Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna

DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN

SCIENZE POLITICHE E SOCIALI

Ciclo 34

Settore Concorsuale: 14/C1 - SOCIOLOGIA GENERALE

Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: SPS/07 - SOCIOLOGIA GENERALE

THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN YOUTHS IN JAPAN

Presentata da: Giulia Dugar

Coordinatore Dottorato

Daniela Giannetti

Supervisore

Debora Mantovani

Co-supervisore

Corrado Tornimbeni

Esame finale anno 2022

Al Lupo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This doctorate has been a challenging uphill rock climb. At times thought-provoking, others stiff and exhausting. Let me here express my thanks to those who have climbed with me, who have taught me the technique, who have shown me where I went wrong so that I could improve my performance, who put a safety net underneath me in case I fell.

I thank my whole family, who got bigger and closer over the last few years. I thank my mother and my companion, who were always there during the most stressful moments and who always found the right words to comfort me. I thank my father, for showing me how to be strong and for being my source of wisdom when I least expected it. I thank my uncle, who always believes in me, more than I do. I thank Silvana and Vinicio, who so naturally welcomed me into their lives. And I thank the old and wise Wolf, who will always be my teacher and guide.

I thank my Supervisor, Professor Debora Mantovani, for the patience she taught me with. She supported me from the very beginning to the very moment of the thesis submission, and never let go. She pushed me to strive for the best when I was going to content myself with less. For believing in me, thank you.

I also thank Professor Takahashi, for being my compass when I was getting lost in Tokyo. I thank Professor Roberts, for always supporting me from the other side of the globe. And I thank Doctor Matteo Dian, who is always eager to share precious pieces of advice on how to navigate Academia without floundering.

I thank the Mahalos, who make the moments we spend together always so colorful and without whom the pandemic period would have been a much tougher rock to climb.

I thank my doctoral colleagues for being such a wonderful, cheerful, and

supportive group. Before entering the doctoral program, rumors had it that I would have competed with other doctoral students, that there would always be tension. Thank you all for refuting such cautionary tales.

Lastly, I thank my interviewees. Although this study only openly includes about sixty people, I also wish to thank the roughly more than a hundred youths and adults with whom I had the chance to talk with, who believed in what I was doing and deemed it necessary to give voice to the issues addressed in this study.

ABSTRACT

The steadily growing immigration phenomenon in today's Japan is showing a tangible and expanding presence of immigrant-origin youths residing in the country. International research in the migration studies area has underlined the importance of focusing on immigrant-origin youths to shed light on the character of the way immigrant incorporate in countries of destinations. Indeed, immigrants' offspring, the adults of tomorrow, embody the interlocutor between first-generation immigrants and the receiving societal context. The extent of the presence of immigrants' children in countries of destination is also a reliable yardstick to assess the maturation of the migration process, transforming it from a temporary phenomenon to a long-term settlement. Within this framework, the school is a privileged site to observe and analyze immigrant-origin youths' integration. Alongside their family and peers, school constitutes one of the main agents of socialization. Here, children learn norms and rules and acquire the necessary tools to eventually compete in the pursuit of an occupation, determining their future socioeconomic standing. This doctoral research aims to identify which theoretical model articulated in the area of migration studies best describes the adaptation process of immigrant-origin youths in Japan. In particular, it examines whether (and to what extent) any of the pre-existing frameworks can help explain the Japanese occurring circumstances, or whether further elaboration and adjustment is needed. Alternatively, it studies whether it is necessary to produce a new model based on the peculiarities of the Japanese social context. This study provides a theoretical-oriented contribution to the (mainly descriptive but maturing) literature on immigrant-origin youths' integration in Japan. Considering past growth trends of Japanese immigration and its expanding prospective projections (Korekawa 2018c), this study might be considered pioneering for future development of the phenomenon.

INTRODUCTION

According to the literature of the late 1990s, Japan is still considered a recent country of immigration. This perception increases when Japanese immigration figures are compared with those of countries with an older immigration tradition. Today, more than one tenth of the population of the United States consists of foreign citizens (Budiman 2020), whereas in 2020, the foreign-citizen residents corresponded to 2.3% of the total Japanese population (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2020b). Nevertheless, this figure represents a record of foreign-citizen residents ever registered in the country and crowns a constantly increasing trend since the second half of the past century. Only the recent COVID-19 pandemic has curbed this growing phenomenon and although official governmental statics have yet to be published, medias already warn about a negative record of entry for 2021 (The Japan Times 2022).

Despite the impediment of movement of people and travel restrictions due to the ongoing pandemic, there are solid reasons leading us to believe that immigration to Japan will resume and keep moving forward in the near future. As for other worldwide industrialized countries, Japan is also characterized by a steadily aging and shrinking population, with projections worsening for the next fifty years (OECD 2019). Not only does this place weight on the national pension scheme but it also has a severe impact on the internal labor market. With the shift in position of Japanese women, who are now leaving their canonical and consigned role of mothers and wives and are turning towards a career-oriented lifestyle, and the booming generation of increasingly educated youth who are no longer willing to undertake so-called 3D jobs[1], Japan is in

---

[1]   The expression "3D jobs" indicates "dirty, dangerous, and demeaning" jobs. It corresponds to the Japanese 3Ks: "*kitanai, kiken, kitsui*" jobs.

dire need of a fertile source to draw upon to recruit new workers. Since the slow but constant increase of newly admitted foreign-citizen residents is still not enough to numerically counterbalance the shrinking and ageing Japanese population, newly admitted foreign citizens might be a solution to the lack of available workers (Huddleston et al., 2015). In this situation and based on the country's past immigration trends, Korekawa (2018c) has estimated that the share of foreign citizens will reach about 6.5% of the total Japanese population by 2040, and about 12% by 2065, thus filling the gap with the current European scenario. Given such encouraging projections and the growing push from Japanese economy for more flexible entry regulations to attract foreign workers, it is safe to argue that studies carried out at this moment in history could be considered pioneering research.

In attempting to build an analytical tool to assess migratory stages in an increasingly mobile world, Böhning (1984) configures a four-stage cycle in the evolution of the migratory phenomenon in countries of destinations. The first stage represents a still-immature migratory panorama, characterized by the predominant short-term settlement of young and male immigrants, and the cycle continues up to stage four, where immigrants' stay gets longer, the rates of family reunifications increase, and ethnic institutions such as churches and schools flourish. Despite its still feeble figures, Japan appears to have just taken its first steps towards this fourth stage. Although limited to urban areas and to regions that are densely inhabited by foreign citizens, immigrants are deciding against the idea to go back to their country of origin; visas issued for family reunification are showing an increase; and finally, places of worship such as Christian churches or mosques, schools for foreigners (principally Korean and Brazilian), alongside recreation and community centers meant for foreign festivities, events, and traditions can be found across the country.

The increasing presence of children of immigrants (the so-called "second generation") is another benchmark that indicates a more advanced migratory phenomenon. In this regard, Japan is also registering a growing presence of foreign-citizen children, as evidenced by their school attendance. The shift from the first-generation immigrants to second generation symbolizes the

transformation of the migratory event from temporary (mainly labor immigration) to permanent (or settlement immigration) (Ambrosini 2011). For this reason, second generations – the adults of tomorrow – are a critical context for the study of immigrants' integration process, as they also present a challenge for social cohesion for both sending and receiving societies and play a vital role in shaping them (Ambrosini, Molina 2004).

The doctoral dissertation project aims to shed light on the integration of second-generation immigrants residing in Japan by making use of the theoretical and analytical tools provided by the Western literary tradition. In this respect, this first chapter introduces the theoretical perspectives that have developed since the end of the 1800s predominantly in the North American and European regions and that guide the investigation as well as the structure of the present study. Special attention is given to research focusing on immigrants' children integration process, a stream of literature that has grown more and more autonomous within the migration area studies. Findings have not only highlighted the importance that ascriptive elements – such as gender, family social class, educational credentials, and so on – have on integration destinies of immigrant second generations (Zhou 1997; Portes 1994; Rumbaut 1994, 1997; Portes, Hao 2002). Social changes and institutional shifts play also a critical role in determining the incorporation outcomes of foreign citizens (Alba and Nee 1997) – it is sufficient to consider the 1970s civil rights movements in the United States, the exacerbated regulations against racial discriminatory acts, or the transformation of the labor market.

Given the importance of looking at the historical, institutional, and cultural structures when investigating migration studies, the second chapter offers the specificities inherent to the Japanese context. It covers theories on the creation of the Japanese national identity from the end of the 19th century to the aftermath of the Second World War; historical and political backgrounds on the 20th century colonial subjects' integration; and more recent theories on immigrants' integration, starting from the 1990s but more developing into the 2000s.

Although it might sound like a mere side-argument, the discourse on the country's national identity formation (or *nihonjinron*, namely "thesis on the

Japanese people") is vital to understand the Japanese stance and theoretical evolution towards immigrant integration. Two main conceptions regarding the origins of the Japanese people emerged in the 19th century: one considered the Japanese to be originated on the archipelago itself, being thus a pure and homogeneous race; the other saw Japanese originating from a mix of people who migrated to the Japanese islands, but who originated from the continent and the Korean peninsula (Oguma 2002; Allen 2008). The popularity of these two perspectives has fluctuated over time in accordance with the instrumental purpose they served to justify Japanese foreign and expansionism policies (Dian 2017). Therefore, with the colonial quest in the Korean peninsula in 1910 and the consequent wave of forced migration from the colonies to the Japanese mainland, Japanese scholars started to systematically discuss matters of immigrant integration (Oguma 2002). Many of these theories were based on existing academic studies published in the United States, readapted to the political and historical contingencies of the Japanese context (Allen 2008). Thus, it is not surprising to discover talks about hierarchy of races and the need to forcibly proceed with "Japanization" (or *kokuminka:* "becoming a person of the Country", Minami 1942), the Japanese counterpart of the Americanization process. Although a great part of this discourse still echoes today in public opinion (see the Study on the Japanese National Character[2]), it is clearly detached from the Japanese academic literature on immigrant integration produced from the 1990s onward. Alongside what has been reviewed regarding scholarships on immigrants in Japan, there are few studies encompassing several foreign-citizen communities rising in the country and systematically testing immigrant integration models.

Chapter three provides a descriptive analysis of the foreign-citizen population residing in Japan today. It presents the distinction between *oldcomers* (immigrants who originated from the Japanese colonial ruling periods over its Asian neighbors at the turn of the 20th century) and *newcomers* (an expression used to address a second flow of immigrants during the 1970s and who are still

---

[2]   The Institute of Statistical Mathematics 2017.

entering the country to date). From the picture offered it is evident how the foreign-citizen population residing in Japan is not merely growing numerically but it is also diversifying, in terms of country of origin. Besides the more traditional immigrant groups, such as Korean, Chinese and Brazilian, the 2010s witnessed a rising numbers of Vietnamese- and Filipino-citizen residents. As projections lead us to believe, if these new foreign citizens also establish a more permanent settlement in the country, the Japanese social fabric, as well as the country's basic amenities and services, will have to come to terms with a foreign population with diverse cultural and linguistic characteristics.

With an increasing number of second generations, it is evident that the Japanese educational institution is one of the first contexts upon which such pressure is exerted. Chapter four illustrates how the school dimension embodies a focal lens to observe and study immigrant second generations. Undoubtedly, formal education plays a crucial role in shaping youth socialization. School rather represents the moment when an individual forms their cultural and behavioral characteristics, where students learn the rules that allow for smooth functioning of society (Giddens and Sutton 2014). Especially for foreign children, school represents the first arena of encounter with the social context of destination, outside the safe familial comfort. Attending school in the country of destination is an opportunity for immigrants' children to study the language, to learn how to behave in a public situation, and to boost skills in order, one day, to compete in the labor market. However, school can also become the stage where social inequalities are reproduced and maintained, strengthening the dominant social group's interests. These critical points need to be addressed, since international studies have calculated that foreign-origin pupils tend to perform worse than their native peers, with clear repercussions for their later occupational achievements and socioeconomic positioning (Portes, Zhou 1993; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Mantovani 2008).

The fifth chapter clarifies the research question and elaborates the implemented qualitative research design. It elucidates the sampling methodologies and the strategies used for data collection, as well as the difficulties caused in doing research amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This study takes ad-

vantage of first-hand data, namely semi-structured interviews conducted with immigrant-origin youths residing in Japan. The chapter then continues by illustrating the tools used to analyze the collected data, ending with some reflections on positionality and ethical concerns.

The sixth chapter presents the data organized through the thematic analysis and juxtaposed to the theoretical perspectives illustrated in previous chapters. Data are presented following the chronological pace of youth integration in the school environment. Starting from reasons leading to school choice, it then presents school progression orientation focusing on access to upper secondary and then tertiary education. It then explores three areas of key importance in the investigation of second-generation's school integration. The first section underscores retrospective educational aspirations and ambition reported by respondents. In fact, past studies have shown how the school success and failure of immigrants' children are determined by a broad set of elements, being structural or subjective to the youths and their families. Among these factors, the literature remarks how immigrant youths' educational expectations as well as expectations families carry for them can be used to predict occupational performance and destinies (Zimmerman et al. 1992; Kao, Tienda 1998; Mantovani et al. 2018; Birkelund 2020). A second emergent aspect is the school environment and relationship with peers. As school represents the first milieu of socialization outside the familial context, the literature stresses how peer relations at school influence children's behavior and understanding of their surroundings (Rumbaut 1997; Portes, Rumabut 2001). Finally, patterns of linguistic adaptation are identified and connected with second-generation integration paths.

Lastly, Chapter seven embodies the analytical core of this dissertation. It offers a key of interpretation of collected interviews through the sociological lens of the typology. Two variables, personal ambition and familial expectations are here taken into consideration to build four recurring youths' types or profiles in order to offer a further level to interpret data and thus conferring the reader a second level of understanding of the phenomenon.

To conclude, this research aims to contribute to the international panorama of studies centered on the integration of immigrant-origin youths. It positions

itself in a geographical context within which the academic literature is still flourishing, therefore giving room for further investigation. This becomes more poignant when considering the great deal of literature focusing on the integration of Japanese immigrant second generations that is (for the most part) descriptive and less oriented towards a theorizing effort.

CHAPTER 1

IMMIGRANTS' PATHS OF INCORPORATION IN COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION: THE WESTERN CONTEXT

1.1. *Not to be taken for granted: Immigrants' integration paths*

Migration is occupying a growing share of the international and national debates worldwide, not only because its international figures are steadily increasing (United Nations 2019), but also because the migration discourse is increasingly more significant for the social, political and economic spheres of countries around the world, who find themselves interconnected by this rising event (European Commission 2020). In this context, studies shedding light on migration and the incorporation of immigrants in countries of destination prove to be strategic to foresee its consequences and provide the best possible structure for its management. Although nowadays migration studies are carried out in research institutes all around the globe, the origins of this field of study and its early development efforts can be traced firstly within the North American context from the end of the 1800s, and later in European countries, due also to its increase in the aftermath of the Second World War. Therefore, first the United States, and then European countries can be considered the cradle of immigrants' incorporation scholarly theoretical production. For this reason, while the overall objective of this research is to assess the integration of second-generation immigrants in Japan, delineating the main Western research elements on the study of immigrants' incorporation is essential in order to subsequently assess whether any existing models can be applied to the Japanese societal context, or whether a new theoretical formulation must be attempted to better understand different arising dynamics.

When delving into the literature on migration studies, and more narrowly into immigrants' incorporation research, particular attention should be paid to

the terminology used. It may not always be possible to find consistency among the terms used in the scholarship, but it is precisely this discrepancy that marks the evolution of different immigrant integration models. Early scholars would coin their own *ad hoc* explanation of assimilation, acculturation, or accommodation; and it is true that canonical assimilation theorists do not differentiate between assimilation and (upward) mobility, reflecting the conception of inevitability of the assimilative process (Gans 2007). Yet, some definitions are more widely acknowledged than others, such of those of the old Chicago school, which conceived acculturation and assimilation as respectively the cultural and social assimilation of immigrants (Park, Burgess 1921; Park 1930). Later assessment of alternative possible outcomes of integration paths introduced new forms of mobility, such as the specification of upward and downward mobility which rejects a single and unilinear result of assimilation (among whom: Rumbaut 1994; Perlmann 1997; Zhou 1997; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Portes, Hao 2002).

The first systematic body of academic literature regarding issues arising from the integration of immigrants in countries of destination can be traced back at the end of the 19th century, with its birthplace in the United States. Undoubtedly, immigrants' integration was already debated as an issue before that, but it was rather a matter and concern for politicians and policy-makers as, for example, newspaper editorials do not fail to remind (Rumbaut 1997).

This chapter introduces the main theories regarding the integration of immigrants in recipient countries, as well as their evolution over time. To do this, while venturing into the evolution of immigrants' integration theories, the following sections also contextualize the theorizing efforts of different scholars in historical and political terms and shortly elucidate the characteristics and unfolding trends of immigration in the United States and in the 20th century in Europe.

The vastly different historical moments during which the several theoretical accounts were formulated should be borne in mind: in this context, it is not difficult to understand how the early 20th century scholarship still heavily regarded racial traits as a determinant element of assimilationist stances: for ex-

ample, Gobineau's 1854 publication (*Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*) was still impacting the perception and criticality of races as biologically justifiable discourse for colonialism and predominance, especially in the African continent. Therefore, it is important to dive into the different integration models not only with a critical contemporary perspective that today would condemn the use of terms such as "race"[3] or notions such as "subordination" or "superiority" of different national groups (as for Simons 1901) for the sake of categorization, but also with the understanding of the structural, political, and social conditions in place when these different models were theorized.

In this extensive summary of the theories of immigrants' integration, three considerations emerged. Firstly, from a more canonical perspective, it is almost taken for granted that assimilation is the outcome that both immigrants and the host country should aspire to: therefore, in their writings scholars dictate how people *should* share common memories and sentiments in order to constitute a unified and homogeneous community that is able to face an endogenous crisis as a whole mind and body. On the contrary, the literature of the late 20th century and onwards focuses more on comprehending *what* the process of immigration can entail, therefore conceiving the possibility different outcomes besides the monoethnic canonical view. Later, scholars at the beginning of the 21st century further push theoretical efforts towards a more functionalistic approach, arguing that theories on immigrants' integration should be framed in a way that allows the *foreseeing* of what outcomes should be expected from ongoing migratory phenomena (Alba 2008).

Secondly, during the evolution of these integration models, the understanding of the figure of the immigrant undergoes a twofold transformation: it

---

[3]   The usage of the term "race" was and still is common in the English language literature and parlance to designate different peoples and national groups with neutral connotations. However, the same does not apply in other linguistic contexts, like in Italian or Japanese, where the term carries a negative bias (as it mostly carries a dichotomous superior and inferior biological meaning), and thus is subject to controversy as its use has justified forms of discrimination and exploitation. Therefore, the term "race" will here only be used when the concerned theory openly addresses it.

goes from being treated as a single entity and passive spectator of the integration process to a more plural actor and main and active character of the phenomenon; it also undergoes a transformation from an isolated individual into a member of an immigrant group, entailing a changed image of the migratory phenomenon. Therefore, in the first pursuits for an integration model, immigrants are conceived as a sole group with no distinct characteristics if not those of race, referring solely to existing somatic differences (as is the case for scholars such as Sarah Simons and Richmond Mayo-Smiths). Thereafter, other variables start to be introduced in the attempt to identify integration outcomes, among which nationality (denoting the group of citizens belonging to the same territorial State) and the ethnic group of origin (with reference to a collectivity with a common heritage and sharing the same cultural and linguistic traits, customs, and traditions). This is how, in one of the most encompassing studies of immigrant community integration in the United States by Portes and Rumbaut (2001), immigrants are being analyzed not only according to their national origin (Chinese, Mexican, Vietnamese, etc.) but also by their ethnicity of origin or, as the authors more broadly formulate it in their studies, pan-ethnicity (thus Black, Asian, Hispanic, Latino, and so on). Indeed, as will be shown later in this chapter, a wide range of other variables enrich the scholarship of the late 20th century: individual factors, such as education, aspirations and expectations, language proficiency, place of birth, age upon arrival, and length of residence in the country of destination; and structural factors, such as "racial" status, family socioeconomic background, and place of residence.

The third consideration concerns the shift of focus of migration studies from first-generation immigrants, thus those people who initiate the migratory trajectory, to so-called second-generation immigrants, that is, children of immigrants who therefore have been unknowingly included in their parents' or ancestors' migratory project. It would be improper to state that scholars supporting the canonical assimilation view completely disregarded the generational pace of the integration process: for example, Lieberson (1973) or Warner and Srole (1945) argue that the generational gait represents the motor for ethnic change, leading immigrants a further step away from their group of origin.

However, the scholarship that starts and dives into the study of second generations differs from its predecessor as it underlines how the integration process of immigrants' offspring assumes a different declination to that of first generations. As it is further developed in the next sections, the integration of immigrants' children comes with its own particular difficulties and strengths, which mostly stand apart from the issues their parents faced, which in turn gives light to concepts such as the "paradox of integration" (Rea, Wrench, Ouali 1999), "downward assimilation" (Portes, Zhou 1993) or Rumbaut's (1997) "boomerang effect". Not only are these models peculiar to the integration trajectories of second generations, but they also underscore how their inclusion in societies of destination should not be taken for granted. In this shift of focus, attention should be given to the emphasis given to second (and following) generations' role in helping to further elucidate critical aspects of immigrants' integration studies: not only does the growing presence of immigrants' offspring indicate a transition from temporary migration to a settlement or more permanent migratory phenomenon; it also represents a growing challenge for social cohesion and peoples' identity formation and perception, for both the immigrant group and the society of destination.

The first section deals with the earliest assimilation theories, such as the canonical and straight-line assimilation theory, as well as some historical context of the political and popular panorama that influenced the relative theorists. The second section presents the immigrants' integration theories developed in the late 20th century and the different political circumstances and changed migratory phenomenon that made scholars reconsider the classical assimilation model. Finally, the third part dives into the 21st century by introducing the dawn and rise of multiculturalism, shifting the focus from North America to Europe. By delineating these theoretical efforts and their evolution over time, in the following chapters it will be possible to draw from the body of pre-existing immigrant integration models and apply them to the case of Japan. This will allow us to better understand the specific immigratory phenomena and integration experiences arising from the narratives of youths of immigrant origin residing in the Land of the Rising Sun.

1.2. From the incorporation of immigrants…

As previously discussed, the United States and (later) Europe saw the birth of migration studies. Before closely examining what models and theories were formulated, it is necessary to look at the political and social scenarios that these contexts navigated while such theories were constructed. On the one hand, at the turn of the 20th century, when the first immigrants' integration theories saw the light, the US was imbued with a widespread sentiment of racial discourse over superiority and subordination of races: the same racialist thoughts present in the literature and public discourse by the end of the 1800s. Regardless of the promise of democratic and unconditional acceptance for anyone wishing for a fresh start in the new world, this racial atmosphere applied also to the mass inflow of immigrants coming from an overcrowded Europe. By the end of the 19th century, immigrants from Northern, Southern, and Eastern Europe represented the majority of incoming flows (the largest groups were the Italians, Germans, Irish, and Eastern-European Jews). Indeed, many were the Americans of African heritage as a consequence of decades of legacy of forced migration and slavery. Instead, incoming Asian immigrants (attracted to the US by the 1870s wave of industrialization) faced an imposed halt amid the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act dictated by the US immigration law and the broader Asian immigrant community would be hindered from accessing the country with the 1917 Act (Salyer 1995). It was not until 1952 with the McCarran-Walter Act that Asian immigrants could legally enter the US once again. In the second half of the 20th century, the war in Vietnam, the pogroms in Cambodia, and Fidel's regime in Cuba pushed the US to adopt a more open stance towards migration, and the country finally started to witness a more differentiated corpus of immigrants in terms of area of origin. While from the late 19th century to mid-20th century North Americans dealt with immigration which was similar in terms of language and culture to that of the average American, the end of the World War II turned the tide completely, putting the host society in contact with a physically and culturally distant immigrant population.

Western European studies on immigrants' integration, on the other hand, flourished later in the 20th century, although internal migration within Europe had been booming since the mid-19th century (Lucassen and Lucassen 2014). In the European setting, two different waves of immigration can also be distinguished. The first was prevalent during the inter-war period and saw migrants moving from one European country to the other, such as the Italian workers emigrating to Germany. This means that incoming migrants, although not speaking the same language, were broadly coming from similar geographically areas. After WWII, migration to and from European countries started to differ. Movement from colonial territories intensified, such as those towards France or the people of the Commonwealth moving to the United Kingdom. Not only was the composition of the immigrant population diversifying, but Mediterranean countries that were historically countries of emigration, such as Spain or Italy, began to reverse this trend, becoming countries of immigration from the 1990s onwards (Fassmann 2009).

Considering this growing inflow of migration, it was no longer possible for these countries to ignore the issue of how to integrate these immigrants into society and what the result of such integration would be. Sociologically, immigrant integration or incorporation (here used interchangeably) refers to the social and cultural process that make the immigrating person a member of the society of destination. More broadly, it also addresses the immigrant's economic mobility and social inclusion, making key institutions of a country (such as the education system, welfare system, labor market, and so on) critical elements for this incorporation process. The first theoretical efforts delineating how immigrant integration occurred was marked by the confusion, or rather nonuniformity, about the definition of assimilation and its corollaries. Robert E. Park (1914), moved by the compelling necessity to shed some light on the abstract (and yet negatively conceived) concept of assimilation, underscores its two different acceptations: "to make like" and "to take up and incorporate". As later explained in Brubaker's (2001) normative and analytical excursus of the assimilation concept, the two meanings have respectively an intransitive and transitive use: the latter, while focusing on the outcome of the integration path, en-

tails an imposition on immigrants who are "forced", or at least strongly encouraged to, assimilate; whereas the former implies that immigrants hold a more active role in the process and therefore, conceived in such a way, this definition makes assimilation less morally questionable. Park, together with Burgess (1921) in an attempt to distinguish the popular notion of assimilation from the sociological concept, defines assimilation as a "process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquires the memory, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (1921, 735). Understood in this way, assimilation does not entail a biological trait or a fusion of "races"[4] but rather a fusion of cultures. It is argued that intellectual and psychological mingling is much longer lasting than physiological; intermarriage, thus race-mixing alone cannot bring to assimilation. It is with these lines that the sociological definition of assimilation pulls away from that popular and political racial discourse of the first half of the 1900s: assimilation is no longer conceived biologically, but rather becomes a social process (Mayo-Smith 1893; Simons 1901; Park 1914; Park, Burgess 1921).

Nevertheless, there are still distinctive traits of the canonical assimilation that are characterized by the political and popular atmosphere of that time, singled out by Alba and Nee (1997) as "intellectual sins" and deficiencies. As the academic work of the early 20th century was heavily permeated by an Anglo-ethnocentric view, it was commonly agreed that the assimilation process was unilinear and inevitable: assimilation would result in the change of the immigrant group with no repercussion for the majority group, and moreover, it was bound to happen (Mayo-Smith 1894; Simons 1901; Warner, Srole 1960; Gordon 1964; Lieberson 1973). Due to the unilinear progress of the process, the canonical approach is also referred to as the "straight-line" assimilation. It entailed the disappearance of any original and ethnic traits eventually to fully

---

[4]   However, race, in its conception of skin color (as for "negros" and the Japanese) constitutes an insurmountable obstacle, which will always mark a barrier to the full absorption of these peoples (Park, Burgess 1921, 760-761).

embrace the national American identity, or to use his words, the "sense of [American] peoplehood and ethnicity" (Gordon 1964, 70). This ethnic disappearance was supposed to happen through the "unlearning" of immigrants' cultural traits, which were deemed as "inferior" (Warner, Srole 1960). All ethnic minorities were bunched together on a lower societal stratum (thus, inferiority envisioned in the structural ladder of the society) with no distinction of any real socio-economic assessment of individual situations. In this frame, assimilation was tantamount to upward social mobility and therefore implied that immigrants' detachment from (lower-class tier) ethnic clusters and accessing the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP – denoting the majority of the US population) group was equivalent to reaching the higher societal strata and enhanced socio-economic conditions. Only two accounts supporting the canonical assimilation theoretical framework partially deviated from the unilinear aspect of the process. Simons (1901) argues, like Giddings in *Elements of Sociology* (1899) before her, that assimilation is a *reciprocal* process but only to reiterate the ethnocentric and racial discourse by pointing out that there were active and superior peoples (the conquerors, who assimilate) versus the passive and subordinate ones (the conquered, who are assimilated)[5]. Accordingly, Park and Burgess (1921) swiftly mention that assimilation was not merely one-sided but, as Kivisto (2004) highlights, they do not elaborate further than this.

Assimilation was thus not only the sole possible and inevitable outcome resulting from immigrants' integration, but it was also desirable both for the immigrant, as it coincided with his or her enhanced socio-economic conditions, and for the society of destination. In this respect, Simons (1901) argues that assimilation had the function of bringing homogeneity to society at large, particu-

[5]   It must be remembered that Simons (1901) worked on the issue of assimilation through a worldwide historical lenses, availing of examples of empire or State formation and development from the American to Eurasian continent.

larly in the public sphere[6], and referred to the adoption of a sole "language, ideals of government, law, and education" as the acquisition of a "consciousness of kind". In particular, she argues that the existence of concentrated residential clusters, in clear reference to Asian populations, impeded assimilation, as it would be easier for "foreign language and customs" to persist and thus for what she refers as a "race-consciousness" to endure (Simons 1901c, 398). In addressing to the same concept, Park and Burgess juxtapose the expression of "like-mindedness" to that of homogeneity underlining that "social solidarity[7] based on sentiment [of loyalty] and habit [of concurrent actions]" would unify the State (Park and Burgess 1921, 759). This like-mindedness was thus perceived to be both the outcome and the driving force for assimilation, also bringing unity where there was a growing social pluralism and increasing widespread individualistic pursuit by members of the society (Park, Burgess 1921; Kivisto 2004). Thereby, the two scholars bring a precious change of pace within the discourse of homogeneity, underscoring that the existing growing plurality did not necessarily clash with the undergoing assimilation phenomenon, a perspective that later in the century would echo multicultural arguments.

As for "like-mindedness", which would have eased the assimilation process of immigrant groups, also other elements were pinpointed as either facilitator or deterrent to a successful assimilative outcome. Although every scholar sets their own laws or essential conditions for assimilation to smoothly take place, there are some common grounds of agreement. As a consequence of the inevitability of the phenomenon, a long-lasting contact was deemed to be essential, implying that assimilation is a matter of time (Mayo-Smith 1983; Simons 1901; Park 1914; Park, Burgess 1921; Warner, Srole 1960; Gordon 1964;

---

[6]   Simons (1901) wrote that in the private sphere, diversity could be allowed, but did not actually support this thesis throughout her writings, proposing further arguments contradicting with the feasibility of multiculturalism at least in the private life.

[7]   Here, the authors referred to the Durkheimian conception of social solidarity, which was shifting from a *mechanical* solidarity, typical of a collectivist society, to *organic*, exemplary of modern societies that were increasingly characterized by a growing heterogeneity and broadening individualistic goals (Durkheim 1997).

Lieberson 1973). In particular, the presence of second-generation immigrants, or more generally the presence of immigrants' offspring in proportion to first-generation immigrants, was deemed to be a hallmark of an undergoing assimilation process (Mayo-Smith 1893, 1894). Consequently, as a growing acculturation could be found in newly born immigrant-origin generations, subsequent scholars pointed out that the time through which assimilation took place was marked by a generational pace (Warner, Srole 1960; Lieberson 1973). Other forces boosting the assimilation process were found in intermarriage, with reference of higher and lower rates of mixed-couples marriages respectively where the immigrant community was too densely populated or where immigrant-origin communities were not numerously represented[8]; common school education, especially in relation of language-proficiency, illiteracy, and age upon arrival or access to the educational system; and the exercise of political rights, as seen through the political participation of either foreign born and naturalized people (Mayo-Smith 1893; Simons 1901).

Meanwhile, among the chief obstacles, besides the resistance of ethnic clusters who, due to their isolation, are reluctant to adopt the language, habits, and customs of the majority (Simons 1901), somatic differences were also noted. Specifically, Park and Burgess (1921) underscore the impossibility for people like "Africans" and "Orientals" to be fully assimilated; not so much because they cannot achieve "like-mindedness", but rather for their skin tone: "The trouble is not with the Japanese mind, but with the Japanese skin. The Jap is not the right color" (1921, 761). Once again, this argument reflected regulations in immigrant control: the Immigration Act of 1924, following decades of peaking immigratory inflows, further limited access to the country based on quotas for each nationality, thus favoring immigrants from Northern and Western European countries and restricting Asians (once again) and Southern, Central, and Eastern European nationals. As immigrants bear a "racial hallmark" or "racial uniform", individually, they will never achieve the mass mingling that

[8]   However, as Kivisto (2004) underlines, statistical evidence alone was not reliable enough to come to certain conclusions.

the assimilation process calls for, especially since these distinctions impede any interactions with the majority due to established racial prejudice (Kivisto 2004), deeply confirming a conscious distinction between them (Park, Burgess 1921).

Within this still scattered understanding of assimilation and how it was meant to progress, Milton Gordon (1964) was the first scholar to attempt to offer a definition of the concept as well as its operationalization. His study contributed to the definition of a set of concrete and descriptive multidimensional empirical elements to enable the systematic and replicable measurement of the extent of assimilation of ethnic groups. Gordon himself acknowledged the confusion among the available formulations of assimilation up to the 1960s and calls for "a compelling need for a rigorous and systematic analysis of the concept of assimilation which would 'break it down' into all the possible relevant factors or variables which could conceivably be included under its rubric" (1964, 61). Gordon divided the assimilation process in seven dimensions, allowing for a clear operationalization of the several facets concerning immigrants' integration. He conceived that immigrants start from "ground zero" and proceeded towards a "core society" – the WASP, envisaged as a sole and homogeneous group – by passing through these different dimensions: acculturation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identity, absence of prejudice, absence of discrimination, and civic assimilation. Within this step-by-step process, immigrants' acculturation (described as the adoption of cultural patterns typical of the host society) could occur without further assimilative steps. It is the structural assimilation step, namely "the participation [of the minority group] into the social cliques, clubs, and institutions [of the core society]" (Gordon 1964, 110) that is described by the author as the most critical moment for assimilation and the catalyst to complete the assimilation process. Therefore, not only would structural assimilation *inevitably* lead to all other steps of assimilation but it would entail, as Warner and Srole also theorize, the extinction of immigrants' previous ethnic characters to fully adopt embrace the national American identity, or to use his words, the "sense of [American] peoplehood and ethnicity" (1964, 70).

Although Gordon's reformulation and methodological enrichment were indeed useful to subsequent students and research, like his predecessors' work, his study has been criticized for being heavily skewed towards an American ethnocentric perspective. Furthermore, he has been found guilty of ambiguity firstly, for his simplification of reducing the whole crucible of ethnic groups into a single encompassing category, making it a one-to-one framework (like the Sylvanian and Mundovian societies) (1964, 68). In Gordon's view, the WASP was also thought to be a sole and homogeneous group and thus oversimplifying the standard of what immigrants had to assimilate to. Secondly, he failed to state clearly in his writing whether he perceived the process on a micro-sociological basis (therefore as an individual-level dynamic) or whether he meant for it to be applied to groups (a higher macro-sociological level) (Alba and Nee 1997).

1.3. *…To the incorporation of their descendants*

The social unrest arising from the 1940s and characterizing the 1960s in the United States, instability due to involvement in the escalating Vietnam war, and especially the mounting movements asking for the re-evaluation and support for civil rights, brought not only a new public and political perception over immigration but also the production of a new stream of literature which completely contrasted with previously established values. Considering the legislation, the Congress proceeded to dismantle the quota system established in 1924, opening doors to immigration[9] (Alexander 2001; Gerstle 2017). Moreover, *Is assimilation dead?* by Nathan Glazer (1993) is maybe one of the most representative paper for this literature shift, underlying how the canonical account and straight-line assimilation theory was losing its appeal throughout the academia until being rejected completely by scholars and the general public for

[9]   However, a system of preference over which categories of immigrants were able to access the country was established, among which skilled immigrants and those entering for family reunification (Gerstle 2017).

its ethnocentric and discriminatory stances. Most criticized was the assumption of the straight-line assimilation theory stating that upward social mobility, thus the enhancement of the immigrants' socio-economic conditions, was only possible if those immigrants assimilated to the core of the receiving society. However, Glazer warns that "The word may be dead, the concept may be disreputable, but the reality continues to flourish" (Glazer 1993, 13), thus pointing to a political and social reality still devoted to assimilation.

Naturally, as with all human phenomena, while there was not always a clear-cut separation between the canonical assimilation scholarship and following research, there were few recurrent elements that marked this transition and differentiated the literature productions from the 1960s onwards. The inevitability of the assimilation process which had so intrinsically characterized the canonical theory account was at this point put into question. Assimilation was now being recognized rather as a course with unforeseeable outcomes (Alba 1990; Waters 1990; Gans 1992a; 1992b; Portes, Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; 1997; Zhou 1997; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Portes, Hao 2002). This had widespread implications in the newly theorized integration models. In particular, two models were conceived in overt opposition to the inevitable and straight-line way to proceeding of the assimilative stance.

While supporting some facets of the canonical theory, Herbert J. Gans (1992a, 1992b, 2007) proposes a new model of integration for immigrants and their offspring called "bumpy-line theory". Gans' new model arises in open opposition to the straight-line assimilation, criticizing Warner and Srole's formulation of an inevitable extinction of any ethnic traits. Instead of leading to a straight-line trend with the inevitable disappearance of any form of "ethnicity", Gans' model would rather lead through "bumps representing various kinds of adaptations to changing circumstances – and with the line having no predictable end" (Gans 1992a, 44). Referring to the work of Richard Alba (1990) and Mary Waters (1990), the author further stresses the unforeseeability of the assimilation outcome by addressing to the persistence of some marginal ethnic traits even after several generations. Gans (1992a, 1992b) calls this a "symbolic" ethnicity: it is characterized by a long lifespan thus persisting through the

generational progress (also, Waters 1990, 155), lingering even without any ethnic group nor cultural affiliation, and embodied in the "the consumption of symbols, […] [as] ethnic restaurants, festivals, in stores that sell ethnic foods and ancestral collectibles, and through vacation trips to the Old Country" (Gans 1992a, 44).

The other theoretical proposal for the study of immigrants' integration into societies of destination, in clear opposition to the straight-line view that started making its way in the academic debate at the beginning of the 1990s, was the segmented assimilation theory, of which Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) could be considered the main spokespersons. Contrary to canonical assimilation theory, segmented assimilation aspires to understand in which different "segments" of the receiving society (therefore no longer unique and homogeneous) the immigrants' integration takes place. So, while the only possible result formulated by the canonical stream was the complete assimilation and acculturation into the "core" of the host society, with a consequent enhanced socio-economic condition, segmented assimilation theory conceives possible different outcomes of adaptation and "divergent destinies" (Zhou 1997, 975) depending into what sector of the host society a particular immigrant group assimilates. Segmented assimilation theory identifies three main possible outcomes: an upward assimilation into the white middle-class society; a downward mobility into the underclass with the worsening of the immigrant group's socio-economic condition; an economic advancement without acculturation, thus the preservation of the community of origin's values and identity (Portes, Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). Therefore, although segmented assimilation theory does not exclude the full assimilation of immigrants into the society of destination, this outcome is considered as possible as any other result.

Other scholars affiliated with the segmented assimilation account support, with empirical bases, the idea that not only that full assimilation outcomes (as formulated in the traditional stance) are not inevitable, but that some immi-

grant groups would be better off without assimilation and acculturation[10]; while others, in pursuing their acculturation process, attain socio-economic standards at the level, or even better, than the average host society (Chiswick, Miller 2008, 2011; Rumbaut 1994, 1997; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Portes, Hao 2002). Such correlations contrast with another corollary of the canonical assimilation theory: the finding that assimilation no longer necessarily meant enhanced social and economic conditions for the immigrant. Consequently, this decoupled assimilation from the attainment of upward mobility. One of the main criticisms Rumbaut brings forward focuses on the linearity of the classical assimilation process. Rumbaut in *Assimilation and its discontents* (1997) empirically tests assimilation as a linear process in a deviant case analysis in four areas of immigrants' life: health, risk behaviour, educational achievement, and linguistic proficiency and ethnic self-identity. Most of the results clashed with the straight-line assimilative assumption. Concerning immigrants' health, Rumbaut finds that immigrants did overall better than natives, thus the more immigrants assimilate to natives, the worse health conditions they reported. Immigrants of precedent waves (mainly European and Canadian) presented worse conditions when compared to more recent incoming immigrants, mainly Asians, Hispanic, and blacks (Rumbaut 1997, 932). For the analysis of risk behaviour, among foreign born it has been argued that the longer the time spent in the United States, the higher the risk of engaging in deviant behaviour, such as drug consumption and delinquency. First-generation immigrants did better than second generations in avoiding deviant behaviour but also in their health condition, rate of school absenteeism (mainly due to health-related reasons) and reduced the risk to fall into obesity and been affected by asthma. Lastly, one of the author's most interesting conceptual introductions was presented with the analy-

---

[10]   Chiswick and Miller (2008; 2011) formulate a "negative assimilation", which brings a deterioration in wage condition across a set time period. However, this is true only in a very specific case, that is, immigrants coming from English-speaking countries who migrate to the US and in a condition where immigrants' skills are highly transferable internationally.

sis of self-identification. On the one hand, Rumbaut argues that patterns of linguistic acculturation confirm the linearity of the assimilation process thus the longer the residency, generation by generation, English has been found as being the most preferred language adopted. On the other, self-identification resulted in quite the opposite. While language adapted in a straight-line "arrow" fashion, ethnic self-identity followed a "boomerang"-line shape tendency. Although the study showed an initial trend among both native- and foreign-born immigrants in the U.S. for the adoption of U.S or hyphenated U.S. self-identification, this trend turned back on itself later on, focusing back on the immigrant's ethnic identity of the country of origin (Rumbaut 1997). This boomerang-line shape had already been anticipated about five decades before by Marcus Lee Hansen, an American scholar on immigration studies who, in the early 20th century, was focusing on second and third generations – quite unconventionally for his time. With the line "What the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember" (Hansen 1938, 9), he underscored that whereas immigrants' children were eager to fully integrate to the larger society to get rid of the stigma and inconveniences of the foreign ethnic label they carried, third-generation immigrants who were born in the US and spoke the language were less afraid of pursing the ethnic legacy of their ancestors (also, Alba, Nee 2003). Lastly, while focusing on different variables, Portes and Hao (2002) also find that linguistic acculturation could not even be reduced to a straight-line trend. The authors identify a plurality of possible linguistic outcomes[11] and, contrary to prior arguments, being able to retain the language of origin while also mastering the host country language is deemed to be the best and most preferable outcome. As a matter of fact, bilingualism, which is found to be more common among second-generation women rather than men, is associated with healthier psycho-social adaptations and sounder family relations (Portes, Hao 2002).

[11]   More precisely, Portes and Hao (2002) narrow the results down to a fourfold typology: English monolingual, Fluent Bilingual, Foreign Monolingual, and Limited Bilingual (p. 899).

Another main turning point explored by immigrants' integration theorists of the late 1900s is the manifest switch of attention towards second generations, which are to be the focus population in this research. Although canonical assimilationist scholars paid particular attention to the *tempo* of assimilation process to be driven by generational pace (Mayo-Smith 1894; Park 1921; Warner, Srole 1945; Gordon 1964; Lieberson 1973), with the literature on segmented assimilation, there is a clear focus on immigrants' offspring as the analytical core of immigrants' integration study. Within the broader area of migration studies, the second generation (and the ones following) represents a separate and specific field of study which cannot be analyzed separately from the cultural, socioeconomic, and demographic transformation of our societies. Second generations are the adults of tomorrow and imply a challenge for social cohesion for both sending and receiving societies, playing a vital role in shaping them (Portes, Rumbaut 2001). Moreover, the increasing presence of immigrant-origin youths embodies the outcomes of past and present migratory phenomena: the shift from the first generation to the following ones symbolizes a transformation from temporary (mainly labour immigration) to permanent (or settlement immigration). Through this perspective, the importance given to second generations by the segmented assimilation theory should be contextualized, as it "offers a theoretical framework for understanding the process by which the new second generation - the children of contemporary immigrants - becomes incorporated into the system of stratification in the host society and the different outcomes of this process" (Zhou 1997, 975).

