A THEORETICAL FRAME ANALYZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

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ABSTRACT:
The aim of this treatise is to propose an analytical framework that gives insight into where territorial expansion is most likely to happen and to give an example application. There are two distinctions that set apart the framework developed here and almost every other framework dealing with territorial expansion: 1) this framework attempts to account for both forcible and amenable expansion under a single rubric, and, 2) this framework is not concerned with explaining the specific reasons which drive an actor to expand. Rather the concern is the circumstances that make territorial expansion more or less likely to come to pass. These two differences lend to creating a framework that is much more versatile in its application and the ability to produce intelligence that is actionable in understanding the likelihood of territorial expansion, which in turn is more useful in proposing apt foreign-policy when dealing with the potential of shifting borders. This is a completely new and innovative way of looking at and understanding territorial expansion. To my knowledge there is no other framework dealing with territorial expansion in the way it is dealt with here.
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I. Chapter 1- Introduction

The aim of this treatise is to propose an analytical framework that gives insight into where territorial expansion is most likely to happen and to give an example application. The present body of literature tends to focus on explaining territorial expansion in the context of the reasons that drive an actor to undertake policies of expansion. Here we take a different approach. Firstly, this study is not concerned with explaining the specific reasons that drive an actor to expand. Rather the concern is the circumstances in which territorial expansion is likely to come to pass. An explanatory exploration into the reasons that drive an actor to want to enact policies of territorial expansion is very different from an exploration into the conditions that make territorial expansion more or less likely. This difference can be better understood if one imagines a situation where an actor wants to enact policies of territorial expansion (due to specific explanatory reasons) but does not territorially expand because the circumstances surrounding the territorial expansion do not allow it. Constructing an analytical framework aimed at understanding the circumstances which make territorial expansion more or less likely is very different from attempting to explain the specific reasons behind the want of an actor to expand. To my knowledge, there is no other study that has attempted to devise an analytical frame focused on the circumstances that affect the likelihood that territorial expansion will come to pass. This frame is designed to be a tool with which to make more informed foreign policy decisions when dealing with the potential of shifting borders.

It is important to note that this endeavor does not fall under the rubric of a single discipline. It should not be considered political science, sociology, anthropology or social psychology. Rather it should be considered an interdisciplinary attempt to do something completely new.

Territorial expansion can be parsed into two types, 1) Forcible-expansion that is achieved through military action and occupation, and, 2) Amenable-expansion that is achieved through willing annexation and integration. It is common that studies of territorial expansion treat the two types (amenable and forcible) as analytically incompatible components related to the larger (disassociated) phenomenon of expansion as a whole. Studies that focus on one type of expansion often disclaim away the other type as analytically incompatible with “the frame of analysis being used” and hence, “outside of the scope of the research” being conducted. Though it must be noted that this professed incompatibility is (most often) cited in studies whose aim is to explain or analyze the mechanisms and reasons behind the decision of any specific actor to undertake programs of expansion. Here there is no claim as to the analytical compatibility of the two types of expansion in the context of explanatory reasons and mechanisms behind the decision to expand. The claim here is that it is possible to account for both types of expansion through a singular frame when the aim is analyzing conditions that affect likelihood that expansion will come to pass. The analytical frame here aims to highlight the likelihood that a specific actor will enact programs of expansion, type of expansion, and regions most likely to be expanded upon.

A reading of Walter Mattli’s “The Logic of Regional Integration and Beyond” is instrumental in devising a strategy with which to bridge amenable and forcible expansion. Mattli began by focusing on economics as an explanatory mechanism driving the process of voluntary regional integration. Along the way he realized that economic theory alone could not account for all the factors, and that these additional factors lay in the realm of political science. That amenable
expansion had two overarching components: economics and political science. Accordingly, Mattli concluded that amenable expansion could only be sufficiently understood through an analytical framework that unified these two overarching components (i.e. economics and political science).

“The analytical framework presented in this book seeks to remedy some of the weaknesses of traditional approaches by bridging political science and economics. Such an analysis is based on the conviction that market integration cannot be explained without reference to institutions, and that institutional analysis that fails to refer to market transactions risks being empty.”¹

The belief here is that Mattli’s assessment of a necessary blended analysis that considers multiple overarching components holds true for territorial expansion as a whole -- not just for voluntary regional expansion. Thus, any analysis that fails to account for all overarching components “risks being empty.”

Lapid (2001) warns of the importance of picking the right analytical concepts: that “picking good concepts is, in fact, somewhat analogous to taking out a "conceptual loan" that must be repaid if we are to succeed in our scholarly ventures. Key concepts are, in this respect, solid picks with excellent collateral backing.”² McLennan (1995) claims that a good component should be "ever-interesting" and "indispensable", interesting “by virtue of their ability to reconfigure in face of changing realities” and indispensable in “their sustained relevance to many major theoretical undertakings.”³

The overarching analytical concepts of this analytical frame are geopolitics and identity. But, these overarching concepts alone are not sufficient to be successful, for they (the overarching concepts) need to be bridged using several underlying synthesizing components (these synthesizing components are not listed here but will be discussed in full later in the text).

Here territorial expansion is understood to be part and parcel of a “simultaneous processes of fragmentation and integration.”⁴ Ascending Empires and disintegrating unions (fragmentation and integration) are dependent on territorial expansion.

“In terms of human history, both unification and fragmentation of territory have been persistent thrusts, each tendency always being present, but with one or the other being stronger at different times and places.”⁵

It is clear how integration is dependent on territorial expansion but less intuitive is how fragmentation is also dependent. Fragmentation is induced when: (1) an outside power incorporates territory from another power, or, (2) an internal territory/population claims

¹ Mattli, Walter. pg. 11, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, 1999
independence. Concerning point (1): B territorial expands taking land from C. This expansion by
B at the expense of C necessarily means that as B expands as C fragments. Concerning point (2):
An internal population claiming independence: Confederate territorial expansion and the first
fragmentation of the United States happened simultaneously, December 20, 1860, when the State
of South Carolina seceded from the Union. Before, the Union was 31 states and after 30:
Therefore the secession of South Carolina should be considered fragmentation while at the same
time it should also be considered integration. The act of secession was Confederate amenable
territorial expansion of South Carolina (before secession the Confederacy had no land, but after
they did). Continued Union fragmentation (more States seceding) resulted in continued
Confederate integration.6

“Processes of integration and globalization have been largely matched, and perhaps exceeded,
by co-occurring processes of fragmentation and disintegration.”7

Here territorial expansion is understood as a process of transformative change driving the
evolution of our societal structuring. According to Lapid (2001) present IR scholarship is
“lacking the logic and vocabulary to understand transformative change.”8 A deficit that has
allowed the status quo to become “an assumptive framework that allows, and perhaps even
requires, an a priori stipulation of preformed identities and interests, where neorealism and
neoliberal institutionalism have practiced their theoretical trade in a profoundly durable
"world".”9,10 The belief is that “mobility and flux (rather than fixity and stasis) will increasingly
determine the mercurial horizon against which the contemporary IR theory needs to be
reworked”,11 and that, "the methodological shift from a language of interacting variables to a
language of mutually constitutive processes requires a somewhat different approach than
traditionally found in the toolboxes of International Relations.”12

To aid IR theory in its ability to understand transformative change Lapid devised the IBO
( Identities, Borders and Orders) triad. Identities, Borders and Orders are three concepts that
“massive bodies of cross-disciplinary literature strongly suggest {...} are intimately related to
each other; they are therefore best defined, and best discussed, in relation to each other. Processes of collective Identity formation invariably involve complex bordering issues. Likewise, acts of bordering (i.e., the inscription, crossing, removal, transformation,
multiplication and/or diversification of borders) invariably carry momentous ramifications for
political ordering at all levels of analysis. Processes of identity, border and order construction are

6 A total of 11 states seceded: South Carolina (December 20 1860), Mississippi (January 9, 1861), Florida (January
10, 1861), Alabama (January 11, 1861), Georgia (January 19, 1861), Louisiana (January 26, 1861), Texas
(February 1, 1861), Virginia (April 17, 1861), Arkansas (May 6, 1861), North Carolina (May 20, 1861), and
Tennessee (June 8, 1861)
7 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 26
8 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 1
9 Ruggie, John Gerard. Pg.4-6, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and
University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
11 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 2
12 Bach, Jonathan Paul Gregory. pg. 10, “Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National
therefore mutually self-constituting. Borders, for instance, are in many ways inseparable from identities. They can help demarcate or individuate. Likewise, they are also inseparable from orders constituted to a large extent via such acts of individuation and segmentation. Thus, in any specific case, if we want to study problems associated with any one of our three concepts, we can richly benefit from also considering the other two.\(^{13}\)

The IBO nodes are three interrelated pressure points that can be manipulated to push or retard the evolution of societal structuring. Therefore, changing any one of these three nodes should be considered part and parcel of the process of societal evolution. As such, territorial expansion (i.e. the changing of borders) can be considered an iteration of societal evolution, which cannot be fully understood without considering the other two IBO nodes. A mature and full understanding of the circumstances of territorial expansion in the context of its likelihood necessitates accounting for all the necessary component parts; it is this reason why this analytical frame incorporates all the nodes of the IBO triad. The dependent variable (i.e. territorial expansion) clearly is part and parcel of borders, while the overarching components include identity and geopolitics (i.e. orders). This logic also demands that all actors involved in any potential move towards territorial expansion must be accounted for. As such, the analytical frame has three (independent) levels of analysis corresponding to the different actors involved. The levels of analysis are: 1) the expanding power, 2) the populations being expanded upon and 3) the region where expansion may take place.

The endeavor to devise a singular frame of analysis (that accounts for both types of expansion) concerning the likelihood of territorial expansion requires interdisciplinary, inter paradigmatic out of the box thinking, which will lead to some operationalizing theoretical pivot points that are brand new. Points that might not have the level of backing literature that academics generally like to display. This does not mean that the whole frame is without a solid academic foundation. It means that the search for scholars who have already written about these theoretical pivot points was unsuccessful. To the extent possible there has been a concerted effort to discuss the literature concerning the themes used in designing these pivot points. Even so, there are places, which at times may seem sparse in the context of citation of those who have previously said or agree with what is being written.

The frame is operationalized by the subjective reading of a number of variables, which can result in different analysts (using the same analytical variables in the context of the same expanding power, populations being expanded upon and region) reaching different conclusions as to the likelihood of territorial expansion. This is not a flaw in the framework rather than being necessary by design. It must be emphasized that the point of this research is not to argue about this or that subjective reading of the involved variables. Rather the point is to demonstrate how the frame of analysis is constructed and fits together and to give an example analysis so that the analysts may us the frame themselves.

Analyzing the conditions that affect the likelihood of expansion involves using variables that are inherently subjectively understood. Fairgrieve, who was one of the earliest scholars to deal with borderlands (and by extension the conditions that affect likelihood of expansion), noted the subjectivity involved. He understood that his analytical frame quite likely would produce

\(^{13}\) Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 7
different results depending on the analyst and their subjective reading of the analytical variables involved. He pre-emptively, in the introduction, dealt with this issue, writing:

“some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but the correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that statement or view.”

Below is a chapter outline:

Chapter 2- fleshes out the concepts that are used in constructing the frame and discusses the literature in the context of each concepts conceptual usage. First will be a review of the literature surrounding forcible and amenable expansion, then the two main overarching components; i.e., geopolitics (in the context of borderlands and cultural fault lines) and identity will be discussed. Following the explanation of the overarching components, and then, the underlying synthesizing components will be addressed. First emotions (specifically fear and hope) followed by a discussion of societal attention spaces, populational lobbyist and manipulation, system progression, collective memory, power, and, framing legitimacy.

Chapter 3- will discuss the 4 sets of analytical typologies that have been devised to operationalize the frame, two that pertain to geopolitics (i.e. geopolitical viability and proximate faultline typologies) and two that pertain to identity (i.e. identity viability and identity typologies)). The chapter will conclude with a discussion of hope confidence and concrete vs. non-concrete events.

Chapter 4- will explain the frame of expansion and how it functions in conjunction with the analytical typologies discussed in chapter 3.

Chapter 5- will apply the frame to Central Asia.

Chapter 6- will apply the frame to the Ukraine.

Chapter 7- includes the conclusion and final thoughts.

For the convenience of the reader a summary will be included at the end of each chapter

Chapter 1 Summary: The purpose of the research is to account for both forcible and amenable expansion in a single framework, which aims to analyze the likelihood of territorial expansion. Such an achievement needs to account for two overarching components (geopolitics and identity) as well as several underlying synthesizing components. It was made clear that territorial expansion is simultaneously fragmentation and integration, which is understood as a process of transformative change driving the evolution of our societal structuring, and that it (territorial expansion) is but one iteration of societal change that operates in an interconnected (IBO) triad, which includes borders, orders and identity, and that a change to one of the triad nodes necessarily influences the other two. Also mentioned was that the present IR scholarship is

14 Fairgrieve, James. pg. VI, Geography and World Power. Dutton, 1921.
“lacking the logic and vocabulary to understand transformative change,” and that "the methodological shift from a language of interacting variables to a language of mutually constitutive processes requires a somewhat different approach than traditionally found in the toolboxes of International Relations." It was then stated that the frame being devised accounts for all three of the nodes on the IBO triad, and that it would account for all of the actors involved through a tiered analytical framework that considers the expanding power, the region and the populations being expanded upon.

II. Chapter 2 - State of the Literature

This chapter will flesh out the concepts used in constructing our frame of through looking at the current literature in the context of the necessary concepts.

A. Present Views on Expansion

As noted the aim here is not explain the mechanisms or analyze the reasons an actor is pushed to enact programs of territorial expansion. Despite this it is still worthwhile to give a general overview of common mechanisms and reasons found in the present literature. After the discussion about territorial expansion we will move on to the overarching frame components.

1. Forcible Expansion

Many have claimed that the international system exists in a state of anarchy, and that this anarchic nature feeds states need/want to forcibly expand, and that an anarchic system incentivizes maximization of relative power. These arguments are consistent with structural theories, such as neorealism and offensive realism.

According to Neorealism a state can never be sure of the future intentions of another state. Therefore, there is a lack of trust between states. When there is no trust the incentive is driven towards counting in terms of (guarding against losses and striving towards gains in) relative power (a loss of relative power has the potential to allow another state to threaten one’s survival). This fact quickly pushes the game into an arena in which survival becomes the primary factor influencing behavior. The neorealist paradigm then becomes one in which states work towards increasing their relative power so as to maximize chances of survival. One popular way in which this increase in relative power is achieved is through the development of offensive military capabilities.

Power in an anarchic system becomes to be understood as the fundamental tool with which to increase chances of survival, which creates an incentive/induces states to work towards achieving regional hegemony. This regional hegemony is often achieved through territorial

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15 Lapid, Yosef. (2001), pg. 1
16 Bach, Jonathan Paul Gregory. (1997), pg. 10
expansion. According to offensive realism the more relative power a state acquires the more likely it becomes that they will pursue forcible expansion.\textsuperscript{20,21,22,23}

Fravel (2010) attempted to analyze the likelihood that future Chinese territorial expansion would be peaceful or violent (i.e. forcible or amenable). In the article “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion” he (Fravel) discussed several common theories that are frequently attached to the phenomenon of forcible expansion. First, he discussed systemic reasons:

- **Lateral Pressure theory** - “offers one argument to explain why states seek to increase their influence abroad through a variety of means, including territorial expansion. States experiencing high rates of population growth and technological change require increasing stocks of resources to fuel further economic development. Over time, states find that they lack resources within their boundaries and thus face mounting ‘lateral pressure’ to expand abroad.”\textsuperscript{24}

- **The Security Dilemma**- “According to the logic of the security dilemma (Jervis 1978), states in search of security may nevertheless pursue expansion to create secure frontiers or buffer zones with which to protect homeland territory from attack. Territorial expansion in pursuit of security results from fear and the perception of vulnerability to attack by the other great powers. As a state’s economy grows and generates increasing levels of wealth, the importance of defensible frontiers or buffers increases because the state has more to protect and defend. States may also worry that their increased wealth might attract other states that seek to block or contain its rise. According to this argument, the principal benefit of expansion is security through the establishment of buffer zones.”\textsuperscript{25}

After discussing systemic mechanisms of forcible expansion, he (Fravel) discussed and highlighted “domestic pathologies in the onset of international conflict”,\textsuperscript{26} pathologies arising from leaders attempting to maximize their domestic political power. These domestic explanations are often consistent with variants of defensive realism.

- **Nationalism** – is often used towards incentivizing expansion based on a number of different reasons. This includes expansion towards rescuing from persecution or bringing back into the fold and/or reunification of ethnic brethren living in neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{27,28,29} Nationalist expansion is often sold in the form of regaining territory based on

\textsuperscript{22} Mearsheimer, John J. (2001)
\textsuperscript{24} Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 513
\textsuperscript{25} Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 517
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid
historical claims, revitalizing lost national pride and status, or, towards realization of a certain national identity.\textsuperscript{30}

- \textit{Log-rolling} – “argues that expansion occurs through the process of forming political coalitions, especially in cartelized political systems where political power is concentrated in only a few groups, such as industrialists and the armed forces. As these actors trade favors with each other, they often justify their policies in terms of expansionist goals to maintain coalition unity. A dynamic that often results in the pursuit of aggression abroad.”\textsuperscript{31, 32}

- \textit{Militarism} - “commonly known as the ‘cult of the offensive,’” the glorification of the offensive within professional militaries and the belief among civilian leaders that offense confers important advantages. According to this argument, militaries prefer offensive doctrines for several reasons, but primarily because they advance organizational interests by increasing autonomy, resources and social status.”\textsuperscript{33, 34}

Another popular explanation of forcible expansion is Power Transition theory, which highlights territorial disputes as a source of dissatisfaction concerning the prevailing status quo.\textsuperscript{35}

Favel’s conclusion concerning the above theoretical perspectives is that they suffer “from two limitations. First, although unrealized benefits are the root cause of aggressive behavior for both Power Transition theory and Realism, neither the scope nor sources of these benefits are discussed in the current literature. Second, power Transition Theory and Realism rarely take on a cost benefit analysis of the conflict resulting from expansive aggression. Likewise, scholars who stress the effects of economic interdependence also do not tend to undertake a systematic cost/benefit analysis.”\textsuperscript{36}

2. Amenable Expansion

Neo-functionalism is often cited when trying to explain voluntary integration. Its (neo-functionalism’s) base line assumption is that supra-nationality is the only avenue through which states can secure maximum welfare. Ergo, the main idea of neo-functionalism is that regional incorporation develops through gradual integration of sector specific areas and “spillover” from integrated functions into new areas.\textsuperscript{37, 38, 39} The implication is that integration within certain areas

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Tir, Jaroslav. "Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and Secessionist States.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 5 (2005): 713-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 521
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Snyder Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 522
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Snyder, James M. (1991)
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Flavel, M. (2010), pg. 506
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Haas, Ernst B. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process.” International organization 15, no. 3 (1961): 366-92.
\end{itemize}
will push integration in other sectors.

“Neo-functionalism is an important building block of a comprehensive account of integration. But it is not enough. By its very assumption it fails to give an explanation of the link between welfare maximization and regional integration.”\textsuperscript{40} Another weakness is that while accounting for the institutional arrangements that govern economic transactions the transactions themselves are unexamined. Also, neo-functionalism never fully specifies the conditions under which sub-national demands for integration become accepted at the national level (a question that is pertinent to this research).\textsuperscript{41}

An alternative approach to neo-functionalism is inter-governmentalism, which approaches the phenomenon of regional integration from the perspective of nation-states, arguing that states are the major actors of international relations, and that states follow only their own interests. The main priorities of these actors are survival and accumulation of power.\textsuperscript{42} Unlike neo-functionalism, it assigns a central role to heads of states and approaches regional integration from perspective of nation-states. The argument is that regional integration can be best understood as a series of bargains based on the convergence of preferences among the political leaders of the major states in a region. Small states are often bought off with side-payments offered by the leading states. Similarly, to inter-governmentalism, liberal inter-governmentalism argues that governments act as rational actors pursuing domestic goals and interests.\textsuperscript{43} Integration is formed through interstate bargaining. States negotiate “deals” on the basis of their preferences and power. The most powerful states have the most power to decide and the treaties concluded are to their advantage. This approach implies the presence of a leader in a region. According to liberal inter-governmentalism, integration presents a “process of collective choice through which conflicting interests are reconciled.”\textsuperscript{44}

Inter-governmentalism suffers from several shortcomings. For example, by focusing solely on episodes of interstate bargains, the theory cuts into ongoing economic, legal, and social processes and presents a picture of integration that ignores and discounts events that precede and follow said bargaining. Furthermore, if progress towards integration through interstate bargains is the result of converging preferences on the part of the leaders of major states then the speed of the process of the integration must also reflect preferences of the leaders. However, a theory that "explains" the varying course of integration in terms of shifting preferences offers little to assess the theory's validity.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{40} Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 10
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid
\textsuperscript{42} Hoffmann, Stanley. "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe." Daedalus (1966): 862-915.
\textsuperscript{43} Moravcsik, Andrew. Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1994.
\textsuperscript{45} Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 15
“Economists who study regional integration look primarily at market relationships among goods and factors of production within a region; for example, customs union theory seeks to understand the welfare implications of integration in terms of trade creation, trade diversion and terms of trade. More broadly, economic explanations are positive theories of welfare gains and losses associated with regional integration, not explanations of the political choices that produce such areas. The weakness arises from the narrow focus on markets; these theories overlook a key aspect of integration, namely the provision of common rules, regulations and policies that govern regional economic areas.”

Explanations posited in the current literature regarding territorial expansion have “internal” gaps that would be beneficial to further explore. Though here the gap that is of interest is not of the “internal” ilk. The interest is not whether economic studies assume away political institutions, or if inter-governmentalism in its focus on interstate bargaining fails to incorporate events that preceded and followed the integration in question. Here the interest is the glaring and overarching “external” gap hovering above the literature. Here the interest is the gap between forcible expansion and voluntary integration. The interest here is to study territorial expansion as a whole -- voluntary integration and forcible expansion analyzed in a singular model.

The above section may seem short and as if it glossed very complex mechanisms and reasons behind the want for a state to territorial expand. This brevity was by design for the subject matter being explored here is not the mechanisms and reasons that make a state want/feel the need to expand. Rather the subject matter is the circumstances that make the want/need to expand more or less likely to be put into action. For this reason, a long-detailed discussion of the mechanisms and reasons behind said want/need to expand is not necessary. As such, we move along to the overarching components of the frame.

B. Overarching Components

1. Geopolitics
Rudolf Kjellén coined the term geopolitics in 1899 describing it as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space.” According to Cohen (2014) “statesmen and scholars who view geopolitics as a vehicle for integrating geography and international politics may find it useful to define geopolitics not as a school of thought, but as a mode of analysis, relating diversity in content and scale of geographical settings to exercise of political power and identifying spatial frameworks through which power flows.”

Here geopolitics is assumed to flow in two spaces and in two different ways: 1) regional geographical space and geopolitical order, and, 2) the international political space and the phenomenon of the perceived geopolitical balance of power. These two spaces are attached to two different levels of the frame of analysis. Point 1 is attached to the analysis of the region, and point 2 attached to the analysis of the expanding power. Both spaces of analysis rely on two assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic and the system exists in a state of constant antagonism; and, (2) actors within the system are generally “self-interested, rational actors, who

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46 Mattli, Walter, (1999) pg. 11
seek to increase their chances of survival”⁴⁹, and, that increased chances of surviving come through maximizing security via relative gains, which as a result the “security dilemma” are used to procure geographical buffer zones against potential threats. Lastly, the frame views “geographical space as a product of political and cultural imagination, rather than as something ‘natural’ or ‘objective.’”⁵⁰

First, we will discuss literature and concepts connected to point 1 in the context of regional geopolitical order.

**Regional geopolitical order**

Regional political order in the frame is used to identify which regions are most likely to experience expansion. The two main concepts backing this ability are cultural fault lines and borderlands (also known as “shatterbelts” or “crush zones”). In this frame, cultural fault lines are applied to identify where borderlands exist. First, we will discuss borderlands and then cultural fault lines.

Borderlands: A common notion in “spatial analyses” is that borderlands are “inherently more prone to conflict than other areas.”⁵¹ Another common notion is that conflict almost always involves a dimension that is related to territorial expansion, and will, in one way or another result in the shifting of geopolitical borders.⁵² Therefore, the claim can also be made that borderlands are inherently more prone to experience territorial expansion.

Research related to borderlands focuses on “rivalries between major powers, studying areas where the push for expansion brought these powers into competition.”⁵³ As early as 1900, Alfred Mahan⁵⁴ used the term “shatter belt” in reference to the zone between the thirty and forty-degree parallels in Asia. He concluded that the weakness of states occupying this “belt” and the resources thought to be contained therein-catalyzed competition towards territorial expansion by neighboring geopolitical powers (i.e. Britain and Russia). Fifteen years later James Fairgrieve⁵⁵ used the term “crush zone” to describe a buffer zone between the sea powers and the Eurasian heartland. The end of WWI brought attention to a borderland in East-Central Europe, which was ethnically and politically diverse, economically underdeveloped and “trapped in the middle of the fundamental rivalry between Germany and Russia for control of East Europe.”⁵⁶

Again, after WWII this Eastern-Central European borderland became the worry of geographers: Whittlesey (1942)⁵⁷ noted that this “middle Europe” borderland was most important in that it

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⁵² Ibid
⁵⁵ Fairgrieve, James. (1921)
⁵⁶ Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. (1994), pg. 3
could be used as a buffer against Russian aggression. Hartshorne (1941)\textsuperscript{58} wrote that the states within it were weak, politically immature and ethnically diverse. A fact that Whittlesey (1942) agreed with when he wrote that WWI had "left Middle Europe subdivided into states with small populations—a shatter belt of mutually antagonistic units, unable to organize for commercial union or for political solidarity. This weakness left it ripe for the plucking." \textsuperscript{59}

A consensus from was that “Middle Europe” was caught between the geopolitical competition of Russia and Europe, and, that the states of Middle Europe were ethnically and linguistically diverse, weak, politically immature and economically undeveloped. Characteristics that were understood as making it “ripe to be expanded upon.” The location of “middle Europe” was understood as making it important to expand upon and used as a buffer against the opposing geopolitical power before being buffered against.\textsuperscript{60} The goal was to close the open borderland before your opponent does. After WWIII, it was the Soviets who closed the “Middle European” borderland, after which, according to East (1961) meant that it could "no longer fittingly described as 'a political shatter belt'" (i.e. borderland).\textsuperscript{61} Though, again after the fall of CCCP the “Middle European” borderland subsequently opened again only to then (for the most part) close again due to and EU territorial expansion.

Early geographers were too preoccupied with “Middle Europe” to extrapolate out its “peculiar” characteristics to identify other borderlands that might exist. Cohen (1957,1973)\textsuperscript{62},\textsuperscript{63} was the first to make such an analytical attempt. He identified the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia as borderlands. His conclusion was that a borderland is a region "whose internal, geographical, cultural, religious, and political fragmentation is compounded by pressures from external major powers attracted by the region's strategic location and economic resources."\textsuperscript{64}

To Kelly (1986) contiguity to competing geopolitical powers was not a necessity in the definition of borderlands. The important part was the aspect of competition. If there is competition for control of the space and resources then the location of the players in relation to the borderland does not matter. Kelly proposed the following definition. “A shatterbelt is a geographic region over whose control Great Powers seriously compete. Great Powers compete because they perceive strong interests for doing so and because opportunities are present for establishing alliance footholds with states of the region. (...) A shatterbelt originates when rival Great Power footholds are present in an area.”\textsuperscript{65} Using this definition Kelly identified six borderlands: Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia and Central America.

\textsuperscript{59} Whittlesey, Derwent Stainthorpe, Charles Carlyle Colby, and Richard Hartshorn, (1942), pg. 172
\textsuperscript{60} Hoffman, George W. "The Shatter-Belt in Relation to the East-West Conflict." Journal of Geography 51, no. 7 (1952): 265-75.
\textsuperscript{62} Cohen, Saul B. "Geography and Strategy." Naval War College Review 10 (1957): 1-32
\textsuperscript{63} Cohen, Saul B. "Geography and Politics in a World Divided." (1975).
Cohen responded to Kelly by claiming that his definition was missing the point because it ignored the fact that borderlands must present “an equal playing field to two or more competing powers operating from different geostrategic realms,” and that Kelly’s definition included regions in which a single major power already exercised dominant control (i.e. US in central America). Van der Wusten and Nierop (1990) criticized Kelly’s definition by the fact that it was too broad, and, that defining borderlands as any place that great powers compete due to a perceived interest would include all the third world. Kelly realized that his list of borderlands was broad and stated that his definition included "literally all contested regions where escalation to global conflict could transpire."

The term “The Great Game” was coined to describe the 19th century struggle for supremacy, between the Russian and British empire in the Central Asian borderland. The result, among other things, was the creation of Afghanistan as a buffer state. Borderlands operate as the nexus of “conflict and divergence of regional and global interests” in a quest “for power and influence.” Here, borderlands are conceived as a Game. As the board of play in which neighboring fault lines will, over time (to a greater or lesser degree according to ability), move toward territorial expansion (amenable or forcible). History has shown many iterations of the borderland Game. Fundamentally these iterations do not change from the end goal of controlling borderland resources, lands and populations. What changes are the players, number of players, rules, and, tactics used. Borderlands cyclically open and close and are the most likely site of territorial expansion. After WWII “Middle Europe” opened only to be closed by Soviet expansion to European contiguity. After the collapse of CCCP it opened again only to be closed by EU expansion, which has almost reached contiguity with the Russian Federation.

The literature on borderlands has some main themes: 1) Borderlands are comprised of “weak states” that are economically underdeveloped, and are perceived to be internally fragmented in the context of race, language, religion, and nationality, 2) The borderland regions themselves are also perceived as being fragmented. Borderland states are often “mutually antagonistic, leaving them unable or unwilling to cooperate economically, politically, and militarily.” The result of these first two points is conflict internal to the borderland states and conflict between borderland states. 3) Borderlands are the sites of considerable external military and economic involvement by two or more competing geopolitical powers. 4) Borderlands do not fall under the purview of the spheres of influence of major powers, yet at the same time, they are accessible to the major

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66 Cohen, Saul Bernard. (1978), pg. 48
68 Kelly, Philip L. (1986), pg. 174
69 The term “The Great Game” was coined in the 1830s by Captain Arthur Conolly (1807–1842) but would become popularized in early 20th century in the novel Kim by Rudyard Kipling which described the “shadowy struggle for political ascendancy” (Hopkirk, op cit, Ref 3, p 2) that took place for most of the 19th and early 20th centuries between the British and Russian empires over Central Asia.
72 Ibid
73 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. (1994), pg. 4
74 Hensel, Paul R, and Paul F Diehl. (1994), pg. 6
powers, thus creating overlapping spheres. Also, the borderland is a field of competition that does yet have a dominant player. 5) Borderlands (more or less) offer an even playing field for major powers to gain a footing. Thus, more than one major power must have an ally, military presence, or strong patron-client relationship in the area. The presence of multiple major powers suggests a competitive aspect to the region.

A generalized definition of borderlands that serves this research are the points listed above, with the addition of another point that stipulates that competing geopolitical powers must be contiguous to the borderland.

**Cultural fault line theory**

Cultural fault lines (an idea that is best known from Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”) can be used to highlight the movement of borders connected to the identities attached. Any identity can be attached to cultural fault lines for analysis, from localized (tribal) to esoteric and relatively removed large-scale (civilizational).

Our frame uses identity and the idea of the cultural fault line to determine the geographic location of the major geopolitical forces and actors in a specific region. The chosen attached identities should be overlaid onto a map and traced in a way that it follows the location of the populations that are considered to be encompassed by said identities. Borderlands will be illuminated when all the major regional political actors/forces are accounted for and corresponding lines drawn.

These lines may be represented by religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation etc. They at times may cross nation state borders; other times they may follow national borders. The only rule concerning what identities are chosen to attach to the cultural fault lines being drawn is that they represent all major geopolitical powers acting in the region being analyzed. Past this, the choice is a subjective reading of the analyst as to which identities best represent these major players and the regional population structure.

"[a]ny regional division is not a true picture of reality, but it is an arbitrary device of the student... depending on what elements appear to him as most significant."\(^{75}\)

An example analysis of using cultural fault lines to map out where borderlands lay will be given later in the text, in chapter 4.

**1.Identity**

Identity theory extends from those that treat identity as a deeply entrenched attachment, implying that such attachments should be stable over time\(^{76,77}\) to those that believe individuals possess a repertoire of potential identity attachments, and that one’s first tier identity often reflects a strategic rationale. In this sense individuals are assumed to adopt certain identities because they

\(^{75}\) Hawsthorne (1939): cited in Cohen. (1973) pg. 63


\(^{77}\) Huntington, Samuel P. (1996)
offer perceived psychological or material benefits. This logic suggests that identity attachments may shift over time due to changes in expected benefits. This (a rationalist) approach to identity contends that individuals employ an instrumental calculation in their adoption of identities. There are three underlying assumptions: (1) individuals are assumed to possess a repertoire of more than one meaningful identity category from which they can theoretically self-identify; (2) adoption of an identity is largely conscious in that an individual’s self-identification often represents a choice; and, (3) this identity choice is often based on strategic or instrumental considerations. Individuals adopt certain identities because of their perceived benefits. The account of identity that is assumed here is one in which individuals are likely to stay with a certain identity category unless there is a clear incentive to shift away.

Below are 11 definitions of Identity that are accepted here. These definitions should help the reader get a contextual feel about what is meant when we speak about Identity.

(i) Identity is “people’s concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others.”

(ii) “Identity is the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture.”

(iii) Identity “refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities.”

(iv) “National Identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols – have internalized the symbols of the nation...”

(v) “Social Identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. ... [Social Identities are] at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations.”

(vi) “By social Identity, I mean the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place within historically specific discourses (or frames of understanding) about the character, structure, and boundaries of the polity and the economy.”

(vii) “The term [Identity] (by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other.”

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(viii) “Identities are ... prescriptive representations of political actors themselves and of their relationships to each other.”

(ix) “My Identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.”

(x) “Indeed, Identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be subjectively appropriated only along with that world {...} A coherent Identity incorporates within itself all the various internalized roles and attitudes.”

(xi) “Identity emerges as a kind of unsettled space, or an unresolved question in that space, between a number of intersecting discourses {...} a kind of fixed point of thought and being, a ground of action {...} the logic of something like a ‘true self.’ {...} Identity is a process. Identity is not a fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the relationship of the other to oneself.”

C. Underlying Synthesizing Components

Manipulation of populations towards collective action is an important aspect to understanding the way in which this frame functions. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss Populational manipulation and lobbyists.

1. Populational Lobbyists and Manipulation

Populational lobbyist leverage programs of manipulation towards catalyzing collective action, without these programs of manipulation no citizenry would be inspired/induced to collectively act. As such, there are two indications: 1) all leaders, of any group or movement, should be considered populational lobbyist, and, 2) manipulation is a is a natural component in pushing societal movement, which means that manipulation (on its own) does necessarily not hold a negative connotation, and, can be understood as a form of persuasion. Persuasion itself is not a good or bad thing. What is good or bad are the ends to which this persuasion is aimed, and, whether these ends are intended to push towards or away from egalitarianism. Van Dijk (2006) parses manipulation into a “fuzzy” distinction between legitimate and illegitimate. He defines illegitimate manipulation as “all forms of interaction, communication or other social practices that are only in the interests of one party, and against the best interests of the recipients.” Then claims, via Grice (1975), that legitimate manipulation is built on conversations that are “truthful, relevant and complete.” Van Dijk’s conclusion is that illegitimate manipulation is likely to “reproduce inequality.” Past this, he falls short of claiming (something that is claimed here) that the likely outcome of legitimate manipulation (opposite to illegitimate) is movement towards

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96 Ibid
97 Ibid
egalitarianism.

The conceptual model of the role of legitimate/illegitimate manipulation in this process fits with Brown’s (2014) theory of System Progression.

System Progression
Brown’s theory of System progression is built around the analysis of objectives. His claim is that the ultimate progression of any system will be a function of the underlying objectives. He lays out what he calls “actual” and “espoused” objectives:

“Espoused” objectives can be defined as the objectives that are publicly proclaimed while “actual” objectives can be understood as the collective motivation of the group designing, building and/or administering the system or framework. “Espoused” objectives can be considered to mirror the collective societal will because, for system implementation to occur, it must be sanctioned by the society on which it will be placed. The collective societal unit will not (except in cases of extreme duress) accept or sanction a system whose objectives it believes to be contrary to societal goals and values. On the other hand, “Actual” objectives are the real intentions and motivations of the group designing, building and administering the system or framework. {…} “Actual” objectives dictate what the system is doing while “espoused” objectives represent what the system is claimed to be doing.”

Brown then goes on to talk about in and out of synch systems. In synch systems occur when actual and espoused objectives are aligned. When objectives are aligned the populational lobbyist behind the proposed policies have publically espoused the actual objectives, have been truthful with the population as to their true intent. Therefore, the assumption is that the “actual” objective behind an in-synch system must have the intent (or at least a byproduct) of being positive for the whole of the population rather than a specific subpopulation (i.e. push towards egalitarianism and be a product of legitimate manipulation). There cannot be an in-synch system that has as its actual objective gain for a specific subpopulation at the expense of the whole. This because the population in question will reject implementation as soon as the lobbyist espouses that the system is designed to benefit a specific subpopulation at the expense of the whole. Which means the only way that populational lobbyists can gain implementation of a system that is for the gain of a subpopulation at the expense of the whole is by espousing one objective while a holding different actual objective (e.g. implementing an out of synch system).

The conclusion is that: 1) out of synch systems can only come about through illegitimate manipulation since legitimate manipulation (i.e. “truthful conversation”) will result in the rejection of said out of synch system, and, 2) in synch systems can only be sold using legitimate manipulation due to the fact that it (an in synch system) must have aligned espoused and actual objectives, which means that the lobbyist behind the system had an honest conversation (i.e. engaged in legitimate manipulation) about the intention of the proposed system.

The implication is that one can gauge whether any bout of collective action is likely to produce societal movement towards or away from egalitarianism by determining whether the system

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being proposed is in or out of synch, or, whether the manipulation being leveraged is legitimate or illegitimate.

From here we will discuss the mechanisms that are used in programs of manipulation towards catalyzing collective action.

2. Emotions

“Until the 1960s emotions were considered a key—for some, the key—to understanding virtually all political action”, yet, “since the end of the 1960s, accordingly, emotions have played almost no role in theories of social movements and collective action.”

Thomas Scheff claims that emotions are motivators of action. Saul Alinsky depicted emotions as having the propensity to be manipulated towards reaching certain political outcomes over others and that a main component in devising mobilizing structures, frames, collective identities and political opportunities comes from the emotions held within. Calhoun (2009) claims “emotions are produced and organized” and that their propensity to be manipulated “ought to figure more prominently” in analyzing politics. He also claims different emotions “work differently from each other. There are patterns and challenges in relating these to each other, and these may be very important for movement analyses. Some emotions may get in the way of others; some may specifically call forth others.”

Lastly, Calhoun claims that emotions can serve to disrupt or stabilize political institutions.

