Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna

DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN

Diversity Management and Governance
Ciclo XXV

Settore Concorsuale di afferenza:
14/B2 - STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, DELLE SOCIETA' E DELLE ISTITUZIONI EXTRAEUROPEE

Settore Scientifico disciplinare:
SPS/06 - STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

Building Peace and/or Gender Equality.

Presentata da: Sabrina Aguiari

Coordinatore Dottorato
Prof. Stefano Bianchini

Relatore
Dr. Giovanna Guerzoni

Esame finale anno 2014
# Table of contents

## Introduction 5

**Space for women in ideals of peacebuilding: definitions and parlance of international cooperation.** 10

- Does peacebuilding like gender? 12
- Evaluating and chasing successful peace 16
- The effort to remain gender blind 22
- The feminist critique of peacebuilding 25

## Peacebuilding initiatives in postgenocide Rwanda: understanding the place for gender priorities through a review of evaluations 34

- Methodology of the evaluation review 34
- Why a review of evaluations on Rwanda? 37
- Examining metaevaluations first 41
- Conclusions from the metaevaluation review. 51
- The reviews of the evaluations: focus on Rwanda 52
- The finding of the reviews 92
- Changing frameworks for evaluating post-conflict interventions 96

## Is Gender Equality Inhumane? Exploring the limits of the concept of ‘human security’ 106

- The Sex Of The Leviathan 106
- The debut of Human Security in International Relations 108
- Rethinking the link between the military and peace 110
- Creating the workshops for forging human security 111
- Governments making sense of human security 112
- Environment or human rights? 114
- Fitting human security in international relations studies 115
- So, where did the women hide? 119
- Constructive reflections: few ideas for a more all-people centered HS 125

## Gender advancement and GBV persistence: exploring links between gender equality and human security in Rwanda 128

- Pervasivity of the gender based violence 128
- Explaining GBV and Domestic Violence 129
Gender equality in Rwanda and the relevance of GBV

Table 1. Timeline of Rwandan Laws and key initiatives to promote gender equality

Defining and outlawing GBV

Data on GBV in Rwanda

Table 2 Comparison of data women experiencing violence and spousal violence proceeding from Demographic and Health Survey 2005 and 2010

Reporting GBV

Table 3: Sexual violence by age and sex reported by Rwanda district Hospitals in 2008

Table 4: Sexual violence – 2008/2011

Table 5: Sexual violence by age and sex reported by Rwanda district Hospitals in 2010

Experiences and perceptions of GBV

Table 6: Types of GBV cases that respondents have heard about or witnessed

Table 7: Women’s Acceptance of wife’s beating over time

Table 8: Women’s opinion on when a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with husband

The emerging patterns and the gaps in understanding GBV

Conclusions and further developments

Bibliography

APPENDIX

N1 – No gender sensitivity and no gender awareness

N2 – Extreme superficiality in checking off a section on gender

N3 – Simple approach in the evaluation: gender = women

Y10 – The gender sensitive evaluations on gender focused programmes

Y01 Gender Sensitive evaluation on gender blind program
Introduction

That ‘peace times’ following international or civil conflicts but also violent revolutions might come with unequal share of the dividend for men and women is an issue which has been discussed since World War II, and constantly receives updates from the events of history.

Wars as we have known them until recent (pre-drone era and pre-terrorist attack) have both significantly impacted and put additional burden of work and violence particularly on women. But they have also opened up to situations that made acceptable for women and the rest of society to step into male roles, functions and type of jobs. Those practical, social, economical and symbolic movements of women criss-crossing gender patterns in exceptional and emergency times of conflict and war, have been often followed by conservative reinstatement of pre-war and patriarchal-inspired order, with less changes and advancement in real options if compared with the range of roles and functions experienced by women in times of conflict or of upheavals, as civilians or as combatants.

A ‘minor’, non mainstreamed, but solid narrative has been constructed by authors analyzing gender in conflict and post conflict transformation from a feminist standpoint. Their work has recognized that the sensitive time called the ‘window of opportunities’ in peace and conflict studies and in policy-making, which typically follows a peace agreement, is often a time in which the relative gender equality gains for women - obtained during conflict with the reshuffling of gender roles - are lost, and the progress towards women’s empowerment and freedom to access a broader range of opportunities and socio-economic roles are reversed, to the advantage of maximizing availability of more (paid) jobs for men, or for keeping space in decision making seats. Ultimately, to maintain a symbolic patriarchal order in a more familiar condition, as it was a more comfortable and familiar frame in which to (re-)implant peace for the society. What has
been also emerging out of this line of researches, is that violence against women does not diminish with the signing of a peace agreements nor with the return of soldiers home. Actually, there might be evidence to say it increases.

On the other side, since 1975 the UN has promoted Conference on the Status of Women in which there has been dedicated discussions, studies and outcoming policy document to urge for positive actions to address the condition of women during conflict and in post conflict. Since 1995, with the Beijing Conference, a full-fledged plan of action was approved, to disseminate knowledge on the many forms of gender inequalities and to indicate concrete objectives to aim at in order to address the gender gap. Specific chapter was dedicated to Women and Armed Conflict, urging at increasing women participation in conflict resolution settings, which is in high level political positions and international relations stage, in parallel with reduction in military spending and increase of women’s protection initiatives and regulations. But military expenditures did not shrink since then. After a relative fall in budget allocated which was observed during the ‘90s in several region of the world, it started to rise again from 1999. According to SIPRI in 2010 it was $1.6 trillion at current prices compared to $745 billion in 1999, with a sharp 50% rise between 2001 and 2010. Did gender equality permeated the initiatives and values of international community in post conflict settings though? Definitely, a significant corpus of policies and international laws was forged under the impulse and the indefatigable work of women’s right activists and movements, even if the concept of peacebuilding initially resisted the sensitization on gender. But what about actual post conflict interventions to contribute to (re-)build peace and the country? Was the international community championing gender equality through the resources channeled in post conflict countries? This research wants to contribute the answer to this question by focusing on the case of Rwanda. Why Rwanda? Because it is a patriarchal society, which underwent a period of ‘legitimate’ (government sponsored) sexual violence against women, which has seen high flow of international funds in post genocide cooperation interventions (both in those explicitly called of peacebuilding and reconciliation in all those aiming at reconstruction and economic development, and which has now reached substantial achievements in tackling gender inequality) becoming a regional leader for gender equality and women’s leadership, with currently the highest world percentage of female parliamentarians members. Also because while it can be labeled as a case of pure failure of the peacekeeping operation, in which troops were unable to predict let alone prevent the eruption of the genocide in the attempt to enforce the 1993 Arusha Peace
Accord, nevertheless the case of post genocide Rwanda can be seen as a success of peace building, as no relapse into violent conflict was observed in the 10 (now even 20) years past the 1994 genocide.

There is an additional reason in the evolution of this research that has suggested the choice of Rwanda. One of the very pillars of the definition of democracy in political theory is still the concept of respecting minority rights in an environment where decision making shall follow majority rule. The pathways for the recognition of the rights of minorities and of the rights of women at international level have crossed each other but progress was made at different speeds, almost as if less resistance historically opposed to the idea of guaranteeing minorities as opposed to women from discrimination and oppression. In Rwanda the statebuilding strategy adopted early after the genocide and particularly in the last decade has implied the banning of all discussions and conversations about ethnicity. Conversely, discussions around gender inequality and the need for law making and positive actions have been predominantly promoted. Indeed the attention around inequalities created in society by gendered identities have substituted the focus on ethnicity and on the injustices endured or perpetrated along ethnic identities. Both are now widely intended as social constructs, in Rwanda as well, but only one has maintained right of political citizenship in the country. The singularity of this substitution, when compared to other contemporary post-genocide countries, played a definitive argument in choosing Rwanda as the case to study in a dissertation of a Diversity Management and Governance course of doctoral study, in which much attention was dedicated to the construction of ethnicity and gender.

Through a review of project and program evaluations in chapter 2, the research explores the level of commitment of the international community to gender equality agenda, and attempts to understand if this advancement in gender situation is an outcome of international cooperation work. Once proposed an answer to the initial question, the research attempts a closer look at women’s condition, particularly at their level of security, sustaining that the ideal condition of peace in a society, if dependent on the definition of ‘human security’, might be ill-equipped to guarantee peace for all, especially for women. In chapter three it is contended the very concept of human security might have developed a mindset in International Relations that betrays the inclusiveness of its very universalistic expression, and does not help focusing on the real experience of insecurity and violence that women experience even in times under peace. Positive expansion of the concept are reviewed and proposed, so that the real
experiences not of a minority, but of a majoritarian group, is considered relevant in understanding and gauging the level of security – and violence – in a post conflict society.

Now, a common denominator in the varied and composite world of feminist activism and studies across time, space and cultures is reworking the theoretical division between the private and the public sphere. The critique contends that the very distinction between private and public spheres resides first on their arbitrary separation and then on the distinct attribution of functions and roles on the two recognized (at the time of its first formulation, in the ’70s) sexes.

The rationale for conducting a research on the definition (in international settings) of peace in connection to gender equality and for exploring transformation in patterns of violence between sexes (in a specific country) is rooted in this ground of feminist vision of life, that cannot avoid to see the irrelevance of discourses on peace and security that do not take into account real conditions and experiences to which are structurally and probabilistically exposed not just a set of minorities, but the majority of population.

In this paradigm, sexual and even domestic violence, perpetrated in familiar and non public (visible, and of shared interest) spaces, are hardly separated in substance from sexual violence in war or peacetimes. More recently, this connection between private and public has been thoroughly explored and has led to better understanding of the phenomenology and prevalence of sexual and gender based violence within and outside the household. But it has also led to a much bolder narrative with respect to the connection between the private and the public sphere of behaviors. Theoretical frameworks are emerging which formulate a correlation (Hudson et alii 2012) or even a causal dependency (Cockburn 2010) between level of inequality and level of violence, not only private but also public: they find similarity between societal gender patterns that create inequalities and legitimize gender violence, and violent conflict and militarization at a country level, and then re-collect evidence to show how this set of variables changes consistently with the assumption. High level of domestic violence might be a predictor of country level violence. Therefore philosophical discussions and political critiques of human security are now starting to be corroborated by large set of data.

Along these new debates, relevant to international studies as much as to anthropological theories, chapter four intends to contribute to pertinent knowledge development on human security in Rwanda by answering a second research question: if
peacebuilding operations have overall been successful (at least in the sense that public violence did not break back in), and significant steps to fill the gender gap have been undertaken over the years, how prevalent is instead gender based violence in country and what are the trends observed over the years after the genocide? Existing secondary data have thus been gathered and compared and an analysis is proposed. Conclusive statements on the evolution of the phenomenon are nevertheless not possible with the available information; therefore directions for further research and investigation are outlined.

Methodology used encompasses literature review (comprising studies, research, institutional reports, as well as national and international legal and policy documents, national parliament proceedings), secondary data review, and unstructured interviews with key informants.
Space for women in ideals of peacebuilding: definitions and parlance of international cooperation.

The definition of peacebuilding in the foundational document that brought the concept in the parlance of UN, the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* of Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, is formulated around its aim, which is “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Few lines before in the same document, peacebuilding is described as the UN assistance in a variety of different post-conflict contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures after civil wars, but also “building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war”. This newly allowed function in a changing international equilibrium opened by the Berlin-wall fall, not bi-polar anymore, is presented together with other three functions: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (diplomacy and international politics under the limitations of Chapter VI of the UN Charter), and peacekeeping. The entire group of functions is presented as necessary to “address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”, resulting of a new “moral perception” spanning around the world.

From elaboration of the *Agenda for Peace* of the concept of peacebuilding, two different unexpressed criteria of success can be derived: one more minimalist, as the avoidance of relapse into conflict, and another one more ambitious, as the actual treatment (if not resolution) of root causes of conflict.

A new definition of peacebuilding proposed by the UN Secretary General in 2001 opts for the more complex version, and for underlying the importance of always having peacebuilding elements in the mandates of any peacekeeping missions. The suggested list of avenues for enacting peacebuilding that is proposed is quite comprehensive:

---

“The Security Council recognizes that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence, or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian, and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.”

The role of the military activities and development cooperation in progressing towards peace is not exclusive at all, and instead they are inscribed in a complex setting, in which they result portrayed as not the most effective tool – for the standard of international community – in order to achieve lasting peace. More then defined by the sum of specific technical cooperation sectors, peacebuilding is defined generically as those “actions” that aim at sustainable development, eradication of poverty, enjoyment of human rights and political participation activities is posited as a necessary component, constituted by a complex set of activities to interact with a multiplicity of aspects of life of a society – included social and economic. Tackling “root causes of conflict” becomes more explicitly a guiding criterion to design interventions and to evaluate results.

This definition, enlarged to incorporate forms of government and development, with explicit relevance of human rights, culture of legality and of peace and non-violence, brings in the multiple needs societies, introducing a focus on the population that the first definition lacked. While it is recalled that “international efforts in peace-building must complement and not supplant the essential role of the country concerned”, the State is mentioned to introduce a *memento* for international community actors to coordinate with the National bodies and cooperate in developing plans for peacebuilding activities, but it is not presented as the central actor in the scene. This change in the relative importance reserved to the State can be seen as the reflex of the international environment transformation and of the structural challenges that an interstate organization as the UN has taken on with involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in situations of intra-State conflict and of failing States, whose legitimacy is.

---


3 The verb used in the text, “eradication”, comes from public health language and refers to the condition of final destruction of any family of virus that could create a certain sickness, while “elimination” is a milder concept which only refers to the absence of epiphenomenal illness, without reference to the genetical hidden level which is instead included by the term “eradication”.

contested by part of its very citizens, thus creating unprecedented situations of vacancy of authority.

**Does peacebuilding like gender?**

Comparing these two profiles of what UN peacebuilding is and shall be, another difference emerges. In the two official UN definitions here recalled the relative importance of gender issues presents a progressive transformation over the years.

In the *Agenda*, democracy and respect of human rights are tight together. In a part of the text very close to the important passage where it is also introduced the new possibility for the senior UN officer to become the crisis-related SG Representative as a way to reinforce the coordination and effectiveness of UN agencies, which has presented a significant change in the UN governance, it is said that for democracy to exist it “requires as well a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, especially women and children.”

While the minorities are here connected with ‘rights’, the vulnerable, and particularly the women and children, are connected with ‘needs’. While the value as well as the UN tradition of protection of minorities is here re-stated on a legal basis, the right, in a very asymmetric fashion the very majority of the population, which is the sum of women and children, is presented as having specific and particular, therefore outside the norm, needs to be considered. This statement reveals an approach that is actually quite prevalent in the international community and in classic international relations. There are two features in it that need to be remarked. On one side, the concept of minority is subtly introduced in the Agenda as an absolutely key issue connected with causes of conflict, in a causal relationship. Since ethnic groups are a much larger number then Nation States, although “[t]he United Nations has not closed its door, [y]et if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.”

On the other side, the reference to the group of “women and children” is not to one that might challenge peace. In the parlance of many UN documents in the 90’s as well as in the first decade of 2000, the general and generic category of women is identified, isolated, and connotated mostly as being in need of something. A group identity of powerlessness and passivity is continuously and consistently reinforced, by bundling women and children together,

---

4 Agenda for Peace: par.84.
who – by exclusion – appear in need to be protected by the male subject from violence while also needing guidance. This expression, that considers acceptable the agglutination of potentially enormous numbers of people into a category with no further differentiation, can be read as the expression of a very situated discourse, enacted by a collective subject who has no risk of happening to be in that bundle, and who is not interested – because experientially extraneous – to further articulate and understand that group. By definition, the members of this group are also innocent, and innocuous. In the *Agenda for Peace* of 1992, no involvement of vulnerable groups in decision making is foreseen, and they are not portrayed as capable of agency (or in need of empowerment). In the same paragraph, social stability is presented as linked to the possibility of economic improvements.

A different vision was developed over the years, passing through the strong momentum gained by gender issues at the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. In the Platform for action gender equality in post conflict is seen as a way to create peace, through “participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation”

, and “promotion of women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace”

. Both protection and women’s empowerment, which foster the agency and independence of the ‘female’ collective subject, are considered, and the insistence on impact of armed conflict on women combined with the claim for more women in decision making contributes to portray women as a reliable and collectivity-concerned political subject capable to ushering peace. In this document the root causes to address are not the ones causing war, but displacement especially of “women and children” “with a view to preventing it and, when appropriate, facilitate their return or resettlement”

. In continuity with this position, but displaying a small ‘quantum jump’ towards more radical values of gender equality, is the vision expressed in the above mentioned *Statement of 2001*, where it is affirmed that the UN Security Council (UNSC) “stresses the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective into peace agreements and peace-building strategies and of involving women in all peace-building measures”

, and where peacebuilding is described as the set of activities to address “the root causes of war”, recommending the involvement, not just the protection of women. This bolder approach must have uneasily gained official ground, as it can be observed a leap from a precedent and highly central report, which was just made public one year before. The year before

---


6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem.

8 Statement by the President of The Security Council. (20 February 2001).
the UNSC had approved indeed the 1325 resolution, on “Peace, Women and War”, which points firmly to the need to involve women in peace negotiations and in peacebuilding, so to incorporate their point of view and needs. This resolution is less than half way between the track of protection, and the track of empowerment, with a resonance of patriarchal language pointing at women’s weaknesses as analysed by Puechguirbal (2010)\(^9\), although it ultimately calls for women’s participation as an essential element to increase chances of successful peacebuilding processes, including in the diplomatic part. The resolution builds on the many cases of informal participation of women to peace process and on the recognition of the enormous role, as a collective subject, that they play in reconstruction – and reeducation – of society. In the preparation for the workplan for its implementation, written five years afterwards, a bolder option for empowerment is shown\(^10\), although no reference is made to a key element co-creating women’s vulnerability: the key issue of lack of entitlements and property rights.

After the UNSCR 1325, a series of further resolutions has been proposed and accepted on the theme of peace, women and security, with a crescendo showing stronger focus on gender equality in peacebuilding, but also at the same time some level of ineffectiveness of the instruments. The series is quite continuous: Security Council Resolutions 1820 (2008)\(^11\) and 1888 (2009)\(^12\) focus on sexual violence in war and on institutions for prosecuting it; 1889 (2009)\(^13\) again calls on for more women’s participation in peace processes and peace building, included at high level; 1960 (2010)\(^14\) and 2106 (2013)\(^15\) re-condemn sexual violence in war, which risk to impede – when used as warfare attack to civilians, to undermine peace processes, and 2122 (2013)\(^16\) again pointing at the need to better articulate information from missions with a gender relevance, and to increase participation and level of decision making of women in peace processes.


http://www.peacewomen.org/portal_resources_resource.php?id=1040

\(^11\) http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/scr-1820-the-text

\(^12\) http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/scr-1888-the-text

\(^13\) http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/scr-1889-the-text

\(^14\) http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/scr-1960-the-text


The creation of the UN Commission for Peacebuilding (2005) has been another important step that has strongly contributed to consolidate the norm incorporating gender in peace operations. The lessons learnt developed by the commission working on gender in 2008 densely connects together arguments for making the point of centrality of gender in a manner unprecedented in intergovernmental settings. Even if the document is just a note, the framework of gender and security suggested by the different speakers tights straight SGBV with security and posits it as an international concern, while pointing and the need for reconstruction to address past legacy of gender inequality. Nevertheless, also its work is considered more helpful on the theoretical and normative level than on real implementation.

In conclusion, the conceptualization of gender relevance in official UN discourse of peacebuilding has been slow and diluted, and rarely the sources indulge on arguing and expressing the reasons they move from for seeking the inclusion of gender topic and for gender mainstreaming. Next, we will be now considering the most mainstream criteria for deciding what a success in peacebuilding looks like, to observe if concerns towards gender equality as a potential element interplaying with conflict and peace conditions have been raised by sources accessible to the community designing, implementing and evaluating peacebuilding. Indeed, the lack of gender focus in post conflict interventions has been thoroughly analysed and described by feminist critique. Then key arguments of these critiques will be used, to contrast them with in the following chapter with a selection of evaluation of interventions, as end of project or end of program, but also as thematic evaluation. By focusing on the case of Rwanda, it will be attempted to understand what real weight has been given to gender in the realization of cooperation initiatives that can be considered of peacebuilding even in absence of a peacekeeping mission to accompany. Rwanda is a quintessential case for many reasons, as argued below, included that since the international community felt a deep ‘guilt’ in the incapacity of preventing the massacre of the genocide (recognized partially as a legacy of colonialism), notwithstanding the high level of involvement that it had in the country for decades before the genocide of 1994; the post-genocide interventions were therefore all strongly operating in the horizon of fostering the re-creation of (a new) peace, and the peace discourse was pervasive in post-conflict interventions.

Evaluating and chasing successful peace

When in 2000 the Secretary General Kofi Annan established a Commission to review peace and security activities and to provide recommendation for bettering these operations by providing recommendations and “frank advices”, the resulting output, the so called Brahimi Report\(^{18}\), surprisingly overlooked completely the issue of protection of women and in general any reference to gender analysis of the peacekeeping intervention. Since the SGs work of reviewing and presenting to the General Assembly the ‘state of the art’ on specific sector of UN activities, it can be considered a policy document which comprehends an evaluation.

In the case of the Brahimi Report, the entire evaluation is conducted with a formal approach that focuses strictly on the conduction of operations and not on the interaction with beneficiary population and with the context in which operations are conducted. The authors strictly keep this focus, with the result of providing recommendations mostly on internal governance and procedures, or on criteria regarding staff and personnel. Even effectiveness is interpreted and elaborated as effective leadership because, it is said, “the United Nations must first agree on basic parameters for defining what “rapidity” and “effectiveness” entail”.\(^{19}\) The main recommendation resulting on peacebuilding is to improve the planning and implementation capacity. Few programmatic orientations are suggested (focus on elections, use of civilian police to work more on Rule of Law component). There is no substantial reference to gender issues and how to position them within a peacekeeping intervention. While there is no reference to the many scandals of gender based violence perpetrated and fostered by peacekeepers in a number of missions, as it emerged during the 90s’, it is several times restated the need for ‘equitable’ choices in terms of human resources, balancing staff both geographically and by sex, especially at the high level positions for decision making.

Beside this official document, intended to provide a framework for identifying successful (and also not so positive) cases of peacebuilding, literature on theory of evaluation of peacebuilding has been growing in the last decade significantly, mostly proceeding from practitioners’ environment. In academic and UN environment instead we observe a production of researches and essays on the criteria to judge when a peacekeeping and a peacebuilding intervention can be called successful.

The debate on how to evaluate peacebuilding has developed over the 90’s and then on last


\(^{19}\) Ibidem, par.86.
decade not only along the OECD DAC guidelines for evaluations, the official result of think
tank of governmental donor community, which have indeed been reviewed and adapted to in
conflict and post-conflict interventions; but rather independently, mostly with the involvement
of practitioners’ communities.

The work for the definition of the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
framework is a project itself that attempted to provide a formal outlet to programming derived
experiences. Kenneth Bush\(^{20}\) initially marked the direction for this project remarking the
common misleading approach to evaluation of peacebuilding that looks at it as it was a set of
actions, instead of an impact. The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management\(^{21}\) has continued the work, producing two handbooks, and offering a guide to
practitioner for conflict-sensitive assessment as well as peacebuilding project evaluations. The
text proposes the different aspects to consider in the conflict environment, the suitability of
available resources, the type of support potentially encountered by different stakeholders. In the
attempt to move on from Bush (1998)\(^{22}\) initial frame, Hoffmann suggests without exploring it,
the possibility of agreeing a set of minimal indicators on the model of Sphere for Humanitarian
interventions. Bush did include a minimal set of criteria for impact evaluation, focusing on the
effects interventions (and conflict) on: 1) access to resources; 2) socio-economic tensions 3)
substantial change on food security; 4) current political socio-economic structure, including the
focus on food security.

It the list the domains on which to look for specific impact, change caused by the
intervention on: the institutional capacity to adjust to conflict and promote peace, on level of
violence and on institutional capacity to control it through different approach, on political actors
and situation, on economic conditions and activities, and on social conditions and
“Empowerment”. Despite the use of the word that in those times was almost exclusively
connected with gender asymmetry, and in particular referred to women, neither the first
(Hoffman, 2001) nor the second handbook (Hoffman 2004) mention gender sensitive analysis
and possible criteria, simply missing on the possibility of articulating or recommending gender
sensitive evaluations for a reliable assessment of the situation. Being conflict centered, gender

---


\(^{22}\) Bush (1998).
patterns must have been considered irrelevant and not capable to influence conflict dynamics. On a side note, it shall be noted that when the handbook refers to principle of ‘do no harm’ (in design stage as well as ex post) it points at potential effects on ‘particular social groups such as the elderly, children, women, or communities and Institutions’, almost revealing in saying so a unaware male-only (and in reproductive age) subject which is the point of observation assumed to be the norm, opposed to the vulnerable ones.

Critical on the possibility of assessing impact, also on the basis of the Utstein Study is Spurk (2008) who recalls the major issues that peace and development project normally show: “Lack of planning” and in many cases of “a system-wide analysis of the conflict environment”, the otherwise often “weak connection between conflict analysis and the intervention itself” when not missing, the vague formulation of project goals, “often so general (‘contribution to peace’) that they were not measurable and overly ambitious.” And last but not least, the “need for a baseline study for the project was not shared or understood”

He suggests therefore to bring the discussion back to regular programming evaluation category, and on following the necessary programming phases. The lack of reflection on what peace would look like, essential in giving value to an impact, does not though find a place in his critique of PCIA. In his contribution, neither formal (correctness towards requirement of gender sensitivity) nor content-related (relevance of gender dynamics to peace or conflict) are suggested as part of a more traditional programming and outcomes oriented approach.

Derived from development and participatory analysis of case studies of intervention in post conflict situations, the work of Mary Anderson Do No harm (1999) has become a classic of international cooperation, and first re-known experience of critical elaboration of collective reflections of practitioners fostered to obtain a very grounded evaluation. While it is not a research on peacebuilding, the a study is intended as a guidance to identify critical elements to be considered for much needed conflict-sensitive assessment in complex post conflict settings, in order to first “do no harm” with uninformed interventions potentially channeling resources to divisive stakeholders (dividers as opposed to connectors, in a relational but also constantly changing set up), ending up supporting warfare with humanitarian aid, and secondly to use resources to activate the “local capacities for peace”.

---

The attention of Andersen on effectiveness of peace work continues in Andersen & Olson (2003), again not in a destructive discourse of practical peacebuilding intervention but with the clear intent of contributing to increase its results. Peace work is recognized and self perceived, in a collaborative analysis conducted by the authors, as fluid and “all over the map”, and with outcomes inextricably linked to means. Although finding a consensual definition of what peacebuilding is results a virtually impossible enterprise, a consensus on two main feature was reached: “Stopping Violence and Destructive Conflict. When agencies work to end war, their programs are aimed at ending cycles of violence which become a cause for continued war, getting warring sides to negotiate and fighters to disarm, mobilizing the public against continued war, etc.” and “Building Just and Sustainable Peace. When agencies focus on supporting social change, their programs are focused on addressing political, economic, and social grievances that may be driving conflict. Such changes are seen as foundations for sustainable peace.”

The effectiveness in peacebuilding needs to be evaluated at lest at two different levels: the program level and the “peace writ large” level. While the first one resembles to more usual evaluation exercise of cooperation, the second one involves more complexity, because it requires gauging “changes in the overall environment that did or did not come about as a result of actions taken. Assessing effectiveness at this level puts the onus on agencies to look for changes outside the things for which they are directly responsible. They must assess how their efforts have, or have not, supported the ending of violence or the achievement of justice.”

The authors also identifies how theories and beliefs of peace might divert the attention on effectiveness and keep the focus only on process and project results, but missing to satisfy on the existing need of the same peace practitioners who want to understand connection between peace projects and the ultimate impacts but the lack of articulation of theory of changes prevents these types of analysis. The document proposes four criteria to assess effectiveness, or in other word success, of a peacebuilding intervention.

First, evidence of local ownership: “The effort causes participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace.”

Second: increase social resilience to counteract violence: “The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict.”

---

26 Ibidem, p.12.
27 Ibidem.
Third, increase individual resilience to counteract violence: “The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.”

Fourth, “The effort results in an increase in people’s security.”

The criteria suggested are formal but attempt to fill the concept of positive peace, and are inclusive, in the sense that they refer mostly to population directly affected by the conflict and they focus on its larger transformation. But then in specific case of mistakes, the example brought reaffirms the realist traditional division of public and private spheres, and labels as ‘[d]iverting human and material resources from productive peace activities an example of an activity addressing conflict at domestic level”. The authors label it missing the mark, and they seem not to refere to the modalities used but the core assumption that is effective to tackle conflict in a society considering conflict at home. As we will see later, this is indeed on central claim of some feminist rethinking of peace and conflict, considering gender relations and gender based violence an element to gauge peace and security of a society. The effectiveness approach also brings to consider the large targeting of children and women in reconciliation process as a waste of time, since “[w]omen and children are usually (though not always) non-belligerents and, thus, apparentlyless committed to the pursuit of war than those directly engaged in fighting. They are easy to identify, and they often welcome the attention of agencies who bring resources with their programs.”

The course of debates focusing on the evaluation of peacebuilding has brought up the concept of accountability of peace initiatives, which should be indeed framed as being accountable to war survivors, according to Anderson & Olson (2004), Church & Shouldice (2003), not to donors.

In an internal essay for UNDP articulating different criteria for judging positive experiences of peacebuilding, Charles T.Call identifies the key challenges of so called post conflict societies towards which peacebuilding efforts engage. After what he calls the “termination of political violence”, in post conflict situation there is “the formation or reinforcing of political rules that were previously contested by the armed groups; a need to demobilize one or more parties to the armed conflict; the potential return of displaced populations; renegotiating the institutions of security to alleviate the fears of former combatants and their constituents; demands to remedy injustices committed in the context of political

---

29 Ibidem: 18.
30 Ibidem, p. 50.
31 Call, C.T. (2007 September). Knowing Peace when you see it: Setting standards for Peacebuilding Success. UNDP.
violence; and certain opportunities to rebuild economic infrastructure damaged by war.” This is certainly an effective and comprehensive synthesis of what the international cooperation in post conflict has considered priorities to address—at least between in the 20 years across the Centuries XX and XXI. Framed in this way the social, political, institutional and economic issues, the place for gender has been coinciding with the place allowed for women, typically the vulnerable ones among displaced. The eye defining the history to be told, has always been identifying political violence as public and visible violence, perpetrated along the lines of the official political tensions and publicly recognized possible gains at stake. And the role for peacebuilding is mostly seen as restorative of an order that was there before: in infrastructure, destroyed with the conflict; in civil condition of those who became soldiers (‘demobilisation’), in resettling those who had to flee (‘return’) and in ‘remediation’ to injustice. The role for peacebuilding is defined within the idea that the State has to be recreated, or reinforced. It does not proceed from an interrogation on the rationale of the State, it does not tribute importance to the need to justify the existence of the State, once the public violence is diminished.

The study organizes the criteria reviewed to consolidate an operational definition of what is a success of peacebuilding, and thus identifies synoptically – operating a synthesis of a large group of theoretical analysis - four variable across different theories and formulation for deciding if an intervention should be looked at as a positive or even successful peacebuilding:

1) whether war recurs (a security perspective)
2) whether the root causes of the armed conflict have found redress (a social perspective)
3) whether a legitimate regime and/or effective state exists (a political perspective)
4) whether economic recovery has transpired (an economic perspective).

Consistently, all the actors involved in peacebuilding seem to agree that the recurrence to war is an indicator of failure. So is for example virtually unanimously classified the evolution in Angola after the 1991 Bicess agreement, and in Rwanda after 1993. As C.T.Call points out, the first discussion within the new born Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, considered a top priority the prevention of the reversion to war. This minimalist approach well falls into the categories neatly articulated by Galtung (1996), in which ‘negative peace’ is opposed to a positive and ‘sustainable peace’ as the absence of (visible) violence relates to active cooperation and interplay of interests and function between two subjects, included States.

---

32 1993 (the peace talks ended with the Arusha Agreements signed in August 1993, a peacekeeping mission was sent to monitor the implantation few months afterwards, and the genocide started on the 6th of April 1994)
Although the negative peace was considered a simplistic and easy way to judge interventions, there has been a multiplication of studies on the topic which have also provided a large variety of non consistent results. Observing the five years period of post conflict activities, even same scholars in different research (Paul Collier and Hanke Hoeffler, 2002, 2003 and 2006) have estimated very different rates of war recurrence: from 50% (2002) to 44% to 21% (2006 on a four years span). In a comparative analysis conducted by Call, the results is that –at country level - chances are 21%-26% in five years, 35% - 40% in 50 years. Balancing recurrence of violence with need for UN to renew peacekeeping missions would results in a rate of success ranging between 60% to 77%.

The framing of success of peacebuilding as the avoidance of resurgence of violent (visible) conflict, as in the definition of “negative peace” in Galtung’s, is followed and proposed by some very influential theorist of international theories, included Roland Paris. Sticking with this first criteria, the UNDP document proposes to classify successes at least: UNMIBH Bosnia, Minigua Gutemala, UNTAG NAmibia, ONUMOZ Mozambique, ONUCA Nicaragua, ONUSaL Salvador, UNMOP Croatia, UNTAES Slavonia. UNMOT Tajikistan.

Without entering in the methodological difficulties for supporting this statements (how long the window of time), other authors see in this regard a failure rate of about 70%, and just commenting on the first in the list with a mild gender sensitive criteria, it shall be noticed that for Bosnia can be considered a positive case in terms of achievement of a lasting peace is clearly a statement possible only with a very high cost, the cost of excluding gender, as Madeleine Rees poses is.

The effort to remain gender blind

While searching purposefully among these important references for peace studies and practitioners, it becomes therefore evident the abstract and attempted neutral approach, and the total absence of gender dimension in defining peacebuilding success. tensions related to gendered societal ordered and potentially consequent conflicts are not even conceived as relevant, let alone mentioned in any of the cases presented in the study. All the arguments on this path of studies manage to remain on a formal level, attempting a mathematic of peace and

---

33 Call (2007). 7-17.
avoiding real life relations and interaction among these war survivors, included those specifically shaped by gender patterns.

It is interesting to note that while evaluation of success in peacebuilding does not suggest to primarily use the question “success for whom?”, for conflict studies researchers focused on peacekeeping have it as the main key question (Diehl 2008)36. The doctrine of liberal peacekeeping, proposing a more multilayered and ‘realist’ discourse on motivation of actors, seems to allow a better critique of the operations then the civilian and academic approach to peacebuilding. Not that the first one dares to break – or become aware- of the definitively male and not neutral vantage point on history, but at least the molteplicity of motivations and values of intervenants are brought in the analysis of the post conflict scene depicting complex settings and multiple identities via multiple interests and interconnections.

In parallel to the discussion on the urgency for cooperation interventions to be consistent with the “Do no harm” framework, developed from the seminal work of Anderson (1999) in programming and monitoring – end evaluation, also the concept of conflict sensitive interventions evolved from evaluation (and assessment) vocabulary and activities, and quickly gained popularity. The same did not happen with the contiguous concept of gender sensitive and responsive programming.

From the environment of human rights based cooperation and peacebuilding several declinations of the ‘Do no harm’ and accountability are found, which indeed touch on the very core issue of evaluating what a successful peacebuilding looks like, and for who, even when respect of theoretically universal human rights are invoked as a possible criterion: “Human rights are narrowly understood to include only matters and groups relevant to the conflict. Important issues with the capacity to make peace real, such as gender equality or the rights of minorities other than the ‘main ones’ (including indigenous peoples), are likely to be eclipsed by a narrow view of the politics of the conflict. While the very link between human rights and the conflict places human rights provisions at the centre of a peace agreement, this may also operate to limit their scope. In particular, the needs of women and minorities not at the centre of the conflict or negotiation process, may be a low priority in implementation or not dealt with at all.”

So paradoxically: “This may lead to a lack of rights for key sectors of society, and indeed perpetuate a narrow view of the role of human rights as relevant only to the society’s main divisions – enabling rights to be resisted by these same key groups. The language of human rights, however, is one which claims to be inclusive. Peace processes form an important opportunity to address the needs of excluded groups. Conversely, the ability of the peace

process to deliver for these groups may be one of the tests of the substantive content of ‘peace’ as a lived experience. Designing human rights institutions so that they address the needs of these groups may also be useful to moving from an idea of human rights as ‘belonging to one side’ only.37

We will follow these insight and revert on these theme of by default exclusion of gender issues both in the next two chapters: the following one while attempting to understand the capacity of evaluation of peacebuilding intervention to capture “the substantive content of ‘peace’ as a lived experience”; and the next one while understanding what places is reserved to the actual human security of women in theorization of new security theories around the concept of ‘human security’.

Indeed the human rights approach might have developed the appropriate set of instruments and have chosen the right platform to operate a deconstruction of values and societal hierarchies, possibly also conducive to seek through gender inequalities and to establish better equilibrium.

From a human rights centered approach it has been elaborated the concept of Human security, proposed in 1994 in the UNDP report. This concept had a strong capacity of twisting the plane of classic international relations conceptual blocks of state security and international security, making the security discourse possibly more realist in a postmodern sense, closer to the actual persons involved. Its appeal could somehow logically be expected given the work done by the UN to articulate the mandate of protection of civilians in peacekeeping but it has not circuited yet with it fully. It has recently been screened by feminist reading38, that have introduced the key question related to the positioning of the subject (whose security) to develop at a more concrete level analysis of gendered patterns influencing the experience and the risk of insecurity in men and women. As it will be contended in Chapter 3, although possibly closer to gender equality concerns, human security has not been (yet) fully harnessed as a measure of peacebuilding to provide stronger structural presence of gender in peacebuilding.

In conclusion, the definitions of peacebuilding as they appear in international studies as well as in international development settings seem to lack structural incorporation of gender sensitivity despite the decades of gender mainstreaming and the attention on women and peace at this point accumulated in the UN governance and agency. They present temporal terms

related to the conflict evolution (peacebuilding after peacemaking and peacekeeping), a list of activities which might encompass early warning, conflict prevention, even includes civilian and military peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, the establishment of peace zones, reconciliation, reconstruction, institution building, and political as well as socio-economic transformation, and even military intervention. Even when the specification of ‘sustainable’ is added as the intended outcome of the peacebuilding process, there is not a conceptualization that fully sees gender explicitly involved in determining this sustainability. Consequently, many definitions and debates on what is successful peacebuilding proceeding from state or multilateral actors do not mention gender equality (neither attempted nor reached) as an element of conflict transformation towards peace. What is found in them in relations to gender differences is instead mostly a reference to the concept of protection and of inclusion of women - as it was a collective subject – in peace processes, presented as orchestrated by ‘others’ and then ideally ‘involving’ women too.