Notwithstanding the evident deviation from the classical assimilation account and rectifying efforts of the canonical theory' intellectual sins brought by the late-20th century theorists, neither of these new models were without criticism. One of the most shared reproaches in the literature is the excessively pessimistic tone that pervades segmented assimilation research. Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) find this pessimism about the destinies second-generation immigrants quite unjustified. Firstly, they argue that the American society is "more receptive to immigrant incorporation" (Perlmann, Waldinger 1997, 917), as the pre-1965 wave of immigrants have previously paved the way for

later migratory inflows. Secondly, they underline that the post-1965 second-generation immigrants face no greater disadvantages compared to their predecessors and that they actually start from a higher socioeconomic ground, with most of them being part of, and thus starting off in, the middle class. Other criticisms of the segmented assimilation theory were presented by Vermeulen (2010), who recognizes the advancements of the segmented model but is generally skeptical of its over-reliability. The Belgian professor provides a series of observations on some flaws of the segmented theory, firstly on the concept of "downward assimilation". Possibly due to the quantitative nature of his research, Vermeulen argues that previous studies have failed to assess the concrete definition of "downward assimilation"[12], and that instead they have shown the *risk* of a possible downward integration. Moreover, he points out that it is usually suggested that the downward assimilation is a permanent and end-stage outcome, whereas this might not always be the case. In a historical perspective, he refers to the old (pre-1965) migratory wave of Italians who undeniably fell into a downward spiral, then ending up displaying elements of achieved upward mobility (Vermeulen 2010, 1226).

As Esser (2006) and Brubaker (2001) point out, there is still an ongoing discussion whether the canonical assimilation is ideologically obsolete and anachronistic for the sociological analysis of new immigration and whether it can explain or represent of today's American and European dynamics. Among the most debated issues against canonical assimilation is the fictious existence of a single and unified "core" to which immigrants assimilate (Esser 2006, 5), whereas a (new) multilevel polycentrism – contrary to the mono- and ethno-centric view typical of the canonical assimilation – is deemed to make this classical framework no longer appropriate for the study of the current migratory phenomenon.

Therefore, in Glazer's own words, "*is assimilation* truly *dead"*? Or, as Esser (2006, 29) inquires, is there still a possibility for its revival? Conscious of

---

[12]   A critique associated with Alba's (2008) remark arguing that the Segmented assimilation's conceivers never really offered an in-writing definition of assimilation.

these undergoing changes, some scholars revisited the assimilation theory on up-to-date terms. Richard Alba and Victor Nee (1997; 2003) propose a "new" assimilation theory, preserving some elements while discarding other from the old canonical account and putting today's shifted structural and ecological constraints under the spotlight.

In delineating their neo-assimilation model, on one hand, the authors preserve some traits of the canonical account, such as the generational and unequivocal pace of assimilation. As a matter of fact, they argue that "Assimilation as a concept and as a theory has been subjected to withering criticisms in recent decades. […] But there is danger in the view of many critics that they have provided a strong rationale for rejecting assimilation, rather than for amending it. We believe […] assimilation still has a great power for an understanding on the contemporary ethnic scene in the United States." (Alba, Nee 1997, 863).

On the other hand, Alba and Nee propose the rejection of some critical moral stances from the canonical stream. They add a two-way dynamic of the adaptation process as for reciprocal effects and influences between the host society and the immigrant groups, stating that "assimilation can be promoted by changes that occur on both sides of an ethnic/racial boundary" (Alba 2008, 41). A perhaps more articulated notion explicating reciprocity in the assimilation process is offered by Zolberg and Long's (1999) expression of boundary shift. While canonical assimilation theory saw the unilinear movement of the immigrant towards the mainstream group, that Zolberg and Long visually represented it as a "boundary crossing", the boundary being the socially, economically, and politically perceived distinction among the immigrant and core society group. In later theories, the authors argue that there is not such a thing as fixed boundary. Thus, it is not immigrants crossing them but rather it is the boundaries themselves that become less well-defined – from this comes the phrase "boundary blurring" (Zolberg, Long 1999; Harris 2009) – as it goes back and forth, like a wave advancing to and retreating from the shore.

One of the main contributions and innovations that Alba and Nee (1997, 2003) bring to the existing assimilation theoretical frame is their model as the "Neo assimilation theory". It is their search for causal mechanisms for assimi-

lation and their elaborations through the three levels of the sociological struc-ture (macro-, meso-, and micro-level). These three levels are respectively asso-ciated with mechanisms occurring at the society level (the macro-level), within the ethnic group (the meso-level), and the personal level (the micro-level). The relevance of developing a causal mechanism model proper of the assimilation theory lies in the possibility this framework can offer to foresee assimilative outcomes, instead of assessing them (as was the case of existing theories) (Al-ba 2008). As many authors reflecting on (causal) mechanisms have already un-derlined, there is not a univocal definition of a *mechanism* (Tilly 2001; Mayntz 2004; Hedström 2005; Kuorikoski 2009; Hedström, Ylikoski 2010) and Alba and Nee fail to give a clear definition of whether their so-conceived causal mechanisms belong to any specific sociological account.

The authors define assimilation as the "attenuation of distinctions based on ethnic origin […], [but] not an inevitable outcome of adaptation[13]. It proceeds incrementally, usually as an intergenerational process, stemming both from in-dividuals' purposive action and from the unintended consequences of their workaday decisions" (Alba, Nee 2003, 38). "Assimilation occurs at different rates within different ethnic and racial groups […] sometimes involving more collectivist modes of accommodation […] and sometimes more individualist modes of adaptation" (Alba, Nee 2003, 39). Therefore, just as Bunge (2004) argued that in a complex system there might be several levels of mechanisms that simultaneously lead to a certain systemic outcome, similarly, Alba and Nee (2003) propose their mechanistic model by separating two different levels of causation, thus into discerning *proximate* and *distal* causes.

Proximate causal mechanisms articulate on two different levels: the pur-posive activity at the individual level and the collectivist efforts of the network (community or primary-group level). The former purposive action addresses the context-bound rationality principle, within its "thick" conception (Nee and Alba 2013). Within this, actors (with the limited cognitive capability of indi-

---

[13]   More specifically, "assimilation does not require the loss of ethnic identity, nor the vanishing of ethnic boundaries" (Nee 2013, 358).

viduals) make decisions with incomplete information[14]: therefore, instead of optimizing the outcome (or actor's goal), they solely seek to or end up improving it. On the network level, mechanisms are envisioned to be social rewards and punishments. Here, networks are meant as the ethnic communities that the individual belongs to and are thus addressed by the authors as close-knit groups. In close-knit groups: "Network mechanisms are the *social processes*[15] *that monitor and enforce norms [...] [and] enable actors to engage in joint action as a means to achieve collective goals*" (Alba, Nee 2003, 42). In addition: "Members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another" (Nee, Alba 2013, 9). These mechanisms maximize the members of the network's welfare, while they might not operate for the benefit of the whole society (where this network is inscribed). The authors argue that this welfare-maximization line of action will eventually match the group's assimilation[16], making it more probable that assimilation is closely correlated with immigrants' upward mobility – one of the principles of the canonical assimilation theory.

Distal causes are embedded in large structures, such as the State, the labour market, and firms. These causes are more precisely referred to as institu-

---

[14]   The authors here offer a crude but clear example of choices made in an incomplete-information scenario: a Mexican laborer living near the Arizona border, reported by the New Yorker. The laborer, to seek for more promising work opportunities, decides to cross the desert to reach the USA. The only information he can rely on are that of people who have died but therefore never came back to report it; and the news of those who have succeeded, stating that the conditions were favorable, and the border not so well monitored.

[15]   Here, again, is an example of how a stylistic choice might generate confusion, as the authors adopt the term "process" as an equivalent of mechanism.

[16]   Among the central roles of migrant networks can be found initiating, sustaining, and expanding streams of labor migration; in this way, newly-arrived immigrants are able to rely on relatives and acquaintances friends for support to find housing and jobs, which eventually leads to their long-term accommodation.

tional mechanisms. More narrowly, they are the structures of incentives and constraints that shape both purposive action and network mechanisms, dictating either a segregating phenomenon or a blending process within the larger society (Alba, Nee 2003). One of the ways in which State implementation of formal rules dictates a possible outcome shaping the institutional environment is the sets of federal rules that have "increased the cost of discrimination" (Alba, Nee 2003, 54), by punishing and sanctioning discriminatory behaviours against immigrants or minorities[17]. More importantly, a shift in institutional norms is said to bring a change in values: it would be sufficient to look to the decrease of racist ideologies after the Second World War, or the shift between the 19th and 20th centuries from focusing on "white supremacy" to a broad consensus of acceptance and inclusion of diversity (Alba, Nee 2003, 57). This does not mean that practices such as racism or discrimination have now disappeared, but they have at least lost their overt public legitimacy.

While the canonical account almost completely overlooked these economic, social, and political determinants, Alba and Nee are not the sole scholars to pick up on the relevance of such structural constraints. Besides pointing to both individual level and structural factors[18] to fully explore the triggers that interact and shape the possible rage of immigrants' integration outcomes, post-1960s academics also argued about the significance of what Alba and Nee would refer to as distal causes. Portes and Zhou (1993) and Zhou (1997) confronted the pre- and post-1965 waves of immigration to the United States to understand the conditions that these immigrants had to face. Their work first points to the changed "structure of economic opportunities" (Portes, Zhou 1993, 76), or the

---

[17]   As enabled, for example, by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the right to intervene in private bias lawsuits; or the Civil Rights Act of 1991, allowing victims of bias to collect up to $300,000 in compensation and punitive damages.

[18]   Individual level factors include: immigrants' education, aspirations and expectations, language proficiency, place of birth, age upon arrival, and length of residence in the country of destination; whereas structural constraints are: such as "racial" status, family socio-economic background, and place of residence (Zhou 1997).

hourglass economy, referring to the ever-decreasing opportunity to climb up the ladder in the occupational market. The lowered chance of mobility is further exacerbated by increasing vicious patterns of residential segregation, especially in inner cities where poverty is concentrated and low-skilled immigrants converge, dictating the conditions where newer immigrants' generations socialize.

1.4. *The rise and fall of multiculturalism for Western liberal democracies*

The social struggles for rights equality for all members of society that now have run through the majority of Western liberal democracies since the 1960s were no longer only voiced by members of the core societies: minorities and traditionally discriminated groups also started to come forward. At this point, however, the battle for civil rights recognition was no longer an issue of immigrants and ethnic minorities alone: alongside the black movements, demands for rights recognition also came from feminists, environmentalists, anti-war supporters, as well as the first movements for gay rights.

The rise of multiculturalism as a claim for rights recognition and independence by minority groups dates back to the 1960s, but the term takes around thirty years to get into widespread usage. It is used in Canadian and Australian academic circles from the 1970s, making its first arrival into the scene in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1989 (Hartman, Gerteis 2005; Glazer 1997), yet it is not until the 1990s that the term makes its appearance in newspapers. "Cultural pluralism" was the term previously used. No matter the wording specificity, it is possible to affirm that both expressions were born in zealous opposition to assimilation and the "melting pot" image as products of the core culture domination.

While, in its earlier formulation, multiculturalism referred to a descriptive characteristic of global societies, in its later academic articulation it stood for "situations in which people who hold 'different' habits, customs, traditions, languages and/or religions live alongside each other in the same social space, willing to maintain relevant aspects of their own difference and to have it pub-

licly recognized" (Colombo 2015, 801). Multiculturalism thus foresees a social context in which members of ethnic, native, or more general discriminated minority groups are entitled to openly preserve their cultural traits in varying aspects of their lives, no longer only in the private sphere as professed in some laxer assimilationist stances. It entails an interventionist role on the part of the State which is called on to safeguard these minorities claims by implementing *ad hoc* multicultural policies (MCPs from here on out).

Multiculturalism has not only become staple for sociologists, but also for political – liberal – philosophers and politicians (Bhikhu 2017; Colombo 2015; Glazer 1997; Kymlicka 2010; Young 1990). Colombo (2015) identifies three main theoretical approaches to the study of multiculturalism: normative, anti-ideological, and prescriptive. The normative approach of multiculturalism has its core in the challenges that multiculturalism poses to the liberal dimension, namely the acknowledgment of plural rights in a context where sameness and unity are the commonly accepted values and rights must be identical for all individuals of the society (Bhikhu 2017; Kymlicka 2010; Rawls 1971). As democratic inclusion, the stronghold of liberal democracies, is attainable insofar as such cultural groups' differences are recognized (Taylor 1994), multiculturalism becomes deeply intertwined within the "politics of different" which strives to overcome the dominant elements of cultural representation (reproduced to the detriment of marginalized groups) and pushes forward to adopt the necessary political tools to recognize and revaluate minorities cultural diversity (Song 2010). The second approach, anti-ideological or critical multiculturalism, focuses on the unmasking of the silent forms of legitimate endorsement that the dominant (white and male) canon of States and cultures have reproduced, thus hiding the existing plurality within society (Wieviorka 2013). Lastly, the prescriptive or "multiculturalism as a feature for current global societies" approach (Colombo 2015, 807) focuses on the more practical aspects to successfully manage cultural differences by finding new forms of accommodation – in the linguistic, political, and legal aspects. However, this cannot take place without a sociologically informed concept of what culture is, and therefore the policymaker or general public should disregard the notion of culture

based on historically-bound, fixed, and defined cultural identity that determines how a group should act (Phillips 2009).

Depending on the geographical area that multicultural studies focus on, multicultural practices might address specific minorities group. For instance, in the United States, multiculturalism encompasses not only immigrant ethnic minorities but also indigenous groups, such as native Americans. Instead, in Europe, where migration has continued to increase consistently throughout the second half of the 20th century, multicultural issues mainly concern the immigrant population. To this regard, Kymlicka (1995) has organically divided multicultural target groups into three categories: firstly, national minorities, who are geographically concentrated groups that consider themselves different from the larger national group, such as Innuits in Alaska or Basques in Spain; secondly, indigenous groups who have been stripped of their land and cultural rights by past colonizers, such as the Kurds in Middle East countries or Ainu in Japan; lastly, immigrant groups. This structured repartition of multiculturalism by groups is functional to the implementation of MPCs, which are to be carried out according to each State's demography. Based on patterns of multiculturalism found in Western democracies, Kymlicka and Banting (2006) have designed three specific sets of MPCs, one targeting each group: for national minorities, policies go from territorial autonomy to forming political representation in central government; for indigenous groups, MPCs policies should aim to ensure recognition of land rights and/or customary law, among other things; finally, policies addressing immigrant groups should allow dual citizenship and should foresee affirmative action, such as reserving places to access high school or public offices (Kymlicka 2010; Kymlicka, Banting 2006).

Despite all the demographic differences that States witness within their borders, further development of the multicultural model by Kymlicka (1995; 2010) consists of a set of three factors that, if present, would secure the survival of a multicultural society. Firstly, the country where multiculturalism takes place must be characterized, demographically, by a declining and ageing population, where the growing inflow of immigrants shifts the hand in favor of non-dominant groups; secondly, such countries should be open to liberal-

democratic values, allowing minorities to claim recognition of their rights and ensuring that the central government plays an active role in rights protection; thirdly, the country must be geopolitically stable, or be in a state of "desecuritisation" according to Kymlicka (2010) – in a state of insecurity, the central government will not be willing to grant power and resources to minorities originating from enemy neighbors.

Regardless of the status of three factors in the United States and Europe, multiculturalism had already begun to lose its appeal by the end of the 1990s, both in the political and academic arena. In 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that multiculturalism had "utterly failed" (The Guardian 2010), and the same assertion was proposed one year later by David Cameron, then-Prime minister of the UK, when he criticized the far too "tolerant" attitude towards "extremist" minorities, to the detriment of a weakened majority (Gov.uk 2011). Besides the conservative and right-wing criticism, scholars also highlighted some flaws in the multicultural framework. Alexander (2001) underlines the change in the acceptation of the term: while multiculturalism denoted unity despite diversity in the 1970s, in the 1990s it is used to confirm that diversity exists, and that it needs to be assessed and recognized[19]. In this way, multiculturalism stresses cultural differences and reinforces the concept of otherness (Alexander 2001; Bhikhu 2017; Colombo 2015; Glazer 1997; Kivisto 2002; Kymlicka 1995, 2010). While allowing for cultural preservation rather than accommodation, these groups remain sealed, encouraging forms of segregation and self-insolation of the same groups that MCPs should targeting. Furthermore, celebrating uniqueness within each group can prove to be dangerous, especially for weaker or hierarchically fragile members of minority

---

[19] In this regard, Joppke (2004) argues about the unilaterality of cultural recognition: while the majority is called for to recognize the minority's culture, the latter is not expected to do the same, fostering conservative statements such as Cameron's 2011 speech.

groups. In fact, multiculturalism ends up fueling internal restrictions[20] (Colombo 2015; Kymlicka 1995), preserving some traditions or habits which are incompatible with the culture of societies of destination (this is the case for children marriage or female genital mutilation). To this regard, multiculturalism might reinforce traditional forms of power: while deciding which cultural traits of the minority group are authentic and should be preserved, the dominant group will only consult with the minority group's elites, thus overlooking alternative visions, mostly those of women and reformers (Colombo 2015). Finally, it should be borne in mind that this whole criticism, as well as the fundamentals of the multicultural theoretical framework, has its roots in a liberal ethnocentric system of values and beliefs, and therefore the normative and prescriptive stances dictated by the multicultural approach are once again imbued by western liberal democratic cultural and moral standards (Bhikhu 2017).

---

[20] "Internal restrictions" are those demands posed by minority group representatives to restrict civil and political rights of its own members on the pretense to maintain internal cohesion. This expression is juxtaposed to "external protections", which is the demand by the minority group to protect itself from the dominant group impositions (Colombo 2015).

CHAPTER 2

THEORIZING IMMIGRANTS' INTEGRATION IN PAST AND PRESENT JAPAN

This chapter focuses on the genesis and development of foreigners' integration theories in the Japanese context. The aim is to reconstruct the most salient elements that characterized the Japanese scholarship on immigrants' integration, as has been done for its Western counterpart in the first chapter of this study.

Identifying Japanese theories on migration does not always fall into the area of migration studies, instead sometimes being incorporated into historical or political studies and at times on research on nationalism. Therefore, the effort to track and reconstruct Japanese discourse and theorization on foreigners' integration was more demanding when compared to research conducted in the previous chapter.

In the case of the US and Europe, theories were formulated and subsequently evolved along with the different and historically discernable inflow of migratory events. As far as the Japanese emergence and formulation of systematic thoughts and theories of immigrant integration are concerned, three main events have been singled out as incisive to guide the scholarship: firstly, the early colonization of the Ainu population of Northern Japan, a long-lasting process taking place from the 16th to the 19th century (Walker 2001); secondly, the colonization of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan at the turn of the 20th century with its consequent inflow of migrants forced to move to Japan from the colonial territories and labeled *oldcomers* in the literature; and lastly, the 1980s income of immigrants characterized by a prominent Latin American components, which eventually evolved into a much more diversified immigratory inflow from the 2000s onward, and referred to as *newcomers*. While the inflow of immigrants entering the country from the 1980s has generated a more nu-

merically and scientifically consistent body of literature, the earlier encounter with the Ainu population and the events following the early 20th century colonization resulted in the first emergence of theories concerning the integration of foreign nationals in the Japanese society, although these were fragmented and mostly woven with politicized discourse.

Before venturing into the panorama of theories carried out by Japanese scholars, it is necessary to shed light on the political and historical circumstances that brought about these theoretical formulations. The end of the 19th century was marked the Japanese attempt to push forward its imperial expansionism which a decade later translated in the colonial rule of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. This Japanese foreign policy was ideologically justified by domestic discourses on the origin of Japanese people and its national identity formation, which in turn noticeably shaped the formulation of theories on foreign nationals' integration. To illustrate how the discourses on the origin and identity of Japanese people played a role to shape the country's foreign policy and subsequently Japanese scholars' theorizing attempts, this chapter is organized as follows: firstly, it presents pre-war discourses on national origin and identity and points out how they shaped the Japanese foreign policy. Secondly, it selects two cases, namely the colonization of the Ainu population from Northern Japan and that of the Korean peninsula to elucidates the main elements that characterized the early immigrants' integration policies and theories. The narration of historical events proceeds along the presentation of emerging discourses and theories in the Japanese elites' context and in turn such theories are juxtaposed to concepts formulated by Western scholars, presented in Chapter 1. The way in which theories are presented are not intended to suggest that Japanese theories emerged later than or as a consequence of Western conceptualization, or that they are readapted versions of them. Although it is true, as stated earlier in the chapter, that from the second half of the 19th century many Japanese scholars were sent on academic missions to North America and Europe, it is hard to accurately determine whether such concepts are the genuine conception of such Japanese scholars or reinterpretations and readaptation of them. The third part shows post-war shift on public discourse on national iden-

tity; and lastly, it presents the state-of-the-art of the body of literature which emerged consequently to the immigration phenomenon of the late 1980s.

2.1. *The pre-war Japanese national identity formation: An instrumentalist perspective*

The academic literature mainly focuses on post-WWII Japanese national identity, since data and materials are less distant and thus more accessible. Therefore, studies on discourses on national identity formation dated prior to the Second World War are rarer and have widely been overlooked. Oguma's (2002) work on the reconstruction of the national identity formation of the Japanese people is perhaps one of the few studies widely encompassing pre- and post-war Japanese academic and political discourses on the matter, not to mention it is one of the few academic studies also available in the English language.

According to the author, by the end of the 1800s, in Japan two main theories were widespread regarding the origin of the Japanese people (including Tanabe 2021). The first is still in circulation, although it is not without its critiques. It considers the Japanese people as a homogenous nation, who originated on the island and never mingled with foreign populations. This belief was mainly supported by nativist Japanese scholars, insisting that "there is not a single person in this land who is not a descendant of the gods[21]" (Oguma 2002, 9), and heavily relied on the mythological history of the creation of the Japanese islands and the imperial descent from the first deities.

On the contrary, supporters of the second theory argued that the Japanese were the result of a mixture of people, a conquering population that pushed aside or annihilated a possible (even multiple) aboriginal population residing

[21]   According to the Japanese mythology, the Japanese island was originally created by two deities, Izanami and Izanagi – who were in turn the descendants of a larger pantheon – and the first emperor, Jinmu, was a direct heavenly descendant (Caroli, Gatti 2011).

on the Japanese island. More specifically, through archeological and anthropological studies, many scholars (among whom some Westerners[22]) traced the origin of this mixture back to the Korean peninsula, therefore arguing that the Japanese and Korean people shared a common ancestry.

Not surprisingly, the emergence of discourses on national origin and identity intensified in the 1880s, when Western powers' colonial quests stretched further into the African and Asian regions. In fact, theories of Japanese national identity developed also in comparison to these advancing Western powers (Caprio 2020). There was a common sentiment among Japanese political elites and scholars that Western powers were *superior* not only in terms of military power, but also with regard to their political systems and their scientific commitment and technological advancement. One of the proponents of modern Japan, the esteemed Japanese writer Fukuzawa (1834-1901), systematically depicted the position that all countries occupied on the civilization ladder. Western countries were deemed to be civilized, Japan, China, and Turkey, for example, were regarded as semi-civilized, while Australia and African countries were still primitive nations (Fukuzawa 2008, originally written in 1875). In this frame, Fukuzawa insisted that the West was to be taken as a role model for Japan to climb that ladder. This was one of the reasons that, in the last decades of the 19th century, the Japanese government promoted the dispatch of Japanese scholars to the most active European and North American academic communities, so that they could bring back this acquired knowledge[23]. However, according to Fukuzawa, imitation of the Western mod-

---

[22]   However, the anthropological findings and tools curated and exhibited at the university of Tokyo by American scholars were later discarded, as "only Japanese could study and comprehend the Japanese history and people" and "the roots of the Japanese should be clarified by the Japanese themselves" (Oguma 2002, 13).

[23]   To better understand the nature and scope of these missions for academic purposes, it is useful to look at the Iwakura Mission. Its members, both male and female scholars and intellectuals, left Japan on a governmentally funded expedition to visit the most influential Western Powers in order to search for information on how to centralize the then-divided archipelago. For a more detailed insight, see Caprio (2020).

el should have stretched further than domestically adapt political systems or technological advancements. The writer's famous *Datsu-A-ron* was conceived in this aspiration, although its interpretation is still today subject to debate (Korhonen 2013). The *Datsu-A nyū-O* thesis, which translates literally as "leaving Asia, joining the West", is most commonly understood as the necessity for Japan to dissociate itself from the rest of the Asian countries (which were symbols of weakness and backwardness) and embrace the political and social modernity that characterized the West. In more concrete tones, it called for the imminent Japanese imperial expansion and affirmation of its colonial rule in Asia (Dian 2021).

However, the Japanese people did not stand united on this front and two opposing factions developed on whether expansion in Asia should be implemented. On one side, there were those against pursuing the colonial quest, identifiable with nationalists and supports of the previously introduced homogeneous thesis. On the other, there were those in favor of colonial rule, who justified their line of reasoning using the mixed-nation discourse (Oguma 2002). The former faction was supported by the philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō (1856-1944) and based its argument on the belief that the Japanese race was inferior compared to the West, and as history had taught, the clash of an inferior and superior race would inevitably result in the annihilation of the former. Thus expansionism, which would have inevitably brought to a confrontation with Western powers, had to be avoided at all costs (Oguma 2002). Furthermore, being a racially and ethnically homogenous race, Japan was unaccustomed to coexist with a foreign population and the purity of the nation, a stronghold of the Japanese national identity, had to be preserved. Expansion and colonization would have unavoidably brought about a mixed residence between Japanese and foreign nationals and this event was also to be avoided.

On the contrary, Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905), a liberal economist and a supporter of colonization rule and of the mixed-nation theory, looked at the USA model as a rampant example of how a country who accepted foreigners in their homes succeeded to become a Western Power. He was strong believer in the argument that Japan was not a racially homogeneous nation, but rather a

mix of formerly migrated Chinese and Korean nationals. Therefore, expanding and living close to foreign nationals would have been possible especially with peoples who "share our language and have the same customs as us" (Oguma 2002, 27). In short, whilst homogeneous-thesis supporters saw no future in Japanese expansion and were thus openly opposed to the colonization quest and the cohabitation of Japanese with foreigners, mixed-race advocates passionately insisted on it as a means to empower Japan.

The homogeneous thesis eventually became a hindrance for the Japanese imperial expansionism, whereas the perspective of Taguchi (among others) of Japan as a mixed nation was instrumentally adopted by elites and political figures to justify the country's advance abroad (Yoshino 2012). To further corroborate the instrumentalist argument, it is worth noting that after the Second World War defeat, it also lost its influence as the mixed-nation theory served the imperial expansionism's purpose. The postwar period sees the reaffirmation of Japan as a monoethnic nation (Oguma 2002; Burgess 2010; Dian 2017; Yoshino 2012; among others). As Oguma cites the words of Kamishima (1982: xvii-xviii): "[A]fter the war, something very strange happened. People, including the progressive intelligentsia, began to insist that the Japanese are a homogeneous nation. There is absolutely no foundation for the claim, but this baseless theory is rampant".

2.2. *Early assimilative practices: From the Ainu of Northern Japan to the colonial period*

This section underlines the emergence of the first and main theories and perspectives on the Japanese stance towards the integration of foreign nationals, in the case of the Ainu population, and foreign citizens, regarding the Korean peninsula. The selection of two cases for the analysis, namely the coloni-

zation[24] of the Ainu population in Hokkaido and the Korean population of the homonymous and still unified peninsula, brings to light representative elements on the integration of foreigners in Japan[25] which are closely related with the ongoing discourses on the Japanese national identity.

One of the most complete accounts on the colonization of Hokkaido dates back to 1948 to the work of Shinichiro and Harrison (1960). The first contact between Japanese mainlanders and the Ainu, the aboriginal population of Hokkaido, was in the early 16th century. At that time, Hokkaido had the same function that Australia played for the British empire at the end of the 16th century: it was the exile destination for Japanese convicts and reprobates. Two centuries

[24]   There is still an ongoing scholar debate on whether Hokkaido can be referred to as an ex-colony. According to historiographical studies, to refer to a country as "colonized", or as an ex-colony, it needs to be eventually liberated or to have gained its independence. Whereas, countries that are still part of their conqueror's jurisdiction, are referred to as "incorporated" (Caprio 2020). Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, Wales and Scotland are considered incorporated within the United Kingdom, while Burma was once a colonized country. The same applies to the Japanese case. While Korea and Taiwan are considered former colonies, Hokkaido and the Okinawan archipelago are deemed to have been fully incorporated in Japan. However, up to date there are studies with conflicting views on the thesis whether Hokkaido (and Okinawa) is to be considered a formerly colonized territory. For this reason, later on in the text, the term "colonization" is also used to indicate the incorporation of the Ainu population. Nevertheless, in this section it is argued that, at least from the perspective of migration studies, whether it is called colonization (as for Walker 2001; Caprio 2009) or a mere pre-modern incorporation (see Mayers, Peattiers 1984), the conquest of the Korean peninsula and Hokkaido was implemented with a very similar integration pattern and both cases offer valuable insights on the understanding of how Japanese assimilation policies worked and how foreign population's integration into the Japanese nation was subsequently theorized by Japanese scholars. Therefore, in this study, Hokkaido is referred to as an ex-colony.

[25]   There are indeed other instances that are not mentioned, such as the case of Okinawans or the colonization of Taiwan, as the dynamics of these two populations are similar (although not identical) to the cases brought as examples.

after, Hokkaido turned initially to a commercial and then exploited colony. Despite the numerous attempts of the Ainu to oppose and rebel against the Japanese advance, the outcome was quite foreseeable. This was not only because the Ainu population was nomadic and organized in tribes with a hunting and gathering lifestyle, but also that Japan was eager to take over a territory rich in natural resources and (most importantly) its strategic role in containing the dreaded advance of Russia, which had found a viable gateway to Japan via the Kuril Islands. Shinichiro and Harrison date the begin of the assimilation policy of Ainu to Japan during this period, 1799, through which Ainu would "eventually turn Japanese" (p. 80). A decisive element characterized the Japanese assimilation process of the Ainu people: the neat subordinate status of this aborigine population compared to the Japanese mainlanders. As the classical colonizer figure, Japanese was deemed to be higher in the hierarchical ladder, no matter the aspect taken into consideration. Ainu people were regarded to be "primitive" (Shinichiro and Harrison 1960, 11) and "ignorant" (p. 27) in various different ways, starting from their societal organization, their polygamy system, and how they carried out trade. This perspective sparked the beginning of the core element of the Japanese colonial policies: education. Ainu had to be "reeducated" (p. 51): not only were they to be taught the Japanese language[26], habits and morals, but they were encouraged to trade (a social organizational upheaval when considering that the Ainu were hunters and gatherers) to industrialize their territory, and to militarize, in order to fulfil their defensive role against the Russian threat. There were various points of the Japanese assimilation policies but the most important element that permeated colonization was the belief that these measures were necessary to improve Ainu's "standards of living" (p. 67). In order to achieve the assimilation process, that according to the previous line of reasoning was desirable inasmuch means of improvement for the living conditions of the Ainu, "bad traditions were discouraged" (p. 72)

---

[26]   The Ainu have their own language, which is still used today and handed down to younger generations by the very narrow circle of Ainu people who have succeeded in preserving its knowledge.

and aborigine cultural, moral and habit traits were not accepted, or, in other words, to be discarded (see also Godefroy 2011). Today, the Ainu population's ancient richness in terms of human capital, language, and tradition has only just survived. The Ainu language is endangered (Fukuzawa 2019), and there is only a small minority of people living in Hokkaido who openly display traditional Ainu costumes and traditions, while some is only a façade for tourists (Wilkinson 2000). However, the last decades have witnessed a growing activist movement from Ainu people to revendicate their station and be officially recognized by the central government as a national body. In 1997, while Ainu activists exercised pressure both nationally and on international bodies (such as appealing to the United Nations), the government passed the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law which provides government funding to support the research and diffusion of Ainu language, music, and culture. However, it was not until 2019 that a bill finally passed officially acknowledging Ainu as Japanese indigenous people (Jozuka 2019).

More than a century later, the annexation of Hokkaido, that is, the colonization of the Korean peninsula also brought to the emergence of a sets of principles and scholarly guidelines that were to guide incorporation of colonial subjects. As previously indicated, the beginning of the 19th century saw the affirmation of Japan as a mixed nation. Once Korea became a protectorate in 1910, the integration of Korean nationals into the Japanese nation was heavily shaped by the principles of this mixed-nation theory, while some older elements that characterized the colonization of the Ainu were preserved. For instance, the discourse of racial superiority of the Japanese people was reaffirmed (Oguma 2002). The superior race is meant to conquer, the inferior one to be conquered. Therefore, in Japan's rush to imitate the Western powers, it was supposed to assume the leading role in the Asian region and subdue its countries. Although it might appear contradictory to the belief that Korean and Japanese people shared the same ancestors, Korea, as another Asian country, was deemed inferior. Therefore, it was inevitable that the State would be subjected to Japanese assimilation (Ukita 1910; Nakayama 1924). Kita Sadakichi (1921), an ethno-historian supporter of the mixed-nation theory and thus of the

colony rule, explicitly outlines the inevitable outcome of this hierarchical relation in his writings, echoing the arguments of Sarah Simons (1901). He also believed that the assimilation process could not but be one-sided, so that it was inconceivable for Japan (due to their superiority) to be influenced by the Korean people. Furthermore, Kita argued that the conquered subjects needed to be willing to assimilate in order to be successfully incorporated, whereas marginalization awaited those who chose to refuse (see also Kang 1997). It followed that the assimilation process entailed the enhancement of the living conditions of the assimilated subjects, as is affirmed in the American-counterpart canonical assimilation theory (Gordon 1964; Warner, Srole 1964). Assimilation, or *Japanization* (*kōminka*[27] in Japanese), was therefore a desirable course for the conquered, but for the conqueror too. Assimilation in fact also had the further goal to bring unity and national cohesion. The perspective that introducing foreign peoples into the Japanese nation would have brought disruption, a sense of kinship, and a united consciousness (*naisen ittai*[28]) which would make all national and foreign people into subjects of the emperor was one of the most important political objectives of this assimilative stance (Caprio 2009). However, a sense of kinship was only possible where a sense of common belonging was present. In this respect, the popular mixed-nation theory played a decisive role in determining the assimilation of Korean nationals, as the formation of a sole and united consciousness was possible thanks to the common ancestry of the Japanese and Korean people (Kita 1921; Minami 1942; Kang 1997; Oguma 2002). This common ancestry also implied that Japanese and Korean were ra-

---

[27] The academic literature in the English language translates *kōminka* (皇民化) into assimilation or *Japanization*. However, the ideograms that compose the word invest it of a meaning which could be literally expressed as "the becoming of people as subjects of the emperor". As it is described in the paragraph, the Japanese assimilation not only meant for the Korean people to become Japanese but to accept becoming subjects of the Japanese emperor.

[28] *Naisen Ittai* (内鮮一体) literally means "Japanese and Koreans as one sole body".

cially similar, which in turn meant that Korean people were easier to assimilate (Ukita 1910; Nakayama 1924). However, as Caprio (2009) is keen to underscore, "to assimilate Koreans made rhetorical sense. To assimilate Japanese in the Japanese nation made none" (p. 11). Therefore, no matter the common ancestry and the racial and cultural similarity, Japanese made sure through their policies and practices during the colonial period to remind the Korean people of their inferior station.

The main steps through which assimilation advanced were marriage, education, the practice of name changing, and the dissipation of sentiments of prejudice on the part of Japanese nationals, among others. While intermarriage, education (especially linguistic, moral and military education (Caprio 2009; Peng 2017)), and the overcoming of prejudices (Kita 1921) were other the steps envisaged by canonical-assimilation scholars (see also, Mayo-Smiths 1898; Gordon 1964), the practice of name-changing (*shōshi kamei*) was a quite unique characteristic of the Japanese colonial rule. It forced Korean nationals to give up their Korean names (especially family names) and to acquire a Japanese sounding name (Caprio 2009). This practice embodied another vital element of the Japanese assimilation process which, to be completed, required the discarding of traits of origin (Kita 1919; Nakayama 1924; Oguma 2002).

To conclude, most of the elements that characterized the political and scholar discourse of the Japanese assimilation process resonated with what had been theorized by academics of the canonical assimilation theory in the North American and European contexts. Although the literature underlines that the incorporation of the Ainu and the Korean people should be approached differently – as Ainu are now Japanese citizens but ethnically different, whereas Korean are foreign citizens *tout court* – studies on the incorporation of these two populations in the Japanese society stress how the two processes were characterized by the same elements. The hierarchy of race, the inevitability of the one-sided assimilation process, the fact that similar races could assimilate more smoothly and easily, even the steps through which the process had to be articulated echoed the perspectives of Mayo-Smith, Simons, Park and Burgess, Gordon, and Warner and Srole. Nonetheless, there is a difference between the

Western and Japanese contexts: the former has developed a body of theories entirely within the academic environment; whereas in the latter, the theorization of immigrants' incorporation has developed hand-in-hand with unfolding political needs and national objectives. Therefore, is it not always simple to assess whether the Japanese scholar activities has preceded or followed elites' political decisions, or even if the academic theorization has served as a means of legitimation for expansionism policies, such as the colonization of Korea. However, with proper precautions, considering how different the Japanese context of reception was in comparison to the US, in terms of political regime, especially the dynamics of the colonial rule, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that the Japanese and the early North American theorizing effort shared noticeable points of convergence.

2.3. *The post-WWII shift on the Japanese national identity*

Since the second post-war, the Japanese national identity has been residing in the publicly and politically supported notion of Japan being a homogeneous nation (*tan-itsu minzoku*, literally translated as "monoethnic nation"). This post-war identity formation has been noticeably affected by the need of Japan to strengthen itself to stand once again as a robust and legitimate actor in the international board (Dian 2017). It is also true, however, that since the 1990s this national homogeneity has been criticized and in scholarly works the expression "the myth of homogeneity" of the Japanese nation has started to spread (Murphy-Shigemitsu 1993; Oguma 2002; Burgess 2010). Fukuoka (2000) is among the spokespersons on the Japanese national identity discourse and supports the notion that the idea of homogeneity is to be considered a mere myth. In his extensive qualitative study on the identity of young people of Korean origin residing in Japan, Fukuoka begins by trying to systematically delineate "what" a Japanese national is. He argues that the Japanese identity is defined on three elements: lineage, in terms of blood lineage; culture, which is here ad hoc conceived to indicate whether the person "speaks Japanese, and

has the kind of values, customs and lifestyle generally thought of a 'Japanese'" (Fukuoka 2000, xxix-xxx); and citizenship[29]. To support his argument that Japanese national homogeneity is a myth, he constructs a framework on the Japanese identity (Table 1.) with the three aforementioned variables, where the plus ("+") indicates that lineage, culture, and citizenship is Japanese, whereas the minus ("-") represents non-Japanese.

Table 2.1   *Typological framework of "Japanese" and "Non-Japanese" attributes.*

Types	"Lineage"	"Culture"	"Citizenship"
1. Pure Japanese	+	+	+
2. First-generation Japanese emigrant	+	+	-
3. Japanese raised abroad	+	-	+
4. Naturalized Japanese	-	+	+
5. Third-generation Japanese emigrant	+	-	-
6. *Zainichi* Korean	-	+	-
7. Ainu	-	-	+
8. Foreign person	-	-	-

Source: Fukuoka 2000, xxx.

The permutations of the three variables not only delineate what is needed to be deemed as a pure "Japanese" according to the author, but also to generate a set of eight idealized possible identities. The first (1) is associated to a "pure Japanese" person, assigned thus to people of Japanese lineage, mastering the Japanese culture and holding Japanese citizenship. Progressively, these traits of Japaneseness fade, until reaching the last combination (8), pointing to a fully

[29] Fukuoka (2000) actually uses the term "nationality" to point to the legal membership to a state. Therefore, instead of "nationality" which might lead to misunderstanding, citizenship is here used not to create any confusion and to align it with the terminology used in this manuscript.

foreign person. The rest of the spectrum is associated to different identities as follows: 2) first-generation Japanese emigrants, for instance, those who moved to North or South America; 3) Japanese people raised abroad (mostly second-generation emigrants); 4) naturalized Japanese people[30]; 5) third-generation Japanese emigrants, implying that from the fourth generation onward, Japanese descendants are no longer considered Japanese[31]; 6) people who have interiorized the Japanese culture but who do not have the Japanese citizenship: *zainichi* Koreans, that is Korean descendants from people who were forcefully migrated to Japan during the colonization period, fall in this category. In fact, *zainichi* means "to stay in Japan", thus it literally translates to Koreans residing in Japan; and 7) people who hold Japanese citizenship, but who descend from a different lineage and bear a different culture. The Ainu are representative of this category, as they have their own separate lineage and culture and only hold Japanese citizenship as a consequence of the Hokkaido annexation. Although being a merely abstract and theoretical conceptualization, Fukuoka's framework underscores three arguments. Firstly, backing his line of reasoning, the existence of this range of different identities alone testifies that Japan is not a homogeneous nation. Secondly, the attempt to defy the Japanese identity can-

[30]   Fukuoka here implies that in order to naturalize, one has to acquire the most defining traits of Japanese culture and Japanese linguistic proficiency. In fact, in order to acquire Japanese citizenship, a minimum level of language proficiency is required, justified by the fact that a prospective naturalized person should be able to autonomously navigate Japanese society.

[31]   The Japanese government based its immigration law on this view in the 1990s, designing it to manage the inflow of Japanese-descendant Latin immigrants. Still in force, the law allows entry (and thus granting a special permanent visa) to immigrants until the third generation of lineage, justifying this decision by stating that the third generation still retained those Japanese cultural traits that would allow the person to smoothly integrate in the Japanese society. This assumption could hardly be more mistaken, as the literature on Latin American immigrants has extensively corroborated that third generations have completely lost any Japanese linguistic proficiency and habits, making they entirely alien to the Japanese society (see Carvalho 2002).

not lie in a dichotomous effort alone – the "Japanese" and the "non-Japanese" as the framework brings to life a more complex reality. Thirdly, notwithstanding that the framework also includes "culture" and "citizenship", it is the "lineage" the dominant element among the three, carrying more weight in deeming Japaneseness.

To conclude, up to the present, a debate is still ongoing over Japaneseness and what determines it. The Japanese academic community today has largely distanced itself from racialized discourses and an increasing number of studies are published to support the pre-war mixed-nation perspective (among others, see, Caroli et al. 2011; Kim 2015; Ichijō 2019; Tanabe 2021). In the wider public discourse and political statements, and at the citizen-level perception, however, the myth of the Japanese homogeneity still persists (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993; Powell 2015).

2.4. *1980s:* Newcoming *immigration*

After decades of decreasing incoming immigration, the 1980s bear witness to a new migratory phenomenon. A "transnational migration", as labeled by Koido (2021), has developed since the last two decades of the 20th century, marking a different kind of migration compared to those previous in terms of country origin. The Japanese language literature has agreed on the term *newcomer* (*nyūkamā*) to identify immigrants who entered the country from the 1980s onward, distinguishing them from the *oldcomer* (*orudokamā*), those – sometimes forcefully – who migrated earlier in the century. While the latter term is mainly used to indicate Korean immigrants, the former category includes a wider range of foreign-citizen immigrants. Although the immigration flow of the 1980s and 1990s mainly consisted of Latin Americans, among whom Brazilian, Peruvian, and Chilean immigrants, from the 2000s the numbers of Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, Nepalese, Taiwanese immigrants in-

creased, alongside many others from the South and Southeast Asian regions[32]. To create a parallel with the North American case, which experienced qualitatively different waves of immigration from the second half of the 1900s when Asian and Latin American presence started to grow and later surpassed the European and Canadian immigrant population, Japan too, by the 1980s, underwent a change in the diversity of its migratory scenario. Accordingly, the academic literature focusing on the migration to Japan also saw a shift from several perspectives. First of all, as anticipated, immigrants originated from different geographical contexts, mainly Latin American, which is quite linguistically and culturally distant from the Japanese setting. Secondly, the academic literature from the 1990s, and more so from the 2000s, developed in more systematically, and thus within the migration area studies scholars specialized in narrower fields of investigation, such as the integration of immigrants in the changing Japanese labor market, the incorporation of immigrant youths in the Japanese education system, and the peculiarities arising from the gendered immigrant groups, such as the Filipino population. Although still a mere assumption, this ramification could be better understood as the post-1990s literature served a different purpose than studies from the beginning of the century. While the latter was oriented towards the justification of the colonial quest in the broader Asian region, the former was geared towards sheer academic goals, namely the need to depict and get to grips with the ongoing migration scenario. Therefore, the 1990s Japanese literature on migration has distanced itself from the pre-war nationalism and thus from racialized perspectives anchored on the hierarchy of races, breaking away from the Japanese-as-a-homogenous-nation discourse that still lingers in the public and political discourse (Lie 2000).

