DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IN ROMANIA: from Socialism to EU Membership

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With their accession to the European Union, twelve new countries - Romania among them - (re)entered the international community of international donors. In the history of development aid this can be seen as a unique event: it is for the first time in history that such a large number of countries become international donors, with such short notice and in such a particular context that sees some scholars announcing the ‘death’ of development. But in spite of what might be claimed regarding the ‘end’ of the development era, development discourse seems to be rather vigorous and in good health: it is able to extert an undeniable force of attraction over the twelve countries that, in a matter of years, have already convinced themselves of its validity and adhered to its main tenets.

This thesis collects evidence for improving our understanding of this process that sees the co-optation of twelve new countries to the dominant theory and practice of development cooperation. The evidence collected seems to show that one of the tools employed by the promoters of this co-optation process is that of constructing the ‘new’ Member States as ‘new’, inexpert donors that need to learn from the ‘old’ ones.

By taking a case-study approach, this thesis gathers data that suggests that conceiving of the ‘twelve’ as ‘new’ donors is both historically inaccurate and value-laden. On one hand, Romania’s case-study illustrates how in the (socialist) past at least one in the group of the twelve was particularly conversant in the discourse of international development. On the other hand, the process of co-optation, while being presented as a knowledge-producing process, can also be seen as an ignorance-producing procedure: Romania, along with its fellow new Member States, takes the opportunity of ‘building its capacity’ and ‘raising its awareness’ of development cooperation along the line drawn by the European Union, but at the same time it seems to un-learn and ‘lower’ its awareness of development experience in the (socialist) past.

This is one possible reading of this thesis. At a different level, this thesis can also be seen as an attempt to account of almost five decades of international development discourse in one specific country – Romania – in three different socio-political contexts: the socialist years (up to the year 1989), the ‘transition years’ (from 1989 to the pre-accession years) and the membership to the European Union. In this second reading, the thesis seeks to
illustrate how – contrary to widespread beliefs – before 1989 Romania’s international development discourse was particularly vivid: in the most varied national and international settings President Ceauşescu unfolded an extensive discursive activity on issues pertaining to international development; generous media coverage of affairs concerning the developing countries and their fight for development was the rule rather than the exception; the political leadership wanted the Romanians not only to be familiarized with (or ‘aware of’ to use current terminology) matters of underdevelopment, but also to prove a sense of solidarity with these countries, as well as a sense of pride for the relations of ‘mutual help’ that were being built with them; finally, international development was object of academic attention and the Romanian scholars were able not only to reflect on major developments, but could also formulate critical positions towards the practices of development aid. Very little remains of all this during the transition years, while in the present those who are engaged in matters pertaining to international development do so with a view of building Romania as an EU-compliant donor.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DEVE Committee – Development Committee of the European Parliament
EIB – European Investment Bank
EU – European Union
EU-12 – the twelve countries that acceded to the European Union in 2005 and 2007
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO(s) – Non-governmental organization(s)
NMS – New Member States of the European Union
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHARE – The Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
RMFA – Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
Soviet Union – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
CHAPTER 1 (Re)Searching for a Discourse: Methodological and Theoretical Approach

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the research project from a methodological and theoretical point of view. It has four main parts. The first part introduces the research questions that guided this endeavor and the hypothesis that will be tested throughout. The second part provides an overview of the main research data that have been used, as well as an insight into the way the researcher approached the ‘field’. The third part of this chapter introduces the research context, while the fourth and last part show how two very debated concepts – ‘development’ and ‘discourse’ – met into and substantiated this research effort.

1.1. Research Questions and Hypothesis

The world ‘community’ of international donors and those who think that international aid is key to ending global poverty have reason to rejoice: twelve European countries and ‘new’ Member States of the European Union, have recently joined their forces in the fight for global development. Twelve new countries became 'new' donors.

There are at least two features that make this a unique experience both for ‘the twelve’ as well as for the development ‘community’. To begin with, it is for the first time in the history of international development that such a large number of countries acquire a donor status in such a short period of time. Secondly, all these countries share a rather exceptional condition: most of them are former socialist states and all seem to be pulled towards donorship by the same driving force which is the European Union. As one representative of the new Member States, Jirí Silny, Director of the Ecumenical Academy of Prague, unequivocally puts it:

‘For the post-socialist countries which have been integrated into the EU, development cooperation including civil society participation became obligatory’.

The first question that led to this thesis relates to the first point mentioned above. In a first instance, the author simply wanted to witness the historical moment that saw the creation of a ‘new’ donor (Romania) or a new group of donors (the new Member States of the European Union), particularly in a context in which: many in the world talk about, propose

and imagine the 'post-development' era; in Romania, the country selected for the case-study and (along with Bulgaria) the most recent of these new donors, only 16% of Romanians believe that Romania can afford to help other countries, while 74% of them believe that Romania should still receive development aid on a par with the Republic of Moldova or the Congo; after having been directly exposed to them, many in Romania are critical about the methods of one major donor which is the European Union.

Some of the questions triggered by this context were: What are the narratives and the strategies at play for 'convincing' countries to become ‘new’ donors rather than new critics of development aid? How is a new donor country 'created' when the majority of its citizens see themselves rather at the receiving than at the donor's end? Is this a natural process that normally occurs when a country reaches a certain international status (ex. integration in a group of donors)? If yes, which are the main steps of such a process and who leads the internal 'demand' for donorship? If not, what are the external forces that have a role in orienting a new country towards donorship? How do they exert their influence?

A second set of questions arose from a certain type and degree of tension between the two aforementioned features of uniqueness. Many of the former socialist countries that are now new Member States of the European Union and ‘new’ donors, were once (during their socialist years) donors themselves; or at least they laid claims to be so. So why is their ‘donorship’ identity built as ‘new’, rather than acknowledging their ‘come-back’? Possibly because there can hardly be any talk of a ‘come-back’, given that their past, pre-89 experience with and awareness of development issues was so superficial (as imposed by the Soviet Union) that it is barely significant or practical in the present-day context?

To be able to answer this last question the author decided to focus on one single country – Romania – and look for data able to shed light on a series of related sub-questions such as: What kind of knowledge was there prevalent in the socialist Romanian society regarding the issues of development cooperation? Was this knowledge rather diffused and shallow,

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3 One respondent told the author: ‘We were very critical about the so-called development projects that the European Union financed in Romania: we detested their bureaucracy and careless regarding the actual and long-term results of the projects as long as the papers were in order. We couldn't stand when their so-called experts who knew nothing of Romania came here and preached us. But now we go to Moldova and we do to them exactly the same things that the Europeans did to us’.
4 See more details in the section relating to the research context.
or was it of a type that could result in concrete proposals for international development\(^5\)? In case Romania did have the ability to formulate concrete proposals, were these proposals listened to in the international fora, or were they rather obscure ideas confined to domestic consumption? Was this knowledge of the domain of the political elites, or was it shared with the wider public\(^6\)? Was it of an empirical kind or was it supported by research and academic work?

This thesis is built on the underlying assumption that discourses are inter-connected not only spatially, but also temporally. Therefore, the next set of questions made its way: Is there any relation between the past and present knowledge of international development? Are the past and the present narratives related in any way? Do they interact and influence each other? If yes, are they likely to produce alternative models of thinking and acting on international development matters?

Preliminary research suggested the hypothesis to be tested:

*The current new Member States of the European Union and former socialist countries of the Eastern and Central Europe are co-opted to the dominant discourse of international development by practices that produce both knowledge and ignorance and construct them as ‘new’ donors.*

As this thesis will show, the NMS are considered by the European Union as ‘new’ donors. This way, the idea that the NMS had formulated in their past a discourse of international development – on the par to the old Member States - is excluded from the very beginning. Therefore, the first task of this research, accomplished in the second chapter of the thesis, was to demonstrate the *existence* and then also the features of such discourse in one country that is taken as case-study. The second task, accomplished in the third chapter, was to reveal the order and the processes of formation of the ‘new’ discourse and understand – in the concluding chapter - to what extent the two are connected through Romania’s policy of development cooperation.

\(^5\) The ability to formulate concrete proposals for international development was seen as an indicator of a good understanding of international development issues.

\(^6\) This question was particularly important in a context in which President Ceausescu was particularly active in the field of foreign policy.
1.2. Research Data and Methodology

This research is about a way of looking at how the field of international development was honed and continues to be shaped in one of the Eastern European and former socialist countries that is now a ‘new’ Member States of the European Union. Romania is the said country and discourse analysis is the privileged lens that is being used for analysis.

For those having grounds to believe that Romania is a ‘newcomer’ to the field of development cooperation, the timeframe proposed by this study might perhaps be somehow surprising: this account begins in the 1970s, at the time when Romania was at the highest point of its international status, and goes on until the present day. One of the implicit assumptions is that – like in other fields – the events taking place in 1989 represent a cross-road.

At a global level, before that year, development discourse can be characterized as having a ‘divergent’ dynamics, with various centers of power (the United States of America, the Soviet Union, China, the European Community, etc.) contesting each other’s primacy in shaping it. After 1989, and in particular since the European Union’s enlargement towards Eastern Europe, the global development discourse shifted its gravity center and firmly established itself in the West: among other major changes, the Eastern European countries disowned now their tradition of co-operation with the South and ‘converge’ to the model proposed by the European Union. It is this particularly interesting shift that forms the background of this research and that is being illustrated, into some detail, by studying Romania’s case.

To best capture, but also symbolize, this sudden shift, the thesis will have a very simple structure: a first, introductory chapter that sets the ‘scene’ and gives some theoretical and methodological orientation; a second chapter to describe the political and aid relations that Romania developed with the so-called ‘developing countries’ during its Socialist years, as well as - what we will call - a ‘discourse’ of international development that the Romanian public was exposed to in those years; a third chapter that shows the steps taken by Romania to become a ‘new’ donor in an enlarged European Union where Romania is a ‘new’ Member State; and a fourth and last chapter that gathers the concluding remarks. Two ‘technical’ chapters (introduction and conclusions) and two ‘content’ chapters: one for what was there before 1989, and one on what we could witness after this year. This
way, the past and the present, the ‘then’ and the ‘now’ simply and naturally reflect each other, without intermediary elements, like in a silent dialogue over time.

To avoid risks of inconsistency and rupture between past and present, a common method – discourse analysis – will be used to collect and analyze the research data for both the first and the second chapter. The present though is also explored through a certain number of interviews and observational methods so as to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by a field that is said to be ‘in construction’. However, saying that the observational methods only investigated the present is perhaps inaccurate. Frequently, what was observed in the present, had a retrospective echo that was able to illuminate an aspect coming from the past.

The next section will describe the three main methods - critical discourse analysis, interviews and the participatory methods - used for data collection and handling. The section is not only a technical explanation of the way each method was considered and used, but also an introduction into the general ‘atmosphere’ of the ‘field’, an account of how this field is populated and inhabited by its experts or experts-to-be; of how the author introduced herself and became an accepted member of a relatively circumscribed community (that of development ‘workers’ or ‘experts’ in the NMS); of how the use of each of these three research methods was influenced by the specificity of a ‘field in construction’.

1.2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis
Wood and Kroger claim that discourse analysis is not only about method, but also about a perspective on the nature of language and its relation to the central issues of social sciences.

‘More specifically, we see discourse as a related collection of approaches to discourse, approaches that entail not only practices of data collection and analysis, but also a set of metatheoretical and theoretical assumptions and a body of research claims. Data collection and analysis are a vital part of discourse analysis, but they do not, in themselves, constitute the whole of discourse analysis’.

While we will take the theoretical assumptions into consideration at a later point, we will look now at some methodological aspects.

As shown by Rosalind Gill\(^8\), discourse analysis is a name for a wide range of approaches to the *study of texts*. This author identifies no less than 57 varieties of discourse analysis, but while so doing, she also proposes a method for ‘making sense of the differences between them’: she classifies the 57 varieties according to three broad theoretical traditions. First, Gill mentions the tradition under the sphere of critical linguistics, social semiotics and critical language studies. From this theoretical perspective discourse analysis is closely associated with the discipline of linguistics, it is concerned with the relationship between language and politics and it looks into the dramatic effects that particular linguistic forms (such as agent deletion, passivization or nominalization) can have upon how an event or phenomenon is understood. A second theoretical perspective is the one influenced by speech-act theory, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. This approach will stress the functional or action orientation of discourse and will look into what people actually do with their words: giving orders, making promises, warning about dangers, soliciting aid etc. The third theoretical tradition is post structuralism; Foucault was one of the most well-known among post-structuralists, most quoted for his ‘genealogies’ and studies of discourse. In his work, this author was interested not in the details of spoken or written texts, but in looking at the historical construction of discourse.

Thus, there is no one single form of ‘discourse analysis’, but many different manners of using this method, that ‘all lay claim to the name’. The common denominator that they share is that they all reject the realist notion that language is simply a neutral means of reflecting or describing the world. Also shared is a strong belief in the central importance of discourse in *constructing* the social life. Here is the main reason for choosing this method for the study of development discourse in one of the new Member States of the European Union: for its potential in influencing and constructing the basis of understanding for this field of study, for its vulnerability of being used in establishing one version of the world in face of competing versions, with remarkable consequences on the actual courses of action that will be later on taken upon.

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In what the new Member States are concerned, many claim that development cooperation is like a blank sheet awaiting to be written. If one wants to know how this sheet is going to be filled in, than discourse analysis might be the most appropriate of the methods. This is because - as Gill shows - doing discourse analysis is about asking a completely different kind of questions. This ‘difference’ entails a radical epistemological shift. Faced with a text about development cooperation practices, the discourse analyst will not seek to discover why a certain practice of development cooperation was embarked upon; or if a certain practice is more effective than one other; if one type of aid is better than other type (say budget support better than program aid); if (say, Western) conditionality is to be preferred over (say, Chinese) lack of it; if the international development practices promoted by donors are coherent with the rest of their conduct on the international and internal setting. What the discourse analyst will try to gather is rather how the decision to become a donor country is warranted by the author(s) of the text; how they orient to potential criticism; how they establish a donor identity; how they ‘legitimate’ such an identity. Just like the ‘traditional’ approach, discourse analysis allows a never-ending list of questions, but as one can notice, discourse analysis questions are fairly different from questions asked by ‘conventional’ social scientists. They do not aim to establish facts or ‘truths’; they will rather look into how the universally accepted ‘truths’ are constructed. In this particular case, one of the questions that have been asked was: how is development cooperation becoming a policy field in the New Member States? Or, more specifically, what made it possible that certain practices of development cooperation are being embarked upon rather than others.

From a ‘conventional’ science point of view, the method can be susceptible of being flawed. From a functionalist perspective, for instance, discourse analysis is not even a valid research method, because it appears like an improvisation, some sort of ‘intellectual bricolage’ that ultimately depends on the interpreter’s subjectivity. As least criticism, the conventional scientist would show that this method can hardly produce empirical generalization. The discourse analysts’ response is that their method

‘does not set out to identify universal processes, as discourse analysts are critical of the notion that such generalizations are possible’

and that

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10 Rosalind Gill, op. cit., p. 186.
'Instead of focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems'.

Inspired by van Dijk, I start from noticing that even if the donors multiplied overwhelmingly along the years, the ‘developing countries’ do not seem to be better off. The twelve new Member States of the European Union are as many new donors. What I wonder is how these countries establish their donor identity. I turned the lenses on them as ‘donors’ and tried to understand how their practices are crafted and promoted as the prevailing model of dealing with Global poverty.

For the actual use of this method, my first source of inspiration was Stuart Hall’s survey of Foucault’s work on discourse and discourse formation. In his book ‘Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices’, Hall summarizes what the elements for the study of discourse were, in Foucault’s view. Of course, Foucault studied discourse formation of topics like madness, punishment/prisons or sexuality, while this research will focus on an utterly different topic. However, this author guided the methodological design of this research not last because of the unambiguous presentation of the elements that the study of discourse should include. In Hall’s reading of Foucault, the study of discourse should be the study of the statements that will give a certain kind of knowledge about a particular field (in this case development cooperation); of the rules which prescribe certain ways of talking about a topic, governing what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ at a particular historical time; of the ‘subjects’ who, in some ways, personify the discourse – the underdeveloped, the poor, the sick person, the victim, the refugee, but also the ‘developer’, the aid officer, the chief of the development agency; of how this knowledge about the topic acquires authority and becomes the ‘truth of the matter’, at a historical moment; the practices within institutions for dealing with the subjects – development strategies for the underdeveloped – whose conduct is being regulated and organized according to those ideas; of the acknowledgement that a different discourse or episteme will arise at a later historical moment, replacing the existing one, opening up a new discursive formation, and producing, in its turn, new conceptions about the studied field.

Statements, rules, subjects, authority, practices within institutions and acknowledgement of future discourse formations – these would be the main elements for studying discourses. Development cooperation – as it is proposed by the European Union - has not, as yet, become the ‘truth of the matter’ in a country like Romania, Bulgaria or some others among the new Member States, perhaps due to a series of ‘objective’ reasons such as: the matter’s low priority on the political agenda; the lack of engagement from the general public; the fact that, as Foucault used to show, a new discourse is a historical reality that needs a certain span of time to emerge, mature and embed into a certain society. In the new Member States the process is still up-to-the-minute, dating no more than a few years ago. Nonetheless, a specific discursive orientation can already be identified.

One of the first things that one may find out from a development worker in the new Member States is that development cooperation is a new field for his / her country and for the whole EU12. As a Hungarian practitioner emphatically once said, in defense of the need for capacity building for development NGOs in the NMS:

‘I feel that there is a huge gap between the old Member States (NGOs)\(^{13}\), who are going like a train forward to the (development) policy and managing a lot of projects in parallel; meanwhile, in the new Member States we don’t have this development (cooperation) work in our countries; we are absolutely new\(^{14}\) (to development cooperation); we are, I am so sorry to say, worse than a Southern\(^{15}\) NGO, because a Southern NGO was until now a recipient, working with you\(^{16}\).’

This is a very frequently heard statement in the NMS, so much so that it seems to be the ‘matter of fact’ of the emerging development cooperation discourse, the universal ‘truth’ capable of creating consensus among parties otherwise disparate: development workers, government representatives, multilateral institutions, etc. The argument as it goes is that Western countries had 50 years of donor experience ahead, the transition years were naturally dominated by NMS’ internal development concerns, therefore the NMS are obviously not conversant into donorship practices.

\(^{13}\) In the brackets: my own words for filling the lacking information with details that had emerged elsewhere in the discussion.
\(^{14}\) Accentuated, lamenting tone of voice.
\(^{15}\) Used with the sense of ‘NGO from a developing country’.
\(^{16}\) ‘You’ is referred to EU15 NGOs. The assumption is that an NGO can get considerable amount of experience for the development work either as a EU contractor of the European Commission, or – if located in the Global South - as a local partner to such EU contracting NGO.
From a discursive point of view, ‘universal truths’ are susceptible of ideological work. This was a point of departure: this type of statement called for testing and checking. In a first instance a ‘contemporary’ consistency-check was needed so as to see to what extent NMS’ representatives (or at least representatives of one new Member State – Romania) shared this view. From various sources of discourse activity (policy papers, articles, magazines, international treaties, etc.), the author collected and analyzed various political and public statements. What emerged was a more sophisticated and sometimes contradictory image. Second, a ‘historical’ outlook was also taken so as to see how statements about the ability and willingness of one ‘former Socialist country / current new Member State’ to contribute to international development evolved over time. For the historical investigation the research was focused on the statements made in Ceauşescu’s Romania. The choice was due to Ceauşescu’s unique (among the Eastern European countries, current new Member States) policy towards the ‘developing countries’, and the author’s facilitated access to Romanian-language material that was never looked upon from this point of view.

The corpus of statements for the historical analysis came mainly from journals, magazines, newspapers, popularization books and academic volumes. Of particular interest was the daily ‘Scînteia’¹⁸, the official journal of the time and the ‘Lumea’¹⁹ monthly magazine, a well-known international affairs publication. What I studied with particular attention were the collections corresponding to the years: 1973, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1985. The timeframe covered by these years roughly corresponds to the main phases in Ceauşescu’s politics towards the South. The collections of these particular years were on focus rather than others because each of these years marks an important event in Ceauşescu’s political involvement in the Third World: the signing of one, if not several, ‘Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation’ between Romania and one or another of the developing countries. From 1973 to 1985, thirteen such treaties were signed with: 10 African countries, Argentina, Costa Rica and Cambodia (see table below).

¹⁷ The researcher is of Romanian mother tongue.
¹⁸ Translated into English, ‘Scînteia’ means ‘The Spark’.
These events were extremely visible and accurately publicized in the press of the time. Extensive coverage of the signing ceremony, reportages from and about the respective country, articles filled with development rhetoric calling for fairer relations among states, commentaries on the country’s economic progress, features on the Romanian technical staff working in the respective country and much other.

The first remark about the corpus available is that, contrary to what one may expect (due to present-day claims regarding the lack of NMS tradition in the field of development cooperation), the choice was incredibly large. ‘Lumea’ hardly published any of its monthly issues without a piece on one of the developing countries’ economy, their ‘achievements’ on the ‘world scene’, the state of affairs in politics, relations with Romania. In ‘Scînteia’, a daily, one can also find an astonishing amount of articles about the developing countries: from describing the ‘natural beauties’ of such countries, to the illustration of the ‘natural wealth’ and the raw materials plenteousness, to the portrayal of the developing countries’ peoples with their traditions and customs, to economic analyses, their relations with Romania, their membership to the United Nations, etc. – everything is reflected by Scînteia, especially when President Ceauşescu or a Romanian delegation would visit the respective country or when Presidents or delegations from a developing country would visit Romania. This means articles or at least short summaries on, practically, a daily basis, as the contacts between the Romanian and Southern officials were particularly intense. The books addressing developing countries’ issues are also in significant number and diversity. In the 1650s and 1960s various Romanian publishing houses start putting out various books and booklets that inform the Romanian readership about the developing countries.
Some of these books are more of a ‘popularization’ type. An example is the collection issued by the Scientific Publishing House in Bucharest, under the logo ‘On the map of the World’. Others are of a more ‘scientific’ kind, making more comprehensive analyses of the developing countries and the plight of ‘underdevelopment’.

This brought in a difficult methodological question. How should such a massive corpus of linguistic material be handled, given the time and resource constraints of one researcher working alone? It was obvious that, while surveying all this amount of literature, the author would only be able to analyze in greater detail an infinitesimal part of it. This involved selecting, from the great amount of linguistic material, some of the most relevant pieces to be then turned into finer analyses. This normally triggers a certain risk: how would an author know that the pieces she opts for are the representative, the reliable and the valid ones? What this author did was to select those texts which were most ‘common’, the most typical, the ones which would not stand out neither as form, nor as content, the ones which would be ‘a piece in a series’. This decision was facilitated by the experiences of other discourse analysts who show that, in terms of ‘substance’, there is always a limited number of ideas, concepts and arguments which can be heard in a certain socio-political context, at a specific historical. Therefore, the ‘quantitative aspect of discourse analysis is always of less relevance to the significance of discourse analysis than the qualitative’ aspect, even if quantity does have a role to play. To make one example only: by over-repeating themselves, some statements acquire the status of slogans that contribute to creating the ‘universal truths’.

The author faced less of a challenge regarding the extent of the corpus when considering texts published after the ‘Ceauşescu era’. In the ‘transition’ years, the Lumea magazine radically changed its profile; Scînteia followed suit and turned into ‘Adevărul’ (The Truth); the leadership’s attention swayed dramatically and ‘deserted’ the developing world; the developing countries’ respective situations were hardly tackled any longer by Romanian books, newspapers and journals. In this context, a different methodology for selecting the research corpus was applied. Two main aspects need to be detailed here. First, the research corpus was confined to the ‘Enlargement years’, or couple of years before accession, the accession year and couple of years after Romania’s integration into

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the European Union (roughly the years 2006-2009). This timeframe was considered as of maximum relevance given that this is the time when Romanian officials and civil society started to be drawn towards the idea that Enlargement would entail taking upon a donor identity and began to acquaint themselves with the practices of international development cooperation proposed to the NMS by the European Union. Second, as a result of a contraction of the sphere of interest for international issues in the Romanian society, the texts were not selected any longer from nation-wide circulated sources, but from more specialized sources such as the positions formulated by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, positions formulated by the Romanian non-governmental organizations or articles published on euractiv.ro, an website mostly dedicated to information and news regarding ‘European’ issues and Romania in the European context.

Many of these texts (particularly those published before 1989) are originally in Romanian; a very small proportion of sources are also in Italian; I translated them all in English and discussed this English version, rather than the Romanian (or Italian) one; however, I kept in mind the spirit and the meaning of the original version: as a Romanian native speaker I felt driven and privileged to bring in the original ‘flavor’ the texts have. All translations were done by the author; even if lacking a special professional competence in this sense, the author approached this task as the best exercise for establishing a more complex, direct and conceptualized relation with ‘her’ texts.

Besides the linguistic translation from one language to another, the author was also confronted with the task of operating a non-linguistic interpretation, from one system to another. Before 1989, the Eastern European countries, current NMS were under Soviet influence, while at the time being they are very much driven by EU processes. The statements needed, therefore, to be considered accordingly and be looked upon from the historical perspective that produced them. This is not like looking for ‘hidden’ meanings. The texts were considered as primary source of information and not some vehicles for second meanings waiting to be ‘discovered’. But while doing so, the author chose to be aware that the NMS are now under much pressure to ‘translate’ the acquis communautaire into their national legislation, as in the past they were called to operate other types of ‘translations’ of a parallel nature. The circumstances and the consequences of these non-linguistic translations, as well as their imbrications with the national particularities and
previous international cooperation history in the region were, therefore, considered, at least in their most prevalent aspects.

To handle the linguistic material, the author generally took Siegfried Jäger\textsuperscript{21} as guidance and looked at her corpus from at least the following four points of view: the institutional framework or the context; the ‘surface’; the text’s rhetorical means; and the ideological statements on contents. When referring to the context, the author offered the reason for selecting the particular text, revealed the significance of the text in the larger corpus and showed in what way the text was important. In other words, the author tried to communicate her perception about the text and her vision about the way the sample text is part of the wider development discourse. The relevance of a text is not something to be taken for granted. These days, we are all familiar with development ‘talk’ and can easily identify a particular text as belonging to this ‘order of discourse’. The ‘cues’ in the articles we read or the speeches we hear are well established paths that lead us to see that the message is about ‘international development’. From this point of view, many of the texts published before 1989 hardly belong to such discourse; in fact, they can easily be read under the ‘international politics’ heading or as texts that ‘only’ inform the public about one or the other of the developing countries. What the author did was to look beyond this foremost assumption and wonder if – in spite of a specific rhetoric that is, in some aspects, different from the one we use today – they belonged to the sphere of what we now call ‘development cooperation’ or international development. The concept was not yet used in those days and in those texts; or at least not with the same versatility that it is used now. But is it possible that – in the end of the day - the quintessence be the same? While analyzing the ‘context’ of an article the author also provided information about: the author of the text; the event that occasioned the publication of the text (was it a foreign delegation to Romania? a Romanian delegation to a developing country? one of Ceauşescu’s visits to an African country? or, after ’89: was it in the context of a European Commission seminar? of new Member States’ negotiation of the foreign relations ‘chapter’? etc.); information about the ‘visibility’ of the article in the publication (was it first page? a long article? with photographs attached? etc.); if the text was actually a public policy or a policy statement the author provided information about the consultation process or the awareness raising activities related to the new policy.

\textsuperscript{21} Siegfried Jäger, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
I was usually succinct when coming to the ‘surface’ of the text. By ‘surface’ I mean the graphic, the layout, the text’s organization into units of meaning; etc. This is not because I thought these elements are of less importance, but because I preferred to offer more space to the rhetorical and the ideological structure of texts. When coming to the rhetorical structure, I looked into: the kind of argumentation that was provided; the logic buttressing the text; the assumptions, implications and insinuations; the clichés, etc. When analyzing the ideological statements I generally tried to answer such questions as: ‘What is the notion of international development advanced by the text?’, ‘How is the text constructing the identities of the ‘developed’, of the ‘developing’ and of the ‘underdeveloped’ countries and people?’, ‘What was the notion of ‘world society’ that these texts were proposing?’.

1.2.2. Interviews
Before being a research method, interviewing is considered by some authors as

‘one of the most common and powerful ways in which we try to understand our fellow human beings’

22, given that asking questions and having answers is the easiest and quickest means for getting hold of facts. This is, conceivably, why the interview is one of the most relied upon research technique, enjoying prominent status in the panoply of methods for collecting and analyzing empirical materials.

However, there is a well-known debate regarding the reliability and validity of this method for collecting research data, with some authors showing that the interview is a rather artificial situation23 in which the data gathered depends on the unique relationship established between the interviewer and the interviewee24. Having this debate in mind, this author preferred to confine the use of this method to two main purposes: 1. to complement the information already collected through participant observation; 2. to collect ‘fresh’ information in those cases in which participant observation was not possible or incomplete. This methodological choice was also connected with the fact that exact facts were less of a concern for this author who was more interested in the type of public statements that can be made in a specific geo-political space (former socialist country, current new Member

24 Idem, p. 56.
State) and on a specific topic (international cooperation). At the same time, the author was more interested in what emerged openly and spontaneously in the public space, rather than the considerations of various key actors.

Two types of interviews were used: the semi-structured interviews and the unstructured interviews.

Before interviewing

Given the rather ‘complementary’ role that interviews had in this research design, before doing any interview activity, the author had a long time of ‘immersion’ into the field, which practically started in 2005, while completing her MA thesis on the consequences of the Enlargement on the European Union’s development co-operation policy. While writing the dissertation, the author was confronted with the extremely limited sources of information available to the individual interested to learn more on NMS’ practices in development cooperation or the way the NMS start building such practices. I realized that even if they had easily closed the External Relations chapter (also referring to development cooperation) of the Accession Treaty, there were important gaps relating to the ‘new donor country’ status of the NMS, as the topic went largely ignored, with little attention from either the media, NMS public or the academic world. TRIALOG – a project financed by the European Commission to raise awareness on development cooperation in the NMS - was the only exception to this rule: its website offered a certain amount of data, information, reports, etc. Upon completion, the dissertation was disproportionately relying on the data provided by the TRIALOG website, as this was nearly the only available source of information on the topic.

A next phase of ‘immersion’ was the author’s experience as an intern with the Brussels-based lobby office of this project, with the expectation that such close contact will provide more detailed information for researching the field. As a TRIALOG intern the author participated in various events that subsequently proved exceptionally relevant for this research effort. To exemplify, two such events can be referred to: the ‘Central Trainings’ and the 2006 TRIALOG regional information days in Romania.
The ‘Central Training’ is so called because it brings together professionals from all EU new Member States and Accession Countries in one annual, major event. In TRIALOG’s own definition this is

‘a seminar for NGDO platforms from new EU member states (NMS) and accession / candidate countries (AC)’.  

From each country, three to four development workers or prospective development workers attend. Usually, a higher number of applications arrive in, but TRIALOG can support financially only this number of participants per country. Every year, the Central Training addresses a different topic: from development education techniques (the focus of the 2008 Central Training) to skills for strengthening the national platforms’ boards of directors (focused upon in 2007). Depending on the topic, the participants can be: coordinators and other staff of the national platforms in the new Member States; members of the board of the national platforms; representatives from the member organizations of the national platforms. The author participated in two such events: in 2006 as a TRIALOG intern and in 2007 as a representative of the Romanian NGDO platform.

The 2006 Central Training was the first time the author had the opportunity to come in contact with a high number of development workers practically from each of the 10 NMS, the 2 Accession Countries (Romania, Bulgaria) and Turkey. A second and much smaller category of participants was there: development workers in the old Member States of the European Union, as well as one European Commission representatives. This second category of participants was there in an ‘expert’ capacity, to share their experience and knowledge of development cooperation and facilitate the learning process of the first group. This is an organizational model that is consistent over the years, as a model that is proposed not only for the Central Training, but for nearly all other meetings, seminars and conferences organized by TRIALOG.

The 2006 Central Training represented an orientation opportunity, an opportunity for ‘opening the field up’; at that particular time, the author was more interested in understanding the content and the dynamic of this international meeting. Regarding the content, I endeavored to grasp the conceptual framework buttressing the event and the positions of the various actors involved; when looking into the dynamics of the event I was concerned with ‘who is who’, how the participants interact and in what capacity, what is

their general outlook over the event, what was the balance of views (did somebody have more ‘speaking rights’ than the average?), what was their level of understanding of the conceptual framework of the event.

The 2006 regional information days in Romania were organized by TRIALOG during the author’s time as an intern in the Brussels-based lobby office and I had considerable amount of input in organizing these events. Under the guidance of the TRIALOG staff, I was responsible for: identifying the three Romanian regions to host the information days, as well as ‘a partner organization’ in each of the regions; proposing the agenda; preparing background documents; overseeing the events’ logistics, etc. More significantly, I also contributed to identifying the need for such regional information days, departing from the observation that, at the time, the Bucharest-based organizations were (almost) the only ones to participate in development co-operation–related events organized by TRIALOG or other organizations across Europe. As the second largest NMS, the need was there to try and take the information to the smaller organizations that were not based in Bucharest. The three regions TRIALOG finally selected were: Timişoara (bordering Hungary), Cluj-Napoca (North-West) and Iaşi (bordering the Republic of Moldova), as important regional centers. These three events were followed by a ‘platform-building seminar’, which took place in Bucharest.

I used these regional information days as an opportunity to broaden my base of contacts and observe: who among the Romanian NGOs was interested in development cooperation; what was the dynamics of this first attempt of an external entity (TRIALOG) to ‘transplant’ the European development co-operation discourse widely among the Romanian NGOs; how the NGOs react to the novelty the TRIALOG message represented for many among them.

Further on, in July 2006, Grupa Zagranica, the Polish NGDO platform organized a study trip for development workers from Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and this was a second important opportunity for taking contact with development workers from the new Member States. Significantly, the atmosphere of this second event was somewhat different from the TRIALOG-organized events. In the absence of TRIALOG representatives, many participants voiced some of their concerns regarding the way TRIALOG influences the development cooperation practices in the new Member States,
and generally took a more critical stance to development co-operation practices in the ‘old’ as well as the ‘new’ Member States.

During this study visit, the participants (the author included): were exposed to information about the Polish NGO sector; met various NGO federations and networks representatives to learn about NGO association models; met the employed staff and NGO members of the Polish NGDO platform to find out about their organizational model; listened to presentations offered by Government representatives on the Polish development assistance; and, most importantly the participants had ample spaces for exchanging information and reports about their own countries’ headway in development co-operation. As it is usually the case with this kind of events, informal exchanges have at least as much value as the formal one, and craft a participant-led agenda. A topic that captured the participants’ attention in the informal time was of a ‘linguistic’ nature, relating to the difficulties of translating the term ‘development co-operation’ in each Eastern European language.

This is only one example of one topic that arose ‘incidentally’ and that directly speaks of the NMS ‘developers’ ‘own’ minds of development co-operation. This was also an occasion to reflect on the fact that the way a society defines its concepts can be instrumental in facilitating or shaping a specific discourse. Thus most of the participants reported that the term was an English ‘import’ into their national languages and reflected upon the linguistic ambiguity this technical expression conveys when used in those national contexts that are not introduced into the practice and discourse of ‘global’ development co-operation. The Polish host provided an illustrative example of how the term penetrates the Polish society and the concrete consequence of its ambiguity: in 2006, the Polish Parliament opposed and refused to vote for the budget for development cooperation as – in our hosts’ view - they did not know what ‘international development’ was; the budget was voted after an intense lobby campaign of the development NGO; the aim of such campaign was to explain the parliamentarians what the phrase means. As a lesson learned, in Poland the expression the NGDOs promote is that of ‘international aid’ rather than ‘development co-operation’ or ‘international development’ as the former, being more intuitive, does not require the speaker to constantly explain what the term means.
The 2006 ‘Polish meeting’ was the first time the researcher made use of the semi-structured interviews. Inspired by the interesting linguistic ‘adventure’ of the phrase ‘development co-operation’, the author built a short interview guide and asked most of the participants about the particular difficulties encountered when using the term ‘development co-operation’ in their country and the strategies they use to come to terms with such difficulty. The type of questions I was asking was:

‘How do you say ‘development cooperation’ in your own language? Can you spell and write it down for me? What is the other’s reaction when you use this term? Do you need to explain to your interlocutor what you mean by this term? What words do you use? etc.’.

One of the respondents (J. from Latvia) completed his answers with a written rejoinder, sent later on by e-mail, which offered a more detailed account for what the Latvian language was concerned. While interviewing the respondents, the author noticed that many of them were talking willingly about these aspects and for some this represented a ‘learning experience’, as demonstrated by such statements as: ‘Only now do I understand / realize ‘such and so’ aspect of the way I / we talk about this’. Like it happens in interviews conducted in a third language (English in this case), some respondents expressed difficulty in making some points, particularly when translating expressions back to English from their own language.

*Structured interviews*

After this series of events the author’s possibilities of involvement within the sphere of development cooperation in the NMS quickly multiplied. An important step forward was made in 2007 when the author became closely involved with the work of the Romanian NGDO platform and then became the Romanian representatives in one of CONCORD’s eight working groups.²⁶

The author’s ‘official’ involvement with the Romanian NGDO platform started in March 2007, after some degree of external observation of the events that conducted to the platform’s establishment. In every of the events described above, the author had had the opportunity of meeting Romanian representatives. Already during 2006, the same

²⁶ According to CONCORD, [http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=30](http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=30), accessed 22 March 2008, these working groups are as follows: Cotonou, Development Education Forum, European Aid Watch, EPAN (Enlargement, Pre-accession and Neighborhood), EU Funding for Development and Relief (FDR), Food Security, Policy Forum, Trade.
Romanian ‘faces’ participated in most events and this proved to be of no little importance for the future shape of the Romanian NGDO platform: these ‘early’ participants later became members of the Romanian’s platform board of directors, as being the ‘natural’ leaders, those who made the initial ‘investments’ of time and energy to understand the language and practice of ‘development cooperation’ and as those who were most connected to the European discourse. As already mentioned, the author first met these stakeholders while being a TRIALOG intern, and then continued to expand her basis of ‘contacts’ progressively and independently, so that later on, when supported by a Bucharest-based NGO\textsuperscript{27}, I started my time of participatory observation, I was already well acquainted to the Romanian development cooperation landscape (or at least to its NGO perspective).

After the first year of participatory observation the author decided to complement her study with a small number of semi-structured interviews. For a total of 10 interviews, the respondents were: Romanian NGO workers; Romanian scholars with an interest in development cooperation; NGO workers from other NMS. The latter category of informants was interviewed through the use of skype\textsuperscript{28} technology, while the other respondents were interviewed in Bucharest, in face-to-face meetings. Skype interviews are very similar to telephone interviews, with the difference that the callers use the Internet to make the (free) calls and are more likely to use hands-free devices (a headset with a microphone). Occasionally the connection may be poor or disturbed, but in general good sound quality can be obtained. The particularity with this type of interview is that, just like in its telephone counterpart, it is more difficult to record / tape the verbal exchanges between the interviewer and respondent. Therefore, while doing these interviews I used to take notes rather then record, edit the notes as soon as possible after the interview, and share the document with the respondent, so as for eventual rectifications to be made. The lack of visual contact can be a constraint in telephone / skype interviews, but the author did not experience the lack of visual contact as a frustrating condition, mainly because the interviewees were known to the author from previous formal and informal contacts. The request for an interview had already been made in such occasions where interviewee and interviewer had met face-to-face. The author conducted two such interviews: in one case

\textsuperscript{27} World Vision Romania which offered the author an employment contract, while being aware and informed that the author will also conduct research.

\textsuperscript{28} A software that allows users to make free telephone calls over the Internet; an intensely used means of communication in my target group.
the interview lasted for one hour, while in an other case the interview had two sessions with each session lasting one hour each.

The eight face-to-face interviews also lasted for one hour on average, depending on the previously agreed timeframe. The interviews usually took place in a formal setting, either in my office or the respondents’ office so that the use of a recording device be possible. Shortly after the interview the author transcribed the records. In this transliteration work the author was most interested in the content of the verbal exchanges and less concerned with paralinguistic information (prosody, intonation, speech speed, tone of voice) or other linguistic features such as the existence and length of pauses, silence management, grammatical errors, overlaps, incoherence, etc. While these features may certainly be interesting from a discursive point of view, I was most concerned now with the actual content the respondents expressed. This allowed me to reduce the rapport between the record time and transcription time to a factor of 2-3 (i.e. 2-3 hours or even less for transcribing one hour of interview). Like in the skype interviews, the respondents were selected from the author’s ‘pool’ of contacts. I usually made an interview request to members of the national platform (well known to me from my participation in the platform work as a participant observer), Government officials that I was already acquainted with due to previous occasions, scholars that I had already met in various settings. The request was usually made in a face-to-face occasion that would also ensure the opportunity for sorting out the practicalities and the main topic of the interview. The occasion was taken to ensure the potential respondent about the confidentiality of his / her responses and the anonymity in any written reports, to indicate that there are no right and wrong answers as I was also interested in opinions and personal experiences, that the time spent together can also be seen as a time for mutual exchange (since the respondent is welcome to interrupt, ask questions back, etc.).

Unstructured interviews

Besides using the semi-structured interviews the author also felt the need of completing her knowledge with data collected through an even more flexible research method - the unstructured interviews. The author sees the unstructured interviews as interviews without any previously established time or content format that unfold like a friendly, non-formal conversation. The opening point of such interviews was usually my witnessing of a
peculiar statement (made by the respondent) for which I felt the need to acquire further clarification. The subsequent questions were then formulated based on the interviewee’s responses and the sequence of questions, as well as the length of the interview largely depended on the respondent’s availability to clarify his / her position. Such interviews (18 in total) were usually conducted ‘on the spot’, meaning there where the respondent happened to be at the time, usually in the break or in the end of a seminar, training or similar event. What I could usually do in these circumstances was to try and remember as much as possible from the respondent’s replies, eventually taking down some notes, but without asking permission for recording. The advantage I perceived from this type of interview was a deeper degree of authenticity and a better insight in the respondents’ beliefs, especially in those cases in which the respondent would otherwise be unreachable. This was the case with international experts, representatives of the European institutions, high-level officials, etc.

As each interview may have its own focus and ask a different series of questions, the scientific precision might be questioned. As Robson (2002) shows, the un-structured interviews are surely

‘not appropriate as the main data collection method but, used in conjunction with other methods, can play a valuable part in virtually all flexible design research’.

This is particularly so, as it helps ‘stabilizing’ the corpus of knowledge one collects during the hundreds of hours of conferences and the correlated informal time spent with professionals of the field. Without this ‘interview’ frame in mind, all evidence thus collected would remain at the informal level, and hardly – if ever - enter the sphere of academic discourse.

Thus, the author started to use this type of interview while attending international events or working groups that offered the rewarding opportunity of being in intense contact with a large number of experts from a wide range of backgrounds, on the frustrating condition of very limited time availability. Clarifying positions and extracting extra-knowledge in such situations can be an enterprise: the whole day is scheduled in such a way that only short side meetings or exchanges are possible (the longest ‘coffee break’ would be half an hour, dinners are a ‘relaxing’ time, etc.); the most senior of the experts are present in the event only for a limited time, usually their own presentation and maybe the coffee break. All ingredients are there to build a certain ‘format’ that is completely inappropriate for more
structured methodologies of research, while intuitively we all know that the ‘formal’ part of the event is only a part and sometimes not necessarily the most important one.

To make an example, the author will refer to her participation in such an international working group - ‘Funding for Development and Relief’ - of CONCORD. ‘Funding for Development and Relief’ (hereinafter FDR) meetings take place three times a year, while work is also carried out by electronic means (e-mail, skype, etc.). The work of the Group focuses on EU-NGO funding policies and priorities, on the allocation of funds to these priorities and on the EU funding process and organisation. Such work is carried out by its members (for example): looking to the EC financing instruments the NGOs have access to; supporting European NGOs partners in the South / developing countries to gain access to EU funding; analyzing the main processes that have an influence on EC-NGO funding (the de-concentration of funding and responsibilities regarding development aid to the EC delegations; the revision of financial regulations and the modalities of their implementation; the EC reform of External Aid Management). The FDR is also looking into the general reflection and NGOs’ position on such global issues such as: EC-NGO relationships; the participation of civil society within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, other geographic/regional envelopes and EU development cooperation in general; the reflection on the role that European NGOs are expected and/or willing to play in the future in this respect. In short, even if this may be one of the most pragmatic working groups of the European NGO platform (CONCORD) that looks into very concrete issues it is also one of the most complex, as its members need to be aware of a wide range of political determinants. So much so that nearly every working-group member whom I’ve spoken to mentioned that in the first meetings he/she was hardly able to follow the issues discussed and that he/she needed a six months to one year period of accommodation and inducement to fully participate in the working group.

The author became member of this working group in October 2007, after a preparation seminar given by TRIALOG for NGO representatives from all new Member States. Being a member of CONCORD’s working groups is not automatic: one needs to be ‘delegated’ by the national platform of the country that he/she will then represent in the working group. In case the country does not have a formally constituted platform (as is the case of Bulgaria, for instance), the member will still have a ‘delegated’ status of some sort, as
he/she will represent the proto-platform or that core group of NGOs that is expected to form a ‘regular’ national platform when time is more ripe.

In the summer of 2007 the Romanian national platform - as well as other NMS national platforms - through the mediation of TRIALOG, received the invitation to appoint its representative for the FDR. ‘Colleagues’ from the national platform encouraged the author to ‘apply’ for this position and ask for a Board decision (of the Romanian platform) in this sense. The whole process was mediated by one of the member organisations, the same that holds the Presidency of the Board (without the President of the board being directly involved). The author welcomed the task for its potential to open new perspectives for my participatory observation research.

Along with other new Member States’ representatives, the author started to attend this working group from a ‘newcomer’s position’. The ‘newcomer’ status was tailored by objective factors: we were indeed novices to the issues discussed, perceived them as rather complex and frequently asked questions of clarification; we were not trying to veil our limited knowledge of the issues, but rather expressed our frustration when things were not clear; NMS representatives even expressed concerns over the ‘equal opportunities for participation’ and the FDR Chairwoman clearly expressed her wish for the NMS representatives to be supported in full participation and encouraged us to join one or several of the four sub-groups of the FDR. In spite of this, older members of the group made it clear that the group’s meetings should not become an instance of capacity building for the NMS (meaning the pace of the working group should not be slowed down). It is in this context that the author realized the need for complementing this instance of participatory observation with a method that would offer more in-depth insight, while maintaining full flexibility. The author found this tool in the unstructured interview and used it to elicit deeper information in the informal time made available by the meetings. The kind of information the author used this tool for was – let us say – of a more ‘personal’ kind, touching on the private beliefs that one would hardly express in a plenary or, even if expressed, one would use a specific ‘code’ that can barely be challenged or grasped by newcomers.

One of the difficulties with these interviews was deciding how and if to disclose its nature to the respondent. The naïve question was: ‘Should I mention this person that this
interesting chat is, for my research purposes, an ‘unstructured’ interview?’. The difficulty was more so as in some cases the unstructured interview did start as just an ‘interesting chat’, but then continued – with very little effort on the author’s behalf – as an unstructured, relevant-for-research-purpose interview. By the time the author had realized that, the time may have been up. In some other case a brief note would reveal its usefulness for the research only time after the interview had taken place, and only when seen in connection with other interviews and events. This is how, most of the times the author did not mention to her ‘respondents’ about that being actually an unstructured interview for her. Or, if she mentioned she did it in a minimalist way, only alluding to her research interest for the respective field. The price the author believes fair to pay is self censure. This is to say that, besides keeping strict confidentiality and anonymity, the author uses this kind of data in a limited way: as support information for an already ‘discovered’ fact; or, as starting point for further inquiry with an ‘official’ enquiry.

How much is enough?
One of the research design decisions the researcher had to take was the one regarding the number of interviews (both semi-structured and un-structured) she should make. The actual and broader question was: when should the research phase stop? Having in mind the specificity of the topic and the limited resources that are available, this is an obvious question. The decision was facilitated by Gaskell’s (2000) view that

‘all things being equal, more interviews do not necessarily imply better quality or more detailed understanding’.

Gaskell shows that there are two bases for his claim: the limited versions of reality and the issue of the size of the corpus to be then analyzed.

In a first instance, Gaskell shows that

‘While experiences may appear to be unique to the individual, the representations of such experiences do not arise in individual minds; in some measure they are the outcome of social processes. To this extent representations of an issue of common concern, or of people in a particular social milieu, are in part shared’.

30 Idem.
Personal experiences *are* an important part of this research. There *is* an embedded and unexpressed intention in the research design of showing the way the individuals ‘live’ the new discourse while building it. However, the major aim of this study is offer details about the discourse itself and the way such discourse is established and shaped.

The researcher’s assumption when starting the interview process was that this research phase would be full of ‘surprises’ and revelations. But given that the author was already acquainted to the field, this was actually not the case. Or if it was, such revelations concerned more the personal experience of each respondent. But more than in collecting fascinating personal experiences, the study wanted to concern itself with the representations that such personal experiences manufacture, as it is such representations that will show the researcher *how* the new discourse of development cooperation is built in the new Member States of the European Union. Thus rather early in the interview series common themes and threads were making themselves obvious. The author interpreted the moment when anticipating the respondents’ views became undemanding as being the ‘saturation’ point that required no further investigation under the form of ‘interview’.

Regarding the size of the corpus to be analyzed, it might be relevant to note that for this research design interviews are only one of the three labour-intensive methods that are being used, so that the time and effort dedicated to collecting data through this method needed to be correlated to the others methods’ respective shares. On average one semi-structured interview could last from one to two hours, while an un-structured interview could go from a few minutes to more or less half an hour. Selecting the respondents is a task in itself that requires careful investigation and time for observing the ‘scene’. Transcribing the interviews, reviewing, analyzing and interpreting them, require further investment of energy and time. I used two methods for retrieving the reported information: notes taking and electronic recording during the interview. Based on the notes, the data were then recollected with the support of the records. Every recorded hour implies two to three hours of transcription depending on the level of complexity of that interview and the level of non-verbal information that needed to be noted down at pace with the verbal content.

Reflecting on the quality of the interviews, the author already acknowledged some felicitous interference with the participatory methods. Conducting the interviews in a
context that was well-known to her, the author was able to understand and easily grasp the ‘local jargon’ and the connotations of unspoken truths. The most known is the situation in which the respondents would stop and say ‘I do not want to make names, but…’ Insisting for the name or the exact situation to be revealed would not only be impolite, but could also be counter-productive (loosing respondent’s confidence). With knowledge from the field the author rarely – if ever – needed to engage into such practices and was rarely confused about the unsaid or the rationale of the unsaid. A similar situation is the one in which the interviewee would say: ‘I am not going into much detail now, but…’. In ‘interview without participation’ that amount of detail may be the most relevant piece of information and the author often felt the advantage of having the kind of common ground that the participatory methods can offer. The depth of the interview was thus supported by previous participation in the same events that the respondents themselves were involved in and also by the role relationship that was established. In a ‘normal’ interview there is an unusual role relationship. The interview is sometimes like a ‘fake’ conversation: it is a one-to-one interaction with questions and answers, but it brings together previously unacquainted persons of which one is expected to ask the questions while the other is expected to respond to them compliantly, as the topic and the sequence of the questions is decided by the interviewer. Compared to this situation, this author always knew her informants from previous formal or informal occasions and had the privilege of bringing on the table a topic that was shared both by herself and the respondent.

