Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

Evci, Bora (2014) Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Economia, 25 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/6569.
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Abstract

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Autore
Evci, Bora
Supervisore
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze economiche e statistiche
Ciclo
25
Coordinatore
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Parole chiave
Matching Theory, Stability, Semi-Centralized Markets
URN:NBN
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/6569
Data di discussione
4 Giugno 2014
URI