Before venturing further into the academic literature on migration to Japan, it is necessary to explain some premises over the use of particular terminology. In the attempt to define who foreign-national residents in Japan are by

---

[32]   See Chapter 3 for a more detailed descriptive analysis on the newcomer migratory phenomenon, as well as an in-depth presentation of the three major foreign-resident groups which are analyzed in this study.

reviewing the existing literature, one would stumble into a broad variety of categorizations, which usually overlap one another and that are specific to the Japanese context. Unlike what is customary in the Western academic literature, citizenship is not the sole category used to discern foreign nationals living in Japan, although, it is an inevitable category used for official governmental data and statistics. In the literature's parlance (in both the Japanese and English language research), most studies often address foreign nationals in Japan with terms representing their migratory pattern. For instance, a Brazilian person of Japanese origin is referred to as a "Japanese descendant" – *nikkeijin*; while usually South and North Koreans are grouped together and labelled as "Korean residents in Japan" – *zainichi.* This leads the reader to a more commonly used classification which, as mentioned, tends to represent the migratory trajectory of the foreign person in question. The most used terms are: *zainichi* (literally "person residing in Japan), used for long-term-resident Koreans, and less often, for long-term-resident Chinese; *nikkeijin* ("person of Japanese ancestry") mainly used for Brazilian and Peruvian nationals descending from a Japanese familial background; and "half" (*haafu*), "double" (*daburu),* "mixed" (*mikusu)*, are all terms referring to people having one Japanese and one foreign parent.

It must be noted that this later academic literature has only slightly stretched to a theory-driven effort, most likely due to the novelty of the phenomenon it focuses on. As anticipated, the literature emerging from the 1990s onwards has developed into more niche, highly descriptive fields of investigation, which can be identified in some encompassing areas as follows: foreign workers (Bartram 2000; Morris-Suzuki 2006; Shipper 2006; Takenoshita 2017; Koido 2021); gendered migration (Piper 1999; Douglass, Roberts 2000; Yamanaka 2000; Yamanashita 2008); ethnic communities (which includes the aforementioned labels, thus *zainichi*, *nikkeijin*, *haafu*, among others) (Fukuoka 1996; Okano 1997; Carvalho 2002; Bail 2005; Kaji 2007; Caprio 2008; Tsuda 2008; Liu-Ferrer 2013; Kingsber 2014); and immigrant youths and school integration[33] (Okano 2016; 2018; Tsuneyoushi et al. 2001).

---

[33]   As a central focus of this work, this topic is fully developed in Chapter 4.

2.5. *Towards the theorization of the Japanese immigratory phenomenon*

It is only since the 2010s that researchers have begun to theorize over the migratory situation of the country, mainly by adopting theories and models previously conceived by North American and European scholars (Chung 2020; Koido 2021). The few sporadic studies that reach beyond the descriptive goal have focused on testing the two most popular theoretical models belonging to the Western academic tradition, namely the classical assimilation theory and the segmented assimilation theory (see, Chapter 1). Throughout these studies, the presented arguments and achieved results can be conflicting, while other times they converge to reach the same result although while looking at different determinants. Either way, the difficulty in accessing data on a national basis and thus having to work with local, diminished, and biased datasets have led most authors publishing in this area to qualify their work by stating that all their studies need further elaboration when a more complete sample is available (Takenoshita et al. 2014; Takenaka et al. 2015; Ishida et al. 2016; Nugaka et al. 2017; Ishida 2018; Korekawa 2018a, 2018b).

A circumscribed number of academic studies have tested the validity of the canonical assimilation theory for the Japanese case, namely by attempting to assess whether there is a substantial intergenerational socio-economic improvement among immigrants. This has been tested for immigrants' economic mobility (Takenaka et al. 2015), academic achievement (Ishida et al. 2016; Korekawa 2018a), status attainment (Ishida 2018), and spatial assimilation (Murayama et al. 2020). Immigrants' academic achievement has shown to follow a straight-line trajectory, namely translated in intergenerational improvement. In fact, second-generation immigrants have shown academic and educational achievements close to their native peers and have far overtaken first-generation immigrants (Ishida et al. 2016; Korekawa 2018a). Interestingly, the study on status attainment has only partially verified the canonical assimilation model. Indeed, status attainment improvement has proved true for the male sample but not female. The author interprets these results by pointing to the av-

erage occupational destiny of native Japanese women. Although this is a decreasing phenomenon (OECD 2019d), marriage and childbearing tend to mark the end of the working career for Japanese women. Assimilating to such a trend implies that immigrant women will also not climb the job ladder (Ishida 2018). Although this is not an argument provided by the author, a further interpretation to these results could be offered by Rumbaut's (1997) work on the implications on health brought about by the assimilation of immigrants in the US context. Limiting his argument to the sphere of health, Rumbaut pointed out that second-generation immigrants show poorer health conditions compared to their parents (for example, in terms of maternal risk factors and pregnancy outcomes, diet regime, and health-related risk behaviours, such as smoking or drug assumption) and thus arguing that in this matter, immigrants are better off without assimilating into North American society, as the length of residency in the country is negatively correlated with a healthy state of both mind and body. In the same way, the assimilation of immigrant women in the Japanese societal context appears, in Ishida's (2018) study, to impede their career progression rather than boosting it, openly contrasting with the canonical assimilation precept. Another studying diverging from the canonical assimilation theory attempts to test the economic mobility of first-generation immigrants residing in the country (Takenaka et al. 2015). The authors argue that, rather a straight-line trajectory, Chiswick and Miller's (2011) negative assimilation is the most appropriate theoretical framework appliable to the Japanese case. Economic mobility, operationalized in the increase or decrease of salary, tends to be U-shaped, thus it declines over the first years (for a span of about thirteen years) to subsequently increase. Finally, Murayama and Nagayusu's (2020) work offers another thesis on whether the classical assimilation theory is applicable to the Japanese case. The authors find out that a slow-pace spatial assimilation[34]

[34] The spatial assimilation theory (SAT) although not necessarily close to the area of social studies, offer a viable indication to understand the degree of immigrants' integration in the host society. In fact, without the sufficient linguistic, behavioral, and

is currently taking place in the country, that is, when immigrants relocate domestically, they tend to move to an area less ethnically inhabited. They also found that this is particularly true for Korean- and Chinese-citizen residents, while it is less the case for more ethnically diverse foreign-resident citizens such as Latin American citizens, for example, Brazilian and Peruvian. Although Murayama and Nagayusu do not elaborate their results any further, these findings corroborate the thesis if Gordon (1964) and Warner and Srole (1945), which assumes that immigrants who are racially closer to the host society face a faster and smoother process of assimilation.

Lastly, few authors test the segmented assimilation theory and, again in this case, results are diverse and not always clear-cut. Chitose (2008), Korekawa (2016, 2018a), and Takenoshita et al. (2013) conclude that the segmented assimilation theory can be applied to the Japanese experience but with some exceptions. For instance, when focusing on educational attainments, Korekawa (2018a) acknowledges some forms of downward assimilation trends present within the scholastic environment. However, he states that these downward paths do not move to the outer Japanese social circle (as it happens in the United States context). Just as Vermeulen (2010) argues that in the European society the lack of a rigid hierarchical social ladder hinders the enforcement of segmented assimilation mechanism, the same holds true for the Japanese context. Simply put, with feeble hierarchical social strata, there is not such meaning in discussing cut-clear paths of downward assimilation. Again, although Korekawa makes no further elaboration, the thesis that Japan lacks a clear-cut class hierarchy[35] echoes the 1960s widespread academic and public discourse that Japanese is a non-polar middle-class society (Chiavacci 2008; Hishida, Slater 2009). However, this middle-class thesis started to lose support from the 1990s onwards, when increasing inequality within the Japanese society was strongly

economic competences moving to areas less populated by fellow-ethnic citizens would in fact be a difficult task (Murayama et al. 2020).

[35] At least outside the school sphere that, as it is presented in Chapter 4, is characterized by and early selection and fierce credentialism.

perceived (Sato 2010), mainly associable with the period of economic stagnation of the so-called Lost decade (*Ushinawareta Jūnen*).

Another flaw found in the applicability of the segmented assimilation theory for the Japanese case has emerged from two distinct and still small-scale studies. Takenoshita and colleagues (2013) argue that downward-assimilation trajectories are the prevalent paths when looking at the academic achievement of second-generation Brazilian immigrants, and therefore the segmented assimilation theory appears to be applicable in this sense. However, it is underscored that the prevalence of downward assimilation paths in the Japanese scenario reflects the lack of national political and public discussion on how to integrate immigrants into the outer society. The authors claim that in the Japanese reception context, ethnic and minority communities have difficulty in forming and growing as the Japanese people are still prejudiced against immigrants and little is implemented to recognize them[36]. Therefore, while ethnic communities play an important role for the upward mobility in the North American experience, this does not happen in Japan due to the lack of tight-knitted ethnic communities (Takenoshita et al. 2013). Although, in this case too, the Takenoshita and colleagues do not elaborate any further on their findings, but two other elements emerge from their analysis. Firstly, their argument that immigrants' incorporation is highly dependent on the economic, social and political structure of the context of reception do not only resonate with the precepts of the segmented assimilation theory. It also echoes Alba and Nee's (2003) new assimilation theory basis which deems it essential to look at micro-, meso-, and macro-level structures of the reception context to understand immigrant integration patterns. Secondly, their study showed how Brazilian second-generation migrants are denied the ascent to upward mobility due to the widespread Japanese prejudice against foreign nationals, which corroborates Gor-

---

[36]   In this discussion, although the authors do not elaborate any further, one of Gordon's (1964) steps emerges which lead to the completion of the assimilation process according to the canonical approach, that is the letting go of forms of prejudices on the part of the host society.

don's (1964) canonical assimilation incorporation structure. According to the canonical approach, the process leading to the completion of incorporation is constituted of steps, one of which is the letting go of forms of prejudices on the part of the host society.

Lastly, Nukaga and Miura (2017) reach a quite similar conclusion to Takenoshita and colleagues using a sample of Filipino youths. The authors aim to verify whether the segmented assimilation theory can be applied to the integration of foreign youths in Japan in the area of identity formation and academic achievement. The results obtained through the analysis of narratives of a 26-respondent sample of youths of Filipino origin[37] make it difficult to fully apply the segmented assimilation model, mainly due to the societal context in which the respondents reside. In fact, Nukaga and Miura also underscore that, conversely from the North American context, Filipino youths do not have the same close-knit ethnic-community network at their disposal that foreign youths residing in the US do, which may allow them to move upwards. Filipino's less cohesive ethnic community entails the lack of support for them to develop a "hybrid" (*haiburiddo*) identity (which, in the Western literature academic is referred to as hyphenated identity), which is associated with an increase in these immigrant-origin youths' socio-economic status (Nukaga et al. 2017).

In conclusion, academic studies attempting to theorize immigrants' integration in Japan are still exiguous and usually rely on modest samples of data, making it difficult to fully grasp the national panorama. Moreover, results are diverse: at times conflicting, at times converging to support the same arguments. The two main tested theories (canonical assimilation theory and segmented assimilation theory) seem to be appliable to certain dimensions of the Japanese immigration phenomenon, while they are confuted when applied to other areas. On the one hand, intergenerational improvement in terms of academic and educational achievements and patterns of immigrants' residency in

---

[37] This study's sample include respondents of mixed-couple (one Japanese and one Filipino parent) and of foreign couples (where both parents are Filipino) from first- and second-generation immigrants.

the country seems to corroborate the canonical assimilation theoretical model, whereas when first-generation economic mobility is taken into account, the classical assimilation theory fails to explain its negative evolution over the time spent in the country. On the other hand, the segmented assimilation theory is supported by the presence of paths of academic and occupational downward mobility of certain groups of immigrants; while, when considering the structure of the society of reception, such as public and political widespread reluctance to accept foreigners, and the lack of a tight ethnic network of support, the segmented assimilation model does not represent the Japanese case. This continued high degree of uncertainty on how the Japanese immigratory phenomenon can be understood and on the best lenses to frame it, alongside the fact that immigration to Japan continues to grow steadily, makes it even more critical to search for a theoretical model that can best be applied to this context.

CHAPTER 3

TODAY'S MIGRATION TO JAPAN

Despite the widespread discourse supported by politicians and a thinning portion of public opinion that Japan is an ethnically and culturally homogeneous country, even a superficial glimpse into official statistics shows that the Japanese population has finally embarked on the path towards growing diversification (Sugimoto 2010).

This chapter focuses on a brief descriptive analysis of the foreign population residing in Japan, based on statistical data retrieved from the Ministry of Justice (hereon in, MOJ) online statistical database (in Japan, the jurisdiction of the immigration situation falls upon the MOJ which directs the Immigration Bureau of Japan) and the National Statistics Bureau – Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication online database. This analytical section will introduce the overall panorama and composition of the foreign population residing in Japan and its geographical distribution on the national territory, an overview of the age of the foreign-citizen population in comparison to the native one, foreign citizens' status of residence, and the foreign population employment status. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the Chinese-, South and North Korean-, and Brazilian-citizen groups as they are the object of analysis for this study.

Hereon in, the terms "foreign-citizen resident", "foreign resident" and "foreigner" are used interchangeably and are adopted to refer to a person of foreign citizenship residing in Japan. The terms "Japanese citizen", "Japanese person" or "natives" are here used to denote a person of Japanese citizenship with no immigrant background.

3.1. *The immigrant population in Japan: A descriptive analytical introduction*

According to the late 1990s literature, Japan is still considered a recent country of immigration: in 2019, the foreign-citizen resident population corresponded to 2,887,116, that is, 2.3% of the total Japanese population (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2019b). As stands out, there was a surge of foreign citizens registered in the 1940s, followed by a drop in the 1950s (Table 1), which historically could be associated with the incoming forced migrants from the colonial territories. Due to the fact that disaggregated data up to the year 1990 are no longer accessible (as only the last twenty years of datasets are kept in the online databases), it is not possible to discern the breakdown of citizenship origins of the foreign-resident population, and thus understand its nature. Notwithstanding the slow but constant increase of newly admitted foreign-citizen residents, they are not enough to counterbalance the shrinking and ageing Japanese population (Huddleston et al. 2015), which is projected to worsen across the next fifty years[38] (OECD, 2019). In fact, when only considering the Japanese-citizen population, official statistics have shown a decreasing trend: the national census registers 126,209,681 Japanese citizens in 2011; 125,319,299 in 2015; and 123,250,274 in 2020 (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021d). In 2020, the birth rate of Japanese citizens reached its lowest since 2011 (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021d), once again showing a slow but steady downward trend. Moreover, according to Korekawa's (2018c) projections, the foreign population in Japan is estimated to reach about 6.5% of the total national population in 2040, and about 12% in 2065, thus filling the gap in the current European scenario.

[38]   According to the OECD *Society at a Glance 2019* document, due to an ageing population and low birth rates, Japan has the highest old-age dependency ratio (i.e., number of people of retirement age per 100 of working age) across all OECD countries: it is currently at just under 50% and expected to rise to 80% by 2060. Furthermore, a low fertility rate and the higher average age of women at first birth contribute substantially to the ageing and shrinking of the national population.

Table 3.1.   *Total and foreign population in Japan and incidence of foreign resident population on the total population. Year 1920-2020.*

	Total	Foreign residents	% Foreigners
1920	55,963,053	78,061	0.1
1930	64,450,005	477,980	0.7
1940	73,114,308	1,304,286	1.8
1950	84,114,574	528,923	0.6
1960	94,301,623	578,519	0.6
1970	104,665,171	604,253	0.6
1980	117,060,396	668,675	0.6
1990	123,611,167	886,397	0.7
2000	126,925,843	1,310,545	1.0
2010	128,057,352	1,648,037	1.3
2020	126,226,568	2,887,116	2.3

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020b; 2021a), and Ministry of Justice (2016a; 2016b) data.

In 2020, more than a quarter of the foreign-citizen residents in Japan were originally from the Asian region, followed by the Latin American-origin population. The rest of the foreign-citizen residents reached a mere 6% of the total foreign-resident population in the country (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). While the Asian and South American-origin components are balanced in terms of their gender composition, in the foreign-citizen groups coming from the other geographical areas, men noticeably exceed women (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). Narrowing the focus down onto the specific groups in the cur-

rent study, the Chinese-, South Korean-, North Korean, and Brazilian-citizen residents are also quite balanced in their gender composition: in 2020, the percentage of women of these groups was respectively registered as 54.2%, 54.0%, 45.3%, and 45.8% (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). The difference between these groups with an older migratory background in the country and who show a more balanced gender composition and those groups, such as European and North America residents, who on the contrary have a more recent migratory history and who show a marked preponderance of men could indicate that the former has now reached a more pronounced settlement process.

In more detail, Tables 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 describe the evolution of the most consistent foreign-citizen groups in the last decade. While the early 2010s were characterized by a stronger presence of foreign-citizen groups with an older migratory history in the country, such as Chinese, Korean, and Brazilian citizens, 2015 sees a shift in the composition of the foreign-resident population. In particular, the increasingly growing figures of Taiwanese citizens stand out (Table 3.2.2).

| Table 3.2.1 | *Annual evolution of the Chinese, Korean, Brazilian, Filipino, and Peruvian-citizen resident population, percentage change (%), and fixed base index numbers. Years 2010-2020.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

	China			Korea			Brazil			The Philippines			Peru		
	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.
2010	687,156		100	565,989		100	230,552		100	210,181		100	54,636		100
2011	674,879	-1.8	98	545,401	-3.7	96	210,032	-9.3	91	209,376	-0.4	100	52,843	-3.3	97
2012	652,595	-3.4	95	530,048	-2.9	94	190,609	-9.7	83	202,985	-3.1	97	49,255	-7.0	90
2013	649,078	-0.5	94	519,740	-2.0	92	181,317	-5.0	79	209,183	3.0	100	48,598	-1.3	89
2014	654,777	0.9	95	501,230	-3.6	89	175,410	-3.3	76	217,585	3.9	104	47,978	-1.3	88
2015	665,847	1.7	97	491,711	-1.9	87	173,437	-1.1	75	229,595	5.4	109	47,721	-0.5	87
2016	695,522	4.4	101	485,557	-1.3	86	180,923	4.2	78	243,662	5.9	116	47,740	0.0	87
2017	730,890	5.0	106	481,522	-0.8	85	191,362	5.6	83	260,553	6.7	124	47,972	0.5	88
2018	958,257	26.9	139	573,497	17.4	101	204,347	6.6	89	307,694	16.6	146	48,816	1.7	89
2019	1,044,278	8.6	152	513,353	-11.1	91	214,643	4.9	93	329,465	6.8	157	49,145	0.7	90
2020	785,053	-28.3	114	455,749	-11.9	81	208,798	-2.8	91	284,165	-14.8	135	48,431	-1.5	89

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020b; 2021a) data.

Fixed b.i.n.: Fixed base index number

Fixed base index number: 2010=100.

	United States			Vietnam			Thailand			Indonesia			India		
Table 3.2.2	*Annual evolution of the United States, Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesian, and Indian-citizen resident population, percentage change (%), and fixed base index numbers. Years 2010-2020.*														
	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.
2010	50,667		100	41,781		100	41,279			24,895		100	22,497		100
2011	49,815	-1.7	98	44,690	6.7	107	42,750	3.5	104	24,660	-0.9	99	21,501	-4.5	96
2012	48,361	-3.0	95	52,367	15.8	125	40,133	-6.3	97	25,532	3.5	103	21,654	0.7	96
2013	49,981	3.3	99	72,256	31.9	173	41,208	2.6	100	27,214	6.4	109	22,526	3.9	100
2014	51,256	2.5	101	99,865	32.1	239	43,081	4.4	104	30,210	10.4	121	24,524	8.5	109
2015	52,271	2.0	103	146,956	38.2	352	45,379	5.2	110	35,910	17.2	144	26,244	6.8	117
2016	53,705	2.7	106	199,990	30.6	479	47,647	4.9	115	42,850	17.6	172	28,667	8.8	127
2017	55,713	3.7	110	262,405	27.0	628	50,179	5.2	122	49,982	15.4	201	31,689	10.0	141
2018	108,786	64.5	215	337,162	24.9	807	96,998	63.6	235	82,153	48.7	330	38,423	19.2	171
2019	119,173	9.1	235	418,625	21.6	1002	111,841	14.2	271	96,497	16.1	388	44,288	14.2	197
2020	59,525	-66.8	117	451,067	7.5	1080	54,843	-68.4	133	67,751	-35.0	272	39,209	-12.2	174

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020b; 2021a) data.

Fixed b.i.n.: Fixed base index number

Fixed base index number: 2010=100.

Table 3.2.3

Annual evolution of the Nepalese, English, Taiwanese, Burmese, and Sri Lankan-citizen resident population, percentage change (%), and fixed base index numbers. Years 2010-2020.

	Nepal			England			Taiwan			Myanmar			Sri Lanka		
	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.	Abs.	%	Fixed b.i.n.
2010	17,525		100	16,044		100				8,577	1.3	100	9,097	2.2	100
2011	20,383	15.1	116	15,496	-3.5	97				8,692	-7.7	101	9,303	-9.9	102
2012	24,071	16.6	137	14,653	-5.6	91	22,775		100	8,046	6.7	94	8,428	8.7	93
2013	31,537	26.9	180	14,881	1.5	93	33,324	37.6	146	8,600	17.5	100	9,193	15.5	101
2014	42,346	29.3	242	15,262	2.5	95	40,197	18.7	176	10,252	29.1	120	10,741	20.2	118
2015	54,775	25.6	313	15,826	3.6	99	48,723	19.2	214	13,737	25.6	160	13,152	27.5	145
2016	67,470	20.8	385	16,454	3.9	103	52,768	8.0	232	17,775	23.5	207	17,346	29.5	191
2017	80,038	17.0	457	17,200	4.4	107	56,724	7.2	249	22,519	19.8	263	23,348	18.1	257
2018	91,521	13.4	522	28,235	48.6	176	141,458	85.5	621	27,472	20.6	320	27,981	6.1	308
2019	99,866	8.7	570	31,632	11.3	197	125,435	-12.0	551	33,790	8.6	394	29,739	3.3	327
2020	97,622	-2.3	557	17,348	-58.3	108	56,481	-75.8	248	36,836	1.3	429	30,750	2.2	338

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020b; 2021a) data.

Fixed b.i.n.: Fixed base index number

Fixed base index number: 2010=100; fixed based index number for Taiwan: 2012=100

In 2019[1], Chinese and Korean-citizen residents in Japan were still representing the two most numerous groups, respectively 36% and 18%, followed by Vietnamese (14%), and Filipino (11%) (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2020b). In absolute terms, the presence of Brazilian-citizen residents has only slightly oscillated, however their incidence in the foreign-resident population has diminished across the last decade, reaching 7% in 2020 (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2020b).

Lastly, two considerations concerning data elaborated in Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are due. Firstly, until 2014, Statistics of Bureau of Japan datasets merged North and South Korean residents into one item. From 2015, these two citizenships were split and were presented separately. To preclude this issue and ease data readability, the sum of the two items into one single "Korea" has been displayed in Table 3.1. Also, this merge is considered consistent with the sampled respondents' profiles in this study: while studying second and third generations, most of respondents' ancestors migrated to Japan before the Korean peninsula was divided. Respondents themselves sometimes cannot (or do not wish to) divulge from which area of the Korean peninsula their ancestry originated. Secondly, in the selected datasets sourced from the Statistics Bureau of Japan, Taiwan firstly appears in 2012 (Table 3.2.2). Although it is not specified, it could be speculated that until the 2011 census, Taiwanese-citizen residents in Japan were merged with the Chinese citizens

---

[1]   Here, instead of the most recent data available, which dates from 2020, 2019 figures are taken into account to avoid any defects that may have been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the number of Chinese-citizen residents noticeably dropped in 2020 and although it cannot be stated unreservedly, the fact that China was the epicenter of the pandemic and the heavy (still existing) restrictions imposed on the access into the country of foreign citizens, might have been decisive in curtailing their presence.

3.2. *The residential patterns of foreign-citizen residents*

In order to understand the geographical distribution of foreign-citizen residents in the country, the composition of the population at the prefectural level is here analyzed. Prefectures are the first level of juridical and administrative division in Japan, as the eight Japanese regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa) do not hold any administrative functions. There is a total of forty-seven prefectures; forty-three of them are proper prefectures (県 *ken*), two are urban prefectures (府 *fu*), one defined as "circuit" (道 *dō*), and one metropolis (都 *to*). Map 1 displays a colored partition, namely the eight regions, and the forty-seven prefectural territorial administrations.

From the point of view of the territorial distribution, in 2020, 19.4% of the foreign-citizen residents was concentrated in the prefecture of Tokyo, however when considering the area of Greater Tokyo (thus taking into account neighboring prefectures such as Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki and Gunma), almost 45% of the foreign resident population lives in the metropolitan area of Tokyo (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021b). Looking at the territorial distribution of the foreign-citizen population from a different perspective, Table 3.3 shows that the residential patterns of foreign citizens follow that of the total population.

Map 3.1. *Political map of Japan, regional and prefectural division.*

Hokkaidō

1. Hokkaidō

Tōhoku

2. Aomori
3. Iwate
4. Miyagi
5. Akita
6. Yamagata
7. Fukushima

Kantō

8. Ibaraki
9. Tochigi
10. Gunma
11. Saitama
12. Chiba
13. Tokyo
14. Kanagawa

Chūbu

15. Niigata
16. Toyama
17. Ishikawa
18. Fukui
19. Yamanashi
20. Nagano
21. Gifu
22. Shizuoka
23. Aichi

Kansai

24. Mie
25. Shiga
26. Kyoto
27. Ōsaka
28. Hyogo
29. Nara
30. Wakayama

Chūgoku

31. Tottori
32. Shimane
33. Okayama
34. Hiroshima
35. Yamaguchi

Shikoku

36. Tokushima
37. Kagawa
38. Ehime
39. Kochi

Kyūshū & Okinawa

40. Fukuoka
41. Saga
42. Nagasaki
43. Kumamoto
44. Ōita
45. Miyazaki
46. Kagoshima
47. Okinawa

Source: Maps-Japan.com 2021.

Table 3.3.   *Distribution of the total population by the most populous prefectures and incidence (%) of the foreign-resident population. Year 2020.*

Prefecture	Total population	% Foreign citizens
Tokyo	13,834,925	4.0
Aichi	7,575,530	3.6
Osaka	8,849,635	2.9
Kanagawa	9,209,442	2.5
Saitama	7,390,054	2.7
Chiba	6,319,772	2.7
Hyogo	5,549,568	2.1
Shizuoka	3,708,556	2.7
Fukuoka	5,129,841	1.6
Ibaraki	2,921,436	2.5
Gunma	1,969,439	3.2
Kyoto	2,545,899	2.4
Other	52,133,936	1.4
Total	127,138,033	2.3

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2021b; 2021c) data.

Only the prefecture of Aichi shows a slightly differing foreign citizens' residential trend compared to that of the whole population. In 2020, Aichi was the second most populated prefecture by foreign-citizen residents (Table 3), while it was the fourth most populous prefecture when the whole Japanese resident population is considered (following Kanagawa and Osaka, which are re-

spectively the second and third most populous prefectures in Japan). As Ishikawa (2019) points out, the convergence of foreign-citizen residents to Aichi might be explained by the flourishing industrial sector in the prefecture. By looking in detail of the residential patterns of Brazilian citizens in 2020, it can be noted that they tend to concentrate in more peripheral areas, such Aichi, Shizuoka, and Mie, all prefectures with a high concentration of industry (Table 5). It is therefore safe to state that Brazilian residents tend to settle in areas with a high availability of low-skilled factory-job positions (Ishikawa 2019).

Meanwhile, the other two groups of focus (Chinese and Korean citizens) tend to be concentrated in more central and urban areas (Table 3.4). On the one hand, in 2020, Chinese-citizen residents were mostly living in the Tokyo and Greater Tokyo area (Table 3.4), as Saitama, Kanagawa, and Chiba are prefectures adjacent respectively to the northern, south-western, and southern part of the metropolis (Map 1). The prefectures of Osaka and Aichi also registered quite a considerable rate Chinese-citizen residents, and once again it is safe to speculate that they are attracted by the high availability of job positions. On the other hand, both South and North Korean-citizen residents also tend to gather in high-density populated areas, such as Osaka, Tokyo and the Greater Tokyo area, and Kyoto, but also in prefectures with a more thriving industrial activity (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4. *Chinese, South Korean, North Korean, and Brazilian-citizen population by prefecture of residence (%). Year 2020.*

Prefecture	% Chinese	% South Korean	% North Korean	% Brazilian
Tokyo	28.8	21.0	17.9	1.9
Saitama	9.6	3.7	4.9	3.6
Kanagawa	9.4	6.5	5.5	4.4
Osaka	8.6	22.1	15.8	1.3
Chiba	7.0	3.6	2.5	1.8
Aichi	6.2	6.7	7.2	28.9
Hyogo	3.0	8.8	9.6	1.3
Fukuoka	2.5	3.5	4.1	0.2
Kyoto	2.0	5.2	5.8	0.3
Hiroshima	1.8	1.7	2.8	1.2
Shizuoka	1.5	1.1	1.3	14.9
Mie	1.0	1.0	1.2	6.6
Gunma	0.9	0.5	1.1	6.4
Gifu	1.4	0.8	1.8	5.8
Shiga	0.7	0.9	1.1	4.6
Ibaraki	1.7	1.0	1.1	3.0
Nagano	1.1	0.8	1.1	2.5
Unknown	0.9	0.2	0.0	0.1
Other	12.0	11.0	15.1	11.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(778,112)	(426,908)	(27,214)	(208,538)

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2021b) data.

3.3. *The age of the foreign resident population: prospects for an ageing society*

Table 5 shows the age-class composition respectively of the foreign-citizen and Japanese-citizen populations. The way that age classes in Table 6 are displayed allows for a deep understanding of the age composition for the pre-school population (up to 4 years old); the compulsory school-age population (from 5 to 14 years old), as junior high school represents the final stage of compulsory education in Japan; upper secondary and tertiary education-age population (from 15 to 24 years old); the working-age population (up to 69 years old); and from the age of retirement onward, which in Japan, since 2021, was extended from 65 to 70 years old.

The average age of the Japanese-citizen population is 47.4 years old (Statstics bureau of Japan 2021d), more than 12 years older than the average age of 35 years old of the whole foreign-citizen population (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). As inferred from the elaborations in Table 5, when considering the whole foreign-citizen population, the working-age population is more consistent when compared to Japanese citizens. In particular, the figure of Japanese citizens who passed their retirement age, thus who are over seventy years old, is eighteen percentage points higher than that of the foreign-citizen population. However, when each group of focus is looked at in detail, there are some noticeable differences among them. For instance, the age-class structure of South and North Korean-citizen residents in Japan is rather similar to that of the native population, and the average age for each group is respectively 50 and 55.7 years old (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). Indeed, the North Korean-citizen residents show to be particularly older, even when compared to native Japanese, with the over seventy years old age class being the most consistent one across the groups considered (Table 5). On the contrary, the Chinese and Brazilian populations are tendentially the youngest among all groups considered and each group is respectively 33 and 35.8 years old on average (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). Chinese and Brazilian-citizen residents in their working age are the most consistent across all groups and earlier age classes are

more consistent when compared to the Japanese citizens (Table 5). The higher proportions of younger cohorts of these two groups in particular offer a significant element to understand how their presence in the country might in the future years come to play a decisive role in a society that is increasingly ageing, especially at the economic level, for the job market, and for the Japanese welfare system.

Table 3.5.	*Japanese, Foreign, Chinese, South Korean, North Korean, and Brazilian citizen population by age class (%). Year 2020.*					
Age class (years)	% Japanese	% Foreign	% Chinese	% South Korean	% North Korean	% Brazilian
0-4	3.8	3.1	4.1	1.2	1.3	4.6
5-14	8.3	5.3	6.6	3.5	3.9	11.7
15-24	9.4	18.2	17.1	6.7	5.4	12.4
25-69	56.9	69.1	70.8	68.8	56.1	69.2
70+	22.0	4.3	1.5	19.8	33.4	2.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(123,731,000)	(2,928,940)	(785,053)	(428,535)	(27,214)	(208,798)

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2021a; 2021d) data.

3.4. *Statuses of residence*

To date, Japan has a system of twenty-nine residence statuses for foreign citizens as reported in the Immigration Control Act. In 2020, national official statistics reported that more than a third of foreign citizens in Japan hold either a permanent residence visa (28.0%) or were special permanent residents (10.5%) (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a).

In 2020, 36.4% of Chinese-citizen residents in Japan held a permanent visa (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a), which allowed them to stay in the country no matter their employment situation. This figure might be associable to *oldcomer* Chinese population, although the distinction is not always clearcut. International students (thus with a student visa) accounted for the second most consistent visa group in 2020. 16.1% of all student visas issued were to Chinese citizens, and their high figure could be interpreted as a by-product of the aforementioned Japanese internationalization program (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). Furthermore, there are high-skilled professional visa holders (Engineer, Specialist in Humanities or Intra-company transferee visa), those with a dependent visa (for spouses or children of the foreign resident), and lastly trainees and those enrolled in the Technical Intern Trainees Program (TITP), who have attracted much attention for a labor-focus academic literature (see Chiavacci 2016; and Liu-Farrer 2013) (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a).

According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2020, 64.2% of South Korean citizens residing in Japan hold the "special permanent visa" (which is the *ad hoc* cases recognized by the national government), while this is the case for almost the totality of North Korean residents (9.0%) (20-12-02-2). Another 17.0% of South Korean citizens hold a permanent visa, while 6.0% reside in the country with a high skilled visa (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a). It can therefore be stated that the high figures of South and North Korean citizens holding a permanent or special permanent visa are mostly descendants of the aforementioned historical events, whereas another share is constituted by a more recent wave of immigration from the peninsula.

Lastly, today's Brazilian legal status in part reveals that most of them are *nikkeijin*, meaning that they have "Japanese blood", as 34.4% (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a) of them hold the long-term resident visa, which is reserved for foreign citizens who have Japanese ancestry, but which need to be renewed every five years. As a matter of fact, the Japanese immigration policy that granting a preferential treatment to *nikkeijin* is consistent with the idea of Japanese conception of being culturally and ethnically homogeneous. According to this logic, genetic proximity would have allowed this new wave of Latin American immigrants to closely bind with Japanese citizens, and on the other way round, facilitate their acceptance by the Japanese society. However, the majority of Latin Americans residing in Japan, especially older generations, have never really experienced nor adopted Japanese customs and tradition; on the contrary, they were patently behaving and showing their rooted attachment to the Latin America (Tsuda and Song 2019). The rest of the Brazilian residents in Japan hold the permanent visa (53.9%), confirming their long-time stay in the country, or reside in the country as spouses or children of either a Japanese-citizen or a foreign-citizen with a permanent or long-term visa (8.9%) (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2021a).

3.5. *Employment*

As underscored by Ishikawa (2019), foreign-citizen workers in Japan play a decisive role in the national labor market and their presence is particularly marked in the industrial and manufacturing sector as 30.7% of foreign citizens were employed in a blue-collar position (Table 3.6). These data support the narrative of the state of the art according to which declining birth rates, the ageing population, and the increasingly better educated young Japanese generations - who are no more willing to be employed in the so called 3K jobs (*kitanai, kitsui, kiken*, namely dirty, demanding, and dangerous jobs) – have resulted in shortage of unskilled labor (Tsuda 1999). In fact, in 2015, most Japa-

nese citizens held a white-collar occupation, either as a professional, office, or service employee (Table 3.6).

Although a consistent share of the foreign-citizen population is employed in a blue-collar position, there are noticeable differences among the groups of citizens analyzed. For instance, the English and US citizens are the only two groups with a marked majority of white-collar workers, whereas their presence in other sectors is minimal. If the three skilled fields of occupations are considered, namely professional, office and service workers, Indian citizens too then have a high figure of workers in a white-collar position. On the contrary, Brazilian citizens are those with the highest share of workers employed in a blue-collar job (63.0%), followed by Peruvian, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Filipino citizens. A fair share of Chinese-citizen workers is also employed in an unskilled occupation (30.7%), however, almost 40% of them hold a white-collar occupation (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6.   *Employment status of the Japanese and foreign citizens population and the detail of the eleven most consistent foreign-citizen resident populations, from 15 years old onward (%). Year 2015.*

Citizenship	Profession-al/technical worker	Office worker	Sales and Service person	Agriculture, forestry and fishery	Production / factory worker	Construction and mining	Transport, cleaning, packaging	Other	Total	(N)
Japanese	16.0	19.2	24.3	3.7	13.3	4.4	6.6	12.5	100	(58,018,675)
Foreigner	13.1	7.1	18.1	2.7	30.7	3.0	6.2	19.1	100	(807,996)
Korean	12.5	13.5	30.1	0.4	10.6	4.7	6.9	21.2	100	(173,534)
Chinese	12.4	8.3	19.2	3.8	30.7	2.1	5.0	18.6	100	(232,756)
Filipino	4.4	2.4	17.8	3.4	47.2	2.2	11.6	10.9	100	(94,165)
Thai	8.6	3.4	18.4	6.1	38.8	2.4	10.0	12.3	100	(16,535)
Indonesian	5.6	2.0	7.8	14.7	52.6	5.6	4.8	6.8	100	(16,708)
Vietnamese	4.6	1.5	5.9	6.2	54.6	7.1	5.6	14.5	100	(52,415)
India	35.2	6.2	23.6	0.1	9.3	0.8	1.3	23.5	100	(6,638)
English	72.2	7.6	6.5	0.5	1.7	0.3	0.5	10.6	100	(7,218)
United States	66.6	9.1	6.5	0.2	2.6	0.7	1.0	13.3	100	(23,294)
Brazilian	3.7	3.3	6.5	0.6	63.0	2.1	6.5	14.3	100	(68,385)
Peruvian	2.7	2.6	8.9	0.3	59.6	2.5	9.4	13.9	100	(17,305)

Source: Elaboration on Statistics Bureau of Japan (2015b; 2015c) data.

Lastly, Korean-citizen workers (here too, official statistics merges both South and North Korean citizens in a sole "Korean" category) is the group whose employment status resembles the most that of the Japanese-citizen population, with one of the lowest figures of workers employed in a blue-collar position (expect for the aforementioned US, English and Indian citizens) and a pronounced presence in skilled labor occupations. This convergence of employment status panorama of the Korean citizens to that of native workers might also be a sign of a more pronounced settlement process.

CHAPTER 4

THE JAPANESE EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND ITS CHALLENGES FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS

International comparisons have shown Japan to be a high-performing country in the field of education (OECD 2018b). In 2019, the enrolment rate of children from 6 to 15 years old in Japan is reported to be one of the highest among OECD countries and the country exhibits one of the highest percentages of people from 25 and 64 years old to have attained a bachelor's or equivalent tertiary education degree (OECD 2021). According to the OECD's Program for International Students Assessment[1] (PISA) study, Japanese 15-year-old students have high levels of achievement in reading literacy[2], science, and mathematics, outperforming the average scores of OECD and partner countries (OECD 2018b). Japanese 15-years-old students also appear to be among the most disciplined in comparison to their peers from other OECD member coun-

[1]   The Program for International Students Assessment investigates the reading, mathematics, and science knowledge and skills of 15-year-old students. Areas of inquiry also include topics unrelated to scholastic performance but still concern the education environment, such as bullying, self-esteem, future expectations, and so on. The Program allows for international comparisons as, since 2000, its measurements have been carried out in more than ninety countries (including OECD and other partner countries) and 3,000,000 students worldwide (https://www.oecd.org/pisa/).

[2]   In the PISA2018 reports, reading literacy refers to "a wide range of cognitive and linguistic competencies, from basic decoding to knowledge of words, grammar and the larger linguistic and textual structures needed for comprehension, as well as integration of meaning with one's knowledge about the world." (OECD 2018b, 28). Therefore, it is different from "reading" skills, which points to students' ability to *tout court* decode and reading a given text aloud (OECD 2018b).

tries. In fact, aside from scholastic competencies, PISA also investigates students' self-assessment on a broader field of topics, including school climate, interpersonal relationships, trust and expectations; for instance, 97.9% of Japanese students stated they never skipped a day of school in the two weeks preceding the PISA test and 87.3% of students stated that they were never late for school in the same interval of time, against 78.7% and 52.4% of the OECD average respectively (OECD 2019b). Only 9.7% of 15-year-old Japanese students reported noise and disorder in class, compared to 31.5% of the OECD average. This was, however, in line with its Asian neighbors; for example, Chinese and South Korean students reporting disorder in class amount to 8.9% and 7.9% respectively (OECD 2019a).

Nevertheless, while this high performance could present the Japanese education system as a role model to emulate, it has its downsides too. In comparison with other countries participating in the PISA investigation, 15-year-old Japanese students reported the lowest levels of life satisfaction and high levels of feelings of sadness at school[3] (OECD 2019c). Furthermore, a strong fear of failure and low levels of confidence in their own ability to perform (especially towards adversity) seem to be common characteristics of 15-year-old Japanese students (OECD 2018b).

Unfortunately, due to the modest size of the migratory phenomenon, PISA data are not yet available for foreign-citizen students residing in Japan. For the same reason, there is also only little official data gathered by the government, and therefore it is still difficult to get a systematic view of the national panorama. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a tool measuring and comparing migrant integration policies over fifty-two countries. It offers a general understanding on what it is like to be a foreign-citizen pupil in the country through international comparison. In the MIPEX2020 analysis and

---

[3]   This item refers to "Prevalence of sadness in schools", more precisely to the percentage of students who sometimes or always feel sad (OECD 2018b).

across the eight policy areas of focus[4], the policy area of education scored particularly poorly, as Japan still only provides limited support: it does not offer the necessary tools for students and their families to independently navigate the education system and therefore to access to its learning opportunities (Solano, Huddleston 2020).

To delve deeper into the educational experience of foreign-citizen students in Japan, this chapter presents the structure of the Japanese education system and its main characteristics, by highlighting its meritocratic early selectivity and the vitality of educational credentials. The chapter proceeds by underscoring the extent of the presence of foreign-citizen students, the national and local level policies and programs that have been implemented to support their school integration, and lastly, the issues that foreign-citizen students enrolled in the Japanese education system still face.

4.1. *The Japanese education system*

The current organization of the Japanese education system was shaped during the post-war period of US occupation in accordance with the North American model. One of its few distinctions from the Western system is its timing: just like the Japanese financial year, the Japanese school and university academic year starts in April and ends in March of the following calendar year.

In Japan, the current basic educational provision entails compulsory education for all students holding the Japanese citizenship from the 1st to 9th grade (from elementary to junior high school). Although compulsory education ends at junior high school, in 2019, the advancement rates to the three-year track of senior high school was 98.8% (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2019b). Therefore, virtually every student advances and completes twelve years of education, making it a semi-mandatory educational path (Sugimoto 2010). The system al-

---

[4]   The eight policy areas analyzed by MIPEX are: labor market mobility, family reunification, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination (Solano, Huddleston 2020).

so accounts for special needs classes in mainstream school or special needs schools across all primary and secondary education (Ishikida 2005). Such classes and schools are provided for "physically and/or mentally challenged children" (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019b, 174) and the decision to enroll children with disabilities in specialized schools or register them in specialized classes lies with the family, that is usually advised by the school administration or the municipal board of education, based on the student's specific situation and the facilities provided within the school (Ishikida 2005).

Advancing to senior high school foresees an entry examination: this represents one of the earliest selection moments for viable future employment and academic opportunities. The majority of senior high schools are governmentally funded (in 2018, about 73% of upper secondary schools) (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019b), with a lower presence of privately funded senior high institutes, and in both cases, co-education or single-sex educational institutes exist. It is common knowledge that the entry examination for private senior high schools is easier than public schools, and at times this influences students' decision on where to apply (Ishikida 2005). Furthermore, it is only possible to apply for one public senior high school entrance examination at a time, while there are no limits for private institutes. This makes this choice a crucial step for students' future school and career plans.

There are two main types of senior high schools: academic and vocational high schools. The former is academically oriented and provides general education so that most students eventually are encouraged to advance to university or junior colleges. Academic high schools are ranked based on the rate of students that enroll in a high-ranked university after graduation (Ishikida 2005). Although not nationally mandated, academic high schools often publish academic performances as well as the list of students who successfully entered high-ranked universities on their websites. Therefore, while navigating the decision of which high school to enroll in, families and prospective students can get a sense of a high school's ranking and positioning in the light of its graduates' destinations.

By contrast, vocational schools prepare students to jump straight into the job market after graduation. However, the distinction between general academic and vocational high school regarding a graduate's future is not definite: some students in the vocational path may end up in tertiary education and some academic high school graduates directly find an occupation. Nevertheless, vocational schools are conceived as a second or less academically driven choice, as students attending these schools usually were unable to enter a public academic high school.

