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TITOLO TESI

YOUTH IN AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A DEVELOPMENT TREND

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Okonkwo was clearly cut out for great things. He was still young but he had won fame as the greatest wrestler in the nine villages. He was a wealthy farmer and had two barns full of yams, and had just married his third wife. To crown it all he had taken two titles and had shown incredible prowess in two inter-tribal wars. And so although Okonkwo was still young, he was already one of the greatest men of his time. Age was respected among his people, but achievement was revered. As the elders said, if a child washed his hands he could eat with kings. Okonkwo had clearly washed his hands and so he ate with kings and elders. (Achebe, 2001, p. 6-7)

“Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity” (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 335)
ABSTRACT

In the history of development policy making for Africa there have been many major changes between the themes and issues that have received the attention and budgets of governments and donors. Different approaches to development, swinging from structural adjustments to market liberalisations, have focused, sequentially, on environmental issues, democratisation, health (HIV/AIDS), and gender issues. Consecutively, new demographic, economic and political bottlenecks have been identified, giving rise to new trends in development policy making and budgeting – what I will refer to in this thesis as ‘development trends’.

Recently, the demographic boom on the African continent, and the consequent challenge of unemployment, has fuelled a focus on ‘youth’. Given that the majority of the African population resides in rural areas, the emphasis of development policies for youth has focused on their employability in the agricultural sector. While the commercialisation of agriculture, as a development theme, has alternated with a focus on food security for decades, the emphasis on youth in agribusiness has come to dominate development policy making and budgeting in the past five years (with country-specific variations). Yet, the ‘youthfulness’ and booming demography on the African continent have not come as a surprise. The mean age of the African population has been oscillating between 17 and 19 years since the ‘1950s’, while the sheer size of the population has steadily grown at a 2.0-2.8% rate in the same period. This thesis seeks to understand how these demographics have turned into a trend only recently despite the lingering youth problematique.

The main research question of this dissertation is: How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in development around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far? This study attempts to answer this question for the case of Uganda. Reflecting the demographic trends on the African continent, Uganda has an exceptionally young population, which is mostly employed in agriculture. Like in other countries throughout Africa, over the past few years, increasing attention and budgets have been placed on engaging youths in

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agribusiness. Moreover, Uganda’s relation with the (international) community has also followed rather average patterns. Thus, while unique in many ways, Uganda is a ‘typical case study’ both as an aid recipient and as a participant in the development trend focusing on youth in agribusiness.

I studied the emergence of the development trend on youth in agribusiness from two angles: conducting ethnographic research with both development practitioners engaged in the field of agribusiness, and youths working both inside and outside of development schemes. In total, I interviewed 24 representatives of development agencies and 110 youths living in four regions of the country. I also engaged in participant observation, joining development practitioners for field visits, sitting in high-level meetings, and interacting with youths during their agribusiness activities at the markets, in the agricultural fields and visiting their households.

From my research, it became apparent that development partners have a range of ‘theories of change’ regarding youths in agribusiness. In particular, while some development agencies took a public-sector approach, others took a private-sector driven approach. Correspondingly, the implementation and impact of these programmes was very diverse across the country and depended mainly on the geographical location and the approach adopted. From my interviews with youths, I also found that this socially constructed category was very heterogeneous. The diversity that characterises this group has strong impact on the implementation of the programmes. The most successful programmes were those that took into account youths’ heterogeneity and geographical specificities.

Altogether, I find that the social category of youth is too vaguely defined to effectively guide development programmes. Development programmes considerably changed, from the elaboration of theories of change to the implementation of the programmes, and the political agendas and incentives of the development organisations required strenuous negotiations and adaptations. In other words, besides the gap in development narratives and actual practices on the ground, there are gaps between and also within the narratives and practices of both groups of development actors (practitioners and youths). There is contestation at all levels, which has consistent impact on the outcomes of the programmes. Theoretically, my research suggests that development, and the implementation of a
development trend like youth in agribusiness, should be understood and studied as a complex process in which social actors enforce power mechanisms, rather than as the enactment of policies into practices.
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1.1 Introduction

1.2 Research problem: why youth in agribusiness?
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1.3 Development in Uganda
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1.7 Structure of the thesis
“‘Youth is just a word’, wrote Bourdieu (1993), referring to the arbitrary and contextual definitions of this social category. As a phase between childhood and adulthood, ‘youth’ is a condition of liminality, marginal and transient in nature. However, despite the apparent marginality of this social category, the concept of ‘youth’ has recently assumed a prominent role in public debates about development in Africa. With a median age that is half that of the European population, the African population is expected to double by 2050 - generating a ‘youth bulge’. With the majority of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture, youth unemployment has become a major concern across the continent. In the past few years, development agencies have brought African youths under the spotlight. Despite the uncertainty and fuzziness that characterises its definitions (Sommers, 2015), ‘youth’ has become the object of multi-million development programmes. Such demographic and economic concerns have fuelled a relatively new trend in development policy making, which aims at engaging youth in agribusiness. This study explores the unfolding of such trend in development, and its rationale and impact.

How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in development around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far?

This study focuses on the case of Uganda, one of the world’s 47 least-developed countries, and the country with the second youngest population on the continent (in terms of median age). I have chosen the Ugandan context as a ‘typical case study’ (Gerring, 2008). As I will show below (sections 1.2.3 and 1.3), the political-economic history of the country, together

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2 ‘Liminality’ is a fundamental concept in anthropological research that refers to a phase ‘in between’ rites of passage, life stages, or anyway uncertainty and ambiguity of the social status of human beings in this stage. The main academic work on this theme is to be attributed to Arnold van Gennep, who, in 1909, published the founding manuscript ‘Rites of Passage’ (van Gennep, 2006)

3 Data accessed on 2/10/2018 on: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/

with its experience as a donor darling, make it a representative case of how such trend in development is adopted in similar African contexts.

Since about 2015, with the second National Development Plan, ‘youth in agribusiness’ has entered the scene of development policy making in Uganda as a major subject. An increasing number of programmes and growing budgets by multilateral, bilateral and Ugandan governmental institutions have been targeting youths. ‘Youth in agribusiness’ has become a multi-million business: a new development trend.

However, little is known as to what defines ‘youth’ in Uganda, and what youths’ capacities and constraints are for agribusiness. With 78% of the population under 30 years of age, defining this social category is as arduous as necessary. Due to the heterogeneity that can be expected of a majoritarian social group, it remains unclear: 1) how have the Ugandan youths been targeted by development agencies? 2) who are the Ugandan youths and what do they think of these programmes? 3) and what has been the socio-economic impact of the programmes? These three questions will be the main focus of the three empirical chapters that follow.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the following section (1.2) I introduce the research problem that I am going to address with this study – namely the rationale of addressing youth in agribusiness with development programmes. First (sub-section 1.2.1), I problematize ‘youth’ as a contested social category. Second (sub-section 1.2.2), I contextualise the choice of engaging youth in agribusiness. Third (sub-section 1.2.3) I justify the choice of Uganda as case study for my research. In the following section (1.3), I give the reader and overview of the political-economic context of the study, by contextualising the history of development in Uganda and explaining the recent trend in development which targets youth in agribusiness (sub-section 1.3.1). Within the frame of the contextualisation of this study, I dedicate section 1.3.2 to a brief political-economic history of Uganda since independence, with particular attention to the agricultural sector (sub-section 1.3.2a). In the following section (1.4), I introduce the theoretical approach I have adopted to carry out this study, within the framework of Foucauldian development studies. In section 1.5 I make an overview and justification of the methodological approach I adopted, combining anthropological methods to a Foucauldian approach. Subsequently (section 1.6), I briefly outline my findings and their
scientific (1.6.2) and societal (1.6.3) relevance. I conclude this chapter (section 1.7) with an overview of the structure of the manuscript.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM: WHY YOUTH IN AGribusiness?

The demographic and economic changes on the African continent over the past decades amount to a historical conjunction where the ‘youth’ are about to become a major social and economic share of the population. Increasingly, political and development initiatives focus on those between ages 18 and 35 for programmes that aim at reducing unemployment and boosting economic growth. From being a marginal category of passage from childhood to adulthood, ‘youth’ has become the prominent subject (or object) of development policy making. In the past decades, youth have been the target of development programmes concerned with education and health. Only recently, development programmes for youth have focused on their engagement in commercial agriculture (in opposition to subsistence agriculture) – or what is now called agribusiness. Programmes for youth in agribusiness in Africa are not new in development policy making, but have become, in the past five to ten years, a multi-million business. Uganda, the nation with youngest population in East Africa, and one of the youngest on the continent – has followed this trend. As I will explain in more detail below (1.2.3), the history of Uganda’s relation with development aid make it a typical case study.

Considering that the majority – 78% (UBOS, 2017) – of the Ugandan population is under 30 years of age, it is hard to give an all-encompassing definition of youth, beyond an age bracket. The arbitrary choice of an age range defines the boundaries of a social category, while such category has little explanatory power of who the youths actually are. In the section (1.2.1) below, I problematize this definitional problem. Moreover, I question the choice of development organisations to seek employment for the Ugandan youth within the agribusiness sector (sub-section 1.2.2). I conclude this section with an explanation of my choice of Uganda as case study for my research on the adoption and implementation of this new trend in development policy making.
1.2.1 YOUTH – A CONTESTED SOCIAL CATEGORY

There is not a fixed moment in our lives when we stop being children to enter adulthood. Rather, this transition is determined culturally within our specific social environments (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, p. 11-20). Calculating age can be an arithmetical, quantitative given – yet, it is the qualitative value that we culturally attribute to it that is functional to social status (ibid: 18-19). Africa is the continent with the youngest population: the median age is half that of the European continent. Like in the rest of the world stages in life are defined as social categories – childhood, ‘youth’ and ‘adulthood’ – within specific cultural environments. Yet, these categories are not static, but continuously adapt and transform depending on changes in society, politics and economics. In Europe, the conceptualisation of ‘childhood’ dates back to the 19th and 20th centuries and goes hand in hand with the industrialisation, the high demand for child labour, and the rise of the bourgeoisie (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, p. 12-13). With the schooling (of the bourgeoisie) and the exploitation (of the working class) of the young, new ideas and rituals were created around passages between age-related social categories – for example the celebration of birthdays.

When I travelled to Uganda for the first time I was 27, young, and thus belonged to a minor segment of the aging European population. I was beginning an extended ethnographic research on youth in agribusiness in Uganda, a country where the wide majority of the population is younger than me. In my home country, Italy, the mean age was almost 46 in 2015. Meanwhile in Uganda the mean age was almost 16.\(^5\) The same social category of youth, between 18 and 35\(^6\), must mean different things in such extremely different demographic contexts – let alone the socio-cultural and economic differences that distinguished my experience of being young from that of my Ugandan peers. I was to find out that indeed being young meant different things throughout the country, and that indeed because of the heterogeneity it brought along, it was a social category with little explanatory


\(^6\) This age bracket is the broadest possible bracket, accommodating the definitions of all development organisations I worked with.
power. Yet, the same category was the target of multi-millions development programmes. ‘Youth’ is a double, ambiguous, social category: on the one hand, it has elusive socio-cultural meaning, on the other hand it is the object of much development attention and resources.

In fact, being young also refers to the effort towards adulthood and planning for a future of stability: youths in Europe study longer, enter the job market later, and marry even later. However, there are great differences in the socio-economic conditions of youths in Europe – which are also reflected in the cultural conceptualisation of this social category (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, p. 60-63). Cultural and socio-economic heterogeneity in the understanding of youth vary greatly also within one country. The use of the concept of ‘youth’ needs to be contextualised (in Europe as much as in Africa), and cannot be projected on diverse socio-cultural environments without problematization. On the contrary, the definition of youth that is used by development programmes, is often limited to an age-range (Sommers, 2015).

In Uganda, ‘youth’ indicates the interval between childhood and adulthood. Like in Europe, there are countless reasons to imagine a heterogeneous group of people responding to the age range between 18 and 35. 43 languages are spoken across the country, which has strong regional disparities. In such diverse socio-cultural environment, it is hard to imagine that youth has one meaning. As Christiansen et al. (2006, p. 10) explain:

Though all too many anthropological, sociological and psychological studies have granted the concept of youth and a priori meaning, seeing it as a developmental or life stage, the transition from childhood to adulthood should not be considered fixed and stable. Generational categories will for most of us – layman and researcher alike – seem self-evident, but rather than being given naturally their meaning and manifestations arise in relation to specific social processes, cultural understandings and historical influences (cf. Mannheim 1952). Youth is differently constituted and configured in different times and places. It may be an influential social category in one context, a marginal one in another and obsolete in a third.

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7 Ethnologue, visited on 3/08/2018 on: https://www.ethnologue.com/country/UG
During my time in Uganda, I found that in the northern and the south-western regions entering and leaving the category of ‘youth’ is a generational process: youth is the liminal phase, which ideally is rather short, in which socio-economic status is accumulated in order to access adulthood – generally through marriage. On the other hand, in the eastern region, the social category of youth does not even have a term in the local language – one would suspect that ‘youth’ does not exist. A direct passage from childhood to adulthood is marked by the initiation rites of passage of circumcision (for males), and with marriage (for females). As I was told (among others) by Alex⁸, a “young but adult” male from Mbale, in his twenties:

Me: When someone, before someone is circumcised, do you call that person a different name?
Alex: Of course! For me as I told you now, for me no one in our family can call me a “ka-boy”
Me: a Ka-boy?
Interpreter: It means “small boy”
Me: Ooh, small boy?
Alex: Yeah, they cannot call me that, now. They give me respect as a mature man.
Me: Ok. Because you were standing still while being circumcised?
Alex: Yeah. As a mature man and I’m circumcised, I put my heart there to circumcise me [i.e. he showed he was brave and faced the pain of circumcision].
Interpreter: And you didn’t blink [i.e. didn’t show he was in pain]?
Alex: Yeah. Now, they give me respect, I am a man and they see me as a mature, yeah...and I can talk in front of the elderly.

Between being considered a ka-boy and being a respected, mature man, the young boy is tested on his achievements, economic status, and future planning. This phase of liminality, an in-between phase, does not even deserve a proper terminology and is shun away. Due to the lack of terminology in the local language – ‘lugisu’ – in the eastern region the English term ‘youth’ is used, when referring to this liminal phase. ‘Youth’ is associated with poverty, and the related precarious condition of being unable to plan for the future. So I was told by

⁸ This conversation took place in Kampala on 5/05/2017
Richard⁹, a 33 years old agricultural entrepreneur – or ‘agripreneur’, i.e. someone who moved from subsistence farming to commercial agribusiness. “The youths plan for today – you know? The majority, they... they don’t know how tomorrow will end. What I’m seeing is that poverty is very hard, to fight poverty is hard but we are trying” – as Richard told me, youths are struggling with poverty and therefore are unable to settle and plan for their future, which is his definition of adulthood.

As figure 1 demonstrates, the population of Uganda has been growing steadily in the past two decades, at a percent rate of 3.2 annum (UBOS, 2017). Currently, 78% of the population is under 30 years of age. Approaching 40 million, the Ugandan population faces a ‘youth bulge’ – with nearly 50% of the population under 15 years of age.

![Census Population](image)


The major concern regarding this rapid (and foreseen) population growth is unemployment. As Datzberger (2018, p. 132) argues, this condition is not unique to Uganda – as much as the very definition of the issue of youth unemployment remains elusive: “As in many low-income countries, youth unemployment is pervasive, though no accurate figures are available on the exact percentage of how many youths are without a stable job. Depending on the definition of ‘unemployment’ and what counts as ‘youth’ estimates on Uganda’s youth unemployment

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⁹ Richard, Mbale, 15/06/2017
rates vary tremendously by source.” Defining unemployment as “individuals not working at all, actively looking for work and are available for work”, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics records a 4.9% of youth unemployment rate for 2017 (2017, p. 33). On the other hand, the World Bank\(^\text{10}\), who focus on formal youth unemployment, declared a youth unemployment rate of 63% in 2012 (down from 83% in 2009) (Datzberger, 2018, p. 132). Despite the fuzziness of definitions and statistics, it is evident that youths are competing for little employment opportunities. Reflecting the public discourse, the media have been talking of Ugandan youth (especially youth male unemployment, though young women are suffering from even higher unemployment rates) as a “ticking time bomb”\(^\text{11}\), threatening national security and political stability.

As a consequence, the social category of youth is extending because of the inability of men to achieve the socio-economic status required to be considered an adult (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014) (Sommers, 2015). The transition from one phase to another becomes diluted, while the rites that culturally demarcated the passage to adulthood lose their meaning (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014). Eriasa\(^\text{12}\), a 33 years-old agripreneur from Mount Elgon in the east, stressed for instance, how the ritual of circumcision has lost its meaning in recent years. With disappointment, he told me, “Now even if a child is ten years they can circumcise and that does not mean the child has grown [into an adult]. In the past they used to circumcise at 20 years, then later it was 18 but at the moment they even circumcise children. But it is our ritual although it doesn’t define adulthood anymore.”

It seems that the category of youth is a consequence of modernity, as the number of young people grow competing for limited resources. At the same time, despite being a growing majority of the population, youth are a marginalized group in socio-economic terms. For these reasons Sommers (2015, p. 13) refers to youth in contexts of poverty, as ‘failed adulthood’. As a consequence of “ structural marginalisation”, which (...) has cultural, political, and economic roots: rigid cultural criteria that stipulate the constituents of adulthood, a state that provides less and less to its citizens, and a weak economy” (Sommers,


\(^{11}\) Ugandan Monitor, article from 7/04/2012: http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-1381200-ara4ho/index.html

\(^{12}\) Eriasa, Mbale, 14/06/2017
2015, p. 13). And therefore, while having outgrown the age of youth, they socially remain ‘youthmen’ (ibid). As described by Sommers, youth is a category of transition where there is little pride in being considered ‘young’, and access to adulthood is frustrated by competition for scarce resources, among a growing number of youths.

1.2.2 YOUTH IN AGRIBUSINESS

The most accessible way of providing income for youths, as for the rest of Ugandan population, is agriculture. Agriculture is the backbone of the Ugandan economy and the main source of (informal) employment. In fact, according to the World Bank (2013), 60% of the population is engaged in agriculture and 68% of the working population are youths between 15-34 years old. However, the career perspectives of youths in agriculture are dependent on the elderly, who own most of the land.

During my fieldwork, I have often been overwhelmed by the fact that while young people constituted the majority in most social contexts, their attitude towards elderly was reverential. More than a gerontocracy, elderly in all regions of Uganda hold a normative power that is seldom questioned. They (mostly the eldest man in the family) decide on matters of marriage, education and inheritance. Therefore, they hold a crucial position of power in youths’ access to land, and ultimately their entrance into adulthood.

Despite the rapid urbanisation, which has resulted in a three-fold growth in the Ugandan population from 2002 to 2014 (UBOS, 2017, p. 14), the majority of the population lives in rural areas (Fan & Zhang, 2012). For these reasons, development programmes targeting youths focus on their engagement in agriculture as a business – agribusiness – or commercial agriculture. Moreover, agribusiness is also seen as a way of slowing rural-urban migration. Development cooperation has focused on the following major issues: yields productivity, commercialization of agriculture, and infrastructures and transport for the accessibility to agri-food markets. The general trend for rural development has been that of a neoliberal

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13 The youngest populations seem to be led by the eldest leaders, particularly in Africa – the youngest continent. Uganda follows this trend: https://qz.com/africa/1162490/the-youngest-continent-keeps-on-being-run-by-the-oldest-leaders/
approach to agricultural industrialization, with the goal of moving away from subsistence agriculture. Nonetheless, the latter remains the most dominant form of agricultural engagement (Gollin & Rogerson, 2010).

1.2.3 COUNTRY SELECTION: WHY UGANDA?

The trend in development supporting youth in agribusiness is widespread on the African continent. The investments in this sector have been driven by policies from major multilateral and bilateral donors. One of the main multilateral programmes for youth in agribusiness is promoted by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the ENABLE Youth programme\(^{14}\); while one of the main bilateral organisations in this sector is USAID. Several African governments have taken up on the this trend, prioritising programmes for youth employment in agribusiness – Uganda being one of them. The trend in development that prioritises youth’s engagement in agribusiness is widespread across the continent, with homogeneous solutions for the various countries.

One of the top-10 recipients of international development aid\(^ {15}\), Uganda is a representative case of how aid is absorbed and spent (Aiyar, Berg, & Hussain, 2005). As I will show in more detail in the next section (1.3), Uganda has entertained an intense and rather stable relation with donors since the 1980s. Uganda has been considered ‘development poster boy’ for development programmes (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 132). Like other developing countries in Africa, Uganda has undergone shifts in international development strategies – from structural adjustment to the post-Washington consensus liberalisation. In Uganda, the implementation of the development trends that followed one another in the past decades was quite typical in comparison to other countries (as I argue in chapter 3).

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Anywhere in Uganda, from the most remote rural area to the urban jungle of the capital city Kampala, a puzzling fact confronts the observer: everybody is so young! Uganda has the second youngest population, after Niger\textsuperscript{16} – and the youngest of East Africa, the most populous region of the continent. 78% of the population is under 30, and nearly 23% of the total population is in the age group of 18-30 (the Uganda constitutional definition of youth) – about twice the European average\textsuperscript{17}. The median age in Uganda is around 16 – which seems exceptionally low against the European median age of 43 years. However, considering that the median age of sub-Saharan countries is 18 years\textsuperscript{18}, the Ugandan population is not far from the average. Most neighbouring countries in the east African region have a median age\textsuperscript{19} that is even lower than the sub-Saharan average. The fact that the majority of youths are employed in (subsistence) agriculture – in Uganda as in most sub-Saharan countries – is also not unusual. Like in other sub-Saharan countries, the composition of the Ugandan population exacerbates the demographic dynamics (youth bulge and employment challenges) driving development programmes to focus on youths.

Certainly, there are specificities to the Ugandan case (for example, the strong regional disparities). These are bound to socio-cultural factors and affect the way in which the development trend looks in practice, when implemented on the ground. These socio-cultural specificities, however, can be expected also in other African countries where the development trend around youth in agribusiness is implemented. These peculiarities, which are different for each country (and can take different forms, from heterogeneity to resistance), are in fact a constant trait emerging from development studies (Scott J. , 1976) (Methorst, Roep, Verstegen, & Wiskerke, 2017) (Escobar, 2012) (Murray Li, 2007). In my research, I pay close attention to these peculiarities, which I highlight as defining traits of youths’ identities, their capacity to engage in agribusiness and their relation to development

\textsuperscript{16} Statistics accessed on 16/09/2018 on: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/niger-population/
\textsuperscript{17} Statistics accessed on 16/09/2018 on: https://www.indexmundi.com/it/unione_europea/distribuzione_di_eta.html
\textsuperscript{18} Statistics accessed on 27/10/2018 on: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/
\textsuperscript{19} Statistics accessed on 27/10/2018 on http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/burundi-population/
programmes. Nonetheless, considering the ways in which programmes were implemented, Uganda is a typical case in many ways.

1.3 DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA

With this section I aim to put into historical perspective the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness by giving an overview of Uganda’s relation with development, since independence. Since the British left Uganda as colonisers in the 1960s, Uganda has received development aid from various multilateral and bilateral donors. As it is shown in the Figure 2 below, however, there has been a net increase in ODA (Official Development Assistance\(^\text{20}\)) in the late 1980s, with another spurt in aid in the early 2000s, around the time of the Millennium Development Goals. This phenomenon follows a rather consistent pattern in development financing. In fact, the two peaks in ODA disbursement are common to other African developing countries, as shown by Desrosiers and Swedlund (2018, p. 8).

\[\text{Figure 2: ODA received by Uganda (USD millions)}\]

\[^{20}\text{Stein (Stein, 2009, p. 13) explains that: “Official Development Assistance (ODA) generally includes grants and concessional loans (with a 25-percent grant component calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) from government and other official sources for development/welfare purposes”}\]
In the spring of 1987, the Ugandan government launched an Economic Recovery Programme with the substantial support of multilateral financial institutions, principally the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and DAC members. Stein (2009, p. 18) explains that:

The initial program involved a 77 percent devaluation (43 percent in real terms), an increase in all export crop prices, budgetary discipline, which improved through shifting access to bank credit for the private sector and parastatals rather than directly from the coffers of the government, foreign exchange controls that were to be replaced by an OGL (open general licensing) system, price control reductions and privatization of parastatals including the liberalization of the crop marketing system.

Uganda was abundantly rewarded by donors, resulting in “one of the most rapid increases of debt of any country in the world, rising by 571 percent between 1980 and 1998. Given the structural weaknesses of exports and their heavy reliance on cash crops like coffee, the debt/export ratio rose (…)” (Stein, 2009, p. 19). Despite the fact that aid began to slow down in the late 1990s, Uganda benefitted from the surge of budgeting for the Millennium Development Goals. In 2014, Uganda was in the top-10 ODA recipients in Africa. Nevertheless, Uganda remains in the United Nations (UN) list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Datzberger (2018, p. 133-134) explains that:

Uganda is a low-income country with a GDP per capita equivalent to 3 per cent of the world’s average. Although Uganda’s GNI (Gross National Income) increased

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significantly, by about 125%, between 1985 and 2012, it continues to suffer from a discriminatory global trading system with negative impacts on the national market due to USD 2.31 billions of exported goods alongside USD 5.52 billions of imported goods in 2015 alone.

In Uganda, like in other ‘developing countries’, standards and criteria are set as to what still needs to be achieved for a country to be considered developed. This “subtraction approach” – a developing country’s inability to be more like a developed country – has been the lens for mainstream economics’ reading of Africa’s chronic failure of growth (Jerven M., 2015, p. 2). With the National Development Plan (NDP) (GoU, 2015) and Vision 2040 (GoU, 2007), the Government of Uganda has set the ambitious objective of achieving the middle-income status by 2020 (yet does not seem to be on track to meet this deadline25).

1.3.1 A NEW TREND IN DEVELOPMENT

With the second NDP (GoU, 2015, p. 46), the Ugandan government committed to sustaining youth employment through various programmes of its ministries – mainly the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) with the Youth Livelihood Program (YLP). The curricula in the education sector had been renovated in 2008 with the purpose of strengthening the BTVET (business, technical, vocational education and training). Datzberger (2018, p. 133) noted how the focus on youths’ education for technical and entrepreneurial skills strengthened an orientation towards entrepreneurship as a skill for self-employment of youth: “entrepreneurship was introduced as a subject at both lower levels of education and at university with a view of imparting practical knowledge and skills to enable youth to become job creators in an environment with limited employment prospects.”

In 2012, the GoU launched the Uganda Youth Capital Venture Fund (UYCVF), which facilitated access to credit facilities to individual young entrepreneurs. This was succeeded by the Youth Livelihood Program (YLP), which ran from 2013 to 2018, and provided small loans to groups of youths with a business plan (mostly, in the agricultural sector). By setting the guidelines for

25 http://parliamentwatch.ug/will-uganda-become-a-middle-income-country-by-2020/#.W7UE9BMzbOQ
development focus and targets, the NDP also catalysed programmes from other development institutions. For example, the FAO has been collaborating with the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture to develop a strategy for the employment of youth in agriculture\textsuperscript{26}; the African Development Bank, which had funded the ENABLE Youth programme\textsuperscript{27} in West Africa, was piloting the programme in Uganda at the time of my fieldwork; CGIAR has been promoting research for development to engage youth in agricultural entrepreneurship\textsuperscript{28}, which in Uganda was mainly implemented by IITA. USAID\textsuperscript{29} through the programme ‘Feed the Future’ also invested in youth in agribusiness as a tool for rural development and poverty alleviation.

However, (youth) agro-entrepreneurial initiatives in development countries remain underexplored by both academics and development practitioners (Leeuwis, et al., 2014). In particular, little is known about the role of factors such as gender, level of education, marital status, location (urban/rural) (in chapter 5 I will show how these factors are crucially important). The very definition of ‘youth’ remains vaguely defined in development policies, and mostly is reduced to an age bracket, which varies based on the development agency. Depending on the development agency, it can be 15-24 (UN (Sommers, 2015)), 18-35 (AfDB\textsuperscript{30}), and 18-30 (Ugandan Constitution (GoU, 2015)).

Most programmes stress the component of entrepreneurship, which entails business and accountancy skills, next to the strictly agricultural techniques. Pushing youth to leave subsistence agriculture behind for a commercial, market-oriented type of agriculture, or a ‘agribusiness’. The entrepreneurial effort to enter agribusiness is described in development jargon as ‘agripreneurship’ – namely the “profitable marriage of agriculture and entrepreneurship” (Bairwa, Lakra, Kushwaha, Meena, & Kumar, 2014, p. 1), of which youths

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26}http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/resources/detail/en/c/1069622/
\item \textsuperscript{27}http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/agribusiness-seen-as-a-solution-to-high-youth-unemployment-on-the-continent-13293/
\item \textsuperscript{28}CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework 2016-2030: https://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/3865/CGIAR%20Strategy%20and%20Results%20Framework.pdf?sequence=1
\item \textsuperscript{29}https://chemonics.com/projects/creating-opportunities-youth-agriculture/
\end{itemize}
would be ‘agripreneurs’. In this way, the approach resonates with James Scott’s analysis of development more broadly, in which he argues that development policy frequently transforms common villagers into “untrammelled Schumpeterian entrepreneurs and price and profit become the major standards” (1976, p. 23). Price and profit become the major standards of success, stressing the neoliberal values inherent to agribusiness development programmes.

Moreover, there is a political component to the trend of targeting youths, which cannot be overlooked. 78% of the population is under 30 years of age – and was thus born under the current government, since the current president, Museveni, has been in power since 1986. At the same time, youth between 18 and 30 constitute more than half Uganda’s voters (Datzberger, 2018, p. 135). In fact, as it was reported to me several times, off-record, by Ugandan civil servants who asked to remain anonymous, that programmes targeting youths have the additional function of satisfying the electorate and calming public unrest over unemployment. This perspective on the political function of programmes targeting youths was also confirmed by the most outspoken informants in the field. One of them in particular, a reverend on the slopes of Mount Elgon in the east, entertained me at length with his sceptical views of governmental interests in development programmes for youths – one afternoon in late June while we were stuck by a torrential rain. He told me:

For me, I feel they [politicians] know the population of the youth is very high, and you convince the youth to rally [politically, for election purposes] behind you...you will go through [i.e. ‘you’ll be elected’]. And how do you convince these youths to rally behind you? is to talk big “we shall do this... we shall do this... we shall do this”. And I think that is the biggest problem with our government they talk big and they do very little. When it comes to talking of how they are going to help the youth...you just think life is going to change! But going down to the grass root, go down to the sub-county... can you find there a well-organised group with hope of developing?

In fact, politics and development, particularly in the agricultural sector, have long been interconnected. In a detailed analysis of the reform, initiated in 2001, of National Agricultural

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31 Extract from an interview in the outskirts of Mbale on 22/06/2017
Advisory Services (NAADS), Kjær and Joughin (2012, p. 329), describe how the programme was increasingly politicised by the government:

As the costs of staying in power increased, public policies were also increasingly affected by political concerns (Barkan, 2011; Mwenda & Tangri, 2005). NAADS became gradually politicised and this affected implementation especially as the February 2011 elections drew closer. Donors were not able to navigate in this process of politicisation.

The process of reform of the NAADS was instrumental to the government, since this platform has the potential of reaching out to the majority of the electorate, which is involved in agriculture. While this is a recent example of politicisation of agricultural development, it is nothing new. In the following section, I will give an historical perspective of Uganda’s political economy, paying particular attention to the agricultural sector.

1.3.2 BRIEF POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF UGANDA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Uganda’s present political and economic situation is emblematic of issues faced by a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, yet at the same time has peculiar features that make it unique. In Uganda, 95% of the poor live in rural areas (Fan & Zhang, 2012) and 60% of the population is engaged in agriculture, unsettled rural development issues (land tenure inequalities, poor infrastructure and gender and generational inequalities) are rooted in a long history of ethnic tensions and regional disparities.

The colonial past has left a legacy in the diversified administration of the various regions and districts in Uganda. Green (2015, p. 492) explains that

Under colonial rule most of Uganda was governed by a system of British district commissioners. Under these commissioners chiefs held powers over taxes, courts, local councils and general law and order. In the eastern and northern parts of Uganda which had no tradition of kingdoms or hierarchical leadership, the imposition of chiefs

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32Data of the Government of Uganda, accessed on 15th May 2016: http://gov.ug/content/agriculture
was alien and, while ruling under “customary” law, chiefs in such areas were actually closer to modern civil servants than traditional pre-colonial rulers.

However, she explains (2015, p. 492) that the situation was different for the traditional “five kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro in the southern and western part of the country, which had a long pre-colonial history of political hierarchy, in some cases dating back centuries”. In these contexts, the colonisers implemented a system of indirect rule – namely giving the kings the responsibility of administrating and ruling ‘their’ populations. The economic situation of the country, towards the end of colonisation, seemed promising:

On the eve of decolonisation – that moment, in the early 1950s, between the hardships of the Second World War and the brave new world of sovereign statehood – the economic prospects of much of Africa were bright, or were at least cause of some optimistic projections. (...) For the colonial administration, the ‘pearl of Africa’ was becoming its little nugget of economic prosperity in the heart of the British East Africa. Indeed, Uganda’s annual GDP growth (depending on which source we believe) averaged 5.9 per cent between 1962 and 1971, anticipating more recent, much-celebrated rates. (Reid, 2017, p. 216)

However, after independence in 1962, Ugandans experienced several repressive regimes and violent conflicts – to which economic decay followed (Isgren, 2018, p. 3). Milton Obote was chosen as first leader of the newly independent Republic of Uganda – and he administered the first years of government with caution. Power was consolidated in his hands, as he gained control over the congress and the executive power. His socialist ideology, particularly privileging Ugandans from his region of origin (north-east), divided internal politics until the constitutional crisis in 1966. As Mutibwa (1992, p. 33) stresses, the tensions within the party verged on ethnically-loaded political interests:

The split soon polarised over ideology and ethnicity, for Obote’s faction assumed the mantle of a nationalistic and socialist movement championing the interests of the so-called ‘disadvantaged’ of the north and east, while Ibingira’s faction became identified with the conservative wing of the party which also served as an advocate for the position and interests of the Bantu people. (...) After the parliament had
decided on the referendum, the Kabaka’s government too decided (...) to reassess its cooperation with Obote.

One year later, Obote abolished kingships, and his politics became increasingly unpopular, generating discontent within the government and army. In 1968, Obote announced he would adopt a socialist strategy, and with the implementation of the ‘Move to the Left’ he planned the move 60% of the means of production under governmental ownership. However, by the time Obote was overthrown, this strategy was not yet fully implemented. Obote had trusted Colonel Idi Amin, Deputy Army Commander, with important operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) – but was rewarded with a coup: Idi Amin, interpreting the dissatisfaction of the army, overthrew him in 1971. Reid (2017, p. 56) explains how the forceful instauration of Idi Amin was initially welcomed by crowds in Kampala: “Obote was gone (he was in fact out of the country when the coup happened), and good riddance, said many – not least the Ganda, who despised Obote for his destruction of their kingdom and the exile of their king, and who were therefore among Amin’s most eager supporters, initially (...)”.

In economic terms, there was substantial continuation between the first regime of Obote and that of Idi Amin (Reid, 2017, p. 236): “A similar combination of economic patriotism and historical injustice informed Amin’s ‘war’ on parasites and foreign influences;“. In 1972, he ordered the expulsion of all non-citizen Asians “who owned too much and contributed too little, who sent their savings abroad (or ‘home’, to India and Bangladesh), and had for too long stood haughtily apart from (even above) Ugandan Africans. As Maxwell (1995, p. 1670) explains, especially in the central region, the Ugandan economy:

was severely damaged by the “war of economic independence” of the Amin regime (1971-79) that was initiated with the expulsion of the Indian minority in Uganda and rapidly gave rise to a highly informal magendo economy dominated by smuggling, illegal currency transactions and state appropriation of private property (Banugire, 1985). In the early to mid-1980s, a guerrilla war was centred on the outskirts of the city. (...) Jamal and Weeks (1993) note that wages in Kampala had been among the highest in East Africa in the 1960s, but fell dramatically in the 1970s. By the 1980s, the urban wage-earning class had shrunk markedly as city residents were forced to
diversify their sources of income to compensate for the drastic drop in wage earnings (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992). This resulted in the massive informalization of the city’s economy, and an increase in urban agriculture.

During the eight years in which Idi Amin remained in power, hundreds of thousands of Ugandans were persecuted, disappeared, and were killed. While the death tolls still remain unclear, the number of ethnically and politically motivated killings is estimated to range between 300.000 and 500.000. In 1979, Tanzanian troops won a conflict over the border and forced him to flee. Before Obote was re-elected in 1980, power was briefly held by three other interim presidents. The second term of Obote was signed by atrocities that further divided the northerners from the rest of the country, fuelling regional tensions. During a long ‘guerrilla’ conflict between the troops of Obote and Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army, 100.000 to 500.000 people died. Obote was, again, overthrown in a military coup by General Tito Okello – but after a short, chaotic period, Museveni was sworn president in January 1986.

Ever since 1986, political power has been concentrated in the person of president Museveni, who has recognized kingships, promoted policies for regional integration and decentralization (Lindemann, 2011, p. 389) (Gentili, 2008). The regime is considered an “hegemonic party regime, defined as one political party remaining continuously in power while holding regular multiparty elections (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Tripp, 2010), and is considered an electoral authoritarian regime.” (Raffler, 2016, p. 12). In fact, despite the fact that in the last years Museveni has implemented a decentralizing policy, “77% of districts are headed by a politician from the NRM (National Resistance Movement, political party led by president Museveni), as are 71% of subcounties” (Raffler, 2016, p. 13).

The regime hegemony of Yoweri Museveni has based its long hold on power on elite bargain and corruption, which have systematically excluded social groups based on ethnicity (Lindemann, 2011, p. 388-9). Since 1986 Uganda has seen no less than seven civil wars, which mostly took place in the northern regions of the country (Lindemann, 2011, p. 388). Since the late 1990s however, “territorial power has been shared more equitably since government’s decentralization programme has gathered momentum” (ibid). This has on the one hand prevented more civil wars and eased tensions in the North, and on the other created a sort of
‘Pax Musevenica’ (Campbell, 2007). In the past decade, elections were reportedly fraudulent\textsuperscript{33}, and opposition leaders have been jailed multiple times. The majority of the population, being under 30 years of age, was born under Museveni – and has recently started to demand political change. Demonstrations, mainly by youths, took over the capital city when the age limit for presidency was scrapped in 2017.\textsuperscript{34}

While economic neo-liberalism has enthusiastically been embraced three decades ago – on the tide of post-Washington consensus developmental reforms promoted by the international community – national politics have increasingly disassociated from the liberal and democratic model that was envisioned by that same international community. A process of decentralisation has originated a fragmentation of the country in 112 districts (from the original 39 when NRM came to power). The initial promise of a more democratic division of political power, has in fact served the (expensive) maintenance of corrupt, central power. As Green (2015, p. 503-504) claims, “the problems of the Ugandan decentralization programme are rooted in its lack of independence from Kampala both politically and economically, which has contributed to such issues as a lack of competent staff, corruption and an obsessive focus on creating new districts for political reasons.”

Another important consequence of the enthusiastic liberalisation conducted by Museveni, is the impact on grassroots organisations of farmers, and the copious entrance of NGOs in the interstices left by the government. The economic liberalization that “made Uganda a ‘poster child’ of structural adjustment” has, according to Isgren (2018, p. 3),

far-reaching implications for agriculture, like the dismantling of marketing boards, slashed budgets for research and extension, and further collapse of the cooperative system (Flygare, 2006). At the same time donors' interest in NGOs exploded and there was a huge surge in NGOs present in Uganda, both domestic and international; by 2000 there were over 4000 registered NGOs (Dicklitch and Lwanga, 2003). Mamdani (1995) described civil society as becoming ‘NGOized’ by organizations that filled gaps

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} Accessed on 3/10/2018 on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-idUSKCN0VT08A

\textsuperscript{34} Accessed on 3/10/2018: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/scrapping-presidential-age-limits-sets-uganda-on-course-of-instability/}
left by the state, but whose members received charity rather than rights and which were primarily accountable to donors.

But the impact of Museveni’s liberalisation on agriculture, is not a novelty in the relation between politics, agriculture and land tenure. As I will show below, since independence the political economy has been strictly intertwined with the agricultural sector – employing the wide majority of the population.

1.3.2A AGRICULTURE AND LAND

Agricultural production and trade is a particular sensitive field in many African countries, where the post-independence history has deepened the socio-political distress inherited from colonialism. On this regard, “Uganda represents a good example of a country accepting the colonial legal arrangements of land tenure and continuing them without any significant changes when independence was gained in October 1962.” (McAuslan, 2013, p. 25). Distressed relations between the central government and the rural population have shaped the post-independence history of this country. Sjögren (2013, p. 143) argues that “Patterns of production, trade and education tended to deepen regional socio-economic disparities, accentuated by divide-and-rule politics”.

Uganda has been seen as the food basket of East Africa, thanks to the climatic conditions that allowed for double-cropping: with two rainy seasons per year, Ugandan agriculture is particularly productive in the central and south-western regions, which are densely populated. Since colonial times, Uganda’s agricultural production has been oriented as much towards local markets, with basic food crops, as towards international markets, with cash crops. The production, mostly smallholder, focuses on food crops such as plantains (*matooke*), cassava, maize, millet, sorghum, sweet potatoes, and beans; the main export crops are coffee, cotton, cocoa, and tobacco (Leliveld, Dietz, Foeken, & Klaver, 2013, p. 10).

However, food production does not necessarily translate in food security, and a slightly downward trend in dietary energy has been recorded in the past decades – remaining just above minimum standards of food security, albeit with regional disparities, and with climate-induced famines (ibid). Leliveld et al (2013, p. 6-7) stress that agricultural productivity, which
has been very promising since post-independence, has been frustrated not only by ecological and climatic factors, but also by the political vicissitudes:

According to FAO data, in the 1960s agricultural production thrived: thanks mainly to area expansion, but also to yield improvements food production in Uganda increased more than population. In the 1970s this process halted, and around 1980 the agricultural area decreased to a much lower level. After 1990 recovery started, visible in steady increase of cropping areas. However, Uganda has some of the highest population growth figures in Africa (around 3% per annum) and agricultural growth can hardly cope with population growth. (…) What happened after the initial good years in the 1960s? As is well-known, Uganda was plagued by violent regimes and conflict in the 1970s and 1980s. The regimes of first Idi Amin (1971-1979) and later Milton Obote II (1979-1985) resulted in a major economic crisis in Uganda that is also visible in the agricultural performance of a country that was long seen as a land of milk and honey.

As much as the political economy of the country influenced agricultural productivity, so has land tenureship. With several land reforms over the years “the state and individuals grabbed and converted kibanja tenure [right of usufruct introduced in 1928] into landlord tenure of the lease and non-lease types. (…) The milder face of this conversion was the politics of “tribalism” (Bazaara, 1994, p. 59). This process of land reform from 1928 – which resulted in the creation of this new land holding system called kibanja – left peasants without security of tenureship, and many evictions were perpetrated. Again, women and youth were the most vulnerable social groups marginalized by these processes. Women in particular are still discriminated when it comes to land access, despite their legal claims to land (Butler & Kebba, 2014, p. 18). In 1998 the Land Act (amended in 2010 without much changes) reintroduced security of occupancy reinforcing tenants’ rights, but the Act was never fully implemented and evictions still fuel conflicts over land (McAuslan, 2013). These “land-related conflicts inevitably have negative impact on productivity as well as equity” (ibid: 89). In spite of the troubled configuration of land ownership, ethnic tensions over land and discrimination of youth and women in land access, agriculture still employs the majority of the population and is seen as a source of gainful employment from development organizations (Gollin & Rogerson, 2010) (WB, World Bank, 2016).
Moreover, old colonial laws and tenure systems continue to exert influence in rural development patterns (McAuslan, 2013, p. 95). This leaves agriculture (and the majority of Ugandan population) in a stagnating condition, where “lower agricultural growth is the root cause of the recent increase in poverty” (Kappel, Lay, & Steiner, 2005, p. 1). As Sjögren (2013, p. 147) puts it: “Uganda’s uneven regional development and fractured polity (...) followed from a combination of colonially imposed economic underdevelopment and indirect rule, reinforced by elite-controlled politics after independence”.

In fact, as Mamdani (1996, p. 21) argued, indirect rule established in Uganda was organized as an “ethnic power enforcing custom on tribespeople”. “Native” institutions (e.g. Native Authority) were established to rule subjects, and this was the process in which ethnic identities were constructed. Not only, but ethnic identities were anchored through customary laws to the land: the “tribally”-individuated community was made customary proprietor of land while the appointed “tribal” political leaders were appointed as “holders and executors of that proprietorship” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 140). If “Tribalism then was the very form that colonial rule took within the local state [...] the revolt against indirect rule also took a tribal form” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 183).

1.4 THEORETICAL APPROACH

Development studies are multidisciplinary by nature, as they borrow from various schools of thought – and can be inclined more towards anthropology, political sciences, economics, international relations, or public administration. Varying with their theoretical paradigms, scholars have approached the study of development phenomena with different questions and perspectives. The measurement of the gap between policies and practices has been the focus of positivist scholarly studies, while post-modernist scholars have focused on the deconstruction of the rationales behind development policies and practices. The first body of studies focuses more on the effects of top-down policies implemented, more or less effectively, on the ground. On the other hand, the second body of studies focused on the bottom-up dynamics, forms of domination and resistance. Foucault’s analytical framework of study of discourse and power, offered the possibility of going beyond a top-down versus
bottom-up approach to development studies. As I approached the fieldwork research in Uganda, with this academic debate in mind, I chose to use anthropological methods to investigate how power relations were constructed through narratives, discourse and practices. In this section, I give a brief overview of the debate and how the theoretical approach I have adopted contributes with a new perspective on the study of a recent development trend.

Arturo Escobar (2012) analyses the invention and construction of development as “politics of poverty” (ibid: 23), from the very ‘discovery’ (and problematization) of poverty in the early post-World War II. This ‘discovery’ identified two/thirds of the world population as poor, and in a seemingly philanthropic burst poverty became the object of a project of modernization as much as “the poor became object of knowledge and management” (ibid, p. 23). “Not only poverty but health, education, hygiene, employment, and the poor quality of life in towns and cities were constructed as social problems, requiring extensive knowledge about the population and appropriate modes of social planning” (Escobar 1992a). In the 50s, ‘issues’ identified as social problems became the object of professionalization and institutionalization of a “lucrative industry of development practitioners” (Escobar, 2012, p. 46). “Like the landing of the Allies in Normandy, the Third World witnessed a massive landing of experts, each in charge of investigating, measuring, and theorizing about this or that little aspect of Third World societies” (ibid, p. 45). According to Escobar (2012, p. 38), the development discourse re-branded countries of the global south as “underdeveloped countries”. Within this discourse the knowledge (habits, goals, motivations and beliefs) and economic system of the people to be modernized and developed is homogenized as non-modern, under-developed and condemned as inferior.

As Escobar articulates, development as modernization is the adoption of the “right” values, namely, those held by the white minority (...) those embodied in the ideal of the cultivated European” (Escobar, 2012, p. 43). Development is a form of socio-economic engineering upon the tabula-rasa of non-places of a generic underdeveloped country – to be developed according to constructed systems of development knowledge. The ‘right values’ are systematized in truth regimes which “(...) represent the Third World as a child in need of adult guidance” – a sort of ‘secular theory of salvation’ (ibid, p. 30) that infantilize the global south.
The modelling of the development discourse around the truth regimes of the global north is particularly evident in the field of agricultural and rural development. The classical agricultural question – namely the transition from feudal to capitalist industrial agriculture – is that growth in the agricultural sector would lower rural poverty and at the same time boost the economy as a whole. This transition is modelled after the European experience of the industrial revolution, but has not been realized elsewhere in the same way (Bernstein, 1996, p. 24). In the past decades, various fads and trends have characterized the development discourse for agriculture, landing new fashions that continue to be modelled after the European experience of agricultural development. However, as Scott (1998, p. 7) bluntly puts it: “formal schemes of order are untenable without some elements of practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss”. In other words, policy briefs tend to underestimate the ‘hidden transcripts’, that “discourse that takes place “offstage”, beyond direct observation by powerholders” of the rural population (Scott J. C., 1990, p. 4).

For good reasons, the academic debate in critical development studies has focused its attention on different sets of issues in development, its politics and power relations, effectiveness, ideology and mandates. These studies have operated with analytical categories that are supposedly borrowed from a Foucauldian study of power, yet have reproduced an interpretation of power relations in terms of domination/sovereignty that Foucault opposed (Foucault M., 1976). Most studies have framed the power relations within development as a relation of domination/resistance between groups of social actors at the top (i.e. development practitioners) and bottom (i.e. beneficiaries). On the one hand the development practitioners with their (supposedly dominant) discourse – produced and reproduced by those social actors working in the ‘development industry’; on the other hand, the development recipients with their own narratives and agency – more often than not contesting the dominant development discourse enforced on them.

Foucault (1976), on the other hand, opposed an interpretation of power in terms of domination and sovereignty. By insisting on the discursive nature of power, which is a constant process, produced and reproduced through narratives, knowledge is constructed by all social actors as foundation or justification of power relations. In fact, he showed how the mechanisms through which knowledge (broadly identified as the ensemble of oral and written narratives of social actors) is produced in everyday life, in every society, within
specific historical, socio-cultural and economic contexts. It is this knowledge that sustains, resists and reinforces relations and structures of power – which in the field of development catalyses limited resources on the grounds of the constructed forms of development discourse. Therefore, he invites to focus on the tensions, discrepancies and resistance within as much as between groups of social actors.

My own research has been developed within such a Foucauldian frame of analysis. In fact, considering the perspectives of Scott and Escobar on development as a discursive, historically-specific construct – I question the motives and modalities by which the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness has been constructed. Combining the scholars’ theoretical framework with Foucault’s analysis of how social actors’ narratives and practices construct a discourse, I analyse how the development discourse around youth in agribusiness has been a mechanism of power in driving a new trend in development. By studying both development actors’ and youths’ perspectives, I bring together the study of top and bottom dimensions of this development trend in the analysis of development practices on the ground – to understand how the mismatch affects the development outcomes.

The social category of youth, despite being the object of much governmental and international development attention, remains a rather heterogeneous notion, which is defined in different ways in the various socio-cultural contexts of Uganda. Yet, a discourse has been constructed around youth, based on demographic and economic facts (unemployed, bulging). Youths’ engagement in agribusiness is prescribed as a development formula to tackle such issues, and consequently development programmes have been implemented across the country – yet, still little is known about their impact so far.

1.5 METHODS

Robbins (2013a) highlights the role of anthropology in understanding different systems of values and challenges anthropologists to act as mediators between cultural worlds facing each other in a globalized world. An anthropological research approach seemed best-suited to carry out my study on development practitioners’ and youths’ narratives and practices on
the recent trend in development. I carried out qualitative research using grounded theory, an inductive research method that infers conclusions from the analysis of ethnographic data through coding: this analytical process highlights recurring ideas and concepts, and thus allows to identify patterns – or narratives – in a body of texts or interviews.\textsuperscript{35} Grounded theory allowed me to identify the narratives of all development actors involved in the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda – namely both development practitioners (including Ugandan civil servants) and young farmers (or agripreneurs). Moreover, I could observe how the development programmes implemented across the country had affected youths, in terms of social and economic impact. In fact, by combining the observations of perspectives of development practitioners and youths, I could identify and analyse the mismatch between development policies, the practices of implementation and the outcomes – according to both groups.

In this way, I was able to recognize the narratives and practices that constructed the (Foucauldian) discourse sustaining the new trend in development. In fact, combining grounded theory for a Foucauldian analysis means to use ethnographic methods to collect empirical data on the narratives that construct the development discourse, but also to elaborate an analysis of the implementation of the programmes to evaluate their impact on the ground. However, my use of a Foucauldian theoretical framework is in line with his elaborated analytical tools (such as the concepts of power, discourse, knowledge and narratives), and at the same time an adaptation of his theories for the ethnographic analysis of the development trend around youth in agribusiness. Yet the very twisting of Foucault’s theory for my interpretative, inductive analysis, is in line with what he intended his work to be: a ‘toolbox’ to be pragmatically adapted to each study (Vallois, 2015, p. 462).

Moreover, the use of ethnographic methods allowed me to shed light on ‘who’ the youths are. It allowed me to capture their heterogeneity and to record their perspectives on the programmes from which they should be benefitting. The effort of collecting ethnographic data across the country, has confronted me heterogeneous and sometimes contrasting perceptions and views (Mosse 2004). Anthropological research methods have allowed me to investigate the systems of values and cultural worlds of both development practitioners and

\textsuperscript{35} I will explain in depth both the methods and the concepts in the appropriate chapter on Methods.
youths, besides collecting insights – through participant observations – on the flaws and strengths of the implementation of development programmes for youths in agribusiness.

The empirical results of my research are grounded in extensive ethnographic fieldwork I have conducted in Uganda in 2016 (1 month), 2017 (6 months) and 2018 (1 month). As exemplified in the table below, I have conducted interviews across four different regions in Uganda, in order to account for the regional variety and disparity. The choice of the location reflected the focus of the development programmes that I have observed on the ground (see chapter 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July – August 2016</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Pilot fieldtrip 22 interviews with development experts and practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January – February 2017</td>
<td>Kampala (capital city)</td>
<td>24 interviews with development practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – April 2017</td>
<td>Gulu (North Uganda)</td>
<td>29 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March &amp; May 2017</td>
<td>Kampala (capital city)</td>
<td>26 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – June 2017</td>
<td>Mbarara (South-West Uganda)</td>
<td>25 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>Mbale (East Uganda)</td>
<td>30 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Follow-up fieldwork 13 interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As argued in sections 1.4 and 1.5 above, I have used ethnographic research methods to a Foucauldian discourse analysis of how the trend in development around youth in agribusiness has been constructed. In this way, I was able to show that ‘youth’ does not have intrinsic explanatory power of who the youths actually are in Uganda and what their experience in engaging agribusiness entails. On the contrary, the narrative analysis of interviews with youths and development practitioners has shown that there are heterogeneous understandings of what it means to be young in Uganda, in the agricultural sector. In fact, these are contextual to the regional and socio-cultural environment, that are extremely diverse in this country. Such heterogeneity can be expected also for other developing countries in which youth is defined only as an age range.

Moreover, heterogeneity has been found also in the theories of change of development actors in targeting youth unemployment through the engagement in agribusiness. Furthermore, in the implementation of programmes with this goal, I have observed a diversified range of development strategies (from public to private-sector driven).

