The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

Chahar, Vijit Singh (2014) The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Law and economics, 26 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/6726.
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This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Chahar, Vijit Singh
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
agency theory, agency cost, corporate law, corporate governance, shareholder proposal, shareholder rights, Rule 14a-8, public choice, constitutional law, direct democracy, initiative, referendum,
Data di discussione
10 Ottobre 2014

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