The feminist critique of peacebuilding

Since the middle of the ‘90s feminist analysis on the gendered impact of war has allowed recognition, articulation and denunciation of the burnt suffered by women in war and in post conflict. Through many new narratives emerging from researches and accounts mostly of female authors, sexual violence started to be recognized as deeply embedded with the culture and values of militarization, in war and as well as in peacekeeping regimes. The work of Cynthia Enloe, started according to her own account, in a quite gender blind fashion, and then slowly led her - and all the readers – to unveil a sort of symbolic burqa laid between women and observers writing on politics and war-time or post war-time in international relations specialized settings. In Banana, Beaches and Basis (first published in 1989) this personal journey resulted in a pathways of research on the sociology of the real life of real people experiencing and doing globalization through tourism, war, trade and marketing, which is what actually makes international relations, and also shapes consciousness through projection and imagination. Focusing on real life of real people’s perspective happened to allow to see women and to talk about their experience and participation in shaping global relationships, like in an “intricate dancing of a international minuet”. Power relations described in international relations started to incorporate discussions and statement of gendered power relationship, and the interaction between the intimacy of sexuality with the collective of international politics.

In 1993 the World Conference on Human Rights adopts the Vienna Declaration, strongly focused on violence against women, and in the same year the Commission on Human Rights establishes a Special Rapporteur on violence to women, and in 1994 adopts an important resolution focused on gender and sexual violence, in which also domestic violence is mentioned and criticized.

Recognition of rape as a weapon of war was first achieved in transitional justice interventions after the former-Yugoslavia crisis. On 25th May 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was established by the UN Security Council, and the rape as weapon of war is included in the list of crimes against humanity that the tribunal could prosecute for. The formulation of the crime is amended in 1998, when a permanent International Criminal Court is established, and the connection with the word “war” is opted out, while maintaining the concept of a sexual violence committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, directed against any civilian population. Nevertheless, at the end of 2010, according to the first SG Special Representative on violence against women, also former EU Commissioner for Environment, only 12 cases out of 50 – 60,000 have been prosecuted.

Traffic in human beings and exploitation of prostitution (among many studies, Mazurana, 2005; Cockburn & Zarkov 2002) has been spotted as a vicious attribute but at some level naturally embedded in the core identity of peacekeeping troops, in which military and masculinity are potentiated by the role embedded in a international mandate; this debate and growing awareness have fostered the decision of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations since 2010 to more intentionally recruit female personnel also among the military component. Research, denunciation, investigation, new code of conduct and mandatory training has broken the silence but not yet achieved the elimination of the phenomenon. As Raven-Roberts (2005) recalls, the total gender blindness of the analysis and silence on gendered impact of the war (let alone of causes) in the above mentioned Brahimi report is particularly striking: it was elaborated in the same months in which the watershed resolution UNSCR 1325 on “Women

---

42 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSV-SVC) was established by the resolution 1888 (2009) and opened in 2010.
Peace and Security” (first of a series, as explained above) was being prepared, also on the basis of a global review with a declared gender lens of peacekeeping missions. That document explicitly recalled the agreed conclusions 1997/2 of the Economic and Social Council in which it was stated that “An assumption of gender-neutrality should not be made.” This silence according to Raven-Roberts not only shows how marginalization of gender issues within the UN has been intense, but also “serves as an instructive example of how several discourses on parallel themes can be initiated and executed within the United Nations without apparent concern for achieving a workable degree of coherence in their findings and policy implications. It is against this background of internal incoherence that additional perspectives must compete for recognition and integration into peacekeeping operations.”

Raven-Roberts provides a narrative on the multiple different streams co-existing within the UN and intervening in shaping peacekeeping and peacebuilding actual operations. Calling them “regimes”, she identifies and provides an historical profile of the Humanitarian Regime, the Human Rights Regime, and the Security Regime. Each of them has inside different agencies coordinating different part of the jobs. This diversity she contends is reflected in the patchy nature of UNSCR 1325, which is one example of how difficult has been (at least till the 2005) in the UN the development of comprehensive and commonly agreed framework for gender equality. Providing a straightforward description of the very type of challenges, concerns and goals of the personnel that composes this broad and variety entity called UN, she assumes as privileged a sociological explanation of why gender is simply not mainstreamed, with arguments ranging from claim of gender equality being outdates, to gender being divisive and a product of inappropriate western feminists (normally described as lesbians too), to being inappropriate not only because of cultural level but because of lack of time in emergency response: “The conceptual problems and misunderstandings presented thus cover a wide variety of positions that range from a lack of knowledge of what a gender analysis and perspective entails all the way to resistance based on personal prejudice and fundamental disagreement with the philosophy of gender perspective. These prevailing attitudes and beliefs present tremendous challenges to the task of changing the organizational ethos of the United Nations staff toward issues of gender.”


Ibidem: 11.


Ibidem: 57.
suggestions and corrections of current - or even under planning–operations. Personal beliefs and protection of personal career can jeopardize the change activated by some node of the system.

Beside a continuous elaboration on the negative impact of war on women, in the political, academic and normative environment, a slower and more reticent debate has developed on the war as an opportunity for women already experiencing structural violence as well as limitations to agency when compared to socially peer men. The reshuffling of roles around productive activities in war times, with women taking over the jobs left by the men caught in the military draft, included those in heavy industrial sector and in administrative position within the military, has been commented and reflected upon since World War I, and even harnessed by national propaganda in WWII. The famous US character Rosie the Riveter, understating that she – and all women - can take on a man’s job since men are gone for fighting and protecting, is a strong quintessential icon celebrating war as a collective efforts, and inviting everyone through a call to solidarity and participation in the vital effort to win the war.

Broadly accepted narratives on historic reconstructions after the conflicts which saw western states as main actors, particularly world war II, point at the transformational impact on the short time that the conflict had on gender division of labour, bringing women in industrial production as well, so as in many men’s (formerly waged) jobs. To much disappointment of many of them, those WWII reinvented female had to promptly abdicate to leave the workplace initially available at the end of war to demobilized men.

Cleared of the contextual differences of different historical moment, and despite the difference in women’s culture, age and social conditions, “[w]hat is striking, nonetheless, is that there are also great commonalities in their experiences, regardless of the kinds of situations they find themselves in, or the kinds of roles they play in times of conflict. During war, women tend to bear a much greater burden than men for taking care of survivors, as well as children. They also carry the main burden for ensuring food provision, while keeping social and political activities going when men are fighting away from their homes. This shift of social responsibilities from men to women is common, despite the many different contexts in which conflicts occur, from remote rural villages in which most of the food has to be grown and/or gathered, to big cities where all kinds of resourceful innovations are developed by women to ensure that families have enough to eat and are otherwise well taken care of. Even in the midst of the horrors of conflict, many women have embraced these changes as moments of liberation from the old social order.”

But as Enloe synthesizes it, “Not now, later”: women mobilized by nationalism in the fight for freedom, or to reject those foreign violence on them, that was humiliating men’s honor (Enloe, 2000: 62), once freedom comes and reconstruction can start still have to wait. “Women must be patient, they must wait until the nationalist goals are achieved; then relations between women and men can be addressed.” The recommendation itself attempts to support the idea that not only development but State-building is gender neutral: “It is advice predicated on the belief that the most dire problems facing the nascent national community are problems which can be explained and solved without reference to power relations between women and men. That is, the causes and effects of foreign investments and indebtedness can be understood without taking women’s experiences seriously; foreign military bases and agribusiness-induced landlessness can be challenged without coming to grips with how each has relied on women’s labor and silence; the subtle allure of cultural imperialism can be dissected without reference to masculine pride and desire. Each of this presumptions seems politically shallow.”

Enloe proposes to look differently at the epic efforts to (re-) achieve the unity and the National integrity: arguing to encompass post-colonial settings as well, wrongly presumed to be moved by something different from patriarchal nationalism, according to her this is what the issue might risk to be in extreme synthesis: “The notion of what the ‘nation’ was in its finest hours – when it was most unified, most altruistic – will be of a community in which women sacrificed their desires for the sake of the male-led collective.” 51

For many contemporary (Nation) States, donors for peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives, this pattern is not extraneous. This is why it is not fully surprising to observe a certain contrast between the proclaimed positions around gender and the actual pursuing of gender equality through the donors’ investment in international cooperation.

In peace and security debate the narrative of impact of war on women, is therefore intrinsically connected to women’s gendered identity, portrayed as vulnerable victims, relationally reinforcing the features of masculinity of the military enterprise. On the other side, gender sensitive analysis of over one hundred years of global wars - global, regional or intra-national (civil war) - have remarked the persistent recurrence of political backlash on women. Some of these analyses (Cockburn, 2004; Pankhurst & Pearce, 1998 / 2007) underline the often anxious tension to restore ‘peace’ and reestablish a pre-war order, in which women’s roles and responsibility are an important and reassuring component. On one visible side, unchallenged assumptions on the masculine character of the military enterprise have biased at least two decades of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects (DDR), sidelining women

51 Enloe, 2000 (III ed.)
and excluding them from first reconstruction livelihoods opportunities. The state can even design and enforce policies that increase control over women sexuality, and imposes restrictions to movement or to access to resources, while at the same time protests of women towards either organized or individual restriction to their freedom in those delicate peace-building times are labeled and castigated as being shaped by western influences; in turn, western or international organization have in some occasion, as the blatant case of Kosovo, failed to promote women’s interests in the fear of being perceived “culturally insensitive”.

On the individual level, and affecting deeply the collective symbolic one, sexual and gender based violence included domestic violence, impacting disproportionately more women than men, has been proven to dramatically grow (included spousal violence) during conflict and to reach even higher level in the aftermath of the conflict. In a variety of situation it has been observed that women endure increase of rapes, perpetrated by former soldiers, policemen, and returned husband former soldiers themselves; they are exposed to risks in refugees camps and faced often with little livelihoods opportunity but prostitution (which often becomes an inescapable trap within human trafficking and sexual slavery business) especially in presence of large peacekeeping contingents.

As Donna Pankhurst synthesizes, despite consistent policies of UN and other key international actors to bring to the attention the impact and legacy of war on women, in reality women have been “reified as peacemakers but excluded by peace processes”, in a combination that from a feminist standpoint is a mix of unfairness, injustice and “hypocrisy”.

Although men’s deaths outnumber women’s in the conflict time strictly considered, women’s casualties due to diseases - if also post conflict is included - are more numerous then men’s, who are still the vast majority in the military industry.

These crude data exemplify one salient aspect of post conflict reconstruction expressed by scholars interested in gender dynamics: the post conflict time can be even harder for women than for men, having a stronger impact on the largest part (in a sex disaggregated view) of the population. This is a line of reasoning that can be found to establish the relevance of gender approach in peace, security and post-conflict domain.

A somehow parallel version of this kind of rationale to establish the importance of including gender sensitive analysis and interventions are the analyses and policies related to the importance of women in the domain of food security. The enormous contribution – and really difficult to account for, worldwide, although clearly higher than the contribution of men in terms of hours invested in a lifetime – that women as a theoretical collective subject have in food production (agriculture, wild food gathering, fishing and animal husbandry), in food processing (supply chain to clean and preserve harvest) and in meal preparation (the actual transformation that makes raw product suitable for human consumption and palatable), is more and more pointed at in the development and even humanitarian settings as a cogent reason (effectiveness - to mainstream gender. But the interesting aspects is that this recommendation is done in the name of effectiveness and efficiency, not primarily with a human rights based approach, or in view of empowerment of the socially and institutionally de-potentiated majority. This approach is based on the recognition that change can successfully happen – and the new condition be sustainable, with chances to me maintained over time, only if all the involved stakeholders (especially those who put more efforts in it) are involved. It is based on a quantitative argument, and can be called a functionalist approach. This approach is becoming prevailing in policies of international agencies which have a supportive relationship with liberalism: it is now in programmes and policies of key development players, as World Bank and FAO. The functionalist-quantitative argument has been quickly internalized by liberalism, as proved by the interest on women small holder farmers as a potential new market for agribusiness reveals; therefore radical feminist cannot embrace this type of argument.

This functionalist-quantitative argument is also found in international relations and peace research, where nevertheless gender issues and focus on women’s arrived later than in development studies (Pankhurst and Pearce 1997), and has led to highlight the importance of involving women and encouraging their participation in peace process and in reconstruction. Recognizing and eventually praising the often self organized and self funded work of women to
develop alternative diplomacy track, finally policies started to develop in this direction, as the above mentioned UNSCR1325, the actual interventions overall do not seem to have focused on providing equal opportunities for women and men in the reconstruction and in the new State creation. The adoption of the functionalist approach – women are important because they are many and most severely impacted by the war – might therefore be failing to reach deep transformation in gender equality because it is not the best placed to allow true pro-gender equality interventions: indeed might just not be pointing at it as its real goal. The functionalist argument in peace and post conflict has supported the essentialist explanations of women being necessary to make peace because of their inner nature. The quantitative rational is supportive of this argument as well: If women are most impacted by war, and sometimes more numerous survivors in post-conflict time, as the case of Rwanda, women are also less present and much less influential in the political public scene from where officially the war has originated, suggesting that their extraneousness to the decision making process originating the war must be telling about their extraneousness to the logic and greed of war itself. But this approach backlashed on the gender equality agenda: limiting in this way the potential range of real women acceptable identities, it also ended up presenting them as ultimately non socially dangerous, and therefore with little negotiating power, and little chance to get a fair share of benefits from the international investments arriving in post war settings.

Also, it has supported a view of women necessary to peace due to the intimate influence that they exercise behind the curtains and in the privacy of the households on their husbands, sons, fathers, and so on, as a relational subject needed to be activated in a higher level strategy to reach the real important objective, the men.

So, in both cases, in food security as well as in conflict related discussions, allowing women in the scene was instrumental to reach an effect, not because of its intrinsic worth and fairness. And in both cases, the space conceded to this supposed sexually homogeneous collective actor is to reach a given objective, possibly to further expand economy and profit, and not because social justice is good. This might be the core of the issue: probably the modest – and rarely unmovable - achievements we observe during post-conflict as well as in development in evolution towards gender equality and women capability of self-determination, despite the

---

official correctness of public discourse (an often in private policies too, as in the case of many big development NGOs), is at least partially depending on the motivation – alien to social justice - that are behind many actors claiming to want to bring about this change.

Part of the feminist thinking on peace and conflict has from the 90’s wanted to disengage from this frame, proposing different structures of reasoning. Building on Galtung’s distinction of negative and positive peace, Enloe proposes to define peace in feminist terms as ‘women's achievement of control over their lives'. And continuing in the exploration of roots causes of war to find root conditions for peace, Pankhurst (2003) suggests that gender inequality might be connected not just to the effect of war, but to the deep causes of conflict. She also holds that the functionalist approach (which she calls ‘efficiency imperative’ following Elson (1995) who focuses on the result-oriented aspect of this approach) has only partially invested the post conflict and reconstruction setting. As Pankhurst (2003) nails down, in conflict studies and international relations there has been not (at least at the time of this writing of hers) an elaboration or analysis constructed on “the impact of gender relations on the conditions of conflict or peace”.

Indeed, there has been much less. The discussion around the criteria of successful peacebuilding and sustainable peace, did not intersect the debate on criteria for successful redefinition of gender patterns towards better gender equality. Indeed the full enterprise was not engineered to make it happen. But the current rethinking of gender relations in view of a change towards equality and fairness is reflecting on the potential that this very dis-equality can have played – and continues to play – in originating violent social conflict. This point will be further explored in chapter 3, as the space is here in the following chapter 2 reserved for a programming-oriented exercise. Contrasting those critiques moved to positive peace with a sample of actual evaluations produced at the end of concrete interventions in a specific post conflict and post genocide setting: Rwanda.

Peacebuilding initiatives in postgenocide Rwanda: understanding the place for gender priorities through a review of evaluations

This chapter shifts the attention from the discussion of the norm of what peacebuilding should be, to the practice of what peacebuilding interventions (or virtually labeled so) have actually done, specifically as far as gender equality is concerned. While the overall theme remains the relationship between peacebuilding and gender, the focus moves from observing institutional and high level policy discourse, to understanding the exercise of interpretation of results of projects and programmes funded through international cooperation.

Through a review of 4 global metaevaluations of peacebuilding and post conflict interventions and of 22 evaluations of project or program of interventions developed in Rwanda between 1994 and 2011, it is attempted to reconstruct primarily what relevance was given to gender by evaluators, and secondarily by the programmes themselves.

Methodology of the evaluation review

The review of evaluation documents was conducted following a basic framework created for this research, which progressively simplified over time, starting from an original more complex one which proved to be not particularly relevant. The initial framework intended to compare in details all the guiding questions underlying the evaluation, trying to understand their degree of gender sensitivity, and also the values around gender patterns that they expressed. The original approach turned out to be not appropriate, since it needed to rely on the Terms of Reference, which is not always available, but also - and mainly – because it is often observed that evaluation implementation does not result in a full adherence to the initial ToR. Furthermore, when
the ToR shows interest for assessing how gender was considered by the project, the evaluation might treat very superficially the issue, listing it often low in the list of broad questions to answer, and framing the gender issue itemized as a specific question, although the project to evaluate might have had gender posited as a cross cutting issue. Overall, a superficial approach to check the mark dedicating a small chapter to gender, might thus be justified by the oversimplification of the ToR itself.

Therefore, instead of comparing the guiding questions among each other across the set of evaluation considered, two main common guiding questions were formulated to interrogate the documents. The first one, broad and generic, looks at gender sensitivity of the evaluation: is gender intentionally considered in the implementation of the evaluation? And it has an optional appendix: if yes, is it considered in the evaluation document or in both the project and in the evaluation?

The second one wants to understand what judgment the evaluator expresses on the capacity of the intervention in post conflict settings to be relevant and address key issues of a society stormed by civil war and intra-national genocide: Does the evaluation consider the intervention evaluated as a factor of peacebuilding, and what vision of success is, in relation to this, suggested?

Interrogating the texts with these two questions in mind is intended to allow to understand two aspects of the approach of the evaluator and of those who mandated him/her and accepted the evaluation: 1) what type of interventions on gender issues is expected - if any – and considered satisfying within peacebuilding initiatives, and 2) what type of sense and importance was likely to be given by the project implementers to the issue of gender while intervening in a foreign society to foster peace in post conflict setting. The overall goal of this review can indeed be formulated as: to explore what is the place of gender equality in the theory of change explicitly or implicitly adopted by evaluators and implementers in international cooperation in post conflict settings where interventions claim to contribute to peace and development.

Initially this review intended to scan as many documents as possible of peacebuilding evaluations conducted in the 90s’ and in the first decade of the new millennium worldwide. Principle of reality suggested to ponder again available resources – time, accessibility of documents, significant variation in interventions and evaluations

60 The possibility of a project / program being gender sensitive and of an evaluation being completely gender blind to the point of not even mentioning the word “gender” at all, has not been considered a possibility.
– and opt for a much more focused and contained universe of analysis, which has been limited to internet accessible evaluations of peacebuilding interventions.

Another limitation though immediately emerged even in this reduced workspace and with a different theoretical toolset. Although online databases of evaluations of international cooperation interventions have been growing quickly in numbers and in content over last few years, and do provide a great wealth of information, any search for “peacebuilding evaluations” was resulting in a very limited amount of documents. It became soon clear that it was more likely to find thematic evaluation on peace related interventions then evaluations of programs explicitly categorizing themselves as peacebuilding interventions. Indeed, even if high level discussions in the UN on the importance and amleness of peacebuilding were a hot topic for now over 20 years and has been progressing in the direction of including all cooperation tackling root causes of conflict and contributing to development to reduce exclusion, the interventions that categorize themselves as such are a very limited amount, and conducted by peace focused organizations.

Therefore, a different approach was chosen to select the sample. I opted to focus on a specific country, Rwanda, which I chose, as explained below in greater details, because it is a country were gender equity indicators in the post-conflict transformations have reached unprecedented level – so a quest on gender interest could have not been irrelevant. Then I considered post-conflict and post-genocide international cooperation interventions to understand what ideal change they intended to enact to contribute to peace and what place was reserved to issues of gender equality. The final sample was basically determined by accessibility of reports. The metaevaluation selected three thematic evaluation and the review twentytwo, for a total of 25 evaluation reports considered. This review draw data from mostly from the following on line database: the OECD evaluation repository, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the UN Evaluation Group database. A smaller quantity have been found through internet search engine following researching for evaluation of intervention from specific NGOs in Rwanda. The metaevaluation has served to better select key elements of the critique, as an introduction to the set of issues focused by the review of the evaluation, largely different from each other as well.
Why a review of evaluations on Rwanda?

The country chosen for this exercise is Rwanda: the rationale for this choice is multi-folded. On one side, the massive genocide had a profound impact on actors of international cooperation: the international civil community did not timely perceive the severity of the surging wave of violence, but the television did bring images of effects of genocidal violence and tension afterwards in the houses of citizens around the world; the peacekeeping mission was a total failure due to selfish diplomacy and to introvert foreign relations; the prevalent narrative on ethnicity from the very initial post-genocide was pointing at the responsibility of western colonialism in the genesis of ‘ethnic hatred’ (with an explanation first proposed by Prunier 1995 and then consolidated by Sellström et Wohlgemuth 1996); and at the trigger was recognized in the conjunctural encroach of a divided society with the destabilizing effects of globalization and of its economic downside (Uvin 1998), partially driven by the economic liberalization particularly fostered by the US. For all these elements, the international community developed a self-confirmed feeling of guilt that enabled unprecedented (over the double) fluxes of international aid money for Rwanda (although mostly spent outside the country to support refugees) quite immediately after July 1994. Due to this high involvement of international community in the post-conflict assistance and reconstruction, and to the burning presence of the conflictual events in collective imaginary, post 1994 cooperation

---

61 As Clinton recognized the first moment he touched ground out of the airplane at the airport in Kigali on 2008: "We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred", from Power, S. (2001, November). Bystanders to the Genocide. The Atlantic. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/2/ (last accessed 7 February 2014).

62 This is the Study n.1 of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda, titled Historical Perspective: some explanatory facts, which was prepared in 1996 through multilateral effort which saw almost all international cooperation agencies contributing to it – with the noticeable absence of France, which pulled out -. It can therefore be considered even more influential on the international cooperation community than other nevertheless popular essays. The explanation proposes that the lineage favored under King Ruhengeri took advantage of a semi-feudal system imposed by the king, which determined socially a difference, between landowners and those who had to exchange labor for access to land: “Under European colonialism, a policy of "ethnogenesis" was actively pursued. i.e. a politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially-constituted categories of the pre-colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority Hutu the have-nots” (p.10).


64 If the peak pre-genocide was reached in 1991 with over 550millions of USD per year (Source: UN African Statistical Yearbook, elaborated by Uvin, 1998), in 1995 the amount disbursed since end of genocide was about 2 billion USD (Kumar et alii, 1996)
in Rwanda can be assumed to have been considered as oriented at re-establishing or fostering peace.

Secondly, the genocide is a form of organized violence that structurally has to do with genetic continuation and sexual reproduction. The focus of *genocidaires* is concentrated on interrupting the blood-related descendancy of the (created) enemy. As it is observed and can be described only in contemporary or historical patriarchal societies, it also coincides with a contingent violence exercised in societies experiencing gender related structural violence, in which women and girls are – although at different level – subjugated to the power of men – and boys. In patriarchal societies the control over female individuals is exerted also by describing their beings as substantially passive, with an identity mainly described by the (though culturally narrated) biological sphere, and functional to reproduction as mere recipients of males’ seeds. Pre-genocide Rwanda is described as a strongly patriarchal society, and during the genocide Hutu militias targeted with extreme sexual violence Tutsi women, always referred to in sexual language by the anti-Tutsi propaganda through hate speech diffused via media. Indeed sexual violence and rape was used as a weapon of the genocide, included in combination with intentional infection with HIV-AIDS.

For this complex of reasons, it seemed crucial to observe how the international response was treating gender might have been particularly relevant in Rwanda, where the assault to women and men had been not only dramatically real but also deeply symbolic: more women then men were ‘spared’ or better not killed, which confirms the assumption that patriarchal symbolism and mindset was providing and the shape to the outburst of rage and violence: the men as active element in reproduction can only be ‘eliminated’ in a genocidal violence, while the (passive) women can be ‘re-used’ for reproductive purposes. Another confirmation of this heavy collective baggage could seem to be found in the fact that – in pre-genocide - more women identified as Tutsi married Hutu then Hutu-identified women married Tutsi men. Furthermore, last but not least argument


66 Mamdani (2001)

67 In this research my standpoint towards ethnicity – which I have not yet explored in depth historically, philosophically, biologically and anthropologically – is an operational one: I do not assume that it ontologically exists, but cannot avoid to use the categories that in the social interplay of the situation I am analyzing played such a determining role. Therefore any use of ‘Hutu’ or ‘Tutsi’ (or even ‘Twa’) is to be read as “Hutu-identified” and so on, to express the concept that that person was
contributing to my assumption of gender relevancy, the Rwandan population demographic after the genocide was extremely skewed towards female predominance. As shown in the analysis of the evaluations, this hypothesis can still be considered valid, but for different reasons: it does not seem that the work and objectives of international cooperation claimed the importance of gender equity and equality, nor that they contributed to achieve it.

The evaluations reviewed are a total of 22 they have been performed between 1996 and 2013, and have been organized in three categories:

Donors’ and international agencies programs thematic reviews on peacebuilding interventions (by sector or country)

Evaluation of Country programs in Rwanda, both from Governmental Donor Agencies and by UN funding or program mechanisms (as the Rwanda as One, or the MDTF) of the more prominent international donors’, or of specific UN peacebuilding fund (operated through Trust Fund as the One UN Rwanda)

Evaluation of specific projects categorizable under peacebuilding initiatives which have been conducted by organizations, NGOs, Donor agencies, UN bodies.

The main specific questions used to read and analyze the documents selected are:

Is this evaluation gender sensitive?

If not, is it silent on gender because the project is so or because the evaluation could not capture and read gender implication and gender vision assumptions behind the program?

If yes, to what degree? And what is the gender vision that it is rooted in, what ideal of gender relationships holds?

Another secondary, less explicit, but still important question guiding this evaluation review, has been the search for hints and information on the dynamics between local and international actors around gender equality agenda, with the hypothesis that shortcomings in implementing actions for gender equality could be due to possibly living in a context in which he/she was also identified as belonging to that specific group, and resented of the power relations, of the structural and physical violence, and of the set of opportunities that were socially opened to him/her due to this collectively recognized identity.
silenced efforts in the design or implementation vs. a bolder policy, due to discomfort of key actors often pertaining to the international community, and to their fear to discombobulate for no good reasons the gender status quo of the country were the intervention was conducted, perceived as potentially resulting in an obstacle instead that a support to pacification. The specific question followed for exploring this aspect was: Is the evaluation mentioning or pointing any concern towards question cultural norms shaping gender identities? Is there any reference to (supposed) mindset and accepted criteria of appropriateness on gender patterns of local key stakeholders and decision makers? This second lens of analysis is strongly influenced by personal experience as well as by literature from feminist critique of development (included Enloe 1999, Raven-Roberts 2005), peace and post conflict international cooperation. The limited scope of this review cannot aspire to contend on the overall prevalence of this gender conservative attitude in the expatriate community of international cooperation; it just intends to research if an analysis of program discourse reveals uncertainty on the centrality of gender equality, and disclose reservation on political correctness of the gender equality agenda. As presented in next chapters, other meta-evaluations have recorded how international actors, despite the gender equality policy the act within, might well be an (if not even the main) important obstacle to the purse of gender equality through international cooperation.

The choice to opt for review of evaluations and not of project documents (or even of donors policies) derives from a personal interest in getting as close as possible to understanding the role of international cooperation on progress in gender equity and equality in Rwanda.

Reviews of the gender sensitivity of project documents are more of a common exercise then reviews of evaluation. As a practitioner of development and humanitarian response interventions, I could experience how few are the cases in which the designers of an interventions are also significantly involved in its implementation. More frequently, the people who write the proposal to obtain a grant are not the ones implementing the project. This trivial and quite common organizational feature can impact on the correct interpretation and realization not only of planned activities but of the ‘spirit’ of the intervention itself, sometimes resulting in reduced motivation and commitment to bring about the standard – especially in complex domain as progressing on gender equality. Also, implementation comes with unanticipated challenges and changing scenarios,
resulting sometimes in adjustments of activities and modalities. Therefore instead of assessing the intention and the proposed activities at the design stage, it seemed more meaningful to opt to get closer to understanding the actual interventions, through the use of sources intended - if not to document - at least evaluate results.

The analysis conducted resulted in a categorization of the reviewed evaluation in five categories, defined along their sensitivity to gender, in terms of presence and of intensity. Category N1 regroups the evaluation with no attention to gender, referred to programs that also seem to be gender blind. The N2 regroups reports in which the treatment.

**Examining metaevaluations first**

As a starting point and a periodic control exercise, a review of metaevaluations was performed as well, to observe and contrast other theoretical exercise for extrapolating similarities and conducting high level analysis from evaluation documents. The metaevaluations selected cover several countries; instead thematic evaluations on one country or country portfolio evaluations have been included in the sample in the second section of the review (the review of evaluations).

Of the several analyzed, only four documents have been retained and analyzed, and these are the most relevant observations emerged. Those documents are very different among each other and do not present a similar structure. This observation is to be connected not only with the recent definition of evaluation standards but mainly to the large variety of perspectives on peacebuilding and on gender, influenced by political visions and ideals of international relations and of democracy.

In the following pages the key elements emerged on the analysis of the role of gender and its interaction with peacebuilding efforts from each of the evaluation is summarised.

**A - The World Bank Working Paper on evaluating impact in peacebuilding.**

The latter is the case of the World Bank Working Paper Gaarder & Annan (2013)\(^6\),

whose main focus is to argue in favor of feasibility of impact evaluation in post conflict and fragile state. This metaanalysis is concentrated on the sampling methodology for example of counterfactual, keeping into consideration ethical concerns. It does not afford the issue of understanding impact in a gender sensitive fashion, nor provides gender informed analysis of theory of changes, while keeping the discourse very formal and detached by specific content. But then it offers content-full examples which disclose a strong baggage of gender presumptions carried by the authors although left undisclosed – and unaware to themselves. The authors, while discussing methodology for ethically sound randomized trials functional to evaluate the impact (a treated population is compared with a non treated but similar population), adopt the implicit values of the evaluators as far as identification of the risky categories in society is concerned. So “An exception to the random assignment was made for those who previously held a rank of general in an armed group. Because they were considered high-risk by the program implementers, all who met this criterion were assigned to the program and were hence excluded from the study.”\textsuperscript{69} In other words, since the element of the risky group have all received the ‘treatment’ because they were too high risk, there is no chance to prove impact by comparison with counterfactual, since there are no counterfactual. By repeating the example, there is an implicit assertion of the assumption that the riskiest population has a defined gendered identity (high grade military virtually impossible to be female) which is highly sex imbalanced. The most interesting aspect is that the example is quoted here to discuss a methodological issue, as if the assumption was a-problematic. The gender asymmetry accepted in the background will be reinforced by an intervention that first and foremost address those considered high risk. While considerations on counterfactual are here considered relevant to the topic of assessing impact of peacebuilding, consideration on gender values interacting with theory of change are not.

The document presents an even more interesting aspect when analyzing the conflict sensitivity for avoiding potential negative effects of evaluation on current tensions. It brings the example of a program in Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{70} where asking about the conflict was considered acceptable, but it was not asking about tensions and conflict

\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem, p.5
\textsuperscript{70} Ibidem, p.9

related to marital infidelity. The renunciation to go in that direction might be considered even a more rigorous choice by someone, in the name of strict relevancy. But this is one of the interesting node, that has to do with visions of world and ideal of gender patterns in a more trivial context as regular programming (evaluation phase). We have here a scenario where a type of conflict existing in society along gendered pattern (what is allowed to a male or to a female, in which case) is dismissed from the analysis because it is considered to bee too sensitive and with the potential to spark more tension. Although sect and ethnic identity have the same potential, it is recalled that they are nonetheless treated by the evaluation actors, although with soft approach (forming same ethnicity focus group). I read in this difference of treatment a difference in the classification of relevance to conflict of the type of tension, and – more profoundly – a difference in the self justification that the evaluation and programming community allows itself ingerence on. It seems here understated that marital infidelity related tensions shall not be afforded because outside the scope of what conflict prevention is considered to be. As it belongs to a domain – the private – which interacts with the public but shall not be too much invaded and does not ultimately have the potential to create public crisis. But marital infidelity and the connected acceptance of polygamy, can be seen as one of the element of structural violence against women, as it brings negative consequences on many levels, from the psychological to the economical to the legal one. Therefore, this passage in which it is confirmed as a correct choice for evaluators/conflict assessors avoiding to probe on tensions related to a defined gendered scenarios (that allows and forbids sexual behaviors differently on men and women) reveals an system of values in which pacification and improvement in a post conflict society can be ‘registered’ despite more private and based on gender asymmetry conflicts continue or even grow.

A third passage of this text could be used as example that gender awareness in reflection and analysis is not just the opposite of gender blindness, but is instead a broad uncharted theoretical space where different level of centrality can be attributed to gender. The authors underline that doing an evaluation is somehow a programming act in itself, and certainly is more of an intervention that just a detached glance un-impacting on the reality that observes.\(^\text{71}\) The example offered is the choice of the evaluators on a program in Cote d’Ivoire where they were attempting to understand the impact of savings interventions on intimate partner violence: instead of just interviewing all program

\(^{71}\) Ibidem, p.10.
beneficiaries who had a partner, they opted to interview also un-married beneficiary, not to actually use those data but just as a mean not to sparkle intergroup tensions. This is clearly a gender sensitive evaluation that adopts a gender aware methodology with the intent of not creating suspicious between married and unmarried (or widowed, or separated) women, even if the main concern in the area were ethnic tensions – a stratum which, unless is considered in post genocide scenario, might be unrelated to the marital status.

The coexistence of these different passages in the same study suggests that gender aware evaluations might be more frequent in presence of clearly gender sensitive (or even gender equality oriented) programs. On the contrary, the glance of the evaluator – and of the metaevaluator – might more frequently attempt to keep a ‘neutrality’ and follow what the program approach was. Indeed, while gender mainstreaming has become over the last two decade a fundamental criterion in vast majority of developmental cooperation policy – at least formally – the same cannot be said for guidelines on how to conduct evaluations, that do not contain any explicit reference to assess gender sensitivity of the program.

B - The DFID Study on peacebuilding and gender. Very different tone and focus is adopted in a review of evaluations realized for DFID by O’Connell & Harcourt (2011). The authors review evaluations, thematic evaluations and studies of peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions across continents selecting to begin with only those that showed some level of attention for gender issues, and then provide analysis of what kind and level of outcomes were achieved from a gender and rights based approach. Without concentrating on comparing the methodology of evaluation, or on regional differences, they proceed instead in identifying limitations in results and outcomes of interventions while also pointing at the knowledge gaps. The document presents analyses and findings organized in three different sectors: women’s political empowerment, interventions for women’s meaningful and sustainable economic empowerment, and interventions for improving women’s and girls’ access to quality services. Evident shortcomings are registered in the first sector, as gender equity resulted not consistently aimed at, with donors adopting uncertain position in regard to this:

“The international community’s apparent hesitancy to act on their policy commitments and international obligations (CEDAW, UNSCR 1325, etc.) is noted by Sorvald (2009) who suggested that: ‘In male dominated cross-cultural contexts women and gender issues could be perceived as something not important enough to bring up’ in peace negotiations, conflict prevention and macro-economic donor conferences. […] Autesserre (2010) […] found that although the UN and most international actors involved in the peace process advertise their commitment to ending gender-based violence, re-installing the rule of law, protecting human rights, promoting good governance and sustainable development, in practice, concentrated most time and money on interventions regarded as vital to the success of an electoral process (2010: 114).”

With a certain irony the report recalls that “Benard (2008) also noted the international community’s cautiousness in advocating for gender equality and equity goals. She found no evidence that such donor advocacy would lead to instability.”

The observation on the soft position of donors community, or better of international cooperation community of expatriate in a given post-conflict country context, is highlighted here as a condition not fully enabling, but instead sabotaging progress towards gender equality in peacebuilding operations. It is noticed that there is “apparent hesitancy” in “international community […] to act on their policy commitments and international obligations.” Indeed, “[t]here appears to be a marked reluctance on the part of external actors who support peace negotiations and the political settlement to act on their own policy commitments or encourage national partners’ compliance with international human rights standards. The impact of this on women’s political empowerment can be significant. A number of explanations emerged from the evidence. Cultural assumptions about women’s status and lack of awareness and understanding of the impact of gender inequality play a part, as does fear of derailing a fragile political settlement by advocating equality and social inclusion. The opportunities presented in political dialogue for discussing gender equality and equity issues were underused.”

---

73 Ibidem, p.7-8
74 Ibidem.
75 Ibidem, p.7.
76 Ibidem.
The review also remarks that women’s economic empowerment as it is proposed in peacebuilding intervention, untighten to political gains, also results fragile and often bound to reinforce gender roles differentiations, (which in turn hamper women’s economic empowerment). Among the examples chosen by the authors is Kottegoda (2010)\textsuperscript{77} analysis of interventions in Sri Lanka where the option of targeting women with economic subsidies, while donors’ approach does not question the right of men to control the money in the family, is conducted on the assumption that women will better provide for the family. This ‘eligibility criterion’ is though considered a negative legacy on women, confirming the care burden exclusively on them: “the targeting of women for poverty alleviation blocks the ‘transformation of the ‘empowerment of women into political activism’ and that a ‘political agenda’ is needed to address directly gender equality and the sharing of power within a strengthened democratic process”\textsuperscript{78}

But also peacebuilding interventions to improve access to service, presents a missed opportunity to create and make inclusive gender responsive service provision, accompanied by lack of understanding and presence of gender analysis.