Critical development studies (Escobar, 2012) (Scott J. , 1976) denounced a tension between aspirations and objectives at the ‘top’ (on the side of development agencies), and at the ‘bottom’ (among young beneficiaries of programmes). My study has confirmed such discrepancy, and has observed an additional tension within development actors at the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’. In fact, I found that development agencies have different interests and incentives, as much as youths have different capacities and constraints. This finding is particularly important because it adds to the debate in development studies by stressing that development as a process cannot be understood only as the enactment of policies (elaborated at the top) into practices (at the bottom). On the contrary, by going beyond this dualistic conceptualization of development, it is possible to capture dynamics that reveal the
heterogeneity in development. Focusing on dynamics between and within groups of development actors allows for an understanding of development that reflects the heterogeneity on the ground, as much as sheds light on important dynamics influencing development implementation.

1.6.2 SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

Despite the growing interest among scholars in the study of youth in development, still little is known about the recent trend around youth in agribusiness – neither from the perspective of development organisations, nor from that of the beneficiaries. How has a new development trend developed around this topic? Certainly, there are pressing societal reasons to address issues of youth employability in agribusiness – but it is particularly important to have empirical evidence on how a new trend in development is constructed and perceived. This study, contributes to filling a knowledge gap on both the theoretical puzzle of why this trend developed as it did in Uganda, and the empirical question of its impact on the ground. I did this by combining ethnographic methods with a Foucauldian approach to development studies.

Moreover, this study adds to the understanding of the social category of youth in a context – the Ugandan one – in which youths are a majoritarian share of the population. In fact, the heterogeneous nature of this social group needs to be systematised for ‘youth’ (as a category and concept) to have explanatory power and concreteness.

This research has brought me to identify and analyse the gap between the intended development programmes and the actual outcomes on the ground, as perceived by the youths themselves. This study proposes an ethnographic account of the elaboration and implementation of a specific trend in development; it offers a perspective on how this trend in development is perceived, and how tensions and discrepancies are found between development ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, but also within these groups of development actors.

This study contributes to an understanding of how development works in Uganda, specifically in relation to a relatively new development trend. As mentioned, studying heterogeneity is
important since the reality I have observed was much more complex than a dualistic relation between groups of actors on a top-down vs bottom-up model. I analyse these interactions as development in action as negotiations and adaptation processes among the development actors – finding divergence not so much between development practitioners and youths, but rather within them. This finding reinforces the argument (elaborated in the first two chapters) that it is necessary to examine a development trend in its heterogeneity: the heterogeneity of development approaches, perceptions and experiences of development beneficiaries, and heterogeneity of interactions, negotiations and adaptations to the reality on the ground.

Moreover, this study offers a confrontation of heterogeneous perspectives on what it means to be young and engaged in development, in Uganda. The mainstream understanding of entrepreneurship is bound to a linear, productivist thinking (Seuneke, Lans, & Wiskerke, 2013) targeting an increase of income for the rural poor (Toenissen, Adesina, & DeVries, Building an Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, 2008). However, research on street food entrepreneurship shows how entrepreneurs escape this very linear and productivist business values, pursuing their own (Wegerif, 2014). Remarkably little attention is paid to agripreneurs’ systems of values in developing countries: the negotiation of their identity as youth and agripreneurs, their understandings of agribusiness and development, and their agency in navigating market values. In the context of the new development trend around youth in agribusiness, in which youth are invested of the responsibility of becoming agripreneurs, the knowledge gap on their identity, capacities, constraints and ambitions, is burning.

Moreover, this study helps understand how development policies for youths in agribusiness respond to the political agendas of development organisations. For instance, I have recorded in several instances how public organisations respond to the political need of keeping the young electorate loyal to the government (see chapter 5).
1.6.3 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

The societal relevance of this study lays in the potential of this research to serve the improvement of development programmes and strategies for youths in Uganda. While my research is not designed to assess the effectiveness of individual programs, my findings suggest that programmes that responded to local, contextual needs of youths were perceived as more successful by the youths themselves. To this end, I organised feedback sessions with the major development agencies, in Kampala, to explain and validate my results. These were held at the Embassy of the Netherlands, at the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, and at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in 2017 and 2018.

Moreover, understanding “public and hidden transcripts” (Scott J. C., 1990) of policy-makers on the one hand and young agripreneurs on the other can produce the necessary knowledge to foster synergies between stakeholders and promote effectiveness for those rural development programmes investing in youth agripreneurship. It is important to understand the development potential of these programmes also by measuring the dynamic and engaged interaction of agripreneurs with the development institutions entitled to their development. For these reasons, this study pays particular attention to the implications of these development programmes for young agripreneurs within and outside development schemes, and their response to such programmes. It aims, indeed, at bringing the emic dimension into the policy enactment process, by showing the agency of agripreneurs and not only their role as recipients of development. The societal relevance of this research project, then, lays also in the chance the study gives young agripreneurs to report their feedback of capacities and constraints encountered in the unfolding this development trend focusing on

36 Consistent investments have recently been made by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in collaboration with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA). The ENABLE Youth Empowerment Agribusiness programme is the latest (agreement signed on 05.05.2015) example: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/innovative-programme-to-improve-employment-and-income-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/

37 In anthropologic jargon, ‘emic’ refers to the perspective of the social group, while ‘etic’ is the perspective of the observer.
them, also by highlighting their active interaction with development institutions targeting
them.

1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter two, I provide an overview of the academic
debate in critical development studies, suggesting that in some instances his analysis of
power has been mis-interpreted. By explaining some of the core concepts of Foucault’s study
of discourse, narratives and power, I aim to develop a theoretical frame of analysis that is
more in line with Foucault’s original intent.

In chapter three, I explain the methodology that I have used to address the research question
in great detail. In particular, I justify my use of grounded theory and provide an overview of
the fieldwork and ethnographic data I have collected in Uganda. I conclude the chapter by
introducing the major field sites and actors.

The first empirical chapter, chapter four, is an ‘aidnography’ that investigates the theories of
change of several development actors. The goal of the chapter is to show how these different
theories of change lead to different development approaches: one driven by the public-
sector and one driven by the private sector. While national agencies are more concerned
with the issue of youth unemployment and the socio-political instability that could derive
from it, international agencies are more anxious about the ‘youth bulge’. In both cases,
however, ‘youth’, as a phenomenon and as a concept, has become a distinct social, economic
and political category, turning into a development and political project.

In chapter five, I examine youths’ definitions of youth and agribusiness, highlighting how
from their narratives they emerge as a very heterogeneous social category. I systematize
such heterogeneity by conceptualizing the factors (e.g. ethnicity, gender, age) that contribute
to their diversity. Moreover, I explore the relation between these factors by inscribing them
in three dimensions that emerge from the narrative analysis as analytical categories: socio-
cultural, territorial and value chain embedding.
In chapter six, the final empirical chapter, I explore the practices through which development practitioners implement their development programmes. I argue that the enactment of this development trend – from programme design, to implementation and outcomes – is a diverse and untidy process that relies on practices of negotiations among many development actors. Through the analysis of negotiation practices among development actors in Kampala, I show how their relations and interactions shape the course of the programme enactment. In fact, I argue that the outcome of these negotiations is compromise between different incentives and stakes of the actors involved before the programme is even enforced on the ground. Moreover, as development actors are confronted with the heterogeneity of youths on the ground, they either fail to meet youths needs and capacities, or in some cases adapt their programmes. This process of adaptation is only possible for those programmes that preserve flexibility in spite of the negotiated compromise with other development stakeholders.

In chapter seven, I conclude the monograph, summing up the outcomes outlined in each of the three empirical chapters and placing these findings within the larger context of the project’s theoretical framework and the academic debate in critical development studies more broadly. Moreover, in this chapter, I highlight the general (and generalizable) empirical and theoretical conclusions of this thesis.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INDEX

- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Setting the scene
  - Development studies
  - Agricultural development and agribusiness
  - Youth in agribusiness
- 2.3 A Foucauldian paradigm
  - Power
  - What is development
- 2.4 Literature review of development studies using a Foucauldian approach
- 2.5 Foucault in development
  - Discourse, knowledge and narratives
  - Practices
- 2.6 Conclusion
We have to study power outside the model of Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the institution of the State. We have to analyse it by beginning with the techniques and tactics of domination. (Foucault M., 1976, p. 34)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I explore the academic debate in development studies and operationalize a theoretical approach for my analysis of the trend in development around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. I investigate the theories scholars have used and developed, showing how critical scholars have relied on a Foucauldian paradigm. I operationalize such paradigm to serve the purpose of answering the research question of this study: *How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in development around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far?*

This research question lays the focus of the research on the mechanisms through which a new trend in development has emerged, and on the impact it has had so far. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, there are demographic and economic issues around youth and agribusiness, which are at the root of concerns of development practitioners. As stressed by critical development studies – such as Scott, Escobar, Ferguson, Murray Li –, there also are political agendas and interests in the construction and implementation of a new trend in development. In their analysis, development and its outcomes is intertwined with structures of power and power relations. These scholars have studied power relations within development with reference to Foucault’s analytical paradigm of power. In line with them, I also explore the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda by using a Foucauldian analytical framework. With Escobar (2012, p. 10) I understand development as a historically contingent creation of a “domain of thought and action”, but also as a “category of practice” (Mosse, 2013, p. 227). As a category of practice, development is produced and reproduced by social actors in particular historical circumstances, reiterating particular cultural knowledges. For these reasons, anthropological research methods were adopted to collect data on the mechanisms through which this trend was constructed and implemented in Uganda (see following chapter 3).
In contrast to several critical scholars in development studies, however, I explore development as a process that is a more heterogeneous than the dualistic contraposition of development practitioners to their (supposed) beneficiaries. Scholars in critical development studies explored development as a more or less effective or contested exercise of domination of the ‘development industry’ on local populations. In this study, I attempt an investigation of the development trend ‘outside the model of the Leviathan’ that contraposes development efforts to its ‘beneficiaries’. As opposed to seeing power as centralized in an institution (e.g. the government, the development agencies) or social category – the Leviathan – (e.g. civil servants, development practitioners) Foucault describes power as a function that cannot be localized:

Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them. (Foucault M., 1976, p. 29-30)

While the model of the Leviathan assumes the logic of sovereignty between an institutionalized, centralized power and its subjugated – Foucault argues that power is the omnipresent function that sustains and structures networks and relations among citizens, between citizens and the state, and within the state itself. Power is, thus, a pervasive process that is embodied, contested and reshaped by all actors in society – and political institutions and authorities are a mere expression of the process. Within this framework, power is understood as a process that is constantly in the making, through the elaboration of knowledge structures and relations between social actors who, with their agency, enact and counteract power structures.

This process unfolds through the constant construction and contestation of knowledge structures: the stories and narratives that contribute to the development discourse. Social, political and economic values and norms underpinning specific development efforts (like the
engagement of youth in agribusiness) are expressed through such knowledge structures. Power relations, development policies and programmes are justified and enforced through the development discourse. Foucault identifies specific yet diverse forms through which power is exercised on and by social actors and institutions and their narratives. In an interview, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ (1980, p. 194), Foucault defines and explains such mechanisms of power: an ‘apparatus’, or ensemble of devices (or dispositif) as

a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements.

In the realm of development cooperation, thus, power is distributed and enforced and constructed by all social actors involved – both development practitioners and beneficiaries, who through spoken and unspoken devices sustain, contest or reshape power dynamics. Development itself, as stressed by development studies scholars, is a discourse – a device – that underpins power structures.

To understand how a given development trend functions in the specific context of Uganda, means to study how power structures are constructed in the system of relations between the elements of its apparatus. Hence, I argue that it will be necessary to investigate the ‘devices’ through which power structures operate and shape relations between and within the various groups of social actors involved. In this chapter I argue for a re-elaboration of the Foucauldian theoretical paradigm of power that escapes the logic of sovereignty and domination. Moreover, in the following I highlight how the use of qualitative research methods allowed to collect data on the study of this trend as a discourse – with concrete impact on the ground.

This chapter is structured as follows. First (section 2.2), I set the scene of the academic debate in development studies, narrowing down the broad field of development studies to the specific debate around agribusiness and youth. I start by reviewing how development has
been defined (2.2.1) by some of the major scholars before coming to my working definition of development. I then restrict the overview to exploring the literature around agribusiness (2.2.2) and youth (2.2.3). Through this section I argue that this field of study can best be analysed through a Foucauldian development approach. In the following section (2.3) I move on to examining Foucault’s analytical paradigm of power, exploring his conceptualizations of knowledge and practices, and the devices underpinning power structures (discourse and narratives). In section 2.4, I examine the academic debate around development by scholars in critical development studies, showing how they relied on a Foucauldian paradigm. However, I show how most scholars have developed their analysis of power relations between groups of social actors in development, thereby reinforcing a narrative of domination – the model of the Leviathan. In section 2.5, I operationalise the Foucauldian paradigm in light of the ethnographic study I intend to make in the field of critical development studies. Here, I show the analytical tools I will use to study development practitioners’ and youths’ narratives and practices. I conclude this chapter (section 2.6) by arguing how the approach I operationalised will allow to conduct my study outside of the model of the Leviathan, thereby contributing to the academic debate in critical development studies.

2.2 SETTING THE SCENE OF THE ACADEMIC DEBATE

2.2.1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

I refer to development as the economic and political effort exercised by various (inter)national agencies, governments and institutions to alleviate poverty and improving living conditions in the global south. Therefore, I focus on development as (inter)national cooperation for socio-economic change – also referred to as ‘aid’ – that is distinguished from humanitarian aid or disaster relief. I find myself in line with Pallotti and Zamponi (2014, p. 19), as they define development as

a process aiming at the achievement of better life conditions and enhanced capacity for self-reliance in economies that are technically more complex and more dependent
on processes of global integration compared to the past (...); and it requires a long-term structural change of society.

This definition positions development as a historically grounded process. In fact, not only the economic change is often result of political efforts of both national and international agencies, but it is also contextual to the society for which structural change is envisioned.

Arturo Escobar (2012) develops an analysis of what he refers to as the ‘development industry’ from post-World War II until our decade, and stresses not only the historical contingency of development programmes, but also its political dimension. He argues that development was ‘invented’ in the post-war West and construction as “politics of poverty” (ibid: 23): poverty was ‘discovered’ and problematized as a condition to be eradicated. This ‘discovery’ identified two/thirds of the world population as poor, and poverty became the object of a project of modernization as much as “the poor became object of knowledge and management” (ibid: 23). In the 1950s, the identified social problems became the object of professionalization and institutionalization of a “lucrative industry of development practitioners” (Escobar 2012: 46). “Like the landing of the Allies in Normandy, the Third World witnessed a massive landing of experts, each in charge of investigating, measuring, and theorizing about this or that little aspect of Third World societies” (ibid: 45).

Since the 1950s, development aid has taken different forms and strategies – what Swedlund (2017, p. 3) refers to as aid delivery mechanisms:

From microfinance to results-based aid, from basket funding to general budget support, development aid is continuously reinventing itself, claiming to have finally found the next big idea that is going to make aid more effective. This relentless innovation—what some call aid fads or fashions—leads to rapid paradigm shifts in development cooperation that are difficult, if not impossible, for development practitioners to keep up with.

The reasons for the changes in paradigm shifts are several, ambiguous and contextual – but certainly should be read in a historical perspective. A development delivery mechanism that is considered to be valid and true in a specific moment in history will change even radically with time. Together with the shifts in aid delivery mechanisms, development discourses
around poverty and Africa have also been fluctuating, as Jerven (2015, p. 123) argues: "narratives on African economic development can switch from one extreme to the other so swiftly. Of course, the truth lies somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘tragedies’. We went from a rhetoric of ‘Bottom Billion’ to ‘Africa Rising’ within half a decade.” These changes show both the political and cultural dimension of aid delivery – also in the field of rural development:

Any attempt to portray evolving ideas in rural development over the past half-century risks oversimplification. While it is superficially neat to characterise the 1960s as modernisation, the 1970s as state intervention, the 1980s as market liberalisation, and the 1990s as participation and empowerment, popular ideas and their practical effects on rural policies did not, indeed, undergo these transitions in such an uncluttered manner. (Ellis & Biggs, 2001, p. 437)

Recently, development programmes have shifted attention from ‘poverty’ to ‘the poor’ (Mosse 2010 in (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p. 45). According to Ferguson (2014, p. 20-21), this shift is a process of depoliticization of development which ‘pathologises’ the subject (the poor) ‘to be developed’. In the early post-World War II the ‘social problem’ “discovered” was poverty; today, it appears from development narratives, the problem is people being poor rather than the (systemic, and thus political) causes producing poverty. Moreover, it is a generic ‘poor’ for which replicable development measures can be adopted. In his analysis of state simplification and legibility, Scott (1998: 81) argues:

First, the knowledge that an official needs must give him or her a synoptic view of the ensemble; it must be cast in terms that are replicable across many cases. In this respect, such facts must lose their particularity and reappear in schematic or simplified form as a member of a class of facts. Second, in a meaning closely related to the first, the grouping of synoptic facts necessarily entails collapsing or ignoring distinctions that might otherwise be relevant.

In line with Scott’s analysis, international development ideology has been critiqued for proposing uniform, replicable and technocratic solutions. In fact, critical scholars (mainly Scott, Escobar, Ferguson, Mosse) identified a tension between development practitioners’
vision of change and ‘indigenous’ farmers. Such a gap has been recognised as being the main motive for farmers’ resistance to development programmes (Scott J., 1992). Lewis and Mosse (2006, p. 2) have shown that in fact there is a disjuncture between the ideal development policy to be implemented and the reality on the ground, concluding even the best development practices cannot bridge this gap:

First, and most commonly within the technical and managerial framework that defines aid policy, “order” can be understood as the “ideal worlds” that development actors aim to bring about through the execution of proper policy and project design. Disjuncture comes from the gap between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to. This comes to be managed in one of two ways. On the one hand, the gap between intention and outcome must be narrowed through the pursuit of proper implementation and “best practice”—a continuing task of agency workers at all levels, and one corresponding to the long-term academic anthropological concern with the contradictions between what is said and what is done in development. On the other hand, developers “try and see to it that the ‘ideal worlds’ [are] consistent with what we know about how real societies actually work, so that ‘development’ planning can set itself objectives capable of being realised” (…).

Considering the failures of development programmes due to this gap between the intended and the actual outcomes, Ferguson (2014) elaborates his theory of the anti-politics machine. He refers to development as an industry (ibid: 8), and “not a machine for eliminating poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally takes “poverty” as its point of entry (…)” (2014, p. 255). While not managing to eradicate poverty, this machine does have (un)intended, concrete consequences: “By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the suffering of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of “development” is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today” (Ferguson, 2014, p. 256).

According to Mosse (2013, p. 229), this industry is a “historical system of thought to the interactions of various actors and systems of knowledge”. With Mosse, the analysis of
development also takes in particular consideration the human dimension of those who make development: the “communities of development advisors, consultants, policy makers, aid administrators and managers – those involved in the construction and transmission of knowledge about global poverty and its reduction.” (Mosse, 2011, p. 1). The complex world surrounding development institutions, organizations, policy papers, and communities of physical development actors is referred to by Apthorpe (in Mosse, 2011, p. 199) as ‘Aidland’ – a concept that hints at the virtual, as much as real, nature of development. In fact, the author defines (Mosse, 2011, p. 199) the concept of Aidland as “a macro construct, whose microapplications are interesting. Aidland has its own mental topographies, languages of discourse, lore and custom, and approaches to organizational knowledge and learning. (...) several aspects of these [expert knowledges] prove to be in some ways more virtual than real – hence the degree of virtual reality of Aidland”.

Therefore, it is important to study the ‘languages and discourses’ of development not only for the extent to which they have an impact on the local realities on the ground, but also because they sustain the development industry. It is through the historically-specific ‘systems of thought’ that the complex world within and around development institutions are sustained and justified. Beyond the evaluation of the actual impact and effectiveness of development programmes, the study of development as ‘domain of thought and action’ allows us to deconstruct relations of power.

Interestingly in fact, development studies have ventured the investigation of the rationale behind development ‘thought and action’. In particular Scott (2014, p. 67) identifies the neoliberal agenda behind development, and questions ‘the human product’ of capitalist labour schemes pushed forward by development and political agendas:

What if we were to ask a different question of institutions and activities than the narrow neoclassical question of how efficient they are in terms of costs (e.g., resources, labour, capital) per unit of a given, specified product? What if we were to ask what kind of people a given activity or institution fostered?

Along the same line of questions, if we consider the shift in the focus from agriculture to agribusiness we are then prone to ask: What type of rural development is envisioned by policy makers emphasizing the role of the private sector? Under this logic, it is crucial to
understand what types of expectations are projected on farmers when envisioning (youth) agripreneurship in development policies.

### 2.2.2 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRIBUSINESS

Swinging along the lines of development changes, agricultural development has also witnessed different fluctuations since the 1960s. Such changes involved both the ideological politico-economic frame of reference, as the consequent strategies for development programmes. The interaction of the international development community with the rural world in developing countries gave over the years more importance to different stakeholders: in the 1960s emphasis was given to smallholders, in the 1970s to the state, in the 1980s to NGOs, in the 1990s to the (liberalized) market and in the 2000s again to family farming. The ‘historical pendulum’, as Cotula (Cotula, 2013, p. 25) names it, shifted over the years between plantation, contractualized agriculture and family farming. Lately, with the policy regime shifting from aid to trade increasing hopes and expectations have been laid on private sector initiatives for the rural development of emerging countries (Westen and Zoomers 2014).

Agribusiness has come to assume an increasingly significant position in the development agenda in the last decades, pushing for a new wave of commercialization. On this matter, some scholars (Collier & Dercon, 2013; Toenissen, Adesina, & DeVries, 2008) have been arguing for a commercialization of agriculture; pushing an agri-business agenda that subordinates agriculture to the implementation of capitalistic and industrial development processes (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p. 59). In this framework, rural development policies that focus on petty commodity producers become a tool for legitimizing neoliberal policies for rural development (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014). As a new rural development fashion, development institutions and African governments are now increasingly investing in agribusiness, with a specific focus on youth.

As part of the general shift from aid to trade, the private sector has made its way into the realm of development cooperation, for example through private-public partnerships (PPP) (Mosse, 2013, p. 238-239). The private sector has become a development agent, while
corporate agendas captured in the unintentionally revealing slogan “Make poverty business.” This goes to the heart of the wider institutional assemblage (Dolan 2012, p. 4) labelled “bottom of the pyramid” (BoP) capitalism (Prahalad 2005), through which, Dolan (2012) argues, development itself is outsourced to the “under-utilised poor” (...).

Along the same lines, in the field of rural and agricultural development, the private sector has entered as an actor of change. On the edge between development and private sector, responsible supply chains (e.g. Fairtrade) have emerged under the increasing demands for sustainable products (Wiskerke, 2009). However the results of this type of for-profit development initiatives have delivered controversial and sometimes counter effective outcomes (Blowfield & Dolan, 2010) (Dolan, 2001) (Freeman, 2009), leaving open the question whether the private sector can indeed act as development agent (Westen van & Zoomers, 2014) (McMichael P. , 2013). The commercial agrifood sector itself has undergone important changes. In particular, due to the ‘supermarket revolution’ (Reardon, Timmer, & Minten, 2012) a process of restructuring the global food market changed pathways of procurement to comply with retailers’ rules.

However, the private sector has entered the field of agricultural development also as a paradigm for development programmes. Reflecting on these changes, some scholars (Toenissen , Adesina, & DeVries, 2008) (Collier & Dercon, 2013) have been arguing for a commercialization of agriculture; pushing an agri-business agenda that subordinates agriculture to the implementation of capitalistic and industrial development processes (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p. 59).

The concept of ‘agripreneurship’ emerged in the context of the increased attention to agribusiness, as a tool for development. Including the element of entrepreneurship in the field of agricultural development, makes the task of agribusiness dependent on the entrepreneurial capacities of the farmer. In fact, the beneficiaries of agricultural development become the very implementers of the programmes – making their own success in agribusiness dependent on their personal qualities. As Mosse (2013, p. 239) argues,

Such “BoP entrepreneurs” are analysed as both instruments and beneficiaries of processes that change donor-recipient relationships, create “legibility” to global
business, produce entrepreneurial subjectivities and recode products in ethical terms, while at the same time dividing, differentiating, and depleting aspects of social life (Dolan 2012).

Investing in agribusiness as a development tool to be achieved through agripreneurship reduces agriculture to its business component. At the same time, it also places the responsibility of success in the qualities of the farmer who, when engaging in an agribusiness enterprise – is referred as an ‘agripreneur’, in development jargon. New hopes have been recently laid on the new generations of ‘agripreneurs’ – the youths. In the next section I will explore the academic debate around this social category as the new target of development efforts.

2.2.3 YOUTH IN AGRIBUSINESS: A NEW DEVELOPMENT TREND

Recently, the focus of development programmes on agribusiness and agripreneurship has been laid on youths – ‘the future of agriculture’. The justification for the increased interest in this social category lays in the sheer dimension of the demographic phenomenon. The concerns attached to the ‘youth bulge’ are related to risks of social instability that could derive from widespread unemployment. The shift towards youth within the narrative of risk has been observed by Van Dijk et al (2011, p. 2), among others:

Within this paradigm of the relation between youth and risk, instigated by the sheer size of the problem, an aid-industry has come to fruition. In its many NGO activities and initiatives, this aid-industry apparently has shifted policy-orientations from the ‘rural’, the ‘women’ or the ‘household’, to the ‘youth’ as the new developmental target and hope for the future.

From this analysis, the development focus on youths as a ‘risky’ demographic phenomenon emerges as a new trend sustaining the development industry. However, there is still light to be shed on the concept of youth. In fact, Sommers (2015, p. 10) argues that it is precisely the vagueness of this concept that allows to keep youth an ‘outcast’ social category:
A fundamental reason why youth are so misunderstood and support for them is so underwhelming is that nobody seems entirely sure just who they are. The definitions that many experts have drummed up invite confusion because they conflict. Governments and international agencies typically rely on age ranges to determine who youth are. While that may seem simple enough, the result is a muddle. One problem arises from the fact that there is no agreement on what those ages should be.

Besides defining youth as an age category, scholars have also considered other coordinates to accurately define and analyse this social category. As van Dijk et al (2011, p. 5) argue, in fact, the ‘situational’ and ‘local’ dimension of youth is crucial in defining the concept of youth:

As social science in Africa has moved away from conceptualising youth only in terms of time – a passage through the generations – and has included the notion of space – not when one is youth but also where one is youth – the ‘situational’ exploration of youth has at least allowed for the possibility of looking at space and place as new modes of understanding. In addition to the concept of youth as emphasising the ‘situational’ it has also turned into the ‘locational’ dimensions. (...) Redefining youth as an identity-project of ‘becoming somebody’, this becoming is captured in navigating certain spaces and places – the bar, the disco, the funeral, the school, the church, the state, the house and so forth.

Since youth has entered the realm of development’s thought and action, it has become an ‘identity-project of ‘becoming somebody’– where the development community defines the objectives of this process of becoming. In particular, development resources have been deployed for youths to venture agribusiness and become agripreneurs. In fact, the authors (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011, p. 7) stress that “Youth has become an ideological project because an arena of interests and scarce resources has been generated around it”.

Interestingly, in the development shifts analysed above, emerges a pattern of framing of the development issues – from poverty to the poor, from agriculture to agribusiness and agripreneurship and the youths – that sustain a neoliberal ideology of development. Such
shifts in the strategies and investments of development cooperation are supported by narratives that underpin and justify them. By studying these narratives, it is possible to shed light on the underlying assumptions and ideologies guiding development.

From the sections above it becomes clear that development paradigm has recently shifted the attention of programmes towards commercial agriculture. In order to make the ‘markets work for the poor’, a development discourse has been constructed that aims at shifting agriculture from subsistence towards agribusiness. At the same time, the social category of ‘youth’ has become the objective of such programmes for agribusiness. However, youth has not been defined other than as an age range – and is identified as ‘a project of becoming’ (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011). In the following chapters I will analyse the ways in which such discourse has been constructed in Uganda. A Foucauldian analytical approach allows us to frame the construction of the trend around youth and agribusiness in Uganda, in terms of narratives and practices. Within the Foucauldian approach, narratives and practices construct a discourse – and are seen as devices of power. In the section below, I will explore Foucault’s theorization of power and the related functions and devices.

2.3 A FOUCAULDIAN PARADIGM FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

2.3.1 POWER

Foucault’s understanding of power has often been endorsed (and adjusted) by scholars in development studies. Development studies is a very political arena for at least two reasons. First, often political strings (e.g. good governance) are attached to the delivery of development aid (but this is not the focus of this study); and, second, because when resources are distributed economic relations are formed, causing a relationship of force.

The relation between power and the economy are so strongly intertwined that their relation has been questioned by Foucault (1976, p. 14, my italics), in these terms:

First: Is power always secondary to the economy? Are its finality and function always determined by the economy? Is power’s raison d’etre and purpose essentially to serve
the economy? Is it designed to establish, solidify, perpetuate, and reproduce relations that are characteristic of the economy and essential to its workings? (...) Or if we wish to analyse it, do we have to operate—on the contrary—with different instruments, *even if power relations are deeply involved in and with economic relations, even if power relations and economic relations always constitute a sort of network or loop? If that is the case, the indissociability of the economy and politics is not a matter of functional subordination*, nor of formal isomorphism. It is of a different order, and it is precisely that order that we have to isolate.

Clarifying the relation between economy, resources and power is particularly important in the field of development studies. In fact, while ‘indissociable’, one is not subordinate to the other: it is not that (development) resources cause or shape power relations. Instead, Foucault (1978, p. 92) insists power is to be understood in other terms:

> It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.

Force (economic) relations, like institutional bodies and laws are expressions of hegemonic relations, but they do not embody power – like the state and its officials do not: Foucault identifies power in the system which relates these expressions of power to one another. In his view, power circulates and therefore is not concentrated in the hands of any entity:

> Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a
position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them. (Foucault M., 1976, p. 29)

This understanding of power as a function that passes through individuals is important to my analysis of development because it shifts the focus of the analysis. Instead of analysing power relations between development practitioners and youths, power should be explored as a function underpinning these relations. Contrary to the interpretation of some of the most prominent authors in development studies (see next section 2.4) Foucault incites to the analysis of power beyond the relation of domination.

2.3.1A DOMINATION

Without denying the brutality of exercise of domination and sovereignty, Foucault (1976, p. 27) invites a broader understanding of domination as a function of power, deconstructing its functions:

I have been trying to do the opposite, or in other words to stress the fact of domination in all its brutality and its secrecy, and then to show not only that right is an instrument of that domination—that is self-evident—but also how, to what extent, and in what form right (and when I say right, I am not thinking just of the law, but of all the apparatuses, institutions, and rules that apply it) serves as a vehicle for and implements relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but relations of domination. And by domination I do not mean the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society; so, not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social body.

While subjugation of one or multiple subjects can be analysed as an expression of sovereignty, he stresses that it is in the procedures and relations of all social actors that power resides. And later in the same lecture at the College de France (Foucault M., 1976, p. 29-30), he continues:
It is therefore, I think, a mistake to think of the individual as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom or some multiple, inert matter to which power is applied, or which is struck by a power that subordinates or destroys individuals. In actual fact, one of the first effects of power is that it allows bodies, gestures, discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted as something individual. The individual is not, in other words, power's opposite number; the individual is one of power's first effects. The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted.

Domination is thus not the effect of power on one person or group of individuals, but rather the expression of a system of power that constitutes individuals, and which they reinforce or resist. Domination does not contrapose groups of power-holders against those to whom power is applied. Rather there are power mechanisms in which individuals are embedded that allow for domination as an expression of power. In the next paragraph, I thus explore the concept of resistance according to Foucault.

**2.3.1B RESISTANCE**

Resistance is a concept that emerges in the dialectic of domination, and like domination is an expression of power. In fact, within Foucault’s understanding of power, individuals enforce as much as they counteract power structures:

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Should it be said that one is always "inside" power, there is no "escaping" it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse of history, always emerging the winner? This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power relationships. Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of the adversary, target, support, or handle in the power relationships.
These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. (Foucault M., 1978, p. 95)

Resistance is exercised by individuals as an expression of power. Moreover, the very existence of power relations is dependent on the points of resistance. In this way Foucault defines the ubiquitous and relational nature of power. The way in which power functions through power devices, is explained in the next paragraph.

2.3.2 NARRATIVES AND DISCOURSE

According to Foucault there is an intricate and diverse range of devices through which power functions – what he calls the apparatuses, or dispositive. Foucault refers to apparatuses as knowledges, truths, norms, and discourses. Devices such as discourses and knowledge are crucial in the functioning of power: through stories people tell, they express a narrative which reflects a discourse. A narrative is the logic within which a certain story makes sense, while a discourse is a broader meta-narrative that comprises and underpins (individual) narratives.

Such dispositives sustain the power structures and relations, by constantly reshaping them in the actions and narratives of individuals. According to Foucault (1976, p. 25), the way in which power functions is by systematizing relations, knowledge, actions and resources according to specific discourses:

Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it. We have to produce the truth in the same way, really, that we have to produce wealth, and we have to produce the truth in order to be able to produce wealth. In a different sense, we are also subject to the truth in the sense that truth lays down the law: it is the discourse of truth that decides, at least in part; it conveys and propels truth-effects. After all, we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks, and destined to live and die in certain ways by discourses that are true, and which bring with them specific power-effects.
The function of discourses is thus to normalize and institutionalize regimes of truth which sustain power relations. The consequences of such devices are very concrete as they shape the actions and decisions of individuals in a society dominated by a given system of truth. At the same time, individuals are themselves the actors who create and therefore can resist the same system of truth. In fact, there is nothing stable and deterministic in this conceptualization of the functioning of power through its devices. On the contrary, Foucault (1978, p. 101) stresses how this is a continuous and instable process:

We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; (...).

Interestingly, Foucault stresses how not only active engagement with power, through discourses, establishes systems of truth. On the contrary, silence and secrecy are also functional to anchoring truths, crystalizing norms of action.

2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES USING A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH

Arturo Escobar is one of the most prominent authors in development studies, who has examined the power relations in development cooperation by using a Foucauldian framework. He defines (2012, p. 45) development as a

historical construct that provides a space in which poor countries are known, specified and intervened upon. To speak of development as a historical construct requires an analysis of the mechanisms through which it becomes an active, real force. These mechanisms are structured by forms of knowledge and power and can be studied in terms of processes of institutionalization and professionalization.
In his analysis of how development grew from the 1960s, he stresses the importance of understanding the mechanisms through which power relations are established and reinforced through development discourse, with explicit reference to Foucault (Escobar, 2012, p. 5): “Foucault’s work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social reality, in particular, has been instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse producers permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible”. In this understanding of development as a discourse, a power dynamic is identified between a dominant discourse – what Escobar later refers to as ‘development industry’ – enforced on those countries of the Global South which have long been represented as ‘Third World’. In his analysis of development, Escobar identifies a power structure with a top and bottom – and studies the dynamics in between in terms of domination, a hegemonic exercise of power (ibid, p. 53).

Along the same lines, in his analysis of development as an ‘anti-politics machine’, James Ferguson (2014) takes up the Foucauldian analysis of the genealogy the of prison to explain failure in development as an (un)intended outcome that produces depoliticization of poverty and the poor. In the introduction of his book (Ferguson, 2014, p. 20-21), the author explains:

Specifically, the remaining chapters will show how outcomes that at first appear as mere “side effects” of an unsuccessful attempt to engineer an economic transformation become legible in another perspective as unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect. It is this unauthored resultant constellation that I call “the anti-politics machine”.

Taking the dichotomic representation (with a top and bottom end of power relations) of development even a step forward, James Scott has studied the hidden transcripts of peasants’ morality and practices. In this earlier study on ‘Domination and the Art of Resistance’ Scott (1992) gives a dualistic interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of power and domination. He opens this study by referring to an Ethiopian proverb that declaims ‘When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts’. The division between lords and peasants in the case study of Scott (1992, p. 54) is analysed in its dualistic
opposition, distributing power on the one hand (the top) and resistance on the other (the bottom):

The balance of power in the village, however, was sufficiently skewed against the harvester that they abstained, out of prudence, from publicly contesting the self-serving definition applied by the rich. (...) Euphemisms in the broad sense I am using the term – the self-interested tailoring of descriptions and appearances by dominant powerholders – is not confined to language. It may be seen in gestures, architecture, ritual actions, public ceremonies, any other actions in which the powerful may portray their domination as they wish. Taken together they represent the dominant elite’s flattering self-portrait.

In fact, as he proceeds in his analysis of class relations in a Malay village, Scott takes further the discursive analysis of Foucault by reading power relations as in a dramaturgical metaphor:

Most acts of power from below, even when they are protests – implicitly or explicitly – will largely observe the “rules” even if their objective is to undermine them (...) As Foucault notes, such formulas “cause beggars, poor folks, or simply the mediocre to appear in a strange theatre where they assume poses, declamations, grandiloquences, where they dress up in bits of drapery which are necessary if they want to be paid attention to on the stage of power”. The “strange theatre” to which Foucault refers is deployed not merely to gain a hearing but often as a valuable political resource in conflict and even in rebellion.

Within the school of Scott and Ferguson, Murray Li (2007, p. 277) has examined the ways in which development in Indonesia has attempted and failed to be adaptive to demands of farmers. In fact, she shows how development schemes fail to recognize and work with the heterogeneity of the reality on the ground:

Villagers resented being required to spend long hours and days in meetings drawing pictures and making themselves attractive to patrons, for which they received minimal material payback and no serious response to the fundamental problem of access to land. (...) Yet, as I have argued, analysis of what empowerment programmes
and participatory initiatives fail to do – empower people, alleviate poverty, achieve “genuine” consultation, or even contain and depoliticize – does not exhaust the topic. (...) as Foucault insisted, programs of intervention are not “abortive schemas for the creation of reality. They are fragments of reality which induce...particular effects in the real”.

In her analysis, Murray Li stresses how the development schemes she studied failed to deliver their objectives and admits that although failing, these programmes still have effects on the reality on the ground – if only exasperating locals and depoliticizing their role in society (by ‘rendering society technical’ in (Mosse, 2011, p. 57-79)).

Although problematized, explored in their dimensions of agency, contestation and failure, the analytical categories used by these authors have been assumed to be in contraposition to each other as a top and bottom dimensions of development. There is a (seemingly) Foucauldian understanding of development that divides actors, their narratives and practices within a dualistic understanding and categorization of development as a structure that is formed, embodied, and reproduced through agency.

However, as I showed in the section above (2.3) Foucault (1976, p. 29) gives a different interpretation of domination and distribution of power:

Third methodological precaution: Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination—the domination of one individual over others, of one group over others, or of one class over others; keep it clearly in mind that unless we are looking at it from a great height and from a very great distance, power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it.

In this perspective, in fact, power functions outside of a dichotomic contraposition of power-holders and subjects. Power is exercised by individuals in relation to each other, and the force relations between them are the result of mechanisms such as truth discourses. Therefore, Foucault pointed the analysis of power in a different direction than the dualistic contraposition of a top and bottom – without denying hegemony:
It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyse the mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for such a long time. And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few - and this no doubt was the scandal of his "cynicism"- who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in the force relationships. (Foucault M., 1978, p. 97)

The methodological prescription of Foucault in the analysis of power – and thus also the analysis power in development – is a paradigmatic change. It encourages to investigate the ‘power mechanisms’ sustaining the force relationships, rather than the force relationships as relations of sovereignty. Therefore, the study of power should focus on the mechanisms that sustain power structures, rather than on a dichotomic relation between the sovereign (top) and the dominated (bottom).

On the contrary, while scholars such as Scott, Ferguson and Escobar have studied the power relations between development top and bottom, few studies have focused on the socio-economic and political dynamics within the bottom (Scott J., 1992) (Murray Li, 2007) and within the top (Mosse, 2011). My study proposes a combined study of development dynamics between and within. The Foucauldian conceptualization of power prescribes an analysis of power mechanisms and apparatuses to understand the strategies and rationales of force relationships – as they function everywhere (though not homogenously). Given a case study (e.g. agricultural practices in a Malay village, or the development industry in Lesotho), the Foucauldian analysis deconstructs the discourses, practices and knowledge that are immanent in all social relations and structures. In order to understand and explain the power structures and relations, it is necessary to elaborate an analysis of its functioning devices and what their effect is. Therefore, it is not sufficient to explain that homogeneous development programmes fail to adjust and embrace the heterogeneity on the ground, nor to highlight the (un)intended consequences of hegemonic relations in the field of development.
In the remaining of this chapter, I attempt to adapt the Foucauldian paradigm of analysis to the study of empirical data collected on the field. I will ground the analysis of power relations within the Foucauldian approach to the relations between development actors in Uganda. In this way, I will operationalise the study of discourse and practices of development practitioners and youths.

2.5 FOUCAULT IN DEVELOPMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT TREND AROUND YOUTH IN AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA

In the previous sections, I have considered the Foucauldian paradigm for the analysis of power and the interpretations given by some scholars in development studies, as they adjusted it to their field of study. In this section, I will attempt the elaboration of an operationalized Foucauldian theoretical framework for the study of the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda.

Rather than studying development policies and programmes for what they prescribe and then evaluating how or whether they work – development analysis should focus on the mechanisms that produce the regimes of truth supporting development policies and programmes. Regimes of truth being the knowledge, meaning-giving process and system of values that underpin the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. Such regimes of truth are what I refer to as discourses, and are constituted by narratives and practices (I examine these concepts below).

2.5.1 DISCOURSE, KNOWLEDGE AND NARRATIVES

Within a Foucauldian approach, the scholar in development studies operates a hermeneutic exercise on the discourses (in its narratives and practices) – what Escobar calls an ‘hyperethnography’ of development. In fact, while the paradigm of Foucault is extremely
theoretical in nature, scholars in development studies have operationalised it (therefore adjusting it) by means of qualitative studies – in search for the social meaning underlying and constituting power structures.

Within this type of ethnographic investigation of power within development, narratives and practices constitute the bricks of discourses. Narratives are the frame against which stories and oral or written accounts make sense. ‘Making sense’ is the process of laying the bricks of truths which social actors hold on to in order to give meaning to their socio-cultural world. Practices are the embodiment of the truths constructed within narratives. Together, narratives and practices constitute a discourse – which is a process ever evolving in the talking and doing of the social actors involved. In this way, discourses function in creating, sustaining or changing the established social and political-economic norms regulating social relations. In such process, discourses function as power. Where development actors talk about their ideas and activities as concrete facts, they do not only tell a story – but they create, in doing that, the foundations for development action.

Even though we speak of these actions as if our understandings are hard and concrete, they are in reality the narrative stories we construct as plausible explanations. What we take to be ‘fixed truths’ are only the stories that have over time come to be consensually accepted as plausible by a significant number of people, including influential interpreters of political events, such as journalists, political elites, scholars, and the like. (...) That is to say, commonly accepted intersubjective meanings are embedded in the very institutions and practices of society; and without them these institutions and practices would be dramatically different, if they existed at all. In short, these social entities cannot be discussed independently of them. Social meanings, in short, cannot simply be abstracted and treated as one of the various variables explaining institutions. (Fischer, 2003, p. 43-44)

Fisher stresses that not all stories develop into fixed truths: individuals do not create meaning alone, but as social beings with others. The shared dimension of discourse is precisely the relational nature of power. Fischer (2003, p. 39) refers to ‘fixed truths’, not as static but rather as shared discourses that become dominant.
Their [words, things, knowledge] regulatory discourses produce 'truth' in the sense that they supply systematic procedures for the generation, regulation, and circulation of statements. The knowledge produced is a part of the discursive practices by which rules are constructed, objects and subjects are defined, and events for study are identified and constituted.

This process of generation of knowledge, truth and meaning has been the object of study of anthropologists for decades. With Geertz, anthropologists investigated knowledge and actions in political-economic and social contexts in the understanding that "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz, 1973, p. 5).

In order to understand and explain the mechanisms of power within development, it is necessary to make a ‘thick description’ of narratives, practices and the context in which they take place.

Thick description is an approach for exploring and discovering the meanings embedded in the language and actions of social actors. Because meanings are attached to the actors being described, the process is both descriptive and interpretive (Maxwell 1992: 288). The depth of such meanings, writes Geertz, can be revealed only through detailed descriptions of the social context of the situation in which communication and action take place. In describing the context of an action, the anthropologists make their field notes 'thick' with underlying inferences and implications relevant to their descriptions. (Fischer, Reframing Public Policy. Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 2003, p. 150 )

Here, I take the thick description of a case study in development to be the operationalisation of the Foucauldian paradigm for the analysis of development discourses and power. In this context, ‘communication’ and ‘action’ – which I here take as ‘narratives’ and ‘practices’ – are the entry points for a qualitative analysis of discourses and power in development. By contextualizing and deconstructing (see Methods chapter) such narratives and practices, I hope to bring to light the underlying discourses structuring the new development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda.
The first most evident knowledge category created by this recent development trend in Uganda is youth. As Van Dijk et al. (2011, p. 1) stress, discussions on the definition of this social category have emerged while the development trend increasingly investing in youth: “Under the current dispensation of donor funding, relief programmes and international aid, these discussions [on the definition of youth] have made the ‘youth’ the major beneficiary of what these policies offer and imply”.

Moreover, Sommers (2015) has stressed how despite the increased development attention for this social category of youth – development agencies mostly do not operate with a definition of youth other than a simple age range. It is thus a generic ‘youth’ – for which replicable development measures are adopted. In his analysis of state simplification and legibility, Scott (1998: 81) argues:

First, the knowledge that an official needs must give him or her a synoptic view of the ensemble; it must be cast in terms that are replicable across many cases. In this respect, such facts must lose their particularity and reappear in schematic or simplified form as a member of a class of facts. Second, in a meaning closely related to the first, the grouping of synoptic facts necessarily entails collapsing or ignoring distinctions that might otherwise be relevant.

Standardized human subjects are “uniform in their needs and even interchangeable (...) they have none of the particular, situated, and contextual attributes that one would expect of any population” (Scott 1998: 346). Societies are, then, reified objects – subject to a kind of social gardening tuned to the abstract knowledge of development. In the specific, the development knowledge in place is the assumption that investing in “youth” in “agribusiness” will contribute at solving the “development problem” – namely “youth unemployment” and un-commercial/unproductive agriculture.

Within this paradigm of the relation between youth and risk, instigated by the sheer size of the problem, an aid-industry has come to fruition. In its many NGO activities and initiatives, this aid-industry apparently has shifted policy-orientations from the
‘rural’, the ‘women’ or the ‘household’, to the ‘youth’ as the new developmental target and hope for the future (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011, p. 2)

Interestingly, the discourse relating youth to risk and violence is almost exclusively referring to young men. Reviewing some of the stereotypizing discourses around young men, Sommers (2015, p. 21) points at an important flaw inherent to argumentations (often backed with statistics): “The statements set out here look unassailable. Young men are violent. When their numbers become excessive, they threaten their own societies. However, although most violent criminals may be male youth, most male youth are not criminals.”. In fact, Sommers continues (2015, p. 21), the correlation is not necessarily causal:

As with crime, most male youth don’t get involved in warfare, either. “While the youth bulge argument is compelling”, Barker and Ricardo note, “it is important to reaffirm that in any of these settings, only a minority of young men participate in conflicts. For example, the vast majority of young men, even those unemployed and out of school, were not involved in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone” (2006: 181).

This counter-argumentation to the discourse that relates a youth bulge to violence shows, indirectly, how the development attention for youth is justified by a discourse of fear for conflict. By building a development discourse on the strategic assumption that an increased young population might lead to increased criminality and even warfare, the development industry has laid the ideology that calls for development intervention.

However, van Dijk et al (2011, p. 9) argue that the creation of a development ideology around youth is not a prerogative of development actors alone:

While ‘youth’ has become a project for governments, religious and political leaders and NGOs in the ordering of society and production and control of interests and resources, youth has become an active ideology for themselves in the pursuit of their own interests; in other words, they have acquired an ideological force of their own.

This argument suggests that indeed the development does not project its forces as a form of domination, shaping social realities and prescribing roles, relations and ambitions for the youths. As Foucault stresses, the discursive nature of power is embodied by all social actors involved and is not concentrated in the hands of some.
At the same time, looking into the ‘ideological project’ (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011) of development agencies for youth, it is clear how it prescribes their engagement in agribusiness. As mentioned above, the development agenda encouraging a turn from subsistence to commercial agriculture is not new – but the specific target of these policies for youth is recent. Agribusiness is supported by development programmes as a strategy for the increase of agricultural productivity and the marketization of the sector: an openly neoliberal agenda. As Scott (1976: 23) argues, within this neoliberal approach common villagers are “transformed into untrammelled Schumpeterian entrepreneurs and price and profit become the major standards”. These neoliberal values are not in line with the “subsistence ethic” or anyhow the “moral economy of the peasants” (ibid).

According to Scott (ibid: 264) the ‘imperial pretentions’ of development is the inability to incorporate knowledge from outside its own paradigm. Inevitably, certain forms of knowledge – like the development discourse – require a narrowing of population, and spaces into closed systems of categories. Categories make the environment legible and thus manageable, and Scott (ibid: 83) describes them as an “authoritative tune to which most population must dance”.

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2.5.1B THEORY OF CHANGE

In this section I set the theoretical premises for the use of an analytical tool for the investigation of narratives of development actors: ‘theories of change’. I refer to theory of change as a meta-concept of development organisations, which emerged inductively from the analysis of interviews with practitioners. In fact, it appeared from the interviews that organisations had an implicit vision of what the development problem was, what its ideal solution would be and what their strategy should be. I systematised development practitioners’ strategic views on development in Uganda in chapter 4 (‘Aidnography’), using their theories of change as analytical tool\

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38 I do not make reference to any specific body of literature theorizing on this concept because it is functional to my analysis only within the Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis. In particular, I elaborate on Mosse’s study of development discourses and ‘aidland’.

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A theory of change is the inherent idea behind a development policy, programme or project that there is a pathway of development that should lead from an identified development problem to an ideal development outcome. In fact, as Chabal (2009, p. 4) argues, I am aware that the assumptions underlying development programmes can be particularly powerful in steering its directions: “Theories of development, whatever their guise, made two clear assumptions: the first was that there is a path to (economic and political) development, which all countries follow, if in different ways; the second was that Africa is merely behind on that path but that it will eventually catch up.”.

In his overview of development studies, Mosse (2013, p. 228) argues that:

The anthropology of development raises core anthropological questions about human similarity and difference, Western modernity, and the terms of economic and cultural integration. International development itself has a commitment both to the principle of difference and to similarity (Corbridge 2007, p. 179). Its narrative of progress implies that difference is a deficit to be overcome, whereas its narrative of emancipation implies that difference is sovereign self-determination and thus present equality (Rottenburg 2009).

The framing of development in these terms, stresses the importance of the ideologies in the development effort of ascribing similarities and difference to the subjects ‘to be developed’ – with a tendency to position such differences and similarities on a moral scale defining ‘poverty’ as deficit in the tension towards the achievement of Western standards of modernity. This “subtraction approach” – a developing country’s inability to be more like a developed country – has been the lens for mainstream economics’ reading of Africa’s chronic failure of growth (Jerven M., 2015, p. 2). Development cooperation has based its interventions on complex discourses that problematized and defined ‘poverty’ and ‘the poor’ in different fashions throughout history. In Uganda, like in other ‘developing countries’, standards and criteria are set as to what still needs to be achieved for a country to be considered developed. The development discourse shapes this agenda, but according to
Mosse (2004, p. 664) it is an illusion to think that good development policies shape reality according to the agenda they explicitly set:

The ‘public transcripts’ of development are sustained by the powerful and the subordinate, both of whose interests lead them to ‘tactically conspire to misrepresent’ (Scott, 1990: 2). In development, we cannot speak of policy controlling or disciplining, being resisted or subverted. Policy is an end rather than a cause; a result, often a fragile one, of social processes. Projects are successful because they sustain policy models offering a significant interpretation of events, not because they turn policy into reality. In this way the gap between policy and practice is constantly negotiated away.

With policy being an end rather than a cause, Mosse means to explain that yes, development policy shapes reality by establishing powerful metaphors and narratives around (segments of) societies which it approaches – but more through its hidden agenda (Ferguson refers to it as unintended). Such underpinning development ideology can be extrapolated by means of conducting an *aidnography* (Mosse, 2013) – namely an ethnography of development aid.

### 2.5.2 PRACTICES

I refer to development practices as the actions and practical behaviours of development actors involved in the enactment of a development programme or project. These practices entail activities involving prevalently development practitioners, such as stakeholders meetings, negotiations of strategies, agenda’s and budget allocation, implementation, capacity building, extension services, monitoring and evaluation; but also activities involving development beneficiaries such as: adoption and/or resistance to development programmes. Below, I specify two particular types of practices in development: negotiation and adaptation.

Within a Foucauldian understanding of power, according to Lewis and Mosse (2006, p. 3), development practices are part of the discourse and can be studied by means of ethnography:
The conception of a power that is productive rather than repressive, that comes from below as well as above, that is heterogeneous, diffuse, immanent and unstable (Gedaloff, 1999, pp. 8 – 9), informs understanding of the practices and negotiations around development “orders” in the ethnographies that follow.

Moreover, I draw from Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’, which is the study of why social actors do what they do the way they do that – and the related concept of habitus. In Bourdieu’s theorization, habitus refers to the embodied dispositions and tendencies to perceive and act on the social world, thereby reflecting and shaping social structures. Bourdieu (1990, p. 53) refers to habitus as:

Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.

This understanding of practices as habitus allows to search for the embodied and performed activities in development as part of the Foucauldian discourse – or as Mosse refers to as ‘domain of thought and action’. In my analysis of the development trend on youth in agribusiness, I specifically concentrate on the implementation of programmes and projects both on the ground (the actual agricultural ground) and in formal official settings in Kampala. In particular, practices that include relations between different social actors in development – the experts and the youths – are crucial to the structuration of power in development. In fact, as Lewis and Mosse (2006, p. 4) argue:

An important tradition in both the sociology and anthropology of development has made such routines, immediate practices, and the lifeworlds of agents and “targets” of development its focus, arguing that it is from these social interactions and interfaces that meaning and structures of power emerge.
2.5.2A NEGOTIATION

As mentioned above, Mosse has shown how the very practices in development make good policy unimplementable. For this reason, I will pay particular attention (chapter 6) to processes of negotiation among development actors. I refer to negotiation in development as a practice that involves mostly development practitioners (civil servants and professionals working in the development industry), at different levels of the hierarchy – who need to compromise on their divergent interests and views. Negotiations can happen at a round table, where decisions need to be made (for example about the design of a development programme or project), but can also happen in the informal interactions and practices (for example in the selection of target groups, management of funds and partners) that shape a development programme or project ‘in action’.

