Judges and Mass Litigation - a (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective

Biard, Alexandre Pierre (2014) Judges and Mass Litigation - a (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in European doctorate in law and economics, 27 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/6742.
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Judicial duties have for decades extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being progressively called upon to occupy the role of social engineers. Meanwhile, contexts in which judges evolve have transformed: mass damage nowadays tends to multiply and create new challenges not only for legal actors, but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ strong interest in seeing judiciaries play prominent and leading roles in the supervision and monitoring of procedures which enable groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by mass events. Judges are thus expected to be neutral and robust agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden. Insights from social sciences however invite us to revisit policymakers expectations and may shed new light on current debates about mass litigation.

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Biard, Alexandre Pierre
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
mass litigation, collective redress, judges, behavioural economics, class action, rational choice theory
Data di discussione
15 Dicembre 2014

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