Kemper (2009) writes that “without the emotions engaged in movement environments, dynamics, and structure, it would be hard to explain how social movements arise, amass critical levels of support, maintain such support in long-enduring campaigns in the face of often intense opposition, and provide means for recruiting and sustaining supporters, both as active members and as favorably disposed publics and bystanders. Unquestionably, understanding the dynamics of emotions clarifies social movement dynamics”, and, that “a structural approach to emotions, by contrast, examines social structural conditions to explain why specific emotions are either prevalent or likely to arise as the structural conditions either change or continue as before.”

He asks, “What kinds of social relational conditions provoke the emotions that ripen the grounds for social movement emergence or recruitment? What kinds of social relational conditions lead to the emotions that signify a waning of social movement support?”

The analytical assumption here is that Fear and Hope are the two base emotions to which all other emotions eventually flow. Hope and fear are part and parcel of each other, while at the

100 Goodwin, Jeff, James M Jasper, and Francesca Polletta. (2009), pg. 5
104 Calhoun, Craig. (2010), pg. 49
105 Calhoun, Craig. (2010), pg. 53
107 Kemper, Theodore. (2009), pg. 59
108 Kemper, Theodore. (2009), pg. 60
same time “paradoxical in their practical deployments.” Despite this paradoxical deployment of hope and fear function in similar fashion, through the same agents, same structure, and potentially towards identical ends. Imagine a battery; it has negative and positive flows, and although they are diametrically opposed, they operate under the same principles and through the same structure.

Hope

Miyazaki (2004) sees hope as a method that reorients knowledge, directing it towards an imagined future, while Braidotti characterizes hope as “a sort of dreaming forward, it is an anticipatory virtue that permeates our lives and activates them. It is a powerful motivating force grounded in our collective imaginings.” Walter Benjamin talks of “cultural ruination” in predicting what identities will emerge as the vehicle of hopeful momentum.

“hope is a key dynamic driving processes of social and political change”

Spreading Neo-liberal reforms brought attention to hope as an analytical mechanism in social theory and (like fear) is conceived as an amalgamation of opposites containing competing contradictory elements (i.e. action and passivity; confidence and patience; past and future). Hage (2003) links the decreasing ability of a societal structure to distribute hope equally to the rise of “paranoid” nationalist movements, which he described as “no-hopers produced by transcendental capitalism and the politics of neo-liberal government.” Yamada (2004) talks of neoliberalism creating “winners” and “losers” and how the losers, when pushed to a breaking point have the tendency to experience a (temporary) loss of hope in a better future. Svenberg defines hope as “the wish for something to come true,” he then goes on to parse this definition into three parts: (1) the wish, (2) the something and (3) coming true. Japanese scholar Seigo Hirowatari suggested adding action to this list.

In terms of societal evolution populational hope resides in the means and ends of acting towards creating and institutionalizing a societal structure that is believed to be able to provide a safer, more secure and economically abundant future. Using the verb “exodus” Bloch (2009) also connects hope to action aimed at a creating and institutionalizing a new status quo: “There is

111 Little, Adrian. Pg. 15,”Fear, Hope and Disappointment: Emotions in the Politics of Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation.” International Political Science Review 38, no. 2 (2017): 200-12
118 Hage, Ghassan. (2003), pg. 21
always an exodus in the world, an exodus from the particular status quo. And there is always a hope, which is connected with rebellion—a hope founded in the concrete given possibilities for new being.”

“In all cases hope is coupled with demands for change {…} if there is to be any progress at all, hope is one of its ingredients.”

Hope should not be confused with dreams. Hope is an activating drive towards changing the status quo, while dreams a pacifying agent. Marx mistook “religion” as the opium of the masses, when in fact the opiate does not reside in religion rather than whether said religion is selling dreams in place of hope. Weber calls hope a “robust motive” and then claims that religions instead offer “hope of salvation” and “hope of compensation.” Ralf Dahrendorf (1976) makes a distinction between “utopian hope” and “realistic/effective hope.” He connects “utopian hope” to consumerism as an opiate. On the other hand, he connects “realistic/effective hope” to “what is concrete and possible to achieve.” Søren Kierkegaard uses the metaphor of hope being the wind that powers the movement of the sailor. Adding that it can also engulf its object. Thus, hindering chances of the reaching the desired ends.

“hope is useful in certain doses—to get the wishing going—but that it also can become so strong that it overwhelms the normal unfolding of hope and prevents it from becoming true”

Fear
Thucydides to Machiavelli to Hobbes have acknowledged fear as a critical mechanism in collective action, societal structuring and its evolution. Fear affects this trio following the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Wood (1995) claims “a founding axiom of modern political thought” can be encapsulated by the idea that fear of enemies “promotes internal social unity.” When survival is perceived to be under threat “individuals and small social groups find a bond in their common fear that enables them to set their differences aside and unite in the pursuit of goals that are otherwise unattainable.” Fear is a powerful motivator because it involves threats to self-preservation: physical (life, health, and/or, home) and/or societal (collective conceptions of culture, “way of life,” principles of governing structures and/or identity). During conflict the line between physical and symbolic attack becomes murky. Both involve feelings of vulnerability, denigration and humiliation that link past losses to present dangers. Fears can be about physical security and/or the extinction of the self, family, the group or its culture (including sacred icons and sites). Smith (1991) uses the term ethnocide to describe

120 Bloch, Ernst. (2009), pg. 107
121 Miyazaki, Hirokazu. (2016), pg. 40
123 Consumerism as a populational pacifying agent is made through Marcus’s “one-dimensional man.”
125 Miyazaki, Hirokazu. (2016), pg. 45.
deliberate efforts to destroy a community's cultural icons.\(^{128}\)

The social utility of fear of outsiders is claimed to have been driving alliances between uncooperative groups for millennia. As groups begin to cooperate their perceptions of the other either softens or hardens. Either internalizing a new understanding or reinforcing preconceived notions and beliefs about the other group. Softening leads to mixing, while hardening to separation. Mixing, towards hope and hybridization and therefore more likely to produce substantive transformation of the involved group identities. Hardening means that the alliance will remain one of convenience, one in which the common enemy is the sole bond of unity. There is little chance an alliance of convenience will lead to significant transformation of each other’s group identities.

To Carl Schmitt the friend–enemy divergence is the ultimate political criterion. Schmitt described the political sphere as one in which the prospect of one’s existence being destroyed is the determining factor in who is considered enemy. If the enemy of my enemy is my friend then who is enemy is also a determining factor in who is considered friend. Hans Morgenthau integrated Schmitt's Hobbesian views into his account of political realism in which calls to security and fear play the part of chicken and egg. Does the fear create the call to security or vice versa? Calls to security can be conceived as the ratcheting of fear (i.e. fear mongering) towards hidden agendas aimed at creating an out of synch system. Yet calls to security can also be considered the reaction to an instinctual self-defense mechanism that has been activated by actual threat. Fear is a “complicated state of mind. Some of its mechanisms are clearly liabilities; they have a paralyzing effect. On the other hand, one-time liabilities may turn into benefits, since fear at the right time and for the right reasons is essential for survival.”\(^{129}\)

“fear of harm, the emotion that triggers our concern with our preservation and security, becomes the enemy, the rallying point for political awareness, vigilance, and meaningful collective action. Even this enemy is not universal, since it pits those who oppose harm against those who threaten or inflict it, and yet it may well be the best that we can hope for.”\(^ {130}\)

Marcus Porcius Cato, a Roman senator during the rivalry with Carthage, was known to end every senatorial speech (regardless of the subject matter) with calls for the destruction of Carthage. On the other hand, Publius Scipio Nasica would counter argue that Carthage should be left alone, for the threat from Carthage was the only thing keeping Rome from descending into civil war.\(^ {131}\) Aristotle also understood this. In “Politics” he recommended that governments “should excite

\(^{128}\) Recent examples of such attacks include the Hindu dismantling of the mosque at Ayodhya in Northern India (1992). Destruction of cultural treasures and mosques in Bosnia (1996), the Taliban's toppling of ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan (2001) and how early 20th century government schools for native Americans and Australian aboriginal children removed them from their families and prohibited them from speaking their native language or wearing their traditional clothing, also demanding that they cut their hair to fit in with the “norms” of “civilized” society. Isis is a huge proponent of this tactic as can be seen all over Iraq and Syria in ancient cities like Palmyra.

\(^{129}\) Evrigenis, Ioannis D. (2007), pg. 8,

\(^{130}\) Ibid

fears and make faraway dangers seem close at hand, so that the citizens will defend the constitution and, like sentries on night-duty, never relax their guard.”

According to Waltz, there are two routes that are taken when states perceive a significant external threat: states can balance (formation of an alliance to counter the perceived threat) or bandwagon (aligning with the threat). Waltz came to the conclusion that balancing is “far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states.” This conclusion would explain Waltz’s observation that threat was much more common than power as the motivating mechanism behind alliances.

“The primacy of self-preservation renders fear of the threat posed by others vital for the formation of alliances, as well as for their subsequent preservation and consolidation, because it provides a way of overcoming barriers to group formation and collective action that are insurmountable by positive means alone.”

McDougall (1985) operationalizes fear through created panic so as to induce reactions in an attempt to gain acquiescence towards certain policies over others. Transmuted through “messages or communications intended as mechanisms for manipulating the recipient’s intrinsic notions of threat and efficacy regarding a particular threat and corresponding protective behavior” (i.e. “fear appeals”). To be successful, fear appeals must play to the self-interests of the audience and must achieve a sufficient level of personal relevance (or issue involvement) for the individual; otherwise, they are ignored and rendered ineffective.

“A properly constructed fear appeal not only serves to induce the awareness that a threat exists but also purveys the severity of the threat and its target population’s susceptibility to the threat.”

Fear appeals when aimed at manipulating the behavior of a society will attempt to create a “moral panic.” A moral panic is a feeling of fear among the citizenry that some evil threatens the well being of society. A Dictionary of Sociology defines a moral panic as "the process of arousing social concern over an issue and is usually the work of moral entrepreneurs and the mass media.”

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134 Ibid
135 Evrigenis, Ioannis D. (2007), pg. 5
The word fear is used to depict responses to any number of stimuli in a variety of situations. The nature of any “fearful” reaction is an amalgamation of variables (including but not limited to) such as the nature of the stimulus, perceived length of the threat, and previous traumatic contact with comparable stimuli. When pertaining to individual psychology fear can be parsed (with good precision and consistency) between anxiety, stress, fright, panic, posttraumatic stress disorder, phobias…etc. Though populational psychology and collective political theory generally conceive fear as a ubiquitous part of the human experience. As such, everyone is regarded as having an intrinsic understanding of the concept. Therefore, defining something that is conceived as being ubiquitous is (generally) deemed unnecessary. This leads to a situation in which fear, without defining or parsing it, is often woven in as a critical mechanism. Aron (2017) claims that “fear needs no definition. It is a primal and, so to speak, sub political emotion. But it is one that all political theorists have discussed, because many of them, since Hobbes, have regarded it as the most human, the most basic emotion-the emotion which underlies the state itself.”

Shklar (1989) argues fear is “without qualification as universal as it is physiological.” The exception to the lack of definition is Hobbes who defines fear as an “aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, […] any anticipation of future evil […] not only flight, but also distrust, suspicion, precaution and provision against.” Two types of fearful reactions can be parsed from Hobbe’s definition: an immediate, almost, instinctual reaction versus a deliberated one. Ledoux (2015) talks about the potential of fearful reactions to travel either the “low” or “high road.” The low road is “quick and dirty” allowing for, almost instinctual, rapid responses to perceived threats to self-preservation. Conversely, the “high road” yields a more discerning, prejudicial and thoughtful reaction.

Here, a guideline assumption is the immediate (“low road”) response is generated by fear of perceived imminent threats to physical preservation of life, health and/or home. On the other hand, the deliberated, “high road” reaction is motivated by perceived threats to societal preservation (i.e. collective conceptions of culture, “way of life,” principles of governing structures and or identity.)

Of interest here is Machiavelli’s question: is a prince better served by being loved or feared? Here love is understood as hope. For the love of the sovereign is born from hope. Subjects loved their prince when he was perceived as being kind, courageous, generous, empathetic, noble and righteous. A ruler perceived thusly will engender populational hope that his reign will bear a future that is more safe, secure and economically abundant than the present. It is this hope that allowed the population to develop love of the ruler. As such, hope is a perquisite to loving the prince. Therefore, in this context, love is equal to hope and the question becomes whether or not a populational lobbyist is best served by generating hope or fear among his target audience. Unwinding this question very quickly leads to more questions: “How is hope lost and regained? What are the economic and material conditions for hope? What is the relationship between individual and collective hopes? What is the linkage between past...

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and future hopes/fears? How is hope/fear anchored in belief?”

is there a difference in the flavors of collective action/inaction more likely to be driven by fear versus hope? (E.g. fascist versus communist movements etc.) And which is the more powerful mechanism in terms of spurning and controlling societal evolution?

Societal movement contains coexisting hope and fear but like yin and yang they do not exist in equal amount in any movement. Therefore, despite this coexistence, movements can be classified into being fear or hope driven. Furthermore, movements can be classified as upholding (in that they push to uphold the current status quo) versus overturning (aimed at overturning the status quo.) As a general rule, fear drives upholding the current status quo, while hope spurns overturning movements. This logic would explain Machiavelli’s conclusion that fear was the more effective tool to maintaining the Prince’s rule (maintaining the status quo).

Epochs of societal evolution are counted by the dividing revolutions that overturned the old and implemented the new. The lengths of these epochs are measured by how long a particular status quo is upheld. The concern here is the shift from epoch to epoch, the overturning of the old and implementation of new; societal evolution. Therefore, following the above general rule, the focus should be on overturning movements. Overturning movements more often are driven by hope rather than fear. As such, logic dictates that the frame used to track and understand epoch transitions should be hope based.

The dynamic relationship between these two forces plays out in the societal attention spaces, which will be discussed below.

3. Societal Attention Spaces

There are many types of societal attention spaces. Though here we are concerned with the political and emotional attention spaces. These two spaces are intertwined and in many ways inseparable. Collins (2001) claims that understanding collective action requires “capturing their emotional dynamics in a social attention space (…).” He continues to argue that “critical mass develop, and fade away, because of emotional dynamics {… and that} Social movements operate inside a social attention space, which has room for only a limited number of participants; hence there is an implicit struggle to position oneself within this attention space. This process largely determines victory or defeat, as well as whether a movement can get off the ground at all and how long it will remain important.” Societal attention spaces are the field of play in which populational lobbyist exploit dynamics so as to gain a majority of the audience’s attention.

Societal attention spaces are organic, breathing in and out as they open and close. They are flexible, overlapping containers conceived in a myriad of ways (cultural, emotional, institutional… etc.). Through leveraging emotions populational lobbyist jockey for market share of these attention spaces. Action drives focus, focus leads attentiveness. An attentive audience will have a lowered ability to accept information coming from a source different than the focus of attention. Attentive audiences have closed attention spaces. On the other hand, inaction leads loss of focus towards inattentiveness. Inattentive audiences are more likely to accept information

147 Miyazaki, Swedberg. (2016), pg. 3
coming from a source different from what is presently occupying the inattentive gaze. It is in the populational attention spaces where populational lobbyist manipulate towards catalyzing collective action aimed at structuring the status quo in their preferred image towards preferred policies.

4. Collective Memory

Collective memory has been studied both narrowly (i.e. a subfield of the sociology of knowledge)\(^{149}\) and broadly (i.e. the connective structure of societies).\(^{150}\) Collective memory has been “seen as involving sets of practices like commemoration and monument building and general forms like tradition, myth, or identity.”\(^{151}\) It has been “approached from sociology, history, literary criticism, anthropology, psychology, art history, and political science, among other disciplines {… and has been studied} in simple and complex societies, from above and below, across the geographical spectrum. Social memory studies are nevertheless, or perhaps as a result, a non-paradigmatic, trans-disciplinary, centerless enterprise”\(^{152}\)

Collective memory was first referenced by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who described it as, "the damned-up force of our mysterious ancestors within us" and "piled up layers of accumulated collective memory."\(^{153}\) Maurice Halbwachs (1925)\(^{154}\) brought about the contemporary usage of the term. Walter Benjamin (without explicitly using the term) talked about collective memory in his writings about “cultural ruination,” in which he analyzed the world as accumulated history and talked about predicting what identities will emerge as the vehicle of hopeful momentum. “Cultural ruination” draws attention to the ways in which material and social remains and residues continue to assert themselves into the present.\(^{155}\)

Bartlett (1933) is considered to have been the first psychologist to broach collective memory in relation to its social dimensions and the importance of group dynamics.\(^{156}\) Anthropologist Evans-Pritchard (1940) established a theory of "structural amnesia."\(^{157}\) Janet (1927) studied the evolution of memory in relation to time. Vygotsky (1929) claimed that memory is a narrative that is unquestionably and fully shaped by cultural influences.\(^{158}\) Central to Marx’s thought process is social reproduction, though Marxism emphasizes an automatic and unconsciousness process, conscious remembering of the past is portrayed as “the tradition of the dead

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\(^{152}\) Ibid


generations" that "weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living."\textsuperscript{159}

Aries (1974)\textsuperscript{160} and Agulhon (1981)\textsuperscript{161} were the first to study commemorative practices as a tool of political manipulation, thus shifting the discussion from ideology to imagery, and, from meaning to manipulation. Hobsbawm in \textit{Invention of Tradition}\textsuperscript{162} portrayed traditions as being pointed efforts at securing political power. Many others have highlighted the ways in which states deliberately exploit and manipulate "history." Smith (1986): "One sign of the formation of the nation out of the protonation is the shifting of the center of collective memory from the temple and its priesthood to the university and its scholarly community."\textsuperscript{163} Breisbach (2007): "Historians were called on to mediate between the demands for change and the equally strong desire to see the continuity of past, present, and future preserved and presented by careful scholars with great eloquence, these histories became popular possessions rather than scholarly curiosa."\textsuperscript{164} Levi-Strauss (2013): "In our own societies, history has replaced mythology and fulfills the same function."\textsuperscript{165} Hobsbawm (1983) writes about states inventing traditions to buttress failing legitimacy.\textsuperscript{166}

Manipulation of collective memory is indelibly intertwined with manipulating identities. Macintyre claims "the possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide." Hobsbawm (1972): “To be a member of any human community is to situate oneself with regard to one's past, if only by rejecting it."\textsuperscript{167} Bellah (1985): "communities... have a history-in an important sense are constituted by their past- and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a 'community of memory,' one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative."\textsuperscript{168} Wallerstein (1991): "the temporal dimension of pastness is central and inherent in the concept of peoplehood."\textsuperscript{169} Zerubavel writes, "being social presupposes the ability to experience events that happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we joined them as if they were part of our own past."\textsuperscript{170}

Olick (2009) makes two claims about collective memory: 1) “Collective remembering is a highly

\textsuperscript{160}Ariès, Philippe. \textit{Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present}. Vol. 3: JHU Press, 1975.
complex process, involving numerous different people, practices, materials, and themes”, and, 2) “the concept of collective memory often encourages us to see memory either as the authentic residue of the past or as an entirely malleable construction in the present. “Traditionalist” models, for instance, assimilate collective memory to heritage, patrimony, national character, and the like, and view collective memory as a bedrock for the continuity of identities. They often ask how collective memory shapes or constrains contemporary action. On the other hand, “Presentist” models assimilate collective memory to manipulation and deception, a mere tool in the arsenal of power. They ask how contemporary interests shape what images of the past are deployed in contemporary contexts and see memory as highly variable.”

“Collective memory offers accounts of emotionally salient events and persons in the past that have particular relevance to how a group understands itself, its present, and, future challenges. These accounts are not simply the details about the past.” A central feature is the moral, political and social lessons they communicate. A starting point for some authors is the difference between what is often referred to as history, which is about facts, specific events and truth (as positivists use the term) {…} A more subjective understanding of the past is located in popular narratives and memories as experienced through the eyes and mind of participants and their descendants.” Both historical accounts and collective memory are built around plausible explanations and accounts about the past found in the narratives offered in school texts, commemorative events, sacred places and symbols. Because many people can remember large-scale events there will be differing accounts in what is remembered. There will always be individuals and groups trying to re-write and manipulate memories towards various objectives.

Three central mechanisms in the development, reinforcement and transmission of collective memories: narratives, ritual enactments, and symbolic landscapes. Specific rituals and events meant to evoke powerful emotions towards articulating particular narratives and stories about the past so as to attribute motives and meanings to key actors. Symbolic landscapes, specific physical objects and sites are used convey powerful messages of inclusivity/exclusivity that can heighten or diminish tensions in an effort induce or retard the likelihood of conflict.

Collective memory contains stored emotions which populational lobbyist manipulate towards organizing group mobilization through linking past experiences to present-day injustices. Transformation of stored emotions into collective action involves making concrete connections between memories and life in the future so as to determine action to be taken in present. Collective memory when activated is used to give the society a sense of who they are and where they belong, or, a sense of who they aren’t and who doesn’t belong. It is unlikely that there is only one simple pattern of linkage. Though it is possible (through analysis of specific situations) to discover some of the mechanisms and their dynamics to gain an understanding of general patterns.

171 Olick, Jeffrey K. (2008), pg. 15
173 Ibid
A discussion of political manipulation of any kind (emotions, identity and collective memory) demands a discussion of power.

5. Power

Here power is understood to be the forces that create movement and change, therefore the settings in which power can be analyzed stretch from office politics to the mechanisms that drive celestial motion. Individuals seek out power to create movement and change in their lives, and/or the society that they live in. This ranges from inciting a civil rights movement to climbing the corporate ladder. Operationalization of power comes in many different sizes and shapes. The analytical nexus in which power is placed for inspection will determine the setting in which it is being observed (i.e. rise of civil rights movement versus rise of corporate C.E.O.)

“Different types of power interact with other key variables in different ways and we need to draw conceptual distinctions in order to isolate these divergent effects. Inferences arrived at in one study are not necessarily transferable to another if the meaning and type of power is not constant.” 174

Peterson (2012) claims “dimensions of power most relevant for distinction between different types of power depends on the interests and concerns that motivate us to the study of power in the first place. This also means that there is no set number of types of power and that different typologies are not necessarily in direct competition with one another.” 175 Barnett and Duvall (2004) called for an analysis of “the normative structures and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals.” 176 Drawing on Habbermas’s frame of persuasion Mattern (2005) argues that attraction is “an interpretation that won out over many other possible interpretations through a communicative process.” 177 O’Loughlin and Roselle (2014) apply strategic narratives (defined as “a communicative tool through which political actors attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives”) to their analysis of power. 178 Relevant here are soft, hard, and ideational power. 179

Soft and Hard Power

Nye (2004) claims soft power (as opposed to hard power) is the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” 180 Traditionally, hard power is linked to

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175 Ibid
179 As stated by Peterson there are many different iterations of power including but not limited to: smart power {Nye, 2011} compulsory power, institutional power, structural power, and productive power {Duvall 2005}, normative power {Diez and Manners 2007}, network power {Grewal 2014}, coercive power, bargaining power, concerted power, and institutionalized (i.e. political) power {Peterson, 2012}
military means and soft power to political maneuvering, cultural diplomacy, mass media, higher education etc. Also included is economic leveraging, which is linked to both soft and hard power.\textsuperscript{181, 182} Here hard power is linked to forcible expansion and soft power amenable expansion. Mattern (2005)\textsuperscript{183} drew a similar distinction: cooptation versus coercion. Mechanisms of hard power (generally) are conceived as resources to be counted (does a country have the military resources to forcibly expand?). While soft power is considered a relationship. Here soft power keeps the above listed mechanisms (political maneuvering, cultural diplomacy, mass media, higher education etc.), though they take a back seat to collective identity.

Hard power remains contingent on having the necessary resources to forcibly expand. While soft power is conceptualized as a “relational phenomenon dependent on the specific encounter of people with their values and preferences in their historical context.”\textsuperscript{184} A relationship that grants “the ability to create consensus around shared meanings.”\textsuperscript{185} Power as a relationship necessitates that analysts pay attention to audience reception and narrative interpretation. It is necessary to understand the “expectations that may feed into decision-making and the expression of support for certain courses of action.”\textsuperscript{186} Feklyunina (2016) asks “should we be concerned only with interpretations of a narrative by a small group of decision-makers? What happens when a projected narrative is rejected by those in power but accepted by those groups that do not have immediate access to the locus of decision making? Can we assess the weight and the dynamics of soft power in a relationship between two or more states?”\textsuperscript{187}

Soft power was originally operationalized through shaping the interests and preferences of audiences through attraction. “Soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”\textsuperscript{188} Important here is understanding how an actor can influence another actor’s understanding of their interests, as well as the transformative tradition of social constructivism in which interests are not static and permanent, rather than being formed by evolving socially constructed identities that transform through interaction with others. Also important are the pressures of both internal and external changes.\textsuperscript{189} Feklyunina (2016) claims that acceptance of the above brings the expectation that “B’s interpretation of their interests is likely to be more compatible with actor A’s interests if there is a degree of compatibility between their socially constructed identities. In other words, soft power is significantly more likely to be present in a relationship between actors who broadly see themselves as part of the same socially constructed reality, which would entail compatible interpretations of their identities, compatible understandings of their interests and compatible definitions of the situation.”\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{181} T Tsygankov, Andrei P. "If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy." Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 7 (2006): 1079-99.
\textsuperscript{183} Mattern, Janice Bially. (2005)
\textsuperscript{184} Guzzini, Stefano. pg. 5, Power, Realism and Constructivism. Routledge, 2013.
\textsuperscript{185} Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. (2014), pg. 72
\textsuperscript{186} Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. (2014), pg. 80
\textsuperscript{190} Feklyunina, Valentina. (2016), pg. 5
The relationship between soft power and identity is not a novel suggestion.\textsuperscript{191, 192} Nye (2011) advises “we like those who are similar to us.”\textsuperscript{193} Reich and Lebow (2014)\textsuperscript{194} stress the necessity of shared identities for an actor to be likely to convince another actor to cooperate. Identity is also an underlying factor in O’Louglin’s (2014) conceptualization of soft power as strategic narratives, which are broken down into three (intertwined and reciprocally reinforcing) narrative echelons: “International System Narratives” (describe the structure of the world), “National Narratives” (project the stories of individual states) and “Issue Narratives” (provide interpretations of various problems and suggest possible solutions). Though there is no identity narrative included in the frame, therefore this frame has no ability to account for collective identities that transcend nation state borders (border transcendent identities) such as ideological (communism or religious) or regional (i.e. European) identities. Feklyunina (2016) argues that if “target audiences” accept an identity narrative they will be more likely to accept “issue narratives.” On the other hand, if a “target audience” rejects an identity narrative it becomes “significantly more difficult for an international actor to promote their interpretation of a particular issue. Thus, the projection and acceptance of collective identity narratives can be seen as an important (albeit not the only) mechanism of soft power through which actor B can reinterpret their interests as more compatible or even common with those of actor A.”\textsuperscript{195} This conception also pertains to other forms of non-coercive power (i.e. social power\textsuperscript{196} and normative power.)\textsuperscript{197}

The implication here (in opposition to Nye’s conception of soft power) is that “an actor cannot choose to resort to soft power in any particular moment. Rather soft power is always at work, shaping the psychological milieu of the relationship--increasing, decreasing or even disappearing together with the evolution of identities and interests. Moreover, because it is working at the level of identities and interests, we cannot attribute any individual foreign policy decision of the second actor to the exercise of soft power by the first actor. While a wide range of factors can affect individual foreign policy choices, soft power works by making some decisions more likely than others. At the same time, any action or non-action of the first actor, including their use of military or economic resources that are traditionally associated with hard power, can be interpreted by the second actor as either reinforcing or undermining the narrative of collective identity and common interests. For example, while Nye would describe a promise of economic gain as ‘inducement’ and thus as an exercise of hard power, one can argue that this promise can also be interpreted by the second actor as confirming their collective identity.”\textsuperscript{198}

Operationalization of soft power becomes complex when conceptualized as being driven by

\textsuperscript{193} Nye, Joseph S. (2011), pg. 92
\textsuperscript{195} Feklyunina, Valentina. (2016), pg. 6
\textsuperscript{196} Van Ham, Peter. 2010. Social power in international politics: Routledge.
\textsuperscript{198} Feklyunina, Valentina. (2016), pg. 6
identity narratives. Often, through the projection of constructed identity narratives, states are induced to adopt policies that they otherwise would not have implemented. It is impossible for any actor to completely control a constructed Identity narrative. Every Identity narrative will contend with competing narratives, as well as opposing perceptions as to what their own narrative stands for. The impossibility of any single actor owning any narrative makes the debate on agency murky. Duvall (2005) frames power as flowing through “interactions of specific actors,” and, through “social relations of constitution.” In his framing, there is structural power (compulsory and institutional power), which can be pinned to specific actors and there is also productive power, which is dispersed through the “constitutive social processes that are not controlled by specific actors”. Productive power can be equated with agency, which is necessary in producing and reinforcing the institutions through which structural power flows. Duvall and Barnett (2005) use as an example a conception in which the US is an “imperial center (...) structurally constituted and discursively produced through a complex of imperial relations that are not themselves fully under the control of the US state as actor”. Guzzini (2013) recognizes the significance of structures while assigning primary analytical focus to agency. This interpretation is contemporary with social constructivist and the reciprocal formation of agents and structures. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) claim that the evolution of identities is “the result of open-ended processes that give space to actors pursuing their specific political projects.”

“Far from a linear process, it is a messy combination of intended and unintended consequences. On the one hand, governments cannot monopolize identity narratives and their own understandings of ‘Self’ and ‘we’ are shaped by existing cultural structures that were formed and evolved in specific historical circumstances. On the other hand, the process of collective identity construction and transformation, although often facilitated by the conscious efforts of cultural or political elites, is not dependent on their top-down instrumental efforts.”

Identity narratives are projected (by Populational lobbyist) towards being accepted by an audience (holding two sub-audiences: the public and elites). If accepted the purveyor will “benefit from a more favorable psychological milieu.” The agency at play has two spheres of operation: (1) supply side (purveyor of the identity narrative), and, (2) the demand side

199 Bilsland, James. The President, the State and the Cold War: Comparing the Foreign Policies of Truman and Reagan. Routledge, 2015.
201 This inability to ever completely control any identity narrative is what makes playing with nationalism akin to playing with fire. In an instant, the flames can get away from its handler and the objectives for which it was being aimed at. (i.e. Brexit-David Cameron, who started the Brexit movement, never wanted (nor envisioned) that Brexit would succeed. David Cameron pushed Brexit as a maneuver to flex against the EU so as to gain concessions. It got away from him and he could not manage to put the genie back in the bottle. Accordingly, he was the biggest he opponent to Brexit going into the referendum).
203 Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. (2005), pg. 66
204 Guzzini, Stefano. (2013)
205 Wendt, Alexander. (1999)
207 Feklyunina, Valentina. (2016), pg. 7
208 Ibid
(audience). “It is important to locate and track the agents […] who have the capacity to affect our interests, as well as those of others.”

Tracking agency on the supply side can help us understand to what extent Populational lobbyist are moving society away from the societal best interest and towards the lobbyists best interest.

On the demand side the expectation is a lack of identity homogeneity with overlapping audiences that express differing identity narratives. A non-homogenous audience results in varying understanding of projected identities, which affect reception and internalization of said narrative. Such variations of interpretation are critical in deconstructing the mechanisms of soft power, and hence the mechanism of amenable territorial expansion. An audience has two sub-audiences of any projected narrative (Government and Public). This means that there can be situation when the government accepts a particular narrative, while the public rejects it, or, vice versa. The outcome of this situation is dependent on the concept of “weight” as a key dimension of power, which is linked to how soft power and collective identity interact.

The weight of an actor’s power here is understood as the likelihood that B’s behavior is or could be affected by A. The expectation is that an actor will have greater ability to leverage soft power “if its projected definition of ‘we’, as articulated in the official discourse and signaled in practice (intentionally or unintentionally), is accepted in all major identity discourses of state B. If the definition of ‘we’ is rejected in some of the major discourses, an ensuing domestic contestation is likely to severely limit A’s soft power.”

Soft power is in constant flux and dependent on the amount in which the intended audience accepts said identity narrative.

**Ideational Power**

If soft and hard power is the agency with which states accomplish territorial expansion. What is the agency through which states create soft and hard power? Classically, agency of hard power is viewed as the ability to amass the physical means and resources to force another actor do what they are told. While the agency of soft power rests in being able to market an acceptable border transcendent identity to another so as convince them to want to do what they are being told. If one digs deeper it becomes clear that agency (especially when talking about soft power, and to a lesser extent hard power) is created by ideational power. According to Carstensen and Schmidt (2015) ideational power is the “capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements. This may occur directly through persuasion or imposition, or, indirectly by influencing the ideational context that defines the range of possibilities of others […] ideational power connects with compulsory, structural and institutional forms of power [while retaining] enough distinctiveness to constitute a form of power in its own right.”

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212 Feklyunina, Valentina. (2016), pg. 8  
213 Relying on Hay’s (2002) definition of power: “the ability of actors (whether individual or collective) to “have an effect” upon the context which defines the range of possibilities of others”  
Ideational Power allows meaning to be imprinted on peoples’ experiences of the world. It facilitates the ability to handle a complex informational nexus, interpret problems and suggest potential solutions. Ideational power allows for the construction of discourses that justify (in cognitive and normative terms) certain policies and programs over others. Ideational accounting of actions is “a result of people interpreting their world through certain ideational elements” (i.e. discourse, practices, symbols, myths, narratives, collective memories, stories, frames, norms, grammar, models and identities). Ideational power is different from other types of power: (1) it is built on a concept of power, “which is exerted through the constitution of intersubjective meaning structures that agents both draw on to give meaning to their material and social circumstances and battle over to affect what ideas and discourses are deemed viable”; (2) Is conceived as top down and bottom up process, and, (3) “conceptualized in agency-oriented terms {...focusing} on the ways that actors, through the use of ideational elements, seek to influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs.” In this conception actors leveraging ideational power are best described as “ideational leaders” or as members of advocacy groups, epistemic communities and/or social movements (i.e. Populational lobbyist).

The control of information and ideas is the agency through which ideational power is leveraged towards nursing favorable perceptions among the listening audience. Focusing on agency does not ignore the importance of structures. Populational lobbyists rely on current ideational structures that are constantly evolving through the agent’s use in advancing, securing and communicating their ideas. Populational lobbyists manufacture ideational structures by pursuing a particular set of ideological ideas. Ideational power comes in three types.

**Power Through Ideas**

Power through ideas is the “capacity of actors to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views of what to think and do through the use of ideational elements.” Power through ideas is not coercive or threatening and not leveraged based on rank, position or material resources rather than being leveraged through oration and reason. Ideational power is a function of the amount of “cognitive and normative arguments that can be mustered in support” of. Cognitive discourse to be successful should describe the problem and propose actions to alleviate said

218 Carstensen, Martin B, and Vivien A Schmidt. (2016), pg. 322
219 Ibid
220 This contrasts with the singular focus on top-down interaction generally characterizing the compulsory, structural and institutional understandings of power.
221 Carstensen, Martin B, and Vivien A. Schmidt. (2016), pg. 323
226 Here reason should be understood as separate from “truth.” Reasoned arguments are not necessarily true.
227 Carstensen, Martin B, and Vivien A. Schmidt. (2016), pg. 324
problem.\textsuperscript{228, 229, 230} On the other hand, normative discourse is aimed at establishing the validity of an argument as its value. As such, the point is to petition the customs and values of the audience. The weight of ideational power will be contingent on the degree that the marketed idea is accepted as appropriate.\textsuperscript{231}

\begin{quote}
\textit{success of any elite group engaged in persuasion is often less related to their analytic skills than to the broad mass intuitions of the moment.}\textsuperscript{232}
\end{quote}

This is the power of the institution creating internalized expectations of how things should be, how things work (i.e. how the economy works). Thus setting (an almost intrinsic) limitation on what kinds of policies the populational lobbyist can imagine, and, what kind of policies the audience can accept.\textsuperscript{233} This conception of agency and ideational power differs from structural and socialization theories as it allows the population to stand separate from, while still critically engaging with the ideas and narratives held. Ideas here are conceived not as a resource or immovable framework, rather than a guide existing between the minds of the audience and the projected narrative. This in-between placement of ideas allows the audience to (at times) buck the system and come together in deliberation towards collective action towards changing the status quo.\textsuperscript{234} Which is why the purveying populational lobbyist is always working towards audience internalization of his message.

Power over Ideas
There are three groups from which power over ideas emanate.

Elitist
Are those who control the mechanisms of “traditional power” (i.e. coercive, structural and/or institutional) and thus strong enough to force their narratives. As a result, elitists have the luxury to (through the media and education system) to disseminate their narratives to the exclusion of the rest. Here ideational power is (in conjunction with other types of power) leveraged to keep the status quo in place. Here ideational power flows top down.

Populist
Are the people who are not in power, who (generally) do not have access to “traditional power.”

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{228}Schmidt, Vivien A. pg. 251, Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities. Oxford University Press, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{231}Schmidt (2006: 251-253) claims that: cognitive narratives based on technical and scientific arguments to be successful as power through ideas need to play the normative role by addressing (in laymen’s’ terms) the agency of the problem and suggest a solution that plays with the audience. (Schmidt 2006: 251–3).
  \item \textsuperscript{233}The neo-Keynesian (cognitive) argument claiming that a state should increase spending in times of recession is proven to be the most successful road to recovery. As such, the expectation should be that it would be the most implemented solution to economic recessions. This expectation is not the reality of the current status quo. In recent decades by appealing to “common sense” arguments of the necessity of tightening the belt during times of economic downturn (i.e. neo-liberal principles) has become status quo solution.
\end{itemize}
and therefore not strong enough to force their narrative. A signifying method of this group is tactically shaming towards conforming the viewpoints and customs of others. Human rights and advocacy groups are a good example of this. Here ideational power flows bottom up.

Obstinates
Obstinates are found in both elitist and populist groups. They are players who have the facility to resist entertaining the possibility of considering different viewpoints. Commonly this unwillingness to consider other views results from arguments that rely on complex “technical” or “scientific” jargon. This language barrier enables players to ignore alternate methods as untenable or not qualified for discussion. Such domineering views constrain what moves are considered viable and which outcomes appropriate. Thus, limiting which policies have a modicum of possible success and which policies dead on arrival.

Financial regulation is a good example where power over ideas has been leveraged by obstinate elitist in an effort to keep the neo-liberal status quo. “Acceptable” policies concerning financial regulation have been cemented (through “elite peer recognition”) into a nexus that underrepresents market skeptic ideas and over-represents ideas aligned with private sector predilections. The ability to affect financial regulation has basically become inaccessible “for policy entrepreneurs with alternative views.” As a result of the 2008 crisis there has been some softening of the neo-liberal monopoly over financial regulation. Though, essentially, the Game has remained the same (i.e. obstinate elitists still have the power to discount alternative conceptions of financial regulations).

Power over ideas is generally more involved in elitist fending off pressures aimed at changing the status quo. Though, it also plays a part in changing the system in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary way.

*Power in Ideas*
Power through and over ideas concern the direct leveraging of ideas to affect the other players, while power in ideas “is about the background ideational processes – constituted by systems of knowledge, discursive practices and institutional setups – that in important ways affect which ideas enjoy authority at the expense of others.” Here the connection is to historical structures producing meaning and a population’s self-understanding, identity and perceived interests. Power in ideas is not focused on the interaction of ideas and Populational lobbyist. Rather the

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241 Carstensen, Martin B, and Vivien A. Schmidt. (2016), pg. 329

concern is “the deeper-level ideational and institutional structures that actors draw upon and relate their ideas to in order for them to gain recognition among elites and in the mass public.”