In addition to these two upper secondary education paths, in 1999, some schools introduced a unified lower and upper secondary schooling in order to promote diversity within the school education system. This six-year secondary school (three years of junior high school and three of senior high school) allow students to access senior high school without the entry examination, which is mandatory for all other senior high schools.

In Japan, tertiary education is split in different academic paths: four-year universities, junior colleges, technical colleges, and specialized training colleges. Four-year universities are deemed to be the mainstream tertiary educational path, and their completion allows student to continue to graduate school or to transition into the workplace. In 2019, 53.7% of senior high graduates proceeded to a four-year university course and contrary to upper secondary schools, most universities are private in Japan (in 2018, about 77%), although eight out of the top-ten high-ranked universities are public (for example, the University of Tokyo and Kyoto) (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019b). Conversely to other tertiary educational paths, four-year university courses require an entrance examination which is deemed highly competitive and usually receives considerable attention and coverage from the media.

Fig. 4.1. *The Japanese education system.*

Source: Okano 2018.

As Sugimoto (2010) states, journalists and scholars tend to overemphasize the university entrance examination because, being part of the higher societal strata themselves, they also participated in and walked this competitive path. There is a tendency to focus on the negative impact of this stressful examination period on prospect students' physical and psychological well-being. As a matter of fact, although in 2019 Japan witnessed a general decrease in suicide rate for the tenth year in a row, only the under-twenty age group still showed a steadily growing figure. According to the Japan Times (2020), the main reasons driving under-twenties to suicide are bullying, failed relationships, and pressure to succeed. Despite the consistent public attention on this entry examination, only around a quarter of students actually face its hardships: the rest of students get into university through recommendations given by their

high schools, thus allowing them to steer clear of this examination hell. Those universities and colleges allowing access through recommendations base their scrutiny on the student's high school academic and overall performance (including therefore sporting competences and leadership inclination) and their high school teachers' favorable references (Okano 2018). Another element that distinguishes four-year university programs from other academic tracks is the *shūshoku katsudō*, namely the job-hunting activity. This is a specific, traditional moment in the life of university students, with distinguished timings and mechanisms. It is a one-time massive hiring of prospective graduates by recruiting companies, taking place in the springtime of the last year of university, when students drop classes to fully dedicate their time and efforts to battle through the competitive selection process (Sugimoto 2010). All dressed in black suits and white shirts (both women and men), future graduates prepare for an entire year to be recruited by the most prestigious company possible. This moment of competition also comes with mental and physical stress (Kawanishi 2020). However, since 2021, this tradition might be coming to an end: with a continually declining birth rate, companies have to select candidates from a shrinking population pool. Companies are therefore trying to secure outstanding candidates before the traditional springtime selection begins, making the existence of the *shūshoku katsudō* artificial and no longer sustainable.

Broadly speaking, other higher education tracks are considered a second choice for those students who fail their four-year university entry examination or who are less academically driven (Ishikida 2005). Junior colleges are two-year programs (hereon in referred to as two-year colleges) and after graduating students have two options: either enter the job market, or transfer to a four-year college, to complete the remaining two years of studies. Compared to four-year universities, only 4.4% of students graduating from senior high school enroll in a two-year junior college and entry examination are here *proforma* or noticeably simplified (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2019b; MEXT 2019). Technical colleges are considered to be part of higher education, but they stretch from upper secondary school to tertiary education. Students who do not enroll in any senior high school can also choose to enter a technical college, lasting five years

and job-oriented for occupational areas such as manufacturing, construction, and public services. Although they are known to ensure high rates of employment in well-known companies after graduation (Ishikida 2005), these students can eventually decide to continue their academic path and transfer to a four-year university. Lastly, specialized training colleges are professional and vocational institutes; they train prospective hairdressers, chefs, fashion designers, and also offer programs on commerce and business, home economics and many more besides. The peculiarity of specialized training colleges is that these schools are accessible at different stages of a student's school path: it is possible to access specialized training colleges after graduating middle or high school. Therefore, adults can also enroll in such a college to attend a specialized course later on in their lives to, for example, advance their careers (Ishikida 2005). These colleges also enable students to transfer to a four-year university course. Like transferring from junior college or a technical college, this is being indicated as a strategy to avoid the aforementioned examination hell (Sugimoto 2010).

4.2. *The hallmarks of the Japanese education*

Although the Japanese education system is not too distant from the non-comprehensive ones, some elements stand out that the literature deems characteristic. Meritocracy, educational credentialism, and early selectivity are among its most distinctive traits. This section presents some of the most widespread school related problems affecting student well-being and the main factors leading to school refusal.

Within the emerging discussion over meritocratic systems in the 1980s, Japan got its fair share of attention. Meritocracy has not always been regarded with its positive acceptation; for example, in Michael Young's *The rise of meritocracy* (1958), the author exposes the faults of meritocracy and warns it will eventually produce broad pattern of inequality within society. Young argues that meritocracy ultimately creates a new class of talented elites and creates a

harsh polarization between those gifted with ability (and thus deserving reward) and those who are not (Young 1958). However, both in the academic literature and public discourse, the term is now not associated with a negative phenomenon (Allen 2011). The schematic but efficient formula "merit = effort + ability" is a given. Thus, meritocratic societies shine forth their fair and just system and institutions that reward individuals who have earned it. In the quest to illustrate the characteristics of the Japanese educational system, Kariya and Rappleye (2020) compare the Japanese system with the British. Starting from the Meiji Restoration period (1868-1889), the Japanese were eager to emulate the Western model in several areas of implementation, such as politics and governing system (see Chapter 2), as well as in their education system. However, few elements of the Japanese education system still hold their station. As Kariya and Rappleye (2020) state: "[…] the Japanese system was recognized as more equitable than any major systems in the Western world: absent were the deeply class-based, cultural, intergenerational entrenchments so prevalent in England and the intractable, racially and geographically exacerbated disparities found in the United States." (p. 8). While formulating its argument on the characteristics of the Japanese school system, Takeuchi (1991) draws considerably from Ralph H. Turner's (1960) work on the differentiation of the American and English education models in creating opportunities for upward social mobility. The former is described as a contest mobility model, where "contestants" (students) race until the end to reach the longed-for occupational status; the latter is imbued by sponsored mobility, with elite students being patently and structurally supported from the beginning of the match to reach the higher strata of society, while racers with lower socio-economic status are led to maintain and accept their inferior standing. Therefore, the common understanding was that Japan ensured that advancement and success in the society was to be accomplished through an individual's effort and merits, instead of passing it on as a hierarchical tradition. This meritocratic philosophy permeating the Japanese social system was further supported by the vision of a correctly working education system producing broad patterns of equality. However, this panorama seems to have changed in recent years. Economic advantage and familial

cultural environment (rather than mere effort and ability) appear to increasingly weigh on individuals' chances to succeed in society (Kariya, Dore 2006).

Nevertheless, this acclaimed egalitarianism rooted on meritocracy is not without its critics. Firstly, it comes with notable social and personal costs, where the tight race for competition lead to the coining of the expression "examination hell" (*juken jigoku*) which epitomizes the struggle for success (Kariya 2009). Dore (1976) illustrates it harshly: "the examination hell sorts the sheep from the goats; a man who can't take psychological strain would be no use anyways." (p. 50). The competition in the Japanese education system reaches its peak in two specific moments: the first is when students enter senior high school. Students (and their family members supporting them) planning to enroll in high-rank senior high schools, which in turn heighten chances to enroll in a prestigious university, might even start preparing since primary school. Furthermore, the fact that it is only possible to register at one public senior high school exam at a time (with public institutions usually being the most competitive) makes this choice even more critical. Failing this exam would lead to exclusion from the competition. In this regard, Sugimoto (2010) and Takeuchi (1991) argue that this examination orientation permeating the Japanese education system makes it referred as a "tournament" type of structure, where those lagging behind have little opportunity to make up lost time. For this reason, the Japanese education system is deemed to show early selectivity in its configuration, as junior high school is the latest stage until which students can postpone decisions on their educational future (Okano 2016; 2020; Sugimoto 2010; Takeuchi 1991; Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011; Yamamoto 2014).

The second moment of competition in the Japanese educational path is the transition to university. Conversely to the competition to enter senior high school, the dynamics to advance to university makes the system more similar to a "league", where students have an actual and feasible second chance. In fact, for students failing their entrance examination to tertiary education, a yearly "return match" – to use the expression coined by Takeuchi (1991) – as they can retry the year after and attend a cram school, or *juku*, to make up for any deficiencies in the meantime. However, cram schools also play a vital

function in earlier stages of education. Middle-school students, for instance, also attend *juku* after school, often dedicating afternoons and evenings to catch up in specific subjects or to prepare for senior high school or university entrance examinations. While attending cram school is quite common practice among students who wish to continue their educational path and progress to university, today, there are still no studies systematically assessing correlation between cram-school attendance and the success rate for entry in a prestigious university. It is however a common belief among students' families that attending a *juku* increases the probability of success in the academic area (Ishikida 2005). This brings the argument to few critics moved to the Japanese shadow education: one is that, due to how extensively it is used by the student population, it generated a true private industry of cram schools with an eye-catching opportunity for profits (LeTendre et al. 1998; Sugimoto 2010). Furthermore, due to their private nature, cram school attendance is an expensive service and consequently only wealthier families can receive support to boost their academic chances (Kariya, Dore 2006; Sugimoto 2010).

This exam-oriented system is subject to further criticism. It appears to have pushed students to develop the wrong sets of skills: it encourages rote learning and memorization (most often directed merely at passing the examination) to the detriment of students' creativity and ability to foster their own critical sense (Kariya, Dore 2006; Kariya, Rappleye 2020).

With such a delineated educational system, it is not surprising that an affirmed ideology of educational credentialism is rooted through the well-spread examination culture that permeates from the early stages of the Japanese scholastic path. Academic credentials are seen to considerably impact on occupational success and therefore in dictating the distribution of the occupational structure. This is particularly true when considering the Japanese lifetime career recruiting character (Kariya, Dore 2006). It allows students graduating from senior high school or university to be selected by companies on the sole basis of their educational credentials, as they have no work experience at their disposal. Therefore, to secure a white-collar professional job in a prestigious company, graduating from a well-known and high ranked university is virtually

mandatory. Nonetheless, promotions within companies are usually based on the university diploma obtained (Ishikida 2005; Sugimoto 2010). This is also the reason that the fierce competition with high pressure to access top universities is a resonating component of the Japanese academic path, and is also t why many students choose their university based on its reputation rather than following their dream job or entering the fields of study they are well-versed in.

However, a more recent body of literature questions the effective weight of educational credentialism within the wider Japanese occupational market, especially in the private sector. Sugimoto (2010) identifies a number of academic studies underscoring that, since the 1990s, private companies have supported and promoted employees based on their individual competences and merits rather than on their educational background and previous university affiliations. Moreover, some efforts have been made in the employment recruitment process, to mitigate the impact of educational credentials: when selecting candidates some companies avoid asking the name of students' home university. Even in public administration, certain ministries in the national bureaucracy attempt to limit the hiring of functionaries graduated from the University of Tokyo, the top Japanese ranked university.

Considering what has emerged so far (the early selectivity entailing a competitive educational environment at the junior high school stage, the subsequent competitive step for university selection and later again for the occupational race), some brief considerations on the implications this might have on Japanese students' well-being are due. As shortly reflected on in the introduction of this chapter, PISA investigations revealed that 15-year-old Japanese students exhibit a strong fear of failure, have low confidence in their own ability to perform (especially towards adversity), and overall display low levels of life satisfaction (OECD 2018b). To further investigate students' well-being, the Japanese Cabinet Office carried out a study to illustrate the main reasons behind some students' decision to stay at home from school (Cabinet Office 2018). Since the 1990s, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and technology (MEXT) has started to officially recognize and thus refer to this phenomenon as "school refusal syndrome" (*tōkōkyohi*) (Ishikida

2005), filling the ranks of the shut-ins, or *hikikomori*, who have exceeded one million people in the last few years (Sekimizu 2021). According to the Cabinet Office investigation, in 2016, students at the primary and junior high school level refused to go to school due to given problems at home (34.4%), while 25.3% of students did not attend due to problems they were experiencing with their peers, excluding bullying (Cabinet Office 2018). Bullying, in fact, only accounted for 0.5% of replies, the least recounted item on the list. Rather, low academic performance (19.7%) and maladaptation due to admittance to a new school following promotion and school change (6.1%) are among the main cause for school refusal. With regard to senior high school, students gave facing a low academic performance as the most widespread reason (18.1%), followed by relational problems with peers (other than bullying) (15.3%), problems at home (14.9%), and maladaptation to a new school environment (12.9%). For senior high school students, "bullying" is also the item that received the lowest rate of responses (0.2%) (Cabinet Office 2018).

These findings confining bullying to last place in reasons for student truancy seems to contradict with existing literature reporting bullying as a widespread phenomenon in Japanese schools and its negative impact on student well-being (Hilton et al. 2010; Yoneyama, Naito 2010; Kobayashi, Farrington 2020). Moreover, alongside failed relationships and pressure to succeed, bullying is considered one of the main grounds for Japanese youth suicide (The Japan Times 2020). This phenomenon has received much public attention in the country, to the extent that schools and municipal educational boards never fail to publish the availability of help facilities and hotlines to support both victims and perpetrators on their websites. However, Reppleye and Komatsu (2020) debunk the stereotypical image of the Japanese education as a system pestered by bullying in an analytical comparison with other Asian and Western country. The authors argue that the excessive Japanese and non-Japanese academic and public attention given to bullying has undeservedly inflated the extent of the phenomenon.

4.3. *Foreign students and schools for foreigners*

To date, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (henceforth MEXT) has still not outlined a comprehensive body of policies for the integration of foreign-citizen and foreign-origin youths in the mainstream educational system (Tsuda 2006; Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011; Okano 2016; Tokunaga 2018). However, over the years it has responded to the various needs of foreign-national residents with step-by-step and ad hoc measures meant for specific foreign groups.

As previously stated, the current basic educational provision entails compulsory education for all students holding Japanese citizenship from the 1st to 9th grade, thus from elementary to junior high school. In 1953, a Ministry of Education notice promoted the "principle of simple equality" with the broader aim to treat and concede to foreign citizens (namely Koreans at the time) the same rights and privileges previously reserved to Japanese nationals, thus granting Korean children to access the mainstream educational system. Nevertheless, unequal treatment still lingered for the years to come as foreign-origin students were made to pay a fee to access school (free for Japanese-citizen students). Eventually, free compulsory schooling and subsidized textbooks were ensured for every student regardless of citizenship in 1965, but to date it is still not mandatory for non-Japanese students to enroll in primary and lower secondary school and no substantial enhancement has taken place with respect to ensuring higher rates of access to mainstream compulsory education to foreign-origin students (Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011; Okano 2018). The first central governmental effort to face this critic structural obstacle was during the 1990s, when local governments were encouraged to send foreign-citizen parents residing in their jurisdictions a letter to inform them about local school entry timing and procedures, as it does with their Japanese counterparts (Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011).

The 1990s were also the protagonist of further improvement of linguistic support system in the government public schools. In fact, with the growing presence of South American immigrant-origin residents (especially Brazilian

citizens), in 1991, the MEXT began to collect data on student needs for assistance in Japanese-language learning, in order to plan any eventual appropriate forms of support. In 2003, the curriculum for Japanese as a Second Language (hereon in L2 Japanese) was established and introduced in government elementary schools, and successively in 2007 in junior high schools (Okano 2018). These curricula therefore specifically address those students enrolled in government compulsory schooling whose mother tongue is not Japanese. The content of these curriculum covers different levels of proficiency of foreign-origin students, from basic and daily jargon of "survival Japanese" (*sabaibaru nihongo*) for daily interactions in and outside school, to the formation of those competencies that allows immigrant-origin students to fully understand and actively participate in every subject taught in class (Ministry of Education 2020).

Due to the ever-growing immigrant phenomenon and the late implementation of programs to support the foreign students schooling, it is not surprising that the central government has only started detecting and registering foreign-student presence in school in recent years. The number of current foreign students enrolled in public schools showed an overall increase from 2007 to 2018 (Table 4.1). The total number of foreign-citizen students reached 93,133 in 2018, representing a mere 0.1% of the total student population from the 1st to the 12th grade, with a slightly stronger presence in elementary public schools (Ministry of Education 2019b; Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019b). As previously mentioned, enrollment from elementary to lower secondary school is compulsory for Japanese-citizen students but not for foreign-citizen pupils. Non-Japanese citizens are only "invited" to enroll in mainstream education, although this is not mandatory.

Year	Primary school	Junior high school	Senior high school	Other*	Total	(N)
2007	61.3	27.7	10.2	0.8	100	(72,751)
2008	60.6	28.3	9.7	1.4	100	(75,043)
2009	59.8	29.3	9.9	1.0	100	(75,417)
2010	57.6	29.9	11.0	1.4	100	(74,214)
2011	56.8	30.1	12.0	1.1	100	(72,512)
2012	56.3	29.9	12.5	1.3	100	(71,545)
2013	56.8	29.7	12.5	1.0	100	(71,789)
2014	58.3	28.8	11.7	1.1	100	(73,289)
2015	59.3	28.1	11.4	1.1	100	(76,282)
2016	61.3	25.8	11.2	1.7	100	(80,119)
2017	62.4	25.4	10.8	1.3	100	(86,015)
2018	63.5	24.8	10.3	1.5	100	(93,133)

Tab. 4.1. *Foreign-citizen students in Japanese public schools, by level of education. 2007-2018 (percentages per row).*

*"Other" include six-year unified lower and upper secondary schools as well as Special education schools.

Source: Ministry of Education 2019b.

There are still no national official data available to determine the foreign citizenship of these students or their geographical presence throughout the territory. However, thanks to the introduction of the L2 program in public schools, the national government has been able to gather some (albeit fragmented) data on foreign pupils. Table 4.2 shows the increasing number of foreign-citizen students who are in need of Japanese language support and thus enrolled in the L2 curriculum in public schools.

Tab. 4.2. *Foreign-citizen students in Japanese public schools registered in L2 programs, by level of education. 2006-2018 (percentages per row).*

Year	Primary school	Junior high school	Senior high school	Other*	Total	(N)
2006	71.1	23.4	5.0	0.4	100	(22,413)
2008	68.3	26.5	4.8	0.5	100	(28,575)
2010	64.4	28.1	6.9	0.5	100	(28,511)
2012	63.5	28.0	7.9	0.6	100	(27,013)
2014	64.7	26.7	7.8	0.8	100	(29,198)
2016	64.5	25.6	8.5	1.4	100	(34,335)
2018	64.2	25.2	9.0	1.6	100	(40,755)

* "Other" include six-year unified lower and upper secondary schools as well as Special education schools.

Source: Ministry of Education 2019b.

The growing presence of foreign-citizen students in need of L2 support almost doubled since the first years of the curriculum implementation, as in 2018 the Ministry registered a total of 40,755 foreign-origin students. Table 4.3 shows that the incidence of foreign-citizen students enrolled in the L2 program on the total foreign-citizen population in public schools has only slightly increased in the time period considered. While this increase draws little attention at the primary education level, students in secondary education showed a more marked growth which could lead to two possible considerations. It could be assumed that the governmental L2 program in public schools is ineffective, thus these students drag their linguistic deficiencies through their education path. Alternatively, it might be assumed that the increasingly differentiating foreign-citizen student population in terms of country of origin makes it difficult for Japanese language instructors to support foreign students in their language acquisition process. Nevertheless, regardless of whether such speculations mirror the ongoing reality, the fact remains that the number of foreign-citizen students in need of L2 support has been growing in the last decade (Table 4.3) is noteworthy in itself. In fact, the literature shows how proficiency in the language of the context of destination impacts both students' academic achievement and later occupational success (Kao and Tienda 1995; Portes, Rumbaut 2001). Knowing the language also affects their psychological well-being by allowing students, for example, to build tight relationships with peers and thus diminishing the chances of being excluded (Portes, Rumbaut 2001) and influencing youth self-identification (Rumbaut 1997; Mantovani 2015).

Tab. 4.3. *Incidence of foreign-citizen students registered in the L2 program on the total of foreign-citizen students enrolled in Japanese public schools, by level of education. Years 2008-2018.*

Year	Primary School		Junior High School		Senior high School		Other*		Total	
	Total foreign students	Foreign students in L2 (% Inc.)	Total foreign students	Foreign students in L2 (% Inc.)	Total foreign students	Foreign students in L2 (% Inc.)	Total foreign students	Foreign students in L2 (% Inc.)	Total foreign students	Foreign students in L2 (% Inc.)
2008	45,491	42.9	21,253	35.6	7,284	18.7	1,015	12.8	75,043	38.1
2010	42,748	43.0	22,218	36.1	8,189	24.2	1,059	14.5	74,214	38.4
2012	40,263	42.6	21,405	35.3	8,948	23.9	929	17.7	71,545	37.8
2014	42,721	44.2	21,143	36.9	8,584	26.5	841	33.3	73,289	39.8
2016	49,093	45.1	20,686	42.5	8,968	32.5	1,372	34.4	80,119	42.9
2018	59,094	44.3	23,051	44.5	9,614	38.2	1,374	48.2	93,133	43.8

*"Other" include six-year unified lower and upper secondary schools as well as Special education schools.
Source: Ministry of Education 2019b.

This second assumption might be supported from what may be inferred from Table 4.4. The official statistics do not collect data concerning the citizenship of these foreign-origin students in need of Japanese language support but it reports data on their native language. Table 4.4 shows that, in 2018, the groups of students most in need of Japanese language support were Portuguese-speaking (thus it could be quite safely speculated that they are Brazilian citizens), followed by Chinese, Filipino (Tagalog), and Spanish-speaking students. It is interesting to note that the Korean-speaking students appear to only need marginal Japanese-language support, which suggests that Korean younger generations might have now reached a more advanced linguistic assimilation. On the other hand, the higher numbers of Brazilian (thus Portuguese-speaking students) and Chinese students could imply that either they face more obstacles in their language learning or that the younger generations of these two groups are the descendants of newer waves of first-generation immigrants in Japan.

Tab. 4.4.	*Foreign-citizen students in Japanese government schools in need of Japanese language support by native language, by level of education. Years 2006-2018 (percentages per row).*								

Year	Portuguese	Chinese	Korean	Spanish	Vietnamese	English	Philippine	Others	Total	(N)
2006	38.5	19.9	-	14.6	-	-	11.2	15.7	100	(22,413)
2008	39.8	20.4	-	12.7	-	-	11.8	15.2	100	(28,575)
2010	33.2	21.6	2.6	12.4	4.0	2.5	15.3	8.3	100	(28,511)
2012	32.8	20.4	2.3	12.9	4.1	2.4	16.6	8.5	100	(27,013)
2014	28.6	22.0	2.1	12.2	4.2	2.7	17.6	10.7	100	(29,198)
2016	25.8	24.1	1.8	10.6	4.5	2.0	18.5	12.8	100	(34,035)
2018	25.5	23.8	1.5	9.3	4.5	2.7	19.4	13.2	100	(40,755)

*"Others" include unified lower and upper secondary schools as well as Special education schools.

**"-" data not available

Source: Ministry of Education 2019b.

Furthermore, there is a component of Japanese-citizen students who are also regarded by the official statistics as in need of L2 Japanese support. Their numbers have risen over the years, almost tripling from 2006 to 2018, when respectively 3,868 and 10,371 Japanese-citizen students needed Japanese language support (Table 4.5). Although there are no data available that show the origin of these students and the nature of their Japanese language instruction needs, as Okano (2018) suggests, it can be speculated that this component is mainly constituted of Japanese-citizen students of immigrant origins, who have acquired Japanese citizenship through their parents[1] but have lived in a different linguistic environment (particularly within the family) other than Japanese. The Ministry reports the "language of enrolment" (to the L2 curriculum) of these students, and Filipino, Chinese, and English represent the major groups, respectively 32.6%, 20.7%, and 11.3% of the whole Japanese-citizen students registered as in need of Japanese language support (Ministry of Education 2019c). When the figures of foreign-citizen and Japanese-citizen students are combined, in 2018, 51,126 pupils in government schools needed support for Japanese language learning.

[1]   Japanese citizenship follows the principles of *jus sanguinis*, thus parentage rather than place of birth determines the possibility for children to become a Japanese citizen.

Tab. 4.5. *Japanese-citizen students in Japanese public schools registered in L2 programs, by level of education. Years 2006-2018 (percentages per row).*

Year	Primary school	Junior high school	Senior high school	Other*	Total	(N)
2006	73.9	20.6	5.0	0.5	100	(3,868)
2008	73.4	21.9	4.0	0.7	100	(4,895)
2010	72.0	22.9	4.4	0.7	100	(5,496)
2012	74.7	20.1	4.4	0.8	100	(6,171)
2014	74.7	20.1	4.2	1.0	100	(7,897)
2016	75.6	18.8	4.8	0.8	100	(9,589)
2018	73.9	20.0	4.4	1.7	100	(10,371)

*"Other" include six-year unified lower and upper secondary schools as well as Special education schools.

Source: Ministry of Education 2019b.

Lastly, the tables presented so far do not fully illustrate the entire foreign-citizen student population residing in Japan. In fact, beside the public and private school system, in Japan there is a circumscribed number of schools for foreigners (*gaikokujin gakkō*): international schools (*kokusai gakkō*) and ethnic schools (*minzoku gakkō*) (Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011). In 2016, there were thirty international schools, sixty Korean ethnic schools, and fifteen South American ethnic schools (mainly Brazilian and Peruvian students) (HURAK 2017). On the one hand, international schools are based on the education system of the country of reference, thus for example, French, German, United States, Brazilian (and other) schools can be found all across the country. These schools are usually affiliated to a nationally structured association, as the European Council of International Schools or the Western Association for Schools and Colleges. Some of them also denote a specific religious background, like Christian-based schools and colleges. These schools are private institutes and therefore have considerable tuition fees and, in this way, they mainly attract the children of expatriates or diplomats, although, at times, they also become an option for children of native Japanese citizens (Mackenzie 2006).

Ethnic schools have been made and for ethnic minorities residing in the country. Korean ethnic schools were the first ones to appear in Japan during the first half of the 20th century, but to date there are Brazilian and – on to a lesser degree – Chinese ethnic schools too. Although ethnic schools are also private, contrary to international schools, their students are not necessarily at the high socioeconomic level. Rather, ethnic schools are characterized by an ethnically homogeneous student population: Korean-origin or Korean-citizen students enroll in Korean schools, Brazilian students in Brazilian schools, and so forth. Ethnic schools usually offer all stages of compulsory education up to senior high school and their curriculum is profoundly based on the home country's traditions and culture. Classes are taught in the ethnic language and teachers usually, but not exclusively, share the same citizenship or national background of their students. These schools are sometimes eligible for governmental funds, whereas some of them are considered as private companies and thus rely solely on student enrollment fees. The Japanese government's acknowledgement of

these institutes and especially the question of subsidies has posed continuous issues. Under the pretext of political tensions between Japan and North Korea[1] (and lately also with South Korea), on more than one occasion, both local and the central governments arbitrarily decided to cut funding to some of the Korean ethnic schools on their territories (Arita 2003; Digital Chosun 2013).

4.4. *Lagging behind: Main barriers for immigrant children to access, stay, and progress in the Japanese education system*

Despite the central government's introduction of a linguistic program in support of foreign-language speaking students in the 2000s, educational problems – such as high rates of non-attendance, low progression rates, and high dropout rates – are among those issues hindering successful academic and later occupational achievement of immigrant-origin students (Sugimoto 2010; Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011; Yamamoto 2014; Okano 2016; Tokunaga 2018; Tokunaga at al. 2018). According to data published by MEXT, by May 2019, 84.8% of foreign-citizen children in elementary-school age attended a government school, while 4.2% were registered in an international or ethnic school[2] (Ministry of Education 2019b). Despite what is affirmed by the existing literature, on-

[1]   The most controversial issue was the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents which took place from the 1970s onwards, which is still today cause of tension between the two countries. In 2002, Kim Jon-Il confessed that North Korea had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens from different coastal areas of Japan (Hagström, Hanssen 2014). However, there are no news regarding other alleged abducted Japanese citizens who disappeared in those same years and many Japanese families are still waiting for news on their abducted relatives. This increases a general attitude of intolerance towards this ethnic group (see also Antonio Moscatello's *Megumi*, 2017).

[2]   Unfortunately, data do not distinguish between students attending international schools and those attending ethnic schools. However, this differentiation would be essential as international schools and ethnic schools welcome a very different population of foreign-citizen students, with a noticeably different socio-economic background.

ly 0.8% of this foreign-citizen student population was confirmed not to attend any form of schooling. However, for 7.4% of foreign-citizen students, there is no information available (recorded as "unknown" category in official data), underscoring the lack of governmental checks due to the non-compulsory nature of education for foreign-citizen students in Japan. The rate is slightly different concerning junior high school attendance of foreign-origin children, as 83.4% attend state junior high schools against the 4.9% enrolled in an international or ethnic school, showing a mild shift of preference to continue higher education in a more ethnic and culturally centered environment. These figures worsen if children enrolled in the L2 program are taken into consideration: in 2017, the MEXT registered that 9.6% of students in need of Japanese-language learning support dropped-out of public senior high school, compared to 1.3% of their Japanese-national student counterparts (Ministry of Education 2018).

Among the reasons for students' non-attendance in school, a ministerial study carried out in 2005 and 2006 in eleven cities with high density of foreign-citizen residents identified two main issues. Firstly, foreign families were not aware of the procedures regulating access to elementary and junior high school. In particular, the lack of parents' language skill impacts their children's access to education. Secondly, foreign-citizen children did not have the Japanese language proficiency that would allow them to comfortably participate and engage in class (Nukuzuma 2014). As in other parts of the world, the missed or misunderstood information of parents or tutors regarding ways to access mainstream education has crucial repercussion on their children's future carriers and opportunities. According to the same ministerial survey, other critical issues leading to school non-enrolment and non-attendance are economic difficulties, foreign families' plan to migrate back to the country of origin, and that Japanese customs and habits differ from those of the country or origin (Nukuzuma 2014).

Official statistics do not allow the disaggregation of foreign students' citizenship nor their advancement rate to senior high school. Nonetheless, since the 2000s, some academic studies have attempted to fill these gaps. Several re-

search studies have underscored the impact of parents' educational background and Japanese language proficiency as well as parental socioeconomic status (SES) on their children's educational achievement and chances to progress to senior high school (Chitose 2008; Omagari et al. 2010; Takenoshita 2013; Korekawa 2018; Kobayashi, Tsuboya 2021). Gender seems also to play a role in foreign-origin and foreign-citizen students' academic achievement, as female students of any citizenship perform better than their male counterparts (Chitose 2008). These findings resonate with existing literature, as Portes and Rumbaut (2001) show how parental SES impacts on children's achievement in school, although there are marked differences among different groups of resident immigrant citizens. In fact, Chinese children, whose parents tend to display higher educational qualifications, have higher attendance and lower dropout rates compared to Brazilian, Peruvian and Filipino children, whose parents, on the contrary, show lower socioeconomic status and lower cultural capital. Considering that ethnic schools are private institutes and thereby requires a given financial investments on the part of foreign families, it would be interesting to research how foreign families' financial assets impacts on their children education (see also Albertini et al. 2019, focused on Italy). However, this area of investigation seems to still be unexplored.

Finally, both ministerial and academic studies underline the gap of employment destination between foreign-citizen children and their Japanese peers. Poorer achievements of foreign-origin students can be witnessed in the access to the labor market: 40% of foreign-citizen students are employed in temporary occupations (rather than permanent contract) against 4.3% of the native Japanese counterpart and 18.2% do not work nor advance to a higher academic educational path after gaining their high school diploma, as opposed to 6.7% of Japanese students graduating from high school (Ministry of Education 2018).

4.5. Good practices and autonomous measures: A bottom-up phenomenon

In the absence of a national integration policy on immigrant students, the literature has identified a strong grassroot response from several actors (local governments, schools, concerned teachers, immigrant parents and communities, NPOs, and NGOs) to provide educational assistance for immigrant young people (Tokunaga 2018). Besides the academic literature, the Shūjūtoshi annual reports are here drawn on as a more direct source of information on current localities' situations. In fact, the Shūjūtoshi (short for *Gaikokujin Shujutoshi-kaigi*, the Association of Cities with High Concentration of Foreigners) is an association of cities with a high density of foreign-citizen or immigrant-origin nationals. It organizes annual national meetings, held on a rotation basis in the areas of its member cities. In these meetings, national government representatives, local authorities, and members of the civil society share and discuss policies and activities related to foreign residents, exchange information on the situation of each city, and actively work to face and solve concerning issues in the regions. Taking into consideration Shūjūtoshi reports is vital for a concrete understanding on the situation of different localities, as they convey ideas and opinions of those actors who are facing difficulties in relating and supporting foreign-citizen and immigrant-origin residents daily.

From both the analysis of academic literature and Shūjūtoshi reports, four main areas of locally-devised interventions are outlined: the introduction of special entrance quotas for foreign-citizen students to access senior high schools; extra-linguistic support for Japanese as a L2; Early Childhood Education and Care initiatives and guidance system to navigate compulsory education; and the enhancement of school teaching staff and Japanese language instructors.

As far as special entrance quotas are concerned, since 2010, some cities and prefectures have started introducing a "special entrance quota" system (*Tokubetsu nyūgaku waku*) in some high schools of their territories, with the goal of facilitating access of foreign-origin students to upper-secondary education and of assisting their increasing rate of academic progression. Not only schools

provide for reserved places for foreign-origin students, but the content of the high school entrance examination is revised in order to meet the students' difficulties, which most of the times lies in the linguistic barrier (Tokunaga et al. 2018; Kikokusha Center 2019). The revision of these special entry examinations varies considerably school by school: usually the number of subjects to be tested on is resized, more time is allowed for test completion, permitting the use of dictionaries, and special forms of examinations (such as oral interviews) are introduced (Kikokusha Center 2018). This could be regarded as an affirmative action – thus reserving places for members of minorities regarding the access (in this case) to public secondary education. However, these quotas are reserved for those foreign students who have a long-term residency experience in Japan, and they are therefore distinguished from international students who have only recently arrived.

As regard extra-linguistic support for L2 Japanese, one of the most widespread projects implemented by these local actors is the creation of Japanese learning sites outside school programs. These activities are usually the result of the combined efforts of municipalities and NPOs, while most of the teaching staff are volunteers (Shūjūtoshi 2010; 2013; 2014; 2016; 2017; 2019). Some of these spaces are also reserved to help children with their schoolwork, homework, and catching up on school subjects. The latter is a support activity which is particularly useful for those children whose parents do not speak Japanese or have not sufficient academic competency to help the child (Shūjūtoshi 2013; 2017; 2019). In this latter case, language courses target parents, aiming to facilitate their parental duties (Shūjūtoshi 2013; 2016; 2019). Some municipalities have showed a greater range of initiatives by organizing summer camps with an intensive linguistic or homework-related program or by creating spaces that offer the opportunity to gather together with volunteers and friends.

Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) initiatives are strategic to offer guidance to immigrant parents in navigating the Japanese educational system, especially at the pre-school stage of education (Shūjūtoshi 2013; 2019). Local actors agree that it is critical for immigrant families to understand the opportunities arising from selecting specific academic carriers as early as pos-

sible. It is also deemed crucial for parents to understand that learning Japanese before accessing elementary schools alleviates children from future heavier burden and that the child will be able to fully and actively participate in daily classes from their first day, instead of spending an initial period of time trying to catch-up linguistically. Therefore, cities' pre-school initiatives follow two directions. The first is the planning of informative meetings with families and creating material, such as pamphlets and brochures, detailing how the Japanese education system works (although these sometimes touch on aspects of every-day life that are not directly related with school, such as health insurance for children). Particular emphasis is put on procedures to advance to secondary upper education, regarded as the most difficult moment, numerically speaking, for foreign-citizen students. Interestingly, these sessions sometimes also cover topics such as school mannerism, that is how students should behave properly in school. The second focus of pre-school initiatives includes Japanese classes for foreign-language speaking children, as well as a preparation program concerning elementary school class contents in order for children to be ready to undertake primary education.

Lastly, strongly linked to the thorny issue of the prefectural budget, the measures aiming to enhance school *teaching staff and Japanese language instructors* are also a communality among Shūjūtoshi member cities. The first action undertaken relates to the need to raise the number of available teachers who have the competences to support foreign students as their figures continue to increase (Shūjūtoshi 2013; 2015; 2016; 2018). Secondly, as students' foreign background is also growing in diversity (outside the more traditional Korean-, Chinese- or Brazilian-citizen children), teachers and instructors who also speak Tagalog and Vietnamese, for instance, are recruited by prefectures and schools. However, it is simple to see the downsides of these initiatives, as these teachers and instructors are not usually officially trained and do not hold a teaching degree (Shūjūtoshi 2013; 2018).

CHAPTER 5

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

As presented in Chapter 3, the Japanese immigration phenomenon is steadily growing, although it is still limited when compared to traditional countries of immigration. More importantly, the oldcomer immigrant groups, the Korean, Chinese, and Brazilian ones which are here object of analysis, have reached a rather mature migratory phase by permanently settling in the country. Immigrants' sojourn gets longer, the rates of family reunifications increase, and ethnic institutions such as churches and schools flourish[3] (Böhning 1984).

This chapter illustrates the research design of the present doctoral study firstly by clarifying the research question and the areas of inquiry. It then presents the data collection process and highlights the issues faced, in particular in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. It sheds light on the interview protocol and analytical tools employed to process interview transcripts. Finally, the chapter ends with some reflections on the researcher's positionality and ethical-related issues faced during virtual face-to-face interviews.

5.1. *Research question*

This study aims to identify which theoretical model best describes the adaptation process of immigrant-origin youths in Japan. More particularly, this

---

[3]   Böhning (1984) configures a four-stage cycle in the evolution of the migratory phenomenon in countries of destinations. The first characterized by short-term settlement of young and male immigrants; the second phase sees an older immigrant population, still mainly composed by man, but with longer settlement timings; the third is characterized by the increasing of the female components of the immigrant population. The last reflects what is illustrated in the main text.

study seeks to ascertain whether any of the pre-existing frameworks can explain the Japanese circumstance (and to what extent), or if there is the need for further elaboration and adjustment. Moreover, it investigates whether it is necessary to produce a new model in accordance with the peculiarities of the Japanese social context.

Japan embodies a valuable case study to observe and eventually create a theory on the integration of second-generation immigrants, and also in a comparative perspective with other North American and European contexts. This is due to the fact that Japan represents one of the few industrialized Asian countries characterized by a fast-aging population, low birth-rates and rapidly shrinking workforce (OECD 2019d). As for other regions facing the same issues, Japan could also take advantage by the inflowing migration population, especially to fill the gaps in the workforce due to the so-called 3D jobs mismatch (Chung 2020).

The increasing presence of children of immigrants can also be considered a benchmark for a more advanced migratory phenomenon. The shift from first-generation immigrants to the following generations symbolizes the transformation of the migratory event from temporary (mainly labour immigration) to permanent (or settlement immigration) (Ambrosini 2011). For this reason, second generations (G2s), the adults of tomorrow, are a critical context for the study of immigrants' integration process. They imply a challenge for social cohesion for both sending and receiving societies and play a vital role in shaping them (Ambrosini, Molina 2004).

With a growing presence of immigrant-resident population, its shift towards a more permanent settlement, and projections of prospective higher presence of foreigners in the country (Korekawa 2018c), current research might eventually turn into a pioneering work paving the way for future development of the phenomenon. This may be more so as G2 presence is also growing, which means that immigrants are increasingly present in the Japanese labour market and that the Japanese education system needs to make preparation to welcome more students who do not speak Japanese and do not share the same background and cultural heritage into its classrooms. Chapter 4 has un-

derscored the growing foreign-citizen student population in Japanese public schools. However, such figures fail to fully illustrate the extent of the phenomenon as many foreign-citizen youths escape the governmental checks for two main reasons. The first is that compulsory schooling (from primary to junior high school) does not apply to foreign-citizen youths and consequently there is no way of understanding how many foreign-citizen children are excluded from school. Secondly, a fair smaller share of foreign-citizen and foreign-origin students attend the aforementioned ethnic schools, which are for the most part deemed as private companies (thus not recognized as schools) and which are also left out from the governmental radar.

The scholastic dimension embodies a focal lens to observe and study G2s. Undoubtedly, formal education plays a crucial role in shaping young people's socialization. In school, a young mind is not only taught the mere content of the curriculum. School rather represents the stage where an individual's cultural and behavioral characteristics are formed and where students learn the rules that allow for a smooth functioning of society (Mantovani 2008; Giddens and Sutton 2013). For immigrants' children in particular, school is the first arena of encounter with the social context of destination outside the familial context. Attending school in the country of destination is an opportunity for G2s to study the language, learn how to behave in a public situation, and where to increase skills to, one day, compete in the labor market. However, school can also become the stage where social inequalities are reproduced and maintained, strengthening the dominant social group's interests. These critical issues need to be addressed, as various international studies have assessed that foreign-origin pupils tends to perform worse than their native peers (Portes, Zhou 1993; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Cobb-Clark et al. 2012). Unequal school attainment among native and immigrant children not only matched findings in countries of an older immigration tradition, such as in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany or France (Ichou 2015; Kunz 2016; Strobel 2016; Pivovarova, Powers 2019; Raabe 2019; Curtis et al. 2021; Plenty, Jonsson 2021) but also in contexts of a more recent migratory phenomenon such as Italy, Spain, China, and Japan, with clear repercussions for their later occupation-

al achievements and socioeconomic positioning (Mantovani 2008; Azzolini, Barone 2013; Borgna, Contini 2014; Tokunaga et al. 2018).

Such issues might turn out to be even more alarming in the Japanese education system, where, as illustrated in Chapter 4, academic performance plays a vital role in determining access to university and, consequently, to higher occupational spheres. As Okano (2018) and Sugimoto (2010) argue, the Japanese school system is permeated by strong competition and early selectivity. Students (and families supporting them) must have a clear plan for their future career as early as junior high school. Consequently, immigrant families who have neither the linguistic skills nor the information on the functioning of the education system might lag behind in the educational race, marginalizing their children from mainstream paths towards higher socioeconomic standings. In a societal context where educational credentials impact heavily on a person's chance to succeed in the workplace, these school dynamics play a vital role in integration possibilities and outcomes of G2s. Therefore, the Japanese educational sphere is a fertile ground to research G2s' integration in the receiving context: additionally, when considering that although the existing literature has been quite prolific in the last decade, it is still strongly confined to the realm of description and less oriented towards theorization.

5.2. *Sampling, data collection, and respondent profiles*

The researcher carried out semi-structured interviews to explore the presented areas of investigation and attempt to answer the research question. The initial sample included eighty semi-structured interviews of which, due to the impediment brought by the pandemic (as illustrated in the following section), sixty-two were concluded. The achieved sampling is built on a non-probabilistic factorial design, and Table 5.1 exhibits the completed targets for each quota. Dimensions upon which the sampling was conceived are gender and interviewees' parents' country of origin.

Tab. 5.1.	*Factorial design of the foreign-origin and foreign-citizen population in quotas generated by the intersection of gender and nationality.*	
Nationality	M	F
Chinese	4 /10	10
Korean	5 /10	6/10
Brazilian	8/10	10
Japanese	9/10	9/10

(N=61)

The sample is made up of four groups: three groups of respondents whose parents' country of origin is either Brazil, China, or the Korean peninsula. The final group is constituted by native Japanese-citizen respondents[4]. The former three groups were selected, first of all, on the basis of numerosity, as

---

[4] The study further benefits from eleven interviews with key informants (Gu 2019). Typical of anthropological field research, "the key informant technique is assessed in terms of the ability of different types of informants to report on various aspects of the social system in which they perform role functions" (Houston, Sudman 1975, 151). Seven of the key informants interviewed for the present study are either children of mixed couples (a Japanese parent and a parent whose nationality is one of the three concerned with this study) or first-generation immigrants. Their accounts offered interesting points of reflection and some of them extended the participants recruitment to their network of friends. One key informant is the head of a volunteering association which offers Japanese language classes to school-age youths in need to boost their linguistic competences. Two are English teachers in Japanese public schools, and their accounts were indeed precious as they provided valuable personal opinions on the internal functioning of schools and some previously unknown problematics to the researchers emerged, related to the school integration of foreign pupils. Finally, the principal of a Brazilian ethnic school also agreed to participate in the study. Her accounts offered priceless insights on problems experienced by ethnic schools and their students.

presented in the Chapter 3[5]. Secondly, as delineated in Chapter 2, these three groups are characterized by the oldest migratory history among other foreign citizens residing in the country. For such a reason, the related second – and the following – generations are among the most consistent in Japan nowadays, not only in the labour market, as for first-generation immigrants, but also in other societal contexts such as schools. Finally, the group of native-Japanese respondents acts as a control group, thus representing a benchmark against which to compare immigrant-origin groups.