Organizational theory has helped anthropologists show how bureaucratic systems (NGO or state) tend to prioritize their own internal “system goals” (of maintenance and survival) over meeting official policy goals (Mintzberg 1979, via Quarles van Ufford 1988). Moreover, the “institutional organizations” that typify the field of international development are those that are compelled, “[to] serve first and foremost the legitimation narrative assigned to them by their [political] environment” (Rottenburg 2009, p. 68), which contains such a diversity of competing interests that these official narratives are characterized by vagueness and ambiguity. The result is pervasive disjuncture in development order (Lewis & Mosse 2006b).

2.5.2B ADAPTATION

The pervasive disjuncture that Lewis and Mosse refer to, emerges in the implementation phase where the development programmes or projects meet reality on the ground. This is the body of practices that I refer to as adaptation: the process by which a given development programme or project comes to terms with the reality on the ground, thereby adjusting strategies and means to fit the sociocultural, economic and value chain context. In practice, this adaptation entails a change in the implementation of the project to adjust to the heterogeneity factors characterising youths and their needs and capacities in agribusiness.
It is a process that is particularly influenced by the agency and resistance exercised by development recipients, and has the effect of modifying the *modus operandi* of a programme or project. This process can be described as a youths’ demand-driven change in the implementation and even design of the development programme or project. While this process is most evident in the implementation phase, it has effects on the outcomes of a development programme or project – and might (in few cases) influence the re-designing of a programme, thereby influencing the negotiation process.

I find myself in line with Lewis and Mosse (2006, p. 4-5) as they use the concept of agency to operationalize the Foucauldian theoretical analysis: “This focus on agency allows for a useful and important corrective to a subjectless Foucauldian analysis. However, we cannot simply substitute an endless multiplicity of actor perspectives, intentions and scenarios for Foucault’s anonymous micro-physics of power.”

### 2.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have set the theoretical grounds for my study on the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. I have explored the current academic debate in development studies and contextualized the particular focus on agribusiness and youth. I have argued that like most critical development scholars, I will make use of a Foucauldian paradigm for my study. In order to understand how youth has come to the centre of programmes for agribusiness, I will study the narratives of both development practitioners and youth. Moreover, in order to understand the impact of these programmes, I will study the practices on the ground. A Foucauldian approach to this study will allow to understand how the development trend has been constructed, considering Foucauldian understanding of discourse and knowledge as devices of power.

In section 2.3 of this chapter, I have elaborated on Foucault’s theorization of power and his conceptualization of the analysis of knowledge and discourse to understand and explain power structures. By exploring how scholars in development studies have used this Foucauldian theoretical paradigm, I have showed that there were some inconsistencies in the operationalization of Foucault’s theory. In fact, some of the studies of Scott, Escobar and
Ferguson, for example, have not escaped the logic of the Leviathan – thereby understanding power as a quality that some social actors can accumulate and exercise upon others. On the contrary, Foucault (1976, p. 29) stressed that power circulates, functions and is exercised through networks and individuals.

This understanding of power implies that the construction of power structures and relations in development is the result of narratives, practices and interactions of all actors involved. In other words, development practitioners and youths also interact among themselves and thereby construct the discourse that sustains a new trend in development. It is not necessarily the case that development organisations impose their will and programmes on youths – as a vertical exercise of power (domination). Rather, the Foucauldian approach invites to investigate the construction of power also horizontally, as the result of interactions, narratives and practices. Therefore, the use of this paradigm allows to analyse the construction of a development trend as a heterogeneous process.

By using this theoretical approach to the study of the recent trend in development around youth in agribusiness, I expect to unravel: 1) how through narratives and practices the category of youths has driven the recent trend around agribusiness; 2) what the impact has been so far, through the practices of implementation of the programmes.

Understanding, with Escobar (2012) and Mosse (2013), development as a political and historically contextual process, ethnographic research methods will allow to collect data on this process. By means of anthropological theories and methods, I adjust Foucault’s paradigm to the study of the development trend of youth in agribusiness in Uganda. As Mosse and Lewis (2006, p. 5) argue, in fact development can be analysed as a process where narratives and practices are intertwined and constitute what Foucault would call a development system of power discourse and relations:

In various ways the ethnographies in this issue demonstrate that policy does not precede or order practice. (...) the disjuncture arising from the autonomy of practice from rationalizing policy is not an unfortunate “gap to be bridged” between intention and action, but is instead necessary and must therefore be actively maintained and reproduced.
CHAPTER 3

METHODS

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to lay out the methodological frame I have used in for the collection, present the ethnographic data and outline the qualitative analysis of my data. In this study, I explore the ways in which a trend in development policy making around youth in agribusiness is adopted and implemented in Uganda. I assume, as argued in the previous chapter, that such trend is constructed through the narratives and practices of all development actors involved (both youths and practitioners). Through qualitative research, I attempt to answer the following research question:

*How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in development around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far?*

To describe, interpret and explain development as a socially constructed reality requires qualitative methods. Therefore, this research entails the investigation of what the social actors involved say and do. As Beuving and de Vries (2015, p. 15) explain, qualitative research means:

> studying people in everyday circumstances by ordinary means. This includes observing how people go about their daily business and how they interact, listening to what they have to tell, considering what they accomplish and produce, understanding what their stories, interactions and accomplishments mean, and reporting back to them.

The study of people’s interaction, stories and actions is a quest for meaning. In the understanding that words and actions are the fundamental bricks through which social actors construct meaning and make sense of their experiences, the qualitative study of people’s words and actions is an interpretation of their symbolic representation “that can serve in the pursuit of uncovering the mental categories by which a society functions” (Beuving & De Vries, 2015, p. 41). In fact, qualitative research methods are the most suitable for the investigation of narratives and practices, in the process of construction of a development trend.

The use, adaptation and adjustment of theoretical frameworks and concepts is crucial to the process of ethnographic research. In fact, qualitative research entails the data collection
within a theoretical framework that helps the research during fieldwork – and which often needs to be adjusted after ethnographic data has been analysed. This process is crucial to most qualitative research, and specifically the grounded theory methods I have chosen. The role and use of theories, is described by Sanjek (1990, p. 396) in these terms:

In addition to significant theories, the fieldworker develops terrain-specific theories of significance about people, events, and places. These determine much of the looking and listening that are recorded in fieldnotes and, in turn, confirm, extend, or revise the significant theories.

Prior knowledge of the theoretical debates around development studies helped me shape preliminary ideas, or ‘sensitizing concepts’, of what I was to explore through ethnographic research. Sensitizing concepts “are not seen as hypotheses that have to be tested against data, but as interesting or challenges ideas to be further explored in the field” (ibid: 60). In fact, Smit (2017, p. 51) refers to Middleton who writes that “[w]hat the fieldworker does in essence is to build up hypothetical structures or patterns as he goes along. Every new fact that he gathers can either be fitted into that structure, or if not, he is forced to change the structure”.

The chapter is structured in five sections. In the following section 3.2, I outline the mixed methods I have used, showing how grounded theory combines with the Foucauldian paradigm (delineated in chapter 2). In section 3.3 I operationalise the theoretical concepts that are key to my analysis, and describe the knowledge categories related to my informants. Subsequently (section 3.4), I move to the description of my fieldwork design, the justification of country selection and its generalisability, and an overview of the data I have collected. In section 3.5, I zoom in the field sites of my analysis, to contextualise the history and social background of my fieldwork. In the next section (3.6), I describe the qualitative methods of analysis I have used, with a critical reflection on the representation of data. I conclude (section 3.7) with a reflection on the limitations of my ethnographic research.
3.2 MIXED METHODS: FOUCAULT AND GROUNDED THEORY

In order to elaborate an analysis of the devices that sustain the design and implementation of recent development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda, I explore the systems of knowledge and practices constructed and performed by the social actors involved – both the development practitioners as the youths. I attempt an analysis and explanation of the power ‘dispositives’ (Foucault M., 1976) and the structures they endorse (and contest). In particular, I focus on the construction of knowledge structures through narratives, and the practices for the implementation of development programmes and projects – which define relations and power distribution among social actors in development.

As Fisher (2003, p. 43-44) argues:

Thus, given that the languages of politics inscribe the meanings of a policy problem, public policy is not only expressed in words, it is literally 'constructed' through the language(s) in which it is described. To offer a simple but clear example, it makes an important difference whether policy deliberations over drug addiction are framed in a medical or a legal discourse. That is, to say something one way rather than another is to also implicitly say a whole host of other things, which will be grasped by some and not by others. In this way, a political 'agenda is established out the history, traditions, attitudes, and beliefs of a people encapsulated and codified in the terms of its political discourse' (Hewlett and Ramesh 1995: 110; Jenson 1991). A discursive approach not only examines these discourses, but seeks to determine which political forces lead to their construction.

The focus of my analysis are the dispositives – narratives and practices – constructing the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda, positioning this study within the field of development studies. At the same time, the methods I used to collect data on these dispositives have been ethnographic, because of the nature of the research question: it does not aim at defining whether development works, but rather how it functions, and what its consequences are on the ground.

As mentioned, I conducted such investigation of narratives and practices with qualitative methods because they are the most suitable to investigate meaning-giving processes and
discourses. In fact, Boeije (2010, p. 11) defines qualitative research as the process of interpretative investigation of the meanings people give to social phenomena:

The purpose of qualitative research is to describe and understand social phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them. The research questions are studied through flexible methods enabling contact with the people involved to an extent that is necessary to grasp what is going on in the field. The methods produce rich, descriptive data that need to be interpreted through the identification and coding of themes and categories leading to findings that can contribute to theoretical knowledge and practical use.

Escobar encourages an “hyperethnography of development” (2012: xv): an ethnography of the regimes of representation constructed by development discourse. The deconstruction of development as a discourse, aims to highlight its forms of knowledge, system of power regulating development practices and the forms of subjectivity fostered by the development discourse (ibid: 10). I delved into this ethnographic field exploring the peculiar processes attributing meaning to social, economic and political phenomena related to youth engagement in agribusiness:

Policy discourse generates mobilizing metaphors (‘participation’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’, ‘social capital’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute agency and to multiply criteria of success within project systems (cf. Dahl, 2001: 20; Li, 1999). (Mosse, 2004, p. 663)

With this study, I embark an analysis of the ‘mobilizing metaphors’ shaping the development discourse around youth and agribusiness – as it is constructed by both development practitioners and youths themselves. Anthropological methods of inquiry serve the purpose of understanding how development works, beyond the deconstruction of the regimes of representation, and beyond the technocratic question of whether development works (i.e. how successful development is) (Mosse 2013). In fact, as Ferguson (2014: 17) argues:
As an anthropologist, one cannot assume, for instance, as many political economists do, that a structure simply and rationally “represents” or “expresses” a set of “objective interests”; one knows that structures are multi-layered, polyvalent, and often contradictory, and that economic functions and “objective interests” are always located within other, encompassing structures that may be invisible even to those who inhabit them. (...) the anthropologist knows well how easily structures can take on lives of their own that soon enough overtake intentional practices.

Without assuming any knowledge structure or discourse as a given, I too acknowledge development as a situated social practice, where “social reality is not a thing ‘out there’ that determines our actions, but instead is a web of sustained interaction, (...) constantly being created and recreated by people through their interaction” (Beauving & de Vries 2015: 52). Drawing from such theoretical framing of the object of study (the new development trend), the research and analysis methods I choose is grounded theory, or naturalistic inquiry.

Grounded theory is committed to remaining close to lived experience and situated social practice. It views these not as some psychological by-product of the socio-structure, but as constituting the core of social life. Theorizing is not done by deducting hypothesis from theory to be tested against some body of empirical data selected for the purpose of verification. Instead what is needed is to formulate propositions inspired by the empirical data themselves. (...) In grounded theory, the same theories are not considered to be universal models of society, but rather as offering interesting ideas that can serve as preliminary guidance in the selection of cases” (Beauving & de Vries 2015: 53).

Applying grounded theory to the study of a new development trend such as youth in agribusiness means building a theoretical explanation by inferring from description, interpretation and explanation of the conditions that give rise to the development trend itself.

Ethnography is defined by Fabietti and Remotti (2009, p. 274) as (my translation): “both the research activity carried out during prolonged periods of stay in direct contact with the object of study, and the production of an anthropological text.” The process that takes the ethnographer from theory, to empirical data and then back to theory requires the researcher
to be his or her own tool of research. In particular during the period of data collection, the fieldwork, the ethnographer uses the knowledge gathered from literature to scan and select the relevant socio-cultural events, which will be revealing for the research question. This process is punctually described by Sanjek (1990, p. 396):

In the early stage of fieldwork the ethnographer “opportunistically” records wide-ranging fieldnotes about whatever goes on, but the objective is not to continue doing this forever (Honigmann 1970b: 269; Powdermaker 1966: 61; Saberwal 1975). This charting of the ethnographic terrain is filtered through theory so that more selective and systematic participant observation will follow. The net of people, places and activities studied opportunistically may continue to widen in fieldnotes, but theory-guided research activities will narrow at the same time.

Specifically, I have used a number of concepts, both in my first approach to the field, and later after I had analysed the data and returned to the theory, developing a Foucauldian frame of analysis. In the following I examine such concepts as I bend them to be theoretical tools for analysis of empirical data, in the following chapters.

3.3 OPERATIONALIZING CONCEPTS

In this paragraph, I will explore the practical use of some of the theoretical concepts I have discussed in the previous chapter (Theory): discourse, narratives and practices. Moreover, I will also describe how I use the main knowledge categories: development actors, practitioners, youths, agribusiness and ethnicity.

3.3.1 DISCOURSE: NARRATIVES, PRACTICES

As I have analysed in the previous chapter, scholars (Mosse, 2013; Murray Li, 2007; Escobar, 2012) in critical development studies have examined development as a social construct and as a discourse. Particularly within its Foucauldian understanding, discourse is a slippery concept to operationalize, since its use has mainly been within the realm of philosophy. Within this study, discourse is understood as the frame against which social actors’ narratives
and practices make sense. In fact, it is produced as much as it reproduces itself through narratives and practices, which can be in agreement or in tension with each other. Therefore, the analysis of development as discourse is an interpretative quest for meaning. Combining the Foucauldian understanding of discourse with qualitative research, bends the concept to an interpretative approach: a thick description of the constituent parts of discourse (narratives and practices) will reveal the meaning of discourse. Meaning is important because it has concrete influence on social formations and actions. Meaning can be constructed both through oral or written narratives, and through actions – or practices.

The concept of ‘narratives’ refers to the meaning socially constructed and attached by individuals or groups of people to practical and concrete situations – working both as a justification and explanation. Narratives are thus extracted as meta-analysis from oral or written stories, which emerge from the way in which people perceive, understand and explain their world. The stories a narrator (an individual, group or institution) tells reflect a cultural ideology, political beliefs and social norms at that given point in time – they can be written, oral or be reflected in actions and behaviours that reinforce such cultural constructs. Development actors (practitioners, policy makers and beneficiaries) create meaning through narratives – which again is the driver of development action. Below, I will explain how I collected and analysed such narratives.

As Beuving and De Vries argue (2015, p. 32): “People act according to the meaning they impute in situations. Once enacted, these behavioural consequences or social formations have an impact on how people define new situations, on how they continue to think and act. (...) [A]cts and meaning continuously interact – there is a dialectical relationship between them.” Discourse is, thus, the meaning and rationale behind the development trend I am investigating; the process through which discourse is constructed is the object of analysis in the empirical chapters that follow.

These acts are what I refer to as ‘practices’, in the context of the analysis of the development trend. These practices entail activities involving prevalently development practitioners, such as stakeholders meetings, negotiations of strategies, agenda’s and budget allocation, implementation, capacity building, extension services, monitoring and evaluation; but also
activities involving development beneficiaries such as: adoption and/or resistance to development programmes, adaptation

### 3.3.2 ETHNICITY

Ethnicity is a problematic knowledge category, since it has served ‘tribalizing’ political purposes during colonial times (Mamdani 1996). In fact, despite the fact that tensions between groups of people in Uganda had emerged before colonisation, also on the basis of socio-cultural and political identities – the indirect rule has fossilized tensions and consolidated ethnic distinctions to serve the purpose of domination. In fact, Mamdani (1996, p. 21) has argued, indirect rule established in Uganda was organized as an “ethnic power enforcing custom on tribespeople”. “Native” institutions (e.g. Native Authority) were established to rule subjects, and this was the process in which ethnic identities were constructed. Not only, but ethnic identities were anchored through customary laws to the land: the “tribally”-individuated community was made customary proprietor of land while the appointed “tribal” political leaders were appointed as “holders and executors of that proprietorship” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 140). If “Tribalism then was the very form that colonial rule took within the local state (…) the revolt against indirect rule also took a tribal form” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 183).

The historical construction of the concept of ethnicity, and particularly its political use, are very sensitive and complex processes. Moreover, it is hard to discern the pre- and post-colonial denotations of the concept, although this distinction is crucial for the contemporary use of the concept in academia. To this purpose, the analysis of Reid (2017, p. 299-300) is useful:

But a note of caution is required here. (…) Claustrophobia and entrapment unquestionably, in many cases, produced more competitive, militant identities – identities which were less porous, it is argued, less flexible, more ‘otherising’ and exclusive, than anything which existed in the broadly defined ‘precolonial’ era. However this was also a process of some antiquity, and a multitude of groups were palpably and demonstrably not ‘invented’ during colonial rule in any meaningful
sense, but which were evolving long before 1900 (...). Colonial rule made ethnic identity a zero-sum game, in many cases, and the fragile nation suffered as a result; but ‘ethnic identity’ itself has become reified as a modern phenomenon, and nuance is needed in considering the twentieth-century evolution of political culture. Groupings that previously had some degree of internal cultural and linguistic affinity now began to consolidate, and cohere more closely.

Having made these considerations, I make use of ‘ethnicity’ as an analytical category. Ethnicity will not be a sampling criteria or variable in the selection of the case study, but it remains an important identity marker in the individual and social interactions involving access to land. I have accounted for ethnicity in my participant observation among youths, to understand whether and how it plays a role in the making of agribusiness for young entrepreneurs.

In fact, my informants were very much aware of ethnic differences and disparities, as much as ethnicity was an important trait of their identity. The very process of obtaining adulthood was, particularly for men, strictly tied to the achievement of the full belonging to their ethnic group.

3.3.3 COLLECTION OF DATA: SAMPLING STRATEGY

In the sampling of my informants I paid attention to three social categories: development practitioners, youths, and their engagement in agribusiness – possibly making them agripreneurs. I adopted wide selection parameters in my selection, in order to reflect the diversity of the sample. In the following sub-sections, I define the profile of social actors I sampled. All of them were engaged in development, and can thus be called development actors.

I refer to development actors as all the social actors involved in the development enactment process: policy-makers, civil servants, employees of development agencies (national and international, governmental and non-), extension service providers, private sector companies, but also youths engaged in agribusiness, both within and outside development
schemes. The ensemble of all these social actors, engaged with different roles in the design, implementation or reception of development activities, are here referred to as development actors. For the sake of structuring the investigation, I have divided this group in two sub-categories: development practitioners and youths (see below).

3.3.3A DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS

According to the Oxford dictionary a practitioner is “a person actively engaged in an art, discipline, or profession, especially medicine”. In this study, I refer to development practitioners as those social actors employed in development agencies, both national and international, at different levels of the hierarchical structure of the organization. Notably, the majority of the development practitioners I have interviewed were males, despite the fact that I did not purposefully select males.

The range of practitioners I have selected was representative of the development practitioners engaged in the development trend around youth in agribusiness. In fact, as I will show in more detail below, I have interviewed practitioners from most national and international development organisations involved in this trend.

3.3.3B YOUTH

As mentioned, 78% of the Ugandan population is under 30 years, and development organisations adopt several, conflicting definitions of youth (Sommers, 2015). In fact, it is the very vagueness of the definition of youth that triggered my research interest in the first place. The very knowledge category of youth is constantly under construction, and it was as such object of my investigation: the meanings and definitions of youth.

Accordingly, for sampling purposes, I selected social actors in the age range 15-35, the broadest bracket possible bracket, including all definitions from relevant development actors.

This bracket is rather problematic given that the life expectancy in Uganda is about 60 years of age: in fact, this age range includes in the category of ‘youth’ also Ugandans in their mid-life stage. In the sampling of the social group of youths across the country I paid attention to the representativeness of the respondents I interviewed. I attempted to gather youths that reflected the heterogeneity of this social group, across the country.

3.3.3 AGribusiness, Agripreneurship, Agripreneurs

The universe of possible case studies is quite extensive given 60% of the population is engaged in agriculture and 68% of the working population are youths (15-34 years) (World Bank, 2013).

While agribusiness has been in the agenda of development agencies for a while, there is no clear, uniform definition of what the concept actually refers to. The basic working definition identifies agribusiness as any income-generating agricultural activity conducted on strictly commercial principles. However, especially those development programmes that are more private-sector driven and/or oriented, refer to a commercial type of agriculture that aims at maximising profit through the capitalisation of income. This capitalistic type of agribusiness often has a strongly competitive and hierarchical structure, and ideally it is envisioned to have a trickle-down effect for employment of labour. Agripreneurship is thus the entrepreneurial mentality that farmers need to have, either as an innate quality or as a learnt skill, to make an agribusiness of their agricultural activity. Those who do, are defined ‘agripreneurs’. However, this definition of agribusiness and agripreneur comprises a great variety of small to large scale enterprises, and professional figures. Paradoxically, in my experience, development practitioners defined as agripreneurs both those most wealthy businessmen or women working on large agri-food enterprises, and small-holders who barely made it to the end of the month. As for the sampling of my informants, thus, I had a very broad universe of possible cases, and I have adopted the emic\(^{40}\) definition of development organisations. Therefore, I have interviewed those young farmers who were targeted for the development programmes.

\(^{40}\) In anthropology, ‘emic’ refers to the perspective or point of view of the informants, in contraposition to ‘etic’ – namely the perspective of the observer.
3.4 FIELDWORK

The field selection was focused on a single case study, Uganda, for two main reasons. First, because of the explorative nature of the research question, which required an in-depth focus on the process of formulation and implementation of development programmes. The research question investigated meanings, perspectives and practices of the social actors involved in order to describe development as a process, and therefore required exhaustive examination of one case study. Second, this study sat out to describe a recent trend in development, on which little academic literature and theory was available. The inductive methods aimed at generating hypotheses on a recent trend around youth in agribusiness, rather than testing available theories. As Donmoyer (2000, p. 51-52) argues, single “case study research might be used to expand and enrich the repertoire of social constructions available to practitioners and others; it may help, in other words, in the forming of questions rather than in the finding of answers.”.

From the analysis of the single case study of Uganda, it is possible to infer the general themes in the development discourse around youth in agribusiness. At the same time, specific ethnographic knowledge can be generated around the implemented programmes on the ground and its beneficiaries. Moreover, by studying the narratives and practices in depth, it is possible to understand the power mechanisms that sustain the recent development trend. Such mechanisms can be inferred to be valid also for other sub-Saharan countries of which Uganda is a representative case. Moreover, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 235) holds that “The advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice”. In this way, the single case study in Uganda allows to test and add to the available academic literature on development studies.

The risk of a single case selection is related to the generalisability: while the specificities of the single case are peculiar to the socio-cultural context investigated, the meta-analysis and interpretation of the results leads to generalizable conclusions. The generalisability of the conclusions of this study is related to the representativeness of the case study selected (see section below).
The selection of Uganda as case study for the exploration of the recent trend around youth in agribusiness is justified by the representativeness of the country for other sub-Saharan countries. The goal of this study is to understand how development programmes for youth in agribusiness are adopted and implemented, and what their impact is. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the rationale and enactment of a new trend in development policy making. The range of possible case studies for this analysis is extended to all the African countries where such programmes are adopted.

I have chosen Uganda as a ‘typical case’ (Gerring, 2008) in comparison to other sub-Saharan countries receiving Official Development Assistance (ODA). In fact, as I have explained in chapter 1 (sections 1.2.3 and 1.3) Uganda has an important though rather standard relation with development assistance. Like other developing countries on the continent, Uganda has experienced shifts in development approaches – from structural adjustment to liberalisation. Moreover, development agencies have focused, in the past decades across the continent, on various themes: education, health, family farming, gender, agribusiness – and recently, youth in agribusiness. Of the top-10 ODA receiving countries, Uganda is representative of: a) the demographic trend recording a ‘youth bulge’; b) youth engagement in agriculture; c) youth unemployment; d) recipient of the major programmes in this field. In fact, with relation to the mentioned criteria, Uganda falls in the averages. In the table below, I have summarised the main data related to the criteria of representativeness selected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA recipients(^{42}), % of total USD disbursed</th>
<th>Youth population</th>
<th>Youth in agriculture Average(^{43}): 64%</th>
<th>Youth unemployment(^{44})</th>
<th>Programmes for youth in agribusiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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\(^{41}\) I have here considered the major multilateral programme, by the African Development Bank – ENABLE Youth programme, which aims at engaging youth in commercial agribusiness. In terms of budget, it seems to be the major programme in this field. However, there is little transparency of the development agencies I have worked with, regarding the budgets.


\(^{43}\) I was not able to find uniform data for all countries, and therefore I refer to the average employment of African youth in agriculture (64%), which varies significantly between rural youths.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>18-35</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>(AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>(AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>(AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Average: 64%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>(AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(76%) and urban youths (39%). According to WB data from 2012 (Brooks, Zorya, Gautam, & Goyal, 2013, p. 12), accessed on 5/10/2018 on: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15605/WPS6473.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y


46 In order to access uniform data for all selected countries, I have used UNFPA data. I have here reported the percentage of the population in the age range 10-24, which is out of my operational definition of youth (18-35). This choice was taken because I could not find uniform data on the age group 18-35 for all countries. I accessed UNFPA statistics on 4/10/2018 on: https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Median age:</th>
<th>Average:</th>
<th>% of population:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Egypt 4%</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>DR Congo 4%</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.3% (AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Morocco 4%</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Uganda 4%</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.9% (AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>South Sudan 3%</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17.6% (AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Mozambique 3%</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42.7% (AfDB) ENABLE Youth programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. COMPARISON TOP-10 ODA-RECEIVING COUNTRIES.**

Given the representativeness of Uganda as an ODA receiving country with young population, it can be considered a typical case study of how development functions – particularly with regards to the trend around youth in agribusiness. The process of adoption and
implementation of the recent trend in development targeting youths in agribusiness, is typical to other developing countries on the African continent. Also in other countries, the trend is constructed through the narratives and practice of development actors involved. Moreover, the socio-cultural specificities that influence the implementation of the development programmes can be expected to play an important role also in other sub-Saharan countries (see chapter 7). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that several considerations I make around this trend in development are applicable also to other contexts. However, empirical research in other aid receiving, sub-Saharan countries would be necessary to verify the applicability of the conclusions drawn from this study.

3.4.2 DESIGN

I have carried out my ethnographic fieldwork during three periods: a pilot fieldtrip of 5 weeks in 2016; extensive fieldwork for 6 months in 2017; and a follow up field trip of 4 weeks in 2018. Altogether, the fieldwork activities stretched along the timeline reported in table 3.2, and allowed me to collect 134 semi-structured and in-depth interviews.

I have carried out multi-sited fieldwork in order to have an overview of how development programmes were implemented across the country. In fact, I have selected four sub-regions: Kampala in the central region, Gulu in the northern region, Mbale in the eastern and Mbarara in the south-western region. Within each of these regions, I have selected the precise areas of my fieldwork based on the areas of interest of the main development programmes I followed up on the ground. The selection of the programmes to follow up resulted from the first phase of fieldwork, in which I interviewed the main development agencies engaging youth in agribusiness. Conducting multi-sited fieldwork meant I had the chance to explore the diversity of Uganda’s regions.

3.4.2A FIELD SITES AND RESEARCH PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July – August 2016</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Pilot fieldtrip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 respondents: development experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3. FIELD SITES AND RESEARCH PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Respondents:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January – February 2017</td>
<td>Kampala (capital city)</td>
<td>24 respondents: development practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – April 2017</td>
<td>Gulu (North Uganda)</td>
<td>29 respondents: young agro-entrepreneurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March &amp; May 2017</td>
<td>Kampala (capital city)</td>
<td>26 respondents: young agro-entrepreneurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – June 2017</td>
<td>Mbarara (South-West Uganda)</td>
<td>25 respondents: young agro-entrepreneurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>Mbale (East Uganda)</td>
<td>30 respondents: young agro-entrepreneurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Follow-up fieldwork 13 interviews with development practitioners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pilot field trip was useful to ground my research focus on youth in agribusiness in empirical evidence of the development trends, and become acquainted with the socio-cultural reality in which I was to conduct fieldwork. Most importantly it was useful to narrow down my research question: from a general interest in the recent trend in development focusing on youth, to a question on its construction through narratives and practices of development practitioners and youths. Therefore, I structured the extended fieldwork in two phases: I would spend two months interviewing practitioners in Kampala, and four months interviewing youths. Interviewing development practitioners from various development agencies helped me to identify their agency’s sampling strategies, definitions of youths, and
objectives, as well as the approaches of the implemented programmes. I then elaborated a preliminary analysis of the narratives of development practitioners as precursor to my interviews with youths.

Based on the results of this first phase of my research and considering two pilot fieldtrips I conducted in the north (Gulu) and east (Mbale) of the country, I identified two main variables of interest. These variables emerged from the interviews as main factors diversifying the development programmes: 1) different development approaches adopted by the development organisations (public or private-sector driven); and 2) geographic location. These two variables diversified the development approaches of the various agencies I had interviewed, and were therefore assumed to have different impacts on the ground. I have thus selected the two most diverse development approaches (private-sector driven approach VS public approach), which I followed up on the ground. Secondly, I have selected 4 sub-regions (Gulu, Kampala, Mbarara and Mbale) to locate the evaluation of the two above-mentioned development approaches. The choice of the locations was justified by two factors: I have considered the locations where the different development organisations were most actively implementing their programmes. Moreover, I have considered the disparity between the regions in terms of development, infrastructures, modes of production, value chains, socio-cultural and historical background. I suspected that the disparity and diversity between these regions would have had an influence on the way the development programmes were implemented. In order to have an overall perspective of the impact of the programmes for the engagement of youths, I needed to collect an overview of the implementation in its diverse contexts on the ground.

In addition to considering the variables of development approach and locations, I have considered a control group of young agripreneurs who were not involved in any development scheme, for each of the four field sites. This sampling strategy is illustrated in the below figure (Figure 3. Sampling strategy):
FIGURE 3. SAMPLING STRATEGY

I have dedicated about 2 weeks of intense fieldwork activities in each of the four sites, to which added about one week of preparations and one week of fieldnotes elaboration.

After returning from the field, I have elaborated the discourse analysis of all the interviews, and written the first two empirical chapters (‘aidnography’ and ‘youthnography’), and inevitably new questions emerged after structuring the analysis into written accounts. In order to answer some of these new questions, and as part of the grounded theory I had chosen for my methods, I embarked in a final follow-up field trip. During this time, I focused on the implementation of the programmes through the practices that took development practitioners to translate their narratives into concrete actions.

3.4.3 THE DATA

As mentioned, I have collected ethnographic data during three periods of fieldwork, which are described in more detail in Table 4 below.

3.4.3A DATASET FROM FIELDWORK WITH DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS (2016, 2017, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilot fieldtrip 2016</th>
<th>Extensive fieldwork 2017</th>
<th>Follow-up fieldwork 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Government civil servants</td>
<td>7 Government civil servants</td>
<td>4 Government civil servants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I used a semi-structured approach during interviews, working from a common guideline but deviating when interesting ideas and topics emerged. While all semi-structured interviews were modelled along the themes described below, I adjusted the formulation of the interviews to the context I was in. This (relative) flexibility allowed me to be more receptive to the issues that emerged as being more burning in the specific contexts.

**Interview guideline’s themes**

| 1. Agribusiness structure & trajectory |
| History, management, trajectory in productivity, profit and investments, marketing strategies and opportunities, definitions of ‘agribusiness’, ‘farmer’ and ‘agripreneur’. |
| 2. Social dimension of agribusiness (partly) |
| Cooperation with others, decision-making strategies, what others are up to |
| 3. Personal dimension of agribusiness |
| General feeling, vision for the future, what should be done differently/what is necessary, what is the vision for their kids |
| 4. Relation with donor/development scheme (partly) |
| Reflection on before/after, decision-making strategies and negotiations with donor, what works and what needs to be done differently, navigating different opportunities |
The majority of the interviews has been recorded and transcribed, except a few ones which have been only noted in my fieldnotes, as the context (mostly the market place) didn’t allow me to pull out my recorder. In each of the four locations I have selected I have interviewed people who were engaged in either a public-sector development scheme, a private-sector driven programme, and a control group, which were not members of either. Generally, the youths in public sector programmes were more difficult to access because of a widespread suspicion: most of them had troubles returning the loan they had received to start their agribusiness, and in that period governmental authorities were patrolling and even jailing in-compliant youths. This situation left me with an unbalanced number of youths in the two different development schemes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
<th>Not-recorded</th>
<th>Dev. scheme</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Focus group discussions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 North</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12 private-sector</td>
<td>Males 19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 public</td>
<td>Females 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 control group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Central</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9 private-sector</td>
<td>Males 8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 public</td>
<td>Females 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 control group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 West</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>11 private-sector</td>
<td>Males 23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 public</td>
<td>Females 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 East</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10 private-sector</td>
<td>Males 19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 public</td>
<td>Females 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Total private sector: 42
- Total public sector: 19
- Total control: 49
3.4.4 THE INTERPRETERS

Many languages (43<sup>49</sup>) are spoken in Uganda, besides English official language – which Ugandans inherited from the colonial times. Despite being the main language taught in school, and also the official language of instruction – English is still not spoken in most rural areas, as children often only attend the (compulsory) elementary school. On the contrary in Kampala, being a multicultural and multi-ethnic environment, English is spoken by the majority of people – next to the local language, Luganda. Besides the rural-urban difference in English literacy, however, there also was a class disparity – both in rural areas and within Kampala: the poorer could not afford an education beyond compulsory schooling, and therefore did not speak English.

Because of all these reasons, the majority of my youth informants did not speak English, and therefore I often needed to conduct my interviews with the help of a translator. Interestingly, the interpreter was not only useful for the task of translation, but also as ‘cultural’ broker in circumstances in which I could not make sense of behaviours or answers to my questions. In fact, the interpreter turned out to also become a key informant – and in one case also a close friend. Therefore, I find myself in line with McMichael (2002, p. 176) as she stresses that she “did not <i>use</i> an interpreter, but <i>worked with</i> an interpreter, (...) This approach enhanced the interview process, as we were able to work together and bring different skills and perspectives to the research project.”.

Fortunately, I had the chance of working with capable interpreters, but since I did not speak the local languages I could not judge whether the translations were accurate, during the time

<sup>49</sup>Ethnologue, visited on 3/08/2018 on: https://www.ethnologue.com/country/UG
of fieldwork. In order to minimize the possible mistakes and misunderstandings in the translations of my interpreters, I have hired native speakers research assistants affiliated to IITA to type out the recordings of the interviews.

3.4.4A NORTH: CATHY TRANSLATES ACHOLI

I met my first interpreter, Cathy, in a shopping mall in Kampala. She was selling honey as a peddler and as I bought a pot from her I figured she was indeed an agripreneur: in fact, she had explained how she would buy the honey in bulk, and add value by bottling and marketing it with her own brand. We got in conversation, and she proved to have great knowledge of the honey value chain from the north. After I had interviewed her, on another occasion, I realised she had great command of English, was knowledgeable of socio cultural environment of the area surrounding Gulu, and spoke the local language – Acholi. Most importantly, she seemed to immediately grasp the rationale of my research and the methods of data collection. For all these reasons, and also simply because I had the feeling I could trust her, I chose her to be my interpreter and ‘cultural broker’ for my field trip to Gulu. In fact, she served the last purpose better than the translations, since sometimes her vocabulary of rural circumstances and agricultural activities was a bit rusty – since her main language was English.

3.4.4B CENTRAL AND SOUTH-WESTERN REGIONS: JOYCE TRANSLATES LUGANDA AND LUNYANKOLE

During the pilot fieldtrip to Kampala in 2016, an agribusiness expert from IITA brought me in touch with Joyce, a “very successful young agripreneur” producing and exporting red peppers. I visited Joyce at her place, where she welcomed warmly and was glad to share with me her experience as an agripreneur. This informal, first interview with her indicated that she was going to be a key informant and a good friend. She has a BA in management and has been working in a hotel before jumping into true passion – agribusiness. She started with hiring 2ha of land in the outskirts of Kampala, and by the time of our first interview she was managing 20ha. During the extended fieldwork in 2017 I visited Joyce weekly while she was
pregnant, and three months after she gave birth she started helping me with translations in Kampala – when she guided me through the main vegetables market. Since our collaboration was working smoothly, she joined me as on the field trip to the south-western region. Or rather, I followed her to her home village, where we stayed at her mother’s place for two weeks. Staying at her mother’s place was crucially important to facilitate my fieldwork in the area: her mother, the teacher at the local school was a respected figure in the community, which gave me access to contacts of district authorities, farmers and community leaders.

3.4.4C EAST: WILBERFORCE AND TIMOTHY TRANSLATE LUGISU

During the first fieldtrip to Mbale in February 2017, Wilberforce, a research assistant at IITA, helped me as interpreter. Together with Wilberforce, I visited the wholesale market in Kamu, up on Mount Elgon. This was also the place where he had built a house with his wife, to whom he introduced me. Wilberforce was an ideal interpreter, since he was accustomed to collaborating with researchers and he was familiar with many agripreneurs in the area who fell in my sampling criteria. Unfortunately, he was not available during the second field trip to Mbale, in June 2017 so he directed me to his friend Timothy. While the relation with Timothy had not been as ideal as with Wilberforce, he was a competent interpreter and he facilitated the majority of the interviews I conducted in the area. He had himself completed a BA in social studies and was acquainted with the research methods of my fieldwork.

3.4.5 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATIONS

Besides the collection of interviews, I have also done participant observations. This anthropological research practice is defined by Fabietti and Remotti (2009, p. 544, my translation) as a technique that “implies the immersion in the daily activities of the community to be studied, (...) it is based on the concept of empathy, it aims at minimizing the problem of reactivity and the distorting effect of the presence of the anthropologist, dissolving the presence of the observant among the observed”. The proximity of the observer to the reality of the case study is a prerequisite for an advanced understanding of the dynamics that are object of study (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 236). Participant observations in a case
study allow to cast off preconceived notions and theories, letting theory emerge from empirical observations (ibid).

In the case of my multi-sited fieldwork, participant observations entailed mainly the observation of how my informants interacted with each other. Particularly useful was the observation of how development practitioners interacted with youths (supposedly) benefitting from their programmes. In the third empirical chapter I will elaborate an analysis of this phase of the implementation of the programmes.

However, given the multi-sited nature of the fieldwork I collected, the time I reserved for participant observations was limited in comparison with the relevance of interviews in my data. In fact, participant observation requires the immersion of the ethnographer in the ‘natural environment’ of the informants, to live with them, and to make part of their daily life. On the contrary, I had only a one-time contact with the majority of my informants.

The risks of participant observation are related to two main issues. First, the subjective perspective of the observer, who will make personal interpretations of the reality observed on the ground. The subjectivity of the observer is not unique to ethnographic research methods, but the ‘real life’, transient, context of observations hinder the possibility of verification of observations. To strengthen the validity of participant observations, ethnographers adopt two techniques: first, punctual annotation of events and observations in verifiable field notes; second, critical reflexivity – namely the researcher’s awareness of her/his relation to the field, which must be accounted for in the ethnography (see section 3.7).

3.5 CONTEXTUALIZING THE FIELDS

‘The pearl of Africa’ has a complex and troubled socio-political history that makes it a particularly sensitive context in which to conduct this research. In Uganda, where 95% of the poor live in rural areas (Fan & Zhang, 2012) and 60% of the population is engaged in
agriculture\textsuperscript{50}, unsettled rural development issues (land tenure inequalities, poor infrastructure and gender and generational inequalities) are rooted in a long history of ethnic tensions and regional disparities. Furthermore, Uganda is an extremely diverse country in terms of its geography and ecology, history, ethnicities, languages and cultures.

Its area is also quite extended: “It has a total area of 241,551 square kilometres, of which the land area covers 200,523 square kilometres” (UBOS, 2017, p. 1) – six times bigger than The Netherlands (41,543 km\textsuperscript{2}), and a bit smaller than Italy (301,338 km\textsuperscript{2}). The country is divided into 116 districts (as of August/September 2014). The districts are further subdivided into 200 Counties, 1,378 Sub-counties and 6,495 Parishes. The role of these administrative units is to implement and monitor government programmes at the respective levels (UBOS, 2017, p. 1).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig4}
\caption{Map of Uganda with field sites marked. Source: Google Maps}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{50}Data of the Government of Uganda, accessed on 15\textsuperscript{th} May 2016: http://gov.ug/content/agriculture
Population has been growing steadily, at about an annual growth rate of 3%, since the 1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Inter-censal period</th>
<th>Average annual growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4,812,447</td>
<td>4,722,604</td>
<td>9,535,051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6,259,837</td>
<td>6,376,342</td>
<td>12,636,179</td>
<td>1969-1980</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11,824,273</td>
<td>12,403,024</td>
<td>24,227,297</td>
<td>1991-2002</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>17,060,832</td>
<td>17,573,818</td>
<td>34,634,650</td>
<td>2002-2014</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


URBANIZATION

While the majority of the population lives in rural areas, there is a clear trend of urbanization, as more and more youth are moving towards the cities to find employment – thereby leaving their agricultural activities. This process is often invoked by development organisations as a justification for the needs to focus on youth employment in agribusiness – thereby counteracting the process of urbanization.
FIGURE 6. RURAL VS URBAN POPULATION 1990-2016. SOURCE: FAOSTAT 2017\textsuperscript{51}

FIGURE 7. RURAL VS URBAN POPULATION 2017. SOURCE: FAOSTAT 2017\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{52}FAOSTAT country profile – Uganda; accessed on 27/07/2018: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/226
There is a substantial disparity in the levels of development of the regional economies, infrastructures, education levels and access to medical institutes. Overall, the greatest disparity is between rural and urban areas. This disparity is shown both in the ownership of assets and access to facilities (Figure 8. ownership of assets and access to facilities (proportion of pop.). , below), and in the levels of education (Figure 9. Youths' levels of education. , below). In the following sections I will delve deeper in the particularities of each of the four field sites where I have carried out fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of asset</th>
<th>Sex of household head</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-movable Asset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Land</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor cycle</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canoe/boat</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed phone</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 8. OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS AND ACCESS TO FACILITIES (PROPORTION OF POP.). (UBOS, UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2014, P. 37)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1-P7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1-S4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5-S6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above S6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of education (mean)</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Source: Uganda Youth Watch Survey 2011**

Literacy is defined as ‘can write in at least one language’

**FIGURE 9. YOUTHS’ LEVELS OF EDUCATION. (BANKS & SULAIMAN, 2012, P. 11)**

### 3.5.1 KAMPALA

Kampala is not only the capital of Uganda, but also the country’s largest urban centre. Officially, about 1.5 million people live in Kampala, twice as many as in the 1990s\(^{53}\). Unregistered inhabitants and daily commuters contribute to make the city congested with a non-quantifiable amount of people. As mentioned above, Kampala has the highest level of literacy in the country, and the longest school attendance (in terms of years of education).

The city stretches over a very extended area, covering about 200 km\(^2\) across seven hills. It has a hectic business and trading centre and an extended residential area that reaches the shores

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of Lake Victoria. Most of governmental institutions are located in Kampala (and a few in Entebbe, near the presidential residence), as are most offices of (inter)national private sector companies and development agencies. From the street markets to the central market to the offices district, Kampala ferments with (informal) business activities.

The strategic importance of Kampala for national and regional trade and politics dates centuries back. Before being the capital of Uganda, Kampala was and still is the capital of the kingdom of Baganda.

The importance of Lake Victoria trade meant, from the 1840s onward, the gradual rootedness, consolidation and expansion of the Ganda royal capital across the hills of modern day central Kampala. Urban growth reflected the expansion of economic scale, certainly in the case of Kampala; they comprised larger markets, housed more or less permanently resident trading communities, both foreign and indigenous, and represented the desire to maximise both profit and control. (Reid, 2017, p. 240)

The politico-economic stronghold of the city has been strengthened throughout history, by the succession of the various political hegemonies. Also the British, during the colonial times, had chosen Kampala to be the capital – and the area their residential district is still today a well-off neighbourhood, where most embassies are located.

From the early twentieth century, urban growth resulted from a long-term combination of economic drivers, with towns becoming stable centres of commerce and industry, the locations of major regional markets, and pools of labour, as well as being sites of socio-economic opportunity. As Kampala, in particular, expanded, it had a wider economic impact: by the beginning of the 1950s, farmers surrounding the city tended to grow less cotton and more food for sale in town. Towns were the target of labour migration, mostly men, but increasingly women, too, which was much more worrying to colonial and chiefly patriarchy. As the local economy changed, providing opportunities as well as introducing new hardships, women sought new ways of earning their own living, including moving to town in the process of asserting their economic independence from men. (Reid, 2017, p. 241)
These social and politico-economic developments contributed to making Kampala a relatively multicultural and multi-ethnic city. While it is very unusual in the rest of the country, inter-ethnic marriages are, in Kampala, quite common. This contributed to making the sample of people I interviewed in Kampala rather diverse, and at the same time their perceptions about ethnicity and gender relations more progressive than in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, the majority of the population are Baganda, from the Ganda ethnic group (the suffix ba- characterizes the plural form of ganda). Throughout history, “Kampala’s demographic composition has been heavily influenced by politics and by the fortunes and misfortunes of the nation’s ethnic groups” (Mwakikagile, 2009, p. 52).

In Kampala, I have conducted fieldwork over four periods of time with two groups of social actors. Firstly, during the pilot field trip in 2016, when I have spoken with development experts, practitioners and some young agripreneurs. During the extensive ethnographic fieldwork in 2017 I have spent two months interviewing development practitioners from 17 different development organisations – thereby spending most of my fieldwork time in offices and on boda-bodas (motor-taxis, the most popular public means of transport); and another month interviewing young agro-entrepreneurs in or around the city. Finally in 2018 I have spent a month following up with a final field trip, which I spent mostly interviewing development practitioners, and giving them feedback on the results of my research thus far. Altogether, Kampala is where I have been based, in-between field trips to other locations of my ethnographic research. Coming back there in 2018 felt somehow like coming home: in fact, during the time I spent there I have built a solid network of friends (mostly expats), and have learnt my way around the city, its amenities and dangers.

3.5.2 GULU

The fieldwork I conducted in the north was the first ethnographic research I carried out outside of Kampala. The journey that took me there gave me a first impression of the ecological change as I moved passed the Nile: it was in the middle of the dry season, and yet I had left behind a lush and green environment in the central region, which make the yellow and dry picture of the region around Gulu very striking. As intense as the colours of the arid
environment they live in, Acholi people have made a strong impression on me for their unusually directness in speech, and for the strength of their character – having endured one of the most violent conflicts of the past decades. Besides their tragic past however, Acholi people I interviewed were exceptionally proud of their cultural traditions and history.

In fact, Gulu is a town counting about 150 thousand inhabitants, located in a widely uninhabited, arid area. There are small villages scattered throughout the country side, mostly concentrated along the main roads. Outside of Gulu, people mostly live in communities of extended families, around commonly owned and cultivated land (which is inherited patrilineally). With the land tenure being communal, the social structure is closely knit around agricultural production as a community-effort. The main agricultural production in this region includes mostly grains and other food crops: millet, sorghum, beans, and groundnuts; recently large-scale farming has expanded the production of maize, soya and rice.

The vast majority of the population of that area belongs to the Acholi ethnic group and speaks Luo, a Nilotic language. Acholi people started identifying themselves as such at the end of the 19th century when tensions arose in the north of Uganda around the slave trade (Reid, 2017, p. 150-151). Different ethnic groups in the area started competing for economic and political power – particularly with the Langi and the Teso, who continued to migrate as a consequence of the conflicts around slave trade. Furthermore, tensions arose with both Ethiopian an Arab merchants, and later against the Anglo-Egyptians who were militarily present in the southern part of Sudan and northern Uganda. The Acholi “sought to take advantage of an increasingly volatile and unstable political environment. (...) this did ‘Acholiland’ begin its journey into the modern era violently insecure – and with a reputation for clannish and incessantly bloodthirsty feuding” (ibid, p. 151). Reid continues arguing that the favouring relation that the British colonialists established with Baganda from central region discriminated Acholi people who were imagined as the internal ‘other’, and this has been perpetuated by the current government (...) [T]his is a question of ‘reversal of fortune’, from north to south. Uganda in origin owes an enormous amount to the north in terms of politics, culture, religion; but the south has latterly come to dominate in political and economic terms, in part the curse of
geopolitics and nature, but largely the result of particular hegemonic visions of political and economic modernity. And so in some ways it is no coincidence that the first twenty years of Uganda’s independence were dominated by northern governments with self-consciously modernist, unitary and patriotic visions of Uganda.

In fact, I have found that many of my informants – who were openly against the current government – were nostalgic of Milton Obote. While in conducting fieldwork in rural areas, I happened to record traditional songs that had proudly incorporated in their lyrics excerpts from that historical period in which Acholi were the ruling elite.

The economy and socio-political reality of this region has been heavily impacted by the long war that has affected the region between 1987 and 2006-2008. Although the conflict is considered to be over, Joseph Kony (its main leader) and the LRA are still active in neighbouring countries. More than half of Acholi people were re-settled in IDP camps, and all my informants had experienced the atrocities of the war either personally or in their family; the majority of them had lived in camps until about 5 to 7 years before.

Despite the prolonged conflict, the there is a “relatively high level of literacy in North Uganda, even though this region displays the highest number of youth who have never been enrolled in school and the fewest youth who have reached secondary school.” (Banks & Sulaiman, 2012, p. 11)

I have concentrated my fieldwork activities in four locations: Gulu town; Atiak – almost at the border with South Sudan –; Parabongo, on the way to Atiak; and Odek to the west of Gulu, the place of birth of Joseph Kony. The selection of these places was mainly determined by the availability of informants: farmers living in Parabongo, were working within a private sector driven development scheme led by USAID Feed the Future – the Youth Leadership in Agriculture Activities (YLA); the governmental programme led by the Ministry of Gender, the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP), which was implemented by the district authorities, led me to Odek; for the selection of a control group I went to Atiak, where a group of farmers was working in beekeeping, besides their own personal agribusiness; in Gulu town, I gathered contextual knowledge about the local culture, language and beliefs.
Mbale is a small town at about 1000 mt above sea level, positioned at the slopes of Mount Elgon, at the border with Kenya. 240 Km and 5 hours ride away from Kampala, Mbale gives the visitor a feeling of being landed in a quiet bubble: its 81 thousand inhabitants mind their own business, there is little hustling on the streets, few cars and a colder climate – thanks to the proximity to the mountain. Life starts early in the morning to make the best of the shorter days (because of the shade of the mountain), and after 7 pm there is no-one to be seen in the streets. The environment is dominated by the breath-taking, lush green of the mountain. Land is densely cultivated and fragmented in small patches. The main agricultural production is coffee, which catalyses a variety of jobs along its chain. There are a few coffee cooperatives employing young labour force, but predominantly the coffee chain is dominated by older farmers (because of issues of land ownership and the long-term nature of the coffee production). Another major value chain, employing youths, is horticulture – which supplies the local market, Kampala and Kenyan markets – and the production of some crops (onions and cabbages mostly) makes its way until South Sudan.
The majority of the population belongs to the Gisu ethnic group, speaking lugisu language and some Swahili – because of the proximity to Kenya. The identification with this ethnic group was strongly felt by my informants, particularly male ones – but the elaboration of an ethnic identity in this context is described as being emerged alongside the change brought by the colonial rule. The grouping that was first related to language and common cultural practices, became institutionalised and reified in the twentieth century (Reid, 2017, p. 300):

Among Gisu, the anthropologist J.S. La Fontaine observed the rise of ‘tribal policy’ by the 1950s, and she described the emergence of ‘tribalism’ in Bugisu, (...) This [tribal policy] is action by Gisu leaders on behalf of the tribe as a whole over issues which appeared to them either to threaten their new identity or seemed to deny them rights accorded to other tribes. Tribalism in Bugisu is thus the mobilisation of loyalties which, in the traditional system, were latent and expressed only ritually, into a political pressure group.

Whether it happened at once or in phases, it is important to notice how the mobilisation of a Gisu identity was the necessary, political response of defence of the socio-cultural traditions.

In this area, I have concentrated my fieldwork at the slopes of the mountain, moving to different locations to reach representatives of the three groups of youths (attached to a public-sector development programme, private sector-driven one, and control group). The first group of informants I have interviewed was the control group, which I encountered in Kamu in February 2017. I returned to the area in June, after the rainy season – which had made transport almost impossible due to bad infrastructures on the mountain. I had looked for youths engaged in the governmental YLP (Youth Livelihood Programme) in Wanale and Bumalunda – but I found that they were reluctant to meet me; therefore in those mountainous areas I have interviewed more youths who were not part of any development scheme. I interviewed youths involved in the YLP in Lwaso and Mbale town. Furthermore, I have interviewed youths working within a private sector driven development scheme sponsored by USAID’s YLA. This programme was implemented by the pumpkin processing company ‘Byeefe’, and I reached youths in this programme in the localities of Bungokho, Kiende and Mbale town. These localities are all so small that are not even found on google maps.
The south-western region around Mbarara is known in popular wisdom as ‘the land of milk and honey’ because indeed is a verdant and fertile part of Uganda. With less than 70 thousand inhabitants, Mbarara is the biggest urban centre. The most important value chains are coffee and dairy, while horticulture is also a major income-generating sector, with matooke (green bananas, or plantain) as main food and cash crop.

The socio-cultural reality of the south-western region around Mbarara is defined by the ethnic identities of the hima and iru – or, as the local, language declines the plural: bahima and bairu. They both share the same language, lunyankore, and in fact both belong to the Nkore ethnic group. There is little agreement whether they are simply two social classes of the same ethnic group, or whether there are two separate ethnic groups sharing a common language and history. Reid (2017, p. 197) argues for the theory of class divisions:

In Nkore, economic specialism came to denote social and political status, and there was an increasing emphasis on the distinction between Hima herdsmen and Iru farmers; by the eighteen century, cattle-keeping and farming were almost mutually exclusive and unquestionably represented the parameters of class formation. While the clans were associated with various economic specialisms, the king was arbiter and
ritually the embodiment of unity, seeking to represent both farming and herding in ceremonial terms.