After interviewing
Each interview was transcribed in a written, Word-edited form. Depending on the interview type, there were three possible situations: transcribing extended notes (mainly for the skype interviews and some unstructured interviews); transcribing records with the support of some key-point notes (face-to-face semi-structured interviews); and recollect data from memory with the eventual help of some keywords noted down (unstructured interviews). The most time consuming was the second situation, as it practically meant: redoubling the time investment to listen for the whole interview; frequently interrupt the flow of the record to be able to put the words down; compare record with notes to ensure consistency; review the transcriptions for logical coherence; fill the gaps in with additional data in case of incoherence. In transcribing the recorded interviews the author kept the dialogical format, noting down not only the interviewee’s answers, but also her own
questions or interventions. In the case of the unstructured interviews the final result was more like a description or a short report of the information retrieved.

All interviews are either in English or Romanian. The author was reluctant to use the English language with her Romanian respondents as she is herself of Romanian mother tongue and speaking in a foreign language – only for research purposes - would have introduced an element of awkwardness in her relation with the respondents. Needless to say, speaking one’s own language brings an advantage of speed and clarity. However, for the research report this posed a problem, as translating all Romanian interviews would have meant a noteworthy investment of time and energy. The author chose to make this investment partially, that is to say only for those strands of interviews that would be then quoted.

After transcribing each interview, analysis followed. The author printed each transcription and read it various times. In some cases further questions arrived and whenever possible the author asked for clarification in further face-to-face meetings or over telephone / skype / e-mail. This was a means to ‘consolidate’ the content of the initial interview. Another means to achieve this was by ‘en-riching’ each interview with the author’s additional notes and comments, connecting the interviews among them and with the ‘external’ world. In some cases, a second print would follow to have all details of the ‘consolidated’ version in one single document.

1.4.3. Participatory Methods

Every social practice is a ‘battlefield’ for meaning and much of this battle is fought on the discursive field\(^{31}\). To make an example: for most of us – particularly those working in development - education is a ‘human right’. For others it is ‘the Trojan horse of re-colonization’\(^{32}\), an instrument of ‘cultural defoliation’\(^{33}\). Hardly can this be seen as a mere preference of terms: if one or the other of these views prevail, the design and content of the


educational programs, their funding and place in national and global politics, will be radically different. Similarly, the NMS are now regarded by the rest of the Union as being ‘newcomers’ to the field of international development, as lacking any experience and tradition for this kind of activity. They are constructed as such so that their co-optation in the dominant discourse of development cooperation to appear natural. The consequence will be the smooth extension of this discourse to new geographical spaces.

A certain discursive order is generally brought about by the interaction among various groups and individuals. Two can be mentioned here: 1. those who find themselves in a position of power that allows them to cast their worldview upon the others; and 2. those who are affected by the first groups’ decisions, be it in a positive or negative sense. As various scholars show (Kaufman: 1997, Gardner: 1996, Escobar: 1995), up to recent date the analytic study of the development relationship tended to focus upon the second one of these two groups, on those to be ‘developed’, the oversees ‘poor’, the ‘backward’, the indigent, the destitute, the ‘Other’34. Fewer studies bring to a point the ‘developers’, or the host of public officials in national offices or national development agencies with duties in drafting up and proposing development cooperation legislation, policies and action plans; their counterparts in supranational bodies (the European Union, the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and their correlates, etc.); international, national and local NGOs both in the North and the South; the national offices and public authorities in the ‘developing’ countries; development workers; universities and research institutes, fund-raisers and other adepts of the development profession. This research turned the lens on this latter category, as it is the ‘developers’ who have a prominent role in producing the dominant development cooperation discourse. In particular, this study was focused on the interaction between one supra-national body with an interest in international development (the European Union) and a specific sub-group formed by ‘new’ development professionals in Romania, one of this Union’s new Member States.

Watching those ‘professionals’ who have the power to shape the development cooperation discourse while undertaking their usual, professional activities is then the ‘natural and obvious technique’35 for witnessing the ‘formation’ of a specific discourse, as some practices are only accessible through observation; other methods, like the interviews can

only account of such practices and make them accessible after having been formed or oriented towards a specific direction.

But what does ‘watching’ mean from this author’s perspective and in this particular context? The answer will need to acknowledge that these are, usually, ‘reserved’ processes. By this, the author does not mean that they are filled with secrecy, but they can hardly be freely observed either: some barriers are posed to ‘non-expert’ full participation. To make the example of a formal meeting with representatives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^{36}\) to offer feedback on the development cooperation action plan, one can only be present if one: one is fluent in the ‘language’ of development cooperation\(^{37}\) (so that one can understand what the meeting is about and is able to offer ‘constructive’ feedback); one can claim and demonstrate a ‘representation’ capacity\(^{38}\) (which of the accepted stakeholders in the field of international development is one representing?); and one has the needed logistic information from the inside (when, how, where the meeting would be taking place). Simply put, ‘watching’ means looking attentively to what is being done by others, but to have all the required requisites for being accepted as ‘watcher’ or for having access to events even if not accepted, one needs also to be involved into some kind and some degree of ‘participation’. ‘Watching’ means, therefore, looking for every relevant opportunity to actually participate in processes that affect the shaping of development cooperation discourse in the new Member States of the European Union and, in particular, in Romania. This means, inter alia: being part of various working groups both at European and national level\(^{39}\); taking formative opportunities in relevant organizations and institutions\(^{40}\); participating in national and European-wide debates regarding development cooperation and the role of the new Member States in this field; observing the way such

\(^{36}\) The public institution that is responsible in Romania for development cooperation at national level.

\(^{37}\) New to most Romanians, especially in its ‘donor’ terminology, as Romania has a 17 years uninterrupted ‘tradition’ as a ‘recipient’ country.

\(^{38}\) To the last (27\(^{th}\) of February 2008) roundtable between the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOND only members of FOND’s board, coordinators of FOND’s working groups and 5 other members were invited to take part.

\(^{39}\) As mentioned, the researcher is member of ‘Funding for Development and Relief’ working group of CONCORD (the European platform that gathers and represents to the EU institutions more than 1500 European and international NGDOs); member of ‘European Programs Reference Group’ of an international organization (World Vision International); member of the ‘Policy and Advocacy’ working group of the Romanian national ‘platform’ (the Romanian NGDO Federation, called FOND); member of ‘International Cooperation’ working group of FOND.

\(^{40}\) Like the 3-months internship with TRIALOG, an EU-funded project to raise awareness of development cooperation in the new Member States of the European Union and the Accession Countries; international conferences, workshops, etc.
debates are reflected in the media (in particular in Romania, due to obvious linguistic barriers when media in other national languages is considered), etc.

In academic wording, ‘watching the people’ is circumscribed to the large category of qualitative methods and, in particular, the observational methods. As their name (observational methods) suggests, the task these methods accomplish is to pay close attention, record and then describe, analyze and interpret what the researcher has noticed. The researcher is responsible here for two complementary tasks: the first one is to look into the realities that she is in contact with, discern among them and turn them intelligible to her own reason. The second task, which is usually the one that comes to the ‘surface’, is to ‘translate’ this reality for a larger audience, for the interested public that did not have the privilege or the opportunity of ‘watching’ that particular fragment of reality.

As a research method, observation can be somewhat more sophisticated than that. Various authors (ex. Robson, 2002; Flicke, 2002) show that there are different approaches to the use of observational methods, with two polar extremes: participant observation – usually associated with the Chicago school of sociology; and the structured observation – useful for those conducting quantitative research. Norman Denzin defines participant observation as

... ‘a field strategy that simultaneously combines document analysis, interviewing of respondents and informants, direct participation and observation, and introspection’.

Being a participant observer is not a ‘natural’ role. Placed in any kind of situation, with the task ‘Observe!’ the researcher’s first reaction is ‘What? What is worthy enough to be observed, reported and analyzed? Is this ‘serious’ science?’. Observation is, indeed, ‘daunting’ from at least three points of view: 1. one can rarely be sure if what one does is what is needed: will this ‘thread’ take the research into the ‘right direction’?; 2. one can rarely be sure if the whole enterprise is ‘scientific’ enough; 3. one can rarely be sure if the degree of ‘participation’ is the ‘right’ one. In short, while doing this kind of research one needs to rely greatly on one’s own ‘insights’ and enjoy the high degree of freedom that this kind of research grants, while taking the whole responsibility.

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42 Colin Robson, op. cit., p. 312.
Let us make some examples and refer to the ‘scientific-ity’ and the degree of personal participation involved by the method. As Michael Angrosino shows,

‘objective rigor has most often been associated with quantitative research methods, and the harmonization of empathy and detachment has been so important that even those dedicated to qualitative methods have devoted considerable effort to organizing their observational data in the most nearly objective form (i.e., the form that looks most quantitative) for analysis’.

And in fact the mathematic rules seem to be more of ‘rules’ than say the psychological ones. Each person that comes to quantitative or qualitative methods does so by bringing her distinctive genius and limits; the difference is that while two researchers working independently with quantitative methods have higher probabilities of reaching the same results, it is more difficult for two researchers working independently with qualitative methods to reach exactly the same conclusions. One way of countering this difference is to keep reporting of events observed at the lowest possible way of abstraction. What this author did in various meetings and debates was to take accurate minutes based on what actually happened in the meeting. “Accurate minutes’ meant writing as much as possible about: what this author heard, understood, heard but did not understand at the moment, understood after confronting her notes with other participants’ notes, whatever detail she could notice in the respective situation, comments of other participants during or after the meeting, etc. ‘Accurate minutes’ also mean paying attention not only to the ‘content’ of the ‘meeting’, but also to the ‘process’ of the meeting. Not only to what was being discussed and decided or not decided upon, but also how the meeting came to be organized, who pushed for having the particular meeting, what were the expectations before the meeting, how these expectations were met, who was the moderator of the meeting, who was given most floor and who was denied the floor, whose suggestions were taken up as decisions and whose decisions were overlooked, etc. A second possibility was to record the events and then transcribe the records for the author to be able to collect as accurate information as possible. These rather time-consuming methods were complemented by a third strategy: ‘colleagues’ were being asked to take notes or minutes from the events where they participated so that the research be able to cover a wider range

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of meetings, debates, events, etc. It proved very helpful the fact that minutes-taking is becoming a professional practice that is ever more used: almost every working group will have its minutes written down by one of the members of that working group. Minutes taken by others can be susceptible if inaccuracy, as they have a functional importance and are not taken for the specific purpose of the research. While their reliability from this point of view can be discussed, they undoubtedly offer valuable information about the decisions that were taken in the respective occasion. In short, what this author did was to look and stay with the actual facts, the things that actually happened in the respective situation and focus less on her own conjectures and ideas. These were, of course, not eliminated, but were ‘separated’ and formed a distinctive body of the final minute or report.

Participant as observer

Sometimes, adults ask children ‘the tricky question’: ‘You love mummy or daddy the most?’ Research shows the abusive potential of this question as for the child the answer entails operating a painful decision. This author remembered the ‘tricky question’ while needing to resolve if it should be ‘full participation’ or ‘pure observation’, the dominant method of her research. The decision to make was actually about the role the author should take upon herself while looking into the way development discourse spreads into the new Member States. Being a full participant or a pure observer is not indifferent as from a theoretical point of view ‘these two ideal types’ carry with them different methodological and philosophical views about the nature and purpose of observation. However, choosing between the two is a ‘tricky’ task only as long the two are seen as mutually exclusive. In the ‘real life’, the two modalities – and the myriad of variants in-between - are both useful depending on the particular time and context.

Like with any other research method, much discussion is there about the advantages and disadvantages of observation as a technique, with various authors offering their favorite list. If it is an advantage or not, what seems to be certain is that the observational methods

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44 One of the unintended effects might have been raised awareness of development issues among those with whom I had established closer relations: they felt responsible to ‘help’ the research through a greater amount of attention dedicated to events and initiatives (ex. taking more detailed minutes from events I could not attend so that the content was not lost to research, collecting and making available for me relevant press articles to make sure that I ‘noticed’ their publication, etc.). While acknowledging the receipt of such ‘information gifts’, I constantly avoided to take any initiative that may have placed me in an ‘important’ or ‘special’ position within the group.

45 Colin Robson, Real World Research:..., op. cit., p. 313.
confer some degree of independence and directness of the researcher who simply watches how a particular situation evolves, takes stock of what people in that situation do and listens of what they say while doing it or while refraining from doing what they say would do. In its national policy for development cooperation, a new Member State of the European Union may express its good intentions and state that its ODA (official development assistance) will primarily add up to the badly needed resources for the least developed countries. ‘Saying is not doing’ says an adage and the researcher may then come to know, through the observational methods that what actually happens in practice is that the new Member State’s ODA will be actually directed to its neighboring countries which are by no account the least developed of this world. Like Robson shows, observation seems, therefore, to be ‘pre-eminently the appropriate technique for getting at ‘real life’ in the real world’46. In the ‘real life’ (meaning the ‘real world’ outside the social scientist’s laboratory), the kind of control the researcher can have in the laboratory, even if desirable, is not possible. In our case, the researcher will never have the power of ruling the ‘breaching’ new Member State to ‘match words with deeds’47, but the value of her inquiry is in the precise recording of the ‘breech’ itself. This is not to say that the researcher will never and in any way influence the researched field. On the contrary, there is an intense debate and even fear that researchers may do exactly that: interfere with and thus change the course of the phenomena under study. Pure observation will be used mostly by those holding that this interference involves an un-ethical condition; they will ‘seek to be an unnoticed part of the wallpaper’48, in opposition with the participant observers who will become a part of the situation that is being studying.

The full participant will ‘dive headlong into the field’49, immersing herself, physically and intellectually, in the context she is studying. In what this author was concerned, this meant residing in one of the New Member States (Romania – Bucharest), with intense traveling to the other new Member States and Brussels. Romania was given preference for residence, due to maximizing opportunities offered by the support a Bucharest-based NGDO50, by the researcher’s previous work experience in the NGDO field in this country

46 Idem, p. 310.
48 Colin Robson, Real World Research: ..., op. cit., p. 313.
50 The NGDO offering support was World Vision Romania Foundation. World Vision is an international partnership of more than 100 inter-dependent organizations working in development, relief and advocacy.
and by researcher’s speaking the local language. Traveling to other new Member States and Brussels was possible due to resources made available by the TRIALOG project and deemed essential as the working hypothesis was that development cooperation discourse in the new Member States was considerably influenced by the EU’s own development cooperation discourse. Brussels is a place where a host of events – attended by all Member States’ representatives – are organized and, therefore, it is the natural setting for inquiry and observation of ‘contamination’ processes. While in Brussels or elsewhere in Europe, the researcher attended such events offering the opportunity to meet the key persons for development cooperation in almost every new Member States. To make an example, the researcher came to know and have an exchange of views with almost all ‘national platform’ coordinators in the new Member States, as well as with other members of the national platforms.

The full participant will also become a part of the group, a constituent with all membership rights and duties, contributing to all decision-making processes. This involves taking responsibilities and being physically present when the group needs such involvement, but also sharing of knowledge and experience. In the working groups that the this author was present in, she considered herself to be bound by the rules of reciprocity that any functional group is based upon: while given the opportunity of finding out valuable information from the members of the group, the author also shared from her knowledge of the field of development cooperation. Development cooperation, especially in its ‘donor’ side and as promoted by the European Union, is new to Romania. At the time being, the possibilities for studying development cooperation in Romania are very limited if not nonexistent. Universities do not offer academic courses or ‘development studies’ programs as they are intended in Western Europe. The closest such programs are in international economics, international relations, world history or globalization, but they are not offered as that systematic, unitary and multidisciplinary section of social science that discusses matters of concern for the developing countries. The website of one Western university offering a development studies course informs that the faculty is

‘providing a richly textured, intellectually rigorous, and highly relevant curriculum that not only deals with the theories of development, but also explores ways in
which different development organizations attempt to reach the poor and the needy.\textsuperscript{51}

Nothing of such extent is available in Romania and few Romanian citizens have undertaken development studies abroad. Therefore the experience of a person who did so – is valued and elicited.

Being aware of that and accepting her role as a ‘participant’, the author was not reluctant to share from the training or scant academic experience that she may have. This was mostly the case in the working groups and other professional settings that are based in Romania. In these situations the author’s role was both as listener / learner, and resource person. This last role – as resource person – is, in certain cases, a responsibility. The Romanian national platform delegates some of its members to represent the national platform in various settings, initiatives and events taking place at the European level. Examples are: the Global Call Against Poverty, the various CONCORD working groups (European Enlargement Working Group, Funding for Development and Relief Working Group, AidWatch Working Group, Development Education Forum), activities organized by TRIALOG\textsuperscript{52} (conferences, Central Trainings, etc.), DEEEP\textsuperscript{53}. The persons representing the Romanian national platform in such events are expected to provide regular reports on their activity in such settings and act as resource person whenever the need may arise in the national context. As Romanian representative to the ‘Funding for Development’ Working Group of CONCORD the author was also expected to provide such reports and act as resource person the need should arise.

Being a full participant is different for this author from being a ‘complete’ participant. While the complete participant ‘involves the observer concealing that she is an observer and seeking to become a full member of the group’\textsuperscript{54}, this author endeavored to become a full member of the group, but without this implying the concealing of her ultimate purpose. The author never hid from the groups and persons she observed that she was doing this both in a professional and in a research capacity. It is true that the author never

\textsuperscript{52} A Vienna and Brussels – based project, funded by the European Commission, to raise awareness about development co-operation in the EU New Member States.
\textsuperscript{53} DEEEP, Development Education Exchange in Europe Project, is a ‘project initiated by the Development Education Forum of CONCORD that aims at strengthening capacities of NGDOs to raise awareness, educate and mobilise the European public for world-wide poverty eradication and social inclusion’ (see http://www.deeep.org/whatisdeeep.html accessed 23 March 2008).
\textsuperscript{54} Colin Robson, \textit{Real World Research:...}, op. cit., p. 316.
had to ‘infiltrate’ myself, as the legitimacy of her presence in various settings was conveniently facilitated by: on one hand, the need expressed by many professionals of disposing of more information about the New Member States (so that research initiative were positively viewed); on the other hand by the author’s professional status as a collaborator of a Romanian NGDO. To say it in plain words, for most part of the research phase I was wearing ‘two hats’ at the same time. The author’s smooth integration into various groups was facilitated or made possible by one of the ‘hats’, with the second following in naturally, after a short explanation about her role in the Romanian NGDO and the purpose of her research. In general this author encountered positive reactions: many of her informants expressed appreciation for a researcher from the ‘inside’ to take upon this kind of research.

One other feature of full participation may be that the researcher needs to establish her role within the group. To make an example, for one of the groups (the International Cooperation working group of FOND) the author acted as convener, informal co-ordinator and representative of the group in formal contexts. This involves a considerable amount of side-work such as: taking care of the logistics of the meetings; ensuring that every meeting will have the minutes written and such minutes will then be shared with the excused members of the group; ensuring drafting and preparation of reports regarding the group’s activity; ensuring this group is linked to other groups related to its work (both at national and international level); last but not least, making sure that all members have a ‘safe’ space for participating and bringing their own contribution.

1.2.4. Concluding Remarks

This section presented the main methods – discourse analysis, participatory methods and interviewing – that the author used to collect and handle the research data. This was not a simple description of the methods used. While introducing some theoretical background of each of the three methods and explaining how they were adapted and used for this particular research environment, the opportunity was also taken for offering a preliminary insight into what this research setting is, in the way that one interested researcher approached her ‘field’, the choices that she needed to make while being a researcher of ‘the real life’.
1.3. Research Context

The focus of this thesis is on Romania - a former Eastern European Socialist country, now a new Member State of the European Union - taken as a case-study to show the remarkable evolutions of almost four decades of international development 'talking', thinking and practice going from Ceausescu's socialist times to the EU membership. In this section we will endeavor to place this research effort into a wider context and show some possible connections with external discourses and practices that most probably had an impact on Romania's development 'talk' and practices in the past, as well as in the present. Rather than a review of development theories circulated in all these decades, this is just a brief outline, an attempt to provide a general frame, the theoretical and perhaps geo-political ‘nest’ that saw Romania growing to the status of ‘new donor’ that is now ready to take upon. While doing so, we will focus on two main aspects: one touching upon the 'past' and the other one connected to the 'present'. The first aspect relates thus to the main theoretical debate that shaped the socialist aid to development and the role of the Eastern European socialist countries in supporting the Soviet aid programs, while the second one relays to the conversion of the former Eastern European socialist countries into new ‘donors’ in the context of the European Union. Whenever possible, the ‘then’ and the ‘now’ will be so presented as to mirror each other, in an effort to show consistencies or inconsistencies, possible fractures or continuances of discourse and practice.

Writing in 1981, the American political scientist of Romanian origin Michael Radu⁵⁵, makes a classification of the Eastern players in the field of international relations, according to the policies they develop towards the Third World countries⁵⁶. He identifies various groups. A first one is formed by the two super-powers of the time – The Soviet Union and China – the only states decision-makers with the ability of formulating and implementing overall and independent policies towards these countries. A second group is formed by Albania and Yugoslavia that could be called the separatist group, given that both Tirana and Belgrade act as separated centers of influence in relation with the Third World countries. A third group called, the group of free-riders, is formed by North Korea and Romania, and it is thus called because even if they are not truly independent in the policy they run towards the developing countries, they still enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in the political decisions they can make and seem to dwell, depending on the

⁵⁵ Michael Radu (1947-2009) was a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and Co-Chairman of FPRI's Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. See Michael Radu’s biography at http://www.fpri.org/about/people/radu.html, as of March 2009.

various interests of the moment, in an intermediary position between the two super-powers. The fourth group is format by Cuba and Vietnam and it is suggestively called, the ‘Trojan Horse’ of socialist interests in the Third World, as both Cuba and Vietnam enjoy a position of prestige and legitimacy among the developing countries, while using such position for promoting the interests and the communists policies in these countries. The fifth group identified by Radu is called the group of the ‘loyal five’, as it is formed by socialist countries that are considered to be directly subordinated to Moscow in what their Third World policies are concerned. The group is formed by: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. All these countries use a series of policy instruments, aid included, to advance their interests in the Third World.

Thus, in the past (before 1989) the current ‘new’ Member States of the European Union were part of at least three different categories of policy-makers in what their relations with the developing countries are concerned. There was the group of the ‘loyal five’ (at present time: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland; East Germany is not taken into consideration as it is not a separate Member State of the European Union); a so-called ‘free-rider’ (Romania); and a group of countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) that are now independent but were – in the past – part of the Soviet Union, the super-power that was acknowledged as an important policy-maker and donor for the Third World. What is remarkable is that at the time being, all these countries, irrespective of their previous experience – which can vary to a great extent, according to the picture sketched above - are expected to become donors, a specific type of donors, along the unique model and according to the common objectives proposed by the European Union. TRIALOG, a project financed by the European Commission to raise development awareness in the NMS, is intended to facilitate this task. Its main target group non-governmental organizations and its aim in relation to them is to contribute to the ‘smooth’ integration of the NMS NGOs in CONCORD, the European con-federation of development NGOs.57

In the past, the Third World policies of the Eastern European policy-makers were circumscribed to a specific theory of development – the non-capitalist path to development – that had been framed in the Socialist block. Attributed to Lenin by some Soviet thinkers58, this theory was, according to some analysts,

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57 See TRIALOG, www.trialog.or.at.
58 Other authors show though that this theory was created in the late 1950s to serve as a theoretical justification for Khruschev’s policy to support revolutionary nationalist movements in the Third World. See
‘A simple, unadorned permit for underdeveloped countries to by-pass the capitalist stage of development and proceed immediately to build the socialist society’\(^59\).

Before the World War II the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries (now ‘new’ Member States of the European Union) had been fully absorbed by their own nation-building and development process and granted little attention to their relations with what will become the ‘Third World’. The Soviet actions for the South’s development were limited to rather vague recommendations exhorting the creation of a ‘anti-imperialist front’ and, possibly, the replication of the Soviet model: anti-capitalist revolution under the guidance of an avant-garde party; capital accumulation by the state; planned and state-controlled economy; mass mobilization; cultural revolution for eradicating analphabetism and traditional mind-sets; a rationalized and systematized labor system\(^60\). Nonetheless, as early as 1882 Friedrich Engels, in a letter to Karl Kautsky, had made a strong statement regarding the development path that the ‘semi-civilized countries’ will follow in their development:

‘Once Europe is organized, and North America, that will furnish such colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilized countries will follow in their wake of their own accord. Economic needs alone will be responsible for this’\(^61\).

After World War II, the Soviet Union progressively grows an interest for the developing countries – now de-colonized – and in 1954 the Soviet Union starts its foreign aid, allegedly with a view to acquiring political influence in the newly independent countries\(^62\). Between 1954 and 1975, to Afghanistan alone the Soviet Union granted an estimated 1.2 $ billion in economic aid, with around 1500 Soviet advisors and technicians sent to assist this country in a large number of development projects\(^63\). By the beginning of the sixties the first aid ‘competitions’ between the two rival super-powers, the ‘alms race’ can be

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witnessed: a large Soviet offer of aid to Ethiopia in 1961 led to a boost in US aid to that country from $8 million in 1960 to $42 million in 1961.\footnote{Carol Lancaster, \textit{Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done}, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999, p. 86}

According to Frank Morey Coffin, deputy administrator of the US Agency for International Development and later on United States’ Representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Eastern European countries will have an important role in building the socialist system of development assistance to the developing countries. In the first decade after the soviet program for economic aid was established, the Eastern European socialist countries allegedly contribute with almost one third of the volume of the socialist aid for development. By the end of the sixties this contribution represented a tall one half and 1968 was the year when the aggregated contributions of all Eastern European countries exceeded that of the Soviet Union. Poland and Czechoslovakia were at this time the main donors\footnote{Frank Morey Coffin, \textit{Witness for AID}, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1964}, with Czechoslovakia reporting as much as 0.74\%\footnote{Laure Després, 'Eastern Europe and the Third World: Economic Interactions and Policies', in Roger E. Kanet, \textit{The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 156. Similarly, Bulgaria and GDR are said to have reported 0.79\%.} of its GDP given to as many as 136 countries\footnote{Even 1\%, according to Daniel Hanspach, Emerging Donors Policy Specialist with UNDP Bratislava Regional Center, presentation given in the framework of the Romanian Development Summer Camp, September 2008. Notes of the author.}

Most often, the socialist aid for development was offered on a bilateral basis, the contribution of the Soviet Union and the East European countries to multilateral funds being rather modest\footnote{3\%, according to Frank M. Coffin, op. cit.}. Multilateralism, though, was not inexistent, but had a specific form: various socialist countries combining their funding either among themselves, either with the Soviet Union for achieving complex development objectives in the developing countries. Needless to say, the Eastern European countries will grant their aid based on the principles that had been formulated and were upheld by the Soviet Union: equity, respect for the sovereignty of the receiving countries, non-interference in the internal affairs of the recipient country, the mutual advantage for the recipient and the donor\footnote{Elena B. Arefieva and Elena A. Bragina, ‘Changing Approaches to Development Strategy and Development Assistance’, in Richard E. Feinberg and Rachik Mamikonovich Avakov, \textit{U.S. and Soviet Aid to Developing Countries. From Confrontation to Cooperation?}, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991, p. 44}. 

In a confrontational logic between the two political and economic systems, the competition was thus extended to the development field. The West, as ‘inventor’ of development aid and promoter of the obviously successful Marshall Plan, has a clear moral advantage. Its donors will come together into a specialized forum - the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development that will propose a first definition for what exactly ‘development assistance’ is\(^70\). Mainly based on this definition, the West will often claim that the East’s development aid is a mere complex system of commercial exchanges, with distinctions between aid and trade systematically blurred so as to make trade agreements look like aid\(^71\). The Western observers show that the aid figures presented by Eastern European donors are ‘difficult to understand’ and point to inconsistencies in reporting\(^72\). In exchange, the East warns against the system of conditionality ushering the West’s aid that would allegedly aim at undermining the South’s sovereignty. In Romania, some authors even deny the existence of a genuine Western effort to support the South’s development. Gavril Horja expresses this point of view when saying that the West’s development aid is only a veiled form of colonialism used to impose the domination of the capitalist monopolistic companies over the economies of the developing countries\(^73\) so that the recipient countries should be cautious with the aid they decide to receive. Thus, the foreign funds should be used to strengthen the state economy (implying that their ‘natural’ tendency is that of weakening them); the ‘government to government’ credits should be preferred to the direct investments so that these resources can be better controlled; joint-ventures should be strictly controlled by the recipient countries; any investment should be made with a view of training the future development experts of the receiving developing country\(^74\).

This way, even if – as it seems - the Western countries were the first ones to use development terminology and practices, the Socialist states were soon to follow the example and embark as well on development vocabulary and programs. The instruments, the strategies and the rationales for the South’s development were bone of contention between the two ‘blocks’, with the East constantly criticizing the West for its influence in the South and vice-versa but in spite of apparently conflicting worldviews, the capitalist

\(^{70}\) See this definition at DAC: [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf), as of March 2009.


\(^{74}\) Idem.
and non-capitalist theories for development also have much in common. The idea of ‘development’ and the need to ‘help’ ‘poor’ countries was shared and supported by all. The question was not if one country should participate in the ‘development’ effort, but how to do this and from which political perspective. In both cases the prevalent view was that the development process needs to be supported from the ‘outside’ and from ‘above’, that it needs to be guided by the national and global elites and should ‘burn stages’ by imitating a model that had been initially developed in a different geographic space. Either one or the other of these two models proposes an optimistic concept of history that sees the ‘backward’, ‘under-developed’ or ‘semi-civilized’ countries recuperating their gaps to experiment economic growth.

What is important to note is that before 1989, the Eastern European countries that are now 'new' Member States of the European Union, were fully ingrained in these processes of 'international development' and claimed to be in line with or above the 0.7% target established by the UN as that 'fair' share of resources that the rich countries should be devoting for the development of the poor ones. Of course, such claims were contested by the 'traditional' donors, but from a discourse analysis point of view, it is less important to investigate the 'truth' of the matter; what is more relevant (from this thesis' perspective at least) is to acknowledge that in a previous historical time these countries identified themselves as aid donors and to correlate this with the fact that at the time being many of these countries disown or ‘disclaim’ their previous experience in the field of development, while the image that the European Union strives to build for them is that of 'new' donors.

Indeed, while becoming Member States of the European Union – the biggest donor of the World as it claims to be – the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe are called to take responsibilities in the field of development cooperation and contribute with up to 0.17% of their GDPs by 2010 (and 0.33% respectively by 2015) to international development. The European Parliament 'stresses the experience of the new Member States, in particular during the transition process', but fails to mention their experience as donors before that transition period started. While talking – at the 2008 European Development

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75 As shown by Carmen Raff: ‘The two ideologies which dominated the twentieth century (privatizing free market capitalism and command / state capitalism) were only ever in disagreement as regards strategies’. See Carmen Raff, Autonomous Development: Humanizing the Landscape: an Excursion into Radical Thinking and Practice, Zed Books, London, 1996.

Days in Strasbourg - about the 'strengths' that the new Member States can bring to the field of development cooperation, Christine Bedoya, director of TRIALOG, refers to four main points: the experience of transition that these countries have in their own country and mentions the transition from authoritarian to democratic political systems, the transition from planned economy to free market economy and the transition from receiver of international development assistance to donor of official development assistance; the dynamism and enthusiasm as well as the young age of the people involved in development cooperation, given the 'NMS role as new donors'; the knowledge and experience of cooperation with their neighbours to the East and South of EU boarders, the so-called European Neighbourhood where all but 2 countries are developing countries which are not traditional partners for OMS development cooperation; and their primary focus on the sector of democratisation, human rights and good governance, where they have own experience. Again the past experience as donors of these countries is overlooked. Invited to speak at a Public Hearing on 'New EU donors' at the European Parliament, Ben Slay, Director of UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, talks about these 'new players' in development cooperation which are the new Member States and last but not least, according to the European Parliament the objective of the EU with regard to the new Member States is not only to 'capitalise' on their experience, but also to 'help them strengthen their role as new donors' and 'bring them into line with the EU's development aid objectives'.

Generally, the new Member States themselves remain silent regarding their past experience as donors. The Czech Republic is the only NMS that makes explicit reference to the past. In a Report published by the Institute of International Relations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, the authors show that

"The Czech Republic reintroduced a program of international development cooperation in 1995 as the first transition country in Central and Eastern Europe."
The program took up the long and rich tradition of relations between former Czechoslovakia and developing countries...

The acknowledgement is straightforward and rather exceptional if it were not for the rest of the sentence which is practically a 'disclaimer' of such past experience. Thus, the Report goes on to show that such relations were resumed 'with the objectionable ideological encumbrance removed'.

In other NMS the prevalent opinion is that development cooperation is a completely new sphere of activity so much so that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs invite ‘twinning projects’ with Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the OMS to promote the kind of 'institutional learning' that is deemed necessary in absence of domestic experience for development cooperation; strategic partnerships are created with the United Nations Development Program so as for the NMS to benefit from this agency's experience in the field of international development; funding from more established donors is welcome for creating the NMS' own institutions and 'models' of development cooperation. In 2008, Ibolya Bárány, Director of HUN-IDA (the Hungarian Agency for Development Cooperation) shows that the new Member States are not yet ready to become 'normal' donors as they are not able to keep the pace with the volumes of aid assistance and development issues proposed by the 'old' donors. Many believe and show that the NMS have a 50 years 'gap' of development history when compared with the OMS and this is why - particularly in the ACP countries – the NMS need to be created opportunities to 'learn' from the OMS.

As the experience of the past is apparently rejected, this ‘learning’ process seems to be go together with a parallel process of ‘de-learning’ or – in any case – of evasion from the knowledge gained in the past. At most, the precedent experiences, the contacts built in the past, can be a starting point for a type of development cooperation that is inspired by

81 Example: the case of Romania that had such a project with the German BMZ.
82 See the cases of Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic.
83 Through the ODACE program - Official Development Assistance in Central Europe – the Canadian Agency for Development Cooperation invests 15 million dollars for consolidating the development agencies of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. See http://www.acdicada.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicada.nsf/En/JUD-327134440-PYY (august, 2008).
85 Idem.
current models. In Romania, the few development workers that had the occasion to work in Africa show that

‘As a Romanian in Africa you feel extraordinarily. Most of the persons with whom I had been working not only heard of Romania, but some have even studied in our country. Hearing that I am in Burundi, a lady managed to get my phone number and, with a very excited voice, told me that 20 years ago she had studies at Bucharest’ 86.

In reply, Romanian officials talk about an undeniable ‘capital of sympathy’ that Romania has in many of the developing countries and show that it is from there that Romania’s development cooperation should start from 87.

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86 Interview, September 2008.
87 Fieldwork, 2008, Romanian official expressing her views in Romania’s first ‘development camp’ in September 2008.
1.4. Discourse and Development
As already mentioned, this thesis is about ‘development discourse’ and its faith in one of the new Member States of the European Union that has been once been the most South-oriented communist regime in Eastern Europe. ‘Discourse analysis’ is not only one of the main methods used for research and analysis, but also the ‘state of mind’ of this. This chapter will briefly outline a very broad picture of how these two intensely debated concepts of our times – ‘development’ and ‘discourse’ – met and supported one another in giving the substance of this thesis. Of course, this will be done in a very schematic and extremely selective manner, as the literature in either of these fields is far too vast for it to be reviewed here.

1.4.1. Development: Not Fads, but a ‘Way of Thinking’
It is accepted now, among development practitioners and scholars, that ‘development’ goes in ‘fads’ and fashions. Thus, some authors lament that in development research, some research topics can be more popular than others not only because they may be more necessary than others, but also because they are simply fads. Other authors show that the ‘latest fads in the development field’ can easily be transformed in simplistic and extremist ideologies, while still others simply recount these continuous ‘changing fashions of development cooperation’.

In this last group of authors, King and MacGrath show that the swings in development philosophy appear to owe more to political and economic cycles of the North that to changed Southern circumstances. Thus, they show that in the 1950s and the 1960s, in the era of decolonization, post-war boom in the developed economies and parallel ‘modernization’ in the developing ones, the road from political independence to economic development was largely seen as short and unproblematic so that emphasis was on training, infrastructural development, as well as large capital projects. The first crisis of development was recorded amongst these years of assumed imminence of rapid economic

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89 Francisco Sagasti and Gonzalo Alcalde, Development Cooperation in a Fractured Global Order: An Arduous Transition, IDRC, Ottawa, 1999, p. 16 quoting Jacques Lesourne at the 25th Anniversary of the OECD Development Center.
91 Idem.
take-off and two main responses were formulated – by the same institution: the World Bank - that corrected to some extent the course of development discourse. The first response came in 1969 through the Pearson Commission that argued that a closer donor-recipient should be formed with the governments in the recipient countries in the driving seat. The famous 0.7% target is now formulated as to give substance to the notion of donor responsibility. A second shift in development discourse came in the beginning of the 1970s with the basic needs approach proposed by new World Bank President Robert McNamara. By the end of the 1970s this latest thing was also replaced by a new ‘ideological orthodoxy’ spread from Margaret Thatcher’s Great Britain and Reagan’s USA: the neoliberal thinking. The assumption now was that the developing countries themselves were the main factors to be blamed for their state of underdevelopment so that a radical restructuring – structural adjustment - of their economic systems was needed to ensure greater fiscal discipline, liberalization of trade and of the financial sector, encourage foreign investments, privatize public services, deregulate production and services. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the practice of structural adjustment began to broaden so as to include ‘safety nets’ programs for those negatively affected by structural adjustment. Moreover, governance started to gain an ever more visible status in development thinking as political constraints came to be seen as major factors for a successful implementation of structural adjustment programs. Development was now about everything: economics, politics, social issues and even culture. In the first decade of our millennium the Millennium Development Goals are the most visible element of the aid architecture. While they are constantly debated and over-emphasized, a less talked of process is going on: organizations dominated by the developed countries (the OECD, the G8, the WTO, the European Union) have now a much greater say in orienting global development policies than a more democratic organization of the United Nations that is now much weakened.

International institutions were at the heart of this constant change of direction in the development practice and philosophy. Thus, during the First UN Development Decade, development was considered a definable path of economic growth passing through various stages; development at this time was thought to be about accelerating economic growth in the developing countries and, in particular, create the necessary conditions for the

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93 Kenneth King and Simon Garth, op. cit. pp. 18-31.
national incomes of these countries to grow by five percent yearly by 1970 so that, with an estimated population growth of 2-2.5 %, living standards could be doubled in two to three decades.\(^95\)

Gustavo Esteva shows that while the first development decade considered the economic and social aspects of development separately, the second decade involved merging the two (in line with McNamara’s insistence on the ‘basic needs’). This historical shift was enshrined in a 1970 UN resolution calling for the identification of a unified approach of development and planning which would fully integrate the economic and social components in the formulation of policies and programs. Nonetheless – this author shows - the second UN development decade that started with a quest for an unified approach, actually evolved towards the opposite direction: dispersion. Issue-based fads were now introduced as ‘major problems’ hindering development were now discovered: population, hunger, women, habitat, employment and so on.\(^96\)

The third UND development decade, taking into account the debate around the new international economic order, pledged the governments to fulfill their commitments to establish such new economic order based on justice and equity.\(^97\) Distributing issues and improving the income of target population grew to be more accepted as important parts of development strategies. Thus, in the 1970s the buzzwords were ‘growth with equity’ or ‘redistribution with growth’ so as to show that while economic growth does remain a main ingredient of development, there is now also a certain concern for the benefits to be shared among all strata of population. In contrast to that, during the 1980s, development grew to be seen as a multidimensional concept encapsulating widespread improvements of the social as well as material wellbeing.\(^98\) In spite of generous rhetoric, the 1980s entered the history of development studies as ‘the lost decade of development’, but in spite of that they still produced a major shift in development thinking: the journey of the Brundtland Commission’s concept of ‘ sustainable development’ now begins. With this new vision of development, environmental issues came to the fore, as most definitions of sustainable development allude to a core of basic principles such as: quality of life that includes and

\(^97\) Peter Golding and Phil Harris, Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization, Communication and the New International Order, p. 236.
links social, economic and environmental aspects; care for the environment’ thought for the future and precautionary principle; fairness and equity; partnership and participation.\footnote{David Gibbs, \textit{Local Economic Development and the Environment}, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 3.} 

All these shifts – and many others that can hardly be reviewed here – were made in the name of optimization, of finding the fastest and easiest way out of underdevelopment. In this process, that according to many authors started with the 1949 inaugural speech of President Truman\footnote{Arturo Escobar, \textit{Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world}, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Gilbert Rist, \textit{Lo sviluppo: storia di una credenza occidentale}, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1997; Arona Moreau, \textit{Pour refaire l'Afrique... par ou commencer?}, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2008; etc.}, the concept and practice of ‘development’ managed to ‘achieve the status of a certainty in the social imaginary’\footnote{Arturo Escobar, \textit{Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world}, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p. 5.}. Indeed, at current date, a wide range of citizens around the World - be they from the ‘poor South’ or the ‘rich North’ and irrespective of their ideological orientations or social status - readily agree with the basic tenet proposed more than half a century ago by President Harry S. Truman\footnote{Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949, [Delivered in person at the Capitol]. See the full text on the web at, \url{http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archives/inagural20jan1949.htm}, exact link as of November 2008.} and believe that ‘we’ all \textit{must} ‘fight against global poverty’, through coherently-organized development strategies.

In 1949 Harry Truman, through four plain points, announced his concept for a ‘fair deal’ for the entire world.\footnote{Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 1.} In his fourth point he famously said:

\begin{quote}
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. (...) Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. (...) The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing. All countries, including our
\end{quote}
own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources'.

This vision of the World rapidly gathered a striking amount of consensus and many now realized the ‘obvious’ fact that people in the developing world live ‘in conditions approaching misery’, that ‘their food is inadequate’ indeed, that ‘they are victims of disease’, that ‘their poverty is a handicap’ and perhaps even ‘a threat’ for the entire world.

In the United States of America and then also in the then European Communities, a whole ‘development business’ grew and flourished beginning with the 1950s, creating a host of new professions such as: development projects managers and officers, development scholars, policy-makers, lobbyists, advocates, consultants and so on. The general public’s flow of concern conducd many of those who were not professionally enrolled in the ‘development business’ to make donations or volunteer their time for raising funds and ‘awareness’ from / of those who could ‘help’, while calling for increased public support for development aid.

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104 Among the authors who reflected on how this consensus was built, see in particular Arturo Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 and Gilbert Rist, Lo sviluppo: storia di una credenza occidentale, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1997.

105 See Escobar, op. cit., for a reconstruction and an analysis of the first years of the American program of development cooperation.


107 As an illustration: according to a public opinion poll, in 2004 the number of Australians who claim to have personally contributed money, time or services to an organization that provides foreign aid has increased from 50 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in 2005. Source: Community Attitudes to Overseas Aid – 2005, www.ausaid.gov.au, exact link as of November 2008: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/newspoll_05.pdf

108 ActionAid’s 2006 opinion poll on public attitudes to aid in the United Kingdom shows that almost three quarters – 74% - think aid should increase ‘even if every penny can’t be accounted for’. See a summary of this poll at www.actionaid.org.uk, exact link as of November 2008: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/poll_summary.pdf. The figure is similar to that reported for Canada, where 78% of the citizens were supported the Canadian aid program in 2004. See: Canadian Attitudes Toward Development Assistance, at www.oecd.org, exact link as of November 2008: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/9/39436670.pdf. In the United States of America there seems to be no increase in the public support for international aid. In 1964 Frank Coffin (Witness for Aid, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1964, p. 36) quotes a Gallup Poll that shows that in the previous year (1963) 48% of the Americans were ‘FOR’ development aid, 30% were against, and 12% had no opinion on the issue. Forty years later, an assessment report prepared by Rosemarie Phillips and Diana Davis for the USAID shows that only 54% of the citizens were in favor when asked: "On the whole, do you favor or oppose giving economic aid12 to other countries?". See www.usaid.gov exact link as of November 2008: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACT061.pdf, p. 9.
The development literature recorded the Truman speech as such a powerful discursive event that even half a century after it has been delivered, contemporary development scholars such as Arturo Escobar\textsuperscript{109}, Gilbert Rist\textsuperscript{110}, William Easterly\textsuperscript{111} or Roger C. Riddell\textsuperscript{112} still reflect on the crucial role that the famous ‘Point Four’ had in proposing a new way of conceiving of international relations, according to the newly introduced dichotomy ‘developed versus underdeveloped’ countries. In the Western context, these authors set a trend in identifying the Truman speech as the cornerstone for the whole discourse of what, in the meantime, has become the ‘development cooperation’ discipline.

Thus, for the Western world Truman’s speech had a crucial role in shaping and legitimating a new field of human interaction between the developed and the underdeveloped ‘areas’ of our world. For the ‘Eastern block’ no similar piece of communication was recorded by the historians of this discipline (international development). In particular, Eastern European contributions to the field of international development are hardly mentioned by this discipline’s literature, while the Western pronouncements seem to be given a much larger space. Along with Arturo Escobar who shows the influence of communism in shaping the global development discourse\textsuperscript{113}, Raoul Ascari is among the few to talk about the Eastern Europeans’ contributions\textsuperscript{114}. The Soviet and Eastern European pronouncements in the field of international development seem rather be in reaction to the West’s first attempts to build an ‘aid discourse’. The ‘mirroring’ effect of the Eastern statements is best illustrated by Khrushchev’s claim that:

\textit{This aid which the capitalist countries are planning to extend to the states which have recently won their independence should also be viewed as a particular kind of Soviet aid to these states. If the Soviet Union did not exist is it likely that the}

\textsuperscript{109} Arturo Escobar, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{110} Gilbert Rist, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{111} William Easterly, \textit{The White Man's Burden: why the West's Efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good}, The Penguin Press, New York, 2006.
\textsuperscript{113} Arturo Escobar, ‘The Making and Unmaking of Third World through Development’, in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds.), \textit{The Post-Development Reader}, Zed Books, London & New Jersey, 2007, p. 89: ‘It is also clear that other historical discourses influenced particular representations of development. The discourse of communism, for instance, influenced the promotion of those choices which emphasized the role of the individual in society, and, in particular, those approaches which relied on private initiative and private property. So much emphasis on this issue in the context of development, so strong a moralizing attitude, probably would not have existed without the persistent anti-communist preaching that originating in the Cold War.’

Ascari shows that Eastern European authors like Rosenstein-Rodan and Vanek offered equally important socio-cultural insights, from the perspective of late developers. Such perspective is said to have the advantage of seeming more suitable to developing countries in need of development models.
monopolies of the imperialist powers would aid the underdeveloped countries? Of course not.\textsuperscript{115}

According to Teresa Hayter and Catherine Watson’s ‘Aid: rhetoric and reality’, for the East it was rather ‘tempting’ to take an attitude of total rejection of aid, on the ideological claim that ‘the very existence of aid implies the existence of inequality’\textsuperscript{116}. However, in spite of such ‘temptation’, the Socialist World was far from dismissing the new international practices that were based on the rhetoric of aid. In various occasions, Eastern and Western scholars\textsuperscript{117} will show that aid discourse and practices were, indeed, not rejected by the Soviet Union and its allies. What the URSS refuted was simply the idea that development aid could be a ‘duty’ for the socialist countries. The obligation to give foreign aid rested with the former colonial powers that were the natural culprits for the current plight of the underdeveloped countries, while the socialist countries’ cooperation with the developing countries was of a kind that envisaged mutual advantages for all parties involved\textsuperscript{118}. Nonetheless, already in 1955 the West’s attention is drawn to the ‘blossoming’ Soviet aid program (in that year, the Soviets had concluded some major agreements with Afghanistan, Burma, India and Indonesia), allegedly motivated by the USSR’s desire to gain recognition as a world power and foster neutralism of the developing countries in East-West disputes\textsuperscript{119}.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, development scholars and practitioners point at a ‘large number of changes in the overall nature and structure of development cooperation’\textsuperscript{120}, triggered by the fading away of the old aid competition between West and East, as well as the disappearance of Eastern donors like the URSS or East Germany\textsuperscript{121}. Ever more voices point to the failures of development and call for its termination. Writing in 1992, Wolfgang Sachs unequivocally shows that:


\textsuperscript{119} Leo Tansky, op. cit., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{120} Kenneth King and Simon Garth, op. cit. p. 22.

\textsuperscript{121} Idem.
'The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary. (...) The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work.'

Critical authors like Gustavo Esteva, Marianne Grønemeyer, Ivan Illich, Arturo Escobar, Majid Rahnema, Ivan Illich, Serge Latouche, Vandana Shiva and many others are now involved in a project of deconstructing the discourse of development. Together, they bring out a ‘development dictionary’ with the

‘hope to disable the development professional by tearing apart the conceptual foundations of the routines’ and to ‘challenge those involved in grassroots initiative to clarify their perspectives by discarding the crippling development talk towards which they are now leaning’.

Majid Rahnema shows that the charismatic power of attraction of the development discourse was based on the ‘strange convergence of aspirations’ of three categories of actors that saw the disintegration of the colonial empires. Thus the leaders of the independence movements were eager to transform their countries into modern nation-states; the masses were hoping to liberate themselves from both the old and the new forms of subjugation; while the former colonial powers were simply seeking a new system of domination that would allow to maintain their presence in the former colonies. ‘The myth of development emerged as an ideal to meet the hopes of the three categories of actors’.

‘Post-development’ theorists now recount the ways in which development as a concept has always been the product of a particular set of power relations and argue that development should be instead focused on what local communities want and not on Northern-imposed models of what a correct form of development is.

For these authors, every intellectual element that builds the concept of development is to be questioned. Education is above all a factor of ‘cultural defoliation’, an ‘instrument of humiliation’ whose only role is to transform its users into becoming ‘developed’ versions

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123 Idem.
of an uprooted *homo oeconomicus*. Scientific knowledge, on which the development process is based, is a source of violence that tends to destroy local knowledge. The United Nations system and international assistance exist only to prolong the ‘colonial’ type of development. All in all, development is an ‘anti-politics machine’ that is only meant to take political realities out of sight while strengthening the presence of the state at local level; it is an instrument for accumulating wealth, but it is not the rich that develop the poor, but – on the contrary – it is the poor that develop the rich.

A critical tone in the development literature, post-development does not go without criticism itself. For some, post-development is simply a ‘non-sense’, an ‘empty-box’ that should be ranged in the ‘drawers of oblivion’ as it not only fails to open a new era of reconstruction of the poor countries, but it is also revives ‘antiquated quarrels’ between Marxism and liberalism. At the same time, critics also suggested that post-development writers promote an over-generalized view of reality and expose their tendency to romanticize local traditions.