The document suggests a critique to the conclusions of Bennet et al. (2010)\textsuperscript{79} where is contended that access to health service does not necessarily result in fostering peace, while livelihood and job creation do, especially in reference “mainly to young discontented men”.\textsuperscript{80} As mentioned in chapter 1, frameworks for peacebuilding include definition of what is a threat to peace. It is frequent, as in the case of the evaluation of the World Bank mentioned above, to encounter the identification of risk to public security with the male (and young) population. This is why it is interesting that the same category is more rarely addressed collectively to prevent risk to other aspect of human security, as gender based or even intimate partner violence is (as it will be seen in chapter 4).

The O’Connel’s & Harcourt’s recommendations are directly focused on programming improvements, for policy makers as well as for implementing actors. Some recommendation is also offered on how to fill the knowledge gender gap, mostly through

\textsuperscript{78} O’Connel & Harcourt (2011:29) quoting Kottegoda (2010: 97-98)
\textsuperscript{80} O’Connel & Harcourt (2011:36)
promotion of studies which should interrogate more: - intersection of gender with poverty, impact of increased political participation of women on the social, the economical and political sphere, - what works to increase women’s political inclusion, - the capacity that targeting specific gender roles has to affect the whole of gender roles and power relations, included the impact on gender roles of programs targeting men and gender, and roles of men and male violence in relation to women and girls’ empowerment and access to quality services (as health and education).81 This last set of questions can be considered in the perspective of transforming existing evaluation frameworks to make them more structurally useful in the improvement of gender equality enterprise.

In conclusion, this second review of evaluations considered is not only gender sensitive, but intends to create stronger gender awareness in existing programming and related knowledge.

C-ALNAP Synthesis of Evaluation of peacebuilding activities by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict resolution Organisations. This third document82 was developed in 1998, and the different cultures on all relevant levels - regarding peacebuilding, evaluation and gender - clearly account for a different cultural environment. Peacebuilding activities were perceived as an adds-on that could even risk to jeopardize mandate of humanitarian agencies, as they were perceived to have the potential to drag them towards more politically compromised initiatives. Also another reason for uncertainty is raised: peacebuilding promised to be a task hardly deemed to be successful. Indeed third parties can only foster peace, not build or achieve it. Evaluations for development assistance – and particularly for humanitarian interventions -, on its turn, was also at the time at an early stage of its evolution, and definitely was not part of shared common knowledge or practice in program development. Much of the concepts and findings of this metaevaluation therefore revolve around the awareness of the lack of common standards in evaluations especially of peacebuilding. The type of peacebuilding the review looks at are all comprised in the so-called “Track-II”, referred to activities conducted by private NGOs, not by government diplomacy.

81 Ibidem, p.45.
Spencer points out how – at the time- finding evaluations of peacebuilding interventions was not an easy task: overall produced in limited number, but also due to the fear of negative judgment (considering how difficult is to prove positive impact, with small local interventions versus a measure of peace gauged at country level) and the risk of loosing credibility and funds, which implied they were hardly disseminated.\textsuperscript{83} This observation is – from the experience of this research and the preparation of this metaevaluation – confirmed as accurate nowadays as well. Indeed not many documents found accessible in evaluation databases (much more numerous nowadays that at the time of ALNAP’s Study) presented the programs as peacebuilding interventions.

Overall, the study attempts to verify what evaluation criteria were used, and contrast the results considered achieved. From the analysis of the 13 documents emerge an opinion of the author condensing how humanitarian response has a potential for peacebuilding, as it has the ”resources to carry out the activities necessary for re-introducing a sense of security which may promote sustainable peace.”\textsuperscript{84}

Creating sense of security for civilians, or also human security, is seen as the intersection between peacebuilding and humanitarian work. Another important clarifications she offers as a result of the study is a synthesis of the multiplicity of meanings that are grappled behind the word “peace” and are differently used in context with different actors:

“At one extreme, peace can be used as evidence of an apparent paradigm shift while behind the scenes the mechanisms which keep the status-quo in place continue to work. At the other, it could also be part of a calling for new thinking and new solutions. The point is that peace is not a value-free term. It is a complex concept which warrants discussion especially in relation to an intervention which claims to build peace. […] It is the evaluator’s job to convey an agency’s position and to use this as a frame for assessing the intervention. Especially for in-depth studies, the evaluation should consider the broader goal which the intervention is trying to achieve, link this to the specific goals of the program/project, and analyse how the intervention matches up.”\textsuperscript{85} If in the entire study Spencer does not attempts to identify explicitly intersection between peacebuilding and gender, nonetheless she opts for identifying in the more complex notion of peace, the one that can also subsume conflict management, the most suitable

\textsuperscript{83} Spencer (1998:13)
\textsuperscript{84} Ibidem, 32.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibidem.
frame to guide the work of humanitarians and development workers. She also – distilling from the evaluations reviewed – recognizes the possibility from a low level perspective, close to citizens’ life, the possibility of intending conflict with positive acceptance, as a dynamic element toward improvements in recognition of more universal rights:

“While ‘peace as order’ thinking dominated international politics, conflict was associated with being a negative, dysfunctional state which disrupted linear development. This perception is changing with cases of ‘positive’ social change resulting from conflict situations, e.g. women asserting their rights in Nicaragua and Serbia. A different view of conflict could arise from the integration of ‘peace as conflict management’ language and ideas into humanitarian and development circles.” Although not explicitly mentioned as a reference to gendered order, the example provided points exactly at it. And few lines below she describes conflict and peace as both being ‘socially constructed concepts”, using an expression that starting from the ‘90s was crystallized in virtually every definition of ‘gender’ (understood as being socially constructed in opposition to being naturally and permanently codified). The conclusion is that this study, although not explicitly interrogating the evaluations reviewed as far as their position on gender and peacebuilding is concerned, nevertheless reflects on the actual meaning of peace assumed by the different evaluations. Suggesting that “peace as order” is an inadequate concepts for those engaged in peacebuilding, and that advancement in – for example – women rights might need to raise some type of conflict, she proposes the concept of peace as conflict management as a more appropriate horizon when a right based approach (or – it could be said - the introduction of inclusive development) is demanded. The interesting element is that this line proceeding from Galtung’s theories – peace as positive peace and improvement in people’s life condition, not as absence of conflict – is here connected with advancement of women’s right, which are presented as implying some level of conflict.

D-Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building. While the Concept study preparing this evaluation (2010) has several passages dedicated to mentioning relevance of gender for peacebuilding, the final text has almost none, except for just a quote of UNSCR 1325 promoting women’s participation in peace processes. In the Concept study it is recalled that specific guidance have been produced by institutional as well as NGO (supported
by governmental and also EU funds) to insert thematic issues included gender and conflict in CPPB; also complementing needs assessment frameworks, in which gender analysis is included, with conflict analysis can be beneficial to understanding changing contexts.

The Concept study, without elaborating on it, also mentions a paper highly critical on liberal peacebuilding, which challenges that it shall be considered as an international enterprise where internationals are the only key actors. The source quoted also contains reflections – which are not recalled nor considered in the Concept Study - on the role of gender equality for peacebuilding, and recognizes “women’s experience in and around conflicts/war” as “crucial if we are to conceive new ways of negotiating conflict and building peace”66. It is surprising to observe such a gender radical source quoted in this document where the inclusion of gender issue is set on the tone of consideration of impact of war on women, not on the more radical vision of peacebuilding as a possibility to redefine power relations (domestically and internationally, but – he also suggests – intra-household as well). If peacebuilding is an opportunity to change a certain order, it means that the authors see in that order intrinsically deep causes of conflict. This is explicit in critique of the dominance imposed by the Global north, which Bendaña (2003) sees confirmed through what is called peacebuilding, and results in a vehicle for consolidating global relationships and hierarchies, with Western Countries on the lead and in control of markets, natural resources and development policies. The style of the reference is therefore very contrasting with the style of the evaluation document, which might be revealing of a large number of actors with a variety of backgrounds and values being involved in the preparation of the Study. Anyhow, in the last version of the Thematic evaluation, reference to intersection between gender and peace building have


Bendaña in that document also contends that global power relations can be challenged through social movements re-defining unequal power relations.
not filtered in, and the only reference to gender is proposed to mention the administrative division of the EC that deals operationally with gender issues in peacebuilding interventions. Which means that at a theoretical level no importance was given to understand actual existing interpretations (in projects and programmes) of the role of gender in peacebuilding, and that no space is planned for it in an exercise for developing a more appropriate theoretical framework intended to foster integrated CPPB. In general the theoretical attention given to gender in the study seems therefore very limited, not deep and heuristic, but somehow only concentrated on the more ‘popular’ meaning. The searched integration means attempting to introduce conflict prevention in other streams; but the intention of mainstreaming it into programming, as it was supposedly done for gender, is proposed more as an operational action that as a theoretical one, so no reflections on reciprocal implication of gender and conflict and gender and peacebuilding is done – only is assumed as accepted need to look at practical differences in the impact of war on women.

Conclusions from the metaevaluation review.

The findings of this rapid review of evaluations, are quite linear.

Among the documents found, only one was thematically focusing gender across the different evaluations considered, while the large majority did not even use the word ‘gender’ or used it inappropriately – in place of ‘sex’. Here below a recap of the main points, listed in Table 1 in the Appendix.

The main finding of this analysis is two fold. On one side it is evident that there is little gender centrality in reviews of evaluations of peacebuilding: unless they are thematically focused on the issue, as the case of the DFID one, they take a fully methodological point of observation that – given current framework of evaluations, which do not include “improvement of equal rights” or “advancement in gender equality” as a value and therefore a criteria in itself – provide an implicit theoretical justification to fully skip the issue. On another side though, where some level of reflection on what is intended with “peace” and “peacebuilding” is present in the document, space seems to open up for a deeper and more structural interaction between gender order and conflict. It is the case of the World Bank Document. The Concept
Study behind the final report of EC might have seen some debate in this direction, but possibly failed to incorporate and elaborate around it.

For the purpose of this research, the presence of attention towards how the program has treated gender issues is called “gender sensitivity” while the presence of some reflection on gender inequality and causes – not just impact – of conflict, is here referred to as gender awareness.

The reviews of the evaluations: focus on Rwanda

Differently from the methodological choice of Spencer (1998) reviews above, who only allowed in the sample evaluations of programs presenting themselves as peacebuilding interventions, I opted for a much more loosen criterion which allowed in turn to have a larger sample of documents. Including in the review all evaluations of programs conducted by international cooperation in post genocide Rwanda, I considered relevant to compare how the evaluations presented the interventions with respect to peace building, attempting to see emerging within the study a rationale for definition what peacebuilding is considered *strictu sensu* in the development and humanitarian community involved over time in the Rwanda response and recovery. The list of documents here below analyzed is also presented in a synoptic table in the Appendix.

The group includes evaluation of a variety of interventions, promoted, funded and implemented by a broad diverse array of actors. To argue this choice, I could propose on one side a theoretical point expressed in clearly and in a linear fashion by Galtung (2001)\(^7\) who sees international cooperation functional to peace in as much it allows channels for populations, not just for elites, to exchange – if not with each other at least with each other’s elites. On another side, the progressive mainstreaming of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in international cooperation, as indicated by a large set of cooperation initiatives (mostly capacity and institution building, but also service related) included by the OECD/DAC guidelines on evaluations (1997). And other transformation of main actors of international cooperation, evolving to incorporate more solidly peacebuilding and conflict prevention with international cooperation as a mean of conducting external relations, as is the case of the internal reorganization of the

---

European Commission internal Directories. Over the last 25 years, building peace has became progressively an activity concerning large groups in the international community, beyond diplomatic sphere, and mostly within those operating in international cooperation.

**N1 - The group overlooking gender in the evaluation implementation**

This group is composed by evaluations unresponsive to gender-related questions, or better which do not attribute attention to gender patterns. The programmes that they evaluate, are assumed not to possibly be “gender neutral”. Although this review did not include a control of impact evaluation of the programs to which the evaluations reviewed are referred, it is here assumed that there is no such thing as a gender neutral program, only gender blind and gender responsive programs, with different degrees of sensitivity and different gender visions. Following Kabeer & Subrahmanian (1996)\(^88\), if an intervention does not attempt to transform gender relationships or does not attempt to subsidize the needs of the most vulnerable within a given gender pattern, it shall be assumed that its attempt to being gender neutral *de facto* means it is just gender blind, and reinforces existing gender inequalities. The evaluations classified in this group are the ones where no discourse on gender appeared at all, and that have been considered gender blind.

Which is, the program most likely did not make explicit how the initiatives and actions intended to deal with existing gender patterns, and therefore most likely – due to the implementation spell which pushes program actors to simplify operations as much as possible to attain results given available resources, time constraints and context – those socio-cultural-economic patterns defining conditions of minority and higher vulnerability for women were not challenged, therefore most likely not compensated either.

1) Among the earliest in the sample of evaluations considered, it is classified in this group the Study II of the important *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, dedicated to Early Warning and Conflict. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) is a set of evaluations which was the result of a joint effort of many donors\(^89\) as an early

---


\(^89\) The promoters of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, composed of one summary and 4 studies, where the Government of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
stocktaking exercise to evaluate the humanitarian response to the genocide have been a reference point for the entire international cooperation community. The report is composed of one summary and four sectorial studies, on Historical Background, one on Early Warning and Conflict management, one strictly on the Humanitarian response, and the last one on Reconstruction. The table below synthesizes titles and aid organization responsible for each study, which in this review have been categorized in different groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study number</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Managing evaluation department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Historical perspectives</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Early warning and conflict management</td>
<td>Norad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid and its effects</td>
<td>ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rebuilding post-genocide Rwanda</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis study</td>
<td>Synthesis and principal recommendations</td>
<td>Danida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This Second Study is a document different from the other three Studies, which are indeed classified in other categories and which show some degree of gender sensitivity: it strictly keeps the analysis of causes of conflict and of genocide gender blind. More than on root causes of conflict and genocide, the Study focuses on identifying signs indicating the escalation of violence, temporally close to the genocide, which could have been – in retrospective – considered as early warning indicators. Since it is presented as and evaluation but it better described as a conflict analysis, it can be labeled as a gender unaware.

Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Commission of the EU, OECD/DAC secretariat, IOM, UN/DHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IBRD, ICRC, IFRC, ICVA, Doctors of the World, INTERACTION, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, VOICE.

Several other countries supported the evaluation, but did not participate actively. As reported in the colophon, France – later on in 2008 formally accused by Kagame government to have supported Hutu genocidaires in their attempt to flee Rwanda after the genocide - suspended its participation in the Steering Committee in December 1995. The cost of the evaluation has been covered with voluntary contributions from members of the Steering Committee-This Committee, composed by representatives from OECD members, bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) secretariat of the OECD, multilateral Agencies and UN units, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) and five international NGO organizations, not named in the report.

The Study posits the accent on the growing uncertain conditions of large number of refugees in the last decade before the genocide, who have been gathering in Uganda since the independence from Belgium (1962) and the escalating violent campaign against Tutsi promoted by Hutu attempting to progressively control the newly established country. In Uganda those massive quantities of refugees could not enjoy local citizenship for the refuse of Ugandan governments despite their large contribution to the combat of 1986 within the National Resistance Army, which overthrew Uganda’s president Obote to let the power to Museveni, unchallenged leader of NRA. The Tutsi refugees, who could not legally settle in the new liberated Uganda, organized thus a new armed group, Rwandan Patriotic Front, whose leaders were mostly refugees who had high responsibility in the Ugandan conflict, included current Rwanda President Paul Kagame. The RPF invasion of Rwanda started in October 1990, combats continued until a stalemate that allowed the Arusha Peace Negotiation in August 1993, which did not bring a pacification but exploded on the 6 April 1994 in the genocide of Tutsi.

The focus on ethnicity (and its coincidence with the identification of refugees) in the Study is dominant and exclusive. No other cleavages crossing the society are recorded and highlighted as causes and generators of conflict. Although the Study II analyses the dynamics within groups of refugees and evolution of their political activism, there is no reference to the importance of gender issues within the militants of the RPF, which strongly promoted gender equality in leadership (Randell & Herndon, 2013). If this is a recent ground of research, still to be explored, nonetheless the authors did not consider relevant that gender equality was a very popular topic in the ‘80s, when it was already becoming a priority for the Ugandan Government, despite the fact that many RPF members refugees in Uganda received an education there and were exposed to the transformation of the society. If ethnicity is the central rationale, the economic crisis is recognized as the enabling conditions.

The contraction of aid, even more than the global market transformation, (which according to Peter Uvin’s (1996) and as mentioned in the Study on Historical Background I of same Joint Evaluation resulted in a strong driver of the crisis, particularly as the coffee prices collapsed. The identification process introduced by colonials and reinforced by Hutu-led government, enforced ethnicity as an all pervasive

---


The Study touches on the issue of *Radio Milles Collines* (which diffused hate speech and pro-violence propaganda against Tutsis), and refers to the uneffective conditionality (or positive conditionality) used by several Donors (Belgium, Canada, later on EU as well), on the lack of reaction to concerns raised about human rights to president Habyarimana by international Donors. Nevertheless it does not cite nor elaborate on the aspects of gendered violence that through the radio was pervasively promoted as well. The Study II also provide an analysis of the Arusha agreement, identifying their core problem as being intended not to prevent further conflict but to create a post-conflict situation.

In conclusion, none of the most important elements identified as fostering conflict have any explicit reference to gender patterns, and no gender awareness emerges in the approach of the authors of the Study. It is important to underline that this study has been vastly diffused and read among the international cooperation community.

2) The tor of the external evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Program 4th phase (2009 – 2011)\(^9\) is gender blind and so is the evaluation, otherwise very structured and explicit on the multiple frameworks used. While not even one occurrence of the word ‘gender’ is registered, the word ‘women’ is mentioned 19 times, only once to refer to the need felt by interviewees that the program should start to concentrate more on women. Otherwise women are mentioned as actors engaged in peacebuilding activities, and are mentioned in the guiding questions for conducting evaluation interviews; but then there is not really any gendered elaboration of answers received). The evaluation mentions that the National Unit and Reconciliation Committee (NURC) which “has worked on the causes of violence since 1994, on the origin of conflict in Rwanda, on social cohesion, on the role of Rwandan women in peacebuilding and reconciliation, and on community conflicts. In collaboration with IRDP and others it has

developed a Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer in 2010. The barometer provide sex (which it calls “gender”, as an improper use of the word) disaggregated data, and presents many indicators disaggregated, but on a crucial question as “what is a primary and secondary source of division in Rwanda?” there is no option containing gender nor it is presented by sex disaggregated graphs. Gender is not a pattern considered relevant to conflict in the barometer either. Therefore, this evaluation understands the need to involve women in activities, but without explaining its position on the ‘why’. In this evaluation there is no attention to gender differences and gender related conflicts, the ethnicity is assumed as dominant instead, and women are considered as element of society to include in activities.

3) In the category of full gender blindness is the internal evaluation referred to a small project, the **Strengthening Youth Livelihood Opportunities In Rwanda** (2011), a radio program conducted by Search For Common Ground and aiming at forming youth and developing economically sustainable behaviors. In the evaluation there is no consideration of a potential impact in terms of gender cliché proposed – even with the intention of presenting them as a negative model - by the program, which features young men in constant need to be surrounded by girls, and attracting them with money. The program itself is not presented as being interested in working on re-imagining gender roles to achieve its objectives, although the examples provided (men mis-using money obtained from savings groups, often obtained in the name of their wives, or from bank) are common, symbolically powerful and have significant gender value, in terms of understanding gender patterns and potentially re-shaping them. In the evaluation there is no sensitivity to understand how the program worked on this important node, as the behaviors that the initiative intends to tackle are indeed widespread, risky and with the potential of jeopardizing households security, but no analysis of potential differential impact on male and female public is performed.

---


96 In the assessment of a community group saving scheme in Malawi mainly targeting women, which I conducted in 2009, I could observe this pattern occurring often. In general men preference for non-household related expenditures (included investments, drinking and gambling) and women’s prevalent option for expenditure’s directly aiming at well being (food, health, education) is a largely accepted fact in development community, which is now using this argument to functionally increase
N2 – Extreme superficiality in checking off a section on gender

This group presents evaluation documents that seem to be written with gender sensitive approach, ad they check for sensitivity in the programme they evaluate. Though the treatment of the gender component in the evaluation is very quick and superficial, satisfied by the very enunciation but not concentrated on identifying the existence of gender analysis nor the gender impact obtained by the intervention.

4- In this group we can find the Evaluation of the EU Program in Rwanda (2006) which agglutinates findings on gender and environment in the same short paragraph, being both considered as crosscutting themes. The document refers very synthetically that the program failed to significantly consider crosscutting themes, as it was included at least half of the time in design of interventions but then regularly lost in implementation. Also it underlines how the awareness on the importance of the issues (gender and environment) was high at the national level but not present with stakeholders at local and intermediate steps.

Nevertheless, in a very quick synthesis of only three lines, the text of the evaluation refers that the support to gender led to important success, not because the theme was properly integrated but because of support offered by the program to specific actions, evidently considered successful: “[C]ette contribution ne résulte pas d’un véritable effort d'intégration, mais plus d’un soutien à des interventions particulièrement pertinentes sur
development programs targeting on women (more then women empowerment) to reduce poverty. See among other sources the UNICEF State of the World Children Report 2007, and Morrison, A., Raju, D., & Sinha, N. (2007). Gender equality, poverty and economic growth. Washington D.C.: World Bank. On the differential benefit for societies at large and household specifically of women enjoying more opportunities and empowerment, studies have been numerous, re-known and only minimally transformed in development programming (and policy) choices. Already in the 90’s the institutionally established development community, also with World Bank studies, recognized that for a given increase in women’s education compared to same increase in men’s education the collective benefit are higher (households with more educated children, less mortality, better wealth); see King, E.M. & Hill, M.A. (1993). Women's education in developing countries: Barriers, benefits, and policies, Washington D.C.: World Bank.

98 “L’analyse suggère que les aspects transversaux sont réellement intégrés à la conceptions des interventions envoi une fois sur deux, puis que le sujet perd de son importance au stade de la mise en œuvre et du suivi. Plusieurs signes montrent également que les aspects transversaux sont une préoccupation au niveau national, mais que l’idée ne passe pas ou peu aux échelons intermédiaires et locaux.” Ibidem, p.17.
cette thématique (Gacaca, Ubudehe...). The support to the Gacaca tribunal is here flagged as one of the activities that have contributed to gender; but as it will be argued below, (see the analysis of Unifem Evaluation 144), rehearsing the traditional justice Gacaca tribunal to deal with genocide crime has been deemed a very controversial action in terms of appropriateness for a gender sensitive intervention, if intended to contribute progress towards gender equality. As far as the Ubudehe system, which is a participatory model of resource allocation for promoting local development on community identified priorities, with a microcredit and self-help component, the experience is evaluated very positively in other report, with great success in improvement of people’s condition, but it was not possible to find any analysis or evaluation of the gender impact of the scheme in available studies. Therefore, the actions mentioned by the evaluation as being good example of mainstreaming crosscutting themes, either scored negatively on gender or have not been analyzed under that lens.

This evaluation of the EU program also lacks a thorough gender sensitive background analysis; its only gendered consideration only refers to the vulnerability of single headed female household.

The evaluation recognizes a strong role to the EU in regional pacification and progress towards development, that individual State cooperation in bilateral formula could have not reached. In this observation there is no elaboration on the condition of peace, and no connection with gender.

5) As a response to a multiyear debate in which better coordination among the UN system organizations was insistently asked for by Member States, in November 2006 a new High Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment was appointed by the UN Secretary General, and conducted in few months its work publishing the report Delivering as One. Eight countries, among which Rwanda, volunteered to pilot this initiative in which coordination among UN organization was the innovative methodological

---

99 Ibidem, p.27.
100 Niringiye, A. Ayebale, C. (2012). Impact Evaluation Of The Ubudehe Program In Rwanda: An Examination Of The Sustainability Of The Ubudehe Program. In Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa. 14(3). Clarion University of Pennsylvania. This evaluation revues former evaluation on the program, beside collecting primary data. It gives no space at all to gender, and the word is not even mentioned once.
characteristic. Evaluations were conducted both of the country programs and on the
global initiative. The evaluation here considered is the Global one, and can be considered
gender sensitive, as it had explicit in the terms of reference the requirement to evaluate
effectiveness reached with a conjoint effort included in the crosscutting issues, among
which gender is comprised. It is requested that is assessed what are the “results achieved,
(or analyzed as on the appropriate path to being achieved) and perceptions of their
relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability; including achievements in the
cross-cutting areas of gender and human rights”\textsuperscript{102}. It is also directed that shall be
appreciated “[w]hat evidence exists on DaO’s contribution to gender equality and
women’s empowerment specifically”.\textsuperscript{103}

While the leading questions are quite specific, the findings remain nevertheless
generic, mostly reporting just on effectiveness in coordination as perceived by national
counterparts, with gender related specific results only proceeding from Albania (where a
DaO project to combat gender violence was established) and Vietnam. The gender focus
present in the ToR is lost, and the attention shifts from results to the process.

In the Global evaluation there was the request to evaluate: “Effectiveness in terms
of strengthened national ownership and leadership, and enhanced national
capacities/capacity development in pilot countries; contribution of the UN system to
development results; implementation of appropriate processes; and production of results,
including on cross-cutting issues, notably gender equality and women’s empowerment”.
But the evaluation implementation turns this “complex and generic” (as defined in the
DaO independent Evaluation) questions into a new set of evaluation questions in which
gender does not ever occur.\textsuperscript{104} The narrative of the report refers to improved results on
coordination on gender but they are not articulated, explained, contextualized in the
different countries, compared to the situation before. Results are presented at such a
high level of aggregation and with such an attention on formal issues (level of integration
among stakeholders) that is possible to say that the window opened in the ToR to seek
for gender in the actual content of the program (especially in relation to capacity
building) is then closed in the implementation of the evaluation.

Different is the level of gender sensitivity of the \textbf{Country led Evaluation for the}
\textbf{DaO Rwanda}, presented in the Y10 group (see below).

\textsuperscript{102} Ibidem, p.106.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibidem, p.98.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibidem, p.97-105.
6- The Evaluation of the UNDP Tokten Volunteer Program\textsuperscript{105} presents numerous occurrence of the word ‘gender’, but also reveals uneasiness in dealing with the very concept. The program reviewed consists of a capacity building intervention with professionals from diaspora returning for a given amount of time (some of them decided eventually to stay and moved back to Rwanda) to help the Government in developing institutions and capacity. The requirements to assess the treatment of gender issues in implementation was present in the ToR. Formally speaking the sectors of intervention of the TOKTEN project, though, seem to have a high potential for treating gender issues and promoting gender equality. The focus was indeed on the revamping and reorganization of the national television, the contribution to capacity building of health sectors and set up of hospitals information management; leadership for Ministries; education and sport sectors.

The concept is classed as a cross-cutting issue, and always mentioned in combination with HIV/AIDS. Notwithstanding the connection with HIV/AIDS, no actual unpacking of the relationship is offered, which would be easy expected to be articulated with gender based violence in the genocide, especially in presence of planned project activities like narration of genocidal violence by women survivors. In the report there is no reference to the genocidal use of sexual violence perpetrated against women identified as Tutsi\textsuperscript{106}, which was incited by the Government and even by the (female) Minister of Family Affairs Pauline Nyiramasuhuk\textsuperscript{107}: organised acts of GBV during genocide included rapes by HIV-AIDS infected patients purposefully released and organized in battalions by the Government.\textsuperscript{108}

The report recalls the difficulties of implementers in actual realization of some of the activities which could be filed as gender oriented. No institution demanded for volunteers with expertise on gender, and when some gender related issue (not further

specified) emerged, the situation is described as a cumbersome circumstance for the volunteers to be in.

The report does not provide sex disaggregated information on the 47 TOKTEN volunteers mobilized and enrolled in the program, but it does mention the countries of provenance of diaspora and their educational level (21 PhD, 19 masters, 5 with Bachelors).

Overall, it can be observed that the evaluation has a quite superficial treatment (or probably understanding) of the concept of gender, and it misses completely on a potentially very rich and interesting question, logically contained in the relevance chapter of the evaluation questions: how much contribution to gender advancement was provided by this group of Rwandan diaspora, supposed supportive of current government and with strongly attachment to their country, also in consideration that nine of them returned to Rwanda permanently back afterwards?

In this evaluation - as in many others - gender is conceived as a “cross cutting” issue, a topic that shall not be addressed in its singularity but shall be seen as relevant to many sectors and considered while shaping interventions in each sector. The difficulties here reported provide material for confirming arguments of those gender analysts who consider very ineffective the choice of gender mainstreaming, as opposed to specifically dedicate interventions to improve gender equality in a focused fashion, often with so called ‘positive actions’ to correct sectorial gender gap. The difficulties sensed in the evaluation seem to mirror a limitation which was present already at the program stage. From the evaluation it can be inferred that the framing of gender as cross cutting issue might have hampered its efficacy and attractiveness, becoming an unfathomable subject difficult to understand and to bring to concreteness through specific actions, especially in absence of key human resources with gender expertise.

7- The African Bank Country Case Evaluation on Policy Lending (2011) evaluation does not have a real gender sensitive approach, but it does interrogate results by contrasting them with the gender agenda, as it reviews commitment and results towards Millenium Development Goals obtained by the Government of Rwanda with funds from the African Development Bank loans. The operation is though quick and not

---

solidly documented. Results shall condition the possibility to obtain further loans (not grants). Overall the evaluation recognizes little analytical capacity to the African Bank, which hampers a better coordination and participation with the Government in spending, as large part of the funds are channeled as budget support not as specific project. The loans evaluated are the ones for Policy Based Operations. The report recognizes alignment between the priority of GoR in the overall Rwanda development Vision2020 and the AFDB, except on the Structural Adjustment Program II, inspired by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank instead. One tranche of loans was slipped in 1999 for over 6 months, because of delays in reaching the promised outcomes, included setting up monitoring system on poverty level, reintegration of teachers, and enactment of laws recognizing women’s right to inherit and own property. In the report the late disbursement of the tranche withhold in 1999 is put in context as conditioned by the late adoption in 2000 of the Gender Action Plan.

In the evaluation the Government is praised for becoming -since 2007 110- coordinator and direct handler of foreign aid, and not just recipient, with the formula of budget support.

The approach of the assessment is such that the report cannot aim at being an impact evaluation, and as noted in the document itself, the African Development Bank has indeed no capacity (at least before the opening in 2005 of a country office) of entering into the program implementation details, and really understands the difference that is being made.

Beside the observation on the Gender Plan, the evaluation mentions the support of the Bank to the Poverty Reduction Plan specifically targeting women (in 1998) and to the education sector 111 in which the Bank did not provide much policy support due to lack of appropriate staff among its own resources. The evaluation then recognizes only one MDG is certainly achieved by the Country: it is MDG3, Elimination of Gender Disparity, that the report recognized as already achieved by the Government of Rwanda, as both indicators have reached the benchmark value (percentage of women in

110 In 2006 the Government approved the Aid Policy, which showed the independent and clear minded posture of the Country, assertively proposing a peer and proactive relationship with donor interlocutors. (http://www.minecofin.gov rw/fileadmin/documents/Aid_Policy.pdf). The policy remarks that also monitoring and evaluation is a sector in which transaction costs could be diminished and time investment made more effective, by using a centralized monitoring service, with great benefit for the country.

111 Program in Support of the Education Sector Strategic Plan- ESSP, 2006-2010
parliament, and gender equality in primary and secondary education). This picture though does not match with the finding of UNICEF, revealing instead of the distance still existing in achieving the objective of parity in secondary education. This demonstrates an apparent attention to gender, with interest very quickly satisfied, thorough little research.

The report cannot evaluate impact (nor gender impact), can hardly provide correct data on effectiveness (which is a criterion present in the framework adopted) included on gender related MDG; it tributes though some attention to interventions for increasing women’s and girls’ opportunities, even if does not provide an analysis of the changes obtained nor of the approach utilized by these programmes targeting women. The context analysis does – at the level of synthesis chosen, a timeline with policy milestone – provide some minimal reference to gender transformation. The evaluation though also suggests that the African Bank priorities have some alignment with the GoR on gender equality, and the conditionality clearly express attention of the Bank program to gender equality and reform. So, the program had gender sensitive objective, the evaluation was gender sensitive, but there is not a thorough analysis and review to properly assess advancement, which are superficially reported as more positive than available data records. As predictable, gender relations and peace are not put in connection, while peace and regional relations are.

**N3– Simplistic approach in the evaluation: gender = women**

The evaluations clustered in this group estimate that gender sensitivity existed in the program since beneficiaries where women or there was sex equity among beneficiaries, but the program itself is not targeting gender patterns per se and the

---


113 The target 3A of MDG3 is: “Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015”. In the baseline prepared by UNICEF in 2002, it is clearly stated that parity is not reached even at primary level: “tremendous gains have been made since 1998, participation levels of girls in primary education still remain lower than those of boys. [...] Girls’ participation in education is very low. More girls than boys drop out of schools from P2; the situation is worse in P5 and P6. The completion rates are very low. Girls perform poorly in school and in P6 national examinations. This means that very few of them, compared to the boys, progress to secondary education. School physical facilities are limited and in bad condition. Sanitary facilities disadvantage girls and contribute to their low participation in schools. [...] Girls lack life skills capacities, thus are exposed to sexual harassment, gender discrimination in school and at home / society.” Okwach, A., Rubagiza, J., & Kabano, J. (2002) *Baseline Study of Basic Education for Girls and Other Vulnerable Groups in Rwanda*. New York: Unicef.
evaluations has no elaboration on gender impact nor on gender analysis. Neither the evaluations nor the projects to which they refer seem to enter into a preliminary analysis of gender patterns, to better evaluate differential impact on men and women of activities proposed (which shall be the literal definition of gender mainstreaming) nor relies explicitly on gender patterns knowledge to contribute to reshape those at some level – cultural, symbolic, economic, legal. In a certain sense, the evaluations are more insensitive, as even pointed at women as a differential target group of beneficiaries, they miss a focus on a gender dimension or even on impact on women. Included in this group are those evaluations that present some attention to understanding women’s condition but do not analyze the possible connection of it to the overall conflict dynamics and conditions for peace and well being of the society. This group is therefore labeled, with a terminology specific for this review, do not show gender awareness.

8) Differently from the Second Study of the JEEAR, classified in the N1 group for being totally gender bling, the First Study touches upon women’s condition, although it does not put gender as a significant element of the conflict analysis. It could probably not be expected that in this report the issue of gender inequality and exacerbated patriarchy of the pre-genocide society were considered in the frame of intersectionality with the ethnicity issue, as Afro-American or post-colonialist feminists had been at the time articulating already, for the concept was then restricted to feminists scholars, and because it would have taken a theoretical leap to apply those category to all-black population, although divided by the ethnic ideology. In the ‘90s Western countries as Sweden, where the report was produced and the authors are from, were already incorporating the variety of elements of identities under a single anti-discrimination

---


115 The concept of intersectionality now popular and represented in different feminists groups, is originally connected to the work of the American black feminist Kimberle Crenshaw, who at the end of the ‘80s started to write on the variety of grounds for definition of social identities – and consequently of power relations - that each person is embedded into together with the gender difference, developing a critique to identity politics, which was referring to monolithic identities denying the multi-faceted social characteristics of each individual. With particular reference to gender and race, she highlighted how gender differences also interplay with race differences in defining one’s identity, relative position in society and exposure to violence. See Crenshaw, K. (1991, July). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. Stanford Law Review, 43 (6), 1241-1299.
legislation framework,\textsuperscript{116} in doing so operationalizing in law and right the concept of intersectionality. But Rwanda looked very likely too different at the time to encourage in the authors similarities with the Swedish context, a comparison that could have virtually allowed to consider gender analysis relevant to conflict analysis. Nevertheless, sexual and gender based violence was clearly driving the genocidal violence, and it is surprising that the historical description would not highlight the connection with gendered hierarchies and ethnicity at all.

The Study underlines the decline starting from the ‘80s in Rwandan economy, highly relying on export as coffee (mostly produced by individual small farmers) and tea (in large estate State owned), as a factor strongly influencing the eruption of the conflict. In addition, it is stated that feelings of overpopulation heavily influenced the political crisis and the justification of genocide is not analyzed with a gender lens, nor put in context with the actual gendered impact of violence, which left a strong unbalance between male and female population. The oppressed position of women in pre-genocidal Rwanda and the influence of the Catholic Church are evoked as concomitant causes of the fast growing population, but the statement is not further elaborated. The authors point at the decade 1980-1990 as being important for women in Rwanda, who started to get organized in civil society organisations: “Within these organisations women have gained a \textit{de facto} legal status through which they can gain access to land and credit.”

Recalling women’s position and recent women’s agency in creating women’s right organizations brings the authors to notice that “In times of political turmoil and upheavals - such as in 1994 - under the traditional, male-dominated and conservative political culture, women in general, however, have not exercised a moderating influence” in the genocide.\textsuperscript{117} This observation is quite dense of implication and not aligned with the more mainstream narrative still cogent nowadays (as i.e. the UNIFEM campaign for bringing more women in the scene of the international Syria crisis) which equals women activism in conflict settings as structurally – and almost ontologically – pro peace. Despite the heaviness of the statement, the issue is not further elaborated.


\textsuperscript{117} Historical perspectives, p. 19.
In conclusion, this First Study of the JEEAR cannot be classified as gender blind (despite no occurrence of the word “gender” is actually found in the actual text\textsuperscript{118}) since it proposes some analysis of women’s condition and sketches connections with topics recognized as influencing the outburst of violence. But it does not provide an attempt to frame in a gender sensitive conflict analysis those elements, nor to evaluate the weight of women’s conditions on the crisis. Therefore it cannot be seen as intended to provide a gender sensitive conflict analysis for programming, nor a gender sensitive analysis to then open for a gender sensitive evaluations of the response of the international community, tackled in the Third Study.

9) The Third Study of the JEEAR, on the Humanitarian Aid Response and its effects\textsuperscript{119}, presents issues affecting women’s life and activities very prominently, as food preference and food preparation, but with no gender analysis. The word ‘gender’ is used three times but to really mean ‘sex’; ‘women’ are expressly mentioned three times, but the context is not analysed, so the gender patterns are not highlighted and the women mentioned do not become actress in the stories told but more as secondary elements. The evaluation analyses the quantitative and qualitative aspects of food aid distribution, overall praising the timeliness of the response to unforeseen sudden onset emergency, but also highlighting some aspects of inadequacy. The food aid, mostly channelled by WFP, is estimated insufficient to real needs – as a consequence, women had to go farm from morning to after dawn far in fields following available employment --; and also inadequate, because the food basket\textsuperscript{120} was strongly relying on maize to reach the needed calories in each ration. Although sorghum was at the time prominent element of Rwandan diet, the evaluation finds that in no refugee camps it was included in the food basket, therefore indirectly favoring the resale of food aid commodities with high food

\textsuperscript{118} The only occurrence is in the evaluation terms of reference which is used as introduction.