Another hypothesis, which is not necessarily in contradiction with that of Reid, argues that these two ethnic groups are associated with the hutu (iru) and tutsi (hima) of neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi. Green (2010, p. 9) draws the progeny of herders and farmers among the Nkore from the ethnic descent of neighbouring countries:

the stratified systems of Ankole [Nkore], Rwanda, and Burundi, where society was split between cattle keepers (Bahima in Ankole; Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi), farmers (Bairu in Ankole; Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi), and, in Rwanda and Burundi, an underclass group named the Twa (Pygmies). In Ankole the “political elite was drawn almost exclusively from the Bahima segment of the population, whereas the Bairu stood largely outside direct political involvements in the state system and in a variety of areas enjoyed lesser rights and privileges in their contacts with the Bahima,” and intermarriage between the two groups was extremely limited.

The strong ethnic identities and class relations between Hima and Iru was not only reportedly important to my informants in that region, but is also crucial for national and regional politics. In fact, president Museveni belongs to the Hima ethnic group and has allegedly favoured Nkore (and Hima people in particular) in the allocation of political, military and economic positions of power. Moreover, the south-western region of Uganda has experienced a faster development in infrastructures and welfare than other regions of the country. From a regional perspective on the history power redistribution and conflicts in the Great Lakes region, Museveni developed important alliances around his belonging to the Hima ethnic group. Particularly strong were the political and military ties with fellow-hima presidents Kagame (Rwanda) and Buyoya (former president of Burundi). As Lemarchand (2001, p. 89) maintains:

This mutual dependence is also true of Buyoya in Burundi, whose fortunes are linked to those of his neighbours to the west and the north. Even more important in creating strong solidarity among Kagame, Buyoya, and Museveni is their sense of belonging to the same embattled minority subculture, to the same pastoralist interlacustrine diaspora. Whether Tutsi (Kagame), Tutsi-Hima (Buyoya), or Hima-Munyankole
(Museveni), they share the same cultural self-awareness and therefore see themselves as the spokesmen of threatened minorities. Deeply distrustful of what they see as the tyranny of the majority implicit in Western forms of democracy, they regard as their first obligation to ensure the survival of their respective communities.

Because of the politically and culturally loaded dimension of ethnic identification in this area, I have selected the field sites in a way that would account for diversity and ethnic balance. In fact, fieldwork in this sub-region has required me to travel the most – compared to other regions.

I have interviewed young farmers engaged in the YLP in Sheema; youths working independently of any development scheme (control group) in Sheema and Bushenyi. As for the youths engaged in a private-sector driven programme, I focused on the Dutch-funded TIDE project in dairy, implemented by a Dutch NGO, SNV. I met these youths in Mbarara, Khasaka, Kyakabonga, Ntungamo and Sanga.

![FIGURE 12. MAP OF FIELD SITES IN SOUTH-WEST: MBARARA, NTUNGAO, SANGA, BUSHENYI, KIRUHURA (IBANDA). SOURCE: GOOGLE MAPS](image_url)
3.6 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTING THE DATA

After having collected all the ethnographic data, begins the phase of the analysis and written representation of data. In this section, I account for the ethnographic analytical methods I have used. According to Geertz (1973, p. 11) “[d]oing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of “construct a reading of”) a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped behaviour.” I took this interpretative approach to the analysis of the interviews and observations I collected, with the purpose of writing an ethnographic ‘thick description’ of the narratives and practices around youth in agribusiness. Again, Geertz has been illuminating on the methods to carry out and ethnography and make sense of the empirical data, which alone is dull of the socio-cultural meanings encrypted. Fisher (2003, p. 150 ) reports famous example from his ethnography of village life in Bali, serves the purpose of explaining the value of the method:

Geertz’s most famous example of thick description concerns cock-fighting in a Balinese village. While it would appear that only the cocks are fighting, they are discovered in fact to be fighting because the men are fighting. Geertz (1983) sets his detailed description of the strange features of cock-fighting against the holistic background of Balinese culture, including its understanding of social relations, traditional beliefs, and religious practices. Placing his contextual interpretation in ever-widening concentric circles, he reveals the 'common world' in which the practice of cock-fight betting makes sense to its participants. In the end, what appears to be an economically irrational game of betting for financial gain is disclosed to be about social structure and status relations in the village community.

Through the elaboration of thick descriptions of the narratives and practices of both development practitioners and youths, I have attempted an interpretative explanation of the way in which this development trend is being constructed, and what its consequences are. Based on the analysis of interviews, informal conversations, stories I have heard and practices I observed, I identified the main narratives of the two groups of social actors.
The main task in the narrative analysis of the interviews is coding (Fischer, 2003, p. 173), which is defined as: “the process by which segments of data are identified as relating to, or being an example of, a more general idea, instance, theme or category. Segments of data from across the whole dataset are placed together in order to be retrieved together at a later stage.” (Lewins and Silver 2007, p. 81 in Boeije, 2010, p. 95). This process of segmenting and coding data is a lengthy process that requires a lot of going back and forth through the data. Thanks to the qualitative analysis programme Atlas.ti, I could carry out this task digitally on my laptop. This computer programme helps to locate, code and annotate findings on primary data, and also to systematically group and compare fragments through the codes, which are manually attributed by the researcher. This process allows me to identify trends and themes, and eventually through systematic comparison the narratives and meta-narratives across interviews.

3.7 ETHNOGRAPHIC PITFALLS AND MY POSITION AS RESEARCHER

With ethnographic research, a concern for the validity of the study generally rises (Smit, 2017, p. 55), particularly with regard to the biases of the researcher, who is her/himself the instrument of the study. For this reason, I will examine my position as white, female researcher in the field of agribusiness development in the paragraphs below. Reflexivity is in fact the best antidote to flaws in my research that are related to my very presence in the field. While reflexivity allows the researcher to take into account the flaws, it does not eliminate them (Salzman, 2002, p. 807). For this reason, it is crucial to account for the position of the researcher in the field. Rosaldo (2000, p. 533 in Salzman, 2002, p. 807) elaborates on the researcher’s reflexivity on her/his position:

The ethnographer, as a positioned subject, grasps certain human phenomena better than others. He or she occupies a position or structural location and observes with a particular angle of vision. Consider, for example, how age, gender, being an outsider, and association with a neo-colonial regime influence what the ethnographer learns. The notion of position also refers to how life experiences both enable and inhibit particular kinds of insight.
Within this understanding of the position of the researcher, it becomes clear that any observer or commentator (also in other scientific fields) is positioned. “Claims of objectivity and truth are really just claims of power” (2002, p. 807) continues Salzman. Therefore, reflexivity helps to overcome the flaws brought along by the researcher’s position in the field. Moreover, the prolonged interaction with the field allows the ethnographer to develop an empathic understanding of the informants and their socio-cultural environment.

Another concern is my position as an independent researcher in the field. I have carried out fieldwork in Uganda in collaboration with and supported by the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA). This institute, which is 50 years old, is pioneer in the researching the role of youth in agribusiness and has recently been appointed by the African Development Bank (AfDB) to lead a consistent development programme on youth in agribusiness.\(^\text{54}\) They offered logistical support (use of their office and accommodation facilities, support in visa application, facilitating access to their network of experts and practitioners) and supervision in the field. My collaboration with this institute has been initiated in summer 2016 as I visited their offices in Kampala and Kigali. Subsequently, I have relied on IITA’s support during field trips to Uganda in 2017 and 2018. I have been attached to the institute as a ‘graduate research fellow’, holding a position as independent researcher. While their views and aspirations within the development trend around youth in agribusiness may have influenced my approach, my continued relation with supervisors at Radboud and Bologna secured the impartiality of my position as researcher.

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### 3.7.1 A white lady in the (agricultural) field: “Mzungu! Mzungu!”

An inevitable yet crucial factor in the process of fieldwork research has been the white colour of my skin, in a context where the wide majority of white people in Uganda are development practitioners. Furthermore, regardless of the actual income, all white people are, in my experience, considered to belong to a higher socio-economic class. For both male and female whites, Ugandans throughout the country use the Bantu word ‘mzungu’, which literally

means “someone who roams”, or “someone who is far from home and lost his/her way”. Interestingly, this term which originally did not have any racial connotation, is nowadays mainly used for white people, or rich blacks who have lived abroad – regardless of their nationality.

From the fieldnotes of 22 May 2017, while on the fieldtrip to the South-West region, a first impression at the arrival is revealing:

We meet many people, as soon as we arrive at Rose’s home [the mother of Joyce, the interpreter]: everybody wants to meet Joyce and the babies, as much as they are curious to meet the mzungu. There is so much fuzz around my presence, that I almost feel uncomfortable. (...) We go and visit the nearby church, where a group of women is cooking at the reverend’s house. (...) The ladies react very surprised by the visit of a mzungu. They all want to greet me and shake hands, they are very friendly and all ask me ‘how are you mzungu?’ which is the only English words they know. It is as funny as embarrassing for me, because besides being white, I have no right to be there inside the house of the revered, taking the seats of honour (while the majority is sitting outside on whatever seat).

A few days later, on the same trip, my fieldnotes reveal how uncomfortable I was feeling in my skin: “Joyce is really doing her best to make my stay as easy and pleasant as possible, as much as mama Rose is the sweetest host I could hope for. I never feel alone, even though it becomes clearer by the day that I do not belong here: the recurrent theme in my days is the colour of my skin – mzungu!”

Also during fieldtrips to the north and east I had experienced this type of “discrimination” – but the scarce presence of development programmes in the South-West region (which is more developed than other parts of the country) also contribute to making the presence of white people more of an exception.

Moreover, it also must be mentioned that being perceived a ‘mzungu’ also might have mislead some of my informants. In fact, since the majority of whites in Uganda work in development, they are often associated with profitable opportunities. Particularly in the
north where the population has experienced humanitarian aid after the war, I have encountered an attitude of entitlement to (monetary) help.

Within the context of anthropology of development, I thus feel in line with the arguments of Mosse (2005, p. 243):

The ground of anthropological practice has changed fundamentally in the past two decades. The fact that anthropologists are no longer justified as value-free and objective observers, the source of politically neutral and authoritative scientific knowledge places anthropology back within historical relations of power. In relation to international development this provides opportunities, if not obligations, for engagement and self-critical reflection, for hope and critical understanding – neither of which is possible without close encounters with the administrative politics of development practice.

In fact, my position in the field has been influenced by the social and historical role of ‘benefactor’ that whites have played in my informants’ lives, despite the efforts I have made during each interview to clarify I was an independent researcher. Being aware of the way in which I might be perceived as a white researcher, I remained reflexive of the position of power in which I found myself. I exercised reflexivity in three ways. First, I punctually asked my translators to explain to the informants that I was a student and was not in any position to financially help them. I took considerable time, in the beginning of my interviews, to contextualise and explain the scientific purposes of my research. Second, the translator her/himself helped me to discern those statements, during interviews, that were conditioned by a bias towards me as a (powerful, external) white lady. Third, and more importantly, in the process of analysis and writing, I discerned the biased and unbiased narratives of my informants, to retain only those which were not too influenced by my position of power.
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  - The pathway to change
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- 4.6 Clustering different approaches
- 4.7 On paper
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55 The term ‘aidnography’ is drawn from Mosse 2013 – I don’t claim any intellectual property or originality on this term.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

“The first issue to be raised, perhaps, is that the present study is an anthropological one. Unlike many anthropological works on “development”, this one takes as its primary object not the people to be “developed”, but the apparatus that is to do the “developing”. This is not principally a book about the Basotho people, or even about Lesotho; it is principally a book about the operation of the international “development” apparatus in a particular setting” (Ferguson, 1994, p. 17)

This chapter aims at answering the first research question of this study, namely: how are development organizations adopting youth in agribusiness strategies in Uganda? The chapter presents the analysis of ethnographic fieldwork conducted among development practitioners in Kampala. In this chapter I will pay particular attention to the narratives emerging from the interviews I conducted with development practitioners, leaving the observations of development practices for chapter 6. This narrative approach will be particularly useful to elaborate an explanation to the ‘how’ of the research question leading this chapter.

All of my informants were involved in promoting youth engagement in agribusiness, within Ugandan and international development agencies. In this chapter, I elaborate an aidnography – namely an examination and deconstruction of the narratives that are produced and reproduce the development discourse. I analyse such system of knowledge (the development discourse), in the effort of investigating how “the delineation of [development] emerges from, and produces, particular historical circumstances, particular cultural logics, and finally, particular subjectivities” (Curtis & Spencer 2012, p. 179 in (Mosse, 2013, p. 230). The goal of an aidnography is to offer a critical reflection on the elaboration and implementation of development policies and programmes. Development cooperation is far from just a neutral, a-political philanthropic hurl to make the world a better place: it has its interests and politics, and is very much contingent to its socio-historical context (Ferguson, 2014) (Escobar, 2012) (Scott J., 1998) (Mosse, 2011). An analysis of how the development discourse evolved can shed light on the politics driving one strategy rather than another.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 I briefly introduce the research and analytical methods I have used to collect the data for this aidnography. In section 4.3 I start the empirical analysis by introducing the way in which development change is being conceptualized by the development practitioners I interviewed in Kampala. Subsequently, in section 4.4, I describe the analytical tool of the theory of change, namely a structure of three steps (development problem, vision and pathway to change) which I will use to analyse practitioners’ narratives. In section 4.5 I delve into the discourse analysis of the theories of change of development practitioners, step by step. I outline the narratives adopted by development practitioners in conceptualizing the development problem, the ideal outcome they envision, and the implementation strategy to operationalize their vision for change. Moreover, I comparatively analyze the theories of change of Ugandan and international development organizations. In sub-section 4.5.4, I describe how development practitioners aim to target youths as object of their development programmes. In section 4.6, I analyze the different development approaches that emerge from the theory of change, showing how Ugandan an international organisations have a tendency towards public or private-sector driven strategies. In section (4.7), I confront the theories of change and approaches that emerged from the interviews with development practitioners, with those emerging from policy papers. I hereby validate or problematize the discrepancies between oral and written perspectives on development for youths in agribusiness. I conclude (section 4.8) by summarising and discussing the conclusions of the aidnography. I argue that there are heterogeneous approaches to development and tensions within the proposed goals and strategies to achieve them. In particular, I confront the approaches of national and international views to the same ‘development problem’.

4.2 RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL METHODS

In my analysis of how the policy discourses frame the development problems affecting youth in agribusiness, I have adopted an inductive method of analysis (Boeije, Analysis in Qualitative Research, 2010) (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). I approached the study of the development narratives by analysing the semi-structured interviews I conducted with 24 development practitioners from 17 development organizations based in Kampala, all engaged in supporting
youths’ engagement in agribusiness. I carried out these interviews during two months of fieldwork in Kampala, in 2017. Table 7 below provides a list of the 17 organisations\textsuperscript{56} where I conducted the interviews:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of development agency</th>
<th>Development agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral development cooperation</td>
<td>1. Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral development cooperation</td>
<td>3. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. USAID - Feed the Future, commodity production and marketing (CPM) &amp; Youth Leadership in Agriculture Activity (YLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. AgriProFocus (agripreneurs network and agribusiness facilitator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
<td>6. AVSI (Italian NGO implementing the Dutch-funded SKY programme)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. ICCO (Dutch NGO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. ZOA (Dutch NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>9. MasterCard Foundation – DYNAMIC project</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Triodos Bank – BRAC programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizations, public and private</td>
<td>11. AKORION (services and marketing provision company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda (farmers’ network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Young Farmers Champions Network (farmers’ network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. CURAD (incubation centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>15. Makerere University Kampala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{56} In the following, I use development ‘organizations’ and ‘agencies’ interchangeably, as much as I refer to development actors, informants and respondents as synonymous.
Importantly, the individual interviews are in my analysis assumed to be representative for the views of development organization the respondent was affiliated to – unless expressly stated to be a personal view. I was able to assume the representativeness of the respondents’ views for their organizations’ because during the interviews I prompted the development practitioners to elaborate, in their answers, on the views of their agency. As much as possible, I cross-checked the organisational positions elaborated by the interviewees with relevant policy documents from these institutions (see section 4.7).

I explored the conceptualizations, definitions and ambitions of the development practitioners I interviewed with the understanding that “if people define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences” (Thomas 1928 in (Boeije, 2010, p. 13). The development discourse is not only a matter of knowledge production within the development world, but a knowledge production that has specific influences in the historical circumstances it is embedded in.

Development narratives also have the function of mobilising support. In fact, Rap (2006, p. 1303) continues:

(...). particular stories, called policy narratives, are influential in informing policy-making. They are considered to be a force in themselves and do not change even when they are confronted with ‘contradicting empirical data’, as they continue to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions’ for policy-making ‘in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization’ (Roe, 1994: 2; Fairhead and Leach, 1995). Other related analytical approaches study policy as argumentation or as a discourse: ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena’. They illustrate how ‘policy discourses frame certain problems’, distinguishing ‘some aspects of a situation rather than others’ (Hajer, 1993, in Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996: 2).
I first carried out open-coding of the transcribed 24 interviews with the development actors, in Atlas.ti. I then extrapolated the themes which were most representative of the actors’ views on the issues around youth and agribusiness. These themes, which are not mutually exclusive, contain the actors’ understandings on the development trend they are principal practitioners in shaping, through their discourses, in Aidland (Mosse, 2011). At the same time, these themes are also my abstraction and meta-analytical conceptualization of their narratives.

4.3 DEVELOPMENT CHANGE – EMIC VIEWS

In this section, I introduce the development sector in Kampala and the development practitioners I have interviewed by presenting their views on what they see to be necessary for youth to engage in agribusiness. Through my anthropological analysis of development discourse around youth and agribusiness, I aim to shed light on the narrative of progress that emerges from my interviews with the development practitioners I interviewed in Kampala.

For example, when envisioning a future for the Ugandan agricultural sector, an informant from the African Development Bank57 noted:

[...]e know that the aged population will wear out. What do we do? ...[R]emember that no country becomes self-sufficient in food production by turning all its youths, or its nationals into farmers. In America, how many percentage of the people population are involved in agriculture? In Italy, in other parts of Europe, what is the percent of the people that are involved in agriculture? But, it is also interesting to know that in Africa, a lot of people almost up to 60% of the people are involved in agriculture.

In this passage, the respondent reveals that his narrative of progress leads to a specific type of modernity. A modernity that resembles the agricultural value chains of “developed” countries (“like where you come from”). She continues:

57 At the African Development Bank I have interviewed three development practitioners (in the same group interview): a country programme officer, a senior macroeconomist, and an agricultural and rural development expert. I will not specify, for each quote, who of the three respondents said it as to protect their identity. This interview took place on 17/01/2017
Someone who is doing agribusiness will need electricity, will need communication, will need to communicate to access markets. So that kind of needs... [will need to] package, add value: package, have designs and you know... Modern, it is modern agriculture. Actually, when you talk about modern agriculture, modernization of agriculture, you talk about mechanization, value addition, processing, packaging and all that. So you look at aspect of kind of a modern style of farming.

This description of what modernity entails – mechanization, processing, value addition etc. – sketches a rather straightforward profile of what the desirable outcome of development efforts can be.

The conceptualization of development in agriculture as a commercialization of the sector, with the required modernization and technology adoption, is well explicated by one of the directors at the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, whom I interviewed in the headquarters in Entebbe⁵⁸:

[W]e want to guide them [the youth] to look at agriculture as an investment. You have to get money and invest. (...) Yes, they should just continue or even [get?] bigger but also now put fertilizers, put good food, even seed, can you put some mechanization or can you may be do some supplementary irrigation, so that at least the productivity goes up. We are trying to say, can you please do it better so that the yield is bigger, and your volume is higher? Can you invest? Can you buy seed? Can you buy fertilizers? Can you may be like hire tractors so that when you do it in time, and you are seen to be doing commercial business? Can you make that investment profile and see what you are going to produce? Can you be linked to a market so that people don’t come to your farm looking for [agricultural produce]? May be can you join up with some other people doing the same enterprise in the area and have a warehouse or store where you can put your grain, it is sorted, it is good quality then you can market?

The respondent makes a long list of the technical changes that are envisioned to be necessary for a modern type of agriculture that is competitive on the market. In fact, the

⁵⁸ This interview took place on 27/01/2018
desirable outcome in her view is either large-scale or intensive production\textsuperscript{59}, which with the support of technologies and stronger business perspectives, would turn subsistence farming into modern agribusiness.

Importantly, the turn towards this specific understanding of modernity is depicted as a choice: the civil servant asks the farmer to choose to become an agripreneur, and they respond positively. In most interviews, respondents mentioned that such change – very much a choice – was a matter of mindset change\textsuperscript{60}. Participants in their development schemes were asked to choose to be more entrepreneurial and “don’t do business as usual”, wherein the usual business is subsistence agriculture and does not result in revenue.\textsuperscript{61} Particularly youth, who are (also) seen as the future of (commercial) agriculture, were depicted as the share of society who is to be mentored to change their mind. When asked what investing in youth in Uganda means, one respondent, for example, explained that it meant inducing a mindset change. According to her, their role as development actors is mentoring and coaching them to make this mental shift. In her words, “They were used to begging, now they are turning to be self-sufficient.”\textsuperscript{62} This respondent, who works for a large bilateral development organization, clearly envisions change as a matter of choice: from being dependent to being self-sufficient, which in agriculture translates from being subsistence farmers to becoming agripreneurs.

In her narratives, the missing link between the choice of changing one’s own mind and actually enacting the envisioned outcome is a matter of a) acquiring the right skills; and b) accessing finance. As a respondent working for a multilateral donor organization explained:

Those who are interested in agricultural production, they can go into it. Those who are interested in value addition, they can go into value addition. Those who are

\textsuperscript{59} Where large-scale refers to commercial agriculture on a large plot of land owned by one corporation or individual, and intensive production refers to a higher use of agricultural inputs, labor and machinery to obtain the highest yield possible also from a limited plot of land.

\textsuperscript{60} Mind-set change was explicitly mentioned, without prompting from my side, in the majority of the interviews with all development actors, as I will describe in more depth in section 4.c.

\textsuperscript{61} See section on Agriculture in the previous chapter for a detailed discussion on the conceptualization of agriculture.

\textsuperscript{62} This quote is extracted from the transcript of one of the interviews I carried out at the Kampala offices of USAID – the respondent is to remain anonymous.
interested in service related to the agriculture in the value chain can also go in and
that is why the programme is mainly focusing on capacity building for the youth in
terms of the incubation, changing their mindset and designing projects that they are
interested in and linking them to financing.63

The mindset change described by my informants in Kampala resonates with the discourse
recorded by Ferguson in Lesotho, decennia back:

Achieving “development” is thus largely a matter of changing values and attitudes, of
winning over individual Sotho hearts and minds. In its extreme forms, “development”
discourse sometimes even speaks as if the problem of poverty is all in the hear – as if
impoverished villagers could escape their condition by a simple change of attitude or
intellectual conversion. The religious imagery suggested by the common self-
description of teams of “development” experts as “missions” is thus well sustained in
their search for “converts”. (Ferguson, 1994, p. 58)

As described by Ferguson and explicitly stated by my respondent, this mindset change is
attitudinal and the role of development practitioners is to facilitate this change by mentoring
and coaching the youth to adopt an entrepreneurial and business-oriented mindset. “To
develop” is something that can be taught, and therefore justifies the presence and activities
of development practitioners as the experts and mentors.

Indeed, it emerges from their own accounts, that development practitioners often perceive
themselves to have a mentoring role. As highlighted by Ferguson (2014), in the development
industry stakeholders take on the role of experts in a redeeming function that can “cure”
poverty by operating a mind-set change. In reference to youth’s engagement in agribusiness
and their presumed impatience, I was told at the Ministry of Agriculture that:

Most youth were not interested in that [agribusiness], so we are looking to guide our
youth to think in terms of having positive work ethics that you must work hard in
order to benefit and you must be patient enough in order to attain what you require
so this is just a matter of like sensitizing, encouraging them and motivating them to
invest more into the abilities that they have. Yeah, so that’s the thing that we are

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63 This interview was carried out on 02/02/2017
looking at. Just continuous, even as you do your thing, you should know that you believe in yourself that you can achieve it and it will take you longer than you think. You encourage them that you see when it gets harder, you are about to reach the solution so you don’t give up when you see things are getting tougher so it’s about talking to them and making them understand that things are possible and it’s not just about having something beautiful.  

In this account, it is suggested that by being patient, motivated and believing in one-self it is possible to obtain successful results in agribusiness. While the mentioned attitudes and values are ascribed to a “positive work ethic”, the role of the development practitioner is the messianic one of a mentor. In fact, it seems that the opportunities for development are there to be grasped. The role of the development practitioner is to simply point them out to young inexpert who have yet to figure out how to sustain themselves through agriculture. As one respondent told me:

[...T]here are so many opportunities out there in the food industry, in agriculture and agribusiness where they [the youth] can sustain themselves and their lives and be able to make it big actually in the near future if you know what to do. So for us, our role is to help them you know, for example to keep the records and track their inputs and see what they get out. To help them do marketing, for example good markets, good prices. Help them to do good business plans, feasibility studies and business plans so that they able to know that if I want to go into beans in this area, in this area I can only go for maize, chicken and if I go for chicken, what type of chicken and if am ready, where do I sell. So that’s where agribusiness is going to come in, to guide them.  

Specific skills (accounting, records-keeping, market knowledge) can be taught for the purpose of succeeding in the predefined objective identified as successful (“make it big”). In the previous and following fragments, by the same respondent, the religious imaginary evoked by Ferguson (2014) stand out:

64 This interview was carried out on 27/01/2017
65 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017 at a large bilateral development agency; as asked by the respondent, I cannot refer either to the organisation nor to his identity.
Me: Okay. So you said that the opportunities are there and your role is to?
Respondent: Mentor, coach and mentor and transform them. Coach, mentor and transform them.
Me: What do you mean transform?
Respondent: Transform is [for example] Maya, don’t tell me you can’t do it. Okay?
Me: So it’s about mindset.
Respondent: Mindset. And actually, investing along with [for example] Maya to make sure Maya sees, because Maya may say “oh no it’s not possible”. And I say “no it’s possible. Where is the risk?”- “I cannot buy that thing alone, I don’t have the money” – “I cost share with you, pilot this scheme, let him see it.”

In this passage the respondent argues that successful agribusiness is a matter of choice and belief. The role of the development actor, the respondent states, is that of shaping this mindset and making the youth believe (in his words: ‘transform’) the capabilities and business values he himself believes to be the right ones for agribusiness. Several more topics emerge from this account: as in the above fragments, opportunities to succeed in agribusiness are there but young people don’t see it, and it is for the development practitioners to play the role of mentoring, guiding and coach towards transformation. ‘Development’ is a transformation that first of all happens in the minds of young Ugandans, thanks to the mentoring role of development practitioners.

4.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK – THEORY OF CHANGE

In order to systematise the narratives of development practitioners, I needed an analytical tool that would capture their views on youth in agribusiness, and would allow for comparison among organisations’ views. I have elaborated a theory of change on the basis of the themes that emerged from the analysis of my interviews: development problem, vision for change, and pathway to change (see Figure 4.2).

The three key propositions summarized by Bacchi (2009, p. xxi) for theory of change analysis are three:
1. We are governed through problematizations.
2. We need to study problematizations (through analysing the problem representations they contain), rather than ‘problems’.
3. We need to problematize (interrogate) the problematizations on offer through scrutinizing the premises and effects of the problem representations they contain.”

I thus elaborated an analytical tool, shaped around theory of change (TOC), which I have used in the analysis of the semi-structured interviews with development practitioners. This tool, which is conceptualized in the below figure (Figure 13), has been used to screen the narratives in three different phases. These phases were not identified before I started conducting interviews with development actors, but emerged in the inductive analysis of the interviews, as major themes. Although the respondents never referred to the concept of TOC, it appeared from their narratives that they were relying on an implicit idea (or ideology) of how development works or should work. I am aware of the critical scholarly debate around the linearity of development (Rap, 2006) (Scott J., 1998) (Mosse, 2004), and my analysis follows the linearity of TOC only to the extent that it helps clarify the discourses of the development actors. As Rap (2006, p. 1303) argues:

According to the linear or instrumental model, all policies run through the successive phases of problem identification, policy formulation, implementation, and impact evaluation (Sutton, 1999; Mosse, 2004). (...) As the political decision to pursue a policy is taken as a given, the usual concern of policy analysts is how to implement the policy and how to realise institutional models in practice. Underlying this instrumental approach, (...) is a positivist epistemological framework (Stirrat, 2001). This implies that success can be measured with a coherent set of policy objectives as clear criteria for impartial researchers that use scientific methods and universal theories.

In this chapter, my analysis concerns only the phases of problem identification, development programme formulation and envisioned implementation, in the search for particular meanings (narratives) and underlying structures of meaning (grand narratives).
Below, I outline the aspects I investigated with the theory of change I elaborated as my analytical tool for the discourse analysis of my interviews with development actors.

The development problem entails the circumstances and social or institutional actors identified as development problem:

- Problematization of issue: problem representation
- Areas of change: which sectors need to be tackled

The vision for change entails the envisioned development outcome:

- Ideal outcome: what is the goal of development efforts? how is the solution to the development problem envisioned? What are the role models?

The pathway to change entails the trajectory and necessary steps to concretize the development goal:

- Strategy for change: which are the concrete implementation strategies and instruments?
- Targeting: who is the objective of development programmes and how are beneficiaries conceptualized?
As Autesserre (2017, p. 119) rightly puts it, “theories of change are not “theories” in the academic understanding of the term; instead, they are “explanations of how and why a set of activities will achieve desired objectives (Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson 2007, 25)”. Rather than explicitly relying on theories of change, most development organisations and their programmes implicitly rely on assumptions of how their activities will deliver desired outcomes. In fact, theories of change are often not even part of the process of programme planning. Assumptions and rationales underpinning policy briefs, programmes and projects – or even the organisations’ central structures – can be deconstructed to dissect their logical framework. As scholars have stressed (Cameron et al 2015; and and Brown et al 2015; both in Autesserre, 2017, p. 120) the problems with these underlying assumptions or (implicit) theories of change, is that they often are unrealistic, simplistic and/or make gigantic leaps in logic. As the wide range of examples in development failures shows, the process between programmes elaboration and their outcomes is not self-evident nor linear, and often results in unexpected outcomes or failure. A case in point is the example of mosquito nets distribution for malaria prevention, which are instead used for fishing, to protect crops, to build chicken coops or even as wedding veil\(^{66}\). Assumptions play a crucial role in the elaboration and implementation of development programmes, as they direct investment from a perceived development problem to an envisioned outcome through pathways that are often devious. Considering the fact that the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda is relatively new, theories of change were not yet tested at the time of my fieldwork research. As a matter of fact, they were mostly implicit (in the form of assumptions) in the narratives of development practitioners I interviewed.

My use of theory of change was thus explorative, as an investigation of their assumptions and rationales. The theory of change (TOC) is here used as framework to search the discourses and strategies of development actors. Below I outline the narratives and trends emerging from my interviews, for each of the three TOC steps.

So many people around here [are] talking about the youth climate change and the youth agriculture and the youth, education and the youth so the youth has now come so much top of the agenda of many disciplines so meaning that the government has now realized that the issues of the youth is becoming a big challenge. And it happened also during the campaigns, last year; the presidential campaigns and the MPs. Most of the people who were being arrested because of misbehaviour and the like, were the youth. Most of the people, who were fighting and doing this and this, were the youth. So am sure the president would advise we need to do something for the youth otherwise it’s going to be a time bomb. This is a time bomb which is going to be really a big challenge to us. So right now many of them are going into that approach.  

The considerations of this respondent—a professor at the Makerere College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, collaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture in the elaboration of the new Strategy for Youth —summarize some of the common concerns shared by the development practitioners I have interviewed. He himself was, at the time of the interview, involved in the development of a development Strategy for Youth for the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). Besides the specific challenges which, according to him, youths in Uganda are facing (climate change, agriculture commercialization, education), he mentioned political concerns regarding the topic of youth in agribusiness. He stresses the increasing attention that this issue is receiving in the (inter)national development efforts – a strengthened focus on the issue that conceptualizes it as a development problem. Through discourse analysis, in the following section, I aim to analyse the conceptualization of youth and/in agribusiness as a development problem. 

Firstly, I clustered the spontaneous and variegated answers of my respondents into five categories (Table 1): these categories emerged from the qualitative analysis (open coding in Atlas.ti) of the semi-structured interviews.

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67 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
Formal unemployment and under-employment, here referring to youth: this category comprises different understandings and forms of shortage or inadequacy of absorption of the workforce in the labour market; competences or skills mismatch (e.g. educated youth doing unskilled work). It is a category that hides the fundamental truth that the majority of unemployed is indeed engaged in agricultural activities (though often unpaid), and is thus not entirely idle.

This category includes concerns regarding the food security (strictly speaking) of Ugandans but also worries about the necessary productivity of the agricultural sector (to secure food security).

Here I include references to the ‘youth bulge’ (or in any case the concerns regarding the growth of the young share of the population), about the aging of the population in the agricultural sector.

This category comprises the social and political stability of Uganda: respondents expressed their concerns about the possibility for the demographic reality of Uganda to result in social unrest and for the widespread youth unemployment to cause political instability.

Mainly refers to two concerns, expressed respectively by two respondents: the lack of adequate skills and education of youth and the concern for Uganda to obtain middle-income status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal unemployment and under-employment, here referring to youth: this category comprises different understandings and forms of shortage or inadequacy of absorption of the workforce in the labour market; competences or skills mismatch (e.g. educated youth doing unskilled work). It is a category that hides the fundamental truth that the majority of unemployed is indeed engaged in agricultural activities (though often unpaid), and is thus not entirely idle.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8. CATEGORIES CLUSTERING THE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

These categories are useful in the identification of trends in the narratives of my respondents, and thus in the identification of the theory of change of the various development organizations – both national and international. 68

I have also calculated the frequency in which development agencies made reference to these five categories. 69 These categories are not mutually exclusive but rather indicative of the

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68 I refer to the development organizations listed and described in the previous section.

69 In cases in which I have interviewed more than one development practitioner per agency, I have only considered the incidence of the mentioned categories per agency, as shown in the appendix in this chapter.
emphasis they put on one theme rather than the other. Observing the incidence of references to these categories, allowed me to deduce the ways in which the organisations conceptualised the development problem. The majority of organizations (about 65% of the 17 organizations) conceptualize the development problem in terms of unemployment. The second major concern (47%) is the booming young population and the aging of the rural population (Figure 14). Food security and agricultural productivity worry about 30% of the organizations. The social and political stability of the country are reasons of apprehension for 23% of the organizations – mainly with reference to the distress deriving from the “youth bulge” and youth unemployment. The achievement of the middle-income status and the supposedly inadequate education of the youth were only distinctly mentioned in two interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualization of development problem</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 14. TRENDS IN CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM, AS REPORTED BY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS IN ALL (17) ORGANIZATIONS

However, the trend looks different when we look at ‘national’ vs. ‘international’ organizations (Figure 15). Looking more closely, unemployment concerns all national organizations but only 40% of the international organizations. Alternatively, while apprehensions about the demographic dividend of the country are widespread among international organizations (70%), they are a more minor concern for national organizations (14%). Food security and agricultural productivity worry national organizations more than international organizations.
(20% vs 43%) – and the same disparity is observed for the socio-political stability of Uganda (about 43% for national organizations vs. 10% of international ones).

**FIGURE 15. TRENDS IN CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM AS REPORTED BY RESPONDENTS OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS CLUSTERED IN NATIONAL VS INTERNATIONAL**

Having identified the trends in the conceptualization of the development problem by development practitioners in all development organizations I accessed, and differences among international and national organizations, I continue to the discourse analysis. I will do that by category, following an order of importance.

**4.5.1A UNEMPLOYMENT**

This concept emerges predominantly in the conceptualization of the development problem among national development organizations and public institutions. It is problematized by the respondent below as comprising more than ‘formal’ unemployment – which according to World Bank (WB, World Bank, 2008/2009) data reaches up to 83% of the population in working age. At the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development, I was told by the Assistant Commissioner of the Youth Livelihood Programme that:
My personal view is that yes [the youth bulge] is a time bomb but the problem here in Uganda, when you talk about statistics, truly from a realistic perspective, the problem here in Uganda is not unemployment per se, unemployment going by the strict definition of ILO, is not that very high. But under-employment. There are so many young people who are under employed.  

Besides the time bomb of the youth bulge, what worries the respondent is the dissatisfaction of the young people in Uganda, who are not necessarily unemployed – the informal economy is flourishing – but employed below their potential. This is attracting the attention of development practitioners and civil servants who are starting to wonder “how to handle these youths”:

Youth unemployment is a big thing and because of that we have so many issues [later in the interview he refers to socio-political instability] in the country. That’s why right now what I see everybody literally is thinking about; how do we handle these youths? because they have to be involved in some gainful employment, something which will hold them, something which will guide them, make them good citizens. But unemployment is a big task.

As a professor at the Makerere College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, this respondent links the development problem of unemployment to that of stability (discussed below). Employment is envisioned as tool for social stability.

4.5.1B DEMOGRAPHY

As mentioned above, under this category go all the concerns related to the demographic dividend of Uganda’s youth bulge. Often the demographic phenomenon is described in the

70 This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017

71 World Bank data reports that more than 60% of the economy is informal, accessed on 28/09/2018 on: http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/understanding-the-informal-economy-in-african-cities-recent-evidence-from-greater-kampala

72 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
development discourse with a threatening vocabulary with particular reference being made to the problem being a time bomb. This is exemplified in the account below, which was extracted from an interview with the Chief of Party of one of USAID’s ‘Feed the Future’ programmes:

This is a time bomb for Uganda. It’s alarming in the sense that if you look at the statistics, I mean the demographics, the sheer number of youth and concentration of specific age group in the Uganda population is one where a significant percentage of the population is young.  

While the concern with the youth bulge seems to be overwhelmingly widespread among development actors, I was curious to hear from them whether they thought that this issue would justify a long-term focus of the development sector on this topic – or whether it was a development trend doomed to fade shortly. Thus, I questioned my informants about the longevity of the development trend focusing on youths. At a Dutch NGO, the development actor – a programme manager – told me that it is the very demographic situation that requires such development attention:

It should at least for now stay, I mean not for now but looking at the number of youth in this country, if you don’t do something it’s going to explode or implode or something.

Another Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’ responded along the same lines:

Respondent: The youth will not go; you know the biggest challenge was in age. Those who are in farming they are 68 years old. They will start dying off. Who is going to feed you? So we need to attract more youth into agriculture to make them farm and provide services and make money to feed the nation. Otherwise we have a time bomb of hunger. (...) The time bomb we were fighting was two things. Unemployment and hunger.

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73 As explicitly demanded by this actor, I cannot further identify him/her by specifying the specific programme within Feed the Future for which this actor was Chief of Party. This interview was carried out on 02/02/2017

74 This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017
Me: So you mean the time bomb will be youth unemployment or aging farmers?
Respondent: The aging farmers with the hunger because they will not be able to produce anymore. Having the highest number of youth population in the world, okay in Africa, meaning not everybody can be employed. 

In this fragment of interview, different themes emerge: the development trend focusing on youth is expected to last; it is considered to be a demographic phenomenon concerning a wide share of the population (the ‘bulge’), which is particularly problematic because of the unemployment attached and it has implications for the food security of the country. The demographic phenomenon is described with an alarming tone for two reasons: because in the meantime the farming population is aging – therefore affecting food security – and because “not everybody can be employed”.

**4.5.1C FOOD SECURITY**

Food security emerged in fewer interviews compared to the previous themes. The capacity to feed the growing population and even ‘to feed Africa’ was a concern that entailed the agricultural productivity and the efficiency of agribusiness. At the same time, it is a matter of employment – showing how development practitioners perceived youths as being more interested in engaging in other forms of employment. A classic concern was the “boda boda” (motor bicycles which serve as informal transport service, see also section below on stability).

In several interviews and casual conversation this form of employment was mentioned as a preferred income-generating strategy to agriculture, thereby contributing to rural-urban migration of young males:

But we are also sure as a nation that there will be food in the nation because if everybody runs away from agriculture and they go into “boda boda” riding, and they go into gambling, sports betting, then who is going to produce the food. 

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75 Also this respondent explicitly demanded to remain anonymous, so I cannot further identify him/her by specifying the specific programme within Feed the Future for which this actor was Chief of Party. This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
In this fragment, the respondent – a professor at the Makerere College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences – expresses his worries about youths running away from agriculture and thereby endangering the agricultural productivity and food security. Interestingly, “boda boda” driving is associated to other depraved activities such as gambling and betting – implicitly ascribing agricultural work to the morally positive endeavours.

At the USAID offices, a respondent – who wished to remain anonymous – working within the programme ‘Feed the Future’, argued that there are a number of factors concurring to food insecurity in Uganda:

Respondent: ... the average age of Ugandan farmers is now 67 years old. And definitely 67 years means productivity would have reduced. And the farmers who were trained 20 years ago are now old to actually go into farming...And that means in a long run there will be shortage of food because... unless we come out with mechanization, but most of the Ugandan farmers still practice the hand hoe method. Mechanization is not rampant across there. That’s one. Second one, Uganda have the highest youth population in the world.77

Aging population, lack of mechanisation and growing young population are, in his views, the major factors of concern for the food security of the country.

4.5.1D STABILITY

Stability, which (explicitly) concerned more national than international development agencies, was explicitly linked to youth unemployment. The dissatisfaction and inability of youths to be economically independent would, in the narratives of development practitioners, push them into criminal activities. At the Ministry of Gender, I was told:

And in addition to that, these youths when they are not employed... unemployment causes political instability. At all times, they are in need of money and they cannot access it, they always keep on breaking into people’s houses at night looking for

76 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
77 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017

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money, at the same time they don’t have money to purchase what to use. So, if you empower them to get employed in agriculture, you are empowering them financially as well putting the country’s political stability at rest.  

The respondent referred to political instability, while actually exemplifying the concern with reference to criminality: it seems that in her views the political stability is directly linked to purchasing power and safety of the citizens. Agriculture is thus mentioned as a tool for the financial empowerment of youths, with the indirect effect of allowing socio-political stability to be maintained. From this narrative, it becomes clear that the employment of youths in agriculture is (also) used as a tool for pursuing a specific political goal, namely political stability. Where the threat of political instability becomes a development problem, agriculture is represented as a political tool. Youths are reserved a space of political convenience: employ them to avoid social distress – in agricultural business – to contribute to economic growth and food security, therefore securing political stability. At an interview at a public institution, my respondent stressed the link between unemployment and political instability with these words:

So if you have many involved in work, you certainly get out of some demonstrations you know, some agitation you know, they get quickly agitated because they lack the money but if they have something to do.  

Chaos, riots and criminality as a result of discontent with unemployment were mentioned in several other interviews – each stressing the capacity of agriculture to offer a distraction from political unrest. Interestingly, criminality and political instability were considered as being part of the same issue, which anyhow is related to the capacity of the government to ensure stability to the country. Between 2016 and 2017 there have been several episodes of social unrest, translating into political instability for Museveni’s government. During election times demonstrations and oppositions triggered violent reaction of the police, and few

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78 This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017

79 The respondent explicitly asked to remain anonymous with reference to his/her opinions on this topic. This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017

months later a demonstration in Kasese\textsuperscript{81} was repressed with fierce violence. In late 2017 in Kampala, students organized demonstrations and strikes\textsuperscript{82} against the proposed removal of the age limit for presidency – which would allow Museveni to remain in power. During an interview at a Ugandan farmers’ organization\textsuperscript{83}, the respondent reflected on social unrest:

One like I have said, it is a threat because when people don’t have what to do, in simple terms they say it is a “devil’s work”. So I expect high crime rate as a challenge and you know what that means, I also expect, these young people can influence even, they can be a threat to create some chaos in terms of riots and that is also a challenge because the government can spend on tear gas trying to calm them down...

Unemployment and the supposedly consequent high crime rate is here referred to as “devil’s work”. The social unrest and government repression is envisioned as a risk for the future, thereby justifying the necessity of development interventions.

Moreover, the issue of unemployment and instability seem to be related to two other concerns: rural-urban migration and “boda-bodas”. Both are quite burning issues, yet interestingly have not been explicitly referred to in the interviews I collected if only \textit{en passent}. In a policy brief by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF, 2016), these issues emerged as being related to one another, as much as they seem to have a strong connection to both unemployment and stability of the country:

The participation of youth in the agricultural sector is minimal and is partially attributed to the migration of youth from rural to urban areas, to engage in small urban based income generating activities like riding ‘bodaboda’ (motorcycles for hire), petty trade and service sector work. The youth prefer to participate in activities that offer quick and regular income with less risk and yet opportunities for them to cause

\textsuperscript{81} Human Rights Watch issued a special report in May 2017: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese killings

\textsuperscript{82} Protests in September 2017 were covered by various news: https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ugandan-students-defy-ban-to-protest-over-presidential-age-limit-20170921

\textsuperscript{83} This interview was carried out on 02/02/2017
change in rural communities with their increased involvement exist especially if they can perceive agriculture as a business while adopting commercially viable practices.

For all the issues mentioned in this passage, the solution proposed seems to be the engagement of youths in agricultural activities. I was surprised that the phenomenon of rural-urban migration had not been mentioned in the interviews and only briefly referred to in one of the 10 policy briefs I analysed (see section below).

4.5.1E OTHER

A few development practitioners mentioned issues as development problems in Uganda which do not fit the above-mentioned categories – despite being closely related to them: the education and skills of young Ugandans, and the concern for obtaining the middle-income status by 2020 (mentioned as a problem in itself, rather than as an objective – which will be explored in more depth in the paragraphs below). I here report a somewhat lengthy fragment of an interview with one of the Chiefs of Party at USAID’s ‘Feed the Future’ programme, which besides problematizing the Ugandan education system, offers an emblematic example of what it currently lacks:

There future is their youth so if they are not investing in education, you are not investing in the policies actually where you can change these patterns making education more accessible, making quality education really worthy so there are kids no matter what who get the skills, in the long term you have invested in the young population to be prepared with the necessary skills that are of value to private sector.

(...) I don’t have any drivers for these tractors you know any drivers, because there are no skills to drive these tractors needless to say they repair them. I need to bring my drivers skilled from Germany, Zimbabwe a South Africa at a huge expense. I am dying to get those skills here. (...). Let them know that four inches, which is a measurement that you have been taught in school, is relevant when you see precisely seed planted four inches by four inches and take them to the classroom here, when you get that kid and have him sit for the first time in his life, in the huge monster tractor and tell him when you are twenty-five, this could be you. That’s the behaviour.
In his account, the respondent explains that there is a lack and need for skilled labourers who could be employed in the mechanized agricultural enterprises. He suggests that if youths would be educated and shown what they could aspire to become (driving a modern “monster” tractor), that they could be happily employed in agribusiness. Implicitly, it is suggested that operating agricultural machinery is an ideal of success – for which only the right behaviour and skills are necessary: that is what to invest in, that is the future envisioned for youths and for the agricultural sector. In the following section I will analyse more closely the narratives around development organizations’ visions for change.

4.5.2 THE VISION FOR CHANGE

Considering the variegated conceptualization of the development problem, we might expect an accordingly diversified range of envisioned development goals. Instead, I found a rather homogenous narrative on the ‘vision for change’, which can be summarized in two main categories (Table 9): economic growth and agricultural modernization. Moreover, while the objectives between international and national organizations varied, there was no substantial difference between the vision for change of national and international development organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic growth</th>
<th>Agricultural modernization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This category concerns a generic economic transformation to achieve the middle-income status (by 2020, as envisioned by the president). It is a shift from largely informal to a formal economy which ensures taxation capacity, and it principally draws from the incentivizing of small and large businesses – as stated in the National Development Plan II. It is a tension towards a “modern” economy, an openly neo-liberal one, which would have the ‘trickle-down’ capacity of lifting the poor from the bottom.</td>
<td>This category comprises a varied range of mostly technical transformation necessary to achieve an idea of modernization in the agricultural sector: mechanization, intensification, productivity enhancement through agricultural technologies and quality inputs. Altogether, it is a radical shift from subsistence farming towards a market-led agriculture. As described in the previous chapter, the ideal for this sector is agribusiness – a neoliberal model for this sector, which requires a mind-set change for an agripreneurial attitude.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 9. MAIN CATEGORIES SUMMARIZING THE VISIONS FOR CHANGE OF ALL DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS INTERVIEWED

Below, I will examine the narratives of these two categories.

4.5.2A ECONOMIC GROWTH

The vision leading development endeavours involving youths and agribusiness in Uganda is that of economic growth. This is not so surprisingly considering the debated shift from aid to trade (Westen & Zoomers, 2014), which prescribes a neoliberal agenda of markets liberalisation, as driver of development change. Within this framework, increasing hopes and expectations have been laid on private sector initiatives for the rural development of emerging countries. This vision is clearly explained in the following fragment from an interview with an actor from a private sector development agency:

Because we need to have money in the economy, we need to have the tax base increasing and I think the other thing that I would like to have is the question that I would love to see ...because in such a case we need to always is, so when they do that, they make money. (…) The more youth registered businesses we have, I think the better. It doesn’t mean registration say...right but what does that mean, you are counted in the economy and you are moving away from an informal economy to a formal economy. You are moving to one which recognizes this work as a formal agribusiness.84 85

On the contrary at the Ministry of Agriculture I was told that the vision should be that of making people rich not through taxation but through boosting the market economy:

the way I look at it among the economies, I am against a situation where you over tax people and they don’t have money; disposable income. Give people money, make

84 This interview was carried out on 09/03/2017
85 the respondent explicitly asked to remain anonymous.
them rich so that they can buy so if we empower these youth, we make them productive, in the end they will be the market; a huge market for East Africa.86

The perspective of both respondents, which is emblematic for the widespread vision I have recorded in most of my interviews, suggests that boosting the formal economic growth – particularly through agribusiness – is the answer to the development problems of Uganda – particularly concerning youths. In his anthropology of international development, Mosse (2013, p. 237) describes this agenda as an effort to make the markets work for the poor. This vision lies on the assumption that economic growth will have a trickle-down effect on unemployment; a mechanism which in his analysis of poverty alleviation strategies Mosse (2013, p. 238) refers to as “bottom of the pyramid capitalism”.

This vision implies a peculiar ideology of success, which was well exemplified by one Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’:

Why should I take up providing [agricultural] services in the village, why can’t I sit in the bank? That means you need to make more money than the guy seated in the bank. That is the motivation by greed. Maya is working in the bank, earns 400 dollars. But you, if you are able to work with 250 farmers, or 230 farmers, you make 6000 dollars.87

The respondent explicitly lays the accent on greed as drive for success, where success is defined in terms of financial success.

4.5.2B AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION

As described in the previous section, the vision for change in the agricultural sector rests on the persuasion that agriculture needs to turn from subsistence farming to agribusiness. Moreover, in the view of a respondent from the African Development Bank reported below, this seems to be the only future perspective that ensures food security:

86 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
87 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
So that is why the bank is targeting a lot of activities to ensure that Africa feeds itself. (...) And so we want to see a situation where we could make agriculture instead of being a subsistence type of thing so that it becomes commercial in nature. 88

Therefore, there is the need for radical transformation of the agricultural sector – continues the same respondent from the African Development Bank:

... the overall objective of the Bank is to transform the agricultural sector. Not only the youth but the entire agricultural sector. To transform it from the subsistence level the way it is into a self-sustaining agricultural business right from production up to consumption, value addition, and everything.

The envisioned transformation entails the industrialization and commercialization of agriculture.

4.5.2C AGRIPRENEURSHIP

Agripreneurship, in my analysis, does not emerge as a vision in itself, but more as a consequent by-product of the vision for economic growth and agricultural modernization. It is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. However, as it emerges from the fragments reported below, it becomes an objective of development programmes to make sure farmers turn into agripreneurs:

Actually we no longer look at farmers as farmers: farmers are entrepreneurs. So the only issue is to give them an opportunity to do what they do in a more business oriented manner which we call farming as a business. So, yes they might be in primary agriculture but they have to do it as a business...to make sure whatever they do is profitable. (...) It’s for all the population. Everyone involving in agriculture should do for a market perspective not for the sake of it because if you use a market perspective

88 This interview was carried out on 17/01/2017

89 To protect the anonymity of the respondent I will not specify the name of the incubation centre. This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017
This respondent, executive director of a Ugandan agribusiness incubation centre, spells out what can be expected from an agripreneur. The personal and professional qualities of an agripreneur are envisioned within the neoliberal framework which also shapes the visions for change previously analysed. These qualities are exemplified in the fragment below, which is extracted from an interview with a development actor working at AgriProFocus in Kampala:

Coming back to your question of entrepreneurship, I know there is a question of risk taking ... That this person is not afraid of introducing something new into business, you get? And I think purely that’s the characteristic of an entrepreneur that every time he improves. Every time he improves. Because of the dynamics of demands and supplies, the forces of demand and supply. So if this person is truly, truly an entrepreneur, you will see some of these things happening on his farm or in whatever business he is doing. But if someone is doing it because there is no option, he will tell you I have done it for 5 years but he is doing the same thing over the years. Now, that’s the difference between an entrepreneur and someone doing it for fun or as a hobby (…) yeah, that’s what I was saying. So the element of competitiveness, of a competitiveness mind is very typical of an entrepreneur.  

4.5.3 THE PATHWAY TO CHANGE

In this section I explore the envisioned strategies of the various development organizations, as they transpire from practitioners’ narratives. Within the framework of theory of change, this part of the analysis entails the understanding of the tools and tactics that constitute the practical enactment of the development schemes. It is determinant in defining the type of development approach that each agency operationalizes for their vision for change. In the section below I aim to outline the conceptualizations of the organizations’ pathway to change through an analysis of the narratives.

4.5.3A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE – ALL

90 This interview was carried out on 21/01/2017
A number of themes emerged from the inductive coding of the interviews with development actors. Table 10 lists the most frequent, while Figure 16 reports their frequency. The strategies that were most frequently mentioned were ‘capacity building’ and ‘mindset change’. ‘Market linkages’ is considered to be the second-favourite development tool; ‘organizing’ and ‘agricultural inputs’ were almost equally popular. The funding of farmers through start-up capital was only envisioned as a minor development tool.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th>Organizing</th>
<th>Mindset change</th>
<th>Market linkages</th>
<th>Ag. inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing a start-up capital directly to farmers or groups of farmers.</td>
<td>Training, capacity building, accountancy, business models.</td>
<td>Organizing youths into groups or (in)formal cooperatives.</td>
<td>Change towards a business oriented agricultural enterprise, therefore turning youths into agripreneurs.</td>
<td>Getting youths in touch with (inter)national private sector actors.</td>
<td>Technology, mechanization, seeds, chemicals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10. CONCEPTUALISATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE (THEMES)**

**FIGURE 16. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE**
However, when dividing such results between the responses of national and international development agencies, quite substantial differences emerge (Figure 17). The most significant difference seems to concern funding and organization, which was not considered as a relevant pathway by international organizations as much as it was by national ones. While capacity building and mindset change were equally important both among international and among national development agencies, they were both significantly more important for national organizations than international ones. The provision and investment in agricultural inputs was considered slightly more important by national than by international organizations.