The point here is the way in which ideas become accepted as the natural order of things, the way in which they come to structure peoples’ thoughts on the construction of society. Though, these “natural” ideas should not be considered as hard and immovable structures. Rather should be seen as malleable, as continuously evolving. Changing realities ensure slow and incremental evolution of ideas. Power in ideas constrains the ways in which elites are able to justify policies to the audience, as well as the range of options that they themselves see as normatively acceptable. Power in ideas is in line with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and, Foucault’s argument that individuals are constituted as objects within a system of thought, which necessarily implies a form of subjectification to a particular way of being.

Coercive and structural power is leveraged in a visible way. The affected are aware of being dominated. On the other hand, players affected by power in ideas, many times, are not aware. Therefore, it can be argued that power through ideas is stronger than most other forms of power, for power through ideas (ideational structures) constrain not just what actors do but also what they think and say. Bourdieu (1994) claims that the doxa or vision of the world of élites who dominate the state creates the ‘habitus’ that conditions people to see the world in the way they (the dominant) choose.

Historical institutionalists use power through ideas when analyzing the institutionalization of ideas embedded in the laws that that come to regulate a society, or, in the way in which ideational permanence becomes the defining mechanism behind the trajectory of post crisis institutional responses. Post Maastricht treaty regulation of the Euro provides a good example. Here neoliberal ideas of currency governance became self-reinforcing and ensured more neoliberal fixes to forthcoming problems.

**Power Conclusion**

In this analysis, soft and hard power is the agency through which territorial expansion is enacted. Hard power is responsible for forcible expansion, while soft power responsible for amenable expansion. Soft power is conceived as the ability to convince others to accept the offered collective identity being marketed by the expanding power. The more soft power an expander can muster translates into a higher likelihood that they will be able to convince the populations being expanded upon to amenable join the union. When there is a lack of soft power the expander must rely on hard power, and forcibly expand. Both hard and soft power are leveraged through the perceived relationship of expander and populations being expanded upon. Therefore, controlling ideas that frame these perceptions are of the utmost importance. It is through ideational power that these ideas are controlled and molded.

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243 Carstensen, Martin B, and Vivien A Schmidt. (216), pg. 329
The conclusion that should be taken away is that Soft and hard power are the agency through which territorial expansion is achieved, and, it is Ideational power that is the agency through which soft and hard power are leveraged.

All instances of political and social manipulation need to be legitimized. Legitimization must be framed. Below we discuss how legitimacy is framed.

6. Framing Legitimacy

All instances of political and social manipulation necessitate a legitimacy frame. Framing is the process in which populational lobbyist employ “reality construction” by underscoring certain information towards specific ends (i.e. winning an election in a media-rich environment of democratic competition, animating popular support for a social movement, or legitimating postcolonial rule). It is a process of making claims about the nature of reality towards influencing an audience. “Frames” have behavioral implications, and, are not necessarily decided by present material factors or necessarily a product of the societal will. Framing can help identify underlying narratives used by populational lobbyist to foster an accepted legitimacy, and to then understand the presentation of said narratives and offered solutions. Here we follow the conception advanced by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies-Hamburg who hypothesized “that the addressees of legitimation discourses extend beyond domestic audiences to the international sphere {…} a conceptualization of the suggested links between legitimation and repression, focusing on discursive justifications and their audiences”, and that the “framing of repression {power consolidation} can have legitimizing or delegitimizing and deterrent or mobilizing effects, depending on the target audience.” “Such justifications may be inspired by globalized discourses and targeted at international audiences beyond the domestic public.”

When framing Watson (2012) recommends aiming “for the higher level of abstraction within framing theory” towards what Snow and Benford (2000) call master frames, which are “flexible and open to extension and the inclusion of more specific issue frames.” One conception of master frames: (1) consolidation of power through “conservative” “frames that focus on stability and security, and, (2) consolidation of power sold as being “progress.”

Another conception is that legitimizing frames have six “interlinked but functionally different mechanisms”: “(1) ideology, (2) foundational myth, (3) personalism, (4) international engagement, (5) procedural mechanisms, and (6) past performance.” Though, the theory/practice dichotomy demands that real world cases not be so clear-cut, rather than “highly complex

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250 Benford, Robert D., and David A Snow. (2000)


255 Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua. (2017), pg 7
variations, transitional forms and combinations of these pure types.”

Mirjam (2017) asks “how relevant the international audience is relative to domestic audiences,” and “what kind of discourse is likely to resonate with them, what narratives are they most likely to accept?” Bank (2004) sees the necessity of identifying the different strategies used when the target audience is the elite versus being the larger population. Though we should not make the mistake of assuming that “elites always use the frames that are most likely to resonate, as framing literature shows that overly extreme or otherwise unsuitable frames are often used. However, there is reason to believe that elites choose their rhetoric strategically.”

We add two types of the above frame conceptions: (1) frames of legitimacy, and, (2) facades of legitimacy. The difference between them; frames of legitimacy are constructed on concrete events, while the façade on non-concrete events (concrete vs. non-concrete events will be discussed later in the text). The type of legitimacy frame used is vital in understanding the “means of rule” as well as “durability” of rule. Another important aspect of the legitimacy frame is whether it is self-contained or non-self-contained (self-contained vs. non-self-contained frames will be discussed in depth later). Understanding what kind of legitimacy frame is being deployed provides two pieces of valuable information: (1) Projected hope confidence movement, and, (2) susceptibility to “external pressure.”

The determination of whether a frame will induce positive or negative movement in relation to hope confidence (hope confidence will be discussed in depth later in the text) is directly related to whether the frame has been built around a concrete or non-concrete event, is it a frame or façade of legitimacy? Frames built on concrete events are expected to (over time) push towards egalitarianism, movement towards egalitarianism breeds positive hope confidence. On the other hand, façades of legitimacy are built around non-concrete events and (over time) expected to push away from egalitarianism. Movement away from egalitarianism translates into negative hope confidence, while movement towards creates positive hope confidence.

Susceptibility to outside actors (external pressure) is directly related to whether a frame is self-contained. Self-contained frames allow the implementing lobbyist to produce all the necessary components domestically. On the other hand, the non-self-contained frame requires components that are not available domestically. The result is that lobbyist legitimizing through non-self-contained frames must look to external suppliers and markets to compile all the necessary parts. While lobbyist legitimizing through self-contained frames do not need external help in design and implementation of said legitimacy frame. The translation is that lobbyist needing to negotiate with external actors for necessary components will be more susceptible to external influence towards domestic change than lobbyist that can manufacture all necessary components.

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257 Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua (2017)
259 Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua. (2017), pg. 9
domestically.

Also, the self-contained frame is more likely to produce periods of isolation than the non-self-contained frame, because the lobbyists running a self-contained frame are not compelled to engage with the outside world to achieve their goal of domestic power consolidation. As such, they are not compelled to worry about external perceptions of methods of domestic power consolidation. Therefore, the self-contained frame is (also) more likely to produce hard repression than the non-self-contained.

Below are examples of the self vs. non-self-contained frame.

Self-contained: A legitimacy frame based on Japanese ethnicity being deployed in Japan.

Non-Self-contained: Legitimacy frame constructed around international recognition, respect and engagement being deployed in any domestic setting.

The self/non-self-contained dichotomy also clues us into who the players are in any situation. In the case of the self-contained frame, since all the necessary pieces can be produced domestically, (in the context of domestic power consolidation) all-external players are essentially sidelined with very little leverage. As such, when analyzing domestic power consolidation where the legitimacy frame is self-contained it is not necessary to account for any external players. On the other hand, when analyzing domestic power consolidation gained through implementation of a non-self-contained frame it is necessary to account for external players. Ascertaining what is the missing frame component leads to identifying potential suppliers of these necessary components. Potential suppliers should be considered as the most likely external players.

Many authors have mentioned Ideology as a master frame but none have parsed it into analytical typologies. Here ideology as a master frame is parsed into two types: 1) Ideological legitimacy frame, and, 2) Ideological feedback loop. These parsed types produce different hope confidence projections. The difference between the two is that the former uses an ideology to logically bring an argument to a specific conclusion, while the later does not have any logical argument leading to the conclusion, rather than cyclically proving itself as true. An example of an ideological legitimacy frame might be a communist party legitimizing their rule through the implementing the tenants of communism. The party does not legitimize itself; rather it is legitimized through their implementation of the communist ideology into the societal structure. Here the party can lose this legitimacy if they are perceived to stray too far from the populational perception of what communism is. On the other hand, an ideological feedback loop legitimizes the ruling party cyclically with tenants that are intrinsically part of the ruling party. The tenants involved in the feedback loop are claimed valid because they are just intrinsically valid not because of an argument that leads to their validity. Rule based on divine bloodline is an example of a feedback loop. Another example is rule based on a leader being the pinnacled reflection of what a leader is supposed to be, therefore he should be leader because he intrinsically is the pinnacle of leadership. Characteristic of the feedback loop is that the point that proves the legitimacy of the ruler is intrinsic in the leader or party, and that this intrinsic quality is what proves that they should be in charge.
An ideological legitimacy frame has the potential exploit both concrete and non-concrete events and therefore has the potential to the whole spectrum of hope confidence movement (negative, positive and neutral). While ideological feedback loops depend on the non-concrete event and produce negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by a hard transmission of the feedback loop.

While writing about process of legitimization framed by neo-liberal power consolidation and expansion into the post-Soviet space Hopf (2002) differentiated between power consolidations achieved through legitimization versus naturalization.262 According to Linz (1978) legitimization comes about through the belief that the current structure (despite shortcomings and failures) is favorable to “any others that might be established.” This logic dictates that legitimization cannot happen if the audience cannot conceive of any other system variations being established. “If alternatives are unthinkable due to a process of naturalization, then legitimization cannot occur.”263 Max Weber also captures this point; “people may submit (to authority) from [...] helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative”264 This is circuitously claimed by Prezworski when he says that sitting regimes can only lose legitimacy if there is a suitable substitute. Also, he claims that when there is not an alternative “nothing much” happens towards threatening the sitting status quo. Theorist critical of democracy claim that the “absence of an alternative may substitute for legitimization in stabilizing a political order.”265 This substitution is what Hopf calls “normalization.” Societal structures that are de facto accepted as legitimate due to the lack of any options perceived as being possible. Whether a particular form of hegemony is legitimized or naturalized is a function of deliberation in which a particular variation was consensually chosen over other candidates. Naturalization is when there is no decision to be made due to a lack of choices. Naturalization is a social process by which politically contestable outcomes, policies, or practices come to be regarded as given.266 267 268 In Hopf’s analysis both legitimization and normalization buttress the current societal structure and lower the likelihood of collective action towards replacing the status quo. Here, in addition to Hopf’s conception, the view is that normalizing buttresses against a negative hope confidence slide, while, on the other hand, legitimizing is the fuel pushing positive hope confidence movement.

In Hopf’s research one outcome of normalization is the post-Soviet transition toward liberal market capitalism. He asked, “How this (liberal market capitalist) alternative became the presumptive future? The answer lies not only in each country’s particular context, but also in their shared past. This common history is the socialist alternative represented by the Soviet Union. But this potential alternative literally collapsed. There is no alternative because the alternative has been delegitimized, albeit to varying degrees in each post-Soviet state {…} Social

264 Quoted in Frank Parkin: Max Weber Revised edition 2002 pg. 77
theorists would suggest that alternatives to the present are delegitimized through the operation of the power of present realities. So, at the macro level, economic and political power is so arranged as to render consideration of alternative arrangements fanciful. And at the micro level, the individual would never consider raising any alternative, as he or she never hears it being treated seriously, and so it is not a natural part of conversation. In this way naturalization operates as a social structure that impedes public deliberation.”

Hopf conceptualized a set of questions (to which he put to focus groups in Ukraine, Estonia and Uzbekistan) that could indicate likelihood that any particular population would be neutral, positive or negatively inclined towards the idea of transitioning to market capitalism. The answers to the questions indicate whether a group is legitimizing/delegitimizing, or, naturalizing/denaturalizing the societal structure. Hopf assigned a (−) to answers that show delegitimizing or denaturalizing and a (+) to answers that show naturalization or legitimization. If the final tabulation of the particular group is a minus then they are negatively inclined towards accepting the push towards market capitalism. The farther negative the score the more disinclined the population is. The same is true for positive score concerning inclination towards the neo liberal structure.

Hopf placed the following questions at the center of his research.

1. Who won?
2. What gains?
3. Who lost?
4. Who is to blame?
5. What is the solution?

Who won? For who is the societal structure making positive gains towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future. Who has benefitted from the societal structure? Who are the winners? And, are these winners deserving of the received reward? Cycles of delegitimization and/or denaturalization occur when the perception of the citizens is a structure that produces mainly unworthy winners. Legitimacy is gained when the population perceives the societal fruit going to the worthy.

Examples of unworthy recipients: Politicians the elite and corporations. It is seldom these winners will be perceived as deserving of the spoils. Usually they are seen as unworthy. Unworthy winners are delegitimizing/denaturalizing.

Examples of worthy recipients: Small business and entrepreneurs will rarely be perceived as unworthy winners. Deserving winners are legitimizing to the societal structure.

What Gains? When calculating gains there are two factors material and esoteric, which can be equated with the two levels of self-preservation (i.e. physical and societal), also these two levels can be understood as being connected to the two levels of hope confidence control (i.e. control Economic and Safety and Security, which will be discussed later).

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269 Hopf, Ted. (2002), pg. 409
270 Ibid
Example material answers: money in my pocket or food on the table, access to healthcare and/or education.

Example esoteric answers: independence, sovereignty and personal freedom (i.e. of thought, speech and religion etc.), or, cementing local language as the as the state language and/or revival of the populations perceived nationhood. 271, 272

A perception of gains (esoteric and/or material) is legitimizing. On the other hand, the perception of negative movement towards esoteric and/or material gains is delegitimizing/denaturalizing.

Who lost? Who bears the brunt of any negative movement towards a safer, more secure and economic abundant future? And, are they deserving of their fate? Undeserving losers might include the working and poor class, families, the elderly, the sick or children etc. Deserving losers might include billionaires, politicians and the elite. Deserving losers legitimize the status quo, while undeserving losers delegitimizes it.

Who is to blame? The question of blame “allows us to differentiate between a case of legitimization with a rejected alternative and a case of naturalization with no alternative. If a process of legitimization were under way, we should record conversations which justify the transition vis-a-vis some alternative futures.” 273 On the other hand, naturalizing discourse can be understood in three ways: (1) inevitability and time; “a process whose pain will end in some indeterminate time in the future”, 274 (2) as a “depersonalized structure; there is never any locus of responsibility or authority to whom one could appeal.” 275, and, (3) “imagery of a turning point, a rubicon, a threshold, an entry into a new world, the crossing of a boundary or frontier. This imagery has great power, for it implies there is no turning back — that which was before can be no more; it is unthinkable.” 276

Naturalization is attributing “the misery of the transition to the ‘natural’ properties of the unavoidable transition itself, and not to the government”. 277 Naturalization is occurring if the answer is nobody is to blame. That the downturn is “a temporary condition” that “maybe in fifty years these problems will not exist.” Or that “it is inevitable {...} that it is life {...} Time {...}” 278 Legitimization is happening if the answer is that the present congress, parliament, King, Emperor or president is to blame. Both (legitimizing and naturalizing) buttress the sitting societal structure. Though as noted: Naturalizing is a buttressing against a negative hope confidence slide. On the other hand, legitimizing is the fuel pushing positive hope confidence movement.

Hopf’s conception of transition is similar to hope confidence. His questions and system of +/- value assessment can be fitted to tracking hope confidence.

271 Though nationhood only counts as a plus if other groups in society do not feel excluded as a result.
272 Populational lobbyists prefer to focus on building the perception of esoteric gain rather than material. Esoteric gains are less expensive to procure and much easier to fake than material gains.
273 Hopf, Ted. (2002), pg. 420
274 Ibid
275 Hopf, Ted (2002), pg. 421
276 Ibid
277 Ibid
278 Ibid
All the themes discussed in the above chapter are part of the patchwork that operationalizes the frame being developed. Purposefully left out of this section was in depth discussion of how these pieces fit to bring the frame together. The next chapters will give will explain the frame, its functioning and how the themes above fit together in operationalization.

Chapter 2 Summary: fleshed out were the concepts used in constructing this analytical frame through looking at the current literature. Starting with a discussion of the present views on expansion. First, forcible expansion followed by voluntary integration. After this the overarching components (geopolitics and identity) were discussed. Under geopolitics discussed was regional political order, which included a discussion of borderlands and cultural faultline theory. After geopolitics, identity was discussed. Following the two overarching components the underlying synthesizing components were discussed. These were: Populational Manipulation and Populational lobbyists, Emotions-Hope and Fear-, Societal Attention Spaces, Collective Memory, Power-Soft and Hard, Power Through Ideas, Power in Ideas, and, Framing Legitimacy.

III. Chapter 3 - Analytical Typologies
The frame being devised has 4 sets of analytical typologies, 2 that pertain to geopolitics (geopolitical viability and proximate faultline typologies) and 2 that pertain to identity (identity viability and identity typologies). Each of these analytical typologies pertains to different levels of the analysis (i.e. regional analysis, analysis of expanding power and analysis of populations being expanded upon). We start with the geopolitical viability and then identity viability, followed by identity typologies and proximate faultline typologies. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of hope confidence

A. Geopolitical Viability
The first assumption taken concerning the likelihood of expansion is that the higher the associated costs of the expansive move the lower the likelihood that it will be enacted. This means that forcible expansion due to the costs associated with military campaigns and occupation) will always be less likely than amenable expansion due to the fact that (forcible expansion always has higher associated costs than amenable.

This assumption leads to geopolitical viability, which functions based on expected associated costs to be levied on the expanding power by other geopolitical actors and coalitions in response to any expansive move. Geopolitical viability is the main determining factor affecting the likelihood that a specific expanding power will not enact programs of expansion. It is based solely on the expanding power’s perception of the international arena and relative balance of power. Is based on the perception that another geopolitical actor is willing and able to, if not outright derail the expansion (amenable or forcible), is able to raise the associated costs rendering expansion too expensive to be a viable move.

No Geopolitical Viability: when the expanding power perceives an opposing geopolitical force that necessarily has the will and capability to raise associated costs of the expansive move past the threshold of a favorable cost benefit analysis, thus rendering the expansive move (in the end) a losing one.
Geopolitical Viability: when the expanding power’s perception is that the expansion will not necessarily engender an opposing geopolitical force with both the will and ability to raise the associated costs of the expansive move past the cost analysis threshold.

The difference between the two is the word necessarily. The difference between the two is 97% of players. A rational player will not undertake any program if it is perceived to necessarily in the end be a losing move that in the end will be more expensive than it’s cost. On the other hand, if a program is not necessarily perceived to (in the end) be a losing move, to be in the end be more expensive than its cost, then any player to may decide to pursue said program. It is assumed that the international arena is running a rational player bell curve (with outlying 1.5% irrational actors and 1.5% cornered rational actors) making the expectation that expansion without Geopolitical Viability is an available option for 3% of the players, while expansion under Geopolitical Viability is an available option to 100% of the players, a difference of 97%. Therefore, no Geopolitical Viability results in a very low likelihood of expansion, while Geopolitical Viability raises the likelihood from low to a (case by case) possibility (not likelihood). Thus, no geopolitical viability means that 97% of the players are expected to not expand, with only 3% willing to consider expansion. On the other hand, 100% of the players might decide to expand when there is Geopolitical Viability. Therefore, the absence of Geopolitical Viability is much more telling than its presence. As such, analytically, geopolitical viability is most useful in projecting likelihood of expansion when a state of no geopolitical viability is determined.

Geopolitical viability is dealing with an assumption about perceptions. It deals with the analyst’s perception of the geopolitical balance of power and the analysts reading of the leaders of the expanding powers perception of the balance of power. This fact can, at times, cause incorrect assessments. There are two places where the analyst could be wrong: 1) their reading of the present balance of power, or, 2) the reading of the perception of leaders of the expanding power concerning the balance of power. The assumption is that there is, at any given time, a collective assumption concerning the balance of power, and that, this collective assumption most of the time is representative of how the real balance of power is. Also, that the perception of the leaders of rational actors concerning balance of power will mirror the collective perception. Most of the time is not always. The system can be rigged and gamed to induce rational actors to make unwise decisions. Saddam believed that he was invading Kuwait under Geopolitical Viability. Saddam was a rational player and would not have invaded Kuwait had he believed that it would engender such a grand coalition against. Before invasion, Saddam was told by U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.’ The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had ‘no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”279 Effectively the U.S. tricked Saddam into believing that he had geopolitical viability to invade Kuwait, when in reality he did not.

One key word when dealing with Geopolitical Viability is “might.” Under Geopolitical Viability, 100% of the actors might, at some time, under certain circumstances undertake expansion. The key to gauging the likelihood of expansion when there is geopolitical viability is through applying conditional if and when statements. If, and when A happens then actor B will have a

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higher propensity to take advantage of geopolitical viability and enact programs of territorial expansion. Conditional if and when statements vary greatly in regards to the variables that may affect the propensity to take advantage of geopolitical viability. Though, these variables are almost always linked a change in the amount of power that is currently being held. This can be a change in the domestic power of the ruling party or leader, or, to the position that the country occupies in the context of the international/regional balance of power. This change in power can be actual or perceived and it can be a decline or gain. When there is a perception that a move towards territorial expansion will increase the power held or mitigate against a loss in power there is a rise in propensity of an actor taking advantage of geopolitical viability and enacting territorial expansion. Some examples in regards to the situation in which A has geopolitical viability to expand on actor B: 1) If and when huge reserves of oil are found in the territory of B the likelihood that A will expand rises. In this case expansion is a function of the gain in power that will be achieved from controlling these oil reserves. 2) If and when the ruling party of country A is experiencing increased domestic opposition against their rule the propensity that they will expand rises. In this second case the expansion is mitigation against a potential decline in domestic power. Expansion is used as a distraction against growing opposition and a way to vent excess populational energy in non-domestic setting. 3) If and when actor A perceives that their rival C is considering expansion into B the propensity that A will expand rises. In this case expansion would be at once a move towards a gain of international power and mitigation against a decline. A will gain position relative to their rival C and mitigate against the loss of position if C were to expand first.

B. Identity Viability
First will be an explanation of identity viability followed by a discussion of European identity viability in the context of further potential European Union expansion.

Identity viability is the main factor in determining whether an expanding power has the option to expand amenable. Due to the high associated costs of forcible expansion amenable expansion is always the preferable choice. Therefore, if amenable expansion is an option an actor will never expand forcibly.

Identity viability is the perceptual identity relationship between the expanding power and populations being expanded upon. How does the population being expanded upon view the projected identity of the expanding power? And how does the Expanding Power view the identity of the populations being expanded upon?

*Full Identity Viability*-when the identities of joining populations and the expanding power accept each other as being culturally close enough that integration can begin without delay; i.e., the unification of East and West Germany.\(^{280}\) *Full Identity Viability* indicates that amenable expansion is likely and forcible expansion impossible because one cannot forcibly expand upon a population who already wishes to join.

*Positive Half Identity Viability*-when only the joining population has the perception that the two identities are close enough to begin integration without delay. *Positive half identity viability* indicates that expansion is possible but not necessarily probable. Here again, the population in

\(^{280}\) The Berlin wall fell in November 1989. August 1990 integration was signed official.
question wants to join the expanding power, which means that any expansion (if it transpires) will necessarily be amenable. When positive half identity viability exists, the expanding power will defer the decision to an application process designed to identify necessary changes that the population being expanded upon must make in order to be considered fully viable.

Negative Half Identity Viability- (the opposite of positive half identity viability) when only the expanding has the perception that the two identities are close enough to be integrated. Negative Half Identity Viability indicates that the populations being expanded upon do not accept the projected identity of the expanding power and do not want to be expanded upon. In this case any expansion will necessarily be forcible.

No Identity Viability- when both the Expanding Power and the Populations expanded upon agrees on the perception of incompatible identities. No identity viability indicates a low likelihood of expansion; here amenable expansion is impossible for one cannot amenably expand upon people who do not want to be expanded upon. Therefore, if against likelihood expansion does happen it will necessarily be forcible.

Positive half identity viability grants a superior bargaining position to the expanding power. This superior position comes from the fact that the expanding power has total control over who is accepted and who is rejected. This superior position is showcased during the ascension process. Official “candidates” will be accepted according to their ability to implement changes based upon stipulations and concessions demanded by the expanding power. EU demands and stipulations are delivered in a document called the Acquis, which outlines the shortcomings of the candidate and necessary steps to become considered acceptable. Once the applicant meets these demands they will be considered as having full identity viability and integration begin without delay. Even before official “candidacy” is granted the expanding power has made an initial evaluation as to the compatibility of populations wishing to join the Empire (or Union). There are two outcomes of this evaluation: Incompatible or Compatible.

Incompatible Identities- perceived as lacking the potential to be sufficiently altered into full identity viability. Incompatible identities are known by the expanding power to not be eligible for amenable ascension into the Union.

Compatible Identities- if a population is not found to be incompatible then it will be considered as de facto compatible. Compatibility does not guarantee acceptance. Compatibility means that the population in question is perceived as having the potential (through stipulations and concessions) to be altered into full identity viability. All populations that amenably ascend to the Empire will have been deemed compatible. But not all compatible populations will ascend. Compatibility can be thought of as the period in which the expanding power ascertains whether the potential to sufficiently alter the population can be achieved. Demands put to the “compatible candidate” are aimed at alteration through ization (i.e. Americanization, Europeanization, Sovietization).

There are only two outcomes are that the population is sufficiently altered into full identity viability, or, realization that the population cannot be sufficiently altered, and, thus relabeled as incompatible. A logical assumption would be that incompatible populations be rejected and only
compatible considered official “candidates.” This would be a wrong assumption. Incompatible identities are not always rejected outright. Sometimes incompatible populations are accepted into official “candidacy” to take advantage of the “candidates” want to join and willing naiveté (e.g., Turkey’s EU candidacy). Stipulations put to the incompatible “candidate” are aimed at taking as much as possible without tipping off that that the process is a sham and the outcome predetermined against. So long as the official incompatible “candidate” believes there is a chance of acceptance they will (in hopes of reaching membership status) jump through infinite “last hoops.”

European Identity Viability
Assad (2002) claims that there is an “anxiety expressed by a majority of Western Europeans about the presence of Muslim communities and Islamic traditions within the borders of Europe”, which results in a European structure that is: 1) “ideologically constructed in such a way that Muslim immigrants cannot be satisfactorily represented in it.” A construction in which they (Muslims) “are included within and excluded from Europe at one and the same time in a special way”, and, 2) buttresses a pervasive perception of Islam as “Europe’s primary alter”, which through an “alleged antagonism to Christians […] represents an early attempt to destroy Europe’s civilization from outside”, and, the association of Islam with “a corrupting moral environment that Europe must continuously struggle to overcome from within.” These points, when taken together, have become “crucial to the formation of European identity.” This is illustrated by a 1992 survey that indicated that that 2/3 of the French population feared the presence of Islam in their society.

European Union Identity Viability is strongly connected to the Christian/Muslim ratio of any specific EU applicant. Since at least the first crusade Europe has been a Christian club and is likely (for the foreseeable future) to remain a Christian Union for Christian states. European Identity for centuries has been built on being a bastion of Christianity defined by their struggle against the Muslim “other.” As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and successful partitioning of the Middle East into nation states that could be played against one another, this “clash of civilizations” (between European Christendom and the Muslim other), for most of the 20th century, fell into respite. The anarchist, fascist and Soviet communist replaced Europe’s Muslim “other.” Eventually, all these 20th century “others” were defeated only to have the Muslim regain pre-eminence as the primary European “other.” Savage (2004) affirms this writing: “following the fall of the Berlin Wall, an older, revived version of the Muslim threat at home and abroad seems to have replaced the Communist threat in Europe.” In 1995 this revival of the threatening Muslim “other” was made clear by the sitting Secretary General of

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282 Ibid
283 Ibid
284 Asad, Talal. (2002), pg. 217
285 Ibid
287 Fascism, as of late, is undergoing a revival.
NATO, Willy Claes, when he declared, "since the end of the cold war {…Islam} has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western security."  

The shape of this Muslim “other” is no longer a state sponsored (Ottoman) army lurking in the shadows of the borderlands attempting to snatch Christian European lands. Instead it is rogue groups of Muslim “terrorists,” and hordes of refugees. Unlike the Ottomans (a uniformed state sanctioned army) the Muslim “terrorist” primary goal is not to conquer European lands rather than to attack European culture and way of life. This new “Muslim invasion” is spread among the faceless mass of flooding refugees who are considered to be much more insidious and dangerous than an invading uniformed army. For an occupying army tends to strengthen the resolve and makeup of the occupied culture, make it more robust, as it is used as a means of resistance against the invading army. On the other hand, an “invasion” of Muslim refugees is perceived as diluting and bastardizing (rather than strengthening) European Christian culture. An invading army is intent on occupation while this new invasion is intent on changing the fundamental makeup of European culture and society, and most frightening, voting demographics. The threat is not an occupying force that can be gloriously expelled. Rather it is demographic shifts in the citizenry and fundamental changes in what it means to be German or French - to be European.

Muslims lost their place as the primary European “alter” for about two generations (from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire (1914) –to- (1989) the end of the Soviet Union). This is not enough time for a society to lose centuries of conditioning towards viewing a certain group as the threatening “other.” For over 1500 years’ European Identity was created through the lens of opposition to the threatening Muslim “other.” A sentiment deeply ingrained into the European identity, collective memory, psyche and narratives. It is deeply ingrained in EU governmental structures; it is systemic. Individual mindsets are quicker and easier to change than the collective mindset or underlying bias ingrained into the societal structure. Therefore, individual protestations of European openness towards welcoming of Muslims are insignificant and hold little attachment to what the collective mindset, memory, identity, psyche, and narratives have programmed into societal system and structure. It is this reason that almost immediately after the Soviet “other” disappeared the Muslim “other” was slid in as a replacement. Thus, making Muslims the new primary factor in configuring European Identity and European identity viability, and therefore the primary mechanism which determines who is eligible to be fall under the fold of EU amenable expansion. Therefore, any country that holds a large population of Muslims has low likelihood to be accepted into the EU. Below we apply EU identity viability to the Balkans and Turkey

**Balkans**

All the countries in the Balkans that have a high Christian/Muslim ratio have either been

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290 Shifting voting demographics is the most insidious of situations to be wrought with. If EU voting demographics lean Muslim Europeans will be forced to abandon at least one of their defining tenants. Either they will have to eschew being foundationally Christian, or, they will have to eschew being foundationally democratic. For logic dictates that they cannot keep both in the face of voting changing demographics connected to a growth of the European Muslim population.
admitted, or, are in ascension talks to be admitted to the EU. Balkan countries that are still considered “potential candidates” have non-favorable Christian/Muslim ratios (excepting Macedonia which while having a positive Christian/Muslim ratio is still 35% Muslim, and, the Christian population is Orthodox not classical “European Christian.”) Balkan Muslim countries have a higher likelihood of gaining EU entry than other Muslim populated countries. This because denying these Balkan countries potentially drives them into the arms of factions that wish to perpetrate ill on the EU. A problem magnified by the fact that these countries are geographically located in what is now considered “Europe.” The thinking is that it will be easier to control and regulate these Muslim populations if they are under EU jurisdiction (keep your friends close but your enemies closer). Second, accepting these Muslims would help placate the political correctness that societies need, belief that they are not racist and bigoted, and, to convince the rest of the world the same. Being openly labeled as racist would certainly hurt the EU brand. This belief of a non-bigoted discriminatory EU is a necessary lie that is as much as a part of the modern European Identity as is the truth of Europe not being for predominantly Muslim populations. Therefore, the EU may ultimately accept these Balkan Muslims, but only after dragging out the process as long as possible. Optimally the EU would like keep these Balkan Muslims countries in a perpetual state of candidacy: a state where they are not accepted but still kept under an official and agreed upon EU watchful eye.

Turkey
Turkey is an example of an incompatible population being accepted as an “official candidate” to be taken advantage of. The EU has never had any intention of accepting Turkey - only of taking advantage of Turkish naïveté.

Originally, Turkish integration was born of European fears of the Soviet Union. Turkey is the gateway to the backdoor of Europe. This gateway falling under “Red” influence would have meant the Soviets expanding to European contiguity. Protection against this possibility was Turkish/European integration. Shortly after WWII this integration began: 1949 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, 1961 they joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and in 1973 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Europe and Turkey had very different ideas about the nature of their relationship during the Cold War. For Europe, Turkish integration was driven by fear of the Soviets. It was nothing more than a tactical security driven alliance. While the Turks understood the tactical aspect behind the alliance, they mistook the membership opportunities and economic integration as Europe accepting the Turkish Identity as being European. The Turks wishfully believed protestations that Europe and Islam are compatible and hence have willfully been played by the Europeans. Turkey is still being strung along in an integration process that has, since the beginning been predetermined against them. Presently, the EU is using hopes of ascension to pressure Turkey into stopping the flow of refugees. Though Erdogan is pushing the Turks to wake up to the fact that the EU has, for decades, been playing and taking advantage of Turkish naïveté.

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291 Greece (1981)- 96% Christian, 4% Muslim; Croatia (2013)- 86% Roman Catholic, 1.4% Muslim; Slovenia (2004)- 75% Christian, 2.5% Muslim; Romania (2013)- 92% Christian, 0.03% Muslim
292 Serbia- 91% Christian, 2% Muslim; Montenegro- 74% Christian, 19.11% Muslim
293 Bosnia- 51% Muslim, 46% Christian; Albania- 56% Muslim, 16% Christian
The likelihood that Turkey will be accepted into the EU is miniscule at best. The main predicting factor is that they are a majority Muslim country.

The belief here is that EU expansion has surpassed its apex. What are the populations that the EU could potentially expand upon? Disregarding the question of Geopolitical and Identity Viability the answer is any population that is contiguous to the current Union; i.e., Turkey, Balkan states (that have not yet been integrated), Belorussia and Ukraine. Above has been discussed European identity viability, which indicates Turkey is unlikely to be accepted and Balkan countries still outside of the EU may be accepted (against identity viability) as a result of geopolitical strategy. Turning to Ukraine and Belorussia the observation is two countries, which potentially have identity viability but certainly do not have geopolitical viability. The Russians can and will commit the necessary resources to stop a move towards European expansion into Ukraine and Belorussia. This is evidenced by the fact that the present conflict in Ukraine was inspired by the Russians in response to the EU making inroads towards Ukrainian integration. The indication is that the EU has reached the apex of its expansive potential, which indicates a cycle of fragmentation is not far off. In fact, fragmentation has already begun; e.g., BREXIT.

Next, we will discuss hope confidence

**C. Hope Confidence**

Hope confidence is centered on populational perception of societal movement. Is the current status quo perceived as fostering positive, negative or neutral gains towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future? There are three possible answers to this question; a population can have positive hope confidence (i.e. the belief that the current status quo is creating positive movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future). They can have negative hope confidence (i.e. the belief that the current status quo is creating negative movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future), or neutral hope confidence (i.e. the belief that (for the moment) the current status quo is able to hold steady a “good enough” quality of life). Each answer has different effects concerning the likelihood of an identity shift and whether a population’s collective pressure will be aimed at altering, further institutionalizing, or replacing the current status quo, and, if the societal attention space is waxing or waning, which is directly correlated the number of populational lobbyist who potentially have the clout to catalyze collective action.

Here hope confidence is conceived as envisioned in past quantitative studies concerning hope. In measuring hope Zetterberg (2005) suggests asking “Do you think that the children who are growing up today will have it better or worse than you have it, when they are your age?”

Gallup International surveying for “optimism” and “pessimism asked: “As far as you are concerned, do you think that 2018 will be better, worse or the same as 2017?”

Hope confidence is a natural cycle, forever traveling through peaks and troughs, across a landscape of empires and nation states, monarchies, “democracies” and dictatorships. The cycle

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is parsed into four levels based on whether perception of societal movement is negative, positive or neutral. The parsing of hope into delineated aspects as a way of understanding how it (hope) affects a population’s outlook is not a new idea. The book “The Sociography of an Unemployed Community” (2017) talked about unemployed in relation to hope. In the study, the authors parsed the unemployed families into three categories “unbroken,” “resigned” and “broken.” The conclusion was that the unbroken still had hope, the resigned had no hope, and the broken felt hopeless.\footnote{Jahoda, Marie, Paul F Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel. Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community. Routledge, 2017.}

Below is a diagram depicting the hope confidence cycle.

Positive hope confidence levels:

*Newly Committed* populations have positive “hope confidence” held in movement towards overturning the status quo. The populational belief is that implementation of a newly chosen replacement status quo will usher in a safer, more secure and economically abundant future (as compared to the sitting status quo). Here “hope confidence” is not only attached to the want to overturn the sitting status quo but also to a conception of a replacement frame. The necessity of the newly committed having a concomitant conception of a replacement frame throws back to Prezworski’s claim (mentioned above) that sitting regimes can only lose legitimacy if there is a suitable substitute.

*Committed* populations have positive “hope confidence” held in the belief that the newly implemented status quo has already implemented and facilitated positive gain, and that further institutionalization will continue to create positive societal movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future.
While both (above listed) phases have positive hope confidence they show collective pressure towards opposite ends. The collective pressure of the newly committed will be aimed at overturning the sitting status quo, while the collective pressure of the committed population will be towards institutionalization of the newly created status quo. The collective pressure of the newly committed pushes towards coalescence behind a singular replacement status quo, as coalescence progresses the intensity behind the hope confidence increases, as intensity increases societal attention spaces close until only one potential alternative replacement status quo remains as a viable alternative. This singular viable alternative is then elevated as the official replacement status quo. On the other hand, the push towards institutionalization coming from the committed population will naturally result in a hope confidence slide towards neutral. This because the hopeful expectations of a new status quo (pre-implementation) will always fall short of actual results. This hope confidence slide towards neutral coincides with a wane in hope confidence intensity, which results in the opening of the populational attention spaces.

A closing attention space indicates a minority of populational lobbyist gaining market share at the expense of the majority. As the game progresses a decreasing number of lobbyists have increasing control of the attention space. These successful lobbyists either absorb or sideline the less successful, resulting in only a few lobbyist groups with the enough attention space market shares to effectively (through manipulation) catalyze collective action towards societal change. On the other hand, an opening attention space sees the major lobbyist groups losing market share to up and comers. As market share diversifies into the hands of many players the likelihood of societal change lessens. This because, although there are more lobbyist groups manipulating none of them have reached the market share threshold necessary to effectively manipulate societal change into being. Before societal change can happen open attention spaces must close thus affording a particular lobbyist group enough market share so as to (through manipulation) be able to catalyze collective action.

Neutral hope confidence levels (0):

*Non-Committed* populations have neutral “hope confidence.” The belief is not in the system being able to create positive societal movement (towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future) rather than the belief that the system can indefinitely maintain the “good enough life.” Neutral hope confidence is the threshold between negative and positive hope confidence. There are only two options for the non-committed population: 1) give the sitting status quo a chance to adjust the internal policies in way that reignites positive movement towards a safer, more secure and economic abundant future, or, 2) accept that the sitting status quo cannot, or, will not create this better future and to start to actively searching for a replacement status quo. Populations are inclined towards trying option 1 before moving to option 2. Therefore, the collective pressure of neutral hope confidence will be (most of the time) aimed at “fixing” or “updating” sitting status quo towards positive movement. The population will continue to support option 1 so long as the lobbyist behind the status quo can convince the population they are sincerely working towards “fixing” “systemic problems”.