\textsuperscript{120} Appropriateness of food basket is a topic on which WFP has over time worked with more and more intention. At the time food rations were mostly input driven, and vastly dependent on the large in kind donations that USA, the largest WFP contributor, was providing. USA food aid has always been related to surplus production, and therefore the in kind portion (prevalent) is characterized by large percentage of maize. It is interesting to point out that after the genocide and the related increased humanitarian response, maize started to be more cultivated and consumed. Between 2000 and 2012 consumption almost five-folded, reaching 500,000 Mt per year, and therefore seeming to the Rwanda Development Board a commodity capable of attracting investors. Retrieved from \url{http://www.minagri.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/INVESTORS_GUIDE/Maize_Sector.pdf} (last access 14 January 2014).
energy losses due to unfavourable (for refugees beneficiaries of food aid) terms of trade, and causing program inefficiency. All across the analysis of the situation, division of functions within the household is hinted at but not elaborated. Women are not mentioned or presented as the ones on the first line dealing with inadequate food rations, nor bearing the brunt of households discontents or of health impact of inadequate food intake, effects recorded in the evaluation; a generic ‘beneficiaries’ is preferred instead. Is like the instant photograph of women’s conditions are not attempted to be connected together to make gendered sense of society. Overall the Third Study concentrates on the efficiency aspects more than effectiveness (and inclusiveness) of the humanitarian response, trying to balance the criteria with consideration on the exceptionality of the crisis and on its very fast onset. The frustration of the authors is clearly perceivable due to overall lack of documentation of the aid response and of monitoring data, which prevented an analysis of impact and to a large extent also of cost-effectiveness. No regret is expressed though by the authors on the impossibility of evaluating the gendered aspect of the operations, which shows the lack of a gender sensitive approach in the evaluation as well as in the interventions.

10) The evaluation of WFP Country Portfolio (2011) also afford gender as an imperative to observe sex parity among beneficiaries, across different schemes; it finds with this definition positive results in both schoolfeeding and food-for-work and food-for-assets, and less balance in the food for training data. The evaluation finds positive results in terms of consistency with Governmental Policy, but it does not suggest any element of the implementation that aimed at actual gender equality, not positive discrimination policy to favor women (i.e., like additional incentives to participate to FFT and attaining sex parity, which could have been an approach to actual mainstream gender in the portfolio). It could be said that the evaluation applies the sex equity instead of the gender equity principle. The objectives are related to the percentage of beneficiaries on a sex disaggregated basis, but they do not take into account the gender analysis of poverty and food insecurity, nor adapt to it the objectives (by doing so also ignoring national

121 For example: “Thus large parts of the response could not be properly assessed, either because information on process and impact indicators was not available or it had been collected differently by different agencies. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs.” Humanitarian Aid and Effect (1996), p.19.
priorities). With this opposition of concepts I propose to better define gender equity, contrasting it with sex equity. I suggest to consider the first as being an ideal formal set of legal entitlements (de iure, non de facto) and theoretically accessible opportunities that intend to be the same for different groups, by recurring to differentiated measures that take into consideration the actual reality of differences and discrimination experienced by the subjects of the two groups, with social profiles defined (also) through gender patterns. The second is here defined as being the legal entitlement recognized equally and with no discrimination to persons of any sex, disregarding not only their biological difference, but also the different conditions actually experienced because of the way people of their sex are considered and expected to behave in a given society. In this way the so called ‘positive actions’ to correct gender disequality are introduced at a higher level: the overall assumption is that equity exist if appropriate (not necessarily 50/50 quotas) corrective measures are introduced given current gender distortions.

Therefore in presence of consistently socially constructed differences in socio-economic indicators, the equity will not be represented by rules to ensure the parity of access between sexes (as for example 50 % of beneficiaries) but shall aim instead at the necessary correction to then reach sex parity. Aiming at equal participation of male and female beneficiaries in a food security initiative when female headed households are highly more insecure, is not an equitable frame. Introducing equal participation would be harnessing sex equity; instead, by taking into account current gender bias in distribution of food insecurity among population, the gender equity approach would set targets that assume this asymmetry and aim at leveling it compared to gender - to further eradicate. The formal frame therefore enmeshes with the current gender situation to veritably pursuing gender equity.

That said, the WFP Country Portfolio evaluation is not gender aware, just gender sensitive, as it does not recognize that gender profiling of food insecurity is not taken into account in targeting. The report quotes indeed the finding of the Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) performed by WFP itself, where it is highlighted (in three different occurrences) how “62% of female-headed households were below the poverty line, compared to 54% of male-headed households”. Despite the asymmetry in needs, the target aimed at and considered aqueous and meeting gender requirements is 50%, in food for work scheme (for adults) as in school feeding (primary school students) and the results are slightly over 50% globally on the different
schemes.\textsuperscript{123} This shows how even in presence of gender sensitive information neither the programmer nor the evaluators considered relevant to adopt a transformative gender equity, in which sex equity is obtained through positive discrimination.\textsuperscript{124}

In the Evaluation of the results of the ART scheme, which targets HIV/AIDS patients, the actual results on beneficiaries sex equity ratio is more aligned with the demographic profiles of patients, despite the planning featured more female at the beginning and then same quantity of male / female beneficiaries at the end of 3 years cycle. In the reality there was a higher percentage of women receiving support (average 60%) which gets closer to the situation described by HIV AIDS prevalence data\textsuperscript{125} - although the evaluation does not remark it, and might therefore not be intentional feature of programming.

11. The Evaluation requested by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning on the Reform of Public Financial Managing\textsuperscript{126} (2012) includes some interest on the gender budgeting introduction, and therefore cannot be considered insensitive to gender issue, but itself it does not provide any context analysis and does not refer to how the reform has contributed to reshape – if it has – gender. Therefore, even if classified in this category, it shall not be considered as structurally gender sensitive, but as inclusive of that program sector directly concerned with gender. The evaluation finds mixed results on the introduction of gender responsive budgeting: the

\textsuperscript{123} It is worth to notice that this same study the evaluation refers to, the 2009 CFSVA of Rwanda, indicates that “most of the single-headed households are female headed: 94% of the households headed by a widow(er) were female-headed.” This means that there was a disproportionate prevalence of female headed household in the vulnerable group of single headed household, and that aiming at 50% was not a gender aware decision. At the national level though only 13% of the households were female-headed households.

\textsuperscript{124} To be considered the observation of the Country Portfolio Evaluation that resources were largely insufficient to cover all vulnerable people in need. This reflection is therefore more oriented at understanding underlying intervention logic that in actually suggesting effective targeting. But it is nonetheless an exemplary case which allows to understand modesty of the interpretation of gender equity in programming.

\textsuperscript{125} Prevalence is higher for female than male with : 3.7% within female and to 2.2% within male (2010 DHS, referred to in the 2010 UNAIDS report, retrieved from http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyouresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce_RW_Narrative_Report%5B1%5D.pdf) The estimate is average of 100.000 female over 15 years of age, on 180000 people).

initiative was piloted successfully in four ministries between 2010-11, and then it was extended to all the others. It is noticed though is that the introduction of GRB is done with separate Statements on Circulars which risks to make the process separate, mechanically continued, and unable to get integrated in the Public financial managing. An important information provided by this document is that both the evaluation and the intervention on GRB and on gender equity budgeting, are being promoted for initiative of the Government of Rwanda, not of an external actor / donor. Although it is portrayed as not having achieved a structural transformation of public financing mechanism, it can be said that this kind of initiatives are in general still very unknown and unfamiliar in development countries.

12. The evaluation of **DFID Education programmes in East Africa**, covering Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda\(^\text{127}\), intends gender as the objective of gender parity in school attendance at primary and secondary school. The evaluation finds weak performance according to the criteria posited by the program and by the theory assumed in the evaluation, the “Opportunity to Learn framework”: the inputs are not tight to learning outcomes in practical ways, the focus is on indicators that do not capture outcomes. Universal education in small lag of time might indeed result negatively affecting actual level of learning, bringing too soon for the capacity of the system too many students. Even if the evaluation suggests that the programmes becomes more focused on quality, also revising indicators for monitoring (for example, enrollment is gauged on first day presence at school) the evaluation itself does not embark on a qualitative assessment as far as gender and education are concerned, sticking with the indicator of gender parity in enrolment – which is also criticized as inaccurate. No review of programmes to assess how educational programmes re-perform and perpetuate gender identities is mentioned, making this evaluation classifiable among those with a superficial, formal and falsely neutral approach. Non reviewing the content of the programmes, and non mentioning the need for it simply assumes that the barrier to female going to schools are only external, depending on socioeconomic conditions and on families, and does not recognize the role that the message proceeding from the

didactical corpus in shaping the “readiness to opportunity”. In combination with the low reliability of the attendance indicator, it reveals overall scarce reliability of the enrollment results tout court.

13. The project to Support Inclusive Participation in Governance (2011-2012) financed by UNDP and by the Embassy of Belgium tributes much attention on media, and the project evaluation\textsuperscript{128} tributes attention to results obtained particularly in the gender action. The main focus here is on verifying if the planned actions referred to gender (audit, training) had been realized. The evaluation follows the usual DAC criteria, and deals with gender as a cross cutting themes (as it is framed in the project). But like other evaluations, it does not use a comprehensive gender lens to overview results and implementation, and does not attempts to assess what was changed by the gender related interventions performed, remaining on basic output analysis. Among indicators chosen, is the sex ratio among the journalists trained, and as a proportion of about 3 males to 1 females is found, the results is considered to be improved. It seems that a confusion is present at evaluation level – at least – as ‘gender’ is understood in its minimum standard of male/female presence. Quality of presence and participation, as well as career levels in media, and remuneration for equal job, are not touched on even if they are the essential texture of a formal gender equity approach. The program is in theory rich of opportunities to tackle how gender inequalities perpetuate themselves through public communication and media, reproducing patterns of appropriate behaviours, roles, tasks attribution; but neither the program nor the evaluation have elaborated on that potentiality, and the gender audit that is mentioned as a planned action is not followed and examined to understand its outcome, indeed presented is presented as a HR review. Therefore, although is a gender sensitive evaluation of a program mainstreaming gender, both interpretation of gender are very basic.

Y10 – The gender sensitive evaluations on gender focused programs

In this group are classed the evaluations that intentionally assess the level of gender sensitivity of the interventions evaluated, some of them further focusing on the achieved

outcomes to estimate their impact on societal gender patterns. All these evaluations refer to programs with a strong gender focus, although with different objectives as far as gender equality results are concerned.

Female authors are more numerous in evaluation team of this group of reports than in any of the others, and individual female evaluators are found in this group uniquely.

14. In the **Country led Evaluation of Delivering as One – Rwanda**\(^\text{129}\), the attention to gender is significant, and the specific results mentioned (in capacity building and in creation of services to fight GBV) are reported to have been attained more effectively exactly because of the interagency cooperation. Gender components are found in many of each specific agency projects, which address GBV, food security and education. A key receipt of the success is indicated by the evaluators in the effective coordination with a government strongly committed to gender equality. As in the global evaluation of DaO, there is not an explicit theory of change as reference; yet in the Global report it is mentioned that where the *One Voice* joint advocacy program was active, results were more effectively obtained, and it was possible to observe improvements especially as far as gender is concerned. While there is no attempt to elaborate on the interrelations between gender and peace in the evaluations, measures to address gender based violence are rubricated as a good governance type of intervention (together with women’s economic empowerment and data management), and not as protection or health, positing GBV more as an issue related to public sphere and stability of society, and ultimately to security sector. The evaluation recognizes that the framing of GBV as a security issue is a position defined by the Government of Rwanda on which the UN adapted: “The GoR addresses GBV as a security issue under the mandate of the police. A GBV desk was created at National Police headquarters in Kigali with support from several UN agencies. Indications from our discussions with stakeholders suggest that GBV is being treated with greater care than was previously the case, pointing to some institutional and behavioural changes.”\(^\text{130}\)

---


The authors (and therefore their sex) are not reported in this document.

\(^{130}\) Ibidem, p.11.
Recommendations do not include though any reference to gender and human rights. From the comparison from this evaluation with the Global one it emerges distinctively that the higher attention to gender and the high level of articulation of the issue in the UN framework for the country was possible because of the strong direction undertaken by the Government of Rwanda, and is not per se a result of the UN joint initiative.

15. The **End of Program evaluation of UNDAF 2008 – 2012**\textsuperscript{131} assesses relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability but also coordination and harmonization of interventions of different UN bodies also working under the Delivering as One initiative. Being focused on the actual capacity of the different UN agencies in collaborating and optimizing use of resource for results, but not on projects co-conducted as in the case of DaO, the evaluation pays explicit attention to interagency process, to the capacity of UN to relate to Governmental agenda and priorities, but also to the performance obtained in focusing on results beyond the divisions of competencies and differences in mandates. Far from being only a formal analysis of the approach, the evaluation is framed as interested by outcomes, not just process performance. In this study gender is considered both as a crosscutting theme and as an objective, intended both as gender equality and gender empowerment, in connection with improvement of respect for human rights.

Ten out of the almost fifty evaluation questions proposed in the terms of reference (ToR) are strongly gender sensitive and almost shaped around gender equality as an independent criterion. In reference to the DAC evaluation framework, those questions are not only inherent to the relevance criterion, which would be a more classic interpretation of right-based approach (“is the project relevant to the need of increasing gender equality, given the strong gender inequality observed?”) but also to the efficiency criterion: indeed they imply a budget analysis under a gender lens. In the ToR gender and human rights expertise is also prescribed as essential in at least one member of the team.

This evaluation pinpoints many reached outcomes that show great improvements towards the overall result\textsuperscript{132} of gender equality within key private and public institutions.


\textsuperscript{132} The evaluation adopts the terminology of OECD, codified in the guideline document. Here the *outcomes* are defined as being some specific effect of the intervention, grouped globally in the result general category: “Outcome: The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an
The planned results are evaluated positively reached considering the activities of advocacy, training, and technical support that lead to significant outcomes in terms of international laws domesticated and implemented, bodies and agencies with mandate on gender equality strengthened, type of laws133 emerged and passed by Government and Parliament in concomitance with the Delivering as One program. The evaluation reports that “UN’s relevance has been especially noted for its focus on the marginalized and vulnerable in society”134 by government officials.

The finding 15 of the UNDAF evaluation states the positive results obtained with the UN support to the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), included the increase in number of reported cases of children’s right violation and SGBV. While in 2008 the cases of complaints of HR violation on children were 154, in 2009/09 they increased to 321, 81 of those were related to SGBV. 135 The evaluation therefore recognizes that an increase in number of known cases of human rights violation (included children’s) is a positive outcome, as is is assumed to imply an increase in reporting. At the same time though the evaluation considers a success the reduction in number of SGBV crimes136 within the rule of law sector of operations – although it can really only mean reported cases). This duplicity might be a slip that shows a double standard. It might be un-avertedly revealing the unspoken values that consider the offense to right of children as more structurally an offense to justice, to be handled with cautionary principles, and worthy the deployment of investigative approach, while SGBV towards women, when considered in its singularity, is treated more superficially, so that decreasing data series is assumed as a decrease in actual offense, not just in reporting. That the increase in reporting is due to the sensitization work performed by the intervention’s”, while results are intended as: “The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention”. Outputs are defined as: “The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes”. See OECD (2002). *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.* Paris. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/2754804.pdf

133 The evaluation recognize the strong contribution of the UN in policy, operating under the common UNDAF scheme, as being proactive in the achievement of: finalization of the National Gender policy and its Strategic plan, UNSCR1325 National Action Plan, the Gender strategy for the agricultural sector, the national policy to fight GBV and its strategic plan, support to media reform.

134 This quote is taken from the earlier version of the evaluation, in its draft report. The content is similar in the final version, but here it is specified that Governmental officers too appreciated the consistency of UN priorities with GoR’s ones. See Rwanda UNDAF Evaluation. Draft version, p.13.


136 Ibidem, p.28.
Delivering as One program (instead of the worsening of the condition of children) can be here considered well founded, since the program scheme provided additional training to increase number and capacity of human rights observers and to set up gender desks in the police intended to collect denunciation.

Good Governance outcomes, which are related to gender equality in the overall framework, are considered good: “UNDAF programming under the governance [Theme Group] has led to the improved delivery of justice and human rights services through expanded coverage of the MAJ\textsuperscript{137} and complaints mechanisms, as well as greater leadership and policy development for Gender. Improved delivery under peace-building and decentralization is more uneven.”\textsuperscript{138}

The evaluation therefore recognizes advancements under the rule of law which might not necessarily correspond to improvements in gender equality, and advancement in gender while peace building is still at odd. It is interesting to note that explicitly the evaluation and the UNDAF adopt a Theory of Change in which – under rule of law - peace consolidation and gender equality are explicitly made consistent among each other, posited as such. This feature provides an indirect answer to one of the guiding question of this research, and puts the issue in historical perspective. So, while on the explicit level there is posited an interconnection between peace – rule of law – gender – etc., in the analysis of data the evaluation might reveal some level of incertitude – a-critically considering reduction in cases reported of SGBV as real reduction. We will get back to the analysis of data on SGBV in next chapters.

Nevertheless, if we remain focused on the explicit level, a significant novelty can be recorded. The Delivering as One – One UN mechanism has implemented a framework that had as guiding programming principles: Human Rights; Gender equality, Results Based Management; Capacity Development; Environment sustainability. The Evaluation presents a Theory of Change in which Gender Equality is seen as a result of Good Governance and related to peace consolidation, with indicators for progress on good governance (outcome Rule of Law) including GBV. Probably this statement is the result of a growing awareness of the lack of commitment to gender equality of the previous years, and also of having understood that peace agenda and gender agenda had problematically not been posited as reciprocally consistent results of statebuilding. Beside

\textsuperscript{137} Maisons d’Accès à la Justice, one of the ‘One UN’ initiatives.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibidem, p.31.
the formula of One UN being more appropriate for proper mainstreaming of gender
equality, the actual transformation of UN framework for action towards a more
coordinated one, also reveals the awareness of how uneffective towards the main UN
mandate – peace and human rights - previous approach had been.

The case of this evaluation opens for a further reflection on effectiveness of the
concept of gender as a cross cutting theme, which seems to perform better, in terms of
advancement of gender equality agenda, either in high level programming (as the
UNDAF framework) or in evaluations with a strong focus on specific outcomes. Peace
and gender equality can in this set up be more effectively harmonised, instead of risking
to be alternative, having here been posited together consistently and in an articulated way
within a broader theory of change, under good governance.

If this is the framing in the latest UNDAF, very different theoretical set up has the
previous 2002-2006 UNDAF document, where gender was considered more traditionally
as a cross-cutting theme: equal participation of men and women was inserted in the
articulation of the pillar Governance & Justice, and women are presented as a vulnerable
group while feminization of poverty is also advancing. In that document the analysis of
advancement on gender policies is recognized as a result mostly of the will of the
Government of Rwanda, although also the substantial contribution of UNIFEM is
mentioned and the support schemes listed:

“The GoR has articulated an unequivocal commitment to pursue equitable
development policies, including the elimination of legal and other barriers to women’s
free and equal participation in Rwandan society, economy and polity. […] For its part,
the UN system is committed to integrating gender awareness, analysis, planning
methodologies and qualitative impact indicators across all program areas, while
enhancing the capacities of Government and other counterparts to do likewise.”

In a separate finding the DaO program is recognized to have contributed to
improvement in education and in closing the gender gap at primary level, while
supporting lifelong learning model and approach to manage the education

programmes.\footnote{United Nations Development Assistance Framework, 2008-2012, Rwanda, 62-63.} As far as the support to the vulnerable, the creation of the One Stop Center in Isange to assist the victim of gender based violence has been considered an extremely positive achievement but with little sustainability.\footnote{Ibidem, p.75.} Indeed the only funding available proceeds from UN; as and additional issue the follow up of survivors who have contacted the center is very weak and relies on “untrained Child Protection and GBV committees and policing structures [who] are inadequate and in some cases have resulted in putting victims at risk in their homes and communities”.\footnote{Ibidem, p.77; reference to the Final Evaluation Of Rwandan Government And One Un Isange One Stop Centre. Final Report (no date available).}

The remarked shift in the vision observed by contrasting the first and the second UNDAF consists therefore in the different relevance tributed to the gender issue especially in relationship to peace: in the 2002-2006 gender disparity is one of the problems, mostly related to demographic of poverty, but disequality is not tackled as such, while in the newer framework gender equality it is presented as almost an indicator “to sustain a peaceful state”\footnote{UNDAF 2008 2012 Evaluation, p.22.}, being gender equality presented as the result to expect out of intervention to strengthen peace. Also, the attention was definitely focused on the improvement of gender focused institutions.

As the analysis of this UNDAF evaluation deepens, a final judgement on level of gender sensitivity becomes more difficult. The evaluation of results of UNDAF 2008-2012 in the sector of Transitional Justice praises the support to the institution and development of the gacaca tribunal scheme, a traditional form of justice administration that was revamped after the genocide to handle genocidaires assaults and sexual violence. As detailed in the following pages, though, the intervention had not positive results from a gender point of view, since the choice of using gacaca tribunals to handle SGBV cases was arguably demonstrated unappropriate in a pro-gender equality UNIFEM evaluation (see below). Therefore, the greatly praised results reached on gender equality, might overall appear more stated then documented and nuanced: indeed a central component of the Transitional Justice sector, the support to Gacaca process, was not evaluated in a gender lens despite being concerned with gender issues - prosecuting genocide related sexual violence.
In conclusion, even if this evaluation is strongly gender sensitive on a gender sensitive program, and incorporates gender in a theory of change (imported from the program) towards peace, the actual gender impact of at least an important one of its schemes is not properly analyzed; therefore, also the overall conclusions on the successful achievement of gender equality results might be hampered and put in jeopardy by this finding.

16. In the evaluation of **Unifem program on Transitional Justice** (1994-2008), intervention incorporating also support to Gacaca, the analysis of the gendered aspects of the genocide sets the scene as in no other evaluation document reviewed, providing a situation analysis that makes gender equality resulting as a very relevant priority for pursuing peace.

The evaluation highlights how uniquely gender equity has been mainstreamed in all sectors, with the 2003 reform of the constitution imposing 30% of gender quotas, the elections – and therefore the emerging culture – have brought to 49% of women in parliament in the 2006 (currently 64% after the election of September 2013). Differences between equity and equality are particularly felt as the rural women’s conditions are considered, with large gaps in economic opportunities, school results, social status. Over the 14 years considered, many UN programmes have been put in place within the transitional justice sector (from UNDP, UNAMIC, MONUR, UNICEF). The evaluation provides the context for all and performs a specific analysis of those realized by UNIFEM.

In the situation analysis of the report, gender based violence is seen as a defining trait of the pre-genocide Rwandan society, but also as a factor embedded in the Hutu extremist propaganda which contributed significantly to the deterioration of social climate, by the way of insistent denigration of female Tutsis, who were hyper sexualized, and dehumanized by being presented inaccessible and dismissive of Hutu males. Information collected in the 1996 Human Rights watch are quoted in the report, to document how the extremist Hutu propaganda specifically addressed Tutsi women in

---

order to manufacture a subject/object of hate, and to forbid Hutu combatants to marry female Tutsi. On the other side, this fixation of gender stereotype, with intersected with supposed ethnic-based characteristics, corresponded to other negative ones towards Hutu women, who were presented to people as being categorized by the old power and the colonial order, to be born as servant, therefore fuelling intra-gender desire of revenge against women from Hutu women specifically. The violence during genocide is presented as heavily expressing gendered order, being rape used as a weapon of war. But propaganda targeting women had effects in women being active in the killing as well, and this fact is mentioned as being the only known case of its kind. And gendered were the impact of genocide, with high number of widows (about half million) and orphans (similar number).

The evaluation focuses on understanding gender justice in comprehensive terms, and in understanding consequences of genocide for women, in a context of feminization of poverty, little access to health care and abortion, and with 70% of rape survivors positive to HIV/AIDS – with intentional infection being openly used as a weapon to make consequences of violence and conflict more pervasive and lasting longer.

Considered the resources and the existent specialized staff of Rwanda Judicial system, it would have taken too many decades to administer retributive justice; therefore the support in transitional justice from international community foresaw a range of interventions, with the institution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the support to formal courts, and the revamping of public fora from the traditional justice system, called gacaca.

The evaluator also relies on this judgment on the researches of Nowrojee (1996 and 2005) who revealed a very unconducive environment for witnesses in cases of sexual violence. This included negative judges’ attitudes, ranging from laughing in the face of survivors of rape while they were testifying on details insistently requested of the assault,

145 Human Rights Watch 1996, retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm (last access 20th October 2013). Among the different sources quoted by the report in this respect there are several set of messages proceeding from Kangura, a journal with small circulation issued in about 10,000 copies but with aculate targeting to local burgomaster and local elected. As early as in the issue of December 1990, "The Ten Commandments of the Hutu," were published and four of them dealt specifically with women: ‘Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi woman; employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? Hutu woman, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.”
to lack of interest and attention to the stories of violence by judges who were normally all males. She contends that ‘the ICTR was not sensitive to the needs of women survivors’ at the stage in which it was mandated with cases of rape during genocide. This conclusion is based on two main direct findings. First, there was only one case, which became famous, among those handled by ICTR in which the organized rape and Hutu propaganda-incited sexual violence on Tutsi women were considered as genocide. This was a particularly positive result of active national leadership of a coalition of Rwandan and International NGOs. But all the others were denied to be sanctioned as relevant to what was seen a security matter of international interest. Indeed “by the end of 2002, the prosecution of sexual crimes had all but ground to a halt and charges of sexual violence were dropped from cases even where there was strong evidence to prosecute them.”

Second, treatment of defendants was significantly better than treatment reserved to victims, the latter also not being able to access HIV/AIDS treatment which was offered to the first, and the lack of privacy on name of the survivors and witnesses, normally leaking back on the origin community, contributing to produce fear, stigma, isolation, disempowerment.

Under the jurisdiction of ICTR, rape was initially classified as category 4 (less important), which became 1 only after long intense advocacy of many organization and of several parliamentarians. The shortcoming of this reclassification was that it was difficult to find sufficient testimony (women were normally raped after people of their

146 The Akayesu case, in which a major in 1998 was condemned as perpetrator of genocide and crime against humanity. The counts recognized were several, and only one on 13 was connected to sexual violence. If the prosecutor explicitly asked for the punishment of his conduct during the sexual assault by governmental police of Tutsi women who were seeking refuge in the Municipality building, the sentence on the contrary does not specifically add an indictment specifically for the facilitation, tolerance and positive sanctioning of rape. Indeed the final sentence simply skips the Count 2, the one referred to rape. Akayesu was nevertheless condemned to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity, but it is worthy to notice that the sentence does not explicitly take position in the analytical part on Count 2, which the prosecutor presented with following words: “Jean Paul AKAYESU knew that the acts of sexual violence, beatings and murders were being committed and was at times present during their commission. Jean Paul AKAYESU facilitated the commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence and beatings and murders to occur on or near the bureau communal premises. By virtue of his presence during the commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders and by failing to prevent the sexual violence, beatings and murders, Jean Paul AKAYESU encouraged these activities.” See the Indictment at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cactamond.pdf. See the Judgment at: http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cak81002e.pdf

family had been killed); this problem added up to the unwillingness – according to the evaluator - of the court to even file the complaint.

Then in 1998 President Kagame reestablished the traditional tribunal, which were organized before the gender quota system entered into force.

In 2000 the law to regulate them was issued, and it excluded from gacaca jurisdiction cases of “the major architects of the genocide and those who perpetrated acts of sexual torture. These were to remain in the jurisdiction of the ICTR and domestic courts.”\textsuperscript{148} This was the result of a strenuous “tug of war” within the parliament and was successful for increasing gender justice thanks to the strong mobilization of civil society in combination with parlamentarians, in a time before gender quotas with few female parlamentarians. Indeed “The original draft law had placed sexual violence crimes in category 4 – along with looting and property crimes.” What was needed was “targeted sensitization of MPs to shift the existing mindset on sexual violence which regarded rape as “une crime banal” – not a serious issue and certainly not a crime against humanity.”\textsuperscript{149}

Only crime of category 3 and 4, therefore excluding sexual violence as we have just sees, were possible under the gacacas, when the actual roll out of the traditional justice system started.

But in 2008 a law was prepared to allow to move cases of sexual violence to gacacas. The gacaca system, though, is structurally not favourable for dealing with sexual violence in genocide, and it did prove to be negative for the victim survivor. The perpetrator had the right to temporary release before the trial, so that he could take the chance to attack and blackmail the victim. Also, the incentive to confess the crime in view of a reduction of punishment turned out to be very negative for the victims: the procedure foresaw public confession of the crime and of the name of the victim, who then found herself covered by the stigma, and without any compensation\textsuperscript{150}. In general, as recalled by the evaluator, “Gacaca […] was originally an institution reserved for adult men, and women needed to be “represented” by the head of the family – either their husband or father. There was no sanction for sexual violence through these local forums” but neither also

\textsuperscript{148} Ibidem, p.22.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibidem, p.20.
\textsuperscript{150} The gacaca were initially meant to recognize victims, acknowledge their loss and define compensation, but in 2004, before the national roll out of gacaca in 2005, the possibility of compensation was deleted. Still no compensation mechanism has been agreed upon and institutionalized in a law. Beside victims of genocide, there shall be included those attacked for being moderate Hutu, while also being victim of RPF attacks.
the criminal law system aimed mostly at ‘the preservation of harmony within the community’ that to punishment of guilt, “once again sideling women’s needs”.151

Despite growing popular skepticism on *gacaca* being an appropriate setting for condemning sexual violence, still in 2008 was deliberated for the assignment of these cases to *gacaca*.

Within the analysis of Transitional Justice intervention the evaluator also scans the Desarmement, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program. She underlines that the scheme did not develop much information on the 1% of women ex combatants who were demobilized. In general, the feeling perceived by the evaluator is that ex combatants received more attention than the refugees and those who did not repatriate.

The evaluator lists the many activities promoted by UNIFEM in the time frame considered, praising the comprehensiveness of the approach. Playing a crucial catalyst role to fight SGBV, UNIFEM successfully carried on advocacy work (draft law in 2006 on Prevention, Protection and Punishment of Any Gender Based Violence), trained judges and military personnel, investigating officers who – as a prove of comprehensive approach – have also been given motorcycle to enable their rapid response. Building solid partnership with the Rwanda National Police on training and logistic level did not prevent UNIFEM to also work on reconceptualization of ‘security’ in cooperation with the Rwandan Defence Force, facilitating a process to focus on human security including GBV as a “security threat” which became a public campaign in 2005152 and created mechanisms for direct intervention. If compared with other literature and debates conducted in the same years, as it can be seen in chapter 3, this shall be seen as a strong contribution to make possible a transformation of the theoretical environment of security to incorporate in it a gender perspective. This step within the Rwanda context has possibly facilitated the recognition of relevance of SGBV issues in institutional building in the time of creating peace, proposing stabilization as an action that not necessarily requires women to loose out.

According to the evaluator, having the bill on SGBV passed at the lower house per initiative of the Women Parliamentarian Forum, the organism connecting women to coordinate actions on gender policies behind the party provenance, demonstrates that

152 A Presentation of the initiative is in UNIFEM video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whM645TZH1g&list=PL18DF4881B5ED9C6C
having numerous women elected is not just a matter of equity but does change the substance of policies.

The report does not attempt a positive definition of success of interventions in post-conflict, but it does challenge the very attribution of label of “post-conflict” when violence – the gender based one – is pervasive and still not over. She contends that “SGBV itself unseats conventional – but gendered – notions of peace and conflict which inform political analysis and policy, including: How do we label a country as “post-conflict” when a large percentage of its population continues to experience ongoing levels of violence and insecurity; and can a purely backward looking focus truly deliver justice if it fails to address similarly rooted current day forms of violence.”

The key point is presented as being obvious to those working on the issue of women in conflict: “there is often a tendency to portray the sexual and gender-based violence of the conflict period as “extraordinary” – obscuring the “ordinary” everyday experiences of SGBV in a “peacetime” setting or the continuities and relationship between the two; including that these experiences often share the same root causes of unequal power relations and result in the same wide-reaching consequences for victims themselves.”

Because of this pivotal reflection, this evaluation is an example not only of gender sensitivity, or of feminist evaluation, but of a gender aware peace study that incorporates gender understanding within the definition of peace, taking real life experience of a central collective subject, the women, to question the premises on peace and peacebuilding.

The report does not seem to use OECD framework, it concentrates on relevance and effectiveness exclusively, bypassing efficiency and only touching upon sustainability, although those terms are not even used, nor are they relevant to the organization in sections of the report.

The formal criteria to analyse and judge are completed with the analysis of the integration with national capacity and institutions, compliance with international regulation related to gender equality in post conflict, and clearly with the parameter of level of pursuing gender equality. The evaluator, reviewing programmes on a large time span, also includes phases and relates results as well as issues to different chronological situation, using it as an explicative criteria as well.

---

153 Ibidem, p.45
154 Ibidem, p.44.
This report beside being gender sensitive can arguably be considered a feminist evaluation. Indeed its author, Nahala Valji, is a gender expert who has produced a significant amount of studies on gender and transitional justice, and is currently a senior gender program in UNWOMEN. Therefore not just an evaluator with deep gender knowledge and gender analysis skills, but a sectoral expert, not a person professionally dedicated to evaluation.

17. Also in this group is the mid-term evaluation of Oxfam GB Peace Building and Development Program in Rwanda\textsuperscript{155} started in 2004 to promote peace while also reducing poverty.

The program is recognized gender sensitive on many level: because participation of women was actively provided and sought for, because key issues defined by gender pattern and GBV were tackled, and because women’s economic capacity, considered dependent on patterns of gender inequality, was addressed and reduced. The evaluation focuses on impacts more then on outputs, which is per se a methodological approach appropriate to gender sensitivity. The activities on improving conflict management are addressed at community as well as at household and individual level; reduction in tensions and disputes it is considered an indicator for success, so as it is the improved assistance to victim of SGBV and advancement in women’s opportunities for livelihoods. The evaluators recognize that the project has mainly worked on the inclusion of women in targets group, and that deep gendered patterns in society have been left untouched: “However, gender issues that influence conflict e.g. domestic/gender based violence, women’s rights to economic assets, sexual and reproductive health, have only been lightly covered.”\textsuperscript{156} From this statement it also seems to emerge that in the theory of change understated by the evaluators gender tensions expressed through GBV are a driver connected with social conflict, position that makes this evaluation gender aware as far as peacebuilding is concerned.


\textsuperscript{156} Ibidem, p.17.
18. The World Bank evaluation of the pilot phase of Land Tenure Reform in Rwanda, posits the property right system as a public good capable to reduce expropriation and to foster transactions towards a more efficient use of the good, included the use as collateral for financial transaction. This statement clarifies the perspective of the WB, not just rooted in right to property but projected towards finance-led economies. Land management is also identified as the main action to drive development, with 85% of population deriving livelihoods from agriculture, with the highest density in Africa (384 inhabitants per km2 over 526/km2 of agricultural land) and with land disputes having been among the deep causes of civil conflict and genocide (Andre and Platteau 1998) in the country.

The land law intervened to correct the exclusion of women from land ownership. In 1999 a law passed to include female descendants as entitled to inherit land, then in 2004 a land policy transformed in law in 2005 included women as legal subjects for land registration. The subject that the program evaluation revolves structurally around correction of gender disequality, and the evaluation itself attempts to cast a light on gender implication as well as on real outcome obtained by the law implementation.

The evaluation recognizes the continuing structural problem in the land reform connected to the 1999 inheritance law: although sons and daughters are equally considered, rights to land of wives are only recognized in they were united to a husband in legal official marriage, included the necessary consent of the spouse to sell land. This provision cuts out the many women who are not under a legal but just under customary marriage, a condition which is more frequent among poor population as the legal marriage has a very high cost. The Organic Land Law (OLL) on 2005 sanctions, under a single statutory pattern, the principle of state ownership (land is usuftructed for a maximum of 99 years), and the limit to land parcellisation (no further division of land if already 1ha or less). The OLL introduced the mechanism of digital land registration, which was supported significantly by DFID and USAID. The evaluation adopted a quantitative design to understand the main impact of the land title registration process.

A main finding is not only sex disaggregated but gender sensitive, as it is interpreted with gender defined vulnerability: “Women seem to benefit more in this respect; estimated effects of land tenure regularization (LTR) on such investment by

female headed households is double that of men with female headed households exhibiting a roughly 19 percentage point increase in likelihood of measures to construct or maintain soil conservation structures. This suggests that low levels of tenure security by females acted as an obstacle to investment by this group and that removing such impediments by increasing women’s tenure security and formalizing rights which they may have enjoyed on an informal basis.”¹⁵⁸ This evaluation is only based on quantitative analysis, but the design and the data allowed a key gender problem to arise. The land title registration process has resulted – on the sample of the pilot phase considered) in a loss for 8% of women as they were not able to register their land, being unmarried or married under customary law. Although among married women 19% more then the control group was able to secure land, those unmarried, and already more vulnerable, had a net loss.

The evaluation is not designed to provide policy recommendations, but information is organized in a way that stakeholders with interest for gender equality and environmental conservation can both use this study to advocate for a change in the process and in the legal framework. Nevertheless, it cannot be considered a feminist evaluation as impact of the policy on the unmarried women is not cogently presented, nor a functional argument linking the two explored theme – gender and environment – is strongly remarked. Although the evaluation connects the problem of land shortage with gender disequality and with conflict, it does not engage in understanding how or if conflict was reduced at local and intrahousehold level through the regularization process.