![Conceptualization of pathway to change](image)

**FIGURE 17. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE – INTERNATIONAL VS NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The differentiation in the popularity of some development tools and strategies over others between national and international agencies suggests that there is a variety of approaches to the operationalization of visions for development change. I will explore the different approaches in the next section. In the remaining of this section I will analyse the narratives that were emerging for each of these themes.
The theme of funding was mentioned as a strategy for change only by two national development agencies, namely the two Ministries I approached. At the Ministry of Agriculture, a civil servant in managerial position explained that the rationale behind the provision of start-up capital is that of empowering youths to be more productive in their agricultural business: “And also within the strategy we are coming up with, there is an element of giving youth capital; start-up capital or giving them equipment to start engaging in production. That is what we are talking about. That is the [agricultural] production part of it”. While one regional implementer of the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) explained the practicalities of their strategy: “The fund is always given, if you are given a fund to utilize within one year and you refund the money, that one will be without any interest, but now when you enter into the second year without paying back the money, that is when they give them five percent [interest rates].”

These practical aspects, which may seem straightforward microcredit strategies, have been originating crucial misunderstandings with the beneficiaries of the programme because rural development programmes providing financial assistance were until now on a grant basis: “That’s why you see at the moment we are finding difficulties to recover the money” – told me the same YLP implementer. However, the trouble recovering the capital invested in groups of agripreneurs was not only originating from a naive misunderstanding about the terms and conditions attached to the fund: there are very political strings attached to the implementation of this strategy. As I found out later during my interviews with young beneficiaries of the YLP, funding was often distributed in times of elections (especially in the Central and Western regions). However, a civil servant in managerial position at the Ministry of Agriculture – reflecting on the YLP – went even further with his hypothesis on the political mandates of funding agripreneurs:

What I am saying is that, like youth livelihood program, the aim was to give the money to the youth in terms of capital, I mean in terms of capital or train them, give them

---

91 This interview was carried out on 13/02/2017, with a civil servant who asked to remain anonymous.
92 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
skills and then give them equipment and then they pay for what they have got within a specified period of time. But then you find that if it is politicized and they say “no this thing is free”, you know there are some politicians that go around, even if government programs are well intended, they take it the other way. They say, no, no, don’t pay, this is what the government has just given you... No, it should not be politicized. Bad politics [i.e. corruption] that’s what I mean. It must have a government way and everybody’s will because it is like a loan, once they get it; they have to pay it back. It’s like a revolving fund.  

It is interesting to notice how the respondent strikes an association between government resources and free (political) money: the previous programmes investing in agriculture were indeed on a grant basis (“free money”), and thus known to have been exploited for corrupt political purposes. The idea of the “revolving fund”, which would jeopardize corrupt attempts at abusing grants for farmers, is not welcome by some civil servants doing “bad politics”.

4.5.3C CAPACITY BUILDING

Interestingly, capacity building was a particularly popular tool among the international and national development agencies alike. At a grass root national agency, I was told that the capacity building concerned mainly financial skills: “so now, we are building capacity in terms of them knowing okay, in terms of business plans, in terms of financial management, they don’t have financial systems so you find they just write that today I have bought this”.  

In any case, it is clear that the skills which are acquired through capacity building strategies are specifically focusing on technical agricultural business, as highlighted by the manager of the SKY programme, a Dutch funded programme for youths in agribusiness in Uganda, implemented by an Italian NGO: “well we designed model within the system that is called earn as you learn so as they learn, as they are getting skilled, they are also earning money...And this money is then kept by the agribusiness and at the end its dispatched to

93 This interview was carried out on 13/02/2017, with a civil servant who asked to remain anonymous.

94 The development actor I interviewed expressly asked to remain anonymous. This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017
each and they can use it as a start-up.” The model here described with the appealing narrative of a “win-win” situation sheds light on an important factor of capacity building: it serves the private sector hiring or providing the training as much as the ‘beneficiary’. In fact, the beneficiary of capacity building is formed to develop those specific skills that are functional to agribusiness private sector company. At the African Development Bank, capacity building was described in terms of “incubation”: “the programme is mainly focusing on capacity building for the youth in terms of the incubation, changing their mindset and designing projects that they are interested in and linking them to financing [opportunities]”\textsuperscript{95}. The “incubation of youths” through capacity building is reminiscent of the social gardening described by Scott (1998, p. 346), in which the ‘objects’ of development programmes become standardized human subjects “uniform in their needs and even interchangeable (...) they have none of the particular, situated, and contextual attributes that one would expect of any population”.

Moreover, the functionalism of the capacity building is common also to development agencies that were not directly working with market linkages. So a regional implementer of the YLP explained to me that: “First of all these youths are always, before we give them the funding, they are always given training... we get their leaders, chairman of the group, the secretary and the treasurer of the group to go for some training. We train them on record keeping, we train them on group dynamics, then also we train them on procurement processes.”\textsuperscript{96} As it emerges from this account, the capacity building is also necessary for the Ministry to be able to recover the money invested: having trained the youths on how to manage their loan, they expect to be more assured of retrieving the sum.

### 4.5.3 D ORGANIZING

This strategy was considered relevant by all development agencies, but particularly the national ones. This strategy entails both the gathering of youths into business groups or cooperatives, as the formalization (subject to taxation) or registration of the group (in the record books of the local authorities). From the narratives, it emerges that the organizing of

\textsuperscript{95} This interview was carried out on 17/01/2017

\textsuperscript{96} This interview was carried out at the regional offices in Gulu on 07/04/2017
Youths into groups has a direct link to the viability and productivity of the business, as explained by a development actor from a grass-root farmers’ organization (who asked to remain anonymous):

Now we are strengthening them and growing their capacity into business entities which are cooperatives and companies. So they aren’t registered either, currently, most of them are community based...Now we are building the capacity such that they can now move from a non-profit orientation to a business orientation and we are going to do that into cooperatives so these groups that we are working with under this project, we are now building their capacity so that they go into cooperative which is a business entity according to Uganda, or form companies.  

The respondent associates the business mentality of the agripreneurs in the business with the organization into cooperatives — and even the very formation of the cooperative is subject to capacity building. In fact, it seems that the group formation is a component of the same strategy as capacity-building itself, as it leads to same objective of adopting a business mind-set change and acquiring skills to perform productively in their agribusiness.

4.5.3E MINDSET CHANGE

Mindset change was together with ‘capacity building’ the most popular strategy for development, particularly among national development agencies. The ideology implied by this strategy is loaded with moral values – the right values – which are envisioned to be necessary to promote change. Within this discourse, development is considered as modernization; and is the adoption of the ““right” values, namely, those held by the white minority (...) those embodied in the ideal of the cultivated European” (Escobar, 2012, p. 43). Development is a form of socio-economic engineering upon the tabula- rasa of non-places of a generic underdeveloped country – to be developed according to constructed systems of development knowledge. The ‘right values’ are systematized in truth regimes which “(...) represent the Third World as a child in need of adult guidance” – a sort of ‘secular theory of salvation’ (ibid: 30) that infantilize the global south.

97 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
One Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’ insisted that it really boils down to adopting the right behaviour towards agriculture to make it an income-generating business:

In that way, you first need to talk to them, it’s a behaviour change thing. As I said, motivation is by greed. If they are aware that they will make 10000 dollars a year even irrespective of what age I am, I will do anything to make ten thousand dollars. So age is not a barrier for the youth. We need 18 to 35. It’s a concept mindset change that we must make money. and that is the drive\textsuperscript{98}.

At the Ministry of Agriculture, I was told by a civil servant in managerial position that having the right business mindset entails a radically different approach than subsistence agriculture, to the extent that: “that’s where they get their income but now we are saying that: can you now deliberately grow it as an income generating [activity]? You eat little but you grow with a mind of saying that you are growing to sell”. In the words of the respondent, agribusiness is prioritized even over food security.

\textbf{4.5.3F MARKET LINKAGES}

Particularly dear to international development agencies, this strategy for change implies a belief in the power of the private sector to drive development change – within what is described to be a clearly neoliberal development paradigm. At the Ministry of Agriculture the director of a department explained that they adopt the strategy of “linking them to the market, to the other value chain actors; like seed and input, dealers then may be if there is a mechanization unit which is hiring out. (...) That’s what we are talking about and we link to the traders”\textsuperscript{99}. And again, the CEO of a Ugandan service provision company, AKORION, collaborating with a bilateral donor, made the role of the private sector was made clear: “one of the systems which we use is called a market driven system. What we mean... like we are private market people right, so I am driven by what the market wants”\textsuperscript{100}. On the one hand the agripreneurs are linked-up to market actors to develop their agribusiness further. On the other hand it is the market itself to determine – through their linkage to the agripreneurs –

\textsuperscript{98} This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
\textsuperscript{99} This interview was carried out on 27/01/2017 at the headquarters in Entebbe.
\textsuperscript{100} This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
the direction of the development of agribusiness: the one is profiting from the other. It becomes clear than that development is also strictly tied to the dynamics of supply and demand, as explained by a Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’:

I think is about change to improve what aspects of that framework but not necessarily any longer applicable to the reality of the business and because markets are dynamic; ...private sector if there is something that knows how to do is they know how to adopt the conditions of the market. That’s what supply and demand is all about, it’s the ability to really see, you know, based on those markets, how does your business need to adapt? So, market trends dictate how opportunities happen and that’s why you want to have a voice and say “hey, let’s go at this together, policy makers and economic clusters”. This is where we need government to invest time, research to assist to facilitate this to happen. And you know, things like incentives that promote, develop private sector that way work better when the design of which incentive takes into account precisely these needs.

From this fragment of the interview, it becomes clear that the incentive of market linkages is a strategy to operationalize the vision for change which foresees the engagement of the agricultural sector in a (global) neoliberal economy. It seems that the role of development agencies (in this narrative, including the basic functions of the government itself) is to promote the wellbeing of the private sector – whereby agripreneurs should be trained to adapt to. The respondent foresees a collaboration of development stakeholders to adopt the same development approach: a market-driven development strategy to boost agribusiness. In fact, in his vision, it is a radical change of development framework – with a strong belief in the power of private sector.

4.5.3G AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

A rather technical strategy for change, this category particularly refers to the tools necessary to make agriculture ‘modern’ – as described in the second category analysed in the section
on the ‘vision for change’. The framework in which the agricultural inputs were promoted, were mostly business oriented, as explained the CEO of AKORION\textsuperscript{101}:

You can start with the farmer, provide them the right seed, train them how to plant, do spray for them, provide them basically production services to farmers so that you can continue getting continuous income throughout the value chain or even the season. So one of the characteristics is like really business oriented.

The agricultural inputs referred to in this category are, first of all, technologies and machineries, which would make agriculture attractive for Ugandan youths – as stated by the professor at the Makerere College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, reflecting on the Strategy for Youths he was elaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture:

So that was another perspective altogether. And I think it’s one of the reason why most of them are detesting agriculture. So one thing we are pushing for is mechanization. All people who love agriculture in this country will talk about mechanization because that’s the way to go...You cannot attract the youth with the hoe. They wouldn’t.\textsuperscript{102}

More explicitly, the mechanization which is seen as necessary strategy for the modernization of the agricultural sector, include a list of technical elements, mentioned by a respondent in a grass-root national organization (who asked to remain anonymous):

That comes with like access to finance as I said, we are guaranteed a market through contracts, so we are the ones looking for the different buyers such that these members can produce and have markets but they need things related to mechanization. Tractors, irrigation systems, agricultural insurance, now if we get some people who can ensure these farmers and off take some of these risks, so now, that agro entrepreneur in future we want is that person who has the right behaviour as far as business is concerned, the right attitude, a business mind, the right skills, the right knowledge, the right values and is surrounded by resources in terms of if he

\textsuperscript{101} This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
\textsuperscript{102} This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
need the machines, he has the machinery, if it is irrigation, he is not depending on rain because now they are being struck by drought.  

As it emerges from this account, the provision or support of agricultural inputs for agribusiness is a development realm of technical support – and very much market oriented. The very future of the agribusiness depends – together with the right knowledge and skills – on the capability of adopting the right inputs for agribusiness. At BRAC, an international private sector development agency, this rationale became clear: “if you buy seeds from here, and how do you sell them, whom do you sell them to how to target clients, at what price can you offer the seeds, so that they, they don’t really charge the farmers higher prices so that they if they charge them higher prices, they can escape. Farmers can go to other shops”. In this way, agricultural inputs allow agripreneurs to earn more – and thereby be ‘successful’ according to the neoliberal definition of success.

4.5.4 TARGETING

A question that remains unanswered is: who is going to be the beneficiary and implementer of the development efforts described within the theories of change of the development agencies I interviewed? It seems clear, also considering the prompting of my questions (regarding development programmes for youths in agribusiness), that the target is youth (see Figure 18) – while and only the minority of respondents thought it should be a structural investment in the agricultural sector.

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This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
Why focus on the youths (the unemployed) themselves? According to respondents, targeting youths is a strategy relying on the assumption that youths are intrinsically innovative and energetic – and therefore can play the role of change agents and drivers of economic growth. As a development actor working at AgriProFocus in Kampala told me:

we have considered youth as the priority and so they are on the list of the top agenda for, for our strategic plan. So, in our strategic plan, we have prioritized youth as the most innovative and energetic group of people that can be the change agents and drivers of economic transformation especially in the agri-, the agrifood sector. So, we prioritize youth effective 2017-2022 in our strategic plan.

Having demarcated the rationale for targeting the development efforts towards youths, the question remains whether the programmes potentially target the whole share of the population between 18 and 35 (broadest definition of youths, including all age brackets) or only a part of it. I encountered both possibilities in the targeting approaches of the development agencies I have interviewed (Table 11), although most organizations used a selected approach (Figure 19):
At AgriProFocus, the approach of targeting selected youth, was explained to me as having a market-oriented rationale:

…the idea is that you target those youths who already have been active either with land in the production, or in the marketing or in the value addition. It’s not like you are trying to get more youths who are doing other things maybe subsistence farming or whatever else to do agribusiness. You are focusing on those who are already doing it. yeah, to do it better…we are identifying, we are focusing at least from 18 to 35 age bracket and then youth who are already motivated, who already appreciate that they can do, they can make it.\(^{104}\)

The goal of this agency is supporting those youths who are already in the agribusiness sector to develop the business further. The selection requirements are thus strictly bond to the rationale behind the vision for change of the organization – agricultural commercialization.

\(^{104}\) This interview was carried out on 21/02/2017
At a multilateral development agency, I was told a similar strategy – investing in few, selected agripreneurs – with the purpose of championing the ones who are already successful and through their empowerment expect a trickle-down effect on the rest of the society, as a development actor at FAO explained: “see how best I can support them and help use those people to change the others. (...) Even if they are just 20%, I use them to become game changers in society. Empower them, train them, give them the necessary capacity, expose them and use them to be game changers of the rest of the country.” 105 The trickle-down effect was really perceived to be a promising trick: “If you become a successful entrepreneur and you employ ten people, wow!” 106

In contrast, government ministries did not target selected groups. At the Ministry of Agriculture this approach was explained to me by one of the principal economists:

Respondent: but now this time ‘round, we want to target the youth. You know the youth are scattered all over, they are not in a specific part of the value chain, they are scattered and you know they are just disguising because of the resources which are required in this. Now, the focus is empowering the youth to empower them to become agri-business leaders, to carry out activities of agri-business along the value chain. This time ‘round, it’s not focusing on those successful people but we are looking at people who are willing and able to take activities along the value chain which are the youth in particular... our population, 70% are youth, young people so you need to empower them because if you don’t empower them at this age.

Me: So the idea is to empower the majority?

Respondent: Yes the majority which are the youth specifically 107

The rationale is rather different: targeting all the youth who are willing and able, the majority of the population in working age – assuming they only need to be empowered with start-up capital, to unlock the potential of Ugandan agribusiness. This approach also entails targeting

105 This respondent, responsible for the coordination and development of policies for the support of Ugandan youths, explicitly asked to remain anonymous, therefore I cannot further specify what his position was. This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017

106 This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017

107 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
the youth as a separate social category, to enable them to become a generation of agribusiness leaders. In fact, this targeting strategy does not focus on supporting value-chain specific agribusiness activities, but rather assumes an intrinsic capacity of the youths to make agribusiness successful, provided they are empowered with start-up capital.

4.5.5 CLUSTERING DIFFERENT APPROACHES

There are different approaches to solve the development problem, as emerges from the theory of change analysis outlined above. Different strategies have emerged, with an interesting differentiation between national and international development agencies. From the analysis of the pathway to change, there seems to be a substantial difference between agencies targeting selected youths or all of them, and those providing funding or rather market linkages. Here it is possible to identify two approaches: one that is more private-sector drive and oriented, and another that is driven by the public sector. In the table below (Table 12), I have summarized the characteristics of the two development approaches:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private-sector (PS) approach</th>
<th>Public sector approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Selected (few) number of agripreneurs</td>
<td>• Getting potentially all Ugandan youths on board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working with groups or individuals</td>
<td>• Working with groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sampling: mobilization through (PS) company structures</td>
<td>• Sampling: project-based application through government structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation through (PS) company</td>
<td>• Implementation through government structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing: market linkages, inputs (seeds, chemicals), training/capacity building and ready market</td>
<td>• Providing start-up capital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 12. DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES (PRIVATE SECTOR VS PUBLIC)

The figure below (Figure 20) gives an indication of the development approaches adopted by the 17 development organizations I have interacted with, where the category ‘other’ comprises agencies adopting in-between approaches. The distribution of the agencies per approach shows a homogeneously spread sampling of the agencies.
Taking a closer look at the distribution of national and international organizations sheds light on interesting trends in the preferences of the agencies. Of the organisations that had adopted a private-sector driven approach, the wide majority (83%) were international. Of the agencies that had chosen a public-sector approach, the majority (60%) were Ugandan. The organisations that had adopted a mixed approach (in the category ‘other’), were equally national and international.

The preference of international development agencies for a private-sector oriented approach confirms the general shift in the international development cooperation from aid to trade, which was mentioned in section 4.4b concerning the vision for change.
4.5.6 ON PAPER: THE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR YOUTHS IN AGRIBUSINESS

This section is aimed to verify that the views expressed by development practitioners reflected the views of their agencies. These policies papers do not constitute my primary data. As the main goal of the analysis was to verify the representativeness of the theories of change that emerged from the interviews with development practitioners, I adopted the same analytical tool of theory of change described above. I analysed the narratives in the policy documents with axial coding on Atlas.ti, using specific categories of discourse which had emerged in the analysis of the interviews.

For each category, which was a step in the ToC analytical framework, I explored the narratives responding to the codes that more strongly emerged from the ToC analysis of the interviews (Table 13). In fact, I wanted to double-check each the representativeness of the responses emerging from the interviews for each code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development problem</th>
<th>Vision for change</th>
<th>Pathway to change</th>
<th>Targeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Targeting all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>Agricultural modernization</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Targeting selected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mindset change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural inputs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 13. CODES THAT EMERGED FROM THE TOC ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS

Below, I portray an overview of the theories of change of the development organisations as they emerge from the narrative analysis of a selected number of policy papers around the theme of youths in agribusiness. The documents I analysed were selected for the representativeness of the peculiar approach, namely where the public versus private-sector driven approaches stand out more clearly. More importantly, these policies are the framework of those programmes which implementation I have evaluated (see chapter 6). As for the public sector, I have compiled a list of 5 development policies, strategic plans and
report which feature the government theory of change (ToC) for the country as a whole; the ToC of the Ministry of Gender for what concerns youth policies (namely, the Youth Livelihood Programme, YLP) and the ToC of the Ministry of Agriculture for what entails the development strategy for the agricultural sector and the role youths should play in it. Regarding the development policy framework for programmes which are more driven and focused on the role of the private sector, I focused on the USAID programme ‘Feed the Future’ and the Dutch-funded SKY project implemented by the Italian NGO AVSI. The only exception being the document of Youth Watch 2012, which I selected mostly because of the overview it gives on the specificities of the young share of the Ugandan population.

Just to clarify the ordering of public policies, let me refer to the Census (UBOS, Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014, p. 5) as it states the hierarchy and logic of the public administration system guiding the development efforts of the Ugandan public institutions:

Uganda’s economy is guided by the National Development Plan. The country is now implementing her second National Development plan (NDP II) which is designed to propel the economy towards middle income status by 2020 in line with the Vision 2040. The NDP is implemented through Sector Investment Plans (SIPs), Local Government Development Plans (LGDPs), Annual work plans and Budgets of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The NDP II also seeks to leverage the International and Regional Frameworks such as Africa Agenda 2063 and the Post 2015 Development Agenda to exploit growth opportunities.

Below (Table 14) is a list of the policy briefs, strategies and reports I have analysed – and which I generally refer to as policy briefs or documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Organisation and programme</th>
<th>Policy papers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td><strong>Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development - Youth Livelihood Programme</strong></td>
<td>1. YLP Periodic update on progress in implementation – 31 August 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ministry of Agriculture,</strong></td>
<td>5. Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Below I report the analysis of the codes for each ToC category, some emphasizing the consistency of ToC narratives of development practitioners and policy papers, and some (minority) which showed some degree of variation. As for the narrative analysis of the interviews, the categories and codes were not used as mutually-exclusive classifications, but are rather observed as importance and attention given to certain topics (codes within the categories).

4.6.1 DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

The development problem has been framed in a more extensive and detailed way in the policy documents than in the interviews – but strikingly reflect a consistency with the visions of the development actors. Although I have not developed the analysis of the policies and guidelines of all the development organisations I encountered in the field, I report below a
comparison between the trends in the answers of development practitioners and the framing of the development problem in the 10 policy documents I have analysed. This comparison is meant as an indication of the consistency I wanted to investigate: it should not be treated as an absolute result in itself but rather as a suggestion that the opinions of my interviewees were generally consistent with the views expressed in the policy frameworks.

As exemplified in the figure above (Figure 22), there is a substantial consistency in the narratives of development practitioners and their organizations as with what concerns the conceptualization of the development problem. The major discrepancy regards the category ‘other’, which mainly refers to the lack of skills and adequate education of youths and the economic condition of Uganda as a ‘least developed country’: more attention to these issues was given in the policy papers I analysed than in the interviews I recorded. The same goes for ‘stability’ and ‘food security’, which were granted greater attention in policy papers than in the interviews. This could be explained as a variation that originates from the broader spectrum of possible conceptualization of the development problems of Uganda, particularly considering the fact that the government policies guiding the implementation of the YLP are broader than main concerns about youths and agribusiness.
The issue of youth unemployment was described as a burning development issue in all the policy briefs I have analysed, with a rhetoric similar to the one used in this fragment from the USAID assessment on Youth and Agriculture in Uganda (Butler & Kebba, 2014, p. 7):

It is clear from all available data that Ugandan youth are struggling to transition into the formal workforce, with the labour market able to absorb only 80,000 new workforce entrants out of the 400,000 youth entering the labour market each year. Weak demand for workers, coupled with a lack of access to finance or to other resources such as land, provides youth with very few pathways to enter formal work, either at an existing workplace or a start-up enterprise of their own making.

The text is underpinned with references to numeric facts and figures and resonates as assertive and sound.

4.6.2 VISION FOR CHANGE

In regards to the vision for change, there was again a strong consistency between the views expressed by the development practitioners I interviewed and those expressed in the policy documents I analysed. In fact, economic growth and agricultural modernization were clearly stated in the documents I examined as the main goals of development attention.

Possibly the brief that had most ambitious development goals was the Vision 2040 (GoU, Government of Uganda, 2007, p. IV), which “is conceptualized around strengthening the fundamentals of the economy to harness the abundant opportunities around the country”. More specifically, as with what concerns the agricultural sector, the same policy brief (ibid, p. 45) states that:

102. Uganda aspires to transform the agriculture sector from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. This will make agriculture profitable, competitive and sustainable to provide food and income security to all the people of Uganda. It will also create employment opportunities along the entire commodity value chain of production, processing and marketing.
The Vision 2040 was really intended to be a guiding principle and framework for all development activities, both for the public sector as for (inter)national development agencies, and therefore maintained a rhetoric that allows for the broad scope of the brief.

Curiously, the issue of employment (particularly of youths) was mentioned as a development goal in itself – while in the interviews it emerged more as a development problem (unemployment) to be solved, rather than being framed as an ideal vision for the future of Uganda. However, for how strongly emphasized in the policy documents, it was referred to as instrumental to the economic growth of the country. Either way, employment was mentioned in development policies of both national and international agencies.

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4.6.3 PATHWAY TO CHANGE

The analysis of the 10 development policies I selected has highlighted a certain level of discrepancy between the interviews and the documents (Figure 23).

![Conceptualization of pathway to change](image)

**FIGURE 23. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE (INTERVIEWS VS PAPERS)**

While ‘capacity building’, ‘organizing’ and ‘agricultural inputs’ have been reported with rather coherent consistency in both datasets, other categories were talked about with different
levels of importance. However, as for ‘funding’, it mainly has to do with the over-representation of public sector policies, which are the development agencies investing in this development tool; on the contrary the sample of interviews had a majority of development practitioners from non-public organizations, which preferred other pathways to change. The same goes for the category of ‘market linkages’: this tool was preferred by non-public development agencies, which were under-represented in the sample of policy documents analysed (in comparison with the sample of interviews).

The YLP reminds us both of the vision for change as of the pathway to obtain such development objectives in clear and ambitious tones:

The Programme Development Objective (PDO) of YLP is to empower the target youth in Uganda to harness their socio-economic potential and increase self-employment opportunities and income levels.

(i) Specific Objectives
– To provide youth with marketable vocational skills and tool kits for self-employment and job creation.
– To provide financial support to enable the youth establish Income Generating Activities (IGAs).
– To provide the youth with entrepreneurship and life skills as an integral part of their livelihoods.
– To provide youth with relevant knowledge and information for attitudinal change (positive mindset change). (Ministry of Gender, 2017, p. 3)

In this passage, several development tools are mentioned: firstly ‘capacity building’ (through the teaching of ‘marketable skills’); then ‘funding’ as a tool for the generation of ‘income generating activities’ (i.e. economic growth); and lastly the building of ‘life skills’ for youths to be able to change their attitudes towards a positive mindset – which would supposedly help them towards employment.

Interestingly, the development tool of ‘capacity building’ is linked in the USAID assessment on Youth in Agriculture (Butler & Kebba, 2014, p. 54) as a set of skills that would allow youths to ‘be their own boss’ and thereby become ‘agripreneurs’: 
Basic business skills training – “what you need to know to be your own boss” – could be offered as an option, and ought to be a significant menu option, coupled with mentoring and advisement. This is the “agripreneur” option. There will be opportunities arising from the connection to value chain operations for young people to form their own enterprises. They will need skills, advice and mentoring, and guidance in basic business strategies.

The most problematic discrepancy between the two datasets concerns a ‘mindset change’. Attitude, behaviour, and mindset were given in policy documents far less importance than in the interviews. I expect that this is to be related to the active and grounded role development practitioners played: the interaction and experience with youths might have triggered the elaboration of ‘mindset change’ as a development tool which could not be valued in policy briefs due to the more abstract than experience-informed nature of the context.

Moreover, an important concept has emerged from the analysis of policy documents: institutional change, described in terms of the necessity to adequate the institutional structures, practices and attitudes of practitioners to the development goals set in the ToC. This concept had not so prominently emerged from the interviews, and therefore has not been highlighted in the narrative analysis. The policy briefs by USAID, AVSI, the NDPII and the Vision 2040 in particular highlight the importance of institutional change. The latest document (GoU, Government of Uganda, 2007, p. 112), for example, discusses the issue in these terms:

Over the Vision period, government shall adopt the business approach for public service delivery where efficiency, effectiveness and economy will be the main basis of decision making. This will include high quality public services, efficient civil service and independence from political interference, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the Government’s commitment to such policies. All public services shall be available to all Ugandans without any form of discrimination.

Interestingly, the government efficiency and broad institutional change seems to be related to a general shift towards a ‘business approach for public service delivery’. This institutional
change towards more of a corporate management of the *res publica* is referred to in Mosse (2013, p. 228-237) as a neoliberal development that puts “business at the centre, governing at the periphery”.

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### 4.6.4 TARGETING

As for targeting, the analysis of development policies confirmed the trends of public sector organisations to target the whole social group of youths (mainly the unemployed youths) and non-public sector organisations to be focusing on a more selected number of youths (particularly the SKY project). For example, the YLP (Ministry of Gender, 2017, p. 3) report states that: “The Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) is Government of Uganda Rolling Programme, targeting the unemployed and poor youth in the country. It was designed in response to the high unemployment rate and poverty level among the youth in the country.”

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### 4.6.5 DISCUSSION

The analysis of the 10 policy briefs enriches but does not alter the ToC that has emerged from the narrative analysis of the interviews with development actors. In fact, while there were some discrepancies, there is a broad level of general consistency between interviews and documents. A peculiar aspect of the narratives emerging from the policy briefs concerns the rhetoric used in the expression of rather vague arguments:

The intermediate benefits arising out the YLP include the following: (i) Youth Empowerment: The greater involvement of the Youth in mobilization, sensitization, prioritization and planning for their needs, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of Programme activities has created a sense of empowerment and confidence to take charge of their destiny.

This extract of the YLP report on progress implementation (Ministry of Gender, 2017, p. 10) is an emblematic example of collection of fuzzy words – mainly development jargon – which refer to little concrete. Although this rhetoric was not a prerogative of public sector policy
briefs, it might have emerged more prominently in government documents because of the all-encompassing nature of their scope. Another example of such vague expressions comes from the Vision 2040 (GoU, Government of Uganda, 2007, p. 45):

101. The opportunity for value addition through agro processing is enormous. This will enhance Uganda’s competitiveness on the world market, boost foreign exchange earnings and employment. It can also reduce wastage, enhance food security, improve livelihoods for low-income groups and empower disadvantaged groups of society like rural women, youth and the disabled.

Interestingly, in this fragment the youths are clearly depicted as being part of the broader social category of disadvantaged people to be empowered and thereby achieving a list of not better specified objectives: global economic competitiveness, foreign exchange, food security etc.

4.8 CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

As emerges from the narrative analysis described above, there are different patterns characterizing the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. These patterns highlight how the development organizations adopt strategies for youth in agribusiness – thereby answering part of the research question I set out to answer in this chapter. For the sake of the analysis of their narratives, I have structured my investigation of the ‘how’ through the three phases of the TOC.

As for the conceptualization of the development problem, there appear to be an array of concepts emerging from the development actors’ narratives, which follow different trends depending whether the actor is affiliated to a national or international organization. Altogether, the development problem is described in terms of youth unemployment and demographic preponderance of youths (the so-called ‘youth bulge’). However, youth unemployment seems to be considered much more of a problem by national development agencies than international ones, who are more concerned about the ‘youth bulge’.
When setting out to envisioning the ideal outcomes of their development efforts, development practitioners describe their vision for change in terms of economic growth and agricultural modernization. About the vision for change, I did not encounter any particular trend differentiating national from international organizations. Significantly, the development goals of the organizations were not diversified according to the definition of the development problem.

Instead, when describing the best strategies for operationalizing their vision for change and tackle the development problem, a considerable variation emerged again: while mindset change and capacity building emerged predominantly for both national and international organizations, they were both significantly more important for national than for international agencies. Moreover, another important difference was that directly funding youth was considered as viable strategy by national organizations, but not by international ones. The narratives concerning the pathway to change were set in a rather ‘technicalizing’ tone, where development change seems to be largely dependent on the adoption of the right business skills and mentality, plus the implementation of modern agricultural technologies and inputs. Despite aligning the analysis of the development narratives in the three phases of TOC, there seems to be quite a dissonance between the conceptualizations of the three phases, as elaborated by the development actors.

Besides the differences between national and international development organizations, two different development approaches were identified as strategies for change. The first being a primarily public approach, adopted largely by national (governmental) institutions, the second being private-sector driven and adopted more by international institutions. While the goal of both development approaches is that of modernizing the agricultural sector and lifting the economy to middle-income status, the operationalization was rather different: the first would invest in creating a new generation of organized agripreneurs by supporting their business plan with an investment capital; the second would focus on connecting private-sector driven market opportunities to a selected number of youths, to promote their business skills to supply the market demand. The private-sector driven development approach seems to be particularly symptomatic of the shift from aid to trade, which is more general to the international development cooperation (Westen & Zoomers, 2014). Mosse (2013, p. 228) describes this shift as putting “business at the center, governing at the
periphery” – thereby strengthening the depoliticizing force identified by Ferguson (2014) in the ‘90s in his *aidnography* of the development industry in Lesotho.

Whatever the differences and trends in the approaches to development efforts, a clearly neoliberal pattern emerged. The development problem was identified as a structural issue that combines the skew demographic dividend with high youth unemployment rates. However, the strategy to target such issues would lay the responsibility of change with those most affected by the development issue: the youths themselves. This also explains the severe tones in which youths are talked about (see previous chapter) in development discourse: either blamed for being lazy, with an entitlement mentality that dooms them to missing business opportunities in agribusiness; or praises them for being the drivers of change, the future of agriculture – the very champions and hope of Uganda. This development trend that shifts the attention from unemployment to the unemployed (the youths), recalls the shift, already identified by Mosse (2010, in Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p. 45), from poverty to the poor.

Moreover, this shift of attention to the youths as beneficiaries *and* implementers of development change pathologizes those among the youths who fail to become agripreneurs, while praising the successful ones as being the champions and drivers of change. This trend in international development had been identified by Ferguson (2014), with reference to poverty and the poor – which in his analysis of the development industry are indeed pathologized and depoliticized. As Rap (2006, p. 1303) recalls:

> Ferguson shows that the framing of development interventions in a technical policy discourse explains why ‘many projects fail in terms of their stated objectives while being more successful in terms of unstated agendas’ (Gasper, 1996a: 166). It works as part of a two-sided process: the ideological effect of such a discourse – depoliticisation – disguises its institutional effects, that is the expansion of bureaucratic power (Ferguson, 1990).
CHAPTER 5

YOUTHNOGRAPHY

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- 5.2 Youth: a contended and heterogeneous social category
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“The ears will never be higher than the head” — Acholi proverb

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The Ugandan population has grown six-fold since the ’50s (UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund, 2011). According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in 2011, 78%, of the Ugandan population was under 30 years of age, with the perspective of a steady increase of this percentage as the population continues to grow. In 2014, the Ugandan Census recorded that 22.5% of the population was in the youth category (18-30) recognized by the Ugandan Constitution. With an increasingly young population, the government and international development agencies have in the last 5-10 years focused their development efforts on this social category.

As described in the previous chapter, development efforts are targeting youth with different strategies and approaches, to boost their employability in agribusiness. Despite the process of urbanization, the majority of the youth still live in rural areas and the majority of youths are engaged in agricultural activities, either for subsistence or business. As mentioned in earlier chapters, I sampled to youths as a social group comprehended between 18 and 35 – the widest range adopted by development agencies. However, defining and identifying their characteristics, capacities and constraints of such a broad social group remains a challenging enterprise that scholars are just starting to attend. There are 56 different ethnic groups living in Uganda (National Youth Policy, 2001). Besides the ethnic variety, youths include both males and females, illiterates and highly educated farmers, experienced agripreneurs and simple subsistence farmers. What is the use of the analytical category of ‘youth’ if it refers to the majority of the population in such a heterogeneous country? How can youths’ heterogeneity be systematised? How do the youths define themselves and how do they experience the engagement in agribusiness?

In this chapter, I explore the meaning and making of youth as a social category in Uganda. Using a qualitative approach, I study youth from the perspective of youths themselves – as it emerges from their narratives, and from my participant observation during fieldwork in four sub regions of Uganda. I investigate youth as a concept, social category, identity and status.
Furthermore, I look at youth as object and subject in the discourse of the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness. By doing this, I try to give an empirical answer to the second (sub) research question of this study: *who are the youths in Uganda, and how do they experience engagement in agribusiness?*

This chapter addresses the definitional problem of youths in Uganda. Given that the majority of the Ugandan population is under 30 years of age, development programmes targeting youth are addressing a wide share of the population – leaving development actors and scholars with the issue of approaching an extremely heterogeneous social group. This chapter offers a *youthnography* – an ethnographic description of the youth’s identity, aspirations and experiences in agribusiness, in and out of development schemes. I hereby attempt a systematisation of the heterogeneity of factors making the youths such a diverse social category, as it emerged from the ethnographic data I collected throughout the country.

The chapter will first (section 5.2) explore the issue defining youths through the academic debate and discussions among development actors, showing how ‘youth’ remains a controversial and fuzzy social category. In section 5.3, I provide a brief overview of the data I have collected from interviews with youth themselves. In this section I will also introduce the heterogeneity factors, which all emerged from the qualitative analysis of my data – as recurrent codes or determinant factors emerging from my observations in the field. These factors, that emerged from an inductive process of analysis, were indicative of the traits that determined youths’ identity and their experience of engagement in agribusiness. In the section 5.4, I systemize the heterogeneity factors making up three main dimensions in which youths are embedded. These dimensions, territorial, socio-cultural and value chain, emerged from the analysis of my data as meta-categories of the heterogeneity factors. In this section, I analyse the data related to each of the three dimensions. Before coming to the conclusion, I make an overview (section 5.5) of the dynamics and relations playing out around the youths. Here, I show the complexity and messiness of the relations in which youths are embedded when engaging in agribusiness development.
5.2 YOUTH: A CONTENTED AND HETEROGENEOUS SOCIAL CATEGORY

Over the last decades the studies on African youths have increasingly grown in number and popularity (Sumberg, Anyidoho, Leavy, te Lintel, & Wellard, 2012), in large part because the demographic growth in most African nations. The analytical tools elaborated by social and development studies make us aware that approaching this social category is an extremely delicate endeavour. Christiansen et al (2006, p. 11) argue that

In studying young people we must, in other words, see youth as both social being and social becoming: as a position in movement (Vigh 2003; 2006). Youth is both a social position which is internally and externally shaped and constructed, as well as part of a larger societal and generational process, a state of becoming. We need thus to look at the ways youth are positioned in society and the ways they seek to position themselves in society, to illuminate the ways the category of youths is socio-politically constructed, as well as the ways young people construct counter-positions and definitions.

According to Van Dijk et al (2011) youth can be studied as a phenomenon, as a category and as an ideology: as a phenomenon, it refers to the booming demography of most African countries; as a category, it indicates a phase of ‘becoming’ from childhood to adulthood; and recently as an ideology, “Under the current dispensation of donor funding, relief programmes and international aid, these [development] discussions have made the ‘youth’ the major beneficiary of what these policies offer and imply. (...) If the donor- ideology prescribes youthfulness for societal and developmental relevance, it will then dictate practice.” (2011, p. 1). Framing the academic debate around youth is a heated and ever-unfinished dispute. As a consequence of the magnitude of the demographic phenomenon, youth has become the object of increased development attention. The study of youths has become an increasingly politicized topic.

Paradoxically, the very fact that youths have been framed as an age-range, puts them in a marginal and liminal position in society. Their precarious condition of unemployment, has extended the period before youth are able to attain adulthood through economic status. Youth, which has traditionally been a brief, liminal, phase of passage (Aime & Pietropolli
Charmet, 2014) has become an extended condition of ‘waithood’ (Sommers, 2015, p. 13). Sommers (2015, p. 65) argues that: “Attaining and retaining adulthood is the most crucially overlooked issue in Africa. As Honwana has highlighted, “Youth are the majority of Africa’s population, but they have been pushed to the margins of their societies and live in a limbo between childhood and adulthood” (2012: 165)”.

As I will explain in more details in the sections below, I found that attaining the status of adulthood was one of the most crucial aspirations for young men I interviewed, also driving their ambitions in and beyond agribusiness. In several contexts, the social status of youth is associated to personal and economic irresponsibility – an uncertain state where especially young males want to get out of. On the contrary, proving to be adult is related to (relative) economic success as much as it is to personal and business planning. The passage from youth to adult social status is thus not bond to age, but rather dependent on personal and material achievements. Moreover, particularly for male youths, the achievement of the adult status is also related to social inclusion in the ethnic group as men. In the case of Bagishu men (Eastern sub-region around Mbale), this passage would be consolidated by the ritual of circumcision – which would determine both the attainment of adulthood and manhood, and full-fledged belonging to the ethnic group. As Alex, a fruit vendor at the central food market in Kampala, originally from Mbale, explained to me:

Me: And other than circumcision, what are other things that can contribute to making someone mature, like a proper man?

Alex: Of course now, we have this way, now like me, I am not at school as I told you. now like I’m 25 years. But what have you done? You have what? Are you planning? Eh? That is the way. They can show you someone that, yea, you are mature enough, you are planning? What have you done? For example, now like in, as I told you that I did a nursery, I did, I did eh, my project of the nursery bedding [he had cultivated and traded coffee seedlings in Mbale, years back, as first business]. From nursery bedding, I used to pay some school fees [for himself and siblings], I could afford to eat at school and I bought my three cows. That one can show that someone [has achieved economic independence], eh? This guy is mature! Instead of getting money, you go and enjoy with your friends, drinking, what, without doing anything. As you said,
when you get 10000 [Ugandan shillings], do you save [it]? you eat some, you save some for future, for tomorrow. There, someone can say that this guy, or this lady is mature enough. A grown up.\textsuperscript{108}

Because of the precarious economic environment in which most Ugandan youths live, the attainment of adulthood through economic success is a precarious. In line with Sommers, such social transformation is closely connected to social instability: where the attainment of adulthood follows the achievement of social status and economic success, “defining young people as youth, in Africa and many other world regions, must entail more than an age range or a culturally delineated transformation period” (2015, p. 14). Nonetheless, most development agencies work with a youth definition determined by age boundaries, although there is no agreement on what the age ranges should be (Table 15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Definition of youth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan Constitution</td>
<td>18 – 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN\textsuperscript{110}</td>
<td>15 – 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU\textsuperscript{111}</td>
<td>15 – 35</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB\textsuperscript{112}</td>
<td>15 – 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID\textsuperscript{113}</td>
<td>10 – 29</td>
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\textbf{TABLE 15. DEFINITION OF YOUTHS BY DEV. ORGANIZATION}

However, given the broad share of the Ugandan population falling under the category of youth, it is hard to underestimate the great heterogeneity. In 2001 the first, rather loose and

\textsuperscript{108} Extract from interview with Alex, on 5/05/2017 in Kampala.
\textsuperscript{112} WB youth policy: [http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/internationalyouthsector/directory/actors/worldbank/](http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/internationalyouthsector/directory/actors/worldbank/)
non-binding National Youth Policy (MGLSD, 2001) was published in Uganda, recognizing the socio-cultural diversity of the group the policy was targeting:

Uganda being a multi-ethnic country with 56 different ethnic groups has so many divergent beliefs and practices. These include issues of early non-consensual marriage where over 50% of Ugandan women marry before 18 years, while their male counterparts marry at 23 years. Other negative practices include wife inheritance/sharing or replacement, Female Genital Mutilation, with associated rituals and culture that teaches females submissiveness rather than assertiveness.

The urban youth are also experiencing a lot of influence from Western culture through the media and are continuously and inappropriately exposed to pornographic materials. This coupled with changing family structures, disruptions etc. challenge traditional control on behaviours of youth. This leaves them in a generation with no clear cultural identity or values often conflicting with society and established structures.

Furthermore the youth in nomadic and pastoral communities experience unique conditions such as lack of education and health facilities and engage in cattle rustling which warrant special consideration.114

From this short article a number of themes emerge as defining the diversity of the young population in Uganda: ethnicity, “beliefs and practices”, marriage practices, gender and adulthood related rites of passage, rural/urban diversity in socio-cultural practices, evolving identity and values, accessibility to facilities and education.

As discussed by Van Dijk et al (2011, p. 4), there is a heated academic debate regarding the definitional boundaries of youth:

...the question of how we can make sure that we do not superimpose Western categories of social analysis, which may become meaningless in the particular cultural or historical setting. Does African youth exist at all and in whose hands rests the conceptual invention here? Or are we exoticising African youth if we assume that

114 MINISTRY OF GENDER, 2001, article 2.8, p. 8
matters must be different in Africa, compared to the West or Asia (...) when it comes to such delimitations and demarcations? (...) Social science studies often followed these ‘emic’ categorisations, sometimes naively, believing that the emic\textsuperscript{115} is the royal road to the truth. Yet in addition to this, the missionary endeavour, the colonial apparatus and the independent nation-states all put in place systems of education that to a large extent were capable of capturing youth and which therefore operated on the basis of ideas of what youth is.

In the following of this chapter, I will attempt a systematic analysis of the factors contributing to shape Ugandan youths’ identity and agribusiness experiences – for the complex, dynamic and heterogeneous socio-economic group they are.

5.3 STUDYING HETEROGENEITY

In this section I briefly summarise the ethnographic methods through which I collected the data on Uganda youths. Moreover, I will make an overview of the main traits that emerged from the qualitative analysis of the interviews with youths.

Before starting the extensive fieldwork with youths, I had travelled through the country during two pilot field trips: I was aware of the diverse socio-cultural, economic and ecologic scenarios I was going to encounter in the different sub-regions. In fact, it was precisely this diversity, together with the awareness I had built up through literature review – that convinced me to focus my research in four different locations\textsuperscript{116}: I was puzzled as to how the theories of change of the development actors I had interviewed would have been implemented in such diverse contexts. Altogether, I have conducted 110 semi-structured interviews in four locations:

\textsuperscript{115} ‘Emic’ is, in anthropological terms, the perspective of the subject, while ‘etic’ is the perspective of the observer.

\textsuperscript{116} I have elaborated the justification of the four fieldwork locations in the methods chapter.
I have studied youths’ heterogeneity with qualitative methods, analysing the interviews collected through coding. In this process, a number of factors emerged as being most influential in determining youths’ heterogeneity of identity and agribusiness practices. I describe such heterogeneity factors in section 5.3.1 below, summarising the main traits of these factors. These factors, which emerged from the coding of the interviews, are categories grouping the most recurrent codes, or determinant aspects I have recorded through participant observation and comparison of data across the regions of multi-sited fieldwork.

Later in this chapter, I will further explore their traits as they emerge from empirical ethnographic data.

### 5.3.1 HETEROGENEITY FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heterogeneity factors</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Family background</td>
<td>Crucial in shaping youths’ identity, aspirations and success in agribusiness was the family in which the youth was born. I encountered youths who, with pride, took over their family enterprise, and others whom had been penalised by their parents for being last born. By family background I refer to the extended family including grandparents, aunts and uncles, grandchildren and female in-laws. In most instances, I encountered patriarchal families where assets and status were inherited patriarchally and married women would live in their husband’s ancestral land. Exceptions were made when the eldest member of the family was a woman, in which case she...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
would be making decisions about agribusiness, inheritance and marriages.

There are several components forming factor: **a)** the social class and status of the family, **b)** it’s economic status and ownership of land, and **c)** the availability of the family to support its youths in agribusiness enterprising.

2. Gender

Gender is certainly a defining trait of one’s identity, particularly so in the liminal phase of youth: the capacity to obtain adulthood was shaped by the cultural norms and values attributed to youths’ sex. In fact, the socio-cultural and economic requirements for the attainment of adulthood (and thus exit the social category of youth) were radically different for men and women. Men would be required to gain social status through economic success: acquiring manhood is in fact strictly linked to economic realization, assuming the latter can be obtained when a youth is mature enough to make sensitive economic choices. In most cases I encountered, this status would be sealed by a rite of passage which confirmed its social recognition (e.g. circumcision). Because of the financial pressure to the achievement of adulthood, male youths I spoke were particularly eager to focus on the quick returns of their agribusiness to exit youth and enter manhood. Female youth would be less bond to economic status for the achievement of adulthood. On the contrary, they would exit the category of youth when they would get married and/or have children. However, economic power of women was generally perceived as a threat to both the patriarchal power distribution in the family, and to the fragile status of men as adults.

Moreover, for women, marital relationship radically impacted their identity and their ability to shape their careers in agribusiness: only the few who were lucky enough to marry a permissive husband would be allowed to work, spend long hours out of home and potentially earn a higher financial and social status then their spouse.

3. Age

For this research, I have adopted a very broad age range for youths, from 18 to 35, a definition which would include all the definitions of the development organisations I have interviewed. However, there was a great variation between the younger and
older informants in this category. Such variety mainly depended on: **a)** youths’ ability to access assets (the elder ones would have more chance of inheriting from their parents, and would have greater chances of accessing financial services) **b)** aspirations and planning (the younger ones would focus more on agribusiness activities that would give quick returns like horticulture and service provision, while the elder ones would aim at more ambitious agribusiness); **c)** knowledge and skills also greatly differed according to the experience gained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Values &amp; norms in agriculture</th>
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<tr>
<td>There was great variation in the meanings attributed to the agricultural enterprises, which could be considered anything from a forced-choice functional to subsistence, to a major ambition for entrepreneurial business. In fact, while the majority of the Ugandan population is engaged in agriculture, this is mostly subsistence agriculture rather than commercial agribusiness. Values and norms attributed to agricultural activities also greatly varied in the different sub-regions where I conducted fieldwork.</td>
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<tr>
<th>5. Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity was a socio-cultural trait which youths often referred to in defining their identity (as youth) and their activities (in agribusiness). It was a crucial factor influencing both criteria for attainment of adulthood status and in shaping the values and norms attributed to agribusiness. I here refer to the concept of ethnicity as a socio-cultural category comprising a shared and dynamic system of norms and values for social interaction, identity and belonging to a community of people sharing language and traditions. The recent, post-independence history has sclerotized ethnic differences, particularly in the North – where Acholi people suffered a long civil war – and in the South-West, where Museveni has favoured the Banyankole people for political reasons. Baganda people in the Central region, which are the largest ethnic group in Uganda had been favoured by the British colonial political system and are recently claiming recognition. During the period of my fieldwork I have often heard concerns about the violent clashes that occurred in November 2016 in the district of Kasese, when the police repressed the Rwenzururu movement for independence of their kingdom.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Politics
The development of an agribusiness, involving the management and competition for resources such as land and financial services, became increasingly politicised as development agencies have dedicated increasing budgets and policy attention. Beyond the national politics, which was a theme that emerged relatively seldom during the interviews, my informants often referred to the way in which local level politics had an important impact on the development of their agribusiness. In particular, the majority of my informants lamented the corruption of public structures, and the discriminatory practices favouring Banyankole people for positions of power within institutions.

7. Ecosystem
The geography of Uganda is very diverse, comprising a variety of ecosystems throughout the country – which naturally has an important impact on the agricultural activities. In the North, the weather can be pretty extreme, with two very dry and hot seasons and two tropical rainy seasons; the major value chains are grains. The Central region also has two dry and two rainy season but are more temperate; besides the major trading activities in Kampala (main market hub of the country), the major value chains are horticulture and animal husbandry (piggery, goats and chicken rearing). In the South-West, also known as the land of milk and honey for its fertility, there the two dry and two rainy seasons are temperate and influenced by the hilly ecosystem that favours the cultivation of tea and coffee, which is done mostly on large scale. The majority of people are engaged either in cattle rearing and dairy (in the lower plateaus around Mbarara) or in horticulture (mainly matooke and fruits) and animal husbandry. The ecosystem of the Eastern region around Mbale is strongly influenced by the presence of the mount Elgon: on the slopes of the mountain coffee is the main agribusiness, while around Mbale the ecosystem is ideal for horticulture.

8. Belonging (to environment)
I refer to belonging to the environment as the territorial dimension of ethnicity, where bonding to ancestral land and its agribusiness traditions is crucial for the development of the identity and career of youths. This feeling of belonging was strong for the majority of my informants, particularly for those living in rural areas. It was crucially important for the ambitions of the youths, and for their commitment to investing into their
agribusiness. However, it was not a condition necessary for the realisation of the agribusiness, in fact in Kampala were living people who were eradicated from their ancestral land and were economically successful in their business.

| 9. Urban/rural | The urban or rural context in which my informants were living had an important impact on the type of business they would get involved, but also influenced their accessibility to market and marketing information. Urban contexts were characterised by a higher exposition to technological and marketing innovations, but greater difficulty to access land. On the contrary rural contexts offered more availability of land, and agribusiness enterprises were more strongly embed in family context (either as family business or as inheritance of ancestral land). It was striking to observe how multicultural was Kampala in comparison to the rest of the country, where particularly in rural areas there was more homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and language. |
| 10. Proximity to market | When confronting the agribusiness experiences of the youths I interviewed, proximity to the market (local village market, regional or central Kampala hub) impacted the profitability of the agribusiness, for the ability of the farmers to bypass middlemen. The only exception was constituted by cooperatives in the South-west of the country, which had built such a strong bargaining power to constitute a market in itself, where the buyer would go to get supply. |
| 11. Identity (worker or entrepreneur) | There was quite an important difference among the youths I interviewed, between those who regarded themselves as workers or (subsistence) farmers and those who considered themselves as being agripreneurs. Their identification with their profession widely differed also within the same environment, development scheme, value chain, and even work group. |
| 12. Embeddedness in value chain | The intensity of the attachment to a specific value chain was very different for my informants: some of them were entirely devoted to one value chain, while other would switch according to market prices without specialising. I encountered youths who were strongly rooted in the value chain of their agribusiness, to the point that their own identity and social status was tied to their success in their agribusiness in that specific sector; this was |
particularly true for Bahima people with cattle rearing. I also encountered youths who had been working in different sectors and even chunks of the value chain – from transport to service provision to production of various agricultural produce.

| 13. Aspirations in/out agribusiness | The commitment of youths to agribusiness differed greatly depending on their aspirations: for some of my informants agricultural activities were a forced-choice, as they had no alternative career paths, while for others it was a deliberate choice and great ambition to be successful in their agribusiness (and not another). |

**TABLE 17. HETEROGENEITY FACTORS**

5.4 EMBEDDING HETEROGENEITY

“Stop calling me a youth! I’ve been circumcised!” Alex tells me. Alex is a 25 years old fruits vendor at Nakasero central market in Kampala, who hailing from the Eastern sub-region of Mbale. Sitting on a pile of fruit boxes in what can be considered the busiest spot of the capital, I had been interviewing Alex about his career and aspirations, as a youth. Observed by tens of pairs of inquisitive eyes, Alex felt he should make his identity as an adult clear to me and the indiscrete passers: he had obtained a social status which would be insulting not to recognize, a status marked on his body in one of the most harsh and diffused rites of passage in Eastern Uganda. Without the blink of an eye, later on the same morning he asked me for advice on how to access a youth development project. Puzzled by what to me was a contradiction, and about to jump to the conclusion that Alex was not a reliable informant, I later came to realize that the Ugandans I interacted with did not see any inconsistency in identifying with different social categories. Belonging to the category of youth was perceived as much as transitory phase, as a situational and interchangeable identity.