Apparently, the deconstructionist approach to development does not reject change or deny the need for it, but it is told to seek to reveal the ‘politics of representation embedded in conventional development discourse’ and to ‘problematize its institutional context’, so as to show how power and knowledge operate to distort the rhetoric of development which emphasizes the alleviation of global poverty. In any case post-development does not necessarily mean no development so that the end of it can not be easily claimed. In the six decades that passed since the development era was opened, development has become a way of thinking, a state of mind. It received a whole range of adjectives: economic, social, participatory, human, sustainable and so on; but the various development models that these adjectives suggest are all inscribed in the same and specific way of conceiving at world

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134 Idem, p. 82.
relations. As Escobar shows, even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies of
development were obliged to couch their critique in terms of the need for development,
through concepts such as ‘another development’, ‘participatory development’,
‘socialist development’, and the like. ‘In short, one could criticize a given approach and propose
modifications or improvements accordingly, but the fact of development itself, and the
need for it, could not be doubted’135.

1.4.2. Discourse: the Magical Property of Language
In the last few decades of scientific research, various scholars take notice of the fact that
terms like ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ have become ‘common currency’136 and are
‘increasingly popular’137 in a wide range of activities and disciplines so diverse as critical
theory, sociology, psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, social psychology
and many others138.

For each of these disciplines discourse can be the center of debate and in each of these
disciplines scholars and users generally focus on a different aspect of discourse.
Sociolinguists, for instance, are particularly concerned with the structure of social
interaction in conversation and study the relations between language and society. They are
mostly concerned with identifying the social functions of language and the way it is used
to convey social meaning139. Psycholinguists study understanding, production and
remembering of language and hence they are concerned with listening, reading, speaking
and memory of language. They are also interested in how we acquire language, and the
way in which it interacts with other psychological systems140. Computational linguistics is
about understanding language processes in procedural terms so as to give computer
systems the ability to generate and interpret natural language141.

135 Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 5.
Discourse analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. viii; Deborah Schiffrin, Approaches to
Discourse Analysis. Methods for Studying Action in Talk and Text, Sage, California, 2000, p. 18; etc.
As shown by Henrik Larsen, author of ‘Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis’, in traditional linguistics ‘discourse’ is used as a ‘micro concept’, for example, as a way of analyzing the pattern of everyday conversation amongst individuals in different situations. Discourse in this way is not linked to societal macro structures in any systematic way, it does not show how discourse is shaped by relations of power, or the constitutive effects which discourse has upon social identities, social relations and social beliefs. This is more a role for social theory and analysis that use discourse as a ‘macro concept’ to show how language shapes societal processes.\textsuperscript{142} There are, therefore, various versions of discourse analysis; one major division is between approaches which include detailed analysis of text and approaches which do not include such textual analysis. To make a distinction between the two, Norman Fairclough introduces and uses the term ‘textually oriented discourse analysis’.\textsuperscript{143}

Ultimately and for the sake of analytic purposes, one can say that the term discourse has two major senses: one linguistic and one social.\textsuperscript{144} In the linguistic sense discourse refers to any connected segments of speech or writing larger than a single utterance, such as conversations, sermons, stories, etc. Discourse analysis in this sense is the study of how such segments or texts are structured and how they are used in communication.\textsuperscript{145} In the social sense, a preliminary definition of discourse can be the one proposed by Jørgensen and Phillips - ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world’\textsuperscript{146} - or the similar definition proposed by John Dryzek – ‘a shared way of apprehending the world (that) enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts’.\textsuperscript{147}

In this second sense, the analysis of discourse is the ‘analysis of language in use’,\textsuperscript{148} so that the discourse analysts need to be aware of at least two important functions that language can have: the transactional and the interactional function. The transactional function relates to the expression of ‘content’, while the interactional function is involved in expressing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{143} Norman Fairclough, \textit{Analysing Discourse}, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 2.
\item\textsuperscript{145} Idem.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
social relations and personal attitudes. Traditionally, the transactional function, the function that ensures the communication of information, was considered to be one of the most important functions of language. As Brown and Yule show, this assumption is based on our cultural mythology that has us all believe that it is the faculty of language that enabled the human race to develop. Nonetheless, research shows that language is equally about negotiating role-relationships, peer-solidarity or identity building\textsuperscript{149}.

Therefore, one of the basic assumptions of discourse analysis is that language is not only about action, but language is action. That is to say that words not only convey a certain meaning, but they also have a certain ‘force’: they are used not only to describe things, but also to do things (ex. giving orders, shaping someone’s behavior, etc.). Utterances can be analyzed along three major lines: their locutionary meaning (what they are about); their illocutionary force (what the speaker does with them); and their perlocutionary force (their effects on the hearer)\textsuperscript{150}.

Most often, language is - at the same time - action and about action. This apparently confusing circumstance is very well illustrated by James Paul Gee who talks about the magical property of language: ‘when we speak or write, we design what we have to say to fit the situation in which we are communicating. But, at the same time, how we speak or write creates that very situation. It seems, then, that we fit our language to a situation that our language, in turn, helps to create in the first place.'\textsuperscript{151} This author shows that we continually and actively build and rebuild our world not just through language, but through language used in tandem with actions, interactions, non-linguistic symbol systems, objects, tools, technologies and distinctive ways of feeling, valuing and believing. In Gee’s view, whenever we speak or write we always and simultaneously construct or build seven different things or seven areas of reality: significance; activities; identities; relationships; politics; connections; and sign systems and knowledge. These building blocks involve us in using language to construe situations in certain ways rather than others. Possible questions, then, for discourse analysts are: ‘How is this piece of language being used to make certain things significant or not and in what ways? What activity or activities is this piece of language being used to enact (ex. get others recognize as going on)? How does this piece of language connect or disconnect things? How does it privilege or disprivilege

\textsuperscript{149} Idem, pp. 1-3.
specific sign systems (ex. technical language versus everyday language) or different ways of knowing and believing?"\textsuperscript{152}.

Immediately after defining discourse (as the ‘written and spoken conversation and the thinking that underlies it’), the Blackwell dictionary of sociology quotes the view of Michel Foucault that sociologically discourse is important because how we talk and think about the world shapes how we behave and the kind of world we help to create\textsuperscript{153}. In many instances, the views of Foucault about discourse are promptly called into discussion as many would agree that the use of discourse to refer to more abstract social phenomena owes its currency to the influence of this French philosopher\textsuperscript{154}. In ‘The Order of Things’ and ‘The Archeology of Power and the Discourse of Language’, Foucault brings forward his concept of discourse as the broad range of discussion that takes place within a society about an issue or a set of issues. Examples – taken from the work of this author – may include ‘the discourse of punishment’ or ‘the discourse of sexuality’ that were analyzed in ‘Discipline and Punish’ and ‘The History of Sexuality’\textsuperscript{155}.

Sara Mills shows that Foucault defined the term ‘discourse’ in at least three relevant ways. First, discourse is defined as ‘the general domain of all statements’; this definition is generally used by Foucault when discussing the concept of discourse at a theoretical level. The second definition makes reference to ‘an individualizable group of statements’ and this second definition it used when discussing the particular structures within discourse, whenever he is concerned to identify discourses, that is group of utterances which seem to be regulated in some way and which seem to have a coherence and a force to them in common. Within this definition therefore it would be possible to talk about a discourse of feminity, about a discourse of imperialism and so on. The third definition is thought to be the one that has the most resonance for discourse analysts: ‘a regulated practices which accounts for a number of statements’. Mills takes this to indicate that Foucault was now less interested in the actual utterances or texts that were being produced and more in the rules and the structures which produce particular utterances and texts\textsuperscript{156}.

\textsuperscript{152} Idem, pp. 10-13.
\textsuperscript{154} John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{155} Idem.
For Foucault discourse is a vehicle or an instrument of knowledge; if knowledge is in relation with discovering truths, for Foucault the truth of a discourse lies as much in what is says as in the strategies it brings into play. One should, therefore, be concerned not only with the meaning of a discourse, but also with one’s intentions in using a particular discourse. At the same time, discourse is intertwined with power, as it can be both an effect and an instrument of power. Different discourses compete for pre-eminence in a specific society and the dominance of a particular discourse inevitably reflects the power structure within a particular society. But given that dominance is the product of competition and negotiations, the dominant discourses can ultimately be challenged and perhaps replaced by new discourses. It is then arguable that at any given time, in any given society there are many different types of discourses which are constantly changing, clashing or reinforcing the network of power relations that make up the respective society.

The belief in the close connection between power and language is central to the type of discourse analysis that has been developed by discourse analysts such as Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, Fairclough, Fowler or Hodge and Kress: the critical discourse analysis (CDA). Critical discourse analysis is defined by one of its founders as ‘an analysis of public discourse, an analysis designed to get at the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt propositions’.

Critical discourse analysis is critical in the sense that it investigates and analyzes power relations in society and formulates normative perspectives from which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities of social change. In so doing it aims to reveal the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of the social world including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power. As showed by Norman Fairclough, one of the founders of this method, the analytic framework of CDA combines relational and dialectical elements and the negative critique in the sense of diagnosis of the problem with a positive critique in the sense of identification of unrealizable possibilities in the way things are for tackling the problem. Thus, the analytic

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158 John M. Conley and William M. O'Barr, op. cit.
162 Idem, p. 63.
framework goes from focusing on a social problem that has a semiotic aspect; to identifying the obstacles for it being tackled by the analysis of the network of practices it is located in, the relationship of semiosis with other elements within the particular practices concerned and the semiosis itself; to considering if the social ordering ‘needs’ in some sense the problem; to identifying possible ways past the obstacle; and ending with reflecting critically upon the analysis.\textsuperscript{163}

To facilitate analysis Gee put forward a series of theoretical propositions about discourse that are particularly informative when a specific discourse as that of development cooperation is under analysis. Some of these propositions are as follows. First, discourses are inherently ideological as they involve a set of values and viewpoints about the relationship between people and the distribution of social goods, about who is an insider and who is not, about who / what is ‘normal’ and who / what is not. Second, discourses are resistant to internal criticism and self-scrutiny because uttering viewpoints that seriously undermine them defines one as being outside of them. Significantly, the power of discourse includes that if defining what counts as acceptable criticism. Third, any discourse concerns itself with certain objects and puts forward certain concepts, viewpoints and values at the expense of others. In so doing, a specific discourse will always marginalize viewpoints and values that are central to other discourses. Last but not least and as already mentioned, discourses are intimately related to the distribution of social power so that control over certain discourses can lead to the acquisition of social goods like money, power or social status. Such discourses that can lead to social goods can be called \textit{dominant discourses}, while the groups that can easily use the dominant discourses can be called \textit{dominant groups}.\textsuperscript{164}

\subsection*{1.4.3. Enlarging the Path: Discourse Analysis and the Study of Development}

As shown by Marcus Power, author of the much-quoted ‘Rethinking Development Geographies’, never has Foucault written explicitly about the idea of international development; and still, his views did shape and had an echo in this field. This was perhaps inevitable as Foucault’s work had an important focus on processes that are so central to the

field of international development. Thus, Foucault examined the transition to a ‘modern’
western society and explored how this was based around new forms of control dispersed
through complex networks of power and knowledge and a number of ‘technologies of
domination’. Very important for the future development of the development thinking,
Foucault developed an ability of looking at how people are constructed as subjects and
assembled a convincing image of how individuals are encouraged by certain kinds of
institutions to behave in particular ways, to reach certain social ‘standards’ and to observe
certain rules of modern living and creation of progress. A concern with discourse in the
development thinking and analysis can be considered as Foucault’s unintended legacy,
with ‘discourse’ being most often defined as referring to those most

*appropriate and legitimate ways of practicing development as well as speaking
and talking about it*.

The most quoted contributions in the study of development discourse come from the
specialized field of development anthropology and the most important contributors could
be considered to be Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson, along with early contributors
such as Apthorpe (showing that Taiwan’s rural economy within development discourse as
an instance of ‘small farmer’ economy was misleading) and Hobart (showing how the
‘western scientific knowledge’ underestimates and marginalizes the indigenous knowledge).

Escobar’s work is noticeably influenced by that of authors like Michel Foucault, Edward
Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, Chandra Mohanty and Homi Bhabha that – in his view – ‘have
opened up new ways of thinking about representations of the Third World’. And indeed,
one of Escobar’s most important contributions was to show forcefully and compellingly to
what extent and by what discursive and non-discursive development practices had the
Third World been produced since its inception – that he places – at the end of World War
II. In particular he identifies and discusses the precursors and antecedents of the
development discourse, as well as other conditions (ex. the need for finding new markets,
the ‘population problem’, the ‘promise’ of science and technology, the professionalization

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167 Idem, pp. 11-15.
168 Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 5.
and institutionalization of development) that shaped this new discursive formation (development)\textsuperscript{169}. Escobar concludes that

‘Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition – as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (...) – these [development] professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity\textsuperscript{170}.’

The research method that made such conclusion possible was discourse analysis as ‘thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it possible to maintain the focus on domination (...) and at the same time to explore more fruitfully the conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of development’. Escobar then quotes Foucault having said that discourse analysis creates the possibility of ‘standing detached from [the development discourse], bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated’\textsuperscript{171}.

As for James Ferguson, he is also influenced by the Foucault’s insights and puts them at work for analyzing those who are doing the development, suggesting – as Marcus Power shows – that the poor were taken away a chance to define themselves\textsuperscript{172}. Studying development as discourse is essential for Ferguson as ‘the thoughts and actions of ‘development’ bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live, and what they do and do not is a product nit only of the interest of various nations, classes, or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of a working out of this complex structure of knowledge’\textsuperscript{173}.

In a narrower sense – that needs to be acknowledged as it is one of the important building blocks of development’s ‘macro’ discourse – development can refer primarily to all those materials produced during technical assessments, policy-making exercises and (project) implementation\textsuperscript{174}. In this sense, development discourse is restricted to its immediate users: the development workers, scholars and consultants imparting information to one

\textsuperscript{169} Idem, pp. 21-53.
\textsuperscript{170} Idem, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{171} Idem, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{172} Marcus Power, op. cit., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{173} James Ferguson, The Anti-politics Machine..., op. cit., p. 18.
another, in vertical or horizontal hierarchies of communication. As one author observed, this narrow sense is rather restricted and makes sense to a rather small audience, formed particularly by those who reside in one of the metropolitan countries that once possessed colonies and are now at the fore of the ‘developed world’\textsuperscript{175}. In the European Union, these would be the ‘old’ Member States, in particular the founding Member States and those who joined the Union in its second and third enlargement. This same author argues that this type of development discourse hardly makes sense to the other ‘pole’: the people acted upon in the old colonies, where ‘development’ is performed and supposed to take place. Similarly, this can be argued to be also the case among the ‘new’ donors – the ‘new’ Member States of the European Union – that are now on their way to be socialized in the ‘grand’ discourse of development cooperation that is practiced by the former metropolises that form now the biggest collective donor of the world. As one development worker in Romania - one of the ‘new’ donor countries - said:

\textit{‘At some of them [the development workers in the old Member States] you can notice a certain surfeit, they come to a discourse that is so technical and so elevated, that it is very difficult to understand what is that that person wants to say; actually that person is only talking or is also doing [something]; they are veeeeeeeery mollified; I can see how a new platform coordinator talks – for instance myself – and how a coordinator from Coordination Sud, or the German or the Belgian platform talk; we are still human; our discourse, as long as we are not yet familiar with all the terminology, with all substrata, with all the financial instruments, with all the acronyms, with all the institutions, we still use a certain language that allows us to understand what we are talking about; that I define as being more human’}\textsuperscript{176}.

As from this particular account there is a ‘human’, but then also an ‘inhuman’ face of the development discourse. Such a blunt dichotomy reminds the ‘abuses of power’ that discourse analysts claim to be erected and reproduced by the forces of discourse. Critical discourse analysis in particular aims to unveil such abuses. As Teun A. van Dijk shows, critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and

\textsuperscript{175} Idem.
\textsuperscript{176} Interview with the author, March 2008.
resisted by text and talk in the social political context. Development claims to be about eliminating social inequality that leads to poverty and humanitarian crises. The two fields of systematic inquiry needed therefore to meet as they did in the work of Escobar, Ferguson, Rist, and others. However, that path opened by their encounter needs to be enlarged so as to show how new ‘donors’, how new ‘developers’, are recruited – through discursive and non-discursive means – to a vision of development that, according to some, is by now so ‘inhuman’ that needs to be not only improved, but simply eliminated.

Chapter 2 Romania’s Socialist Years: Policy and Discourse towards the Global South

This chapter aims to analyze Socialist Romania’s policy and discourse towards the Third World.

It has two main parts. The first part will focus on Romania’s policy towards the developing countries, while the second – and most extended part – will discuss Romania’s discourse towards these countries.

The first part will have four main subsections that will discuss Romania’s self-positioning (as a developing country itself) in relation to the developing world and will analyze the main phases of Romania’s policy towards the Third World. While so doing, this first part of this chapter will also analyze Romania’s program of foreign aid.

The three subsections of the second part will: introduce Romania’s concept of international development as it was proposed and argued for by Romanian scholars and as it is revealed by a series of ten concrete proposals for international development brought forward by President Ceauşescu in a UNCTAD context; make a detailed analysis of a speech made by Ceauşescu, so as to give an idea of what was an official, typical pronouncement of those times; reveal the sort of information about the developing world that the Romanians of the 1970s and the 1980s were being exposed to through their written press.

2.1. Socialist Romania’s Policy towards the Global South

In this sub-section the author’s intention is to realize a short and introductory overview of socialist Romania’s policy towards the developing countries, so as to give a general backdrop for the following sections’ analyses. The accent in what follows is on the main phases in Romania’s foreign policy-making between 1960 and the end of the eighties.

2.1.1. Romania as a Socialist and Developing Country

Starting with the 1960s, Romania’s foreign policy seems to have been ‘one of a kind’ among the Eastern European socialist countries. ‘Dissident’, ‘partially aligned’,
‘independent’, ‘deviant’, ‘unique’\textsuperscript{178}, ‘autonomous’\textsuperscript{179}, ‘brave’\textsuperscript{180} are only some of the attributes that political analysts in both East and West employed to characterize the Romanian foreign policy. For these observers and commentators of Romanian foreign and domestic policy, the most relevant instance\textsuperscript{181} of Romanian ‘deviance’ was the 1968 episode when Ceauşescu spoke up unambiguously against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, delimiting itself from both the Soviet Union and other Eastern and Central European socialist countries.

An impressive position for the time, the condemnation of the Soviet-led action against Czechoslovakia was not - as a matter of fact - the only instance in which Romania stood apart in its relations with the Moscow-led communist block. In the beginning of the 1960s, Ceauşescu’s predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, had already opposed fiercely what Moscow called ‘the international division of labor’. Using this economic concept, the industrialized countries of the block, supported by the USSR, argued that those socialist countries who had not developed their heavy industry until that moment should refrain from doing that in the future to avoid unnecessary competition. The un-industrialized countries like Romania were suggested to develop other industrial branches for which they had more tradition, resources and markets. For the Romanian leaders – already launched in an ambitious process of national industrialization - this represented a relegation to the ‘agricultural country’ level, a ‘conviction’ to acting as the ‘bread basket’ for the socialist block. In a letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej clearly spells out that


\textsuperscript{179} Robert Weiner, \textit{Romanian Foreign Policy and the United Nations}, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 57. The qualification is explicit when this author observes that: ‘Another manifestation of Romania’s \textit{autonomous} foreign policy took place in 1978, when it refused to go along with the Soviet policy of raising the level of military expenditure of the Warsaw Pact nations’. (The author’s italicization).


\textsuperscript{181} According to Eugen Denize this, along with other such instances, offered Romania the opportunity of playing a ‘fairly important role on the international arena, especially if we correlate this role with Romania’s real economic, political and military capacities’. Other such instances are: Romania’s refusal to interrupt its relations with Israel in 1967 (the only Warsaw Pact member taking this course of action); its contributions to establishing a dialog between the US and Vietnam; and its contribution to the re-establishment of the relations between the US and China. See Eugen Denize, \textit{Istoria SocietăŃii Românie de Radiodifuziune. România sub Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989)}, Editura Casa Radio, Bucureşti, 2002, vol. 3, p. 133.
‘the Romanian Workers’ Party is against the whole ensemble of envisaged measures (...), considering that by their very nature they will lead to the indentation of the national sovereignty of the member states of the COMECON’.182

In view of its policy towards the developing countries, Romania’s most significant but also controversial ‘deviation’ was operated in 1972 when this country took the unusual step of declaring itself a “socialist developing country”183. This identity change was strongly supported and promoted by President Ceauşescu: he introduced this concept himself, in occasion of his speech to the 1972 National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party, on the 20th of July 1972. Speaking to the Conference President Ceauşescu showed the main reason behind this decision:

‘Following the achievements scored in all fields of activity we have put an end to the state of backwardness we started from, we have risen to a new level of development. Nevertheless, we must say that we still have plenty to do... If we compare ourselves with the economically developed states, we find that in many spheres an important lag still exists. This is why Romania, while having surmounted the stage of an underdeveloped country, continues to be a developing country’.184

In Ceauşescu’s analysis, when compared to other Western and Central European countries, Romania’s economic development had been for a long time hindered by ‘a series of objective historical factors’185: the feudal system that, unlike in those countries, protracted itself for a longer time and hindered the enlargement of the internal market; the foreign domination ‘of hundreds of years’ which procured ‘many sufferings to the large working masses’ and delayed the development of the forces of production; the foreign capital, facilitated by the ‘enslaving debts’ that Romania had contracted abroad, which ‘seized the main branches of Romania’s national industry’ so that at the end of the eighteenth century more than half of the 625 enterprises making the ‘big industry’ in Muntenia and Moldova

183 Michael J. Sodaro, op. cit., 51; Thomas P. M. Barnett, op. cit.
184 Scînteia, 20 July, 1972. Author’s translation from Romanian.
185 Nicolae Ceauşescu, Speech at the festive assembly for the anniversary of 80 years from the creation of the political party of the working class from Romania, 30 March 1973 in ‘Romania…’, cit., vol. 8, pp. 254-256.
were ‘exploited’ by foreign capitalists. According to this view, in the socialism times, through the ‘serious efforts’ of the working class, the peasantry and the intellectuality that was close to the people, all led by the communist party, Romania started to register the above-mentioned ‘achievements’.

Innovative and ‘revolutionary’ methods were introduced to stimulate the fight for development. One example is the 1972 ‘socialist contest for realizing the five year plan in four years and a half’, organized to celebrate the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Republic. In this competition every factory, production plant of any kind and the agricultural cooperatives committed ‘in front of the Party’s Conference’ to over-achieve its respective five-year plan. Every day Scînteia informed its public about the ‘great achievements’. A factory in Brăila is shown to have produced 10,000 tons of laminated products so that the initial plan was exceeded by 2,000 tons; the cement factory in Cluj produced 6600 tons above the plan; in Covasna 439 tons of coal was extracted above that mining plant’s plan and so on. In countless articles Scînteia showed that due to better organization, lower production costs and larger output, the 7.5-8.5 per cent growth rate established by the tenth Congress of the Party was exceeded abundantly, so that the growth rate was 11-12 per cent and the country’s ‘consumption fund’ could be increased with 35-45 billion lei on top of what the tenth Congress had envisaged. In his speech to the National Conference, President Ceauşescu himself showed that: the 1971 cereal harvest ‘registered the highest level ever registered until now by our country’ and that the national income increased by 12.8 per cent. Taking 1938 as baseline, President Ceauşescu points out to real improvements: the industrial output in 1972 was 21 times the industrial output in 1938; the agricultural product was 1.9 times higher; the real salary was 2.7 times higher so that the global salary fund was more that 3 times Romania’s national income in 1938; the health system was now receiving 19-20 times more funding than in 1938. In 1979 the industrial output was already 42 times larger than the levels of 1938, while other sectors were no less successful: Romania was producing 111 times more electric energy, 53 times more metallurgical products, 161

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186 Idem.
187 Presentation at the meeting (consfătuirea de lucru) of the party in the field of ideology and of the political and cultural-educative activity, 9 July 1971, in ‘Romania…’, op.cit., vol. 6, pp. 197-198.
188 Collection of Scînteia newspapers from 1972.
189 Scînteia, 30 July, 1972.
190 Scînteia, 1 August, 1972.
191 Scînteia, 4 August, 1972.
192 Scînteia, 3 July, 1972.
times more machines and equipments, 260 times more chemical products, 35 times more textiles and 10 times more food\textsuperscript{194}.

In spite of such ‘glorious’ \textsuperscript{195} progresses and ‘spectacular changes’ \textsuperscript{196}, President Ceauşescu was insisting that Romania was far from having reached its full potential. As Ioan Nistor echoes him:

‘with all this growth and rapid socio-economic development, Romania is still in the stage of a developing country, needing to recuperate a big economic gap’\textsuperscript{197}.

The ‘gap’ was before everyone’s eyes and was over-emphasized by the Romanian elite, starting with Ceauşescu himself. In 1972 the nation’s income per head was said to represent only 500-600 dollars, 4 to 5 times less than that of the developed countries; the level of labor productivity was several times lower; industrial output of several major industrial sectors was 2 to 4 times lower. In his speech to the Party’s National Conference Ceauşescu says:

‘What we have realized until now strengthens our trust that in the stage that we set for ourselves, in a relatively short historical period, we will succeed to outstrip the phase of developing country in which Romania is now, we will position ourselves at the level of the developed countries, ensuring in this way a high standard of living of the population, fulfilling its growing material and cultural requirements’\textsuperscript{198}.

For realizing these ‘grand objectives’\textsuperscript{199}, President Ceauşescu gives the ‘orientations and the directions of Romania’s socio-economic development for the next decades’. In the presidential view, from 1976 to 1990 the annual growth rate will need to be of no less than 9-10 per cent; in 1990 the industrial output will be 6-8 times larger than in 1970; in 1990 the electric energy output was established to reach 180-200 billion kWh and the steel production will reach 20-25 million tons; 150-200 thousands trucks will be produced along with 450-500 thousand cars and 35-40 million tons of cement; the raw materials will be ensured by further prospecting the soil and by ensuring the needed imports; the agriculture

\textsuperscript{194} Interview given to the Portuguese press agency ‘Anop’, reproduced in Scînteia, 14 March 1979.
\textsuperscript{195} Adjective frequently used by Scînteia and Lumea in expressions such as: ‘glorious efforts’, ‘glorious results’, ‘glorious achievements’, ‘glorious assembly’, etc.
\textsuperscript{197} Idem, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{198} Scînteia, 20 July, 1972.
\textsuperscript{199} In Romanian ‘mărețele obiective’, expression frequently used by the elites and media of the time.
will be completely mechanized and chemical fertilizers, pesticides and bio-stimulators will be introduced ‘at the level of modern agro-technique’ so that in 1990 Romania will produce 28-30 million tons of cereals. This way, in 1990 the net national income will increase five to six times and it will represent 2500-3000 dollars per head. In the development process the country’s social structure ‘will register deep qualitative changes’, so that the active population will reach 11 million persons; the percentage of the citizens employed in industry and constructions will reach 50%, while those employed in agriculture will decrease from current 50 % to 10-15%, what is the average in the developed countries; ‘the nations’ young people will receive solid education’ as the high-schools will be generalized and the higher education will be extended.

Romanian economists200 and their President speak of development as of a linear process, made of successive stages that replace one another at appointed times. Until the 1960s Romania had been a ‘poorly developed country’201 with a ‘rudimentary agriculture’ and ‘a low standard of life for the great majority of the population’202. According to the official statements, under the Romanian Communist Party’s guidance in the 1970s Romania left behind this state of underdevelopment, became a ‘developing country’ and took its first steps for ‘exceeding’203 this latter stage204. The years from 1981 to 1985 were considered as the ‘decisive moment and stage in the transition to the stage of medium developed

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200 See in particular: Gheorghe Obreja, România în procesul trecerii de la stadiul de ţară mediu dezvoltată’, Editura Politică, Bucureşti.
201 Gheorghe Obreja op. cit., pp. 35-40, is one of the authors to bring forward the main arguments for defining interwar Romania as a ‘poorly developed country’. Among these arguments: in the years from 1925 to 1934, a Europe-wide survey showed that the income per inhabitant was ‘maximum for England and minimum for Romania’ and the same held true for the years that followed; Romania’s level of industrialization was so low that in 1938 Romania had to import 95% of all needed industrial equipment; Romania’s agriculture was so unproductive that only 10.3 quintals of what could be obtained for each hectare of cultivated land; in 1938 Romania’s place in the global economy was that of an ‘annex’ and exporter of raw materials and importer of industrial products; the unfavorable commercial balance resulted in an exceeding public debt (78.4 billion lei in 1938); the national income per head was of only 80-100 dollars; in Romania, as much as 4 million analphabets were there and life expectancy was as low as 40 years; the second world war only worsened this already bleak tableau.
203 Obreja’s wording, op. cit., p. 43.
204 See for instance the above-mentioned ‘Orientations and directions’ given by President Ceauşescu for Romania’s socio-economic development for the following decades. Obreja, op. cit., pp. 43-68, brings further clarification: from 1965 to 1980, Romania invested heavily in the ‘country’s industrialization’ (‘industrializarea Ńării’), in agriculture, ensured an ‘optimum’ rate between savings and investments, invested in scientific research, technical development and ‘introduced the technical progress’, increased its level of participation in the world economy through international trade, increased its demographic dynamism, numerically increased and professionalized its workforce and introduced a series of social measures that increase the population’s general welfare.
country\textsuperscript{205}, while the years from 1990 to 2000 were expected to see the achievement of the intensely advertised state of ‘multilateral development’.

Romania’s decision to define itself as a ‘developing country’ had surprised the foreign observers and commentators\textsuperscript{206}, but from a national perspective, this decision was made to appear as rather natural and neutral. Romania’s status as a ‘country in the course of development’\textsuperscript{207} was understood as one phase in a series that would bring the country to ‘the highest pinnacles of progress and civilization’\textsuperscript{208}. More importantly, this was supposed to be no more than one short and transitory phase, needed for Romania to be able to continue its advancement from an underdeveloped to an ‘averagely developed’ and then a fully developed country. This is how and why, from an internal perspective, the ‘developing country’ status – formally forged from the collaboration between the Romanian Communist Party and its social base represented by the Romanian people - represented a major achievement in itself.

Officially, the decision to declare Romania a ‘developing country’ was based on a comparative approach. Romania’s economic indicators were weighed against those of more developed countries, from both the socialist and the capitalist ‘camp’. The economic indicators chosen for assessment were mainly: the level of per capita national income, the percentage of agricultural versus industrial population in the total active population, the level of labor productivity in industry, the average crops per hectare, the level of per capita consumption for the main industrial and agricultural products, the structure of the


\textsuperscript{206}In particular Barnett, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{207}In Romanian, ‘developing country’ is translated by ‘țară în curs de dezvoltare’; a mot-a-mot translation back into English is ‘country in course of development’.

\textsuperscript{208}Expression frequently used by President Ceauşescu and the Romanian media. See for instance Nicolae Ceauşescu, ‘Cuvântare la Plenara Consiliului Suprem al Dezvoltării Economice şi Sociale a României’, in Scinteia, December 23rd, 1987.
In addition to President Ceauşescu’s ‘directions and orientations’ and in support of his political line, Romanian authors bring further arguments and data. Ion Barac quotes the World Bank Atlas and shows that in 1973 – one year after Romania’s ‘transformation’ into a developing country – Romania’s per capita national product amounted to US$ 890. This was an increase from the 500-600 dollars / capita announced by President Ceauşescu for the previous years, but still one sixth less than the per capita GDP of countries like the USA, Switzerland or Sweden, one fifth less than the per capita figures of the Federal Republic of Germany or Denmark and less than a quarter of what Japan or Austria scored. The table below is a summarized illustration of these data, emphasizing Romania’s economic backwardness when compared with the World’s developed countries.

**Figure 2 - Romania's Economic Growth Compared to Other Countries**

![Graph showing economic growth comparison](image)

*Source: data presented by Ion Barac, visual elaboration by the author of this thesis.*

In 1979 Ioan Nistor shows that the per capita national income continued to increase, but so was the income of the more developed countries, so that Romania was still at the rear. The fact became evident when comparing Romania’s performance in 1960 and 1975: in the reference group selected by this author, Romania continued to be on the last position. In the table below, Nistor’s data speak for themselves.

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210 Such as: Alexandru Puiu (1974), Ioan Nistor (1979), Ion Barac.
212 Nistor presents data on a group of 20 countries (Romania included). The author operated a selection
Beyond gaps in per capita national product, Barac also shows that in 1973 the share of the Romanian population employed in agriculture was 42.2 per cent of the total active population, as against 10 per cent in most of the developed countries.

Barac compares Romania not only with the Western countries, but also with other socialist countries like Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic or Hungary and finds out that Romania lagged behind not only when compared with the best performing economies in the World, but also when compared to its socialist counterparts. Thus, he shows that in 1974 Romania’s per capita industrial output represented a mere 37.4% of that of Czechoslovakia. In agriculture, the Romanian wheat average output per hectare in the period 1971-1976 is reported to have been of 22.5 quintals only, compared to 40.9 quintals in the German Democratic Republic and 36.6 quintals of Czechoslovakia. For maize the figures were 26.5 quintals for Romania and 41.2 quintals for Czechoslovakia and 39.6 quintals in Hungary.

This way, to demonstrate Romania’s claim of being an authentic ‘developing country’, Romanian authors bring concrete statistics to the public’s attention and compare Romania’s economic performance with the economic standing of the more developed countries, both in the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. However, an important nonattendance is to be noticed. While arguing for being considered a developing country, Romania never compares itself with the countries from the global South: indeed, comparative statistics to put Romania in contrast with the developing countries themselves are never produced or reproduced in the Romanian official sources such as Scînteia, Lumea or academic and popularization volumes. Such statistics were of course available\(^\text{213}\), but in this particular

\(^{213}\) Example: Ilie Serbănescu and Ilie Olteanu, *Grupul celor 77. TendinŃe şi semnificaŃii. Documentar*. Editura Politicǎ, Bucureşti, 1978. In this booklet the authors produce three statistics annexes referring to the Group of the 77. Romania, a member of that group, is shown to have a national income / capita of 1300 US$, occupying a middle positions between members like Bhutan, Kampuchia, Laos, Mali, Rwanda, Upper Volta whose income was below 100 US$ and members like Kuweit or the Emirates whose income was at the time
debate the accent was always on Romania’s performance in comparison with the ten or so most developed capitalist countries and the ten or so most developed socialist countries. In spite of convincing rhetoric this may be an indicator that Romania was hardly picturing itself like a ‘truly’ developing country, of the kind that Asia or Africa was full of.

A question concerning Romania’s ‘genuine’ reasons for defining itself as a ‘developing country’ might then be raised. In spite of all explanations given by the Romanian President, journalists and authors for Romania’s decision to ‘re-brand’ itself like a developing country, various foreign commentators of the time still debated on Romania’s possible reasons for having taken such a decision. The economic reason (already presented by the Romanian official position) was also discussed by the foreign commentators such as Radu, Barnett and Gafton, but from a different perspective. These authors suggest that the ‘developing country’ label and strengthened relations with the developing countries were pursued by Romania over economic gains that Romania could have obtained both from the West and from the developing countries themselves.

Barnett in particular suggests that as a developing country, the goods that Romania produced in ‘joint venture’ with other developing countries were now eligible for trade with the European Economic Community (EEC), while in absence of such a ‘shortcut’, the EEC market would have remain closed for the Romanian commodities. At the same time, in the name of its solidarity with the developing countries, Romania could now promote its products more aggressively and open new markets, especially for those low-quality goods that were not sufficiently competitive to be presented to the Western consumer.

Equally important might have been the raw materials that the South was rich in. Under the Communist Party’s guidance, Romania developed and implemented a series of very close or slightly above to / of 11,000 US$. Other countries with national incomes of around 1000 US$ like Romania were at the time: the Barbados Islands, Brazil, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Jamaica, Lebanon, Morocco, Mexico, Panama, Surinam, Uruguay.

217 An indicator of perseverance if not ‘aggression’ were the numerous ‘development’ credits that Romania extended to the developing countries. Most of these credits supported Romanian exports into these countries. A case in point is Zambia, an important importer of Romanian tractors. See a list of Romanian credits in what follows.
ambitious and - with the wisdom of the hindsight some have argued\textsuperscript{218} - unrealistic industrialization plans. Romanian decision-makers of the time deemed that Romania’s industrialization, based on the heavy industry\textsuperscript{219}, ‘was for Romania the only way for an efficient use of the natural and labor resources existent on the whole national territory, which offered real possibilities for the durable improvement of the standard of living of the population, which opened the horizon towards the amplification of the commercial exchanges and, in general, towards economic relations with other states’\textsuperscript{220}.

During the 1960s and the 1970s, by increasing the size of its industrial units, Romania developed its famous industrial ‘giants’\textsuperscript{221} – plants that occupied from 3000 to 5000 workers and more\textsuperscript{222} and were concentrated – as the Communist Party’s wanted – on producing production means rather than consumption goods\textsuperscript{223}. The doctrine ‘Romania – agricultural country’ which was prevalent before WW II, started to be systematically and ‘scientifically’ de-constructed\textsuperscript{224} and, in a relatively short period of time, Romania’s production capacity expanded significantly\textsuperscript{225}. Using once more the wisdom of the hindsight, one may wonder if this super-industrialization was indeed needed given the modest sizes of Romania’s internal market, its ability to find external markets\textsuperscript{226} for its commodities\textsuperscript{227} and the availability of the required raw materials. It is illustrative that – for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{218} See Lucian Boia, \textit{România, țară de frontieră a Europei}, Humanitas, București, 2005, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Claudia Rodica Popescu shows that the heavy industry was for Romania a ‘dogma of the economic and political independence’. At the same time, other industrial branches were de-emphasized as preferences of ‘bourgeois consumption’. See Claudia Rodica Popescu, \textit{Industria României în secolul XX. Analiză geografică}., Editura Oscar Print, București, 2000, p. 101.
\item \textsuperscript{220} ***, \textit{Repartizarea teritorială a industrii}, Editura Academiei, București, 1977, p. 14 (author’s translation from Romanian).
\item \textsuperscript{221} Claudia Rodica Popescu talks about ‘industrial gigantism’. See Claudia Rodica Popescu, \textit{Industria României în secolul XX. Analiză geografică}., Editura Oscar Print, București, 2000, p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{222} According to Claudia Rodica Popescu in 1989 16.2\% of all industrial plants were plants that employed at least 3000 workers, 59.8\% of the Romanian workforce was occupied in such plants and 50.5\% of the national output was produced in these plants. See Claudia Rodica Popescu, op. cit., p. 109.
\item \textsuperscript{223} ***, \textit{Politica Partidului Comunist de industrializare socialistă a țării}, Editura Academiei RSR, București, 1978, p. 155.
\item \textsuperscript{225} The 1988-1989 UNIDO Report ‘Industry & Development’ situated Romania 20\textsuperscript{th} in the rank of the 25 most industrialized countries which produced 93\% of the global industrial output. Romania’s share was 0.6\% with an annual growth rate of 4.8\%. See Claudia Rodica Popescu, op.cit., p. 88.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Authors of the time were also raising questions, even if in a veiled manner. For instance, Al. Puiu shows that ‘one should not omit the difficulties that our country, as other countries in full process of industrialization, has in placing on the global market the machines and equipments (it produces), (in the context in which) preference is given usually to commodities coming from countries having a longer tradition in their production and export’. According to this author, Romanian exports were also ‘impeded by some insufficiencies which manifest themselves in the research and the prospecting of the global market, in the reduced number of marketing surveys’ as well as the maintenance services that are needed for this category of products. See, Al. Puiu, op. cit., p. 49.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Questions formulated by Claudia Rodica Popescu, op. cit., p 109.
\end{itemize}
example – in 1986 Romania was producing more steel than Austria, Sweden and Australia combined, being the 7th producer of the world, much ahead of some developed countries such as the USA, Canada, France or Italy. The same was the case with sodium hydrates (6th place), crude iron and synthetic fibers (7th place), aluminum (10th place) and cement (11th place)\(^ {228} \). However, such impressive production capacity seems to have been weakly correlated to the country’s reservoir of raw materials. From a raw materials exporter Romania turns itself into a raw materials importer: by 1989 Romania was importing 86.1% of the iron ore, 50% of the coal\(^ {229} \), 60% of the black coal for coke and 67.1% of the oil it needed\(^ {230} \). As already showed, in the beginning of the 1960s Romania had been in a position of defending its right to industrialization. Now the newly discovered reservoir of raw materials from the developing countries could have represented the card to be played by the Romanian elites in their fight for the country’s economic emancipation from the Soviet system. The developing countries became, this way, important trading partners for Romania. As Horja unequivocally showed,

*This policy of Romania of close collaboration with the developing countries expresses our solidarity with the fight of these peoples for their national and social liberation (…). At the same time, the exchanges and collaborations in production contribute to solving some of the problems of our own development, such as: furnishing the Romanian processing industry with some raw materials, the complete utilization of some production capacities, the superior economization of our own natural resources and workforce*\(^ {231} \).

Data on Romania’s foreign trade with the developing countries surely support the economic argument. Kanet shows that between 1960 and 1978 Romania’s trade with the non-communist developing countries increased dramatically: exports went up from 40

\(^{228}\) Gheorghe Obreja, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
\(^{229}\) Very significant if one has in mind that iron and coal are two main raw materials that are fundamental for the steel production.
\(^{231}\) Gavril N. Horja, op. cit., p. 106. My own translation from Romanian. In original: ‘Aceastǎ politicǎ a României de colaborare strinsǎ cu Ńǎrile în curs de dezvoltare exprimǎ tocmai solidaritatea noastrǎ cu lupta popoarelor acestor Ńǎri pentru eliberarea lor naŃionalǎ şi socialǎ (…). Totodatǎ, schimburile şi cooperarea în produŃie contribuie la rezolvarea unor probleme ale propriei noastre dezvoltǎri, cum sunt: aprovizionarea industriei prelucrǎtoare româneşti cu anumite materii prime, utilizarea completǎ a unor capacitǎŃi de produŃie, valorificarea superioarǎ a propriilor noastre resurse naturale şi de forŃǎ de muncǎ’.
million US dollars in 1960 to 1,751 million dollars in 1978, while imports increased from 20 millions dollars to $US 1,639²³².

![Figure 4 - Romania's Trade with Non-Communist Developing Countries: 1960-1978](image)


The line chart above (elaborated by the author, based on Kanet’s data) is a visual illustration of the growing value of trade exchanges between Romania and the non-communist developing countries which shows a dramatic increase in trade exchanges, from values that start from a couple of thousands of dollars to values that reach almost two billion dollars at the end of the 1970s. Exports and imports go hand in hand, suggesting an economic correspondence in the regime’s professed concept of ‘mutually advantageous help’.

Other Romanian authors - Ecobescu and Celac (1975) - report that in 1975 the economic relations between Romania and the developing countries represented more than 13 per cent of total Romanian trade exchanges. As a matter of routine, besides the political documents that were concluded during the high-level visits, additional agreements, protocols and conventions were regularly signed, as the aim of the Romanian governments is that the weight of African, Asian, and Latin American countries in Romania’s total foreign trade to reach at least 30% by 1980²³³.

²³³ Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac, Socialist Romania in International Relations, Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1975.
For how significant the economic factor may have been, according to some foreign commentators\(^\text{234}\) the most important factor motivating Romania’s self-definition as a ‘developing country’ was the ideological one. This particular status came with the opportunity for President Ceauşescu to

‘*ride the wave of economic radicalism rising among developing countries in the early 1970s*’\(^\text{235}\)

and create, this way, an image for himself as a leader of Third World socialism, while also boosting the domestic legitimacy of his internal development strategy – the famous grand plan by which Romania would have reached the so-called ‘multilaterally developed society’. Promoted as Ceauşescu’s own and potentially most important idea that represented the true ‘*fundament of the country’s socio-economic progress*’\(^\text{236}\), the ‘multilaterally developed society’ was introduced in the public discourse by the eleventh Party Congress. As President Ceauşescu explained himself:

‘*We/I*\(^\text{237}\) gave the name of ‘multi-laterally developed society’ to our future society in order for not creating misunderstandings, for not leaving place for the neglect of any facet of activity, for not concluding that, speaking about the multi-laterally developed society, we would refer only or predominantly to the development of the economic base.*’\(^\text{238}\)

When the concept was first launched, it was estimated that 20 to 25 years were needed for its achievement. The ‘multi-laterally developed society’ was advertised as a truly ground-breaking concept, a ‘*historical event for the theoretical and ideological activity in our country*’\(^\text{239}\), resting on the ‘innovative’ and ‘profoundly revolutionary’\(^\text{240}\) idea that socialism was not to be built ‘at once’, by passing from the old regime to full socialism, but it presupposed instead a whole series of historical stages which were needed for the socialist value to be able to affirm their superiority in any society\(^\text{241}\).


\(^235\) Thomas Barnett, op.cit., p. 50.


\(^237\) The original formulation in Romanian is ambiguous: ‘am dat formularea de…’ can both mean ‘I’ or ‘We gave the name…’.


\(^240\) *Idem*, p. 70.

\(^241\) Idem, p. 70.
The achievement of the ‘complex’ objectives required by the multi-laterally developed society implied ‘systematic actions’ in various ‘directions’, the first of these being

‘The forceful development of the production forces (...), the extension of the country’s own basis of raw and energetic materials, the creation of an advanced economy, of an intensive and highly efficient industry and of an agriculture capable of satisfying the ever growing demands of the population’.

Such ‘forceful development of the production forces’ was actually translated in absolute priority given to industrialization, in particular the heavy industry and the oil refining capacity, although Romania’s depleted oil reserves were rather suggesting that Romania did not have the needed resources for turning this industry into a profitable one. The explosion of the oil prices at that particular time had disastrous consequences for the Romanian balance of trade, so that the burden imposed on the population for achieving the grand project of internal development was soon to be out of reasonable limits: Romania’s foreign debt almost tripled in 5 years, raising from 3.6 $US billion in 1977 to 10.2 $US billion in 1981. Nonetheless, from an ideological point of view, to abandon the industrialization project was not feasible: in the regime’s view, industrialization was the symbol itself of any ‘developed’ society. To urge citizens’ mobilization, the regime offers an intrinsic motivation - that of living in a soon-to-be ‘multilaterally developed society’ - and an extrinsic one, embodied in ‘the fear of being left behind in the chasm of a development gap between North and South’. This is how the times are high on development rhetoric, with one concept (‘the multilaterally developed society’) for internal use and a second one (‘developing Socialist country’) for external consumption, in an effort for harnessing all possible forces to achieving the development goals.

In Barnett’s analysis (1992), President Ceauşescu’s decision to enroll Romania among the developing countries is received with skepticism both at home and abroad. At home, it seems that there was a lot of dragging of feet for conceiving of Romania as a ‘developing’ country. As Almond shows:
‘Whereas his state visits to Washington, London or Bonn had given Ceauşescu enormous status even within Romania, his tireless traveling around the Third World helped to undermine respect for him at home. It was one thing to have turned his own country into an ‘underdeveloping’ society, but to seek out the company of the other basket-cases of the world economy was to add gratuitous insult to already grave injury in the minds of the most Romanians.’

While Almond leaves the above-mentioned claim undocumented, Barnett reports Silviu Brucan247 and Corneliu Bogdan248 confirming that decisions on the development policy and the Third World strategy were made by Ceauşescu ‘single-mindedly’ and ‘forced onto the ruling elite of the time’, which resented most of them. After 1989, Nicolae M. Nicolae, another Romanian ambassador to the United States249, recalls that former Prime Minister Gheorghe Maurer had confidentially told him, in the beginning of the 1970s:

‘I think that including Romania in the rank of developing countries is a big shame. It means for us to admit that in almost thirty years of socialism, our only merit were that we brought Romania at the developing country level250.’

The attempt to uncover clear evidence of resistance to the ‘developing’ claim in the Romanian public sources of the time is a lost cause, as Romanian journals and reviews had only words of praise for President Ceauşescu’s external policy251 and never published any material not aligned with the President’s thinking252. An indication of high-level, noiseless internal struggle over this matter does exist, however, but it comes – once again – from President Ceauşescu’s own words that Party officials can hear when he openly complains about their attitude:

‘We situate ourselves firmly on the position to act also in the future for the strengthening of the collaboration with all developing countries, for the extension

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247 Romanian communist activist, one of the main ideologues of the Party. Progressively became a dissident of Ceauşescu’s regime.

248 Former Romanian ambassador to the United States.

249 From 1976 to 1978, the period corresponding roughly to this second phase of Romanian policy-making towards the South.


251 An example, in Obreja, op. cit., p. 109: ‘It is the merit of our party, personal of its secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, whom, on the basis of a profound analysis (…) has conceived and prefigurated a new stage of economic and social phase of our country…’. Examples like this abound in Scînteia, Lumea and other sources.

252 An excellent and thoroughly documented case-study in this sense is Eugen Denize’s history (op. cit.) of the Romanian Radio Station.
of our collaboration with all developing countries (...) ... the experience (we had) until now – good or bad – must be used not for restraining the actions of cooperation with the developing countries, but for better organizing the activity in the future... I insist upon this thing because there are some comrades from the economic sectors which forwarded proposals for restraining of the actions of cooperation with the developing countries, instead of learning the lessons from the previous mistakes253.

Even if things are only ‘referred to’ and not clearly spelled out, names are not given and behaviors are only alluded at, for the standards of those times, this strand of speech might be seen as particularly strong. Ceauşescu was a tireless supporter of ‘his’ Third World policy which he always depicted in positive wording. Now the existence of some ‘bad experiences’ is suggested, the word ‘mistake’ is allowed to stand together with the Romanian ‘actions’ towards the developing countries, bad organization of activities is implied and it is made clear that ‘some comrades’ had even brought proposals for the South policy to be played down. This is a clear, though indirect, indicator that not only Romania’s inclusion in the rank of the developing countries was resisted to some extent by the Romanian ruling elite, but the whole strategy that Romania had developed towards these countries and, in particular, the commercial preference that Ceauşescu wanted to see in relation with these states.

Abroad – Barnett argues - Romania’s aspiration for entering the ranks of the developing countries received a cold welcome in all relevant international circles: the West, the Soviet Union and the developing countries themselves. According to Barnett, for the developing countries Romania’s new identification was disturbing due to their reluctance to share aid revenues with a European ‘competitor’, while the West suspected Romania’s intent of gaining access to its funding for development, as well as those market facilities normally granted to the ‘traditional’ developing countries. In Radu’s opinion, however, the greatest difficulties were encountered not so much when trying to convince the South or the West, but when communicating Romania’s new identity to the Soviet Union:

‘The difficulty of convincing the developing countries that Romania is in a situation similar to their own in terms of development and that it therefore has essentially similar interests is perhaps less of a problem to Bucharest than is the need to

convince Moscow that being a ‘Socialist developing’ country does not mean weakening of its links with either the Warsaw Pact or the CMEA.\textsuperscript{254}

However, the two authors hardly quote any source, instance of criticism or irrefutable proof of other countries opposing or doubting Romania’s self-introduction in the group of the developing countries. Barnett does mention that Romania’s first application for the Group of the 77, filed in the 1960s, was initially rejected by the Group, but the historical fact remains that Romania was eventually accepted to be part of this Group in the 1970s. Moreover, Romania was also welcomed as an observer to the non-alignment movement, it was granted the status of the Most Favored Nation by the USA of and became an active member of various UN specialized agencies.