One dimension articulating the sample design is parents' country of origin. Rather than differentiating between (and thus selecting) respondents on the basis of citizenship, selected participants had to be offspring of parents originating either from Brazil, China, or the Korean peninsula. Only respondents whose parents were both foreign nationals were to be selected. This excluded offspring of mixed couples, namely children of a native Japanese parent and a foreign parent. This choice is motivated by the intention of detaching this study from the literature of *haafu* or *mikkusu* (half or mixed) children (Burke 2016; Kuramoto 2019). When addressing immigrants' children, further discernment based on the time upon arrival in the country of destination are commonly used. To use the literature parlance and with particular reference to Rumbaut's (1997) formulation, the expression "second generation" (G2) is

---

[5]   As presented in the descriptive analytical chapter, in recent years, the number of Vietnamese and Filipino-citizen residents has been on the rise, now outnumbering the Korean and Brazilian-citizen resident populations in Japan. However, Vietnamese and Filipino nationals have been excluded for two main reasons. Firstly, due to their relatively new migratory pattern in the country, there are more first-generation immigrants than second-generation within these populations, thus not fulfilling the target studied population of the current research. Secondly, the Filipino-citizen resident population is strikingly gendered, with an overwhelming proportion of women over men, and therefore concerns a different type of literature (see, for example, Fuwa 1999; Piper 1999; Douglass, Roberts 2000; Nakamatsu 2005; Suzuki 2005; Graham et al. 2012; Hollifield, Sharpe 2017).

strictly used to indicate immigrant-origin youths born in the country of destination. Nevertheless, the classifications 1.75 (G1.75), 1.5 (G1.5), and 1.25 generations (G1.25) are also widely acknowledged and they point to children born in the country of origin but who immigrated in the country of destination at 0-5 years, at 6-12 years, and at 13-17 years respectively. Given the importance of the school experience in this study, G1.25 youths have been excluded, as by definition they access the Japanese school system at a later stage of their educational path. Lastly, the sample also include G3 respondents, thus youths whose grandparents originally migrated to Japan.

Respondent selection entailed being part of the 20-30 years age group. The reasons for this age classification are threefold: firstly, interviewing youths in their twenties also allows the researcher to discern both educational and academic outcomes and occupational destinies, thus offering a more complete picture of their integration trajectories. Secondly, the upper age limit is given as the focus of the investigation lies within the schooling experience and respondents of a more advanced age might be less able to accurately recall their past experiences. A third element in support of selecting a narrower age group is related to the cohort effect. By including respondents of a considerably different age, thus belonging to different cohorts, there is a risk of comparing people who have lived through different historical, political, and societal moments, such as attending school within a different political context or experienced different widespread sentiment of society towards immigrants[6].

Initially, the investigation was to be confined to the area of Greater Tokyo (see Chapter 3). As a matter of fact, this area not only accommodates the highest figure of foreign-citizen residents in the country, but also presents a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of country of origin of such residents.

---

[6]   The age criterion has not been respected in eight cases, due to the limitation of conducting research remotely. These were: four Chinese and two Korean respondents (32 years old), a Brazilian respondent (17 years old) and a Japanese respondent (31 years old). Nevertheless, it was decided to keep such respondents in the sample as their profile complied with all other criteria.

Due to the difficulties presented by the remote recruitment of participants, on a later stage it was decided to extend the criterion of geographical residence to other areas that are densely populated by foreign citizens, namely to the Shiga Prefecture and Osaka prefecture.

Interviewee recruitment took place through the snowball technique. At first, the researcher contacted her personal network of acquaintance residing in Japan and asked them to introduce anyone matching the aforementioned profile within their own social network. This ensured that, from the very first interviewees, there was the personal distance between interviewer and interviewee necessary to carry out the study. The first set of interviews were collected in person from February to March 2020, during the researcher's visiting period at the University of Tokyo. These first interviews ended up being both exploratory and preparatory for the research design and for the rest of data collection. Among the first respondents were six foreign-citizen youths and one native Japanese-citizen respondent (as part of the control population). Among the first six foreign respondents, three have not been included in the sample as they did not match the targeted profile. Due to contingencies caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the visiting period was interrupted with the sudden return in the country (Italy) of the doctoral student. As a consequence, data collection was also suspended, in anticipation of the possibility to resume the visiting period in Japan. This, however, was completed due to the impossibility to access the country with a study visa. Therefore, interviews resumed once again in September 2020 and were carried out until December 2021. Resuming interviews took place by recontacting respondents who had been interviewed face-to-face. In this second round, interviews had to be conducted remotely, through online platforms such as Skype, Zoom, Messengers and LINE application (very similar to the European WhatsApp, LINE is one of the most used messaging applications in Japan). At the end of each interview, respondents were asked to invite friends or acquaintance to join the interview. Where necessary, the interviewer had to specify that respondents' relatives such as siblings and cousins could not be included in the study, to ensure that analyzed cases were as heterogenous as possible and not focused on narratives concerning a particular fa-

milial circumstance. These chains rarely stretched beyond a third-grade relationship from the researcher, therefore, a friend of a friend of a friend would usually stop the snowballing chain, by not replying to communications or simply not showing up at the date and time scheduled for the interview (about seven people forfeited at the last minute without prior notice).

Another strategy to recruit participants was carried out by posting virtual flyers on social medias, mainly through Facebook and Instagram. However, this route brought no results, as no participants were recruited through social media.

Interviews were conducted in Japanese or English, according to the interviewees' preference. The semi-structured lasted from two hours to three-and-a-half hours. Those conducted with native Japanese participants (four conducted in English and fourteen in Japanese) would usually last less (about an hour and a half) as they were not asked questions such as their family's migratory trajectory and or experience of discriminatory events.

5.3. *Doing research amid the* COVID-19 *pandemic*

Carrying out research during the current COVID-19 pandemic resulted in considerable impediments, particularly concerning the fulfillment of the planned quotas in the sample. Besides personal distress on the part of the researcher and the delay in the data collection caused by the uncertainty surrounding the evolving pandemic, three main problems arose. These were: the impossibility to pursue a visiting period in host universities; the consequent physical incapacity to access the fieldwork and having to conduct all investigations remotely; and the nature of online interaction established between the researcher and participants which (while not without its benefits) made it hard to establish a trusting and thus more solid relationship.

Firstly, due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the doctoral student was forced to interrupt her visiting period, therefore losing access to the second host university (Waseda University, Tokyo). One of the key advantages

of the visiting period would have been the chance to interact and engage with professors and scholars with advanced expertise on the area of study. In this way, there was little opportunity to confront and revise the present study in a more systematic way.

Secondly, a further problem of not being able to physically access the fieldwork geographic area was the consequent impossibility to access centers of association of the targeted respondents, such as Japanese language support centers (offering language classes or translation services) or centers for foreigners (such as volunteering associations providing legal counseling services or psychological support for foreign citizens residing in the country). These clusters would have granted further access to the target respondents. While around forty of these centers in the Greater Tokyo area were contacted via e-mail (in Japanese), only five replied, all denying the request to engage in the research project. These replies were justified by two answers: one was that, due to the pandemic, the center was not fully operative; the other was the lack of personal and physical contact with the researcher while in Tokyo: this act would have allowed the centers to decide whether to participate in the study in a later moment.

Thirdly, the virtual and remote nature of interactions between the researcher and recipients made data collection more arduous. Except for the first interviewees met in Tokyo, participants were only able to get to know the researcher through a screen. Hesitancy and lack of trust towards the researcher were sometimes tangible, at least at the beginning of interviews, as the doctoral student might have been perceived as an outsider, with no chance for participants to directly weigh up who they were speaking to.

Nevertheless, conducting virtual face-to-face interviewing presented the researcher with some advantages too. Being able to conduct interviews online forestalled the most evident issue related with distance and the past and current impossibility to travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, virtual interviewing offers a sense of anonymity and might support participants who do not feel comfortable sharing their experiences and opinions in person (Hanna and Mwale 2017) allowing the study to delve deeper into troubling or touchy

topics. However, this detachment between the researcher and participants also showed some downsides. In fact, reaching out to participants was particularly demanding as prospective respondents could simply ignore e-mails or messages from the researcher.

5.4. *Interview protocol, data analysis and coding*

Once the researcher got hold of a prospective participant, the communication proceeded as follow: the researcher introduced herself, briefly presented the study and its main goals. Once both the researcher and the participant accessed the virtual room and before conducting the interview, the interviewer proceeded by reading the participant information sheet (PIS) (Gareth and Braun 2017) on the content of the study, the publication-oriented aim of the study, the voluntary nature of the interview, and the guarantee of anonymity (for details about the PIS, refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix). Finally, the interviewer asked permission to record the interview (in no case was permission denied). Thereafter, the interview began with some ice-breaking topics (such as the ongoing Olympic games, or other small talk) to relieve any initial tension.

The interview protocol was organized in thematic areas aiming to explore the following six macro-topics, some to be investigated retrospectively:

- Personal background: this set of questions aimed to learn about respondents' demographics, thus concerning information about legal status, citizenship, age, and the socioeconomic level. These questions were rarely asked directly, but rather emerged throughout recipients' narratives. In cases where these personal questions were posed more directly, they were asked at a later stage of the interview, not to stifle the pace of the interview.

- Family: questions on family aimed partly to position parents' socioeconomic status, by investigating their educational level and occupational positioning. Then, topics such as familial relationship, namely the presence of intergenerational conflicts, the language used at home, the qual-

ity of time spent together, and patterns of transnationalism with family members were also investigated. Further questions also concerned the family's area of residency, to assess any patterns of convergence towards more ethnically populated areas.

- Migratory trajectory: this section explored parents' or ancestor's migratory trajectory, why the choice fell on Japan, the reasons that led to emigration from their country of origin, eventual episodes of discrimination reported by them at the time upon arrival.

- School: this dimension represents the core of the interview protocol and explored the chosen school track and the reasons leading to a certain educational path. The school environment was investigated by probing questions on the relationship with classmates, schoolmates, and teachers and whether there were episodes of bullying or discrimination. Respondents were asked retrospectively about their own and family's future aspirations and expectations, both on educational and occupational terms. Further questions that could offer a more complete understanding of interviewees' past school experienced covered, for example, attendance in cram schools (*juku*), experiences in school club activities, the way respondents spent their free time, and their socialization outside school.

- Daily life and socialization: this section regarded day-to-day life experiences and opinions on both the ethnic group and Japanese society, such as the current occupational status, relationship with peers, and eventual experience of discriminatory episodes.

- Self-assessed identity: finally, focus was dedicated to the scrutiny of self-assessed identity and what led to its formation. Opinions were also collected on how parents and siblings perceived their own identity, and the potential contrast among them.

Table A.1 in Appendix lists the set of questions asked as outcomes of the operationalization of the areas of inquiries presented in the previous paragraph.

After collection, interview recordings were transcribed literally and then coded, following the methodological indications of the thematic analysis using the CAQDAS MaxQDA[7].

Thematic analysis (Fereday, Muir 2006; Braun, Clarke 2008; Riessman 2008; Bazeley 2009; Leavy 2017) is one of the most frequently used qualitative approaches in qualitative academic literature (although at times it is used without its label being clearly reported). The thematic analysis is a search and identification of recurrent (or absent) themes. It dictates the identification of patterns in the data, and the categories or themes isolated become guidelines for data coding or indexing. The analysis proceeds according to the following step guide proposed by Braun and Clarke (2008): familiarisation with data; pre-analyses and idealization of a rough coding scheme; code polishing by identification of patterns (or anomalies) within the data transcripts, which entails a possible merging of redundant codes or themes, creation of specific sub-themes and sub-codes, and (more rarely) the separation of previously merged codes. This theme re-organization complies with the principles of *internal homogeneity* (within elements belonging to the same theme) and *external heterogeneity* (among elements of different themes).

Following the thematic analytical framework, the transcripts' analysis proceeded as follows. Firstly, as an exploratory stage, interviews' transcripts were coded *in vivo* (Leavy 2017, 151), the so-called indexing method which is carried out by using respondents' own words instead of pre-set codes. This allows for the identification of emergent themes. Then, transcripts underwent a second and theory-driven layer of coding. In a deductive stance, the identified themes mirrored what lies in the relevant literature's theoretical framework. In this way, the analytical process here becomes recursive or hovering (Braun and Clarke 2008), which means that the analytical process is repeated and refined alongside the data collection, departing from a pre-analysis of a rough coding scheme to a more concrete and polished theme identification and realization of a final-stage codebook.

---

[7]   https://www.maxqda.com/.

The finalized codebook is presented in Table 5.2. as it lists the finalized thirteen codes with annotations on what subthemes each code includes.

Tab. 5.2.   *Codebook*

	Code	Annotations and themes included in the code
1	School	- School experiences - School choice - Examinations (access to senior high school and university) - Bullying
2	Ethnic school	- School experiences - Lack of teachers training
3	Family	- Family support in scholastic activities - Migratory plans - Financial difficulties - International marriage - Transnationalism
4	Language	- Language proficiency - Language spoken at home - Language spoken with peers
5	Peers	- Peer relationship
6	Future expectation/aspiration	- Respondents' future scholastic, academic and working expectations and dreams. - Respondents' parents' future expectations, for their children. - Parents' motivational push, for their children.
7	Occupation	- Recruitment dynamics - Occupational level
8	Discrimination	- Episodes of discrimination
9	Relations among immigrant generations	- Relationship with parents - Feeling pressured by the parents (to work, to study more, etc.); - Feeling thankful to the family
10	Feeling an outsider/feeling of belonging	- Perception of being considered as an outsider / as different from the rest - Feeling of Japan don't accept others - Refusing Japan

11	Japan "in their own eyes"	- How respondents see the Japanese people. - Criticism on the Japanese society/Japanese ways (ex. lack of critical thinking, hierarchical and vertical relations) - Adjusting to the Japanese culture/way
12	Ethnic environment	- Perception of one's own ethnic community - Breakaway from the present path
13	Identity	- Self-assessed identity - Passport issues/citizenship issues

Source: Author's analysis with MaxQDA.

5.4. *Positionality and ethical dilemmas in qualitative youth research*

Some final considerations on positionality and some ethical dilemmas faced in particular during data collection are due.

Positionality of the interviewer should always be an object of reflection, especially in qualitative studies that imply a face-to-face communication between the researcher and the respondent. Indeed, the literature has shown how interviewers' ethnic background affects respondents' replies and approach during data collection (Gu 2019; Van Heelsum 2013). For the present study, on the one hand, the researcher profile (a Caucasian woman in her late 20s) turned out to be appropriate for the targeted respondents. Being a foreigner, and thus an "outsider" to the participants' profile, made it possible to steered clear of those issues that emerge with being an "insider" of the investigated group as, for instance, the risk to lose impartiality, or the Weberian neutrality, while observing and analyzing (Ganga, Scott 2006). Although the researcher always divulged her expertise on the topic, being a foreigner also resulted in more detailed accounts and explanations narrated by the respondents, as if they had to offer explanations to someone who is a completely novice on the addressed topic. Moreover, the commonality of the researcher and participants age eased

the flow of the conversation and most of the time allowed for sincere and at times intimate revelations on the part of interviewees. On the other hand, alongside the circumstances brought by the pandemic, this "outsider" status might have hampered information collection and respondents' recruitment (Gu 2019).

Despite the established affinity between interviewer and interviewee during interviews, some of the touchiest discussion topics that emerged lead the researcher to be more attentive towards specific situations. This was the case in particular when the conversation turned to identity, discrimination and family-related issues. There were four cases (out of sixty-one) that respondents were emotionally strained in elaborating their answers. One female Korean respondent had only in the recent years found out that her parents were both of Korean origin and was still struggling to process this new part of her own identity. One male Korean respondent had trouble talking about the social and political affiliation of his parents to North Korea. One female Japanese respondent recalled with pain her stress in the quest to satisfy her parents' academic and occupational expectations. Finally, there was one male Japanese respondent who refused to disclosed information on his family. There were no cases in which any of these respondents were pressured to answer. However, they were all offered an alternative way to reply as they were asked whether they would have preferred to answer in a written form, through messaging apps, e-mail or by filling a word document (Braun et al. 2017). While the female Korean and female Japanese respondents preferred to continue to answer verbally in the face-to-face interview, the male Korean respondent accepted the alternative of filling in a word document and its written answers have been added to the interview transcript. On the contrary, the male Japanese respondent confirmed that he was not willing to answers questions regarding his family.

CHAPTER 6

SCHOOL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN CHILDREN IN JAPAN

This chapter presents the main findings drawn from the thematic analysis of interviews conducted with immigrants' youths residing in Japan. It highlights the six investigated areas concerning school choice and past school experience. Findings are presented by following a chronological pace, starting from: 1) the first choice of school, proceeding to 2) choice to upper secondary education, a crucial junction for students inscribed in the Japanese education system. It then presents 3) ambitions students and their families hold for these youths' future and their eventual positioning both academically (their progression to tertiary education) and occupationally. Lastly, it focuses on 4) school environment and socialization with peers, on the 5) emergence of different patterns of linguistic adaptation, and some 6) final respondents' reflection on their past school career.

As is custom for qualitative research, final write-ups are complemented with excerpts from interview transcripts. Generations are here partitioned based on the division presented in Chapter 5, according to Rumbaut's (1997) design: second generation (G2) includes respondents born in the country of destination; generation 1.75 (G1.75) are those who emigrated by the age of 5; and generation 1.5 (G1.5) for those who arrived in Japan between 6 and 12 years old. Finally, G3 indicate children whose grandparents were the first in the family to migrate to the country.

For interviews conducted in English, excerpts were left true to transcripts, thus to respondents' wordings: therefore, the transcripts are not necessarily grammatically correct. However, adjustments were made where comprehension could be considered difficult: for instance, punctuation, subjects and

objects were added when they had been left implied, and repetition was deleted when too wordy. For interviews carried out in Japanese, excerpts were translated into English by the author. In those cases where excerpts provide in the texts include an exchange between the interviewer ("I:") and the interviewee (/respondent, "R:").

Before venturing into the data presentation, the following paragraph presents patterns of the socioeconomic status of respondents across the three country groups, as well as that of their parents. The two elements investigated to discern socioeconomic positioning was the level of occupation and cultural capital, namely the level of education attained.

Out of the thirteen Chinese respondents, eleven have a tertiary education degree and were employed in a white-collar position. The remaining two were enrolled as university students (in a four-year university program) at the moment of the interview. Chinese parents were also characterized by a high level of cultural capital (they had obtained either a senior high school degree or a university degree, with one case of parents with a doctoral degree). Chinese parents' occupations include figures of self-employed (among which some cases of Chinese restaurant owners) or employed in a white-collar position.

Korean youths are also characterized by a highly educated profile. Out of eleven respondents, ten had already graduated with a university degree (from a four-year university program) and were all employed in white-collar positions, while the remaining one was enrolled in a (four-year) university course at the moment of data collection. Korean parents tended to show a lower educational attainment compared to Chinese parents. Most Korean parents had graduated from senior high school (especially Korean mothers), with fewer cases of parents with a university degree. In terms of parents' occupational positioning, there are about an even number of Korean parents employed in a white-collar position and self-employed parents. In this case, too, self-employment mostly concerns ethnic-related business, such as Korean restaurants.

Compared to Chinese and Korean youths, Brazilian respondents, as well as their families, showed the lowest socioeconomic positioning. Out of the eighteen Brazilian youths interviewed, five had got a senior high school diplo-

ma and had not gone on to tertiary education. Out of the thirteen Brazilians who progressed to tertiary education, only four enrolled in a four-year university program (one of them was still enrolled at the moment of the interview), while the rest graduated from a two-year university course. Regarding employment status, five Brazilian youths were employed as factory workers, two had a part-time job, one was self-employed (as a financial consultant, not an ethnic-related business) and the rest were employed in a white-collar position. Brazilian parents also showed to be characterized by the lowest levels of cultural capital among all groups. Out of the eighteen Brazilian youths, twelve of them had at least one parent, most often both of them, employed in a blue-collar occupation (mostly as a factory worker) or in a precarious occupational situation, conducting the so-called *naishoku*, which are occasional piecework carried out at the employee's own domicile (Roberts 1994). The rest were self-employed, running small businesses (mostly serving the Brazilian community in the area), or had part-time jobs.

6.1. *The first dichotomic school choice: Japanese or ethnic?*

The school choice is indeed an important step that has implications for students' future possibilities, both academically and occupationally. It is even more so in a context such as the Japanese one, where, as delineated in Chapter 4, educational credentials hold such an important effect on youths' destinies and positioning in the society they live in. Therefore, it is here deemed significant to shed light on what are the decisions behind the first choice that students and their families make in regard to their school career.

The first moment Japanese students need to make a choice for their school path is the access to senior high school at the age of 15. This crossroad will either lead them to an academic senior high school or one of the vocational tracks. Previous educational steps (primary and junior high school) are often dictated by the geographic area of residence, as Japanese students usually end up enrolling in scholastic institutions close to their homes (Ishikida 2005).

However, foreign-origin and foreign-citizen students have one other option: kindergarten. This option is as early as the first year of primary school or even pre-school education. Ethnic schools, in fact, stretch from primary to senior high schools, channeling foreign students into an educational path which is parallel (therefore, never intercepting) to the mainstream Japanese system. There are, however, also forms of private ethnic pre-schools in alternative to Japanese kindergarten. Given the early age this choice is made (as students entering primary school are merely 6 years old and even younger for pre-school), it can be stated that the selection of a Japanese or ethnic school is at the discretion of families. It is in this first moment that parents start molding their children's future, basing their choice on their priorities and on the elements and information they have at their disposal.

Only Korean and Brazilian interviewees reported to have attended their nationalities' ethnic school. On the contrary, no Chinese respondent attended a Chinese school, meaning that they all attended Japanese schools. Regarding Korean respondents, four 3G youths attended a Korean school from primary to high school, while one 3G Korean youth transferred to the ethnic school after graduating from a Japanese primary school. Quite surprisingly, almost all parents had also attended a Korean school for their educational careers. The other six Korean recipients (all 2G and 3G youths) attended a Japanese school from primary to senior high school. Concerning Brazilian respondents, fourteen of them attended a Brazilian from the primary to the senior higher education level (one of whom transferred during junior high school as she was a victim of bullying in her previous Japanese school[8]) against five Brazilian youths who attended the mainstream Japanese education system. There is no pattern of correlation between recipients' generation to school choice.

Concerning the Korean group, there was no clear pattern between parents' socioeconomic status, broken down by level of education and employment, and school choice. Korean parents showed an overall high level of education. On the contrary, the common thread among the five Brazilians who attended a

---

[8]   This account is illustrated in detail in section 6.5.

Japanese school path was to have parents with a relatively higher educational level compared to respondents who attended a Brazilian school, although not necessarily a higher occupational status. Brazilian youths who attended a Japanese school had, in fact, at least one parent with a university degree. Among other Brazilian parents, there are cases who have only gained a junior high school degree. Regarding parents' occupational status, there is not clear distinction between the two groups.

Across all groups investigated, learning the language of the context of destination is a recurrent rationale for parents to enroll their children in a Japanese educational path. Anticipating integration into a Japanese-speaking context is also deemed a strategical step for children's language acquisition, pushing parents to enroll them in a pre-school track.

> Yeah. My mom knew that there's plenty of schools just for Korean people, it's called Korean school. But she thought it's better for me to go to just normal Japanese kindergarten so I can learn Japanese quickly (D.C., Korean, F, 26yo, G1.75)[9].

To send their children to a Japanese school path seems to be a greater strategy in situations where the language spoken within the familial environment is different from the one of the contexts of reception. In this way, school represents the first chance for children to learn Japanese.

> So, like when I was in kindergarten, my mom was actually a stay-at-home mom, but she wanted me to improve my Japanese skills because if I was living with my parents, they only speak Portuguese, right? And she wanted me to be able to speak Japanese. So, when I got into kindergarten, it was actually… my Japanese was better than my Portuguese, to be honest (L.I., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G2).

[9]   Respondents' information is given in brackets and is organized as follows: initials of the names, affiliation to one of the four groups of respondents who object of this study (Brazilian, Korean, Chinese, or Japanese); gender; age; generation.

However, at the same time language represents a reason against choosing a Japanese school. For children to be able to retain and master the language of the country of origin is, for some parents, a valid enough reason to send them to the ethnic school.

> They [my parents] were like, you are Brazilian, you have to speak Portuguese. You are not going to forget your own language (T.W., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G1.75).

The same reasoning, namely for children to be able to preserve proficiency of the language of origin, is also used by families who, among its members, use Japanese. The following excerpt refers to a third-generation Korean respondent whose parents, both second-generation Korean, have retained little proficiency in the Korean language and ended up using Japanese in the domestic setting. For this case, the ethnic school becomes a means to reclaim the family's station in the cultural context of origin.

> Yeah, so, my parents, especially my father, had a fear I cannot speak Korean, and so maybe I will have an identity… a crisis of the languages. So, he wanted me to speak and study Korean culture (K.S., Korean, F, 24yo, G3).

Language does represent a key element around which the school choice is made. Beyond learning a new language, retaining parents' language of origin, or the willingness to regain their ancestors' cultural and linguistic background, the level of respondents' Japanese proficiency is also another factor participating this dichotomic Japanese or ethnic school decision. Not being able to keep up with the curriculum or being bullied due to the lack of linguistic skills or to simply somatic differences pushed parents (especially of Brazilian respondents) to choose the ethnic-school path for their children.

So, what they [my parents] said is that they were afraid of me getting bullied because I didn't have command over Japanese at all. So, you know, like keeping up with school subjects would be such a hassle for me. And they probably heard about a lot of…you know, like people who got bullied or they got racially abused because they were… although you look Japanese, you don't speak Japanese [laughs]. This type of story, you know? And yes, so they had that in mind, and I feel they were kind of like… with that in their heads, they were afraid of me getting traumatized or something. That's why they chose to put me in a Brazilian school in Japan, I guess (D.Y., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G1.5).

"Rumor has it…" appears to be a convincing element too. Although episodes of bullying at school had not yet been directly experienced by the students themselves, stories from fellow foreign citizens who migrated to Japan play a role in the parents' choice. The fear of parents that their children may be discriminated against or attract bullying behavior perpetrated by both classmates and Japanese teachers pushes them to choose the safer ethnic school environment. These narratives develop to the point that Japanese school is associated with a sort of punishment.

My mom and my dad would always tell me that they were going to put me in the Japanese school if I did something wrong. It was kind of like a punishment. Yeah, because I don't know if you've heard the stories of foreign people in the schools. They suffer a lot of bad things. You know what *ijime* is? Bullying. My mom never wanted me to go to Japanese school because of that. She was afraid that I was going to get bullied at school just for being a foreigner, and she was afraid that I wouldn't be able to tell that I wanted to go to the bathroom or to tell the teacher that I was hungry, to tell the teacher that I wanted some water and so since she has always been really worried about my well-being, she decided to put me in a Brazilian school, which would be easier for me, of course since I speak Portuguese, and they would just... It's actually a funny story, because they treated the Japanese school as a punishment (T.W., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G1.75).

141

Indeed, it was not always the case that stories of mistreatment and bullying heard from other parents eventually led children to enroll in an ethnic school. Concerned family friends and relatives would eventually reach out to ascertain the condition and well-being of children, as happened in the case of the respondent of the following excerpt, who emigrated to Japan with her parents at the age of 10 and, although she knew no Japanese, enrolled in a Japanese primary school.

> I had been in Japan for only about a year, and a Chinese friend of my father repeatedly asked me, are your friends all right? Have you not been bullied? Are Japanese people kind enough? For the time I had been in Japan, people had really been nice to me, so I couldn't really understand why I was being asked such a thing (Y.H., Chinese, F, 29yo, G1.5).

Two other recurrent reasons for respondents to enroll in an ethnic school emerged throughout interviews. The first aspect is parents' future migratory plan and more precisely their intention to go back to their country of origin. This was particularly true for the Brazilian respondents, although there were also some cases among the Chinese and Korean groups. Their reasoning was that there was little point in their children learning Japanese and growing distant from parents' linguistic and cultural background when the family planned to return to their country of origin within a few years. Rather, the choice to socialize and educate children in the scholastic system and linguistic environment of origin is a strategic choice if parents plan to eventually go back.

> Because she [my mother] had heard stories of her friends that put their children in Japanese school, and when they went back to Brazil, they would be really unhappy, even depressed because they would feel like an outsider. […] So, my mom didn't want that, my mom wanted me to have the same feeling as her, that our stay in Japan is just temporary and we're going home eventually. So that's why maybe she was a little bit worried

that I would forget Portuguese because it would make a lot harder for me
to get adjusted to Brazil again (G.N., Brazilian, M, 25yo, 2G).

This is the case for many other Brazilian respondents, although none of them ended up returning to Brazil. The common theme among these respondents' narrative was their parents' migratory trajectory: young Brazilian citizens who migrated to Japan to work with the idea that once they had put enough money aside in savings, they would have returned home. In the end, however, none of them did.

The reason why I went to a Brazilian school in Japan is because they [my parents] always thought about going back to Brazil after having earned enough money. But that never happened. Spoiler alert [laughs] (L. I., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G2).

Brazilian youths who were often reminded that Japan was only a temporary home and that the family would *return* back to the country of origin – even though some of them had never set foot in Brazil – developed a sense of detachment and a lack of belonging to the Japanese context. from their narratives it is clear that this sense of temporality translates into a lack of investment for long-term stay in Japan: they do not attend a Japanese school, they never socialize with Japanese peers, nor do they put any effort into learning the Japanese language, with apparent repercussions on their later occupational possibilities. Nevertheless, this lack of parental farsightedness never appears to lead to parent-child conflicts. This is rather understood by the recipients as a simple reality, a phenomenon common to the Brazilian community migrating to Japan.

Like many of the Brazilian that come here, they come with a plan to stay here just a few years to save money and they go back. That was [my parents'] plan as well, so I was born here [in Japan] […] So, first my dad he came back to work with a plan to stay just a few years as well, but my mum saw that staying away from my father was not that of a good idea, so she decided to come as well... with the plan to stay just a few years as

well [chuckles] so that's why we were in the Brazilian school, because
we had the plan to go back to Brazil (P. E., Brazilian, F, 26yo, G2).

A final reason for parents to send their children to an ethnic school would
be the lack of information they have at their disposal about the functioning of
Japanese education system. International literature underlines how lack of in-
formation regarding the school system of the receiving context hinders access
to educational possibilities (Vargas 2004; Christen, Granato 2007). This should
not cause any surprise considering that for foreign-citizen children it is not
mandatory to attend the nine years of compulsory schooling (from primary to
junior high school). One example of this is the fact that parents do not get noti-
fied by local education boards and municipalities of the start of school, as hap-
pens with Japanese-citizen students. Although, at first, one could assume that
families lacking information about the structure of the local education system
may be characterized by parents' lower educational level. However, this
proved not to be the case. Among respondents who reported that, parents did
not know how the Japanese educational system worked at the time of their
primary school enrollment, many of those parents were university graduates.

[It] is that just there's not enough information [regarding on how to enroll
in a Japanese school]. It's like information doesn't circulate enough.
That's one point. But, also, usually families are not really backing [their
children] up [to attend a Japanese school] (G. N., Brazilian, M, 25, G2).

I didn't know how to enroll in a Japanese school, how it worked. All my
family and siblings attended the Korean ethnic school and beyond this I
did not have any other information (P. S., Korean, M, 32yo, G3).

Quite evidently, the ethnic-schools attendance has led to the emergence of a
cohort of foreign-citizen and foreign-origin youths who have been brought up
and educated in a separate context from that of their native Japanese peers. As
is argued in the following sections, this has a considerable impact on these

youths' socialization, linguistic adaptation and, at times, on their future socio-economic positioning within the receiving society. Alba and Nee (2003) offer a viable theoretical interpretation to this ethnic-school phenomenon and the clear-cut separation that it creates between immigrants' children and their native Japanese peers. Looking at this panorama through the authors' lens, in fact, when deciding to enroll their children in ethnic schools, the immigrant community puts in place a segregation behavior, referred to by their new assimilation theory as a *network mechanism* (Chapter 1). However, the community would not be able to carry forward a segregation stance if it was incentivized by the institutional environment, namely the Japanese educational system and its regulations. It can then be argued that, among the institutional mechanisms (or *distal causes*) that allow for G1 immigrants to send their offspring in an ethnic yet compartmentalized educational environment, the fact that foreign-citizen children are excluded by compulsory schooling is at the root of this early segregation reality.

6.2 *Access to upper-secondary education: A selection concerning everyone*?

Access to senior high school represents the first crossroad in the educational system for Japanese youths (see Chapter 4). *De facto*, Japanese upper secondary education offers a plurality of tracks, from those academic path senior high schools to those institutes that channel their pupils towards a vocational course. However, the literature remarks how the preparations that students (and their supporting family members) who are planning to enroll in high-rank senior high schools, which increase their chances of enrolling in prestigious universities, make might start in primary school (Sugimoto 2010). Furthermore, the fact that it is possible to register to one public-senior-high school exam at a time (with public institutions usually being the most competitive ones) makes this choice even more critical. Failing such an exam entails direct exclusion from the competition. This is why the Japanese education system is deemed to show early selectivity in its configuration, as junior high schools are

the latest stage that students can postpone decisions on their educational future (Okano 2016; 2020; Sugimoto 2010; Takeuchi 1991; Tsuneyoshi et al. 2011; Yamamoto 2014).

The sampled population for the present study did not include any respondents who had previously attended a vocational upper secondary school. Therefore, no arguments or additional reflections on this matter can be pulled from the data. However, further elements of selectiveness emerged from respondents' narratives about their progression to senior high school.

Senior high school rankings have played a role in some of the Japanese respondents' choice for school advancement. Senior high schools are ranked on the basis of the figures of graduates who successfully accessed highly reputed colleges and universities (Sugimoto 2010). Senior high school tends therefore to advertise such numbers so as to attract prospective students who in turn also aspire to access the same prestigious universities.

As far as Japanese students are concerned, school prestige is a crucial dimension to consider when graduating from junior high and deciding on their next step. The amount of effort they make regarding their studies is therefore proportionate to the students' educational aim.

> In junior high school, we had like rank, ranking, after test and... When I was a first-year student, I was like middle, but because I wanted to go to, like, to a kind of high-class high school, I really tried hard to study. And when I was in the final year in junior high school, I was like, second in the school ranking (E. K., Japanese, F, 27yo).

Regarding the foreign group of respondents attending a Japanese junior high school, as can be expected, the transition to senior high school was heavily influenced by the information that students and families had at their disposal. From the narratives of foreign respondents, it is evident that students have families with little knowledge of the Japanese education system tended not to ponder much on the choice of senior high school. The selection was either made by proximity to the residence or just by following the decision of other

junior high school classmates. Also, teachers from junior high schools or instructors from cram schools seemed to play a discreet role in sorting senior high schools, although only in a limited number of respondents' accounts. This is the case of L.Y., a Chinese respondent whose parents offered little support for this transition, and therefore he was guided by his teacher from cram school.

> For the high school, I moved to a different one, it's closer to Saitama prefecture[10]. And yeah, it's a little bit more focused on the study kind of stuff […]. It was the teacher from *juku* who advised me to go there. So, the one thing, I think because my parents didn't know the whole system of the Japanese education, there are many options, they didn't know the choice, what kind of choices were there, yes (Y. L., Chinese, M, 32yo, G1.5).

It should not be forgotten that besides subjective factors of immigrants' children and their families, there is a whole structural dimension of the education system that plays a crucial role in discerning the educational paths of these youths (Pitzalis 2012; Romito 2016). For instance, among the concerned structural dimension influencing students' progression to upper secondary and tertiary education, Takahashi (2016) underlines how teachers in Japanese schools contribute to shaping foreign-citizen and foreign origin students' educational possibilities. As introduced in Chapter 4, the choice of high school choice is not one to be taken lightly. Junior high school graduates can only attempt one entry examination to a Japanese public senior high school at a time, while there are no limits for private senior high schools. In other words, if one student aims too high and fails the entry examination to a public senior high school, the only choice left is to enroll to a private institute, assuming it does not weigh excessively on the student's finances. Otherwise, the risk is to postpone school enrollment by one year. As also demonstrated by some of the foreign respondent experiences, junior high school teachers sometimes act as advisors in counseling students about their best next choice. However, as Romito (2016) under-

---

[10]   Saitama prefecture, situated in the northern outskirts of Tokyo, presents a high number of Chinese-citizen residents.

lines in the Italian case, teacher guidance for immigrants' pupils appears to dampen students' ambitions and encourage them to pursue safer alternatives, de facto inducing students towards a *downward* orientation for future educational careers.

> So, usually you [the student] can talk to the teacher who can recommend what high school you can go with your grades. But... I think in the beginning I was trying another high school because you can go to the open-day to know the school and stuff and I had one high school that I really wanted to go because the English education there was really good but when he [the junior high school teacher] talked to me, he was like, I think it will be impossible for you, so... he recommended one that is close to my house so... in the end I decided to go to that one. But I have many friends who were told the same thing like "Oh, that one it's impossible for you", they really... ehm... take off their motivation? (P. E., Brazilian, F, 26yo, G2).

Subsequently, it would be the case to understand whether the tendency of teachers to reorient students to lower educational institutions and thus resizing students' ambition is only directed towards foreign-citizen and foreign-origin students or whether it also affects native Japanese youths. Unfortunately, there is too little data to safely argue any hypothesis on the matter. Although openly probed on the matter, Japanese youths hardly mentioned anything regarding teacher orientation towards senior high school. The same goes for foreign respondents. When the interviewee from the previous excerpt was asked whether she believed that her teacher would have oriented a Japanese student in the same way, she pointed out that teachers objectively orient children by weighing up their competences.

> I think it depends on the teacher but for example if a foreigner was told that, I think many of them would think that it is because they are foreigners, and I saw that too before but now that if I think back... I think they see the grades too and also because of the language, they try to think if it [the language proficiency]

would be enough or not, and actually I think you can just take one test for one school at times, I think it's one public and one private, so if you don't pass that you cannot go there. That's why they thought it's better to have a safe plan (P. E., Brazilian, M, 26yo, G2).

On the contrary, families that were more informed on the different available schooling paths showed a clearer inclination to make choices on senior high school based on their children's future academic and occupational plans. This is the case of a Chinese respondent who had attended a Japanese public junior high school: they decided to enroll in a private senior high school affiliated with Chuo University, in Tokyo. Albeit private and thus costly, such senior high schools have two advantages. They usually do not require an entry examination or only impose a watered-down entry examination, compared to the more articulated and demanding exams to access other public senior high school. Secondly, it ensures, after graduation, direct admittance to the affiliated tertiary institution, avoiding university entrance exams. This therefore turns out to be an investment ensuring a safe transition for the student to tertiary education.

> For high school, the entry examination was not that hard. I went to a private senior high school, not public. It is a senior high affiliated with Chuo University, *fuzoku[11]*... Maybe it is famous for lawyer, legal studies. Some universities, for example, Keio University, you know? And Waseda University. These two are maybe ranked higher, while Chuo University is a little... right beneath, and these universities have affiliated high schools, all managed together, in the same system. So, if I entered the high school affiliated with Chuopa University, which is called Suginama High School, I knew that I can access directly the Chou University after graduation (Y. G., Chinese, F, 32yo, G1.75).

[11]   *Fuzoku* is literally translated to "affiliated", anticipated by the concerned university.

Applying to a private senior high school can, however, turn out to be a comfortable and safe solution for youths who are less inclined towards studying. In fact, just like the aforementioned university affiliated senior high schools, private high schools do not require any entry examination (or the exam is eased) and the overall school experienced is considered less demanding and stressful. When asked why, after public junior high school, the following Chinese respondent decided to enroll in a private senior high, her answer pointed to the eased entry examination alongside other justifications which were only partially related with future academic or occupational plans.

> Originally, I didn't like studying, so it was difficult to take the exam at a public school. However, in private schools all you have to do is take an interview and you're in. Also, uniforms were quite cute. I originally wanted to work in the arts, so I was lucky that there was a private senior high school that also offered an art-related curriculum (R. I., Chinese, F, 21yo, G2).

Lastly, how does this selection moment influence students at ethnic schools? It is safe to argue that such students are virtually left out of the running in this competition. As ethnic schools stretch from primary to senior high school, students enrolled in a Korean or Brazilian school were never concerned by this rite of passage. These youths would progress from one educational level to the following without the need to pass any high school entry examination.

6.3. *Educational aspirations and expectations*

Among factors determining school success and failure of immigrants' children, the literature remarks how immigrant youths' educational expectations as well as expectations families carry for them do have an impact to predict occupational performance and occupational destinies (Zimmerman et al. 1992; Kao, Tienda 1998; Mantovani et al. 2018). Within the realm of achievement drivers, aspirations and expectations denote two different forms of future ambition. Aspirations indicate the desired educational level or occupational sta-

tus, at times formed on unrealistic bases; whereas expectations refer to a more down-to-earth goals, on what youths realistically believe will happen (Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Birkelund 2020).

Seeing the importance of future ambitions on children school success, the present study has devoted a section to the investigation of respondents' aspirations and expectations. Due to the age-class of the sampled populations, questions have been asked retrospectively, thus respondents were invited to answers questions while turning back time and putting themselves in their high-school-self's shoes. Questions not only investigated respondents' aspirations and expectations for their future academic and occupational goals, but they also inquired into the expectations that their parents had for them. Indeed, parents' expectations are filtered and expressed by youths through their memories and perspectives.

Narratives offered by the group of native Japanese respondents were quite homogenous. They underlined a relatively scarce presence of aspirations and somewhat barren set of expectations. The latter, as illustrated later in the paragraph, appeared to be in line with parents' expectations. Unanimously, respondents' parents wished and pressured their high-school-age children to strive for a good university – referring to the aforementioned high prestige university rankings – in order to be employed by a well-known and established company later on. The area of study of choice for respondents' university career carried little relevance. Therefore, respondents' expectations too showed to be less focused on a specific field of interest, both concerning their academic studies and later occupational implications, and more on the mechanisms that lead to a long-term and secure employment.

> When I had to choose a university back then… I didn't have any clear ambitions about my academic path, so. Actually, the university I finally entered was not my first choice, yes. I actually I wanted to go to Tokyo University, that top university, yeah. But I failed its test so… I just dropped the test. But the main reason why I wanted to go to Tokyo University was that when I went when you enter Tokyo University, then in

first year, you don't need to choose what you want to study. So, you can like, attend like many classes, many classes like studying about general things, not only some kind of technical or specific things. Hmm… So, I didn't have any clear ambition about whether I wanted to study this academic thing or like that. Hmm… Ok, maybe like just I wanted to continue studying English, and that's all that was (E. K., Japanese, F, 27yo).

Even more transparent regarding a lack of genuine interest for the student's own future was the experience recounted by the next interviewee. What emerges here is an aversion to walking down a pre-set path, with little room to go down a more customized route.

So, there is a school hierarchy, right? The goal was to get into a good university for most of the people, so they don't even have a dream, including me. And for me, I just didn't want to take the entrance exam because I don't like test. But I did. But the main point here is, yes, as you can tell, you know, I didn't really have a core value or anything. I just went with the flow. And I think that's pretty much, you know, like, not uncommon. For students like all my friends go there, so I also go there. Things like that are not uncommon. Because we don't really have a dream. So, you know, there's a limited way of deciding something. Oh, my friends are there, so why not? You'll be fine. That's pretty much it (T. S., Japanese, M, 25yo).

Whilst the youths lack of a clear vision of where they are heading or where they wish to head to, their parents appear to have a more concrete grasp of what they expect from their children's future. Parents' expectations reported by recipients were pretty homogenous throughout the sample, heavily shaped by their informed understanding of how the Japanese education system works and the requirements of the recruiting process. To ensure a stable employment for their offspring, it is then deemed necessary to aim for a high-ranking university as educational credentials is the one key factor for recruiters. The respondent from the previous excerpt then continues his narration by underlining what he

perceived to be his mother's – his only parent – expectations for his future.

> Oh, I couldn't really figure out what she wanted me to do. Ok, I guess getting to a good university for prestige and something like that, because of the name of the university, which, you know, in Japan… You know, if you graduated from famous universities, then that's the sort of privilege. And if you didn't, then in the job-hunting rail they will tell you, oh, you're not from that university and that… you have no chance anymore (T. S., Japanese, M, 25yo).

In accordance with these academic-oriented expectations for native respondents to enroll and graduate in highly ranked universities, Japanese youths reported being subjected to a certain degree of pressure by their parents to perform well in senior high school. This academically push can be such a strain that, at times, it caused tension between children and their parents.