Interviewing young (18-35) Ugandans throughout the country allowed me to develop an overview of the diverse ways in which young people defined themselves in different settings. There were different factors and circumstances that had an influence in their perceptions and strategically positioning in the scale from childhood to adulthood. Youth is indeed a liminal phase of transition, but also an iterative process that can be redefined and undone.
Not only diverse circumstances, but social contexts, and sociocultural environment played a role in the identification and definition of youth, but also defined and was defined by the ways in which agricultural business was experienced.

Importantly, in contrast to definitions used by development actors, identification as a youth was not necessarily bond to an age range: Stephen, a 34 years old dairy farmer, married with children, was not only proudly identifying himself as a youth, but even advocating for a political standing up of a new generation of leaders – in and outside of agricultural business:

We have peace so I think it’s also upon us, the youth, the new generation, to fight for our rights and to fight for transformation. We shouldn’t sit and think some people will come from abroad and do it for us. (...) [But] We can’t have a voice when we are scattered. We have to get an organized group that unites us and we start that voice. Once that voice is heard, even the president will change. Because we are the owners of this country tomorrow. These politicians are going away; they are getting old. So, we who are coming in... are we trained? are we capable of taking over? In whatever sector, leave alone agriculture, in other sectors so we need... the youth need to be organized and we have to organize ourselves first.  

Interestingly, Stephen refers to youths as the new generation of political-economic leaders, embracing a narrative of youth as the future of the nation: a social category not only of great prestige, but also of great responsibility. In fact, youth in Uganda means anything from a denigrating social status of someone who is not yet a man, to a political category of crucial importance to the future of the nation.

In fact, the specific ways in which youth engaged and gave meaning to their agricultural enterprises was as diverse as the heterogeneity of the subjects involved. Methorst et al (2017, p. 1) argue that:

Diversity or heterogeneity in farming is, as many studies have shown over the past 25 years, one of the main features of farm development. Heterogeneity in farming is likely to affect the pathways in farm development strategies towards more

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117 Extract from an interview at Stephen’s dairy cooperative in South-West Uganda, 1st June 2017.
sustainable food production systems. (...) In farm development, the farmer both reacts to and enacts the context, whilst adapting to changes and perceived threats and opportunities. The decisions made by the farmer will structure farming practices and the relation between the farm and its context.

Likewise, the heterogeneity of farmers has an influence as much on the decisions made for the development of the agribusiness as it does have an impact on the way in which development schemes unfold on the ground. I argue that heterogeneity impacts the outcome of development programmes as much as development programmes influence the identities and meanings in/of farming activities.

Below, I identify and describe the factors and qualities of the heterogeneity characterising the young Ugandans I have interviewed. These are valid for all the youths I have interviewed, although some factors played a stronger role for certain youths than for others. Systematising the heterogeneity by analysing its factors is a process that required a selection (and thereby a simplification) of all the possible features and influences of diversity. This analytical process is grounded on the qualitative coding of the interviews with youths, but also on the participant observations I have made while on the field.

Three main themes emerged from the analysis of the interviews and the observations I have made on the ground: territorial embeddedness, socio-cultural embeddedness and value chain embeddedness. These three dimensions had great influence in shaping the identity of the youths, and in determining their engagement in agribusiness. Later on, I will analyse the ways in which such themes also interact with the implementation of development programmes. Such themes are analysed here in light of the concept of embeddedness as it has been re-elaborated by Methorst et al (2017, p. 3): “embeddedness can best be viewed as a dynamic process that can vary and is subject to management choices. The dynamic process approach places the emphasis on the agency of an actor in making choices in relation to the context in which the actor operates”. Embeddedness as a concept referring to a dynamic process can best be used in its verb form embedding. Drawing from the work of Hess (2004), Methorst et al elaborate on three dimensions of the process of embedding: *societal* embedding, *network* embedding and *territorial* embedding:
The societal embedding is re-conceptualised as the socio-cultural relations of the farmer, asking how farmers view themselves as a farmer and with which values, norms, and ‘culture’ of farming a farmer identifies him or herself. The network embedding is re-conceptualised as the value chain relations, asking which value chain the farm is a part of or linked to, or which networks or spheres of influence affect farm development. The territorial embedding is re-conceptualised as the resource relations of the farm, asking about the origin of the resources for farm production.

The re-conceptualisation of the authors helps to frame the themes that emerged from the analysis of the data I collected among Ugandan youths. As I minor change to their conceptualization, I will refer more specifically to value-chain embedding instead of network embedding, and more precisely about socio-cultural embedding instead of social embedding. Interestingly in fact, from the analysis of my data, there emerged to be the same three dimensions of embedding characterizing youths’ identity and experience in agribusiness (in and out of development schemes). Moreover, the positioning of youths within a specific context is also object of arguments of van Dijk et al (2011, p. 5), where they argue that:

As social science in Africa has moved away from conceptualising youth only in terms of time – a passage through the generations – and has included the notion of space – not when one is youth but also where one is youth – the ‘situational’ exploration of youth has at least allowed for the possibility of looking at space and place as new modes of understanding. In addition to the concept of youth as emphasising the ‘situational’ it has also turned into the ‘locational’ dimensions.

Drawing from this theoretical framework, I have proceeded to systematizing the data I have collected into three dimensions – abstract categorizations of the various factors of diversity emerging from my data. These factors have, for the sake of systematic analysis of heterogeneity, been distributed among the dimensions of embedding. However, the observation of realities of youths and the interaction of all the diversity factors show that

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I am aware of the fact that there is a vivid debate within social geography regarding spatiality, territoriality and environmental embeddedness. It would be a promising line of research to explore these dimensions to a wider extent, yet it is not the focus of my research.
these dimensions interrelate and overlap and are not mutually exclusive. In the figure below, I illustrate the clustering of the diversity factors among the above-described dimensions of embedding.

5.4.1 CLUSTERING EMBEDDING DIMENSIONS AND HETEROGENEITY FACTORS

As it is exemplified in the figure above, and as transpires from the data I have collected, the multitude of factors contributing to the heterogeneity of the youths can be categorised in the three dimensions of embedding. However, the factors are in a dynamic relation with one another, and the intensity of their influence on youths’ identities and agribusiness experiences can vary.

5.4.2 TERRITORIAL EMBEDDING

Exploring the definition and identity of youths in agribusiness, and the meaning and experience of their farming activities throughout 4 different sub-regions in Uganda, I could appreciate how the contextual specificities of the environment had particular impact on the youths and their agribusiness. The ecosystem and agricultural traditions were very context-
specific, as much as the perception of belonging to the territory was articulated in a variety of
different ways and intensity. Moreover, the politics and history of the sub-regions were
Crucial in influencing youths’ perception and interaction with agribusiness stakeholders,
constraints, possibilities and ambitions.

This dimension was particularly determinant in differentiating the experiences of youths in
agribusiness, and their identity. In fact, due to the regional disparity in terms of development
of history, infrastructures (roads, schools, health facilities), climate and markets (see chapter
3) – this dimension was very influential also of the socio-cultural and value-chain dimensions.

5.4.2A NORTH – GULU SUB-REGION

The northern sub-region around Gulu is a dry and torrid one, with two main rain seasons and
two dry ones. I have conducted fieldwork in the districts of Gulu, Pader and Amuru. All the
informants I have interviewed belonged to the Acholi ethnic group.

With regards to agriculture, this sub-region mostly produces grains – the most resistant crop
to the extreme weather conditions of this ecosystem. However, agribusiness is an enterprise
that requires investment, and thus implies some sort of trust in the future. Because of the
prolonged insecurity of living in camps and under the constant threat of violence of civil war,
trust was certainly a shaky ground for the establishment of a business. The proximity to the
South-Sudanese border also had a strong influence in the marketing of local agricultural
produce and the trading business. In fact, particularly for people living close to the border in
Atiak, selling and trading produce over the border was quite a lucrative business.

I arrived in Gulu for the first time in the beginning of 2017, 30 years after the sanguinary civil
war was initiated by the Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) insurgency. The youths had lived
most of their lives in a territory affected by conflict, eradicated from ancestral land, living in
camps. Every single person I spoke to while on the field around Gulu had lost at least one
family member during the civil war, and most of them had returned to their own land or
village since 5 – 10 years, after having lived in camps or hiding in Gulu town for decades. As
all of the lives of youths I spoke to had been affected by conflict. They had also been affected
by conspicuous flows of humanitarian and later development aid. Local civil servants and
development actors often complained about the ‘entitlement mentality’ of farmers: participating in governmental and/or international development programmes was for the majority of my informants one of the livelihood strategies.

Historically, the northern region around Gulu has been supporting the opposition parties against the current NRM regime. This political opposition is rooted in ethnical rivalries that have been strengthened after the conflict. Acholi people often express feelings of discrimination, particularly by Baganda people from central region and Banyankole people from the South-West\textsuperscript{119}. Francis, a 26 years old student at the University in Gulu told me how he had spent part of his education period in Kampala, but that he would have never want to return to live there as he would feel discriminated by Baganda: “when I was there I would always get to pay higher prices...If I went to the market, I would pay two or three times more for a pair of trousers than any other Baganda. Life there is not good for us”.\textsuperscript{120} The other way around, some of the Baganda friends I had asked about the tense relationships with Acholi people, expressed that they could not trust them after the prolonged violence and massacres of the civil war: “They have been killing each other for so long, why did they do that? Also, they are probably traumatized... how can you trust them after what they have gone through?”.

A feeling of belonging to the territory was strongly bonding my informants around Gulu to their ancestral land, to the extent that they didn’t feel their land could be sold, yet land was often cause of fierce land-related conflicts. In March 2017, I asked Clementine, a lady who was old enough to have witnessed independence, but who was not sure of her age, about the possibility of buying and selling ancestral land: “it cannot happen – if someone would want to sell land, there would start a rebellion”.

\textsuperscript{119} I have recorded these feelings of discrimination in my fieldnotes from Gulu, on 31/03/2017, from informal conversations I had with 3 young Acholi who had lived in Kampala while studying, and had returned to Gulu because they felt unwelcomed and discriminated, and were unable to find a job in the capital. This issue of discrimination was also confirmed by my interpreter Cathy, an Acholi lady who had been living in Kampala for decades, and felt threatened and discriminated.

\textsuperscript{120} This conversation took place in an informal setting, at a café in Gulu, in April 2017.
In the eastern sub-region I conducted fieldwork in the district of Mbale, Sironko and Bududa, on the slopes of mount Elgon. The majority of the informants belonged to the Bagishu ethnic group, as this area is socio-culturally quite homogeneous. The agricultural business revolves around horticultural and coffee production, on the slopes of the mountain. Older famers who are landowners, however, dominate coffee production. Therefore I focused my research on the horticultural value chain.

I visited this region when the rainy season had just ended, and it was as green as it gets – with idyllic tropical landscapes and breath-taking views over the fertile plain, cultivated in regular, small patches and orchards. I had left the congested streets and hectic life of Kampala: Mbale felt like a sleepy far-west destination, as much as its people seemed discreet. I wanted to reach the core of the horticultural activities of the region, so I was directed to the wholesale market in Kamu.

I arrived in Kamu at 7 in the morning, after we had been climbing up mount Elgon on an unpaved, tortuous road that was made more for donkeys than for cars. I was looking forward to getting out of the car to give my stomach some fresh air, and there I found myself amid one of the most vivid markets I had visited. I was late! – I was told – “people get here to start trading when the sun is rising, around 4 or 5 am!”. Cabbage, tomatoes, onions and potatoes in great quantities, strictly divided along the road by produce: I was told there was a hierarchy of social status in the production and trading of the horticultural produce. Farmers would climb up the ranking from potatoes to cabbages, and would reach a higher status when they could afford buying a cow or even purchasing land for coffee production – which was seen as the most valuable (and profitable). Another important trait distinguishing the social status of farmers was the amount of time they had been working on the market: the newcomers were relegated to a position of service provision, while the veterans were trading

\[121\text{On 16/02/2017 I conducted a long interview with Charles, the old head of a family of coffee producers; his sons and daughters took part in the interview as well. They reported how young generations were not able to work in this value chain because of the long-term investment necessary for a coffee plantation, and the difficulty in accessing large plots of property land. This was confirmed also by IITA experts in this sector, during various conversations both in Kampala and during the trip to Mbale.}\]
their produce – the highest position was taken by those who owned a shop along the road. Interestingly, the socio-cultural norms ordering the market hierarchies and practices were strictly intertwined with business experience and embeddedness in the value chain networks.

The proximity to the Kenyan border had made the population acquainted to transnational trading as much as movement of people, both ways. In fact, there was a strong perception of the region beyond the boundary dividing the mountain in two, and several of my (male) informants had been in Kenya to attend some business, work for a period, or visit a relative.

Generally, the majority of my informants showed a rather strong feeling of belonging to their ancestral land. This emerged in several interviews with both males and female informants, but particularly during an incidental episode in which I found myself in the midst of a land conflict. I was directed to a remote area in Sironko district, where I was to meet a group of youths engaged in the governmental Youth Livelihood Programme. Accidentally, a group of angry men on the road mistook our car for that of the district authorities – which they were expecting to come and redraw the boundaries of the national park, to their loss. Thinking we were the cause of their loss, they directed us towards an ambush they had prepared. Luckily my translator had smelled the danger and decided to take a right, towards the other side of the valley: once on the other side we could see and hear how the car of the district authorities was ambuscaded. The day after, the local newspapers reported a small conflict between stout mountain people and the authorities – no one had lost their lives. At a safe distance from the ambush, I interviewed a group of young men that had observed the scene with us, explaining how the tensions with authorities had escalated in the past months. “This is our land, our ancestors are buried here – they cannot take it away from us. If they take it from us, it’s like taking the food from our mouths. (...) If they [the park people] enter peoples land it means fighting...we are ready to die with them!” told me Amidou during the interview. With this blunt statement, Amidou was reinforcing his arguments about the injustice of the land conflict – tensions that had been ongoing since 1993 when Museveni had distributed land, but then reclaimed it a decade after. Amidou, in his thirties, had sat with me, the translator and the driver and a bunch of other furious men discussing the politics of land ownership, analysing corruption at district level up until the injustices

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122 Extract of fieldnotes, trip to Sironko on 13/06/2018.
perpetrated at national level by politicians and police men. Land, belonging and agricultural production proved once more to be a heated political arena.

5.4.2 CENTRAL – KAMPALA SUB-REGION

I concentrated my fieldwork in this region on the urban district of Kampala and the neighbouring district of Wakiso. Although I had been traveling around the country, I was new to the environment: I had spent the first two months of my fieldwork in Kampala, as I was carrying out interviews with development actors. Yet the feverish and hectic life of Kampala started to get me only after I started interviewing its youths: the population of capital and its surroundings is indeed a very young. While the urban population keeps on growing as effect of the steady rural-urban migration, the number of people populating the city also varies incredibly from the night to the day: it is estimated\(^{123}\) that almost half of its population lives in the outskirts of the city, commuting daily. I encountered a substantial variety in the ethnical background of the people I have interviewed in the Central region, defining this territory as a melting pot of socio-cultural traditions. The issue of rural-urban migration concerns the local authorities as much as development actors, incentivizing the strategies that focus on employment creation in rural areas. Youths who moved to Kampala from elsewhere refer to their homeland as ‘the village’ – whatever the location and size of their hometown: Kampala is somehow perceived to be an island of ‘modernity’ and opportunities.

During an interview with two youths engaged in the Youth Livelihood Programme with a piggery project, in the outskirts of Kampala, I asked Henry what made him move from his village in the West to Kampala:

\begin{quote}
Me: And why did you decide to move in 2010? what was the decision that made you move here?
Henry: The decision?
Me: Yes, was it for the job, was it for love, was it for... you wanted to change?
Henry: it was just for the job. Because I had completed schooling, so I had to move around [to find employment]
\end{quote}

\(^{123}\) This data was reported by the Dutch Embassy on 13/11/2017; article accessed on 26/09/2018 on: https://www.government.nl/documents/media-articles/2017/11/13/tackling-traffic-jams-and-air-pollution-in-kampala
Dorah: You know for us we have a saying that if you want to die rich you move to Kampala
Me: I didn’t know
Henry: Money is raised from Kampala then you go back to the village with sugar and bread
Me: ok. Repeat it one more time?
Dorah: If you want to die rich, you have to come to Kampala. You have to leave the village.

I was aware that Kampala was perceived to be an environment offering more employment opportunities than the countryside, and indeed I found that such perceptions to be so explicitly rooted in common sense. Besides education, may be the major driver of rural-urban migration is indeed the belief that through living the hard city life, youths can achieve success – and with it, adulthood.

The major agricultural production around Kampala is horticulture (and floriculture), followed by animals rearing (mainly pigs and chicken). This involves different types of production – from the most technologically advanced greenhouses systems producing mainly for the export market and restaurants in the capital, to small-scale production for the main markets downtown. I have found that although the majority of my informants in the capital would not want to move anywhere else in the country, their attachment to the territory was mostly related to their perceived work opportunities than to the land itself. On the contrary, in the rural areas where I had conducted fieldwork, my informants were attached to their ancestral land and ideally would not want to move.

During the time I spent in Kampala I came to realise how citizens are very sophisticated about the national and local politics, keeping up to date with several newspapers and radio programmes daily. Politics is a major topic of conversation – mostly resulting in a frustrated laughter: in informal chats corruption is a given, discrimination in resources distribution is reinforcing ethnic divisions, while long-yearned change seems long to come. My young informants were well aware of these dynamics, yet a resigned, apathetic attitude permeated

extract from a group discussion with Dorah, Henry and Joyce (translator) in Kampala on 4/05/2017
our conversations about the possibility of political change. They were born under the current regime, and testified the widespread presence of intelligence reporting on non-compliant political activities: chit-chats and informal complaints don’t get anyone into troubles, but political action is repressed.

As I left the country in summer 2017, new hopes had risen about the election as member of parliament of Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, a business man and musician, known under the stage name of Bobi Wine. Representing a local constituency in Wakiso District, Bobi Wine was seen to bring the wind of change he had been singing about into the parliament: outspokenly supporting the opposition, during 2016 election he had released a song calling for change: “When the going gets tough, the tough must get going, especially when our leaders have become misleaders and mentors have become tormentors, when freedom of expression becomes a target of suppression opposition becomes our position.” 125

The song was banned, but he had already became a role model for the youths, and his public figure had been recognized by foreign and Ugandan institutions for being a positive example to the next generations. In an interview for the local newspaper ‘Daily Monitor’, he told about his farm and stressed the importance of producing one’s own food, and encouraged Ugandan youths to do the same: “Your parents educated you with money from the farms. Why can’t you go back and do some farming? That’s where real money is, not the air-conditioned offices and sports betting halls. But still, we also have to blame the government for neglecting the youth”. 126

After leading heated protests against the unpopular social media tax127 in summer 2018, Bobi Wine was again at the centre of international attention in August and September 2018. His life was attempted by the military forces in Arua after a political rally, when his driver was

125 The full original video of the song from 2016 can be found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBiEhk_CVjw While another version of the video was released later, reporting news on political repression of journalists and openly supporting the opposition leader, Kizza Besigye.
127 This news was reported on national and international level. BBC article from 11/07/2018 accessed on 26/09/2018: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627
mistakenly shot dead. He was arrested and tortured in prison\textsuperscript{128} and only weeks later was allowed to fly to the USA for specialised medical treatments. During those heated weeks, protests were brutally repressed in Kampala, as Bobi Wine’s supporters called for political change. As the socio-political situation in Kampala remains tense, youths have hopes that Bobi Wine will be able to succeed to Museveni.

\section*{5.4.2D SOUTH-WEST – MBARARA SUB-REGION}

I conducted fieldwork in the districts of Mbarara, Kiruhura, Sheema, Ntungamo and Bushenyi. This sub-region is known in Uganda as ‘the land of milk and honey’. In fact, it is a particularly fertile and green land, where there are strong agricultural traditions, mainly dairy farming, coffee and matooke. However, the majority of the young population engaged in agricultural business is involved in horticulture and animal rearing (pigs and goats), or in dairy cooperatives. While the population is generally known to belong to the Ankole ethnic group, there are important differences between Bahima and Bairu peoples\textsuperscript{129}.

In fact, the most striking example of ethnic tensions and embeddedness of agricultural practices in ethnic-bond cultures and traditions was located in the south-western sub-region, between Bahima and Bairu. My informants reported different and contrasting historical and cultural justifications of the differences and tensions between the two ethnic groups. In an interview with the community leader of the village in Sheema where I was staying,\textsuperscript{1} I was given the perspective of the Bairu:

\begin{quote}
Janet: In the ‘40s and ‘50s this tribe of Bahima, the cattle keepers, did not like the crop farmers, the Bairu
Me: But is there a relation between the Bahima or the Bairu and the Bahutu and the Batutsi?
Janet: History says so, that the Bahima and the Batutsi originated from Somalia
Me: so the Bahima and the Batutsi...
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{129} For a detailed historical and social analysis of this ethnic question, see the methods chapter.
Janet: ...Are the same except that one group went to Rwanda and the other group went to Ankole but they all came from Somalia. And then the Bairu came from Congo (...)

Me: But while their [Bahima and Bairu] look is different, their language is the same!

Janet: They say we are all Bantu, but you speak the language, these Batutsi and Bahima speak the language where they go. Where they immigrated to, eh, but they, when you see their looks, is different.

(...)

Me: That’s something that is confusing for me because I thought I come to west region, it’s all Banyankole

Janet: yeah, we are Banyankole but we have different cultures

(...)

Me: so is the difference in culture related to the different habits of agriculturalists and pastoralists?

Janet: I think different habits. Because you say the Bahima were not eating solid food they used to depend on milk (...) they don’t like eating solid food

(...)

Me: so they were not interested in cultivating?

Janet: yeah, but these days they are trying to cultivate. Now they have banana plantations but they themselves can’t dig. So the Bairu help them to cultivate. A Muhima woman will never cultivate...

Another important consideration to be made about the territorial identity of this country regards its politics: Museveni, who is originally from this area is perceived to favour this sub-region.\textsuperscript{130} The infrastructures in this area are noticeably (though relatively) more developed than the rest of the country, with the exception of Kampala. Ugandans from the rest of the country assume people from the south-west are better off, but my informants in Kiruhura complained that it is not the case:

Me: So you have a good road but no electricity?

\textsuperscript{130} More specifically, Museveni is from Kiruhura district, which is mainly inhabited by Bahima people.
Isaac: Electricity is powered, it’s going to the president’s place but hasn’t been channelled here yet.

Me: But if he’s the president, why doesn’t he provide for his people?

Isaac: That is always in people’s minds, but it depends what he can do... he could provide, but he doesn’t. It doesn’t work this way

(...)

Alice: You think Museveni is coming from Kiruhura, so every Kiruhura people [Bahima] are rich. Museveni could supply money...but we have never seen Museveni with our eyes. 131

Interestingly, the development programmes implemented in this sub-region were sensibly less than in other parts of Uganda: in the North of the country the highest number of development activities is recorded and in the South West the lowest. However, I have found that my informants could rely on a strong support network constituted by members of their extended family. More than in other regions, family constituted a springboard for youths’ agribusiness, possibly because family enterprises were also in a better economic position to offer start-up help.

5.4.3 SOCIO-CULTURAL EMBEDDING

Besides the dimensions of territorial and socio-cultural embedding is the factor of values and norms in agricultural practices: this factor strongly emerged across all the interviews I carried out, although it indirectly arose from the analysis of the narratives and observation of the agribusiness practices. In fact, youths seemed to give very disparate meanings to their agricultural activities. Engagement in dairy farming in the South-west was a crucial feature of acquiring a respectable social status for the bahima ethnic group; in the East, men would need to obtain economic independence through their business to even being considered

131 extract from a group discussion with three members (two young men and one older lady in the management position) of a dairy cooperative in Kiruhura, on 30/05/2017.
men and bagishu (see below); for some youths, particularly in the North, the agricultural activities are strictly bond to the well-being of their extended family, and thus is not felt as an individual enterprise.

In fact, the experience of youths in agribusiness was influenced by the belonging to one or another **ethnic group.** The clearest example comes from the south-west of the country, where there was a strong identification of the ethnic group with the type of agricultural value chain. Bahima – historically the same ethnic group as the Tutsi of Rwanda, have a particular bond with the dairy sector, while the Bairu – historically belonging to the ethnic group of the Hutu of Rwanda, are more inclined to agricultural activities, mostly matooke, coffee and horticultural production. While Bairu have long been owners of land, Bahima had been nomadic until the late ‘80s, when president Museveni allocated land and enforced a schooling policy. During a group discussion132 in Kiruhura, young dairy farmers, all Bahima, explained to me:

Peter: “It’s like this: we are all Banyankole but we have different clans...”
Isaacs: “Banyankole is a tribe, then Bahima are cattle keepers”
Alice: “then the Bairu are farmers”
Isaacs: “Only after Bahima started going to school [after they settled, in the late ‘80s], they learned from each other, so the Bahima can also grow crops, Bairu can have cattle”.

Interestingly, the development programmes in this region reflected the propensity of such deeply rooted agricultural cultures.

As with regards to ethnic identity and adulthood, there is a strong **gender component** – which clearly emerged in the eastern region. Properly becoming a mugishu man is quite a tricky business: in fact, ethnic belonging is not a given identity that comes with birth but rather a status that has to be earned and socially recognised. There is, properly speaking, no category of youths but only a passage from childhood to adulthood. A young mugishu man is not properly recognized as retaining the ethnic ‘mugishu’ identity until he’s considered

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132 extract from a group discussion with three members (two young men and one older lady in the management position) of a dairy cooperative in Kiruhura, on 30/05/2017.
mature enough to be circumcised – among others factors of ‘maturity’ considered, having achieved economic independence. This usually happens around the twenties, in a majestic public ceremony that lasts three days and involves the whole community. During this rite of passage young men obtain both the adulthood status and their manhood status. On the contrary, mugishu women do not need to undergo any rite of passage, as their adulthood is obtained with marriage and pregnancy – thereby entirely detached from their maturity or economic status.

Discrimination of women, especially in land ownership and agribusiness entrepreneurship, is a painfully problematic issue throughout the country. In fact, it is often the case that women are held in a subordinated position in household relations, by means of distribution of resources and responsibilities that keep women in a position of dependence. Because the attainment of adulthood (and thereby, manhood) for young men is closely linked to their economic status, the economic status of women in the family is perceived as a threat: women should not be the bread winners of the household, else the social status of men is at risk.

While the development schemes I have followed up on were sensitive to gender equity in the implementation of their programmes, this often didn’t go beyond the inclusion of women’s quota in the number of participants. The majority of women I interviewed who were involved in development schemes reported that they had to hand in their salary to their husbands, many testified that some of their colleagues had to stop working because their husbands were beating them. The majority of the successful women agriprenuers I encountered lived in Kampala and were either single or divorced. Only a few were able to retain a balance in their marriage.

Another feature complicating the gender relations is polygyny – which was more widespread in the regions I visited out of Kampala. Just as a general precaution I had been holding on the white lie that I was married, which in most cases did not prevent my informants to encourage me to marry again with one of their relatives. In such cases, I would ask whether it was also allowed for women to have multiple husbands – to which they would reply that in fact it is only allowed for men to marry multiple times: besides jealousy, this socio-cultural norm had
to do with the responsibilities attached to manhood, who would have to provide for the wives:

Joyce [translator]: what about your country, is there jealousy or why do you only marry once?
Me: yeah. We don’t have many wives and many husbands, we only have one - one.
Peter: one, one? Due to lack of land? or is it a government policy? What is it?
Me: it’s a cultural thing. Yeah, what about you, are you planning to marry again?
Peter: yes, if I have enough resources
Me: if you have, you have to have a what?
Peter: if you have enough resources like money, or cows, or assets you can marry, there is no problem.
(...)  
Me: wow. What is the maximum [number of wives] that you ever heard of?
Isaac: there is no maximum

Gender norms regulating relations and the possibility to marry multiple times is related to the fact that men are the perceived bread winners of the household, and therefore their capacity to provide for more than one wife is related to their socio-economic status.

It is important to consider that within the broad age category of youth that I have worked with – between 18 and 35 – there was a great diversity between the younger and the older ones. In fact, the younger ones were coming out of school and had little experience in agribusiness compared to the older youths. Needless to say, perhaps the divergence in the levels of education and experience which are necessarily bond to age. While some of the older youths were already considered by their family and peers as adults, others were still in the uncertain position of youths – struggling to exit it by means of socio-economic status. Therefore, their aspirations were different, as much as their accessibility to financial assets is more likely for older youths (see Figure 25).
Besides the access to financial services, the younger youths would have a harder time accessing land. In fact, older youths were more likely to have inherited land from their family, either after their father’s passing, or in correspondence with marriage. As with the passing on of ancestral land to (male) youths, the factor of age would intersect with that of the family’s socio-economic status.

In fact, another important factor emerging from the interviews with youths throughout the country is the family background: while the ethnicity may affect the broader socio-cultural environment, the family has proved to have a strong impact not only in the definition of youth identity and status, but also for youths’ engagement and success in agribusiness. The most direct impact of the family background is that of the socio-economic class, offering youths a more or less advantaged start of their career.

5.4.4 VALUE CHAIN EMBEDDING

I have approached the sampling of my informants in a rather loose way, by adopting the definitions and targeting strategies of the development programmes which implementation I have evaluated. In fact, the youths (18-35) were mostly defined as ‘agripreneurs’ for the mere commercial attitude they held towards their agribusiness: anyone who was doing agribusiness for the purpose of earning an income out of it – and not solely as subsistence strategy – was considered by most development agencies an agripreneur. However, throughout the four sub-regions where I have conducted fieldwork I have encountered the most diverse attitudes towards agribusiness, among the same youths aiming at earning a living out of agriculture. As part of my interview guidelines, I ask each interviewee their own definition of their identity as farmers or agripreneurs. While in the East sub-region, Cathy – a single mother in her thirties, engaged in a private-sector driven programme – explained to me that there is a substantial difference between farmers and agribusiness-men or women:

Cathy: Yeah doing something...now like growing pumpkins you have to have that passion and say I love these pumpkins, I have to every evening you go there and check on them, you have that love for the for something so that it also, because if you don’t have love for it [you won’t manage]

Me: Yeah, but then a business man or woman does not have love for what they grow?

Cathy: They just grow it for money.

In fact, for the majority of my respondents, the main criteria for distinguishing farmers from agripreneurs was whether they were farming for subsistence (possibly also including earning a little income from cash crops) or as a business activity that requires dedication to the management of a development plan and accountancy. Moreover, those youths who consider themselves as agripreneurs would not necessarily be involved in the production section of the value chain, and would aim at pursuing their career within agribusiness, while
others would simply use the opportunities agribusiness offers to step out of agriculture into another sector (a widespread aspiration regarded the tertiary sector\textsuperscript{134}).

Youths who were located in proximity to the market were mostly more deeply embedded in the value chain network: they had a wider network of people involved in different activities along the value chain, thereby being exposed to more updated knowledge about technologies, prices and opportunities. In fact, while this was particularly evident in the comparison between youths in and away from Kampala, also in rural contexts the youths that were living closer to the market had stronger connections and positions in their agribusiness relations along the value chain. Depending on the value chain, youths were able to make higher profits out of their business in rural or urban markets – or in the trading of products: what mattered was their ability to play with the latest marketing information, but also activating the right connections to make the best of business opportunities. On the contrary those who were living in more remote areas and were not very embedded in the value chain relations of their crop, were to rely on second-hand information, on middle men and ended up profiting less than their colleagues close to the market. Interestingly, this factor seemed to play an even stronger role than whether or not the youths were engaged in a development scheme.

Particularly influencing youths’ identity and aspirations in agribusiness was their residence in rural or urban contexts. As Burgess and Burton argue:

\begin{quote}
What is perhaps more obvious now is that, as young people in Africa migrated in greater numbers to towns and cities, their immersion in a new world of urban tastes, sounds, and stimuli, and new encounters with diverse peoples and conditions led to relative anonymity and often a process of personal reinvention and the embrace of new identities. (2010, p. 1)
\end{quote}

While the author make a general statement about African youths, this was certainly accurate for the youths I encounter in and away from Kampala. Being resident in the capital, but also in bigger urban centres like Mbarara, Gulu or Mbale required my informants to attain a

\textsuperscript{134} There is a higher social status associated with jobs that do not require physical efforts. As it was reported by several of my informants, a common ambition of farmers was to be able to open a shop – as, the case of Carlos and Scovia, whom I interviewed in Parabongo (Gulu) on 30/03/2017.
different attitude than they would hold in the village where they were coming from. The urban lifestyle would push youths towards other priorities and status symbols – but also, as Sommers (2015) argued, gave youths an escape from the community pressures for the attainment of adulthood. This was particularly true for women among the youths, who would have a higher chance of pursuing an independent career outside of their household duties.

5.5 YOUTH IN DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION

After having observed the way in which youths went about their agribusiness activities, in and out of development schemes – I came to realise that the reality in which they were embedded was more complex and dynamic than I had expected as I approached the field. As I argued in the paragraphs above, there emerged to be the three major dimensions in which youths were embedded, each containing a number of factors of heterogeneity. Considering the various degrees to which each of the factors of heterogeneity were playing a role in shaping youths’ agribusiness experiences, it becomes evident that youths were embedded in a complex network of relations. The complexity and multiplicity of relations in which youths were embedded problematizes the perspective that opposes the social group of youth to that of development practitioners.

Scholars (Escobar, 2012) (Murray Li, 2007) (Scott J. , 1998) (Rottenburg, 2009) analysing development processes, on the contrary, often portray a dualistic opposition of development practitioners and the groups of their programmes. In the following chapter, I further problematize this framework of analysis. On the contrary, from my observations in the field I observed how youths were embedded in an intricate web of relations with each other and with various development and social actors. In Table 18, I listed the 18 types of social actors with whom youths were to some extent related, directly or indirectly, while involved in development schemes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Explanation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Youths</td>
<td>Within the broad age range comprising both males and females between 18 and 35; working as individuals, in groups or cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Multilateral</td>
<td>Donors engaged in supporting youths’ engagement in agribusiness were, in my research, the African Development Bank and FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bilateral</td>
<td>Donors engaged in supporting youths’ engagement in agribusiness were, in my research, USAID and the Dutch Embassy – but I am aware that other embassies were also involved in related programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ugandan Government</td>
<td>Within the frame of this research, it comprised mainly the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Animal Industries. At a broader level, the central Ugandan government was responsible for the elaboration of national youths and agribusiness strategies which would server as guidelines for international donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Local Government</td>
<td>District authorities, local councils, sub-country and parish authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Implementers</td>
<td>Extension providers – mostly at the level of district authorities – but also contracted development agencies (NGOs): in this case I refer to the specific individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. NGO's</td>
<td>Within my research, I have interacted with a number of actors working for the following NGO’s which were implementing bilateral development programmes (mainly for the Dutch embassy): ICCO, AVSI, ZOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Research</td>
<td>Next to institutes carrying out research for development (for example, IITA), the Makerere University was playing an important role in advising the ministries in the elaboration of development policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Media</td>
<td>In Uganda the media which are reaching out to most people were the newspapers The New Vision and the Daily Monitor, together with radio programmes. All of these played a role in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mainstreaming youths engagement in agribusiness: for example the New Vision had a competition programme for the best farmer, funded by the Dutch Embassy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Associations</th>
<th>(Grassroot) farmers’ associations, unions, both governmental and non-governmental.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Private sector</td>
<td>Small, medium or large size private enterprises or companies offering input or output markets to the youths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Banks</td>
<td>Financial institutions offering loans to individuals or groups of youths within or out of development programmes. I hereby also refer to two banks, Mastercard Foundation and Triodos (through Brac foundation), who were implementing their own development programmes for youths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Education</td>
<td>Primary or secondary schools, incubation centres, courses and degrees which were attended by my young informants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Service providers</td>
<td>These include middle men, transport providers, owners of machineries (tractors etc.) providing seasonal services, input (chemicals etc.) retailers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Market</td>
<td>The market itself is, besides a physical place, a space for social interaction and economic transactions: the people rotating around it contribute to shaping, with their relations and interaction, the dynamic environment that constitutes the testing ground of youths’ agribusiness, and often times the place where they build their professional figure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Peers</td>
<td>Other youths, also out of agribusiness, who contributing in consolidating socio-cultural values and norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Family</td>
<td>By family I refer to the broad extended family comprising various generations running down the patrilineal kin structures. Oftentimes the youths I interacted with had been raised by other relatives than their parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Community leaders</td>
<td>These key figures – usually the elders in the community – are important in giving an imprint to the socio-cultural identity of youths, but also shaping their ambitions in and out of agribusiness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The extent to which these relations were direct, intense, or determinant for youths’ engagement in agribusiness varied considerably in relation to the three dimensions analysed above. For instance, community leaders and family background had a stronger impact in rural areas, while in urban contexts the proximity to the market and exposure to media and market actors was more determinant. However, it was not the core purpose of my research and analysis to map the nature of the relations between youths and social actors in agribusiness development, nonetheless I was struck by the messiness of it all. In the figure below (Figure 26) I outline the messiness and intricacy of the relations, showing how some actors were directly related among each other and only indirectly to the youths (for instance, Ugandan government and multilateral donors).

![Diagram of social actors](image)

**FIGURE 26. MAPPING OF THE NETWORK OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN SHAPING YOUTHS’ IDENTITY AND AGRIBUSINESS**

The various social, political and economic factors contributing to shape youths’ agribusiness experience were heavily affecting both their identity as youths as their approach and aspirations in agribusiness. The success of their agribusiness depended on institutional
development actors as much as on many other actors, institutions and organisations. Observing the way in which these actors were contributing to shape youths’ reality, I realised the framework with which I had approached the fieldwork was not exhaustive. In line with the theoretical framework (see chapter 2) I had built up, I had planned to study the relation between youths on the one side and development actors on the other, their respective narratives, theories of change and experiences. However, this dualistic framing of the development reality did not prove to be accurately corresponding to the phenomenology of development in action on the ground. Where by development in action I refer to the actual practices and relations involved in the implementation of development schemes, with the above mapping (figure 5.3) also refer to the broad web of relations the youths are embedded in order to be able to carry out their agribusiness activities.

5.6 CONCLUSION

I set up the fieldwork research throughout the country with the ambition of understanding who were the youths engaged in development programmes, and how their experience in agribusiness shaped up in their respective socio-cultural, political, economic and ecologic environments. In fact, from the literature review and pilot field trips I had carried out, I observed an important heterogeneity characterising the social category of youths – as in Uganda the majority of the population is ‘young’. As Methorst et al (2017, p. 1) argued:

Diversity cannot be explained in full by ‘external’ structural factors such as ‘markets’, ‘technology’, or ‘nature’ [1,5,6]. Farmers make decisions about the everyday management of their farm as well as strategic decisions about farm development. The practices resulting from these strategic decisions in turn affect the perceived opportunities and new strategic decisions. In this iterative process of strategic decision-making in farm development, the farmer tries to anticipate and balance the effect of developments in the context of the farm with the needs and aims of the family farm.

In line with the authors, I have encountered three main dimensions clustering the heterogeneity of the Ugandan youths: my informants were embedded in territory,
sociocultural and value chain environments. Within these dimensions, I identified 18 factors contributing to the heterogeneity of my informants. The interaction of these factors contributed in shaping the different traits making youths the diverse social category they constitute. At the same time, such dimensions and heterogeneity factors were interacting with each other in a dynamic way – making the agribusiness experience of youths an ever-evolving process that point out to the vibrant reality of their identity and business activities.

Through such analysis I could identify the social and institutional actors that embody the processual and dynamic agribusiness reality in which youths are embedded, and I mapped such relations in Figure 26.
CHAPTER 6

MIND THE GAP

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AND WITHIN POLICIES AND PRACTICES

INDEX

- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Methods
- 6.3 Development practitioners and youths: confronting narratives
- 6.4 Implementation
  - Social impact
  - Perceptions of development programmes
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- 6.6 Politics in contention
- 6.7 Adaptation
- 6.8 Negotiation
- 6.9 ‘Empower Youth’
- 6.10 Conclusion: explaining the gap
6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters have investigated the narratives of two groups of development actors: development practitioners and youths. I explored the ways in which development practitioners and recipients constructed their discourse around youth in agribusiness. On the one hand, development practitioners constructed a variegated development discourse resulting in different theories of change, and thus developing a diverse of development approaches. On the other hand, given a variety of heterogeneity factors, young farmers constructed a diverse range of narratives and definitions of youth and agribusiness. While both youths and development practitioners were aiming to engage youth in agribusiness, their narratives indicated they had different understandings of what youth and agribusiness actually mean, as well as what youths’ needs actually are. How this mismatch affects development outcomes is the first object of study of this chapter.

The second objective is to analyse the actual implementation of development programmes for youths in agribusiness in Uganda. Through an examination of the youths’ and practitioners’ perceptions of the programmes practices, I come to an observation of how ‘youth’ is constructed as a knowledge category and ‘driving metaphor’ for development and political contention.

The academic debate in development studies has focused its attention on different sets of issues in development, its politics and power relations, effectiveness, ideology and mandates. These studies have operated with analytical categories borrowed from a Foucauldian study of power: on the one hand the development practitioners with their dominant discourse – produced and reproduced (and sometimes contested) through the agency of the social actors working in the ‘development industry’, and on the other the development recipients with their own narratives and agency – more often than not contesting the dominant development discourse enforced on them. My own research has been operationalized within these analytical categories: where the first chapter explores the production and reproduction of the development practitioners’ discourse around youth in agribusiness, the second analyses the variety of narratives and experiences of youths themselves – highlighting their heterogeneity. With this chapter I bring together the study of top and bottom dimensions of this development trend in the analysis of development practices on the ground – to
understand how the mismatch affects the development outcomes. Through the analysis of such outcomes, in the very process of programmes implementation, I observe the tensions between perceptions, incentives and political agendas. In this way, I provide insights on the unfolding, flaws and strengths of the recent development trend on youth in agribusiness in Uganda.

This chapter is divided in nine sections, before coming to a conclusion. I will start by giving an outline of the research methods (section 6.2) I have used, describing the phases of the ethnographic research, between 2017 and 2018, that constitute the empirical basis for the analysis for this chapter. With section 6.3, I start the analysis with a comparative analysis elaborated in the previous empirical chapter: I confront the narratives and practices of development practitioners and youths, around their perceptions of youth, agribusiness and development programmes. In this section, I also briefly compare the development approaches of public-sector programmes versus private-sector driven ones, as intended by the development practitioners and perceived by the youths. In the section 6.4 I make an in-depth analysis of the implementation of the programmes. I analyse the social impact of the programmes, exploring the perceptions of the programmes from the point of view of both youths, their main constraints. As part of this section, I also examine the heterogeneous outcomes of the development programmes which implementation I have observed on the ground. In section 6.5, I discuss how the perceptions of the programmes reveal that they contribute to ‘rendering technical’ the needs of youths, who are reduced to a social category that responds to the agendas of development organisations. I continue on this line of analysis in the sixth section, where I analyse the political agenda behind some of the development programmes, and the instrumentality of the social category of youth, despite being a very broad and vague category due to its heterogeneity. In section 6.7, I describe the ways in which some of the programmes I have observed manage to adapt to the heterogeneity of the needs and capacities of youths. In the eight section I describe the ways in which various development practitioners, who have different stakes and incentives in the administration and implementation of the programmes, negotiate among each other – often changing (and frustrating) the initial outset of the programmes. In section 6.9, I analyse the observation of the case of a development project for youth in agribusiness, which has been frustrated by strenuous negotiations and corruption of the parties involved. In the last section, I draw the
conclusions of the analysis of narratives of the various development actors involved, the practices of implementation and their perceptions.

6.2 METHODS

In this chapter, I analyse ethnographic data that I collected during extensive fieldwork across Uganda in 2017, as well as during a follow-up fieldtrip to Kampala that I carried out during the month of May 2018. The motives for returning to the field were two-fold. On the one hand, returning to the field offered the opportunity to validate my conclusions on the development agencies’ theories of change and approaches, during interviews and feedback sessions. On the other, it offered me the opportunity to investigate the reasons why there was a mismatch between the narratives of development practitioners and recipients.

During the first phase, I focused mainly on identifying the two narratives. The purpose of this chapter, and my subsequent fieldwork was to analyse and explain the mismatch between different sets of development narratives and practices – as exemplified in the figure below (Figure 27). By development practices, I mean the actual activities that involve development actors – both at the top and bottom – as a development programme unfolds from design to implementation and outcome: these include formal and informal meetings, evaluations, extension services, consultations and actual agronomic and business activities within the framework of the programme or project. This definition is functional to my analysis: in addition to an analysis of the mismatch between development practitioners’ narratives and practices and those on the ground, I also explore gap between development programmes’ narrative elaboration and their implementation in practice.
Moreover, in this chapter I analyse the implementation of the development programmes supporting youths in agribusiness through the examination of the participant observations on the ground (which I carried out in 2017). During multiple fieldtrips throughout the country, I had the opportunity of observing how development practitioners implemented the programmes, how they interacted with youths, and how youths perceived these practices.

The data for the analysis of adaptation and negotiations include interviews with development practitioners and youths I had previously met during extensive fieldwork, in addition to observations of meetings and high-level negotiations among development practitioners. I carried out such observations in a partially new setting, among two groups of practitioners: one in the process of setting up a pilot project for youth engagement in agribusiness, and one agribusiness development platform for public-private partnership (PPP).

6.3 DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS AND YOUTHS: CONFRONTING NARRATIVES

The previous chapters offered an in-depth analysis of the way in which development practitioners and youths understand and perceive the programmes engaging youths in
agribusiness. In this section, I summarise the results from previous chapters, by confronting their narratives (Table 19). The summarised perspectives in the table below are based on the ethnographic data collected during fieldwork in 2017.

### 6.3.1 NARRATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Development practitioners</th>
<th>Youths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectations from development programmes</strong></td>
<td>- Create the enabling environment for youths’ engagement in agribusiness</td>
<td>- Achieve gainful employment in agribusiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who are the youths?</strong></td>
<td>- Age bracket ranging 15- or 18- to -30 or -35, male and female.</td>
<td>- Youth is primarily a socio-cultural category between childhood and adulthood, not necessarily and contextually bond to an age bracket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social category constituting the target of development programmes: youths are seen as both the bearers of the problem of unemployment as they are the agents of change, through agribusiness.</td>
<td>- Meanings and belonging to this category are radically different for males and females.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Youths are different throughout the country, but they are mostly targeted with homogeneous programmes.</td>
<td>- There are a number of heterogeneity factors defining youth in relation to their agribusiness activities, and these are related to three dimensions of embedding: socio-cultural, territorial and value-chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What are the youths’ problems, preventing them from engagement in agribusiness?</strong></td>
<td>- Youths are unemployed and don’t have the entrepreneurial mindset and assets to start their own agribusiness.</td>
<td>- Youths struggle to earn rewarding income from agricultural activities because of technical, economic and political constraints – which vary depending on the three dimensions of embedding: quality agricultural inputs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is agribusiness?</strong></td>
<td>- Agribusiness is not for subsistence but for self-</td>
<td>- Agribusiness is not agriculture for subsistence but for income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
employment, with the supposed trickle-down effect of generating employment. It is thus radically different from subsistence agriculture.

- Agribusiness is modern agriculture, which can contribute to making Uganda a middle-income country.

- Agribusiness is perceived as the way out from the youth category into adulthood.

What is needed to improve agribusiness?

- Capacity building: including training, entrepreneurship skills development, extension services, accountancy and management

- Access to financial services and land

- Input and output markets: quality inputs (chemicals, machineries), and ready markets for their produce or value addition

- Access to financial services

| What is needed to improve agribusiness? | - Capacity building: including training, entrepreneurship skills development, extension services, accountancy and management | - Input and output markets: quality inputs (chemicals, machineries), and ready markets for their produce or value addition | - Access to financial services |

TABLE 19. COMPARING NARRATIVES OF YOUTHS AND DEV. PRACTITIONERS

6.4 IMPLEMENTATION

Besides the above-mentioned disparities in narratives, I have also observed tensions in the implementation phase. Throughout the multi-sited fieldwork, I have observed various stages of implementation of development programmes both in the public as in the private-sector driven approaches. For the majority of the field visits, I moved independently (with driver and interpreter), I was also able to conduct some participant observations of field visits with development practitioners. Visiting agribusiness enterprises, mostly in occasion of monitoring and evaluation visits, was particularly interesting to observe the interaction between development practitioners and youths. These observations revealed different ranges of discrepancy between their perceptions of the programmes and what they were intended to deliver. I have encountered heterogeneity also in the success and limits of the programmes, not only because of their efficiency, but also because each had a different working definition of success. In this section, I examine the complex and diverse dynamics I have observed in the phase of implementation, exploring the impact of the programmes on the local socio-
economic realities, interaction between the actors, their perceptions of the programmes, and the success and limits of the programmes.

The analysis of the implementation phase is particularly important, after having examined the narratives, for two reasons: on the one hand the functionalistic assumption that policy discourse simply needs to be ‘translated’ into practice appears to be more complex and problematic when paying due attention to the relations and practices on the ground. On the other hand, implementation is as crucial as production of narratives for the construction of a development discourse through practices. As Mosse (2004, p. 640) observed:

Despite the enormous energy devoted to generating the right policy models, however, there is surprisingly little attention paid to the relationship between these models and the practices and events that they are expected to generate or legitimize in particular contexts. (...) At best, the relationship between policy and practice is understood in terms of an unintended ‘gap’ between theory and practice, to be reduced by better policy more effectively implemented.

The ‘unintended gap’ between policies and their outcomes are the object of study of Mosse, who analyses the implementation of a British farming project in India in which he participated as development practitioner. His analysis (2004, p. 653) lead him to conclude that however ‘good’ the policies guiding the project, they could not be implemented due to the organisation’s interests to remain in the development business: “It was increasingly clear that project practices were shaped less and less by the formal goals (of policy/design) and more and more by the organization’s ‘system goals’ that revolved around the preservation of rules and administrative order”. Interestingly, my very first participant observation of an agribusiness programme implementation quickly drew me to the same conclusion.

The first field trip I have conducted out of Kampala was to Gulu, as I joined a monitoring and evaluation trip of a large bilateral agency that asked to remain anonymous. I was quite excited: I was going to the ‘real field’ – the agricultural one. I was going to observe the unfolding of a strongly private sector-driven and oriented scheme that linked medium and large scale agribusiness to groups of farmers. These farmers, who development practitioners from the agency called ‘agripreneurs’, would be working in out-grower schemes (contract farming) for the agribusiness companies. I went along with a Chief of Party of the
programme, who illustrated his strategy: “We plan a quick-in and quick-out: we are not going to be there forever, and these guys need to be doing their business without us. We are just facilitating”\textsuperscript{135}. In his narrative, the facilitation of market linkages between different parties was bluntly expressed as “they don’t see the market opportunities”. In fact, much of the activities the development agency was implementing on the ground were oriented to the education of farmers to become agripreneurs, and “change their mindset”. In fact, the role of development practitioners I observed in-action was that of mentoring and training.

Besides the Chief of Party, I was traveling with two communications officers and one implementer based in Gulu. I was excited to see how they would operate, observe the way they talked about the programme and agripreneurs, and finally find out who these agripreneurs were according to them. However, the first participant observation as we arrived at the local offices had been rather shocking: at the debriefing meeting with the rest of the team, the Chief of Party explained to the communication specialists:

\begin{quote}
we are here to collect success stories, high level stories with pictures…They have to be impact-stories, we have to convince the current administration keep funding this project, otherwise we can all go home! \textbf{Guys, we are here to make business! We make money out of this, it’s our job.} We need to get new contracts for development projects! We’re making money out of this by helping others making business… so let’s collect our success stories and go back to Kampala\textsuperscript{136}.
\end{quote}

This statement was an explicit positioning of the role the development practitioners would be playing on the ground: working for themselves to remain in the business of the Ugandan development industry, while at the same time facilitating agribusiness for young farmers. The implementation of the programme, and it monitoring and evaluation, were instrumental for the preservation of the development agency position as professional actors in the field of agribusiness development. This finding may not be surprising nor revealing of the inherent system flaws of the ‘development industry’, but highlights how the implementation phase as an object of study is more than the measurement of the ‘gap between policies and practices’.

\textsuperscript{135} Extract from an informal conversation in the car, on the way from Kampala to Gulu, on 7/02/2017.
\textsuperscript{136} Extract from an observation I made in the offices of the organization, in Gulu, on 7/02/2017 – which I noted in my fieldnotes. Emphasis added by author.
In line with Mosse (2004, p. 655), it seems that “Policy may not generate events, but it helps stabilize the interpretation of events”.

The Chief of Party was determined to demonstrate the social impact of the programme, in terms of creation of agribusiness opportunities for youths in Gulu as a necessary justification for the programme’s existence. Particularly during times of budget cuts, the role of communication officers in this endeavour was crucial in the assessment of the programme’s impact. As in the case of Mosse’s DIFID project in India (2004, p. 659), “The project never did clarify the instrumentality of its model, instead it focused on demonstrating impact. Significantly, the series of detailed impact assessment studies that followed (and in which I was involved) demonstrated that the project was perceived by villagers as having a significant positive economic and social impact”.

6.4.1 SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMMES

Besides the development organisations’ question of the economic improvement, development programmes have a variety of different social impacts on the individuals and communities involved in the schemes. Given the fact that since independence western development organisations have been supporting agribusiness with different approaches, it is hard to isolate the impact of a single programme. In some regions more (North) than in others (South-West), my informants had been engaged in several development programmes for agribusiness before the scheme I was interviewing them about. The study of implementation of programmes targeting the social group of youth, which is relatively recent target, has the advantage of showing the impact of a single, isolated programme. At the same time, most of the programmes I have followed up on in the four different regions had been running for a relatively short period of time (minimum of 6 months to maximum of 2 years), and thus made it sometimes difficult to assess their impact.

Nonetheless, my interviews with participants revealed several flaws in the programmes. The establishment of a development programme catalyses both social and economic transformation in the community – whether the scheme involves single individuals or multiple members of the family. It is precisely the external input of economic possibilities for
transformation that can provoke a misbalance in the community. In fact, social dynamics are generally structured around economic status. The case of Acholi communities in the north are emblematic of the important transformation that the engagement in a private-sector development scheme had brought.