To all those who might have been skeptical, the Romanian official sources (Scînteia; Barac, 1977) respond that there is no contradiction in defining Romania both as a socialist country and as a developing country. One of the most elaborated demonstrations of this argument is given by Barac\textsuperscript{255} in 1977, when he explains that ‘we’ are in the presence of a characterization based on two different criteria which are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the first criterion is related to the social and political system, while the second is related to the level of economic development. Generally, the countries of the world were classified into three major groups: socialist, capitalist and developing countries. But Barac shows that this classification is flawed, as it does not apply the two criteria – the social and political system and the level of economic development – in a unitary and consistent manner. In the first two cases (socialist and capitalist countries), states are grouped by the criterion of the social and political system while in the third case by the criterion of economic development. Similarly, when considering the category of market economy developed countries both criteria are applied. According to Barac, a better description of the international structure requires the use of those criteria not in opposition to one another by complementary to one another, so that each country may be characterized both from the angle of the development level and from that of the socio-political system that it belongs to. Therefore, defining Romania as a socialist developing country is only clarifying Romania’s international position, by characterizing it both in relation to its social and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{255} Barac, op. cit.
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political system (a socialist country) and to the level of its economic development (a developing country).

2.2.2. Policy Expansion and Extension of ‘Aid’

Economically or ideologically motivated, warmly or coldly received, in the beginning of the 1970s Romania started to build itself a ‘developing and socialist country’ identity. Romania’s self-introduction as a ‘developing country’ is the first and most visible sign of its complex strategy towards the ‘Third World’ countries, a signal that initiates a phase of 3-years (1972 to 1974) ‘policy expansion’ towards the developing South.

In the 1950s Romania’s foreign policy is significantly pulled under Moscow’s control, but the 1960s are a time of reassessment of Romania’s position within the socialist subsystem, followed by an active rapprochement with the West and the South. At the end of the Second World War, Romania had diplomatic relations with one single country from Africa and Asia respectively, and only two countries from the Latin America. The 1960s will see this state of affairs change radically, as Romania will steadily broaden its relations with the developing countries so that by 1974 Romania has diplomatic relations with no less than 39 countries from Africa, 32 countries from the Latin America and 16 countries from Asia. An overview of the expansion policy is given in 1971 by President Ceauşescu himself who says:

‘Romania has developed, especially in the last years, relations of broad cooperation with the developing countries, seeing in this both the path for the socio-economic growth of the respective countries and an integrated part of the fight against the imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. We have collaboration agreements with 53 developing

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256 The periodization of Romania’s foreign policy towards the South is inspired by Thomas Barnett’s research and writing.

257 An indicator can be Romania’s voting behavior at the United Nations, documented by Weiner: ‘In all major crises considered in the United Nations during this period – the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the Suez crisis in 1956, the Lebanese and Jordanian crises in 1958, and the Congo crisis in 1960 – there was no manifestation of a single Romanian deviation from the Soviet Union’.

258 In the words of Corneliu Mănescu, Romanian foreign minister, the beginning of the 1960s will see the ‘new course’ of Romania’s foreign policy. Weiner (1984) points out that ‘as early as 1960 the roots of what might be termed incipient Romanian autonomy could be seen in the Romanian decision to derussify the language and Romanize it ad to change the constitution from that of a people’s republic to that of a socialist state’.

259 General De Gaulle and President Nixon visit Bucharest; Romania’s trade is now oriented towards the European Economic Community; Romania is granted the Most Favored Nation status by the United States (Radu 1981).

countries, of which 27 African countries. Also, we have economic cooperation agreements in production\(^{261}\), which also include technical assistance, with 26 developing countries, of which 13 African countries. In the field of technical assistance 642 Romanian specialists work in the developing countries, of which more than 500 are in the African countries. From the developing countries 665 students study in various training institutions from Romania, of which 166 come from the African continent.

President Ceauşescu anticipates future plans and shows that:

‘At the time being there are in course of conclusion a series of agreements with a great number of developing countries, African included, which will make that the technical assistance and the number of Romanian specialists who will work in these countries and the number of young people from these countries that study in Romania to grow sensibly’\(^{262}\).

In the three years from 1972 to 1974 Romania is particularly interested in the quantitative increase of its diplomatic and trade ties with the developing countries. President Ceauşescu himself is a restless promoter of his country in the developing World and he is among the few Eastern European leaders to ‘tour’ the developing countries. These ‘Third World Tours’\(^{263}\) – highly visible foreign policy instruments to become so characteristic of his time - are intensely publicized multi-nation, official visits. The first of these tours took place in 1972 and included countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; after Africa, the Latin American continent comes in attention, with two dedicated tours (in 1973 and 1975); some countries in the Middle East were toured in 1975, while Africa was high on agenda again, in 1977, 1979 and 1983.

\(^{261}\) In Romanian, in original: ‘relaŃii de cooperare economicǎ în producŃie’.

\(^{262}\) Author’s own translation from Romanian.

\(^{263}\) ‘Turneu’ in Romanian. It is famous the expression coined by Scânteia: ‘Turneul de pace al Tovarǎşului Nicolae Ceauşescu în Ńǎrile în curs de dezvoltare’ (The Tour of Peace of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu in the countries on the course of development).
Central African Republic  | Nigeria  | Sudan  | Somalia

Besides the multi-country tours, which usually last from ten to twenty days, President Ceauşescu also makes very frequent shorter-term state visits, when not receiving Third World leaders and delegations at Bucharest\(^{264}\). An example of his diplomatic agenda for a randomly chosen month is given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>Delegation of trade unions from the German Democratic Republic Minister of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Guinea, Minister for economic development – Nigeria, Director – Israel Radiotelevision – interview release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6-7 September</td>
<td>Visit to Bulgaria, meeting Comrade Todor Jivkov, visit to Beroe industrial plant, participation to the Romanian-Bulgarian friendship ‘great’ meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September</td>
<td>Belgian Parliamentary Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September</td>
<td>Government Vice-President of Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>Accreditation letters of the Ambassador of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 September</td>
<td>Meeting the Costa Rican Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>V.G. Kullikov – Commander of the United Armed Forces of the states participating to the Warsaw Treaty, Federal Minister of industry, commerce and trades from Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September</td>
<td>Message to the General Conference of the International Agency for Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>Chinese Military Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September</td>
<td>Ambassador of the Congo Republic presenting his accreditation letters, Receiving Denmark’s Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>President Ceauşescu meets representatives of UNESCO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data elaborated by the author of the thesis, based on Scînteia, September 1977

President Ceauşescu’s foreign affairs agenda is given exceptional attention by the Romanian media. When he receives developing countries’ leaders at Bucharest the guest’s

\(^{264}\) According to Almond, such devotion to African and Asian states was surprising given Ceauşescu’s couple dislike of humidity and aversion to mosquitoes. Almond also mentions a ‘well-developed sense of superiority to those they still thought of as negroes’. See Mark Almond, *The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu*, Chapmans Publishers Ltd, London, 1992, p. 177
personal biography is frequently exalted and his country is often described in detail if not glorified\textsuperscript{265}. An example is Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko who visited Romania in 1980 and signed the friendship and cooperation treaty between Romania and Zaire. Mobutu arrived at Bucharest on 17 of March 1980. Already on the 13\textsuperscript{th} Scînteia opens its edition with a very visible announcement on the first page:

\begin{quote}
‘At the invitation of President Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbengu Wa Za Banga, President of the Republic of Zaire, will make an official visit to Romania’\textsuperscript{266}.
\end{quote}

The day after, under the signature of Viorel Popescu, the Romanian readers can learn from Scînteia about this ‘country of bronze mountains’, once a colony, known as an ‘absurdly rich country with an absurdly poor population’, as consequence of the ‘spoliation’ of foreign ‘monopoles’ which cruelly ‘exploited’ the local population. The reader can find out about Mobutu’s new strategy for development and two industrial sites - Inga\textsuperscript{267} and Shaba\textsuperscript{268} – are described in great detail as examples of impressive enterprises that will bring development to Zaire\textsuperscript{269}. On the 16\textsuperscript{th} of March, a new advertisement in Scînteia:

\begin{quote}
‘Upon President Nicolae Ceaușescu’s invitation, tomorrow the President of the Republic of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko arrives in our country. Welcome to the High-Level Guest!’
\end{quote}

The article under this title presents a detailed life history of the guest and describes his political achievements. Generous space is also dedicated to the description of the good relations between Romania and Zaire\textsuperscript{270}. Scînteia takes one more opportunity to inform that the ‘ceremony’ of the arrival of Mobutu will be broadcasted live from the airport upon the guest’s arrival at Bucharest, estimated for 11 o’clock the following day.

\textsuperscript{265} Many examples in Scînteia newspaper.
\textsuperscript{266} Scînteia, 13 March, 1980.
\textsuperscript{267} An electric plant built upon a gigantic dam whose concrete wall weights 650 000 tones and is 600 meters long and 53 meters high.
\textsuperscript{268} Shaba – a mining site – is described as the ‘copper fortress’ and the place of a bewildering industrial ‘ballet’, as ‘day and night gigantic trucks, tractors of all types and powerful excavators maintain a thrilling rhythm of the industrial activity’. The 25 000 miners of the Zairian company Gécamin – which superseded the former foreign company ‘Union Minière’, are said to be the ‘expression of the concretization of a major imperative: ‘The Zairian Copper to the Zairian use!’’
\textsuperscript{269} Popescu writes: ‘Inga and Shaba symbolize the undefeated aspirations of the 24 million Zairians to unbind themselves from the belts of underdevelopment and the backwardness which persists in large areas, like a tragic heritage of the colonial past, rising themselves towards the horizons of progress and civilization.’
\textsuperscript{270} The text reads: ‘Having common ideals and objectives of development and independent affirmation, for the salvation of détente and peace, for the large and equitable promotion of the international cooperation – Romania and Zaire have established and developed relations of friendship and collaboration founded on the principles of the respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs, equality in rights and mutual advantage’.
In a similar vein, when Ceauşescu travels abroad ‘Scînteia’ (and also the monthly ‘Lumea’) would not only narrate every possible detail of these state visits, but ‘prepare’ them much in advance with detailed accounts of Romania’s relations with the visited state; descriptions of the economic and social conditions of the visited countries; and even short historical and geographical accounts. Upon Ceauşescu’s return, his own reports of the trip are published in Scînteia, accompanied by extracts from the visited country’s newspapers, to demonstrate to the Romanian public the high ‘esteem’ enjoyed by Romania and his leader in that particular country. In the 2-hours per day television program, much of the time was dedicated to the latest news relating to the state visits paid by Tovarăşul Nicolae Ceauşescu to this or that country.

In ‘whirlwind diplomacy’ style, the tours are supported by intense summitry – 59 high-level summit participations from 1972 to 1974 - as Romania is resolute to convince the Third World countries about the genuineness of its claim of truly belonging to the group of developing countries. This is why, while introducing the concept of ‘Romania – a socialist developing country’ to the domestic audience, President Ceauşescu also invests considerable amounts of effort in promoting his country’s new status on the international arena. In particular, he addresses the developing countries themselves to whom he explains once and again:

‘Why do I deem that Romania is a developing country? Because, in spite of all remarkable results we have obtained, a fairly large distance separates us from the economically advanced countries. It is true that our social order is superior, but we can not ignore the fact that the material base is still low. Therefore, we set for ourselves that in the following 10-15 years to practically liquidate this lag and get closer, from an economic development point of view, to the advanced countries.’

Ideologically or economically motivated, Third World expansionism comes at some costs, as Romania is now compelled to show its solidarity with all non-aligned and developing

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271 Comrade, in Romanian.
272 Term used by Thomas Barnett, op. cit., p. 52.
274 In Romanian: ‘decalaj’.
countries and, in particular, with those ‘struggling’ for their independence and against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Thus,

“The Romanian people extended political, diplomatic, moral and material support to the African and Asian peoples in their struggle to free themselves from the imperialist and colonialis domination, and to win their right to a free and independent life.”

In 1971 Romania established a special fund for the national liberation movements, foreign trade with the developing countries was already on a steep increasing slope and governmental credits started to be offered by Romania to the developing countries.

The displays of Romanian ‘solidarity’ were so significant as to make some foreign commentators talk about a substantial increase of Romania’s ‘aid’ budget. The inverted commas are particularly due in the context in which Romania is critical and cautious towards the notion of ‘aid’ and, through the writings of one of its authors, warns against the neo-colonialist danger in the ‘so called’ foreign aid that the rich countries grant to the poor ones. From the Romanian perspective there is little talk of ‘aid’, as the terms used by Romanian diplomats and commentators are rather: ‘material support’ (mentioned above), ‘mutual help’, ‘technical assistance’ or simply ‘assistance’.

2.1.2.1. Romanian Sources on the Romanian Aid Program
In spite of increasing references, it is rather difficult for the interested scholar to grasp what exactly the Romanians understood by their ‘material support’ for the developing countries. Was it referred to the export- and development-credits offered by the Romanian government? Was it referred to the economic joint-ventures that saw the association of Romanian and developing countries’ resources for building industrial infrastructure in the developing countries? Was this ‘material support’ exclusively formed of commercial instruments (as the two mentioned above) or did it also have some grant elements?

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276 Nicolae Călină, op. cit., p. 205.
278 Barac, op. cit., p. 6.
279 Scînteia, 16 July, 1971, also mentioned by Gafton, op.cit.
280 Barnett, op. cit.; Linden, op. cit.
282 This is not to be read as Romania opposing foreign aid. On the contrary, Romania will frequently point a finger against those developed countries that do not reach their foreign aid commitments. What Romania opposes is the ‘strings attached’ by the rich countries to their aid contributions.
In 1973 Nicolae Mănescu makes an overview of the main forms of economic and technical cooperation between Romania and the developing countries. He mentions four such forms, all oriented towards industrial and commercial ends. Thus, Romania builds ‘economic objectives and new production capacities’ in the developing countries, with Romanian machines, equipments and technical assistance; second, Romania and the developing countries form mixed companies for ensuring (Romania’s access to) raw materials and for increasing Romanian exports on those markets; third, Romania creates, in the developing countries, trade companies with ‘one 100 per cent Romanian capital’ that will realize a ‘direct contact with that market’; and finally, Romania makes technology and technical assistance available for modernizing the ‘existing production capacities’ of the developing partners. Technical assistance is indeed mentioned, but this or any other kind of material support does not represent a separate ‘form’ of economic and technical cooperation. The law no. 1/1971 on Romania’s foreign trade distinguishes technical assistance from other instruments, but it also clarifies what technical assistance stands for. Thus, technical assistance is only one of the forms of Romania’s external trade:

*The activity of external trade is given a broad content, by its comprising the commercial operations and of economic cooperation regarding the vending, the procurement and the exchange of goods (...), tourism, the design and execution of works, technical assistance or collaboration (...)*

The ambiguity between ‘technical assistance’ and the commercial forms of cooperation is promoted from the highest levels. In one of his ‘expositions’ (expunere) Ceauşescu shows that:

*‘Taking into account the fact that socialist Romania is itself a developing country and has limited resources, the main form of help that we can promote towards the developing countries is the cooperation in production (... on mutually advantageous bases’*
However, immediately after making such a clear statement, Ceaușescu adds a confusing element when saying that:

‘even if this imposes on us some efforts, we grant and will grant in the future too, technical assistance to the developing countries and, at the same time, we will train specialists from these countries in our country’.

Beyond information regarding the creation of a special fund for the national liberation movements, one can hardly find any other official data regarding the size and operations of this particular fund or about the creation and operations of similar funds. In extremely rare occasions, difficulties in keeping the flow of aid open are alluded at, but never is there a clear indication of the amounts involved. In the ‘exposition’ mentioned above, Ceaușescu refers to the kind of difficulties that Romania has when extending its assistance to the foreign students, but instead of producing concrete data he just uses the opportunity to show his determination for such difficulties to be overcome. In his speech, he says:

‘Even if we have to face some problems related to the accommodation spaces, our country will go not towards restraining, but towards developing the activity of training, in our education system, of the specialists from these countries’.

Information about the Romanian credits for the developing countries is relatively less difficult to put together. Bucharest was a convinced supporter of credits as a form of

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287 Idem.
288 Scînteia, 16 July, 1971. In a first-page article Scînteia presents the conclusions and decisions taken at the ‘enlarged meeting’ of the Executive Committee of the RCP, chaired by comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, general secretary of the RCP. Among other decisions, we quote: ‘The Executive Committee, taking account of a series of requests received from different countries and giving expression to the sentiments of international solidarity of the Romanian people with the people’s fight for national independence against colonialism, decided the creation of the of a Fund for Solidarity and support of the liberation movements, of the young developing states, as well as the support (ajutorarea) of the population from some countries in case of some natural calamities. This fund will be realized by contributions of the state, of the socialist and community (obștești) organizations, as well as by the benevolent contribution of the citizens’.
289 Even if such information were given, there would still be a question about the developmental value of these resources that were most probably used for achieving political objectives.
290 Only one such reference was found by the author in the sources of the time, in spite of extensive consultation of the Scînteia collection from various years, as well as speeches and Reports presented by Ceaușescu himself.
291 Idem. Author’s translation from Romanian: “Tinând seama de faptul că România socialistă este ea însăși o țară în curs de dezvoltare și are resurse limitate, principală formă de ajutor pe care o putem promova față de țările în curs de dezvoltare este cooperarea în producției (...) pe baze reciproc avantajoase. […] De asemenea, deși aceasta ne impune o serie de eforturi, acordăm și vom acorda și în viitor asistență tehnică țărilor în curs de dezvoltare și, totodată, vom pregăti specialiști din aceste state în țara noastră (...) Deși trebuie să facem față unor probleme legate de asigurarea spațiului de învățământ și a spațiului de cazare, țara noastră va merge nu spre restrângerea, ci spre dezvoltarea activității de pregătire în sistemul nostru de învățământ a specialiștilor din aceste țări.”
292 Based on official sources Gafton (1977) has put together a table of Romanian credits offered to developing countries. The author has completed this list, by her own research.
assisting the developing countries. As the Romanian Communist Party’s Program had showed:

‘Only if the developing countries receive credits with low interest or no interest at all ... can we talk about assistance’

This may also explain why this issue was more covered by the Romanian media. The regular reader of Scînteia can find out about Romanian credits offered to one or other of the developing countries, usually on the day the credit contract is signed (particularly if it is President Ceauşescu to sign the agreement).

<p>| Figure 7 - Romanian Credits Granted to Africa and Latin America |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in dollars</th>
<th>Source of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>Reuter 11 March 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Radio Bucharest 6 February 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>Calafeteanu, 2000:510*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Probleme Economice No. 2, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>130,000,000</td>
<td>Scînteia 14 July 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>Romania Liberă 1 July 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Radio Bucharest 7 December 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>AP estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Scînteia 12 March 1974*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Scînteia 22 April 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Scînteia 23 September 1973*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
<td>Reuter 27 March 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>Radio Bucharest 13 July 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>Scînteia 26 March 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>Scînteia 28 August 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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293 Programul Partidului Comunist Român de făuire a societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate și înaintare a României spre comunism (The Program of the Romanian Communist Party for building the Multi-laterally Developed Society and the Progress of Romania towards Socialism), București, Editura politică, 1975, p. 180. Translation by the author from Romanian.

294 Information about Romanian credits offered to one or other of the developing countries is usually published when the contract is signed and such information is more likely to be revealed if it is President Ceauşescu to sign the agreements.

295 Author’s observation, based on careful review of the Scînteia collection.

296 * - author’s own research data.
However, Scînteia generally fails to mention if these credits are export- or development-oriented, as it sometimes fails to mention other important details regarding the size and scope of the credit contract\(^{298}\). As regards Romania’s technical assistance, this is consistently and systematically associated\(^{299}\) with the number of Romanian ‘specialists’ working in the developing countries plus the number of young people from the developing countries studying in the Romanian universities. If anything else is included in the sphere of ‘technical assistance’ – this is never made very clear.

If Romanian sources offer limited official and public information about the actual size of Romania’s ‘material support’ to the developing countries, data about the level of ‘technical assistance’ (as described above) is before everybody’s eyes. Romanian authors proudly inform that:

‘**thousands of Romanian specialists are presently working in developing countries, while an important number of young people from those countries study in Romania**\(^{300}\).’

How reliable such data is might sometimes be a question of interpretation. In 1979, Călîna shows that there were 15,000 Romanian specialists working in 60 developing countries (the non-aligned countries included), a sharp increase from 1970’s 4,000. At the same time, 15,000 students (most of them from the developing countries) were studying in Romania at the time this author was writing\(^{301}\). But in 1971 (just one year after Călîna’s alleged 4000 Romanian specialists working in the developing countries) President Ceauşescu himself shows a different picture, when saying that:

‘**In the field of technical assistance 642 Romanian specialists work in the developing countries, of which more than 500 are in the African countries.** From

\(^{297}\) Presumably a refinancing of the 1972 credit.

\(^{298}\) In some cases not only the purpose of the credit is kept from the public, but also the value of the credit remains unspecified.

\(^{299}\) Various Scînteia articles, Călîna, op. cit., p. 2006.

\(^{300}\) Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac, *Socialist Romania in International Relations*, Meridiane, Bcuureşti, 1975, p. 65.

\(^{301}\) Călîna, op. cit., p. 6.
the developing countries, 665 students study in various training institutions from Romania, of which 166 come from the African continent."}

Since such a sharp decrease (from 4000 to 642) is unlikely to have taken place in a time when the size of Romanian technical assistance was supposed to be on the increase, it follows that while the program of ‘technical assistance’ as such is real, its exact size is more difficult to be established. In any case, it is a matter of national pride that many young people in the developing countries ‘dream to accomplish their studies in Romania’ and this is given as one of the reasons for which the Romanian state is so willing to enroll them in such large numbers in the Romanian universities.

A further observation regarding the actual size of Romania’s technical assistance program is the way such size is expressed. If one is satisfied with the ‘head count’ (number of Romanian specialists and number of foreign students) for figuring out the size of Romania’s program of technical assistance, one will find such data (even if sometimes controversial, as shown above) for almost any year starting with the seventies and ending with 1989. However, one will hardly find out the lei or dollar value of such programs. The reports will always be given in this form (number of Romanian specialists – number of foreign students) and never as a comprehensive amount of funds that the Romanian state might have spent. One possible explanation can be the fact that the expenses incurred with the Romanian specialists were usually supported by the developing countries themselves and not by the Romanian state budget. However, the students’ scholarships do not follow the same scheme of reasoning, as the scholarships were usually given by the Romanian state. Nonetheless, their value was still given as ‘head count’ (number of trained students) rather than a comprehensive amount spent year by year from Romania’s state budget. This might be due to fears of unpopularity of the program had the public knew how exactly Romania was spending on foreign aid: indeed, while Romanians themselves were experiencing economic hardships and the leadership was constantly promoting the ‘developing country’ doctrine, information about the state giving away scarce resources that could be better spent for Romania’s own development could have raised many questions.

302 Interview released by President Ceauşescu to ‘Jeune Afrique’.
303 Ioan Grigorescu, reporting for Scânteia on the 15th of April 1979, in occasion of President Ceausescu’s visit in Zambia, interviews the ‘young Kinje Kumolo’ who ‘dreams to accomplish his studies in Romania’. He is passionate about chemistry and followed closely the scientific progresses of this discipline in our country’. Kinje Kumolo is quoted to say: “I know that many Zambian students study in your country – he says. This is one of the most concrete forms of cooperation, because tomorrow all these young people will be reliable cadres for our national economy and Zambia’s advancement”.

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Romania’s contribution to improving the skills of developing countries’ professionals is part of what Romania also calls its ‘scientific assistance’ to the developing countries. Under the ‘scientific assistance’ heading Romania unfolds a whole series of activities such as: offering state-funded scholarships for developing countries’ nationals; sending Romanian professionals and experts to work in the developing countries; having Romanian professionals train developing countries professionals; transferring scientific, technologic and teaching equipment to research institutes from the developing countries 304.

An overview of Romania’s forms of assistance (as ‘assistance’ is defined by Romanian sources) would not be complete without mentioned that, beyond all, Romania takes a very broad view when classifying the forms of assistance it grants to the developing countries. Thus, it considers that it assists the developing countries not only when extending credits, scholarships or grants, but also when sharing from its own experience in capitalizing on the country’s natural resources; when backing the developing countries positions in the various international forums; and when joining their fight colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. In addition, Romania is also a supporter of East–South multilateral cooperation, a form of cooperation in which two or more socialist countries pull their efforts together for accomplishing various economic objectives in the developing countries 305. Great pride does Romania take also from a special form of industrial cooperation, officially called the ‘industrial cooperation in two phases’ or ‘buy-back’. According to the Romanian scholars this form of cooperation came to be known in international forums as the ‘the Romanian formula for industrial cooperation’, given that it was for the first time proposed by Romania as early as 1958, at the 13th session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe 306.

According to reports, articles and interviews by Scînteia, this mix of assistance formats is acknowledged by many leaders in the developing countries. An example is the Gabonese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edouard-Alexis Mbouy-Boutzit, speaking in 1979, in occasion


of President Ceauşescu’s state visit to this country to sign the Romanian - Gabonese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In this occasion the Gabonese Minister said:

‘In the field of staff training, for instance, it is enough to show that almost 500 Gabonese are now studying in Romania, specializing in various professions. We have high esteem for Romania’s participation in joint venture for the exploitation and valorization of our natural wealth, especially our iron ore, at Benga. For us, it also of great importance the interest of Romania to participate in building the trans-Gabon railway, which, as our President Bongo is the backbone of the multilateral development of Gabon. Our country shows a special interest towards the Romanian technology and experience, which can help us in the complex capitalization of the national wealth, allowing Gabon to take new steps on the path of underdevelopment liquidation’.

This way, in the Romanian approach to development cooperation and, in particular, its contribution to other countries’ development, its ‘assistance’ for other countries was not so much about hard-currency cash transfers as about a transfer of goods and services that need to be in the advantage of both ‘donor’ (Romania) and ‘recipient’ (the developing country). This – the ‘mutually-advantageous help’, in Romanian ‘într-ajutorare’ – can be considered as one last, but very significant, feature of Romania’s ‘assistance’ to the developing countries.

Generally, in the West as in the East a positive return on investment is expected not only from purely commercial relations, but from development assistance as well. The donors’ self-interest has been documented and reviewed by various authors and still the West is rather reluctant in emphasizing its self-interest. In contrast, Romania and its socialist counter-parts legitimized their self-interest by enshrining it in official discourse. In an interview released to the ‘Jeune Afrique’ review (22nd of October 1971), President Ceauşescu shows that:

‘Romania has developed, especially in the last year, relations of broad cooperation with the developing countries, seeing in this both the path for the socio-economic growth of the respective countries and an integrated part of the fight against the imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.'

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307 Scînteia, 8 April, 1979. Author’s translation from Romanian.
In other words, cooperation – economical, cultural, diplomatic, etc. – between a socialist and a developing country has a development effect in itself, so that Romania is already granting a form of assistance in the very moment it cooperates with the ‘countries engaged on an independent development path’.

2.1.2.2. Foreign Sources on the Romanian Aid Program

In spite of information scarcity in the Romanian public sources, foreign sources report various data regarding the size of Romania’s ‘aid’ program. Paul Gafton, quoting the 1st of April 1977 edition of The Neue Züricher Zeitung, estimates that the overall Romanian assistance to all developing countries in the 1950-1975 period amounted to 1,767 million dollars. To offer a scale of comparison, the article shows that the assistance of the USSR and the East European countries during the same period was 19,87 million dollars. However, the term ‘assistance’ is not defined so that it is difficult for the reader to infer how these amounts are spent.

Writing in 1983, Linden quotes a Radio Free Europe Research Report from 29 of April 1977 estimating that in the time from 1966 to 1970 Romania contributed an average of $40 million per year in foreign aid, while for 1971-5 aid commitments ‘jumped’ to an average of $350 million per year, to a level that was ‘by far the largest foreign aid budget in Eastern Europe’.

Thomas Barnett’s book ‘Romanian and East German Policies...’ is a third source where the interested reader can find data on Romania’s aid program (see figure 6 below). Basing his conclusions on the United Nations’ Statistical Yearbook, Barnett talks about ‘Romania’s bilateral commitments of capital to non-communist developing countries’. The author makes it clear that with the expression ‘bilateral commitments of capital’ he actually refers to aid money, but – like his predecessors – he also fails to define what ‘aid’

309 Phrase used by the regime to denote the developing countries.
310 The author consulted: Scînteia, Lumea, and various Romanian authors like Sorica Sava, Mircea Maliţa, Gavriil Horja, Eugen Preda and Cristian Popişteanu, etc.
311 Paul Gafton, op. cit.
is meant with. A further potential sources of uncertainty is introduced by Barnett, when discussing Romania’s aid to the ‘non-communist developing countries’, without giving any indication about similar commitments to communist or socialist-leaning developing countries. Is the reader to infer that Romania was concentrating its ‘bilateral commitments’ on the non-communist developing countries? Should we believe that similar commitments were made to left-leaning developing countries? Were the former larger or smaller than the latter?

Figure 8 - Bilateral Commitments of Capital to Non-Communist Developing Countries: 1970-1978

This way, Barnett’s data are theoretically not comparable to those quoted by Gafton and Linden as these authors do not make the distinction introduced by Barnett and probably refer to Romania’s aid giving to all developing countries. Neither one of these three authors offers data regarding the countries receiving Romanian aid, so that one can hardly know which the beneficiary countries were.

Nonetheless, some clear conclusions can be drawn. One of the most important of these is that Romania is seen as an aid giver and each of these authors presents firm data – sometimes collected from the most authoritative sources (ex. Barnett’s using the United Nations Statistical Yearbook) to support this allegation.

A second conclusion is that the size of the Romanian aid program – for the small-sized country that Romania was at the time – was not negligible. In the tableau pictured by Gafton’s data, between 1950 and 1975 Romania is assumed to have contributed an average of 70 million $US per year (1,767 millions $US divided per 25 years = 70.68). Linden talks about a sudden increase from 40 million $US per year between 1966 and 1970 to an
average of 350 million; this means that, practically, between 1966 and 1970 Romania spent 200 million $US (40 million $US per year x 5 years = 200 million over 5 years), while in the 5 years to follow, Romania allegedly spent 1,750 $US million (350 million $US per year x 5 years = 1,750 million). Linden and Barnett’s data seem to confirm each other: for the period from 1971 to 1975 Barnett also reports 1,750 million given by Romania in bilateral commitments. It is interesting to note that, according to these data, in the five years starting with 1966 Romania had allegedly spent approximately $200 million in foreign aid, while in the following five years it has increased its aid budget by a factor of 8.5. This increase perfectly corresponds to Romania’s increase in diplomatic activity to these countries.

This way, a third conclusion is that the 1970s seem to be the most relevant years in Romania’s history as an international ‘donor’. At a global level, the ‘aid industry’ was set out by the Western powers immediately after the Second World War, with President Truman’s inaugural speech of 1949. The East did not wait long for realizing aid’s potential as an ‘instrument for the destruction of the imperialism’ and for starting to use such instrument for its own advantage. For the first two decades of the ‘development age’ Romania seems to have brought its own contribution – even if at modest levels - but the 1970s saw a more consistent involvement with as much as 750 $US million put forward in one year alone (1974). Quantitatively, this might have been the peak of the Romanian aid program, followed by a gradual decline and reversal (with Romania becoming an aid receiver immediately after 1989).

2.1.3 Policy Stagnation with Ever Stronger Pro-development Rhetoric

The next phase – from 1975 to 1977 – of Romanian policy making towards the South is labeled by Barnett as a time of ‘cooling off’, characterized by a decrease in high-level...
political contacts between the Romanian leaders and their counterparts in the developing countries. In 1975, the number of summits attended by Romania reached a high 27 in number, but this was mainly due to Ceauşescu’s Latin American tour of that year. 1976 and 1977 stand with more modest summitry levels: ‘only’ 23 summits were attended by Romania in the two years to follow (11 summits in 1976 and 12 summits in 1977).

Nevertheless, these years are equally strong if not stronger in pro-development rhetoric. The occasion is given by the onset of the ‘New International Economic Order’ debate. In Romania, this debate is not only followed, but it is also given a ‘Romanian’ interpretation, as various Romanian commentators write about the ‘Romanian concept of the new order’.

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was a set of proposals channeled by the developing countries through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Non-alignment Movement to advocate for better conditions for developing countries’ participation in the international economic life. Some of the measures the developing countries were bringing forward were: improved terms of trade; increased development assistance; technical assistance with no strings attached; transfer of technology to the developing countries; developed-country tariff reductions in favor of poor countries’ development. In the Romanian perspective the ‘new order’ should be ‘covering all spheres of international life, and not only the economic one’, so that President Ceauşescu would rather speak about a ‘new economic and political order’, as to underline the ‘growing interdependence between economic, political, social and military factors’. Romanian authors never hesitate to stress that

‘Romania was the first country to have formulated the comprehensive concept of the new international economic and political order and to have signed out the close connexion between the new international economic order and the new international political order.

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320 Ion Barac and Dragoș Serbanescu, op. cit., p. 345.
321 Idem.
322 Orthographic mistake in the original text.
323 Idem, pp. 344-346.
Romania’s support for the NIEO was all the more enthusiastic as every NIEO proposal held potential benefits for Romania’s own development and the achievement of its ‘multilaterally developed socialist society’ (MDSS). The fact that the NIEO was instrumental for the MDSS was most obvious – according to Barnett – in the Romanian declaration to the 1975 UN Seventh Special Session. On this occasion, Romania asked for measures such as: 1. the need for the developed countries to transfer advanced technological resources to the developing countries; 2. the elimination of all barriers to trade (a call that is still with us at current date); 3. the need to stimulate world food production; 4. the creation of new energy sources and the need to stabilize price relations between raw materials and industrial goods; 5. creating a just international monetary system; 6. increasing Western technical aid; 7. increasing the United Nation’s role in North-South talks on these issues. As Barnett shows, most of these points were related to Romania’s own development needs, as the MDSS campaign needed access to Western technology (see the ‘transfer of technology’), Western markets (see the ‘trade barriers’), at the time Romania’s perceived economic strengths was agriculture (see ‘food production’) and oil-related industries (see ‘raw material prices’), while Romania’s external debt could hinder its development (see the reference to a ‘just monetary system’). It is clear, thus, that Romania ‘had a vested interest in the promotion of the NIEO’, as it is also obvious that Romania was making plans for taking advantage of its new status as a developing country for advancing its own developmental plans.

Possibly due to its constant presence on the international arena, Romania gains now large diplomatic recognition in important international contexts. In 1975 it is granted the Most Favored Nation status by the United States of America; the same year it also achieves to receive the ‘guest’ status to the Non-aligned Movement’s annual conference; Romania becomes member to every specialized and technical agency of the UN family, where it advocates on the similar issues as the Southern countries; and, most importantly, in 1976 Romania gains the long aspired-for membership of the Group of 77 – the only forum which could give Romania worldwide recognition for its claim of being a developing country. Romania had sought G77 membership as early as 1964, but it had been turned down on the Group’s reluctance to integrate a European country or a COMECON member. Among other things, the Group feared Bucharest’s unfair competition over aid resources from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other donors.

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324 Thomas Barnett, op. cit.
So hardly obtained, Romania’s membership to the UNCTAD and the Group of 77 was vividly supported by President Ceauşescu. According to Romanian sources\(^{325}\), under Ceauşescu’s ‘guidance’ Romania had been a particularly active and successful actor on the international arena up to the last years of his stay in power. Serbănescu and Olteanu show that in 1964, at the first session of the UNCTAD, Romania – together with Indonesia, Egypt and Tanzania – drafted a proposal regarding the opportunity of industrial equipment for the developing countries to be offered on credit and the credits to be repaid by the products the respective country would produce with the respective equipment\(^{326}\). In 1968, at the second session of the UNCTAD in New Delhi, two Romanian resolutions were adopted unanimously\(^{327}\). On the same occasion Romania circulated a ‘memorandum’ regarding the ‘modern forms of international economic cooperation’; some of the ideas in this memorandum were then included in a resolution drafted by the Group. Romania was a member of the 40-member working group that drafted a document regarding the economic rights and duties of the states and

‘from the very first meeting of the working group Romania presented a broad document entitled <The Structure of the Chart of economic rights and duties of the states>’.

Romania’s ideas were also heard at the third UNCTAD session, where the ‘Chart of economic rights and duties of the states’ was for the first time introduced. At the fourth session of the UNCTAD – Nairobi, 1976 – Romania participated as a fresh member of the Group of 77

‘bringing her constructive contribution, particularly active (…), supporting firmly the Declaration and the Action Program adopted in Manila\(^{328}\)’.

Romania was an active member of the Group of 77, until Ceauşescu’s last year in power. Thus, in September 1989, in occasion of the Group’s Ministerial Meeting at New York, the Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu presented the Group with a series of proposals to be advocated for in international forums. Many of Totu’s proposals used to refer to the debt problem, a predicament that regarded not only the great majority of the developing

\(^{325}\) In particular Scînteia, Lumea, Serbănescu and Olteanu (1978) and others.
\(^{326}\) Ilie Serbănescu and Ilie Olteanu, *Grupul celor 77...*, op. cit., p. 61. Serbănescu and Olteanu mention that ‘Gazzette de Lausanne’ appreciated Romania’s proposal as ‘an original and realistic plan intended to ensure the financing of aid towards the underdeveloped countries, while fully taking into account the interests of the industrialized nations’.
\(^{327}\) One of the resolutions was referred to the promotion of exports and the other one regarded measures to be taken for informing the global opinion about the works of the UNCTAD and the problems of development.
\(^{328}\) Ilie Serbănescu and Ilie Olteanu, *Grupul celor 77...*, op. cit., p. 65.
countries, but Romania itself. Totu’s proposals called for: a 4-5% interest rate for credits from the MFI and the ‘big banks’; the recalculation of the existing credits to a 2-3% interest rate; the MFI and other banks to relinquish the ‘structural adjustment’ programs; ‘reasonable’ prices for the raw materials to halt the ‘transfer of wealth from these countries to the developed countries’\(^{329}\). This way, as it had been the case with the NIEO proposals some fifteen years before, the new proposals were both in the interest of the developing countries, and in Romania’s own interest, as President Ceauşescu was allegedly striving to build a sense of ‘dialectic unity’ between Romania’s internal and external policy. In this sense, Romania’s external actions were to be harnessed to the construction of the Romanian multilaterally developed society, while the latter was to be built in a world in which – theoretically - every individual country had the right to determine its own way towards development. As expressed by Popişteanu in 1976,

‘supporting actively the efforts of the Asian, African and Latin-American states, Romania promotes the concept of a world in which, both internally and in the international relations free development of each country is the condition of the free development of all countries’\(^{330}\).

2.1.4. Over-extension, Withdrawal and Marginalization

In spite of President Ceauşescu’s enthusiasm for associating Romania with the developing countries and include it in the Group of 77, the first signs of political slip-ups come into sight. Barnett shows that the significant increase in trade - that was so much hoped for - remained at expectations level and never materialized into practice\(^{331}\). As it is obvious from figure 3 Romania never succeeded in having a significant advantage in its trade with the least developed countries and actually, 1978 and 1979 are the first years when imports from Africa are quantitatively above the Romanian exports to that continent. The difference is of few million US$ in 1978, but this will quickly reach 100 million US$ in 1979\(^{332}\). Alarmed, President Ceauşescu shows that:

‘One of the very serious problems (…) is that of fuel and energy. We became big oil importers. The Romanian production of oil is today smaller than its imports. You

\(^{329}\) Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 602.

\(^{330}\) In Romanian, in original: ‘libera dezvoltare a fiecărui este condiția liberei dezvoltări a tuturor’. Popişteanu, op.cit., p. 49.

\(^{331}\) Barnett, op. cit.


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all know how oil prices have raised (...). There are developed countries that set to themselves from this very year to achieve a decrease of their oil consumption by 4-5%, or even more. We, unfortunately, have decided to import even more oil this year. It is obvious that we can not continue on this path\textsuperscript{333}.

Thus, for President Ceauşescu the problem is of a technical nature and the ‘serious problems’ are not due to mistaken economic decisions taken at the highest levels (actually by himself); the problem is that ‘we import a big quantity of oil, more than 50% of out our national economy needs’\textsuperscript{334} and less the fact that previous economic decisions made these imports vital for Romania’s industry, bringing it in the awkward situation of needing to import others’ oil in order for her to be able to keep its oil refining plants open.

As Barnett\textsuperscript{335} shows, all these happened because President Ceauşescu had tried to avoid depending on the Soviet oil. When Romania started to build its heavy industry, the wide network of Romanian - developing countries relations seemed to be a viable alternative to dependence on Russian imports. Important steps were taken so that by mid 1970s every barrel of oil that Romania needed came from the OPEC countries. With dwindling national reserves, Romania was obliged to import ever larger quantities of oil, in the worst of the times: at the exact moments when the world was experiencing the first, and then the second, oil crisis. This way, Romania passed from self-sufficiency to importing ever larger quantities of oil: 2 million tons in 1970, 9 million tons in 1977 and as much as 16 million tons in 1980. On a smaller scale, the predicament was the same for other industries, too: steel plants that needed to import steel, aluminum plants that needed bauxite, etc. Needless to say, such an economic policy quickly led to trade deficit and currency drain. In this context, the Romanian commentators started to avert a sense of concern. Ilie Serbănescu – Romania’s most authoritative economic journalist – was soon to voice the regimes preoccupation with this development and wrote about ‘the obvious sense of betrayal by fellow developing countries’, especially the OPEC ones that were now draining the resources of their counterparts (Romania obviously included). One of the solutions presented by the Romanian delegate to the Ministers’ Conference of the Group of 77, was

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\textsuperscript{333} Speech at the meeting (consfatuirea) with management staff in industry, construction, transport and agriculture, 6 March 1979. Romania… vol. 17, Bucureşti, Editura politică, 1979, pp. 570-571.
\textsuperscript{335} Thomas Barnett, op. cit.
\end{flushright}
for the existing surpluses (namely the petrodollars) of some of the developing countries to be used for the financial aid of others.

In the beginning of his Third World strategy, the regime had planned for a high 30% of its world trade to take place in partnership with the developing countries. Due to high oil prices this share was almost reached in 1981 (29%). Sadly, this was not in favor, but to the detriment of the Romanian society that, in the meanwhile, had accumulated a $US 10 billion foreign debt that was mainly invested in unreasonable economic objectives like the ones described above. In face of disaster President Ceauşescu refuses to admit failure and blames the ‘capitalist’ Western banks that squeeze developing countries like Romania to the last drop. In disappointment, President Ceauşescu will shift Romania’s trade back to COMECON countries, and especially Soviet Union (for what oil was concerned). According to Barnett this shift only took place because trade with West and South had proven to be ‘too unpredictable and dangerous for the regime’. At the political level, after another African tour in 1983 the level of diplomatic activity decreased significantly ‘to levels not seen since the pre-1973 period’.

As Barnett shows, the final result of President Ceauşescu’s policy towards the South (and all its correlates) seemed to trade one sort of dependency for the other: ‘in 1970 Ceauşescu’s nightmare involved Soviet tanks crashing over the border, by 1980 that image had changed to Western bankers knocking at the door’. In the past, the Romanian development goals and needs were dressed up in the language of international rhetoric. Once more, ‘Romania’s presentation of the Third World’s development needs was subsumed under its own’, so that ‘the Romanian debt campaign colored everything that the regime said or proposed concerning the Third World’. Ceauşescu began to advance such proposals as debt forgiveness for all countries with an annual per capita of less than $600; rescheduling of debts; a moratorium on all repayments; a ceiling on annual repayments of 15% of export earnings.

By the mid 1980s, Ceauşescu and his foreign policy become marginal for the international system. The ‘peace’ debate can perfectly illustrate how. In Romania, Ceauşescu was always praised and depicted as one of the World’s most important ‘fighters for peace’, in a context in which
'peace can no longer be viewed as the interval of tranquility between two wars, but as a vital problem on which our sheer survival depends'.

Indeed, President Ceaușescu did not waste any opportunity to speak about and urge for peace and according to Romanian commentators, this was one of Ceaușescu’s ‘greatest merits that brought him the esteem and the consideration of the widest political circles from allover’.

In the most varied national and international circumstances he repeated relentlessly that ‘The fundamental problem of the contemporary époque is stopping the arms race, in the first place of the nuclear ones’.

In 1987, the two opposing super-powers of the day - the Soviet Union and the United States – agreed for the first time in history for a treaty that contemplated the elimination of a certain type of armament – the nuclear missiles - as opposed to previous treaties that were only setting maximum ceilings for armaments. In view of his persistent ‘fight’ for peace, one could have expected this recent Soviet-American development to be enthusiastically welcomed by the peace fighter that Ceaușescu allegedly was. But this did not happen. In his press release, Agerpres - the Romanian Press Agency – briefly considered the historical step that had been taken and disproportionately insisted on what was still unaccomplished. Even if the nuclear disarmament had been Ceaușescu’s main point up to that moment, now he insisted that the treaty should also include other types of armament and that it should be viewed as a mere first step towards the intensification of the fight for peace. This way, Ceaușescu willingly places himself on marginal positions, fearful that the two super-powers were only plotting against him. Other clamorous cases saw Romania refusing to sign the six-point declaration of the Paris Conference held in 1988 aiming to prohibit the chemical weapons and the final document of the Vienna Conference for security and cooperation in Europe.
Gorbachev’s coming into power and his policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* invited to the democratization of the whole block. Visiting Bucharest, the Soviet leader ‘thinely veiled criticism of the ruling Ceaușescu clan’, at a time when the West started to voice serious concerns over human rights in Romania (triggered most specially by the ‘systematization’ affair). Romania’s brilliant foreign policy and its dream of becoming a respected leader of the Third World approach their end, while President Ceaușescu remains ever more isolated on the international arena.

### 2.1.5. Concluding Remarks

As Linden shows, Romania’s policy towards the developing countries was one of the most active when compared to its socialist counterparts and allies. In many instances, President Ceaușescu’s foreign policy was appreciated as being ‘deviant’. One of the most relevant instances of deviation was Romania’s self-identification as a socialist and developing country. There are two main factors that justify this European country to enroll itself in developing countries’ ranks. Economically, this policy is needed to support Romania’s own development policy, its ultimate goal of reaching the so-called ‘multilaterally developed society’. Politically, the policy is embarked upon its potential of securing a certain degree of national legitimacy by establishing a relative autonomy, if not independence, in relation with the hegemonic Soviet Union, by presenting Romania as a highly visible, respected and effective international actor.

By officially entering the group of developing countries Romania qualifies as potential aid recipient. At the same time, in the name of ‘mutual help’, ‘reciprocal advantages’ and ‘South-South cooperation’, Romania is also a giver of aid, probably one of the most important among its Eastern European socialist peers. Romania’s aid mainly consists in export credits, scholarships for developing countries’ nationals and Romanian transfers of know-how (Romanian transfers of technology and Romanian experts working in the developing countries). This way, just like the policy towards the developing countries, the aid policy is promoted with a view to strengthening Romania’s performance in its internal opposed by the other counterparts, as it would have meant that the principles of consensus and unanimity were being endangered.

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345 Idem.
347 Carl A. Linden, op. cit.
348 Carl A. Linden, op. cit.
development. Be as it is, due to its high level of activism, Romania needs to be acknowledged as a relevant policy-maker towards the South and an aid giver according to the same criteria that qualify the Soviet Union as one of the most important donor of those times.

2.2. Romania’s Discourse for International Development

As already shown in the previous section, various scholars, analysts and commentators had studied Romania’s foreign policy, its close relations with the developing countries, its activities in the Third World, or the treaties of ‘friendship and cooperation’ it had agreed with these countries. Less studied are the discursive processes that made these political behaviors possible, the articulations of knowledge and practices that were needed for some things rather than others to become ‘thinkable’ and ‘sayable’ in the socialist Romania in what the field of international development was concerned.

The orientation towards a discursive approach is supported by preliminary research informing that from the 60s to the 90s, President Ceauşescu delivered countless of speeches on development matters; upon his initiative and through intense diplomatic efforts Romania applied and became a member of the Group of the 77 – a unique status for a member of the socialist ‘block’; Scînteia and Lumea published innumerable articles describing the living conditions of the ‘poorest of the poor’ in the developing World and

349 Consultation and extensive reading of newspapers, journals and books published before 1989; speeches delivered by President Ceauşescu in various settings; reviews of Romania’s South policy by foreign commentators, etc.


352 One of the most powerful was ‘Seceta Sahelului’ (The Sahel’s Drought’) in Scînteia, 28 May, 1978. An excerpt from this article is worth quoting, while noting that, according to the author’s knowledge, no similar pieces of writing has been published in a post-89 Romanian newspaper: ‘It was the year 1973, and then 1974. The numbers were tragic – over one hundred thousand deaths as consequence of the prolonged drought, and the photographs, even if they clip only limited shots of the disaster seemed more tragic than the tragic numbers: the earth – a crust rift by the heat, like an enormous distension of clay; bunches of people consummated by thirst around dry wells; a mother carrying aback her child without knowing that the child
various volumes were printed on Romania’s ‘vision’ of underdevelopment and the ways to
tackle its causes; numerous ‘calls’ were launched by Romania for the ‘rich countries’ to
take action against global poverty.

Given socialist Romania’s ‘overextended’ policy towards the South (illustrated in a
previous section) and a rather impressive amount of public pronouncements on
international development, there is background for considering that, in its socialist years,
Romania did master a specific discourse of international development. This section of the
case study will bring arguments for this hypothesis and will unveil some of the
characteristics of Socialist Romania’s discourse of international development. In a later
stage, this will form the backdrop for arguing that the assumption – frequently held in
various institutional settings - that the New Member States are ‘newcomers’ to
international development needs to be discussed in view of historical evidence, while fully
taking into consideration the impact that precursor discourses might have on the current-
date attitudes and practices.

Delineating Romania’s discourse for international development is a challenging task.
According to practices of the time, Romania was a donor country, while according to
standards created by itself, it was also a ‘developing’ country. This way, Romania
could enjoy the advantages of an ambiguous status – as both a supporter of and donor for
the developing countries and a potential recipient of development aid. Romania was not

passed away long ago; skeletal agonizing people, skin on bone, like survivors of the camps in Auschwitz or
Buchenwald; simply atrophied animals, turning into dust…;

A classic study in the Romanian literature: Sorica Sava (coord.), Căi şi strategii de lichidare a

Term used by Robin Alison Remington, “Romania: Boundary Disintegration between East and South”, in
Brigitte H. Schulz and William W. Hansen, The Soviet Bloc and the Third World: The Political Economy of

At least when compared the amount of pronouncements performed before and after 1989. The author
drew such a comparison by empirical observation means, taking into consideration the main journals that
were published in Romania before and after 1989.

See section 4.1.1. for a discussion of the Romanian foreign aid.

These ‘standards’ refer to Romania’s initiative to declare itself a ‘developing country’. See section 4.1.1.
for a discussion on how the argumentation in favor of such identity was forged by President Ceauşescu and
various Romanian scholars.