Neutral hope confidence is where the populational lobbyist behind the out of synch system gain the most and the whole of the population loses the most. The trick becomes convincing the population that the status quo has not been delivering positive societal movement due to design
flaws, which can be fixed. When the reality is that that the status quo cannot be “fixed” because it is not broken, for the negative societal movement is a function of an out of synch system doing exactly what it was designed to do (i.e. create gains for a subpopulation at the expense of the whole). Neutral hope confidence is the preferred position for lobbyist behind out of synch systems because there is not the necessity of creating actual gain for the whole of the population, there is only the necessity of creating the mirage that they are attempting to create solutions, attempting to make sincere and meaningful adjustments to “complicated problems.” This ruse is made easier by the natural tendency of the population to attempt to “fix” the status quo (option 1) before abandoning it (option 2).

Neutral hope confidence has more open attention spaces than the newly committed or committed populations.

Negative hope confidence levels (-):

Consciously looking populations have negative “hope confidence.” The populational perception is that the current status quo is leading a less secure, safe and economically abundant future. The population is actively looking for a replacement status quo, which, when found will lead the transition to being newly committed. Here there is a lessened percentage of societal pressure being exerted on the system due to the fact that most of the pressure is being exerted and diverted towards finding and cultivating a replacement status quo. This phase has the most open attention spaces.

Hope confidence is designed to gauge the likelihood that a population will undergo an identity shift, and/or, that said population will exert their collective pressure towards altering, replacing, or further institutionalizing the current status quo. Also, the cycling of hope confidence is connected to the opening and closing of societal attention spaces, which is directly correlated to the number of populational lobbyist who potentially have the clout to catalyze collective action. Negative hope confidence pushes the spaces open with the search for the replacement while positive hope confidence closes the spaces as it galvanizes a rally around a chosen replacement. Hope confidence is the mechanism that populational lobbyist leverage to facilitate the acquiescence of their vision of the societal structure. Hope confidence has mechanisms of control that can be manipulated to slow or speed the transition from one phase to another. These mechanisms of control will be discussed later in the text.

Using hope confidence as an analytical variable depends on being able to determine the hope confidence level of a given population. The most obvious way of determining whether the trajectory of a population’s hope confidence is to ask them. One could use quantitative fieldwork involving surveys and interviews, though this method has barriers (it is expensive), limitations (often access is restricted by authoritarian governments) and analytical problems (answers can never be assumed true to be due to possible coercion and pressure from authoritarian governmental and/or cultural societal structures). Here there was never the chance to press up against problems of restrictive access or coerced responses, as barrier # 1, money, was the foiling hurdle. Considering hope confidence is such a pivotal piece of this research the inability to undertake a quantitative study to determine hope confidence trajectory presented a major
challenge. As such, there was the need to create an alternative method of determining hope confidence.

This alternative method rests on the connection between hope confidence and societal movement towards or away from egalitarianism. The connecting assumption is that movement towards egalitarianism is related (for the majority of a given population) to a society becoming safer, more secure and economically abundant (i.e. positive hope confidence trajectory) while movement away from egalitarianism is related (for the majority of a given population) to becoming less secure, safe and economically abundant (i.e. negative hope confidence trajectory). Therefore, this assumption creates a link between movement towards egalitarianism and a positive hope confidence trajectory, and, a connection between movement away from egalitarianism and negative hope confidence trajectory. Discussed above was that in synch systems created movement towards egalitarianism and out of synch systems away. Also discussed was that in synch systems were a product of legitimate manipulation and out of synch systems a product of illegitimate manipulation. Therefore, it can be claimed that if a status quo was legitimzed through illegitimate manipulation then the expectation is that it will show an out of synch system, which will lead away from egalitarianism and produce a negative hope confidence trajectory. On the other hand, a status quo legitimzed by legitimate manipulation will show an in-synch system, which will lead movement towards egalitarianism and produce a positive hope confidence trajectory. Therefore, determination of hope confidence trajectory can be ascertained through determination of whether the particular status quo was legitimzed by legitimate or illegitimate manipulation. On the surface, this is a hard point to discern. For the whole point of illegitimate manipulation is to fool the population into believing that it (illegitimate manipulation) is in fact legitimate. Here we have devised a way in which to discern between the two. Legitimate manipulation is based around and built on concrete events, while illegitimate manipulation is based around and built upon non-concrete events.

Below we will discuss concrete vs. non-concrete events and why it is that we assume concrete events to be attached to legitimate manipulation and non-concrete attached to illegitimate.

D. Concrete vs. Non-Concrete events

Events refer to the points that populational lobbyist use to back any specific program of populational manipulation. Events (concrete and non-concrete) can be drawn from the past or future. Past concrete events are pinpointed factual happenings (i.e. attack on Pearl Harbor or Apartheid). Future concrete events are things that, as proven by repetition and precedence, can with high confidence be expected to happen (i.e. the next American Presidential Election).

Non-concrete events are events that, when being intellectually honest, did not happen (i.e. Gulf of Tonkin) or do not have a likelihood of coming to pass (i.e. Sharia law being implemented in

297 On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox (U.S. destroyer) was conducting a DESOTO patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin when it reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats from the 135th Torpedo Squadron. This concrete event was used by the Johnson administration to pass resolution 1145, 1964, which authorized the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The attack in question had an exact date and time it happened, there were transcripts of radio communications as well as statements by witnesses describing the incident. In reality, the attack in the USS Maddox never happened. It was a hoax, a staged
the U.S.), or are linguistically modified rhetorical concepts that definitionally cannot exist (i.e. Cold War).²⁹⁸

The point of the non-concrete event is to convince a population something happened when it did not happen, or that something is going to happen when likelihood states the opposite, or linguistically manipulate to create a concept that definitionally cannot exist, all of which involve intellectually dishonest discourse. Intellectually dishonest discourse, by definition, cannot be an “honest conversation” and therefore is precluded from being considered legitimate manipulation. Also, the assumption is that the necessity of the intellectually dishonest discourse is a function of trying to sell a system that is aimed at gain for a subpopulation at the expense of the whole. For if the aim were gain for the whole then the lobbyist in question would engage in “honest conversation,” which would preclude the need to create an intellectually dishonest non-concrete event.

The important part is plausible connection between any event and the policies being sold, for populations will reject policies that have no plausible connection to an event (concrete or non-concrete). Specificity found in concrete events limits plausible connection to closely related objectives, which limits the availability of the concrete event to lobbyist who are pushing action towards closely related objectives. The farther away the objective from the event the less likely that said concrete event would be enough to induce sanctioning of collective action. The specificity of the concrete event (unlike a non-concrete event) means that it cannot be moved to accommodate objectives that are not closely related. This inability to move the concrete event to accommodate non-related objectives is an intrinsic resistance to being used in programs of illegitimate manipulation.

A concrete event: B attacks A. There is plausible connection between the attack and the suggestion that A should counter attack or levy sanctions against B. There is even the chance that A’s population might be convinced of enough plausible connection to launch an attack or levy sanctions against C. For B and C are so close that the potential of them being in cahoots is quite high. It may even be possible to convince A’s population the same concerning D. The more steps that are taken away from the actual event (attack by B) the more tenuous the connection becomes. The more tenuous the connection the harder it is to (individually and collectively)

²⁹⁸ According to Robert L. Scott the Cold War was a “rhetorical construction…[that] seems strange, even inappropriate. Can a war be cold? … It is an oxymoron.” (J. M. Hogan, cited in Medhurst. (2000), pg. 138) Webster defines war as a state of armed conflict. Therefore, a war that is “cold” indicates an absence of armed conflict between the belligerents. An absence of armed conflict is a state of non-war. Therefore, if a war is “cold” it by definition cannot be a state of war and therefore is a state of non-war. A “cold war” is a linguistically manipulated scenario that definitionally cannot exist. A “cold war” by definition is a state of non-war. But a state of non-war is not useful in manipulating collective action towards war like policies. Therefore, the idea of a “cold war” was invented so as to be able to manipulate populations in a state non-war to accept war like policies.
convince a majority of the population to act. Populational lobbyist using the attack by B as the premise for collective action against C, D, or E will encounter a steadily lowering likelihood of success. Populational Lobbyist using the attack by B as the premise towards inducing action against F-Z are unlikely to be successful because the space of between reality and plausible connection with the attack by B is becoming too large.

Concrete events (as opposed to non-concrete events) push towards resolution, which mean that they are not good candidates to be used in long-term manipulation (long term manipulation is a tool of illegitimate manipulation). The problem of concrete events pushing towards resolution for programs of illegitimate manipulation is that is unlikely that one will be able to convince a population to continue collectively acting after the resolution of the event that was the premise of the collective action in the first place. It is this reason that why populational lobbyist looking to implement out of synch systems prefer not to use specific wars as the locomotion behind collective action.

To help the readers understanding between concrete and non-concrete events we will discuss 9/11 (a concrete event) in relation to the invasion of Iraq vs. Afghanistan. 9/11 is considered a past concrete event that was perceived to affect most Americans. Thus, there was (inspired by the uncertainty of being attacked and the fear that another attack may be imminent) a reactionary cohesion of the citizenry towards collective action aimed at alleviating the generating source of the threat, the generating source of the fear. A strong plausible connection between 9/11, al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and the Taliban was laid out. Policy suggestions based on this strong plausible connection included the invasion of Afghanistan. Espoused objectives of this invasion were capturing Bin Laden, destruction of al-Qaeda and the removal of the Taliban. The invasion of Afghanistan was sold to the American public based off a concrete event (i.e. 9/11).

Conclusion: Concrete events in likelihood are used in programs of legitimate manipulation, which push towards egalitarianism. Therefore, if the invasion of Afghanistan was based on a concrete event (9/11) then we can also claim that (in likelihood) it was an in-synch system achieved through legitimate manipulation. Therefore, we can also claim that the expectation should have been societal movement towards egalitarianism. Many will argue that the invasion of Afghanistan has not resulted in societal movement towards egalitarianism rather than movement away. Here we agree with such an argument. That the war in Afghanistan has pushed away from egalitarianism. Does this fact disprove the theory? For i according to the theory have created movement towards egalitarianism. The answer to this is that the invasion of Afghanistan was originally based on a concrete event. But the basis for the war around the time of the push towards an invasion of Iraq was changed to become based on the “war on terror,” which is considered a non-concrete event, considered a linguistically manipulated concept that cannot definitionally exist. Therefore, the expectation of movement towards egalitarianism shifted to an expectation of movement away from egalitarianism when the basis of the war shifted from the concrete (i.e. 9/11) to the non-concrete (i.e. “war on terror”).

In 2002 clan Cheany/Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld began manipulating to convince the American citizenry to invade Iraq. They tried very hard to base the necessity of this invasion on 9/11 (concrete event). This attempt failed because there was no plausible connection between 9/11
and Iraq, which the public recognized. Clan Cheany/Wolfowitz knew that their objective of invading Iraq was not related to 9/11. They knew that their suggested policy of invading Iraq was going to be rejected if sold with 9/11 as the only backing event. At this point the Bush administration fabricated 3 non-concrete events to back the invasion of Iraq: 1) a past non-concrete event- That Saddam still had weapons of mass destruction left over from the 90’s and that he had been trying to develop nuclear weapons, as proven by his attempts to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger. Both points were verifiably false, and the Bush administration knew it. 2) A future concrete event- that the invasion is necessary because it was perilous to “wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud,” and, 3) the linguistically manipulated concept of the “war on terror.” It was these non-concrete events that were ultimately used in manipulating the American citizenry into supporting the invasion of Iraq.

Conclusion: The necessary intellectual dishonesty of non-concrete events precludes them from being part of programs of legitimate manipulation. They can only be associated with programs of illegitimate manipulation. Illegitimate manipulation results in out of synch systems, which push away from egalitarianism. If one accepts the premise that the invasion of Iraq was sold on the back of non-concrete events then one must also accept that the result was an out of synch system implemented through illegitimate manipulation, and that the expected outcome should be movement away from egalitarianism.

299 Vice President Dick Cheney on Meet the Press December 9, 2001 claimed that Iraq was harboring Abdul Rahman Yasin, a suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Cheaney repeated the statement in another appearance on September 14, 2003, saying "We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s, that it involved training, for example, on BW and CW, that al-Qaida sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems that are involved. The Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the al-Qaida organization, we know, for example, in connection with the original World Trade Center bombing in '93 that one of the bombers was Iraqi, returned to Iraq after the attack of '93. And we've learned subsequent to that, since we went into Baghdad and got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably also received financing from the Iraqi government as well as safe haven.’ Once again in an interview with National Public Radio in January 2004 Cheaney stated that there had been "overwhelming evidence" of a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda based on evidence that included Iraq's purported harboring of Yasin. In the same interview Cheney implied a connection between Iraq and Mohamed Atta; "The Czech interior minister said today that an Iraqi intelligence officer met with Mohammed Atta, one of the ringleaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, just five months before the synchronized hijackings and mass killings were carried out", and, "With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohamed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we’ve never been able to develop any more of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know." These claims were doubtful to the Intelligence community, which the CIA told president Bush, VP Cheany and Rumsfeld directly. V.P. Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated a secret program to re-examine the evidence and marginalize the CIA and its Director George Tenet. The questionable intelligence acquired by this secret program was "stovepiped" to the vice president and presented to the public. In some cases Cheney's office would leak the intelligence to reporters so that outlets such as The New York Times would report it. Cheney would subsequently appear on the Sunday political television talk shows to discuss the intelligence, referencing The New York Times as the source to give it credence.

300 George W. Bush October 6, 2002 Cincinnati, Ohio

301 The only way that a war can be a concrete event is if it is specific in its time, place, and belligerents involved. The “war on terror” has none of these specifics. Hence it is a linguistic manipulation to say that we are at “war with terror.” One could be concretely at war with a specific group, in a specific country, at a specific time. A war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the beginning of 2002 would be a concrete event. But a “war on terror” or “communism” or “drugs” can never be a concrete event and should always be considered a non-concrete event that is part of a program of illegitimate manipulation.
Differentiating between non-concrete and concrete events, like much of this treatise, is a subjective process. The above text attempts to give guidelines and examples to help the reader understand the process of differentiation. But it is likely that users of this system may come to different conclusions about the same event. Here we make the statement (a statement that will be repeated many times) that it is not the point of this research to argue over the subjective readings of the framework being proposed. Rather the goal is to lay out the framework and let each user worry about their own subjective input factors.

**Hope Confidence Control**

Hope Confidence has two levels of control: (1) economic and (2) perceived safety and security (to the physical and societal self). Perceived safety and security is easier to manipulate than the economic factor. It is easier to convince a population that their physical safety is in imminent danger by a covert, unseen enemy than to convince them that they have invisible food on the table and money in their pockets.\(^\text{302}\)

Perceived physical safety and security is more easily linked to national territorial integrity. While economic confidence is more easily linked to “material forces.” Generally, economic hope (“material forces”) is more related to affecting positive hope confidence and safety and security affecting negative movement. The threat of negative movement due to safety and security concerns held against a result of neutral movement will be perceived as an accomplishment, while the promise of positive economic hope confidence that results in neutral movement will be perceived as a failure. In the context of implementing an out of synch system the preferred lever of control is safety and security with the economic lever being necessary to create a minimum amount of stability to deploy the threat of safety and security. The opposite holds true for the implementation of an in-synch system where safety and security is a concern in the context of creating enough stability so as deploy the economic lever towards positive societal movement.

Hope confidence can be a useful tool in understanding the way in which populations are manipulated towards certain types of societal structuring over others. Though, this is not the function of hope confidence in the context of the frame being devised. As such, an illustration of how hope confidence is manipulated by populational lobbyist is not contained in the main text. Annex 1 contains an illustration of how the Authoritarian manipulates the control mechanisms in their quest to reach authoritarian stability.

**E. Identity Typologies**

Rogers Smith (2004) has noted that there is an emerging consensus that identities are “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics”\(^\text{303}\) yet Abdelal (2006) claims that “social identity scholarship suffers from two sets of problems: conceptual issues and coordination gaps. The main conceptual questions that the field has yet to answer satisfactorily are: (1) how can we compare different types of identities; and, (2) how can we

\(^{302}\) While it is more difficult to manipulate economic hope, it is not impossible. This has been shown recently with the ARM mortgage bundling scam that activated a bubble in the U.S. housing market, which, in the end resulted in the economic crisis of 2008.

exploit theoretical advances in operationalizing identity as a variable?" Analytical identity typologies in the context of borders can explain when it (identity) is expected to be an ally to territorial expansion and when a hindrance. Such information will make it possible to bypass conceptual issues, close the coordination gaps, allow for the comparison of different identities, and exploit the theoretical advances in operationalizing identity as a variable. Below are proposed identity typologies. These typologies are used in the analysis of the expanding power.

**Bordered** identities are, by definition, contained; they exist inside an accepted and recognized box and hence are not easily offered to those outside the box. **Bordered** identities are not expansive or inclusive and are first and foremost concerned with the territory inside their borders. Safety and security concerns are managed through a hardening of the box. Over time **bordered** identities move towards internal exclusion through immigration and social policies aimed at “othering” certain groups (creating an internal enemy) to justify the hardening of the box.

There are two types of **bordered** identities: (1) national, and, (2) ethnic. Ethnic Identities are bound by the fact that one is or is not Russian, Chinese or French etc. An ethnic Russian could never choose to be ethnically Chinese nor could a French ethnic identity be offered to an ethnic Russian. On the other hand, international recognized borders box in national identities. Citizenship cannot easily be offered to populations living outside of the national territory. An ethnic identity may also have an attached national identity and vice versa, though the two are in and of themselves exclusive. **Bordered** national identities are more flexible than ethnic identities (inclusively and exclusively). Inclusively: an ethnic Frenchman has the potential to be a Chinese citizen but not the potential to be an ethnic Chinese. Exclusionary: It is not possible to exclude a Frenchman from being ethnically French, though the French government could possibly revoke citizenship of an ethnic Frenchman.

When **bordered** identities expand past agreed upon boundaries they will (necessarily) be perceived as an aggressor trying to take what does not belong to them and be met with automatic resistance.

**Border transcendent** identities are not boxed in by present nation state and ethnic borders and can be easily offered to new populations. Border transcendent Identities, opposite to bordered identities, are programmed to be expansive and inclusive. There are two types of Border Transcendent Identities: (1) ephemeral, and (2) structured.

**Ephemeral** identities can be thought of as an idea, ideology or belief system. An idea or belief has no borders and is available to anyone, anywhere, at any time. Anyone, at any time may decide to convert to Islam or subscribe to Communism. Ephemeral Identities do not create territorial expansion but rather increase the number of subscribers across disparate geographic areas and populations. Ephemeral Identities create population expansion (as opposed to territorial expansion) because any idea, ideology or belief (via the Internet) has a global reach into an

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immense population of possible converts. Ephemeral Identities and their disparate pockets of coalescence will have varying amounts of commonality and connection with one another, but they cannot create meaningful territorial expansion because an idea, belief, or ideology cannot control an apparatus (government) with which to govern or hold territory. Yet, it is possible that a government can have an ephemeral identity as a means of locomotion for its legitimizing frame towards domestic (or international) power consolidation.

Structured border transcendent identities are connected to a physical space and have an apparatus that can hold territory, govern and exact territorial expansion. Structured border transcendent Identities have co-opted into their founding tenants an ephemeral identity; i.e., “Democratic’/Capitalist America, Islamic Iran, Communist CCCP.305

The Soviet Union had Communism and Iran has Islam, but we must separate the two. America, for over 50 years, was at war with Communism but never at war with the Soviet Union. Israel may go to war with Iran but will make clear they are not at war with Islam. Once an ephemeral Identity is co-opted into the framework of a governing apparatus, it is no longer an ephemeral identity but becomes part of a structured identity.

Expansion under Bordered identities is harder and has higher costs than expansion under Border Transcendent identities. If Turkey territorially expands under a Turkish Identity they will be perceived as an aggressive nation state stepping outside of their defined and recognized borders, while at the same time they will be unable to offer the populations being expanded upon a Turkish Identity (e.g., it is impossible for an Azerbaijani to accept a Turkish Identity). On the other hand, a Neo-Ottoman identity can be potentially offered to a much larger geographical space. Expansion under a Neo-Ottoman identity will not necessarily be perceived as an aggressive nation state stepping outside of where it belongs. It may be perceived as an attempt to reunite different parts of a long-separated family.

From here we move to the last typology involved in the frame of expansion being devised. Below is a discussion of proximate fault line typologies.

F. Proximate Faultline Typologies

Proximate faultline typologies are used (mainly) during the regional level of analysis. Built on the idea of the cultural faultline with an added assumption that proximity of faultlines to one another affects expected behavior, and, that this expected behavior could be extrapolated to help project likelihood of territorial expansion. Below the typologies and their expected behavior are discussed.

Contiguous—when two or more fault lines become so close that they can be thought in contact with each other. Contiguous fault lines manifest as (1) hard borders, or, (2) the front lines of conflict.

305 Two structured Identities that have co-opted the same ephemeral Identity will not necessarily be ‘friends’ (i.e. Maoist China and the Soviet Union.) Sometimes two structured Identities will be friends across ideological lines to the detriment of another structured Identity with the same ephemeral Identity (i.e. Iran backing Christian Armenia in a war with Muslim Azerbaijan).
**Neighboring**-two or more fault lines that are geographically separated by a middle territory called a borderland. Following the logic of the security dilemma neighboring powers are driven to expand into borderlands by a compulsion to insulate geographically against their neighbors before they are insulated against. Past the compulsion towards buffering against other neighbors the prime concern of any neighbor is to prevent an opposing neighbor from expanding to contiguity.

**Borderlands**-were already discussed in chapter 2. A recap of the characteristics of the borderland:

1) Comprised of “weak states” that are economically underdeveloped, and are perceived to be internally fragmented in the context of race, language, religion, and nationality.
2) The borderland regions themselves are also perceived as being fragmented. Borderland states are often “mutually antagonistic, leaving them unable or unwilling to cooperate economically, politically, and militarily.” The result of these first two points is conflict internal to the borderland states and conflict between borderland states.306
3) Borderlands are the sites of considerable external military and economic involvement by two or more competing geopolitical powers.
4) Borderlands do not fall under the purview of the spheres of influence of major powers, yet at the same time, they are accessible to the major powers, thus creating overlapping spheres. Also, the borderland is a field of competition that does yet have a dominant player.
5) Borderlands offer (more or less) an even playing field for major powers to gain a footing. Thus, more than one major power must have an ally, military presence, or strong patron-client relationship in the area. The presence of multiple major powers suggests a competitive aspect to the region.307

Borderland populations will, to varying degrees, have connection to all of the neighboring powers. Connection (Identity Viability) is very much related to “cultural ruination” and may come in many ways: cultural, historical, ethnicity, living memory, architecture, language (written and spoken) and relics of Empire left behind. Fanning the flames of connection will be the way in which surrounding fault lines will justify and sell the territorial expansion to borderland populations -- the way that expanding powers will meet identity demand conditions.

**Ephemeral** - when any specific fault line is not geographically close to another specific fault line i.e. US/Russian line.308

Neighboring lines are the most likely to enact expansion because they are contiguously located next to borderlands. Borderlands are the most likely typology to experience expansion because they are caught in between two or more geopolitical rivals, who all want to use the borderland as a buffer against rival neighbors before rival neighbors use the borderland to buffer against them.

308 While the ephemeral line is a proximate faultline, and may be necessary in certain analyses, it is not necessary in this specific analysis.
Contiguous lines are the least likely typology to either experience or enact expansion because contiguous predicates two lines that are (essentially) touching each other, and that each line has an attached identity that considers itself different from that of the second line. The indication is that there is no open space or identity viability between contiguous lines. As such, there is no prospect for amenable expansion, only forcible. Forcible expansion has a lowered likelihood of coming to pass due to higher associated costs. If against likelihood military expansion across contiguous lines occurs expected movement will be relegated to the border regions separating the two. The deeper the expansion across contiguous lines the higher the associated costs. Therefore, deep expansion across contiguous is less likely than expansion into the border regions, and, if against likelihood deep expansion comes to pass it is considered less sustainable than expansion into border regions. As a rule, to be sustainable, deep expansion across contiguous lines requires an erasure of the contiguous faultline, which is accomplished through genocide, forced migration and settlement programs. Attempts at erasing a contiguous faultlines generally have very high costs, therefore deep and sustainable expansion across contiguous faultlines have a low likelihood of coming to pass.  

Chapter 3 Summary: Laid out were 4 analytical typologies that are used to operationalize the frame. Two typologies derived from the geopolitical component (geopolitical viability and proximate faultline typologies) and 2 derived from the identity component (identity viability and identity typologies). Also included in this chapter was a discussion of Hope Confidence

*Geopolitical viability* is the main determining factor in projecting likelihood that a specific expanding power will not enact programs of expansion. It is based solely on the expanding power’s perception of the international arena and relative balance of power. Is based on the perception that another geopolitical actor is willing and able to, if not outright derail the expansion (amenable or forcible) is able to raise the associated costs rendering expansion too expensive to be a viable move.

*Identity viability* is the main factor in determining whether an expanding power has the option to expand amenably. Identity Viability is the perceptual identity relationship between the Expanding Power and populations being expanded upon. How does the population being expanded upon view the projected identity of the Expanding Power? And how does the Expanding Power view the identity of the populations being expanded upon? Included in the discussion of identity viability was as application of it (identity viability) to the likelihood of further EU expansion.

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309 Extremely low likelihood events still statistically happen. Two examples of programs of faultline erasure: 1) American westward expansion across Native/American contiguous line. US westward expansion necessitated being forcible because it was across a contiguous faultline. Manifest destiny demanded that said expansion be deep, sustainable, long-term. The only way to achieve such expansion is through an erasure of the contiguous line being crossed (in this case Native American). The tactics required to erase a contiguous fault line are settlement programs, forced migration and genocide. The US government used these tactics, erased the Native contiguous faultline, and, achieved deep, long-term and sustainable westward expansion. 2) Israeli expansion into Palestine crosses a contiguous faultline. As such, said expansion necessitates being forcible. Israel wants to achieve deep, long-term and sustainable expansion into Palestine. Achievement of such expansion requires an erasure of the Palestinian contiguous faultline. Tactics required to achieve this erasure are settlement programs, forced migration and genocide. The Israelis have used the first two tactics but (thus far) have stopped short of perpetrating genocide.
Hope confidence is the mechanism that determines whether a population being expanded upon is likely to collectively act towards overturning the present status quo. Populations likely to collectively act towards overturning the present status quo are also more likely of accepting the proposition of being amenably expanded upon. Included in this discussion were the levels of hope confidence and how using a legitimacy frame analysis in conjunction with concrete and non-concrete events can be used to determine what level of hope confidence a population inhabits. Also, there was a tertiary discussion of the mechanisms of hope confidence control, which populational lobbyist can use to exploit and manipulate the hope confidence cycle.

Identity typologies are the mechanism which projects whether an expanding power is likely to be successful in marketing a projected identity to the populations they are interested in expanding upon. The ability to project a compatible identity to populations being expanded upon is a crucial component in being able to expand amenably.

Proximate faultline typologies are built on the idea of the cultural faultline with an added assumption that proximity of faultlines to one another affects expected behavior, and, that this expected behavior can be extrapolated to help project likelihood of territorial expansion. Proximate faultline typologies are mainly used in the regional analysis to show the location of borderlands.

The next chapter explains the frame and how it functions.

IV. Chapter 4 - Frame of Expansion
The proposed frame uses a tiered analysis based on (and accounting for) the region, expanding power and populations being expanded upon. These three levels of analysis incorporate the analytical typologies (and hope confidence) discussed in the previous chapter.

  Regional Analysis- Proximate Faultiness
  Analysis of the Expanding Power- Identity Typologies
  Analysis of the Populations being expanded upon
  Compatibility of offered Identity
  Likelihood of an Identity shift (as determined by hope confidence)

Each level of analysis is separate from the other two, and, each level deals solely with a single component; i.e., region, expanding power or populations being expanded upon. Unique analytical tools allow each level of analysis to judge whether expansion is more or less likely for its specific component.

The Regional analysis indicates which geographical areas should be considered borderlands. The analysis of the expanding power indicates whether the chosen expanding power is more or less likely to enact programs of expansion. The Analysis of populations being expanded upon indicates two things: (1) whether the population is likely to experience expansion in a general sense, and, (2) whether a particular actor is more or less likely to undertake expansion on the population designated as being expanded upon.
The above frame is an open template; the analysis may be tailored towards the specific needs and interests of the researcher. Therefore, A is the expanding power, B is the populations being expanded upon and the Region would be the surrounding landmass where these countries are located. If the analyst is mainly interested in the expanding power then they should adjust the equation by choosing different populations to be expanded upon until they find an equation that signifies on all three levels likely expansion. If the interest is the population being expanded upon then they should adjust the expanding power.

Results may vary according to level. Analysis may suggest a region is likely to experience expansion while the specified expanding power is deemed less likely to expand or vice versa. The more levels of the frame that indicate expansion the more likely that the advanced scenario will result in expansion.

We begin with the regional analysis.

A. Regional Analysis
The primary goal of the regional analysis is to determine the location of borderlands. A regional analysis requires that the proximate typologies be overlaid on any specific region. The example region used here is the Euro-Asian continent (West of the Chinese Pacific coast to the Atlantic excluding East Asia and Africa). Each of the shaded areas represents a distinct cultural faultline; e.g., European, Turkish/Islamic Secularism, Arab Sunni, Iranian/Persian/Shia, Indian/Hindu, Chinese, Tribal/extreme Islam, and the Russian Federation. Once cultural faultlines have been overlaid determination of the location of contiguous and neighboring faultlines can be made, which then indicates the location of borderlands (represented by purple shaded areas).
This regional analysis indicates the following contiguous lines:
1) European/Russian Federation
2) European/Turkish
3) Turkish/Arab Sunni
4) Turkish/Iranian-Persian-Shia
5) Iranian-Persian-Shia/Arab Sunni
6) Iranian-Persian-Shia/Tribal extremist
7) Tribal Extremist Islamic/Indian
8) Indian/Chinese
9) Chinese/Russian

Expected behavior of contiguous faultlines suggests a low likelihood that any party of one of the above pairs will expand into the territory of the other. As such, Russia is not likely to expand into Europe or China; Europe is not likely to expand into Russia or Turkey; Turkey is not likely to expand into the Arabian Peninsula, Europe or Iran; Iran is not likely to expand into the Arabian Peninsula or Pakistan/Afghanistan; Members of the Arabian Peninsula are not likely to expand into Turkey or Iran; Afghanistan and Pakistan are not likely to expand into Iran or India; India is not likely to expand into Pakistan, Afghanistan or China; China is not likely to expand into India, Russia, Afghanistan/Pakistan.

In any of these cases, if against likelihood, there is expansion it will be forcible and contained to border regions. If against likelihood deep expansion is undertaken then the expectation is that the expanding power will have to attempt to erase the contiguous line, which is even less likely.

The overlay also shows the location of 4 borderlands and identifies their neighbors:

1) Ukraine/Belorussia-neighbored by Russia and Europe
2) The Caucuses-neighbored by Iran, Turkey and Russia
3) Central Asia-neighbored by Russia, China, Tribal extremist, India, Iran, Arab Sunni and Turkish lines
4) Mongolia-neighbored by Russia and China

Expected behavior of *proximate faultline typologies* suggests that these borderlands are likely to see one or more neighbors move towards policies of territorial expansion.

Not all borderlands have an equal likelihood of experiencing expansion. Therefore, it is important to assess which borderlands are more likely and which less. This assessment requires understanding certain borderland intricacies.

**Borderland Intricacies**
Likelihood of expansion into any borderland is affected by the following three factors: (1) size of the borderland, (2) number of neighbors, and (3) whether the borderland is spread across areas of water.
Number of Neighbors
The more neighbors the higher likelihood that there will be expansion. Borderlands with two neighbors have the lowest likelihood of expansion. As the number of neighbors increases so does likelihood of expansion.

More neighbors increase the likelihood of expansion due to the simple fact that more neighbors mean more actors that may decide to expand. Number of neighbors is directly related to likelihood of Geopolitical Viability. The fewer number of neighbors the lower the likelihood that Geopolitical Viability will be available. If there are only two neighbors, and one expands, the other neighbor will only have one opposing actor to account for in their decision to attempt to stop the expansion. As the number of neighbors increases the number of actors that need to be accounted for in the decision to commit resources to stop expansion also increases, the more potential combatants to a conflict the more likely that the situation will snowball into a multi-party quagmire. Therefore, a lower number of potential combatants to a conflict translates into a higher likelihood that any neighbor be willing to commit to stop an opponent from expanding. The higher likelihood that an opponent will commit resources to stopping another’s plans for expansion translates into a lower likelihood of geopolitical viability being available.

On the other hand, when there are multiple potential participants to the conflict there is lowered likelihood that any neighbor will commit their resources towards stopping the expansion of an opposing neighbor rather than committing these resources towards their own expansive measures on unclaimed parts of the borderland. The result is a higher likelihood of expansion.

"East Asia is a crowded neighborhood, which includes Russia, India, and Japan in addition to China and the United States. Alignments among these states might also increase China’s need for buffers by increasing China’s perception of encirclement by major powers on multiple strategic fronts."\(^{310}\)

Size
Size of a borderland is directly related to sensitivity towards a neighbor’s expansion, which is directly related to Geopolitical Viability, which is directly related to associated costs of expansion, and hence, likelihood of expansion.

A larger borderland has a higher likelihood to experience expansion than a smaller borderland. This is a function of the fact that as neighboring lines converge they become more sensitive to expansion by opposing neighbors. Sensitivity increases as borderland space decreases. Increased sensitivity translates into a lower likelihood of Geopolitical Viability for any expansive move. When considering size of a borderland it is important to remember that of utmost importance to any neighboring line is the prevention of any other neighbor expanding to contiguity. Neighboring lines will with a high degree of certainty (assuming presence of ability) commit the necessary resources to prevent an opposing neighbor from expanding to contiguity. As such, any expansion to contiguity will very rarely be Geopolitically viable and hence always have a lowered likelihood.

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\(^{310}\) Taylor Fravel, M. (2010), pg. 517
Note: Water
Expected behavior of cultural faultlines changes when they exist over areas of water; i.e., South China Sea, Kuril Islands and much of Southeast Asia. It is not the goal of this research to establish exactly how faultlines behave when existing over areas of water. There is no attempt to further explain, only to make the reader aware of this water caveat. This is an area of research that needs to be explored.

When applying borderland intricacies to determine likelihood of expansion the first differentiating factor is number of neighbors. The delineation is between borderlands with two neighbors versus more than two neighbors. The Euro-Asian continent has two borderlands with two neighbors: Mongolia and Ukraine/Belorussia, and, two borderlands with more than two neighbors: Central Asia and Caucuses. As explained above, borderlands with two neighbors have a lower likelihood of expansion than borderlands with more than two neighbors. Therefore, Central Asia and Caucuses have a higher likelihood of being expanded upon than Mongolia or Ukraine/Belorussia. Past this initial assessment it can be further deduced which borderland in each pair is more likely to experience expansion. Which is more likely to experience expansion: Caucuses or Central Asia? Mongolia or Ukraine/Belorussia?

Two Neighbor Borderlands
Determining whether the Mongolian or Ukraine/Belorussian borderland is more likely to experience expansion is connected to the variation in size of geographical buffering between neighbors of each borderland. This size effect is a direct result of which way has the borderland been shrinking, which neighbor has been more successful in enveloping the borderland. If the ratio of geographical buffer between the two neighbors is equal, expansion becomes less likely. The more one sided the ratio the more likely is expansion.

Ukraine/Belorussia
After the fall of the CCCP the Eastern European borderland was large enough that the Russian Federation was not so sensitive to EU expansion that they were willing/able to commit the necessary resources, and accept the consequences, of attempting to stop EU expansion into the post-Soviet space. This translated into EU Geopolitical Viability. EU amenable expansion has pushed the borderland towards contiguity with the Russian Federation. All that is left of the borderland is Ukraine and Belorussia. EU (or NATO) expansion into Ukraine or Belorussia would result in expansion to Russian contiguity. In fact, it was EU movement towards Ukrainian integration that was the cause of the current crisis. In 2014 Ukraine was set to sign a set of trade deals with the EU. These trade deals were perceived by Russia as paving the way for the EU to push towards to contiguity. Russia stopped the deal by buying off (then) Ukrainian President Yanukovych, who quickly dropped the deal with the EU and signed one with Russia. A majority of the population supported the deal with the EU. As such, the about face by Yanukovych spurned a revolution. The Russian federation took advantage of this revolution by supporting and encouraging separatist movements in eastern Ukrainian oblasts where there is a high concentration of ethnic Russians. Therefore, Russian perceived EU movement towards further eastward amenable integration catalyzed Russia to commit the necessary resources to stop said expansion.
On the other side of the coin, Europe is much less sensitive to Russian expansion into Belorussia and Ukraine than is Russia to EU expansion. This lower sensitivity is a function of the fact that since the fall of the CCCP European expansion has been shrinking the borderland eastward towards Russia. Europe has been very successful in enveloping the Eastern European borderland, while Russia, has until recently (Crimea) enveloped none of it. Europe has a large geographical buffer zone while Russia essentially has none. As such, Russian expansion into Ukraine or Belorussia would not be to European contiguity rather than becoming contiguous to the European buffer zone. Contiguity to a buffer zone is not such a huge deal as that is the function of the buffer zone-to stand in-between you and an opposing neighbor.

At this point many readers may be thinking this is wrong. That Eastern Europe is part of the EU; part of Europe and therefore Russian expansion into Ukraine and Belorussia would be expansion to contiguity. Technically (much of) Eastern Europe is part of the EU, but one must understand that the underlying reason that Eastern European integration took place was a security measure to secure a buffer zone against their unruly Ruski neighbor. One must remember that it is Western Europe (Brussels) that is in charge of EU policy, and having Eastern Europe between Russia and Western Europe offers tranquility to Brussels. If the seat of EU power was located in Krakow (for example) then it would be a different story, the EU would be very sensitive Russian expansion into Ukraine and Belorussia, and, would consider such expansion to contiguity, which would mean that the Krakow power based EU would be ready and willing put all necessary resources into preventing said Russian expansion. But this is not the situation. EU power is held in Western Europe, which has a buffer zone (Eastern Europe) between Brussels and the Belorussian/Ukrainian borderland, which means Russian expansion into the Ukrainian/Beorussian borderland is only to contiguity with the buffer zone, not the “motherland.” The indication is that the EU will not be willing to commit the necessary resources to stop Russian expansion into Ukraine or Belorussia. For expansion to contiguity with a buffer zone is not the same as expansion to contiguity with the “motherland.”

The insinuation is that the neighbor with the geographical buffer (Europe) will not have Geopolitical Viability to expand any further as this expansion will push to contiguity because the second neighbor (Russia), who has no buffer zone, will commit all necessary resources to stop said (European) expansion. On the other hand, the neighbor with little (or no) buffer (Russia) will have Geopolitical Viability to expand because the first neighbor (Europe) will not be willing to commit resources at any cost to stop the expansion because this expansion will only push to contiguity with the buffer zone, not the “homeland.”