During my first visit in the area together with the Chief of Party and communication officers, I came in touch with one of the farmers, Robert, who had been enrolled both as seeds out-grower for the seed company, as for the extension service provider for the company. Robert was considered a success case, and had become a role model for other youths – and a flagship case for the programme. He had directly been trained by the bilateral development agency, and linked up to the seed company who, through him, would reach out to more farmers to be contracted. Farmers in the scheme, were given improved seeds together with the necessary chemicals by the company itself, and were in charge of multiplying the seeds on their land. Robert had gained both an improved income from the seed multiplication, as much as a higher social status as focal point for the members of the community he was mentoring as trainer and extension-service provider. Friends and family members from his community would look up to him as the one who had brought a new opportunity for income generation. He had catalysed the formation of a social group around renovated ties – based on a principle of entitlement through age. They would meet to discuss their business and strategies and advice each other on agricultural practices. However, the most crucial aspect for them was the ability, as youth, to obtain the economic status that would allow them to enter adulthood. In fact, the improved income of a number of youths in the community had drawn to them both the responsibility and honour of the social status of bread winners. The development programme had therefore offered a paradoxical possibility for the youths – as such – to overcome their status as youths and enter adulthood.

The attention that the community paid to Robert and his fellow young/adult agripreneurs however, was not only positive. On the contrary, their economic success also triggered jealousy. Robert introduced me to his friend Carlos, who received me in his home not far from Robert’s household. Carlos and his wife Scovia had joined the seeds multiplication project since little more than a year and had already gained sufficiently to open up a small store in the village located on the main road. They worked there in turns, made a relatively considerable profit, and substantially improved their income and social status. Scovia told me
how this improvement had made their parents happy for them, yet she had observed a change in the behaviour of her neighbours. She explained how they would not greet her anymore, “they are jealous” – she said, with much concern and anxiety. I understood that the sudden economic improvement distressed her relations and asked her whether paradoxically such improvement had negative effects, too. She answered “yeah, it is now becoming a bit difficult, if... That is why we don’t want to stay in this kind of house [straw hut] when we are fearing that when we are not home, you can even see... We can even find our house has been burnt. That is why we fear to stay in that kind of house”. In fact she was fearing what she had seen happening to another neighbour, whose house had been burned down by jealous neighbours. These facts were later confirmed by other farmers in the community.

I recorded similar events of jealousy in other socio-cultural contexts and other regions, where the accumulation of capital in the hands of individuals or agribusiness groups had created inequality in the community, and provoked theft or even damage of the yields. The social impact of development schemes is an economic trigger, with important consequences for the balance of resource distribution and social status.

6.4.2 PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES ON THE GROUND

Perceptions of development programmes are extremely variegated and can be summarised along three key dimensions: first, the difference of perspectives of youths and development practitioners; second, the strong influence of regional differences in the implementation of the programmes (also the same ones); finally, the difference of development approaches: private sector driven and/or oriented, or public sector schemes.

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137 I recorded such events in group discussions in Atiak, at the border with South Sudan, on 3/04/2017, and also the next day by the treasurer of the YLP group in Odek, who wanted to remain anonymous.
Participants in the development programmes I have observed perceived development schemes as transitory economic opportunities. Informants who had not taken part in development schemes before had heard of programmes of different kinds from their social networks. Either way, participation in development programmes was mostly perceived as an opportunity to improve agribusiness income – although with the awareness of the transient nature of such opportunity. When asking them about their previous experiences with development initiatives, they would mention participation in the most disparate range of activities, more or less related to agribusiness: from the distribution of seedlings and calves\(^{138}\), to the setting up of saving groups\(^ {139}\), women’s self-help groups\(^ {140}\), or sporadic experiences with cooperatives\(^ {141}\) and contract farming.

Around Gulu in particular, I found that the post-conflict peace-building and development programmes had marked farmers’ perception of the relatively new programmes targeting youth in agribusiness: the fact that they were accustomed to receiving humanitarian aid, had developed an attitude of entitlement in many of my informants\(^ {142}\). Development programmes were perceived as providing temporary relief from a (structural) poverty that set them in an underprivileged position in comparison to other regions, and especially in comparison with whites. Receiving aid seemed a form of compensation in the eyes of many of my Acholi informants. Nevertheless, I was told several instances of programmes that had failed to bring tangible nor lasting benefits. Because of the precarious and temporary nature

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\(^{138}\) As reported by Michael in Parabongo (North), on 30/03/2017

\(^{139}\) As reported by Lydia in Mbale, on 21/06/2017

\(^{140}\) As reported by Joy in Sheema (western), on 27/05/2017

\(^{141}\) I found two examples in the dairy sectors, in Kiruhura (western), one on 30/05/2017 and one the day after.

\(^{142}\) Off-record, when I had completed my interviews, it happened in several instances that informants expected to benefit either directly or indirectly from the collaboration with me – despite explaining upfront that I was a student conducting independent research. In particular, on 30/03/2017 in Parabongo (north), Clementine asked me whether I was going to help her and her family with handouts. Also the interviews I conducted in Odek (north) on 4/04/2017 with members of the YLP group framed the presence of several other programmes in the past (mostly related to post-conflict relief) in terms of ‘help’.
of development programmes, farmers would welcome them like discounts in the supermarket.

Besides such disillusioned perceptions of development programmes, my informants also reported how they had benefitted from previous or present programmes: as springboards for their agribusiness, they had navigated opportunities to capitalize on their income. Perceived improvement was often measured with the ability to buy a cow or build a bricks home. Those who were more positive about development programmes reported having learned business skills and having established an agribusiness of their own – leaving subsistence agriculture behind for a more commercial one. As a matter of fact, the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture emerged as generalizable threshold of success for my informants throughout the country, thus taking the risk of positioning income generation above food security. However, the majority of those who were indeed able to capitalize on the transitory opportunities that development programmes offered, were youths who had the personal qualities of an entrepreneur. As a matter of fact, in my experience, a key factor for youths to benefit from a development scheme was an entrepreneurial personality or character – and therefore a very arbitrary and personal quality. This personal trait was so determinent that I could notice how some of the most successful agripreneurs were not even part of any development scheme (see section below on control group).

Moreover, since the programmes were stressing the educational component, they were perceived by youths as learning opportunities. In a context in which education is seen as exit route from poverty, my informants highly valued the training and capacity building of programmes. In fact, one of the recurrent complaints concerned the lack of training and extension services – mostly regarding public sector institutions. However, the transient nature of programmes partially hindered the commitment of youth to the learning trajectory. Programmes that were giving out certificates of participation were seen as providing a sustainable service, since the certificate could be invested for future employment. However, the fact that development agencies would become providers of such educational services, made youths identify development programmes targeting them as even more of an ephemeral yet essential process. Training in agribusiness skills had somehow turned into a necessary commodity for youths to profit from in their pathway towards commercial agriculture.
Perhaps the most surprising effect of development schemes for youths was their impact on the socialisation of agribusiness colleagues on the principle of age. Programmes would catalyse the gathering of men and women within a given age range, who in most cases would undergo a training process before continuing with their agribusiness as partners within one common enterprise or as colleagues in individual enterprises. Either way, their cooperation was crucial at least for marketing purposes, and in most cases also for learning from each other. The majority of the programmes I have observed included a gender quota in their strategy, to ensure women’s participation in agribusiness. However, more often than not, I have observed how women in the newly formed youth groups were discriminated by their male colleagues or by their very husbands at home. Although it was not always openly discussed, I observed that in the majority of youth groups the economic independence of women seemed to be perceived as problematic\textsuperscript{143}. Particularly but not exclusively in remote rural areas in the eastern and southern regions, women are relegated to household activities and are mostly not entitled to retaining their own finances. Their engagement in agribusiness enterprises, particularly in collaboration (or competition) with men, is perceived as a threat to the gendered relations within the household and community at large.

This issue, which had emerged during interviews and informal conversations – is unfortunately common knowledge in Uganda. It was explained to me very clearly by Immaculate, the manager of a large flower-cuttings enterprise in the outskirts of Kampala. She was supervising the work of hundreds of women in the enterprise – in both the branch in Kampala and in the West-Nile region; she was the point of reference for all the ladies who had compliances – either work- or home- related. I visited her several times, and on 16 March 2017, we discussed the difficulties that women had, paradoxically, due to their empowered economic status. When I asked her what were the consequences for the female employees, who became the breadwinners, she told me:

\textsuperscript{143} On International Women’s Day, 8/03/2017, in Kampala, I interviewed Sharon – the successful CEO of an agribusiness enterprise. She told me how she was finding it hard to get married, because she was so ‘empowered’. She reported: “And also you know that most of the successful women, they are either widows or they have separated with their husbands or they have, we don’t have divorced now, it is not so much pronounced but they have probably separated with their husbands or their husbands are fully involved in the business”. On 15/03/2017, also in Kampala, Joyce told me she was facing the same struggles to find a husband, because of her successful financial status.
Immaculate: Like when they are here they are working for their families so when they reach home of course they are women as you said and as we saw and in the African setting, a woman is always kept low. And when you are kept low, even you may not be participating in using your own salary to develop a family so you find that even when the person has learnt and you see you are the one supporting the family a hundred percent, you are not supposed to say that “I am a bread winner”. There is that hindrance...

Me: I have heard that a lot. Yeah

(...) Me: so women are working, they take money home, the majority of the people here...Do you think they are able administer their own money or they bring money and they give it to?

Immaculate: They are not able, some are able, and others are not. The biggest percentage are not able.

Moreover, I have recorded several instances in which women were beaten and forced to quit their jobs within contract farming development schemes, while the championing of individual female agripreneurs had led to sexual harassment of a couple of my informants\textsuperscript{144}. The social prominence that women would obtain with economic status was like a revolution in the patriarchal and sexist social contexts, and therefore forcefully repressed by males who felt their status was threatened.

\textsuperscript{144} I recorded these events around Kampala, by 3 managers (ladies) in two large horticultural enterprises, who were in touch with female employees – on 16 and 17/03/2017. Moreover, Joyce, on 10/03/2017 had told me how an acquaintance from her region, in the south-west, got her hand chopped by her husband for having dared to sell some of the goats she had bought with her own money – but he considered to be his own:

Joyce: When the husband came home, asked “where are the goats?” She said “I sold them to Mwesigwa’s son” and then the man cut her. They said he asked for money, money or goats, bring money or goats. The woman I think wanted to pay for fees for the children...

Me: So, the man cut her
I: But he really chopped the hand?
Joyce: It almost went off because for a villager to move from Sheema [south-west region] to come to Mulago [hospital] for treatment in Kampala, it has to be serious...
This became particularly clear during a visit I paid to a project in the north, where youths out of school (already from the age of 15) were trained to operate tractors. As I was discussing the project’s strategy to include women in the training for tractors operating, Barbara walked in. A 20-something years old girl, wearing a bright yellow dress, she appeared proud of the leading position she held in the project: from being an apprentice, she was now herself training other youths. She told us how she enjoyed driving tractors, fighting the Acholi socio-cultural stereotypes around women, not supposed to be doing this kind of job. She bluntly stated “I can do what men can do” – as she was explaining that in the beginning members of the community wouldn’t believe that she and her colleagues were actually females! In fact, it was unheard of women to wear trousers, let alone driving a tractor bigger than the huts where people lived in. In fact, they were encouraged by the (Australian) project managers to wear trousers for the practical reason of operating tractors – and they were, for this simple reason, assumed to be men by community members. Barbara was upset by the fact that rather than challenging their own stereotypes about what women can do, her community questioned her gender. Therefore, she insisted she wanted to stick to her traditional women clothes, “to show that you don’t have to be even like a man to do that work”. However, such ‘revolutionary’ act of challenging the local gender roles, did not pass unpunished: later on, I learned that Barbara had experienced sexual harassment when she was working as a tractor operator in a large agribusiness. Unfortunately, this is far from being an isolated case, and I have encountered several women that had to give up on their married life to pursue their career in agribusiness – either through divorce, or simply remaining unmarried.

This discrimination, and the perceived negative impact of programmes supporting women participation, would also partially explain the fact that the majority of my informants were males, despite my efforts to achieve a gender balance in the sampling phase. The social impact of a development programme targeting youths with a quota for female participation was rather disrupted. I encountered several instances in which groups of youths were already formed before joining the development scheme, as saving groups (known as SACCO, Saving And Credit Cooperative). Besides few gender-mixed saving groups, the majority of cases I observed where women were included were women-only groups: this would allow them to

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145 I use a fictitious name, as much as I was asked to keep the anonymity of the tractors training project and the bilateral programme which was financially supporting it.
retain economic independence and capitalize on their profit (either for agribusiness, kids’ education or personal purposes) without having to hand in their finances to their husbands. Besides this gender issue, members of saving groups were not gathering with any other criteria than the purpose of saving, and when turning to a development scheme the age benchmark felt as artificial. In fact, I have observed how the majority of my informants did not share the awareness of belonging to a specific social category for fitting an age bracket. Other socio-cultural and economic categories were perceived as being more determinant, such as gender, economic and social status, ethnic group, were perceived as being more determinant.

6.4.2B MAIN CONSTRAINTS TO YOUTHS’ ENGAGEMENT IN AGribusiness

Throughout my interviews with youth informants, I systematically asked my informants about what they thought need improvement in the development programmes they were participating it. Besides the contingent necessities such as agricultural machinery and quality input (seeds and chemicals), the issues that youths reported as having the most negative impact on their agribusiness were problems that lay beyond the possibilities of programmes: namely financial capital, access to land and climate change.

The main issue that was reported was the ability to access financial. In fact, interest rates of financial institutions that are not collaborating with development programmes or the government are extremely high (fluctuating around 20%), and thus inaccessible. Moreover, accessibility to financial services is particularly difficult for younger youths, who have no collaterals to show as guarantee for their loans. This issue was confirmed by dr Mildred Barungi, who conducted a large survey in 2013 for the Economic Policy Research Centre146 (Figure 28, below).

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146 The Economic Policy Research Centre is part of the Uganda National Panel Service.
As for accessibility to financial services, the youngest among the youth were having a harder time accessing land. Land is mostly inherited patrilineally, therefore access to land affects female even more than male youths. However, despite the fact that land is a minimum requisite for agribusiness, is yet beyond the scope of any short-term development programme. In fact, as outlined in the first chapter, the issue of land tenureship reform is a complex issue that remains unsolved since decades. The possibility to address this issue lays within the responsibility of the government, yet no serious attempts have been made\(^\text{147}\).

Respondents also point to challenges related to climate change. Unpredictable rain fall, together with a stable increase of temperatures had impaired yields productivity and exacerbated pests and diseases. Seasons were perceived to have blurred, jeopardizing traditional knowledge on agricultural techniques. These issues in turn made farmers even more reliable on the support of development programmes.

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\(^{147}\) In April 2018, there was a rather science-fiction proposal to use blockchain technology to regulate the cadaster, as reported in the news after an international conference to which Museveni enthusiastically participated. The New Vision reports an article, accessed on 24/09/2018 on: [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1476564/transform-uganda-land-registries-blockchain-technology](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1476564/transform-uganda-land-registries-blockchain-technology)
For example, after hearing how the area around Gulu had been suffering from irregular rain fall for the past two or three seasons, I asked Robert and his mother Clementine how their engagement in agriculture had changed. Clementine answered, and her son Robert translated for me:

Robert: so what changed the weather like this, the rain is not coming?
Clementine: we don’t know God’s will
Robert: maybe because of the trees that are not there.
Clementine: this rain, back then in this month it would have rained…but now it’s gone like it’s the dry season.
Robert: it has been two years that the rain keeps disturbing us like this.
Clementine: you plant rice like this, the sun comes and dries everything.

Climate change was an issue perceived by most farmers and agripreneurs, regardless of their age. On the contrary, issues such as accessibility to financial services and land were more youth-specific.

6.4.2C DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS

As I will describe in the sections below (negotiation, adaptation and in the case study analysis), development practitioners on the ground would have to undergo a consistent amount of adjustments to implement the programmes as they had elaborated in theory. Much of these adjustments were driven by specific, contextual characteristics of the regional agribusiness market, and in some instances on the requirements of the private sector partners. However, in the encounter with the youths, their perceptions, narratives and practices were shaped by the concrete reality of the individual youths – who mostly did not correspond to the ideal archetype of youth envisioned before implementation. In fact, I have observed how there was a substantial difference in the perception of the youths (and the narratives around them) depending on the degree of engagement of the practitioners with operations on the ground. In fact, practitioners working mainly from headquarters office had a more general and abstract perception of youths, with a superficial knowledge of the

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148 Group leader for a private-sector driven programme in Gulu, interview extract from 30/03/2017.
specific characteristics, needs and capacities of the target groups in the different sociocultural, regional contexts.

Interestingly, development practitioners that were either observing (monitoring and evaluating) or directly implementing a programme on the ground, had a very ambiguous perspective on the youths involved in their scheme. Sometimes youths were perceived as being victims of poverty, precious potential to be “unlocked” for a “brighter future”, while at times they were described as “stubborn” or unwilling to adopt their development strategies or knowledge\textsuperscript{149,150}.

In February 2017, I observed how a development practitioner from a private-sector programme\textsuperscript{151} monitored the progress of a small enterprise in Nwoya, a couple of hours drive from Gulu. Denis, I was told on the way there, was their most successful agripreneur: he had set up a business from scratch, and now had set up an agri-school to train other youths within their scheme. He was a “role model” for the youths in the area, because he was the living testimony that “there is money to be made in agribusiness!”. Yet when we sat down with him in the back of his office I could see how the interaction between the development practitioner and Denis revealed a skewed relation: Denis was holding a reverential posture, looking down on the ground and twisting his fingers, as he was asking for advice on the training of young farmers on his demonstration-farm. On the other hand, the development practitioner was questioning his decisions, asking why and how he had not yet completed

\textsuperscript{149} Such polarized perception of development ‘subjects’ was also recorded by Mosse (2004, p. 652) in a British programme he had been working on in India.

\textsuperscript{150} The narrative of ‘unlocking youths’ potential’ for a brighter future was reported by the most optimistic development practitioners within the Ministry of Gender I interviewed on 20/01/2017, at the Ministry of Agriculture on 27/01/2018, and International NGOs on 13/03/2017 and 21/02/2017; but also reported in the news, as titles the New Vision article: “Unlocking youth potential imperative in transforming Uganda”, consulted on 24/09/2018: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1458529/unlocking-potential-youth-imperative-transforming-country

The counter-narrative depicting youths with a negative tone was also recorded in several instances, both in Ugandan and international agencies. For example, on 20/01/2017, at FAO headquarters in Kampala, I heard the concerns of an anonymous development practitioner saying that youths were “sitting idle, doing nothing and they get into the political arena because of unemployment – youth unemployment rates are dangerous because they can harm the stability of the country”.

\textsuperscript{151} The organisation expressly asked to remain anonymous
some bureaucratic procedures to show for his trainings, complaining about his administration and pushing him to justify himself. I felt so uncomfortable that I left the room. Later on the practitioner conducting the evaluation explained to me how he saw his role as mentor – “you have to keep on pushing them! There’s money to be made, you know, but they don’t see the market opportunities so we have to create the market linkages.”

6.4.2D MISMATCH IN PERCEPTIONS

Importantly, a mismatch in practice did not only emerge between the two groups of development actors, but also among the actors within them. The enactment of a development policy involves several development actors from the elaboration of a theory of change, to the design, implementation and outcome of the programme. Reflecting the reality of ‘Aidland’ (Mosse, 2011), the data I collected on the interactions among development practitioners also shows that the process of designing and implementing programmes and projects frustrated the outcomes. In fact, such process involves the cooperation among parties that have different understandings of the development problem and how it should be tackled, but also different interests and incentives. Taking a closer look at the practices ‘at the top’ over a period of time of roughly one year (spring 2017 to spring 2018), I have observed how the programme changes over time. To exemplify and attempt an explanation of how such mismatch emerges, later in this chapter I will examine one example at length, as to explore all the dynamics involved from elaboration of a theory of change to the outcomes.

As with regards to the youths, I recorded a sensible variety in youths’ perceptions of the programmes I have evaluated throughout the country. The country-wide public programme, the most homogeneous approach, still resulted in very different outcomes for several reasons: politics at local level played an important role in the interaction with communities on the ground, particularly in favouring NRM supporters.

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152 This observation and conversation took place during a monitoring and evaluation visit on 8/02/2017 in Nwoya, northern region.
153 In section 6.4.3a I analyse these issues in depth.
Moreover, the financial incentive was capitalized differently, according to the heterogeneity factors outlined in the previous chapter. Youths that were well connected in their value chains networks and received land and support from families were better off than those who needed to rent land and start the enterprise anew. Territorial and socio-cultural embedding – particularly factors such as the ecosystem and norms and values in agribusiness – also played a crucial role in diversifying throughout the outcomes of both development approaches. This was particularly true for the different private-sector driven programmes, because of the slightly different approaches of the programmes (for instance, some programmes were offering stronger marketing connections while others were structured as out-grower scheme), but mainly because the strategy of the programmes was capitalizing on assets and qualities that were not distributed homogeneously among the youths. For instance, only some of the youths were able to become out-growers, depending on whether they had access to land. This socio-economic factor was unequally distributed across the country.

The heterogeneity of youths, in fact, emerged as a major factor shaping the outcomes of programmes. For example, in a conversation with Trust Birungi, an agribusiness man working as service provider for AKORION, I asked him what he thought were the most relevant features defining youths as a diverse social group. He stressed that the contextual differences where determined by the socio-economic status of the youths and their family, telling me that:

> there are the underprivileged, who don’t have a perception of development as if it was in their hands to change – they expect help to come from the development programmes, so when they’re targeted in terms of entrepreneurship there is a clash with the programme’s design; on the contrary, the non-underprivileged have more questions about the programme’s potential benefit for them – engaging with questions such as ‘how can the programme benefit me for my purposes?’\(^\text{154}\).

Trust related this economic-class difference to the fact that those better off could afford taking more risks. In addition, they were more likely to have their own resources for starting up. The combination of these two factors enabled an entrepreneurial mindset.

\(^\text{154}\) Extract from an interview with Trust in Kampala, on 23/05/2018
Importantly, these socio-economic disparities map up with regional and ethnic groups. Trust argued, for example, that “For instance, in Mbarara, people have bigger farms (for example 10 acres) and are thus able to diversify the value chains in which they engage, getting into several businesses at the same time – but those who have less than 1 acre will invest in food crops for subsistence.” Inevitably, discrimination as side effect of homogeneous development approaches to diverse socio-economic contexts, also unfolded along regional disparities. At AKORION, for example, they found that it was easier to have relationships with affluent groups in the South-West. According to Trust, these farmers would ask to become partners of AKORION, rather than clients. Alternatively, farmer groups in the North, near Gulu would ask: “Can you help my farmers? Can you subsidise this or that?”

Moreover, he added that there was a cultural reason, besides the socio-economic ones, contributing to the major difference between North and South-West – both in the agribusiness mentality and relation with development partners. As it was also confirmed by other development practitioners\(^{155}\), he stressed that the handouts people in the North had been receiving after the war had influenced northerners’ ‘entitlement mentality’ (see section 6.4.2a). Furthermore, he stressed that in the North agribusiness is influenced by “a cultural mentality: land holding is communal, so it’s more of a socialist, less capitalist mentality. For example, if the community decides they’re going to plant millet, but one entrepreneur who sees potential and wants to plant simsim [sesame] – he cannot decide on the land use! While in the South-West the individual can decide on the value chain which can generate more returns: it’s individual choices, together with a stronger support of the family.”\(^{156}\)

\(^{155}\) This argument was made also by development practitioners I interviewed in Kampala in an international NGO on 23/01/2017 and at the Ministry of Gender on 10/04/2017.

\(^{156}\) This argument was also made by a development practitioner in an international NGO on 25/05/2018, and confirmed by conversations I had with agricultural experts at IITA, during the follow up field trip in May 2018.
The evaluation of the ‘success’ of heterogeneous programmes supporting youth in agribusiness in Uganda is a complex and at the same time somehow arbitrary task. In fact, the programmes I have observed on the ground differed in their approach (public vs private-sector driven), institutional structure, donor funding and incentives. Ministerial programmes were guided by the National Development Plan II (NDPII), and worked in the political interest of the government to show for their commitment to tackle youths’ employment issues. Programmes from bilateral organisations were only to some extent bond to governmental guidelines, and rather responded to the incentives of their own home agency, in the interest of obtaining funding for yet new development projects. Grassroot Ugandan organisations instead, worked to lobby their position in policy making and to strengthen their visibility within government structures.

Predictably, such heterogeneity was also reflected in the programmes’ definitions of success, which were as disparate. With the observation of programmes’ implementation, I came to realise that there was a discrepancy between programmes’ definitions of success and the organisations’ theories of change. For instance, the ministerial Youth Livelihood Programme aimed, on paper and in the practitioners’ narratives of their theory of change, to boost employability of youth in productive agribusiness. However, in practice, the programme was considered successful when the loans that had been disbursed to youth groups had been restored, thereby fuelling a revolving fund for district authorities to re-invest in new youth groups. During the last follow-up field trip to Kampala, I met several practitioners at the Ministry of Gender, who had evaluated the programme one year after my observation in the field. They insisted on the success of the programme, since they had financed youth groups who had managed to repay their loans. On the contrary, while in the field in the south-west region, young participants in the programme reported their disappointment in the scheme: despite having repaid the loan, they said they had not improved their situation but instead contributed to enriching corrupt civil servants. Repayment of the loans was, in the instances I observed, not synonymous of ‘success’ for the youths. In fact, as Mosse (2004, p. 662) argues “‘success’ and ‘failure’ are policy-oriented judgements that obscure project effects”.

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Oftentimes private-sector programmes funded by international agencies needed to demonstrate their success in terms of number of youths they had engaged in agribusiness. Their impact was measured as training of a certain amount (their specific target) of youths in agribusiness skills, or their engagement in contract farming. Strikingly, the success of the programmes which implementation I observed on the ground, was relative to their specific programmatic definitions of objectives, that would respond to their structural incentives – while their theories of change aimed at economic growth and agricultural modernization for youth employability. This mirrors Mosse’s (2004) finding that the very selection of participants in a development scheme tended to facilitate a biased selection of those who already possessed the qualities and skills they were to be taught.

Moreover, the regional differences I outlined in the previous chapters played an important role in diversifying the range of ‘meanings of success’. Because each region had its territorial, socio-cultural specificities (see chapter on *youthnography*), and because there was great variety in the value chain in which youth were venturing, the success of the agribusiness enterprises was contextual. For instance, the same private sector driven approach, in which the development agency constitutes the link between groups of farmers and private sector companies, had very different outcomes in the north then in the southwest. In the north, farmers would multiply improved seeds for a company that constituted both the input and output market: i.e. providing the seeds and chemicals and buying the end product. In the south-west, dairy farmers, working in cooperatives, would be provided the machinery (e.g. cooler) to collect milk by the same private sector company who would buy the milk. In the case of seeds multiplication, farmers would earn higher incomes but commit their land use for non-food crops, where market was (nearly) exclusively constitute by the company, risking a position of dependency for the marketing of their produce. In case of the dairy cooperatives, farmers would actually gain a stronger bargaining power in prices negotiation, thanks to the consolidation of the cooperative, and thanks to the broader market of the dairy sector (with multiple buyers).

A common characteristic to all programmes, throughout the country, was the perception, on the side of the youth, of the programmes as transient and not durable. The impact of the programmes engaging youth was thus that of creating a momentum of attention for the cause of youth unemployment, with the cynical understanding that it was a temporary
opportunity. Since the majority of my informants had already experienced multiple other development programmes, they knew how to surf the trend around youth agribusiness but were concerned about the sustainability of the change the programmes promised to bring. During fieldwork in the north, I interviewed a 23-years old member of a youth group in the Youth Livelihood Programme, who had participated in international development and humanitarian programmes before. He expressed his concern, when I asked him how he viewed the various development organisations active in the territory:

Yeah so they don’t implement what they intend to do. So they only implement half of it leaving other [objectives unimplemented]. So they just do things just to complete may be the project period and other things so they only look at the sustainability of the project to the community. I don’t have a problem with the donors but the implementers here, the social workers and the rest.157

His concern was with the capacity of development practitioners on the ground rather than with the good intentions of the programme, as he later lamented the corruption that was frustrating the potential impact for the communities. Elsewhere in the same region, I had observed several sign posts of past programmes and organisations that had been operative on the ground, engaging various social groups – women, victims of the war, smallholders and now youths. In general complaints, lamented the water pumps that broke down shortly after the development agencies left, or the useless provision of banana suckers or coffee seedlings from the government – “they only come around here [hinting at the remote rural areas] when it’s time to harvest votes”, I was told during the same interview.

6.4.3A PUBLIC SECTOR APPROACH - YOUTH LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMME

The aim of the programme, enforced by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, is that of supporting groups of youths mainly with a start-up capital (loan) to start or scale their agribusiness. The implementation involved a long bureaucratic procedure which would foresee youths’ groups application for funding to the local authorities, which

157 Extract from an interview in Odek, province of Gulu, on 8/04/2017, the responded wished to remain anonymous.
would pass it to regional authorities and then to the ministry of Gender in Kampala. Once granted the loan, youths would receive one-time training for agricultural and business skills from local authorities. During the first fieldwork there were widespread controversies between government authorities and youths about the repayment of the loans, while during the follow-up I was reassured by civil servants that the majority of funds had been recovered. Practices of implementation included the training of youths at the beginning of the projects, and sensitization campaigns launched by the Ministry to recover funds. While the programme’s definition of success is the engagement of as many youths as possible in profitable agribusiness, the actual measure of success was the repayment of the loans (with little or no follow-up on the ground).

Through fieldwork, it became clear that, although both practitioners and youths had the same goal (youths’ employment in agribusiness) they defined very differently the key concepts, procedures and practices of implementation. Throughout the country, youths lamented corruption of civil servants involved in the programme and lack of quality inputs and extension services. In general, the loans were misunderstood for hand-outs and often referred to as ‘political money’, namely bribery of their votes. An emblematic example of this practice, which tied the loan of the programme to the elections’ agenda, emerged in May 2017, as I interviewed Dorah, a member of a group within the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) in the outskirts of Kampala:

Me: When did you get together for the first time?
Dorah: The first time, it was 2016, around January [a month before the presidential elections]
Me: Ok. How did you decide to get together? What were the main reasons why you wanted to work together as a group?
Dorah: As a group, no, we started with, remember by 2016, we had started organizing for elections, primaries, NRM [National Resistance Movement] whatever... So, we were a group, they were looking for votes of our councillor. So as a group, we were around 15 youths. So, during that process, we said but the election, after the elections what are we going to do so that we keep our group together? So we decided to...we started, we decided to start with poultry as a community work that
could keep us together still even after the elections so from there we started working as a group, till we got that program of YLP to apply for the money of the youth

Dorah and her colleagues expected that the local councillor wanted youths’ votes, bringing funding opportunities along with the presidential elections. They decided to capitalize on this opportunity and joined the YLP, facilitated by the councillor. While on the one hand this episode shows how buying votes is assumed to be the custom, on the other it also showed how youth in this context were aware that their vote counted.

Beyond this instance, I have encountered several other YLP members who – often off record – would confirm that it was perceived as being a governmental programme institutionalising the custom of distributing “political money”. Since this form of public development was experienced as being highly political, there was much confusion as how the loan system was supposed to work. In fact, I was told that during previous elections or other campaigns, civil servants distributed handouts or in-kind goods, so the loan system was not welcomed.

On a positive note, the procedures for the implementation of this programme secured the ownership of the projects. In fact, the spontaneous application of groups of youths for funding of their agribusiness allowed them to invest in the enterprise and value chain which was most relevant to them. Moreover, securing the means for their enterprise, and thereby income, allowed youths that were successful in obtaining the grant to gain higher social status – therefore exiting the local cultural category of youth into adulthood. Perhaps the most successful example of YLP groups was the one I encountered in Gulu – more precisely Odek, the village of birth of Joseph Cony. Working together in the YLP group enterprise allowed youths to strengthen previously distressed social relations. Besides repaying the loan, they were able to capitalise on the profits to set up a saving group – allowing for resilience in times of poor yields. Moreover, they would often meet up even when they did not need to talk business: they had set up an amateur theatre in which they re-elaborated social issues such as alcohol abuse or domestic violence.

In cases in which the groups were not as successful in setting up a collective agribusiness, the loan system generated financial debts. While in Mbale in June, Hassan told me (euphemistically): “the Youth Livelihood Programme has helped to get simple things like
soap, kerosene and doing small business and the family gets what to eat. Generally, it has not been bad. But now the yields have not been good because changes in seasons, so we have some debts.” In fact, Hassan was pointing to the fact that without sufficient training and experience in managing capital, external issues such as changes in the weather not only damaged their productivity, but also put them in tricky financial debts – having invested a higher sum than they were used to.

6.4.3B PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH

The programmes I have evaluated were mainly aiming at linking individuals or groups of agripreneurs to private-sector companies that would enable youths to scale their business, also by facilitating access to financial services (by providing collaterals). The implementation involved the setting up of consortia of youths and directing their agronomic activities towards the business model set-up by the private sector. Practices for the implementation entailed mainly facilitating market linkages, access to input (machinery and chemicals) and output markets (selling their produce), training and capacity building. Besides the agricultural skills, youths would be trained in developing an agripreneurial mentality and management and accountancy skills. Different development agencies had different definitions of success (training a given number of youths, constituting or strengthening cooperatives, employment in out-grower schemes) – but all shared the same focus on the economic interests of the private sector company, who would have to benefit either in terms of production, labour or marketing for their input and services.

Despite the context-specific regional variety, youths engaged in these programmes generally reported to be earning higher incomes than before, mainly thanks to the connection with ready markets (often the company itself) for their produce. For instance, John from Gulu told me:

At first, the level of production was a bit low but due to the NGO coming to facilitate farmers by giving them training and facilitating them with some other inputs, and

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158 Extract from an interview with Hassan, member of a YLP group in Mbale, on 14/06/2017
taking them to some other outside companies who buy goods from here, made us gain some capital out of it, out of the produce we normally get from the garden.\textsuperscript{159}

In this extract, John points at some of the most valued aspects of private sector approaches – namely the specialized agribusiness skills training and the input provision. Both were seen as opportunities to capitalise on agricultural enterprises and move from subsistence to commercial agriculture.

In fact, youths appreciated private sector driven programmes because they provided, besides the inputs (seeds, chemicals), also the output market. In Mbale, Richard explained what made him satisfied about the programme (which asked to remain anonymous) he had joined as contract pumpkin farmer: “They give you seeds and that the end of it all they are going to buy the produce.”\textsuperscript{160} Richard contrasted this to the YLP program where it “was good to give a lot of money” but since it was a loan, there was no security of being able to capitalise on it, thereby running the risk of frustrating the possibility of improvement.

However, the contract-farming scheme implied that youth were attracted to the programme as a way of securing a job, rather than boosting their entrepreneurship. In fact, their capacity to continue in the sector or value chain in which they were trained strictly depended on the marketability of the produce beyond the company in the scheme. In fact, as in the case of pumpkins or improved seeds, often the value chains in which the private sector was investing were not marketable beyond the company itself. I found an interesting exception in the south-west region, where the programmes were investing in value chains which were rooted in the local agribusiness culture (dairy). Not only where the youths facilitated in accessing the dairy business, but they were not in a unidirectional relation with a single private sector company.

Therefore, the resilience of the agribusiness and the capacity for spill over depended on the value chain. The best example in this sense was an SNV project, funded by the Dutch

\textsuperscript{159} John is a fictitious name, since he asked to remain anonymous – interviewed in Gulu on 8/04/2017
\textsuperscript{160} Richard was interviewed in the outskirts of Mbale on 15/06/2017. Emphasis added by author.
Embassy, in the south-west region. The project had capitalized on the dairy value chain, supporting cooperatives by linking them with private sector companies that would provide machinery and buy the milk. SNV was responsible for the training of youths within the cooperative, and for providing collaterals for loans – where necessary. The fact that the dairy sector is strongly embedded in the socio-cultural and economic dimensions of the region made it possible for youths in the programme to capitalize on the profits derived from the scheme, and include growing numbers of members in the cooperatives and even set up saving schemes. As a consequence of the growing number of members, respondents reported that cooperatives were strengthened and with it also their capacity to negotiate better deals with the dairy industry.

Moreover, as argued in section 6.4.2a, the programmes were perceived as transient business opportunities and were not considered as sustainable frameworks to support their business. In fact, youths had seen a variety of international organisations coming and going, and lamented the brevity of their programmes.

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6.4.3C CONTROL GROUP

The control group was a very heterogeneous sample of youths, not only because of the heterogeneity factors I mentioned in the previous chapter, but also because such factors emerged more strongly than in the other groups of youths I interviewed. This happened because of two combined reasons. One, the broad sampling category of ‘youth in agribusiness’ allowed me to collect interviews with youths from all walks of life. Two, youth who were gathered in groups within development schemes had more in common among themselves than random youngsters in agribusiness. In fact, for the youths within the development schemes the bias of the selection of the development organization played a homogenizing role.

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162 This emerged both from the interview I conducted with members of a cooperative in a remote village in Kiruhura (south-west region), on 30/05/2017, as from the interview with the director of a cooperative in Sanga (south-west region) on 1/06/2017
Therefore, I met youths – both male and female – who barely earned an income from (partially) commercial agriculture, but did not see nor aspire a future in agribusiness, and others who had left well-paid white collar jobs to venture into agribusiness as profitable enterprise and desirable career. Both fit the definition of young (18-35) agripreneur (earning income from commercial non-food crops production), although for the one, agribusiness is a forced-choice, and for the other an aspiration and career path.

Interestingly, the most successful ones – in terms of economic profit and satisfaction with their career – had not benefitted from development schemes to start their enterprise. In their cases, other factors were playing an important role: firstly, the arbitrary component of their entrepreneurial mindset and personality; secondly, their family and economic background, which in most cases allowed them to study till university level – as education was in fact a third determinant factor. The majority of youths in the control group of my informants were working individually rather than as groups. This was certainly due to my sampling, which did not target youths working in cooperatives or organized groups since I had learnt that group-enterprises were not representative of the majority of the social category of ‘youths in agribusiness’. In fact, besides some highly organized value chains such as dairy, young agripreneurs joined forces only in the phase of bulking produce for transportation.

As for this group, it can be deduced that factors such as socio-cultural context and economic background played a crucial role. Moreover, these factors had even more impact than the development programmes had for youths participating.

6.5 RENDERING TECHNICAL

Considering the perceptions that youths had of the programmes, and those of practitioners about the practical implementation of the programmes, it can be inferred that there was a discrepancy in the perception of the social and economic impact of the programmes.

163 I borrow the concept of ‘rendering technical’ from the analysis of development implementation in Malaysia of Murray Li (2007).
Moreover, it appears that while for development practitioners the implementation of programmes was a technical matter that was restricted to agribusiness practices and skills, the agribusiness experiences of youths were a complex matter that encompassed their whole socio-cultural and economic world. In fact, as shown by the case of successful agripreneurs in the control group, the heterogeneity factors described in the previous chapter were crucial. On the contrary, the approach of practitioners was partial – limited to few aspects of agribusiness – such as business skills, market and finances, namely their notions of success.

This is clear in the prominent role given by practitioners to the concept of ‘mindset’ in the implementation of programmes. Mindset was discussed as a skill that could be taught; a personal trait to be developed through capacity building. Mindset was a commodity that the programmes claimed to provide, as a service for youths, and at the same time depicted as a key to success in agribusiness. As a commodity, mindset was something that most youths lacked and could be provided. As a consequence, youths’ poverty or unemployment becomes a condition that depends on the personal, individual capabilities of farmers to turn into agripreneurs. By giving the responsibility of coming out of poverty to the individual, the structural adjustments that would be responsibility of the government – such as infrastructure, industrialization – are depoliticized. Rather, the focus of development programmes lay with the skills that youths can learn to turn from subsistence to commercial agriculture, with the support of public or private-sector schemes. The solution to youth unemployment is to become an agripreneur. Similar to Mosse (2004, p. 649-650), I observed the commodification of a personal trait such as the ‘entrepreneurial mindset’.

Within such discourse, I observed during fieldwork, the projects’ ability to provide youths the skills to escape unemployment, justified the need for programmes implementation and thus the fuelling of the development industry around youth in agribusiness. In other words, the way in which youths needs (for an entrepreneurial mindset and skills), justified the organisations role as mentors. It reinforced the development practitioners position as (technical) experts in the field of agribusiness and youths mentoring. As Mosse (2004, p. 652) concludes: “These factors shaped the style of project practice (tight schedules, targets,

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164 As explained in the first empirical chapter, the aidnography, the focus on mindset change and agripreneurship was stressed by the majority of the development organisations.
subsidies) and the type of project relationships (patron–client, employer–employee) that emerged”.

Perhaps the most striking observation to be made about the implementation phase of the programmes and youths’ perceptions of them, is that the very targeting of youths as a social category was experienced as arbitrary. The variety of heterogeneity factors described in the previous chapter were in fact not only a cause for problematizing this social category, but, alone, determinant factors for youths to succeed or not in agribusiness. Youths, thus, had become the ‘collective subject’ to which Murray Li (2007, p. 132) referred, as necessary target of development efforts:

Through its program for community development, the project proposed to create a new collective subject, a community that would assess, plan, reach consensus, and think of population and natural resources as entities to be managed. The proposed technique for creating this subject was to guide villagers through a carefully crafted sequence of activities: participatory assessment of community resources, problem analysis, preparation of development proposals, application for funding under the official budget planning process, monitoring, and evaluation of outcomes. The plan referred frequently to participation, but how villagers would participate and to what ends was predefined.

However, the targeting of the social category of youth was not only functional to the fuelling of the development industry – but had also a political significance, particularly for Ugandan organisations (both governmental and grassroot). I will explore the political aspects of the development programmes for youth in the section below.

6.6 POLITICS IN CONTENTION

The attention my informants received by development agencies for the sake of being young, felt arbitrary to all those who did not see the (political) potential of leveraging the momentum for their own benefits. In a few cases, young agripreneurs had a full awareness of the political and economic leverage they had for being part of a demographic majority. These
cases stood out for being the exception\textsuperscript{165}. Khamutima, a coffee farmer from the west who moved to Kampala for his studies, organised a youth network (YOFCHAN – the Young Farmers Champions Network) of farmers to lobby for youths inclusion in policy making at the Ministries, FAO and other bilateral organisations; Joyce, crucial informant and friend in Kampala, advocated for young women in agribusiness at forums in East Africa; Stephen, a dairy farmer in the Western region and director of a dairy cooperative, is trying to halt rural-urban migration by sensitizing youth to form coalitions.

Stephen explained how together with some other members of the cooperative, they had submitted a project to an international NGO to support the formation of a youth council:

Stephen: For us we had a proposal to [the international NGO who wished to remain anonymous] but they didn’t like it, they never took it up, we wanted to form youth councils. Youth councils, we manage them as youth, we sensitize other youths who are in towns, we start setting up conferences in towns, let’s say in Kampala, you organize the youth, you call youths from Kampala, take them to Sheraton Hotel you talk to them, tell them people, why are you stuck in towns, come back to Villages, let’s go and do farming. (...) Let’s come back to here [Western region of Kiruhura] then if we have an organized group, also we can talk of such problems of land. A youth is willing to come back to the village but he doesn’t have own land. We can as a group petition. (...) If we have a voice, we can push. Even, we can push for laws if we have one voice. That is if we have an organization or a platform that can petition even up top parliament for laws to be changed and they favour the youth who are trying to go into farming.

Me: Okay, I think that there is already a youth council in the parliament in Kampala

Stephen: One, representing the whole youth in Western Uganda. He [head of the youth council] is just there to eat money [i.e. corruption]. He can’t stand alone and fight for our rights. We need organizations that can support youths.

\textsuperscript{165} In chronological order: Khamutima, whom I interviewed in Kampala on 2/02/2017; Joyce, whom I interviewed in Kampala on 10/03/2017; Stephen, from the south west region, whom I interviewed on 1/06/2017; a young civil servant who will remain anonymous, whom I interviewed in Mbale on 14/06/2017. I will give more details on these informants through this section.
Stephen was motivated to constitute a youth network not only for agribusiness purposes, but also because the old generation of politicians “must go – it’s our time to take the lead of the country”. However, the organisation of youths into political groups was not welcomed not only by international NGOs, but especially by the government.

When in Mbale, I have a long conversation with a young exponent of the district authorities – who asked to remain anonymous. In the beginning of the conversation he was reluctant to share his thoughts with me and gave me a politically correct account of the motivations of the government to invest in youths in agribusiness: he explained that Museveni was supporting the youths because they otherwise would remain idle and be a threat to national security. He himself had voted for Museveni, but argued that since youths are the majority of the population, they should be given more space in politics. Until that moment, youths were organized in the National Youth Council, with representatives from each district – and had nominal authority in the parliament. I report from the fieldnotes of 14th June 2017, my surprise when he finally took confidence to explain the real political stakes for government to engage youths in development programmes:

When I switch off the recorder, the real interview starts – the narrative totally changes. The first time he voted for NRM because he was grateful for the long-term peace that this president had brought to the country. But afterwards he realized he didn’t really have another option – if he wanted to stay in politics and pursue his career. He gives the example of a friend of him who was also involved in politics as a youth representative and decided to stand up for the opposition and was cut off the political system. [He explained that] When it’s election time he gets money from the party to distribute and make sure that the youth votes NRM. Around those times the local politicians and the national politici who come from this area [Mbale] come and distribute sachets of waragi [local gin] to get people drunk and make them vote for Museveni. He admits that he’s actually just waiting for the president to die. He also tells me how in the beginning he really believed that Museveni had a good agenda and could make a difference for Uganda, but that now the people around him are too

166 He allowed me to make reference to the information he gave me, provided he would remain anonymous.
corrupt and “eat the money” which is meant to go for the people on the ground. What scares me is what he tells me about the amount of intelligence that is hired by the government to be informed about the local dynamics: they are around at parish and village level, as much as in towns and within district authorities. Even those baganda men that live in Mbale and sell groundnuts on the streets, they are actually believed to be intelligence people controlling the movement and activities of people. If someone starts advocating for the opposition, s/he will be immediately reported so that will be jailed or at least their career jeopardized. He gives me an example: he had once organised a youth group around Mbale, and the day they had an assembly to set the constitution “people from KLA” (meaning from NRM) came unexpectedly and uninvited, saying that he would be jailed if he wouldn’t accept the bribe and convince the youth group to vote for NRM. (...) “Either you remain poor and you keep your political opinions, or if you make progress and have success it means you support the government” (otherwise they don’t allow you to be successful).

The strong control the government was holding on youth groups and organisations, both the agricultural and the political ones, showed how the support of youths was a controlled empowerment. Even more so, the organisation of a large portion of the population in groups facilitated the penetration of government structures among the electorate. In this way, it appears that the investment in the social category of youths – a fuzzy knowledge category with little explanatory nor descriptive significance – resembles what Mosse (2004, p. 650-651) refers to as “mobilising metaphor” (Porter, 1995) — could mean many things to many people, and allowed a multiplication of criteria of success.”

Rather than arguing that there is a premeditated causality in the support of youths in agribusiness for the actual purpose of electorate control – I argue with Mosse that ‘mobilising metaphors’ (such as youth) are part of the organizations’ exigencies to maintain relations through development interventions. These metaphors are thus constructed as much through the narratives as through the practices of implementation.

I do not hold that there is a programmatic intention in constructing metaphors, but rather they emerge in the process through which the discourse around development emerges. In
fact, as I explain below, there are processes of adaptation and negotiation of the development programmes.

6.7 ADAPTATION

In my fieldwork, I observed how some programmes evolved over time, from their formulation to their implementations and outcomes. In this section I delve into the observations of how programmes (the few ones which structures allowed for flexibility in implementation) changed to adapt to the heterogeneity they encountered on the ground. I refer to adaptation as the (positive) process by which a given development programme or project comes to terms with the reality on the ground, thereby adjusting strategies and means to fit the sociocultural, economic and value chain context. In practice, this adaptation entails a change in the implementation of the project to adjust to the heterogeneity factors characterising youths and their needs and capacities in agribusiness.

Adaption is a process that is particularly influenced by the agency and resistance exercised by development recipients, and has the effect of modifying the *modus operandi* of a programme or project. This process can be described as a youths’ demand-driven change in the implementation and even design of the development programme or project. While this process is most evident in the implementation phase, it has effects on the outcomes of a development programme or project – and might (in few cases) influence the re-designing of a programme to fit contextual specificities.

In Uganda, I observed that the programme and projects that seem to be the most adaptive were either small in scale (in terms of budget and target regions and youths), or had little strings with their donors (namely, they had a relatively wide range of flexibility in the implementation). These two factors appeared to allowed development practitioners the necessary flexibility to adjust their strategies to fit reality on the ground. On the contrary, programmes which involved many parties had to negotiate and compromise their strategies (see section 6.8 below on negotiations) to meet other practitioners’ priorities and interests. Negotiation and adaptation are not necessarily opposed to each other, since programmes
which had to negotiate strategies and priorities with several parties would still be able to exercise flexibility to adapt to specific local agribusiness contexts.

While I have encountered different degrees of adaptation of programmes to local contexts, only few of the programmes I have evaluated on the ground could actually be considered adaptive to the heterogeneity characterizing youths. Besides experiences such as that of Trust in AKORION, mentioned above – which was selecting the groups of youths and regions where they could build on existing assets and “entrepreneurial mentality” – another example was that of the Dutch-funded SKY programme, implemented by the Italian NGO AVSI. The programme manager, Samuele Otim Rizzo, explained to me how the programme accounted for youths’ heterogeneity: he explained that their approach was focusing on individual characteristics and aspirations of the youths: “not all of them have the mindset to become entrepreneurs, each youth is different”. The programme had developed selection criteria for the beneficiaries, which would also include qualitative aspects besides hard criteria like age and gender. Development practitioners in the selection process would, for example, consider what the youths’ interests are, the specific value chains they were already engaged in – and then they would invest in that specific sector, enabling to grow the existing start-ups. I insisted asking about the different ways in which – in the implementation phase – the programme had adapted to the different socio-cultural contexts and to all the individual specificities he mentioned. He explained that one of the main traits of SKY was its flexibility, which sometimes also brings them in a difficult position with the donors: “it’s hard to justify why some youth gets more start-up capital or input than others – and that really has to do with his or her capacities to capitalize and scale their business”.

Besides adapting to the individual potential to capitalize on development investments, adaptation also adjusts the programme to the territorial differences between Ugandan regions. Reportedly, development practitioners saw the greatest degree of regional disparity when comparing the Northern region – which has been affected by war for decades – to the South-Western region – which has been privileged by the president. “We cannot do a replication of the same approach in all regions.” – stresses one of the implementers of
Agrivalue’s agribusiness accelerator project. And he continues explaining what he recognizes to be the three major features that diversify Uganda’s regions:

Well I think there are three main territorial differences: first of all language, you know in Uganda we have so many different languages, you may find it is difficult to translate the same message everywhere. Then tribalism...all the different ethnic groups, they have different cultures, if you think of the North and the West you see they have very different ways of life. And then education: in the North the education level is poorer because of the war they had for 20 years.

While the three factors this development practitioner has mentioned might be a subjective perception, what is clear is that his programme would take those into account to adapt their development strategies to the contextual differences. Later in the interview, he also stressed how through the process of adaptation to regional variety the development project itself changed: “Of course we have an idea of what we want, but we don’t know what will actually work – we are willing to bend and fit the complexities of the regions where we are going to work.

Despite stressing that heterogeneity was more of an individual trait or socio-economic asset that favoured or hindered agricultural entrepreneurship – also Samuele also admitted there were general regional specificities:

Acholi [North] people are warriors – we know that, it takes much more convincing. And the Karamojong [North-East] are warriors and pastoralists. So we have to take into account the aspirations of the youths, but also the motivation of their family. Family support is more important in the north than it is in the south, [in the North] they need to be encouraged and sustained more than in the south – where they are more independent: [in the South] they rely on the social safety net for the start-up but then it’s an individual agribusiness. In the south, there seems to be more respect for individual enterprises flourishing – they capitalise on their resources. In the north, there’s the mentality that it’s better to be equal than to have few successful – there

\[167\] See case study below
also is more jealousy than in the south. For example if someone starts a wood plantation, they go and burn their trees!

This account was reinforcing some of the perceptions I had also recorded during my previous fieldwork: I had observed how land tenure and socio-cultural structures were strongly intertwined, as much as they were influencing the agribusiness practices (see previous chapter). Therefore, I asked Samuele how they needed to adapt to all these differences that he had mentioned: he explained that of the four focus points of their programme, needed to be emphasized in the north and left behind in the south:

1) Agri-skills necessary to develop a business development plan was more necessary in the north than in the south, as much as 2) life skills – which fill in the psycho-social dimension of the individual; but particularly the 3) entrepreneurship skills development was seen as being alien to northerners’ approach to agribusiness, and thus required a stronger capacity building investment, while in the west farmers would have more of an agribusiness mentality which didn’t require AVSI to invest too much in entrepreneurship training; 4) gender was reported to be more of a problem in the north than in the south; in particular, the issue of gender inequality was tackled with an household approach, to sensitize men as much as women of the importance of women’ engagement in agribusiness.

Samuele reported how the programme was adapting to the different regional needs, as much as to the individual assets and aspirations: in his view, flexibility to adapt to the contextual specificities was their key to achieving their programme goals. By stressing the ways in which the programme was adapting to heterogeneous groups of youths, Samuele also indicated that the programme had changed from the time of its design, two years before. In fact, he also mentioned that the programme had started out too ambitious, and that some of the outputs will not be achieved. The choices on which outputs were to be left behind, had been made in agreement with the Dutch embassy – where I perceived that the word agreement was actually referring to negotiations about both sides’ priorities.
6.8 NEGOTIATION

I was sitting at a round table in an air-conditioned office – one of those buildings you could spot from afar, on top of Nakasero hill in Kampala – amid diplomats, business men and women, civil servants and development practitioners working for NGOs. The agenda ambitiously announced we were to discuss the launch of the Belgian platform for agribusiness and thereby also the future of the Belgian-Ugandan cooperation. Facing the undeniable challenge if a decreasing budget for development, the Belgian Embassy had set up this “stakeholders platform” to counteract fragmentation of aid among too many actors.

The Belgian ambassador opened the meeting with a round of introductions, and then proceeded to presenting the viable strategies – all pointing towards an ‘aid to trade’ policy: the embassy would promote private-public-partnerships, support Ugandan entrepreneurship and “open the doors for Belgian private sector companies who want to come to do business in Uganda”. Strategizing partnerships with the private sector was an approach that the ambassador recognized to be similar to that of the Dutch Embassy, “and certainly we want to partner up with our Dutch colleagues and join forces”. As for the meeting itself, the theme of the cooperation between private and public sector meant that a fierce negotiation unfolded between traditional development actors from NGOs, the Embassy representatives, and business men and women.