See section 4.1.1. for a discussion on how this ‘developing country’ identity was proposed and built by
the Romanian elite of the time, as well as potential reasons for advancing such a proposal. To ‘give a clear
image of the general orientation of Romania’s international policy’ Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac
consider that ‘it is necessary to remind its objective coordinates’: Romania is from a political point of view a
socialist country; from a demographic and territorial point of view Romania is among the small and medium-
sized countries; from an economic point of view, Romania is a developing country, while from a geographic
point of view, Romania is an European country. Romania’s external policy is determined by these ‘objective
parameters’. See Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac, Principiile politicii externe a României socialiste,
the only communist country to have forged such an identity. China, for instance, had preceded it. But – to ad to the above-mentioned ambiguity - Romania was, for sure, the only country in Europe to voice such a claim.

Therefore, when analyzing Romania’s concept of international development discourse and practice, one needs to be aware of this contradiction that leads Romania to speak both from a potential donor as well as a potential receiver (given its status of ‘developing country’) of development aid. At the same time, one needs to bear in mind that Romania’s practices in the field – obviously influenced by a socialist ideology – might have been different from Western practices of the time or from what we now understand by ‘development cooperation’ or ‘official development assistance’.

Besides, and as already shown, hardly was there a clear distinction between commercial operations and aid programs, while statistics on the aid volumes were hardly available. To further obscure the scene, President Ceauşescu’s keen interest into all foreign policy issues, his ‘friendship’ with the Third World leaders, his ability to control the Romanian society, rendered him an almost exclusive right to speak on international development matters, in such a way that other voices could hardly be heard if not for praising or bringing arguments for Romania’s official positions.

Nicolae Ceauşescu stayed in power for more than two decades, covering the whole period in which Romania attempted to boost its status in the international life and to be involved in the international development debate. In such a context, it might be overly ambitious to try and operate a distinction between what was ‘Ceauşescu’s and what was ‘Romania’s concept of international development. Last but no least, Romania’s set of proposals for international development was formulated over a period of several decades and was never collected in a single document: there is no equivalent, for the Romanian context, of Western countries’ ‘strategies for development cooperation’, ‘development cooperation

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360 No other Romanian was interviewed by Scintea on development matters. Journalists would usually explain Ceauşescu’s ‘proposals’. Scholars – such as Sorica Sava or Gavril Horja - writing on development would duly quote and support Ceauşescu’s views on international matters.
policies’, ‘policy papers’ and other similar documents that give a – more or less – clear idea of that particular countries’ intentions and position in the field.

Therefore, any attempt to ‘unveil’ Romania’s concept of international development needs to be made cautiously, with an archeological-like attitude. This assignment calls for the will to look far beyond the historical and ideological context of Romania itself, to the whole socialist ‘camp’, without, at the same time, neglecting developments in the ‘capitalist’ World; and most importantly, it calls for one to be open to consider the words and deeds of a former political leader – President Nicolae Ceaușescu – in the current historical time when most of what he said and did in his days is largely discredited and rebuffed.

In what follows we will try to avoid every hurdle and explore what could amount to a Romanian concept of global development, as exposed by Romanian scholars and commentators; we will analyze the influence President Ceaușescu had through his actions, and more importantly, through his pronouncements in the field; and we will look into the way the general public was being involved in and informed about global development affairs. Three main sources will be used: academic, but also popularization, articles and volumes on development matters authored by the Romanian scholars of the time; President Ceaușescu’s official speeches; and articles published by the Romanian Communist Party official journal – Scînteia - and other Romanian journals.
2.2.1. The Romanian Concept for International Development

As Robin Alison Remington\textsuperscript{361} showed, Romania’s ideological agenda for the South can be characterized as of a ‘Byzantine complexity’; to sort it out would require a case by case analysis of Romania’s relations with every developing country\textsuperscript{362}. There are various reasons for such ‘Byzantine complexity’: calculated ambiguity being standard practice in Bucharest’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{363}; the Third World itself representing a wide range of political, ideological and economic opportunities to Romanian policy-makers\textsuperscript{364}; Romania’s policy towards the South not being exclusively developmental, but also having an obvious political and economic agenda behind\textsuperscript{365}; Ceauşescu – as a main actor behind such policy – seeming to play the ‘Third World’ card to boost his personal status and reinforce his own personality cult, domestically and internationally\textsuperscript{366}.

This section of the case study will not aim to establish a ‘historical truth’. It will not endeavor to ‘discover’ if the main tenets of Romania’s concept of global development were ‘consistent’ in the sense of making rhetoric meet reality and practicing what it preached; if this concept was effective and efficient in the sense of providing real relief to the ‘backward’ countries; if it was based on factual and ‘scientific’ rather than ideological grounding; if it was an emulation of Soviet thinking, rather than a genuine Romanian set of beliefs. What this section is doing, is to put to an use the vast amounts of discursive resources produced before 1989 in the Romanian context and analyze them with a view to understanding the characteristics of the stated conception that Romania promoted as (what we would nowadays call) ‘good practices’ of international development. Our query is more related to what Romania was proposing, than to what Romania was doing to ‘help’ poor

\textsuperscript{361} Professor Emeritus, Political Science at the University of Missouri – Columbia and a research affiliate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies. Her publications include: 


\textsuperscript{363} Idem.

\textsuperscript{364} According to the Law no. 1 / 1971 technical assistance to the developing countries is circumscribed to the foreign trade instruments: ‘The activity of external trade is given a broad content, by its comprising the commercial operations and of economic cooperation regarding the vending, the procurement and the exchange of goods (…), tourism, the design and execution of works, technical assistance or collaboration (…)’. Quoted by Alexandru Puia, \textit{ComerŃul exterior şi rolul lui în realizarea programului de dezvoltare economică a României}, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, p. 6.

countries. At the same time, this section will attempt to understand if the sum of things being said and written at that historical time could amount to a specific semantic domain that was in any correspondence with the Western discourse of development cooperation, as well as with the contemporary one.

2.2.1.1. Romanian Scholars on International Development

Beginning with the second half of the 1970s, a series of Romanian scholars, particularly from the economic field, start giving ever more attention to matters related to international development, developing countries’ state of underdevelopment and related topics\(^\text{367}\) that would nowadays be included under the title ‘development cooperation’ or ‘development awareness’\(^\text{368}\). The drive towards such analyses was explained\(^\text{369}\) by one of these scholars in 1980:

> ‘There are not many issues that raise in the current times such a big interest and such lively controversies as the issue of economic development and underdevelopment. [...] The analysis of the causes, of the ways and means for solving this issue can let nobody unconcerned. It is against reason that the spectacular economic progress recorded today in the World, under the impact of the technical-scientific revolution to be shadowed by the picture of

\(^{367}\) As revealed by bibliographic research carried out by the author. The main keywords used for reviewing the Romanian literature in this field were: ‘subdezvoltare’ (underdevelopment), ‘Ńǎri în curs de dezvoltare’ (developing countries), ‘relaŃii externe’ (external relations), ‘dezvoltare’ (development), ‘ajutor pentru dezvoltare’ (development aid).

\(^{368}\) An example: the Office for Documentation and Scientific Information of the ‘Stefan Gheorghiu’ Academy will publish a series of ‘dossiers’ including documents adopted by the UN and its specialized agencies regarding the ‘problems of the creation of a new international economic order, of underdevelopment and the ways for removing it’. See ***, Subdezvoltarea economicǎ şi câile întăturǎrii ei în dezbaterea ONU şi a organismelor sale specializate’, Academia ‘Stefan Gheorghiu’, Oficiul de documentare şi informare ştiinŃificǎ, caiet documentar 3/1976, 1976. The dossier includes a list of resolutions initiated by Romania between 1957 and 1974. Many of these are related to global development. Some examples are as follows: 5 December 1959 - Possibilities for international cooperation in the field of oil industry in the underdeveloped countries; December 20 1968 – International cooperation in the field of using electronic computers and computing techniques for development; December 13 1969 – Public administration and development; 22 March 1968 – Measures for informing the global public opinion on the works of the UNCTAD Conference and the problems of development; May 17 1972 – Disseminating information and mobilizing the public opinion regarding the problems of commerce and development, etc.

\(^{369}\) Beyond this explanation, other scholars and commentators show that in the 1970s Ceauşescu was eager to ride the tide of Third World radicalism and present himself as a world leader. See, Thomas Barnett, Romanian and East German..., op. cit. For a more recent analyses, published by the Romanian press, see Liviu Turcu, ‘Spionajul romanesc, folosit de Ceausescu să-şi facă imagine în presa mondială’, in Jurnalul NaŃional, April 7, 2004, article available online at [http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/70450/spionajul-romanesc-folosit-de-ceausescu-sa-si-faca-imagine-in-presa-mondiala](http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/70450/spionajul-romanesc-folosit-de-ceausescu-sa-si-faca-imagine-in-presa-mondiala), as of December 2008. [Liviu Turcu, a graduate of the Faculty of Sociology in Bucharest, former researcher at the Study and Research Institute for Economic Forecasts, PhD in philosophy, member of the former ‘Securitate’ in the DIE service (external information), defected in January 1989].
underdevelopment, of misery and poverty which takes in the majority of the World’s population’.370

One of the scholars bringing an important contribution371 to the study of global underdevelopment was Sorica Sava. A Romanian economics professor, Sorica Sava coordinated and co-authored various volumes on issues such as: macro-economic analyses, critical essays on ‘capitalistic planning’, international economic relations and studies on the international capitalistic trade.372 Three of her volumes need to be mentioned, as being the ones that are the most dedicated to international development: ‘Căi și strategii de lichidare a subdezvoltării. Probleme ale făuririi unei ordini economice internaționale’ (‘Paths and Strategies for Liquidating the Underdevelopment. Problems of the Making of a New International Economic Order’), ‘Restructurarea relațiilor economice internaționale – cerință a eliminării decalajelor’ (‘Restructuring of the International Economic Relations – Request of the Elimination of Gaps’) and ‘Problematica crizei economice mondiale în gândirea economică contemporană’ (The Issue of the Global Economic Crisis in the Economic Contemporary Thinking’).

Beyond the academic writings, one of professor Sava’s main contributions may consist in that she managed to develop a panel of authors who published collective volumes on matters pertaining to international development, while also analyzing some of these issues

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370 Ion Bulborea, ‘Dezvoltare și subdezvoltare economică în optica gândirii marxiste din Anglia’, in Sorica Sava (ed.), Orientări actuale în gândirea economică contemporană. Lucrările colloquului național de gândire economică. București, decembrie 1980, Institutul central de cercetări economice. Institutul de economie socialistă, București, 1981, p. 162. English translation from the Romanian version reading as follows: ‘Puține sunt problemele care să suscete în epoca actuală un interes atât de mare și controversate atât de văi ca problema dezvoltării și a subdezvoltării economice. […] Analiza cauzelor, a căilor și a mijloacelor de soluționare a acestei probleme nu poate lăsa indifferent pe nimeni. Este împotriva rațiunii ca progresul economic spectacular înregistrat astăzi în lume, sub impactul revoluției tehnico-științifice să fie umbrat de tabloul subdezvoltării, al mizeriei și sărăciei care cuprinde majoritatea populației globului’. The article reviews the works of English authors such as Maurice Dobb, Geoffrey Kay, John Grahl, Dave Currie and others, proving that the Romanian scholar is familiar with the development debate at international level.

371 According to the author’s bibliographic research.


374 Titles’ translations into English belong to the author.


376 Sorica Sava (coord.), Problematica crizei economice mondiale în gândirea economică contemporană, Institutul Central de Cercetări Economice. Institutul de economie socialistă, București, 1986.
from a ‘Romanian’ point of view. To Sorica Sava’s collective volumes contributed scholars like Professors Nătă Dobrotă, Ion Bulborea, Sultana Sută-Selejan, Virgil Ionescu and other authors like Marina Rudăreanu, Eufrosina Ionescu, Stefan Mihai, Marcel Duhâneanu, Sanda Arsene. Scholars Marina Rudăreanu and Eufrosina Ionescu contributed to each of the three volumes mentioned above, while Stefan Mihai, Marcel Duhâneanu and Sanda Arsene signed chapters in two of these volumes (‘Căi și strategii’ and ‘Restructurarea relațiilor…’). Other scholars collaborating with dr. Sava are Ioan Resteman and Mariana Stancu, signing articles related to the foreign assistance for international development (in ‘Căi și strategii…’).

Together, this group of economists has been able to cover a wide range of issues pertaining to international development. Thus, Eufrosina Ionescu introduces the Western economists’ views about the ‘current’ economic crisis (its nature, causes and ‘remedies’) and elaborates on the role of the ‘transnational societies and the sovereign development of the

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377 According to the author’s knowledge Professor Dobrotă, PhD, taught at the Academy of Economic Sciences in Bucharest and Politehnica București University. Other relevant volumes co-authored by Professor Dobrotă are: Nicolae N. Constantinescu (coord.), Const. Manolescu, Nătă Dobrotă [et al.], Consecințele economice și sociale ale cursei înarmării, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1982; Nătă Dobrotă, Reproducția capitalistă contemporană. Probleme economice actuale ale ţărilor capitaliste dezvoltate, Editura Politică, București, 1981. The first volume relates to the economic and social consequences of the arms race, while the second volume is concerned with the ‘economic problems of the advanced capitalist states’.

378 In November 2008, Professor Bulborea (born: 1928), PhD with the Lomonosov University in Moscow, was awarded the ‘Excellence Diploma’ for the whole academic activity, by AFER – the Assosiation of Economics Faculties from Romania. Professor Bulborea’s main fields of studies were the Romanian economic thinking (in the nineteenth century and the interwar period) and some currents in the universal economic thinking. For more information, see ‘Laudatio’, available at http://www.rau.ro/mydocuments/laudatio-bulborea.pdf, as of December 2008. In Professor Bulborea’s bibliography (among others): Nicolae Ivanciu, Ion Bulborea and Armand Popper, Istoria doctrinelor economice, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1964; Ivanciu Nicolae-Valeanu, Doctrine economice contemporane, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1979.

379 Author of various university manuals, Sultana Sută-Selejan, PhD, is currently a professor at the Department of Communication and Economic Doctrines of the Academy of Economic Sciences in Bucharest. Her most important academic volumes are in the field of international trade and economic doctrines. See among others: Nicolae Văleanu Ivanciu (coord.), Doctrine economice contemporane, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1982; Sultana Sută-Selejan, Doctrine economice: o privire panoramică, Editura Eficient, București, 1996; Nicolae Sută, Dumitru Miron and Sultana Sută-Selejan, Comenzi internaționale și politici comerciale contemporane, Editura Eficient, București, 1997; Sultana Sută-Selejan, Doctrine și curente în gândirea economică și contemporană, Editura All, București, 1992.


381 Eufrosina Ionescu, ‘Economii occidentale despre criza economică actuală – natură, cauze, remedii’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Problematica crizei..., op. cit., pp. 141-160. This article is not exclusively referred to the economic crisis in the developing countries, it emphasizes the ‘capitalist’ crisis in its broader sense.
national economies. One of her main contributions to the study of underdevelopment is related to the developing countries’ ‘own efforts’ to overcome the underdevelopment stage. In 1980 she introduces the Romanian public to the Indian development thinking, while making an overview of how Indian authors look at the concept of ‘modernization’ and its relevance for the developing countries, as well as the role of the small and medium industries in re-orienting these countries’ development process. The emphasis is on how the imported models of development have proved to be inadequate, as ‘they disintegrated and destroyed the indigenous modes of production in the developing countries’, while the developing countries’ economic modernization and their ‘implicit industrialization’ should not be conceived with the exclusion of agriculture and the small and medium industries, the village industries and the traditional crafting, as these activities can be a source of employment, as well as a source of supply and demand. For Eufrosina Ionescu the underdevelopment is a ‘product of economic international relations of domination and diktat, of inequity and exploitation of some peoples’ which can only be eliminated by a national strategy that is elaborated and carried out by the respective state. According to her own words, in her conclusions Eufrosina Ionescu will be guided by the ‘Romanian concept regarding the decisive role of the internal factors and we insist on them [i.e. the internal factors], accommodating the view that the development is an essentially endogenous phenomenon, while we permanently have regard to the fact that the elimination of underdevelopment through a national strategy is taking place in a world of connections and inter-state interdependencies and, as a consequence, a conducive international environment embedded in relations based

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on the respect of equality and sovereignty of all states is crucial for the efficiency of such an ample work as the elimination of underdevelopment is\textsuperscript{388}.

Between the development strategies crafted by the global community and those proposed at national level, there needs to be mutual support\textsuperscript{389}, but they should all be subsumed to the guidance of the developing state that needs to be recognized and respected as a fully sovereign entity. The national strategy of development (the strategy proposed and implemented by the developing country itself) is the expression of the

‘organization of the national fight for overcoming the economic and social backwardness stage, unfolded in the context of the participation of the national economy to the economic international exchanges’\textsuperscript{390},

as well as the reflection of the concrete, internal and international historical situations and the social, economic, political and spiritual traditions of the respective countries. From this point of view, according to this author, the existence of one single and unified development strategy, valid for all developing countries is impossible\textsuperscript{391}. Reflecting on the international development strategy elaborated in the second development decade of the United Nations, the author shows that such strategy can not be an ‘exclusive, unique development policy’, as the existence of 100 developing countries necessarily involves the existence of 100 different development strategies. Ultimately, the development strategy is a

‘particular response to the same problem, which is defined by extremely divergent data’\textsuperscript{392}.

\textsuperscript{388} Idem, p. 138-139. English translation by the author from Romanian: ‘În aprecierile și concluziile noastre pornim de la conceptul românesc privind rolul decisive al factorilor interni și insistăm asupra acesteia, acceptând dezvoltarea ca un fenomen esențialmente endogen, dar avem în vedere permanent că lichidarea subdezvoltării printr-o strategie națională se desfășoară într-o lume a conexiunilor și interdependențelor interstatale și, ca atare mediul internațional propice în care să sălășluiască relații bazate pe respectarea egalității și suveranității tuturor statelor este indispensabil pentru eficiența unei opera de asemenea anvergură ca cea a lichidării subdezvoltării’.

\textsuperscript{389} Idem, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{390} Idem, p. 140. English translation from the Romanian version: ‘Strategia națională a dezvoltării este expresia organizării luptei naționale pentru depășirea stadiului de înapoiere economică și socială, desfășurată în condițiile participării economiei naționale la circuitul economic mondial’.

\textsuperscript{391} In recent years the World Bank and other institutions have acknowledged that and created the so-called ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs). In theory, the PRSPs ‘are prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as external development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’ (see Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), on the IMF’s website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp). In reality, scholars like James Ferguson claim that the PRSPs are frequently ‘copied and paste’, so as to correspond to the donors’ favored practices.

\textsuperscript{392} Idem, p. 140. English translation from the Romanian version: ‘… răspunsuri particulare la aceeași problemă, care are însă în cuprins date extreme de diferite’.
Similarly to Eufrosina Ionescu, who introduces the Romanian public to the Indian development thinking, Marina Rudăreanu writes about the Latin-American viewpoint on development, focusing on the importance of agriculture. Like Eufrosina Ionescu, Maria Rudăreanu is also taking the opportunity to speak against the ‘external models’; in particular, she refers to the models that were adopted, at their time, by the now developed countries. She shows, with arguments borrowed from the Latin-America scholars, that these models, along with other Western proposals (such as the demographic control or the ‘green revolution’) should be opposed, just as the Latin-America scholars are actually doing. Obviously, the role of the state remains important, particularly in agriculture, so as to eliminate the

‘layer of autochthonous and foreign intermediaries, by encouraging the agricultural production by inducible prices and other measures favoring the dynamic evolution of the agri-food market’.

In another instance Rudăreanu makes an extensive overview of the ‘opinions’ (particularly of the Western economists) on ‘the implications of the economic crisis on the current international economic relations’, while showing that the economic cooperation among the developing countries is a ‘factor for the elimination of the underdevelopment’. In Rudăreanu’s view, the economic cooperation among the developing countries (or what we would call now the South-South cooperation) might be one of the ‘ways and means’ for eliminating the underdevelopment. In favor of a ‘collective autonomy’ of the developing countries, Rudăreanu brings powerful arguments: the international strategy for the second

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394 More recently, other authors show new reasons for opposing the West’s prescriptions for the Rest’s development. In a remarkable study Haa-Joon Chang examines the great pressure on developing countries from the developed world to adopt certain ‘good policies’ and ‘good institutions’, seen today as necessary for economic development. Adopting a historical approach, this author finds that the economic evolution of now-developed countries are attempting to ‘kick away the ladder’ by which they have climbed to the top, thereby preventing developing countries from adopting policies and institutions that they themselves used. See Haa-Joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder. Development Strategies in Historical Perspective, Anthem Press, London, 2003.
395 Idem, p. 183.
398 Marina Rudăreanu, ‘Cooperarea economică dintre țările în curs de dezvoltare – Factor de eliminare a subdezvoltării’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Căi și strategii..., op. cit., pp. 201-240. This article is a rather technical one, analyzing three ‘main aspects’ of the economic cooperation between the developing countries: cooperation in the field of trade; the financial-monetary relations and the cooperation in the field of production through the multinational enterprises that are exclusively participated by the developing countries.
399 Idem, p. 201.
development decade promoted by the United Nations produced unsatisfying results; the economic situation of most of the developing countries is worsening; the need felt by the majority of the developing countries for the dependency on the industrialized nations to be reduced, while strengthening their own capacities to negotiate in international settings. Complementarily, she will argue for the ‘existing’ international commercial relations to be improved.

Marcel Duhăneanu writes about the international commercial policies and the need for all states to participate in the regulation of the commercial exchanges. This author argues that the fair participation of the developing countries in the international economic exchanges is fundamental in the fight for development. In this respect, this scholar shows that the GATT is characterized by a series of flaws that ‘represented as many channels for the exploitation of the developing countries’. Duhăneanu shows that, along time, the developing countries had lost in terms of market share: if in the 1950s their share in the global trade was 31%, in 1974 this was down to 20%; moreover, the developing countries are clearly dependant on their exports of raw materials, as two thirds of their incomes come from this source of export. In agreement with his colleague Rudăreanu, Duhăneanu deplores the fact that the trade among the developing countries themselves is so low, representing only 23% of the total trade of these countries and this shows, in this author’s opinion, the specificity of the international division of labor that bears the imprint of the colonial and neo-colonial relations between the developing and the developed

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400 The authors quotes the Economic Declaration adopted by the fifth high-level conference of the non-aligned countries, held at Colombo, 1976.
403 Marcel Duhăneanu ‘Politici comerciale internaționale și necesitatea participării tuturor statelor la reglementarea schimburilor comerciale internaționale’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Restructurarea..., op. cit., p. 89. To support this view, the author quotes an ECOSOC Report that speaks about the inequity between the developed and the developing countries in what the negotiation power is concerned. In this article, Duhăneanu unveils the various forms taken by the developed countries’ protectionism: the high tariffs (sometimes double when compared with tariffs imposed to other countries), non-tariff barriers (subsidies granted by the developed countries to their producers, customs and administrative regulations, various quality standards, etc.), the agricultural protectionism.
countries. He argues in favor of the liberalization of trade among the developing countries, as this would

‘fructify the [developing countries’] possibilities for mutual help in their common fight for the elimination of underdevelopment and the gaps that separate them from the developed countries’.

Therefore, Duhâneanu speaks against the ‘uniform liberalization’ of trade, as such a policy would give the developed countries the opportunity of ‘invading’ the developing countries’ markets, hindering the latter’s economic growth.

This author also discusses the international system of prices that, in his view, is clearly putting at a disadvantage the developing countries. What is needed is that a set of ‘radical and urgent’ measures be adopted to encourage the developing countries in their efforts to diversify and expand their exports, not only towards the extractive industries but also to other industrial and manufacturing branches. To this aim, the developing countries need to be offered preferential treatment by the developed countries; they need to be able to rely on long-term contracts; they have to create export-oriented enterprises and state-subordinated export agencies so that exports are promoted in the most efficient ways; they will have to find the ways for strengthening their banking system so that the resources that are needed by these countries’ exporters are made available.

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405 Idem, p. 176.
406 Idem, p. 190. In Romanian: ‘…fructifica posibilitățile lor de întrajutorare în lupta comună de lichidare a subdezvoltării și a decalajelor ce le despart de țările dezvoltate’.
407 In recent years, Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist at the World Bank argues that in what the foreign trade is concerned and for globalization to ‘work’, the principle of ‘reciprocity for and among all countries – regardless of circumstance’ should be replaced with the principle of reciprocity among equals, but differentiation between those in markedly different circumstances. Thus, rich countries should simply open up their markets to poorer ones, while middle-income countries should open up their markets to the least developed countries, without extending them to the rich countries. See Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, Penguin Books, 2007, p. 83.
408 Marcel Duhâneanu, ‘Strategia dezvoltării…’, op. cit., p. 191. The author brings as an argument the agricultural policy of the developed countries that distorts ‘not only their own economies, but also the international markets’, as the ‘dumping’ practices and the protectionist policies have only worsened the existing imbalances for the prices of the agricultural products. In this sense the author argues for the developing countries to be supported, bilaterally and multilaterally, not only through fair prices policies, but in what their agricultural production capacities are concerned (p. 193).
409 Idem, p. 177.
410 In his book (see previous note), Stiglitz shows: ‘Developing countries are different from more developed countries – some of these differences explain why they are so much poorer. The idea that developing countries should, as a result, receive ‘special and differential treatment’ is now widely accepted’. See Josph Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 82.
411 As already showed in a previous section, in the 1970s, Romania used to offer various credits to the developing countries. More recently, Romanian Professor Lavinia Betea, teaching Political Psychology at the University of Bucharest and department head of Recent History at Jurnalul Național București, wrote about Ceaușescu’s plans of creating – at the end of the 1980s and after having repaid Romania’s on foreign debt -
In a technical key, Sanda Arsene writes about the possibilities and limits of the models of economic growth in the developing countries, giving an overview of the development thinking in this field; she then discusses the balance of trade of the developing countries, elaborating on the financial ‘problems’ of these countries; the ‘burden’ of the external debt and the need to encourage the non-commercial activities of the developing countries; as well as the importance of the ‘sovereign use of the national wealth’ of the developing countries and their ‘participation’ in the global trade. According to this author the raw materials that the developing countries abound in had been ‘non-economically and irrationally’ exploited. Through the activity of the international companies an ‘immense amount’ of raw materials had been extracted and exported to the developed countries, without any kind of processing in their country of origin, due to the low levels of economic development of the developing countries. At the same time, the developed countries, due to their economic strength, seized the opportunity for building their processing capacities so as to use the world’s wealth in their own interest. This structural orientation of the global economy, imposed by the developed countries, led to a polarization of the production of the raw materials in the developing countries and their processing in the developed countries. This way, the developing countries were integrated into the global economy, but in a way that was ‘fatal’ to them, as the system of prices, imposed by the ‘great imperialist powers’ were profoundly unequal towards the developing countries.

Arsene identifies the method by which this flawed integration was possible and this is – in her opinion – the very definition of the notion of ‘underdevelopment’. As long as the underdevelopment is defined as a stage in the economic growth, the developing countries...
will be motivated to integrate themselves ever more and always in an ‘un-selective’ manner in the global economic system. Even worse – the author claims – is the attempt of accrediting the idea (as the Rapport Dag Hammerskjöld does) that the developing countries have to be directly interested in the economic development of the developed countries, based on the idea that ‘without the development of the center, the development of the periphery wouldn’t have existed either’\textsuperscript{419}. But, according to this author, this is the exact mechanism that keeps half of the world in economic backwardness, as the development priorities are established starting with the needs of the developed countries and not with those of the developing ones\textsuperscript{420}.

In this context, Arsene’s recommendation for the developing countries is for them to start exerting their ‘permanent, indivisible and full’ national sovereignty on their own raw materials, in accordance with a series of UN resolutions that support the nations’ sovereign rights over their natural wealth\textsuperscript{421}. Cooperating more among themselves can be a first ‘expression’ of this right enforcement\textsuperscript{422}, as this could not only offer collective protection of this right, but it could also enhance the developing countries’ bargaining power in the negotiations with the developed countries.

Mihai Stefan elaborates on the Romanian perspectives on the new international economic order\textsuperscript{423} as well as the need for high rates of growth, should the elimination of underdevelopment be expected\textsuperscript{424}, while Ioan Resteman discusses the volumes and quality of the financial foreign assistance for development\textsuperscript{425}, taking the view that

\begin{quote}
\textit{The increase of the interdependences among states involves a balanced development of the global economy, because any difficulty in a region or a few}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{419} ‘Que faire’, Rapport Dag Hammerskjöld, quoted by the author.\\
\textsuperscript{420} Sanda Arsene, ‘Folosirea suveranǎ a bogǎŃiilor naŃionale şi participarea Ńǎrilor în curs de dezvoltare la circuitul economic mondial’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), \textit{Restructurarea…}, op. cit., pp. 158.\\
\textsuperscript{421} The author quotes (p. 169): The Resolution 523/VI of 22 February 1952 of the UN General Assembly; the December 21 1952 626/VII Resolution regarding the sovereignty of people on the natural resources; the Resolutions 1515 (December 1960) and 1803 (December 1962). This enumeration is also followed by a discussion of these resolutions, the role of the Group of 77 in this debate, the ‘Chart of the economic rights and duties of the states’ and the Western economic debates opposing the transfer of sovereignty at higher levels than the national ones.\\
\textsuperscript{422} Sanda Arsene, ‘Folosirea suveranǎ a bogǎŃiilor naŃionale şi participarea Ńǎrilor în curs de dezvoltare la circuitul economic mondial’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), \textit{Restructurarea…}, op. cit., pp. 177.\\
\textsuperscript{423} Stefan Mihai, ‘O nouǎ ordine în relaŃiile economic e internaŃionale. ValenŃele conceptului românesc.’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), \textit{Restructurarea…}, op. cit., pp. 15-37.\\
\textsuperscript{424} Stefan Mihai, ‘Creşterea în ritm înalt – condiŃie a eliminǎrii subdezvoltǎrii’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), \textit{Cǎi şi strategii…}, op. cit., pp. 55-94.\\
\end{flushright}
Ioan Resteman builds on his colleagues’ work when arguing that the foreign assistance is an ‘additional’ element to the country’s ‘own efforts’ towards development. In his analysis of the structure of the financial flows from the developed countries to the developing ones, Resteman makes an intense use of World Bank and OECD statistics, quoting extensively the ‘Development Cooperation – OECD Review’ of 1975 and 1977, the ‘Observateur OECD’ of 1976 and the Statistical Abstract of United States of 1974. The first observation made by this author, based on the data taken into analysis, is that the volume of aid, as well as its quality, is not adequate when compared with the real needs. He shows that the UN targets (1% - for total financial flows from the developed countries and 0.7% - of total public resources channeled by the developed countries to the developing ones) for development assistance were never achieved. Instead, the ODA volumes diminished (volumes of ODA per inhabitant were 9 USD in the 1960s and only 4.80 in 1957-1973) and even worse, the developed countries governments’ share of development assistance was on the decrease. The author deplores this governmental ‘disinterest’ for the faith of the developing countries, as it was this tone of apathy that, in his view, made ‘possible’ the penetration of the foreign capital in the developing countries ‘with the whole array of negative consequences for the economic development of these countries’.

Probably for the first time in history, the Romanian reader is introduced to various concrete data that show, in this author’s opinion, a clear picture: the ‘arbitrary character’ of the development assistance policies of the developed countries. According to Resteman, the donor countries were more interested to promote their own interests rather than the genuine development of the ‘backward’ countries. This was shown by various choices that the developed countries made in distributing their foreign aid. The issue of the ‘tied’ aid

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427 Idem, p. 277.
428 Idem, p. 278.
429 Tied aid is aid that can only be spent in the donor’s country or in a selected group of countries. The ‘tied aid’ discussion is an ongoing one. According to the DAC Committee, ‘untied ODA’ refers to loans or grants which are freely and fully available to finance procurement from substantially all aid recipient countries and from OECD countries. The DAC Committee made various recommendations in favor of aid untying. The 2001 DAC Recommendation was amended on 15 March 2006, and more recently in July 2008. For more information on the most recent recommendation, see DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least
is discussed compellingly and the author shows that the receiving country usually has to put up with a double inequity. On one side, the developing country will contribute – with its already meager resources – to supporting the developed country’s economy (by having to buy whatever the donor country decides to ‘tie’ to its aid). On the other side, projects that do not always correspond to the real needs of the receiving countries are financed to promote the ‘aid’ items that the developed countries have available. The conditions brought by the ‘tied’ aid, are – in this author’s view – ‘as many obstacle for an adequate use’ of the resources made available by the development assistance flows, corresponding to a ‘restrictive and constraining policy’ that only brings flaws in the economic development of the receiving country430.

One other choice that shows the ‘arbitrary character’ of the development policies is the one that orients the financial resources towards particular geographic regions, instead of a decisive preference for the poorest among the developing countries to be made the greatest receivers of foreign aid. More than that, Resteman shows a decrease of the financial flows for the least developed among the developing countries. Related to the geographic preference, the author also analyses the assistance relations between the former empires and their respective former colonies, taking the example of the United Kingdom that is shown to distribute as much as 80% of its foreign aid to its former colonies. But one of the most important factors of ‘arbitrariness’ is considered to be the fact that the assistance policy had a voluntary character431, depending exclusively on the will of the industrialized countries’ governments so that the volumes and the conditions for granting the foreign assistance were actually dictated by short-term decisions and were based on reasons departing from the developing countries’ mere needs for development funding432.

After a factual critique of foreign aid – only summarized here – Resteman shows that the scarcity of development assistance and the low quality of the development aid, forced many of the developing countries to resort to taking credits from the private markets,

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431 The ‘voluntary character’ is also underlined by Gheorghe Dolgu, Economia și înarmărilă, Editura politică, București, 1974, p: 45. This author says: ‘Needless to say, the dimensions and the forms of technical-economic assistance granted to the developing countries are a matter of political will’.
432 Idem, p. 287. The author enumerates: the will of the developed countries to maintain their spheres of influence, tendencies for international hegemony, internal affairs ‘or the so-called moral reasons’, special relations with the former colonies.
which only led to the worsening of the debt crisis. Therefore, the author shows that there is a

‘dire need of improving the assistance policies in a context in which the restructuring of a whole set of economic relations is actually needed’.

Resteman’s work is complemented by Mariana Stancu writing about ‘some aspects of development financing and assistance through UN institutions and bodies’. After offering a historical overview of the beginnings of the foreign aid debate and practice, the author introduces the Romanian reader to the main international mechanisms with responsibilities in the field of global development. Stancu shows that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is ‘the most important financing body created with this aim’ and discusses its working and mechanisms; the International Monetary Fund and then the United Nations Development Program, the International Labor Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation and UNESCO are also analyzed from a critical perspective that brings the author to emphasize the ‘unsatisfying character’ of development assistance. The word ‘aid’ is sometimes used between inverted commas, so as to underline this term’s inadequacy.

Like Resteman, Stancu makes reasoned references to the ‘subjectivity’ of the ‘contemporary’ practices of development assistance which, instead of being built on ‘objectives’ grounds, are rather determined by the developed countries’ ‘wishes’, while the volume and forms of assistance are

‘dictated in the greatest of the measures by unilateral reasons and regard short-term decision, without longer-term perspectives’.

For this author the foreign assistance granted by the rich countries is clearly driven by the developed countries’ interests, as the assistance is given for various reasons, including: political reasons, special relations with the former colonies, and concerns regarding the ‘Cold War’. On their side, the developing countries could ‘rightfully’ observe that this kind of ‘assistance’ (inverted commas in the original text) is granted in a way that

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436 Idem.
437 Idem.
438 Idem.
undermines their sovereignty, when not even harming their development by burdening conditionality such as the developing countries being compelled to accept inadequate technology, unfitted systems of schooling or inappropriate models of development.

What is even worse – this author claims – is that beyond such harmful conditions, the foreign ‘assistance’ also bears prohibitive costs that promote the interests of a minority, rather than that of the majority of the recipient country.

Romanian scholars seem to share a vigilant and even suspicious attitude towards the foreign aid granted to the developing countries. The inverted commas as a sign of diffidence are frequently used and, in some cases, such diffidence is clearly outspoken. One author shows, data at hand, that

‘One of the veiled forms of colonialism is represented by the so-called ‘aid’ granted by some capitalist countries to some developing countries, in occasion of which the receiving countries are imposed a series of economic and political conditions, so that the so-called help becomes a means for maintaining the foreign monopoly positions in the developing countries’ economies, leading to the limitation or the restriction of their independence, to the arrest of their fight against the economic underdevelopment.

Another scholar notes that the biggest proportion of foreign aid is given bilaterally and this practice has a ‘substratum’: the bilateral forms frequently allow the developed countries to impose conditions which would not be possible should the funding would be channeled through multilateral bodies.

Romanian authors are not there only to criticize. They also propose solutions. Constantin Moisuc, another Romanian economist, shows that, to countervail the detrimental effects of

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440 Idem, p. 315.


442 In Romanian, in the figurative sense, substratum stands for ‘reason, true cause (but hidden) of an action. See Dicţionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române, online version: www.dexonline.ro.

development assistance, a series of specific criteria should be observed. Of the nine criteria suggested by this author, six are among the most relevant: 1. foreign assistance final aim needs to be the elimination of underdevelopment for it to be able to eliminate all gaps without creating new gaps in other fields of economy or areas of the world; 2. development assistance will need to lead to the strengthening of the economic independence of the helped states, meaning that the foreign assistance will need to contribute to the diversification of the national economies of the receiving countries; 3. the economic, technical and financial assistance will only take place with the accord of the receiving governments; 4. development assistance will have to contribute to the achievement of industrialization programs, as complementary sources and not by substituting the states’ own efforts, so that the national responsibility will be combined with the international responsibility for the economic progress of all countries; 5. the foreign assistance will not be given with ‘enslaving’ economic, political or military conditions; 6. foreign assistance will be given for the development priorities established by the receiving country to avoid dependency by orienting receiving country’s trade and investments against the receiving country’s own interests. These criteria are derived as a matter of fact – from Romania’s principles for conducting its external affairs. In their volume ‘Principiile politicii externe a României socialiste’, Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac show that Romania’s behavior in its relations with all the other countries is based on: the respect of other countries’ national sovereignty and independence; the ‘perfect equity in rights’; non-interference in the internal and external affairs of a country; the non-use of force and threat of force; the territorial integrity and the state border inviolability; the mutual advantage and respect; the ‘inalienable’ right of every people to
‘be the master of its own fate’, to ‘build its own life’ and future. According to Romania’s President these principles can not

‘make the object of any transaction’, ‘they can not be questioned under any circumstance’.

All these authors make their consideration in the general framework given by Professor Nătă Dobrotă who shows that the underdevelopment crisis was related to the crisis built into the capitalist system so that only a new economic order will have the capacity of eliminating the underdevelopment.

As for the coordinator herself - professor Sorica Sava – she believes that the main trait of those years’ world economy was the existence of a ‘crisis of development’ given by a series of ‘anachronistic structures’ that, after centuries of colonialism, prevented the greatest part of the World’s population to provide for its own basic needs – food, health, habitation, clothing, or education. In spite of an obvious potential for the improvement of the living conditions of all peoples in the World – due to notable progresses of science and technology – the economic growth did not lead to the decrease of inequalities and economic gaps among countries. This view was actually amounting to a denouncement of the Western policies for international development, by implying that the two ‘decades of development’ along with all resources made available from the end of the Second World War for the cause of development, had failed to bring any improvement for the developing world.

Professor Sava will also give a clear definition to the notion of ‘underdevelopment’, understood as the ‘absolute gap’ (in Romanian: decalajul absolut):

‘Underdevelopment manifests itself in the existence of a level of the production forces that do not ensure the satisfaction of the basic needs, meaning those (needs) that characterize a minimum level of life. We refer to those needs which demand

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452 Nătă Dobrotă, ‘Criza economică mondială şi criza sistemului capitalist – analiză comparată.’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Problematica crizei..., op. cit., pp. 8-36;
satisfaction in an absolute manner, meaning those with a vital significance: food, shelter, health, education, etc.  

The main task of the process of global development, as well as its main instrument – development assistance – was, therefore, the elimination of these gaps. As Resteman had also showed, the eradication of the economic gaps was a compelling task that was deemed necessary not only for the developing countries but for the whole humankind. Developed countries’ assistance did not amount to philanthropy, but to a key investment in all countries’ welfare, as:

‘The accentuation of underdevelopment and gaps means an increase of global insolvency, which provokes a contraction of economic activities in the developed countries too, an aggravation of the state of recession and economic stability in general’.

In Sava’s view the fastest way to the ‘backward countries’ economic development was through to achievement of a new international economic order and the ‘restructuring’ of the ‘current’ system of economic international relations; through the attainment of a more equal international division of labor to be restructured in ways that favor the developing countries not only in what they produce, but also in what they are capable of trading; but first and foremost, by speeding up the industrialization process of the developing countries, as one of the main ways for eliminating the vestiges of colonialism by

‘stopping and attenuating (...) the growing economic inequities between the developed countries and the developing countries’.

Other authors – not directly related to professors Sava’s team – also take an interest into global development issues.

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453 Sorica Sava, ‘Lichidarea subdezvoltării şi a decalajelor în edificarea unei noi ordini economice internaţionale’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Căi şi strategii..., op. cit., p. 34.
456 Sorica Sava, ‘Diviziunea internaţională a muncii şi eliminarea decalajelor dintre ţările industrializate şi ţările în curs de dezvoltare’, in Sorica Sava (coord.), Restructurarea..., op. cit., pp. 54-86.
458 Idem, p. 135.
Initially preoccupied with youth issues in the context of the global economic crisis, Ioan Bari is another Romanian economist who developed an interest for international development. In his book *The Chances of a World. Underdevelopment – irreversible phenomenon*, co-authored with Sterian Dumitrescu, Bari makes a short overview of the various definitions given to underdevelopment and seems to reject all those that fail to take into consideration the ‘human factor’. In Bari’s view, it is the

‘human behavior that ultimately decides if a country will benefit or not from a corresponding economic efficiency’.

In offering his own definition for the state of underdevelopment, Bari seems to be in a scientific dialogue with Sorica Sava who had defined the underdevelopment as ‘the absolute gap’ between a set of fundamental needs (food, health, literacy, employment) and the real possibilities for ensuring a minimum standard of life. Instead of defining underdevelopment through the existing ‘gaps’, this author will argue for ‘thresholds’ to be taken into consideration when deciding if a certain country is an underdeveloped country or not. This ‘threshold’ is needed for

‘helping us to determine where the state of underdevelopment ends and where the state of developed country begins’.

This, he argues, is necessary because the problems of underdevelopment are not the same everywhere: every poor country is confronted with specific needs so that every underdeveloped country needs to establish its own ‘threshold’, given by its own traditions and its economic, social, cultural and political characteristics. To this end a broad interdisciplinary cooperation will be needed for defining the criteria and the scientific methods for assessing the various levels of development and international comparability.

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463 The sense of uncertainty created by the expression ‘seems to’ is due because Bari does not make any direct reference to Sava’s work.

464 Sorica Sava, ‘Lichidarea subdezvoltării şi a decalajelor în edificarea unei noi ordini economice internaţionale’, in Sorica Sava, *Căi şi strategii...*, op. cit., p. 34. Another Romanian author taking a ‘gaps’ view towards underdevelopment was Marian Chirilă. See Marian Chirilă, ‘Imperativele eliminării decalajelor economice şi a subdezvoltării’, in Nicolae Ecobescu (coord.), *Către o nouă ordine internaţională*, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp. 208-234. This author already assumes the relations between ‘gaps’ and underdevelopment; his contribution is to show the fields in which such ‘gaps’ exist between the developing and the developed countries. Chirilă identifies: the national gross product, the energy field, industry, agriculture, trade, science and technology, ‘anachronistic economic, political and social structures’.
In other words, the necessary minimum of subsistence is different from one country to the next. It has some values in the United States and other values in India. There is hardly any need for attempting to multiply by the dozens of times the goods and services that are available for the developing countries. For an Indian farmer the exit from a state of underdevelopment will not necessarily be marked by the moment when he will afford the lifestyle of the American farmer.

‘For realizing the fundamental conditions of physical health, creative work and the respect of the human dignity, it would be enough a more modest, but real and constant, multiplication of the annual income per head in the developing countries. This performance is at hand to many developing countries.’

Therefore, the author shows, the developing countries need to take the path, that is perhaps more difficult but safer, of the self-promoted development; the Third World countries need to ‘take their faith in their own hands’ and accomplish the development processes by their ‘own efforts’. In this sense, Bari echoes Eufrosina Ionescu who – almost a decade before - had also argued for the developing countries’ ‘internal efforts’, as

‘there are no international strategies for eliminating the state of underdevelopment, no action of the global community that can substitute the national efforts of development and no such strategies and actions can be successful in the latter’s absence’

An important chapter in Bari’s book is the one in which he speaks about the ‘contemporary external factors of development’. In this chapter the author takes the opportunity of analyzing a wide range of aspects: from the relations that the developing countries establish among themselves (the South-South cooperation), with the North (North-South cooperation) and with the East (the East-South cooperation), to the commercial relations of these countries, their financial rapports and their limited access to science and technology. The author shows that while the East-South cooperation is a

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466 Chapter two of Bari’s book is suggestively entitled ‘Efortul propriu’ (‘The internal effort’).
467 Bari expresses these views in 1988, while Ionescu had written her article in Sava’s 1979 book, ‘Câi și strategii...’, op. cit. An other Romanian author analyzing the ‘relation between the internal effort of the interested countries and the international aid’ in the receiving countries’ was Constantin Moisuc. See Constantin Moisuc, ‘Transferul real de resurse pentru dezvoltare, în contextul instaurării unei noi ordini economice internaționale’, Nicolae Ecobescu, *Către o nouă ordine internațională*, Editura Politică, București, 1976, p. 235.
469 Regarding this aspect the author talks about Romania’s important role in promoting a ‘new technological international order’. See Ioan Bari and Sterian Dumitrescu, *Sansele unei lumi...*, op. cit., p. 237-238.
factor of progress\textsuperscript{470}, the North-South relations are at a ‘crossroads point’\textsuperscript{471}. This is because the East and the South are on the ‘same side of the barricade’, representing a common front in the fight against the anti-imperialist policies. Beyond this political motivation, there is also an economic reason for cooperating. This economic factor is to be taken into consideration, but with the awareness of the fact that ‘by developing their relations with the ‘Third World’ the socialist countries are not after obtaining unilateral advantages’\textsuperscript{472}. The East’s cooperation is of a different kind, as the socialist countries are ‘not asking for exclusivity in exploiting the resources of the developing countries and do not impose conditions upon them’\textsuperscript{473}.

By all its arguments, Bari’s book has an optimistic message as the author is able to show that underdevelopment is not an ‘irreversible phenomenon’, as ‘the process for liquidating the underdevelopment is in full progress’, even if this process is not a linear one: it has fluxes and influxes. But – the author warns – the process of development depends ‘in the biggest of the measures’ on the existence of peace, it depends on ‘the way the humankind will know how to stop this absurd race arms’\textsuperscript{474}: the ‘final attack’ against underdevelopment can not be unleashed until there is effective disarmament and the instauration of peace on the whole planet.

Peace and disarmament\textsuperscript{475} are seen, not only by this author, as one of the most important factors of development. Military spending used to be presented as one of the main obstacles to development, as it subtracted to the latter important financial and human resources\textsuperscript{476}. For Romania, disarmament was not an episodic, but a constant preoccupation of foreign policy\textsuperscript{477} and disarmament was one of the most salient and stable motives of

\textsuperscript{470} Ioan Bari and Sterian Dumitrescu, Sansele unei lumi..., op. cit., p. 154.
\textsuperscript{471} Idem, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{472} Idem, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{473} Ioan Bari and Sterian Dumitrescu, Sansele unei lumi..., op. cit., pp. 154-155.
\textsuperscript{474} Ioan Bari and Sterian Dumitrescu, Sansele unei lumi..., op. cit., p. 244.
\textsuperscript{475} Very powerful arguments and strong words are used in Romania to advocate for disarmament. The ‘arms race’ is defined as a modern ‘cancer’ by Costin Murgescu: ‘O dinamicǎ a contradicŃiilor în economia mondialǎ’, in Mihail Florescu, Costin Murgescu (coo rd.), Omenirea peste un sfert de secol, Editura politicǎ, Bucureşti, 1989, p 28.
\textsuperscript{476} See Nicolae N. Constantinescu (coord.), ConsecinŃele economice şi sociale ale cursei înarmǎrilor [In English: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race], Editura Didactica si Pedagogicǎ, Bucureşti, 1982. Nicolae N. Constantinescu, former member of the Romanian Academy, was a Romanian professor with the Academy of Economic Sciences in Bucharest.
\textsuperscript{477} Some claim that the central place that disarmament occupied in the Romanian foreign policy was linked to President Ceauşescu’s ambition to be seen as a ‘man of peace’ and his secret aspiration to be awarded a Nobel Prize. But it is also true that, according to Robert Weiner, op. cit. p. 58, in 1978 Romania refused to
President Ceaușescu’s pronouncements on the international stage. As he liked to emphasize:

‘The realization of disarmament would set free a huge quantity of production means and labor forces for improving peoples’ life conditions, the acceleration of nations’ economical and social development, and in the first place, of those that are underdeveloped. Disarmament would ensure that the wonderful conquests of science and technology not to be subordinated any longer to the cause of war and destruction, but to be used for progress and civilization, of man’s welfare and happiness...’

As Robert Weiner showed, Romania had taken an early interest towards all states’ conversion to disarmament and especially towards disarmament’s economic and social benefits for development. It constantly claimed to be ‘appalled’ by the high spending for military purposes and called for the disintegration of both NATO and Warsaw military pacts as being ‘anachronistic’; for establishing nuclear-free zones in various areas of the World (the Balkan area included); and for an international disarmament council – and other international institutions for disarmament - to be created. Romania had also supported proposals to convene a world disarmament conference and, with certain regularity, called for renewed efforts to mobilize the global public opinion against disarmament. In 1975, when Romania introduced to the United Nations its position regarding ‘the problems of disarmament’, Romanian commentators claimed that that the UN decision to establish the UN Commission for Disarmament ‘represents the materialization of a Romanian initiative, in collaboration with other states’.
In sum, Romania’s efforts to disarmament were as sustained and enthusiastic as to make Weiner acknowledge

‘the rather curious situation in which a neo-Stalinist regime marked by a highly developed personality cult is making a positive contribution to the world order value of peace’.

In line with the official pronouncements, various Romanian scholars will take a close interest in the relations between development and disarmament. To make an example, Constantin Ene, Romanian scholar and public servant, will write about the relations between disarmament and the new international and economic order, showing that the arms race is simply incompatible with the economic content of the new economic order. In a situation in which 70% of the World’s population is underdeveloped,

‘it is unconceivable how funding assessed at 300 billion dollars can be wasted annually for the arms race, for unproductive aims’.