Mongolia
The neighbors to the Mongolian borderland (China and Russia) both have an equal amount of geographical buffer (Mongolia). Neither neighbor has been more successful than the other in enveloping the Mongolian borderland, which has remained static for over 50 years. Any expansion by either neighbor will be expansion to contiguity. Therefore, both neighbors will be willing to commit whatever resources necessary to prevent the other from expanding. Therefore, the expectation is that neither neighbor will possess Geopolitical Viability. Both neighbors (China and Russia) realize that expanding into Mongolia is not geopolitically viable, and, both being rational actors means that neither will expand without geopolitical viability. The outcome is a tacit agreement to accept Mongolia as a shared status quo buffer zone. This tacit agreement
is not likely to be violated due to the spiraling ramifications that would follow. It is this reason that the Mongolian borderland has remained static for so long and why it can be expected to remain static.

Conclusion: Ukraine/Belorussia has one neighbor with geopolitical viability while none of the Mongolian neighbors hold geopolitical viability. Therefore, the assessment is that Ukraine/Belorussia is more likely to experience expansion than Mongolia.

Borderlands with more than two neighbors
Likelihood of expansion between multi-neighbor borderlands is a simpler analysis than between two neighbor borderlands. Likelihood is purely based on size and number of neighbors. The more neighbors the higher the likelihood of expansion and the larger the borderland the more likely expansion. Here the analysis is straight forward as Central Asia is both larger and has more neighbors than the Caucuses and therefore more likely to experience expansion.

The Regional analysis of the Euro-Asian continent has found four borderlands. The determined likelihood of expansion is described in the following list (most to least likely):

(1) Central Asia
(2) The Caucuses
(3) Ukraine/Belorussia
(4) Mongolia

It is important to remember that the Regional analysis is only the first level of the analysis, that it only deals with Geopolitical Viability based on expected behavior of proximate faultlines. The main function of the regional analysis is to locate borderlands and then gauge which borderlands are most likely to experience expansion. A regional analysis does not touch on Identity Viability. It also does not assess (other than borderland determination) which populations (within any specific borderland) are more likely to experience expansion, these other assessments are provided by the next two levels of analysis.

B. Analysis of the Expanding Power
The hinge factor here is whether Identity is an ally or hindrance, which is directly related to whether the expanding power is operating under a bordered or border transcendent Identity. The goal of the expanding power analysis is to ascertain whether the chosen expanding power is currently operating under a bordered or border transcendent identity. So long as an expanding power is projecting a bordered identity then likelihood of expansion is lowered. If the chosen expanding power is projecting a border transcendent identity then the likelihood of expansion is raised. This raised likelihood is a function of the fact that projection of a border transcendent identity offers the possibility of amenable expansion while bordered identities (for the most part) preclude the option of amenable expansion. When an expanding power is setting preparatory groundwork to move towards amenable expansion they will begin an institutional shift away from defining their societal structure using a bordered identity towards an internalization of a border transcendent identity. This shift requires a massive, and overtly public propaganda campaign, as well as changes to educational curriculum. Such a shift should be visible to researchers.
Not all neighbors to a borderland have equal likelihood of being able to create and bring to market an acceptable border transcendent identity. Achieved in the next level of analysis will be the analysis of the populations being expanded upon, which should shed light on which expanding powers are more likely to be able to bring to market an acceptable identity option to which borderland populations.

C. Analysis of Populations being expanded upon
There are two analytical points used in the analysis of populations being expanded upon: 1) Likelihood of undergoing an identity shift, and, 2) Compatibility of offered identity.

Likelihood of undergoing an Identity shift
Is directly related to which hope confidence level is the population occupying. Positive hope confidence (i.e. newly committed or committed) has the lowest likelihood of an identity shift, of abandoning the present status quo, of collective action towards integrating with the expanding power. Positive hope confidence precludes identity shifts, for the population has confidence that the present identity/societal structure will usher in a safer, more secure and economically abundant future. Neutral hope confidence breeds the possibility (not likelihood) of an identity shift. Populations with Negative hope confidence are most likely to undergo an identity shift, of abandoning the present status quo, of collective action towards integrating with the expanding power.

Compatibility of Offered Identity
Amenable annexation and integration requires an expanding power to supply an acceptable supra-national hope generating identity to fill the demand of hope generation in the societal attention spaces. Therefore, supply conditions equal the ability of the expanding power to promote and bring to market an acceptable identity to a population with either neutral or negative hope confidence. An assessment of compatibility of offered identities is how one ascertains the likelihood that an expanding power can market and sell an acceptable identity to the population being expanded upon. This assessment includes a comparison of the shared history, language, culture, religion, memory, “cultural ruination” and relics of Empire.

Language is the most impactful of these factors because language, the ability to communicate with one another, historically, has been a major factor in determining the extent with which groups interact with each other. The closer the language the more interaction there will be. More interaction means more sharing of culture and religion. Therefore, closeness of language (generally) has a direct effect on closeness of culture and religion, which results in a higher likelihood that an expanding power will be successful in offering a compatible and acceptable identity. In general, a population will have deep reservations of accepting an identity of a people who speak a completely different language. The lesser amount of viable communication between the two groups increases the feeling that the other group is an outsider who does not belong. A Kyrgyz might not see the Turkish as complete outsiders because Kyrgyz can (to an extent) communicate to Turkish speakers (Kyrgyz is a Turkic language). On the other hand, Kyrgyz cannot understand at all Chinese and will therefore see the Chinese as more foreign.
Do the expander and population being expanding upon speak the same language? If not, how close are the two languages? Do they have the same root? (I.E. Italian/Spanish, Turkish/Azerbaijani, Ukrainian/Russian) or are they from completely different families? (I.e. Chinese/Russian).

The larger the language overlap between expander and populations being expanded upon the less foreign the expanding power will be perceived. The larger the language overlap the higher the likelihood that the expander and the populations being expanding upon will have similar culture and religions, as such, the closer the languages the higher the likelihood that the expanding power will be successful in offering a compatible and acceptable Identity. Closeness in language, religion and culture does not guarantee or preclude amenable expansion. History and shared memory can override or magnify closeness of culture, religion and language. Positive shared history and memory is a boon to expansion while negative shared history and memory a detraction.

Positive shared history and memory: If the populations being expanded upon and expander have in the past been allied to defeat an invading enemy. If the two were together part of an historical empire that is perceived to have been civilized and learned. If this learned and civilized shared empire exists in living memory it will have a stronger affect than a purely historical example. If the living memory of said empire is remembered as being better than the current life the result will be positive likelihood towards identity viability.

Negative shared history and memory: If the expander and populations being expanded upon have warred upon each other in the past (the more recent the war the stronger negative the effect). If the expander is perceived to have (in the past) perpetrated ill upon the populations being expanded upon (i.e. Genocide) or capital exploitation (i.e. slave trade or being colonized), if the two have been in a union or empire together that exists in living memory but the life is remembered as being worse than the current life.

Conclusion
Analysis of populations being expanded upon involves two points: Likelihood of an identity shift and Identity viability. Likelihood of an identity shift is essentially a measure of hope confidence. Populations with positive hope confidence are least likely to willingly undergo an identity shift, followed by populations by neutral hope confidence; populations with negative hope confidence are most likely to willingly undergo an identity shift. Identity viability is a measure of how likely an expanding power is to being able to promote an acceptable border transcendent identity. Likelihood of populations accepting an offered identity from an expanding power necessitates that the population being expanded upon be likely to undergo an identity shift (i.e. have negative hope confidence), and, that the expanding power have the ability to offer an acceptable and compatible identity (i.e. there must be identity viability).

Chapter 4 Summary: This chapter explained how the frame functions. Explained was that the frame is tiered and includes an analysis of the region, expanding power and populations being expanded upon, and, that each of these levels of analysis operate independently of each other. Also, each of the levels of analysis uses different combinations of the analytical typologies discussed in chapter 3. These three levels of the frame (analysis of the expanding power,
populations being expanded upon and regional analysis) were discussed and explained. Though only the regional analysis was included complete in this chapter. The included regional analysis applied cultural faultline theory and proximate faultline typologies to the Euro-Asian continent (West of the Chinese Pacific coast to the Atlantic excluding East Asia and Africa). The application indicated that the region has 4 borderlands (i.e. The Caucuses, Central Asia, Ukraine/Belorussia, and, Mongolia). After this indication, it was discussed that to determine which borderlands were more likely to experience expansion one must apply borderland intricacies. These intricacies were discussed and then applied. The resulting list of borderlands ranked from most to least likely to experience expansion is as follows: (1) Central Asia, (2) The Caucuses, (3) Ukraine/Belorussia, and, (4) Mongolia.

The next chapter will apply the frame to Central Asia.

V. Chapter 5 - Application of the Frame-Central Asia
In the Regional analysis above Central Asia was identified as being the most likely borderland to experience expansion. The populations being expanded upon (thanks to Stalin) are divided into 5 distinct societal structures (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) that could be potentially expanded upon by any of the neighboring fault lines (i.e. Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Fundamentalist Islam and Arab Sunni). There are two components to the analysis of populations being expanded upon. (1) Likelihood of an identity shift, which is determined by hope confidence level of the population being expanded upon, and, (2) Compatibility of offered Identity, which is determined through cross referencing the identity that the expanding power is offering, or could possibly offer, against the historical, cultural and religious leanings of the population being expanded upon.

This is not the first, second, or even third time that the Central Asia has been a borderland (i.e. caught between the rivalry of geostrategic players). It is worthwhile to compare and contrast the way in which the Central Asian borderland game has been played in the past vs. the way in which is being presently played. It has been decided to relegate said comparison to the annexes. This decision was made so as to avoid interrupting the flow of the main text and keeping the reader from losing focus of the main point of the research. The comparison of the Central Asian borderland iterations can be found in Annex 2.

A. Likelihood of an Identity shift
Likelihood of an identity shift is correlated to hope confidence movement. Negative hope confidence leads likelihood of an identity shift. Positive hope confidence insinuates that there will be no identity shift. Neutral hope confidence projects not a likelihood of an identity shift rather than a potential that should be judged on a case-by-case basis. The most obvious way of determining the trajectory of a population’s hope confidence is to ask them. But, as discussed above, there is not always the possibility of quantitative fieldwork. Therefore, here, we have devised an alternative method of determining hope confidence trajectory. This method was discussed earlier in the text, but shall in summary be repeated below.

This alternative method rests on the connection between hope confidence trajectory to societal movement towards/away from egalitarianism, which is a function of whether the societal status quo was built through legitimate or illegitimate manipulation, which can be determined through
an assessment of whether said status quo was legitimized using concrete versus non-concrete events. Therefore, the non-concrete/concrete dichotomy can through Euclid’s first common notion (“Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other”) determine hope confidence trajectory. The determination as to whether a societal status quo is built on concrete or non-concrete events is achieved through a legitimacy frame analysis.

It is important to note that the below legitimacy frame analyses are summary analyses. Full legitimacy frame analyses for each Central Asian republic can be found in Annex 3. The choice to only include in the main text summary analyses and put the full analyses as an annex was made so as to help the narrative to flow unhindered.

Kazakhstan
With Kazakhstan we could just rely on the Gallup (2017) Institute’s survey on Happiness, Hope and Economic Optimism to determine the populations hope confidence level. According to the survey Kazakhstan can be considered as having positive hope confidence. The country scored positive numbers in every category and was ranked in the top 10 happiest countries with a total score of +74. Also, Kazakhstan scored a +35 on the hope index and a +11 on the economic optimism index.\(^{311}\) Though we could rely on this survey in regards to Kazakhstan the rest of the Central Asian countries were not included in this survey. Even though we could rely on this survey we choose to also evaluate Kazakhstan using a legitimacy frame analysis.

Nursultan Nazarbaev is the leader and founder of the populational lobbyist conglomerate Clan Nazarbaev. Clan Nazarbaev deployed a frame of legitimacy that was domestic rule based on international engagement, recognition and “respect.”\(^{312}\) Claims of legitimacy based “on external recognition broadcast inward to domestic audiences.”\(^{313}\) Olcott (1992) highlights that Kazakhstan “paid more attention to its international representation than any other Central Asian republic.”\(^{314}\) The main pivot to hope confidence trajectory is whether this “international, engagement and respect” is a concrete event. In this understanding, it is considered a concrete event. Nazarbaev in fact did achieve said international engagement, recognition and “respect.” The pinnacle of this was Kazakhstan receiving the OSCE chair in 2010. Populational manipulation centered on concrete events will push towards egalitarianism, which in turn creates positive hope confidence. Therefore, Kazakhstan can be considered to have Positive hope confidence trajectory, and, therefore holds a low likelihood of undergoing an identity shift.

\(^{313}\) Schatz, Edward, (2006) pg.270
See Annex 3 for full Kazak legitimacy frame analysis.

**Uzbekistan**

Islam Karimov lead Clan Karimov in domestic power consolidation into authoritarian stability. The most prominent master frame exploited by Clan Karimov was ideology. Karimov and the ruling party constructed and transmitted to the population an ideological feedback loop called the “Ideology of National Independence.” According to the framework an ideological feedback loop has not the potential to be based on concrete events. As such, an ideological feedback loop is precluded from being able to create positive hope confidence. Ideological feedback loops produce negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by the hard-repressive transmission of the feedback loop. A situation which is expected to, at any particular moment, have a low likelihood of an identity shift, while at the same time, at any non-particular moment (over time) have a high likelihood of undergoing an identity shift.

See Annex 3 for full Uzbek legitimacy frame analysis.

**Turkmenistan**

In Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov lead domestic clan power consolidation into authoritarian stability. Here, as in Uzbekistan, ideology was exploited as the master frame and an ideological feedback loop constructed and repressively transmitted. Ideological feedback loops have not the potential to create positive hope confidence. As such, Turkmen hope confidence trajectory has only the potential to be a negative slide buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the feedback loop. Therefore, likelihood of a populational identity shift, as in Uzbekistan, is low at any particular moment while very high at any non-particular moment (over time).

See Annex 3 for full Turkmen legitimacy frame analysis.

**Tajikistan**

In Tajikistan (like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) president Emomali Rahmon lead domestic clan power consolidation into authoritarian stability through the transmission of an ideological feedback loop. As such, Tajik hope confidence trajectory has only the potential to be a negative slide buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the feedback loop. Therefore, likelihood of a Populational identity shift is low at any particular moment, while very high at any non-particular moment (over time).

See Annex 3 for full Turkmen legitimacy frame analysis.

**Kyrgyzstan**

The countries first president Askar Akaev deployed a legitimacy frame built around “democratization” and liberal societal and market transformation, a frame that in 1990 could potentially be based on non-concrete or concrete events. This because liberalization and democratization of post-Soviet space was a completely new experience with no like past concrete events to point to, which means no repetition and precedence with which to gauge if it should be considered a future concrete event. One must wait until some time has passed and societal movement against egalitarianism can be gauged. Many considered Kyrgyzstan by 1998
to be a failed state. Considering freedom of speech and press there has been great movement towards egalitarianism. Considering quality of life and economic security there has been great movement away from egalitarianism. Negative economic movement towards egalitarianism (in the long term) has a bigger impact on hope confidence trajectory than positive movement towards egalitarianism concerning freedom of speech and press.

This is a situation where the ruling party uses the positive freedom of speech and press movement to buttress against the negative economic quality of life movement. The functioning is similar to an ideological feedback loop, in which the aim is to buttress a negative hope confidence into neutral. In this respect, the difference between the two is the chose lever with which the negative hope confidence slide is buttressed. In the Kyrgyz case the buttressing lever was positive gains in freedom of speech and press. Unfortunately, for the purveyors of this lever, freedom of speech press (unlike the hard and repressive buttress of the ideological feedback loop) is not strong enough to offset into neutral, for any sustainable amount of time, sustained negative economic movement. In addition, more freedom of speech and press ultimately will quicken the negative slide as it allows for a multiplication of populational lobbyist with the freedom, ability and platform to exploit and capitalize off the negative economic movement in their own attempts to gain power and overthrowing the present status quo. This process is demonstrated by the fact that there have been two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 1990 and none in the other Central Asian republics. The conclusion is that Kyrgyzstan has negative hope confidence trajectory, and is, therefore, more likely to undergo a populational identity shift.

See Annex 3 for full Kyrgyz legitimacy frame analysis.

Below is a chart that tabulates the 5 Central Asian republics and their hope confidence trajectory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hope Confidence Trajectory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Populations with positive (+) hope confidence trajectory are less likely to experience an identity shift. Populations with negative hope confidence trajectory (-) are more likely to undergo an identity shift. Populations with (=) have at any particular moment a low likelihood; while at any non-particular moment (over time) have a high likelihood of an identity shift.

B. Analysis of Expanding Powers
The first point to an analysis of the expanding power is identifying whether said expanding power is projecting a bordered or border transcendent identity. This point will be rolled into an
analysis of compatible offered identities. The analysis will first focus on the Central Asian borderland as a whole and then be adjusted to focus on the 5 individual Central Asian republics. The result will be a series of charts illustrating the variation in likelihood of expansion based upon compatibility of offered identities. These charts will show illustrate how connection points were awarded according to the following categories: language, religion, shared history and memory. History and shared memory can be further parsed based on removal in time, and, whether the memory and history are viewed as positive or negative. Each element of a category can be awarded a score from 2 to -2 (0 being neutral) +1 is slight push towards likelihood and +2 a larger push. Conversely -1 a slight push against likelihood and -2 a larger push against. The higher the total the more likely the specific neighbor will be able to bring to market a compatible border transcendent identity to Central Asia in a general sense (in the first section) and to each of the Central Asian Countries (in the second section). The lower the number the less likely. Additionally, it will be considered whether the expanding power is projecting a bordered border transcendent identity. If an expanding power is projecting a border transcendent identity 1 point will be awarded. No points will be awarded to those powers projecting a bordered identity. The expanding powers being analyzed mirrors the list of neighbors to the Central Asian borderland (i.e. Turkey, Iran, China, India, Fundamental Islam, Arab Sunni, India and the Russian Federation).

**Turkey**

*Borders versus Border transcendent* - Turkey is presently projecting a nationally bordered Turkish identity. A projected bordered identity receives no connection points.

Projected Identity Total: (0)

*Religious connection* - Most of Central Asia is self-proclaimed Sunni Muslim.\(^{315}\) Much of the population is predisposed to the secular versus the non-secular (due to the anti-religious stance of the CCCP), while at the same time much of the population is predisposed to the non-secular (also due to the anti-religious stance of the CCCP).

Awarded connection Points - The fact that Turkey is mainly Muslim gives +1 point. The fact of being Sunni also brings +1 point. The fact of secularism brings no points because this is a boon to part of the Central Asian populations while being a detraction to the other parts of the population, therefore equaling out at 0.

Religious total: +2

Note: Sunni and Islam are only awarded 1 connection each point, this because, on a macro level (due the Soviets Religion Policy) Central Asian populations are mostly not spiritually moved to claim Sunni Muslim. Rather the claim is a result of genealogy and ancestry.\(^{316}\)

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\(^{315}\) According to the pew research institute the percentage of Muslims in the Central Asian republics in 2009 were: Tajikistan 98%, Uzbekistan 96.3%, Turkmenistan 93.1%, Kyrgyzstan 88%, Kazakhstan 70.2%. These percentages for the most part represent Sunni. Only Tajikistan has a Shia population above 1%, which stands at 7% Shia http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf

\(^{316}\) "Although the Soviet Union was largely successful in destroying Islamic learning and the knowledge of Islamic teachings, it did not eliminate the majority of the population's self-perception as having an Islamic identity." (Gunn 2003: 391) According to Olcott, "the consciousness of having an Islamic heritage was one of the elements
Shared History and Memory: Due to being part of the Ottoman Empire Central Asia has significant shared history and memory connected to Turkey. Connection, which is not ancient history but also already passed from living memory. The memory of Ottoman times does not evoke strong feelings pro or con of a better life or atrocities being levied on the Central Asian populations. Yet one can still hear people talking about how their grandparents wrote in the Arabic script due to the Ottomans.

Shared History and Memory Connection Points-The fact of the Ottoman shared history and memory brings one connection point. Only 1 point because this memory is not super palpable anymore and does not evoke strong emotions.

Shared history and memory total: +1

Language Connection: Four out of five of the Central Asian languages are Turkic rooted

Language Connection Points- +1 connection is awarded due to the root language connection, but not a full point because only 4/5 (80%) of the Central Asian countries share this root.

Language total: .8

Consolidated Turkish Connection Points: 3.8

Iran

Bordered versus Border transcendent- Iran could decide to project a semi border transcendent Shia identity, or, could decide to project a nationally bordered Iranian identity. In the case of Central Asia projection both of these identities should be considered bordered. The Iranian identity is bordered because Central Asians are not Iranian. A Shia identity should also be considered bordered because the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian populations are Sunni.

Projected Identity Total: (0)

Iranian Religious connection: Most of Central Asia are self-proclaimed Sunni Muslims, while Iran is mainly Shia.

which for the Central Asians continued to define their identities - even if a particular individual knew almost nothing about religion and observed none of its tenets" (Olcott 1995:21). “Being a "Muslim" is widely understood as constituting an integral part of the identity of the majority of Central Asia's population.” (Gunn 2003: 391) "Virtually all indigenous Central Asians consider themselves Muslim, although a large number of Central Asians have only a vague idea about what that implies. Most Central Asians simply observe that being Muslim distinguishes them from [Christians] and that to be a Muslim means to live in their traditional style and to practice rituals related to their beliefs" (Gleason 1997:42) “The Muslims of the region think of Islam as being a part of their social identity in a way similar to how they conceive of their ethnicity, family, and mother tongue.” (Gunn 2003: 391)
Iranian Religious Connection Points- The fact that Iran is mainly Muslim gives 1 point. The fact being mostly Shia is a -1 against the Sunni character of Central Asia. These points cancel each other out.

Iranian Religious total: 0

Iranian Shared History and Memory: For the most part (excepting Turkmenistan) Central Asia did not fall under the dominion of the Persian Empire. This does not mean that there is no shared history and memory. The idea of the Silk Road is principal to the Central Asian identity. This Silk Road memory cannot be held without recognizing a shared past that is intertwined with the Persians and their culture. But this shared past and memory is far removed pushing towards time almost forgotten. The almost mythical role that the Silk Road has taken on in the context of Central Asia means that these times cannot be remembered as good or bad, though the myth pushes positive.

Iranian Shared History and Memory Connection Points- One point is awarded for the ancient memory of the Persians that is intertwined into the history of the Silk Road. One point is awarded to the fact that the almost mythical nature of the “Great Silk Road” pushes positive this forgotten memory.

Iranian Shared history and memory total: +2

Iranian Language Connection: 1 out of 5 of the Central Asian languages (Turkmen) is a dialect of Persian and therefore share the same root as Farsi, the major language of Iran.

Iranian Language Connection Points-One connection point is awarded due to the root language connection, but not a full point because only 1/5 (20%) of the Central Asian countries share this root.

Iranian Language total: .2

Consolidated Iranian connection points: 2.2

China

Bordered versus Border transcendent- China is presently projecting a nationally bordered Chinese national identity. Therefore, no connection points are awarded.

Projected Identity Total: (0)

Religious connection: Central Asia has no religious connection with China

Chinese Religious total: 0

Chinese Shared History and Memory: The Central Asian populations have thousands-year-old relationship with the Chinese, a story of two different peoples, in Empires together, but in a master/conquered relationship with both peoples playing both parts over the millennia. This
history, when remembered highlights not being able to live together as one, not of compatible identities. This is a negative when held against compatibility of identities and being able to live together under one roof.

Chinese Shared history and memory total: -1

Language Connection: There is negative language connection between Central Asia and Chinese. Chinese is about as far from the Central Asian languages that one can get.

Chinese Language total: - 2

Consolidated Chinese Connection Points: - 3

Fundamental Islam

Bordered versus Border transcendent: Fundamentalist Sunni Islam is a fully transcendent identity without a concomitant governing societal structure. This means that, at the moment, expansion will not be territorial but Populational. Territorial expansion is not possible until the moment when a structure is created, coopted or taken by force (Isis is the most prominent example of the Fundamental Islamic fault line creating a concomitant structure with which to exact territorial expansion).317 Fundamental Islam is considered a border transcendent identity but the fact that they do not control concomitant societal structure means that only a half a point is awarded.

Fundamental Islam Projected Identity Total: (.5)

Fundamental Islam Religious connection: Fundamental Islam is for the most part Sunni. Across Central Asia a majority perception is negative towards the fundamental aspect, though there are in places (to varying degrees) an undercurrent of fundamental sympathizers. Though (in Central Asia as a whole) the negative pressure from the majority outweighs the minority level of sympathy.

Fundamental Islam Religious Connection Points-One point is awarded here for the Sunni aspect and one for Islam. The fact that the negative pressure against the fundamental aspect outweighs sympathy results in a negative point.

Fundamental Islam Religious total: +1 (Sunni) +1 (Islam) – 1(fundamental)= 1

Fundamental Islam Shared History and Memory: Only since 1990 (since the fall of CCCP) has there been an open relationship between Central Asia and extreme types of Islam. This is not enough shared history and memory to gauge an effect; as such we apply a zero.

317 There may be analyst who argue this situation is one in which Pakistan and Afghanistan have coopted the fundamental ideology as locomotion for their societal structures. Here we do not take this view. We do not accept the view that either the present Pakistani or Afghani government has been co-opted by fundamental Islam. Here we do subscribe to the view that many individuals in these governments are fundamentalist sympathizers but as of yet they have not been able to co-opt the governments. The view here is that the Taliban, when governing Afghanistan, was a situation in which fundamental Islam had co-opted a government. But the Taliban no longer controls the Afghani government.

79
Fundamental Islam Shared history and memory total: 0

*Language Connection:* Arabic has a connection to Central Asia both through it being the language of the Koran and the fact that Arabic script was used during Ottoman times. People remember that their Grandmothers wrote in Arabic script. Also, it has a connection through the self-proclaimed majority Islamic nature of the populations. The idea of learning Arabic has a positive and non-foreign connotation. Also, many across the region already speak Arabic. As such one connection point is awarded.

Fundamental Islam Language total: +1

Consolidated Fundamental Islam connection points: 2.5

*Arab Sunni*

**Bordered versus Border transcendent**—The Arab world is projecting a regionally bordered Arab identity. The reach of the regional transcendence of Arab does not extend into Central Asia. Central Asians are not Arabs; they can never be Arabs. As such, no connection point is awarded. Arab World has tried to project a border transcendent Sunni identity. The result has been populational expansion of the Sunni religion. But this projection has been made with an underlying understanding that, the purveyors of this Sunni projection are Arabs, while the recipients of this Sunni projection are not Arab. This imbedded distinction essentially decouples the Sunni identity projection from the Arab state apparatus, making the Sunni projected identity not an ephemeral bordered identity. Which means that it is unlikely that this projection will result territorial expansion, rather than Sunni populational expansion, and that this populational expansion is not necessarily connected or controlled by the Arab states.

Arab Sunni Projected Identity Total: 0

*Arab Sunni Religious connection:* One point is awarded here for the Sunni aspect and one point for the Islamic aspect of the Arab projected identity.

Arab Sunni Religious total: +2

*Arab Sunni Shared History and Memory:* The shared history and memory concerning the Arab Sunni line is not a direct connection. The shared memory history and memory is one of two peoples being part of a larger conquering Empire (i.e. Ottoman). This is not a direct Empire connection as with Turkey (Ottoman Empire) or Iran (Persian Empire). The result is that a score of zero is applied.

Arab Sunni Shared history and memory total: 0

*Arab Sunni Language Connection:* Arabic has a connection to Central Asia both through the fact that Arabic script was used during Ottoman times. People remember that their Grandmothers wrote in Arabic script. Also, it has a connection through the self-proclaimed majority Islamic nature of the populations. The idea of learning Arabic has a positive and non-foreign
connotation. Also, many across the region already speak Arabic. As such one connection point is awarded.

Arab Sunni Language total: +1
Consolidated Arab Sunni connection points: 3

*India*

**Bordered versus Border transcendent** -India is projecting an Indian national bordered identity. Therefore, no connection points are awarded.

**Indian Religious connection:** There is a superfluous Muslim connection due to the fact there are 172 million Muslims in India, but these Muslims are part of a societal structure that has coopted Hinduism, as such half a connection point is given.

*Indian* Religious total: +.5

**Indian Shared History and Memory:** There is limited history and shared memory due to the natural barrier of the Himalayas, but India, like Iran, is part and parcel of the legacy of the Silk Road legacy. Though, the Indian presence in this (now almost mythical) legacy is less than that of the Persians, as such a half a connection point is applied.

*Indian* Shared history and memory total: + .5

Indian Language Connection: Hindi is as foreign to Central Asia as Chinese is. Therefore, negative two points are applied

Indian Language Connection total: -2
Indian consolidated connection points: -1

*Russian Federation*

**Bordered versus Border transcendent**—Here there is a federational structure, which makes Russia the only neighbor whose structure is not bordered either nationally or ethnically. Not nationally bordered because a federation can always invite others to join in a way that a nation state cannot. Also, Russia already has over 150 ethnicities within the federation. The result is that the identity being projected by the Russian Federation is a regionally transcendent with the potential to include Central Asia. Therefore, one connection point is awarded.

Russian Projected Identity Total: +1

**Russian Religious connection:** There is no religious connection coming implicitly from the Russian federational structure, though the Russian Federation does include several Muslim republics. The fact of having Muslim republics is worth half a connection point.

Russian Religious total: +.5
Russian *Shared History and Memory*: Central Asia has two distinct memories and histories concerning Russia. (1) Imperial Russia, and, (2) Soviet Russia.

(1) Imperial Russia is still remembered for their harsh treatment of the Central Asian populations including what some call a genocide of Kyrgyz and Kazaks in 1916. Imperial Russia, like the Ottoman Empire, is not so far removed in time to be ancient, yet already passed from living memory. The remembrance of Imperial Russia is negative, but Imperial Russia was overthrown with the Bolshevik revolution in 1918. Imperial Russia is not necessarily counted as being connected to the modern Russian Federation. Therefore, (-.5) is applied for the shared memory and history of Imperial Russia.

(2) The Soviet Union is very much still contained in the modern memory of the population. The Central Asian populations (generally) considered themselves happy under Soviet rule. In fact, at the time of the collapse not a single Central Asian Republic wanted to leave the Union. They all tried to stay in the Union rather than opting for independence. The quality of life provided by the independent republics (for the majority of the central Asian populations) has dramatically fallen compared to life in the CCCP. The Soviet Union has become the memory of what the “good times” used to be like. Good times, which the independent republics cannot seem to replicate. Therefore, two connection points are awarded.

Russian Shared history and memory total:  +2 (CCCP) -.5(Imperial Russia) = 1.5

Russian Language total: Thanks to CCCP Russian is understood and spoken relatively well across the Central Asian Populations. Therefore, two connection points are awarded:

Consolidated Russian Federation connection points: 5

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(a) General Central Asian Identity Compatibility Tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Fundamental Islam</th>
<th>Arab Sunni</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected Identity</td>
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<td>Shared History and Memory</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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318 According to A.L. Aref’eva (2012) in the period 2009-2012 the percentage of the Central Asian populations who were fluent in Russian was: Kazakhstan 84%, Kyrgyzstan 49%, Uzbekistan 41%, Tajikistan 33%, Turkmenistan 18%
Compatible Identities held against specific Central Asian Republics

**China, India and Arab Sunni**

China, India and Arab Sunni numbers do not change from the general sense to the context of specific Central Asian Republics.

**Iran**

The only modification to the Iranian numbers concern language connection and Turkmenistan. Turkmen is a dialect of Persian. Therefore, concerning Turkmenistan Iran receives 1 language connection point (versus .2 points against Central Asia as a whole).

**Turkey**

Turkish numbers must be modified concerning language connection and Turkmenistan. Turkmen is the only Central Asian language that is not Turkish rooted, therefore, when talking about Turkmenistan Turkey loses the +1 language connection point it received against Central Asia as a whole. Also, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have a much more spiritual belief in Islam than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. As such the secular nature of the Turkish line is expected to be a minus when talking about these three republics. Therefore, turkey loses a religion connection point when concerning Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

**Fundamental Islam**

Fundamental Islam enjoys more support among the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen populations than it does in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan. Increased support is believed to be a function of 2 mechanisms. (1) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan all-share borders with either Pakistan or Afghanistan, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan do not. Populations that have shared borders are more easily accessible than populations without. (2) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are all structured by ideological feedback loops. Fundamental Islam is also powered by an ideological feedback loop. Therefore, the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen populations are already predisposed to this kind of ruling ideology. Kazak and Kyrgyz are not ruled by ideological legitimacy frames and thus less disposed. In this case Fundamental Islam receives an extra religious connection point when talking about Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

**Russia**

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are (as opposed to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) more spiritually (rather than genealogical) prone to claiming Islam. This more spiritual connection means that the history of being part of the CCCP takes less positive view as it is more likely to be remembered in the sense of stifling and being an enemy of the Islamic faith. This takes away one shared history and memory connection point from Russia when talking about Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Also, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have a much lower Russian language penetration and proficiency than in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. As such one language connection point is deducted.

Below are the country specific connection point tabulations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Fundamental Islam</th>
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<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Connection</td>
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<td>.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Connection</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared History and Memory</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above section conflated an analysis of the expanding power (concerning whether a bordered or border transcendent is presently being projected by each borderland neighbor) with the compatibility of offered identity concerning the populations being expanded upon. The result is a numerical value that represents the potential that each central Asian neighbor will be able to bring to market a compatible border transcendent identity to the populations of Central Asia. The higher the number the higher the likelihood that a specific expanding power will be able to reach identity viability with the populations being expanded upon.

Some might consider the above analysis threadbare and claim that any analysis trying to quantify culture, language and historical connection demands a much more in depth reading. The response to this criticism is agreement with the statement and reminder that the point of this treatise is not depth of the analysis rather than the example of how to use the frame to make the
analysis. Therefore, the fact that the analysis is threadbare in its depth does not affect its relevance towards the intended goal (i.e. an example application of the frame). The suggestion is that anyone using the frame should dig deeper into the quantification and comparison of the connection points. But again, here, we are not using the frame rather than just giving an example analysis to show it functions.

The following section continues with the expanding power analysis and looks at Central Asian geopolitical viability.

C. Central Asian Geopolitical Viability
The question here is which Central Asian neighbors can be considered having geopolitical viability, and which ones considered holding no geopolitical viability.

No-Geopolitical Viability

Turkey and Arab Sunni
Arab Sunni and Turkish lines can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. This is due the fact that both Arab Sunni line and Turkish do not directly border the Central Asian borderland. Any expansion by Arab Sunni or Turkish lines requires going over or through Iran or Russia. There is no geopolitical viability in going through another neighbor. While going over a neighbor towards expansion is a weakened position and is almost always not geopolitically viable. Going over means that the territory being expanded upon will be isolated from potential reinforcements. This raises the cost exponentially for the expanding power while lowering the costs to bordering neighbors who want to render the move a losing one. Going over a neighbor towards expansion is only a viable option when there is a significant power gap in favor of the expanding power in relation to the neighbor skipped over. In the case of Turkey and Arab Sunni lines there is no significant favorable power gap in the context of Iran or Russia. Therefore, the Arab Sunni and Turkish lines have no geopolitical viability concerning territorial expansion into Central Asia. Therefore, unless Turkey or the Arab Sunni lines are considered to be non-rational or cornered-rational actors then the likelihood is very low of expansion into Central Asia. Also, both Turkey and the Arab world are predominately Sunni, which means that any expansion into Central Asia would be seen as an extreme threat to the predominately Shia Iran. It is probable that Iran would be willing to commit the necessary resources raise the associated costs of a Turkish or Arab expansion past the point of being a viable move.

India
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability towards Central Asian territorial expansion. This is due to the rivalry with Pakistan. Any Indian territorial expansion into Central Asia will certainly be seen by Pakistan as an aggressive move. Pakistan is probable to commit necessary resources to render any Indian expansion into Central Asia too expensive to be a viable move. Also, the rivalry with Pakistan consumes India in an obsessive-compulsive way preventing it from imagining an attempt to expand into Central Asia.

Iran
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. Any Iranian expansion into Central Asia will be pushing towards increasing contiguity with the Fundamental Islamic neighbor. Expansion to contiguity will almost always induce a response that is likely to render the expansive move too
expensive. Also, The Arab Sunni line (like India with Pakistan) is obsessively consumed with Iranian power moves. Any move by Iran to gain influence anywhere will be met with Arab Sunni and (probably Turkish) interference to stop it. It was Iranian gains in Iraq that pushed the Arab Sunni governments to allow for and help create ISIS.

China
Can be considered as not having geopolitical viability. This lack of geopolitical viability is partly a function of having the lowest score (-3) concerning compatibility of identities. Such a low score means that opposing neighbors will get more distance out of resources aimed at ultimately rendering the expansion a losing move.

All the above listed neighbors, along with the reasons listed above; also, must deal with a high potential that Russia will be willing and able to commit the necessary moves to derail any programs of Central Asian expansion from any and all of the neighbors. Russia feels that Central Asia is their sphere of influence. Russia is not likely to let any of the other neighbors gain influence that is not approved by the Kremlin, especially any kind of territorial expansion. Therefore, all the above listed neighbors also hold no geopolitical viability because Russia is likely to be willing and able to commit the necessary resources to raise the associated costs of any expansive move by any of the Central Asian neighbors past the threshold of being worth it.

Neighbors with Geopolitical Viability

Russia
Russia is the only neighbor that can expand into Central Asia and not push to contiguity with another neighbor. Russia can expand into Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan without pushing to contiguity with any neighbor (excluding China). Contiguity with China is excluded because of China’s -3 identity compatibility score held against Russia’s 5.5. What this means is that in the event of Russian expansion China will get diminishing returns on its effort to derail. For if Russian expansion is amenable and China attempts to derail, the perception will be a neighbor with no compatibility interfering with wanted Russian expansion. The point is that the -3 score on identity compatibility severely limits China from derailing Russian expansion, which the Chinese understand. Therefore, it is likely that China would look past any Russian expansion in the knowledge that, in this case, attempting to derail the expansion is likely to be a loss to China, and not necessarily raise the associated costs past the threshold necessary to make it a losing move for Russia.

Fundamental Islam
Can be considered to have geopolitical viability because this is a fully transcendent identity with no attached structure. The implication is that there is no expanding structure for any opponents to rail against and no connected structure to bear the increased costs. Derailing the spread of an ideology is an extremely hard and impractical undertaking. Once there is an attached structure, then it can be railed against and expansion pushed past the cost threshold, but until then there is a de-facto geopolitical viability that comes along with fully transcendent identities lacking a structure.

Geopolitical Viability Tabulation
Below is a tabulation of the geopolitical viability of the Central Asian neighbors.
Actors without geopolitical viability (i.e. Iran, China, Turkey, India and Arab Sunni lines), if they are part of the rational actor bell curve, have a low likelihood of undertaking programs of expansion. Actors with geopolitical viability (i.e. fundamental Islam and Russian Federation) do not have a likelihood of expansion rather than the potential of expansion, which must be determined on a case by case basis using conditional if and when statements.