19. The ten year Evaluation of the German Peace Service¹⁵⁹ in Rwanda tributes much attention to present the activities of the program conducted with the formula of technical assistance between 1999 and 2009, included those related to gender issues or aiming at involvement and consideration of women in the peacebuilding initiatives. It goes into details of the activities, and although results are presented narratively, it indulges on detailed descriptions. Recognizing the interventions as highly relevant, the

---

report provides recommendations to increase sustainability and effectiveness. The program shifted from providing technical assistance by partnering with the government to partnering with NGO, which is reported to be a well working model. Encompassing post-trauma counseling, conflict resolution and radio production activities, it developed on the individual as well as on the collective level, also using training of trainers. The work that is categorized as gender mainstreaming is both support to women survivors of genocide and victim of rape, and sensitization and information on sexual and gender based violence. Some details on results achieved is produced, including the positive feedback on the counseling work service of women survivors of rape, who suffer the stigma of the community on them and on their children, particularly the children of rape. Gender based violence in this evaluation is framed overall as a long term negative effect of the war and the genocide, and some preventative measure beside victim support is activated. The evaluation recognize as a weak point the lack of shared understanding between the German Peace Corps and the local partner from civil organization, included disagreement on what shall be the desirable effect of peacebuilding. The evaluation refers to the DAC OECD guidelines on conflict and peacebuilding. While it enters into the details of interventions, focusing on how post traumatic support was an essential help for women survivors, it does not embark in a thorough gender analysis of the context not of the program or of the specific actions. The specific section on GBV and on support to survivors is fully gender sensitive, but the other components are not presented under this lens, therefore suggesting that the approach of the program to gender is more ‘tactical’ then ‘strategic’. Or revealing an attitude in the receiving public of the evaluation only ready to accept an evaluative gender lens on topics clearly accepted are linked to gender, as GBV is.

Y10 – Gender sensitive evaluation of programs which might have been gender blind
This group of evaluation shares a particularly interesting category which reveals how gender equality is becoming an unarguable value, as the international legal framework on gender equality gets more solid and a consensus in official narrative develops in international cooperation, beyond the actual limitations of individual projects or programs.
20. The evaluation of the Africa Development Bank intervention on the Social Sector, prepared in 2003 and referring to the 1999-2001 program aiming at poverty reduction in the rural environment as well as in urban areas, gives quite low marks to the implementation of the program it evaluates. The report observes as the Government’s efforts have been directed towards the consolidation of the legal and institutional framework, but it does not list achievements. As far as economic inclusion is concerned, the report recalls that anti-poverty measures have been taken already in 1996-98 programming phase, and refers to interventions being short on effectiveness, but no details are provided. The document superficially analyzes the profiles of disadvantage and vulnerability including a gender sensitive consideration (lack of women’s access to land, and great number of women head of household). It presents the results of the interventions, included reorganization of education, with no elaboration around gender issues. Even if all along the document gender is introduced as a “cross-cutting issue”, nevertheless there is no cross-cutting analysis of gender impact. Instead, just a small paragraph is dedicated to what Government has done on the legal level and direct aid to benefit women – not to address gender disparities. The program itself seems to betray its focus, which should have been much more ‘social’, as a specifically organized preparatory workshop in Kigali in 1998 also requested. Also the program is presented as having lost the gender approach expected, given the framing of needs and initial design. Even if in implementation, poverty reduction remains a principle subject, it seems to have been diluted through the multi-sector approach, and lost its cogency. The evaluation remarks a number of highly critical structural points in the whole of the program assistance: among the others, the lack of an overall post–conflict strategy, a project approach too unfit to accommodate “Important social issues (reinsertion of the former refugees, children household heads, women’s rights, etc.)”\(^{161}\). It also analyzes the difficult personal relations between technical assistance components (typically international consultants contracted and assigned to governmental institutions) and the governmental counterparts, together with the lack of coherence in the intervention that did not follow up on inputs received in a participatory workshop with local capacities. In the recommendation, the evaluation points out as: “Beef up preparation/appraisal of projects with environmental research and sound social analyses are prerequisites to appraisal missions. For poverty reduction


projects, particularly in rural areas, the aspects relating to the determinants of poverty, gender, institutional and land issues should come out clearly.” 162

This evaluation can be considered thus gender sensitive while the all program is not: even if it does not elaborate on how the program implementation with its shortcomings has missed the gender component, and potentially had anyhow not a neutral but a negative gender impact, it does move a global critique to the intervention that could be functional to prepare the ground for a more gender sensitive and gender effective new round, also underlying as critical the lack of adequate initial gender analysis in programming.

21. The evaluation of the Belgian Cooperation 1996-2006163 declares its own limit as having been unable to estimate results all over the cross-cutting themes164. The presentation of the different sector of interventions (of all Belgian cooperation, not just bilateral) is proposed by sector. The domains of intervention are potentially all fertile fields for operating with gender sensitivity: health (included reproductive health), education, rural development and food security, private sector. Almost no elaboration around gender issues is present in any of the sectors, even if topics very easily related to gender discourse as inclusiveness of education are mentioned. Nevertheless, the line of reasoning around what durable peace shall be allowed or challenged by, presented in the analysis of the health sector, could be a sketch of a strongly gender sensitive theoretical framework for peace building. In the presentation of activities in health sector, the authors openly show their perplexity in front of the absence of projects on reproductive health although it is a priority in the Belgian policy for cooperation and definitely a priority for the country considering population growth; the authors underline that not treating this aspect makes the interest in women / men equality too superficial.

The report observes as there has been a lack of truly gender oriented approach, and gender equality has been dealt with programmes targeting women, but it critically

162 Ibidem, p.27.
164 The cross cutting theme mentioned are “l’égalité homme-femme, l’environnement, le VIH et l’économie parallèle). La grande variété des acteurs, modalités et projets mettant en œuvre la coopération belge rend toutefois difficile l’examen de ces politiques, en particulier ce qui concerne des thèmes transversaux, que l’évaluation n’a pas été en mesure d’identifier.”
recognisez that “aucun projet n’a formulé des objectifs hommes/femmes dans
l’optique d’améliorer le statut ou le pouvoir de négociation des femmes”. On
reproductive health the authors see a sensitive nervous center which – if properly healed
– could be part of the solution in stabilization, but since it is not—at the time and
according to the authors—it could actually backfire on violence. This theoretical linkage
is a quite bold one and to a certain extent clashes against other modalities of treating
gender, more intended as attention and sensitivity to the division of roles. The fear of
demographic pressure orient the discourse of the authors to connect lack of intervention
on reproductive health to weak approach to peace consolidation, providing argument not
just for a more in depth gender analysis but for an intervention that promotes gender
equality as a functionalist approach to durable peace. Although the evaluation seems to
understate a relations between gender inequality and demographic pressure, the link is
not done within a women empowerment approach, therefore women are in the
background as target of a potential intervention to increase peace sustainability, but the
overall gender patterns are nevertheless left unchallenged.

In another point the text refers to the orientations of Belgian cooperation, those in
force during the time evaluated, notably the Notes Stratégique 2000: the expression
mentioning the attention on gender issues are phrased in the evaluation as “la place et du
rôle de la femme”, with a terminology quite depasse’ and denoting a very restrained
interpretation of gender, with a focus on roles instead that on the complex structure
defining gender.

Overall this evaluation can be seen as presenting a certain (although very un-
homogeneous, probably due to the many hands who worked on it) degree of gender
sensitivity, with even bold theoretical assumption on the correlation between gender
equality and peace, but referred to projects that did not address the core of gender
inequalities.

22. While the pilot on Gender Responsive Budget (#11 in category N3) is here
presented as successful, the Multidonor Evaluation of the General Budget Support
(2006) reveals that the initiative never took really place, for lack of expertise available

on gender and for difficulties in being implemented together with the PFM. This General Budget Support evaluation can be considered a gender sensitive one, as it does include observations on gender components, and considers gender as a cross cutting issue. But it does not articulate the underlying gender patterns, nor present the impact of the program on gendered structures. The document praises the government for being ‘gender aware’, and for the high level of gender equity reached in the parliaments, but noticed as budget related to gender interventions has been underspent, especially on poverty reduction programmes, mostly because of “absorptive capacity Constraints” as reported by ministry of Finances. But no interventions have been put in place by the World Bank or other donors to increase capacity of the Cabinet on this. Moreover the document recognizes lack of conditionality on gender in the WB programmes and in the donors’, and in general no ‘measurable conditions’ to monitor advancement in human rights (and then gender equality) as a whole.

The finding of the reviews

The evaluations reviewed presented a large variety of structures and organisations. While many of them organized at least some content around the main criteria, (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability; more rarely coherence) coded by the first OECD in the evaluations guidelines, there is much diversity on the level of details, on the approach to the exercise and therefore the overall objective, which is rarely specified. If the form can overall be understood (end of project evaluation, metaevaluation, interim, etc.) by the reader, it is nonetheless not made very explicit and could instead be expanded. In the sample chosen there is no mention of theories of change, and in general the focus is hardly on the change that the program was supposed to introduce.

As far as gender is concerned, there is a very low presence of gender sensitivity in the whole set of evaluations reviewed. Beside the many which have not even paid a ‘word’ service to the issue, almost all of those which have been classified as gender sensitive in reality are mentioning activity or processes of the project they are evaluating which supposedly had to do with addressing gender (inequality?) issues. In most of the cases it only meant that the projects behind were having women targeted in higher quantities or with better packages. With only one exception, none of the evaluation has embarked in constructing a gender analysis of the context, nor in articulating gender with
causes of conflict and with dynamics to create peace sustainably. Indeed in about half of
the documents (excluded evaluations 1, 2, 3, 13, 16, 17) the intervention is not explicitly
linked to establishing peace, and there is not an impact evaluation approach.

Many of the evaluations in which the word ‘gender’ recurred do not provide a
gender sensitive situation analysis, nor a clear visions of what inclusion of gender in the
project shall have led to in terms of concrete objective, nor analysis of outcome of
impact with reference to societal gendered differences.

One explanation for the prevalence of general gender blindness even when the
objectives of the program intend to be gender sensitive (as categories N2 and N3) might
be due to the structural shortcomings of the culture of gender mainstreaming vs. the
culture of positive action which was opted for in the course of the ’90s as a double edged
result of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995).

Mainstreaming may not be the most effective way to bring about equality agenda if
it is interpreted as a formal condition, as an assessment of foreseen gender impact
without an intentional will to actually provoke a gendered impact which results in a more
equilibrated socio-economic-legal pattern, allowing male and female same opportunities
and access to decision making and societal power.

Surely the critique of the gender mainstreaming option (explored in details below),
be in policy as well as in programming choices, as opposed to positive actions, can
explain this limited or more diluted presence of gender sensitivity in the evaluations and
in program design. The fault might not necessarily be at the level of the overall policy
orientation were positive action have been called, mostly for participation and protection.
Indeed, the policy framework regulating peacekeeping and postconflict interventions, has
seen in the years after 1995, when the Beijing Action Plan first officially indicated the UN
recognition of the need of higher participation of women in conflict management, as well
as a cap to military spending and protection for refugees, specifically for women. Over
decades, the rationale to bring more women in the peace processes became less and less
essentialist and more a gender justice option, to complement with positive actions for
introducing more equality in the statebuilding process, or in the (re-)establishing rule of
law, an option already sanctioned by the Convention to End Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW, 1979). In 2000 the UN Security Council sanctioned with a resolution
(UNSCR 1325) the need to guarantee adequate presence of women in peace process and
reconstruction, while underlying the specific needs of women in post conflict for protection, as constantly exposed to sexual and gender based violence. This resolution served as a watershed to aliment gender equality agenda in post conflict settings at least at the policy level, as many other resolutions followed (UNSCR 1820, 1880, 1860, 1898) to provide legal basis for women’s inclusion and protection. Pushed by a variety of subjects, mostly the United Nation Division for the Advancement of Women who prepared with the DPKO the study “Mainstreaming: a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations”, but also by women activists involved in international cooperation and in diplomacy, the UNSCR 1325 and the so called ‘sister resolutions’ can be seen as positive action in the history of peacebuilding.

If not the fault of a tepid gender mainstreaming approach, the reason for such a soft presence of gender attention in actual intervention of peacebuilding and postconflict shall probably be ascribed to something else. The stark difference between the legal and policy level and the real level of programs and implementation might originate in the sociology of the aid machinery. The male-dominated social and economic structure sustained or mirrored in the military force before, during and after the war (Enloe 1989, 2000; Mazurana 2005) is certainly resistant to change. Promoting gender equality in those circumstances is hard. In the word of the representative of a women’s right organization, "Donors look for the easiest way of dispersing funds. They give it to big aid agencies and don’t want to take a so-called risk on women's organizations who may not have administered large amounts of funding before." 166 To the social dynamic among stakeholders involved in post conflict international aid look feminist scholars, and Angela Raven-Robert (2005) provides a dense and graphic synthesis. She refers the governance of gender in post conflict within the UN developed under different ‘regimes’, notably the Human Rights (with main key actor ECOSOC) and the security, and actions happen in a ‘patchy’ environment, for gender as of the rest of sectors relevant to response, progressively building hands-on guidelines and standards, as country support is provided. Furthermore the overall male environment, amplified by the tendency to bring in post conflict and peacebuilding groups former military, is made more challenging by the very

---

environment of peacekeeping operations: uncertain conditions, precarity of jobs (limited in time and dependent on the donor geopolitical choice) of very well paid jobs, which sometimes are used for seconding inconvenient staff. All of this is the dense layer in which working relationships develop, and where gender experts are often recruited as such, as advisors submitted to program officers, often low in career level.

This was most likely the average situation at the time Angela Raven-Robert was writing the chapter “Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. Just drawing from personal experience, I can add that some breakthrough at the sociological level of the governative (national and international) stakeholders must have happened as situation is changing. Mostly it is observed within high level stakeholders of national “counterparts”, as an expatriate working in international cooperation would say from her/his vantage point. It is less unfrequent to find high level officers in ministries for planning of recovery and development not only female but dedicated to organize workshop, elaborate policies with gender into focus, although more frequently just “women”. For many is becoming an opportunity of career, not just within the ministry dedicated to family and social welfare, but also in other sector, mostly education, justice, economy and land management. Understanding the conditions that are allowing this change is out of the scope of this research, although it can be pointed to the effectiveness of the narrative, very popular in third world country and especially in Africa, presenting women as a subject substantially more trustful and capable of governing for a larger good. This strategy does not seem to have been embraced in western developed countries to aim at gender equality. In the case of Rwanda, as mentioned above and confirmed by some evaluation (as n.7), the main momentum for gender equality since 2003 proceeds from high levels of the government and from a radical group of female parliamentarians, beyond the intention and capacity of the international cooperation. From this review on a total of 22 country evaluations only 3 showed total gender blindness (N1) to the point that even the word gender did not occur. The larger group is composed by a total of 10 evaluations (N1+N2) where the concept of gender was largely non understood by the evaluators and not put in context with the objective of the project. There was not the sense to find gender blind evaluation on gender sensitive program, but the reverse was found in three cases. Adding those programmes to the one with completely gender blind evaluations and to the programmes of which evaluations only generically attempted to see some trace of gender sensitivity
but there is no understanding on what shall have been done (N1+N2+Y01 and in N3 n.8,9 and 13) the result is that on 22 cases, at least 12 programmes had no specific articulated intervention modeled over some gender consideration, while the other 10 cases often show understanding (and validation by the evaluators) of gender sensitivity just as sex parity of beneficiaries.

**Changing frameworks for evaluating post-conflict interventions**

Currently, evaluation is claimed as key tool not only for accountability, but also for learning and improvement in relation to gender equality (Espinosa, 2010; Moser and Moser, 2005 and Ruiz-Bravo & Barrig, 2002).

Although in general many evaluations nowadays follow classic OECD DAC guidelines, the ones here reviewed seldom do so. And at least one explicitly declares to follow the OECD DAC guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding activities.\(^{167}\)

These guidelines, in the version 2008, recommend conflict analysis as an essential part of both the program and the evaluation. They also point at the need to develop gender awareness and understand how gender has been shaping people’s experience of the war. The guidelines recommend to determine in each circumstance if a specific focus on gender shall be adopted by the evaluation, depending on the program and context. They point the attention of the evaluators to verify if the project understood and took into consideration “gender and any relevant conflict-specific inequalities when decision were taken about with whom and how to co-ordinate (especially in the context of coordination with local actors)”.\(^{168}\)

But nevertheless, beside some suggestion on appropriateness of the evaluators and on sensitivity of project, no gender related set of key guiding questions is introduced in the checklist for creating a conflict analysis. If this could be ascribed to the formal and high level tone of the document, it is more likely due to the non recognition of gender a cause in the conflict, or in potential new emergence of violence in the analysed context.


\(^{168}\) Ibidem, p.44.
Different is the tone and content in the text of 2012 version\textsuperscript{169}. An indication to “consider gender equality” is in the checklist (generic although more open than the gender awareness mentioned in the first edition) as a step in the planning phase. The new version bring in the responsibility also of those commissioning an evaluation, recommending to assess how gender intended to be considered in the intervention.

The UNSCR 1325 is quoted as a bonding reference, which was not before. Conflict is seen as not only having a differential impact on men and women, boys and girls, but also as a driver of change of those identities and relations. And as a very different perspective, the new guidelines introduce the concept that gender inequality might be a driver of conflict and therefore analysed also in terms of obstacle to peace.

“Systematic violations of women’s rights and their exclusion from economic, social and political spheres are barriers to development and may affect conflict dynamics,”\textsuperscript{170}

The 2012 edition also provides examples of questions to bring gender into the evaluation, and it also frames the issue of gender under coherence of the intervention with interventions, in consideration of the complex patterns of disequality that societies have also along gendered identities. As the previous one it calls for not falling into the trap of stereotypes of identities along gender, and it adds that “it should be acknowledged that women may also be perpetrators of violence, just as men may be victims.”\textsuperscript{171}

Specific questions to articulate gender are proposed in the explanation of each of the reinstated evaluation criteria; it is introduced that bringing gender expert – not necessarily evaluator – on board of evaluation might be necessary in some circumstances.

The two edition therefore differ on the relevance provided to gender in evaluation of post conflict, definitely enlarging the senses that gender can take in the evaluation questions, and they also provide more operational instrument to practically introduce gender in the evaluation. What does not change are the basic elements of the theory of change proposed as a set of values against which to judge the program. Gender equality, as it was in the first edition, is present only in the objective-item “culture of peace”, as it was in the former edition. Although gender equality is hinted at as an element concurring to peace, the horizon of equality is not recalled in the other items that should

\textsuperscript{170} Ibidem, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibidem.
consistently decline the role or place of gender equality virtually in all the categories proposed, but at least in reduction of violence, social justice, good governance, transitional justice. The omission of a reference to gender in this key framework signals that the authors - and the community of donors that they talk to - are not ‘ready’ (or interested) in dealing with the conflict nested in the (unequal) gender relationships. Gender relationships have long been considered deeply entrenched with family and intrahousehold relationships. If the change of focus from international conflict to intra-national conflict is at this stage broadly digested, same cannot be said for a focus on purely domestic level, which can be reached with a further zoom from intra-national to intra-household. So, if the ingerence in domestic level, in the sense on national and as opposed to international, is now broadly accepted as a legitimate intervention of humanitarian recovery and development with clear statebuilding functions, and has official recognition irrigated by the lymph of geopolitical interest, the further focusing of the sight, meaning the attention towards the next ‘domestic’ level (within the family), is still beyond the scope of the international cooperation in terms of solid and coherent action. Therefore, it can be said that the articulation of gender and conflict in this guidelines still flies over societal patterns, without a tight connection to the level that most expresses the inequality, that is at the family level. The household is silently posited as a unit and left unchallenged by the DACO 2012 guidelines’ theory of change.

Towards a feminist evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict

These guidelines are by definition systematic and able to incorporate gender and articulate its meaning for evaluators in a more complete and theoretically bold, as far as theory of conflict is concerned, than the previous ones. But they are nevertheless less comprehensive and focused on gender if compared to the synthesis offered by Julia Espinosa (2010) in her contribution to the congress of the European Evaluation Society. She presents all the elements that a gender sensitive evaluation, and by inclusion, assessment, shall feature, in an attempt to make simpler analytical gender work, accused of being cryptic and only for highly specialized professionals.

According to Espinosa several are the reasons for the slowness and retard in gender fully entering development enterprise, included evaluation, “as the lack of political will and limited institutional capacity on gender and evaluation; the use of women and gender as synonyms; and assumptions about the difficulty of measuring
improvements in gender equality, among others.” The early 90’s have seen a predominant Women in Development approach, with a focus on women as target beneficiaries to be brought in the development stream, an approach that disregarded considering the social, legal, cultural structures defining gender identities, while from the end of the ‘90s on the attention moved to consider gender relations instead, and to consider appropriate not just targeting women but – also with the inclusion of men – working more comprehensively in the context that is also originating the inequalities and limitations that policy wants to address. Despite the strong conceptual shift, very little transformation can be seen in the programming approach. Or at least, in the approaches of evaluations promoted even along the years in which Gender and Development approach was professed by policy papers of international cooperation actors. In the thematic review that Espinosa (2011) undertakes of gender sensitivity in the evaluations of different national cooperation, she highlights common features across the different actors promoting them. The Great Britain, through DFID, approaches gender equality through the fight to poverty, but it does not reach a rigorous framework with gender indicator, nor produces explicit theory of change, otherwise normally generated in DFID supported evaluative work. The Swiss cooperation, pioneer in gender sensitive evaluation at the end of the ‘90s, which in the first decade of 2000 progressively established the relevance for programming of the evaluation function, establishing a dedicated department and culminating in the redaction of its own guidelines (in which no specific gender-related content is developed), succeeds in producing some gender sensitive evaluations – mostly related to the odd of capacity of external consultants recruited - but not in genderizing its evaluation branch nor the aid agency. The third cooperation she observes, the Spanish one, shows a more recent attention to gender than the others, especially Suisse, an incorporation of gender sensitivity and gender equality within the objectives of


development, but not in the guidance for evaluations nor in the policy document (2011:338), both produced after the Paris Declaration, which is considered a milestone in re-focusing on gender. Despite increased attention on gender in cooperation policies starting from 2004, evaluations do not show an evolution towards incorporation of criteria to evaluate gender, and not only methodology but also preparation of evaluations is not systematic and lacks gender focus, with very diverse formulation in ToRs, and lack of specific requirements in team composition as far as sex and gender experience is concerned. Overall, inclusion of gender sensitivity has been dealt with at the status of a recommendation, therefore projecting large variability in results, which mostly depended on consultants’ background and approaches.

These results are substantially aligned with the results of the review conducted in this chapter. They compel to rethink the evaluative process and therefore the official references on which it has been slowly shaped over year.

The first observation to progress on developing a theory of evaluation that more structurally could help advancement in gender equality through cooperation is that probably the term gender has over time evaporated its cogency, and that gender sensitivity has been skewed to a very un compelling concept, too evanescent on one side to be really made operational, and presented as too technical to allow development professional non-gender specialist to exhaust the gender duty with superficial ‘lip service’.

The second observation is related to the mildness of the theoretical development connected with gender sensitivity. Indeed feminist scholars engaged in evaluation have observed as gender (sensitive) evaluation is different from feminist evaluation, and might risk to be more in contrast to it than to gender unsensitive evaluation, considering the mild gender elaboration that evaluation containing the word ‘gender’ might display, as argued in the first part of the chapter.

The differences are more on the level of usefulness of the guidance, in terms of instructions for operability, then on a deep theoretical level. This observation is rooted in what feminist evaluation has been evolving into over the latest ten years. A definition of key elements of a feminist theory of evaluation is proposed in Sielbeck-Bowen, Brisolara, Seigart, Tischler, and Withmore (2002), around some key guiding concepts. First and foremost, feminist evaluation assumes that gender-based discrimination and dis-equalities
are structural and embedded within systems. It is primarily concerned with understanding how an intervention would reverse the gender inequities – at legal level - which lead in real life social and economic injustice. In the conversations that originated this article, the epistemological question must have been quite important for all participants, as it is formulated the impossibility of neutrality, expressed through recognition of the political nature of the evaluation act, of the environment in which it happens, and in the positioning of the evaluator him/herself. Self-reflexion is praised as a necessary element in research methods, while knowledge based on experience (and many possible knowledge are recognized as possible, although not equivalent) has the potential of being transformative and shall be given appropriate consideration.

Donna Podems (2010) offers a dense list of criteria extracted by feminist evaluation itself to decide what is gender sensitive and what is feminist evaluation. She had to do so when confronted with the situation of a donor requesting to set up a pool of gender experts for gender sensitive evaluation but stiffly refused to see the exercise as the creation of a feminist task force. She consolidates elements from evaluation literature that can be found to be common denominators of feminist evaluations (drawing also on Seigart (2005), Patton (2008)). Further, she describes the frameworks of gender evaluation (reviewing the differences expressed over time by the shift in paradigm from Women in Development / Women and Development and Gender and Development approaches) identifying the common elements. Then eventually she compares the two approaches identifying five key differentiating features.

The first one she formulates is the most apparent but also fundamental at the same time: while gender evaluations are oriented at describing the differences in men’s and women’s experience, feminist evaluations intend to understand the causes of the differences and identify ways to transform this order, because “at its root feminist evaluation challenges women’s subordinate position”.

The second one can be rephrased as the degree of simplification that the two tend to introduce in their narratives: while the gender approach would contrast men to women, feminist evaluation would tend to look at what is elsewhere, in feminist theories, called ‘intersectionality’, also differentiating within women’s experience according to age, class, ethnicity.

---

The third difference is found in the understated assumption on what women are expected to want: while gender frameworks assume the reference being what men have or should have, feminist evaluation can challenge the existing (pathriarcal) values, and can have different criterion of success to evaluate results – and therefore judge same results differently.

The forth difference according to Podems can be found in the style and content of guidance provided by the two approaches: while feminist evaluation does not have a framework, gender evaluation / assessment relies on them and on derived tool providing instructions on data collection and tools for research. In less structured fashion, feminist evaluation approach encourages reflexive attitudes in evaluators, recalls the importance of understanding bias at play in each evaluation and declare them, stresses the need to listen to a variety of women from different endeavors and social class, and to allow marginalized people points’ of views into the final narrative.

The final difference identified by Podem is in the level of acceptance that gender responsive evaluation can have compared with feminist evaluation. This is true with many stakeholders, and according to Mertens (2009) also in UN environment in Africa, included with female counterparts.

Additional remarks can proceed directly from the basis of personal experience, which fully confirms the discomfort noticed in international cooperation environment when the word ‘feminist’ emerges, both in evaluation and in project design exercise. It can be sometimes branded as an accusation, and it means some equivalent of bold partiality. Indeed several conversations on feminist approaches in evaluation suggest this same issue, and evaluators would recommend emitting to use the word ‘feminist’ in conjunction with ‘evaluation’, a very challenging couple of concepts, which as Podems says, will develop very negative reactions.176

The third observation is that in the large majority of evaluations showing some gender elaboration, although qualifying for gender sensitivity, gender is framed as a cross cutting issue, and therefore usually bundled together with environment, and often HIV AIDS. This conceptual option does not seem to have produced effective results in terms of advancement on gender equality. When treated as a cross cutting issue, in the evaluation reviewed, the authors ended to be satisfied with quick as well as tautologic reference to gender and the other cross cutting issues, as the purpose of this framing was

176 See conversation in the American Evaluation Association blog aea365.org.
verbally explicitating that the specific actions were connected with sector of life including women. This framing seems to be - in program world - the operationalisation of the concept of ‘gender mainstreaming’.

The conceptual tool of gender mainstreaming, commonly referenced from an ECOSOC report in 1997\(^{177}\), refers to the approach that demands across all sector, the introduction of concern about the gender impact of policies and directions impressed top-down to societies. Although in the reference formulation the ultimate goal is gender equality, and there is an explicit reference to impact, the accent is not – or at least has not been posed historically in all the development and humanitarian sector in which this tool became popular and common use – on the actual transformation produced nor on the equality, but became more as a point in a generic checklist that was satisfied if the word itself was sufficiently mentioned in whatever type of document, be it policy or programmatic. Ní Aoláin, Haynes & Cahn (2011)\(^{178}\) provide a comprehensive critique to the concept of gender mainstreaming, concluding that it was used “not necessarily to dismantle discrimination, but rather to introduce a conversation about gender into policymaking practices and institutions”. Indeed it does not aim at a critique of the unequal gender patterns, instead to develop ‘gender sensitivity’ – which – it can be added - might even slip into the preservation of status quo to avoid cultural offense.

The few gender equality related results referred in the evaluations analysed that have adopted (as the program behind) gender as a cross cutting issue, indeed reveals how this systemic approach can work best where the system resources (stakeholders in general, but also staff of donors, development and recovery agencies, governmanetal and national officers) mostly are convinced of the legitimacy and correctedness of gender equality. It becomes though very unoperable when the people involved are suspicious of gender (or of the “Gender Gestapo”, as Raven-Roberts (2005) condense with a quote from a UN officer the opinion of many stakeholders towards professionals identified as gender experts) have no specific training on how to transform the gender patterns or do not have gender equality as an objective of their own personal or institutional agency. Ní

\(^{177}\) “Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, included legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels”. U.N Econ. & ŠOc. Council [ECOSOC]. Agreed Conclusions 1997/2, U.N. Doc. A/52/3 (September 18, 1997).

Aoláin & alii (2011) bring strong evidence in their work that “gender mainstreaming has become a tool of convenience for policy makers, rather then a radical mean of achieving gender equality” and propose the conceptualization of “gender centrality” to incorporate the attention on the outcome beyond just on the level of analysis (sensitivity) or on theoretical opportunities.

A focused contribution could be generated by enriching and equipping the (latest) DAC to better orient evaluators of post conflict settings towards ‘truly gender sensistive” evaluations. Or maybe rethinking more boldly some of the underlying assumptions.

This exercise is here attempted, drawing from the knowledge developed in the gender analysis (of context and programs) and of feminist-valued authors who have contributed to shake the concept of security to incorporate women’s experience and to transform the standard to classify ‘peaceful’ a given society, and therefore ‘successful’ the effort to lead the society itself out of conflict.

In the review of gender sensitivity of Evaluations, Espinosa (2011) observes that the group which more clearly developed gender sensitivity, in reality, does not follow DAC criteria at all: “En términos generales, ninguno de estos criterios se corresponde con los cinco criterios clásicos del CAD –eficacia, eficiencia, impacto, pertinencia y sostenibilidad. Por el contrario, suponen una propuesta elaborada pensando de forma directa en el objeto de evaluación, la estrategia de mainstreaming de género.”

The review conducted in this chapter fully confirms that improving evaluations by ensuring that DAC guidelines are followed per se obtains no advantages of gender sensitivity. Instead, a new set of value beside relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability might need to be added. To be able to guide and realize truly gender sensitive evaluation (and by fostering learning, truly pro-gender equality programming) they need to either substitute those criteria or at least incorporate on their side new criteria which will lead the attention on justice and equality, behavior change, transformative potential of intervention (including ability to find entry point in cultural, social, economical and legal systems it deals with, capacity of dissemination and replication), and value for money (intended not as efficiency but as trade off to obtain what the aim and objectives are even if it might be more expensive or intensive the realization).

179 Espinosa (2011)
But as a foundational step to reinforce the legitimacy of rethinking evaluation guidelines, an effort shall be done first to change the values underpinning peacebuilding intervention, as to make more explicit gender equality as a value to pursue in post conflict, not just equal participation of women in peace talks and reconstruction.

For this reason, the following chapter attempts to redefine human security incorporating gender equality: because peace is accepted as a condition in which societies enjoy human security.
Is Gender Equality Inhumane?
Exploring the limits of the concept of ‘human security’

The Sex Of The Leviathan

The concept of ‘security’ has provided the strongest justification for the existence of Nation State in modern western history and in the so-called classic political theories as foundationally theorized by Thomas Hobbes in its *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and power of A Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* published in London on the 1651.

In this view, the social contract exists to reduce reciprocal harm; members of a State, like parts of a body, do not use violence against each other, and leave to the superior entity created through their pact the monopole on its use. The aggregated identity, which survives the individuals who form it, rests on an analogy with the ancient Greek theater: the ‘personas’ - the actors who wear masks – are the ones who represent and enact universal human dynamics and situation.\(^{180}\) The State is this enormous persona where individual specifications are subsumed and reconciled in One’s interest; and the persona is the One who can *act* on behalf of all those that it represents. At a closer look, this meta-subject has subsumed only *some* individual differences into a higher level of similarity. The Leviathan, represented on the cover of the book as a super male composed by many males, has canceled more than subsumed the original sex difference experienced by humans.

The real subject who happened to be authoring theories of State, as well as rules of the State itself, and also the modular element constituting the Leviathan itself is – in this order of discourse, and for many centuries - a white, academically educated, often

English speaking, grown up male. That political theories and analysis could be influenced or defined by the gendered identity of the researcher, stayed well off the limits of the mainstream rationality of discourse in IR long after it was initially posited.\textsuperscript{181} The work of feminists in International Relations (IR) over at least four decades, has contributed to spell out implication of a discourse that uses false universals, and is unaware or uninterested in how sex differences in gender-unequal societies can create differences in identities, opportunities, levels of participation. This work is slowly starting to permeate IR discourse, and it is part of a larger transformation which begun already before the World War II as a critique to a rationality based on the principle of neutrality, to which feminist epistemology contributed as well, through for example the metaphor of ‘standpoint’\textsuperscript{182}.

A second thought on the capacity of attaining universality and neutrality of the State and the related concept of security, has also been ushered by changes in military economies and strategies, which provided a decisive argument. In a quite globalized international scenario, with global threats to individual security posited by nuclear weapons (and by smaller weapons produced in far corners of the world), it became difficult to believe the State to be the best placed actor that can satisfyingly represent anyone and protect everyone. The new concept of ‘human security’ emerged, with an expanded relevant population, to incorporate all humans inhabiting planet earth, not just the fellow citizens. But in the continuing IR debate, the potential of this concept risks to be reduced, and to result in a too large-tooth comb unable to retain a point key to its comprehensiveness: how threats to security are necessary different according to sex in society with fully gendered identities.

\textsuperscript{181} Much changes appeared in the 80’s: George Mosse shaped conceptual tools and revealed understanding how gender plays role in the creation of individual identities and of Nation State, while feminists scholars as J.B Elshtein, C. Enloe, A. Tickner, M. Mies and C. Sylvester, aware of their different standpoints, provided different accountings of IR realities compared to traditional IR researchers.

\textsuperscript{182} The references on the critique to false universality of sciences and rationality, and on the relevance for any theorization of the standpoint, as being determined by a multitude of factors on the individual and social level, has grown very long, but among largely recognized sources can be mentioned Donna Haraway, Nancy Hartstock, Susan Bordo.
The debut of Human Security in International Relations

There is consensus in considering the UNDP Human Development Report (HRD94) published in 1994 as the source in which the concept of human security (HS) coalesced, received recognition in international settings and started to be broadly cited in IR environments. In HRD94, HS is presented as a new comprehensive concept overcoming traditional military security, and encompassing: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political. Therefore, understanding, gauging and comparing HS across societies requires analysis through all those different sectors of life. The HRD94 explicitly articulates HS with gender identity. It is contended that inequalities created by the social interpretation of sexual identities (intended in a binary framework) are a great source of personal insecurity, in many domains of life.

A study of MacFarlane and Khong (2006), realized within the initiative United Nations Intellectual History Project, contends that the origin of HS has to be searched in the founding of the UN system itself. The archeology of the concept proposed in this study is guided by the political dilemma freedom vs. security, and centers on the rising of human rights. Despite in the UN texts there is a significant elaboration along gender dimension no attention is paid to the emergence of this category.

In the HDR94 a quote from Edward Stettinus, US Under Secretary of State at the time when the Charter of UN was signed, illustrates this point ending with explicit acknowledgement of humanity as composed of women and men:

“The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace (...) No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.”

185 UNDP, Human Development Report (1994) p.24. The two freedoms evoke a famous speech given by F.D.Roosvelt (who chose Stettinus as Under Secretary of State) on the 6th of January 1942, recorded as “The four freedoms”, properly the 1941 State of the Union address. The other two were: freedom of speech and of worship.
From this key quote originates the essential definition of HS as “freedom from fear and freedom from want”, largely referred to since the issuing of the Report on. In the HDR94 a first definition of this concept is proposed:

“Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.”186

But when it comes to indicator proposed to gauge HS, the promise of incorporating issues of gender asymmetry and inequalities is not fulfilled. Job and income insecurity, human rights violations, ethnic or religious conflicts, inequity and military spending; all indicators proposed appear gender neutral, defined univocally as equally relevant for both women and men, and no recommendation on sex disaggregation appears.

Although in the examples proposed as side graphs sexual and domestic violence is mentioned, in the selection of indicators those real threats very relevant and heavy to women security are not retained. Those issues were clear and officially recognized by UN already at the time of the HRD94 preparation. If the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) signed in 1979 did not incorporate gender violence explicitly, Committee overseeing CEDAW implementation adopted the General Recommendation 19 in 1992, asserting that gender violence is a discrimination hampering women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a equality basis with men, and the need to keep this statement into sight in law and policy making. In 1994 the very first UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights with the mandate of analyzing and documenting the prevalence of violence against women, also advocating towards governments and reporting about their performances.

It was also already clear the extent and severity of the issue. In the course of the ‘90s statistics on violence of women begun to be more regularly developed and violence classified, included through life cycle187. The massive quantity of rapes that were

---

187 A dense synthesis is the following: “Pre-birth Sex-selective abortion; effects of battering during pregnancy on birth outcomes. Infancy Female infanticide; physical, sexual and psychological abuse. Girlhood Child marriage; female genital mutilation; physical, sexual and psychological abuse;
perpetrated in Bosnia between 1992 and 1993 by Serbs, and public awareness of these violence, created the critical mass to persuade the chief prosecutor Justice Richard Goldstone of the UN International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague international to treat it as a crime of war. In June 1996 eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers were indicted in connection with rapes of Muslim women in the Bosnian war. The indictment was after the Report was published; but debates and information on the magnitude of the old phenomenon in the new war were widespread at the time of the editing. Simply, the issue of gender based violence (GBV) did not get enough attention and value to be spelled out as an indicator of HS.

**Rethinking the link between the military and peace**

Just before the HDR94 was published, a strong public statement was issued by the UN Secretary General (SG) B. Boutrous Ghali when asked by the Security Council to lay out the direction for new approaches in peacekeeping to enhance its effectiveness. In *Agenda for Peace* (1992) the SG offers a theoretical scenario which validates a new terminology, extends and legitimize new type of international interventions in conflict scenarios. It calls for an enlargement of the mandate of the military but at the same time recognizes the limitations of the military response if the objective is the achievement of the HS and peace. In the *Agenda* it is stated that every element in the UN governance system, beside the one directly mandated with peacekeeping, should be seen as having a role to play for an integrated approach to human security.

