Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

Bianchi, Giuliano (2013) Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate, [Dissertation thesis], Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna. Dottorato di ricerca in Economia, 24 Ciclo. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsdottorato/5346.
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This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Tipologia del documento
Tesi di dottorato
Bianchi, Giuliano
Dottorato di ricerca
Scuola di dottorato
Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore disciplinare
Settore concorsuale
Data di discussione
23 Maggio 2013

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