> And then since I moved to high school, I kind of hit the problem. So... Like, since I was really good at study in junior high, I decided to go to a high-rank high school and then from that time I experienced like being worse at studying and that just make me feel disappointed about myself […] And then I sometimes ask my parents for help, but it didn't work very well. So that was the time when my relationship between me and my parents started to be different... study changed it (R. O., Japanese, F, 22yo).

Concerning the foreign respondents, answers were fairly homogenous across the three groups. Chinese respondents resulted the closest to the control group in terms of school expectations and career. As previously mentioned, the reports from Chinese respondents confirm the literature findings (Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Haller and Portes 2019), namely that high school expectations quite accurately predict subsequent educational success. Moreover, compared to Japanese parents, Chinese parents proved to be even more demanding about their children school performance and academic expectations (as confirmed by

Zhang et al. 2022). This did not only transpire when comparing the answers from native Japanese and Chinese respondents: Chinese interviewees also openly addressed this comparison when recalling their own past experience. In their eyes, Japanese parents were far too lenient and permissive to their children compared to the very strict and burdensome Chinese parents. It is upon these differences that Chinese respondents reflected on their own parents' discipline.

> I've constantly felt pressure from my parents. My parents wouldn't like buying toys, like for birthdays and for New Year but they would usually buy school supplies, like book and pencils. And so, yeah [chuckles] they were very academically inclined, and they really wanted us to study hard and maybe become doctors, be respected professionals, you know […] So, to us they were very strict. I guess I thought that when I visited... ehm, very few Japanese friends. Yeah. I was very shocked to see that no one checked that they did their homework, if she had homework or if she did her homework. And she was just staying very late in the evening and not calling her parents and yeah, she did not care if she did not get hundred percent in every test, yeah. It was surprising... And she had all the latest toys also, and I was like, oh, that's interesting that she has all the latest toys. And I sort of...Was very puzzled because my parents always used to give us rewards for good marks... But what did you do to earn this? (K. H., Chinese, F, 29yo, G2).

In some cases, such high expectations on immigrant-origin youths (especially when coming from parents) had undesired consequences. The literature has argued how the parents' high educational expectations for their offspring risk to result in parent-child differences and conflict (Agliata, Renk 2008; Wang, Benner 2014). Such conflicts escalate when children, going into adolescence, refine their understanding of their surroundings and start to perceive their selves and futures based not only on information from their families but also from their peers, teachers, and the larger society (Nurmi 2013). Ongoing parental pressure on Chinese respondents appears to be one of the main sources

of intergenerational conflict, which is the highest compared to the other two groups of foreign respondents, although close to that of native Japanese respondents.

> The Chinese society is heavily based on educational credentials, so, for example, it is unconceivable not to take the entry examination to university for an excuse such as falling in love…My mother, too, had the same way of thinking as other Chinese parents. And as I was told way too may times [to go for a university degree] I rebelled. As a consequence, I went against of what I was being told and I ended up not studying at all. I acted the exact opposite of what my mother told me to, although just for a bit (R. I., Chinese, F, 21yo, G2).

Eventually, R. I. decided to enroll in a vocational college (*senmongakkou*) and after a year she transferred to a 4-year university program.

Among the three groups of foreign respondents, Korean respondents who attended a Japanese school track demonstrated the most similarities to the control group in terms of academic and eventual occupational destinies. Korean respondents who attended an ethnic school also converged to the profile of native Japanese students with regard their progression to tertiary education and access to the job market. The expectations of Korean interviewees for their own educational and occupational future are fairly similar to those of Japanese respondents. They recalled no particular ambitions, but a sort of complaisance to a path that had already been forged for them. The only distinction was that Korean parents tended to be more lenient towards their offspring compared to their Chinese counterparts.

> I don't think I talked a lot with my parents about what I should have been doing in the future. I had the feeling that whatever I would choose, they would be fine with that. Why is that…? They never really told me anything as I believe they trusted me and respected my decisions (S. A., Korean, M, 32yo, G3).

Finally, out of the four groups analyzed, Brazilian respondents presented the most different profile. First of all, contrary to the other groups, Brazilian youths less-often aimed for a prestigious tertiary educational institute and at times did not envisage any progression to university at all. As is presented in more detail in the following section, Brazilian respondents showed the lowest academic and occupational attainment across all groups, underlining once again the importance of expectations when predicting later academic and occupational destinies. Among Brazilian interviewees' who strove to attain a graduate diploma, there were some cases where college or university was functional to strive for more than what their parents could attain. In fact, many Brazilian respondents' parents and peers – including some respondents themselves – were employed as factory workers, which (although remunerative) is a tiring and unrewarding position. This pattern manifested particular in families where parents were employed in low-level or blue-collar occupations, although not necessarily where parents hold a low cultural capital.

Before graduating from high school? Yeah, right. To be honest, I had no plans. I wanted to go to university partly because I didn't want to go to factory work (G. K., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G2).

According to the accounts of the Brazilian youths, their parents demonstrated the lowest expectations in terms of school performance for their offspring compared to the other groups' counterparts. Almost no Brazilian respondents recounted being pressured by their parents to study more or to get better marks on tests. This was especially true for Brazilian youths who attended a Japanese school: parents hardly engaged in their children's school activities (such as checking homework or help them studying the language, mainly due to the parents' linguistic deficiencies). Quite predictably then, Brazilian interviewees also reported the lowest school engagement, such as not aiming for better marks or giving importance to homework and school-related activities.

I wasn't the A-plus student... The day before a test, I would never sit down in my room and study like crazy. I never did the kind of thing. You know, I would just try to rectify things. I got in the classroom and applied myself to do the test, which ended up like in a good sometimes and sometimes not so good. But yeah, I never... I never had bad grades, but they were not the best. […] My mom would ask me, don't you just have a test tomorrow? And then my dad would come at me like, you prepared, right? And that was it. I could sit down and study a bit more to get better grades, but I would still have an OK grade. And my parents were fine with that (A. K., Brazilian, M, 27yo, G1.5).

As Mantovani et al. (2018) argue, low parental expectations are found especially where parents present low levels of cultural capital. Nevertheless, in the present study, there was hardly any correspondence between parental educational expectation and their educational level. Among youths who reported to being pressured by their parents to perform better in school or pushed and supported to progress to tertiary education (while a minority), there are those whose parents attained a rather low educational degree, such as middle or high school diploma. Vice versa, among youths whose parents had a higher cultural capital (who thus had graduated from university), there were those who reported to have received only limited encouragement to perform better or continue their education path after senior high school. This leads to the consideration that other elements, rather than socioeconomic standing, impact the formation of immigrant-origin youths' educational ambitions and expectations.

6.4. *Living up to expectations: Progression to tertiary education and occupational possibilities*

Having presented the expectations for the future in academic and occupational terms of the respondents and their parents, it is therefore necessary to assess whether interviewees have lived up to these expectations.

Chinese and Korean respondents' educational and occupational mobility are overall pretty similar to that of the native Japanese group. Although they reported to have higher or lower academic drives, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean interviewees all showed the same trajectories following graduation from junior high school. This mainstream educational progression entails to strive, whenever possible, for a highly ranked senior high school to ensure access to a four-year university program (as opposed to a two-year course, which is deemed less prestigious, especially in light of future employment possibilities). Graduating from a four-year university program, in turn, guarantees high rates of success in employment within well-known and established companies with permanent contracts. Moreover, Chinese and Korean interviewees who attended an ethnic school have shown not to be led astray from this mainstream path. For the cases of Chinese respondents who attended a Chinese school, they did so only up to junior high school, at which point they had to progress to a Japanese senior high school. In this way, they joined their Japanese peers on the main educational track, therefore having the opportunity to learn the language and the same means to compete in university access. Regarding Korean respondents who attended a Korean ethnic school, they did so up to senior high school, and it was only when accessing college and university did they finally enter the Japanese academic and social environment. However, considering that most of them are third-generation Korean immigrants, they reported a familial environment where the language used was Japanese, where parents were mostly informed about the mechanism of the Japanese education system and society, and therefore who are not 'alien' to the Japanese milieu.

The same academic and occupational mobility is assessed among Brazilian respondents who attended a Japanese school. Despite the initial distress of passing from the Brazilian familial background to the linguistically and culturally different Japanese environment, the profile of Brazilian respondents who attended the Japanese educational track broadly converged to that of Japanese respondents. In reality, Brazilian respondents proved to be the richest in linguistic adaptation, as most of them are fluent in three languages: including Japanese, Portuguese and English.

Finally, quite a different academic and occupational destiny is revealed for Brazilian respondents who attended an ethnic school. Among them, there are youths who did not access tertiary education and, after obtaining their senior high school diploma, looked for employment directly, usually a factory job found through their social connections. Reasons given for not continuing their education to college or university ranged from their lack of Japanese language proficiency to difficult financial situations. The latter, together with the fact that often Brazilian respondents reported having a large part of their family still living in Brazil, meant that many respondents planned to go to Brazil to attend university with more contained fees compared to the Japanese markets.

> R: And I could have gone to college here [in Japan], but my mother had other plans of getting pregnant and stuff so she couldn't help me here. So, it was easier for me to go there [to Brazil]. And I did. And it didn't... Come out right [chuckles] everything went down. I didn't finish college and I came back [to Japan].

> I: College in Japan was not an option?

> R: No... I mean, there was one option, but it was like the same school that [respondent's Brazilian fellow] went. And that was like a language school in Kyoto[12]. And but, yeah, it was it was expensive. And my mother and she had plans to get pregnant again and within with our financial situation, she can't help me here. And I was like, not happy as I was working at the factory at the time. When I finished high school, I started working in to raise money to study and but it wasn't enough, and I just couldn't handle it anymore. I couldn't wait till she got pregnant and see if it works or not (A. D., Brazilian, M, 21, G1.5).

For those who instead decided to progress to tertiary education, respondents did not opt for a four-year university program but rather a two-year college. Only one of the respondents had the chance to transfer from the two-year col-

---

[12]   Namely, a two-year college.

lege to a mainstream four-year university program. Access to these two-year colleges, however, in most cases took place in an unusual way. Instead of taking an entry examination or simply paying the entry fee (as a matter of fact, two-year colleges are private institutes), Brazilian schools stipulated a deal to send their young senior high school graduates for a favorable price.

> So, after I because I graduated high school and then I had a really nice opportunity to start university already, and there was a university that wanted more international students, so they made an offer to our Brazilian school. If you send X number of students from your university, from your school to any city, we're going to give you a big discount. (G. K., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G2).

In this way, students graduating from a Brazilian ethnic schools end up being channeled, once again, to a different academic track to their native Japanese peers. However, this path has two different outcomes. Firstly, considering that most of these two-year colleges offered an entire curriculum taught in English, designed specifically for non-Japanese speakers, enrolling in such a school meant further postponing these Brazilian respondents' engagement with a Japanese-speaking environment. Secondly, two-year colleges do not have a specific job-hunting (*shūkatsu*) period within their curriculum, as is seen in mainstream four-year universities programs. Therefore, these youths are once again excluded from a process that would have otherwise offered them further means to access certain sectors of the job market.

6.5. *School environment and peers*

Besides their own home and family, school represents the setting where children and youths spend most of their daily lives. Within the school environment, their relationships with peers play a fundamental role in shaping children's selves, behaviors, and future ambitions and motivations (Nurmi 2013). Such aspects are even more critical for immigrants' children, for whom school

embodies the first chance to learn more about their receiving context. In this way, peers, together with the scholastic institution, become central agents of socialization (Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Liebkind et al. 2004; Mantovani 2008).

Nevertheless, the existence of ethnic schools in Japan appears to limit socialization within the receiving context. In fact, the risk for youths who would only attend an ethnic school is to be excluded from the chance to socialize with their native peers, who do not have access to ethnic schools. Attending school daily and then having the possibility to spend afternoons on club activities, again within the school context, would inevitably exclude ethnic school students from building robust relationships with peers outside that context.

> Are you asking me if I had also Japanese friends when I was attending the Korean ethnic school? At that time, there were none. Maybe there were some [Japanese] children living in the neighborhood, but beside from them I had not even a Japanese acquaintance. Uhm, now that you make me think about this, I really had no other relationship besides that of the little community of the school (S. A., Korean, M, 32yo, G3).

As a result, immigrants' offspring attending an ethnic school up to senior high school life will live in an "ethnic bubble", and it is only later in their adolescence that they start connecting with the larger Japanese society with, as illustrated in the next section, evident consequences for linguistic adaptation.

At any rate, for the rest of youths within the mainstream Japanese education system, socialization in school remains an important element influencing their integration in the country of destination. When shedding light on alternative paths of assimilation, Portes and Rumabut (2001) underline how the receiving social context impacts immigrants' children formation of the selves. In particular, they point out that immigrant-origin youths might risk showing signs of what the authors refer to adversarial outlook or deviant behavior when accessing the US school environment. By associating with US students, immigrants' children also showed signs of drop-out from school, joining youth gangs, or falling into the drug subculture (also, Rumbaut 1997). Portes and

161

Rumbaut (2001) label this alternative path as a form of downward assimilation, underlining how important the social context and school climate of reception is for foreign children integration outcomes.

Therefore, it is strategic to look at the school environment starting from the perspective of Japanese students themselves. When looking at results of PISA 2018, Japan stood out as having one of the most disciplined school climates among the countries included in the study. On par with South Korea and China, 15-year-old Japanese students stated (among other things) that there is hardly ever any disorder or noise in class or situations where students do not listen to the teacher. On the contrary, Western countries from which this study draws in terms of literature and points of comparison show to be characterized by a more spirited school climate. The United States and European countries with solid immigration histories (such as France, Germany, and Italy) show the highest rates of students reporting disruptive behavior during classes (PISA 2018). Thereby, the Japanese educational environment seems to be less prone to show a social context offering paths of deviant lifestyle that immigrants' children can associate to and embrace.

Overall, the group of Japanese respondents has reported living through a calm school environment, with no noteworthy events that might recall forms of adversarial outlooks. Among the respondents, there was only one Japanese boy (23 years old) who got expelled from senior high school as he was caught drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes on the school grounds with fellow schoolmates[13]. However, there was one recurrent topic that emerged throughout the narratives of all Japanese respondents: bullying. This is in apparent contradiction on official findings on the matter presented in Chapter 4 and suggests that bullying is rather an overestimated phenomenon. Nevertheless, either directly or indirectly experienced, no Japanese interviewee failed to mention episodes of bullying that occurred in class or at school. Especially for victims,

---

[13]   In Japan, the age of majority is twenty years of age. The consumption of alcohol and smoking is thus forbidden by the law (besides any other rules the school might implement) for under twenty-year olds.

such as for the following interviewee, bullying was perceived as the *old-school way* of managing school club activities (in this case, water polo), as an expected step, part of the school routine. No particular reasons for such bullying to occur, such as the victim's physical characteristics or otherwise, was offered.

> R: And when I went to junior high school and high school, I was bullied for some time, several times. […] Yes, I was bullied, basically. And it's very like old school way of managing a club. So, the instructor just beat you up and let you bleed or anything.
>
> I: Did you report it?
>
> R: No, because that was normal at that time. Parents… I think they knew [what was happening inside the club]. Because some of the members wanted to leave, but apparently, they go back and, you know, they stay (T. S., Japanese, M, 25yo).

Episodes of bullying were also reported by those foreign respondents who attended Japanese schools. In their case, however, bullying or unwanted attention seemed to be bluntly targeting the person for their status of foreigner. Earlier stages of education appear to be where bullying or open confrontation occurred, compared to later stages of education. Narratives therefore underlined that episodes of bullying mainly took place as early as kindergarten and up to junior high school. Some episodes include experiences of being openly addressed as a foreigner and more precisely with the pejorative abbreviation of *gaijin*, which is short for *gaikokujin* (literally, "foreign person"), and is intentionally used to show contempt.

> Yeah, the kindergarten kids would be like, oh! *Gaijin*, go back to your country! or like, my mum and the teachers say that Chinese people have diseases and something, so sometimes I would get very mean comments (K. H., Chinese, F, 29yo, G2).

Some recurrent strategies to counter bullying behavior emerged in different accounts. The first was to pass as Japanese. For the two Asian groups of respondents this could still be true at the somatic level as physically they are less visible with no distinctive traits that would make them stand out among their Japanese peers. For them to pass as Japanese, two hindering elements were present: the Japanese language proficiency and bearing a non-Japanese sounding name. While the former aspect is addressed in detail in the following paragraph, the latter was a recurrent element for both Chinese and Korean respondents.

> Yeah, kindergarten was pretty hard for me, to make friends it took a long time. And then my parents, they wanted to let me and my younger sister have Japanese names and sort of either of us would pass as Japanese and they thought maybe they would make life easier for us. Yes, and then I think I finally got the anonymity and this comfort of invisibility. I was just one of the kids and not like, oh! This is the foreigner. […] In elementary school then, I also remember the uncomfortable approaching of this other Chinese boy because I sort of like did not want to associate too closely with him and be alone with him, also. I sort of remember this emotion... vividly. But my mom was very close to his mom, and they still call each other, they still keep in touch. Even now, so it's kind of like, I was sort of pretending to be Japanese, still a little insecure about myself and sort of not wanting all the people to discover that my family is not normal... (K. H., Chinese, F, 29yo, G2).

As is narrated, becoming Japanese or passing as Japanese would at times entail not associating with other foreign children in school. Being tied to this other Chinese schoolmate who was clearly marginalized by other peers risked undermining the respondents' membership to the Japanese group with a cascade of undesirable outcomes, among which being the object of bullying. Within the theoretical framework of the canonical assimilation, Gordon (1964) argue that discrimination and prejudice found in the context of reception must subside before immigrants and their descendants can aspire to successfully assimilate. In

this way, for the canonical theory, discrimination perpetrated by the receiving society hinders the assimilation process. However, in the aforementioned dynamics, it appears to be quite the opposite. For the young G2 Chinese student, the fear of being discriminated against pushed her forward in the race to become Japanese (or at least, to pass as one). And at the same time, it made her grow more distant from a fellow Chinese child.

When trying to identify the physical features of an average Brazilian citizen, one would be led astray by picturing a fairly dark-skinned individual with big eyes. Nevertheless, among Brazilian respondents there are some interviewees that have the Asian somatic characteristics and that, at first glance, could not be told apart from a Japanese person. However, for those Brazilian respondents who have more distinctive traits, like different hair color or being taller than average, passing as Japanese proves more challenging.

> So, after graduating from the primary school, as I was afraid of being bullied, I thought that I really needed to become Japanese. Then I started to change my hair, my clothes to be Japanese and my mother always said that it's not good for me but I wanted to be a Japanese because I wanted to be one of them, so... but when I entered junior high school, I was always told by my classmates that I was not Japanese, that I couldn't speak as a Japanese. As I was Brazilian, I would steal things, or if you sit next to me, they are also going to turn into bad people, and stuff like that. (Y. A. U., Brazilian, F, 20yo, G2)

While in most accounts offered by the respondents, there were not grave consequences arising from being bullied, there are some cases, such as the previous excerpt's interviewee, where being bullied resulted in staying at home from school due to psychological distress. After some months spent at home, her parents eventually agreed to enroll her in a Brazilian school, where she eventually adjusted and successfully obtained her senior high school diploma. For Y. A. U., discrimination played a role in the exact way Gordon (1964) theorized. The mistreatment she suffered by her native Japanese peers had the effect of

stopping her path to become a Japanese person, forcing her to retreat into the more welcoming and understanding ethnic school environment.

The second strategy adopted by foreign respondents is to avoid being targets by turning into a good pupil at school. This is the case for the following respondent. Short after K. S., a 3G Korean youth and a native Japanese speaker, entered a Japanese public primary school, she noticed that she was being treated differently from her classmates. At first, other children merely behaved as if moved by genuine curiosity. Soon after, her classmates' interest turned into mockery and derision. They would laugh whenever teachers called out her name, a patently Korean name, and the only reason K. S. could find at the base of other children's (and their parents') scorn was her being a foreigner. Eventually, she noticed that as her scholastic performance improved bullying subsided until disappearing altogether.

> I was bullied for the first year [of elementary school], but after that, fortunately, I liked studying, so the text score was not bad and finally [the bullying] disappeared (K. S., Korean, F, 24yo, G3).

As is argued below, proficiency in English is considered a noteworthy means to acquire confidence and dodge unwanted attention. The interviewee of the next excerpt also found herself bullied for no other reason than being foreign. Although her native language was Korean, she was also highly proficient in Japanese by the time she entered primary school as her mother had decided to enroll her in a Japanese kindergarten. Nevertheless, at first, she experienced being a victim of bullying: she recounts that she would find her indoor school shoes[14] torn apart as a 'joke' perpetrated by her schoolmates or simply being laughed at. D. C. eventually found a way to redeem herself in the eyes of her peers by excelling in her command of English, something that other Japanese

---

[14]   Japanese school regulations, from primary to senior high school, often require school uniforms. Indoor school shoes are part of these uniforms, and students change into

schoolmates could not attain.

> Yeah, I actually told my parents because they noticed that I was a little bit down all the time. They asked me if I want to leave school, but I already knew that, like all of that, like talking the kids do, like even though I moved to the school, they will tell other kids' school about me. So, I told them, like, oh, I'll be fine here. Yeah, but my mom decided to take me to study in the Philippines for six months, to study English. Because... to get away from the school. And I was able to gain confidence in my English. And since I have something that I can be proud of, like when I go back to Japan and kids looked up at me a little bit differently (D. C., Korean, F, 26, G1.75).

On the contrary to Japanese schools, respondents who attended ethnic schools reported almost no bullying episodes when narrating their school days. Two reasons were offered by respondents to explain such a difference. Firstly, ethnic schools host a perceptible smaller figure of students. In metropolitan areas such as Tokyo or Osaka, Japanese schools' classes typically have thirty or forty students, with multiple classes for each grade. However, ethnic schools have only around ten student per class, with only a few classes in total. Moreover, students enrolling in an ethnic school will quite likely stay in the same school for their whole school career, and thus the students will continue living in the same class with the same classmates from primary to senior high school level.

> If [ethnic schools are] compared to the Japanese public school, there are really only few people. Like, in my school there were no more than forty-two students in the same grade, when I was in primary school my grade had even as low as fourteen students in my class. These are really low numbers, right? Therefore, from kindergarten to senior high school I end-

them in the morning when entering the school. When leaving for home in the afternoon, students put the shoes back in their assigned locker, to find them again the morning after.

ed always been together with the same children, the same friends. It almost seemed like a family. Of course, there were children I would get along with and other children I was less friend with… But we have spent really a long time together (R. K. Korean, F, 32yo, G3).

So, because it was like a there are not many students, I mean, like compared to the Japanese school, right? So even Japanese school are like, I don't know, four hundred students, right? But in the Brazilians goes like two hundred students. Yeah, so everyone knew each other, right? So, like right from the start, we were all very close friends with each other, and as we grew up, a lot of people. Back to Brazil, of course, but we never really lost touch with each other, so yeah, when like when they went back to Brazil, they already had like social media, like many kinds of social media. So, we kept in touch via Facebook or Instagram and stuff, right? But inside the school, I think like all of my friends that I had in the elementary school, they are still my friends today (L. I., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G2).

The second element that created this family-like school environment that permeates ethnic schools is the common background these students share. Indeed sharing, or even discovering, the same origin and feeling of belonging to a common destiny further tightened the relationships among ethnic school students.

Well, so, in junior high school I was happy yes because there was some relief same background same experience as students, we had same experience and same background, so there was some relief. And also, I practiced Korean traditional dance and I LOVED it, yes actually, I didn't study hard, I actually practiced dance. So, it was nice (K. S., Korean, F, 24, G3).

But still, like the people are like the background their backgrounds like... Well, everyone, of course, everyone has their own stories, but. They were somehow connected to my story, too (A. K., Brazilian, M, 27yo, G1.5).

Overall, youths attending an ethnic school lived a more accepting and peaceful school environment compared to recipients who attended Japanese schooling. However, for Brazilian respondents in particular, enrolling in an ethnic school eventually comes at a price, as will be shown in the next section: integration into the receiving societal contexts is achieved too late to acquire the necessary skills (especially linguistic) to make it in Japan.

6.6. *Language adaptation*

In the previous sections, it emerged how important language is for the choice of children's school path and impacts their school experience and relation with classmates. More specifically, respondents' narratives have exposed how the need to learn the language of the receiving context or the willingness to retain the parents' language of origin determine immigrants' children school destinies.

Various studies have so far uncovered that a multiplicity of linguistic adaptation types of immigrants' children exists (Portes, Schauffler 1994; Portes, Rumbaut 2001). The adaptation crosses different gradients of nuances, stretching from a foreign monolingual (where the child only speaks the language of the parents' country of origin) to a so-called linguistic assimilation (where the child becomes monolingual by fully transitioning to the language of the context of origin). Between these two poles, it is found that fluent bilingualism is the most desirable outcome, as it has positive effects on family relations and on children's psychological well-being (Portes, Hao 2002). In addition, Portes and Schauffler (1994) argue that, according to their findings based on a US case study, children of immigrants almost universally master the language of destination, they had no preference between that and their parents' language of origin, and that bilingualism is inversely related to the length of permanence in the country.

Among factors influencing linguistic adaptation, international literature points to two main elements. Firstly, international findings indicate a positive

correlation between the length of residency in the destination country and linguistic assimilation (Carliner 2000; Chiswick et al. 2004; Van Tubergen 2010; Altinkamis, Agirdag 2014). To put it differently, the longer the stay in the receiving context, the higher the number of individuals who only speak the language of destination. Secondly, the extent of the exposure to the receiving language is another determinant of linguistic adaptation. Such exposure has been categorized into: language spoken at home with family members; language used at school; and language spoken with peers (Dustmann 1997; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Chiswick et al. 2005; Hwang, Xi 2008). For instance, cases that report speaking the language of the country of origin at home or living in an ethnically concentrated environment, such residential areas densely inhabited by foreign-citizen or foreign-origin individuals, would be negatively affected in their linguistic acquisition process.

In this study, too, different degrees and stages of linguistic adaptation were assessed. Although the qualitative nature of this research does not allow for the establishment of causal relations, it is however possible to assess the dynamics which brought respondents to grow up monolingual, bilingual or even trilingual and the effects that linguistic proficiency produced.

A first pattern of linguistic adaptation found across the sample corresponds to cases of youths who could not speak Japanese at all, or who spoke with limited proficiency. This linguistic adaptation (or better, *non-integration*) was found only in Brazilian respondents and coincides with those who attended a Brazilian ethnic school. This group of youths is here addressed as *ethnic monolingual*.

> I mean, it was always like Brazilian education, because even in Japan, I studied in Brazilian school, so I never went to the Japanese school, so my Japanese like, *ma ma*, it's not so good (M. H., Brazilian, F, 26yo, 2G).

Attending an ethnic school not only means that the whole curriculum is taught in the language of the country upon which the education system is based (in this case, Portuguese), but also that socialization only occurs among children

speaking the same language. As highlighted in the first section of this chapter, this ethnic monolingualism is the result of a form of self-segregation (Alba, Nee 2003) that the Brazilian community, to a certain degree inadvertently, end up implementing. In this way, Brazilian youths grow up in Brazilian families speaking Portuguese and also socialize in Brazilian schools, live in areas densely resided by Brazilian citizens where they can find shopkeepers and doctors whose native language is Portuguese. If not, they receive assistance from relatives or fellow Brazilians to translate in case of necessity.

In the attempt to address this widespread monolingual situation, ethnic schools also usually offer Japanese language classes, but are deemed insufficient by the respondents to build robust competence. When ethnic-school Brazilian interviewees, the unanimous view underscored a still feeble Japanese language curriculum which was far from a real solution.

> Yes. So, they do offer it. Yes, they do offer it. But it's probably not the best course. I'd say yes. Maybe they haven't proven it by a lot right now, but back in my time, it was like three prairie non-sensical because I think we would just learn the same thing over and over again every year. So even if you, you know, like go up a grade because, you know, like from especially because let's say you were like in high school first year and then you went to the second year. So, you'd expect to have like a level up or, you know, like a change of some sort, but that was none of it. So, I think most of the time we just learn like basic *kanji*[15] and then I don't know why, but that was like this, you know, we would always practice *hiragana* and *katakana*[16] over and over again, even though, like we pretty

---

[15]   *Kanji* are the logographic characters originating from the Chinese writing system that constitute the majority of the Japanese written form.

[16]   *Hiragana* and *katakana* are two systems of phonetic syllables, the former assumes mainly a grammatical function in the written language, whereas the latter is used for transliteration of foreign words into Japanese phonemes. In the first approach for the Japanese language learning, *hiragana* and *katakana* are always taught first. Hiragana in particular is essential especially for a non-Japanese speaker who have no command of *kanji*.

much all of us, I'd say, can at least do that much (D. Y., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G1.5).

For these youths who attended an ethnic school and lived their lives within the ethnic social circle, graduation from senior high school marks the needs to step out of this safe zone either for work or to proceed to tertiary education. In fact, in Japan there is only one "ethnic university": the Korean University based in Tokyo, which is attended by many Korean ethnic school graduates and offers a curriculum taught in Korean. Therefore, the majority of ethnic-school students risk only being fully exposed to the Japanese language at around eighteen years old, when they graduate from senior high school. As the linguist Eric H. Lennerberg (1967) pointed out, waiting to learn a new language by the time of senior high school is already deemed too late. This is years after a child's brain has passed its best moment for language learning, to internalize new phonemes and process them through proper language acquisition. The next excerpt belongs to a Brazilian respondent who attended a Brazilian school for her entire school career. College was therefore the first moment she had to get in contact with other Japanese-speaking peers. Classes were taught mainly in English, and she managed to maintain many of her previous Brazilian friends, so that she really never full immersed in Japanese. It was only when she experienced work that she was forced to face the necessity to learn and speak Japanese as a very last resort.

I graduated high school. I didn't really know how to speak Japanese because I had been sheltered for, like just very tight-knit Brazilian community in Japan. And I grew up surrounded by Brazilians, so I never really had the exposure to Japanese culture. […] But after school, the only time that it really studied Japanese was in college. So, I went to college and we were in the same group, so we never really made new friends outside of the group we already had. So, it was very hard for me to learn Japanese in the college setting, right? So, after I got into the Japanese company, that was a whole another story. So that's where I was forced. Yeah, I was forced to like, learn Japanese, right, because they were all Japanese. And

172

if I wanted to communicate, I needed to speak Japanese and nobody there [speak English] … there was no way out. No English. There is no way out (L. I., Brazilian, F, 24yo, G2).

Studies have also shown that the language spoken at home within the familial home affects immigrants' children linguistic adaptation, as one of the afore-mentioned elements of linguistic exposure (Portes, Rumbaut 2001). Studies based in the United States focus on immigrants' children who attend American schools and thus who study in English. For such cases, immigrant youths have higher chances of being bilingual if at least one parent speaks his or her language of origin at home. However, the Japanese scenario is more fragmented compared to the North American one, where children are also immersed in their parents' language of origin in the school environment. In fact, the common thread among Brazilian respondents who do not master Japanese is the fact that they also speak Portuguese at home with their families. Therefore, these youths do not have the chance to engage with a Japanese speaker either at home or at school. This, however, does not mean that everyone in the family does not speak Japanese. There are cases where it is exactly because one of the parents or guardians speaks Japanese that all the necessities to be addressed in the language are taken care by the Japanese-speaking family member. This then becomes an excuse not to pursue the Japanese-language learning. When J. U., a Brazilian respondent was asked about her mother (the only cohabitant member of the family) whether she could speak Japanese, she answered:

Yes, she does, because she's been living here for a long time. So that's probably why I'm always so comfortable. You know, if I actually had to learn Japanese, maybe I would be more, you know, like actually studying stuff like that. But since I have her, every time I need something, I'm like, Mom, can you translate something for me? Can you talk to the guy for me? (J. U., Brazilian, F, 25yo, G2).

173

This non-Japanese speaking group of respondents however cannot be referred to as monolingual. In fact, all these Brazilian interviewees were actually fluent bilingual as, besides Portuguese, they were all fluent in English[17]. Reasons given to the fact that learning English as a second language was preferable to learning Japanese include: the family future migratory plan to return to Brazil; the fact that ethnic schools Japanese language education is scarce and more room was given to learn English; and lastly, that Portuguese and English are more similar than Portuguese and Japanese, making it harder to be able to master the latter.

> So, in the Brazilian culture, English is seen as crucial. If you want to work and it's closer, the grammar is pretty similar. […] Yeah, so we don't need to learn everything from scratch. It's easier. And if you compare how much you can use English compared to the Japanese, for example, even though we're here, we had the mindset that we're not going to stay here. As I said, our parents imagined that we would stay here for five years, then go back to Brazil and we will be closer to the United States, maybe go to Europe. So, these languages were, in their minds, more useful and also at the at the school, they would think it was going to be more useful in the future to study English. So, we had those two advantages. It's close to Portuguese, and it's going to be more useful in the future. And since we're in Japan, you're going to use Japanese. So, you need to learn this. But it was on the third in the list of priorities to learn in terms of languages. And also, we didn't have the Japanese teachers who were trained to teach foreign students (G. K., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G2).

A second pattern of linguistic adaptation that emerged in the sample was that of fluent *bilingualism* and even *trilingualism* (in cases where respondents

[17] The recurrent English language proficiency found in the sample might also be traced back to the research design. The researcher could only speak Japanese and English and therefore could only invite interviewees proficient at least in one of the two languages. This fact has excluded any Portuguese (but also Chinese and Korean) monolingual respondents from the sample.

also demonstrated English language proficiency). The most representative group of such adaptation was found in the group of Chinese respondents, although cases were also found among Brazilian and second-generation Korean respondents. Although among bilingual and trilingual respondents there are youths who attended an ethnic school, most attended a Japanese school track. Coherently with findings of the state-of-the-art (Portes, Schauffler 1994; Portes, Rumbaut 2001; Portes, Hao 2002), respondents exhibiting bilingualism have been or are currently exposed to both languages. For those who attended an ethnic school, the language at home would usually be Japanese with at times parents who had little or no proficiency in their language of origin. This was particularly the case among third-generation Korean respondents, whose parents were not able to preserve their Korean or (as transpires from the next excerpt), as the language of origin was not spoken at home, the parents' linguistic proficiency is unknown.

> So, actually my mother... she can listen to Korean, but it's difficult for her to speak Korean. That's my mother. And about my father... yeah, he had spent ten years of his life in South Korea, so maybe he can speak (K. S., Korean, F, 24yo, 3G).

Those respondents who attended a Japanese school and still show signs of fluent bilingualism also affirm the use of the parents' language of origin at home. In some cases, in particular with Chinese respondents, parents actively and personally made sure that their child learnt the dominant language while retaining their language of origin.

> At first, I studied Japanese at home. My mother, with the books she also used to study with, my mother would teach me Japanese. My father, he always told me, you must absolutely speak Chinese, and so with my father I would always speak Chinese, not to forget (Y. H., Chinese, F, 32yo, G2).

However, other respondents became bilingual due to the fact that at home parents could not speak Japanese. Attending a Japanese school and speaking their parents' language at home also appears to be a recipe for preserving both languages.

> Yeah, Portuguese was my first language, 'cause my mum… she didn't speak Japanese... and she doesn't yet [laughs] (A. A., Brazilian, F, 26yo, G2).

A third and last pattern of language adaptation is *Japanese monolingualism* shown by respondents there were fully linguistically assimilated. Representing the minority of the sample, respondents who could not speak their parents' (or grandparents', in case of G3 Koreans) language of origin were mainly found among G3 Koreans who had attended a Japanese public school. Among these, there are also cases of full monolingual (meaning that they were also not fluent in English), making them the closest to the Japanese group of control linguistically.

The following figure (6.1) summarizes the so-far delineated linguistic adaptation patterns[18], combining them with the two broad sets of educational paths (mainstream Japanese and ethnic-school) presented in section 6.1. This elaboration provides further understanding of educational and occupational destinies that characterized youths at the times of the interview.

[18]   In regard to language proficiency, the command of English has not been included, as not regarded as a competence proper of the Japanese societal core. Furthermore, considering English proficiency would have constituted a bias since, due to the research design needing to include Japanese- and English-speaking respondents, their presence would have been overrepresented.

Fig. 6.1.

Integration modalities of immigrants' youths in Japan, based on patterns of linguistic adaptation and expectations.

Linguistic adaptation

		Ethnic monolingualism	Bilingual	Japanese monolingualism
Educational path	Mainstream	*none*	**B** Selective acculturation (fully bilingual)	**D** Assimilation
	Ethnic	**A** Downward exclusion	**C** Selective acculturation (limited bilingual)	*none*

A total of four integration modalities (A to D) were identified:

- A: *Downward exclusion*. The intersection between ethnic monolingualism and ethnic educational path includes youths who attended an ethnic school and could not speak Japanese, but only their language of origin. This entails that, even after completing their schooling, they did not have either the chance or willingness to learn the language of their country of residence. This group only includes Brazilian respondents. Among them, some graduated from senior high school and went straight into the labor market (just one case only attained a junior high school diploma) and are now employed as factory workers or in part-time occupations related to the Brazilian community (such as working in a Brazilian nursery). Others graduated from a two-year program university and are now employed in part-time occupations or with short-term contracts.

  This integration modality might resemble the *downward assimilation* as envisaged by the segmented assimilation theorists, namely indicating

the integration into the lower strata of the receiving society. However, while this group is characterized by a low socioeconomic standing (thereby the term downward is appropriate), they do not assimilate into Japanese society but are rather perpetually excluded from it.

- B and C: *Selective acculturation*. These two groups are characterized by an upward mobility and socioeconomic assimilation into the Japanese core but preserve one's own ethnic traits, among which proficiency of parents' language of origin. On the one hand, the group with integration modality B corresponds to youths who attended the mainstream Japanese school path and are thus fully fluent in Japanese but who still retain their command of their parents' language of origin. This group mainly includes Chinese and some Brazilian youths. All of them are then characterized by the same progression to tertiary education, as they all completed (or were enrolled in at the moment of the interview) a four-year university program and the same occupational level (permanent employment). On the other hand, group C includes respondents who attended an ethnic school and have managed to adapt into bilinguals. They are characterized by the same cultural capital and socioeconomic standing of group B. However, this modality includes both Brazilian and Korean youths, although these two foreign groups reported to becoming bilinguals in two different ways. Brazilian youths attending a Brazilian ethnic school have had the chance to acquire the Japanese language only at a later stage of their adolescence: after high school when accessing college. On the contrary, Korean respondents who attended a Korean school were all G3, thus at first and within their familial milieu their mother tongue was Japanese. They acquired the Korean language only after accessing primary school but continued to use Japanese at home. This is why, both Brazilian and Korean individuals in group C result as limited bilinguals (their limited proficiency is to be found respectively in Japanese and Korean language).

- D: *Assimilation*. This last group includes respondents who attended the Japanese schooling and are fully fluent in Japanese, although they have

178

no command of their parents' language of origin. This group is characterized by high level of cultural capital and high socioeconomic standing, on par with the native Japanese group of control. This group comprises mainly G3 Korean youths, one Chinese respondent and one Brazilian respondent. The strong concentration of G3 respondents in this integration modality corroborates the intergenerational pace of the canonical assimilation theory, depending on which each new generation represents a step closer to the more complete assimilation (Lieberson 1973).

Lastly, two intersections found no correspondence with any of the interviewed participants. Unsurprisingly, no youths were found to be either an ethnic monolingual and having attended a Japanese school path or fully Japanese monolingual while going through an ethnic school career.

6.7. *What if…? Concluding reflections on past school experiences*

A last set of questions asked during interviews investigated respondents' closing opinion about their school experience. Firstly, interviewees were asked whether they believed that if they had attended a different school, their present life would be different. More particularly, respondents who attended an ethnic school were asked if they think whether attending a Japanese school would have changed their present lives and *vice versa*. Secondly, respondents were asked whether they would send their children (or their hypothetical offspring) to a Japanese or an ethnic school. This question was formulated with the aim to further stimulate and thus investigate respondents' perceptions on the outcomes produced by attending the ethnic school track.

A first pattern of answers was centered around the language acquisition topic, especially coming from those respondents who, as illustrated in the previous paragraph focusing on language, do not have any command of Japanese. Their accounts report that attending a Japanese school would have been a good chance to master the dominant language.

I don't regret going to the Brazilian school. I definitely kind of like wish that I got… I wish I've got more opportunities to actually be in touch and use Japanese more often and learn Japanese more often. Because, you know, after you graduate university and you start working, it's, you know, you have to use Japanese in a very, very, you know, different level than you were using it when we were a student, obviously. But. And in that sense, I say that I like to have had more chances to study more Japanese intensively, I guess (D. Y., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G1.5).

As is revealed from the excerpt, the language adaptation argument is then often associated with the possibilities within the occupational sphere. As was underlined in the previous section on language, youths attending an ethnic school and who speak their parents' language of origin at home have little opportunity to socialize with Japanese speakers. Engagement with the Japanese-speaking environment only happens at a later stage of their lives, after senior high school graduation or directly when accessing the job market. Therefore, it is quite recurrent to find the association linking the Japanese language proficiency with the lack of occupational possibilities in respondents' narrative. The following brief excerpts reports the account of a Brazilian respondent who, at the time of the interview, worked in a factory.

Oh, yes, it would [be different]. But I'm not sure if it would be hundred percent... But like, I don't know if it would be better, you know? I mean, it would be good because I would be fluent in the language. So, I could, you know, work like do another job or something like that (J. U., Brazilian, F, 25yo, G2).

At the same time, while recognizing that attending a Japanese school would have safer Japanese language acquisition, some respondents have also emphasized the value of (Brazilian) ethnic school in teaching English. At the time of the interview, R. P. worked as an English language teacher in a private language school for children and adults.

I do feel happy that I went to the Brazilian school in Japan, but the trade-offs with the trade-offs that I got from attending it, I think it's I think it gave me a lot of opportunities. First of all, because I went to the Brazilian school, I think it was easier for me to learn English and language. Yes. On the other hand, if I got to, you know, like enroll in the Japanese-Japanese school, probably my Japanese would be better than that in now-adays, but I wouldn't probably speak as good of an English as I can right now. So, yes, but I think in general, I am happy with the results (R. P., Brazilian, M, 24yo, G1.5).

At the same time, respondents who attended a Japanese school who were asked how they would see their life if they had attended an ethnic school, also stressed the linguistic aspect. For them, learning both the Japanese language and the Japanese way of life holds a greater weight than being able to retain parents' linguistic and cultural background.

I didn't know that the option [of attending a Korean ethnic school] was there. Yeah. But even though I could, I think I was glad I went to the Japanese school because it's better for me to learn more of the Japanese way, of how things are done, than just like speaking Korean, even though you're in Japan (D. C., Korean, F, 26yo, G1.75).

However, contrary to the preceding excerpt, third-generation Koreans consider themselves happy to have attended the Korean ethnic school and to have been able to draw closer to their ancestral culture. This seemingly echoes Rambaut's boomerang effect or Hansen's (1938) words, "What the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember" (p. 9).

I might be saying something weird but if I have children, I don't think I would send them to (North) Korean ethnic schools as I don't like the af-filiation to North Korea… But I don't think there is a single part of me who's not happy I have attended a Korean school. Well, it is thanks to the

181

Korean school that I can speak the language and that I can understand the culture of Korea properly. Although it was just for a little, I also used to have some prejudice against foreigners, however by living as a *zainichi* Korean in Japan I got over it, so I think it's good in that sense. I don't know if my life would have been better than it is now if I had been accustomed to Japanese school or Japanese society from an early age, but I think it would have been a very boring life (S. A., Korean, M, 32yo, G3).

One final pattern was identified in accounts that show some critiques towards the Japanese educational system. In particular, respondents openly criticized that the Japanese education does not stimulate students to formulate their own ideas and to stand up for them. They underline their lack of critical thinking and the generalized acceptance of Japanese people towards peer pressure. As the young Brazilian respondent was asked whether she wished for her child to enroll in a Japanese school like she had, her answer left no doubt.

No! Ah, because of the education thing. From my opinion, really, from my opinion, in the Japanese elementary school, from elementary school to university maybe, if the teacher is Japanese most of the time you know they all just... they are the ones who talk the whole time and write on the board and the kids they are just listening and copying whatever is written in the board. They don't really create, the kids, don't really create the sense of criticism, and also, they don't make the kids go and do research on a subject and come back you know to argue and discuss about subject, whatever subject it is, History, or anything. But I started doing that in university thanks to my foreign professors (A. A., Brazilian, F, 26yo, G2).