Concerning Fundamental Islam: A fully transcendent identity cannot create territorial expansion only populational expansion. Therefore, fundamental Islam will not enact programs of territorial expansion into Central Asia. If and when fundamental Islam is coopted into the governing structure of one of the Central Asian neighbors they will have the ability to enact territorial expansion but will cease to have geopolitical viability. For Russia will commit the necessary resources to derail such an expansive move. Therefore, in the event that a Central Asian neighbor coopts fundamental Islam as the locomotion behind it societal structure it still will not be likely to enact programs of expansion, unless this new fundamental Islamic state is considered to be outside the rational player bell curve. It is possible that fundamental Islam will coopt directly into Central Asia. That there will be a revolution in one of the Central Asian republics and a fundamental Islamic group comes out on top. Such a case would be territorial expansion into Central Asia by fundamental Islam in a way that bypasses the issue of geopolitical viability. In this scenario, the expectation is that any further expansion past the borders of the coopted republic would not be geopolitically viable, and therefore low in likelihood.

Concerning the Russian Federation: The Russian Federation is likely to move towards territorial expansion into Central Asia if and when they feel that it is to their geopolitical advantage to do so. The Russian federation is likely to move towards geopolitical expansion if and when they feel that they are losing their geopolitical viability. Russian movement towards expansion into Central Asia is likely when they feel that their influence is declining to the point that they no longer hold a decisive advantage over the other neighbors.

D. Central Asian Frame Conclusion

According to the frame Russia is the most likely power to expand into Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan the most likely of the Central Asian Republics to look for and invite in an expanding neighbor.

Though, as stated many times, the main point here is not the answers posited rather than the construction of the frame and the example analysis given. Again, it will be reiterated that the above analysis is not the only way to view the situation. The analysis is based on many subjective readings of pieces of the puzzle. It is possible that another analyst may read the underlying components in a completely different light than viewed above. The point is not to
argue about the different subjective measures used to operationalize the frame rather than to create the frame so that it could be operationalized to begin with. Again, we quote Fargrieve, who was one of the first scholars to write about borderlands in the context of territorial expansion:

"some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but the correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that statement or view.

Chapter 5 Summary: Starting with the analysis of populations being expanded upon, which encompasses two analytical components. 1) Likelihood of an identity shift, which is solely determined by looking at the population being expanded upon, and, (2) Compatibility of offered Identity, which is determined through cross referencing the identity that the expanding power is offering, or could possibly offer, against the historical, cultural and religious leanings of the population being expanded upon. First addressed was likelihood of an identity shift, which is correlated to projected hope confidence trajectory. As discussed in chapter 3 the method being used to determine hope confidence trajectory is a legitimacy frame analysis, which is referenced against concrete/non-concrete events. The indication from this analysis (which was applied to each of the 5 Central Asian republics) is as follows: Kazakhstan is holding positive hope confidence trajectory making it the least likely to undergo an identity shift. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and, Turkmenistan are all holding negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by hard transmission of an ideological feedback loop, which means that these three republics have at any particular moment a low likelihood of undergoing an identity shift, but at any non-particular moment (over time) they have a high likelihood of undergoing an identity shift. Kyrgyzstan is holding negative hope confidence trajectory and thus more likely to undergo an identity shift.

Next the chapter addressed an analysis of compatibility of offered identities in the context of the five potential expanding powers (i.e. the neighbors to the Central Asian borderland; i.e. Turkey, Russia, Iran, Extreme Islam, Arab Sunni and China). In this analysis connection points were awarded to each potential expanding power on the basis of language, religion, shared history and memory. Also included in this analysis was the analysis of the expanding power (i.e. whether each expanding power is projecting a bordered or border transcendent identity). Points were awarded (from -2 to +2) according to the variables listed and depending on whether the variable had a negative or positive connection to the population being expanded upon. These points were then tabulated. The lower the number the less likely that the expanding power would be successful in being able to bring to market a compatible and acceptable identity. First the tabulation was done against Central Asia as a whole and then against the 5 independent Central Asian republics. If looking at Central Asia as a whole the list of expanding powers from most to least likely to be able to successfully offer a compatible identity is as follows: 1) Russia, 2) Turkey, 3) Arab Sunni, 4) Extreme Islam, 5) Iran, 6) India, and, 7) China.

Following the analysis of the populations being expanded upon (Central Asia) was a geopolitical viability analysis in the context of the seven potential expanding powers. The indication is that of these seven powers 5 do not have geopolitical viability (i.e. Turkey, Arab Sunni, Iran, India, and China) and 2 have geopolitical viability (Russian and Fundamental Islam).
VI. Chapter 6 - Application of the Frame-Ukraine

According to the above Regional Analysis Ukraine/Belorussian borderland is a two-neighbor borderland (neighbors: EU and Russian Federation) and was assessed to be (next to Mongolia) the least likely borderland to experience expansion. Here we focus on Ukraine. We start with an analysis of the populations being expanded upon, which (as noted above) has two components (1) likelihood of an identity shift, and, (2) compatibility of offered identities. We start with likelihood of an identity shift.

**Likelihood of an Identity Shift (Analysis of Populations being expanded upon)**

The current Ukrainian conflict is a function of different sectors of the population having already undergone identity shifts. Having already placed positive hope confidence in competing ideas of future societal structuring. Hope confidence has already been placed in either the Russian Federation or the EU. Therefore, the analytical point here is to determine which Ukrainian populations have placed positive hope confidence in the EU and which populations in the Russian Federation. Identifying the populations that have placed hope confidence in the Russian Federation allows deducing which populations have placed hope confidence in the EU. There are two pivot points that can be used to locate populations holding hope confidence in the Russian Federation. Many claim that primary Russian speaking populations are likely to have hope confidence in the Russian Federation. Such a view of Ukraine looks like this.

![Map of Ukraine showing language dominance](attachment:image)

Others claim that it is Ethnic Russians that are likely to have positive hope confidence in the Russian Federation. Such a view of Ukraine looks like this.
There is a stark difference between the geography covered by primary Russian speakers versus ethnic Russians. Populations of ethnic Russians are contained to less than 10% of the country with largest concentrations being in the far-east border regions with Russia (3 oblasts, Donetsk Luhansk, and Crimea), while concentrations of primary Russian speakers are contained in about 50% of the country (7 oblasts, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odessa and Crimea). The difference between the two views (whether one thinks ethnic Russians or Primary Russian speakers hold hope confidence in the Russian federation) directly affects the assessed reach of Russian soft power, and, the size of the (perceived) population who wish to see the societal structure push towards the Russian Federation. Ethnicity as the pivot point relegates likely Russian expansion to the Ukrainian/Russian Federation border areas (10% of the country and 3 oblasts), while language as the pivot relegates likelihood of Russian expansion much deeper (about 50% of the country and 7 oblasts). Below it will be argued that ethnicity is the more reliable pivot point in regards to populations who have placed positive hope confidence in movement towards the Russian Federation.

Conclusion: The populations of the Ukraine hold positive hope confidence, albeit, in different and competing versions of imagined societal structuring. Even so, the answer is still, that the populations of the Ukraine (due to the positive hope confidence) are not likely to shift away from backing either movement towards the EU or the Russian Federation. The implication is that both the EU and Russian Federation have likelihood to expand upon the portions of the populations, which have placed positive hope confidence in the respective neighbors (i.e. Russian Federation or EU).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hope Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A. Expanding Power analysis
There are two points that are discussed here; (1) Whether the expanding powers are projecting a bordered or border transcendent identity, and, (2) Compatibility of offered identities.
Expanding Power Projected Identity

Russian Federation
If the pivot point being used as a gauge is Russian ethnicity, then the Russian Federation does not necessarily have to project a border transcendent identity to accomplish amenable expansion. In fact, if marketing to primarily ethnic Russian populations it may be advantageous to project an ethnically bordered Russian identity rather than a regionally transcendent federational identity. On the other hand, if the pivot point being used is Russian language speakers, then projecting a regionally transcendent federational identity likely will be more effective. To this point, the Russian Federation can project either. The advantages of a projected federational identity versus an ethnic Russian identity are dependent on the audience being projected to (i.e. Russian speakers vs. ethnic Russians).

European Union
A union identity is always regionally transcendent, for the Union can always offer its neighbors the option to join. The European identity (as opposed to a European Union identity) has since the fall of the CCCP become a regionally transcendent identity that keeps being redefined by those populations that are offered Union membership. Brussels, on a macro scale has done a good job of conflating being European with being offered EU membership. On a micro scale, not all the classically considered European populations buy into this conflagration. One does hear micro grumbling that some of the admitted EU populations should not (outside of the technicality of being part of the EU) be considered European. Despite this, Brussels markets to interested parties that becoming part of the EU (technically) will result in becoming European. The marketing is one in which a regionally transcendent Union identity brings with it the transformation to becoming European. The EU is projecting to (non-Russian) Ukrainian populations the idea that moving towards the Union is movement towards becoming European.

A. Compatibility of Offered Identities
Compatibility of offered identities, in the context of Ukraine, is held against four sub-populations. Ethnic Russians, Russian Speakers, Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian Speakers. These groups also happen to be (in the context of Ukrainian national territory) concentrated along Eastern/Western geographic divide. Ethnic Russian and Russian speakers concentrated in the East and Ethnic Ukrainian and Ukrainian speakers in the west. Below we discuss the compatibility of EU and Russian Federation offered identities held against these 4 Ukrainian sub-populations.

Russian Federation
Russian Speakers
While all ethnic Russians can be considered primary Russian Speakers not all Russian Speakers can be considered Ethnic Russians. As displayed by the above maps there is a much larger concentration of Russian primary speakers in Ukraine than there are ethnic Russians. Russian speakers (as a group) are comprised of one or more of the other ethnicities that make up the Ukrainian population. Therefore, any Russian speaker could be Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, German, Polish, Moldavian, Romanian, Belarusian, Greek, Bulgarian, Tartar, Romani or “other.” This mix makes it very hard to judge the compatibility of any Russian Federation offered identity concerning the amalgamated group “Russian Speakers.” Therefore, the only certain positive connection area that the Russian Federation holds in the context of primary
Russian speakers is language connection. Though this language connection is easily undermined and weakened by other negative connections (i.e. religious, shared history or memory). In addition, the language connection is potentially undermined by the fact that primary Russian speakers do not necessarily speak only Russian. Many of these primary Russian speakers may in fact also speak Ukrainian. Excluding language (as it has already been established that we are talking about primary Russian speakers) let us take a cursory glance at the ethnicities that make up the category “primary Russian speaker” and the connection point categories in the context of the Russian Federation.

Jews—have a different religion than Orthodox Christianity, and a shared history and memory involving both Imperial and CCCP in which persecution is a recurring theme. \(^{319,320,321}\)

Ukrainians—may or may not be Orthodox and have a shared history and memory with the CCCP, which holds a very negative connotation. \(^{322,323,324}\)

Germans— not are likely to be orthodox, also with a likely negative perception concerning shared history and memory in regards to CCCP and Imperial Russia. \(^{325}\)

Polish—Most likely not orthodox with a likely negative perception of the shared history and memory of the CCCP. \(^{326,327}\)

Belarusians—more likely to be Orthodox and with a less negative shared history and memory concerning CCCP. \(^{328,329}\)

Moldavians—likely to be Orthodox with a likely negative perception of shared history and memory of the CCCP. \(^{330,331}\)

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\(^{330}\) Abbott, Pamela. (2007)

Greek-likely to be orthodox, here it is important to remember that their countrymen were not in the CCCP rather than being part and parcel of the opposing team (the West), as such, their view of the CCCP likely to be skewed negative.

Bulgarians-likely orthodox with a negative perception of the shared history and memory of the CCCP.³³²

Tartars-probably not orthodox with a likely negative perception of the shared history and memory of the CCCP.³³³, ³³⁴

Romani-not likely to be orthodox with a shared history and memory of the CCCP in which persecution was a recurring theme.³³⁵, ³³⁶

A cursory glance indicates a majority of the ethnicities that make up the population of primary Russian speakers have negative shared history and memory concerning the Russian Federation. Negative shared history and memory which is expected to overshadow any positive religious and language connection. The indication is that the Russian Federation will have an upward battle in marketing a compatible identity to Primary Russian speakers who are not Ethnic Russians.

Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as not having identity viability concerning primary Russian speakers.

Ethnic Russians

Among the four Ukrainian sub-populations Ethnic Russians are expected to be the group with which the Kremlin is most likely to be successful in being able to offer a compatible identity. All connection areas are expected to be positive. Russia offering a compatible identity to ethnic Russians needs no in-depth explanation. What does need mentioning is that in many ways this connection is de-facto rather than a choice. For ethnic Russians are not Asian, nor Arab. They are not Persian or Indian, and they are not European. They are different from all surrounding neighbors. As such, Ethnic Russians have very few available identity choices (other than what the Kremlin is offering or some religious conversion as an identity i.e. Muslim). Therefore, the indication is that being ethnically Russian means de facto accepting the identity projected by the Kremlin.

This de-facto relationship was tested after the fall of the Soviet Union. Would the ethnic Russian living in the different Soviet Republics (i.e. Ukraine) be accepted as national brethren who belong? The more complex answer is that result varies depending on which post-Soviet republic is being discussed. But generally, the uphill battle of ethnic Russian acceptance in the post-Soviet space is self-imposed discrimination in which Ethnic Russians living in Ukraine have

refused to view themselves as part of the Ukrainian family. “Russian resistance persists even in the general absence of exclusion on the basis of ethnicity. Why is that?” According to Chinn & Kiaser this is a result of the status of ethnic Russians going from dominant minority (during CCCP) to simple minority (post CCCP).

The question of whether Russians are European has been pondered upon for many centuries. In the 17 and 1800s the Russian aristocracy thought they were accepted by Napoleon and the French as European, this was Russian Naïveté combined with French trickery. Some argue that the Russians are European because of the even starker differences between Russians and their other neighbors (i.e. Asians, Persians, Indians and Arabs). That when viewed in this context Russians seem to be close to Europeans. Also, some argue that many Russians view themselves as being part of the European family. These points may be so. But they do not matter. In the end, what matters is whether or not Europe accepts Russians as being part of the European family, which they do not. In fact, the view here is that the Europeans also do not view the Ukrainians as part of the European family. Though in a geopolitical move, to spite the Russian Federation, they (Europe) is willing to hold their noses and look past this and accept Ukrainians as European.

Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having full identity viability in regards to Ethnic Russians. Ethnic Russians should be considered as having limited identity choices other than the Russian Federation.

Ethnic Ukrainians
The strong religious and language connections that the Russian Federation has with Ethnic Ukrainians are overshadowed by an extremely negative shared memory and history, which indicates little chance ethnic Ukrainian populations will consider any identity projected by the Russian Federation. Any push to project any type of power (identity or otherwise) onto Ukraine by the Russian Federation is likely to be perceived (by Ethnic Ukrainians) as aggression, which is likely to catalyze stronger resistance against.

Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having an absolute lack of identity compatibility concerning ethnic Ukrainians.

Primary Ukrainian speakers
Here there is a mirror situation as the above analysis with Primary Russian speakers. A situation in which all Ethnic Ukrainians can be considered Primary Ukrainian speakers, though not all Primary Ukrainian speakers can be considered ethnic Ukrainians. Therefore, the amalgamated group “Primary Ukrainian Speakers” is comprised of multiple ethnic subgroups (i.e. Bulgarian, Belorussian…etc.). Already, above, there was a cursory analysis if these ethnic subgroups and

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their projected predisposition towards accepting an identity projected by the Russian Federation. The conclusion was that all of these ethnic sub populations (excepting Ethnic Russians) are likely to be negatively predisposed towards a Kremlin projected identity.

Conclusion: The Russian Federation should be considered as having no identity compatibility concerning primary the Primary Ukrainian speaking populations.

Russian Federation identity viability tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Russians</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Russian Speakers</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Ukrainian Speakers</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No identity Viability (-)
Identity Viability (+)

The conclusion is only 1 (Ethnic Russians) out of the 4 Ukrainian sub-populations holds identity compatibility towards a Kremlin projected identity. If only ethnic Russians have identity compatibility with a Kremlin projected identity then the implication is that only those areas heavily populated by Ethnic Russians are likely to place positive hope confidence in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the implication is that the maximum amount of territory of the Ukraine that could potentially wish to see Russian expansion plateaus at about 10%, or, the three border oblasts of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk.

European Union

Primary Russian Speakers
As stated above primary Russian Speakers do not necessarily only speak Russian, chances are that they speak more than one language. Said second language can bridge the language differences with the EU. Also, the EU unlike the Russian Federation does not have an overarching and official language, rather than having a myriad of nation state languages. As far as shared history and memory the assumption here is that a majority of the groups that make up primary Russian speakers in Ukraine do not have an intimate experience with the European Union. Some of these groups can draw from the EU experience of their homeland countrymen. Germans, Polish, Greeks and Bulgarians who all have homelands that are part of the European Union, and thus are (for the most part) assumed to have a positive shared history and memory, at least positive enough that their countrymen amenably ascended into the EU. Moldova is at the moment in ascension talks. Hence the assumption is that they also have a positive enough shared memory history and memory to want to be amenably expanded upon by the EU. Tartars and Belarusians here are considered to not have intimate shared history or memory concerning the EU, and so can be considered to be neutrally disposed. Of all of the groups that make up the Primary Russian speakers, only the Romani can be considered to have a negative shared history and memory concerning the EU, this due to their living on the fringes of society and feelings of being “othered” and persecuted. Though, this negative shared history and memory is not specific to the EU. The Romani people have negative shared history and memory in the context of all the
places in which their brethren live. Therefore, Romani negative shared history and memory should be viewed in a relative way. When Romani negative memory and shared history is held in a relative view it becomes less negative as compared to the shared memory and history with the CCCP.

Conclusion: It is hard to judge how much being primary Russian speakers affects the population’s attitude towards the EU. Therefore, the claim is that the EU has the potential (rather than likelihood) of identity viability concerning primary Russian speakers.

Ethnic Russians

Among the four Ukrainian sub-populations Ethnic Russians are expected to be the group with which the EU is least likely to have identity viability. Europe has (at least since the end of WWII) defined itself through an othering opposition towards Russia. An “othering” of a population precludes identity compatibility. Aside from the language divide Russians have a shared history and memory in which Europe (and the larger Western world) were enemies on the verge of ushering in a post-apocalyptic world. Even if ethnic Russians were open to accepting a European identity (which they are not) it is inconceivable that Europe would offer.

Conclusion: The EU has no identity viability among ethnic Russian populations.

Primary Ukrainian Speakers

The analysis of Primary Ukrainian speakers is very close to that of primary Russian speakers. The differences being that the primary Ukrainian speakers are missing the primary Russian language connection with the Russian Federation. The lack of this connection takes away one main mechanism through which the Russian Federation attempts to undermine EU attempts to market an acceptable offered identity. The lack of this mechanism means that the EU is in an advantageous position marketing an acceptable and compatibility identity to primary Ukrainian speakers.

Conclusion: A Majority of the groups that make up the primary Ukrainian speakers are considered to have a positive disposition towards the EU in context of shared memory and history. As such, the EU is considered as having identity viability concerning Primary Ukrainian speakers.

Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians do not have an intimate shared history and memory with the EU, though they have a very intimate and negative shared history and memory concerning the Russian Federation. Here it is proffered that the negative CCCP experience is a main contributing factor as to why ethnic Ukrainians have placed positive hope confidence in the EU. Pushing towards the EU is viewed as moving away from the Russian Federation. Moving away from the Russian Federation is seen as putting behind traumatic times in which the CCCP attempted to destroy the Ukrainian culture, a time in which the Ukrainian people suffered genocide and persecution. Ethnic Ukrainians have already decided that the EU can offer a compatible identity. The question becomes whether the EU deems Ukrainians as being compatible. Or, is the EU pushing towards integration with Ukraine simply to spite Russia. Is the EU playing the Ukrainians the way that they have been playing the Turks? Are they pushing the idea of integration on a population that
they know is not compatible? Pushing the idea of integration so as to take advantage of the ethnic Ukrainians willing naiveté? The fact that ethnic Ukrainians have placed positive hope confidence in moving towards the EU indicates that there is (at the very least) half positive identity compatibility. Whether the EU chooses to fully exercise this compatibility is a question that at this point in time cannot be answered.

Conclusion: The EU should be considered as holding identity viability concerning ethnic Ukrainians

EU identity viability tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Russians</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Russian Speakers</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Ukrainian Speakers</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No identity Viability (-)
Identity Viability (+)
Neutral identity viability (=)

The overall conclusion concerning identity viability and Ukraine is that the Russian Federation is considered to hold positive identity viability in only 1 (Ethnic Russians) out of 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations. On the other hand, the EU is considered to hold positive identity viability with 2 (Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian Speakers) out of 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations, also the EU holds neutral identity viability with 1 (primary Russian speakers) out of 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations, while holding negative identity viability with only 1 (ethnic Russians) of the 4 of the identified Ukrainian sub-populations. An important note to remember is that a precursor to having positive hope confidence in an identity is having positive identity viability. Negative identity viability precludes the ability to hold positive hope confidence in a projected identity narrative. Therefore, the overall take away is that Ukrainian hope confidence divide between the EU and RF is not the often claimed 50/50 east/west split. Instead it is closer to 90/10 divide in favor of the EU. A divide in which EU identity reach spans almost the whole of Ukraine and the Russian Federation identity reach is contained to 3 oblasts to the far east, one of which (Crimea) has already been annexed.

B. Geopolitical Viability
Russia is viewed as having geopolitical viability concerning Ukraine. This geopolitical viability is connected to the direction that the borderland has been shrinking over the past decades, which (as discussed above) is connected to sensitivity to possibility of a neighbor’s expansion to contiguity. As an actor expands it gains a buffer against rival neighbors, with this buffer comes a lessened sensitivity to expansive moves of any rival geopolitical power. Actors are not so sensitive to rivals expanding to contiguity to with a buffer zone than they are to rivals expanding towards contiguity with the homeland. As an actor gains a buffer zone they become less likely to be willing to commit the necessary resources to stop expansive moves of any rival geopolitical rival. On the other hand, loss of buffer zone space leads to increased sensitivity to expansion of any geopolitical rival. As a rival’s expansion continues the closer to reaching contiguity with the
homeland this rival becomes. As proximity to contiguity increases so does sensitivity to further expansion. As sensitivity increases so does the likelihood of being willing to commit necessary resources to stop this rival’s expansion.

When this rule of sensitivity is applied to the borderland between Russia and Europe one can see that Europe has made great strides in expansion. The borderland between Russian and Europe has been shrinking almost exclusively eastward towards reaching contiguity with the Russian Federation. Europe has gained great swaths of buffer against Russia, while Russia has lost great swaths of buffer to the EU. Therefore, Russia is (at this point) much more sensitive to further EU expansion than the EU is to potential Russian expansion. Added to this is that any further EU expansion (into Ukraine or Belorussia) will be to contiguity with the Russian Federation, which as noted is something that rival neighbors want to avoid (at almost any cost). The indication is that Russia has a high likelihood of being willing to commit necessary resources to stop any further EU expansion, while the EU is not likely to be willing to commit (at almost any cost) the necessary resources to stop potential Russian expansion.

Putin has already amenably expanded into Crimea. The frame posits that this expansion could have happened under two circumstances: 1) Putin and Russia are rational actors that enacted this expansion perceiving that they had geopolitical viability to do so, or, 2) Putin and Russia were an irrational or cornered rational actor who expanded into Crimea under no-geopolitical viability. The view here is that Putin and Russia are not irrational or cornered, which leaves only the view that Putin is a rational actor who expanded onto Crimea under perceived geopolitical viability. He did not perceive that the balance of power contained any actor (or coalition of actors) who had the will and capability to necessarily render the move a losing one. There are many actors who are currently, through sanctions, trying to raise the associated costs of the Crimean annexation. The jury is still out as to whether they will be able to push the cost of the annexation of Crimea past the threshold of being worth it. Though the outcome is not the important part, the important part is Putin’s perception of the balance of power concerning geopolitical viability at the time of Crimean expansion.

Following the frame and its rule of sensitivity concerning the direction that the borderland has been shrinking indicates that that Putin has, and, perceives having geopolitical viability concerning further expansion into the Ukraine. The implication is that Putin’s perception of the international balance of power is that there is no actor or coalition of actors that have both the will and capability to commit the necessary resources to necessarily render further Russian expansion into the Ukraine a losing move.

As noted geopolitical viability does not project a likelihood of expansion rather than potential of expansion that must be judged on a case by case basis using conditional if and when statements. Here the view is that the potential for Russian expansion into Ukraine is inexorably connected to further EU expansion and the potential of Ukrainian NATO membership. If and when Ukraine becomes part of the EU or NATO two things happen: 1) Russian geopolitical viability concerning Ukraine shifts to no geopolitical viability, and, 2) Europe will have expanded to contiguity with the Russian Federation. These are two things that Russia will (at almost any cost) prevent from happening. Therefore, there is a threshold of movement towards economic integration with the EU and talks of NATO membership that once past will trigger Putin to
expand into the Ukraine. If the goal of NATO and the EU is to induce Russian expansion into Ukraine then they will continue to push towards EU integration and NATO membership. If their goal is to lessen likelihood of Russian expansion into Ukraine then they will lessen such integrative conversations.

In fact, there is a very strong argument to be made that the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was precipitated from NATO pushing strongly towards admitting Georgia. 342 Russian President Dimitry Medvedev recently said in an interview (essentially) that Russia is ready, able and willing to commit all necessary resources and take any action to derail any potential admittance of Georgian membership to NATO. 343

Conclusion: Russia currently has geopolitical viability concerning Ukraine. The if and when mechanism which pushes the potential of Russian expansion to a likelihood is further EU and NATO pressure towards Ukrainian integration. Lastly, it is the belief here that it is the EU and NATO that are responsible provoking the current Ukraine crisis, and, who have the ability to push the conflict further or bring about de-escalation. Both outcomes are directly related to whether or not the EU and NATO continue to push for integration/admittance of Ukraine. See Mearsheimer (2014) for a detailed argument as to why he agrees that the current Ukrainian crisis is almost completely the fault of the west and their “liberal delusions,” and that the outcome of this crisis hinges on freeing themselves from said delusions. 344

C. Ukraine Conclusion

Identity Viability
The EU has identity viability with three out of four of the identified subpopulations, while the Russian Federation has identity viability with only one of four. Furthermore, the geographic breakdown of these sub-populations suggest that EU identity viability covers roughly 90% of the Ukrainian geography, while the Russian Federations identity viability only about 10%, which is located along the Russian/Ukrainian border. The take away is that the commonly cited 50/50 east/west divide is an inaccurate reading of the situation. An accurate reading of the situation is a far east/western divide, a 90/10 divide in favor of the EU. If judged on identity viability alone the EU would be considered in a superior position with a larger likelihood of enacting deep territorial expansion. Unfortunately for the EU, Identity viability is not the only factor that must be considered.

Geopolitical Viability
The EU does not have geopolitical viability. This means that if one considers the EU to be a rational actor then there is minimal likelihood that they will seriously engage with the idea of expansion into Ukraine. If one considers the EU to be an irrational or cornered rational actor,

then there is at least some likelihood that they might push towards territorial expansion. The view here is that the EU is a rational actor therefore the projection is that they will not seriously engage the idea of territorial expansion. The same holds true for Ukrainian NATO membership. The expectation is also that the EU will mess with the Russian Federation by putting on a show of seriously engaging with the idea of Ukrainian integration and NATO membership with the goal of keeping the Russian Federation off kilter. This is a dangerous move that can quickly backfire and push Putin to invade.

The Russian Federation has geopolitical viability. As noted above geopolitical viability does not affect likelihood of territorial expansion rather than making it a possibility. What affects the likelihood of expansion when there is geopolitical are if and when statements. If and when Putin believes that Russia is close to losing geopolitical viability due to steps towards Ukrainian integration into the EU or NATO membership then Russian expansion becomes more likely.

The Ukrainian borderland is a (relatively small) two-neighbor borderland, which means (according to expected behavior of proximate faultlines) there is, from the get go, a lowered likelihood of either EU or RF expanding past perspective border regions. There is an even lowered likelihood that the EU will seriously attempt (past theatrical gestures to keep the Russian Federation off kilter) territorial expansion since the EU does not hold geopolitical viability. On the other hand, the Russian federation holds geopolitical viability which means that there is a heightened likelihood of Putin moving towards expansion, especially in areas in which he holds identity viability (Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea), for this would mean amenable expansion (rather than forcible) and amenable expansion holds low associated costs (compared to forcible). The likelihood of any expansion by Putin (either amenable into Luhansk, Donetsk or Crimea or forcible deeper expansion) is directly related to how strongly the EU (or NATO) theatrically or seriously engages Ukraine in integration talks and deals.

These talks and deals will bring Putin to expand, first amenably, in geographic areas where he holds identity viability. If this amenable expansion puts an end to EU (and NATO) integrative movement then Putin will not expand further. If the EU (or NATO) continues Putin will then expand more, forcibly if necessary. For the Russian Federation knows that now they hold the advantage, that no actor or coalition of actors has the will or resources to necessarily make an expansive move a losing move. Putin understands that the political and societal structuring of the West does not facilitate the ability to outright confront Russia in Ukraine. He also knows that this dynamic will shift when EU/Ukrainian integration is fully underway or when Ukraine becomes part of NATO. Putin will commit to a full-scale invasion before he lets this happen. For this would mean the European fault line has pushed to contiguity, which is something that should be avoided at any costs.

Chapter 6 Summary: This chapter turned the frame of expansion to Ukraine. The departure point was an analysis of the populations being expanded upon and the likelihood of an identity shift as determined by hope confidence. The populations in Ukraine have already undergone identity shifts. Different sectors of the population (ethnic Russians versus the rest of the population) have already placed positive hope confidence in opposing forces (Russian Federation versus EU) that push competing ideas of future societal structuring. Populations that have placed positive hope confidence in the EU are not likely to shift away from pushing society towards the EU until they
(EU) are perceived to have failed in creating a safer, more secure and economically abundant future. At such a time, the population will shift towards actively looking for a new vehicle to place positive hope confidence. The same is not exactly true for Ethnic Russians and hope confidence placed in the Kremlin, this because of the de-facto nature of the Ethnic Russian identity relationship with Russia and the surrounding cultures (see pg. 93).

The populations of the Ukraine should be considered as having positive hope confidence. Though as noted above positive hope confidence can at times translate into a lowered likelihood of being expanded upon and at times result in a raised likelihood. The differentiating factor is whether positive hope confidence is placed in a domestic actor (as in Kazakhstan) or in external actors (as with Ukraine). When hope confidence is placed in external actors the likelihood of expansion is raised. While hope confidence placed in domestic actors lowers this likelihood. Ukrainian populations have placed positive hope confidence in powers that are external to the nation state (EU and Russian Federation). Therefore, these external powers have a raised likelihood of undertaking expansion. As such, positive hope confidence in the case of Ukraine raises the likelihood that they will be expanded upon (opposite that of Kazakh positive hope confidence).

Concerning geopolitical viability and Ukraine; the Russian Federation holds geopolitical viability and the EU does not. The EU has a low likelihood of expansion, unless one deems that the EU is an irrational or cornered rational actor. As noted, holding geopolitical viability does not project a likelihood of expansion rather than the potential of expansion. To assess when potential becomes likelihood one must apply conditional of and when statements. The conditional if and when statement used in this case is: If and when Putin believes that Russia is close to losing geopolitical viability due to steps towards Ukrainian integration into the EU or NATO membership expansive potential becomes an expansive likelihood.

Concerning compatibility of offered identities: Here we parsed the population of Ukraine parsed into sub-populations: 1) Ethnic Russians, 2) Primary Russian Speakers, 3) Ethnic Ukrainians, and, 4) Primary Ukrainian Speakers. These four populations were analyzed for compatibility of offered identity in the context of the Russian Federation and the EU. The indication projected was that the EU has a likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity to 2 of these subpopulations (i.e. Ethnic Ukrainians and Primary Ukrainian Speakers) they have the potential (as opposed to likelihood) of projecting a compatible identity to 1 of the subpopulations (i.e. Primary Russian Speakers), and negative likelihood of projecting a compatible identity to 1 of the subpopulations (i.e. Ethnic Russians). On the other hand, the Russian Federation has a positive likelihood of offering a compatible identity to only 1 subpopulation (Ethnic Russians) and a negative likelihood of offering a compatible identity to the remaining 3 (Ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian Speakers, and, Primary Russian Speakers). When held against a map showing the locations of these subpopulations the indication is that the EU holds positive identity viability in at least 50% of Ukraine (west), neutral identity viability between the western 40% of the country, and, negative identity viability in the far east (10%) of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian Federation holds positive likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity only in the far east (10%) of the country. In the rest of Ukraine (90%) the Russian federation holds negative likelihood of being able to offer a compatible identity.
The indication of likely territorial expansion into Ukraine comes down to geopolitical viability, which in this case trumps all other aspects of the frame. Even though the EU has a larger base of support among the population, and even though they are likely to be able to market a compatible identity to 3 of the analyzed sub-populations against Russia’s 1, this does make the EU likely to expand into Ukraine. The fact that the EU does not hold geopolitical viability is a good indication that, despite the advantages it holds concerning the other factors, there is a low likelihood that they will expand. They will not expand because they perceive that Russia will necessarily commit the necessary resources to raise the associated costs past the threshold that they (EU) are willing to pay for Ukrainian expansion. On the other hand, Russia holds geopolitical viability, which means that if and when Putin perceives that the EU (or NATO) is making gains towards integration the Russian Federation will enact more territorial expansion. If there is expansion into Ukraine the most likely scenario is Russian Federation amenable expansion along the border regions where there is a concentration of ethnic Russians. Though, this expansion is only likely if the EU and NATO continue to press their integrative agenda. Though, this expansion is also not probable. For it is not likely that the EU or NATO will push seriously their integrative gestures with the Ukraine. For the EU (and NATO) understand that integrative moves aimed at Ukraine raises the likelihood of further Russian expansion that they (EU/NATO) are not able/willing to commit to stop. The best-case scenario for EU/NATO is an independent Ukraine that will be more under Russian influence than European. For Russia, this is also the premier option. Both sides understand this, and aside from theatrical political gestures and grandstanding, both are likely to accept such a tacit agreement.

Additionally, it is useful to look more in depth at Russian projects of soft power identity projection into Ukraine, and the extent to which they (Russia) have been successful. The decision has been made to place this topic in the annexes so as to avoid interruption of the flow of the main text and to prevent distraction of the reader. More information about Russian identity projection into Ukraine can be found in Annex 4.

VII. Chapter 7 – Conclusion
The point of this research was to build and give a sample application of a frame capable of projecting the likelihood of territorial expansion. The frame deals with territorial expansion differently than it has customarily been dealt with by past studies, theories and frames. The past analytical approach has two issues retarding the depth and breadth of understanding that can be achieved concerning territorial expansion.

1) In the past territorial expansion has been parsed into related, yet still, analytically incompatible phenomenon (i.e. forcible and amenable).

2) In the past territorial expansion has been approached by focusing on the mechanisms that drive an actor to feel the want/need to territorially expand.

The analytical approach of the past leads a number of issues:

Concerning point 1: Academia has created de facto analytically incompatible amenable and forcible status quo. This parsed status quo has led to massive compartmentalization and creation
of intellectual, disciplinary and paradigmatic walls, which have allowed amenable expansion to (traditionally) be claimed by economics and forcible by political science. The problem is not in claiming that one type of expansion is better understood by one discipline over another. The problem is that a status quo that assumes amenable and forcible analytical compatibility precludes the possibility that there might be an approach in which compatibility can be achieved, which precludes the construction of a single rubric that can account for both. This creates an impossibility of being able to gain a deeper and wider understanding of territorial expansion as a whole, which severely limits the ability to project the likelihood of territorial expansion coming to pass. Such a deficit negatively affects the ability to construct adaptive and forward thinking foreign policy concerning territorial expansion and shifting borders. The remedy to this problem is a starting point assumption that amenable and forcible are analytically compatible, which has allowed for the construction of a single rubric accounting for amenable and forcible. The result is a deeper and wider window of understanding that can be used to better predict the likelihood of shifting borders and therefore create more apt foreign policy.

Concerning point 2: Historically the approach taken when dealing with territorial expansion has been focused towards explaining the reasons and mechanisms driving an actor’s want/perceived need to territorially expand. This approach leads to narrow tailor-made frames only applicable to specific actors in specific situations at specific times. Additionally, such an approach is intellectually disadvantageous because it claims the preeminence of the mechanisms behind want/perceived need. This is a mistake. Want/perceived are factors but not the preeminent factors concerning whether territorial expansion will transpire. Sitting preeminently are the circumstances of the board of play that dictate whether said expansion is more or less likely. For it does not matter whether an actor has both want and need to expand if the circumstances of the game does allow for the expansive move to be made.

Historically studies of expansion have churned out narrowly specific frames incapable of accounting for both amenable and forcible expansion, while we aimed towards amenable and forcible expansion to be accounted under a single rubric with applicability across regions, time periods and situational peculiarities anchored to specific actors. Such a frame will be a boon to authors of foreign policy when dealing with creating action plans concerning potential shifting borders in the future.

The claim being levied is that the rubric laid out here is superior and more actionable (from a foreign policy perspective) than the way in which territorial expansion has been analyzed and dealt with in the past.

Final Thoughts
The goal was to create a tool with which to judge and create foreign policy in the face of potential shifting borders. This goal was achieved through an exercise in theory building and fashioning new theoretical pivot points towards construction and example application of a frame that accounts for both amenable and forcible expansion. To the best of my knowledge no one else has attempted such an undertaking. In any theory (even more so when dealing with new young theory) if one looks hard enough they will find contradictions and behavior that is
unexpected (according to the theory). This should not be looked as a negative. Rather, it should be viewed as a positive. For good theory will at once bridge the limits of our understanding while also highlighting previously unseen contradictions. It is through bridging these newly highlighted analytical contradictions that we are enabled to reach an even deeper understanding of the world that we inhabit.

The point of this work was to design and demonstrate the usage of a frame that analyzes likelihood of expansion. This has been achieved! Some (even many) might not believe that it can accurately predict expansion, though this would only be a belief, for time and further application of the frame by others will be the judge as to whether this belief is correct, whether the frame is capable of being used to make apt predictions. The point was not to test the frame. The point of this work was to create the frame in a way that it can be taken and applied to different actors, situations, regions and circumstances. It is a design in which each individual user can tailor the expanding power, region and populations being expanded to their area of interest. Overall, here we skewed to using macro identities, though it is dealer’s choice on what identities to connect for analysis. As such, potentially the frame of expansion can be applied in an infinite number of ways to predict expansion in almost any setting. A few of the possibilities that strike interest here are: political party affiliation, tribes and gangs to name a few. It is our hope that the frame will be, if not accepted, at least given enough interest so as to encourage others to engage with it and try it for themselves.

Lastly, we mention and address expected criticism of the frame.

1) The expectation is that some (possibly many) will write this endeavor off as an unsubstantiated “exercise in imagination.” When we say unsubstantiated we are referring to the expected criticism about places in the paper that have sparse academic sighting. This is because much of the frame is built on brand new theoretical pivot points. It is not an uncommon phenomenon that brand-new things will be sparse in the context of being able to find a litany of people who have commented and written on the newly minted subject. If there were such a litany of citations then it would not be brand new. To the extent that was possible, I tried to mention and cite studies and academics who wrote about similar and backing issues that are related to these new theoretical pivot points. To this being an “exercise in imagination”, well, it absolutely is! Without exercising the imagination we would never come up with new ideas or theories and the world (and our knowledge about it) would remain static.