But all these authors - Sorica Sava, Ioan Bari, Constantin Moisuc and the others - are representatives of the academic life and one may notice that their volumes might have had a restrained circulation, like it is sometimes the case with academic writing. The Romanian general public would then remain oblivious of the global issues that the Romanian elite

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483 Robert Weiner, op. cit., p. 66.
485 Constantin Ene: BA (History and Philosophy) with the Taras Ševcenko University of Kiev, Master Degree - International Relations with the New York University (1967); Functions: diplomat in MFA, Permanent Mission of Romania to UN/New York; UN Secretariat; all diplomatic ranks up to Ambassador. Director, Director General, State Secretary in MFA. Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (2001); Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Romania to UN Office and Disarmament Conference/Geneva (1972-1980); Ambassador, Chief of Mission of Romania to NATO (1993-1997) and EU (1993-2000), the Romanian diplomat with the longest career in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (49 years), he negotiated (among others) the integration (in 1976) of Romania in the Group of 77. Sources: the CVs made available for the European Convention (available online at http://european-convention.eu.int/cvs/pdf/ene.pdf as of January 2009) and the online version of ‘Enciclopedia Personalităților din România’ (The Encyclopedia of Romanian Personalities): http://www.whoiswho-verlag.ro/stronyx/300.php?day=mo&lng_PersID=RORO0100123&page=1, as of January 2009.
486 Constantin Ene, ‘Înâptuirea dezarmării – cerinţă primordială a noii ordini internaţionale’, in Nicolae Ecobescu (coord.), Câtre o nouă ordine internaţională, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp. 121-144. See also, in the same volume, at pp. 411-428: Dumitru Mazilu, ‘Renunţarea la forţă şi ameninţarea cu forţa – cheia de boltă a unor noi relaţii internaţionale’. An equivalent in English of the two titles can be: ‘Achieving disarmament – primordial condition of a new international order’ and ‘Giving up force and the threat of force – keystone of new international relations’
487 Idem, p. 124.
were so preoccupied with. But this was hardly the case in Romania, since ‘popularization’ booklets and volumes were published to speak to the general public in a more accessible language about these major issues of the international life, in particular the fate of the developing countries. First, a book series - ‘On the World’s Map’ – introduced the general public to individual states; many of these states are those listed as ‘developing countries’.

An example is ‘Burma’, introducing this country’s position and geographical conditions, giving an overview of its historical, social and economic background, of its form of government and constitution, as well as Burma’s religion and customs. Burma’s financial situation is deplored and the author shows that only the socialist countries can really help Burma. Viewed in retrospect and by comparison with contemporary discursive practice (where is common for the developing countries to be described in tragic images recalling famines, disease, conflict and misery), one thing that is remarkable about this booklet is that positive wording and images are predominant. To the present-day reader, this booklet speaks an unusual language, with hardly any reference to recent or past famines, or other manifestations to epitomize underdevelopment. The author has only words of admiration for this ‘brave people’ that is ‘intelligent, diligent and willing of progress’. In a climax of eulogization, Khrushchev is quoted saying: ‘Aren’t the Burmese, people as capable as, for instance, the Russians and the English? The peoples can not be divided in capable and incapable. If they are created equal conditions, they will have successes in their development’.

Second, more comprehensive overviews, also detailing Romania’s positions and contributions to the global development, are given by various (young) scholars. In their volume, ‘Dialogue with three continents. Relations of Romania with developing countries’, Eugen Preda and Cristian Popișteanu dedicate a full chapter to matters

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488 In Romanian – Pe Harta Lumii.
490 Sorin Petrescu, Burma, Editura Stiintificǎ, Bucureşti, 1956.
492 Cristian Popișteanu, a Graduate in diplomacy from The Institute for International Relations, The Academy of Economic Sciences, Bucharest (1959), PhD in history with the University of Bucharest (1968); co-founder of Lumea, the first Romanian weekly on foreign affairs; member of: the Board of Directors of the
related to underdevelopment. The authors do not endeavor to offer the definition of this phenomenon underdevelopment, but prefer instead to focus on its manifestations. Statistic data\(^{493}\) are given as they are an ‘overwhelming witness’ of some countries’ dire conditions. Very inspiring is the last part of the book where the Romanian reader can find concrete examples of Romania’s assistance to these countries: picturesque portraits of Romanian professionals, working along with developing countries’ nationals, in the latter countries, to build factories, oil stations or cure illnesses\(^{494}\).

The complex and more technical issue of the ‘gaps’ – a central concept in Romania’s explanation of underdevelopment – is explained to the general public by Mircea Malića\(^{495}\) in ‘Cronica Anului 2000’\(^{496}\) (The Annals of the Year 2000) that intends a forecast into the future. In plain words, he shows that there are at least five levels of social gaps: the gap in the field of food, where ‘there is the man who eats and the man who does not eat’; the gap in the field of knowledge with so many illiterate people in the world; the technological gap dividing the world in ‘those who handle a big quantity of machines and those who use primitive tools’; the military gap which is an expression of the technological and informational gaps; and finally, the economic development gap\(^{497}\). To encourage the non-expert readership, this author shows that

\[ \text{‘there is nothing that one can state in more simple terms than the issue of development that is ultimately about at the creation of accumulations to be invested} \]

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\(^{493}\) Example: developing countries ‘giving’ only 11% of the industrial output ‘of this world’, while sheltering 75% of its population; a disproportionate number of people in the developing countries being illiterate (800 million), affected by famine (500 million); lacking access to water (over one billion), etc.

\(^{494}\) An example is engineer Ion Petcu, a 7-year consultant with India’s ‘Oil and National Gas Commission’, who contributed to installing the first drilling machine to Jawalamukhi, where a training school has also been established: ‘hundred of autochtnous technicians – are said to – have deciphired, under engineer Petcu’s guidance, the secrets of this specialization’. President Nehru is quoted when saying that ‘a new chapter in India’s history is opened with the inauguration of this refinery. The Romanians also contributed to opening the Barauni refinery, as well as the Gauhati refinery, in the Punjab region, while the mechanical complex in Baroda was built on the basis ‘elaborated in our country’.

\(^{495}\) Mircea Malića was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (1962-1970), Minister of Education (1970-1972), Professor at the University of Bucharest, Department of Mathematics, Ambassador to Switzerland, UN Geneva, USA; Member of the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference on Population, Bucharest (1974), and of the World Conference on Science and Technology for Development, Vienna (1979), where he chaired the Committee on the Future of Science. In more recent years, Mircea Malića has been a respected Member of the Romanian Academy, President of the Future Studies Commission of the Romanian Academy, Vice-President of the Commission of Science Policy Studies of the Romanian Academy, Secretary General of the Association of International Law and International Relations, Vice-President of the European Cultural Center, Bucharest, etc. Professor Malića published extensively in mathematics and diplomacy.


\(^{497}\) Idem, pp. 238-240.
in the growth process. How these to be realized, how can they be best used in the most efficient of ways, what price should a society pay for them? – here the questions that every country needs to answer in conformity with its conditions and history⁴⁹⁸.

Mircea Maliţa is not the only author attempting to link his interests for the future of science with the need to explain to the Romanian public the complex matters of global development. In a collective volume ‘The Humankind in a Quarter of a Century’⁴⁹⁹, various authors write about the future of global agriculture (Dumitru Dumitru and Virginia Cămpeanu), the alimentary future of humankind (Eugen Buciuman), the world’s population (Vladimir Trebici), etc.

But one of the most complex popularization books, the one that offers one of the most comprehensive and easiest to understand overview of the causes, manifestations, policies and politics of underdevelopment is Gavril Horja’s⁵⁰⁰ ‘Conquering the Underdevelopment, a Cause for the Entire Humankind’⁵⁰¹. For this author, underdevelopment is one of the ‘strange paradoxes of the contemporary world’⁵⁰₂ given that, on one side, there are children and adults that die as not having enough to eat, while on the other side, a great quantity of food (the examples of Australia and the European Community are made) is simply destroyed so that prices can be maintained. Echoing his colleagues, Horja shows that underdevelopment is about such discrepancies and ‘gaps’ that show themselves is a variety of fields: nutrition, but also science and culture⁵⁰₃. According to this author underdevelopment has one, fundamental and reductive cause: the state of severe exploitation that the current developing countries were forced to undergo while under the domination of foreign, colonialist and imperialist powers. Underdevelopment is, therefore, an ‘abnormal state of affairs’, it is

’not a necessary, unavoidable stage, through which have passed or need to pass, in their way towards progress, all the peoples of the world, but this state is a

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⁴⁹⁸ Idem, pp. 244-245.
⁵⁰¹ Author’s translation of the title into English. The original title: Gavril Horja, Invingerea subdezvoltǎrii cauzei a întregii omenirii, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, București, 1981.
⁵⁰₂ Gavril Horja, op. cit., p. 22.
deviation from the natural development, being caused by the way in which the capitalist order developed itself unequally, at the international level.\(^{504}\)

In particular – this author claims - such deviation occurred when the imperialist powers in search for new territories interrupted the conquered countries’ progress, which amounted to a condemnation for the latter to lag behind. All other theories of underdevelopment are refuted on grounds of their being ‘unscientific’, while the colonization theory for underdevelopment is constructed as the only ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ cause of the South’s poverty.\(^{505}\)

The author is concerned not only with the causes, but also with the solutions of this phenomenon. In his view, there are three main passageways out of poverty: the ‘decisive role of the country’s own efforts’, the international collaboration for development and disarmament.\(^{506}\)

The ‘decisive role of the developing countries’ own efforts’ is further explained and the Romanian reader can find out that it practically means that the natural resources of each country should be governed and mastered by the respective people, as a right that needs to be respected by all other countries in the world and, in particular, by all former colonial powers; that each developing country needs to design and implement its own programs and strategies for fighting against poverty, given that every underdeveloped country has a specificity of its own (with some countries having an extremely large population, while others need to rely on an extremely small number of citizens, some areas being endowed with natural resources, while others need to do without, with some countries being landlocked, while others are not) so that the models of development – especially those experimented by the advanced capitalist or socialist countries at the time of their development - can not be indistinctively applied, as there is no unique model of development that can be applied to any country, at any time and any place.\(^{507}\); that the

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\(^{504}\) Gavril Horja, op. cit., p. 29.


\(^{506}\) Gavril Horja, op. cit., pp. 49-103, Chapter III, ‘Căi și mijloace de înlăturare a subdezvoltării’.

\(^{507}\) For the observer of Romanian foreign and domestic policy, this argument can be a very familiar one. In 1964, with its famous ‘Declaration of Independence’ Romania first formulated this principle in what it was concerned itself. In that instance and in reaction to Soviet plans to relegate Romania to a food production role in the international division of labor within the Soviet bloc, Romania affirmed that each socialist state had its own unique historical and socio-economic circumstances and that it should be the ensemble of these
agrarian issues need to be democratically solved, as the ‘agrarian problem’ is closely connected with the food shortages that these countries experience; that industrialization needs to be encouraged as the real basis of progress and independence; that national staves need to be trained so that all the tasks deriving from these recommendations to be implemented by the nationals of the respective country themselves. Second, the international factors should be made to work towards the global development: in particular the commercial exchanges should be made equitable towards the developing countries; the developing countries’ access to science and technology should not be restricted; the developing countries should be assisted with financial aid; and the developing countries’ solidarity should be strengthened. Thirdly, disarmament is called into question, as ‘a vital requirement for development and global peace’.

Conclusions
In socialist Romania, authoritative scholars, (future) members of the Romanian Academy, civil servants and diplomats take a sound interest in global development issues and endeavor not only to penetrate this complex field with their academic writing, but they also introduce their thinking to wider audiences, to the general Romanian public, through various vulgarization volumes and booklets.

In their writing, the Romanian authors demonstrate not only that they are familiar with the Western development thinking (see for instance Rudâreanu’s study in the ‘opinions’ of the Western scholars in what the economic crisis was concerned), but also with the development thinking of scholars from the developing countries themselves (see Ionescu’s study in the Indian development thinking, as well as Rudâreanu’s introduction in the Latin-American ideas for international development). Moreover, the Romanians seem to be sufficiently conversant with global development theories so as to be able to openly criticize and even denounce some of them (mainly the ‘capitalistic’ ones). They distance themselves from what they call ‘arbitrary’ development assistance policies of the ‘West’ and signal their vigilance towards the Western donors’ strategies by various discursive
means (ex. the use of inverted commas when referring to development aid or other expressions associated with the idea of international relief).

Beyond criticism, the Romanian authors are also able of bringing forward concrete proposals. The list of keywords and expressions in the solutions that the Romanian scholars propose is rather long and, more often than not, in opposition with the Western policies: ‘self-promoted development’, ‘endogenous strategies’, ‘South-South relations’, ‘collective autonomy’, ‘liberalization of trade among the developing countries’ as opposed to the ‘uniform liberalization’, ‘industrialization’, ‘sovereign use of the national wealth’, ‘selective versus un-selective integration into the World economy’, ‘strengthened unity of the developing countries so as to increase their negotiating power in relation with the developed countries’, a ‘more equal division of the international labor’, the ‘restructuring of the economic international relations’, ‘disarmament’, etc. Some of these proposals have been discarded, while others are still with us through the day.

Nonetheless, even when criticizing or opposing the predominant policies of development assistance, the Romanian scholars were hardly challenging the concept of development as such. The need for development – both at home and abroad – was beyond doubt: in the Romanian society, as elsewhere, ‘development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary’.

In short, Romanians were part of the same order of discourse by which a specific ‘domain of thought and action’ had been enacted – some contemporary scholars would claim – for producing knowledge about and exercising power over the Third World.

2.2.1.2. Ten Romanian Proposals for International Development

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508 One of the most striking is Joseph Stiglitz’ recent argument that the principle of ‘reciprocity for and among all countries – regardless of circumstance’ should be replaced with the principle of *reciprocity among equals, but differentiation between those in markedly different circumstances*, amounting to Romania’s proposals of ‘non-uniform’ trade liberalization. See Joseph Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, Penguin Books, 2007, p. 83.


510 Expression belonging to Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 10.

511 See Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 9.
In this second part of this section of the case-study we will analyze one of Ceaușescu’s most important official statements on topics of international development: his ‘message’ for the fifth session of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in Manila, in 1979. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate the general framework of socialist Romania’s concept for international development in much finer detail. By so doing, we will be far from having a complete and exhaustive view over Romania’s pronouncements on international development, but such an exercise would still have the merit of being - according to the author’s knowledge – one of the first of its kind, particularly so if its relevance to the contemporary international development debate is also reviewed.

This particular ‘Address’ on international development issues was chosen from many others, mainly due to its exceptional visibility in Romania’s media of the time. The ‘Address’ made 10 proposals for international development and every one of these was explained to the Romanian reader in a special article published by Scînteia: 10 proposals – 10 articles signed by various Scînteia journalists. In Ceaușescu’s Romania, every piece of writing was supposed to pay what could amount to an ‘intellectual tribute’ to President Ceaușescu. This meant that every scholar or journalist would quote one or the other of President Ceaușescu’s speeches, reflections, comments or pronouncements, no matter the field of writing. All the more so must have been the case in a field – foreign policy and international development – in which President Ceaușescu was so active (as demonstrated in a previous section of this case-study). To make some examples, in her paper in the collective volume ‘Căi şi strategii’ coordinated by Sorica Sava, Eufrosina Ionescu will quote President Ceaușescu no less than four times, adding also two quotations from the Program of the Romanian Communist Party for building a socialist ‘multi-laterally developed society’; Marina Rudăreanu, in her article in the same volume, will quote Ceaușescu five times; Duhâneanu – 3 times, and so on. In some of these cases, a thesis was made, analyzed and demonstrated by the author and the demonstration would be further legitimized and strengthened by quoting Ceaușescu; in other cases, the hypothesis to be demonstrated would find its initial point in one of Ceaușescu’s pronouncements. In

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512 Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu, adresat celei de-a V-a Conferința a Națiunilor Unite pentru comerț și dezvoltare de la Manila, in Scînteia, 8 May, 1979, p. 1 and p. 6.
514 Sorica Sava, Căi și strategii..., op. cit.
general, President Ceaușescu’s views on any domestic or international affair were promptly echoed by Romanian publicists and commentators. Never were his opinions criticized: in the socialist society the role of the media was not to challenge the leader, but to act as an explanatory forum for further clarifying - for the general public - the sense of the various statements made by the President\textsuperscript{516}.

The Address sent by Ceaușescu to the Manila Conference is a particularly relevant official document: on this occasion Ceaușescu enounced the above-mentioned ten-point coherent ‘Romanian position’ on international development, accompanied of a ‘worldview’ (given in the introductory part of the ‘Message’) on which these proposals were based. In his introduction, President Ceaușescu says:

‘It mounts to a grave anomaly of the contemporary social-political reality the fact that in the period of the most ample technical-scientific revolution, of the conquests of science and civilization, of the human knowledge, a great part of humankind still lives in conditions of underdevelopment, of poverty and famine, that the world continues to be divided in poor and rich countries, as a result of the old imperialist and colonialist policy of exploitation and oppression. This provokes sufferings to thousands and thousands of peoples, expropriating them of the most elementary conditions of civilized life, of the possibility of affirming their creative force, of manifesting and participating fully to the international life, to the efforts for the progress of the whole humankind\textsuperscript{517}.’

The world is thus divided in those who have and those who do not have; those who are developed and those who are underdeveloped; poverty and famine are the distinctive characteristics of the latter, while the former are characterized by human knowledge and ‘scientific conquests’. This argument is familiar: it echoes the technical argument spelled out by President Truman 30 years before, when he said in his inaugural address:

‘Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas\textsuperscript{518}.’

\textsuperscript{516} This statement is based on author’s extensive reading of written sources of the time, in particular Scînteia and Lumea.
\textsuperscript{517} Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu, adresat celei de-a V-a Conferințe a Națiunilor Unite pentru comerț și dezvoltare de la Manila, in Scînteia, 8 May, 1979, p. 1.
Unlike President Truman who refrains from referring to any causes of underdevelopment, President Ceauşescu vigorously points to old colonialist policies. In his Address, President Truman had pictured the ‘Third World’ as a land of helplessness, hunger and misery. In his Message, Ceauşescu would use less blunt wording: he prefers euphemisms such as the poor peoples being deprived of the ‘most elementary conditions of civilized life’, instead of making explicit reference to their ‘misery approaching conditions’, ‘inadequate food’ or ‘primitive and stagnant economic life’. Beyond euphemisms Ceauşescu also uses positive wording: he speaks of these peoples’ ‘creative force’, their ability to participate to the international life and their willingness to contribute to global developmental efforts. Romania’s view about the Third World is mixed: deprivation is indeed an attribute of these countries, but they also have positive features. For the negative attributes (hunger, misery, etc.), as well as for all the opportunities that these countries miss, the former colonial powers and them exclusively are to be blamed.

In his Message, President Ceauşescu also shows that development is a core element of world peace as the

‘Perpetuation of the big economic and social gaps between the countries in course of development and the advanced countries mounts also to one of the permanent factors of tensed inter-states relations, of global economic instability and the accentuation of crisis phenomenon...’

For President Ceauşescu, the nexus security – development, or, more precisely, the nexus development – disarmament, is a very important one and he constantly reminds it in his speeches and writing. In a Cold-War environment, President Ceauşescu believes that global poverty can be a source of global conflict and here is, therefore, one more reason for investing in the underdeveloped areas’ development. According to Thomas Barnett, scholar and attentive analyst of Romania’s foreign policy, Romania was actually advocating for an inseparable connection between political-military security and economic development.

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519 President Truman’s terminology. See Harry Truman, op. cit.
520 Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu, adresat celei de-a V-a Conferinţe a Naţiunilor Unite pentru comerţ şi dezvoltare de la Manila, in Scînteia, 8 May, 1979, p. 1.
521 In the same year (1979) of this Message, under the signature of Nicolae Ceauşescu, it is being published a 239-page volume collecting the speeches, reports and interviewed he had given / released on development and disarmament. See Nicolae Ceauşescu, Dezarmarea, necesitate vitalǎ a întregii omeniri [In English: Disarmament, Vital Necessity of the Entire Humankind], Editura Politicǎ, Bucureşti, 1979. Similar volumes have also been published in 1981, 1982 and 1988, see: Nicolae Ceauşescu, Stiinţǎ, progress, pace [In English: Science, Progress, Peace], Editura Politicǎ, 1981; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Pentru o politicǎ de pace în întreaga lume [In English: Peace Policy in the Whole World], Editura Politicǎ, Bucureşti, 1982; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Pace, progres şi colaborare internaţionalǎ: întâlniri ale tovarǎşului Nicolae Ceauşescu cu conducătorii de state: 1987 [In English: Peace, Progress and International Collaboration: Meetings of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu with World Leaders: 1987], Editura Politicǎ, Bucureşti, 1988.
well-being. But in so doing, Romania was in *contrast* with the Soviet Union. While for the Soviet Union the political détente between East and West needed to be extended to military relations *before* real development could take place in the South, for Romania political and security could hardly be achieved without the elimination of underdevelopment; thus, the fight against poverty or, in the language of the time, the fight against the ‘economic and social gaps’ should be given expedite precedence. To emphasize this particular view, Romania actually reformulated the ‘new international economic order’ as ‘the new international economic and political order’.

Generally, relations between security and development, the way they mutually affect and influence each other, have always been considered by development scholars. In the post-Cold War context, security has been mostly interpreted as ‘human security’, rather than ‘state / national security’. At current date, various connections between the two are hypothesized: that human security forms an important part of people’s wellbeing and is therefore an objective of development; that lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on development; and that lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict. The last of these hypothesis reminds of Ceauşescu’s thinking (*Perpetuation of the big ... gaps ...mounts ... to ... tensed inter-states relations*), while more radical authors show that security and development are often impossible to disentangle from each other as militaristic states that need money and ‘aid’ for their repressive systems can have them much easier when being able to promote their demands as good development projects in favor of the people.

As last point in the introduction to his message for the UNCTAD conference, President Ceauşescu offers his views regarding the main elements for a resolute fight against underdevelopment. He proposes a three-pronged strategy. In the first place and in

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523 In more recent times, see the work of Mark Duffield (*Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security and Development, Security and Unending War*), Mary Kaldor (*Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention* and *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*), David Keen (*Complex Emergencies*) and others.


consensus with Romanian scholars’ recommendations\textsuperscript{526}, he reminds the ‘developing countries’ own efforts’ for their own development. The domestic efforts of the poor countries are seen as an

‘amplification of the collaboration among themselves, their mutual help in the fight for creating a new technical-material basis, for the consolidation of their economic and political independence and the increase of living standards of the masses\textsuperscript{527}’.

This position is not innovation and this view will represent a constant feature of his external policy. In the past, he had already expressed his belief in the endogenous strategies for international development. Two years earlier, in 1977 he had said:

\begin{quote}
In the elimination of the economic backwardness, the decisive role is, of course, that of the developing countries’ peoples themselves which have to mobilize their forces for valorizing all means and material and human resources they have available.\textsuperscript{528}
\end{quote}

In the years to come, he will never fail to stress the people’s important role in development\textsuperscript{529}, as well as the need for more cooperation for development among the developing countries themselves. Support for a common ‘front’ of the developing countries was built into the calls for a new international economic order and the idea that solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa would lead from mutual support in anti-imperialist struggles to economic cooperation, dates back to the Bandung Conference of 1955\textsuperscript{530}. The idea of South-South cooperation not only survived the failure of the North-South negotiations over the NIEO, but some important mechanisms for South-South and triangular cooperation were established in the late 70s\textsuperscript{531}. Traditionally, the South-South cooperation has been viewed as encompassing technical cooperation among developing countries, with a focus on sharing of experiences or exchanges in capacity-building and economic cooperation among developing countries, covering financial, investment, trade

\textsuperscript{526} See previous sub-section for details, even if it is difficult to say if the scholars influenced the President’s views, or the scholars’ views are just another instance of ‘board sounding’ for President Ceauşescu’s views.

\textsuperscript{527} Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu, adresat celei de-a V-a ConferinŃe a NaŃiunilor Unite pentru comerŃ şi dezvoltare de la Manila, in Scînteia, 8 May, 1979, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{528} Nicolae Ceauşescu, România pe drumul construirii socialiste, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{529} Nicolae Ceauşescu, Rolul hotărâtor al popoarelor în determinarea unui nou curs în viaŃa internaŃională [In English: The Decisive Role of Peoples in Determining a New Course in the International Life], Editură Politică, Bucureşti, 1988.


\textsuperscript{531} For instance, a Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) established one year before this message, in 1978, by the United Nations General Assembly. This unit is hosted by the UNDP with the mandate ‘to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation on a Global and United Nations system-wide basis’. See \url{http://tcdf1.undp.org/}, retrieved on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of July 2008.
and technical flows. In time, with growing criticism towards the North’s development cooperation (in particular reference to the fact that the Northern expertise was not only the most expensive expertise available, but also inadequate), the idea of South-South cooperation started to influence more and more development practices so as that the United Nations recently announced that the South-South cooperation actually is ‘one of the most important United Nations strategies for strengthening developing countries and their economies’.

The second element of Ceauşescu’s three-pronged strategy for international development was the centrality of the new international economic order (NIEO), and in particular

‘equality and equity relations, the respect of every nation’s right to be full master of national wealth and to capitalize them in full concordance with every nation’s own interests’.

As a self-declared socialist and developing country, Romania was a firm supporter of both UNCTAD and the NIEO, while Ceauşescu’s interest for issues of energy and raw materials was well-known. From its ‘developing country’ position Romania’s interests largely coincided with those of other developing countries: any kind of benefits from a new economic order, which may have accrued to the latter as a group, was likely to be of Romania’s profit too. The main goals of the NIEO, according to the Romanian view and as expressed by Romania’s official declaration on the NIEO for the 1975 UN Seventh Special Session on economic affairs, were: the transfer of technological advances to developing countries; the elimination of all barriers to trade; the stimulation of world food production

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533 The case of the ‘white elephants’ is well known. A theory of the white elephants was developed by Robinson and Torvik (2002). They argue that these ‘investment projects with negative social surplus’ are a particular type of inefficient redistribution that is politically attractive when politicians find it difficult to make credible promises to supporters. Robinson and Torvik show that it is the very inefficiency of such projects that makes them politically appealing, because it allows only some politicians to credibly promise to build them and thus enter into credible redistribution. The fact that not all politicians can credibly undertake such projects gives those who can a strategic advantage. Socially efficient projects do not have this feature since all politicians can commit to build them and they thus have a symmetric effect on political outcomes.
534 An indirect acknowledgement of its growing importance may be seen in the 58/220 of 23 December 2003 resolution of the UN General Assembly declaring the date of 19th of December, the United Nations’ Day for South-South Cooperation.
537 Nicolae Ceauşescu, Resursele energetice şi de materii prime [In English: Raw Materials and Energetic Resources], Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1980. Like many of the books published under his signature, this volume is actually a 216-pag es collection of speeches and interviews given / released by President Ceauşescu along the years, on the common theme exposed by the title.
the creation of new energy sources and stabilization of price relations between raw materials and industrial goods; the creation of a just international monetary system; an increase of Western technical aid; and the increase of the UN’s role in North-South talks in these issues. But the majority of these seven points were related to Romania’s own development needs, so that Romania’s advice for the Third World countries is now merging with its own needs and interest.

As third and last strategic approach in the battle for development President Ceauşescu mentions the official development assistance, expressed as

‘the support offered to the peoples left behind by the economically developed states’. In spite of his insistence on the role of the endogenous efforts and strategies for development, President Ceauşescu is clearly in favor of the West providing development aid for the poor countries. To paraphrase Arturo Escobar, he is part of that order of discourse in which it seems ‘impossible to conceptualize social reality in other terms’. However, being part of the discourse does not preclude the possibility of criticism or calls for special conditions to be applied. Indeed, while calling for development aid to be granted to the poor countries, President Ceauşescu advocated for such aid to be free of any conditionality and subsumed to the developing countries’ own programs for development. His position was in line with that of the Program of the Romanian Communist Party from 1974 that showed that:

‘For the elimination of backwardness, for and independent socio-economic development and for building a new social order, it needs to be started both from the maximum use of the endogenous human and materials means, and the extension of the international cooperation, as well as the use of the unconditioned aid of other states. The harmonious consociation of the internal and external factor (...) represents the expression of a correct policy of every people’.

President Ceauşescu and the Program of the Romanian Communist Party show the way for reading the international practices of foreign aid. The official relatively mild hints at an

539 Tomas Barnett, op. cit.
‘incorrect’ use of development aid, were subsequently taken over by the Romanian scholars writing on international development issues. Development aid received a particularly bad press, being thoroughly criticized, if not ridiculed, by some of the Romanian scholars and journalists. In the 1970s the calls for ‘more and better aid’ were probably less frequent as they are in our days, but in Romania the voices raising to warn against the development ‘gifts’ were surely much more heard at that historical time than they are today.

In the introductory lines to Ceaușescu’s Address to the Manila Conference, language is suggestive and relevant. One of the first remarks concerning the linguistic means of the “Message” is that if some expressions used in socialist Romania are different from those used in the contemporary development discourse, some others are actually the same. To make some examples: ‘backwardness’ – a term that was so frequently used in those times – is not in use any longer in the contemporary context; ‘economic and social gaps’ was used to refer to global poverty, but it is not being used to any further extent; in general, euphemisms were preferred to blunt references to misery and despair in the Third World. At the same time, ‘combative’ wording was used in those times as it is still used at current date. An example is the ‘fight’ metaphor. In the Western discourse, development is frequently a ‘battle’ for some things, a ‘fight’ against other things: fighting disease, fighting poverty, fighting a whole series of problems that are to be found in the poor South, rather than the rich North. As Carmen Raff shows, according to the Western development industry the antonym for ‘development’ is always the South’s ‘under-development’ and never the North’s ‘over-development’, as ‘there is a quasi-universal

543 See the previous part of this section of the case-study.
544 I owe the inspiration for this comparison to Joseph Berliner. In his book ‘Soviet Economic Aid’, Berliner recalls the case of Burma whose Prime Minister had once said: ‘We prefer to pay for it [economic aid extended as a credit line], as this forms a more solid basis of friendship than acceptance of gifts’.
545 Statement based by author’s fieldwork and close observation of the international development debate in current-date Romania.
547 From the eight of the so-called ‘millennium development goals’, at least six have a direct reference to ‘tackling’ setbacks in the South and only one – the one exhorting the creation of a global partnership for development – has an implicit reference to the rich countries as well. See the Millennium Development Goals at http://www.undp.org/mdg/, as of January 2009.
agnostic silence\textsuperscript{548} about the latter term. The ‘fight’ metaphor is also central to Romania’s view. But for Romania, the ‘enemy’ was not always in the global South, or better said, it was not exclusively in the South’s poverty, but also in the North’s overabundance and, in particular, the way such abundance was achieved: the colonialist practices are considered to be the main reason for the South’s present state of underdevelopment. As President Ceauşescu had unequivocally showed, already years in advance of his ‘Message’ to the Manila UNCTAD:

‘One of the burning questions of international relations is the presence, in great areas of the world, of a large number of countries that are lagging economically and socially as a consequence of the long colonial rule. The robbing of their national riches by the imperialist powers has prevented these peoples from developing their productive forces, their industry, agriculture, science, from securing high spiritual and material living standards, while in advanced capitalist countries the national wealth has continuously increased\textsuperscript{549}.

The constant references to the need for aid to be ‘unconditioned’ and to the call for of always ‘fighting’ colonialism and neo-colonialism can be read in this light. The solution was, therefore, not only (or predominantly) technical as in the Western tradition of development cooperation\textsuperscript{550}, but also political: concessions were sought from the West, as the West was held responsible for the developing countries’ state of under-development. The South instead was held to put all its ‘own’ efforts in the development process so that one day, it can ‘catch-up’ with the developed North. Indirectly, the West and the East agree that development is the objective to be achieved. As a matter a fact

‘The two ideologies which dominated the twentieth century (privatizing free market capitalism and command / state capitalism) were only ever in disagreement as regards strategies\textsuperscript{551} and not the ‘developmental’ philosophy as such.

After the short, but revealing, introduction, President Ceauşescu lists the ten actions that, in his opinion, represent the groundwork for the poor countries’ development. This 10-


\textsuperscript{550} For long years, and still today, the developed countries offer ‘technical assistance’. For an overview of the role that the faith in science and technology played in the elaboration and justification of the development discourse, see: Arturo Escobar, op. cit., pp. 35-38.

\textsuperscript{551} Carmen Raff, op. cit., p. 17.
point inventory forms the main body of the Message and urge the creation of a long-term program of measures for agriculture, industry and infrastructure; more attention for the training and education of developing countries nationals; creation of specific research and knowledge centers; creation of a Common Fund for ‘Disarmament and Development’; fair prices for raw materials and elimination of custom barriers to trade; free access to modern technologies; rules for foreign and trans-national companies; strengthening developing countries’ unity; strengthening the United Nations Organisation; and the UNCTAD to create a unitary program for action against underdevelopment.\footnote{Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu... op. cit. p. 1 and p. 6.}

The Romanian media shows awe-like flattering attention to President Ceauşescu’s proposals for international development. In an introductory, non-signed article\footnote{Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu adresat Sesiunii U.N.C.T.A.D. amplu program de acŃiune pentru făurirea noii ordini economice internaŃionale. 1. Un ansamblu armonios de mǎsuri practice, concrete eficiente [In English: The Message of President Nicoale Ceausescu addressed to the UNCTAD Session, ample program of action for building the new international economic order. 1. A harmonious ensemble of practical, concrete, efficient measures], in Scînteia, May 10, 1979, p.6.}, Scînteia talks about the profound ‘echoes’ that this message recorded both nationally and internationally:

‘The Romanian people, the public opinion from the whole country, as well as the largest circles of the international public opinion took note with the most vivid interest of the \textit{MESSAGE ADDRESSED BY THE COMRADE NICOLAE CEAUŞESCU TO THE 5\textsuperscript{TH} CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT}\footnote{The bolded capital - according the original text.}\footnote{Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu adresat Sesiunii U.N.C.T.A.D. amplu program de acŃiune pentru făurirea noii ordini economice internaŃionale. 1. Un ansamblu armonios de mǎsuri practice, concrete eficiente, op. cit.}.

After reviewing the main ideas expressed by the message, the article shows that this ‘vivid interest’ is self understood for a ‘document of so high political significance’ that contains ‘such a rich load of ideas’, formulates such ‘bold’, but ‘realistic’ proposals, and delineates such ‘constructive directions of action for solving one of the most fundamental problems of the contemporary world’, which is implied to be the problem of underdevelopment. The message of President Nicolae Ceauşescu is deemed to ‘enlist itself as a new contribution to the development of the concept of the new order, as well as to the arsenal of means of fighting for its accomplishment’.\footnote{Idem.}
‘an expression of the profound understanding of the need of ousting the grave anomalies of the contemporary world’, as well as ‘a firm commitment of our party and state to act also from now on with all the energy, not to spare any effort, for accomplishing some stringent desiderates of the contemporary life, for the economic and social advancement, for strengthening the independence and the sovereignty of the developing countries, of the non-aligned countries, of all states, corresponding to the burning hopes of peace, progress and well-being of the whole humanity’.

Beyond this obsequious review, Scînteia devotes ample space for explaining and illustrating the President’s ten proposals for international development. During the following three weeks, more precisely from the 10th to the 31st of May 1979, in ten special articles, a team of specialized commentators will detail for the general public each and every one of these proposals. Each of the five journalists in this team will quote the President, will provide statistics to show the need for the specific proposal, will express admiration for the President’s contribution to the international development debate and will use any rhetorical argument for building a case in favor of the proposal each of them is called to introduce to the Romanian readership. In what follows we will analyze each of these points.

1. A long-term program of measures for agriculture, industry and infrastructure

In President Ceauşescu’s view the first thing the UNCTAD should do in its fight against underdevelopment is to elaborate a long-term program – up to the year 2000, with a first stage in 1990 – of measures for a more intense economic development of the poor countries’ economies. The program would pay particular attention to three main areas: agriculture, in particular the mechanized type of agriculture to ensure ‘the consumption requests of the masses; industry, with a special focus on the food and textile industries, as well as other trades that could use the raw materials the developing countries abound in; and the means of communication, especially the railroads and the transport supported by the internal waters.

557 Idem.
558 Gh. Cercescuc, Viorel Popescu, Radu Bogdan, Dumitru Tinu and Ion Fintînaru.
Long-, as well as short-term programs for development are far from being innovative. Since the very first years of the ‘development era’ the ‘Plan’ was the preferred method of conceiving of international development\textsuperscript{559}. The three ‘development decades’ were such medium-term programs for development; every one of the more than 200 development agencies in the World\textsuperscript{560} has one or a series of development ‘program’, and one of the UN agencies that is most relevant to development has the word ‘program’ in its title (the United Nations Development Program); the history of the development industry seems to be but a long list of programs for development and, as William Easterly shows, Tony Blair’s call for a ‘big, big push’ in 2005 and the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ agreed by the World’s political leaders in 2000 are all manifestations of the program-led development philosophy\textsuperscript{561}. To listen to this author, neither of these ‘big plans’ ever succeeded and never will one succeed as

‘Asking the aid agencies and development workers to attain utopian ideals makes them much worse at achieving the doable things\textsuperscript{562}, that are actually needed.

On the contrary, while listening to another eminent development thinker - Jeffrey Sachs – all it takes to end global poverty is a really well-crafted Big Plan\textsuperscript{563}.

If Ceauşescu’s idea of designing an ambitious program for international development was hardly innovative, neither was so the content of the program. Infrastructure – for communications and transport, but not only - was a preoccupation for developers of all times. At least in the landlocked countries, one of the key roles for Western donors’ development aid was infrastructure building for improving transport links\textsuperscript{564}. As for the East’s aid, already in the beginning of the 1970s, 75.1% of the Soviet aid for Africa was granted for energy and heavy industry\textsuperscript{565}, while a transport infrastructure project was an other major socialist donor’s (China) largest single foreign aid project (the $455 million-


\textsuperscript{560} The estimate regarding the number of development agencies, belongs to Roger Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{561} William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden..., op. cit., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{562} William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden..., op. cit., p. 29.


plus Tanzania-Zambia railway). Closer to our days, the European Union, in its Strategy for Africa, foresees a ‘three-pronged EU response’ focused on peace and security; economic environment; and good governance. The improvement of the economic environment is understood as increased economic growth, actions to tackle the MDGs and actions to interconnect Africa

‘as limited access to transport and communication services, water and sanitation, and energy restricts economic growth’.

An EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure is proposed to complement the new Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and the AU-NEPAD Infrastructure Plan and to support and initiate programs such as the Trans-African Networks that facilitate interconnectivity at continental level.

2. Training and education for national personnel of developing countries

As a second proposal, Romania brings forward the need for adopting

‘a program regarding the development of education, of training the national staves for all fields of activity, corresponding to the needs of the multilateral progress of these countries’.

The explanatory article in Scînteia strongly emphasizes the importance of this issue. First – the article shows - there is a self-evident connection between the qualified staff available and the capacity of the developing countries to capitalize on their own national resources. In absence of trained staff, economic opportunities are missed as human resources are fundamental for transforming the natural wealth of a country in actual wealth for its inhabitants. The article demonstrates that the lack of ‘national’ qualified staff is also a problem of national independence, especially for those of the developing countries that depend on their former colonizing powers for the specific skills that they may need for boosting their economic growth. Independence is at risk in a context in which – to make

only one example from the numerous statistics quoted by the author of this article – the number of scientists per 10,000 inhabitants is of 10.4 in the industrialized countries versus 0.35 in Africa, 1.16 in Asia and 1.15 in the Latin America. Therefore, the article calls for immediate measures to be taken and advertises for the progresses made by Romania itself to be taken as an ‘example’ by the other developing countries. According to this article it is only due to its active policy for education and staff training and professionalization that Romania is now on the ‘orbit of progress’. But due to its own experience, Romania is now able to offer an important contribution to the developing countries’ development, by supporting their efforts in training their own staff. The support thus granted by Romania would then be an expression of ‘the active solidarity, in action, of our people with the peoples of these countries’.

The commentator’s advertising intention is obvious and part of this publicity is to show that the aid granted by Romania is oriented towards ‘various directions’: educating and training, in the Romanian educational system, no less than 15,000 young people from developing countries, half of which on scholarships granted by the Romanian state; granting technical assistance, through more than 15,000 Romanian experts that contribute to developing various economic, industrial, agricultural and cultural objectives; educating the young generations of the developing countries in their own countries with the help of more than 1000 professors from Romania, who participate directly to the ‘realization of the national programs of education and professional training’.

Regarding the ethos of this article, it is relevant to note the sense of fulfillment that is communicated. Offering this type of aid is for Romania a positive experience, as:

‘It is ... a reason of real satisfaction and patriotic pride the fact that Romania, due to the great successes scored in its industrialization, in modernizing its whole economy, in the field of technical-scientific research, in developing its educational system and the latter’s adaptation to the practical demands of production, has now a potential – ever growing – which allows it to grant such qualified assistance’.

As a matter of fact, academic and technical training programs were a privileged form of assistance not only by Romania, but by all those allies of the Soviet Union that developed international development programs. In 1961 Czechoslovakia, the influx of foreign

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569 Viorel Popescu, op. cit.
570 Idem.
students from the developing countries prompted the decision of establishing a separate university in Prague to teach science and technology, as well as social sciences and humanities. Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba University of People’s Friendship was famous for its constant influx of Third World students. In 1978 – one year in advance of President Ceauşescu’s ‘Message’, 26,000 Third World students were in the Soviet Union with an additional of 18,500 in Easter Europe. According to Kanet and Ipatov, Soviet education programs for Third World students, representing ‘an important component of the overall Soviet economic assistance program’, were intended to achieve three major goals: providing the needed skilled personnel required to modernize these countries’ economies; staff the projects and programs inaugurated with Soviet assistance; train a future elite that, at a minimum, will be favorably disposed towards the Soviet Union. At the time President Ceauşescu was sending his ‘Message’ to the Manila United Nations Conference, around one tenth of the total education budget of the developing countries was covered by external aid, with some donors such as France dedicating as much as 35% of their bilateral ODA to educational programs.

In more recent days of the international development cooperation, the importance of ‘capacity building’ or ‘human resources development’ can hardly be understated: in its report of its fourth session, the UN Committee for Development Policy stressed that ‘The primary goal for aid and assistance should be capacity-building in recipient countries, that is to say, the creation and development of human and social capabilities that would foster autonomous development, innovation and change’. Eliminating illiteracy and promoting development through education is one of the oldest activities of developers, with a special UN agency – UNESCO – entirely dedicated to this

571 This university was closed in 1972. Apparently, one of the reasons was the proliferation of spontaneous political activity among the students. After this date, a fixed numbers of students were admitted to already existing educational institutions in Czechoslovakia. See: Vratislav Pechota, “Czechoslovakia and the Third World,” in Michael Radu (ed), Eastern Europe and the Third World: East Vs. South, Praeger, New York, 1981.
572 Vratislav Pechota, “Czechoslovakia and the Third World,” op. cit.
aim\textsuperscript{578}. At current date, one of the eight Millennium Development Goals, is referred to achieving universal access to education\textsuperscript{579}, while the Commission for Africa Report recommends that states provide funding for all boys and girls in sub-Saharan Africa to receive free basic education, while secondary, higher, vocational education, adult learning, and teacher training should also benefit of appropriate emphasis within the overall education systems\textsuperscript{580}.

3. Create regional research bodies
Correlated with the problems of education and training, a third proposal is that of creating regional research centers, for better orienting the developmental programs and decisions. In his Address President Ceauşescu shows that:

‘Having regard to the great diversity of the new problems that the developing countries are confronted with, it is important the creation of some study and research bodies, in geographical areas, to analyze the specific economic and social tasks and to propose concrete solutions for their achievement\textsuperscript{581}.

In the explanatory article in Scînteia, Gh. Cercele\textsuperscript{582} shows that this presidential proposal is based on the ‘whole experience’ accumulated by the developing countries in their process of economic emancipation. The regional organization of these research centers is fundamental because

‘Life has proved that the measures with a general character addressing all the developing countries (…) are insufficient for overcoming the difficulties that each of these countries face\textsuperscript{583}.

What is rather needed is for the strategies of development to be based on the thorough knowledge and analysis of the specific conditions of each of these countries, taken in the regional context in which it is placed.

\textsuperscript{579} The Goal is to achieve universal primary education by 2015, with three important targets to ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. More information on this Goal is available online at http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal2.shtml as of January 2009.
\textsuperscript{581} Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu…, op. cit., p. 1 and p. 6.
\textsuperscript{582} Gh. Cercelescu, a Romanian journalist at Scinteia, currently a journalist with ‘Gandul’, continued to write articles on domestic and foreign economic matters.
\textsuperscript{583} Gh. Cercelescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu adresat Sesiunii U.N.C.T.A.D. amplu program de acțiune pentru făurirea noii ordini economice internaționale. 8 – Strategii ale dezvoltării în funcție de cunoașterea temeinică a condițiilor specifice din fiecare țară, Scinteia, May 26, 1979, p. 6.
Some of the critics of the global development discourse deem that education – the developers’ practice endeavoring to bringing knowledge to the developing countries - was more of ‘an instrument of cultural defoliation’\(^584\), rather than one of advancement of the developing countries. In some circles, schools and educational programs sponsored by Western aid were perceived as having

‘fostered unprecedented processes of exclusion against the poor and the powerless, despite their claims to serve as a new instrument of democratization’\(^585\).

The developers’ attempt to extract or produce knowledge from / about the Third World is equally criticized\(^586\) as in the development context the poor countries are ‘known, specified and intervened upon’\(^587\). Through a set of techniques, strategies, and disciplinary practices that organize the ‘generation, validation and diffusion of development knowledge’\(^588\) a specific ‘politics of truth’ is created, through which certain forms of knowledge are given the status of truth in a way that made possible to remove all problems from the political and cultural realms ad transfer them in the apparently more neutral realm of science\(^589\).

Apparently and as suggested by this third Romanian proposal for international development, this ‘unprecedented will to know everything about the Third World’ – as Escobar, its most fierce critique, puts it – was experienced not only by the Western, but also by the Eastern developers, offering a concrete and telling example on how Western and Eastern practices of international development converge, support each other and reinforce a specific vision of international development.

It is beyond the scope of this section of the case study to establish if this Romanian recommendation was implemented and with what practical results. What is relevant, though, is to note how Romania – now a new Member State of the European Union and ‘new’ donor – used to contribute, in its past, to building the ‘historical construct’ which is the global discourse for international development.


\(^{586}\) Idem.

\(^{587}\) Idem.

\(^{588}\) Idem.

\(^{589}\) Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 45.
4. A Common Fund: Disarmament and Development

Let us imagine that a new development fund has been recently launched. This Fund is to be filled by voluntary contributions of the donor countries, as well as by the savings realized through a general reduction in military spending. Every country would cut its military spending by 10-15% / year and a substantial part (50%) of the freed-up resources will go to this new common fund for development. The income thus realized by the Fund is at least the double of what is needed to eradicate hunger and lift 1 billion people from absolute poverty. Special rules would be observed by those willing to benefit from the Fund’s resources: only the least developed countries would be eligible to apply for funding; only those countries that themselves allocate up to 20% of their national income can fill a request for funding; and to be eligible a country would spend no more than 4-5% on armament.

This however, is not only an imaginative exercise: it is the core idea behind the fourth of the proposals advanced by the Romanian President to the fifth Conference of the UNCTAD.

Establishing joint ‘Funds’ or ‘Trusts’ for development is a usual practice by which donors pull together resources to be invested in development projects. With this proposal that brings together the issues of development and disarmament, Romania tackles two of the five big ‘D’s that it says to promote in the international arena: development, disarmament, decolonization, de-pollution, (the fight against) discrimination.

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590 This paragraph is based on data and information given in the corresponding explanatory article published in Scînteia by Gh. Cercelescu. See: Gh. Cercelescu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu adresat Sesiunii U.N.C.T.A.D. amplu program de acŃiune pentru fǎurirea noii ordinii economice internaŃionale. 4. Fondul de dezvoltare: un mijloc concret şi eficient de stimulare a eforturilor pentru lichidarea decalajelor economice [In English: The Development Fund: A Concrete and Efficient tool for stimulating the efforts for the elimination of the economic gaps], in Scînteia, May 15, 1979, p. 6.


592 An example is the European Development Fund (EDF), established as soon as 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, with a view to granting technical and financial assistance, initially to African countries (former colonies of the original members of the European Community). At current time The European Development Fund is ‘the main instrument for providing Community aid for development cooperation in the ACP States and OCT’.

Through the day, in the UN circles the relationship between disarmament and development is still controversial\textsuperscript{594}, but in other development-related circles already in the 1970 and the 1980s it was almost a cliché to say that ‘the arms race and underdevelopment are not two problems: they are one’ and they needed to be solved together or they will not be solved at all\textsuperscript{595}. Faced with failing decades for development, the ‘great reserve’ – as military spending was called by some of the developers\textsuperscript{596} – was appealing to many of them.

Article 26 (Chapter V – Functions and Powers of the Security Council) of the United Nations Organization Charter says that:

\begin{quote}
‘In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, (…), plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments’.
\end{quote}

Some\textsuperscript{597} read this article as embodying the implicit linkage that should be observed between disarmament and development. In particular, the reference to the ‘least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources…’ is the part that is most quoted as an argument for such logic.

The idea of creating a common fund for development to be filled with resources released by a reduction in arms spending seems to have been first circulated among the members of the non-alignment movement. Apparently, a first proposal to politically link disarmament to development - through diverting resources released by a reduction in military spending to development projects - belonged to Edgar Faure, the French Prime Minister who attended the conference of Bandung in April 1955. The idea was revived just one year before the Romanian proposal: in 1978, in his speech to the Extraordinary Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing proposed the "creation of a special fund of disarmament for the development" by evoking the disproportion

\textsuperscript{596} See Inga Thorson, op. cit., p. 31.
between "the one billion dollar devoted each day to the military arsenals" and the resources dedicated to development aid which were 14 times lower.\(^{598}\)

Soon after President Ceauşescu’s demise, in the former socialist block, the ‘disarmament-development fund’ idea, received significant support from a group of Soviet and American scholars that had work together through the 1980s for analyzing and bringing forward – probably for the first time in the history of development cooperation – a series of proposals for joint US – USSR cooperation with developing countries. In particular, Bowles and Arefieva showed that the case for US-USSR cooperation in the field of development assistance ‘is compelling on many grounds’.\(^{599}\) In particular, they name: environmental problems, changes in the political atmosphere of the 1990s, security concerns, greater mutual understanding, the need for the Soviet Union to ‘understand the requirements for participation in the world economic mainstream’, to remind the private sector in the West of the many opportunities for joint ventures with the Soviet Union. But the two authors see a potential hindrance for the ‘tripartite cooperation’ (US, USSR and the developing countries) in the lack of adequate funding. Four potential sources of funding are suggested and the first of these is the savings to be realized from arms reduction. The two scholars argue that while a program of ‘disarmament and development’ is still under discussion in the UN forums, the United States and the Soviet Union could attempt this kind of linkage and, for setting an example, experiment with some harmless, modest joint projects.