From preventive and secret diplomacy, to construction of peace with active involvement of civil society, new modalities are officially legitimated as tools at the

incest; child prostitution and pornography. Adolescence and Dating and courtship violence (e.g. acid throwing and date rape) Adulthood economically coerced sex (e.g. school girls having sex with “sugar daddies” in return for school fees); incest; sexual abuse in the workplace; rape; sexual harassment; forced prostitution and pornography; trafficking in women; partner violence; marital rape; dowry abuse and murders; partner homicide; psychological abuse; abuse of women with disabilities; forced pregnancy. Elderly Forced “suicide” or homicide of widows for economic reasons; sexual, physical and psychological abuse.” From UNICEF. (2000, June). Innocenti Digest. 6. p.3.

Already in 1998 Charlotte Bunch, feminist writer, human rights activist and professor, had categorized sexual violence gender based along women’s lifetime phases. See below for a presentation of some of her key positions.


189 In 1992 the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created.
disposal of the international community in dealing with affairs which are no longer considered exclusively domain of sovereign States, but that are instead connected to the objectives of international development.¹⁹⁰

In the Agenda the support to sub-national level - informal groups or institutions - becomes pivotal, because the national level is understated as problematic, weak and unreliable.

Creating the workshops for forging human security

The Commission on Human Security was created in 2001 as an answer to the UN Secretary-General’s Kofi Annan call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear”. It was realized upon initiative of the Government of Japan. Composed of twelve world re-known personalities, including the Nobel prize laureate for Economics Amartya Sen, the Commission published a Report in 2003 which proposed a selection of policy options needed to achieve basic human security:

“1. Protecting people in violent conflict
2. Protecting people from the proliferation of arms
3. Supporting the security of people on the move
4. Establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations
5. Encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor
6. Working to provide minimum living standards everywhere
7. According higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care
8. Developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights
9. Empowering all people with universal basic education
10. Clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations.”¹⁹¹

The Report purposefully plotted together standards of security in conflict and of economic security, cutting away environmental issues, but tightening them all up with a clear need to develop a universal and inclusive concept of human beings.


In the Report structural gender disparities are recognized as the basic problem universally hampering women economic security and making opportunity for livelihoods between men and women asymmetric. The Report brings attention to GBV and also to domestic violence, recognized as an additional threat mostly experienced by women; it also points to the frontline position of women in addressing and solving issues of human security in their work of care towards others - although Charlotte Bunch and Susan McKay, feminist authors in IR presented below, criticize that women’s condition interaction with security is not fully explored. The Report is also criticized for not adequately spelling the variety of roles and interactions that women experience with conflict.

When in 2004 the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was selected to be hosting the newly established Human Security Unit (HSU), the Trust Fund set up by the Japanese Government moved under the management of the new multilateral Unit. The handbook for the preparation and realization of projects with the Fund support includes reference to gender at three levels: first, reference to sex-disaggregated data (confusingly called ‘gender-disaggregated’); second, the caveat on the need to keep into account local gender patterns while programming and implementing; third, the need to address gender equality “given the seriousness of domestic and sexual violence” because “gender equality also requires special consideration as human security cannot be achieved without the active participation of women”.

**Governments making sense of human security**

If the direction taken by the Government of Japan in the interpretation and use of the concept was quite close to the UNDP one, being both elements of the concept – freedom from fear and want – addressed and considered, i.e. with inclusion of investments on health as a functional mean to achieve HS, other interpretations privileged more one than the other. Canadian approach, for example, opted for freedom from fear, considering central the military response in the discourse and enlarged the scope by examining, developing and advocating for policies for protection of civilians.

---

The Norwegian approach explicitly bent towards improving gender equality in post conflict decision making. This line has been held as a reference within the Human Security Network (HSN), an informal committee initially based on a bilateral agreement between Norway and Canada, signed in 1998, and successively extended and accessible to other countries. Motivated by the success of the co-operation between Canada and Norway on the campaign to ban landmines, the agreement intended to replicate the formula that had led to the so called Ottawa Treaty and addressed other major threats to people’s safety. The common agenda included: security reform in post conflict settings, reinforcement of women’s participation in peace processes and decision making, advocacy against sexual violence in conflict.

Inspired by the Canadian approach to HS the work starting at the very beginning of 2000 has become a reference for international norm on the role that military have in the protection of civilians in other states. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was created as an ad hoc body for defining acceptable means and scenarios in which inerence in other State’s affairs becomes necessary for the protection of human rights. In its first Report *The Responsibility to Protect* (RtoP - 2001), although no reference is made to structural gender inequality existing in societies, violence against women in conflict as a weapon of war is mentioned as a threat that can trigger the use of means envisaged by the Commission to protect civilians in context where the State is failing.

Within this frame, “protecting” women is presented as an acceptable reason for inerence within national affairs. If on the practical level for those who aim at the best wellbeing for all people this step necessarily appears as an evolution towards making people more important then conventional norms of IR, on the symbolic level this is not a liberating type of thinking: indeed it re-insist on the consolidated imaginary order and value system of a State that organizes force through a male-military organ to protect the other half of fellow (half) citizens, who do not typically fight wars, but stay behind at home and need to be protects together with the children, the elderly, the invalids and the assets. It is remarkable the contrast between States and UN debates on HS and the RtoP Report, where the violation of the principle of State sovereignty is accepted in the name

\[\text{193 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997.} \]

of ‘acute’ gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict, but not in its ‘chronic’ expression of asymmetric socio-economic positioning of male and female in societies. The Nation-State, whose identity was created with broad utilization of traits of masculinity, is restrained when it fails operating one of the masculine functions included in its mandate, protection of women in time of conflict. Violence towards women finally enters in the international debates on HS, but in its war related form, and used as the argument to allow ingerence in other State’s domain and responsibility. What even the debates on refugees could not achieve during Cold War, was eventually made more acceptable with the cause of protection for women.

**Environment or human rights?**

Researches and conferences from Asian States and Asia-focused scholars present a large attention on HS in its interplay with climate change and natural disasters.

Mely Caballero-Anthon\(^{195}\) contends that in Asia debates on HS are different from discussions in western States: while in both areas the discourse has enlarged security bringing it also beyond the military domain, in the South East the main actor defining and promoting reflections on HS are the Governments, which primarily need stability to exercise this peculiar function\(^{196}\), and also NGOs.

The appropriation of this concept by the ASEAN States might be a defensive response to the fear of being challenged as far as monopoly of violence is concerned. Furthermore, the strong interest on natural disaster in South East Asia can maybe be read not only as a geographical necessity but as a modality to shape the discourse on HS is a less political way, on a ground possibly far from matters of human rights and consequently of gender inequalities. According to Acharya “some Asian Government and analysts see human security as yet another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies”\(^{197}\), although the richness and openness of the concept makes worthy considering not dismissing it\(^{198}\).

---


\(^{196}\) Caballero-Anthony, op.cit., p.161.


The suspicion of Asian Governments for HS was parallel to the enthusiasm of Asian civil society, which got involved in the debate and progressively identified as essential contents of human security discourse the analysis of causes of conflict, assuming that conflict has root causes “in socio economic and gender disparities as well as in environmental degradation and lack of political participation”.

**Fitting human security in international relations studies**

While a certain convergence is observed in State policies and multilateral initiatives, a greater diversity – with overall less attention to gender - is registered in academic debates of IR scholars on HS.

On one side are those critical of the supposed radical change introduced with the new expression, like Roland Paris, who prefers to view the debate on security as a continuous progressive enlargement of the inventory of ‘relevant’ threats, with changes in adequate response beyond the pure military intervention. He calls HS therefore just a “category of research.” Another group is created by those like Florini and Simmons, who cannot see any utility in such an energy-consuming and broad discussion, which has not much chances of achieving agreed upon definitions of the concept. A third group can be identified with those scholars who attempted articulated definitions and creation of frameworks in the belief that beyond a catch phrase there is a possibility of a mental content helpful in describing more accurately present world and in guiding the action.

Despite the pivotal role that in their frame the concept of societal security has, some authors like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap De Wilde – pertaining to the Copenhagen school of realism - completely ignore gender patterns as a main plot of societal fabric.

Retrieved from:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/research/workingpapers/wpspaisfiles/christiearcharya1108.pdf
(Accessed 17 April 2012).

199 Caballero-Anthony, op.cit, p.166.
Motivated in coalescing a working definition of HS before momentum expired, some space for gender was found in Sabina Alkire, who proposed a framework rooted in international legislation on human rights, with the objective of making it operable within existing institutions in a State-based systems.

Her efforts provide a formal structure capable to subsume both the two main threats, violence and poverty. She reaches her objective developing definitions and indicating procedures not from an institutional but from a people centered point of view:

“People who are trying to survive – whether it be a woman locking her door at night, or taking her children to be vaccinated – do not choose between addressing ‘violence threats’ or ‘poverty threats’.”

She keeps human development and human security separate, the latter being more limited then the first, useful to orient preparedness and response, not societal transformation. She retains GBV as one component, but with no articulation to theoretical tools or indicators to perform gender analysis. Ultimately, she seems to devise the reader from the promise of looking at threats from the eyes of people: although she does not propose disciplinary or institutional divide between issues of poverty and of fear, she does not acknowledge difference in being a woman or a man, (or a girl or a boy) as a key condition to map threats to people.

Since 2005, two Human Security Reports and three briefs have been issued by the Canada based group HS Report Project, affiliated to the Fraser University.

In the brochure that presents the themes developed in the report and geographically rendered in the Security Atlas, as well as in the chapter that in 2005 Report offered the definition of the object of research, the sense of HS that is chosen is the “narrower” one, freedom from fear or violence, in opposition to the “broad” sense that encompasses food security, appropriate shelter, protection from poverty, and sometimes from other “threats to human dignity”. The narrower one is presented also as


referred to a set of threats that have a lower toll: hunger, disease or the (growing number of) natural disasters have a larger deadly impact than conflict, terrorism and genocide altogether.

The narrower sense of HS, intended as freedom from violence, is explored in the two HS Reports in sections developed around a set of indicators that provide evidence for positive improvements in human security over the years. The number of wars among States, as well as of conflicts among non-State parties, but also the decreasing death toll shown in statistics, to end with human rights abuse and the level of fear within a State, measured through the Political Terror Scale with a gradient from 1 to 5 that is derived from the Annual Amnesty international Reports. Globally, all the quantitative results proposed show improvement in HS.

While the researchers of the group hold tight to the idea of HS as a concept to be related to the individuals and not to the security of the States, the overall conclusion on the reduction of occurrence of armed conflict, refers to interstate or intrastate conflict. The promised focus on individual security that the researchers’ group has proposed as part of the approach is hardly kept after the double cut imposed on the matter: narrowing the scope of the concept to freedom from violence, and then observing trends at State level might have given enough materials of study to leave little explorations to other dimensions.

The section in the HS Atlas dedicated to review and evaluate human rights violation seems in principle to be the one where gender analysis lenses could be best and easiest applied. Let alone GBV, no profile is developed on violation of rights as produced by even sexual violence, or violence against women in war and post war, although the opening statement of the section does contain the word ‘rapes’ at the *incipit*. No reference is made to statistics signaling increase of rape incidence in post conflict settings. Sexual violence is far from being conceptualized as a possible element of terror in a society, potentially interesting half or so of the population – because the terror is in these studies narrowed down to domain of political opinions. It is mentioned the threat of abduction of children in conflicts, but not of women. In the HS Report 2010/11 there is no mention at all on violence against women either, while broad space is dedicated to the counterintuitive finding that mortality decreases in war time.\footnote{The apparent paradox is mostly explained as the result of the extensive immunization, health and hygiene work conducted through decades by UN organization as UNICEF and WHO, which has reinforced population}
Again, access of the researchers of HS Report Project to studies and papers rich in gender approach surely exist: through the repository of the Human Security Gateway, side project of the HS Report, large quantity of resources are posted on line, indeed organized around a taxonomy that includes the category “gender and armed conflicts”. The absence of gender must be therefore an intentional choice of researchers defining the architecture of the reporting study.

The Human Security Index is an initiative promoted by UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, championed and led by an individual researcher, D.Hastings, but originated from debates in a academic conference of the University of Hanoi. If the HS Report Project is all concentrated on the narrower sense of the concept of HS, this other analysis uses an enlarged framework, which still remain gender blind. The index is developed as a combined rating of indicators on social, economic, and environmental dimensions.

The first Version had indicators on equality only to tackle economic gaps in societies (using the Gini Coefficient) but not to gauge equality around gender patterns. The Version 2, released in 2012\(^{207}\), does include the Gender Gap Index as an indicator, but the source is the World Economic Forum, an international Foundation of international economic actors with a very positive stand in favor of global capitalist, which is often criticized by feminists as the powerful agent increasing gender divides. More relevantly, the index does not contain statistics related to occurrence of GBV – although it contains data on laws to punish violence against women.

Academic journals fully consecrated to HS are not numerous: currently active are the Journal of Human Security, published by the RMIT University, an Australian university specialized in engineering and technology, and Praxis, the Fletcher Journal of Human Security of the Tufts University. While the latter is a journal coordinated by graduate students, and includes short articles eligible for a tag on gender, the first one presents often papers that are critical of gender approaches in research on HS.

So, where did the women hide?

In Academic as in Development communities, HS functioned as a high-speed train to bring complex thinking and reflections of diversity management in the heart of international relations debates although only brought marginal consideration of gender asymmetry in the set of theories and tools that have originated from it.

Paradoxically, the States paid more interest to gender then Academics. The scarcity of gender analysis in the Academic discourse on HS is particularly surprising if we consider that: 1) the debate around the new concept of HS spread also thanks to the attention that it received by Sen and for the theoretical articulation with the concept of human development, which made much easier to explain gender in socio-economic and political spheres; 2) the decade of the HS was also the decade on gender, with a milestone in the Conference of Women in Beijing. How could such an important parallel stage, the discourse on HS, be left substantially empty by gender theorists? Does it have to do with scarcity of gender sensitive scholars, who maybe at the time were all busy within UN, having been recruited for mainstreaming gender in development-related assignment? Or does it have to do with gender sensitive intellectuals having overall a more pragmatic approach, like Florini and Simmons (1997), and taking as satisfying the UNDP Report and concentrating on ways for implementing fresh ideas for strengthening security of people? Those were also the years in which gender was broadly spelled out as a social construct, which could have contributed to reinforce the mental resistance found in scholar in utilizing this additional tool of socio-economic analysis.

Few islands of interest in defining HS by incorporating gender nevertheless exist. It seems possible to generalize that those authors are those who proceed from gender studies and / or who have gender programming experience.

---

208 As a reference on this shared and diffused awareness, Ridgeway and Correll (2004) are particularly explicit: “One of the important achievements in gender knowledge in the past decade is the revolution in our theoretical conceptualization of what gender is as a social phenomenon. There is increasing consensus among gender scholars that gender is not primarily an identity or role that is taught in childhood and enacted in family relations. Instead, gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as two significantly different categories, men and women, and organizing social relations of inequality on the basis of that difference […] Like other multilevel systems of difference and inequality such as those based on race or class, gender involves cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro level, patterns of behavior and organizational practices at the interactional level, and selves and identities at the individual level.” From: Ridgeway, C.L. & Correll, S.J. (2004). Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations. Gender and Society. 4. 510-531.
A crucial voice that struggled to keep an authoritative position in IR while also elaborating an innovative gender aware critique on IR discourse (and sociology) is Ann Tickner. She provides a definition of security that qualifies for HS and that revolves around the post-modern awareness of the structural relevance of observer’s stand-point in the re-construction of reality: “Feminist perspective of security starts with the individual or community rather than the State or the international system. Rejecting universal explanation that, they believe, contain hidden gender biases, since they are so often based on the experiences of men, feminists frequently draw on local interpretation to explain women’s relatively deprived position and their insecurity. Consistent with their focus on social relations rather than State relations, feminists seek to uncover how gender hierarchies and their intersection with race and classes’ exacerbate women’s insecurities.”

The focus on social relations corresponds to a focus on economic webs and relative positions. Feminists analysis of HS is strongly entwined with the universally confirmed observation that women of all races in every society and at every class enjoy relative lower economic power than men, and that this minor gendered identity creates a circular condition of vulnerability, that confirms lower power of purchase. Women receive lower pay for equal job, have a much higher share of non remunerated reproductive work: when shocks occur, they result in greater relative economic impact on women.

Charlotte Bunch has broadly treated issues of violence towards women as connected with gender patterns of inequalities. Being in civil society, as well as in the academic and the UN environments, she had actively worked to increase understanding and inform policy making to make sexual and domestic violence an issue of public security.

The main arguments used to connect violence against women with HS are the universality of the phenomenon, with variation in magnitude, and the persistence across al phases of women life, in different forms. Manifestations are culturally specific, but GBV occurs at high level across countries, classes, and ethnicities.

---


Her stronger point of advocacy has been on the recognition of women’s right as human rights, in all their socio-economic and legal declinations, and in parallel of GBV as a HS component. Bunch describes GBV as not only a violation of women’s security and rights, also as a mean through which violence is accepted and perpetuated.\textsuperscript{211} Acting against GBV can also recreate gender identities:

“Addressing violence at the heart of society, in our families and daily life, is a key component to addressing how we lay the conditions for human security for all as an alternative to the nationalist military based security that is fueling so many conflicts and problems in the world today.”\textsuperscript{212}

The feminist critique has broadly focused on how globalized economy has reinforced and sometimes increased the gender divide on economic capabilities and entitlements\textsuperscript{213}. Some author has proposed this discussion on the table of the debate on HS. Kristen Timothy, who served from 1993-1995 as the United Nations Coordinator for the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, nails down that the concept of privacy is the obstacle at State level for making human rights concrete standards for all individuals. She also direct a beam of light on the crucial connection HS–development, showing how gender approach itself could offer an explanation on what is the interaction between HS and human development: providing security for women is an important process for fostering development, indeed failure to meet women’s need for safety and security can be considered an indicator of underdevelopment. Focusing on concrete and specific risks faced by women’s, men’s, girls’ and boys’ “may help to focus action and identify those accountable for reducing


\textsuperscript{212}\textsuperscript{212} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{213}\textsuperscript{213} Following the eye-opening work of Amartya Sen on real dynamic of poverty and impoverishment, I use the word ‘entitlement’ in its broad sense of acquired rights or commodities in the political and economic sphere, which are not absolute but valorized in the system (political or economical, included value of currency and terms of trade of the possessions owned) they are in. Sen (1999) defined the expression ‘economic facilities’ as the concrete opportunities that individuals really enjoy for consuming, producing or exchanging. When focusing on women’s socio-economic conditions, the use of the world entitlement might be stretched for referring to both what can be owned in terms of economic availability and what can be owned in terms of legal possibility that a society allow women to, meaning the economic facilities that women have access to. Purchase of land, for instance, is in many countries something that women are not entitled to, in the sense that even if for an individual woman resources are available to purchase, she would not be allowed to do so by law. Therefore, walking on a gender analysis path, I use the word in its enlarged meaning.
risks in daily life and in relations to long term threats”\textsuperscript{214}. She takes position on the need for the State to accept the interference in the private domestic domain if women’s security has to be realized as well, and calls violence against women an issue of human rights as well as of security. She sustains that States shall be accountable for failing to guaranteeing human security, by “sanctioning customs that increase women’s dependence on men”. In the list is found violence against women, denial of property right and access to land, forced marriage, acceptance of extremist religious behaviors that restrains women’s freedom. \textsuperscript{215} She also highlights economic threats, provoked not by custom law but by globalization, which do not have same outcome on male and female citizens:

“After years of looking to State Governments to address social and economic needs, the women’s movement has been confronted with a weakening of the State in the face of global capital. This has contributed to the growing inability of States to respond to the needs of their population placing women even lower on the list of priorities despite their importance for the well being of society as a whole.”\textsuperscript{216}

Timothy suggests policy instruments for en-gendering the concept. Her proposal includes better data acquisition to have evidence based indications of differences in (perceived) security according to gender, and resources allocation based on socio-economic analysis structured around HS framework.

She also promotes the proposal of Naila Kabeer and Ramya Subrahamian (1996) for incorporating in programs and policy monitoring of HS indicators, where relevant indicators could include: survival, security, autonomy.\textsuperscript{217}

A key connection between a possible renewed role of State – after feminist critique of false neutrality - through the pursue of human security in the era of globalization, is supported also by a (South) African feminist voice, Heidi Hudson\textsuperscript{218}, who provides a different angle within gender studies on the consideration and the worth of State.

\textsuperscript{215} Timothy, (2007: 53)
\textsuperscript{216} Ibidem, p.50.
Often within the initiatives sponsored by the Canadian Government, the development researcher Beth Woroniuk has produced practical guidance for realizing peacebuilding activities that structurally incorporate gender analysis and mainstreaming. Her approach is programmatically oriented, pragmatically driven by the question: “…what would human security agenda look like if gender equality considerations or a commitment to women empowerment were fully incorporated into understanding of this concept?”219? The answers focuses on the need for planning for “everyone’s security” which means “the security of women and men (as well as boys and girls)”220, Woroniuk also proposes essential indicators221 to gauge if human security exists and other practical suggestions222.

Susan McKay reminds the essence of the feminist critique in IR in a paper presented to a conference promoted by the University of Hiroshima, the ground 0 of nuclear deterrence security model, where the irrationality – in terms of security for people and possibility to reproduce human life (and not only) on the planet – is revealed.

“Girls and women experience human insecurity differently from men and are subject to gender hierarchies and power inequities that exacerbate their insecurity. Because of their lower status, girls and women are less able to articulate and act upon their security needs, as compared with boys and men.”223

Security, as many other aspects, is defined by male subjects in societies with significant gender discrimination, and it is tailored on men’s and boys because of sexism.

221 Ibidem, pp.10-11. Woroniuk proposes two orders of indicators. The first set is what we could call ‘metaindicators’ which concern gauging the gender sensitivity (there is evidence that a gender analysis has been conducted and that women and men have been consulted in setting priorities and implementation strategies; expected results include a gender equality dimension; all indicators are sex-disaggregated; resources are provided to ensure that the gender equality dimension is delivered during the implementation phase; women are considered as actors, not just a ‘vulnerable group’; and the implementing organisation has a demonstrated capacity to work with equality issues). Then there are direct indicators for gender equality in peacebuilding which also includes a sector on HS: number of conflict related deaths and injuries (disaggregated by sex and age), incidence of gender-based violence, number of women/men displaced, incidence of domestic violence, cases of violations of human rights – both women and men, infant and maternal mortality, women’s perception of security.
It is therefore important that the experience and the perspective are brought in and understood, and need to be reiterated:

“A key feminist question about human security is “whose security is emphasized and how?”.224

As Alkire, also McKay intends to offer a frame to be used for policy and decision making, as well as for programme design. She reviews key feminist authors on HS with the intention of consolidating the feminist critique in a positive and comprehensive approach that could explain conditions for and effects of HS or insecurity on men and women.

Starting from the observation that gender inequalities are supported by structural violence,225 McKay adopts a feminist approach in the way theoretical synthesis proceeds from direct experience, bottom up,226 and proposes the formalization of an instrument for ‘rationally’ presenting and categorizing violence in a way that violence against women is well mapped and a discourse on security becomes more concrete.

More recent, and finally beyond the need to find justification for adding gender lens in understanding and defining human security, is the original research led by Valerie Hudson227 founded on an extensive review of studies connecting level of violence of societies with level of violence towards women within those same societies, and displaying results of quantitative analysis on selected and non mainstreamed statistics. The work wants to provide arguments for recognizing the correlation between security of women and security of the entire society; it documents correlations between the kind of treatment of females with level of development and security within society. Among the many proposed: high level of domestic violence is associated with large occurrence of violent conflict resolution means; correspondence between strong gender hierarchies and high level of corruptions also associated with low indices of women’s social and economic rights; or states with higher level of social, political and economic and higher level of gender equality are less likely to adopt military force in disputes. From psychology and anthropology many researches are recalled to show the apprehended

---

224 Ibidem, p. 155.
nature of violence, while findings in evolutionary biology are brought in for explaining sexual differences in strength of male and female bodies as a specific outcome of a selective path observed in patriarchal societies.

Including in security discourse statistics on violence against women demonstrated to be an engaging task in itself for the scarce availability of sources experienced by the team.228 The approach is empirical but complex in the understanding that both qualitative and quantitative data are needed in this research. The result is not only the demonstration of an association, but also the creation of the instrument to run the experiment to verify the hypothesis – that violence against women is associated with level of security existing at State level.229

This work, re-elaborated and more comprehensively framed in the recent book “Sex and World Peace”230 authored by the same team, seems to have the features to be considered a watershed in academic discourses of HS. Focused on the freedom from fear and also on freedom from want in relation to culturally shaped institutions, it has the ability of entering into social dynamics re-reading economic or social components through the category of gender that - if a people centered approach is to be explored - is more primordial and permanent in the experience of humans and construct of identities than others. When the mechanism for the creation of gendered differences is unveiled, and the association between codes and prevalence of use of violence between sexes and actual use of violence at State level is recurrent, then policy makers can be hold accountable for ignoring offenses against women. This argument can allow to show that the sexual assault to a woman, particularly if in conflict time, is indeed a violation not only to the rule of law, in case a law exist to sanction that behavior, but to the whole common good of human security.

Constructive reflections: few ideas for a more all-people centered HS

Human security, at least in its narrower sense, has the characteristic of a logical paradox. Since the insecurity to humans is mostly – at least in perception - caused by other humans, there is something unattainable in the promise of this concept. It implies

---

228 To respond to this constraint the team has developed an on line portal called WomanStats Database, were can also be found 7 variables on domestic violence alone; 11 on rape; 15 on marriage practice.


an agent who provides for ensuring security, but at the same time its caliber is on the single individual. More: it reveals the incompleteness of political theories and agency that do not take the value and wellbeing, nor even the physical security, as the criteria for judgment, although relying on the axiom that the State is created to reach security.

The paradigm shift that the new concept - to make sense - requires, has to do with a transformation not only of means to attain security, but also of participation of subjects. If the individual and not the State is the subject of the discourse, it is at the individual level that a deep transformation of humans can happen. We have to correct an evolutionary direction which continue to be defined by memorized positive sanctions of violent behaviors. We also have to correct the hierarchical asymmetric structure of power relations between males and females that has been accompanying the reproduction of the specie for several thousands years.

We are becoming aware of those mechanisms and we are also better equipped to theorize, to “see” beyond visible what are the reasons for individual, collective, State, interstate behaviors. The framework of Susan McKay, together with the empirical and theoretical synthesis of the “WomanStat group”, supported by the conceptual scaffolding of structural violence versus cultural violence that Johan Galtung has constructed (almost revealed, if its cogency and simplicity is taken into account): those elements seems to be a proved essential gear to embark in gender sensitive evaluations of peacebuilding initiatives, where peacebuilding can be reformulated as “activities to improve the level of human security and avoid the relapse into public or private violence”.

In such a kind of evaluation, the tools-set shall include the following principles:

- Power relations inform security conditions; it is important to map them in order to foresee threats and envision plans for maintaining (or developing?) security for all. This is why a bold division between HS and HD is difficult from a gender perspective: structural violence needs to be addressed and changed to allow security of those who are in powerless position and who are more vulnerable to any hazards (due to comparative less capabilities, as less resources, entitlements, networks, capacities, cultural freedom, health, time)

- No one single country has a fully just gender identity differentiated patterns. No international cooperation can exist between a fully secure and a fully insecure group of people, because such entities do not exist.
- If security threats are not listed also through inclusion of the most vulnerable, how can such a list be relevant to the universal group?

- Not all types of industry if successful are equally conducive to economic development and HS. Behind the potential ecologic damage of production or distribution or waste management processes of certain development, if more narrowly concentrating on violence, the industry of war has an inverse relationship with human security. The industry of weapons in a globalised capitalist economy requires that consumers are found in places where terms of use are not controlled, and that products are continously sold, used, invented, produced, sold, used. A war can bring destruction and human insecurity, and the wealth proceeding from development of war industry as well, because it pushes piece of society to find occasion for using the products in stock. There can be short-circuits between development and human security.

- States contributing to peacebuilding, if they adopt human security as an operational or political principle, not necessarily have developed awareness – or ar interested at all - of how gender patterns interact with policy for security. What type of HS is in those cases exported? Do the structural and direct violence existing in donors’ countries become the reference standards, or does the interaction became an occasion of reflection on what is the ‘tolerable’ violence?
Gender advancement and GBV persistence: exploring links between gender equality and human security in Rwanda

Pervasivity of the gender based violence

Gender based violence (GBV) is the expression used to refer to a variety of forms of violence experienced by a person for the very reason of belonging to the sex that in that society does not enjoy the same power as the other one. In this formulation it is purposefully highlighted how GBV heavily rests on a vision of the world that is dualistic and conceives as primary the opposition male/female. The relevance of gender asymmetry producing and condoning violence against women in time of peace as well as in war, became a progressively accepted narrative accepted in international settings. As synthetically stated by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders:

“Though a law against gender-based violence exists, some of the identified major root causes of SGBV are traditional social and gender norms that continue to perceive women as inferior; limited awareness on human rights; culture of silence due to stigma; poor communication on sexuality within the family; limited community dialogue on SGBV; gender roles and norms that vest men with greater access to and control over power and resources. Other identified factors contributing to SGBV include poverty, ignorance, and low self-esteem among women, including peer pressure and abuse of alcohol by the men. Others were, extra-marital relations and declining quality of parenting (i.e., poor parenting).”

For this reason it is of particular relevance to feminist and gender equality studies understanding what societal changes is this attention on broader human security producing, and contributing to put in context and perspective the data trends on GBV\textsuperscript{232}.

Explaining GBV and Domestic Violence

Theoretical explanation of root causes and/or of finalities of gender based violence changed over time and explored interpersonal relations and individual development with a variety of foci and perspectives.

Many of the initial wave of theories on gender based violence would opt for etiologies revolving around the experience of the individuals committing violence or enduring it: mental health conditions and psychological issues, initially seen as causally linked to violence got instead recently interpreted as effect or attractor of domestic violence\textsuperscript{233}, early witnessing of domestic violence\textsuperscript{234}, unelaborated psychological needs and unaware relationship with the mother. More sociological theories seek for socio-economic determinants of violence in socio-demographic profiles, work status, educational status and in general wealth conditions. These latter are the approaches that international development is mostly interested at, as they are perceived as immediately relevant and functional to decision making affecting policies and programming. While US and Europe are home to many studies pointing at the health and psychoanalytical approach to GBV, many studies proceeding from Asian scholars or with a focus on

\textsuperscript{232} Current UN expression is ‘sexual and gender based violence (SGBV)’ instead of the more traditional ‘gender based violence (GBV)’. For simplicity and typographic consistency with the majority of the sources here quoted it has been opted for the short version, GBV, understanding that sexual violence is a form – and a very widespread and in several settings prevalent – form of GBV. Almost all resolutions starting from 2000 became more explicit and consistently refer to GBV naming sexual violence, in the effort to ban these violent behaviors of parties in conflict, which despite the changing international and national laws continue to condone if not encourage rape against women and in general sexual violence against civilians. The resolutions with explicit language naming sexual violence comprise: a) the set of resolutions on women peace and security: UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106; b) the specific in conflict country resolutions, which started in 2003 with 1468 for Democratic Republic of Congo, and continued over time until the recent 3013 round, which includes 2113 for Darfur, 2116 for Liberia, 2119 for Haiti, 2120 for Afghanistan, 2121 for Central Africa Republic, 2124 for Somalia, 2126 for Sudan).


\textsuperscript{234} Witnessing IPV as a child has proven to also correspond to reduced social capabilities as empathy and change of perspective when compared to children from non-violent households. Cfr Edleson, J. L. (1999). Children’s witnessing of adult domestic violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 14(8).
Asian society focus on socioeconomic patterns. Feminist thinking on violence has as common denominator the tracing back to patriarchy the origin, legitimation and reiteration of violence against women. Reflections from feminists of Latin America and Africa connect the legitimation of patriarchy as power on bodies with the story of colonialism and transformation undergone by societies, landscapes and model of relationships. An effort to provide a larger and comprehensive theory to interpret, predict and transform factors contributing specifically to violence against women conducted by Lori Heise (1998) articulated the so called ‘ecological framework’ which has become a reference for academics and for the international community – particularly UK cooperation involved in GBV programming.

Beside the variety and change over time of theory on causes of GBV, also the attention on the many effects recognized as deriving from violence against women, and particularly domestic violence, has moved and changed target. As the work on GBV started in medical settings, it can be observed that the initial focus was originally on health consequences (as in origin explanation on causes were mostly all inherent to mental health or psychodynamic) of domestic and particularly intimate partner violence (IPV, which accounts for three quarters of violence against women), included undesired pregnancies and HIV AIDS infection. While impact on health remains an essential argument articulating advocacy and programming, another theme seems to become more central in observing IPV impact, notably socioeconomic effect of IPV for victims and societies at large. This perspective seems to be the complementary to the attention on socioeconomic determinants of domestic violence, wielding causal factors and effect in a cycle that has been described as a vicious circle of violence. It is an approach that has overthrown the traditional framing and brought about the intimate aspects of spousal violence on the public scene, and indeed consider them no longer “family matters” or “aberrational” and “errant” but “as part of a broad-scale system of domination that

---


affects women as a class.” Wife battering along with the development of feminist practice and research progressively and slowly is posited as a public concern not just for public health category (taking care of the victims through medical care, or of the abuser through mental care) but as a symptom for socio-political analysis. Over time especially in the discourse of large international development actors as the World Bank, it is also shaped in terms of subtracted contribution to the collective development, as women victim of domestic violence can spiral down to wealth status. As violence undermines self confidence, the abusive relationships diminish autonomy, freedom of movement and entrepreneurial attitudes; health problems consequent to violence reduce performances and productivity, and increase costs for living expenses. Also, violence has direct repercussion on the victim’s body integrity and reproductive health, as well as on public and private health services expenditures. In evolution of awareness and programming around GBV and specifically IPV we observe a progressive increase of reasons to justify the ingerence of public discourse in the private scene.

An ideal continuum of the transformation of the discourse on GBV in international development can be traced. It starts with individual but also public health arguments (as the link between violence and prevalence of HIV AIDS, as explored by Lori Heise 2011241), passing to concerns for country economies, by linking individual economic contribution to national GBP, and then to the recognition of individual security in home setting as an indicator collective security tout court. Some of these approaches can also be found along governmental agenda for recovery in Rwanda, starting with medical and psychological assistance to women and girls survivors of genocide but scarred largely by sexual violence, to progress towards economic inclusion and equality of chances and then towards clear sanction and monitoring of GBV in order to increase the very security

of citizens. While the World Bank\textsuperscript{242} proposes a link between domestic violence and economics that looks at the missing productivity of women offended by IPV, the Government of Rwanda has framed the link between violence and economic capacity within the horizon of entitlements and access to assets, engaging in a political fight to GBV that aims at restructuring legal, social and economic factors influencing unbalanced power dynamics between sexes. For this reason beside the effort of the Law on GBV (2008) it has been working on the Land Law and agrarian reform, ensuring women’s right to land ownership.

**Gender equality in Rwanda and the relevance of GBV**

Rwanda has walked enormous distance along the path towards gender equity and equality, since the reconstruction post genocide started and in comparison with the situation before the genocide.

The country is broadly pointed at as a case of exquisite failure of peacekeeping (which could not halt the genocide in 1994 after the Arusha Peace Accords signed in August 1993\textsuperscript{243}) but also as a recognized success of peacebuilding (in demobilization and reconstruction post genocide), both in the sense of economic assistance for development oriented activities concerning civil society, governance and economy, and in the management of military resources, with a demobilization that has created a police force with military and militia integrated.\textsuperscript{244} Public ‘ethnic’\textsuperscript{245} violence is reduced, and in which no relapse into extreme violence is experienced. Rwanda can be considered a place where, after dramatic failure of peacekeeping operation, peacebuilding interventions and statebuilding work has obtained successes, as there has not been a relapse into conflict and (public) violence, and since the causes of the conflict, notable poverty and ethnic divisions, have been proactively and explicitly tackled through a programme of economic


\textsuperscript{245}For the understanding and use of ‘ethnicity’ in this research, see note 67 in chapter 1.
growth, and through an aggressive critique and deconstruction of the ideological basis for ethnicity, solidly portrayed as a colonial invention.

Although as seen in the review of the evaluations (chapter 2) the attention on gender equality was not particularly high in the programs promoted by the international community, the government itself has put this as a key priority in its own agenda.

Indeed many steps have been taken in policies and laws passed, therefore improving gender equity\(^\text{246}\), as the timeline (see table 1) can document. Real transformation towards gender equality, though, is still to be appraised, with some research dedicated to sectorial impact study, included the evaluation n.18 of World Bank on the Environmental and Gender Impact of Land Tenure Regularization reviewed in chapter 2.\(^\text{247}\)

While pursuing gender equality through more equitable laws and policies incorporating positive actions, the government of Rwanda has also started to contrast gender based violence (GBV), with a number of instruments: introduction of a specific law, survivors support (medical), awareness campaigns, training of police in gender matters and particularly in handling reporting of GBV cases.

This important focus on gendered violence that has been - and still is - accompanying the statebuilding enterprise especially since the mandate of Paul Kagame started, makes Rwanda a quite unique case. Improving human security represents for a post conflict country a total priority, but Rwanda’s interpretation has included women’s security – as the largest number of GBV cases are against women and perpetrated by men - in public policies, and connected the security of the country to the experience of

\(^{246}\) The use that is here done of the expressions ‘gender equity’ and ‘gender equality’ is to refer with different terminology to the de jure status of men’s and women’s rights, access to opportunities, and duties, contrasted with the actual gendered patterns that societies put individuals in. Although the interpretation follows more a current language use of the opposition then the specific different articulation of concept developed along gender studies and feminist discussions, it seemed more appropriate for the discourse of the research just to distinguish between the theoretical right and the real experience of men and women, contrasting the ideal that the legislation poses with the socio-cultural-economic complex experienced in daily life. Therefore the opposition of terms does not refer to equity in relation to what is acceptable to a society given cultural norms that globally there is no challenge for. The expression gender equity in the acception here used includes positive measures stated by policy or legal instruments, while gender equality refers to an ideal condition in which individuals experience entitlements, access to opportunities, rights in absolute independence from their sex.

security of individuals taking into account gendered threads and specifically including women.