2) The frame is too subjective. Two analysts could potentially use the same points of analysis and come out with opposing projections. The frame is built around subjective analytical points because we are analyzing the relationships between people, identity, culture, history, societal emotions and memory. These things are subjective variables. People understand and relate to them in different ways depending on their own experiences and biases. Trying to take subjectivity out of things that are inherently subjective would prevent the points from functioning to operationalize the understanding being sought. Subjectivity can be removed but only through basing the frame on non-subjective variables, which would mean a return to cold war materialist political theory in which it was sufficient to analyze the balance of power by counting tanks and jets etc.
Subjectivity is part and parcel of trying to read identity compatibility and of historical comparison. History itself is a subjective retelling based on the whims of how the winner has written it. Historical fact is an oxymoron. The only fact is that one version of an event has gained predominance over other versions. The only fact is that there is no way to tell what truly transpired unless one witnesses the event personally, and even then, witnessing itself can be skewed and incorrect as to what happened. Witnesses frequently claim to have personally seen different versions of the same event. Geopolitics is also subjective based on one actor’s perception of another actor’s power and ability. Identity is also a subjective decision to identify as this or that, or, reject this or that identity. The point is that the subjectivity of the frame is unavoidable when considering the variables being used and comparisons being made.

Lastly, it should again be noted that the point was not to argue over the reading of subjective points rather than to construct the frame and give an example of the way it functions. That is, to showcase a new tool and let each analyst use their personal subjective understanding of the variables involved. Again, I go back to the quote from Fairgrieve:

“some things may not present themselves in the same light as they do to the author, but the correctness of the thesis as a whole does not depend on the accuracy of this or that statement or view.”

3) It is also expected that criticism will be leveled at the fact that there is no endeavor to explain territorial expansion rather than focusing on the circumstances that make expansion more or less likely. To this we ask why do we always have to try and explain something? Is an explanation more valuable than an analysis of likelihood? I think not. In fact, one might argue that an explanation of something is less valuable if it does not lead to the ability to make some sort of applicable prediction. So what if I understand something but that understanding does not lead to any practical applications. Practical applications will come from the ability to use the knowledge to predict the way in which something functions in the real world.

If the same question is reversed we get a different answer. So what if I can analyze the likelihood of one outcome over another but cannot explain the mechanisms behind the object of prediction, in this case the so what is that predictions can be made. Being able to predict has an intrinsic value that is not necessarily predicated on being able to explain. In this regard, it seems short sighted to call it “questionable” to attempt to develop a frame of prediction in isolation from trying to develop a frame aimed at understanding. Some (many might) question if it is possible to be able to predict without being able to explain. The answer is yes; it is possible to identify what are the factors that make something more or less likely without explaining the interworking of the phenomenon itself.
Following the bibliography are several annexes with related information and topics. This information and topics were purposefully left out of the main text so as not to confuse the reader or lose focus on the main goal of development and sample application of the frame.

The End!

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Annex 1
Mechanisms of Hope Confidence Control and Authoritarian Stability

Much literature theorizes over the mechanisms behind the ability of the authoritarian to push the societal structure into Authoritarian stability. Some example mechanisms: The weakness of civil society\textsuperscript{345, 346} redistribution of wealth, cronyism and economic liberalization;\textsuperscript{347} Arab culture,\textsuperscript{348, 349} the monarchial system,\textsuperscript{350-352} division and manipulation of opposition forces,\textsuperscript{353-355} political institutions, parties and electoral laws, which Brownlee (2007),\textsuperscript{356} Pousney (2002)\textsuperscript{357} and Blaydes (2011)\textsuperscript{358} claim to be the primary mechanism through which “authoritarian” stability is reached. The perception here is that all of the above mechanisms may be used to reach authoritarian stability but play a supporting/secondary role to leveraging popualtional perception of movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future (i.e. manipulation of hope confidence).

The sitting authoritarian is only secondarily interested in his citizenry believing that the societal structure will create positive movement towards a safer, more secure and economically abundant future. To the sitting authoritarian the primary concern is to create the perception of imminent negative movement away from a safer, more secure and economically abundant future and that this negative movement is being held at bay by the strength and resolve of the ruling party. That neutral movement is all one can hope for, that the citizenry should be happy with neutral movement, as it (neutral movement) is not the imminently close negative movement. Every day of neutral movement should bring respect for the authoritarian, as it is another day the apparatus has succeeded in abating bedlam.

Under such a regime the most intense official implication to the citizenry should be that “it is unclear whether the current system will usher in a better life. On the other hand, it is perfectly

clear that a life without the current societal structure will breed death and destruction, brought upon by any one of the many economic, physical and cultural threats emanating from a regime cultivated and constructed group of "others." The strategy is creation of a fear appeal (and hopefully) "moral panic" through convincing the population that self-preservation is under imminent threat. Whether it is better served to appeal to physical or societal self-preservation (or both) is dependent on the stability level of the authoritarian, circumstances of the societal structure, present populational psyche, and, the precise goal to which this appeal is being fostered.

For the citizenry, the intended take-away is that the Authoritarian structure is the only protection against sophisticated, and evolving threats to self-preservation. This line if accepted and internalized will yield support for more aggressive and militaristic force, leading to ever constricting internal security measures. Each step of acceptance of the Authoritarian regime (even tacit) increases the likelihood of a next step.

Inglehart and Baker (2000) claim the slide into authoritarianism can be understood as a coping mechanism adopted when individuals doubt their ability to provide themselves and their families with the necessities of survival and inclusion. A coping mechanism is one way to look at it. Though it is much more fruitful to understand it as a program of manipulation of hope confidence to pressure the citizenry into a submissive position. From a submissive position, there is no ability to dare to hope for anything different.

Authoritarian stability is reached by controlling hope confidence. Hope confidence is corralled only when both perceived physical safety and security, and, economic outlook is commanded. If only one of the two is controlled the population should not be considered fully submissive. Populations not in full submission will have regular flashes of collective resistance. Populations in full submission, in the short to near term, have an extremely low likelihood of collective action threatening the authoritarian structure- "authoritarian stability." Populational submission is reached by leveraging a stable non-excessive level of populational hunger, humiliation and fear against hope confidence. There is a threshold of hunger and humiliation that when crossed sees the "good enough" life dissolve and a neutral population pushed negative.

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367 The treaty of Versailles placed an excessive amount of hunger and humiliation on the German citizenry. Stabilizing Populational hunger and humiliation was step 1 for Hitler, and what powered his starting momentum.
From neutral tactically timed positive or negative hope confidence shifts are used to corral and direct the population into processual sanctioning an increasing institutionalization of authoritarianism. Periods of positive and negative movement should not be excessive in intensity or length (too intense of an episode will cause the population get away from the handler and become unpredictable, too long an episode potentially gives alternative conceptions of the societal structure a chance to gain a foothold). The Game is to keep the population in neutral, in a “good enough life,” and to constantly redefine what the “good enough life” looks like by leveraging fear appeals against the ability to sustain that “good enough” life. Periodic (controlled) hope confidence vents residual energy that could be used in opposition and shifts the focus of the societal attention spaces to where the authoritarian wants the focus to be.

ANNEX 2

GREAT GAME OF CENTRAL ASIA
(OLD VERSUS NEW)

Above it was determined that Central Asia is a multi-neighbor borderland that is the most likely (of identified borderlands) to experience territorial expansion. “Central Asia is one of the most important regions of the world, given its impact on the politics and economics of the great powers,” it “is once more a key to the security of all Eurasia” as it “forms a buffer zone between great powers.” Duarte (2012) claims, “Whoever controls this space {Central Asia} will dominate the world.”

The two major players in the previous (19th century) iteration were British and Russian imperial powers. In this (19th century version) the “indigenous populations, local rulers and subjects {were} treated as subservient to the aims of these powers.” Imperial players are no more, replaced by the more numerous national players. Changing rules of the Game have allowed for regional nation state level actors to play. Five new states in Central Asia seek to “define their roles in their regions and the world.” New Central Asian nation states, “who are not ‘not cipher states’, and thus play the Game for their own advantage and for their own motives and interests”. In addition to these new regional state actors there are also supra state players (i.e. NATO, UN, OSCE etc.) as well as sub and proto state actors (i.e. multinational companies and corporations, NGO’s, terrorist and criminal organizations to name a few.) The last iteration was a “Game of high politics—a Game of colonization and military contest between the two empires {...} the New Great Game has nothing to do with high politics of the two imperialist powers. The New Great Game {...} pertains to low politics. It is about creating niches of influences in Central Asia by neighboring countries.” The last iteration of the Central Asian “Great Game” is widely accepted to have had 3 main phases.

373 Ibid
The first phase was Imperial Russian expansion into Central Asia (late 18th-early 19th century), which was particularly alarming to the British East India Company. The company successfully manipulated and folded a private venture worry into British Imperial safety, security and foreign/colonial policy, which resulted in a framework of divide and conquer that relied on secret agents manipulating local tribes and peoples. Following this, Wilham (mimicking British tactics of conquest) undertook German expansion with the aim of control of India. Then Bolshevik expansion “by means of armed uprisings, to liberate the whole of Asia from imperialist domination.” The Game ended with the Soviet hegemonic control over the Central Asian borderlands. The Soviets did not only end the Central Asian “Great Game” but also reigned supreme in the last Eastern European, Baltic and Caucus iterations. The Soviets enveloped and closed these borderlands to contiguity with neighboring fault lines. The fracturing of the CCCP opened these borderlands and began new iterations of these 3 games. The new Eastern European iteration has already concluded with the EU reigning supreme. The Baltic iteration is also essentially finished, with the EU coming out on top. New Central Asian and Caucus iterations are still in play. As mentioned, tactics, number of players, types of players and geographical location may change but the fundamental driving force behind shrinking borderlands does not. Let us compare the last iteration of the Central Asian “Great Game” with the new.

“For centuries, Central Asia has been the crossroads of Eurasia. Indeed, it is the point of confluence of four civilizations that have, concurrently, controlled and been controlled by the Central Asian peoples.”

The New Game is two-leveled. The primary level, the international level, is where governments, proto state and supra state organizations (i.e. NATO, UN OSCE etc.) operate. Rumer (1993) claims that the primary level is directly linked to competition between the major powers in Central Asia. The secondary level is the operating level of sub state actors (i.e. multinational companies and corporations, NGO’s, terrorist and criminal organizations etc.). In the last iteration governments dominated the primary level with supra-state government organizations holding less sway. The new iteration has seen supra-state government organizations multiply in number and power. In the last iteration, the undercurrent of the secondary level was infinitely less than it is now. Though, the new version allows sub-state actors the ability to substantially affect the outcome of the primary level. It can be argued that in the new iteration the secondary level of the Game has become as (if not more) important than the primary level.

In the last iteration, there were (essentially) two major players (Imperial Russia and England) who held the same goal; i.e., gaining hegemonic control of the borderland before their opponent. The new iteration is a web of different types of players with a numerous variety of aims. At the state actor level: “the establishment of a form of neo-imperialist hegemony, the formation of cultural allegiances and influence and the promotion of state security concerns.” At the non-

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376 Hopkirk, Peter. (2002), pg. 61
377 The closing of the Eastern European borderland has created a new borderland Ukraine/Belorussia.
378 A historical look suggests that geographic location changes much less frequently than players, number of players, types of players, rules and tactics.
379 Duarte, Paulo. (2012), pg. 7
380 Rumer, Boris Z. (1993), pg. 89.
381 Edwards, Matthew. (2003), pg. 89
state actor level: “maximization of profits, securing of contracts and dominant shares in consortia and the securing of local influence and politico-religious aims.”

Secret operatives at the edge of supervision and control waged the last game, where military force was used as an occasional accessory to buttress hegemonic control. In the New Great Game the overt use of military force is more restrained in the degree to which it can be used without justification. The populations over which the last iteration was played were not protected by the prevailing imperial status quo. They were treated as nothing but proxies. Changing and dissolution of state borders, as well as open manipulation and control, were permitted and accepted tactics. Imperial rules do not apply to the new iteration as there are now implemented protections enshrined in the accepted norms of international laws of national border integrity and sovereignty. The implication is that in the new Game “states cannot be violated, controlled, dissolved or destroyed in a manner similar to the past.”

Central Asia is once again an open multi-neighbor borderland caught in a reoccurring spiral of territorial expansion to contiguity, and the inevitable withdrawal. Since the last inevitable withdrawal (of CCCP hegemony) there has been little movement of the neighboring faultlines. Meyer and Brysac describe Central Asia as:

"Six new republics, predominantly Islamic but vibrantly distinct, are grouped around the Caspian Sea, the current landlords of untapped oil and natural gas reserves that rival those in the Persian Gulf. Pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiums, and contracts are the prizes of the New Great Game. India and China, each with exponentially growing energy needs, are vying for access, along with Russians, Europeans, and Americans. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have their own political, economic, and cultural interests in the former Soviet republics, where slumbering rivalries have abruptly awakened among Azeris, Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and other long-subject peoples ... it is a bloody muddle, made worse as before by outsiders."

The shape and tenor of this muddle is the result of number of factors: (1) legitimizing frames, (2) players, (3) levels of play, (4) fields of play, and, (5) board of play.

Legitimizing Frames
The legitimacy frame deployed tells what kind of hope confidence movement is expected, susceptibility to “external pressure,” likelihood that the regime will be repressive, likelihood of experiencing stretches of isolation and clues into who (if any) are the other important external players.

Players
Players can be divided into inside versus outside.
Inside players operate inside the board of play and outside players operate from outside the board of play. In this analysis, in the context of the Central Asian borderland, inside players are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All other players are outside players.

Outside players can be divided into neighboring (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, India and Pakistan) and a non-neighboring (US and EU). Outside players can be further distinguished into major (i.e. US, China and Russia), middleweight (Iran and Turkey) and minor (Pakistan and India). Outside players also include supra, sub state and non-governmental actors (i.e. World Bank, IMF, WTO and Islamic fundamental groups).

These actors are playing a Game with two levels of play

The levels of play (International/Domestic) are coinciding Games of power consolidation; international actors consolidating power in the international level of play, and, national players consolidating power in the domestic sphere. Players are not bound to only playing in their respective levels. Domestic players can try and consolidate power on the international level and vice versa. Players can cross play between the levels, and, can transfer momentum gained in the international level towards power consolidation in the domestic and vice versa.

These levels of play stretch across two fields of play: 1) geostrategic (geopolitical), and, 2) cultural (identity).

The geostrategic field of play is more connected to the international level of play and more likely to be a top down approach to power consolidation. On the other hand, the cultural field of play is directly connected to the domestic level, to the shared memories, narratives and identity of the populations that inhabit the desired piece of land. As such, this approach is more connected to the population and is more likely to be a bottom up approach.

ANNEX 3
UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS; LEGITIMACY FRAMES OF CLAN-NEOLIBERAL AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

For analytical purposes the Central Asian republics will be parsed using the following frame characteristics: Self-contained vs. non-self-contained, and, ideological feedback loop vs. not. Each of these points comes with expected behavior. Also included is whether a strongman rollover was experienced.

Strongman rollover—when the sitting Soviet strong man rolled his power over into the post-Soviet transition to become the new strong man of the independent republic.

First will be a recap of the expected behavior of these characteristics. Then a chart illustrating which Central Asian republics shows which characteristics.

Self-contained vs. non-self-contained legitimacy frames
If a legitimacy frame is self-contained there will be a higher resistance to external pressure towards domestic change, and, a higher likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. Also, in the context of domestic power consolidation there is not the necessity of discussing other players, for all the components for domestic power consolidation can be produced internally. If non-self-contained there will be lower resistance to external pressure towards domestic change, and, a lower likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. Also, in the context of domestic power consolidation there will be other players that must be considered.

Ideological feedback loop
Ideological feedback loops are expected to show negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by a hard transmission of the ideology. The ideological feedback loop has a higher likelihood of resulting in authoritarian stability. On the other hand, other types of legitimization do not have likelihood of reaching authoritarian stability rather than being a situational dependent possibility.

Strongman rollover
If there is a strong man roll over there is a heightened likelihood of reaching authoritarian stability. The combination of the strong man and the ideological feedback loop has the highest likelihood of reaching authoritarian stability.

Below is a chart of the Central Asian Republics concerning the above listed characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-Contained</th>
<th>Non-self-contained</th>
<th>Ideological Feedback loop</th>
<th>Other type of legitimization</th>
<th>Strong Man Rollover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The differences found in the tabulation can explain the different trajectories of the republics in question.

For analytical purposes the Central Asian republics can be parsed into two groups: Group 1) Central Asian ideological feedback loops-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and, Group 2) Other Legitimation-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.\(^{386}\) We start with an analysis of the countries where an ideological feedback loop was deployed (Group 1). Followed by an analysis of republics in which other types of legitimization were used (Group 2).

Group 1) Central Asian ideological feedback Loops-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

\(^{386}\) It is an interesting note that the same country groupings are reached if we had parsed by self-contained vs. non-self-contained.
First, we will discuss mechanisms of the ideological feedback loop. Followed by the 3 deployed Central Asian ideological feedback loops.

Mechanisms of the loop
Ideological feedback loops are designed to subordinate the whole of the domestic political system. The four levers used to achieve subordination are (1) Immunity, (2) Reflection, (3) Unification, and, (4) Goal orientation.

Immunity
Immunity is transmitted in two ways: through the state ideology, or, through the (claimed) strength and foresight of the sitting strongman/president. There are two levels of immunity:

*Ideological immunity* is constructed on the idea that openings in the ideological attention spaces are cracks, in which “alien/foreign ideologies” find room to potentially spread in their quest towards “foreign/alien” domestic domination. The only way to protect from being used and abused by a parade of conquering “alien/foreign ideologies” is through a full market takeover of the societal attention space by the ideological feedback loop.

*Presidential Immunity* is when the sitting president is sold to the population as the single driving factor and guarantor of such things as territorial integrity, national unity, safety, security and economic development. That said president is the only purveyor of a national path forward. That without said president the country is doomed to lose one or more of the listed items.

In both cases the nation is afforded immunity (either through the state ideology or the president himself) from threats to their safety, security, independence, national and identity integrity as well as economic wellbeing. There are only two options put to the population; 1) Support the state ideology and/or president and be protected from all manner of bad happenings, or, 2) Do not support the president and/or ideological feedback loop and show oneself to be an enemy of the state. For not supporting the state ideology and/or president is equated with being against national safety, security, independence, integrity and economic well-being. Is equated with choosing a path that is likely to lead to the nation being pillaged, plundered and torn asunder by both external and internal enemies. Clearly only an enemy of the state would choose this second option.

For a leader or ideology to offer immunity it must be considered homegrown and be reflectively sold.

*Reflection*
Reflection is the process in which populational lobbyists convince the people that the ideology and systems being are authored by the collective rather than by the individuals driving the implementation. The idea is to sell the immunizing homegrown ideology/president as the reflection of a pre-existing “organic nation.” This is important because the indication is that the “organic nation” becomes the creator of the power of the president and/or ideology behind the feedback loop. The inference becomes that the president and/or national ideology is incapable of being “hijacked” to shape policies in ways that are not in synch with the needs and wants of the
national population. This because the “organic nation” is incapable of creating a reflection that is not attuned towards pushing policies aimed at its (national population’s) best interest. This logic suggests that any ideology or politician that is in opposition to the wishes of the “homegrown” ideology/president is therefore against the wishes and needs of the nation. Only “alien ideologies” or saboteurs would be against the needs of the nation. Therefore, any opposition to the “homegrown” ideology/president is an “alien ideology” or saboteur. The presence of any opposition is proof that there needs to be a harder transmission of the immunity coming from the chosen “homegrown” ideology/president, which reflects the needs and wishes of the “organic nation.”

Unification
This is the sleight of hand in which leading populational lobbyists convince the citizenry that it is not they (the leaders) who are implementing societal change. Rather it is the ideology, working through these men, is responsible for the implementation and administration of the societal change. In this way, the populational Lobbyist running and implementing the system divest themselves of any accountability, while at the same time add leverage and sustenance to their preferred implemented policies. In this situation, any argument towards implementing preferred policies of the ruling populational lobbyist holds the weight of the homegrown ideology behind it, which means that it is has the weight off the wants and needs of the “organic nation” behind it. On the other hand, if the policies fail the populational lobbyist behind said policies are not at fault. Rather the ideology and organic nation all hold equal culpability. For the reflection cannot be faulty rather than the fault lying in the object of reflection.

Goal Orientation
This is the tactic of orienting the chosen homegrown, reflected and unified ideology towards generic goals. For “the logic of authoritarian political unity is only intelligible in relation to some collective good, the validity of which no political force can possibly deny.” Cliché goal orienting is resoundingly towards “making the nation (i.e. Trump’s America) great again,” or, commitment towards development through safety and security. There is no room for dissent. No one (who is not driven by an “alien ideology”) is against “making the nation great again” through development, safety and security. The nation is agreed on these goals and so there is no need for “competitive politics.”

Goal orientation (generally) contains both fear and hope. Fear based on external threats and hope of internal development. Using only fear runs the risk of being a “self-defeating tactic.” For if the populational lobbyist is too successful at eliminating the source of fear then he deprives himself of his legitimizing frame. The goal of development goes hand in hand with populational lobbyists who are legitimizing themselves through national pride. Also, development is an infinite well from which to draw from, there can always be more development.

Ideological feedback loops are built on the language of expertise, special knowledge, and “efficiency,” which are all code words for guardianship, consolidation, and the elimination of dissent. The point of the ideological feedback loop is to serve as an encompassing stratagem that uses fear of instability and inefficiency to argue away the need for politics. The point is to make

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387 March, Andrew F. (2003), pg. 315
politics unnecessary through the presentation of a pre-determined socio-political outcome.

*Central Asian deployed ideological feedback loops*
Transitioning into independence Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan all deployed self-contained feedback loops. Therefore, all three should have been expected to show negative hope confidence buttressed into neutral by a hard transmission of the ideology. All should have been considered to have a heightened resistance to external pressure towards domestic change, and a higher likelihood of experiencing periods of isolation. All three republics also endured a strong man rollover, which in combination with the ideological feedback loop shows the highest likelihood of reaching authoritarianism. Lastly, in the context of domestic power consolidation the self-contained nature of the feedback loop means there is not the necessity discussing other players.

Below will be an analysis of the three Central Asian feedback loops in the context of the above mechanisms.

Uzbekistan
Karimov is known “for the extent to which he has gone to legitimate his regime through an official state ideology—‘The Ideology of National Independence.’” Clan Karimov sold to the Uzbek nation the logic of authoritarianism under cover of an abstract conversation of the necessary role of ideology in society. The “Ideology of National Independence” was constructed around a theoretical discussion of the ideology/societal nexus in which ideology is a “necessary pre-political foundation of a community that serves to fuse nation, state, goal and regime, thus replacing constitutionalism and procedure as the pre-political ‘givens’ of the state {...} This conception of ideology is then developed so as to argue away the need for open, competitive politics by suggesting the presence of unassailable, unifying and self-evident political goals to which all rational Uzbeks subscribe.”

Karimov played the threat angle hard. In his most disseminated text he spent 130 pages detailing said threats, which included “regional conflicts, religious extremism and fundamentalism, great-power chauvinism and aggressive nationalism, ethnic and interethic contradictions, corruption and criminality, regionalism, clans, and ecological problems.” After highlighting all these threats Karimov eased the population into accepting the idea of ideological immunity. “Without an ideology, man, society, and the state lose their pathmarks along their route. And wherever an ideological vacuum arises it will naturally be filled by another ideology” and, “In order to protect our people from various ideological threats, to formulate in society an ideological immunity, it is necessary to arm it with an authentically humanist ideology, comprising in itself a powerful impulse towards the spiritual uplifting of the nation” Such rhetoric often concludes that there is only one possible “authentically humanist ideology,” which just happens to be controlled by the elite.

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388 Ibid
After Ideological immunity is transmitted reflection should be practiced.

“The ideology of our society, reflecting the vital interests of the simple man, who himself is the pillar of that society, must become a source of strength and energy for our people in the attainment of a peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable life. The ideology must first reflect the spiritual particularity and uniqueness of the sacred traditions and aspirations of our nation, formulated over many centuries and millennia.”

The attempt is to equate national culture with the “Ideology of National Independence,” to make criticism of the ideology analogous to criticism of the nation. This logic is aimed at the assertion the national ideology has sole claim to the national identity. The National Ideology thus becomes the “incarnation of the glorious values, aspirations and moral principles of its (Uzbekistan’s) multi-national population.”

“Irrespective of the diversity of the existing views and life positions, aspirations, and hopes of the various social groups prevailing in our society and of the faith and convictions of our individual citizens, a single ideology is called upon to unite these groups and individuals around a single national banner and to secure the priority of the higher interests and goals of the nation and the state.”

Concerning goal orientation: Karimov and his cohorts are abundantly clear in the goal of the “Ideology of National Independence,” that it is designed “to reduce all political processes to a common denominator.” The common denominator is looped, through reflection, back to being the wants and needs of “organic nation.” Wants and needs that only can be achieved through ideological immunity offered by the “Ideology of National Independence,” an immunization that can only be reached through reducing the political process to one overarching denominator (i.e. the Ideology of National independence), which all Uzbeks agree upon unless they have already been indoctrinated by an alien ideology. As such, any opposition proves the existence of “alien ideologies,” which then justifies an even harder transmission of the “Ideology of National Independence.”

Following this marketing of the “ideology of national independence” as being an Uzbek common denominator there is a concerted effort to remove the “Ideology of National Independence” from the political realm. This is done through a negative association attached to the word “politics,” as opposed to positive association placed upon the national ideology. Politics and political ideologies are redefined to be understood as private interests and power moves being passed off as “national interests.” The result is that all political ideologies are rendered as against the “organic Uzbek nation.” Anything against the nation is also against the national ideology;

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393 Karimov, Islam A, 1999 pg. 89
395 Karimov, Islam. (1999), pg. 88
anything against the national ideology should be considered an alien ideology and excluded from sphere of being acceptable.

“The goal is the distinct, unifying, directing banner of the nation. This banner is a force embodying the spirit and pride of the nation, its potential and aspirations. The goal of our state, with its grandeur and nobility, its justice and uprightness, should become a powerful stimulus capable of unifying nations and peoples and transform into a force and ideology overcoming everything. It will be an ideology established on the outlooks and mentality of the nation formed over millennia, determining the future of that nation, enabling it to take its distinguished place in the world community, and capable of becoming a stable bridge between past and future.”

March (2003) claims “A secular nationalist has few choices in what types of goals to pursue, and Karimov offers no surprises: the state will be committed to the pursuit of development and national greatness while guaranteeing security and stability. The only thing unique is the long, drawn-out mystification of these banal goals through the discourse on “ideology.” The general strategy being employed is thus to define the entire state in relation to common goals, to define the goals and aspirations as virtually constitutive of the nation as such, and to equate the regime with the proper articulation and realization of those goals through the state apparatus. These circular definitions, woven together theoretically by the concept of “ideology,” ensure that the acceptance of one claim implies the acceptance of all of them and, more importantly, that opposition to one of the parts can be treated as opposition to all of them.”

 Turkmenistan

First president (and strong man rollover) Saparmurat Niyazov took control of a country that was “psychologically, institutionally and economically ill-equipped for independence.” Turkmenistan was as Metternich once said if Italy, only a “geographical expression.” “The people had no common story of a fight for independence from Moscow; no common enemy; no shared story of clandestine nation-building as a counterpoise to Soviet rule.” “Saparmurat Niyazov, recognized that securing his own position would require some kind of ideological glue to replace that afforded by Soviet power.” Such a state of affairs offered the president a “fairly wide scope to shape the terms, if not the complete content, of national identity production in the early post-Soviet period.” Turkmenistan was a blank canvas that needed a history, an ideology as well as a vessel to impart this history and ideology. The face of the vessel is much easier to procure, and disseminate into populational internalization than is the creation and transmission of a history or an ideology.

A face needs only to be aggressively pushed into the public spaces. The first resolution passed by the new Turkmen congress (1992) sanctioned the unlimited production of state portraits of the

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397 Karimov, Islam. (1999), pg. 87
398 March, Andrew. (2003), pg. 317
402 Denison, Michael. (2009), pg. 1173,
new president. This law allowed Niyazov to envelop the top layer of the public space (the things you hang on the physical landscape i.e. posters, billboards, placards etc.) as well as the physical landscape itself, which is reclaimed by renaming (airports, street cities etc.) and building (monuments, parks and grand buildings). In 1992 local leaders and officials began “requesting” permission to start renaming the physical space after Niyazov. The culmination of this Niyazovification of the landscape was the 1998 installation (in the capital Asghabat) of a 60-ft. golden statue of Niyazov that rotates so that the memorialized president always faces the sun.

Post landscape saturation Niyazov created an ideology mashed together with a produced version of Turkmen history- a historlogy that was intertwined and connected to him personally through a “mythic like” personal biography and bloodline. The outcome of this project was publishing of the (2000) Ruhnama (“The holy book of all Turkmen”, “a blend of pseudo-history, genealogy, homily, memoir and loosely articulated political analysis” in which Niyazov emerged as “the architect of national independence.”404 In it he (Niyazov) describes how he (Niyazov) channels (from the “historical” past) the aggregated force of all Turkmen wants and needs to positively shape the future. Using a metaphor of oarsmen in a galley the Turkmen population is urged that believing in and doing what they are told to do is the only way to safely reach a better future; “If all the oarsmen obey one captain, and row in accordance with the orders of the captain, the ship will be put out to sea.”405 Niyazov pushes the population to internalize himself (Niyazov) as being responsible for the plight of all Turkmen and as a sells himself and his internalization of the responsibility for the plight of all Turkmen, as a “mirror of the national soul {...} making the heart wiser and kinder”406 and “a source of power and striving to reach the targets of Turkmen’s Golden Age.”407

As Niyazov’s image was aggressively inserted into the Turkmen public space the Ruhnama was aggressively inserted into the Turkmen private space. Becoming a required in almost all aspects of life, from university exams to obtaining drivers licenses. Police officers could stop one at random and ask questions about the Ruhnama, which, if not satisfactorily answered could result in a fine or being arrested. Niyazov “eliminated other available histories. Other scholarly works not approved by him personally were either not allowed to be published or, in at least one case, burned by state authorities and the author removed from his position at the Magtumguly University because his history contradicted that in Ruhnama.”408,409

“*The ordinary Turkmen finds it impossible to carry out a daily chore without encountering Turkmenbashi.*”410

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405 Turkmenbasy, Saparmurat. (2003), pg. 62
408 Clement, Victoria. (2014), pg. 555
409 Türkmenbashi (2002): 9, 66–7, 77, 293) claimed (in spite of evidence proving the opposite) that Turkmen have lived in modern Turkmenistan for over 5k years. Books that claimed (correctly) that Turkmen tribes migrated from China 2k were outlawed.
“Official” Turkmen scholars claimed this penetration necessary as “a bridge to the world of moral values and the rich cultural heritage of the Turkmen people.” While at the same time it “cultivates personality” and sets out “the moral obligations of society.”

Before the Ruhnama was published many believed that Niyazov was pursuing policies of “Turkmenification,” which was legitimized along linguistic-nationalistic lines. Designed to be inclusive to the whole of the Turkmen diaspora (provided they spoke Turkmen) while at the same time internally exclusionary to all those living in Turkmenistan who did not speak Turkmen. The aim was to “to create cohesion among Türkmen, as defined by the state, and to keep non-Türkmen out of that collective.” In spite of this domestic exclusionary character a majority of the population “felt that they were not losing with the Türkmenification of social structures so much as they were gaining a country.” The makeup of this linguistically based identity was “an anti-Russian, pro-Western, Turco-Islamic heritage, which looked to its ancient cultural antecedents and ignored the Soviet experience, except to denigrate it.”

The publishing of the Ruhnama was the culmination of a process of inventing the necessary ideology and history to fully bring about the transmission of the ideological feedback loop. When in full force this ideological feedback transitioned from being about “Turkmenification” to being about “Niyazovification.” Even though the loop came into full effect with the publishing of the Ruhnama the decision to work towards its construction and deployment was made in 1991.

“The construction of national identity is a lengthy process: identities are constructed” over time.”

Immediately after independence Niyazov brought together “ideologues to produce the image of a highly idealized and divine leader” that combined national myth with the image of himself (Niyazov) as a “national savior.” In 1993 Niyazov awarded himself the title of Turkmenbashi (Prophet of Turkmen Nation). In 1999 awarded himself presidency for life, which he held until his death in 2006. The end representation was a semi-divine divine Niyazov who was an example of the Turkmen archetype.

Turkmen citizens (daily) were “required to pray an oath of fidelity to Turkmenistan, and personally to the President.” Through “scientific research” Turkmen historians connected Niyazov’s bloodline to all the important historical figures in the Turkmen culture (i.e. Turkmen hero Oghuz Khan, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and even Muhammed). Upon this bloodline Niyazov was celebrated as the most important person in Turkmenistan’s history.” His biography was instilled as a “mandatory school subject.” State media and institutions were

413 Clement, Victoria. (2014), pg. 554
414 ibid
415 Clement, Victoria. (2014), pg. 550
418 Polese, Abel, and Slavomír Horák. 2015
used to reinforce the connection between Turkmenbashi and the motherland in the attempt to make loyalty to one inseparable from the other.

The Niyazov homegrown ideology was portrayed as reflecting the Turkmen organic nation. Though this reflection was a bit different than was seen in Uzbekistan. The “Ideology of National Independence” was overarching and connected web that drove all party members to be indelibly pushed towards doing right by Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, the reflection was not sold as an overarching web that encompassed the whole system. Rather the reflection of the organic nation was contained in Saparmurat Niyazov, in Turkmenbashi. Denison explains this difference in the comparison between the cult of Turkmenbashi and Ataturk:

“The visual forms of the Niyazov cult clearly draw from the imagery, texts and rituals of both Stalinist and Kemalist rule. {...} The adoption by Niyazov of the appurtenance of Turkmenbashi in 1993 is an obvious referent to Ataturk. The principal difference between Niyazov and Ataturk lies not only in the obvious disparity in the quality of their political leadership, but that the image of Ataturk symbolizes a certain abstract developmental path of secular modernization and national unity-it embodies a set of values beyond the personage of Ataturk-whereas in Turkmenistan, the cult has been really rather indissoluble from Niyazov's own predilections and idiosyncrasies-and, as a consequence, really only came to stand for little more than Niyazov himself.”

This difference in the way that reflection was practiced affected the way in which unification was practiced. In Uzbekistan, the elite was divested from accountability resulting from policy failure due to the fact that these elite were not acting out of self-motivation rather than being driven to action by the “Ideology of National Independence,” which was a reflection of the organic nation. Therefore, any blame ultimately runs downhill to the Uzbek populous. For it is impossible that the reflection be faulty, rather than fault lying in the object of reflection, which (in this case) would have been the organic Uzbek nation. On the other hand, in Turkmenistan, the constructed ideology was not part and parcel of the whole elite running the system rather than the president being the sole incarnation of the ideology, thus also the sole reflection of the Turkmen organic nation. In Uzbekistan, the protection emanating from unification was spread out among the party elite. While in Turkmenistan the protection from unification was centered in the President himself.

Viktoria Clement (2014) who did extensive fieldwork in Turkmenistan describes how this individualistic type of unification made it easy for Turkmenbashi to avoid taking blame for “administrative excesses like the bugging of phones, or social deficiencies such as rampant bribery. Citizens told me, ‘if he knew about it, it wouldn’t be happening’ (Fieldwork observations, 2001–2002). Turkmen knew that Niyazov was ultimately in charge. But, they also rationalized that he could not control every detail in daily life, and thus cited self-interested elements within the administration as the source of Turkmenistan’s social problems (Fieldwork observations, 2001–2002). The element of psychological defensiveness that is apparent in such an outlook is part of how {ideology feedback loops} personality cults work. They succeed as cults because they are able to claim loyalty and credit, while evading responsibility. In fact, Niyazov deliberately kept his administrators and state institutions weak by allowing individuals

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419 Denison, Michael (2009), pg. 1174
to hold their posts for only short periods of time. It was not unusual to turn on the evening news and see the president calling ministers to task in a televised meeting. He would berate them for corruption, disloyalty, thievery, or incompetence and then force them to beg for forgiveness, before firing them and sending them off to jail or demoting them to a menial job. Many were indeed guilty of corruption since they knew they would only be in office for a short period of time, and hoped to make the most of it. If Niyazov had allowed individuals to stay in office long enough to gain some professional knowledge and build some political capital, his people may have become effective administrators; but then his own {ideological feedback loop} cult-like role would have been diminished. Niyazov’s pose as the people’s protector against corruption and incompetence required a continuous supply of both; his regime was calculated to produce them.” 420

“Niyazov asserted that only the state with himself at the helm could guide the Turkmen on their new path, uniting Turkmen national identity with what became a personality cult.” 421

Presidential immunity can be seen in the very early stages of Turkmen independence. Article 54 of the constitution claimed that Turkmenbashi was the “chief guarantor of national independence {and} territorial integrity.” This logic suggest that it is Turkmenbashi who is providing the continuation of said independence and territorial integrity, that without Turkmenbashi at the helm there is the very real risk of losing them both. It is Turkmenbashi the individual who is providing the immunity to move into positive future and it was Turkmenbashi who offered immunity from tribal conflict and potential civil war.

The result was that Turkmenbashi deployed a homegrown ideological feedback loop that was unified in the president. Presidential immunity was used to orient the goals of the path forward towards to securing the safety and security of Turkmen independence and prosperity. This ideological feedback loop was constructed on three main components: 1) independence, 2) the Ruhnama (which included the created ideology and Turkmen history), and, 3) permanent neutrality.

The first two pieces are directly held in the President himself. Turkmenbashi is the guarantor of independence and the sole creator and inspiration behind the musings found in the Ruhnama. The third component permanent neutrality was designed to provide protection from outside meddling in the internal affairs of Turkmenbashi’s power consolidation. The idea is that a neutral country will be more likely to be left to its own devices than a country that is taking sides.

Tajikistan
The first president of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon was a strong man rollover from the CCCP. He was president before the civil war (1992-1997) and remained president after. Clan Rahmon attempted to transmit a populational internalization of an organic Tajik populational character connected to an ancient past, what Cummings has called “internally invented signs of national

420 Clement, Victoria. (2014), pg. 558
421 Clement, Victoria. (2014), pg. 557
certainty."\textsuperscript{422} As such, Clan Rahmon began to create an “imaginary of the nation.”\textsuperscript{423} Resulting in him (Rahmon) becoming the only visible architect of the Tajik national identity and the incarnation of Tajik independence. As a path towards legitimacy Clan Rahmon took to “formation of a new national identity.”\textsuperscript{424} Like Niyazov in Turkmenistan, Rahmon wrote a multi volume book “The Tajiks in the Mirror of History,” which like the Ruhnama, set out to rewrite (in disregard to accepted facts) Tajik history. The book sold Rahmon as the single and authoritative expert of Tajik history as well as the guarantor of national unity and the only man capable of preventing a slide back into civil war. The attempt was to instill a populational perception that the enclosed ideology and history is the reflected image of the organic Tajik nation, a reflection to which only Rahmon can bring to the Tajik population. A point divested in the title of the book. A point reiterated by the state news agency Khovar when they claimed that the volumes “aim to be mirror of sacred values of the Tajik nation.”\textsuperscript{425} Like the Ruhnama the “Tajiks in the Mirror of History” became required reading in almost all aspects of Tajik life. Including the requirement that university students take the following two courses: “Emomali Rahmon-the architect of the new Tajik state,” and, “The Tajiks in the Mirror of History.” Fergananews.com explains that each of the two courses comprises of 32 hours of theory and 32 hours of practical work. Like Turkmenbashi, Rahmon enveloped the Tajik public spaces as well as the physical landscape. Villages and neighborhoods were renamed Ramonhood and his depiction through monumentation (supposedly at the request of the Turkmen populous) is “anchored throughout Tajikistan’s landscape” In December 2015 Rahmon was formally confirmed as the “founder of peace and national unity and the Leader of the Nation.” In 2016 parliament went a step further when the constitution was amended to include the “Law of the President,” which comprised of 16 articles whose purpose was to push unification, Presidential/ideological immunity and reflection. Article 1 designates Rahmon as the “symbol of the longevity of the Tajik sovereign state, of peace, of national unity” and the “guarantor of stable development.” Article 3 granted Rahmon a parliamentary seat for life and appoints him as the sole “representative of the public movement and national unity of Tajikistan.” Article 4 requires that official decorations and prizes (in his honor) be established; also, both Rahmon and his family received lifelong immunity from prosecution. Article 11 requires that “museums, a library and archives of the Founder of Peace and National Unity- the Leader of the Nation will be erected.” Article 14 stipulates that these be included in the state budget.