Lack of action on what may otherwise seem a wise idea, may lead to think that plans for releasing development funds from disarmament generally fall in an idealist model of international relations. However, closer to our times, the ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development’\(^{600}\) identifies five ways in which disarmament can release or increase the financial, human or physical resources available for development: by reducing military expenditure, accompanied by a decision at the national level to reallocate released resources to


\(^{600}\) Drafted upon request of the UN General Assembly, by operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002. The full text can be retrieved from [http://disarmament.un.org/cab/d&d.html](http://disarmament.un.org/cab/d&d.html), as of July 31\(^{st}\) 2008.
development, for either national socio-economic spending or ODA\textsuperscript{601}; by conversion (of the military industry towards civilian production); by strengthening security through confidence building; by creating conditions for economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and by preventing conflict and building peace. The first modality is particularly relevant for the current discussion. Nevertheless, in spite of the Group’s recommendations for the relationship between disarmament and development to be mainstreamed and several recommendations calling on the Member States to meet the agreed development commitments, nowhere is there a specific and clear recommendation regarding the creation of a ‘disarmament and development’ fund. This way, in spite of much scholarly and political discussion, in practical terms, Romania’s proposal for a disarmament-development fund to be created seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Otherwise, one may acknowledge that, once again, the issue raised by Romania and others that (used to) push for the relationship between development and disarmament to be acknowledged and worked upon, opened a discussion that will take much more time and energy than initially expected to bear fruit. In any case, what is again evident is that, once again, through its proposals, Romania was part of that global movement that brought forward a specific ‘domain of thought and action\textsuperscript{602} that is simply called ‘development cooperation’. In this particular case, Romania seems to have been at the forefront of the movement, anticipating issues that are still under debate today.

5. \textit{Fair price of raw materials and elimination of custom barriers to trade}

Already in the 1980s (around the time President Ceauşescu’s ‘Message’ was being sent to the Manila Conference), the question of the terms of trade between rich and poor countries had arisen a fair amount of controversy\textsuperscript{603} and, in the context of the NIEO, the calls for fair prices for raw materials extracted by / from the developing countries were frequent. In its General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-V), Programme for Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, of May 1974, the United Nations declared, on the basis of the first ever study on the relations between development and the raw materials, that such new order should be founded on the full respect for the principle of

\textsuperscript{601} As the Report shows, reducing military expenditure in itself does not necessarily mean that additional resources will be automatically available for development.

\textsuperscript{602} The author owes this expression to Arturo Escobar, op. cit.

‘just and equitable relationship between prices of raw materials, primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods exported by the developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured capital goods and equipment imported by them’

The fifth Romanian proposal for the UNCTAD puts itself at the center of this (still very actual) controversy, tackling in particular the issue of the declining prices of raw materials and the ensuing negative effects this phenomenon used to incur on the developing countries’ economies. Viorel Popescu’s explanatory article in Scînteia quotes UN statistics that show that annually consumers pay as much as $200 billion for raw materials, while the developing countries barely cash in the seventh part of this amount: the ‘lion’s share’ goes to the (Western) multinationals. For the reader to better grasp the context, Popescu shows, by bringing in various examples, that in 1960 to buy one jeep the developing countries were due to export up to 145 tons of iron ore, while in 1979 (the year the article was published) they were due to export more than double of that amount (357 tons). A decade later, in 1979, to cover the expenses for one imported rectifier the developing countries had to export 3 tons of copper, 9 tons of plant rubber or 14 tons of lead, while in 1975 for the same rectifier they had to export 8 tons of copper, 16 tons of plant rubbers and 27 tons of lead. The author quotes a ‘recent’ GATT study showing that at the date, the developing countries had to export cca. 40% more than in 1950 for the same amount of imported goods from the developed countries. This ‘scissors of prices’ is surely not favorable to the developing countries, in particular the non-oil-exporter ones, which see their budget deficits going to the stars: from $ 22 billions in 1977 to $ 35 billion only one year later. Of course, the culprits – according to this journalists – are the Western monopolies and the multinational companies that take the above-mentioned ‘lion’s share’. This is the reason – Popescu shows – for this fifth proposal for international development that Romania was bringing forward.

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606 Viorel Popescu, Raporturi juste între prețurile materiilor prime și ale produselor industrializate – cerință esențială a stabilizății economiei mondiale [In English: Just Reports between the prices of the raw materials and the industrialized products – essential requirement of the stability of the global economy], Scînteia, May 21, 1979, p. 6.
In his message to the UNCATD Conference, President Ceaușescu calls for the developing countries to be guaranteed ‘full sovereignty’ over their ‘own wealth’ and the possibility for them to

‘take the national control (…) over the exploitation and the participation to benefits for the natural resources they own’.

In his view and according to the socialist doctrine, the prices should be ‘scientifically determined’, to avoid any further worsening of the exchange rate between the raw materials exported by the developing countries and the manufactured products exported by the rich countries. In the same context, Romania also reminds that the poor countries’ exports have very limited access to the rich countries’ markets due to high tariffs and other barriers that the latter impose. President Ceaușescu averts the ‘recrudescence of protectionist tendencies in the Occidental commercial policy’ and calls for the barriers of all kind to be eliminated both for developing countries’ raw materials and for any other manufactured products they may be ready to sell abroad.

The ‘battle’ for trade barriers removal is a long one and far from being ceased. In recent times, the Report of the Commission for Africa warned that

‘Africa will not be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, nor set itself on a sustainable path to growth and poverty reduction, without increased trade’ and called for trade barriers in developed and other developing country markets ‘that frustrate the fulfillment of Africa’s trade potential’ to be removed.

6. Free access to modern technologies

The faith in science and technology has played a crucial role in the justification of the development discourse, since its very foundations at the end of the 1940s, as science and technology had always been the markers of progress and civilization. As Arturo Escobar shows, President Truman’s grand idea for international development was based on the application to the poor countries of two ‘vital forces’: modern technology and capital.

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608 Idem.
610 Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 35.
Today, the role of technology in advancing the development discourse, at least in one of the most important aid agency in the World (the United States Agency for International Development) is far from being lessened; on the contrary, it now represents a special form of development cooperation: the scientific and technological co-operation. For the future, more than ever, developers expect science and technology to continue to represent a ‘broad platform for development’, given that

‘many developing countries, particularly the poor countries of Africa, do not have the human resources, physical and economic infrastructures, and access to take full advantage of the S&T expertise and achievements of the United States and other industrialized countries’ and ‘Nevertheless, countries at all levels of development have a strong desire for more robust S&T capabilities’.

In recent times, under one of the newest of the development paradigms – that of ‘sustainable development’ - the role of science seems to be even more important. As Jung Uck Seo, Minister of Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea, showed in his opening speech to the ‘International Scientific and Technological Co-operation for Sustainable Development’ Conference, held in Seoul in 2000:

>We entered the Millennium with mixed expectations about the future of our planet. Today, many people remain optimistic, anticipating that the current economic boom will continue and that the scientific and technological breakthroughs - information, technology, biotechnology and others – will bring unparalleled economic growth to all parts of the world.

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612 Idem, p. 18.
613 Idem, p. 2.
With his sixth proposal for the Manila Conference President Ceauşescu was actually urging the developed countries to keep and deepen the promise they had made when promoting science and technology at the core of the development strategies:

‘The booming evolution of the global technical-scientific revolution imposes, as a fundamental requirement for the elimination of the big economic gaps, to ensure an open access (of these countries) to the modern technologies. In this sense, new measures need to be made for ensuring an increased technical assistance to be granted by the developed countries, for delivering the new scientific discoveries (to the developing countries) in advantageous conditions which allow the peoples left behind to walk faster on the path of their economic and social progress’.616

But modern technologies – such an important premise for social and economic development - were surely a weak point for the socialist block, as the latter was continuously lagging behind the West in what the creation of modern technologies was concerned617. Due to its preferential relations with the West, Romania was frequently in the position of having privileged access to Western technology618, but surely not in the amount and quality desired. It is, therefore, not by chance that Romania speaks up in favor of free access to modern technologies for the developing countries.

As with every last one of the ten presidential proposals, this sixth proposal is explained to the Romanian readership in a special article, published by Scînteia – the official Party and State journal – on the 23rd of May 1979. This explanatory article619, signed by Romanian journalist Valentin Pǎunescu620, endeavors to build a convincing case for this proposal. It brings into argument the ‘discriminations, restrictions and obstacles’ faced by the

616 Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu..., op. cit., p. 1.
developing countries when claiming access to the modern technologies developed by the industrialized ones. The author argues that such undesirable features draw negative effects not only for the developing countries, but for the whole world system (the developed countries included), as, in the end, they will result in a 'confinement of the world market', eventually leading to a vicious circle and perpetuation of underdevelopment. In support of such thesis, the UNCTAD Secretary General is quoted to say that the technological development of the ‘backward’ countries could in fact represent a form of valorization of industrialized countries’ economies. Granting access to modern technologies for the developing countries would hardly amount to a ‘philanthropic action’, as there is an obvious ‘convergence of interests’ between all the countries involved. Statistics from the UNCTAD are also quoted to show that the price tag for the developing countries’ imports of modern technologies is a high $9 billion. In Păunescu’s view, such amount represents a heavy burden for most of these countries, and this is seen from the fact that some of them are already being forced to renounce important developmental projects.

After mentioning that, in ‘recent’ times, some improvements had been made in the field of technological cooperation, the article proceeds by showing that a long list of restrictions still remain, starting with the prohibitive prices that the developing countries need to pay for the technological imports; the ‘restrictive conditions for some contracts’; the fact that the Western technology delivered ‘at key’ to the developing countries is far from being adapted to the real needs of these countries; the fact the most often Western technology is available only in association with Western capital which creates a circle of dependence for the developing countries, and so on. The article argues that what is actually needed is a radical solution such as the replacement of the ‘old’ institutional and juridical framework with a new system of international cooperation, ‘with programs and institutions based on the principle of international law, of equity and the mutual advantage’.621

In this context Romania declares itself a full supporter of a ‘code of conduct on technological exchanges’ to be adopted by the UNCTAD Conference in Manila, expressing its support for

‘The acknowledgment and the respect of the right of every nation to benefit from the conquests of modern science and technology, to build its own scientific-

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621 Valentin Păunescu, op. cit.
technological structures and, at the same time, for the development of a wide cooperation (...) among all the states’.  

Romania is shown to have worked, together with other developing countries, for these principles to be enshrined in the UN documents, Romania being one of the initiators of the UN Conference for science and technology for development, to take place later on in the year (1979).

Last but not least, Romania’s experience in making technology work for development is advertised. Thus, consistent with the principle of endogenous development (the country’s own efforts), Romania is shown to have granted special attention to all branches of science and technology, as a fundamental factor if its national development. Based on its own experience, Romania has then developed cooperation relations with a long list of developing countries, supporting these countries’ ‘own efforts’ in building their modern economies.

7. Rules for foreign and trans-national companies

Throughout the 1970s, a number of critical studies on the impact of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in the developing countries were published. The social scientists, showing themselves concerned with the MNCs’ imposing commercial, technological and political power, called for the developing countries to exercise more autonomy and more state-aided development. To this day, MNCs are considered to be both the hope of the Third World and the scourge of the Third World, given that the Third World countries frequently seek to attract the MNCs for the jobs they provide and the technological transfers they promise, only for the MNCs to be heavily criticized for exploiting the resources and the workers of the Third World. Thus, while the MNCs are considered to be a means for improving the standards of living of the underdeveloped countries, they are also blamed for the poverty and starvation such countries suffer, as well as the destruction of local cultures.

622 Idem.
An UNCTAD demand since this institution’s third meeting in Santiago (1972)\textsuperscript{625}, the controversial issue of the transnational companies is also tackled by President Ceauşescu. In his Message to the Manila Conference, the Romania leader says:

‘Romania considers that a special importance has the just regulation of the conditions in which the foreign companies unfold their activities in the weakly developed countries. In this sense, it is compelling to ensure the national control both in what the exploitation of the natural resources is regarded, as well as their participation at returns. We consider that it would be just and equitable that the developing countries have an effective participation at the ownership of these companies of at least 50 per cent.’\textsuperscript{626}

The background of this proposal is revealed to the Romanian readership by the usual expounding article published by Scînteia - this time - under the signature of foreign politics editor Radu Bogdan\textsuperscript{627}. In his article, Radu Bogdan starts from showing that ‘it is a reality the fact that, given the historical evolutions, a number of foreign companies and in particular transnational companies are active on the territory of the developing countries.’\textsuperscript{628} The journalist cites UN statistics showing that such foreign companies are able to control more than one fifth of the developing countries’ economies and more than two fifths of their industries. In Radu’s view, the transnational companies are definitely a ‘scourge’ rather than a ‘hope’ for the developing countries: through these companies the ‘big metropolises’ had embarked on a systematic program of ‘spoliation’ and ‘exploitation’ of developing countries’ natural resources, aiming at transforming them in

\textsuperscript{625} Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 20. This author shows that UNCTAD-III (Santiago, 1972) formulated two new demands (one related to the international monetary order and one related to the control of multinational corporations), along the ones already formulated in UNCTAD I and refined in UNCATD II (price stability and better prices for primary products, market access for manufactured products and greater financial flows from the rich to the poor countries).

\textsuperscript{626} Nicolae Ceauşescu, *Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu*, op.cit., p. 6.


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reservoirs of raw materials. Radu emphasizes that such exploitative practices were common both during the colonial times, as well as in ‘recent’ years due to renovated and more refined neo-colonialist practices that ensured that these companies could grab huge benefits, while developing only those economic structures that helped them continue with such exploitative practices.

The author shows that in this context, ever more voices from the developing countries, supported by ‘wider circles of the public opinion’, speak up for the creation of a code of conduct for the transnational companies. According to this author, such code of conduct was supposed to foresee measures for: impeding the interference of such companies in the internal affairs of the host country; regulating the companies’ activities in the host country; coordinating the activities of such companies with the development plans of the host country; realizing the transfer of technology in conditions of equity; regulating the distribution and repatriation of benefits. Romania - a member of the Intergovernmental Commission for the Transnational Companies under the UN Economic and Social Committee that promoted such code of conduct – was a convinced supporter of the Code of Conduct, as this could have been a chief instrument in the implementation of one of the principles that Romania promoted in international development: the principle of the mutual advantage.

Indeed, after the 1970s, internal (generated by the companies themselves) or external (contemplated in a wider economic and political context) codes of conduct have proliferated and took shape as part of a broader movement of corporate social responsibility. Among the best known examples of external codes of conducts promoted by the international organizations, are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise, providing voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct and the UNCTC Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. The draft of the latter, initiated in the 1970s (at the time President Ceauşescu was formulating and releasing his ‘Message’) in the framework of the Group of 77, might well have been the single most

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630 OECD, Directorate for Financial Affairs, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available online at: http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html as of January 2009.
ambitious UN-promoted effort to address international business issues. However, the
draft of the Code was never ratified: from the outset it was clear that major
disagreements existed regarding the nature and the contents of the Code. The capital-
exporting states were eager to use the Code as a means for protecting the transnational
corporations against ‘discriminatory’ treatment of the TNCs, while the capital-importing
countries of the G77, supported by the socialist countries, were more interested in the
Code to be used as an instrument for greater regulation of the foreign companies present in
the developing countries, in line with the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.

Obviously, as Radu showed, Romania advocated powerfully for the Code to regulate the
activity of the transnational companies as strictly as possible. Given the lack of financial
resources and skilled personnel in the developing countries, these were compelled to
continue their ‘collaboration’ with such companies, in spite of their alleged exploitative
tendencies. The Code was to become the instrument for countering such tendencies. In the
negotiating rounds, one of the most important issues was to identify those conditions under
which such collaboration was to be carried forward. In Romania’s view, these conditions
were to be based on the usual principles that Romania adhered to and promoted in its
foreign policy: full sovereignty of all states (including the sovereignty over the national
resources as part of one country’s economic independence), non-interference in other
countries’ internal affairs and the mutual advantage in the collaboration among states.

The right of every country to control its national wealth was – for Romania - a ‘sacrosanct’
right, that needed not only to be acknowledged formally, but also enforced, as the
‘reincorporation of the natural wealth in the national patrimony represents (...) a
first class objective of the fight of the developing countries’.

To fully respect that right, the intervention of the foreign capital and the foreign skilled
personnel was only to take place upon the specific request of the specific country, while
the exploitation of the natural resources needed to be realized in full observance of the
laws of the particular country and with the equal participation (of at least 50%) of that

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633 The negotiations were suspended in 1992. The period of negotiations was marked by a shift away from
the regulatory approach towards the TNC and its gradual replacement in successive drafts with formulations
closer to those favored by the capital-exporting countries. See Peter Muchlinski, op. cit., p. 594.
635 Bogdan Radu, op. cit.
same country. The 50% (minimum) ownership of the developing countries over the transnational corporations operating on their respective territories was vital if these countries’ property rights over their natural resources were to be truly respected and reinforced. Moreover, the shared ownership was all the more important as the developing countries were entitled to the possibility of supervising and controlling the use of the foreign capital in the best interest of their national economic development. Last but not least, the shared ownership would have also ensured the enforcement of the mutual advantage principle.\footnote{Bogdan Radu, op. cit.}

8. Strengthening developing countries’ unity – creating a common platform

Nowadays, the Third World solidarity is open to questioning on various grounds: the relatively ‘affluent’ among the developing countries, like the oil-exporting countries, prefer to invest their surplus funding in the developed Northern countries; others among the developing countries tend to grow faster than the rest, so that we can see the ‘newly industrialized countries’ (like Mexico and Brazil on the American continent and Korea, Taiwan and Singapore on the Asia one) leaving behind a group of very poor ‘Fourth World’ countries; when in need of development models, most of the developing countries – be they newly industrialized, oil-exporting or ‘Fourth World’ - will rather look at the rich Northern countries, rather than to their counterparts in the Third World.\footnote{Sandeep Chauhan, \textit{Demand for New International Economic Order}, MD Publications, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 14-15.} However, this was not always the case. At the time Romanians could read in their Scînteia (May 1979) about President Ceauşescu’s proposals for international development and a new international economic order, Professor Adelayo Adedeji, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,\footnote{Professor Adelayo Adedeji’s biography is available online at \texttt{http://www.unhistory.org/iac_res/adedeji.htm}, as of January 2009.} was heard saying in a lecture held at the Indian Institute for International Affairs:

In his ‘Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity’, Darryl C. Thomas shows that there are at least four generations of developing solidarity among Third World states. First, Afro-Asianism emerged in the 1950s as the Third World response to the racial hierarchy in the world system. Second, nonalignment evolved as a reaction of Third world leaders to the Cold War. Third, the East-West conflict was replaced by the North-South conflict as the most salient issue confronting the Third World during the 1970s and the quest for a new international economic order became the raison d’être for Third World solidarity from the 1970s to the 1980s. Fourth, the South-to-South dialogue developed in the 1980s as an important catalyst for community building in the South, during an epoch of global restructuring. The non-alignment movement and, in particular, the Bandung Conference have a primary role in establishing the political origins of Third World solidarity, as Paul Prebisch’s Economic Commission for Latin America had the prominent role in establishing its economic grounds. The four steps above correspond to various missions that the group of developing countries had given itself. Thus, the Third World solidarity evolved from ‘pan-pigmentationalism’ (solidarity based on race and geography) to ‘pan-proletarianism’ (solidarity based on economic disadvantaged as the movement progresses from an issue of race, to a determination to avoiding the Cold War alliances, to a stated mutual interest for eliminating poverty and inequality.

In Romania’s view the ‘vertical cooperation’ (North-South) was essential for global development, but even more important was the ‘horizontal cooperation’ or the cooperation among the developing countries themselves. As President Ceauşescu had said into his ‘Message’:

*We consider that a special importance is to be given to the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the developing countries, the intensification of the collaboration and cooperation among them, of mutual help with regard to the settlement with common forces of the burning problems of the socio-economic progress.*

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642 Darryl C. Thomas, op. cit.
The sense of this consideration is explained to the Romanian readers by Dumitru Tinu, Romanian journalist, expert of foreign policy and speech writer for the Romanian leaders of the time. In his article in Scînteia, this journalist shows that the developing countries’ solidarity is ‘an essential factor for the elimination of their subordination and dependency towards the industrialized countries.’ In Tinu’s view, it is a ‘sad reality’ the fact that even if more than 80 countries had fought and won their independence, most of them remain dependent to their former colonial powers. Striving for the elimination of their underdevelopment, the ‘young states’ had imported the North’s services and technology, which only led to the deepening of their state of dependence: the South’s cooperation with the North was often a source of tension and underdevelopment as the North’s experts and capital led to the emaciation of scarce resources, while the expensive technology imported from the North is more adapted to the North’s ‘monopolistic interests’ and less sensitive to the South’s needs.

This is why the ‘horizontal cooperation’, what we would now call the ‘South-South’ cooperation, is preferable and should be emphasized, in spite of the wide differences among the developing countries. The latter’s group is very heterogeneous, with countries of different size, various levels of development, irregular endowment of resources (oil an other raw materials) and socio-historical conditions that may lead to divergent positions. The journalist shows that the ‘progress-hostile circles’ – a probable euphemism for indicated the ‘capitalist’ developed countries - have more than once tried to artificially ‘fuel’ such divergent positions of the developing countries. Nonetheless, for this commentator

‘It is clear that only by acting united these countries, which form the great majority of the countries in world, can make their voice heard more powerfully, to ensure that problems are solved according to their interests and aspirations.’

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645 Declaration by Cornel Nistorescu (Romanian journalist in the former regime, currently journalist and shareholder with various media institutions and other companies in Romania), quoted in Stefan Cândea and Sorin Ozon, Dinostaurii media, [In English: The Media Dinosaurs], Center for Investigation Journalism, September 5 2005, available online at http://www.crji.org/news.php?id=55&l=1 as of January 2009. According to Cândea and Ozon Dumitru Tinu is one of the Romanian ‘media dinosaurs’ as Tinu started his career with Scînteia and ended it with Adevărul, a spin-off of Scînteia after 1989. At Adevărul Dumitru Tinu was a director; at his passing away Dumitru Tinu seems to have left an ‘impressive’ wealth for a journalist, apparently realized through his participation in various Romanian companies, while also being the major shareholder with Adevărul.

646 Dumitru Tinu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu, op.cit.

647 Dumitru Tinu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu, .. op. cit.

648 Dumitru Tinu, Mesajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu, .. op. cit.
Regional groupings, as well as a forum for all developing countries, are therefore essential, but in over-emphasizing this aspect, there is also room for ‘reassuring’ the developed countries. Tinu shows that:

‘It is self-understood that this collaboration does not contrapose itself to the collaboration with the developed countries. On the contrary, the extension of the collaboration among the least developed countries is intended to create new possibilities for the enlargement of their relations with the industrialized countries’.

This strategy is all the more needed as the developed countries have regular meetings themselves, to decide upon their positions and ‘elaborate a common economic strategy’, so as to increase their leverage on countries not belonging to their own group.

Last but not least, Romania’s efforts for ‘unifying the efforts of all developing states’ are succinctly reviewed, by making explicit reference to: more than 30 ‘economic objectives’ that Romania and some of the developing countries have achieved together in the fields of industry, agriculture, constructions, transport, trade; to the technical assistance that Romania grants ‘in various forms’ to the developing countries, in particular training for their cadres; to Romania’s activity in the Group of 77 as well as in the non-alignment movement. Based on its own experience and the needs it can perceive itself, what Romania envisages and calls for in practical terms is a permanent body of the developing countries with a mandate for negotiating with the developed countries ‘in an organized manner and in conditions of full equity’, ‘on the basis of a common platform’.


As one contemporary observer of the United Nations system shows, the “UN development enterprise is no minor operation”. More than $5 billion are spent each year through this institution in the attempt to fight global poverty. Approximately 30% of the UN’s regular budget and just about one third of UN’s Secretariat are employed for development-related tasks. Nonetheless, the UN’s mandate in this field is less certain than usually deemed, mainly due to its membership widely differing views on how development should be practically achieved. One of the views – backed by the Northern countries – assigns only

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649 Dumitru Tinu, op. cit.
limited functions to the UN. These countries believe that global governance, including its social and economic development – should rather be a task for the Bretton Woods institutions. On the opposite side, the Southern states, believe that the UN, as the sole body made of sovereign and equal states, should be at the heart of the governance architecture, with authoritative decision-making powers in relation with the Bretton Woods institutions.651

The debate was at its highest at the time President Ceaușescu’s Message was being addressed to the 1979 UN Conference for Trade and Development. At about that time, a major initiative to reform the UN was being launched by the United States Congress which asked President Carter to submit a report on the reform of this institution. The report, called ‘Proposals for United Nations Reform’ was issued in 1978652 (one year before Ceaușescu’s Message) in a context that was witnessing developing countries’ boldest demands for structural changes in global governance. These were the years of the calls for a new international economic order, strongly supported by the socialist countries.653 Apparently, in developing and the socialist countries’ view, for the new order to be created, a strong UN (in which they actually had the majority of votes) was instrumental and fundamental.

In this context, Romania declared its full support to the developing countries’ position. In his Message, President Ceaușescu unequivocally shows that:

‘Romania considers that in the whole activity geared towards the creation of a new international economic order, the United Nations Organisation must have a more active role’.654

For such active role to be achieved, President Ceaușescu calls for the creation of a special UN body formed of developing countries, socialist countries and ‘advanced capitalist countries’ to be entrusted with the mandate of elaborating concrete programs for the ‘liquidation’ of underdevelopment. These programs should be brought forward for the 1980 UN General Assembly consideration. Moreover, the above-mentioned special body should initiate the elaboration of the Chart regarding the new principles of the new

651 Jacques Fomerand, op. cit.
653 Joachim W. Müller, op. cit., p. 13.
international economic relations. Such Chart, based on the principles of full equality and equity among all states, should then be adopted by the United Nations Organisation.\textsuperscript{655}

As Ion Fântânaru’s explanatory article in Scînteia\textsuperscript{656} shows, this proposal responds to Romania’s conviction that Third World economic development should gain an ever growing importance in UNO’s activity, as to reflect the concern of the great majority of its members which are – for the matter – developing countries. Since poverty and underdevelopment are a topic of concern not only for the poor countries themselves, but for the whole world due to poverty’s spill-over effects, the fight against poverty is ‘a fundamental problem for the whole human community’.\textsuperscript{657} In the Romanian view, the existence of rich countries and poor countries is in itself a contradiction and a source of tensions and animosities that will not wane as long as one part of the world will accumulate ever more riches, while the other part of the world will become poorer and poorer. In this context the UNO has the ‘responsibility and duty’ to concern itself with all matters that regard the elimination of underdevelopment. The UNO is called to guarantee and uphold the equity among states, as there is no other body that could take this role up.

Romanian calls for a strengthening of the United Nation’s role in global development come in a ‘golden period’\textsuperscript{658} of Romanian activity to the United Nations. After its first application to joining the United Nations had been bluntly rejected in 1947 on grounds of disrespect of human rights\textsuperscript{659} and subsequent intense lobby for its application to be reconsidered, Romania finally joins the United Nations Organisation in 1955, following a Soviet resolution calling for the General Assembly to reconsider membership applications of Romania and other candidate countries. A ‘package deal’ is reached in December 1955 and Romania (together with 16 other states) joins the UN with 49 votes in favor, two votes

\textsuperscript{655} Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu, op.cit., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{657} Ion Fântânaru, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{658} Robert Weiner, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{659} According to Robert Weiner, op. cit., in 1949 Australia contended that Romania was guilty of violating article 55 of the UN Charter (human rights and fundamental freedoms), in particular due to government’s religious persecution of citizens and religious leaders. Invited to send a representative at the Ad Hoc Political Committee to discuss the matter Romania refused to comply on grounds that this represented an interference in Romania’s internal affairs. Failure of Romania to cooperate with the International Court of Justice – asked by the General Assembly to issue an advisory opinion on the matter – was qualified as evidence that Romania was not a peace-loving country so that it did not fulfill the criterion of becoming a UN member state. Beyond this incident, for various reasons, the United States conducted a policy of exclusion of the Soviet satellite states from this international organization.
against and five abstains. In spite of this modest début at the United Nations, in 1961 Romania is elected to the East European seat on the Security Council for a split term of one year. According to Robert Weiner\textsuperscript{660}, this mandate coincided with a turning point in Romania’s policy at the United Nations. If prior to 1961 Romania’s position was perfectly aligned with the Soviet Union, from 1963 – also facilitated by the intensification of the phenomenon of polycentrism in the Soviet bloc - Romania emerges as an apparently more autonomous member of the United Nations. Suggestively (especially in regard of point four of President Ceauşescu's 1979 message), Romania differs from the Soviet Union on an issue concerning arms control in Latin America. Equally interesting – this time from the point of view of its support for developing countries’ internal efforts in the development process – in 1964 Romania issues what has come to be called ‘Romania’s Declaration of Independence’ that challenges the model of the center of world communism by claiming that each socialist state has its own and unique historical circumstances that should determine that country’s development strategy.

In the same process of carving spaces of autonomous evolution in the United Nations environment, Romania plays a key role in the creation of a group of small and medium-sized Western and Eastern European states – the Group of Ten\textsuperscript{661} that aims to promote the regional cooperation on the European continent. In 1967 Romania is the first East European state to recognize West Germany and, the same year, Romania accomplishes a truly prestigious position at the United Nations: Romanian national Corneliu Mănescu becomes the first East European and Warsaw Pact President of the General Assembly. A far more important confirmation arrives in 1975, when Romania is elected – unanimously - to serve a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

The partial disengagement from the Soviet Union was complemented by a partial engagement and alignment with the Third World and, in particular, with the non-alignment movement\textsuperscript{662}, sharing with the developing countries the idea that power and resources in the international political system were unequally distributed so that a radical redistribution was needed.

\textsuperscript{660} Robert Weiner, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{661} Romania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden, Yugoslavia.
\textsuperscript{662} Robert Weiner, op. cit.
In 1979, when sending his message to the UNCTAD Conference, President Ceauşescu was speaking on behalf of a respected member of the international community; a member of the Group of 77; an associate of the non-aligned movement; a supporter and donor of developing countries that in the previous five years had committed nearly $200 million to non-communist developing countries. In short, the call for a strengthened role of the United Nations in the field of development came from an authoritative voice. Since 1955, when it was accepted to the United Nations, Romania had worked constantly and endeavored to be (in its own terminology) an ‘active factor’ of international life, in particular in those activities pertaining to global development. Being an ‘active factor’ meant for Romania honing the discursive skills that were needed for international diplomacy and, in particular, have its speaking rights acknowledged in several relevant bodies of international activity, particularly those dealing with international development issues.

10. A unitary program for action

The last of the ten proposals advanced by President Ceauşescu is also related to the functioning of the United Nations Organisation, in particular the specific role that the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development should take in representing the developing countries’ interests. Established in 1964, UNCTAD’s main purpose was to provide a forum for the poor countries to express their views on international trading arrangements and on the economic policies of the rich countries in general, as well as to coordinate the international efforts for poor countries’ development. Seven triannual conferences have been held (in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987), issuing rather ambiguous resolutions that ‘committed nobody to any specific action’.

President Ceauşescu calls for such specific action and shows that:

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663 President Ceauşescu had received at Bucharest General De Gaulle, President Nixon and scores of Third World countries’ leaders; he repaid their visits and in many cases he was welcome like a prestigious leader; Romania was a ‘guest’ of the non-aligned movement in spite of its membership to a military pact and the United States grant Romania the ‘Most Favored Nation’ status. President Ceauşescu receives scores of prizes and awards from the most prestigious institutions in the West and the South. In 1974 Bucharest is selected to host the World Population Conference and this event will further boost Romania’s international prestige.

664 Figure compiled based on data provided by Thomas Barnett (op. cit., p. 62), citing the United Nations Statistical Yearbook.


666 Hans Wolfgang Singer and Javed A. Ansari, op. cit., p. 145.
'The public opinion, and in the first place the peoples from the weakly developed countries, which represent the majority of the humankind, expect that the fifth Conference of the United Nations of Trade and Development to mark a new moment in the effort for the termination of underdevelopment and the creation of a new global economic order'.

In concrete terms, President Ceauşescu proposes that, having in mind the proposals presented by the participating states, the UNCTAD should start immediately the elaboration of a ‘unitary program for action’. In his view it is time for this forum to ‘overcome the stage of general discussion of these vital problems for the humankind’ and to ‘adopt practical, concrete measures for their settlement’.

To underline the sense of urgency, President Ceauşescu warns that ‘it is clear that the actual state of affairs can not go on’ and ads that it is imperative that everything should be done by all states for ‘finding undelayed solutions for these grave problems of the humankind’.

2.2.1.3. Concluding Remarks

In various instances – including the most important international summits – Romanians speak convincingly on international development matters. At an academic level, volumes are published to reflect on issues such as theories of underdevelopment, means and strategies for fighting against global poverty, the role of international institutions, and so on; the Romanian public is made aware of international development by means of the Party’s main information instrument – the daily Scînteia; and the (still respected in the international arena) Romanian President articulates and brings forward a comprehensive message with concrete proposals that could amount to a Romanian ‘position’ or ‘concept’ regarding international development.

Along the decades, not few world leaders have proposed measures, objectives, programs, strategies and the like for ‘making poverty history’. President Ceauşescu’s list comprises ten points that are also proposed with the intention of making the developing countries a

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667 Nicolae Ceauşescu, Mesajul Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu, op.cit., p. 6.
668 As already mentioned, the 10 points are as follows: the creation of a long-term program of measures for agriculture, industry and infrastructure; more attention for training developing countries personnel; establishment of specific research and knowledge centers; creation of a Common Fund for ‘Disarmament and Development’; fair prices for raw materials and elimination of custom barriers to trade; free access to modern technologies; rules for foreign and trans-national companies; strengthening developing countries’ unity; strengthening the United Nations Organisation; and the UNCTAD to create a unitary program for action against underdevelopment.
better place. Of course, Romania’s concept of international development – as it is expressed by the Romanian president and various commentators – is obviously tributary to this country’s socialist orientation and affiliation. However, most of the concrete proposals it brings forward are still actual and obviously connected to the Western development discourse.

Romania articulates its international development discourse in the 70s, at the confluence of two major directions in development thinking. On one hand, in the 50 and the 60s the main preoccupations were with growth, modernization and structural change, while there was little concern with issues such as social or human development. According to Leftwich, the focus on growth was especially sharp in the constitutions, thinking and policies of the post-war international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the United Nations, mainly due to the dominance of the major industrial powers in these institutions. Development was therefore conceived as per capita income with a focus on technology, capital planning, development of resources and aid. These elements are all emphasized by the Romanian pronouncements on international development, clad in the Romanians’ calls for technological modernization of the developing countries (point six of President Ceauşescu’s message to the UNCTAD); for the developing countries to participate and benefit from the ‘capitalist’-driven efforts of developing raw materials and resources originating in the developing countries (point five); the establishment of a common development fund, even if this fund was to be replenished in an ground-breaking - and maybe unrealistic - way, through savings realized through cuts in armament expenditures (point four).

On the other hand, as from 1960s, a number of factors (former colonial states becoming independent; compelling political commitments of some third-world leaders; evidence that development was simply not working; growing beliefs in the third world and radical Western circles that growing inequalities within the developing countries and between them and the developed countries) started to undermine and expand these prevailing conceptions so that the dominant discourse of international development shifted towards

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670 Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., p. 40.
what we now call ‘social development’. This is a time for more radical pronouncements on international development, with calls for nationalization of major assets, redistribution of income, wealth and power and socio-economic equity. Traditionally, these are major topics for the socialist block or the non-alignment movement, but this is a time when not only these countries, but also major international institutions (such as some of the more recently created UN agencies like the United Nations Development Program or the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development) find arguments in favor of such development strategies. With its (sometimes radical) proposals and pronouncements on international development, socialist Romania joins its voice to the choir advocating for this shift of paradigm in international development discourse and thinking.

Conversant in the dominant development discourse, Romanian commentators show a sense of pride at Romania’s contributions to the international efforts of fighting global poverty and are critical of Western forms of aid that is suspected to be offered with the hidden intent of ‘maintaining foreign monopoly positions in the developing countries’. In their view, Western aid is to be accepted cautiously and the country’s ‘own efforts’, as well as cooperation among developing countries, should prevail.

Development as a discourse of domination is a relatively recent field of study, promoted by a ‘small but radical’ group of anthropologists and geographers such as Esteva, Sachs, Escobar, Said, Ferguson and others. Unlike these authors, that put a question mark on the whole discourse of development cooperation, Romania is skeptical only in what the Western motives and intentions are regarded. As a self-declared developing country with an ambiguous status of (potential) donor, Romania grants its whole support for building the international development discourse; criticism towards Western practices is used not to challenge such discourse, but rather as a versatile tool for orienting it in the directions most convenient for itself and other developing countries.

2.2.2. President Ceauşescu’s International Development Rhetoric

671 Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., pp. 41-43. This author who defines social development as ‘a shorthand term for improvement in such fields as education, health care, income distribution, socio-economic and gender equality and rural welfare’.
672 Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., p. 43.
673 Gavril Horja, op. cit., p. 46.
674 Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., p. 65.
The previous sub-section of this case-study discussed the main elements of what could amount to a Romanian concept of international development. The emphasis was on the Romanian scholars’ contributions and the proposals formulated and brought forward, in a UN setting, by President Nicolae Ceauşescu. What this previous section was most interested in was the content of the Romanian discourse of international development and not so much in the discursive means and mechanisms that made this discourse possible. Its was more about an inventory of ideas that were in circulation at that particular time (the 1970s and the 1980s) and particular context (socialist Romania under the rule of President Ceauşescu) and less about how the comprehensive discourse that allowed these ideas was being built and justified for the Romanian and international audience. Taking in consideration the ‘how’ is what we will do in this sub-section, through the analysis of a small, but representative, strand of communication that President Ceauşescu delivered in one of the frequent occasions in which he used to talk about international development.

As suggested by written resources of the time\textsuperscript{675}, it seems that President Ceauşescu was particularly keen to express his views on development matters and took every occasion to give a talk or to write on this topic in the most varied of occasions: in front of the Great National Assembly\textsuperscript{676}, in UN and other international fora\textsuperscript{677}, when addressing the Romanian Communist Party\textsuperscript{678}, when speaking to the Romanian people\textsuperscript{679}, when

\textsuperscript{675} The author mainly investigated the journal Scînteia and the magazine Lumea.

\textsuperscript{676} Examples ‘Expunere la Marea Adunare NaŃionalǎ cu privire la mǎreŃele realizǎri ale poporului romǎn în cincinalul 1971-1975 şi la politica externǎ a României, pusǎ în slujba pǎcii şi colaborǎrii internaŃionale – 18 decembrie 1975’, in Romǎnia pe drumul construirii societǎŃii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate, vol. 12, Editura Politicǎ, Bucureşti, pp. 297-298; Presentation regarding the activity of the party and the whole people for eliminating the consequences of the catastrophic earthquake from March 4, the actual social-economical development of the country, the international activity of the party and state and the world politics situation, given at the common session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Great National Assembly, the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development – March 28 1977, in Romǎnia..., op. cit., vol. 14., pp. 203-204; Expunere to the Great National Assembly regarding the great achievements of the Romanian people in the quinquennial 1971-1975 and Romania’s external policy for peace and international collaboration – December 18 1975, in Romǎnia..., vol. 12, pp. 313-315.


addressing other nations upon his frequent state visits, in interviews awarded to foreign journalists, in books published under his signature, through the Romanian scholars and journalists quoting his views and other forms of expression that were characteristic to a socialist country leader of the time.

The critical analysis of ‘Truman’s speech’ offers a telling example of how language can become a primary object for researching development practices, as well as a tool for investigating this social phenomenon (development cooperation) whose mechanisms comprise, by now, every country of the World. However, to the author’s knowledge, such discursive analyses were never taken afar, towards the socialist countries or towards the developing countries themselves – if not to a rather limited extent. The development scholar, as well as the public opinion, is disproportionately more familiar with the Western discourse of development cooperation, or with the discourse developed by the donor countries, than with the discourse developed by the ‘poor countries’ or the recipients themselves, while the ‘Eastern’ (or former socialist) discourse on international

679 International development issues are present in Ceauşescu’s speeches when he addresses the ‘people’. See examples in: Speech at the Satu Mare meeting, in occasion of the visit in the Satu Mare county – July 13 1969, in România..., op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 161-162; Speech at the great popular assembly from Cluj-Napoca, in occasion of the first documented proof of the existence of Cluj as a municipality – October 16 1974, in România..., op. cit., vol. 10, p. 856

680 About Ceauşescu’s state visits to the developing countries see the section on Romania’s policy towards the South.


682 At the University Central Library (Biblioteca Centrală Universitară) of Bucharest one can find 245 titles published under Ceauşescu’s signature. Such a high number of titles was arrived at by two main means. First, individual reports, ‘cuvântări’ (speeches) or ‘expuneri’ (exposés) are published as separate volumes. Example: Nicolae Ceauşescu, Cuvântare la Conferinţa Organizaţiei Municipale de Partid Bucureşti: 9 noiembrie 1989, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1989. Second, Ceauşescu’s speeches on various themes are reunited together to form a volume with a central theme. For instance, his speeches on disarmament will form the volume ‘Dezarmarea, necesitate vitală a întregii omenirii’, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1979. Ceauşescu’s volumes are not classical writings in which one formulates a theme and elaborates coherently on it, but such collections of disparate speeches that are reunited and blended together, more or less artificially, to form a volume.

683 As norm of the time, every publication would quote President Ceauşescu. Especially academic volumes were prefaced by a text giving lengthier outlines of President Ceauşescu’s views.

development is even less known. Generally, Eastern European contributions are hardly mentioned in the development literature. Arturo Escobar or Raoul Ascari are among the few to put some emphasis on the Eastern Europeans’ contributions to the discourse of international development. Ascari, in particular shows that Eastern European economists such as Rosenstein-Rodan and Vanek offered important socio-cultural insights, ‘from the perspective of late developers’.

In Romania’s case this comes in spite of an extremely rich corpus of samples of texts easily available and highly visible: the discursive activity of President Ceauşescu was prodigal and Scînteia – the official journal – published extensively on international development and the developing countries. In his long political career, President Ceauşescu spoke on development topics as various as: the importance of fighting underdevelopment, the nexus between disarmament and development, the role of technology in international development, the debt crisis, strategies of international development.

This can also be put in relation to the fact that the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, current New Member States of the European Union never developed schools of ‘development studies’ as they are established in older Member States of the European Union. These countries are only now developing and introducing in their universities such disciplines on the models provided by Western European countries. Information based on the author’s participation to the international conference ‘Development Studies – Perspectives for Romania’, organized by UNDP Romania, in Bucharest, on the 14th of January 2009.

Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 43: ‘It is also clear that other historical discourses influenced particular representations of development. The discourse of communism, for instance, influenced the promotion of those choices which emphasized the role of the individual in society and, in particular, those approaches which relied on private initiative and private property. So much emphasis on this issue in the context of development, so strong a moralizing attitude probably would not have existed without the persistent anti-Communist preaching that originated in the Cold War.’


Ascari argues that such perspective has the advantage of seeming more suitable to developing countries in need of development models.

‘We speak up firmly for solving the problems of underdevelopment. The actual state of affairs, when two thirds of the humankind lives in misery, in underdevelopment, can not go on’ said Ceauşescu in his speech upon receiving the leaders of the delegations participating to the session of the General Council of the World Trade Union Federation, delivered on the 30th of October 1987, quoted in România ..., op. cit., vol. 31, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1989, p. 124-125. See also the chapter on ‘Lichidarea subdezvoltării – cerinţă logică a asigurării progresului societăţii umane. Necesitatea obiectivă, logică a instaurării unei noi ordini internaţionale’, in Nicolae Ceauşescu, Conceptia tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu privind acţiunea legilor obiective ale dezvoltării economico-sociale, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1989, pp. 276-288.


Selected examples: Speech upon receiving by Nicolae Ceauşescu of the chiefs of delegations participating at the ministerial meeting from Bucharest of the Group of 77, delivered August 17, 1979, in România..., vol. 18, p. 539; Address to the Conference of the United Nations for Science and Technology in the benefit of development, delivered August 1979, in România..., op. cit., vol. 18, pp. 549-550. On Ceauşescu’s views on science and technology in general, see ‘Revoluţia tehnicoprincipiul – implicaţii şi consecinţe’ [The
development\textsuperscript{693}, the need for the developing countries to own their development processes and rely primarily on themselves\textsuperscript{694}, the importance of the developing countries being supported in their fight against colonialism and the ‘imperialist forces’\textsuperscript{695}, and so on. The Romanian public was kept informed about events taking place in the developing countries: without this being an exception\textsuperscript{696}, in July 1969, the month before President Ceauşescu made the address that we will discuss, Scînteia published articles and news on countries as varied as the United Arabian Republic that had signed a $ 45 million agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organisation\textsuperscript{697}, Peru’s measures for ‘consolidating’ the agrarian reform\textsuperscript{698}, South Yemen’s political changes\textsuperscript{699}, Algeria’s Arzew, the ancient ‘Portus Magnus’, a locality that was ‘now’ ‘the heart of the Algerian petro-chemistry’\textsuperscript{700}, Sudan’s

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\textsuperscript{693} Sciintifical-technological Revolution – implications and consequences, in Nicolae Ceauşescu, \textit{Procese şi tendinţe fundamentale ale dezvoltării mondiale contemporane,} Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1979, pp. 91-95. 

\textsuperscript{694} President Ceauşescu shows that a ‘global solution’ is needed, as ‘the attempts that are now made for solving this problem with each country on an individual basis can not bring real results. This orientation has, as a matter of fact, the intent of keeping the developing countries divided for them to be imposed hard conditions by the financing organizations, including the International Monetary Fund’. See this and more in the interview given to the Bangladeshi ‘The Tide’ on September 2 1986, quoted by \textit{România...}, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 512-513.

\textsuperscript{695} In particular – the new international economic order. ‘I understand the new economic order not as something that opposes the two groups of states, but as a form of new collaboration between the developing countries and the developed ones, which ensure the more rapid progress of the backward countries and, at the same time, the stability of the global economy...’. Quote from the interview given to the Mexican daily ‘El Nacional’ on May 6 1978, in \textit{România...}, op. Cit., vol. 16, p. 149. On Ceauşescu’s broad view on the new international economic order see ‘Raportul Comitetului Central cu privire la activitatea Partidului Comunist Român în perioada dintre Congresul al X-lea şi Congresul al XI-lea şi sarcinile de viitor ale partidului’ [The Report of the Central Committee regarding the activity of the Romanian Communist Party in the period between the Xth Congress and the XIIth Congress and the tasks for the future of the party], November, 25, in \textit{România...}, op. cit., vol. 11, pp. 36-39. See also: ‘Orientări politice şi diversitatea strategiilor de dezvoltare’ [Political Orientations and the Diversity of Development Strategies] in Nicolae Ceauşescu, \textit{Gîndirea politică contemporană. Tendinţe şi orientări,} Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1987, pp. 136-141.

\textsuperscript{696} ‘I want to say openly – said Ceauşescu on September 7 1988 in occasion of his state visit in Tanzania – that, according to our opinion, the solution for the grave problems of the international life can not come from anybody’s mercy. The rich will never willingly understand the poor’. See \textit{România...}, op. cit., vol 31, p. 187. [Author’s translation from Romanian].

\textsuperscript{697} See ‘Lupta pentru independentă politică şi economică – parte integrantă a luptei pentru socialism, pentru pace’ [The fight for political and economic independence – constitutive part of the fight for socialism, for peace] and ‘Legitimitatea mişcărilor de eliberare şi necesitatea sprijinirii lor [The legitimacy of the freedom movements and the importance to support them], in Nicolae Ceauşescu, \textit{Gîndirea politică contemporană. Tendinţe şi orientări,} Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1987, pp. 136-141 and 127-129. See also ‘Lupta popoarelor pentru lichidarea deplină a colonialismului şi neocolonialismului. Rolul noilor state independente, al ţărilor în curs de dezvoltare, al statelor nealiniate in lumea contemporană’ in Nicolae Ceauşescu, \textit{Procese şi tendinţe fundamentale ale dezvoltării mondiale contemporane,} Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1979, pp. 65-72.

\textsuperscript{698} According to the author’s review of the Scînteia collection up to 1989.

\textsuperscript{699} Agenţiile de presă transmînt: Un acord între FAO şi guvernul RAU, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8112, 1 July, 1969, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{699} Peru. Măsuri în vederea consolidării reformei agrare, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8114, 3 July, 1969, p. 6. See also \textit{Noi naŃionalizǎri în Peru,} in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8121, 10 July, 1969, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{699} Nicolae Lupu, Restructurǎri politice în Yemenul de Sud, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8114, 3 July, 1969, p. 6. See also \textit{Agenţiile de presă transmit: Generalul Hassam El Amri a demisionat,} in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8121, 10 July, 1969, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{700} C. Benga, Arzew – inima petrochimiei algeriene, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8116, 5 July, 1969, p. 6. See also \textit{Agenţiile de presă transmit: un proticol cu privire la colaborarea dintre Algeria şi Republica Democratǎ Vietnam,} in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8121, 10 July, 1969, p. 6.
internal tensed situation; Kenya, whose Minister for the economic planning, Tom Mboya, had been assassinated; India’s political life, Iraq’s attempts to diversify its national economy, Guinea’s fight for national independence (as depicted by the ‘people who face the <rain of fire> and their leader, Amilcar Cabral, that had accepted to meet the journalists writing this article); (the conflict between) Honduras and Salvador, and so on. Other articles focused not so much on individual countries, as on issues of concern for the whole group of developing countries. Thus, in this same month (July, 1969), Scînteia publishes an article on the worldwide cotton industry and the way the developing countries are affected by the price fluctuations, as well as a series of ‘internal and external obstacles’ that hinder these countries from taking full advantage from this industry. In a different tone, a series of articles reflect on the consultative meeting of 51 non-aligned countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America that had met in Belgrade to ‘analyze the place and role of the non-alignment policy in the contemporary world, as well as the possibilities for intensifying the activity of the non-aligned countries in the international life, with the aim to increase their contribution to the fight for peace, independence and social progress’.

Given that the available discursive material is so extraordinarily rich, selecting a sample to be analyzed can be a rather difficult enterprise. But as Wood and Kroger show, decisions about the samples to be selected for discourse analysis are similar to those in other research, in that the sample should be relevant to or representative of the phenomenon of

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interest. In what the size of the sample is concerned, Wetherell and Potter show that for discourse analysis the success of the study is not in the least dependent on sample size, as it is not the case that a large sample necessarily indicates a more worthwhile piece of research. As these authors show, there is hardly a ‘natural boundary’, a point at which sampling can be said to be complete: it is rather a case of giving a clear and detailed description of the material one is analyzing and its origins.

Based on these theoretical considerations a series of decisions were needed for determining the nature and the size of the sample to be analyzed. The first decision was facilitated by the political period that this case-study takes into consideration: the socialist years. Given that internal consistence is an asset for a case-study and considering that the case-study in its entirety is focused on the Ceauşescu years, selecting a text delivered by the same political leader was given preference. However, on issues of international development, President Ceauşescu was such a prolific author and speaker that the attempt of bringing his discursive activity to a gist and find the most relevant text(s) to give that might have become an off-putting endeavor. To narrow down the scope of the eligible material, a further decision was taken to select text(s) he delivered in the beginning of his political career, when he enjoyed the maximum of his standing, both nationally and internationally. Finally, preference was given to texts enjoying the widest possible Romanian audience.

