At the intersection of Behavioural Economics, Nudging and Regulation: Rethinking the process of nudge design for regulation

Alongside the developments in behavioural economics, the concept of nudge was introduced as an intervention able to guide individual behaviour towards better choices without using coercion or incentives. While behavioural teams were created inside governmental units and regulatory authorities, nudging emerged in regulatory discourse, being increasingly regarded as a regulatory instrument that could overcome the disadvantages of other tools. This thesis analyses the viability of incorporating nudges into regulation. In particular, it investigates the implications for regulators of bringing iterative experimental testing – a widespread nudge design methodology outside regulation – into their own design practices. Nudges outside regulation are routinely designed using experiments of all kinds. This thesis intends to answer whether design premises rooted in iterative experimentation are still valid in the regulatory space, an arena that nudging entered into and that is distinct from the one where it originally emerged. The design and provision of nudges using the premises of iterative experimental testing is possible, but at a cost and burden for regulatory nudge designers. Therefore, the thesis evaluates how this burden can be reduced, in particular how nudges can be feasibly designed and provided through regulation or, put differently, how to more efficiently design and provide nudging as a regulatory tool.