multiple factors including government policies regarding land reform and investment, market failures, military conflict, drought and crop failure, and other factors combined led to another large-scale famine in the country (Webb and von Braun 1994). The Derg regime, like its predecessor, failed to act to prevent the death of "peasants" from starvation.

On October 1984, the BBC journalist Michael Buerk announced to the world the unfolding famine disaster in Ethiopia, what became known as the Great Ethiopian Famine. The journalist described the conditions as "dawn, and as the sun breaks through the piercing chill of night on the plain outside Korem it lights up a biblical famine, now, in the twentieth century" (Hilhorst & van Uffelen 2013: xv). The BBC's news coverage of the large-scale famine disaster in the Horn captured an exceptionally high level of media attention throughout the world that led to set into motion a huge response, foremost consisting of food aid for the starving people in Ethiopia (Koehn 1979; Rahmato, Pankhurst, and Uffelen 2013). Official data indicated that in 1984-1985, external food aid made up just over 26% of the total food availability in-country (FDRE 2002).

Similarly, the response of the post-1974 military government to the 1983-85 famine was remarkably similar to that of the previous administration (Kebbede 1992). Kebbede observed the tragic persistence of famine experience and governments' lack of accountability;

> The gross neglect of the junta was demonstrated when it squandered scarce resources, several million dollars (estimated between $150 and $200 million) to celebrate the tenth anniversary of its seizure of power and the inauguration of the new Communist Workers' Party at a time when the famine was rampant. When starvation reached a peak that summer, the military dictatorship was preoccupied with its preparation for this extravaganza. A large sum of public money was spent to build squares,

> statues, and buildings. The government denied foreign journalists and diplomats' permission to travel to the areas where people were dying of hunger during the celebration. Starving people flocking to Addis Ababa by the thousands were rounded up and sent back in the direction they came before they reached the capital (Kebbede 1992, 77)

There is no doubt that recurrent droughts have led to poor harvests and severe food shortages, but drought was only a contributing factor, not the prime cause of the famine. For example, Kenya, which experienced a much more severe drought than Ethiopia over most of its agriculturally productive territory in 1984-1985, was able with timely government action to avert famine entirely (Henze 1989). Thus, multiple factors explain the persistent food insecurity in rural Ethiopia, including the problems rooted in structural discrimination against peasants such as unequal access to land and resources, considerations of peasants as backward and economically irrelevant, traditional policy bias against the agricultural sector and lack of investing in the sector. Furthermore, the lack of accountability mechanisms and the political weakness of the peasant sector contributed to the impediments to better food security in Ethiopia.

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