As a matter of fact, the topic of the support of agribusiness entitled the representatives of private sector to set the agenda of what seemed to be a priority for them, while other development partners appeared to be playing a corollary and supportive role. Part of negotiations were played around the responsibility for training youths for agribusiness and soft skills such as accountability and business planning: actors from private sector companies insisted it was not their responsibility to provide training, while NGO workers argued they had other mandates than training youths to suit private sector labour needs. While the latter stressed the programmes they were bond to implement did not leave them with sufficient flexibility to adjust to market demands, business men and women lamented they could not do all the development work on their own. Belgian civil servants stressed they had set mandates from Brussels that pushed them to invest in education, human rights and partnership and support with the private sector, while the business men and women at the
round table sighted and rebutted that it was time to be pragmatic: the Embassy should facilitate financial frameworks for business development, and invest in opportunities that the private sector was ready to take. Eventually, the result was an agreement that the Embassy would be mapping private sector needs and facilitating interaction with financial and Ugandan governmental institutions, as long as the private sector would take up social responsibility towards Embassy’s target groups (mainly women and youths) in their agribusinesses, with the support of NGOs. The purpose of setting up a platform of different development stakeholders was finalized.

It was particularly interesting to observe the nature of the interaction, for it reflected the Embassy’s prioritization of the private sector interests and the business side of development cooperation. Such dynamics were indicative of the contemporary trend described by Mosse (2013, p. 239) as the positioning of business at the centre and governing at the periphery for the implementation of programmes that enforce a ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ capitalism. The development agencies were strong of their expertise in “making markets work for the poor” but were in the position in which they often had to justify their inability to adjust to market trends and needs.

While at first sight the tuning of development practitioners into a common agenda could be considered an important effort towards cooperation and maximisation of efforts, it should also be taken into consideration that it meant important compromises – and veiled different incentives. As Mosse (2004, p. 664) describes the process through which policies come to be shaped as a discourse that reinforces itself, he stresses how its flaws lay precisely in the interactions, incentives and negotiations:

> Practices and events are too obviously shaped by the logic and demands of institutional relations (and incentives). Indeed, during the ‘implementation phase’ all the diverse and contradictory interests that were enrolled in the framing of an ambiguous policy model and project design, all the contests and contra-dictions that are embedded in policy texts, are brought to life and replayed. (...) So, while the coherence of design unravels in the practical unfolding of a project, everybody is particularly concerned with making, protecting, elaborating and promoting models with the power to organize authoritative
interpretations, concealing operational realities, re-enforcing given models and limiting institutional learning.

Moreover, as many development practitioners have testified during the last follow-up fieldtrip, the development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda is gaining momentum: while a plethora of (governmental and international) guidelines, strategies and recommendations are spreading, donor and private sector budgets increasingly invest in this issue. As the scale and dimension of interests and investments in the theme of youth in agribusiness has been growing in the past few years in Uganda, more and diverse development practitioners are involved. The growth of the attention and resources dedicated to this issue have ambivalent consequences: development agencies develop different expertise and strategies, but the growing scale and number of programmes jeopardizes the ability to maintain flexibility to adapt to heterogeneity on the ground. Diversity within development cooperation, in combination with a steady growth of development resources and incentives for the specific theme of youth engagement in agribusiness creates ambiguity and risks to frustrate outcomes. As the development trend grows to become a multi-million, multi-stakeholders industry, it sustains development of knowledge and expertise, but also fragments and multiplies efforts to please (too) many parties. As Ferguson (2014, p. 19) argues: “A structure always reproduces itself through a process, and through a struggle; and the sense of a structure, Willis shows [Paul Willis’ Marxist analysis of reproducing structures through ‘education’], can only be grasped through that sometimes surprising and ironic process, and never by merely labelling the structure with the name of those whose interests it serves.”

During a long conversation with a lady working for a private sector-oriented development agency (who asked to remain anonymous), she often referred to the negotiations that she had to undergo with private sector partners and with the local governments. I prompted her to elaborate on this theme, asking to what extent she had seen her development programme had changed through negotiations she referred to – and she boldly replied: “Are you kidding? It’s ALL about negotiation!”. In particular, since her agency was providing market linkages with private sector companies in agribusiness, the implementation of their programme had

changed in different regions – according to the value chains and market dynamics the programme was engaging with. While in the design phase of the programme she had theoretically considered all factors the programmes should be tackling to “unlock market system change” – during the implementation phase her ambitious planning came to face the reality and interests of partners in development. Specifically, the private sector companies were responsible for the actual market change, were also determining the shifts in the programme: “all development ideas depend on the market! Actually, on the private sector partner”. Through negotiations with development partners, but also through the adaptation to market opportunities, the development programme changes.

6.9 ‘EMPOWER YOUTH’ – A FAILED PROGRAMME

‘Empower Youth’\textsuperscript{169} is a relatively small development project, a project of the Development Bank – under a broader continent wide programme. It is co-financed by two multilateral donors, and the budget is channelled through a Ugandan Ministry, administered by an NGO which in turn has contracted ‘Agrivalue’, an agribusiness accelerator. The purpose of this three-year project was to pilot a strategy to support young agripreneurs and scale their agribusiness in four Ugandan regions. On the basis of these results, the Development Bank would adjust a larger strategy for a wider and longer-term programme in Uganda. As the pilot project was still setting out its initial steps, and was yet to develop a strategy – the manager had been seeking empirically sound scientific evidence to guide their approach. In this contingency and as a researcher on the theme of youth in agribusiness within IITA – I was able to engage with Agrivalue’s development practitioners and study a stretch of their experience in setting up the project.

On a Wednesday afternoon in May 2018 Agrivalue’s programme director, programme manager and communication officer came to ask IITA advice on the implementation of their Empower Youth scheme: I had the pleasure to attend and get a sense of the politics involved

\textsuperscript{169} Under express request of my informants, I have substituted the all names of development agencies and practitioners to ensure anonymity.
in the interaction between donors, Ministry, coordinating NGO, contractor and youths – who all had different priorities and were pushing for different agendas. The room for manoeuvre and negotiation among the parties was quite spacious: the regions and budgeting had been determined by the Ministry, while Agrivalue was entitled to develop the agribusiness incubation strategy in agreement with the supervising NGO. Moreover, I could see how the project, which officially started in January 2018, had already changed some of the traits that were agreed upon during the first agreements. For instance, although the Ministry had insisted in investing in irrigation techniques, Agrivalue had selected value chains such as beekeeping and fruits processing which did not foresee irrigation but other agricultural technologies.

This meeting unfolds as a mating dance between the representatives of the two organisations: stressing on the qualities of each other, and on the reasons why they may need each other. They speak in turns, alternating jokes, lessons learnt from the field, anecdotes about the poor functioning of the state institutions. At the end of the mating-meeting it was clear to the two directors that they were going to collaborate in the implementation of the programme – using the agronomic knowledge of the research institute to inform the implementation techniques of the agribusiness accelerator. As for me – I was allowed to interview and follow operations in exchange for ‘expert advice’ on the ‘best strategies to engage youths’.

A few days later I interviewed the project manager, and asked how the project had been evolving:

We have an idea of how things should go, but it might change. For example, in the project proposal for the ministry we wrote that we wanted to use online tools for mentorship of the youths in the hubs in the various regions. But then we did a field visit and we realised that there was barely any internet connection: the proposal we submitted to the Ministry won’t work! So how should we mentor the youths? We then thought of taking trained mentors from Kampala to the local hubs. But then we realised that wouldn’t work either because of a number of factors: first of all language – the mentors from here wouldn’t speak the local languages of the youths! Secondly, the youths would listen more to the local community leaders, the people they know
and trust in their environment. They would not establish a connection with the mentors we would send. So what we did was to get in touch with local mentors and trainers from within the community. The mentors should be teaching hands-on knowledge about the daily running of the business – as they themselves had their business they could accompany the youths in the process.

There are several aspects of the development enactment process that emerge from this account. Firstly, the development project had changed over time – despite it was, at the time of the interview, only 4 months old. Regardless of the proposal that had been approved by the Ministry, the project needed to adjust to unforeseen traits of youths’ reality on the ground, for two reasons: the hard fact of youths’ lack of accessibility to internet connection, but also the capacity of extension services to approach them effectively. The fact that they had not thought of these issues upfront was a revealing yet problematic aspect: it reflects a top-down approach that was not grounded on empirical evidence of the needs and capacities of youths on the ground. By choosing a different strategy, however, the project is adapted to the reality on the ground: not only the local language is necessary in communication, but also the trust relations with the community leaders is perceived by the programme manager as important strategies for the implementation of the programme.

While the programme manager reflected on the ways in which they had been adjusting the project to youths’ reality – I was also able to observe how such process unfolded: I attended a meeting in which Agrivalue discussed beekeeping business strategies with one potential ‘local mentor’. Agrivalue had selected beekeeping as a suitable business for one of the sub-regions they were going to implement their agribusiness incubation project, and had requested a representative of the biggest private sector in the honey business to come to Kampala and discuss a strategy to work together. The private sector company would be in charge of the training of the youths selected by Agrivalue to be part of the scheme – and the two parties needed to negotiate the time frame and conditions for such training: Agrivalue had already allocated budget and amount of days in their planning, coming in tension with the honey company’s intention to follow Ministerial guidelines for beekeeping. They finally found a compromise, and moved on to discussing the profit margin the honey company would be allowed to keep from collecting honey produced by youths.
Unfortunately, such negotiations with the private sector partner would have been frustrated by negotiations at a higher level, between Agrivalue, Ministry and coordinating NGO. Despite having sensed that there were tensions in their relations, I had not expected to observe how their interaction could cause a drastic change of perspectives for the project. It came as a cold shower on meeting in which we were supposed to discuss the implementation strategy.

I arrived at a meeting where I was to discuss the implementation strategy for the pilot project in one of the four target regions and found there is a lot of trepidation: whispered half-words about “big changes”, and bad-terms relations with the Ministry, and “the way forward” were on the mouth of everyone sitting at the round table. I understand half of what is going on, but I also understand it was not the right moment to ask questions. Finally, the project director, Sarah, sat down with me and gave me a short overview about what had been discussed before my arrival. She explained that ‘something happened’ and that she is not anymore willing to go along the ineffective cooperation with the Ministry.

Sarah explained that “corruption is just too much – they don’t work towards an effective implementation of this project, they just want to get as much profit as possible from the fund, and don’t allow me to get any closer to the donors. I wanted to report all of what is happening along the structure, because they [donors] are unaware of the mismanagement of their money.” I perceived how disappointment and desolation had already left space for anger and frustration. “I’m withdrawing – I don’t want to be part of this system even if this means that the programme is not proceeding with us. I’m going to do this myself – I have learnt from the past months and seen opportunities to make a business model of this. I’m just looking for funding to get started.”

Sarah had already told me in several instances how the relation with the government parties was problematic, slow and inefficient – and how she was not going to comply with a number of their demands, which she thought didn’t make any sense (in terms of business opportunities for the agribusiness hubs). But this was the first instance I had ever heard where the relation was so bad that it would break the deal. I was surprised by how easily a project that was supposedly grounded as a strong operation, in the collaboration with multiple development parties could crumble for the decision of one of them. At the same time, it was an indication of the nature of negotiations among the parties involved.
6.10 CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE MISMATCH

Wary of a body of literature that, in the past decades, has focused its attention on the power dynamics between ‘top’ and ‘down’, and the gap that such dynamics trigger – I have explored the gap between policies and practices in my own field of development study. Bringing together the analysis carried out in the previous chapters, I have here confronted the results of development practitioners and youths’ narratives and practices. Furthermore, I have examined the dynamics on the ground as the implementation of the programmes bring together youths’ and development practitioners’ narratives and practices. This chapter explores the tensions between and within two groups of development actors – practitioners and recipients – to understand whether, how and why a mismatch between policies and practices emerges in the unfolding of the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness. It argues that such gap can be explained through an analysis of the dynamics within the development ‘top’ and ‘bottom’. On the one hand the issues of adaptation and negotiation that emerge from the analysis of implementation practices at the ‘top’ (namely, among development practitioners). On the other, the variety of outcomes of the programmes on the ground, which were influenced by the heterogeneity factors characterising youths in their specific cultural and socio-economic contexts.

The perceptions of youths and practitioners of the implementation of programmes reveal how the outcomes of programmes are more than the translation of policies into practices. In fact, through implementation, the significance of the social category of youth emerges for its power as a driving metaphor. Different development organisations, according to their internal incentives and political agenda, have a stake in the ‘use’ of the metaphor of youth beyond the declared intentions of the programmes. Naturally, I do not disregard the socio-economic reasons for paying attention to the social category of youth. However, the construction of a discourse around it mobilises and reinforces power relations.

While the demographic boom in Uganda is an objective reason of concern, the targeting of the youths themselves as a social category – rather than the structural factors contributing to their unemployment – remains unjustified. There is an overlooked need for structural market
system change, such as the investment in other sectors than agriculture, or the lack of infrastructures and legislations that would allow for employability of the Ugandan population (among which, the young generations). Despite these tangible deficiencies, the focus of development programmes lay on youths. Besides the social impact of these programmes, there are social and political consequences: for instance, as I argued above, the creation of a scrutinized social category that allows the government to control the electorate, or international development agencies to provide commodified development services.

Furthermore, I have compared the narratives and practices of the two groups of development actors: development practitioners and youths. From this comparative analysis, a mismatch emerges between the two groups’ narratives and practices. How could this mismatch be explained? I found that the social category of youth (18-35), being so heterogeneous, was misleading of the programmes – often targeting homogeneously (yet with different development approaches) young farmers with different capacities and constraints.

Few development programmes and projects manage to adapt to the heterogeneous reality of youths on the ground: most programmes do not need to engage in negotiations with multiple parties. On the contrary, those programmes that involve bigger budgets, little flexibility and a range of several development partners to conciliate – run the risk of being stuck in development negotiations. I have analysed how development programmes fiercely negotiated both at formal round-table discussions as in informal interactions. As Mosse (Mosse, 2004, p. 663) explains, it is not an inherent quality of ‘good policies’ to be unimplementable,

Or, rather than ‘unimplementable’, we should say that policy goals come into contradiction with other institutional or ‘system goals’ (Latour, 1996: 92) such that policy models are poor guides to understanding the practices, events and effects of development actors, which are shaped by the relationships and interests and cultures of specific organizational settings.

As I have shown through the analysis of the case study, relationships, interests, and cultures of organizational settings, when brought together at the negotiation table, can hinder the unfolding of the project to the point of making it collapse.
While my analysis is certainly partial and only considers selected development practices, it does allude to the importance of studying power dynamics and relations at the same time between and within groups of development actors. Development studies have explained the power dynamics between top and bottom within a dualistic understanding of development as a structure that is formed, embodied, reproduced and enforced through agency. However, for as much as this paradigm helps understand the dynamics between and within these development categories, it does not explain how development programmes evolve from design to implementation and outcome – sometimes failing along the way. My analysis suggests that it is the study of both dynamics between and within these categories at the same time that allow us to explain outcomes and the mismatch between policies and practices. In fact, my data show that there is such ‘messiness’ in the way development unfolds, that it indicates that development does not unfold as a structure enforced onto the social reality of recipients, but rather as a dialectic process, emerging property, that is created through all the narratives and practices of all development actors.

The ‘messiness’ of the unfolding process of programmes implementation, has nevertheless concrete impacts on the ground. These impacts, which I have analysed separately for each of the development approaches, reinforce the power of the constructed knowledge category of youth that, by remaining fuzzy and ‘empty’, constitutes a ‘driving metaphor’ for development action. By studying the ‘messy actualities’ that characterize development practices around youth in agribusiness in Uganda, demonstrate that the messiness and diversity of narratives and practices in development do not neatly fit a coherent Foucauldian understanding of development unless practices and relations are studied in their interactive and processual nature – “the complex conjunctures where multiple powers coincide”. “Empowerment is still, in short, a relationship of power” (Murray Li, 2007, p. 275) – yet a relationship that emerges within and between groups of development practitioners and recipients.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

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7.1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The focus and strategies of development in Africa has changed over time, from structural adjustment, to market liberalisation, to health, environment or gender issues. The identified bottlenecks for development drove policies, budgets and programmes – creating trends in development policy making. Recently, development concern has turned its attention to demographic growth and youth unemployment challenges. The average age of the African population is half as much that of the population in the European Union, so the social category of youth includes a growing share of the population across the continent.

This category, however, is mostly defined as an age range – which differs per development agency or government (Sommers, 2015). Given the extent of the population in this age range, across the continent or even just within one country, the social category of ‘youth’ has little explanatory power of who the youths actually are. Moreover, as target of increased development attention, specific knowledge would be required to tackle their capacities and constraints. However, recent programmes for youth are homogeneously targeting this social category with the aim of engaging them in agribusiness. In fact, despite rapid economic growth of African countries, the labour market is not yet able to absorb the growing population, and the majority of young Africans is already engaged in agriculture.

It is, therefore, unclear what the rationale is for engaging youth in agribusiness. There is little evidence that it would be the majority of youths’ aspiration, nor the most effective way of tackling youth unemployment. This puzzle around the social category of youth, in combination with youths’ engagement in agribusiness, triggered the question of the thesis: *how has the recent trend in development been constructed and what has its impact so far has been?*

The focus of the research has been that of understanding the adoption and implementation of new trend in development; therefore, I have focused on a major recipient of ODA: Uganda. The political economic history of the country has shown an emblematic relation with the ‘development industry’ over the past decades. With a very young population, Uganda has a representative demographic composition in comparison to other sub-Saharan countries.
This chapter is structured as follows. First (sections 7.2 and 7.3), I will summarise the results of the two-fold research question: 1) how through narratives and practices the category of youths has driven the recent trend around agribusiness; and 2) what the impact has been so far. I will also problematize the focus on the ‘gap between policies and practices’, which has occupied many scholars in development studies. In section 7.4, I confront my results with the existing academic literature, showing how my study contributes to a better understanding of the recent development trend. In this section, I also outline the potential implications of my study for other countries. Before concluding, I discuss (section 7.5) the shortcomings of my research and recommendations for future research. In the final section (section 7.6), I elaborate some policy recommendations, focusing on the most practice-oriented results that can be useful for development practitioners. I conclude (sub-section 7.6.3) with a short reflection on the implications of my research for conflict studies.

7.2 YOUTH IN AGRIBUSINESS

In this section, I outline the ways in which the category of youth has driven the development trend around agribusiness in Uganda. An analysis of how the development discourse was constructed also illuminates the rationales of this trend. I draw from the empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6) and confront the results with the literature in critical development studies.

The analysis of development practitioners’ narratives in chapter 4 showed that youths are defined as an age range representing both a threat and hope for development. While international development organisations are more concerned about the ‘youth bulge’, Ugandan agencies are more concerned about youth unemployment as a threat to the stability of the country. In both cases, youths are identified both as the ‘development problem’ as the target of development strategies. The social category of youth is invested of the responsibility of being ‘drivers of change’ – provided they change their mindset towards commercial agribusiness. I have recorded, across all 17 development organisations approached, a polarisation of perspectives on youths: narratives ranged from a description of youths as a ‘ticking time bomb’ to the optimistic portrayal of youths as the hope and future of Uganda. The development narrative on the social category of youth recall the instable
development discourse on economic development in the continent. Jerven (2015, p. 123) argues that “narratives on African economic development can switch from one extreme to the other so swiftly. Of course, the truth lies somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘tragedies’. We went from a rhetoric of ‘Bottom Billion’ to ‘Africa Rising’ within half a decade.” Development cooperation, is contingent to its socio-historical context. The analysis of how the development discourse around youth in agribusiness evolved sheds light on the politics driving one strategy rather than another.

Despite the awareness of the great socio-cultural and economic disparity across Ugandan regions, the development narrative strikingly lacks a problematization of the social category of ‘youth’. In fact, development actors explained that their programmes had a regional focus. However, they themselves lamented not having empirical evidence on what youths’ capacities and constraints were, across the country. In chapter 5 (‘Youthnography’), as emerging from my interviews with youths themselves, I identified 13 heterogeneity factors clustered in three main dimensions socio-cultural, territorial and value-chain embedding. These dimensions had a strong influence in shaping both youths’ identity and their experience in agribusiness. As a result, the identity and agribusiness practices of youths across the country were extremely diverse.

In chapter 6, I compared the narratives and practices of the two groups of social actors – development practitioners and youths. Youths’ heterogeneity was not reflected in the narratives I had collected in development agencies in Kampala, anticipating a discrepancy of perspectives and practices also in the implementation phase of the programmes. A discrepancy emerged from the confrontation of perceptions and aspirations of youths and development practitioners on who the youths in Uganda are and what their role in agribusiness should become.

The vagueness of definitions of youths by development agencies do not reflect the complex heterogeneity of identities and agribusiness experiences I recorded. The social category of youths, thus, emerges as an ambiguous concept that means everything and nothing at the same time. Ugandan and international organisations have defined on this social category as an age range. But an age bracket does not have the explanatory power to account for the heterogeneity I encountered on the ground. What is the rationale of using such category as
main focus of multi-million development programmes? Mosse (2004, p. 663) suggested the use, in development policy making, of fuzzy concepts as ‘mobilizing metaphors’ for development:

Policy discourse generates mobilizing metaphors (‘participation’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’, ‘social capital’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute agency and to multiply criteria of success within project.

As a mobilizing metaphor, ‘youth’ has in fact had the power of driving a trend in development with the most disparate approaches and theories of change.

I have asked development practitioners about their organisations’ views on youths’ engagement in agribusiness, and from the interviews emerged a variegated range of theories of change. The variety of conceptualisations of development problem, vision and strategy for change show the heterogeneity characterising this trend in development in Uganda. In fact, this trend is not a unilateral, homogeneous process. Such heterogeneity is also reflected in the variety of different development approaches of the development programmes aiming to engage youths in agribusiness.

According to Mosse (2004, p. 648, italics original), the formulation of development policies and programmes is driven by a political agenda:

The first proposition is that policy (development models, strategies and project designs) primarily functions to mobilize and maintain political support, that is to legitimize rather than to orientate practice. Anybody who has been involved in project formulation knows that this is work which is technically expressed (as project designs) but politically shaped (by the interests and priorities of agencies). Project design is the art, firstly of making a convincing argument and developing a causal model (relating inputs, outputs and impacts) oriented upwards to justify the allocation of resources by validating higher policy goals; and secondly of bringing together diverse, even incompatible, interests — of national governments, implementing agencies, collaborating NGOs, research institutions, or donor advisers of different hues.
Such political dimension of development programmes for youth in agribusiness emerged in the analysis of how programmes changed over time (chapter 6). From the observation of how development programmes are negotiated among different stakeholders, different agendas and incentives emerge as determinant factors changing the course of development programmes. Tensions between agendas and incentives showed how tensions emerged also within the group development actors at the top. This adds to the body of literature in development studies that focused on discrepancies between development actors at the top and bottom. Furthermore, in the following section, I report the discrepancy within the development practices at the bottom.

7.3 SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMMES, SO FAR

The variety of theories of change of development organisations translated in a variety of programmes that were implemented on the ground. In chapter 6, I analysed what their impact has been, from the perspectives of youths. Considering the heterogeneity of development approaches and the heterogeneity of youths across the country, the outcomes and impact of the programmes were also heterogeneous. There were two main variables influencing the diversity of outcomes: the regional variety and the development approaches (public vs private-sector driven). Within these two variables, the heterogeneity factors described in chapter 5 played an important role in diversifying the impact of programmes. For instance, the same programme in the same location would have different impact on males or females (gender being one of the heterogeneity factors). In most cases, while young males could dispose of the economic improvement obtained through agribusiness, female counterparts were not allowed (by their husbands) to retain their income for themselves. Another example, regarding the factors of ethnicity and embeddedness in the value chain: programmes addressing the dairy sector in the south-west region had a stronger impact on youth from the bahima ethnic group, which historically and culturally have a tradition in this value chain.

Besides the heterogeneity of outcomes (described in chapter 5) there were three general outcomes, homogeneously distributed across the country.
First, the absence of political or civic engagement amongst youths. Men and women I spoke to did not identify themselves as ‘youth’, despite being targeted by programmes as youth. Despite the mobilization of ministries, politicians, international organisations, media and budgets for the Ugandan ‘youths’, I recorded scarce awareness of their potential as a majoritarian share of the population. ‘Youth’ was, to young farmers in programmes targeting them, not a political category: belonging to the category of youth, culturally, is associated with not having obtained the status of adults. Only adulthood is a social status that allows access to political and social decision-making. Youths felt, across the country, insulted when (mistakenly) approached as youth, while having obtained the social status of adults (for example through circumcision, for males). Youth was, to them, a condition to exit through attainment of socio-economic status.

Second, agribusiness was considered a springboard to obtain the socio-economic status to access adulthood. Agriculture is still the major sector employing the Ugandan population, and commercial agriculture is perceived as a better income generating activity than subsistence agriculture. Despite the fact that youth experience agribusiness very diversely across the country, amongst my interviewees agribusiness was generally considered as the most accessible way to work up the ladder of socio-economic status. In this way, agribusiness could be considered a ‘rite of passage’ for youths to access adulthood. In this way, their requests and expectations from development programmes were mostly related to the improvement of their economic status. The most common requests regarded irrigation systems, tractors and quality inputs (seeds and chemicals). These requests reveal their pragmatic views on the programmes as benchmarks for obtaining the socio-economic status for adulthood.

Third, I observed a gap between development policies and programmes implemented. This gap was at two levels: on the one hand, there was a gap between practitioners’ narratives and practices. On the other hand, there was a gap between the intended and actual outcomes as perceived by youths. In the following sub-section (7.3.1), I will delve into the problematization of these two gaps.
7.3.1 MIND THE GAP

In chapter 6, I focussed on the practices of both groups of development actors to explore the synergies and discrepancies between and within the narratives of the two groups. I examined the ways in which development programmes unfolded in the implementation phase. I analysed the perceptions, impact and outcomes of different development approaches. From this analysis, it emerged that while development practitioners were concerned about access to land, capital and markets, youths’ constraints in agribusiness were heavily influenced by other heterogeneity factors, such as family background, gender and location. Besides the heterogeneity factors, which in their three dimensions played a crucial role in influencing the implementation of programmes, the outcomes of the programmes differed according to the approach used (public vs private sector driven).

As for the public-sector approach, there was a substantial discrepancy between the political agenda of development practitioners and youths understanding of the programme. In the central and south-western region, youths reported their disappointment with corruption: the start-up capital was intended by practitioners as ‘political money’ in times of election. In the majority of cases YLP officers had trouble retrieving the loan, because the start-up capital was often perceived as a political handout (to buy votes). There was a great discrepancy in the ways in which the programme was politicised, more in central and south-western regions than in the north. The most successful YLP groups were in the north and intended the programme as a way to strengthen the distressed social relations after the war, while building a self-help saving scheme in the meantime.

As for the private-sector driven approach, there was a discrepancy between the embedding of youths in the value chain and the interests of companies setting up the out-growing schemes. In fact, oftentimes the companies required the youths to work in value chains that were not the main focus of their household or agribusiness. The most successful outcomes were in the environments where the private sector companies were investing in value chains grounded socio-culturally in the local environment (e.g. dairy sector in the south-west). The majority of youths working as contract-farmers were satisfied with the improved income, but they were in a position of dependency rather than of entrepreneurship (contrary to the
proposed theory of change). In fact, the company constituted both the input and output market for their produce.

Moreover, only a few development agencies adapted their development strategies to fit (or exploit) the heterogeneous agribusiness and socio-cultural environments in which youths were embedded. Here the Foucauldian approach was useful to gain a deeper understanding of the gaps both between and within development practitioners and beneficiaries. Within a Foucauldian approach, development is understood as a dialectic process where agency within the top and bottom are as explanatory as the power relation between the two. I argued that it is the very dynamics at the top, which I analysed in terms of negotiation practices, that shape the relations with and within the bottom. As the trend on youths in agribusiness grew to a multi-million ‘industry’ the negotiations among development practitioners’ collided with the necessity to be adaptive to the heterogeneous reality of youths on the ground.

7.4 ETHNOGRAPHY OF DEVELOPMENT AND FOUCAULT

I was able to bring to light the heterogeneity in development, and its ‘messy actualities’ (Murray Li, 2007, p. 282), thanks to the ethnographic research methods I adopted. In particular, an anthropological approach to the study of development as discourse accurately applied the Foucauldian approach to the study of power and discourse. While Foucault invited us to study power relations and discourse as a process that circulates and is in the hands of all social actors, many scholars in development have used a Foucauldian approach without exiting the dualistic paradigm of domination (see chapter 2). With this study, I show that through ethnographic research methods it is possible to overcome such dualistic approach and explore the power mechanisms within development. In fact, my study shows that the development trend around youth in agribusiness materializes in a complex context of relations, with negotiations of different interests and agendas and adaptation to different contexts. The dynamics highlighted in my research stress that the enactment of a trend is far more complex than bilateral relation between development practitioners (‘top’) and ‘beneficiaries’ (‘bottom’).
Rather than focusing on how a policy was enacted, enforced from the top to the bottom, I studied how the trend around youth emerged, through the narratives and practices all social actors involved. This study is in line with the Foucauldian understanding of power as a circulating rather than bilateral process, in the hands of all social actors.

The study of narratives, in particular, is crucial ‘to explore how subjectivities were produced’ (Murray Li, 2007, p. 282). The social category of youth, which until recently was only considered a brief liminal phase, became the object of much development attention. ‘Youth’ was constructed in different ways by the narratives of the development actors I interviewed, contributing to the emergence of a social category. In the following sub-sections I spell out the ways in which such subjectivities (youths, 7.4.1) were produced and the development discourse (agribusiness, 7.4.2) in which they were incorporated. The production of such subjectivities and development discourse can be considered the ‘unintended effects’ (Ferguson, 2014) of this development trend.

7.4.1 YOUTH

As discussed above, development practitioners and youths had different understandings of what this social category means in Uganda. In particular, ‘youth’ loses explanatory power in light of the vague definitions by development organisations (as discordant age ranges) and the heterogeneity of youths across the country. Yet, in the course of the years (2015-2018) I spent studying this development trend in Uganda, it turned into a multi-million development industry. Interestingly, the trend grew despite the fact that the major ‘development problems’ identified in the theories of change of the organisations were structural rather than youth-specific: demographic bulge, youth unemployment and stability, and agricultural modernisation.

Moreover, from the analysis of the implementation of the programmes emerged that approaching such a broad and heterogeneous segment of the population was often misleading. The programmes that had the most successful impact for youths’ engagement in agribusiness were those that adapted to their specificities. Youths themselves had mixed opinions on the same programme because of the heterogeneity factors characterising their
experience of agribusiness. In fact, the heterogeneity factors were often more determinant for youths' success in agribusiness than the actual impact of the programmes. Therefore, the social category of youth stood out as a fuzzy concept in development narratives. Yet it still functioned as a ‘mobilizing metaphor’ (Mosse, 2004, p. 663).

In light of the Foucauldian theoretical approach I sketched in chapter 1, as a ‘mobilizing metaphor’, ‘youth’ can be described as a dispositief of power in the construction of a development discourse. ‘Youth’ for development practitioners is the subject of knowledge inscribed in the power system of development programmes and relations. ‘Youth’ for the youths is a heterogeneous and concrete experience, a phase in life to be escaped to access adulthood through economic status. As a category of development knowledge, constructed through narratives at different levels, ‘youth’ justifies the (re)enforcement of power relations tangled in the development industry. In this context, it is not the actual individual youths (with their particularities and heterogeneity) to be at the core of development focus: the theories of change of practitioners were concerned with general rather than actual youths, with the ‘mobilizing metaphor’ of youth, the conceptual category. In the study of micro-physics of power in ‘Discipline and Punish’, Foucault reflects on the construction of power-knowledge relations that go beyond the actual subject of knowledge and domination (in his case, the body of the punished, in my case the youths). Foucault’s analysis (Foucault M., 1975, p. 27-28) is revealing:

These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.

In the case of the construction of a development discourse around youth, the focus of the analysis is not whether youths are ‘useful or resistant to the power’ relations in which they are built-in. Rather, youths as a social category have entered the domains of knowledge-
power. With this new trend in development, a share of the Ugandan population – a majoritarian one – has entered in the realm of ‘social gardening’ (Scott J., 1998) and development politics (Ferguson, 2014).

Of particular relevance, this social category also constitutes the majority of the voting population. The political relevance of this social group is evident for governmental agencies that are subject to the strong power of Museveni, who came to power in 1986 when 78% of the current Ugandan population was yet to be born. In fact, the regime of Museveni has been considered an example of ‘personal rule’ in post-colonial Africa (Carbone, 2015, p. 42). Since the past election were rigged, it would seem that youths’ political opinion (which increasingly supports the opposition) is not actually taken into account. However, the democratic guise of the regime needs to contain the increasing dissatisfaction and tensions, which in the past year have generated violent demonstrations and social tensions. It can be argued that there is a political interest in showing that the issue of the ‘youth bulge’ and youth unemployment has been addressed with development programmes, considering that youth constitute a wide share of the electorate. In particular, the public sector programme (Youth Livelihood Programme) was politically manipulated in several regions where it was implemented, with the scope of winning votes – as reported by my informants.

7.4.2 AGROBUSINESS

The development discourse around youth clearly proposes agribusiness as solution for unemployment. In development narratives, this was described as a win-win solution, as it would tackle unemployment and at the same time contribute to the modernisation of agriculture and economic growth. In fact, the majority of youths in Uganda is already engaged in agriculture, although mostly subsistence agriculture. There is also little evidence that agribusiness would indeed be the best solution for youths’ employment and there is little evidence youth prefer this career path. On the contrary, among the youths I interviewed, only a minority saw agribusiness as voluntary career aspiration.

Yet, agribusiness emerged in the recent trend in development, as promising strategy – in which the majority of youths could be employed. The youths themselves adopted this
narrative and envisioned agribusiness as a strategy to gain economic status and thereby adulthood. In this way, the discourse on agribusiness and the identity of youths as agripreneurs was adopted by all actors in development rather than being imposed. Agribusiness became, for youths in Uganda (and elsewhere in the continent), what Scott (1998, p. 83) refers as the “authoritative tune to which most population must dance”.

However, in my study, it became clear that besides few pockets of success (in terms of economic improvement through agribusiness) the outcomes of programmes targeting youths’ engagement in agribusiness were variegated and limited. In particular, it was clear that besides few motivated entrepreneurs (who often had not even benefitted from development schemes), the majority was going to be employed as contract-farmers rather than agripreneurs. The very neoliberal model of agribusiness which centralises power in the hands of few agripreneurs, would be able to absorb a limited number of youths – leaving the majority to labour or at all excluded. Within the discourse stressing the responsibility of youths to adopt an agripreneurial mindset, those who served as contract farmers or simply continued as subsistence farmers failed in the project. Ferguson (2014, p. 19) considered the aspect of failure in development in the light of the Foucauldian study of the genealogy of the prison:

The prison, Foucault shows, was created as a “correctional” institution. It was intended to imprint on the inmates the qualities of good citizenship...[but] prisons do not in fact “reform criminals; that, on the contrary, they make nearly impossible that return to “normality” that they have always claimed to produce (...). While such a result must be conceived as a “failure” from the point of view of the planners’ intentions, the result has quite a different character when apprehended as part of a different “strategy”. (...) the prison did end up serving as part of a system of social control. (...) The point to be taken from the above argument is only that planned interventions may produce unintended outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control – authorless “strategies”, in Foucault’s sense – that turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility.

Within the context of failure of development cooperation, Ferguson focuses on the ‘unintended outcomes’ rather than on the actual effectiveness of the programmes: whether
development works or does not, is only relevant to some extent. Within the Foucauldian paradigm, Ferguson considers the effect of development “strategies” of social control. The prison may fail to reform criminals, but it instils a peculiar concept of illegality in the minds of others; again, while prisons fail to eliminate crime, they produce delinquents as “pathologized subjects”. In the realm of development studies, Ferguson transposes the unintended effects of failures of development programmes as de-politicization of issues of poverty and pathologization of development beneficiaries. In the case of the trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda, the imposition of ‘agribusiness’ in the development discourse is a normative strategy that as a consequence pathologizes unsuccessful agripreneurs and subsistence farmers.

7.4.3 HETEROGENEITY AND GAPS

A recurrent theme in my study was ‘heterogeneity’ – of the theories of change, of the programmes, of the outcomes and of the youths. Such heterogeneity emerged from the data and invited me to problematize my approach to development. While scholars in critical development studies (Scott J., 1998; Escobar, 2012; Ferguson, 2014; Murray Li, 2007) examined development as a negotiated, resisted or oppressing relation between the development apparatus and its beneficiaries, the messiness of the reality I examined on the ground invited to look beyond this binary contraposition. Development programmes changed over time for a variety of reasons: regional disparities jeopardized or required changes in approaches; there were negotiations and/or conflicting incentives among stakeholders implementing the programmes; programs were forced to adapt to the heterogeneous reality of youths across the country; there were tensions between youths and local authorities or development practitioners, as well as tensions among the youths for the management of group decisions.

The observation of the processes of implementation of the programmes highlighted the complex reality of development: far messier than a unilateral enactment of policies into practices. Power relations articulated within besides between groups of development practitioners and youths. This result reinforces the argument of Foucault that “power
circulates” (1976, p. 29) and is thus to be analysed beyond the dualistic model of domination/resistance between a top and bottom.

Moreover, through my analysis, it becomes clear that however ‘good’ development policies are, it is a range of different practices, engaging a variety of actors, that will determine the success of these policies. At the same time, it is hard to evaluate the success of programmes because of their transient nature and the disparate definitions of success within the various agencies. In line with Mosse (2004, p. 663), “policy models are poor guides to understanding the practices, events and effects of development actors, which are shaped by the relationships and interests and cultures of specific organizational settings”.

Overcoming the contraposition between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, problematizes the classic development question of the gap between policies and practices. In fact, I have argued that programmes change, adapt or even fail because of relations on the ground, power relations and conflicting incentives. In my research, I have identified tensions at all levels, within as much as between groups of social actors, abstract policies and actual implementation practices and outcomes. Consequently to these tensions, gaps emerged at different levels: between the narratives of youths on their identity, which was substantially different across the country and between genders; between governmental and international agencies on the best approach to tackle agribusiness; between the policies and the practices through which they were implemented; between narratives of development practitioners on how they intended the programmes and how they were perceived by youths. Therefore, it is necessary to re-frame the focus of analysis and investigate tensions in development beyond the classic question of ‘development policies and practices’. The gaps emerging from my analysis show that development is more than the enactment of policies into practices. In this way, I add to the conclusion of Mosse (2004) that (good) development policy is unimplementable: not only because of the internal incentives of development agencies, but because the reality of development enactment is more heterogeneous and messy than the dual paradigm of policies and practices.
7.5 DISCUSSION

This study meant to investigate a trend in development as a discursive process, using a Foucauldian approach. The ethnographic approach allowed me to study power as something that circulates rather than being imposed, through the examination of narratives and practices of social actors in development. As Mosse (2004, p. 663) argues, with reference to Scott: “The ‘public transcripts’ of development are sustained by the powerful and the subordinate, both of whose interests lead them to ‘tactically conspire to misrepresent’ (Scott, 1990: 2). In development, we cannot speak of policy controlling or disciplining, being resisted or subverted.” With this in mind, my research suggests the need to remove development from the dualistic logic of domination and resistance, top and bottom. Capitalizing on an ethnographic approach is one way to do this:

An ethnography of policy in the making focuses on both policy practice and performance and brings out the actual behavioural, unofficial, and unintended aspects of policy-making. More ethnographic and anthropological work could permit us to deepen our understanding of the performative and imaginative dimensions of policy-making. Actual observation in the flow of events could help to understand policy better as an ongoing process of representation to mobilise support. It would reveal that this takes place through a variety of social and material practices, means, and events. (Rap, 2006, p. 1319)

In fact, ‘the observation in the flow of events’ inherent to ethnography allows us to study development as a process – its construction through narratives and practices. Perhaps even more importantly, this methodological approach – which pivots on inductive research – accounts for ‘unintended effects’ of development.

As with any study, however, there are limitations in my analysis. First, I have not collected empirical data on the applicability of my results in other African countries. As I have argued in chapter 3, there is little reason to believe the construction of the recent trend in development around youth in agribusiness has followed substantially different paths in regards to narratives and practices in other countries. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that many of the trends I discussed in this dissertation are applicable in other contexts.
Additionally, empirical research in other country contexts, however, would need to verify this. Second, by carrying out multi-sited research, I did not have the opportunity of delving into in-depth ethnographic analysis of one location or group of social actors. This limitation prevented me from collecting exhaustive data on the identity and agribusiness experience of youths. Nevertheless, it allowed for gathering an overview of youths’ heterogeneous narratives and practices across the country. Third, being a white lady and not speaking the local languages, I incurred the risk of misunderstanding or being misunderstood. I have taken several steps to limit such misunderstandings, but these are to some degree inevitable in research of this type. Four, the ethnographic nature of my research, together with time constraints, only allowed the sampling of a limited number of youths. To help limit internal validity concerns, in both the sampling of youth and development agencies, I tried to be as representative as possible and ultimately interviewed over 130 persons for this research. In addition, whenever possible, I validated the narratives of development practitioners by confronting them with their agencies’ policy briefs.

7.6 POLICY ADVICE

Since the topic of this study was directly relevant to development stakeholders, during my fieldwork I was often asked to report back my results. For development practitioners the main question is often ‘what works and what doesn’t’ – not only in terms of efficiency of programmes, but also in terms of strategy for future approaches. In this section, I will therefore focus on two main practice-oriented results of my research. First, the feasibility and assumptions underlying the theories of change of development organisations; second, how to take youths’ heterogeneity into account when addressing their engagement in agribusiness, by considering their diverse identity and constraints.

170 The policy advise presented in this section is based on a working paper (Turolla, Swedlund, Schut, Muchunguzi, & Jassogne, 2018) that was distributed to the majority of the development practitioners I worked with, during the third field trip to Uganda in 2018. With this working paper, I was able to give feedback to organisations that requested to be informed on the outcomes of my study. Moreover, I was able to validate the results of my study by presenting them to my informants. Dr. Haley Swedlund and IITA staff members collaborated in the elaboration of this text.
I will conclude this section with a broader consideration on the implications of my study for conflict prevention, given that youth studies often link the youth bulge to unemployment.

7.6.1 FEASIBILITY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THEORIES OF CHANGE

In general, the trend around youth engagement in agribusiness relies on the assumption that engaging youths in agribusiness will result in a decrease in youth unemployment and a general economic growth and agricultural productivity. Narrowing down to the specific development approaches, I have shown how the main goals and outcomes of two approaches at the extremes of the spectrum are often incongruous. The main public sector programme (YLP) supporting youths in agribusiness was set out to foster youth employment in agribusiness, but through its approach it ends up stimulating informal entrepreneurship along the agri-food value chains. On the other hand, the private sector approach aims at stimulating agripreneurship, but through the popular contract farming schemes it ends up fostering a paid-labour type of employment. Neither of the two outcomes are to be considered failures, but rather unforeseen results of the ‘pathway to change’ they had chosen. However, it is important for the effectiveness of the programmes, to understand whether there is a logical correlation between the three steps of the theory of change.

A deeper understanding of the organisations’ or programmes’ theories of change allows us to set feasible and consequent objectives. Defining the programme’s success and vision upfront should also define the pathway to change. For example, if the aim is youths’ employment, it will be necessary to develop the specific agri-skills necessary for fulfilling their duties in the out-grower scheme – while if the aim is entrepreneurship and spill-over of enterprises, it will be necessary to train them in agri-skills for the ownership of the agribusiness enterprise.

Moreover, I have seen how programmes’ definitions of success were also a guiding principle for the choice of a development approach over another. Different development agencies have different definitions of success, including: repayment of the loans, employment and/or training of youths, boosting of agribusiness production, spill-over effect. For instance, the majority of bilateral development programmes for youths were eventually held accountable for the number of youths trained or employed in an agribusiness firm. As a result, the
incentives to achieve such organisations’ targets were much stronger for development practitioners implementing programmes than their theory of change. Moreover, it can be concluded that success is relative and depends on theories of change, assumptions, and incentives and targets. Depending on their own definitions of success, their programmes can be set up and evaluated differently. Therefore, it can be concluded that the success of the development programmes depends, among others, on three main factors: 1) on the feasibility of the underlying theory of change; 2) on the definition of success; 3) on the extent to which youths’ heterogeneity and specificities are accounted for. In the following section I will explore the latter factor impacting programmes efficiency.

7.6.2 HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR YOUTH HETEROGENEITY

As I have shown in chapter 5, youths are a heterogeneous social group. Capacities, constraints and aspirations of youths in agribusiness vary significantly and require different types of support depending on three dimensions: territorial, socio-cultural and value chain embedding). Such heterogeneity results in diverse agribusiness cultures. Uganda is an extremely diverse country, both in terms of ecosystem and socio-cultural environments as in terms of regional disparities of development (markets, infrastructures, education etc.). Youths agribusiness enterprises incubated in development schemes kick-off better where the programme are embedded in local networks and value chains. Therefore, it is crucial to address youth engagement in agribusiness within their specific context. Considering the heterogeneity of socio-cultural and economic backgrounds of youths should encourage a tailor-made programme design, accounting for at least three factors: a) the age- specific aspirations and abilities; b) their gender based-capacities and constraints; c) their local, culture-bond values and norms around agriculture.

Besides these factors of diversity, gender is probably the most crosscutting indication that youth means different things, and that youths’ ability to engage in agribusiness is not equally distributed. Women in agribusiness have a harder time then male counterparts. In particular, they face discrimination in two main ways: first, accessibility to assets such as land – which is almost exclusively inherited by men; and, second household relations, which don’t allow
them to earn and retain an income (especially if higher than their husbands’). Development programmes accounting for gender disparities with quotas of female participants are thus not enough. Household approaches are more successful in empowering female participation in agribusiness as they tackle the cultural environment generating discrimination. Considering the youth-specific challenges for agribusiness (mainly access to finance and land), it is important to engage the whole household when involving youths in development schemes: in this way, they have more chances of counting on family support for starting up an agribusiness enterprise. This is particularly important for women, where the family and/or spouse’s support is crucial.

7.6.3 THE CONTROL OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AROUND THE ‘YOUTH BULGE’

From the analysis of the theories of change, emerged a conceptualisation of the development problem that relates youth unemployment to issues of social security and political stability. This concern was particularly strong among public sector development practitioners. In their narratives, the ‘youth bulge’ was described as a destabilizing factor, assuming unemployed youths would either steal or join social protests organised by the opposition. There was a clear gender bias in these postulations, whereby the actual threat was constituted by males. Sommers (2015) confirms that also the concerns in international development cooperation are particularly focusing on young males. Moreover, Sommers (ibid) also problematizes the link between youth unemployment and conflict, arguing that there is no direct correlation.

My study shows that development practitioners had little evidence on the actual issues, capacities and constraints of youths at the time they targeted them with development programmes. Moreover, as shown by Sommers (2015), there is little scientific evidence that confirms a causal correlation between youth unemployment and conflict (in Uganda and elsewhere). Even assuming a connection between youth unemployment and instability and insecurity, I question the effectiveness of development programmes for youth in agribusiness as counter-measures. As argued above (section 7.4.2), there is little evidence that shows that the engagement of youths in agribusiness will reduce youths unemployment, let alone halt
social insecurity and conflict. It is hard to imagine an effective approach to secure security and political stability, without a clear understanding of who the youths are, what their issues are and what would trigger youth-led instability and insecurity. The studied development trend was more efficient in the construction of the social category of youth and a development discourse for their engagement in agribusiness, then in securing the stability of the country from the ‘ticking time bomb’ of the ‘youth bulge’.

In fact, as argued in chapter 5 (section 5.4.2), in 2017 and 2018 social unrest took over the streets of the capital, Kampala. Under the lead of Bobi Wine, a singer turned politician, now MP of the opposition, youths called for political change. Bobi Wine has often argued that the current president should give way to a new generation of leaders. His songs voiced youths discontent and called for political action of youths (the majority of the Ugandan population) across the country. Yet, as I have shown in my study, one of the ‘unintended outcomes’ (Ferguson, 2014) of the recent trend for youths in agribusiness was that of creating a social category of ‘youth’ perceived by the youths themselves as a-political. Absorbing youths in the development discourse of agribusiness had the effect of framing their success (in entering adulthood) in agripreneurial terms.

Rather than addressing the (potential) sources of social conflict related to the disproportionate demographic dividend and unemployment, this development trend has (partially) achieved the ‘unintended outcomes’ of social control through the political manipulation of development policies addressing youth unemployment (see sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3). Nevertheless, recently, (urban) youths have started to respond to Bobi Wine’s call for political action: “When the going gets tough, the tough must get going, especially when our leaders have become misleaders and mentors have become tormentors, when freedom of expression becomes a target of suppression opposition becomes our position.”

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171 Ugandan Monitor, article from 7/04/2012, accessed on 29/10/2018:
http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-1381200-ara4ho/index.html
Empowerment is still, in short, a relationship of power.

(Murray Li, 2007, p. 275)
## APPENDIX

### LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS

<table>
<thead>
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<th># Interview</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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TABLE 20. LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS

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LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH YOUTHS

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<td>ws750152</td>
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<td>Eastern</td>
<td>14.06.2017</td>
<td>Hassan</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750153</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>14.06.2017</td>
<td>Adjala + Lucia</td>
<td>female + female</td>
<td>control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750154</td>
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<td>Eastern</td>
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<td>male</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Eastern</td>
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<td>Wilber</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.06.2017</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750161</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>22.06.2017</td>
<td>group discussion</td>
<td>male + female</td>
<td>private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ws750163</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>22.06.2017</td>
<td>Lorna</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750164</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>22.06.2017</td>
<td>Ivan</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750165</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>22.06.2017</td>
<td>Reverend</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>private</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(anonymous)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws750167</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>23.06.2017</td>
<td>Moses</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>control</td>
</tr>
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<td>ws750168</td>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>23.06.2017</td>
<td>Gerald &amp; Kiria</td>
<td>male + male</td>
<td>control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voice 008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>voice009</td>
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<td>voice011</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 21. LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH YOUTHS**

---

**APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4**

**SECTION 4.9 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. African Development Bank</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. USAID</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AgriProFocus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### TABLE 22. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM (INTERNATIONAL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AKORION</th>
<th>Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda</th>
<th>Young Farmers Champions Network</th>
<th>CURAD</th>
<th>Makerere University Kampala</th>
<th>Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries</th>
<th>Ugandan Ministry of Gender,</th>
<th>2/10 = 20%</th>
<th>7/10 = 70%</th>
<th>4/10 = 40%</th>
<th>1/10 = 10</th>
<th>0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>MasterCard Foundation – DYNAMIC project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Triodos Bank – BRAC programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### NATIONAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AKORION</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Young Farmers Champions Network</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CURAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Makerere University Kampala</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Gender,</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

303
### RESULTS

| Labor and Social Development | 3/7 = 42,8% | 1/7 = 14,3% | 7/7 = 100% | 3/7 = 42,8% | 1/7 = 14,3% |

**TABLE 23. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM (NATIONAL)**

---

### ALL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS (17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/17 = 29,4%</td>
<td>8/17 = 47%</td>
<td>11/17 = 64,7%</td>
<td>4/17 = 23,5%</td>
<td>1/17 = 5,9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 24. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM (ALL)**

---

### 4.9B CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE

#### INTERNATIONAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th>Organizing</th>
<th>Mindset change</th>
<th>Market linkages</th>
<th>Ag. inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>AgriProFocus</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>MasterCard Foundation – DYNAMIC project</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Triodos Bank – BRAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programme</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>7/10 = 70%</td>
<td>3/10 = 30%</td>
<td>7/10 = 70%</td>
<td>6/10 = 60%</td>
<td>4/10 = 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 25. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE (INTERNATIONAL)**

---

### TARGETING – INTERNATIONAL

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<th>Targeting BLANKET</th>
<th>Targeting SELECTED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. African Development Bank</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. USAID</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AgriProFocus</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AVSI</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ICCO</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ZOA</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. MasterCard Foundation – DYNAMIC project</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Triodos Bank – BRAC programme</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESULTS**

0% | 10/10 = 100%

**TABLE 26. DATA - TARGETING (INTERNATIONAL)**

---

### NATIONAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th>Organizing</th>
<th>Mindset change</th>
<th>Market linkages</th>
<th>Ag. inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. AKORION</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young Farmers Champions Network</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>CURAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Makerere University Kampala</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESULTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2/7 = 28.6%</th>
<th>7/7 = 100%</th>
<th>5/7 = 71.4%</th>
<th>7/7 = 100%</th>
<th>4/7 = 57%</th>
<th>4/7 = 57%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TABLE 27. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE (NATIONAL)**

---

**TARGETING – NATIONAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Targeting ALL</th>
<th>Targeting SELECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>AKORION</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Young Farmers Champions Network</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>CURAD</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Makerere University Kampala</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ugandan Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4/7 = 57%</th>
<th>3/7 = 43%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TABLE 28. DATA - TARGETING (NATIONAL)**

## CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE – ALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th>Organizing</th>
<th>Mindset change</th>
<th>Market linkages</th>
<th>Ag. inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/17 = 11.8%</td>
<td>14/17 = 82.3%</td>
<td>8/17 = 47.1%</td>
<td>14/17 = 82.3%</td>
<td>10/17 = 58.8%</td>
<td>8/17 = 47.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 29. DATA - CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PATHWAY TO CHANGE (ALL)**

## TARGETING – ALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting ALL</th>
<th>Targeting SELECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/17 = 23.5%</td>
<td>13/17 = 76.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 30. DATA - TARGETING (ALL)**

## 4.9C CLUSTERING OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS BY APPROACHES

### Private sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKORION National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYNAMIC International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSI International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy of the Netherlands International</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 6/17 development organizations = 35,3% | 1/6 national - 5/6 international = 16,7% - 83,3% |

**TABLE 31. CLUSTERING OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS BY APPROACHES (PRIVATE SECTOR)**

### Public sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUK National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAIF National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGLSD National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/17 development organizations = 29.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 32. CLUSTERING OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS BY APPROACHES (PUBLIC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>YOFCU</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOFCHAN</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURAD</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AgriProFocus</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17 development organizations = 35.3%</td>
<td>3/6 national, 3/6 international = 50% - 50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 33. CLUSTERING OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS BY APPROACHES (OTHER)**


Butler, E., & Kebba, A. (2014). *Youth and Agriculture in Uganda: An Assessment Combining agriculture improvements and youth development shows promise for both*. Washington: USAID.