Like the interviewee from the last excerpt, many of those respondents (although not representing a majority of the recipients in the project) who criticized the Japanese educational system were also openly in contrast with Japanese societal customs and norms, depicting a country where they could not fit in. Although this point deserves its own argument and space, many among them declared that they were ready to leave Japan, either in a short term or for

good. A. A., already has. At the time this chapter was written (almost two years after the interview was conducted) she left for the US with her North American husband, where they currently live, showing no sign of willingness to go back to Japan.

CHAPTER 7

BUILDING A TYPOLOGY OF IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN YOUTHS

7.1. *At the crossroad of personal ambitions and parental expectations*

This seventh and last chapter embodies the analytical core of the inter-
views which is presented by identifying recurring profiles of immigrant-origin
youths in Japan according to their collected accounts. Defining a *typology* is a
widely used sociological tool within the realm of qualitative methodological
research. It aims to order and make intelligible the otherwise chaotic human
sphere by simplifying its reality along with given criteria. As such, building a
typology does not represent the final stage of a study nor it aspires to be repre-
sentative of the whole researched object. It rather provides a means to investi-
gate the studied dimensions and articulate a final argument supported by em-
pirical data.

The selection of two dimensions, namely two variables, have allowed the
introduction of four profiles, also referred to as *types*. These two variables con-
sist of 1) the retrospective educational and academic aspirations of interview-
ees and 2) the degree of support that youths received from their family mem-
bers to pursue their educational and academic career.

The first variable considers students' ambitions regarding their educa-
tional careers. This area was explored retrospectively, therefore respondents
were asked what their ambitions were at the time they were junior and high
school students. It is here deemed essential to explore ambitions already from
junior high schools for two main reasons: firstly, it has been expansively illus-
trated in Chapter four how the Japanese education system is characterized by
an early selectivity, with students making already pivotal decisions on their ed-
ucational career as early as junior high school, in some of the most extreme

cases even in elementary school. Secondly, not all interviewed respondents progressed to tertiary education, and having explored ambitions in earlier years allows to include them in the typology and understand under what factors and conditions they choose not to continue with their educational paths. Youths' ambitions are discerned into *instrumental* and *attitudinally*-oriented motivations. The former concerns school and university-related choice functional to the extent a given educational credential is spendable in the occupational market. The latter refers to school and university ambitions based on the respondents' skills and competences and their preferable discipline and field of study.

The second variable refers to support and motivation that family members, as well as close figures such as teachers, offer to youths educational decision-making process. Such support is concretized in motivating and supporting children and students to carry on with their educational path, thus to progress to senior high school but most importantly to tertiary education, either to a four-year university program or a two-year college program, or technical college, etc. This variable has been discerned into two sub-variables, by identifying whether respondents reported there to be such forms or support or not (respectively "Yes" and "No" in Table 7.1).

Tab. 7.1   *Typology of youths of immigrant origin discerned in four types, by the identification of two selected variables.*

		Educational and academic aspirations	
		instrumental	Attitudinal
Familial	Yes	Guided	Supported
support	No	Going-with-the-flow	Independent

For the selection of this second variable, it has been decided not to include in its arena familial support of the economic type. If financial support

was to be included in the variable construction, there would be no discernment among the 61 analyzed cases. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, as underlined in Chapter four, the Japanese shadow education, that is attending cram schools or *juku*, strongly permeates the daily life of a multitude of students. Throughout the interviewed youths only a few cases, especially among the Brazilian, never attended any cram schools, whereas most of Japanese, Chinese and Korean respondents reported, at some stage of their educational path, to have enrolled in *juku*. Japanese cram schools are a very profitable privately-led market entailing that it is only with the economic support of students' families that they can attend after-school courses. Secondly, it is to be considered that ethnic schools, are private too, with only a few Korean schools receiving national subsidies. Therefore, in this matter too it is not possible to regard immigrant-origin students attending an ethnic school not receiving parents' economic support. That is why, in a way or another, the whole sample, except virtually one case, would have been regarded has receiving parental support is the economic sphere was to be included.

The next four sections present in details the identified four types delineated in Table 7.1.

7.2. *The guided*

The first type obtained by implementing the typology tool is the *guided* one. The guided youths are those respondents who reported to have received familial support (or tutors' or teachers' support) in the decision-making progress concerning their educational and/or academic path and who based their educational and academic ambitions functionally on whether or not a given degree would be spendable in the occupational market. Table 7.2 lists the respondents who embody this first type by highlighting their main characteristics.

Tab. 7.2   *Main characteristics of the guided type.*

#	Gender	Origin	Generation	Educational degree	Ethnic-school path
2	F	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
3	F	Brazil	2	University (4y)	Mix
7	F	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
10	F	Brazil	2	Senior high school	Mix
16	M	Brazil	2	University (4y)*	No
18	M	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
21	F	Korea	3	University (4y)*	Mix
23	F	Korea	2	University (4y)	No
24	F	Korea	3	University (4y)	No
27	M	Korea	3	University (4y)	Mix
31	F	China	2	University (4y)	No
32	F	China	2	University (4y)	No
33	F	China	2	University (4y)	No
37	F	China	1.5	University (4y)	No
38	F	China	2	University (4y)	No
39	F	China	2	University (4)	No
40	M	China	2	University (4y)	No
41	M	China	2	University (4y)	No
43	M	China	2	University (4y)	No

*Currently attending a four-year university program.

The guided type includes the majority of the immigrant-origin youths and it is quite uniformly constituted by all three foreign-origin groups. However, if one addresses the number of cases relative to each group, it can be noted that 6 out of 19 Brazilian respondents are of the guided type (26.3%), 4 out of 11 for the Korean group (36.4%) and 9 out of 13 for the Chinese groups (69.2%) thus making it characterized by a slightly stronger presence of Asian-origin youths. Considering how ethnic schools have impacted negatively on immigrant-origin respondents, especially for the Brazilian-origin cohort (as illustrated in detail in Chapter 6) Table 7.2 also underscores the kind of school attended (last column), marking it with a "Yes" or "No" if youths respectively attended or not an ethnic school, or with a "Mix" if respondents attended both the ethnic school and Japanese school path (for instance, there are interviewees who attended an ethnic primary school but then moved to a Japanese junior high school, and so on). Nevertheless, having attended a Japanese or an ethnic school does not seem to impact in any way guided youths on the two selected dimensions considered to build the typology.

Regarding the ambition dimension that guided-type, youths reported that they grounded their school and university choices based on how useful a given degree and discipline was in the occupational market. In their accounts, attending a university or even a two-year college is just a means to ensure a job position later on. In particular, studying economics or focusing on a program in hard science are the most commonly valued options.

> It was me who choose to study business and economics at university. I was kind of interested in these subjects… Actually, it would be better to say that I was not particularly interested in them, rather I thought that they would be useful to find a job later on (A. K., Chinese, F, 24yo, G2).

As a result of choosing one's educational path based on mere future gains, it was recurrent for respondents to report that they were not particularly interested nor keen on the area of studies they focused on. At the base of such pragmatic choice, a widespread discourse emerged which relates to the lack of

plans youths had for the future at the time of their junior and senior high school years. When asked, retrospectively, whether in junior or senior high school they carried any ambitions for their future academic or occupational career, one widespread account pointed to the fact that they did not have any clear idea nor preference of what la ahead.

> Back at that time I had no idea what I was doing [chuckles] so, I went to university, not knowing what I was doing, because back at that time you know, I was a foreigner, no... I am still a foreigner, but you know [chuckles] I was just a high school kid, with a foreign nationality, the only way I could think of doing things it was by working in business (Y. L., Chinese, M, 32yo, G2).

Such a sense of dismay about one's future possibilities and even preferences is a discourse that accurately echoed what also emerged from the Japanese-native youths' accounts. As elucidated in the previous chapter, during their senior high school years, Japanese youths often reported not having a clear idea or any aspirations about what to do in their future. Eventually, most of them end up complying with their parents' pressure to apply to a well-known university, generally independently of the field of study, and to find a job in an established and renowned company. As a matter of fact, the Japanese-native respondents mostly belong to the guided type. As the widespread comprehension of the importance of holding a high educational credential, Japanese parents do know how strategic it is for their children to achieve a high educational degree, thus, especially Japanese mothers in their children's accounts appear to invest both financially and timely in their children education. The main consequence of such a drive arising from parents is that Japanese-native youths do not (or rarely so) look for an educational path in which they have a keen interest or in which they are well versed in but rather aim for a degree in an area or discipline which will be later on easily spendable or useable in the occupational market. This dynamic transpires from the following extract, where R. O., a Japanese-native youth with a passion for Music admitted to hav-

ing given up on her ambition to aim for an occupation in the artistic field after confronting her mother's opposition.

> When I was in high school, I didn't have any exact dream for my future job […] I just wanted to keep involving with music. So, I think I wanted to do some job which could include some music […] But, since when I was little, my mom told me I cannot go to, like, Music university because of money, although I know she was afraid for my future career. So, even when I felt, oh, I want to try a musical instrument, always my mom's words would pop in my mind like, that I won't be able to go to Music university, so I maybe… I just gave up that dream (R. O., Japanese, F, 22yo).

Concerning the second dimension, namely the support of push provided by familial members, guided youths tend to be usually pushed by parents who see education, more specifically a university-level degree, as the most critical means to ensure an occupation.

> In China, there is no way you do not attend university. That is, the Chinese society is very much based on degrees and such, it is very highly educated. Let's say, it is not admissible not to take the university entrance examination just because you found your special one. And that's how all Chinese parents think like (R. I., Chinese, F, 21yo, G2).

Other times, parents' support turns out to be less oppressive and more subtle but still accompanies youths in their decisions regarding their future possibilities.

> My parents always said like if you study hard now, you can live easily in the future, so [laughs]. So, I knew that if I study hard and continue with university it will be like... it will be good like... I will benefit from it in the future (S. K., Korean, F, 21yo, G3).

For first-generation parents living in Japan but having experience migrat-

ing to another country, it does not surprise that they also wished for their children to adventure abroad. With the recurrent situation of having a child who feels lost about her next steps, some families pushed their offspring to move and study abroad, making it a very distant ambition compared to that provided by Japanese-native parents to their children.

> Some months after my high school graduation, I didn't really know what to do. I could not really decide on a university, and both my father and my mother wished that I could spend some time abroad. They said that if I stayed in Japan, I could help them out at home. But they didn't wish for that. They wanted me go abroad and experience new things. That's why I started to inform myself and look for a country where I could travel and study (Y. H., Chinese, F, 32yo, G1.5).

Within this type, parents' socioeconomic standing as well as their cultural capital appear not necessarily to be correlated with such forms of support offered to children regarding their educational progression and academic ambitions. In fact, guided youths' parents present pretty diverse levels of social capital and of occupational positioning. Thus, not necessarily a high parental cultural capital is reflected with a strong and firm parental support on whether youths should pursue higher educational degrees. At times, the opposite is also true, that is parents with a lower educational credential (such as junior or senior high school diploma) encourage their children to continue and progress in their education. What emerges is the parents' wish for intergenerational social and economic mobility, namely for their children to attain a better position when compared to their own past and present possibility. That is the case for the following Brazilian youth's account, who reported that parents explicitly saw in education the means for their child not to end up in a blue-collar position.

> Fortunately, they [my parents] always supported me to keep my studies 'cause my dad he went to university and he graduated but my mum she stopped in high school, so she really wanted me to focus on my education to go on, not to end up, they always said that they didn't want to see me

working in the factory like them (P. A. E., Brazilian, F, 23yo, G2).

Nevertheless, few of the guided youths did not receive support from family members but from individuals outside the family but still close to the youths, such as teachers. This fact does not surprise if it is considered that some parents, namely first generations especially among the Brazilian group of respondents, are not proficient in the Japanese language and are not familiar with the Japanese school system nor with its educational possibilities. That is why Brazilian youths who attended a Brazilian school path at times have the chance to receive support, in particular in sense of informative aid, from teachers of the school who are personally interested in the future of their students and guide them through the road of school progression. For instance, A. K., a Brazilian-origin youth who was asked whether what his intentions and ambitions were at the time of high school, reported that without his teacher's support he probably would have not been able to access college and eventually occupy his current working position.

> I didn't know of any Brazilian kid who would attend a Brazilian school here in Japan that went to like higher education in a Japanese institution. Every Brazilian kid from the school where I studied, they either go back to Brazil to study, or they would follow career in Japan like their parents, like in factories or, you know, hard-working stuff. Then I had this teacher, she used to teach Chemistry, but well, she was very good in Japanese so she also taught Japanese in weekends. […] And she mentioned the Japanese college, call *senmongakkou,* the technical college. And she presented me like a list of this colleges, like, why don't you take a look? And then I brought the papers to my parents because, as you know, here in Japan, it's not that cheap, right? And then they were super into it, of course, like, if you want our money to study, you go ahead. Then they gave me all the support for it... You know, without this teacher of mine I couldn't attend the higher education here in Japan (A. K., Brazilian, M, 27yo, G2).

A final remark concerning guided youths is that they all, with a slightly

varying degree, present a medium to high socioeconomic standing. The Asia-origin immigrant youths, at the time of the interview, were either long-term employees in a Japanese company or attending their four-year university program. The Brazilian-origin youths presented a slightly less favorable job position, like part time Japanese-Portuguese translator in school or a full-time receptionist in a hotel. Nevertheless, none of them hold a blue-collar position nor was a factory worker. Overall, the guided-type youths showed to be the best positioned among all four types of youths as identified by the typology, underlying that familial support and the functionally-led ambitions regarding their educational path played a role in ensuring their socioeconomic mobility.

7.3. *The going-with-the-flow*

The second identified type is here addressed as the *going-with-the-flow* youths (hereon addressed to as the flow type, for brevity). These youths, as the previous illustrated type, are characterized by a form of school and academic ambition functional to the expendability of their degree in the occupational market. However, they did not receive any support in such a decision-making process, not from their parents, family members, nor supportive teachers. Table 7.3 lists and presents the flow-type youths. The flow type represents the second most consistent group in the typology, with a patent stronger presence of Brazilian-origin youths. The Latin American more robust presence in this group does not come unexpected, considering what has been presented so far. In fact, the lack of familial support in children's education is expected in situations where parents, like the Brazilian ones, know little about the local education system and hardly master the Japanese language. On the contrary, the smaller figure of Asian-origin youths goes in accordance with the widespread tendency in Asian culture for parents to invest time and energy to ensure successful achievement of their children's studies.

Tab. 7.3   *Main characteristics of the going-with-the-flow type.*

#	Gender	Origin	Generation	Educational degree	Ethnic-school path
1	F	Brazil	2	University (4y)	No
8	F	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
11	F	Brazil	2	Senior high school	Yes
13	M	Brazil	2	University (4y)	No
17	M	Brazil	2	University (4y)	Yes
19	M	Brazil	1.5	University (4y)	Yes
30	M	Korean	3	University (4y)	Yes
34	F	China	2	University (4y)*	No
35	F	China	2	University (4y)	No
36	F	China	1.5	University (4y)	No

*Currently attending a four-year university program.

As for the guided youths, Asian flow-type respondents' academic possibilities hardly appear to have been affected dependently whether they attended or not an ethnic school. The same cannot be argued for the Brazilian youths. In fact, although there is only a limited figure of cases to be explored, only youths who attended a Brazilian ethnic school, such as for cases number 8 and 11, show a lower educational degree. Still, not all Brazilian youths who attended the ethnic school showed a lower cultural capital compared to their peers who attended a mainstream Japanese school path.

The flow youths too, as their guided counterpart, have based their educational ambition functionally on the marketability of a given credential. And

with the previous type they also share the lack of future dreams and of a clear-cut ambition, which most of the time appear to be the main reason behind their functional choice.

> At that time, I didn't really think about my own future, and about what I wanted to do, and when I was in the last year [of senior high school] I started thinking what I wanted to do in the future [chuckles] but actually I really didn't know (S. K., Chinese, F, 22yo, G2).

The Brazilian-origin youths, although sharing this dismay regarding future ambitions and inclinations, see their progression to tertiary education as a means to escape the occupational destiny their peers and parents have ended up being entangled into. Thus, although without an attitudinal ambition regarding their education, the ambition of not falling into a blue-collar occupation is the driver for continuing to university or college.

> To be honest, I had no plans. I wanted to go to university partly because I didn't want to go to factory work. I knew that there were so many opportunities for Brazilian Japanese at that time. There was already a big boom of private universities offering English courses or programs. (G. H., Brazilian, M, 25yo, G2).

> Okay, career wise. Well, there was a thing that, it's not a dream, but that was a thing that I didn't want to become, I didn't definitely want to work like part time in a factory, like my brothers and sisters that are in Japan, and my parents as well. I'm not saying this with the intention of, you know, shaming people who work in factories… but seeing the reality of my parents and how they live here, I definitely didn't want to follow the same path (D. Y., Brazilian, M, 25, G1.5).

Nevertheless, some going-with-the-flow youths did narrate about having personal dreams and ambitions based on their likes, interests and on those areas they felt confident in. In such cases school and university decision implied weighing pros and cons of choosing on rather than another path. But for flow-

type youths such decisions always ended up on opting for the occupationally-wise rational alternative, thus resulting in giving up on ones' passions.

> When I was a high school student, I wanted to be an interpreter or an English teacher. But then I realized, you know, to be an official teacher, like to work for junior high or high schools, being a foreigner is not an advantage. [...] Like, teachers with a permanent job they are considered as civil servants in Japan. To become a civil servant for a person with a foreign nationality is really really difficult, so I realized that the business sector is the only way for me you know, to survive and to find more opportunities. And that's the reason why I decided to study economics, which was a mistake tough [laughs] because I had no idea what I was doing [...] You know, to pursue my passion, my professional passion, that was not the path I should have walked. But anyway, at least thanks to that kind of time, thanks to my education in university at least now I can understand what the newspaper is talking about [laughs] (M. J., Chinese, 28yo, G15.).

The lack of familial support this type exhibits does not generally come with a patent or manifest disinterest or neglect. Rather, youths narrate the tendency for parents to let them children be and passively accept their decisions. When respondents were asked whether their parents hold any particular plan for them or ever pushed them for a given direction, mostly answered that their parents would be happy with anything at all.

> They always said to me, do whatever you wanted to do, just... it could have been fun every day, they didn't really care about it. Even though they wanted me to go to the public school, but I ended up going to the private school, they didn't say anything to me (S. K., Chinese, F, 22yo, G2).

Such an attitude displayed by parents is mostly welcome by the interviewee, who showed to be glad not to be object of forms of oppression.

Never. One thing that's really brilliant about my mother, she never pushed any opinion of herself, she let me to, in other words, she just let me be [laughs] […] That's pretty cool (M. J., Chinese, F, 28yo, G1.5).

Indeed, this parental permissiveness, when deemed positive by youths' accounts, contributed to build serene parents-children and thus intergenerational relationship and served to create a peaceful environment at home.

Nonetheless, there is a minority of youths who regarded their parents' lack of support, and at time evident negligence, on their future educational paths on a negative light. It is the case of a few Brazilian interviewees: as many of other families, these youths' parents planned to stay in Japan only temporarily, the years necessary to amass the right amount of financial resource to live comfortably once back in Brazil. In this way, the first generation never looked further than a few years, let alone work on their children education and plan their future possibility for their lives in Japan. This emerges from the following extract, where the respondent subtly underscored his parents' lack of farsightedness.

My parents always told me, like some time in the future, we're going back to Brazil. So, I didn't really think about my future here in Japan… although I am still here […] My parents didn't really say anything about my future, but I mean, you know, like they are here in Japan also to save money and also, you know, to get financially sure. So, they kind of worry mainly about money, for example, I think they wished for me to go to a public college instead of a private one 'cause it's a lot cheaper, but that was it (R. H., Brazilian, M, 27yo, G2).

As for the guided youths, also the going-with-the-flow type's parental socioeconomic position and cultural capital level show to consistently vary. This profile's Korean and Chinese parents are, as for the other types, characterized by white-collar job and high educational credentials. On the contrary, Brazilian parents tends to show lower standings if compared to the guided-type

197

parents, displaying a higher figures of factory workers and of middle school diplomas as the highest level of education achieved. Nevertheless, among non-supportive parents there are also university graduates, thus making it difficult to argue whether the family's background plays a critical role in putting in place forms of support for the children.

Lastly, flow-type youths all display an occupational level equal to that of their native Japanese counterpart, except one case, a Brazilian young woman who decided not to continue after university and was employed as a factory worker at the moment of the interview. Therefore, it would be safe to argue that, also considering the socioeconomic position of the guided youths, that rather than parental support, it is the rationality and pragmatism behind immigrant-origin youths' ambitions to lead to a social and economic upward mobility.

7.4. *The supported*

The third type is constituted by the *supported* youths. Here are gathered respondents with attitudinal ambitions, namely those who reported having chased an educational career that reflected their own personal interests and competencies, and who received familial support to pursue it. Table 7.4 lists the youths who match such a profile and highlights their main characteristics.

Tab. 7.4   *Main characteristics of the supported type.*

#	Gender	Origin	Generation	Educational degree	Ethnic-school path
14	M	Brazil	2	Senior high school	Yes
15	M	Brazil	2	Senior high school	No
20	F	Korean	3	University (4y)	Yes
22	F	Korean	2	University (4y)	No
42	M	Chinese	1.5	Technical college (4y)	No

The supported youths are less numerous when compared to the other three types, making it believe that they represent the exception rather than embodying a recurring pattern. This type's composition is quite uniform in terms of origin and gender. The cultural capital level of these youths varies: this time, the Korean-origin youths show to have the highest level of educational credentials, followed by the Chinese, where there is the only case of a Chinese-origin youth holding a technical college (*senmongakkou*) diploma which is to be considered less prestigious compared to the four-year university degree but vocationally oriented, thus an educational path offering stronger professional competences in contrast with what is achieved with a two-year college degree, more academically oriented. As for the rest of the previously presented profiles, also for the Asian-origin supported group, having attended a Korean or Chinese school rather than a Japanese school track does not have any repercussion for the attainment of a high credential. The same cannot be argued for the two Brazilian youths who attended a Brazilian school and stopped their educational path after senior high school.

Contrary to the two previous types who set their school choices on functional ambitions, the supported type tended to have, at the time of their senior

school years, a very clear and motivated vision about their future studies and future occupations. Educational and academic decisions were thus built on one's attitude, personal preferences and youths' strengths. This does not entail, however, that attitudinally-based choices are necessarily unrealistic and respondents tendentially showed to have a good understanding of how and in which labor sector their vocation could be employed.

> Since I was so confident about language, I always thought that being able to speak three different languages is my strength. So, I wanted it to work in travel industry or working in airports for example, so that I can use my strength. I just wanted to go to university and find it (D. C., Korean, F, 26yo, G2).

It is not always the case that supported youths' educational and occupational ambitions and parents' support always strive towards the same direction. For instance, parents are reported to initially prefer for their children to enroll in a more spendable degree, especially economics, whereas youths reported having ambitions that could explore and make use of their personal interests as a hobby. It is at times like this that both parties eventually allow for a compromise: the youth accept to diverge to a more down-to-earth area of study for university enrollment and parents agree on their children's revised choice.

> Actually, my mother wanted me to study, of course, but she didn't agree with what I was choosing to do. My dream was to work with cinema, movies, acting, producing, directing. And she rather wanted me to be a doctor or something like that. So, I picked psychology, I do like psychology. And she agreed with that. (A. G. D., Brazilian, M, 21yo, G2).

Unfortunately, A. G. D. never completed his studies and dropped out of his university program and at the time of the interview he was employed as a factory worker.

Support for the three Asian-origin youths, on the contrary to their Brazilian counterpart, came less subtly and resulted more compelling, in accordance with

the educational pressure posed by Chinese and Korean parents illustrated in the previous chapter. However, their support and ambitions for their children are, as for the Japanese parents, usually less specific. The recurrent demand is for their offspring to attend university, find a stable position and earn a respectable salary.

> Korean parents, they always have high expectations. So, they just want you to have like stay in the stable company and earn like a good amount of money. And then later on we have to give back to parents [laughs] Yeah, in Korea they are so passionate about education. So even my cousin, who is just elementary school, she comes home at 10 p.m. at night because after school she has three after school classes. And not just studying, they will teach swimming and piano and many things, they want you to become a doctor or a lawyer or something like that (D. C., Korean, F, 26yo, G2).

Supported youths, as for the other three types, display different occupational levels depending on whether they are of Latin American origins or Asian origins. The two Korean and the Chinese youths are all employed in Japanese companies with a patent pattern of upward mobility when compared to the first generations. The two Brazilian respondents have lower socioeconomic standing, as they both work in a factory. Nevertheless, the one Brazilian youth who attended the mainstream Japanese education occupies a hierarchically higher position than his fellow, as he could take advantage of his Japanese mother-tongue linguistic level.

7.5. *The independent*

The fourth and last profile is the *independent* type of youth and its cases are listed and described in Table 7.5. Independent youths are marked by having made attitudinal choices regarding their education and career and by having lacked parental support to make and pursue such decisions.

Tab. 7.5   *Main characteristics of the independent type.*

#	Gender	Origin	Generation	Educational degree	Ethnic-school path
4	F	Brazil	2	Senior high school	Yes
5	F	Brazil	2	University (4y)	No
6	F	Brazil	2	Junior high school	Yes
9	F	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
12	M	Brazil	2	College (2y)	Yes
25	F	Korea	3	University (4y)	Yes
26	M	Korea	3	University (4y)	No
28	M	Korea	3	University (4y)	Yes
29	M	Korea	3	University (4y)	Yes

Independent-type youths are for the most part of Brazilian origin, only partially of Korean, but not Chinese-origin youth falls within this category. Korean youths all present the same level of cultural capital, independently whether they attended an ethnic school path. Differently, independent Brazilians' credentials appear to have been impacted by the kind of education they pursued. The only Brazilian respondent who reported to have achieved a four-year university degree, in fact, attended a mainstream Japanese school – although it was private schooling since junior high school – whereas the rest of the Brazilian youths who attended a Brazilian ethnic school graduated from a two-year college course, or did not progress any further after their senior high school diploma. Only one case, a Brazilian young woman who attended the ethnic school path, narrated to have dropped out of senior high school, hence she

completed only her junior high school.

As for the going-with-the-flow type, the independent youths lacked the support of their parents – and other point persons – in making decisions on possible educational roads ahead of them. In some cases, too, the lack of support was manifested subtly, as youths reported that their parents would have been fine with whatever decision children made. In the following account, too, when the interviewee was asked whether his parents ever pressured him to undertake a given academic curriculum or whether they pushed him towards a specific career, he stated:

> You know that they would actually never, never talk to me about that. They would say only like, well, just do what you prefer. So, I was never pressured into a career or something. They just weren't... they would never say, well, you have to be rich, when you have money enough to survive, it's fine. So, yes, never, never had this pressure about getting to university (R. P., Brazilian, M, 24yo, G2).

In the same way as supported youths, independent types tendentially show to appreciate the non-oppressive behavior that characterized their relationship. And this element appears to play an important part to maintain a peaceful intergenerational kinship.

> They always said, they would always accept my decision, even my sister's decision. They don't tell us to be a doctor or lawyer, considering that in my father-side of the family, everybody's a lawyer, and only my father is in the I.T. industry, which is why I think he believed that people should choose what they want to do. So, he would ask me, what do YOU want to do, so that's why I got the strength to choose, to make my decision by myself. I really like how they [my parents] are. Yes. So, no, they respected what I choose, which is really nice, and I really like that a lot about them (E. K., Brazilian, F, 22yo, G2).

Among the independent youths, there are also those who initially re-

ceived support and at times pressure to undertake an academic and then the occupational path from their parents. However, these respondents decided not to comply with their parents' ambitions and eventually parents' support for the attitudinally oriented decisions made by their children subsides. It is the case for the following Brazilian youth, who is initially directed by her parents towards a specific and highly-valued educational path and position, namely going to university and then concur to become a civil servant, deemed a stable, financially rewarding and not particularly demanding job. However, the respondent later on decide to embark on her own preferred track: to study cookery and become a chef.

> They [my parents] wanted me to study for like, we have public service in Brazil, you know, to work for the government. They wanted me to like to try the concourse to get the job, but I never wanted because they said that if you once you work for the government, you have that job forever. And my parents would say, well, they pay you well and you don't work so much. So, for these kinds of reasons, they wanted me to get this kind of job, but it was never like something I wanted to do. […] Instead, I actually came to Tokyo because I wanted to study for... Cooking? Chef? A completely different thing... And yeah, so I moved here because I wanted to go to this cooking college (M. K. H., Brazilian, F, 26yo, G2).

Yet, M. K. H. could not enroll as the 2020 and 2021 pandemic situation forced the cooking school was forced to shut down, and at the time of the interview she was working as a part-timer in a nursery in Tokyo.

Although independent-type youths based their school and later career choice on their skills and predilections, rather than on more rational calculations for future investment in the labor market, it does not mean that personal inclinations and occupational market reality do not match. It is the case for another Brazilian interviewee, who completed his two-year college program and was encouraged by his parents to continue to a four-year university course. Although the youth enrolled in university, after many difficulties in getting ac-

cepted due to a low score on his entry examination, he gave up after a few months and dropped out. Instead, as he was very fluent in English, he decided to pursue his linguistic proficiency certificate in order to work as an English teacher in private institutions. And eventually, he succeeded in his plans.

> I enrolled in Nagoya university, in Aichi Prefecture. But I dropped out as it wasn't for me. I was coursing languages mainly like literature, you know. So, I would study a lot, a lot of like literature for from Brazil, Portugal. But after... Eight months I guess, something like this had dropped out. It wasn't my thing and I was focusing more on getting English certificates so I could have more opportunities to teach English in Japan (R. P., Brazilian, M, 24yo, G2).

On the contrary, J. A., also a Brazilian-origin youth, did not achieve her own independent plan. She received no support nor guidance from her family regarding her education: as she decided to drop from senior high school, she reported that her mother and grandmother (the only family members she lived with) did little to change her mind. At the time of the interview, she was employed in a factory not too distant from her place, while saying that she was currently focusing on her Japanese – as she attended a Brazilian ethnic school, she only spoke Portuguese and English – in order to find a job at McDonald's or in a *conbini*[19], evidently pointing to these two options as her career ambitions.

> And that's why I like studying Japanese to work at McDonalds. You know, it's different. It's really different or at the *conbini* because I don't want to work for a factory. No. Yes. It doesn't work for your mental health the...Mental health doesn't work fine (J. A., Brazilian, F, 17yo, G2).

[19]   *Conbini*, a Japanese expression short for *convenience store*, namely shops selling miscellaneous items, from food to laundry sets and other daily necessities, usually open 24h. Lawson and 7-Eleven are the most famous chains of retails of such shops.

Lastly, it is interesting to consider how independents' parents socioeconomic positioning and level of cultural capital might explain their lack of support displayed to their children. Brazilian independent youths report their parents present different and varied educational credentials, from senior high school diplomas to university degrees. Nevertheless, independently from high and low levels of cultural capital, mostly all Brazilian parents are employed as factory workers, putting them in a low occupational position. Korean independents' parents, too, tendentially are reported to have a low level of education as only one couple of parents have a university degree whereas the rest have a senior high school diploma. Furthermore, most all Korean parents are self-employed in an ethnic business, such as Korean restaurants (no youth reported to have hired any employees, so they all can be considered family businesses). Considering how in this independent type lower family socioeconomic standing and lower level of education are recurrent, it could be argued that such parental positioning might concur to the lack of educational support provided to youths.

Although familial background among the two groups of origin is similar, it is interesting to notice that independent youths' socioeconomic destinies are pretty differentiated. In fact, all Korean youths except one resulted to be employed in a Japanese company, on equal terms to their guided and Japanese peers – the exception being a self-employed Korean youth. The situation for Brazilian youths is more diversified: one factory worker (the young Brazilian woman who dropped out of senior high school), two English language teachers and two employees in Japanese companies. Overall, both groups of youths appear to show some forms of intergenerational mobility, with the Brazilian one still lacking behind compared its Asian counterpart.

Despite the global halt of the movement of people in these last two years amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan is unarguably bound to witness an expansion in its immigration panorama. Foreign-citizen students and foreign businesses continue to knock on the doors of the Japanese Immigration Bureau office, asking to be let in. Past inflow trends and prospective projections all point to a steady and imminent growth in the figures of foreign-citizen residents. The Japanese immigration phenomenon is not only experiencing a quantitative shift: the nature of it is also changing. The greater presence of foreign-citizen resident youths further supports the fact the Japanese immigration is now entering Böhning's (1984) mature "fourth phase".

The school setting is one of the clearest *locus* where the growing presence of immigrants' children visibly stands out – the Japanese Ministry of Education has registered a steady increase of foreign-citizen children in Japanese public schools and classes in the last ten years. Moreover, the literature has underlined an increasingly broad set of issues that the Japanese education systems is now facing due to the growing diversity in terms of country of origin of these youths. There are clear signs of a school system which is attempting to come to terms with a more marked reality: teachers pushed to face and manage an unexpected expanding cultural diversity; linguistic barriers; the creation of – still not fully efficient – L2 Japanese programs; among others. In this way, the school becomes the privileged site to analyze the modes of incorporation of immigrant-origin youths.

This study explores the narratives of immigrants' youths who pursued their educational path in Japan. The final presentation and elaboration of findings mainly emphasizes their retrospective school experiences, merely touching on their socioeconomic standing at the time of the interview.

The following concluding remarks are organized by proposing the main theories on immigrants' modes of incorporation and underscoring points of contact and contrasts with findings drawn from this doctoral study. The discussion proceeds chronologically, by pointed to theories and modes of incorporation as they emerged over the years in the last century.

One of the strongholds of the canonical assimilation theory is the inevitability (as a sole and possible outcome) of immigrants' assimilation into the core of the receiving context, entailing the complete eventual erosion of any ethnic traits of origin. This is partly refuted by what emerged from the analysis of interviews. As a matter of fact, immigrant-origin youths demonstrate different degrees of integration and non-integration. It is true that youths showing stronger traits of assimilation to the Japanese context have all reached a high socioeconomic standing, on par with their native Japanese peers. However, youths who have retained ethnic traits of origin (i.e., linguistic proficiency) demonstrated themselves to have a high level of cultural capital and occupational positioning. This indicates that assimilation is not necessarily the only viable path for "making it" in Japan. Ethnic traits of origin may, on the contrary, persist over time and over generations. Nonetheless, it is true that G3 Koreans who had not attended a Korean ethnic school were the ones showing the strongest signs of a more marked assimilation outcome. This means that, if observed over a longer time period, the integration process might corroborate the canonical theory's precept underlying the inevitability of the assimilation outcome.

As promoters of the canonical assimilation approach, Warner and Srole (1960) argued that the rate at which the assimilation process occurs is correlated to the hierarchy of "racial" and cultural acceptability. Therefore, the more distant the "racial" and cultural background of immigrants, the longer and more difficult the assimilation process will be. Such line of thoughts appears to resonate with the fact that among the investigated groups, Brazilian respondents are the ones fairing the worse, both at the educational and occupational level. Nevertheless, more than "race" and cultural distance, the type of school attended, and more specifically, having attended the ethnic-school path seems to be the

cause of downward mobility for these youths. In fact, Brazilian youths who participated in a mainstream Japanese educational career showed themselves able to compete for upward mobility as successfully as their foreign-origin and native Japanese peers. Furthermore, Warner and Srole's proposal (which has been overly criticized for its ethnocentric stance) elevates the particular US cultural model – middle-class Protestant whites of British ancestry – to the normative standard by which other groups are assessed and should aspire to in order to succeed in the North American context. As shown in the preceding paragraph, assimilation to the Japanese core (in this case, represented by the group of control) is not the sole possibility for immigrants' youths to succeed in Japan.

Another element characterizing the canonical assimilation theory is Gordon's (1964) dissection of the assimilation process in seven stages. Among these stages, discrimination stands out. Gordon argued that the receiving context had to extinguish any sentiments and attitudes of prejudice and discrimination against immigrants for them to eventually be able to assimilate. Events of discrimination are recurrent within the narration given by the youths interviewed, either in their past school experiences or their current lives. The occurrence of discriminatory episodes in school or bullying targeting these young people specifically for being foreign has led to the emergence to two different and opposite outcomes. On one hand, the reaction of immigrant-origin youths to the discriminatory behavior perpetrated by their Japanese peers has brought about their retraction from socialization in the Japanese societal context into the ethnic circle. In this way, and just as Gordon predicted, discrimination has substantially hindered the assimilation process. On the other hand, other immigrants' youths who found themselves the victims of bullying in school opted for the opposite strategy. They cut bridges with their fellow foreign-origin peers so as not to be associated with them, avoiding any further unwanted attention. At the same time, they report doing everything possible to pass as Japanese, in order to become "invisible" to bring an end to the bullying. Rather than the canonical approach, Gans' (1992a) bumpy-line approach, with its assumptions arguing unpredictable outcomes for immigrants' incorporation,

seems to be more appropriate to describe such findings.

Compared to the canonical approach, the segmented assimilation theory goes one step further in predicting the incorporation of Japanese immigrants' youths. In fact, it argues that there is not one single possible outcome of incorporation but rather, as illustrated in the elaboration in Figure 6.1, modes of incorporation differ according to a series of ascribed characteristics of immigrants and structural constraints of the context of reception (Portes and Zhou 1993). Nevertheless, as Nukaga and Miura also argue (2017), even the segmented assimilation theory's tripartite scheme of incorporation (upward assimilation, downward assimilation, and the upward mobility with the preservation of the individual's ethnic traits) is not appropriate to describe the Japanese panorama. Although the findings confirmed patterns of upward assimilation and selective acculturation, no downward assimilation was acknowledged. Rather, a trend downward exclusion was assessed for a part of Brazilian youths who had attended the ethnic-school path.

Ultimately, Alba and Nee's (2003) new assimilation theory fills the gap that the previous proposed models appear to overlook. The originality of the new assimilation theory is the formulation of an organic scheme of how micro, meso, and macro structural dimensions intervene in shaping and influencing immigrants' modes of incorporation. What has been underlined in the present study is how *distal causes* (macro-level causes) marks the possibilities of immigrants' offspring to integrate in Japan by encouraging first-generation immigrants to implement decisions that would eventually lead to segregating behavior. Downward mobility of Brazilian youths is here tightly associated with following the ethnic educational path. The new assimilation theory would argue that there are underlying macro-level constraints (such as national regulations) influencing the Brazilian parents' decision to send their children to a Brazilian school. *In primis*, it is here argued that the Japanese national provision excluding foreign-citizen youths from compulsory schooling is at the root of the (downward) exclusion of Brazilian youths residing in Japan.

While refuting the ethnocentric and racialized discourse that characterized the canonical approach, Alba and Nee's new assimilation model remains

anchored to the cornerstones of its ancestor. It argues that the basic mechanisms and structural conditions in the host societies will, in the long run, give rise to cultural assimilation, upward mobility and adaptation to cultural and socioeconomic traits of the receiving context. As illustrated above, this might be representative of the Japanese case. However, to corroborate such argument, it might be necessary to observe the Japanese phenomenon in the long term.

The results obtained thanks to the typology analytical tool furtherly, although not entirely, support the applicability of the New assimilation theory and the appropriateness of observing and understanding the Japanese immigratory phenomenon through the mechanism lenses. In fact, no matter the types that emerged in the constituted typology, the Asian respondents showed to have an overall better positioning compared to their Latin American, considering the fact that the majority of Brazilian youths interviewed attended the alternative ethnic educational path. This entails therefore that, no matter the functional educational ambitions and the support received by parents – the two variables selected to construct the typology – having attended an ethnic school tends to pose an obstacle to youths' upward mobility. Nevertheless, it is evident that for second and third generations Koreans who attended an ethnic school, independently of their *type*, fare noticeable better than their Brazilian counterpart. That could thus mean that, rather than the two considered variables, cultural proximity and the generational pace are better predictors to understand their integration and mobility outcome in the country.

Although constituting a viable case study for comparison with other industrialized democracies, the Japanese educational system stands out for its unique features. Even if they are a minority compared to the total number of Japanese schools on the national territory, the acknowledged presence of ethnic schools has a decisive role in bringing up, nurturing and educating a cohort of youths who think differently, behave differently, and feel different from the larger Japanese society. It is clear that such a system impedes the new assimilation theory's prediction of an eventual full assimilation outcome.

APPENDIX: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Tab. A.1 *Interview Protocol and questions*

Introduction and PIS

Dear **Interviewee**,

I am a PhD student from Bologna University, Italy, conducting research in Japan focusing on youths of foreign origin. (So, even if you are Japanese, I would still be very happy if you could share with me your story).

All this information will be treated by me only, and all data will stay anonymous. The final goal for this interview will be the PhD dissertation I am working on now, which I will most likely present by March 2022 to the Commission of professors of Bologna University.

Remember that you participate to this interview on a voluntary basis. You are free not to answer to questions or even to walk out of the interview at any moment. At any time, please feel free to ask me to repeat questions or to rephrase them.

If you see me taking notes, please do not worry. I have a list of questions with me, so I am just making sure we go through all topics prepared.

I have a recorder here with me (**). If you don't mind, I would like to record our conversation for the sake of having a more natural talk and detailed later account of our interview.

Personal Background

1 Year and Place of birth (time upon arrival), place of residence

2 Citizenship(s)

3 Language proficiency

4 Level of education

5 Occupation/job

Family

6 Parents' (and siblings): Nationality, place of birth (time upon arri-

val), educational level, occupation, language proficiency

7   What language do you speak at home?

8   How was/is the relationships with your parents/family members? (Time spent together, arguments or disagreements, divergent opinions on daily matters, etc.)

9   Did/Do you attend any ethnic based activities with your family? Did/Do you like it?

10   What kind of neighbourhood/area do you live in?

11   Do you feel people in your neighbourhood/area help each other? In case of need, who would you ask help to?

12   Do you have other relatives in Japan? And outside Japan?

Migratory trajectory

13   Who in your family were the original immigrants?

14   Do you know why they left?

15   Why did they choose Japan?

16   Did their whole family come over or just them?

17   How do you know this information?

18   Do you think your ancestor faced discrimination when they first came to Japan?

School

19   What was your scholastic path like? (Type of schools attended) And why did you choose _____ school?

20   How was your school's environment? (Any episodes of bullying, discrimination, relationship with teachers / you felt you did not belong there / you had many friends, etc.)

21   How was the relationship with your class/schoolmates?

22   What did you think about your scholastic performance?

23   What were your educational/occupational aspirations? But, what do you actually expect to achieve?

24   What where your parents educational/occupational expectations?

25   Who helped you choose your scholastic carrier? (Teachers, parents,

acquittances, etc.)

26   Have you ever felt responsible to take care of your parents?

27   Have your parents ever taken part to your scholastic experience? (They helped with homework, assist you with language learning, often talked to teachers, participated to school events?)

28   Have you ever felt obliged/compelled to follow your parents' instructions? (Push for better grades, go to work early, etc.)

29   If you attended Japanese/ethnic school (instead of an ethnic/Japanese school) do you think your life would be different now?

30   Did you wear any ethnic traditional *seifuku* (school uniform) in school?

Daily life and socialization

31   Who do you spend most of your time with? (Nationality / language used / age and gender / kind of activity / work environment)

32   Do you feel more comfortable being around _____than non-_____? At what times? Any idea why?

33   Can you describe some of the ____ customs or practices that affect your everyday life? (i.e., food, music, cultural events)

34   Are there any aspects of Japanese daily social interactions you don't / like? (Excessive politeness, hierarchical relationships, lack of critical thinking, discipline)

35   Have you ever experienced any act of discrimination? (Like while looking for a job or an apartment)

36   Do you feel that the Japanese society is welcoming towards foreigners? Why do you think that?

37   Are there any nationality or religious groups that you think face discrimination now?

38   What are your plans for the future? What would your "top priorities" be? (Job, family, migratory plan, how to grow up your children etc.)

Self-assessed identity

39 How do you identify, that is, what do you call yourself

40 Have you always considered yourself ____?

41 Was there any particular situation that made you change how you see yourself?

42 Do you think of yourself as a Japanese sometimes and as an _____other times? When does this happen? Can you give me an example?

43 If you plan to /If you have any children, do you plan to pass down to them your ____ cultural luggage? (Language, customs, traditions, etc.)

44 How do your parents identify themselves?

45 How do your parents feel about their (ethnic) background?

46 Did they talk about it often?

47 Do you think Japanese have a stereotype of what being ____is? What is it?

48 Do you know of any people who have changed their name? What do you think of this practice?

Conclusion

Is there anything else you would like to share? Has something been missed out?

How did you feel about this interview?

Could you think about any acquittances that might be willing to be interviewed?

References

Agliata, Allison K., and Kimberly Renk. 2008. 'College Students' Adjustment: The Role of Parent-College Student Expectation Discrepancies and Communication Reciprocity'. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 38(8):967–82.