Table 1. Timeline of Rwandan Laws and key initiatives to promote gender equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/99</td>
<td>Law n. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 supplementing Book One of the Civil Code and instituting Part Five regarding matrimonial regimes, liberalities and successions: The law accords women equal rights with men in marriage and inheritance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47/2001</td>
<td>Law N. 47/2001 of 18/12/2001 instituting punishment for offenses of discrimination and sectarianism: This ensures women are accorded equal respect with no discrimination in all aspects of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2003</td>
<td>New Constitution 4 June 2003 – (amended?) gender dimension including SGBV should crosscut all development sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2004</td>
<td>National Gender Policy elaborated (gender in all development sectors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/2009</td>
<td>Gender based violence law is promulgated, it defines violence, and calls for prevention and punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>In 2009 three related documents were prepared: the National Policy Against Gender Based Violence, which specifically includes the fight against gender-based violence as one of its objectives, the National Gender policy Strategic plan which takes into consideration CEDAW actions, and the National Action Plan (2009-2012) on UNSC Resolution 1325.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>In 2010 the National Gender Policy was reviewed – and approved? (NGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27 October 2010</td>
<td>26 –27 October 2010 high level international conference on the role of security organs to prevent SGBV, Kigali: output: the “Kigali Declaration on the role of security organs in fighting SGBV”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>In July 2011 the Code to fight GBV was approved - the cabinet passed a policy and strategic plan against Gender Based Violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Standard training modules on gender and Gender Based Violence to build the capacity of practitioners and the general public developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 2011</td>
<td>18 November 2011 passed a Prime Minister’s Order determining modalities in which government institutions prevent and respond to gender- based violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10th December 2011: Launching of the One Stop Center in Nyagatare District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Campaign “From Peace at Home to Peace in the World”, 16-25 November, Initiatives joining the 16 days of Activism for no violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Community policing operational at every Umudugudu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>GBV/Child Protection Committees and Anti GBV clubs established at the grassroots level in all Districts and schools respectively (objective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>- Access to Justice Office (AJO) or Maison d’Acces à la Justice (MAJ) with one over three members dedicated to GBV, one AJO in each district (objective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Gender desk in Rwandan Police and Rwandan Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>20X Rwandan Police launches the free hot line to denounce SGBV abuses included from witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Anti –SGBV Directorate established in the National Police to respond to cases of SGBV and the rights of the victims, with focal points in all police stations in the country who work closely with hospitals and health centers to facilitate access to medical expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Training for peacekeeping forces (both military and police) In Haiti, Liberia, Darfur) on GBV. More training in Rwanda to international peacekeepers from African countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) considers Gender Based Violence (GBV) a serious threat to international security and human rights.” So goes the incipit of the internet page of the Ministry of Defence in Rwanda dedicated to fight to gender based violence. Straightforward, the connection domestic security international security is done as if the wires of a circuit just needed to be connected, having long awaited for. Many official Presidential and High Officials declarations posits the Rwanda’s take on gender based violence as a security issue.

In the Presidential Speech that Paul Kagame gave at the 2013 launch of the Africa Unite Command Post Exercise, training and coordination activity of security organs from 33 countries apprehending best practices in ending GBV:

“Every sector has its role to play and efforts need to be intensified to eradicate violence against women and girls. […] The ramifications of this kind of violence go beyond the individual concerned and therefore, issues of handling violence against women and girls should be an integral part of training of security and law enforcement.”249

Even more clearly, the Ministry of Defense Kabarere during a high level training for international organs of security stated that “Sexual and GBV should be looked at as a human security issue as well as a hindrance to sustainable development”.250

The framing of official governmental position for eliminating violence against women within the discourse on security (not public health as it is usually framed) makes it a variable of peace and even of international peace, as the training on GBV is ensured for troops and for other armies assigned as peacekeepers in international peace missions, to which Rwanda contributes significantly. Indeed Rwanda is currently the sixth Major Troop and Police Contributing Country in the UN, with of over 4,000 troops, over 400 Police, and 13 Military Observers in seven UN Missions.251 Also the country is the third highest world contributor of female police officers, and second if African countries only are considered. Specific training for preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual

250 Training opening at Rwanda Peace Academy, Nyakinama, Musanze District, December 2010.
violence in peacekeeping operations was developed (although does not seem to be regularly institutionalized in all training for peacekeeping personnel), and training on gender based violence has been provided over time also to other African countries’ troops assigned to international peace missions.²⁵²

The Rwandan Government has conducted steady steps on the policy level to keep aligned to the current international more advanced edge, supporting and quickly ratifying conventions and protocols related to women’s condition and to violence.

Notably, Rwanda joined the Convention on the Eradication of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 by the United Nations just one year after: it signed on the 1st of May 1980 (being the fourth country after Cuba, Sweden and Portugal) and ratified at national level on November 1980²⁵³. The country participated and supported the Beijing Platform of Actions, adopted in September, 1995. Again through Presidential decree (December 31, 2002), the country adhered to the Convention on the Repression of Trade in Human Beings and the exploitation of prostitution. It ratified (2002) the Convention on the Consent to Marriage, the Minimum age for Marriage, and the Registration of Marriages,²⁵⁴ (open to signatures on 7th November 1962); it signed the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa ²⁵⁵ (adopted on 7 November 2003)²⁵⁶ with Chapter 4 dedicated to security and integrity, and to an explicit condemn of sexual violence “whether the violence takes place in private or public”.²⁵⁷

The first decade of 2000 was an intense arena in the Government and Parliament in terms of debates and legal activities on gender equality, and the gender agenda became busy as it was outlined in the Report to the African Commission of Human and People’s

²⁵² See the calendar of realized training course of the Rwanda Peace academy: http://rpa.ac.rw/training-education/conducted-courses-workshops/
²⁵³ Presidential Decree n° 431/12 dated November 10, 1980.
²⁵⁶ The African Charter was instead adopted on the 27 of June 1981. It is ratified by 53 countries of Africa, the same signing for the constitution of African Union, while the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa is ratified by 23 countries, included Rwanda that ratified on June 2004, and that in general has ratified all legal instrument of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Rights (2003): intention to focus on and change cultural discriminatory practices, and of legal reform to obtain equity. As expressed by the Ministry of Gender,

“These reforms have significantly impacted not only on women’s lives, but the Rwandan society as a whole. They have created a strong sense of worth that comes as a direct result of restoring the dignity and purpose of women in our country.”

The starkest contrast with other countries where gender equality is advancing at fast pace, as for example Liberia, is the relative low weight of Civil Society Organisations in the picture. Many of them recognize to have lack of capacity in articulating gender analysis, in monitoring with proper indicators the level of mainstreaming in their activities.

In Rwanda the capacity on gender sensitivity is dense in the institutional structures and singularly generic and shallow in the many CSOs. Exceptions are the CSOs specifically dedicated to women’s right, who have the status of NGOs and operate in network with regional and international groups. Overall, what is surprising is both the absence of participation of women in grassroot organization and the urge from CSO to request a support of international and national programmes in order to foster participation at grassroot level.

Defining and outlawing GBV

In 2008 the Rwandan Parliament passed the Law No. 59/2008 on “Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence” prepared over two years before by the Forum for Rwandan Women Parliamentarians (FFRP) and developed with consultations and involvement of groups of rural women, in depth id not large. The document developed out of a consultative process which also included the consultation of 720 women

---


261 Consultations and groups of key informants provided many inputs, according to the rapporteur Judith Kanakuze; it included a radio programmme called «kubaza bitera Kumenya» (“inquiring is the source of knowledge”).
nationwide supported by UNIFEM and UNDP. The research revealed that “more than 50 per cent of these women had been assaulted by their male partners for not preparing meals on time, more than 50 per cent for suspicion of adultery, and a similarly large number had been raped during the 1994 Genocide.”

In close partnership with UNDP a number of institutionally-directed initiatives on GBV have been conducted, including joint training of judges on dealing with GBV cases, training within the Ministry of Defense with military personnel and the establishment of and a Gender Desk, launched in 2005, for coordinating a comprehensive response to GBV cases as well as prevention activities. Through this work, investigating officers have been trained in victim empowerment, psycho-social support and victim protection. Clearly illustrating the comprehensive approach in which such projects are being conceptualized, and the good degree of operationalization, police have also been provided with motorcycles to allow them to respond rapidly to reports of violence: indeed scarce availability of police vehicles had served as an obstacle to an effective response in the past. Feedback on the initiative has been particularly positive from the side of the police force and Rwandan Commissioner General of Police Andrew Rwigamba has stated to the media that in the police service’s struggle to respond to GBV, “UNIFEM is our main partner and supporter”. In 2007 UNIFEM signed an MOU with the Rwanda National Police to conduct activities at community-level. The key aims here are to encourage women to speak out and for each police station to have designated offices and individuals for GBV.

It was not an easy task for women within and outside the Rwandan Parliament to obtain that sexual violence during the genocide was classified as a Category One crime instead than Four.

---

262 Quoted in Valji, N. (2008). Supporting Justice: An evaluation of UNIFEM’s Gender and Transitional Justice Programming in Rwanda (1994-2008). South Africa. (p.45). Retrieved from http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender_issues/women_war_peace/SupportingJustice_AnEvaluationOfUNIFEMsGenderAndTransitionalJusticeProgrammingInRwanda.pdf (last access 29 April 2014). Valji synthesizes the Rwanda approach to GBV in partnership with (at the time) UNIFEM as a case to look at for replication: “UNIFEM’s work with the Rwandan Defence Force is perhaps the most innovative in terms of best practice for other contexts, as they have worked with this institution to assist them in rethinking their entire conceptualization of security to include human security – and more specifically to include GBV as a “security threat”; and within this to look at their role in preventing and addressing it. Projects such as this demonstrate the practical possibilities for engendering institutional – and in particular security sector – reform in a post-conflict setting”. (p.46)

“When asked about their early experiences in parliament, most said that they had found it difficult to make a place for gender issues; an example mentioned by several respondents was the campaign to have rape and sexual torture crimes moved from Category Three of the post-genocide prosecution guidelines (in the same category as property damage) to Category One (in the same category as murder). One deputy called it ‘a tug of war’ another ‘a battle’. In contrast to this in the current parliament, ‘the work has been easy because women have been many’. Two of the deputies mentioned that the larger number of women assured by the quota system is a kind of guarantee on women’s rights and participation in parliament. Currently Rwanda is the only country in the world to have in the parliament an absolute majority of female members – and a large one after the 2013 elections, with 51 seats out of 80, corresponding to 64% in the lower camera, and 10 seats over 26, almost 40%, in the Senate. But it had not always been like this, and as one member of the Rwanda Forum of Women Parliamentarians revealed, “When men had the majority, we had trouble passing anything that had to do with gender issues. But now, with our numbers, we have a stronger voice than before,” said Espérance Mwiza, a female member of Parliament.

The debate to get to the approval of the law against gender based violence has some interesting elements worth of notice. It has probably the testimony of one of the

264 Ibidem, p.20.
266 Global index to understand and compare gender discrimination in laws and in practice are all of recent construction and still in adaptation and finalization process. Since 2006 it exists the Global Gender Gap, realized by the World Economic Forum, not particularly appreciated by feminist critique for its principles rooted in liberalism. Rwanda anyhow is not included in countries monitored. The Social Institution and Gender Index of OECD was only launched in 2009; it focuses on legal and de facto restriction faced by women, not on positive achievement. Rwanda is improving steadily its position according to this index passing from 66 out of 102 in 2009 to 28 out of 86 in 2012. The Gender Inequality Index of UNDP only started in 2011 (experimental in 2010 to replace the Gender Empowerment index) and attempts to gauge the loss of a national in comparison to its level of development due to the gender gap. It focuses on job market and economic participation. In this index Rwanda ranked 166 out of 187 in 2011, and 76 in 2012. This index does not include yet shares of female parliamentarians: the field in the database is there, but empty. This is an interesting omission, as data on parliament composition are open and available for every country, and even compiled by the Interparliamentary Union on the internet: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. It is difficult not to l
267 From the documentary directed by Zak Mulligan, Rwanda – Reaching new Heights, UN Development Programme (UNDP). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=3WtoYSg3AGA#t=92
268 This paragraph draws from the reading of the parliamentarian acts of the debate on the proposed law on Prevention, Protection and Punishment of any Gender Based violence. The acts examined are: 1) REVISION ON THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT BILL ON PREVENTION, PROTECTION AND PUNISHMENT OF ALL GENDER BASED VIOLENCE ON 3 AUGUST 2006). PV No67 -81, 2006; PV No 77/PV/CD/MG 3August2006.
tough battle that Mwiza refers to. The Bill was presented in 2006 for debate by a female member of the Parliament, Judith Kanakuze, a survivor of genocide from the area of Kibuye, in the West of the country, where terrible massacres with basically no people left were conducted in all public and private spaces, included in church and stadium. From the early steps in the parliament she was favourable to introduce gender quota at the 30%. In the defense of the law she present in March 2006 she underlines how respect of tradition and of human rights have to go together, and proposes the legal change as an initiative that will reinforce the leading role of Rwanda on the international scene. “Our culture and our traditions must be preserved providing it is in its turn respecting human rights. […] This draft law is going to solve the issues faced by Rwandans and people from other countries as well and it is also seen as a beacon of respect and tolerance for others who may be inspired by it. It is undoubtedly in our turn the time to set the example first as a nation and in our individual efforts to fulfill our own responsibilities as decision makers working in the Senate. This law should be accepted, informed and spread everywhere in order to prevent gender based violence and to preserve the highly praised cultural values of the Rwandan society as well as in the couple made of two Rwandans living together so that their union will reflect harmony in decisions making as it is stipulated in the ninth principle of the project for instance, in deciding sexual intercourse and averting possible consequences that may ensue if sexual relations are made as one of them is affected by AIDS and taking the decisions in terms of family planning as it is written in article 37 of this project.”

The debate on GBV law within the Rwandan Parliament is highly revolving – on the side of the proponents of the bill - around human rights and the right to own one’s reproductive choices, with the caliber clearly set on domestic violence as it become relevant mentioning family planning. The main proponent insists on dismantling the opposition between culture and human rights. The law adopts an empowered victim approach, as it insist that the culprit is judged where the offense happened, which is considered in the debate to be favourable for accountability towards the victim, and also makes easier for the victim to testify.


The interpretation of culture provided by the law support appears as a clever and critical one, seen from a western vantage point: even dowry is presented as something which is nowadays displaying a corrupted interpretation – and therefore a betrayal of ‘true’ culture – as it should be really regarded as a prize, and not as a price. Playing on the interpretation of authenticity redeems (imagined) Rwandan culture to a pro-gender equality position. A remark on culture being improperly invoked by the detractor of the bill is done in the discussion of the session which approved the bill: This law does not in any way fight this culture of our country but on the contrary it is preventing us from adopting any counter culture for our people, we cannot reasonably leave a man who beats his wife, by saying this is a problem of culture, and if there are people out there who think this is their culture, we should fight them with the full force of the law. 269

The arguments used in the debates both of 2006 and of 2008 clearly show how autonomous and not aeternonomous is this quest for a law negatively sanctioning and preventing gender based violence. Indeed there is the approval of the supported not only of a control (which ultimately seems to intend to be a ban) over pornography, depicted as a causal factor of GBV, but also of a control over fashion and way to dress which is seen as a trigger of violence. The way in which the debate on GBV is frames is all deeply immersed in relational sphere, and the two parts are seen as both players of the resulting behavior. This approach, not only in feminist environment and literature, but even in official UN documents,271 is considered inappropriate as an expression of the rooted attitude of blaming the victim.

The debate – as well as the final text of law – treats in the same law the sexual violence and the negative consequences included impregnation keeping untouched the unspoken principle that protecting women is protecting motherhood – and children have to be protected before everything else, included their mothers: indeed abortion was and still is a crime in Rwanda. The debate on the bill has had a discussion on maternity leave

269 From the remark of Deputy Marie Josée Kankera, Revision On The Basis Of The Draft Law On Prevention, Protection And Punishment Of All Violence Based On Gender, PV no 67-81. PV no76, 2/08/2006.

as well, and comments for ensuring that violence to minors, as well as sexual harassment especially at work, is included and forbidden.

In the speech to defend the bill held in August 2006, there is a clear perception of the authors of the draft bill of being at a crucial step in the process of statebuilding. There is no reference to direct influence from external actors, as donor countries or organization, but there is the awareness of being in the spotlight of the international community: “I would like to thank Honorable Makuba who sustains that gender based violence should be punished with the full power of the law; let me remind you that the world is watching and our country is seen as a model.”272 While the speaker shares awareness of being a leader of a country under strict observation, she expresses uncovered pride and the will as a leader to reinforce the momentum for gender equity. During this speech the connection between collective peace and private security is expressed clearly again, and the case is made for intensively sensitizing the population through adequate means so that if a victim does not report violence suffered due to fear, the people who are testimony of it shall do it instead: “Honorable Connie is right when she says we will reach a full confidence in our society when there is no fear; but it requires our effort, and it is the price to be paid for real peace in our country.” The overarching value that the group drafting the bills relies on is named to be protection, “because it is designed to foster harmony in Rwandan families.” 273

The whole defense of this bill resonate perfectly with one main difference in feminist activism in North America and Europe when compared to the one in Africa. The capacity of procreation and the reliance of identity building on family relationship is systematically dismantled by many members of western feminism while it is often a pillar in African feminist writer or gender activists. Much activism and legal design envisions increases of women’s rights and power while keeping strongly embedded maternity and procreation as a characteristic which not only calls to protection but defines the feature of feminine power. The inclusion in Rwanda’s anti GBV law of sexual abuses towards children might be looked as an extension of protection on vulnerable due to the positioning of the main authors. The tendency to connect gender and age in legal provisions might be looked at as a way to extend the protection introduced (mostly) for women in the anti GBV law to the persons whom by gender women mostly care for. In

272 Ibidem.
273 Ibidem.
political activity and positioning is normal and quite unchallenged in Rwanda (as well as in other African countries) to pursue protection of women at the same time with promotion of (monogamous) families. The discourse to obtain equality and prevent GBV (and establish the right for women to plan parenthood) does not pass through the refusal on the natural nexus between womanhood and precreation and family, but between womanhood and being singled out as the only one responsible for care (especially cooking) work: “Our culture is at the heart of some of the conflict that are likely to arise in families as some men cannot cook even once, because it is a taboo in the Rwandan culture and most surprisingly they cook in the workplace when they work as cooks or domestics. […] Yet there are men who are willing to take that responsibility especially those whose wife are a bit behind in their studies and study in universities like ULK, UNILAK and other universities with evening programs. Some men are respectful of this condition and will fulfill the different roles until their wives got graduated but there is a majority of men who cannot suffer cooking and they choose to hire a female domestic. Here we have a tricky situation in our hands since this can provoke conflict in the family. 274 In this debate the discussion brings in the intersectionality as women belonging to lower classes are seen by the rapporteur as being at risk of being cristallized in a subordinate social position, since they serve the interest of the dominant group.

The measure of compensation for the victim that was introduced in the proposal functions as a deterrent for the abuser, a support to the victim, but also as a response to the risk of moving GBV down towards poorer members of society.

In the logic of the authors of the law, which shows originality if compared with western law significantly more focused on the individual, and where the victim is considered independently of her relational status and their family network, only called into the scene as the factors of the violence received. In this bill reinforcement of healthy marriage is the overall objective, stronger and comprehensive of the protection of individual women. The keystone of the law on gender based violence therefore is quite related to the centrality of official marriage: only relationships in a wedlock can be recognized by the State and therefore requested to match a given standard encompassing security for its members (as absence of violence) but also with the positive presence of collaboration and fare division of duties in the house. The recognition of wedlock is the grip to allow public jurisdiction on private affairs.

274 Ibidem.
In the 2008 debate the cases imagined and proposed to discuss the norms are always presented in the speech explicitly with both the hypothesis of the offender being a male or a female, even if it sounds more a formal than a substantial exercise as it fails to be a persuading representation of an existing symmetry in current reality. In this session not just the main rapporteur is given the floor but opponents or parliamentary members attempting to reshape articles.

Concern to avoid economic type of violence based on gender is also resolved passing through the officially registered marriage: under that conditions, women and men shall both be entitled to take part in deciding on properties and assets. Posing the centrality of marriage is also an attempt to reduce the negative effect of polygamy or male adultery on women: although positing adultery as a crime might be seen in western country as a measure very negative for women, its introduction is supported as a means to avoid de facto polygamy and impoverishment of women who committed all their work and energy in the creation of family, development of family assets (included improvement of agricultural land) and fostering children. Again this element is an additional mark of autonomy of the design of the law within the post conflict context, despite the high intensity of international presence.

During genocide in Rwanda, rape was used as a weapon to hurt, humiliate, dispossess, torture women and their families. An enormous number of women, estimates between 250,000 and 500,000, were faced and largely succumbed to rape and extreme physical violence. As in many recent and past cases of rape used as a weapon of war, the violence perpetrated on women channels a quantity of meanings and tend to crystallise a symbolic order of patriarchy. The assault on women signifies a ‘conquer’ the heart of the ‘other’s’ domain, the forced impregnation the overriding of a property with the sign of a new master, and barring the way to the continuation of the ‘other’s’ group. This second element is a key assumption in genocidal gender violence: the father’s input is the one defining the identity of the future child, and the biological (or the belief on the biological) level is considered to override the cultural level, since the first is seen as proceeding from the father while the second can only be possible given to the child by the mother.277

If impregnation to destroy an ethnicity was the dominant element in the Serbian Government organized rapes, in the case of Rwandan genocide the government used rape as a reward for militias as well as a long lasting torture: in the words of current president Kagame, “We knew that the government was bringing AIDS patients out of the hospitals specific all to form battalions of rapists.” 278

Data on GBV in Rwanda

Gender Based Violence is defined in a variety of ways, and a certain consensus has been developed, mostly aroung the definition contained in the CEDAW.279 Rephrasing

279 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women of the United Nations General Assembly (1993) defined violence against women as a special and most common case of GBV: “Any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.” This definition encompasses all forms of violence against women over the entire life cycle, starting from feticide and sex-selective abortion to female infanticide, female genital cutting, and other forms across ages included physical, sexual, psychological, verbal and also economic abuse. Also, as the study of DHS group to standardize data collection on domestic violence “Women are […] harmed by limiting their access to food and medical care, carrying out dowry deaths and honor killings, and coercing them to have sex through rape and/or sexual harassment. Men who hurt women can be intimate partners, family members, or other men. The sub-set of violence by intimate partners is usually referred to as ‘domestic violence’, although the term is not always clearly defined.” (Kishor, S. & Johnson, K. (2004). Profiling Domestic Violence. A multi-country Study. ORC Macro. Domestic violence, in its turn, encompasses a variety of
commonly occurring concepts in a single definition, it could be said that GBV is that type of violence operated on people because their sex positions (and sometimes traps) them within a bundle of cultural conventions which makes them in interpersonal and social relations inferior, dependent, more vulnerable and less entitled than the other sex; broadly the paradigm within which GBV has been in the discourse of international cooperation so far articulated, documented, and narrated provides for only binary sexual identities, male / female. In the overwhelming majority of geographical and historical situations, being born female posits a person in the subordinate group, condition that impacts on the range of experiences that that person is exposed (and entitled to).

The cultural conventions become unquestioned and consolidate over time especially in a society where gendered identities are characterized by large differences in power. Those conventions have shaped a relation between male and female that is highly unbalanced and that expresses and condone violence, at least in three broad forms: physical violence, economic predominance, and legal asymmetry. Concentrating the attention on these three domains in the work of Hudson et alii (2012) produces a solid framework for inquiring, collecting and analyzing data.

For the purpose of this research only data on violence are gathered and examined, as a focus on women’s experience of violence allows a thoroughly understanding of the form of violence across the relationships that are possible at intra-household level; spousal or intimate partner violence is the form of violence expressed along the relationship that holds together adults partners in monogamic or polygamic/polyandric relationships. In the present study violence against children within domestic context is not analysed, although by definition comprehended in expressions of domestic violence.

This concept is here referred only to the official histories currently predominantly narrated in academics and schools and originally consolidated after the Renaissance. The case of modern archeology (starting with the work of Maria Gimbutas, who first concentrated the attention on objects from Neolithic age and constructed a narrative of pre-Indo civilization as being profoundly matriarchal) expanding horizons by considering the possibilities of civilization with other gender cleavages, illustrates the epistemological leap that storiography in general and specific disciplines related to human history have had across ‘900. As opposed to ‘history’, twisting the term through a sort of false ethymology, women’s movement in Anglophone areas in the late ‘60s have started – not without criticism - to explore the ‘herstory’, a narrative of events from a female and feminist point of view, concentrated initially on female characters systematically ignored in official history narrations. But historical accounts, tending to ignore women’s public figures as well as women’s life, contribute to a narrative of past events consistently embedding gender inequality in nowadays societies, and presenting it as the tradition. This provides to gender inequality an additional advantage, because those pursuing gender equality are – falsely, if we follow Gimbutas broader narrative of tradition – confronted with the accusation of being disrespectful of tradition and identity. The deep paradigm shift for historical accounts proposed by Gimbutas, explaining structural and acceptable physical violence against women as cultural product emerged at some point in time and connected with militarization of societies, are condensed in Gimbutas, M. (1974). The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe: Myths and Cult Images. University of California Press, and even more particularly in Gimbutas, M. (1991). The Civilisation of The Goddess: the World of Old Europe. San Francisco: Harper.
abstracteness of discourses around human security. The work of Hudson is a potent exercise of large data analysis to explore the correlation between a specific form of GBV, domestic violence, and level of security of nations. The research project behind Hudson and her team’s work arrives to consider level of violence against women as a predictor of instability of a country. For this reason developing knowledge on GBV in Rwanda, in a country that continuously declare violence against women as a threat to peace and stability, allows a better understanding of the process of peace creation that has been undertaken.

Despite the strong, broad and continued efforts to tackle GBV in Rwanda, although conducted mostly through a top down approach, according to official statistics the cases are increasing over the years.

Sources of data that could be gathered for this research are mostly proceeding from the Demographic and Health Survey Project, supported by USAID and technically supported by the OCR of Maryland, but also from baseline research specifically of GBV in Rwanda, and compared with the

- Demographic and Health Survey 1992 (1994)
- Santé pour tous. Demographic and Health Survey 2000
- Demographic and Health Survey, 2005
- First Rwanda Statistical yearbook 2009
- Demographic and Health Survey – Key Findings, 2010
- Demographic and Health Survey – 2010 Preliminary Findings (2011)

---

285 From the colophon: “the field work was conducted from September 26, 2010 to March 10, 2011. The funding for the RDHS was provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Global AIDS Program (CDC/GAP), the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the World Vision, and the Government of Rwanda. ICF Macro provided technical assistance to the project through the MEASURE DHS project, a USAID-funded project providing support and technical assistance in the implementation of population and health surveys in countries worldwide.” DHS 2010.
- Rwanda Statistical Yearbook 2010
- Rwanda Statistical Yearbook 2011
- Rwanda Statistical Yearbook 2012
- Mugabe, Dusabumuremyi & Rwego. (2012) Gender-Based Violence Base-Line Study In 13 Districts

To compare information on GBV across the different sources, different methods and time, and also with an abnormal population composition is a delicate task to be conducted carefully. Indeed different studies have different methodology, and even different edition of the same study with consolidated methodology do frame the same issues in different ways. As this is not a quantitative based research the different findings from different sources will be analysed and put in context recurring to qualitative investigation and analytical approach.

A common reference in the discourse on GBV is the definition provided by the Recommendations to the CEDAW. The General Recommendation No. 19 (11th session, 1992) specifies that the definition of discrimination includes “gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those

\[\text{Retrieved from} \quad \text{http://www.statistics.gov.rw/sites/default/files/user_uploads/files/books/Statistical%20Year%20Book-2010.pdf}\]
provisions expressly mention violence.” The act concerned and included in this statement are both public and domestic violence. Across the different surveys, variations on how to articulate GBV when surveys and interviews are needed is observed. If acts as sexual assault (from spouse or other person) are included in all surveys, other behaviors as psychological violence are not. For this reason limiting the comparison to physical violence within and outside spousal relationship allows to maximize relevant sources.

The first finding from a data review on GBV in Rwanda is that the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 1992 as well as in 2000 had no explicit reference to GBV (nor in general not to a specific type), while in DHS 2005 and 2010 a chapter is dedicated to investigate domestic violence entirely. This shall not be considered just as inherent with the transformation of Rwanda and with the growing interest towards gender by the government and part of Rwandan society over time, but it is most probably the effect of a transformation at DHS global programme level: indeed while only few DHS reports had a section on components and behaviors that could be classified as GBV, it was not until 2004 that a consistent framework using DHS indicators and integrating it together was elaborated, and consequently a publication on GBV and revised DHS methodology were developed.

Polygamy, as does not present itself as equaled by polyandry and rarely is consensual for the first wife, can be considered itself a form of GBV, although for the purpose of this research it was not classified as such. Data on polygamy were collected both in the 1992 and in the 2000 survey. In 2000 women in polygamous marriage where 12% of women in a relationship, while men were 6%. In 2005 prevalence was estimated 21% in Rwanda; see: Coast, E., Randall, S., Golaz, V. & Gnoumou, B. (2011). Problematic polygamy: implications of changing typologies and definitions of polygamy. Princeton University. Retrieved from: http://uaps2011.princeton.edu/papers/110800. Data based on proportion of currently married women reporting no co-wives. http://www.statcompiler.com (Accessed 23/06/11).


appears to be the first methodological effort to standardize the use of DHS indicators to understand GBV in a country. The cases that the study builds on are related to specific practices, as FGM in the DHS Egypt 1999, that at the time of the country study were not presented as GBV and in the 2004 study are, and other studies from year 2000. The methodology used recurs to the codification of violence of Touliatos and others (2001), and to the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS), who listed a variety of detailed acts of violence in domestic settings, and a group is selected. Specifically, the guidelines to conduct a survey list a number of questions as well as few other connected to the following:
- say or do something to humiliate you in front of others?
- threaten the person or someone close to her with harm?
- push, shake or throw something at?
- slap you or twist arm?
- punch with his fist or something that could hurt?
Comparing these two reports, as they were conducted with same standard methodology, opens up for a number of consideration and hypothesis on current trend of gender based violence and specifically of spousal violence in Rwanda in the last decade.

Overall, many indicators show an increase in spread of violence on women, within and outside the spousal relationship. The table below provides a synthetic comparison, with few additional data proceeding from the UNIFEM baseline (which did not follow the same methodology).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Violence</th>
<th>DHS 2005</th>
<th>UNIFEM Baseline 2008</th>
<th>DHS 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31% of women have suffered physical violence at some point since age of 15.</td>
<td>48% of women has suffered forced sexual intercourse</td>
<td>Two in five women (41%) in Rwanda have suffered from physical violence at some point since the age of 15.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of Intimate partner’s violence</td>
<td>66% of cases of physical violence on average on all respondent was perpetrated by the spouse/partners</td>
<td>64.8% of cases of physical violence on all respondents was perpetrated by spouse/partners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.1% of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence by their current or most recent husband have (also) experienced such violence in the 12 months preceding the survey.</td>
<td>78% of women who have experienced physical or sexual violence by their current or most recent husband have (also) experienced such violence in the 12 months preceding the survey.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate Partner Violence</td>
<td>Over 37% of ever married women declare they suffered some form of spousal violence (physical, emotional, and sexual).</td>
<td>49% of the respondents had been insulted/sworn at by their husbands/spouses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>31% experienced their husbands/spouses forcing them to have sexual intercourse.</td>
<td>56.4% of ever-married women have suffered from spousal or partner abuse (physical and/or sexual) at some point in time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- kick or drag you?
- try to strangle or burn you?
- threaten with a machete, gun, or other type of weapon?
- attack with a knife, gun or other type of weapon?
- physically force you to have sexual intercourse even when you did not want to?
- threaten you in order to have sexual intercourse even without consent?
- force you to perform types of other sexual acts you did not want to?
- physical attack when pregnant?
- did the children hear or see attacks?


The DHS methodology collects data from women aged between 15 and 49, intended as the fecund ages.
emotional violence. Among women suffering spousal violence, 26% declare these acts are of moderate violence, and 3% severe.

- **Recent intimate partner violence**: 81.1% of ever married women experiencing spousal physical or sexual violence were confronted one or more times with it in the latest 12 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profiles of victims</th>
<th>13% of the women surveyed underwent it once to three times, while 18% suffered it 4 to 10 times.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differential according to marital status</td>
<td>78.5% of ever married women experiencing spousal physical or sexual violence were confronted one or more times with it in the latest 12 months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Profiles of victims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Women with no instruction or only primary instruction are more likely to experience physical violence (30.8%) than those with secondary education (24.4%).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Women working for cash are the ones experiencing higher rate of sexual violence 26.1%. Then only 15.8% of women unemployed experienced sexual violence, against 18.8 who are employed but not for cash.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Profiles of victims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Women working but not for cash is highest percentage of women experiencing violence (33%) followed by women working for cash (30.5%) and lowest being those who are unemployed (28.1).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent violence by working status</td>
<td>Among women experiencing spousal violence the most exposed in last 12 months are women working for cash (only 12% did not experience violence against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Profiles of victims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Women who are divorced, separated, or widowed are almost twice as likely (37.4%) to have ever experienced sexual violence than never-married women (17%). One in five women (22.3%) have ever experienced sexual violence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent violence by working status</td>
<td>10% of women have suffered violence when pregnant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women in marriages in which both spouses are equally educated are the least likely to have experienced violence from their husbands (50.4%), women who are more educated than their husbands are most likely to have experienced such violence (58.9%).

Women with no education are twice as likely to have experienced physical violence compared to those with secondary level of education (53.2% no education against 24.2%).
### Profiles of victims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural / urban</th>
<th>Geographical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36% of ever married women in urban setting against 50% of women in rural settings against have been recently confronted at least three times with spousal violence.</td>
<td>53% of women from the Province of Kigali declared they were confronted with at least 3 acts of spousal violence against 31% in the North.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.9% of ever married women experiencing physical (included sexual) violence from their husbands are in urban settings, while in rural settings the percentage is 57.6</td>
<td>46% of women in the province of Kigali and 54.9 in North (and in East as well) experienced spousal violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing 2005 and 2010 DHS data on violence against women the trend shows a net increase of the general problem, and a slight decline of incidence of domestic (spousal specifically) violence. This datum nevertheless does not mean that there are less cases of spousal violence reported. Indeed in 2005, ever married women declaring to have suffered violence by their spouse were 37%, and in 2010 they were 56.4%.
Moreover, recent violence (latest 12 months) within spousal relationship did not decline significantly, although it did not increase either: it was 80.1% in 2005 and became 78.5% in 2010.

The level of 56.4% of ever married women having experienced spousal violence is definitely towards the most severe end of the range when compared to global data, which in 2005 were spanning between 13% and 61% (most sites between 23% and 49%). Specifically, the range of lifetime prevalence of sexual violence by an intimate partner was between 6% and 59%, with most sites falling between 10% and 50%.\textsuperscript{291} This specific subindicators shows that almost all spousal (or as defined by the WHO survey ‘intimate partner’) violence in manifested as sexual violence.

The reports highlight the condition of divorced or separated as being in correlation with high level of experience of violence: in 2005 48% of widows declared to have experienced physical violence, while the average was 31% on all women, and 20% for never married; in 2010 it resulted still twice as likely (37.4% separated/widowed compared to 17% never married, to have ever experienced specifically sexual violence. But if the data are analysed in comparison with recent violence, we note that the trend on violence from intimate partners for separated women are showing some positive evolution: in 2005 only 10% of separated and widowed had not experienced spousal violence in the latest 12 months, while the same indicator in 2010 is 57.9%. This trend would be an illustration of Bowlus and Seitz (2006)\textsuperscript{292} contending that domestic violence is a determinant of divorce.

This type of data seem extremely important to gauge if a change is really happening in society (more women are suffering violence) or if increased reporting is to be considered the main explanation for data rising trends. Beside the condition of separated and widows that is showing improvements, it can also be observed that education as a possible predictor of violence: in both 2005 and 2010 datasets women with no education are more likely to be experiencing physical violence. The striking data is that while in 2005 women with no education and experience of physical violence were the 30.8% they became 53.2% of the all women population in 2010.

Significantly less clear is the relationship between working status and violence. In 2005 the highest prevalence of violence is among women working but not for cash (33%) similar to those working for cash (30%), with the unemployed being the category with less prevalence. In 2010 the large difference is between unemployed, with the lowest prevalence of 15.8% and employed for cash at the higher end with 26.1%. Different is the trend observing domestic violence: in 2005 the most exposed were women working for cash (with only 12% not having experienced recent violence, with the better off being women working for cash 23.5% of them did not experience violence in recent 12 months), while in 2010 the most exposed were the unemployed (only 14% not suffering recent spousal violence, while working women are all above 20%).

If data portray reality accurately, the indicator on education tells that risk of violence and education are inversely proportioned, which is consistent with research findings on GBV and education. Research pointing at the negative correlation between women’s education and experience of domestic violence, and on education level being a predictor of risk of violence, are numerous but not unchallenged, even if they have created a large consensus on programming strategies than those very uncertain on recognizing in it a risk factor.39 While Jewkes 2002c U-shaped model theorizing that those at higher risk are women with just medium education, not the lowest not the highest, does not fit appropriately those data, they suggest an extremely more linear correlation with the strengths of very significant data (from 30.8 to 53.2 of women at the low end of education continuum, against a stable 24% of women with high education) and also the stabilization at 1 over 4 ratio, in 2005 as in 2010, for women with higher education. The relation is anyhow complex as we know394 that higher attendance of girls in school also mean higher exposure to violence in school included from teachers, and that the school itself is a place where GBV is apprehended395 and condoned/endured.

Understanding these data bring the attention on the literacy and education data of the country. The first contrast that can be observed, opposite to considering education a negative correlation of violence, is between the high level of GBV and domestic violence and the high rate of literacy in the country, which has indeed the highest attendance rates

in Africa, with a primary net enrolment rate (2012) of 96.5% (slightly more positive for girls: 95% Boys, 98% Girls), primary completion rate (2012) of 72.7% and secondary net enrolment of 28%. Despite this primate, it ranks quite high in the list of countries with the almost the highest prevalence of physical violence against women, only second to DRC, and positioned very high in the list also on prevalence of recent violence.