Parliament claimed amending the constitution to include the “Law of the President” was necessary to assure that the “people acknowledge the merits and qualities of the one who made a great service to [the] nation and country.”\textsuperscript{426}

\textsuperscript{425} http://khovar.tj/rus/2016/04/entsiklopediya-kultury-tadzhikskogo-naroda-zerkalo-duhovnyh- tsennostej-tadzhskoj-natsii/
The way in which Rahmon deals with Islam is characteristic of how the ideological feedback loops function. The claim is that Islam should enhance societal coherence. As such, any “Muslim who challenges the government is depicted as a ‘radical’ {and} a threat to society. In defining radicalism in this way [...] all opposition {can be considered} extremist and potentially violent.”\(^{427}\) Rahmon also advocates for “an expansion of political pluralism” as long as it “exercised in the boundaries of the law, for if not, it can undermine the stability of the government” as the weapon of “antipatriotic groups, domestic extremists and some interested foreign circles.”\(^{428}\) Like Islam, political pluralism is accepted only as long as it does not buck against preferred presidential policies. If it questions preferred presidential policies then it becomes a dangerous threat to national stability and independence and is against the organic Tajik nation. The take away is that political debate is viewed as a challenge to the wants and needs of the organic nation.

The conceptual foundations of the organic Tajik nation are national unity, solidarity and independence, all of which are exclusively embodied in the President Rahmon. The logic relied upon is that without Rahmon at the helm these foundations are at risk of being lost and that any opposition to the president is also opposition to said foundations of the organic nation.

*Central Asian Feedback Loop Conclusion (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan)*

In the main text it was pointed out that ideological feedback loops do not have the possibility of being built on legitimate manipulation, only on illegitimate manipulation. Ergo it follows that ideological feedback loops cannot produce positive hope confidence momentum. It was discussed above that ideological feedback loops produce negative hope confidence trajectory buttressed into neutral by the hard transmission of the connected ideology. Therefore, this should be the expectation for all of the three countries discussed above, for all of these countries framed their domestic legitimacy by deploying ideological feedback loops.

*Other Legitimized Frames-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan*

Concerning domestic power consolidation, the major analytical difference between the ideological feedback loop group and this (other legitimized) group is the necessity of considering additional external players, which is a result of the deployed frame being self-contained vs. non-self-contained. Therefore, identifying additional external players is the first step when analyzing this (other legitimizing) group of Central Asian republics. Identifying potential other external players is achieved through understanding the details of the legitimacy frame deployed by player one (in this case Clan Akaev and Clan Nazararbaev). Said details will pinpoint necessary frame components that cannot be procured domestically. Knowing these missing components allows the generation of a list of potential suppliers. This list of suppliers is the list of potential external players.

In 1990, in the immediate post-soviet world, Clan Neoliberal was the only player who controlled access to the international level of play. As such, all post-soviet leaders who deployed non-self-

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contained frames that necessitated components found in the international level of play were left with only one choice with whom to collaborate (i.e. Clan Neo-liberal). Before we turn to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan we will discuss Clan Neoliberal.

Clan Neo-Liberal
Clan Neo-Liberal was consolidating internationally through inter-level play aimed at domestic momentum in the post-soviet space to be leveraged against an international audience. It must be understood that Neo-liberal ideologues did not in and of themselves consolidate, hold and control access to the international level of play. They accomplished this through coopting host organizations. There are two types host of organizations that can be co-opted. Rooted and non-rooted, the difference between the two is populational liability. Rooted organizations hold populational liability, non-rooted do not.

Populational Liability (rooted)—when a player holds responsibility of and to a population. The determining factor is whether the structure of the player is directly intertwined with a geographic space. This geographic space usually contains a population. Therefore, this population is also intertwined into the structure. As such, said player must (to a greater or lesser extent) consider said citizenry when implementing policy. For a structurally intertwined citizenry means that policy implementers (to a greater or lesser extent) will be held accountable for the results of implemented policies. This accountability (to varying degrees) forces leaders to consider the outcome that said policies will produce. Which means that pushing policies that are risky towards the collective good are also risky to the implementers. Rooted organizations (to varying degrees) have “skin in the game.”

Players without populational liability (non-rooted) have a dangerous modus operandi. One in which there is no concern with the outcome because they are not accountable to those that will suffer the consequences of their implemented policies. They do not care about the outcome because in the scheme their slice of the pie is not connected to the result rather than being a commission on the transaction. Non-rooted players often sell hope to vulnerable and traumatized populations to induce them to accept taking risky bets that they themselves (non-rooted organizations) design and facilitate. Non-rooted host organizations are not playing with their own money or lives, which enables them to play hard and fast on schemes expected, if not designed to fall flat. The scheme falling flat is a boon for the non-rooted neo-liberal host organization, for it drives already vulnerable and despondent populations deeper into desperation, which induces a willingness to take even riskier bets. Which, of course these non-rooted organizations are more than happy to underwrite. Non-rooted organizations will only move away from their preferred policies when their bottom line is affected. Which is seldom, because they use all their power and wealth to protect said bottom lines. It is this non-rooted nature of the beasts of war, industry and fossil fuels that is the reason that they will probably destroy the planet before their bottom line suffers, before they voluntarily make changes. The opinion here is that non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations are the biggest threat to long-term global security and survival.

In the early post-soviet world Clan Neoliberal based their power consolidation on “democratizing” towards prosperity through implementation of neo-liberal market and political reforms, as well as privatization. The question becomes whether this “democratization” should
be considered a concrete or non-concrete event. The concreteness of “democratization” is determined by whether said “democratization” was transmitted directly or 3rd party.

Direct “democratization” is when the leading power behind the design and transmission of said democratization holds populational liability of the peoples being “democratized.”

Third party “democratization” is when the leading power behind the transmission and design does not hold populational liability towards the peoples being “democratized.”

As a general rule, 3rd party democratization will not push towards egalitarianism, and thus, should not be considered a concrete event. On the other hand, direct democratization situationally has the potential to push towards or away from egalitarianism, which means that it can situationally be considered a concrete or non-concrete event. Whether direct democratization should be considered a concrete event is dependent on the actual objective of the main author. It should be counted a concrete if the main objective is towards process resolution rather than at indefinite processing. The aim must be towards creating a democracy rather than towards producing an indefinite process of “democratization.” There is a finite amount of time in which “democratization” should finish processing and a result rendered. A democracy achieved or a failed attempt, in either case the process has come to a resolution. The longer the process of direct “democratization” is the base of the legitimacy frame being deployed the less concrete it should be considered.

EU transmission of democratization onto Eastern Europe and West Germany onto East Germany should be considered direct democratization. For both transmitting organizations (EU and West German government) held populational liability for the populations being “democratized.” In both cases the transmitting organization was attempting to fold willing populations into their societal structure (the melding of east and west Germany and Eastern Europe becoming part of the EU). Almost all U.S. programs of “democratizing” should be considered 3rd party “democratization” for the U.S. has rarely held populational liability for the myriad of nations they have “democratized.”

Third party “democratization” has a minuscule likelihood of resulting in a democracy, while direct “democratization” has potential (rather than likelihood) of resulting in democracy. As a general rule, 3rd party “democratization” will push away from egalitarianism while direct democratization, situationally depending, has the potential to push towards or away. Lastly, non-rooted players are precluded from partaking in direct democratization. For the non-rooted player does not hold populational liability to anyone. Therefore, it is impossible for the non-rooted to

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429 Three examples of where the U.S. accepted populational liability of the countries that they were democratizing are West Germany and Japan after WWII and South Korea after the Korean War. In these countries, it can be seen that vibrant democracies were reached. Why did the US take populational liability for these countries but not other countries in which they have practiced “democratization?” Maybe they felt it was the right thing to do since they were a major partner in the destruction of these countries or maybe they thought that it was the best way to reach a real democracy, which is what they felt in these cases was in the best interest of the U.S. Maybe it had something to do with trying to get permanent military bases in these countries. Though these listed reasons are only speculation. We cannot know why the U.S. accepted populational liability for these countries but not other countries that they have practiced “democratization” on (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan etc.).
hold populational liability to the recipients of said “democratization.” As such, it is impossible for the non-rooted partake in direct “democratization.”

In early 90s post-soviet transition major non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations were the IMF\(^{430}\) and World Bank. Major rooted neo-liberal host organizations included the U.S., EU and UN.\(^{431}\) In the context of 90s Central Asian post-soviet transition rooted players (U.S., EU and to an extent the U.N.) played a diminished role as compared to Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe 90s post-soviet transition rooted organizations can be considered as the main force and architect behind “democratization.” In central Asia it was non-rooted organizations (IMF and World Bank) that were the main force and architects behind democratization.

This tells us that from the beginning there was a chance that Eastern Europe democratization might reach democracy. On the other hand, Central Asian democratization had very low likelihood of reaching democracy.

Below we speak about the two Central Asian republics that did not deploy ideological feedback. Speak about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who deployed non-self-contained frames, which required collaboration with clan Neo Liberal.

Kazakhstan

Historical statehood as legitimacy was tried: populational manipulators attempted to link the post-colonial statehood to historical statehoods. In Kazakhstan, the link was the Kazakh khanate,\(^{432}\) whose establishment was marked and projected as the beginning of Kazakh statehood. This historical link did not particularly resonate due to the fact that it is widely understood that the Central Asian states were a Stalinist creation. Also, claiming historical statehood to a traditionally nomadic people was counterintuitive and in contrast to a nomadic historical memory. Therefore, a legitimacy frame based on historical statehood was not likely to be widely accepted by the citizenry.\(^{433}\) In 1990 the Kazakh economy showed negative indicators in all macroeconomic and human development indicators.\(^{434,435}\) As such, a legitimacy frame based on economic performance was a nonstarter. Nazarbaev ran unopposed in the 1991

\(^{430}\) An article that shows how the non-rooted IMF practices forcing risky bets onto despondent populations. Bets designed with a known high probability of failure and a negative outcome for the population the policies are being implemented on. The IMF does not care about the outcome because they charge a commission on the transaction, and, are not liable to the population that will eventually suffer the consequences. The article in question is talking about the way in which they handled the Greek bailouts.


\(^{431}\) The US is rooted to the US population and EU rooted to European populations. The UN is rooted to the member states, which are rooted to their particular populations. The UN is less rooted than a host nation state (US) or regional governing structure (EU) due to it being a step removed from the populations of the member states.

\(^{432}\) Successor to the Golden Horde, the Kazakh Kanate (15th-19th century), was more or less located in present-day Kazakhstan. At its height the khanate ruled from eastern Cumania to most Uzbekistan and was involved in military campaigns that stretched from Astrakhan to Khorasan Province. A series of Dzungar invasions pushed the Khanate to fragment into three zhues, which were gradually expanded upon by Imperial Russia.


\(^{434}\) UN Development Program, 2004

\(^{435}\) This negative momentum began to reverse in the late 90s. Though this was well after the government already cemented international standing as legitimacy a frame.

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presidential elections. Therefore, democracy also was not likely to convince the Kazakh audience.

A frame of ethnic legitimacy would have demanded Kazakh populational lobbyist push the idea that they would make amends for systemic disadvantages that the CCCP placed upon ethnic Kazakhs. Deployment of such a frame was problematic in two ways: (1) at the time, in Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority, and, (2) such a push would threaten the majority ethnic Russian population. The ethnic frame was deployed in other former soviet republics resulting in increased ethnic tensions leading a number of civil wars. Nazarbaev did not pursue an ethnic legitimacy frame. Legitimacy based on Islam may have reverberated, but was never tried in Kazakhstan.

Ultimately, the frame of legitimacy deployed was domestic rule based on international engagement, recognition and “respect.”436 Claims of legitimacy based “on external recognition broadcast inward to domestic audiences.”437 Olcott (1992) highlights that Kazakhstan “paid more attention to its international representation than any other Central Asian republic.”

This was a non-self-contained frame. The critical component (international respect, recognition and engagement) is not something that could be produced domestically. As such, Nazarbaev had to look to outside markets to find the missing component. This is inter-level play. The power of the deployed frame is gained in the international sphere while the primary targets of its leverage reside in the domestic sphere. As stated above, in the early 90s Clan Neo-liberal (whom in the context of Central Asia were primarily represented by non-rooted organizations) controlled the only avenue of access to the international level of play.

Player 1-Clan Nazarbaev: Consolidating domestically through a non-self-contained legitimacy frame based on international engagement, respect, and recognition.

Player 2- Neo-liberal non-rooted host organizations; Consolidating internationally using momentum gained in the post-soviet domestic sphere, and, legitimizing through “democratization” supported by privatization and market reforms

An insightful note: In this situation neither player deployed a legitimizing frame based on democracy. Therefore, neither side needed to produce a democracy. Neo-liberal ideologues needed show an international audience the process of Kazakh “democratization,” not a Kazakh democracy. Clan Nazarbaev needed to show domestic populations international engagement, recognition and respect. This tells us that there was virtually no potential of Kazakhstan becoming democratic.

Because Clan Nazarbaev deployed a non-self-contained frame it is expected that Kazakhstan is more susceptible to external pressure towards change. Also expected is a lessened likelihood that Kazakhstan would experience periods of isolation. Lastly, as discussed above, the international recognition and respect that Narzabaez aimed for was verifiably achieved. Therefore, this international recognition and respect should be considered a concrete event. Above it was

436 Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence.
437 Schatz, Edward. (2006), pg. 270
discussed that concrete events when used as a basis for legitimacy frames push positive hope confidence trajectory. As such, the expectation should be that Kazakhstan would push a positive hope confidence trajectory.

Kyrgyzstan
Following the collapse of the CCCP Kyrgyzstan was the only country who did not experience a strong man rollover. Askar Akaev, the country's first president, was an outsider to the political power game. Akaev was also the only Central Asian leader who deployed a frame of legitimacy based on “democratizing.” Akaev’s implemented program of democratization claimed to be aimed at bridging east and west. Towards becoming the “Switzerland of Central Asia” with the aim of adopting the neo-liberal western model, while at the same time holding on to Kyrgyz and Central Asian values and culture. A self-determinant central Asian “island of democracy” dominated by no one, yet, still friends with all. Akaev did not have the resources nor the know how to implement domestic democratization and therefore had to look to external players for help. As such, the legitimacy frame deployed was a non-self-contained frame and necessitated support from the international level of play. As with Kazakhstan, and as mentioned above, in the early 90s the only avenue to international level of play was controlled by Clan Neo-liberal who in the context of Central was primarily represented by non-rooted organizations.

Player 1-Clan Akaev; Consolidating domestically with a non-self-contained frame of “democratization” towards becoming the “Switzerland of Central Asia.”

Player 2-Neo-liberal non-rooted host organizations; Consolidating internationally using momentum gained in the post-soviet domestic sphere, and, legitimizing through “democratization” supported by privatization and market reforms.

The frame suggests that non-self-contained deployed frames in likelihood will produce regimes more susceptible to external pressure towards change. Also suggested is that regimes that deploy non-self-contained frames are less likely to experience periods of isolation. This should have been the expectation of Kyrgyzstan in 1990.

In the early 90s Kyrgyzstan committed to rapid liberal economic reforms. It was the first republic to convert to its own currency (1993) and the first to join the WTO. Quickly, land reform and privatization proceeded thus securing financial assistance from the international community. The implemented neo-liberal democratization saw inflation, unemployment, poverty and the equality gap skyrocket. Akaev was aware that the negative economic outcomes of these reforms would create a pushback towards their implementation. To counter this, he tried to normalize said reforms: “It is my conviction that radicalization of the reforms is the only correct way for Kyrgyzstan. A comprehensive and decisive breakthrough in every course of the reform is required, while we enjoy serious support from CIS countries, the world’s economically developed nations, and international finance organizations. We have no right to miss this historic opportunity.”

Also there was the understanding that the negative economic slide would produce negative hope confidence. Negative hope confidence, unless buttressed against, will quickly lead to pressure to overturn the sitting status quo.

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438 Askar Akaev, pg. 47, “Kyrgyzstan on the Way to Progress and Democracy”, Bishkek, 1995
Buttressing against an expected negative slide in hope confidence is aimed at making the populations look past their belief that the status quo is leading a less secure, safe and economically abundant future. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan buttressed against negative slides with a hard transmission of ideological feedback loops. On the other hand, Akaev and his neo-liberal conspirators attempted to buttress against this negative slide with increasing the populations’ personal and political freedoms.

As a long-term tactic buttressing against a negative slide with increased political and personal freedoms can only be successful if there is a pre-existing infrastructure of distracting elements and wedge issues to fill the personal freedom and political space. Without this infrastructure the people are not distracted from the negative slide. Without this distraction network the population will use the personal and political freedom to air and spread their negative grievances. As such, without this this prepared infrastructure the buttressing effect of political and personal freedoms is extremely transitory and will quickly transform from a buttress against the negative slide into an exasperating factor.

By the mid 90s, in Kyrgyzstan, buttressing against the negative hope confidence slide with increased personal and political freedom started to exasperate the slide into negative territory. To quell this exasperation of negative hope confidence Akaev started to roll back the freedoms and buttress with the authoritarian stick. Clan Akaev was able to attempt rolling back the democratic gains for two reasons:

The first reason: To sponsoring neo-liberal host organizations the gain in Kyrgyz freedom of speech and press had already served its two-fold purpose:

1) To be paraded to the international audience to show that the almighty western liberal program had already made Kyrgyzstan a better place, both for its people, but more importantly for the world. This move is leveraged against an international audience and aimed at Neo-liberal consolidation in the international level of play.

2) To be paraded to the Kyrgyz domestic audience. To show that almighty western liberal program had already made Kyrgyzstan a better place for Kyrgyz. That accepting the rest of the western-liberal policies would similarly make Kyrgyzstan even better for the Kyrgyz.

By the mid 90s, neoliberal international power consolidation had been achieved and Kyrgyzstan had accepted implementing a whole foray of western liberal privatization and market reforms. Non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations had achieved their goals and hence no longer cared what Akaev did domestically. If he wanted to roll back the political and personal freedoms his non-rooted neo-liberal cohorts would not stand in his way.

The Second reason: In the mid 90s Akaev started receiving the promised billions of dollars in kickbacks (aid) from the sponsoring non-rooted neo-liberal host organizations. This money allowed him the power and resources necessary to attempt a push towards authoritarianism. This tracks with the argument of McGlinchey; “only if central governments are consistently starved of the economic resources of rule, do opportunities for liberal change arise”, and that, “the initial period of Kyrgyz independence between 1991–1994 was characterized by political contestation
and a lack of economic resources leading to liberal change, while in 1994–1995, upon the receipt of international aid, the leadership was able to use Soviet-era institutions (hierarchical patronage networks and a predatory judicial system) to exert control over political opponents.”

The trajectory of Kyrgyzstan did not take the same path of the rest of the region because Kyrgyzstan was the odd man out concerning the two Central Asian trends mentioned in the main text. Kyrgyzstan did not experience the strong man rollover (unlike the other 4 Central Asian republics) and Clan Akaev did not deploy an ideology-based frame of legitimacy (unlike Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Kyrgyzstan (unlike all neighboring republics) never reached authoritarian stability. The political and personal freedoms that were introduced in the early 90s were not able to be fully rolled back, and to this day persist (relative to the other central Asian republics). The result is that Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian republic to be considered as having a negative hope confidence trajectory.

**ANNEX 4**

**RUSSIAN IDENTITY PROJECTION AND UKRAINE**

The CCCP historically depended on soft power as collective identity. The Soviet narrative of collective identity based on anti-capitalist class markers was both accepted and rejected by portions of the Soviet audience. During the early post-soviet era, the Russian Federation pursued a warmer association with the West, though Moscow overlooked creation of an organized projection of common collective identity. In the 1990s Moscow expressed a muddled identity narrative lacking a well-defined vision of commonality.

Post CCCP Moscow was particularly interested in promoting Russianess (i.e. Russian language, Russian-language media, the Russian Orthodox Church and business networks.)

Focusing on the blurry idea of “compatriots” Russianness was not clearly defined, sometimes meaning all Soviet born and descendants (excluding the populations of the now independent republics) and at other times meaning all those with cultural links to Russia. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 underlined Moscow’s pledge to advance the newly founded Commonwealth of Independent States into a capable organization “based on the commonality of interests.” Though, this “commonality of interests” was unclear. What was clear was that Russian perceived interests were held above the best interests of the organization.

In the 1990s projected Russian identity simultaneously stressed two competing ideas: (1) That the Russian identity belonged to Europe, and, (2) Russia exists apart from Europe as its own great power. By the early 2000s narratives 1 had been sidelined by narrative 2, the focus

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became Russia’s civilizational distinctness and preeminence vis-a-vis the declining West. As such, Moscow pushed issue narratives highlighting Russia’s special responsibility for maintaining stability in the post-Soviet region. This interpretation of Russia’s identity created a narrative of a broader community. This Eurasian narrative was frequently appealed to in the Kremlin’s relationships with the post-Soviet states. Marketed through the observance of traditional values protected by Russia against the fraudulent influences of a capitalistic, post-modern declining West. Marshaled and sold by RT (Russia Today), this narrative gained a foothold in both post-Soviet states and among right wing parties throughout the EU.

Faltering relations with the West (late 2000s-early 2010s) lead Moscow to try and regain some of its lost influence through being more forceful in its regional policies. The goal was to prevent other players (i.e. U.S., NATO and EU) from further infringement upon the Russian “sphere of privileged interests.” A rejuvenation of Russian inspired integration was the whole point behind the Eurasian Union, which Putin (2013) claimed was “a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent center for global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.” This Union was designed to transcend purely economic considerations and aimed at being a mechanism “for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space.” Unfortunately, there was a missing link - Ukraine. The Kremlin failed to induce Kyiv to join their Customs Union.

Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, referring to US and EU democracy promotion, talked of “a risk of destructive and unlawful use of ‘soft power’ and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states.” The document advised for a more efficient use of Russia’s own mechanisms of soft power. Shortly after there was an increase in the presence of existing Russian actors in the area of public diplomacy (i.e. Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, International Humanitarian Cooperation and Voice of Russia) also new organizations were created (i.e. “Russki Mir” (Russian World) Foundation, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund as well English, Arabic and Spanish language news channels.

The 2004 the Ukrainian revolution and the rise of pro-Western President Yushchenko were perceived by Moscow to be the result of EU and US meddling. The worry was that Ukraine was steadily sliding into European arms, or worse, into the arms of NATO. From the outset NATO ascension was geopolitically unviable. For Russia was and is willing to commit the

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447 Ibid
448 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013)
necessary resources to raise the associated costs of Ukrainian NATO membership, making it, in the end, too expensive for both NATO and Ukraine. One of the methods used to stop movement towards ascension was the narrative that membership was a betrayal of Russian/Ukrainian unity. In 2010 NATO ascension was removed from Ukraine’s official security policy.\textsuperscript{452} To Russia Ukraine is pivotal in terms of Russian economic and military security, and also, in terms of identity.\textsuperscript{453} Considering this, Ukraine became the key target of a substantial propaganda operation to prevent further Ukrainian-Euro integration and ensure Ukrainian ascension into the Customs Union, and theoretically into the Eurasian Union.

Another narrative that gained strength during this time was “Russian world” (Русский мир), which was aimed at ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The “Russian world” narrative was especially conspicuous in official Russian discourse in the run-up to the current Ukrainian crisis. A “Russian world” that extends past the borders of the Russian Federation is not a new idea.\textsuperscript{454} The idea of the “Russian World” had already been long discussed by Russian philosophers, sociologists and political scientists before being mentioned by Putin in a 2007 address to the Russian Parliament.\textsuperscript{455,456} By including the “Russian world” into official discourse the Kremlin aimed to muster a specific understanding of this idea while weakening opposing iterations. The Kremlin’s preferred iteration was constructed on four points.

1. The “Russian world” was conceived to be a civilizational community defined by cultural rather than ethnic markers (i.e. Russian language, Orthodox Christianity and Russian culture). Putin (2007) styled the Russian language as a “living space of a multimillion Russian worlds, which is, of course, significantly wider than Russia.” The “Russian world” included “millions of ethnic Russians, native Russian speakers, their families and descendants”, as well as, “the millions of people worldwide who have chosen the Russian language as their subject of study, those who have developed an appreciation for Russia and its rich cultural heritage.”\textsuperscript{457} Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill (2009) claimed the “core of the Russian world are Russia, Ukraine, [and] Belarus.”\textsuperscript{458} Putin (2013) also reinforced this understanding by articulating the significance of Orthodox Christianity in “uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus through strong bonds of brotherhood.” A wide definition of the “Russian world” includes all Ukrainians irrespective of their ethnic, linguistic or religious background, while a tighter definition only includes Russian speakers and ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{459}

2. The “Russian world” was constructed on the common past and heritage of the Russian Federation and (the now independent) post-Soviet states. Putin (2013) claimed “Kievan

\textsuperscript{452} Feklyunina, Valentina. (2015), pg. 18 
\textsuperscript{453} Molchanov, Mikhail A. "Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations." (2002). 
\textsuperscript{456} Щедровицкий П. Русский мир: космические цели самоопределения. Независимая газета 14 February. (2000) 
\textsuperscript{458} States that are located on the territory of medieval holy Russia 
Rus started as the foundation of the enormous future Russian state, with Russians and Ukrainians as its descendants sharing common traditions, a common mentality, a common history and a common culture.” This reading inferred the Russian empire with a natural quality while disregarding examples of forcible expansion and oppression. According to Putin (2012): “for centuries, Russia developed as a civilization-state bonded by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us.” This celebrated shared history was contrasted with the aberration of present estrangement. In spite of separation from the flock the “Russian world” narrative did not explicitly question the sovereignty of the post-Soviet states. In fact, Putin (2013) continually stated that Russia had “no desire or aspiration to revive the Soviet empire.” Even so, at the same time, Russians and Ukrainians were (and still are) “one people” in terms of their shared past and shared culture. A theme echoed and reiterated by Patriarch Kirill (2009) when he described Russians and Ukrainians as ‘spiritually’ one people.

3. The “Russian world” narrative and its projected identity created a massively inconsistent graded connection between Russia and other post-Soviet states. There was conspicuous tension between the visions of the “Russian world” as a multinational civilizational space (in which Russia was one of many integral components) and that of a Russo-centric “Russian world.” On the one hand, there is the story of a civilizational identity that encompasses various cultures. On the other hand, it is the story of an ethnicity that subjugated various cultures. When speaking about the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture, Putin (2013) termed them as “part of our greater Russian, or Russian–Ukrainian, world.” This iteration of the “Russian World” was in line with the concept of medieval Russia, which included Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and much of the post-Soviet space. The underlying and unspoken claim here was that Russia has historical claim to the region. Building on this, Patriarch Kirill (2009) referred to the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan cultures as “organic parts” of the “Russian world” that had “enriched [its] multi-faceted culture.” Conceptually Russia was placed at the center of this constructed community. Being part of the “Russian world” inferred connection with Russia rather than with the Rus. The Russian World Foundation’s website claimed “all layers of the Russian world {...} are united through perception of their connection to Russia,” and that the “Russian world is the world of Russia.”

4. This projected collective identity constituted self and other by stressing the difference between the “Russian world” and the West. The result was farther movement from the idea of Russia as Europe, moving from a European/Russian in-group perception to an out-group perception. In effect, moving a perception of friends to that of the “other.” The first option breeds cooperation, friendship and trust. The latter is built on mistrust and

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463 ibid
scapegoating. The “Russian World” was fashioned as a “unique civilization” based on the “ideals of freedom, faith, spirituality, kindness, [and] conscience.” While both (Russia and Europe) have Christian heritage, the “Russian world” was invented to be distinct and superior to Europe. Europe had lost the tie to traditional Christian values Putin (2013): “without the values embedded in Christianity and other religions, without standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity.” The civilizational distinctiveness of the “Russian world” inferred that it could not duplicate Western political models, and, therefore, the only potential road to be taken is a distinct one. This conception of identity inferred specific versions of common interests. For the “Russian world” to continue to sustain its values, all of its component parts needed to come together and oppose any efforts to leave the common space. This understanding of common interests conflicts with foreign policy choices that would embody treachery against the imagined community. Membership in the EU or NATO is framed as the largest betrayal that could be imagined. At the same time, being part of the “Russian world” required closer collaboration with Russia, including membership in regional Russian sponsored integration projects.

A common characterization of Ukraine is of a country split among amid two opposing “identity complexes: (1) “Eastern Slavic identity complex”, constructed on being part of the “Russian world”, and, (2) an “ethnic Ukrainian identity complex”, based on dissociating with Russia and integrating into Europe.

White and Feklyunina (2014) argue that acknowledging only two competing identity complexes is shortsighted. In fact, there are three narratives at work in the Ukraine:

(1) European Ukraine.
A conception, in which Ukrainians are distinctly different from Russians, that is buttressed by a distinct Ukrainian language and historical accounts of Russian oppression, and, appeals to the idea of Ukraine’s historical belonging to Europe. The emphasis is the normative superiority of the democratic values associated with the European integration project. The good times are sold to be at the end of the golden road of European economic prosperity and that this road leads to healing and moving past the traumatic CCCP experience.

(2) Ukraine as part of the “Russian world”
Here the Russian language is the primary identity marker and is bolstered by a “remember good times” mentality, in which the historical relationship with Russia is sold as a fond memory of better times.

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466 Patriarch Kirill (2009)
469 White, Stephen, and Valentina Feklyunina. "Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus." New York: Palgrave Macmillan 10 (2014)
As with any narratives, these resonate with some audiences more than others (one of the main points of this research is to examine the degree of acceptance across the populational spectrum), acceptance of the “Russian world” narrative was (for the most part) accepted by ethnic Russians and members of the political class “who articulated the vision of self as an “Alternative Europe.” In Crimea, the political party Russian Unity embraced the idea and served as a major force that pushed the referendum to be amenable expanded upon by the Russian Federation. The southeastern-based Party of Regents also attempted to push alternative Europe. Though they had considerable less success when a number of their key members rejected many of the tenants involved. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church embraced alternative Europe.

An organic regional “Russian” community was frequently summoned by and described as “a unique civilizational thousand-year unity of our peoples.” In this context the “Russian world” “does not deny our countries, our peoples, or our national languages or cultures.” Here the foundation of belonging to the “Russian world” laid in common religious roots. Though for some the connection lay in the Soviet past, which the frames the “Russian world” as fundamentally different from a declining West. At the same time the more forceful Russian hand in setting the agenda in the post-Soviet space was understood as reinforcing a pre-existing collective identity. Dmytro Tabachnyk wrote that the 2008 Georgian-Russian war was confirmation that “from now onwards any attempt to exercise aggression or force towards any part of the Russian cultural world will be suppressed by Russia.”

Acceptance of being part of the “Russian world” necessarily places Ukrainian and the interests of the Russian Federation as one and the same. Symonenko (2013) views full Ukrainian “participation in the Eurasian integration processes” as the first measure of “maintaining civilizational identity.” Russian Unity leader Sergey Aksyonov (2013) often claimed, “Our strength is in unity and solidarity {with the “Russian world”}.

The “Russian world” narrative emboldened unconditional belonging to the wants and wishes of Russian Federation while the “Greater Europe” narrative saw belonging to the “Russian world” as being conditional on Ukrainian status. There was an acceptance of cultural affinity with Russia, but also an emphasized distinctness that challenges the intrinsic hierarchical structure in which Russia is the natural core. To Volodymyr Zubanov (deputy head of the Party of Regions faction) the “Russian world” is too narrow. As such, he supports a “Slavic Europe” narrative.

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471 Ibid
“Slavic Europe” is more encompassing and (more importantly) validates Ukraine as the “cradle of Slavdom.” To the “Slavic Europeans”, Russian coercion of Kyiv away from the EU has a negative tenor.

The closer Ukraine got to signing the association agreement with the EU, the stronger Moscow flexed its coercive strength. The more flex projected by Russia, the more adamant was the rejection of the “Russian world” narrative. Both sides painted the situation as having only two options: “loyalty” or “betrayal”. Olena Bondarenko (Party of Regions member) pointed out the fallacy in these two choices, as “Ukraine hasn’t taken up a job of Russia’s soldier or scout.” Russia’s conduct of coercion refuted their projected narrative of Russian/Ukrainian friendship, for friendship requires “mutual compromises, mutually beneficial contracts, patience [and] understanding” rather than “blackmail, ultimatums, [and] insults.” The fact that Russia was not willing to negotiate on cheaper gas drove the belief of divergent Russian/Ukrainian interests. The feeling was that friendship is incompatible with “profiteering on a friend.”

The “Russian world” narrative was most vehemently rejected by the “Ukraine as Europe” audience, a narrative that is most populous in western Ukraine, especially supported by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and numerous political parties aiming at capturing the nationalist vote. Patriarch Filaret stressed that critical to the Ukrainian identity was an independent (from Moscow) Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian language. Positive reminiscing of the common past was overshadowed by historical grievances, which confirmed (to this audience) their perception of the “Russian world” as being an oppressive world. Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2013) (who became head of post-Yanukovych government):

“what did we have in the [common] past apart from Holodomor, Stalin, {...} executed priests, burnt down churches [and] destroyed genetic code of the Ukrainian nation.”

Archbishop Evstratiy Zorya claimed “that by accepting itself as a “country of the Russian world” Ukraine would have to accept itself as Russia’s colony.” Russian pressure leading up to the 2013 EU summit in Vilnus was viewed as strong-arming that had to at all costs be opposed. Yatsenyuk (2013) talks about the Ukrainian/Russian relationship as a “wall of threats, hostility and trade wars.” In this narrative, Ukraine and Russia are not part of the same imagined community, and therefore have foundationally different interests.

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477 Ibid
478 Ibid
The “Russian world” identity was mostly accepted by political players who subscribed to the “Alternative Europe” narrative, and, was generally was rejected by those subscribing to the “Ukraine as Europe” narrative. The “Greater Europe” audience accepted cultural similarity with Russia but spurned Russian declarations of supremacy.

To what extent is the “Russian world” identity acceptable to the populations of Ukraine? According to a Razumkov Center (2013) survey few respondents were even aware of “Patriarch Kirill’s doctrine of the Russian world.” Counter intuitively, the most respondents aware of this creed were found in west Ukraine (36.3%). The smallest aware percentage was in the east (12.9%). The larger awareness percentage of the west may be attributed to a visceral rejection of any border transcendent identity emanating from Moscow. The eastern populations reacted less viscerally, and hence less likely was the narrative to attract media attention. There was divided assessment among respondents (familiar with the “Russian world” border transcendent identity) when asked about their perception about (Russian) goals driving the narrative. Western respondents (78.3%) saw the “Russian world” as being driven by restoration of empire. Conversely, southern (14.8%) and eastern (28.6%) respondents perceived the “Russian world” in terms of empire restoration. Moreover, a majority of Southern (59.5%) and eastern (70.5%) respondents perceived that the “Russian world” supported the “spiritual unity of the brotherly ... peoples.”

Between 2010 and 2013 the overall percentage of respondents that perceived the “Russian world” as empire restoration rose (2010 -30.4%; 2013-48.4%). At the same time, respondents who viewed the “Russian world” positively fell (2010-48.4%; 2013-39.7%).

The suggestion is that the Kremlin was not especially effective in marketing the “Russian world” to Ukrainian populations. Yet it is important to recognize levels of tacit approval or rejection, which can be achieved by considering prevailing feelings towards pre-crisis Ukrainian/Russian integration. In March-April 2012, close to half of southern respondents (47%) and a majority of eastern respondents (60%) supported joining Russia’s Customs Union. On the other hand, western respondents showed much less (7%) support for the Customs Union and great support (70%) for joining the EU. There were also noteworthy regional disparities in what respondents anticipated from integration with Russia. A 2013 survey showed that in the south and the east (59% and 53%, respectively) there was an expectation that joining the Customs Union would positively affect the economy. Comparatively, in the west the percentage (22%) that expected Customs Union to bring positive results was much lower. Therefore, it can be claimed that part of the Russian allure was potential economic gains. Though, it can also be claimed that these expectations were disproportionately spread across the regions, with much higher expectations in the south and east than in west, where low expectations reigned supreme.

The varied response to which the “Russian world” narrative was met indicates that weight of Russian soft power was essentially limited to one out of three audiences (an audience consisting of mostly of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the south-east). Also, the amount of civic support significantly declined in the years leading to the present crisis. The supporters of the “Russian world” narrative viewed more forceful Russian policies in the immediate region as

483 Razumkov Centre pg. 14, Украина-2013: Державно-конфесійний відносини. Національна безпечн

138:(1): 3–15

484 Ibid


confirmation of the Kremlin’s willingness to protect the “Russian world” community. Though, on the other hand, those who subscribed to the other two narratives were pushed farther away as Russian pressure increased. In Crimea, both the public and politicians prodigiously backed being part of the “Russian world.” However, supporting the Russian border transcendent identity did/does not necessarily come with an innate willingness towards separatism.

The present crisis has fractured the Ukrainian national identity, and thus created space for more populational lobbyist to market their particular identity narrative. More space to work means the possibility of a larger and more diversified platform. Not only has there been an uptick of available identity narratives to choose from, but also more robust efforts from the classic actors. For example, the extra space allows the Russians to market a number of what Rosselle et al. (2014) calls “issue narratives,” (i.e. fear of fascist leanings emanating from Kyiv). This narrative simplified the “transfer of power to pro-Russian forces” and ultimately, territorial expansion into Crimea. Though, Russian lobbyists were not able to garner enough across the board support in the Southeast towards gaining more territory than Crimea. Only parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions actively moved towards separatism, and even in these regions it is “questionable whether this could have happened without the involvement of Russian operatives.” 487

The above narrative analysis comes to the same conclusion as the main text analysis in which Ukraine is parsed into 4 sub-populations. The conclusion: the populations who have placed hope confidence in the Kremlin and actively push towards being expanded upon by the Russian federation are located primarily in the far east, is an 90/10 split of Ukrainian territory. The expectation is that only the Ethnic Russians will embrace the “Russian World” and that support from outside of ethnic Russians will steadily decline as it has a converse relationship to the amount of Russian pressure applied. On the other hand, support towards moving towards Europe (outside of ethnic Russians) will continue to increase as more Russian pressure is applied.

487 Feklyunina, Valentina. (2015), pg. 18