Alba, Richard D. 1985. 'The Twilight of Ethnicity among Americans of European Ancestry: The Case of Italians*'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 8(1):134–58.

Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. 'Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration'. *The International Migration Review* 31(4):826–74.

Albertini, Marco, Giancarlo Gasperoni, and Debora Mantovani. 2019. 'Whom to Help and Why? Family Norms on Financial Support for Adult Children among Immigrants'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(10):1769–89.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2001. 'Theorizing the "Modes of Incorporation": Assimilation, Hyphenation, and Multiculturalism as Varieties of Civil Participation'. *Sociological Theory* 19(3):237–49.

Altınkamış, N. Feyza, and Orhan Ağırdağ. 2014. 'Determinants of Language Use and Attitudes among Turkish Speakers in Flanders: A Focus on Generational Difference'. *Bilig, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World* (70):59–80.

Altschul, Inna, Daphna Oyserman, and Deborah Bybee. 2008. 'Racial-Ethnic Self-Schemas and Segmented Assimilation: Identity and the Academic Achievement of Hispanic Youth'. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 71(3):302–20.

Ambrosini, Maurizio. 2011. *Sociologia delle migrazioni*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Ambrosini, Maurizio, and Stefano Molina. 2004. *Seconde generazioni: un'introduzione al futuro dell'immigrazione in Italia*. Torino: Edizioni Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.

Arita, Eriko. 2003. 'Japanese Discrimination Against Korean and Other Ethnic Schools'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 1(4).

Azzolini, Davide, and Carlo Barone. 2013. 'Do They Progress or Do They Lag behind? Educational Attainment of Immigrants' Children in Italy: The Role Played by Generational Status, Country of Origin and Social Class'. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 31:82–96.

Bail, Hélène Le. 2005. 'The New Chinese Immigration to Japan: Between Mobility and Integration'. *China Perspectives* 2005(5).

Bartram, David. 2000. 'Japan and Labor Migration: Theoretical and Methodological Implications of Negative Cases'. *The International Migration Review* 34(1):5–32.

Bazeley, Pat. 2009. 'Analysing Qualitative Data: More Than "Identifying Themes"'. *The Malaysian Journal of Qualitative Approach* 2(2):17.

Bhikhu, Parekh. 2017. *Rethingking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Birkelund, Jesper Fels. 2020. 'Aiming High and Missing the Mark? Educational Choice, Dropout Risk, and Achievement in Upper Secondary Education among Children of Immigrants in Denmark'. *European Sociological Review* 36(3):395–412.

Böhning, Walter R. 1984. *Studies in International Labour Migration*. London: The Macmillan Press.

Borgna, Camilla, and Dalit Contini. 2014. 'Migrant Achievement Penalties in Western Europe: Do Educational Systems Matter?' *European Sociological Review* 30(5):670–83.

Bozzetti, Alessandro. 2021. *Oltre la selezione scolastica: i giovani di origine straniera all'università*. 1st edition. Bologna: Bononia University Press.

Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. 2006. 'Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology'. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3(2):77–101.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. 'The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(4):531–48.

Budiman, Abby. 2020. 'Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants'. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved September 2017 (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/).

Burgess, Chris. 2007. 'Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the "Myth" of Homogeneity [Indonesian Translation Available]'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 5(3):25.

Burgess, Chris. 2010. 'The "Illusion" of Homogeneous Japan and National Character: Discourse as a Tool to Transcend the "Myth" vs. "Reality" Binary'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 8(9/1).

Burke, Rachel S. 2016. 'Negotiating Space and Identity: The Experience of Hafu Children in Japanese Early Childhood Education'. *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 18(2):57–70.

Caprio, Mark. 2008. 'The Cold War Explodes in Kobe—"The 1948 Korean Ethnic School "Riots" and US Occupation Authorities'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 6(11):1–15.

Caprio, Mark. 2009. *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Caprio, Mark. 2020. 'To Adopt a Small or Large State Mentality: The Iwakura Mission and Japan's Meiji-Era Foreign Policy Dilemma'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 18(20/3).

Caprio, Mark, and Yu Jia. 2009. 'Occupations of Korean and Japan and the Origins of the Korean Diaspora in Japan'. Pp. 21–38 in *Diaspora without Homeland*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Carliner, Geoffrey. 2022. 'The Language Ability of U.S. Immigrants: Assimilation and Cohort Effects'. *The International Migration Review* 34(1):158–82.

Caroli, Rosa, and Francesco Gatti. 2011. *Storia Del Giappone*. 7th ed. Roma: Editori Laterza.

Carvalho, Daniela de. 2003. *Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil: The Nikkeijin*. London: Routledge.

Chiavacci, D. 2008. 'From Class Struggle to General Middle-Class Society to Divided Society: Societal Models of Inequality in Postwar Japan'. *Social Science Japan Journal* 11(1):5–27.

Chiavacci, David. 2016. 'Migration and Integration Patterns of New Immigrants in Japan: Diverse Structures of Inequality'. Pp. 233–49 in *Social Inequality in Post-Growth Japan: Transformation during Economic and Demographic Stagnation*. London: Routledge.

Chiswick, Barry R., Yew Liang Lee, and Paul W. Miller. 2004. 'Immigrants' Language Skills: The Australian Experience in a Longitudinal Survey'. *International Migration Review* 38(2):611–54.

Chiswick, Barry R., Yew Liang Lee, and Paul W. Miller. 2005. 'Parents and Children Talk: English Language Proficiency within Immigrant Families'. *Review of Economics of the Household* 3:243–68.

Chiswick, Barry R., and Paul W. Miller. 2008. 'The "Negative" Assimilation of Immigrants: A Special Case'. *IZA Discussion Paper* 3563:1–41.

Chiswick, Barry R., and Paul W. Miller. 2012. 'Negative and Positive Assimilation, Skill Transferability, and Linguistic Distance'. *Journal of Human Capital* 6(1):35–55.

Chitose, Yoshimi. 2008. 'Compulsory Schooling of Immigrant Children in Japan: A Comparison across Children's Nationalities'. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 17(2):157–87.

Chung, Erin Aeran. 2020. *Immigrant Incorporation in East Asian Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., Mathias Sinning, and Steven Stillman. 2012. 'Migrant Youths' Educational Achievement: The Role of Institutions'. *The*

ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 643(1):18–45.

Colombo, Enzo. 2015. 'Multiculturalisms: An Overview of Multicultural Debates in Western Societies'. *Current Sociology* 63(6):800–824.

Curtis, Kaley, Catherine Anicama, and Qing Zhou. 2021. 'Longitudinal Relations among School Context, School-Based Parent Involvement, and Academic Achievement of Chinese American Children in Immigrant Families'. *Journal of School Psychology* 88:1–17. doi: 10.1016/j.jsp.2021.07.002.

DeWind, Josh, and Philip Kasinitz. 1997. 'Everything Old Is New Again? Processes and Theories of Immigrant Incorporation'. *International Migration Review* 31(4):1096–1111.

Dian, Matteo. 2017. *Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Elsevier.

Dian, Matteo. 2021. *La Cina, Gli Stati Uniti e Il Futuro Dell'ordine Internazionale*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Digital Chosun. 2013. 'Yokohama Stops Subsidies for Chongryon Schools'. *Digital Chosun Inc.*

Dore, Ronald. 1976. *The Diploma Disease. Education, Qualification and Development*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Durkheim, Emile. 1997. *The Division of Labour in Society*. New York: The Free Press.

Dustmann, Christian. 1997. 'The Effects of Education, Parental Background and Ethnic Concentration on Language'. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 37:245–62.

Esser, Hartmut. 2006. 'Does the "New" Immigration Require a "New" Theory of Intergenerational Integration?' *International Migration Review* 38(3):1126–59.

Esser, Hartmut. 2010. 'Assimilation, Ethnic Stratification, or Selective Acculturation?' *Sociologica* 1:1–30.

European Commission. 2020. 'Increasing Significance of Migration'. *Knowledge4policy.Ec.Europa.Eu*. Retrieved September 2021 (https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/increasing-significance-migration_en).

Farley, Reynolds, and Richard Alba. 2002. 'The New Second Generation in the United States'. *International Migration Review* 36(3):669–701.

Fassmann, Heinz. 2009. 'European Migration: Historical Overview and Statistical Problems'. Pp. 21–43 in *Statistics and Reality. Concepts and Measurements of Migration in Europe*. Amsterdam: AmsterdamUniversity Press.

Fereday, Jennifer, and Eimear Muir-Cochrane. 2006. 'Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive

Coding and Theme Development'. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 5(1):80–92.

Fukuoka, Yasunori. 1996. 'Beyond Assimilation and Dissimilation: Diverse Resolutions to Identity Crises among Younger Generation Koreans in Japan'. *Saitama University Review* 31(1).

Fukuoka, Yasunori. 2000. *Lives of Young Koreans in Japan*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Fukuzawa, Yukichi. 2008. *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fuwa, Nobuhiko. 1999. 'The Filipino "Entertainers" in Japan'. *Philippine Studies* 47(3):319–50.

Ganga, Deianira, and Sam Scott. 2006. 'Cultural "Insiders" and the Issue of Positionality in Qualitative Migration Research: Moving "Across" and Moving "Along" Researcher-Participant Divides'. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7(3):12.

Gans, Herbert J. 1992a. 'Comment: Ethnic Invention and Acculturation, a Bumpy-Line Approach'. *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12(1):42–52.

Gans, Herbert J. 1992b. 'Second-Generation Decline: Scenaioes Frot Eh Econoic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15(2):174–92.

Gans, Herbert J. 2007. 'Acculturation, Assimilation and Mobility'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(1):152–64.

Gerstle, Gary. 2017. *AmericanCrucible. Race and Nationa in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Giddens, Anthony, and Philip W. Sutton. 2013. *Sociology*. 7th ed. Oxford: Polity Press.

Glazer, Nathan. 1993. 'Is Assimilation Dead?' *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530(1):122–36.

Glazer, Nathan. 1997. *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Godefroy, Noémi. 2011. 'Deconstructing and Reconstructing Ainu Identity'.

Gordon, Milton M. 1958. *Social Class in American Sociology*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life. The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.

GOV.UK. 2011. 'PM's Speech at Munich Security Conference - GOV.UK.Pdf'. Retrieved March 2021 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference).

Graham, Elspeth, Lucy Jordan, Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Theodora Lam, Maruja Asis, and Su Kamdi. 2012. 'Transnational Families and the Family Nexus:

Perspectives of Indonesian and Filipino Children Left behind by Migrant Parent(s)'. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 44(4):793–815.

Gu, Chien-Juh. 2019. 'Interviewing Immigrants and Refugees. Reflexive Engagement with Research Subjects'. in *Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*, edited by S. J. Gold and S. J. Nawyn. Oxon: Routledge.

Hagström, Linus, and Ulv Hanssen. 2015. 'The North Korean Abduction Issue: Emotions, Securitisation and the Reconstruction of Japanese Identity from "Aggressor" to "Victim" and from "Pacifist" to "Normal"'. *The Pacific Review* 28(1):71–93.

Haller, Archibald O., and Alejandro Portes. 1973. 'Status Attainment Processes'. *Sociology of Education* 46(1):51.

Hanna, Paul, and Shadreck Mwale. 2017. '"I'm Not with You, yet I Am...": Virtual Face-to-Face Interviews'. in *Collecting Qualitative Data. A practical guide to textual media and virtual techniques*, edited by V. Braun, V. Clarke, and D. Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hansen, M. Lee. 1938. 'The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant'. *Augustana Historical Society*.

Harris, Anita. 2009. 'Shifting the Boundaries of Cultural Spaces: Young People and Everyday Multiculturalism'. *Social Identities* 15(2):187–205.

Hartmann, Douglas, and Joseph Gerteis. 2005. 'Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms'. *Sociological Theory* 23(2):218–40.

Healy, Ernest, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami, eds. 2016. *Creating Social Cohesion in an Interdependent World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Hedstrom, Peter. 2005. *Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hedström, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. 'Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36(1):49–67.

Hilton, Jeanne M., Linda Anngela-Cole, and Juri Wakita. 2010. 'A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Factors Associated With School Bullying in Japan and the United States'. *The Family Journal* 18(4):413–22.

Hollifield, James F., and Michael Orlando Sharpe. 2017. 'Japan as an "Emerging Migration State"'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17(3):371–400.

Houston, Michael J., and Seymour Sudman. 1975. 'A Methodological Assessment of the Use of Key Informants'. *Social Science Research* 4(2):151–64.

Huddleston, Thomas and Migration Policy Group. 2015. *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015*. Barcelona: CIDOB, Migration Policy Group.

HURAK. 2017. 'Discrimination against Minority Children in Japan in the Provision of Educational Opportunities: Focusing on Children Attending Korean Schools in Japan'. *Universal Period Review of Japan* 1–17.

Hwang, S. S., and J. Xi. 2008. 'Structural and Individual Covariates of English Language Proficiency'. *Social Forces* 86(3):1079–1104.

Ichijo, Atsuko. 2020. '*Kokugaku* and an Alternative Account of the Emergence of Nationalism of Japan'. *Nations and Nationalism* 26(1):263–82.

Ichou, Mathieu. 2015. '*Origine migratoire et inégalités scolaires : étude longitudinale des résultats scolaires des descendants d'immigrés en France et en Angleterre*'. *Revue française de pédagogie* (191):29–46.

Ikeuchi, Suma. 2019. *Jesus Loves Japan: Return Migration and Global Pentecostalism in a Brazilian Diaspora*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Ishida, Hiroshi, and David H. Slater. 2010. *Social Class in Contemporary Japan. Structures, Sorting and Strategies*. Oxon: Routledge.

Ishida, Kenji. 2018. 'The Status Attainment Structure for Immigrants in Japan': *ISS Discussion Paper Series*.

Ishida, Kenji, Makiko Nakamuro, and Ayumi Takenaka. 2016. 'The Academic Achievement of Immigrant Children in Japan: An Empirical Analysis of the Assimilation Hypothesis'. *Educational Studies in Japan* 10:93–107.

Ishikawa, Yoshitaka. 2019. Chizu de Miru Nihon No Gaikokujin *(Mapping Foreign Residents in Japan)*. Kyoto, Japan: Nakanishiya Shuppan.

Ishikida, Miki Y. 2005. *Japanese Education in the 21st Century*. Ebook: iUniverse, Inc.

Joppke, Christian. 2004. 'The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy'. *The British Journal of Sociology* 55(2):237–57.

Jozuka, Emiko. 2019. 'Japan's "vanishing" Ainu Will Finally Be Recognized as Indigenous People'. *CNN*.

Kaji, Itaru. 2007. 'Determinants of Future Course of Chinese Studens: Focusing on Students of "Returnee from China"in Osaka'. *Kyoiku Shakaigaku Kenkyu* 80:331–49.

Kamishima, Jiro. 1986. Jiba No Seijigaku *(The Politics of Tacit Pressure)*. Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami Shoten.

Kang, Etsuko H. 1997. 'Kita Sadakichi (1871–1939) on Korea: A Japanese Ethno-historian and the Annexation of Korea in 1910'. *Asian Studies Review* 21(1):41–60.

Kao, Grace, and Marta Tienda. 1995. 'Optimism and Achievement: The Educational Performance of Immigrant Youth'. *Social Science Quarterly* 76(1):1–19.

Kao, Grace, and Marta Tienda. 1998. 'Educational Aspirations of Minority Youth'. *American Journal of Education* 106(3):349–84.

Kariya, Takehiko. 2009. 'From Credential Society to "Learning Capital" Society: A Rearticulation of Class Formation in Japanese Education and Society'. in *Social Class in Contemporary Japan. Strucutres, sorting and strategies*, edited by H. Ishida and D. H. Slater. Oxon: Routledge.

Kariya, Takehiko, and Ronald Dore. 2006. 'Japan at the Meritocracy Frontier: From Here, Where?' *The Political Quarterly* 77(s1):134–56.

Kariya, Takehiko, and Jeremy Rappleye. 2020. *Education, Equality and Meritocracy in a Global Age: The Japanese Appraoch*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Kikokusha Center. 2018. 'Zenjitsusei Kōkō Gaikoku Hito Seito No `waku' Ni Tsuite (Special Entry Quotas for Foreign Students in High School)'.

Kim, Nora Hui-Jung. 2015. 'The Retreat of Multiculturalism? Explaining the South Korean Exception'. *American Behavioral Scientist* 59(6):727–46.

Kingsberg, Miriam. 2014. 'Becoming Brazilian to Be Japanese: Emigrant Assimilation, Cultural Anthropology, and National Identity'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56(1):67–97.

Kita, Sadakichi. 1921. '*Nippon Minzoku No Seiritsu* (The Formation of the Japanese Nation)'. *Mizoku to Rekishi* 5(2–4).

Kivisto, Peter. 2002. *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*. Ebook. Wiley-Blackwell.

Kivisto, Peter. 2004. 'What Is the Canonical Theory of Assimilation? Robert E. Park and His Predecessors'. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 40(2):149–63.

Kobayashi, Emiko, and David Farrington. 2020. 'Why Do Japanese Bully More than Americans? Influence of External Locus of Control and Student Attitudes Toward Bullying'. *Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice* 20(1):5–19.

Kobayashi, Hiromi, and Mioko Tsuboya. 2021. 'Social Resources and Challenges Related to the Schooling and Education of Immigrant Children at High Schools in Japan'. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 22(1):369–84.

Koido, Akihiro. 2021. 'Migration: Diversifying Transnational Flows under Neoliberal Transformation'. *International Sociology* 36(2):265–77.

Korekawa, Yu. 2018a. 'Analyzing Immigrants' Integration into the Japanese Labor Market with Immigrant Assimilation Model (IAM)'. *National Institute of Population and Social Security Research* 17.

Korekawa, Yu. 2018b. '*Imin Dainisedai No Kyōiku Tassei Ni Miru Kaisō-Teki Chii No Sedai-Kan Hendō: Kōkō Zaigaku-Ritsu Ni Chūmoku Shita Bunseki* (Educational Attainment of Second-Generation Immigrants)'. *National Institute of Population and Social Security Research* 19–42.

Korekawa, Yu. 2018c. 'Migration Transition in Japan and Its Mid- to Long-Term Consequence: Beyond the Japanese Exceptionalism'. *Migration Policy Review* 10:13–28.

Korekawa, Yu. 2019. 'Japanese Language School as an Educationally Channeled Migratory Process: An Analysis Using Panel Survey of Immigrants in Japan (PSIJ)'. *National Institute of Population and Social Security Research* 20.

Korhonen, Pekka. 2013. 'Leaving Asia? The Meaning of Datsu-A and Japan's Modern History'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 11(50/1).

Kristen, Cornelia, and Nadia Granato. 2007. 'The Educational Attainment of the Second Generation in Germany: Social Origins and Ethnic Inequality'. *Ethnicities* 7(3):343–66.

Kunz, Johannes S. 2014. 'Analyzing Educational Achievement Differences between Second-Generation Immigrants: Comparing Germany and German-Speaking Switzerland'. *German Economic Review* 17(1):61–91.

Kuorikoski, Jaakko. 2009. 'Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal System and Abstract Form of Interaction'. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 23(2):143–60.

Kuramoto, Makiko. 2019. 'Cultural Identity Disequilibrium Experienced by Intercultural Parents Durign Their Children's Elementary School Selection and Adaptation: A Qualitative Analyisis of Interviews With Japanese Mothers Married to Non-Asian Fathers'. *Kyouiku Shinrigaku Kenkyu* 67:203–20.

Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, Will. 2010. 'The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies: The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism'. *International Social Science Journal* 61(199):97–112.

Kymlicka, Will, and Keith Banting. 2006. 'Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State'. *Ethics & International Affairs* 20(3):281–304.

Leavy, Patricia. 2017. *Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, Mixed Methods, Arts-Based, and Community-Based Participatory Research Approaches*. London; New York: Guilford Publications.

Lenneberg, Eric H. 1967. *Biological Foundations of Language*. New York, London, Sidney: John Wiley & Sons.

LeTendre, Gerald K., Thomas P. Tohlen, and Kangmin Zeng. 1998. 'Merit or Family Background? Problems in Research Policy Initiatives in Japan'. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 20(4):285–97.

Lie, John. 2000. 'The Discourse of Japaneseness'. in *Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*, edited by M. Douglass and G. S. Roberts. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1973. 'Generational Differences Among Blacks in the North'. *American Journal of Sociology* 79(3):550–65.

Liebkind, Karmela, Sonja Nyström, Eeva Honkanummi, and Anders Lange. 2004. 'Group Size, Group Status and Dimensions of Contact as Predictors of Intergroup Attitudes'. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 7(2):145–59.

Liu-Farrer, Gracia. 2013. 'Chinese Newcomers in Japan: Migration Trends, Profiles and the Impact of the 2011 Earthquake'. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 22(2):231–57.

Liu-Farrer, Gracia. 2020. *Immigrant Japan. Mobility and Belonging in an Ethno-Nationalist Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lucassen, Jan, and Leo Lucassen. 2014. 'Measuring and Quantifying Cross-Cultural Migrations: An Introduction'. Pp. 1–54 in *Globalising Migration History. The Eurasian Experience (16th-21st Centuries)*. Vol. 15/3, *Studies in Global Social History*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers.

MacKenzie, Peter. 2009. 'The Attraction of International Schools for Japanese Parents Living in Japan'. *Journal of Research in International Education* 8(3):326–48.

Mantovani, Debora. 2008. *Seconde Generazioni All'appello. Studenti Stranieri e Istruzione Secondaria Superiore a Bologna*. Bologna: Istituto Carlo Cattaneo.

Mantovani, Debora. 2015a. 'Legami e Origini. La Dimensione Identitaria Dei Giovani Italiani e Stranieri'. *Quaderni Di Sociologia: Giovani e Stranieri* 67:49–81.

Mantovani, Debora. 2015b. 'Who Am I? Italian and Foreign Youth in Search of Their National Identity'. in *The History of Migration in Europe: Prospectives from economics, politics and sociology*, edited by F. Fauri. New York: Routledge.

Mantovani, Debora, Giancarlo Gasperoni, and Marco Albertini. 2018. 'Higher Education Beliefs and Intentions among Immigrant-Origin Students in Italy'. *Ethnicities* 18(4):603–26.

Maps Japan. 2021. 'Japan Map with Prefectures'. *Maps Japan*. Retrieved (https://maps-japan.com/japan-map-with-prefectures).

Mayntz, Renate. 2004. 'Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34(2):237–59.

Mayo-Smith, Richmond. 1893. 'Statistical Data for the Study of the Assimilation of Races and Nationalities in the United States'. *Publications of the American Statistical Association* 3(24):429–49.

Mayo-Smith, Richmond. 1894a. 'Assimilation of Nationalities in the United States. I'. *Political Science Quarterly* 9(3):426–44.

Mayo-Smith, Richmond. 1894b. 'Assimilation of Nationalities in the United States. II'. *Political Science Quarterly* 9(4):649–70.

MEXT. 2019. '*Ryō Kazu Moto Nendo Gakkō Kihon Chōsa (Sokuhō-Chi) No Kōhyō Ni Tsuite* (About the Publication of the School Basic Survey (Preliminary Figures) of the First Year of Reiwa (2019)'.

Mika, Fukuzawa. 2019. 'Ainu Language and Ainu Speakers'. in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Sociolinguistics*. London: Routledge.

Milton, Gordon M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Minami, Jiro. 1942. Jikyoku to Naisen Ittai *(The Present and 'Japan and Korea as One')*. Kokumin Souryoku Chousen renmei.

Ministry of Education. 2018. '*Hyō 8 Heisei 29-Nendo-Chū No Nihongo Shidō Ga Hitsuyōna Kōkōsei-Tō No Chūtai Shinro Jōkyō* (Table 8 Status of Dropouts and Careers of High School Students Who Need Japanese Instruction during 2017)'.

Ministry of Education. 2019a. '*Gaikoku Hito No Kodomo No Shūgaku Jōkyō-Tō Chōsa Kekka* (Results of Survey on School Attendance of Foreign Children)'.

Ministry of Education. 2019b. '*Kōritsu Gakkō Ni Zaiseki Shite Iru Sotokokuseki No Jidō Seito-Sū* (Number of Foreign Students Enrolled in Public Schools)'.

Ministry of Education. 2020. '*Hyō 7 Nihongo Shidō Ga Hitsuyōna Jidō Seito Ni Taisuru Nihongo Shidō No Naiyō-Tō Ni Tsuite* (About Contents of Japanese Instruction for Children Who Need Japanese Instruction)'.

Ministry of Justice. 2016a. '2016 Immigration Control - Data Section'.

Ministry of Justice. 2016b. '2016 Immigration Control - Part I'.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 2006. 'Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan'. *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 32(1):119–53.

Moscatello, Antonio. 2017. *Megumi: Storie Di Rapimenti e Spie Della Corea Del Nord*. Napoli: Rogiosi Editore.

Murayama, Koji, and Jun Nagayasu. 2020. 'International and Interprefectural Migration in Japan: Implications for the Spatial Assimilation Theory'. *Tohoku University Repository* (116):1–23.

Murphy-Shigematsu, Stephen. 1993. 'Multiethnic Japan and the Monoethnic Myth'. *Melus Asian Perspective* 18(4):63–80.

Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie. 1984. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Nakamatsu, Tomoko. 2005. 'Faces of "Asian Brides": Gender, Race, and Class in the Representations of Immigrant Women in Japan'. *Women's Studies International Forum* 28(5):405–17.

Nakayama. 1924. '*Chousenjin No Na o Zenbu Nipponmei Ni Henzubeshi* (All Names of Koreans Should Be Changed into Japanese Names)'. *Nippon Oyobi Nipponjin.*

Nee, Victor, and Richard D. Alba. 2013. 'Assimilation as Rational Action in Contexts Defined by Institutions and Boundaries'. Pp. 355–77 in *The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research*, edited by R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, and V. Nee. Stanford, California: Standford University Press.

Nee, Victor, and Jimy Sanders. 2001. 'Understanding the Diversity of Immigrant Incorporation: A Forms-of-Capital Model'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(3):386–411.

Nukaga, Misako, and Ayako Miura. 2017. '*Firipin-Kei Nyūkamā Dainisedai No Gakugyō Tassei to Bunki Yōin: Esunikku Aidentiti No Keisei Ka Hodo Ni Chūmoku Shite* (Academic Achievement and Dividing Factors of the Second Generation of Filipino Newcomers: Focusing on the Process of Ethnic Identity Formation)'. *Wakōdaigaku gendai ningen gakubu kiyō (Bulletin of Faculty of Contemporary Human Studies, Wako University)* 10:123–40.

Nukuzuma, Shunsuke. 2014. '*Nihon Ni Okeru Gaikokujinjidō Seito `fu Shūgaku' No Jittai Chōsa Todōfuken Kyōiku Iinkai e No Shitsumon Chōsa Yori* (Data on Foreign School Children's Non-Attendance in Schools in Japan: A Survey of Boards of Education in Japanese Prefectures)'. *Multicultural Relations* 87–98.

Nurmi, Jari-Erik. 2013. 'Socialization and Self-Development: Channeling, Selection, Adjustment, and Reflection'. Pp. 85–124 in *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*, edited by R. M. Lerner and L. Steinberg. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

OECD. 2018a. *Education Policy in Japan: Building Bridges towards 2030.* OECD.

OECD. 2018b. 'Japan. Student Performance PISA 2018'. *GPS Education. OECD.* Retrieved December 2019 (https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=JPN&treshold=10&topic=PI).

OECD. 2019a. 'Chapter 3 Disciplinary Climate (T007)'. in *PISA 2018 Results*. Vol. 3. OECD.

OECD. 2019b. 'Chapter 4 Truancy and Lateness (T008)'. in *PISA 2018 Results*. Vol. 3. OECD.

OECD. 2019c. 'Chapter 12 Student Feelings (T016)'. in *PISA 2018 Results*. Vol. 3. OECD.

OECD. 2019d. 'Society at Glance 2019: A Spotlight on LGBT People'.

OECD. 2021. 'Japan. Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators'. *OECD Library.* Retrieved September 2021 (https://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/sites/1426642c-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/1426642c-en).

Oguma, Eiji. 2002. *A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Okano, Kaori. 1997. 'Third-Generation Koreans' Entry into the Workforce in Japan'. *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 28(4):524–49.

Okano, Kaori H., ed. 2016. *Nonformal Education and Civil Society in Japan*. New York: Routledge.

Okano, Kaori H. 2018. 'Japan: The Localization Approach and an Emerging Trend Toward the Study of Poverty Within Ethnicity and Inequality'. in *The Palgrave Handbook of Race and Ethnic Inequalities in Education*. Vol. 2, edited by P. A. J. Stevens and G. A. Dworkin. Ebook: Palgrave Macmillan.

Omagari, Yukiko. 2010. '*Zaigaku-Ritsu to Tsūgaku-Ritsu Kara Miru Ainichi Gaikoku Hito Seishōnen No Kyōiku: 2000-Nen Kokuseichōsa Dēta No Bunseki Kara* (Enrollment and Attendance Rate, the Education for Foreign Youth in Japan: Analysis of 2000 Census Data)'. *Asia-Pacific Research Center Annual Report* 31–38.

Park, Robert E. 1914. 'Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups With Particular Reference to the Negro'. *American Journal of Sociology* 19(5):606–23. doi: 10.1086/212297.

Park, Robert E., and Ernest W. Burgess. 1921. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Peng, Huan-Sheng, and Jo-Ying Chu. 2017. 'Japan's Colonial Policies – from National Assimilation to the Kominka Movement: A Comparative Study of Primary Education in Taiwan and Korea (1937–1945)'. *Paedagogica Historica* 53(4):441–59.

Perlmann, Joel, and Roger Waldinger. 1997. 'Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Present - A Reconsideration'. *The International Migration Review* 31(4):893–922.

Phillips, Anne. 2007. *Multiculturalism without Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Piper, Nicola. 1999. 'Labor Migration, Trafficking and International Marriage: Female Cross-Border Movements into Japan'. *Asian Journal of Women Studies* 5(2):69–99.

Pitzalis, di Marco. 2012. 'Effetti di campo. Spazio scolastico e riproduzione delle diseguaglianze'. *Scuola Democratica* 6:20.

Pivovarova, Margarita, and Jeanne M. Powers. 2019. 'Generational Status, Immigrant Concentration and Academic Achievement: Comparing First and Second-Generation Immigrants with Third-plus Generation Students'. *Large-Scale Assessments in Education* 7(1):7.

Plenty, Stephanie M., and Jan O. Jonsson. 2021. 'Students' Occupational Aspirations: Can Family Relationships Account for Differences Between Immigrant and Socioeconomic Groups?' *Child Development* 92(1):157–73.

Portes, Alejandro. 1994. 'Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath'. *The International Migration Review* 28(4):632–39.

Portes, Alejandro. 2021. 'Language and the Second Generation: Bilingualism Yesterday and Today'. *The International Migration Review* 28(640–661):23.

Portes, Alejandro, and Josh DeWind, eds. 2007. *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Portes, Alejandro, and Lingxin Hao. 2002. 'The Price of Uniformity: Language, Family and Personality Adjustment in the Immigrant Second Generation'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25(6):889–912.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: New York: University of California Press ; Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2005. 'Introduction: The Second Generation and the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28(6):983–99.

Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants'. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530:74–96.

Powell, Jaya Z. 2015. 'Denying Difference: Japanese Identity and the Myth of Monoethnic Japan'. Duke University, Durham, Noth Carolina.

Raabe, Isabel J. 2019. 'Social Exclusion and School Achievement: Children of Immigrants and Children of Natives in Three European Countries'. *Child Indicators Research* 12(3):1003–22.

Rappleye, Jeremy, and Hikaru Komatsu. 2020. 'Is Bullying and Suicide a Problem for East Asia's Schools? Evidence from TIMSS and PISA'. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 41(2):310–31.

Rawls, John. 1999. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Riessman, Catherine Kohler. 2008. 'Thematic Analysis'. Pp. 53–76 in *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences*. London: Sage.

Roberts, Glenda S. 1994. *Staying on the Line. Blue-Collar Women in Contemporary Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Robinson, Micheal E. 1998. '16 Broadcasting in Korean, 1924-1937: Colonial Modernity and Cultural Hegemony'. in *Japan's Comepting Modernities*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Romito, M. 2016. *Una scuola di classe. Orientamento e disuguaglianza nelle transizioni scolastiche*. Milano: Guerini e Associati.

Rumbaut, Ruben G. 1994. 'The Crucible within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation among Children of Immigrants'. *International Migration Review* 28(4):748–94.

Rumbaut, Ruben G. 1997. 'Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rhetoric and Reality'. *The International Migration Review* 31(4):923–60.

Sato, Yoshimichi. 2010. 'Stability and Increasing Fluidity in the Contemporary Japanese Social Stratification System'. *Contemporary Japan* 22(1–2). doi: 10.1515/cj.2010.003.

Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. 1991. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. New York: W. W. Norton Company.

Sekimizu, Teppei. 2021. '"Hikikomori" and Dependency on Family: Focusing on Father–Son Relationships'. *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 30(1):182–96.

Shibutani, Tamotsu, and Kian M. Kwan. 1965. *Ethnic Stratification*. New York: McMillan.

Shinichiro, Takakura, and John A. Harrison. 1960. 'The Ainu of Northern Japan: A Study in Conquest and Acculturation'. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 50(4):1–88.

Shipper, Apichai W. 2006. 'Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan'. *Pacific Affairs* 79(2):269–89.

Shūjūtoshi. 2010. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2009'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2011. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2010'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2012. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2011'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2013. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2012'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2014. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2013'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2015. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2014'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2016. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2015'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2017. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2016'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2018. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2017'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2019. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2018'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2020a. '*Ryō Wa Ninendo Kaiin Toshi Dēta* (Reiwa 2nd - 2020 Year Member City Data)'.

Shūjūtoshi. 2020b. 'Shūjūtoshi's Annual Meeting Report 2019'.

Simons, Sarah E. 1901a. 'Social Assimilation. I'. *American Journal of Sociology* 6(6):790–822. doi: 10.1086/211021.

Simons, Sarah E. 1901b. 'Social Assimilation. II'. *American Journal of Sociology* 7(1):53–79. doi: 10.1086/211032.

Simons, Sarah E. 1901c. 'Social Assimilation IV. Assimilation in the Modern World'. *American Journal of Sociology* 7(3):386–404.

Simons, Sarah E. 1901d. 'Social Assimilation V. Assimilation in the Modern World'. *American Journal of Sociology* 7(4):539–56.

Simons, Sarah E. 1901e. 'Social Assimilation. VII. Assimilation in the Modern World'. *American Journal of Sociology* 7(2):234–48.

Solano, Giacomo, and Thomas Huddleston. 2020. *Migrant Integration Policy Index. Measuring Policies to Integrate Migrants across Five Continents*. Barcelona, Brussels: CIDOB and MPG.

Song, Sara. 2010. 'Multiculturalism'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2011. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Shusshinji Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Gaikokujin Tourokusha* (Table 2 - Foreign Registrants by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age and Gender 2010)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2012. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Shusshinji Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Gaikokujin Tourokusha* (Table 2 - Foreign Registrants by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age and Gender 2011)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2013. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Shusshinji Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Gaikokujin Tourokusha* (Table 2 - Foreign Registrants by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age and Gender 2012)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2014. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2013)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2015a. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2014)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2015b. '*Heisei 27-Nen Kokuseichōsa Shūgyō Jōtai-Tō Kihon Shūkei (Rōdō-Ryoku Jōtai, Shūgyō-Sha No Sangyō Shokugyō Nado)* (2015 National Census Basic Tabulation of Employment Status, Etc. (Labor Force Status, Industry / Occupation of Workers, Etc.) Table 00910'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2015c. '*Heisei 27-Nen Kokuseichōsa Shūgyō Jōtai-Tō Kihon Shūkei (Rōdō-Ryoku Jōtai, Shūgyō-Sha No Sangyō Shokugyō Nado)* (2015 National Census Basic Tabulation of Employment Status, Etc. (Labor Force Status, Industry / Occupation of Workers, Etc.) Table 03210'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2016. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2015)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2017. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2016)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2018. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2017)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2019a. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2018)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2019b. 'Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2020a. '*Dai 1-Hyō-Toshi Yowai (Kaku-Sai), Danjo Betsu Jinkō Oyobi Jinkōseihi - Sō Jinkō, Nihonjin Jinkō (2019-Nen 10 Tsuki 1-Nichi Genzai)* (Table 1 - Population by Age (by Single Year), Gender. Total Population, Japanese Population (as of October 1, 2019))'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2020b. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2019)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2021a. '*Dai 2 Hyou - Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Nenrei/Danjou Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 2 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and Age/Gender 2020)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2021b. '*Dai 4 Hyou - Todoufuken Betsu Kokuseki/Chiiki Betsu Zairyuu Gaikokujin* (Table 4 - Foreign Residents by Nationality/Area of Origin and City/Village/Region of Residence 2020)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2021c. '*Ryō Wa 2-Nen 1 Tsuki 1-Nichi Jūmin Kihon Daichō Jinkō Setai-Sū,-Rei Wa Gan'nen (Heisei 31-Nen 1 Tsuki 1-Nichi Kara Ryō Wa Gan'nen 12 Tsuki 31-Nichi Made) Jinkō Dōtai (Todōfuken-Betsu) (Sōkei)* (January 1st, 2nd Reiwa Year (2020) Basic Resident Register Population / Number of Households. 1st Reiwa Year (2019) Population by Village, City, Prefecture)'.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2021d. '*Sankou Hyou Zenkoku Jinko No Suii* ((Reference Table) Evolution of National Population)'.

Strobel, Bernadette. 2016. 'Does Family Language Matter? The Role of Foreign Language Use and Family Social Capital in the Educational Achievement of Immigrant Students in Germany'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39(14):2641–63.

Sugimoto, Yoshio. 2010. *An Introduction to Japanese Society*. 3rd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suzuki, Nobue. 2005. 'Filipina Modern: "Bad" Filipino Women in Japan'. Pp. 159–73 in *Bad Girls of Japan*, edited by L. Miller and J. Bardsley. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Takahashi, Fumiko. 2016. '`*Bunka' No Tekiō to Iji Kara Miru Nihon-Gata Tabunkakyōsei Shakai ― Nyūkamā Jidō Seito o Oshieru Kyōshi e No Intabyū Chōsa ―* (Japanese-Style Multicultural Society from the Perspective of Adaptation and Maintenance of "Culture" -Interview Survey with Teachers Teaching Newcomer Children and Students-)'. *I Bunka-Kan Kyōiku* 44:33–46.

Takenaka, Ayumi. 2009. 'Ethnic Hierarchy and Its Impact on Ethnic Identities: A Comparative Analysis of Peruvian and Brazilian Return-Migrants in Japan'. P. 24 in *Diasporic Homecomings. Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Tsuda. Stanford University.

Takenoshita, Hirohisa. 2017. 'The Impact of the Recent Economic Crisis on Unemployment Among Immigrants in Japan'. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 18(2):563–85.

Takenoshita, Hirohisa, Yoshimi Chitose, Shigehiro Ikegami, and Eunice Akemi Ishikawa. 2014. 'Segmented Assimilation, Transnationalism, and Educational Attainment of Brazilian Migrant Children in Japan'. *International Migration* 52(2):84–99. doi: 10.1111/imig.12057.

Takeuchi, Yo. 1991. 'Myth and Reality in the Japanese Educational Selection System'. *Comparative Education* 27(1):101–12.

Tanabe, Shunsuke. 2021. 'Sociological Studies on Nationalism in Japan'. *International Sociology* 36(2):171–82.

Taylor, Charles. 1994. 'The Politics of Recognition'. Pp. 25–74 in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Terry, Gareth, and Virginia Braun. 2017. 'Short but Often Sweet: The Surprising Potential of Qualitative Survey Methods'. in *Collecting Qualitative Data. A practical guide to textual media and virtual techniques*, edited by V. Braun, V. Clarke, and D. Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Institue of Statistical Mathematics. 2017. 'Study on the Japanese National Character'. *Kokuminsei*. Retrieved June 2019 (https://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/en/index_e.html).

The Japan Times. 2022. 'Foreign Visitors to Japan in 2021 Fell to Record Low 245,900'.

Tilly, Charles. 2001. 'Mechanisms in Political Porcesses'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4(1):21–41. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.21.

Tokunaga, Tomoko. 2018. 'Possibilities and Constraints of Immigrant Students in The Japanese Educational System'. *2019 GEM Report*.

Tokunaga, Tomoko, Misako Nukaga, and Fumiko Takahashi. 2018. 'Growing up in Multicultural Japan: Diversifying Educational Experiences Of Immigrant Students'. in *Japanese Education in a Global Age, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects*. Vol. 46. Singapore: Springer.

Tsuda, Takeyuki. 1999. 'The Permanence of "Temporary" Migration: The "Structural Embeddedness" of Japanese-Brazilian Immigrant Workers in Japan'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58(3):687–722.

Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2006. *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in a Comparative Prospective*. Oxford: Lexington Books.

Tsuda, Takeyuki, and Changzoo Song, eds. 2019. *Diasporic Returns to the Ethnic Homeland: The Korean Diaspora in Comparative Perspective*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Tsuneyoshi, Ryoko, Kaori Okano, and Sarane Spence Boocock. 2011. *Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan: An Interactive Perspective*. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Tubergen, Frank van. 2010. 'Determinants of Second Language Proficiency among Refugees in the Netherlands'. *Social Forces* 89(2):515–34.

Turner, Ralph H. 1960. 'Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System'. *American Sociological Review* 25(6):855.

Ukita, Katsutami. 1910. 'Kankoku Heigou No Kouka Ikan (The Effect of Annexation to Korea)'. *Taiyou* 16(13).

United Nations. 2019. 'International Migrant Stock 2019'. Retrieved June 2020 (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp).

Van Heelsum, Anja. 2013. 'The Influence of Interviewers' Ethnic Background in a Survey among Surinamese in the Netherlands'. in *Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrants Populations, Methodological Challenges and research Strategies*, edited by J. Font and M. Mendez. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Vargas, Joel H. 2004. *College Knowledge: Addressing Information Barriers to College*. Boston: The Education Resources Institute.

Vermeulen, Hans. 2010. 'Segmented Assimilation and Cross-National Comparative Research on the Integration of Immigrants and Their Children'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(7):1214–30.

Waldinger, Roger, and Joel Perlmann. 1998. 'Second Generations: Past, Present, Future'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24(1):5–24.

Walker, Brett L. 2001. *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wang, Yijie, and Aprile D. Benner. 2014. 'Parent-Child Discrepancies in Educational Expectations: Differential Effects of Actual Versus Perceived Discrepancies'. *Child Development* 85(3):891–900.

Warner, Lloyd W., and Leo Srole. 1960. *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Warner, R. Stephen. 2007. 'The Role of Religion in the Process of Segmented Assimilation'. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 612(1):100–115.

Waters, Mary C. 1990. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weaver, Matthew. 2010. 'Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has "Utterly Failed"'. *The Guardian*, 3.

Wieviorka, Michel. 2013. 'The Re-Enchantment of Universal Values: Given as the 2013 ERS Lecture at City University London, May 2013'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(12):1943–56.

Wilkinson, Jane. 2000. 'Tourism and Ainu Identity, Hokkaido, Northern Japan'. in *Souvenirs: The Material cultural of Tourism*. London: Routledge.

Yamamoto, Yoko. 2014. 'Immigrant Children's Schooling and Family Processes in Japan: Trends, Challenges, Adn Implications'. Pp. 55–74 in *Global Perspectives on Well-Being in Immigrant Families*, edited by R. Dimitrova, M. Bender, and F. J. R. Van de Vijver.

Yamanaka, Keiko. 2000. 'Nepalese Labour Migration to Japan: From Global Warriors to Global Workers'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(1):62–93.

Yoneyama, Shoko, and Asao Naito. 2003. 'Problems with the Paradigm: The School as a Factor in Understanding Bullying (with Special Reference to Japan)'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 24(3):315–30. doi: 10.1080/01425690301894.

Yoshino, Kosaku. 1995. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan a Sociological Enquiry*. London: Routledge.

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Zhang, Jing, Hsiu-Lan Cheng, and Kimberlee Barrella. 2022. 'Longitudinal Pathways to Educational Attainment and Health of Immigrant Youth in Young Adulthood: A Comparative Analysis'. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*.

Zhou, Min. 1997a. 'Growing Up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 23:63–95.

Zhou, Min. 1997b. 'Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation'. *International Migration Review* 31(4):975–1008.

Zimmerman, Barry J., Albert Bandura, and Manuel Martinez-Pons. 1992. 'Self-Motivation for Academic Attainment: The Role of Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Personal Goal Setting'. *American Educational Research Journal* 29(3):663–76.

Zolberg, Aristide R., and Long Litt Woon. 1999. 'Why Islam Is like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and United States'. *Politics & Society* 27(1):5–38.