Another important factor considered a predictor of spousal violence is woman’s income. While in the DHS data those information are not detailed, there are three categories dividing women in unemployed, employed non for cash and employed for cash.

As far as income and consequently work status as a predictor of violence, the data here compared could be read through the lens of different and also conflicting theory. Women who do not have economic autonomy or possibility to manage their own cash income, according to Richard Gelles (1976) are those with limited resources and therefore unlike to leave abusive relationships: this would explain high prevalence of violence in women working but not for cash (2005) and for unemployed women (2010).

Reinforcing the validity of this interpretation, research on GBV data and on land ownership in Rwanda confirm that economic independence is not a trigger of violence but a negative causal factor of domestic violence, as women accessing land experience less violence than women with no entitlements.

The main problem proceeding from the analysis of these data is that only few extractions have been done on the data set, and little work is done for analyzing profiles of risks by controlling for several factors.

The second problem is in reality the first, well clear to all researchers collecting data on gbv and domestic violence in particular: underreporting. Police data are too

---

distant from reality, but DHS data as well, despite the good protocol for protecting women’s privacy and integrity, are considered by researchers not fully reliable. In particular, as Mary Ellsberg et alii 2001299 have underlined, research of domestic violence is highly sensitive to the methodology for data collection, and under reporting might depend from the data collection procedure as well as on other factors.

It is worthy to notice that the preliminary findings of the DHS 2010, more detailed and enriched with table data then the final, had no reference to gender violence at all. The final synthesis report version has a one-page section on GBV and empowerment where the variable of decision making in the household and employment are presented, but does not go into details of intrahousehold GBV dynamics. On the contrary, the 2005 survey broadly articulates the section on GBV, concentrating on respondents’ experience of violence perpetrated from spouse, member of the family or of the community, and excluding questions on perception.

Another element that is not analysed in full is the correlation between vulnerability to violence and marital status. It is said that women divorced or widowed women are the category reporting higher level of experience of violence, but it is not clear from the report what is the causal link in this correlation: if those women are also mostly the same having declared they are experiencing spousal violence than it means that the separation might be an outcome of violence, and that it is not the condition of being single that exposes women as vulnerable. Profiling vulnerability also through a qualitative study seems an important addition to the comprehension of the phenomenon of violence. Just presenting the group of the separated women as those with highest experience of violence induces the idea that they are the ones more at risk of violence.300 Clear variables of vulnerability seem to be instead household setting (in urban vs. rural) and education levels, as women with higher education have experienced lower level of violence.

It could therefore be concluded that the 2005 edition had a much stronger focus on articulating and understanding GBV especially as physical violence at domestic level,


300 From the Rwamrec Baseline (2012) emerges that 34% of households are headed by a (single) woman, and remaining 66% by men; the proportion is basically the same in urban (34%) as in rural (33%) settings (34 in urban settings. The proportion increased clearly passing from 21% in 1992 to 36% in 2000, with an inversion of trend in 2005 (34%).
while the 2010 DHS (published in 2011) seems to have lost the committed focus to unpack through the DHS instrument, from a health based point of view, women’s experience of violence especially at home. It seems indeed significant to point out that the Rwanda Interim Demographic and Health Survey Report (2007-08) – RIDHS was published in 2009, and was designed “to provide reliable indicators to monitor and assess the implementation of the country’s sector programs and policies, the Poverty Reduction Strategy, Vision 2020 and the commitments it has undertaken at the international level, in particular the Millennium Development Goals.”

Differently from the 2005 edition, this report does not inquiry on spousal violence, and surprisingly uses the word ‘gender’ in the place of ‘sex’ (as in the expression “the gender of each child”): a linguistic shift that is uncommon in health related studies in which normally authors do not feel the need for avoiding the uncomfortable word – ‘sex’. The suppression of this section is particularly noticeable as the report is presented as a monitoring tool of key governmental policies. The report must not have been cut due to length and editorial reasons: indeed a brand new section is added compared to the precedent edition and male circumcision is broadly treated in the last five page of the report. If this new section is per se pertinent, as demonstrated by the fact that 64% of the people who are circumcised underwent the practice for health or hygiene reasons, it is nevertheless singular that this focus is added while the one on sexual (included spousal violence) is removed considering the magnitude of impact of two experiences. Only 12% of men on average in the country are estimated to have been circumcised, while at least 31% of women in 2005 (and it grew in the following data collection to 41%) suffered physical violence. It is worthy to remember that the governmental agenda for gender equality and to fight GBV started before this survey was published in 2009, and that subtracting the monitoring of a key aspect as GBV seems incoherent with the progress towards country priorities.

This observation just wants to remark again, from a different angle and by recurring to different sources, that the type of monitoring brought about by DHS, non endogenous but supported with economic resources and technical expertise (by USAID, DFID, EU and the Global fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) does evolve and becomes more fitting to the sponsor priorities at the time. Just quick lines in table data of DHS 2005 become a chapter dedicated in 2009. The connection between health and circumcision might appear fully legitimate, as in both side of the contention

circumcision was seen as a determinant of vulnerability of HIV AIDS, either in the position of those who see a positive correlation (more infection if circumcised) than in the other (less infections for circumcised ones). What is less legitimate in a health perspective is the dismissal of the focus on GBV in terms also of long term impact of women’s, societies and development, which is certain, while the HIV AIDS relation with circumcision is still searching for ultimate confirmation. This shift in the focus is definitely not proceeding from the transformation of government priorities but instead from a change in interest of the scientific and technical apparatus, mostly proceeding from US, which support the realization of the survey with expertise and by marshaling resources. So in this case as well, as in the review of evaluation of Chapter 2, the decreased attraction towards progresses towards better gender equality, seems to be brought about by the international community on Rwanda, and not sought for by the government as such. Indeed a gender expert with specific mandate on GBV is present in the national team of the Institute of Statistics of Rwanda in the preparation of the report.

**Reporting GBV**

Despite its different approach, some of the data recalled can be used to compare, as the numbers of police reports are presented. What all the data confirm is an increase in this specific kind of GBV, which is domestic violence in the spousal relationship. Indeed data from Police show an absolute increase between 2009 and 2010, with a growth from 388 to 430 cases of women reporting being battered by their husband. Considering population in 2010 and female population in the age normally considered by DHS, the resulting percentage that the police report constitute is too low to even resemble to the magnitude of what—from DHS— seem to have the phenomenon: a small 0.013% of the relevant population, against the closest parameter found in the data, 31%

---


304 From the UN Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision": the total estimate of population in 2010 in Rwanda is of 10 624 005 composed by 5 215 009 males and 5 408 996 females. The DHS data are on women aged between 15 and 49.

305 Data from CIA World Factbook. The source provide sharp information in age clusters that are not completely coincident with DHS: it can be gregated to go from 15 to 55 years instead of 49.
of women (aged 15-49) having suffered violence at some point in their life. Therefore the increase in values on this data set might only mean that the violence is too underreported for quantitative data proceeding from police record to be indicative of an objective trend. The hypothesis that seems more appropriate is therefore that what police data capture is a tendency to increased trust of survivors of GBV in the act of reporting and a growing awareness of GBV.

Between 2009 and 2010 there has also been a dramatic increase in reported number of women killed by their husbands, passed from 38 to 83. Again, as those numbers are too small in comparison to population, their increase might mean immediately an increase in awareness of GBV and trust of the population in the institutions mandated with assisting and preventing GBV.

The increase in reports recorded by the police seems to show a certain incremental trend: the Ministry of Gender and Promotion of family underlines that within the “statistics provided by Police department in charge of fighting GBV in Rwanda, in September 2012, the total GBV cases reported across the country were 322 compared to 270 GBV cases reported in October of the same year”.

Beside the DHS and the data from the National Police, data from the National Institute of Statistics are also available starting from 2009 (relative to 2008). These statistics are not directly comparable with the police data, which only are sex and not also age disaggregated. Data collection criteria for the yearbook have evidently changed over time. In 2008 the data were presented sex and age disaggregated.

| Table 3: Sexual violence by age and sex reported by Rwanda district Hospitals in 2008 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Type of case                     | < 5 years       | 5 – 18 years    | > 18 years      | Total           |
| Number of cases with symptoms of sexual violence | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male|
| 319                              | 99              | 1031            | 93              | 390             | 35              | 1967            |
| Number of cases received at the hospital suspected of being victim of sexual violence | 111          | 58              | 389             | 32              | 28              | 28              | 646 |

Source of data: MoH, 2009 Rwanda Health Statistical Booklet – from the Statistical Yearbook 2009

In 2012 sex and age parameters were agglutinated. In the 2009 edition (relative to 2008) it was reported that the total number of cases (both male and female victim, sex

---

disaggregation lost) with symptoms of sexual violence was 2268. Differently, the number reported in the 2012 edition for 2008 is 3393. Significant differences also exist with the other indicator, cases suspected of sexual violence: here from the initial datum of 646 presented in the 2009 Yearbook, the 2012 yearbook reported the value 1187 for the same year (2008).

Table 4: Sexual violence – 2008/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of case</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases with symptoms of sexual violence</td>
<td>3,393</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>6,975</td>
<td>2,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases received at the hospital suspected of being of sexual violence</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Discordant data also can be found for the year 2010, when compared the 2012 Yearbook synthesis with the 2011 Yearbook data.

From the Statistical Yearbook 2011 we can obtain the data for 2010 with sex and age disaggregation as they were collected by the Ministry of Health. Also for 2010 we observe inconsistencies in data referred to same year. While the 2012 yearbook records 6975 cases with symptoms of sexual violence, 1508 are the number of cases recorded by the hospitals.

Table 5: Sexual violence by age and sex reported by Rwanda district Hospitals in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of case</th>
<th>&lt; 5 years</th>
<th>5 – 18 years</th>
<th>&gt;18 years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% change from 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases with symptoms of sexual violence</td>
<td>297 F</td>
<td>869 M</td>
<td>272 F</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases received at the hospital suspected of being of sexual violence</td>
<td>831 F</td>
<td>2602 M</td>
<td>901 F</td>
<td>4577</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National HMIS database 2009-2010 – from

This incongruence jeopardizes reliability of the data sets, but suggests also the need for a verification of data management, to be added to the need of further investigating the reason for a progressive increase in recorded cases of violence. From the UNIFEM baseline emerges that it was estimated that only 18% of the survivors of violence reported the case to the police. Among those who filed a report, 33% of cases

---

were judged guilty, but only 5% received a financial assistance. The same report also states that only 8% of survivors sought for assistance. Considering these data, and the high percentage of people who did not report nor sought help, convalidates the hypothesis of underreported sexual and GBV. Another findings of the UNIFEM baseline indeed confirms this hypothesis: 55% of the subjects who experienced physical assault decided to do nothing, while 36% were unable to do anything.\textsuperscript{308} Also, 38% of the survivors immediately reported the incident to someone, 20% reported to someone several days/months after the occurrence, and 36% did not talk about.\textsuperscript{309} This findings suggest that, given current data, considering the still relatively recent introduction of law against GBV, considering increase in cases reported as an objective increase of violence might be misleading.

**Experiences and perceptions of GBV**

The 2012 GBV Baseline survey coordinated by RWAMREC, a Rwandan NGO promoting men’s participation in the transformation of gender patterns towards more equitable society, has a different scope if compared with the UNIFEM baseline or to the DHS: first, it mostly focuses on people’s perceptions, being instrumental to a GBV awareness raising programme. Second, it presents data completely ignored by other reports: intra-household violence against men is considered and narrated as well. Those data never appear in the other reports reviewed. There is a rise in reported cases between the 2009 and 2010 also in those data: men battered passed from 84 to 94, men murdered by their wives from 31 to 60, and men committing suicide because of the deterioration of relationship with their wives 18 to 31.\textsuperscript{310}

Rwamrec is particularly active in promoting the involvement of both male and female citizens in understanding and contrasting this type of violence. The research is conducted with mixed methods and intended to photograph the situation before the start of a multiannual programme.

The definition of GBV utilized by the interviewees is quite complete: overall it is considered as GBV:

\textsuperscript{308} Ibidem, p.33.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibidem, p.34.
\textsuperscript{310} Rwamrec GBV Baseline (2012).
• Any discrimination based on one’s sex
• Power imbalance in decision-making between men and women
• Unjust labor division between men and women
• Sexual abuse
• Beating and other physical violence
• Economic deprivation.

It is worth noticing that psychological violence perpetrated to spouse is here not listed as a form of GBV. On the contrary, lack of care for children (children denial) is included as a GBV category.

As it is not a category appearing in the official UN literature nor academic studies, the choice of including this kind of age-related (and not sex related), violence in the definition of GBV, is interesting from a sociological and almost epistemic point of view. It provides hint for understanding a specific contribution to reflection and transformation around GBV proceeding from a distinct and new on the scene epistemic subject.

This seems to be the only report providing large space to reporting male-suffered GBV violence as well as female against women, and has been coordinated by the Rwandan Association of Men organized in contrasting GBV. It is difficult not to think of the influence that the specific positioning of the observer had in defining further what qualifies as GBV. RWAMREC, NGO who led the survey, is a men’s group openly gathered on the basis of their sexual identity and with the motivation of theoretically and socially redefining masculinity and the traits of constructed social identity that are conducive - on their turn - to re-generate GBV. This group includes denial of children as a practice to be considered GBV. This stands as specific contribution that researchers elaborating from within their male identity can provide. Being denied the possibility of having children by the spouse’s choice is a form of psychological violence with a variety of gradient related to cultural norms and expectations; it certainly affects women but probably more intensely than other type of domestic violence, it has a strong impact on men’s perception of self identity.

The 2012 Rwamrec Baseline explored perceptions on GBV obtaining from large majority of responders, 72.9%, the confirmation that it is known to exist, while 22.8% denied its existence and 4.3% said they did not know. The total average of 70.9% also
declared they witnessed or had direct information on cases of GBV, confirming the data on perception. The research disaggregate the data on the different kind of GBV that responders have heard about, and the data are presented in the table here below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of GBV cases that respondents have heard about or witnessed</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent/12%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape/sexual harassment</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitting</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation from resources</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insult and intimidations</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual deprivation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions/denial of freedom of movement</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation from friends/family members</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early marriage (for girls under 18)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being killed by partner</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced marriage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unplanned pregnancy and forced abortion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of children</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown significantly poses rape (included rape from intimate partner) and sexual harassment as the most frequently occurring, with 58% of respondents referring to it.

The DHS 2011 adds a perspective to interpret perceptions on domestic violence: it finds that women who are or have been married report that spousal violence is the most common form of violence, while women who never got married identify in community or in neighbors the largest number of perpetrators of physical violence.\(^{311}\)

The second most common type of violence named by respondents is hitting. The respondents, as explained in the study, are also aware that this type of abuses are the ones most frequently reported to the administrative organs in charge of providing assistance to GBV survivors. There is a slight difference in the top three abuses reported in this table compared to the ones reported when interviewees are asked on their perception of frequency. The highest position is occupied by hitting (39.5%), the third by rape and sexual harassment (36.6%), insult and intimidation occupying the second

\(^{311}\) DHS 2011, p.13.
position (37.3%). The study also points at sexual deprivation as a quite high frequency behavior classified as GBV, and emerging as particular common element in the Northern province where prevalence of polygamy. The deprivation seems to be mostly experienced by women, as men would not recognize their ‘right’ to pleasure or to initiate marital sexual intercourse.

Hitting or wife beating comes as second. On this behavior there seems to be a quite large acceptance still. In the DHS 2010 more women (56%) than men (25%) consider acceptable at least one of the reasons given for wife beating. Living in urban settings, education level and household income are all negative predictors of decrease of acceptance. Overall although still high acceptance shows a decrease in 2010 data compared to 2000, where 63% of women and 47% of men stated the partner violent behavior was acceptable in presence of at least one of the given reasons (same list as in 2005). When compared in the details these data do suggest, despite some step back, a change in the definition of acceptability of violence. The steadiest reason over time remains neglecting children, which is evidently perceived as a core of women’s identity, as acceptability for beating one’s wife for not caring for children does not change much over time (always above 40%, less then 20% variation).

Table 7: Women’s Acceptance of wife’s beating over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>trend</th>
<th>2000 DHS</th>
<th>2005 DHS</th>
<th>2010 DHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burns the food</td>
<td>⬅️</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argues with him</td>
<td>⬅️</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goes out without telling him</td>
<td>⬅️</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglects the children</td>
<td>⬅️</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuses to have sex with him</td>
<td>⬅️</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,421</td>
<td>11,321</td>
<td>13,671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source DHS 2000 – 2005 – 2010 - Data extracted through the StatCompiler

Only one indicator has had a very large change over time, and it is the cause n.2 (‘Argues with him’). From a low 11% in 2000 passed to an even lower 7.3% in 2005 and then spiked to 32.7%.

312 GBV Baseline, table 7 p. 54.
313 Ibidem, p.56.
314 Burning the food, arguing with him, going out without telling him, neglecting children, refuse to have sexual intercourse (DHS 2010).
A close indicator is the transformation of attitudes towards women refusing sex to their spouse.

In 2008 the GBV law passed, and this reduction might be ascribed to this important change in legal framework. Though another source, the Rwamrec study produced in 2010 on Masculinity and Gender, reports 70% of both men and women agreeing that intimate partner violence might be necessary. The finding from both other studies though, DHS 2000 and 2010, show a higher percentage of women condoning intimate partner violence than men. These result is in line with findings of Rani, Bonu & Diop-Sidibé (2004): their multicountry study\textsuperscript{315} shows men being consistently less likely to justify wife-beating than women, in all the six countries considered (Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe). Women condoning intimate partner violence (most agreed reason: disregarding children; least of consensus: burning food) ranged from 36% in Malawi to 89% in Mali, while for men who ranged from 25% in Malawi to 75% in Ethiopia.

Interesting finding in the 2012 research of L.Bublik\textsuperscript{316} on antenatal care, in which is shown that 28% of nurse of antenatal care – trained and well informed on legislation regulating GBV – agrees that spousal violence might be necessary. While no research existed on the topics before, the author compares her findings with studies in Tanzania were the acceptance of spousal violence spiked to 63% among female health care professional. The author suggests that “It is possible that nurses experience in the clinic with patients affected by IPV could affect nurses into taking a stand against it.”\textsuperscript{317}

Between 2000 and 2005\textsuperscript{318} we observe in DHS data that larger percentage of women start justifying refusal of sex to the spouse. Almost all specific reason show an


\textsuperscript{317} Ibidem, p.28

\textsuperscript{318} This indicator is not collected in 2010. It confirms the shift in focus of the DHS which seems to be abandoning data collection of data on sexual violence and attitudes towards violence.
increase in women subscribing them, except refusing sex for having recently given birth. Again, as in the case of neglecting children as an acceptable reasons to beat a wife, delivering children seems to be perceived as essential to the identity of ‘proper’ woman, and therefore less flexible the judgment on those who might be showing behaviors considered ‘unnatural’.

Table 8: Women’s opinion on when a wife is justified in refusing to have sex with husband

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITION</th>
<th>2000 DHS</th>
<th>2005 DHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knows husband has sexually transmitted disease</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows husband has sex with other women</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has recently given birth</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is tired or not in the mood</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women: Number</td>
<td>10,421</td>
<td>11,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS 2000 – 2005 – 2010 - Data extracted through the Stat Compiler

The UNWOMEN Baseline (2008) orients questions on perceptions mostly for identifying the causes attributed by people to the existence of GBV and particularly of sexual violence. The study presents three groups of answers in relation to the cluster group, women and young women, men and young men, key informants (unspecified by sex or age or social profile). The first group’s explanations tend to consider ‘environmental’ drivers: poverty, genocidal mood and continuation of violence against women, unappropriate housing. The second group tend to seek causes in the ‘quality’ or behavior of the victims (short skirt, cultural belief that bodies of women and youth will ‘heal’ HIV AIDS). The third group seems to interpret GBV as a backlash of progressive transformation, as if women emancipation (i.e. women with a higher salary that the one of many males) could be a determinant of intimate partner violence.

The UNIFEM survey (realized before the passing of the law against GBV) uncovers a large magnitude of women who survived sexual violence and who would not share, let alone report, stories from the violence endured.

This finding reinforces the hypothesis that the growing number of violence reported through the different channels is due mainly to growing awareness of GBV, and
to accessibility of support services (although uncertainties on follow up and on the capacity of justice), then to actual increase of cases. Data and perceptions from both the UNIFEM and the RWAMREC baseline are unanimous in identifying spousal violence as the main typology of violence.

As the RWAMREC Survey collects data on male experiencing (spousal) violence, it also shows that comparatively vast majority of GBV victim are female: 46.3% women and 43.7% girls, vs. 7.5% men and 2.6 boys.

As for the other studies, from the 2012 Baseline Survey data information on the distribution of profiles of victims, perpetrators and type of violence does not emerge. The study points out though how at global level it is calculated that GBV is constituted between 16% and 50% of cases by domestic violence.319 Another study on country situation, funded by USA320 cooperation, considers domestic violence prevalently exercised against women, largely more than against children.

The emerging patterns and the gaps in understanding GBV

In the Parlamentarian debate to approve the law against GBV, the main speaker Judith Kanakuze in 2006 said: “Considering national statistics provided by the Rwandan National Police, and the research carried out by MIGEPROF from 1998 -2002 and research that were done during colonization, prior to genocide, during genocide and in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda, there is strong evidence that gender based violence had spread extensively in our society whether at the scale of the whole country or within families in particular.”321

On the other side, it shall be considered that one of the main programme currently transforming patters of powers at intrahouse level – most likely in daily life conversation, planning between spouses, and self-perception -, that is the Organic Law on land accompanied by the Land Title Registration process, according to the Gender Monitoring Office, is contributing to reduce cases of disputes and GBV on women, allegedly by improving the level of security on their right to plot of land.322

321 PV No67-81, 2006; PV No 77/PV/CD/MG 3August2006
322 Critiques to the fairness of the Land Title Registration process for women are extensive, and is challenged the principle that they largely contribute to improve women’s status, as customary
Although the analysis of perception in the reviewed studies might be supporting the classification of GBV and specifically domestic violence as a growing phenomenon, there are reasons to believe that this increase in data is mostly due to an increase in reporting. The data review conducted for this research does not allow a conclusive statement on this key point. Additional research with qualitative data collection could be of great use to clarify this situation further. It is true that the increase is shown by data proceeding from household surveys, not just in cases reported at the police, and surveys, at least the DHS ones, have been codified a protocol for administering questionnaires which guarantees quite good privacy to the interviewees. In case of more women present in a household only one is interviewed, to avoid fear or shame to prevent women’s accounts. Also, it has to be observed that data referring to recent domestic violence are increasing. But overall seems to be diminishing the range of situation that make women consider socially acceptable wife beating, and consensual decision on having sexual intercourse seems to be a value that is increasing among interviewed population.

Also, the outreach of infrastructures for support to victims and to survivors of GBV, increasing thanks to a number of programs like the One Stop Isange center, the Gender Desk of the police offices, the increasing field visits of the Gender Monitoring Office is spreading in capillary fashion. This is accompanied by education to recognize and treat GBV by basic service officers, and also by awareness campaigns to the general population. Another factor pointing at the possibility that the main reason for increase in data is due to increase in reporting, in turn obtained by a decreased sense of fear, stronger awareness of violent behaviors and reduction in tolerance, could be noticed in the rise of data trend regarding violent behavior of women towards men, including homicide.

Therefore, if the data trend increase on GBV is a result of the data review, its interpretation might not be univocal and referred to an actual increase but there are many elements pointing at an increase in reporting and in disclosure of experience of violence, included domestic (spousal) violence.

---

Isaakson, A.S. (2011). *Unequal Property Rights: A study of land right inequalities in Rwanda*. Working Papers In Economics n.507. University of Gothenburg. Additionally, more monitoring could be used on the strengths of existing measures to protect small farmers, especially women, from land use change, expropriation or forced selling, and impoverishment in the rise of presence of more international agricultural investors.
Conclusions and further developments

The impressive work of statebuilding and legal and symbolic transformation that has been realized in Rwanda mostly with the momentum of the governing elite starting from 2003, invites to consider the change as a deep and profound one, capable of overtaking the genocidal rape ‘normality’ and possibly also to challenge supremacy of patriarchy, as the preservation of ‘culture’ was reinterpreted by pro-gender equality leaders.

Discourse on ethnicity does not have legitimate course anymore, and under Kagame direction discourse on pacification between sexes by redefinition of gender seems to have taken on the space left to discuss root causes of conflict.

While certainly more research are needed to explore how much the data showing increase in violence depend on increased reporting or from actual increase of violence, what appears clearly from data and literature – and from direct appraisal – is that over a decade of work on increasing gender equality with a strong top-down approach, in an environment with high density of international donors, succeeded in obtaining in current acceptable discourse the substitution of ethnicity with gender issue. This act has enormous implication. On the theoretical level, and from an international studies perspective, it sanctioned the validity of a more inclusive discourse on human security, which structurally incorporates gender, and which defines security at home, in opposition to secret domestic violence as a key element to ensure security for the society as a whole, and for ‘peace writ large’. On a perspective concentrated on international cooperation, this substitution appears as a nemesis capable of washing the negative legacy of colonialism on the formation of ethnicity. Indeed Rwanda overtook the mild positions of international donors on gender and obtained unique results in gender equality representation as well as relative progress in legislation incited to the change by an
endogenous momentum. Gender equality progressed much more for internal political agendas than for external inputs and conditionalities. And by doing so, Rwanda has occupied a leading position in societal change towards gender equality, uprooting political submission to more ‘advanced’ western positions (from former colonial countries) in realizing human rights standards. The shortcoming of the transformation resides in the partial realization of human rights, as the acceptable narrative on them is circumscribed gender injustice but not to granting political citizenship to opponents. This situation might derive from a complicated set up. If the words ‘Hutu’ and “Tutsi” have a sense, they might mostly have in terms of political groups and power, even beyond division of caste and of type of livelihoods. The armed group of RPF is commonly associated to the Tutsi resistance, and the RPF is the group from which the vast majority of current leaders’ class originated. That said, the very fact that among former RFP members there are many outspoken champions for gender equality, considering all these factors altogether might suggest a different acception in understanding the centrality of the gender equality battle. Transforming the level of discourse (from ethnicity to gender) and having one of two former parties with a clearer and stronger agenda on the issue, does contribute to create an at least indirect political advantage vis a vis international donors for the members or the individual closer to the RFP and to its political evolution.

Also, because of the genocide, developing in depth critique to the role of colonialism in the essentialisation of the category of hutu and tutsi and to the creation of the dramatic social (and economical) conflict among the two groups, was too much of a dangerous act of tampering with fire. Different the condition of the theory of gender disequality: affording causes and dramatic consequences of genocidal rape was a urgency with a large constituency, and the reflection on sexual violence presents universal features and concepts, able to develop alliances along very different cleavages, with respect to the debate of ethnicity. Therefore, the swap of focus from ethnical (or social) division and injustices to gender inequality has been a very successful measure of peacebuilding as it has contributed to blur lines of opponent groups and to reshuffle concepts, oppositional values, and urgency. The overall frame for putting gender equality as central has been the respect of human rights, and the National Commission of Human Rights, established in the Constitution of 2003, has contributed to all laws relevant to
shaping a higher level of gender equity in the legal corpus. As equality and security disregarding political convictions continues to be severely hampered according to many observers, first and foremost Human Rights Watch, gender equality fully gained the status of (officially) unchallenged human right.

So the cultural, legal and symbolic shift being conducted by the Rwandan Government on gender issues has obtained amazing and unique results, as the 63% female representation in the Parliament, and has started to describe not only human security but national security as strictly dependent on women’s security. In general, the strong political will of Rwanda to improve gender equality within the country is unequalled. It cannot be seen as a natural evolution directly influenced by the scars of genocide and of the its wide spread rape violence: indeed Bosnia y Herzegovina who also experienced genocide and high level of use of rape as a weapon of war did not evolve their priorities in the same ways. Concentrating on improving equality gender has allowed the shift of attention and envisioned the annihilation of the interest for division related to ethnic narrations of the country. Actual security for women is though unachieved yet. As seen in chapter 4, the number of known cases of violence and particularly domestic violence remains very high, and is actually increasing.

This opens up for further research and investigation, as understanding if the increase is connected to actual increase of tensions and violence in domestic settings and in inter-gender relationships could be pursued with an in-depth qualitative and quasi experimental research, contrasting findings from areas of the country diversely exposed to anti GBV awareness campaign and services with other more exposed. An additional criteria could be understanding level and nature of domestic violence in areas where land reform and women’s access to land registration is high, contrasted to areas where this indicator is low.

Another path of research which is opened up by this work to further understand the depth of gender evolution and GBV in Rwanda statebuilding strategy would attempt to answer question on what is the actual role of Rwanda on the regional scene and long lasting still ongoing warfare, particularly on the conflict in DR Congo, and what is the Rwandan approach to the key problem of gender and sexual based violence in the area during this tangled warfare strongly motivated by the attempt to control DRC rabundant

mineral resources. Accused to have backed up the armed violent group M23, one of the many armed parties involved in the complex political and military scene of failed state of DR Congo, accused – as well as many others – of extensive violence on civilians, of massive rapes and of recruiting child soldiers, the Government of Rwanda is now experiencing suspension for 2013 of budget support from UK government and from specific budget lines from US cooperation.\textsuperscript{324}

Both these research paths could contribute understanding of the societal dynamics in political use of gender. The first one, could contribute understanding if an increase of violence, as we are nevertheless seeing from data in Rwanda as demonstrated above, despite the muscular operation of transformation towards gender equity, is a backlash to expect, in households, in workplaces and in the streets, when deeply rooted gender patterns are challenged and reshuffled and women do increase their share of power. The second, could contribute verifying if the commitment to gender equality and women security in which Rwanda mainstream governmental politics is or not an element of agency in external relations of the country to contribute regional security. The first could tell more about anthropological evolution, the second about possibilities of strategic framing of – and influencing on - international security.

In previous chapters it has been explored the extent of the contribution of the international community to transforming gender inequalities in Rwanda and to solidly redefine security and peace around an essential and inescapable condition of parity and actual non-discrimination between sexes. The thesis offered is that it was mostly a determined endogenous political will which has constituted the momentum for the transformation, while international actors where either counterproductive (by being gender blind and reinforcing gaps in cooperation interventions) or disinterested and inessential (overall lack of conditionality on use of funds, low gender sensitivity of the academic and international debate on human security), or rarely supportive (as in the example of programs from UNIFEM and UNDP for GBV specific interventions).

This endogenous will, in a country with a strong male President of unchallenged power, and with gender equality specification that do not fit western feminist discourse, included the opposition between gender equality centered approach and militarization, represent a complex experience that escapes attempt of explanatory reductionism, but

constitute a living and constantly changing experience of a laboratory for creating (or re-creating, if theories on the original fall of humans being division and hierarchisation of sexes are founded) gender equality which is worthy to watch, document, and learn from.
Bibliography


Peacekeeping Practice. New York: UNIFEM.


Bowlus, A. J. & Seitz (2006 November). Domestic Violence, Employment, and


Caprioli, M. (2003). *Gender Equality And Civil Wars.* Social Development Department -

Chowdhury, A. K. (2010). *UN Doable Fast-Track Indicators. Turning The 1325 Promise Into Reality*.


Peace.


Mosse, G. (1985). Nationalism And Sexuality: Respectability And Abnormal Sexuality In


Republic of Rwanda. (2001). *Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2000*

Republic of Rwanda. (2006). *Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2005*


Republic of Rwanda. (2012). *Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2010*


Ruiz-Bravo P and Barrig M (2002). *Lineamientos para la incorporación del enfoque de género en el seguimiento y evaluación de proyectos.* PREVAL.


Kumarian Press.


Briefing Paper


### APPENDIX

#### Table A.1 – review of metaevaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors and promoter</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year and countries covered</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Gaarder, M. &amp; Annan, J. World Bank</td>
<td>Impact Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>the word ‘gender’ is used in place of ‘sex’ (‘stratification by gender’)? although it presents itself as a purely methodological study, assumptions are made and accepted towards gendered orders in society without analysis of their impact and implication for programming</td>
<td>- it is accepted with no critique that some questions strictly related to gender patterns are considered to have the potential of igniting more tensions in a fragile post conflict set up</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>O’Connel, H. &amp; Harcourt, W.</td>
<td>Conflict-affected and fragile states: opportunities to promote gender equality and equity?</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>- fully concentrated on the impact on gender patterns of the interventions, and on the negative effect of lack of commitment to gender</td>
<td>- it is only suggested as problematic the identification of young male as the dominantly risky subjects - it is subtly adversed the position that considers progress in service as health and education not as relevant for peacebuilding as others (on livelihoods) because considered emitted from a male point of view</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Spencer, T.</td>
<td>A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organisations</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>- does not explicit gender equality as criteria to look for in evaluation of peacebuilding interventions, although example quoted refer to women’s right initiatives in post conflict</td>
<td>- “‘peace as order’ not useful for peacebuilding, better ‘conflict management’; this can allow space for gender equality advancement in peacebuilding</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>A.D.E.</td>
<td>Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The Concept Study considers gender as a sector The final report does not</td>
<td>- the Concept study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A.2 – review of evaluations of interventions in Rwanda

#### N1 – No gender sensitivity and no gender awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors / promoters</th>
<th>Sex of authors</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Gender occurrence</th>
<th>Passivity of women</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Howard Adelman, Astri Suhrke, Bruce Jones</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Early Warning and Conflict Management Study II - Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, dedicated to Early Warning and Conflict (conflict analysis)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>only 1 ‘gender' in the TOR, … the well-being of the innocents, particularly women and children (p.64)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>External Evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Program 4th phase (2009 – 2011)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>unexplored</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Strengthening Youth Livelihood Opportunities In Rwanda</td>
<td>Oct 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>No attention to gender relevant content nor to impact</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## N2 – Extreme superficiality in checking off a section on gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors / promoters</th>
<th>Sex of authors</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Gender occurrence</th>
<th>Passivity of women</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EC - Commission Europeenne Rwanda</td>
<td> </td>
<td>Evaluation de la Cooperation de la Commission Europeenne avec le Rwanda. Evaluation de niveau pays.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Very quick and superficial check of gender off the list</td>
<td>6 over 59 pages</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| 5  | UN Evaluation Management Group | &nbsp; | Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One. | 2011 | Y | Mentioned but not explained, mostly rooted in the experience of Albania where the program was on gender based violence | | N | N |


| 6  | UNDP | &nbsp; | Support to Implementation of Rwanda TOKTEN Volunteer Program. | 2008 | Y | Gender mentioned but gender related issues are not analised and interventions considered unlikely to succeed. | | N | N |

http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1814

| 7  | Operations Evaluation Department. African Development Bank | &nbsp; | Evaluation of Policy Based Operations in the African Development Bank. Country Case Study: Rwanda, 1999-2009 | 2011 | Yes | - but very high level type of aggregation of information, only refers to gender policy and not to any aspect of society or of presence of economic opportunities for women and men. | 2 over 70 pages | N – mentioned women’s rights law | N |

### N3– Simple approach in the evaluation: gender = women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors / promoters</th>
<th>Sex of authors</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Gender occurrence</th>
<th>Passivity of women</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lennart Tor, Wohlgemuth Sellstrom.</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>“Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors.” In The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Uppsala: 1996.</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Not really - No, women's condition is presented but not used to understand the crisis</td>
<td>Only 1 but in TOR</td>
<td>The word 'women' instead occurs 21 times. Analysed women condition pre-genocide</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| 9  | John Borton, Ermery Brusset, Alistair Hallam (3m on 5) | Male | Humanitarian Aid and Effects – Third Study | 1996 | Y | Presentation of some aspects of women conditions, but not put in context nor connected with the program effectiveness | 3 over 205 pages | y | N | N |


| 10 | Hugh Bagnall-Oakeley, Kate Godden, Joanne Philpott, Gerard Rubanda, Alexis Dukundane, Fiacre Kamanzi | All | WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation | 2011 | Y | Recalls asymmetry in food insecurity, but has a weak gender equity (sex equity) approach aiming at half women targeted | 13 over 98 pages | Not particularly, women and children (or girls) presented together only 2 times over 45 instances | N | N (only sex parity not gender equity) |


| 11 | Ecorys | All | Independent Evaluation of | 2012 | The program is focused on Reference to the gender | ? over 120 (included acronyms) | Women=0 | N | N |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors / promoters</th>
<th>Sex of authors</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Gender occurrence</th>
<th>Passivity of women</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Independent Commission for Aid Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td>DFID’s Education Programmes in Three East African Countries</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Gender as parity</td>
<td>18 over 30</td>
<td>Women=0</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Byabagamba, Arthur</td>
<td>1 male on 1</td>
<td>End of the Program Evaluation ‘UNDP Support to Inclusive Participation in Governance” (IPG) Program Final Evaluation Report.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Gender sensitive, but superficial understanding of gender as parity</td>
<td>26 over 73</td>
<td>Women combined with youth and disabled</td>
<td>(4 on 73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Y10 – The gender sensitive evaluations on gender focused programmes**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Authors / promoters</th>
<th>Sex of authors</th>
<th>Title - typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender sensitive</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Gender occurrence</th>
<th>Passivity of women</th>
<th>Intersection gender equality and peace issues</th>
<th>Gender Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Universalia Management Group</td>
<td>(no Authors mentioned)</td>
<td>Country led Evaluation of Delivering as One – Rwanda</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>28 over 78 pages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender equality is in the program ascribed to good governance. The evaluation does not elaborate on that, the strength in in the GiR policy not in the evaluation nor in the DaO</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Gender Sensitive</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
## Y01 Gender Sensitive evaluation on gender blind program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Gender Ratio</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Evaluation Details</th>
<th>Women Mentioned</th>
<th>Gender Commitment</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kane, H.B.</td>
<td>1 male on 1</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Gender consideration grounded in post 1994 change in demographics, but little done to enable women's economic capacity. Only mentioned ratio m/f, not used - problem was framed as a gender analysis (32.1% of female HH, difficult access to land) but not implemented as such (only attention to targeting women). Not followed national priorities either (on poverty and on gender).</td>
<td>2 over 49 pages</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/39975222.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/39975222.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Belgian Cooperation</td>
<td>1 male on 1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Gender as equality between sexes and power relations. Observed lack of gender analysis in programming. - only &quot;women&quot; (femmes 28 over 163)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.oecd.org/derec/belgium/42660141.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/derec/belgium/42660141.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>