In the end, there were still many choices. To take only a few examples, in 1967 Ceauşescu presents the Great National Assembly with a government report on ‘The Conditions for the Development of Backward Countries’; a year later, in occasion of the UN General Assembly, he addresses the UN delegates with a speech relating to the ‘The International Commitment to Overcome the Underdevelopment’; in 1969 President Ceauşescu addresses the International Conference of the communist and workers’ parties, with a presentation on the ‘Politics and Economy in the Third World Countries’; ‘The results of colonization’ is given at the assembly celebrating the 100th anniversary of V.I.

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711 Idem, p. 162.
Lenin’s birth (1970); in occasion of Zambia’s President visit to Romania in 1970\textsuperscript{713} President Ceauşescu talks about the ways for ‘Overcoming the Gap between the Advanced and the Under-developed Countries’; and the list may well go on through all the years that he stayed in power up to December 1989.

Thus, the corpus of pronouncements to be reviewed and analyzed is impressive, but as a research method, discourse analysis presents an important advantage: the researcher does not need to identify and analyze every text or verbal pronouncement made by a certain actor. Well picked samples will suffice, not last because of what Foucault had called ‘the rarefaction of discourse’ or that ‘surprising fact that although the utterances which could be produced by any one person are theoretically infinite, in fact they are remarkably repetitive and remain within certain socially agreed-upon boundaries’\textsuperscript{714}. In other words, theoretically, a social actor like Ceauşescu, speaking as leader of a sovereign nation, could have produced an enormous number of texts and ideas pertaining to international development. In reality, though, his content may have been fairly restricted by various factors such as national and international societal norms; the (a)symmetrical positions of the two super-powers of the time; his own ideology; and ultimately by what was acceptable to say about this topic at that particular time.

A text that would best abide to the few self-ascribed criteria mentioned above would be the ‘cuvîntarea’ (the address) President Ceauşescu delivered on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August 1969, from the tribune of the Great National Assembly.\textsuperscript{715}. The purpose of this address was to celebrate the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Romania’s emancipation from the ‘fascist yoke’ and the Romanians ‘glorious’ fight for building their modern Romania and the socialist state, under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party. In the economy of this text, international development has a rather subsidiary role, but what it does say is very similar – for rhetoric, wording and content – to many other more extended addresses of this kind. This is,

\textsuperscript{713} Such presentations will then become routine whenever a leader of a developing country will visit Romania.
\textsuperscript{714} Quoted by Sara Mills, Discourse, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 70.
therefore, an official typical pronouncement for those times. Without diminishing the importance of texts addressing directly the issue of under-development\textsuperscript{716}, we argue that small strands of political speeches like this are no less important for creating a specific view and ‘public awareness’ on the ‘developing countries’ and international development. What is said indirectly is as relevant as what is said directly. From a discursive perspective, definitions are critical, but more illuminating for the critique of a social problem are the strategies employed for reaching such definitions, the mechanisms through which they exert their fascination and the way they ‘creep’ into the social body. Moreover, the fact itself that international development matters were mentioned in a context that had such an obvious national connotation is extremely significant and illuminating for the importance that that particular society used to attached to these matters.

On the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of August 1969 President Ceauşescu said:

‘Poporul nostru, care în decursul istoriei sale a cunoscut din plin ce înseamnǎ exploatarea și asuprirea strǎinǎ, este întru totul solidar cu popoarele care se ridicǎ pentru scuturarea jugului strǎin, susţine cu căldurǎ luptǎ lor împotriva imperialismului, colonialismului și neocolonialismului, pentru cucerirea și întǎrirea independentei naŃionale, pentru dezvoltarea progresistǎ a societǎŃii, pentru pace. Adresǎm salutul nostru fierbinte tuturor popoarelor din colonii care luptǎ cu arma în mînǎ pentru scuturarea jugului imperialist. Le urǎm success cît mai grabnic în luptǎ lor. (Aplauze puternice). România va sprijini și în viitor luptǎ tinerelor state pentru dezvoltarea de sine stǎtǎtoare, pentru apǎrarea suveranitǎŃii și afirmarea lor tot mai activǎ pe arena internaŃionalǎ\textsuperscript{717}.

‘Our people, which in the course of its history, knew very well what the exploitation and the foreign oppression mean, is in absolute solidarity with the peoples which rise to shake off the foreign yoke, warmly supports their fight against the imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism to conquer and strengthen their national independency, for a progressive development of society, for peace. We send our warmest greetings to all peoples of colonies who fight arms in hands for freeing themselves from the imperialist yoke\textsuperscript{718}. We wish them the most rapid success in their fight. (Strong applause) Romania will support also in the

\textsuperscript{716} Like, for instance, the text we have studied in the previous sub-section representing President Ceauşescu’s message to the fifth Conference of the UNCTAD.

\textsuperscript{717} Sesiunea Jubiliarǎ a Marii Adunǎri NaŃionale consacratǎ celei de-a XXV-a aniversǎri a eliberǎrii patriei de sub jugul fascist. Cuvîntarea Tovarǎşului Nicolae Ceauşescu, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8165, 23 August, 1969, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{718} Here the text published by Scînteia signals – between brakes – ‘strong applause’.
future the fight of the young States for an independent development, for the protection of their sovereignty and for their ever more active affirmation on the international arena\textsuperscript{719}.

It is rare – if not impossible - for a text or a concept to be put forward by one person working alone. Like in Truman’s case, President Ceaușescu’s words did not become powerful on their own, but acquired power by the use powerful people and institutions made of it. In the former case, Truman’s main tenets became a framework for future policies at national and international level, with the United Nations among the most active in expanding on his initial proposals. In the latter case and in completely different circumstances, concepts proposed by Ceaușescu made their way into Romania’s treaties with the developing countries\textsuperscript{720}, as well as into various international fora of debate for development matters, through the support Romania granted to the initiatives and proposals brought forward by the Third World countries\textsuperscript{721}.

In what follows, this sample of discourse will be analyzed, by first looking at the context in which it was delivered and then at the discursive functions of the text itself. Based on David Nunan’s guidelines\textsuperscript{722} for context analysis, this endeavor will look at: the type of communicative event, the purpose, the setting and the participants at the communicative event, as well as the background knowledge and the assumption that the communicative

\textsuperscript{719} Translation by the author, based on the original address in Romanian and its translation in Italian. The Italian version is: ‘Il nostro popolo, che nel corso della sua storia ha ben conosciuto cosa significhino lo sfruttamento e l’oppressione straniera, è assolutamente solidale con i popoli che si sollevano per scuotere il giogo straniero, sostiene caldamente la loro lotta contro l’imperialismo, il colonialismo e il neocolonialismo, per la conquista e il rafforzamento dell’indipendenza nazionale, per lo sviluppo progressista della società, per la pace. Rivolgiamo il nostro fervido saluto a tutti i popoli delle colonie che lottano armi alle mani per liberarsi dal giogo imperialista. Auguriamo loro il più rapido successo nella loro lotta. La Romania appoggerà anche in avvenire la lotta dei giovani Stati per uno sviluppo indipendente, per la difesa della loro sovranità e per una loro affermazione sempre più attiva nell’arena internazionale.’

\textsuperscript{720} In a timeframe of 12 years, from 1973 and 1985, Romania signed 13 treaties of friendship and cooperation with as many developing countries: (in alphabetical order) Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Costa Rica, Gabon, Guinea, Mozambique, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The political significance of these treaties is rather mixed. According to Michael Radu the treaties with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea are rather ‘natural’, due to close ties of these countries with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, while the treaties with Sudan, Guinea and Zaire demonstrate the importance of Romania’s close ties with China, a supporter of all these countries. Radu’s belief is that such anti-Communist states like Zaire, Gabon and Sudan accepted treaty relations with Romania in a probable attempt to maintain some channels of communication with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, each one of these states, together with Zambia, were rather interested in Romanian credits, investments and joint economic ventures, with Zambia also a ‘significant’ recipient of technical aid (ex. advisers, mining experts and teachers). See Michael Radu, Eastern Europe and the Third World: East Vs. South, Praeger, New York, 1981.

\textsuperscript{721} Some examples of developing countries’ initiative supported or co-sponsored by Romania, in Ilie Serbanescu and Ilie Olteanu, Grupul celor 77: tendinŃe şi semnificaŃii, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1978.

\textsuperscript{722} In particular: David Nunan, Introducing discourse analysis, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1993.
event rests upon. The text analysis will be focused on the text’s socio-political properties and, in particular, the text’s ideological functions. The analysis aims to unveil how President Ceauşescu is construing and justifying, through discourse, the structure of the Global society from the standpoint of the relations between those who are developed and those who are still developing themselves, as well as Romania’s involvement in such relations. In what the text is concerned we will follow the analytic method proposed and developed by professor and discourse analyst Teun Adrianus van Dijk\textsuperscript{723} and we will look at self-descriptions proposed by President Ceauşescu for Romania and the Romanian people in relation with the developing countries and peoples; at activity descriptions understood as the role Romania and Romanians ascribe to themselves in the international ‘arena’ in relation with the developing countries; at goal descriptions and the sources of legitimacy found for Romania’s above-mentioned activities. Last but not least, we will also look at some of the linguistic means employed by the speaker, in particular at one of the most pervasive and powerful metaphors that he employs.

2.2.2.1. What is the Context Conveying? Context Analysis

The main focus of discourse analysis is language, but not language alone. Context needs to be taken into consideration, as language is always occurring in context: there is no instance of communication without participants, situations involving the participants, a ‘history’ of the specific act of communication and so on. The analysis of the context sheds light on who is communicating with whom and why; on the type of the social situation created around or by the respective communication; on the type of communication involved\textsuperscript{724}, etc. Moreover, beyond linguistics, at a systemic level, discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context\textsuperscript{725}. Texts are only one of the constitutive elements of discourse as the latter term refers to ‘the whole process of social interaction of which text is just a part’\textsuperscript{726}.

Context can be defined as the ‘material, mental, personal, interactional, social, institutional, cultural and historical situation in which the utterance was made’\textsuperscript{727}, or,

\textsuperscript{723} Personal webpage of professor van Dijk: \url{http://www.discourses.org}, as of January 2009.
simply, ‘the situation giving rise to discourse and within which discourse is embedded’⁷²⁸. David Nunan⁷²⁹ points at two different types of context: the linguistic context (the language surrounding the discourse under analysis) and the non-linguistic or experiential context within which the discourse takes place. Non-linguistic aspects of context include: the type of the communicative event, the topic, the purpose of the event, the setting (including location, time of day, physical aspects of the situation), the participants and the relationships between them, and the background knowledge and the assumptions underlying the communicative event. In what follows, we will use various sources (articles from ‘Scînteia’, historical writings, memoirs) to understand the features of the non-linguistic context in which this address is situated.

2.2.2.1.1. Type of Communicative Event

A communicative event is one in which language plays a significant role⁷³⁰. The importance of language in a particular event is not always easy to determine⁷³¹, but when a leader is addressing ‘his’ nation in a solemn circumstance, language is likely to play an exceptional role. As Alessandro Duranti shows, in the 1970s Hymes proposed that those communicative events in which speech plays a fundamental role in the definition of what is going on, to be rather defined as speech events and be distinguished from speech situations that are activities in which speech plays a minor or subordinate role⁷³². In the words of Stephen Levinson, a speech event is a ‘culturally recognized social activity in which language plays a specific, and often rather specialized, role’⁷³³.

In socialist Romania speech events had a particular role in every structure of communication: there were the ‘plenaries’ of the Romanian Communist Party’s Central Committee, the plenaries of the County Committees of the RCP, the Congresses of the Romanian Communist Party, President Ceauşescu’s own ‘cuvîntări’ (speeches,
allocutions), his ‘expuneri’ (exposés)

234, the party meetings (ședințe de partid), the meetings of the UTC (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist – the Union of Communist Youth) and down to the meetings of the pioneers. In President Ceaușescu’s own political life, speech events had a remarkable importance: his career as an international statesman started with one and ended with another, both delivered from the same balcony of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee’s building in Bucharest. Thus, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ceaușescu convened a mass meeting in Bucharest 235 and managed to raise the well-known waves of sympathy that boosted his status nationally and internationally. Two decades later, in 1989, when he again called for a mass meeting in Bucharest to condemn the recent developments from Timisoara, he was promptly interrupted by hostile chanting that put an end to his regime

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At the time President Ceaușescu delivered his speech in occasion of the 25th celebration of Romania’s liberation from the fascist yoke, Romania, a founding member of the Warsaw Pact, was also enjoying a certain standing with the Western World. Western analysts used to describe Romania’s foreign policy as ‘dissident’, ‘maverick’, ‘deviant’ or ‘unique’ 237 and for the Romanian General Secretary of the Communist Party – Nicolae Ceaușescu - this was an obvious source of international prestige. As the Romanian historian Lucian Boia 238 shows, at the time, nothing had worked “better and easier” for the Ceaușescus than their wish to play an important role on the international arena 239. Speaking up against the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceaușescu had won plenty of votes of confidence

234 In English this word is defined as ‘a public revelation, as of something discreditable’. In some of Ceaușescu’s exposés an element of criticism regarding the implementation of policies could be heard, but criticisms could also be heard in his ‘cuvîntǎri’, minimizing this way the difference between the two.


238 According to the Romanian daily Evenimentul Zilei Lucian Boia is one of the ‘best known historians from Romania’, a true ‘myth hunter’, an expression that alludes to his most constant research interest. [See ‘Lucian Boia, vânătorul de mituri’, Evenimentul Zilei, December 18 2005, article available online at http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/701624/Lucian-Boia-vantorul-de-mituri/, as of January 2009].


from Western leaders. De Gaulle’s 5 day-visit to Romania - in the same year - was one of the clearest benevolence signals from the West and the prestigious ‘Legion of Honor’ conferred by the French leader to Ceaușescu was a clear signal of the latter’s ascending prestige on the World stage. Only three weeks before his celebration speech, on 2-3 August 1969, U.S. President Nixon had visited Romania, had met RCP Secretary General Ceaușescu and solemnly declared, in front of a numerous audience:

‘This is not my first visit to your country. It is the first visit of a President of the United States to Romania. The first state visit by an American President to a socialist country or to this region of the Continent of Europe. ‘Să trăiască prietenia româno-americană’ (Long live the Romanian-American friendship).

Ceaușescu seems now to be at the highest of his popularity both at home and abroad. In Boia’s view, the interlude between 1964 and 1971 was one of the best in the communist history of Romania, even if – for this author – ‘the best’ does not mean ‘good’ but only ‘better’ when compared to other historical communist moments. Boia shows that some in Romania could now travel in the Western countries; the national values had acquired more visibility on the political and social scene (a progress from the previous ‘sovietization’); the risk for Romanians to be imprisoned was now reduced (not last

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740 According to Alexandru Bârlădeanu, interviewed by the Romanian political psychologist Lavinia Betea, this visit had been prepared for Ceaușescu’s predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, whose foreign policy Ceaușescu had continued without ever acknowledging his predecessor’s merits and taking full personal credit for every positive result it brought. Bârlădeanu was a Romanian expert in socialist economy, Minister of Foreign Trade (1948-1953), Vice-President of the State Commission for Planning (1953-1968), representative in the COMECON of the ‘policy of independence’ promoted by Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union, signatory of the ‘Letter of the six’, President of the Romanian Senate after 1989 (1990-1992). See the full interview in Lavinia Betea, Partea lor de adevăr, Editura Compania, București, 2008.

741 The premier order of France, established by Bonaparte.

742 Apparently De Gaulle was not the only statesman expressing his ‘admiration’ for Romania. Scînteia quotes Valery Giscard d’Estaing saying: Romania unfolds an active and original diplomacy. It has relations of friendship with a great many European and non-European states. It is present in all important international debates. This explains the value that I personally place to examining together with president Ceauşescu the problem of common interest’. See ’15 ani de puternică afirmare a politicii externe româneşti’, Scînteia, year XLIX, no. 11791, July 19, 1980, p. 8.

743 More on this visit: Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, Ashgate, Burlington, 2008, pp. 98-101. This author argues that in occasion of their bilateral talks, Nixon had said to President Ceaușescu: ‘Frankly, if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China’. Ceaușescu is reported to have replied by affirming Romania’s willingness to mediate between US and China. See also: Nicolae Rădulescu, Președintele Statelor Unite ale Americii, Richard Nixon sosiește azi în țara noastră, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8144, 2 August, 1969, p. 1; Vizita în România a Președintelui Statelor Unite ale Americii, Richard Nixon, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8165, 23 August, 1969, pp. 1-2; Incheierea vizitei în România a Președintelui Statelor Unite ale Americii, Richard Nixon, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8146, 4 August, 1969, pp. 1-2.

744 In Romanian. Words pronounced in Romanian.

745 See video of this speech on the World Wide Web: at http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_media/nixon.html

746 Lucian Boia, România, țară de frontieră a Europei, Humanitas, București, 2002.
because they had learned to act more guardedly); consumer’s goods were now easier to find and ‘tovarășii’ had now less trouble in finding food and clothes on shops’ shelves. Everything seemed to convey a sense of ‘relaxation’ introduced by a leader who seemed willing to invest considerable amounts of time and energy to promote himself as a Conducător that is close to the nation and interested in everything that is of importance for the people.

The speech Ceaușescu made on the 23rd of August was subsequently published in various newspapers, journals and volumes both in Romania and abroad. In one of the books published abroad, the text appears in the chapter ‘Romania and the Third World Countries’, under the title ‘Romania’s Solidarity with the Third World Countries’. The ‘official’ topic – or the theme that the author himself ascribes to his text – regards therefore the spirit of unity and cohesion that Romania displays towards the developing countries. This way, at surface, the topic is easily identifiable and is supposed to build a certain identity for the Romanian people. At a next level of analysis, however, one will notice that the Romanian ‘solidarity’ with the developing countries is so deeply embedded in specifically-tailored social institutions and political practices, as to loose its intuitive

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The comrades’, in Romanian.

Leader, in Romanian.


Scînteia, year XLIX, no. 11791, July 19, 1980, p. 8, reports that 80 volumes were published in 19 languages in different countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and America.

In Italy: Nicolae Ceaușescu, La Romania sulla via verso il socialismo e nella lotta contro l’imperialismo. Milano, Edizioni del Calendario, 1971.

As Duranti shows: ‘Speech events are where communities are formed and held together’. See Alessandro Duranti, op. cit., p. 289.
certainty. What did this ‘solidarity’ mean? How was it conducted? What kind of actions did it entail? Was it close to the type of political and economic ‘support’ for poorer nations that we now know as ‘development assistance’?

2.2.2.1.2. Purpose of the Communicative Event

As Ellis shows, there are numerous qualities of communicative events that are important for the production of social structure, but their purposes are most central. People communicate for a reason, and these reasons inform the structural organization of culture. According to this author some communicative purposes are very clear, while others are rather indirect and opaque and will always remain unknown to others. This is because there are often cross purposes, multiple purposes, and mixed purposes.\(^{753}\)

The communicative event under this analysis was organized with the declared purpose of commemorating Romania’s quarter of a century of ‘freedom’ from the ‘fascist yoke’. In the regime’s calendar of significant dates, the 23\(^{rd}\) of August was one of the most important, celebrating the end of the Romanian – German alliance. During the Second World War, ever since the beginning of 1943, general Ion Antonescu had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Adolph Hitler to reach a compromise peace with the British and the American forces and concentrate exclusively against the Soviet Union.\(^{754}\) Romanian political groups opposed to the war and to Antonescu’s dictatorship – The National Peasant Party, the Liberal Party and the Communist Party – started a movement for coordination and joined forces in a National Democratic Bloc in June 1944. The National Democratic Bloc called for the immediate conclusion of an armistice with the Allies, the withdrawal from the Axis and the replacement of the Antonescu regime with a democratic one.\(^{756}\) Since Ion Antonescu resisted domestic pressure for discontinuing co-operation with Germany and plainly rejected an armistice proposed by the Allies, the National Democratic Bloc started to plan for a new government and an eventual coup. On the 19\(^{th}\) of August 1944, the Soviets launched a new offensive against Romania; the offensive was hardly resisted by the Romanian troops which, at that time, were still fighting side by side with the ones of Germany. On the 23\(^{rd}\), general Antonescu was


\(^{755}\) Blocul NaŃional Democratic in Romanian.

arrested upon the order of King Michael I of Romania, who had given his full support to the efforts of the opposition for bringing the Antonescu regime to its end. Late in the evening of the same day, the King broadcasted a proclamation to the nation announcing the break of diplomatic relations with Germany and declaring that Romania had joined forces with the Allies, against the Axis. The day started to be known as the time when the Romanians ‘have turned the weapons’ (‘au întors armele’) and, over the years, held an extremely important place in the communist historiography.

Having been member of the political bloc which decided upon and enforced ‘înțoarcerea armelor’, the Communist Party allotted itself a paramount role in organizing and carrying out the overthrow of the Antonescu regime and the 23rd of August became a day of celebration and self-celebration for the Romanian Communist Party. Officially, workers had the day off, but most of them only to participate in ‘spontaneous’ gatherings of celebration. In particular, the members of the Patriotic Guards were called to stage parades and spectacles in occasion of this day. Every year the Party would organize various manifestations and its Secretary General would address the nation with a solemn speech pronounced in front of the nation’s most significant decision-making bodies. The speech was broadcasted by the Romanian public television, it was published in various Romanian newspapers and journals and would then be used as a source for quotes by all political commentators until the following year’s speech.

Historically, such exceptional emphasis on the date of 23rd of August may seem a double paradox. First – as Treptow shows - the Soviets never recognized the 23rd of August as the day for Romania’s entry into the war against Germany. Instead, they actually moved the alleged date forward to 12th of September, as to deny the Romanian economic and military contribution in the interim and evade, this way, to account for the ‘war booty’ they had

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757 Idem, p. 499.
758 See the Scînteia collection, in particular each year’s articles on the 23rd of August.
759 Paramilitary force created by Ceaușescu, in 1968, after his condemnation of the crushing of the Prague Spring. The Guards were created to resist an eventual foreign invasion. After the danger of such invasion the Guards were maintained and expected to ‘volunteer’ for various ‘patriotic tasks’, most often in agriculture (ex. to gather the harvest). The Guards were called regularly to military drill, shooting exercises and other training. More on the reserve military and the Patriotic Guards: Eugene K. Keeffe, Romania a Country Study, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Kessinger Publishing, Kila, 2004, p. 316; Biljana Vankovska and Håkan Wiberg, Between Past and Future: Civil-military Relations in Post-communist Balkan States, Tauris, London, 2003.
760 Based on author’s research of the Scînteia collection.
Second, at the peace treaty negotiations, Romania was never granted the co-belligerent status, in spite of Romania’s losses being fourth in importance, immediately after those of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. In spite of evidence and the Czechoslovak’s delegation special plea for Romania to be granted the co-belligerent status, Romania’s contribution in the war against Germany was ignored. Nevertheless, the 23rd of August was re-elaborated by Romania’s communist regime in such a way as this historical event to gain visionary proportions. As Boia shows such re-elaboration was achieved gradually: in a first instance it was presented as ‘the liberation of the country by the glorious Soviet army’, passed through the variant ‘armed anti-fascist insurrection’ and became ‘revolution of national and social liberation, anti-fascist and anti-imperialist’, carried out under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party.

Taken at face value, this communicative event is a celebrative one; beyond that, it can also be defined as an event to shape attitudes towards the past, orient and direct the public opinion towards a certain reading of historical ‘facts’, while emphasizing Romania’s current position in the world.

2.2.2.1.3. Setting of the Communicative Event

Beyond signifying certain functional or attitudinal requirements of participants, settings have an important role in shaping discourse: at the least, they have the power to assign specific roles to the speakers and shape ‘the available set of conversational options’ (meaning that the participants do not have equal rights in turn-taking). The setting of the communicative event taken into analysis was represented by the building and particularly the tribune of the Great National Assembly.

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761 Treptow, op. cit., p. 516. A Soviet-oriented Romanian Communist Party could have been expected to embrace the Soviet vision of the events, but ‘întoarcerea armelor’ was celebrated anyhow, on the 23rd of August, according to the original Romanian version of the events.

762 Treptow, op. cit., p. 516.


764 See –in what follows – the presence of so many foreign delegates.


According to the 1952 Constitution\textsuperscript{767}, The Great National Assembly was the ‘supreme organ of state power, the only legislature of the Socialist Republic of Romania’\textsuperscript{768}, elected every 5 years\textsuperscript{769}, and exercising 24 powers\textsuperscript{770} - the first one being that of adopting and modifying the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania\textsuperscript{771}.

According to article 54, the Great National Assembly worked in sessions: the ordinary sessions were convened twice a year at the proposal of its Bureau, while the extraordinary sessions were summoned any number of times they were needed, upon the initiative of the State Council, the Bureau of the Assembly or at least one third of the deputies’ total number. On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of August 1969, the Great National Assembly convened in such extraordinary, ‘jubilee’ session, ‘consecrated to the XXV-th anniversary of the liberation of Romania from the fascist yoke’\textsuperscript{772}.

According to Scînteia, this anniversary session was attended by a significant number of guests from both Romania and abroad\textsuperscript{773} and it was characterized by a grandiose atmosphere: the ‘great room’ was

\textit{‘dominated by the state emblem of the Socialist Republic of Romania, flanked\textsuperscript{774} by red and tricolor flags. The festive dates ‘1944 – 23 August – 1969’ written on the background of the tribune, mark the symbolic epoch of profound social transformation, of great achievements in the construction of socialism which Romania traversed in the 25 years since the liberation’\textsuperscript{775}.}

At 10 o’clock the delegates and their guests salute with ‘strong applauses’ and long, recurring ovations the arrival in the room of ‘Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu’, the other party leaders and the leaders of foreign parties and states who participated at this celebration.

\textsuperscript{767} Buletinul Oficial al Marii Adunări Nationale a Republicii Populare Române, no. 1, 27 September, 1952. The text of the 1952 constitution is also available online at \url{http://www.constitutia.ro/const1952.htm}, as of January 2009.

\textsuperscript{768} Constitutia Republicii Populare Romane 1952, article 42.

\textsuperscript{769} Constitutia Republicii Populare Romane 1952, article 45.

\textsuperscript{770} Constitutia Republicii Populare Romane 1952, article 43.

\textsuperscript{771} Significant for the present work is also power number 21 which is to decide the guidelines of Romania’s foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{772} Sesiunea Jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naționale consacrată celei de-a XXV-a aniversări a eliberării patriei de sub jugul fascist. Cuvântarea Tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, in Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8165, 23 August, 1969, pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{773} Idem, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{774} In Romanian: ‘străjuită’.

\textsuperscript{775} Sesiunea jubiliară..., op. cit.
Subsequently, the session is opened by a short speech delivered by Ştefan Voitec\textsuperscript{776}, President of the Great National Assembly, who welcomes the foreign guests, addressing each country’s delegation by name of country and chief of delegation\textsuperscript{777}. After the opening, ‘Comrade’ Ceauşescu delivers a long speech to an ‘enthusiastic’ audience which – says Scînteia - greets the General Secretary’s every second phrase with ‘hurrahs and ovations, with lively and enthusiastic applauses’. The session is closed by a second short speech of the Great National Assembly’s President, Ştefan Voitec, who addresses his ‘warmest congratulations’ to the audience and expresses his belief that the ‘26\textsuperscript{th} year of free life’ will bring to the ‘working people on Romania’s territory’ the will to transpose in facts and life the internal and external policy of ‘our’ party and state.

After the communicative event, the day continued with Secretary General Ceauşescu decorating some of the members of the Soviet Party and Government delegation and other Soviet guests with the jubilee medal ‘The XXVth anniversary of ‘Motherland’s liberation’. On the same occasion a great number of Soviet military men are also decorated with this honor. The same day, huge and allegedly ‘spontaneous’ manifestations take place all over the country, as ‘under the triumph arch of August’ the people wanted to ‘celebrate the socialist triumphs’\textsuperscript{778}.

\subsection*{2.2.2.1.4. Participants to the Communicative Event}

From a discursive perspective, it might be relevant to acknowledge the fact, in a podium event\textsuperscript{779} like the one organized in August 1969, the conditions of participation are different

\textsuperscript{776} Stefan Voitec, trained as a teacher, was a Social Democrat who joined the Romanian Communist Party in 1948 when he became a Prime Minister. Voitec fell from favor during a Stalin-era purge but became a Deputy Prime Minister again, from 1956 to 1961. For 13 years he was a chairman of the Great National Assembly and from 1974 he became one of Romania’s Vice Presidents. See Obituary in the New York Times, \textit{Stefan Voitec Is Dead at 84; A Vice President of Romania}, published on 5\textsuperscript{th} of December, 1984. See also obituary in Scînteia: \textit{Tovarăşul Ştefan Voitec a încetat din viaţă}, Scînteia, year LIV, no. 13152, December 5, 1984, p. 1. See also \textit{Funeraliile Tovarăşului Ştefan Voitec}, Scînteia, year LIV, no. 13155, December 8, 1984, pp. 1, 5.

\textsuperscript{777} Ex. ‘We salute the representative of the Government of the Chinese Popular Republic at the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the liberation of Romania, comrade CIAN HAI-FUN, ambassador of the Chinese Popular Republic at Bucharest’ or ‘We salute the representative of the Italian Communist Party at the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the liberation of Romania, comrade Gerardo Chiaromonte, member of the leading body of the Italian Communist Party’, and so on.


\textsuperscript{779} Category introduced by Erving Goffman. Podium events are defined as social events which are either addressed to or performed for a live or mass media audience (ex. lectures, sermons, staged plays, etc.).
for the diverse participant groups. Participants can be easily categorized in two main
groups: those ‘on the podium’ and those in the audience. The first group can be called
‘first-frame’ participants, while the second group can be called ‘second-frame’
participants. A large number – thirty one - of first frame participants is reported by
Scînteia, but in spite of their formally privileged position (being members of the
‘presidium’), their speaking rights are shadowed by those of the Secretary General Nicolae
Ceaușescu.

The group of the second-frame participants is much larger and is formed by the remaining
members of the Great National Assembly and ‘numerous invitees’: members of the Central
Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and of the Government; leaders of central
institutions and ‘community-based’ organizations; old participants to the illegal fight of
the Party and ‘the armed insurrection of August 1944’; commanders of military units on
the ‘anti-Hitler front’; front-rank workers; representatives of all counties (județe); party,
state and mass organizations; generals and commanders in chief; science, art and culture
people. All these individuals, together with the Romanian citizens - expected to heed the
radio and television broadcasts - form the primary audience of Ceaușescu’s speech, but
there is also an equally important secondary audience: the international one. There are
numerous guests from abroad: journalists and delegations from other socialist countries,
chiefs of diplomatic missions accredited at Bucharest, military attachés and other members
of the diplomatic body, journalists and correspondents of the foreign press. Scînteia counts
no less than 24 countries which sent their delegations or representatives to attend the event.
In some cases, the foreign delegations were state or government delegations; in some other
cases the delegations were formed by (communist) party representatives or representatives

Anita Fetzer and Gerda Lauerbach, Political Discourse in the Media: Cross-cultural Perspectives, John

Ex. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Gheorghe Pană, Dumitru Petrescu,
Gheorghe Rădulescu […] Ion Iliescu (future President of Romania after 1989 - note of the author), Ion
Ioniță, Carol Kirlay, Vasile Patilineț, etc.

‘Comunități obștești’ in the Romanian original.

‘Comandați’ in the Romanian original.

‘Sesiunea jubiliară…’, op. cit., p. 4.

The Romanian public television of the time had one channel only. There was not private television in the
country. The public television would broadcast 2-3 hours a day. From here, the ideological clout of
broadcasting such a speech that could mean a good proportion of all television time available on a particular
day.
of national liberation movements. An international audience is, thus, directly and indirectly targeted and reached.

The relations between the participants to this communicative event can hardly be fully grasped by the general public. In spite of offering generous space for ‘covering’ the event, what is covered is mostly Ceaușescu’s own speeches and activities. His address is published in full length, on 3 of the six pages of Scînteia and Scînteia Tineretului, while the event is also covered by the Lumea magazine. Besides Ceaușescu’s, the only other speech that is published is the introductory one made by the President of the Great National Assembly. Contrary to Ceaușescu’s, Voitec’s speech is a purely institutional one intended to greet the foreign delegations, after a short word of welcome to the whole audience and very few considerations on the importance of the event. No other speaker is reported to have been given the floor, nor was any other mentioned by Scînteia.

2.2.2.1.5. Background Knowledge and Assumptions

Upon coming into power, Ceaușescu criticizes Dej for the latter’s opulent lifestyle, but – as Gilbert Trond shows – he soon starts to engage himself in the same practices, doubled by an all-encompassing personality cult. Even if 1969 is not yet the climax of his personality cult, it was still reaching no modest proportions. His public appearances are already exceedingly well orchestrated, so that the masses gather ‘spontaneously’, chant ‘Ceaușescu and the People’ or other slogans, while the children offer flowers to him and his spouse.

According to the same author, Ceaușescu’s leadership style is a unique blend of Marxist-Leninism and personal traits; he is a leader who believes in centralized power, distrusts the masses and thinks that they need to be led by a forceful hand. This is in spite of the

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786 ‘Sesiunea jubiliară...’, op. cit., p. 4.
787 Scînteia Tineretului [The Youth’s Scînteia], was the ‘central organ of the Union of the Communist Youth’. See: Sesiunea Jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naționale consacrată celei de-a XXV-a aniversări a eliberării patriei de sub jugul fascist. Cuvîntarea tovarășului Nicolae Ceauşescu, in Scînteia Tineretului, year XXV, series II, no. 6305, August, 23, 1969.
788 Under the heading Sǎrbǎtorirea gloriosului jubileu al României Socialiste, [Celebrating the glorious jubilee of Socialist Romania], Lumea publishes two article: Eugen Pop, Anii marilor împliniri, [The years of great achievements], Lumea, no. 36 (305), 28 August, 1969, pp. 2-3; and Ilie Serbănescu, Manifestări de stimă şi preţuire, Lumea, no. 36 (305), 28 August, 1969, pp. 3-4.
789 Sesiunea jubiliară a Marii Adunări, op. cit.
professed ‘organic unity’ between Ceauşescu and the people, and extravagant rhetoric about himself being the ‘beloved son of the Party and the people’.

In the ‘Ceauşescu era’, Romanian ‘exceptionalism’ was promoted in all fields. Romanians learned that in the international arena their country was one with a role of utmost importance. In its issue on the 28th of August (the first one after the ‘celebration’), ‘Lumea’ dedicates a whole article to reviewing the ‘manifestations of esteem and appreciation’ that President Ceauşescu and the Romanian people had received from all over the world in occasion of their important celebration. Ilie Serbânescu shows that:

‘In numerous countries, on all meridians of the Globe, our great national celebration represented a new occasion for manifestations of sympathy and friendship towards our country, towards its achievements and its politics’.

The important ‘place that Romania occupies in the concert of nations’ and, in particular, among the developing countries was, therefore, unquestioned. The congratulatory message from South Vietnam makes explicit reference to the support received from the Romanian people, state and Communist Party, while Amilcar Cabral is quoted to ‘express the unanimous sentiments of our people’, towards the Romanian people.

In the economic field Ceauşescu was allegedly following the policies initiated by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, acknowledged for his efforts to take Romania out from absolute Soviet control and for having resisted the Soviet proposals for economic specialization in the CMEA. Being a producer of primary products and raw materials, such economic specialization would have inevitably relegated Romania to being the ‘gas station and breadbasket’ of the more developed communist countries. Seeing industrialization as the exclusive strategy towards development and valuing a national development path, the

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791 Title of Scînteia article, 22nd of January, page 3. With photos from his work visits, while pointing his finger towards various technical devices or on a field looking inside sacks, probably to harvested.
792 See a discussion of the Romanian protochronism in Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, pp. 79-81. A manifestation of nationalism, the protochronist movement strived to show that some of the most important achievements in human science and culture had their origins in Romania. To make an example, historians endeavored to prove that the revolution of Horea was a precursor of the French Revolution.
794 Author’s translation from Romanian, Ilie Serbânescu, *Manifestări de stimă şi preŃuire*, op. cit., p. 3.
795 Expression used by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Head of Government, in his speech at the debate over the RCP’s external policy held in 1967. See *Cuvîntarea tovarăşului Ion Gheorghe Maurer*, in Scînteia, year XXXVI, no. 7413, July 26, 1967.
Soviet proposals were clearly in contrast with the regime’s concept of economic development and, in particular, with the ‘multi-laterally developed society’ concept that will be later on introduced by Ceauşescu himself.

On a time scale, the communicative event of the 22rd of August 1969, takes place just four years after Ceauşescu’s coming to power in socialist Romania and two years after his 1967 address concerning the foreign policy of ‘the Party and of the Government’, delivered in July at the Grand National Assembly†. The 1967 address can be considered as laying the early foundations of Ceauşescu’s foreign policy: many of the principles that will be followed during the subsequent decades are now expressed. In particular, the 1967 report showed Romania’s willingness to pursue economic and political contacts on a global level, rather than on a regional one. After showing that there is an unquestionable ‘superiority of the forces of socialism, progress and peace, over the forces of reaction, of imperialism’, Ceauşescu lets his audience see that Romania is embarked on an effort to develop ‘friendly relations and many-sided cooperation between Romania and the countries belonging to the World Socialist system’, as the ‘friendship and alliance with all the socialist countries’ is ‘the central element of the foreign policy of Romania’. However, he makes it clear that Romania developed (and will continue to do so) ‘political, economic, cultural and scientific relations’ not only with the Socialist states, but also with the ‘states with a different social system’§, as well as with the peoples struggling ‘for winning and consolidating national independence’ (meaning the developing countries). The basis for his claiming that the Romanian Communist Party be in ‘full solidarity’ with this last group of states is the fact that ‘the communist parties, the advanced revolutionary forces play an important part in the struggle for the democratic, progressive development of the young independent States’. Therefore, he says:

‘The Romanian people develops relations of friendly cooperation with these countries, feels a deep sympathy with the cause of these peoples, manifests its full solidarity with the struggle they wage against imperialism and colonialism, for national independence, for progress and prosperity, stands close to them in their efforts to defend their democratic revolutionary gains."

§In the regime’s political jargon: the Western states.
2.2.2.2. What the Text Conveys? Text Analysis

As Chilton and Schäffner show, political activity does not exist without the use of language. While acknowledging that other behaviors like coercion may have a role, these authors argue that politics is primarily constituted in language; hence, they formulate an argument in favor of a close alliance of the study of politics with the study of language\textsuperscript{802}. If this premise is correct, then - Chilton and Schäffner claim - there is abundant empirical evidence in the form of talk and text\textsuperscript{803} that need to be analyzed. Due to a rapid expansion of discourse studies, there are now various methods of text analysis that can be employed\textsuperscript{804}. Their use is very much facilitated by their flexibility: the degree to which they involve predefined sets of procedures varies to the largest extent. While some of them do so heavily, in others the emphasis is more on the theoretical presuppositions concerning the cultural and social worlds to which the text belongs\textsuperscript{805}.

One such method - that informs the present analysis - is critical discourse analysis. This method was given preference due to its concern for the ways in which texts and talk can reproduce power and inequality in society\textsuperscript{806}. As one of the founders of critical discourse analysis shows, compared to ‘non-critical’ linguistics, critical linguistics does not only describes discursive structures, but it is also concerned with

\begin{quote}
how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants\textsuperscript{807}.
\end{quote}

The ‘society’ that we are now considering is the ‘global’ society, the world system in which Romania is a functional part, with a specific role that it strives to build through discursive as well as non-discursive means. An additional focus in what follows is on the pragmatic function of language, defined as ‘what language does to make social life as we

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{802} Paul Anthony Chilton and Christina Schäffner, Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse, Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2002, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{803} Paul Anthony Chilton and Christina Schäffner, op. cit., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{806} Anssi Peräkylä, op. cit.
\end{footnotesize}
know it possible. Inspired by discourse analysts’ claim that the phenomena of interest in social research are constituted in and through discourse, we will look at what Ceauşescu’s text and talk is doing and achieving, on the means it employs and exploits for conveying and constructing a certain identity for Romania and its position in relation to the ‘developing countries’.

As already mentioned, the text taken into analysis is part of a much larger communication in which Ceauşescu elaborates on Romania’s ‘achievements’ in the 25 years passed since – what he calls - the ‘motherland’s liberation from fascism’. The 4-sentences excerpt (already quoted) in which he refers specifically to Romania’s relations with the World’s ‘youngest states’ (how he calls the Third World countries) was selected mainly due to its similarity in message, tone and linguistic structure to many others that Nicoale Ceauşescu delivered in his long political career as leader of socialist Romania. This excerpt can therefore be considered as a representative sample of speech.

2.2.2.2.1. Romanian People’s Solidarity. Discursive construction.
The sentences of this short excerpt are declarative and positive, framed in the active voice and their main agent is ‘us’, the Romanian people who is ‘sympathetic with’ and ‘supports’ Third World countries.

For critical discourse analysts, discourse is shaped by other practices and structures and, most importantly, discourse contributes to the construction of: 1) social identities; 2) social relations and 3) systems of knowledge and meaning. Discourse has, therefore, three main

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810 As Wood and Kroger show, a major source of the view that language is action is Austin’s (1962) theory of speech acts. An imperative statement does not only have a referential meaning (what it is about), but is also giving an order or constructing the hearer’s identity as a subordinated subject. Discourse analysts are, therefore, interested not only in content, but ‘their aim is to go beyond content to see how it is flexibly used to achieve particular functions and effects’. More on these aspects: Wood, Linda A., and Rolf O. Kroger, op. cit., pp. 4-10.
811 Sesiunea jubiliară..., op. cit.
812 ‘Our people, which in the course of its history, knew very well what the exploitation and the foreign oppression mean, is absolutely like-minded with the peoples which rise against the foreign yoke, warmly supports their fight against the imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism to conquer and strengthen their national independency, for a progressive development of society, for peace. We send our warmest greetings to all peoples of colonies who fight arms in hands for freeing themselves from the imperialist yoke. We wish them the most rapid success in their fight. Romania will support also in the future the fight of the young States for an independent development, for the protection of their sovereignty and for their ever more active affirmation on the international arena.'
functions: an identity function, a ‘relational’ function and an ‘ideational’ function. In what follows we will look at the discursive practices being used for constructing a certain type of social identity, that of a Romanian people that is caring and concerned for the faith of the ‘under-developed’ people.

The first remark to be made is that participant roles are important: it is not indifferent how a certain subject is portrayed – as an agent or as a patient. As Cornelia Ilie shows, in discourse studies particular attention has been paid to the discrepancies that occur in the way in which three core participant roles, namely Agent, Co-agent and Patient, are instantiated in the discourse of political speeches and she herself studies these roles with reference to the Ceauşescu’s speeches delivered to the Romanian Communist Party meetings. While the agent, defined by Ilie as the ‘wilful instigator of an event or action’ - is always responsible for her deeds and decisions, the patient – defined as ‘the involuntary affected participant’ - is seen as rather constrained or compelled to a certain course of action. Wood shows that the agent-patient distinction involves a way of seeing people and not a claim whether they are actual agents or patients; a person constructed as an agent is ‘charged’ with responsibility, blame or credit for her actions, whereas if the person is constructed as a patient, responsibility can be deflected. Ilie shows that the agent is ‘the case of the typically animate perceived instigator of the action identified by the verb (...) the only one to act according to his or her own will in order to bring about a certain effect’.

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814 ‘Patient’ is used in discourse studies in its sense as ‘person or thing that undergoes some action’.
815 Professor Ilie, of Romanian origin, teaches English linguistics at Örebro University, Sweden. Her research, which is largely corpus-based, spans four main fields: pragmatics, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics and rhetoric. See more on Professor Ilie on the website of the Örebro University: http://www.oru.se/templates/oruExtNormal_46705.aspx, as of January 2009.
817 Cornelia Ilie, op. cit., p. 194.
818 Idem.
820 The author’s own emphasis.
Rather than an animate, the agent of the text under our analysis is an abstract entity – the Romanian people with all its 20 million citizens that Romania counted at the time the speech was delivered\textsuperscript{822}. The difference between a concrete and an abstract agent is of no little importance. While the animate agent can be held fully responsible for the quality of her actions, the inanimate, collective agent (like the ‘people’ is) poses a series of questions regarding levels of responsibility for specific actions. As van Dijk shows

‘since groups and institutions, as such, do not write or speak or understand discourse, there is no way social structure itself may directly affect text and talk, unless through the agency of communicating individuals as members of groups or social categories\textsuperscript{823}’.

Transposing this insight to Ceauşescu’s Romania, we realize that the category ‘the Romanian people’ as such can not speak, decide, support others, or do anything else by itself; to see things accomplished, it needs communicators, decision-makers, implementers, etc. Already the most important decision-maker of his country\textsuperscript{824}, Ceauşescu takes upon himself the role of communicator, as a role with an obvious potential to enhance his own image and power on the national and international arena. In any society, at any given time, linguistic resources are unequally distributed\textsuperscript{825}, but in Ceauşescu’s Romania they are even more so, due to the tight control instated through a sophisticated system of state and Party censorship\textsuperscript{826}. In this system, Ceauşescu finds himself in a privileged position, as the only Romanian citizen ‘delegated’ to speak on behalf of the ‘people’ and for the ‘people’ and he

\textsuperscript{822} See in Scînteia, the celebration on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of August, of the 20,000,000\textsuperscript{th} citizen of Romania: Sărătorirea celui de-al 20 000 000-lea cetăŃean al Republicii Socialiste România, Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8143, August 1, 1969, p.1. A special festivity was organized at the ‘Palace of the Republic’, attended by Secretary General Nicolae Ceauşescu and many other political leaders of the time. See also the interview with the general director of the Central Direction for Statistics: Paul Diaconescu, Suntem un popor de 20 000 000! ['We are a people of 20,000,000!'], Scînteia, year XXXVIII, no. 8143, August 1, 1969, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{824} According to Ceauşescu’ former head of cabinet of the Central Committee of the RCP, Curticeanu (2007), the members of the Romanian Great National Assembly, the legislative body of the country, had a ‘purely decorative role’ (p. 109) as all legislation was drafted Ceauşescu’s exclusive initiative, and adopted as he proposed it, with no change. The deputies’ mission was to validate what had already been decided by Ceauşescu.


does so in the most diverse of the situations: from addresses at the Great National Assembly, to official state visits and from marketplace gatherings to UTC\textsuperscript{827} meetings.

In Ilies’s definition, the ‘typically animate’ who occupies the agent’s position needs only to be ‘perceived’ as the instigator of the action identified by the verb. The play between reality and perception is relevant in the discursive construction of subjects as agents or patients. In the speech Ceauşescu delivers the attention is called upon Romania and this country’s role and characteristics. The emphasis is on Romania capacities, abilities and readiness to take upon international tasks. There is an advertising intention that is mixed with information, and this blending of advertising with information is not occurring by chance. As Fairclough shows, advertising is a strategy whose constant use will surreptitiously transform the sense of the information provided:

\begin{quotation}
\textit{“Under the influence of advertising as a prestigious model, the blending of information and persuasion is becoming naturalized, divisions between them in orders of discourse are being fractured, and as a consequence the nature of ‘information’ is being radically changed,”}\textsuperscript{828}
\end{quotation}

Under the appearance of an informative text, the speaker conceals a distorted promise (ex. ‘Romania will support also in the future the fight of the young States for an independent development…’). The promise is distorted, as it is saying: ‘I, X (Ceauşescu), promise that you Y (young states) will be supported by Z (Romania)’ or ‘I, Ceauşescu, promise that somebody else (Romania) will support you’\textsuperscript{829}. In usual circumstances, credibly promising on behalf of somebody else can only be accepted if both the ‘promiser’ and the promised

\textsuperscript{827} Uniunea Tineretului Comunist (The Union of the Communist Young People).


\textsuperscript{829} This is not the only instance when Ceauşescu operates with such promises’. In his report for the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party from July 19-21, 1972, Ceauşescu says: , I would like to ensure all these states, from the rostrum of the National Conference, that Romania, our Party will do everything to bring to life the understandings and agreements concluded, for the promotion, in the future too, of friendship and solidarity between our peoples and parties’. See Raportul prezentat de tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, la Conferința Națională cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-socială a României în ținutură ani și în perspectivă, la perfeționarea conducerii planificate a societății și dezvoltarea democrației socialiste, la creșterea rolului conducător al partidului în edificarea socialismului și comunismului, la activitatea internațională a partidului și statului, in Scînteia, year XLI, no. 9214, July 20, 1972, p. 7. In his Report to the XIIIth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party: „Ensure our friends abroad that also in the future the Romanian Communist party, socialist Romania, will make all efforts to bring their contribution to the... making of a better and more just world on our planet”. See Raportul Comitetului central cu privire la activitatea Partidului Comunist Român în perioada dintre Congresul al XII-lea și Congresul al XIII-lea și activitatea de viitor a partidului în vederea înfăptuirii obiectivelor dezvoltării economico-sociale ale cincinului 1986-1990 și, în perspectivă, până în anul 2000, a României, prezentat de Tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, Scînteia, year LIV, no. 13139, November, 20, 1984, p. 7. For similar examples, see Scînteia collection.
know and accept that the ‘promiser’ has the power of making that ‘somebody else’ to comply with the promise. One can hardly find indices about the credibility this promise (and other similar promises) might have had among the ‘young states’, but this is actually less important for the purpose of our analysis here. What is relevant is that with these words Ceauşescu reveals his belief of having such power over Romania, people and institutions altogether.

Ideologically, by utterances like these, Ceauşescu creates a pyramid of power: himself at the top; Romania and the Romanian people immediately behind, as those who will implement his decision-promise and as holders of the capacities, resources and willingness to support the ‘developing countries’; on a third and last layer - the ‘young states’ themselves who will be awaiting for this support to be implemented after having been so promised. Thus, as President of Romania, a socialist country, Ceauşescu speaks to other non-socialist, socialist and potentially socialist countries in the Third World (especially those which are small or medium in size) from the power position of a potential provider or rescuer. The point here is not to establish if Romania was indeed a provider of aid for these countries. Nor is it to see if Romania’s activities in these countries were of real help and efficient. The aim is for us to grasp an ideological position that this leader associates himself and his country with, when conferring with third world nations.

By use of discursive means (‘advertising’ included), Ceauşescu assigns positive characteristics to the Romanian ‘people’, a ‘friend’ of Third World countries. Thus, the lexical content following the ‘people’ is expressed in reassuring adjectives as: ‘friendly’, ‘collaboration’, ‘sympathy’, ‘fully supportive’, ‘solidarity’, ‘feelings’, and so on. It is arguable that General Secretary Ceauşescu proposes a new cognitive map: he is trying to ‘teach’ his people on how to conceive of itself in relation with a different, specific group of countries: the developing ones. There is a certain degree of novelty in this endeavors which rests on the fact that no other Romanian leader before him was programmatically engaged in such an exercise, at least not with the kind of boldness and effort that he for one was willing to invest. By numerous addresses of this kind, his great care in visiting a great number of developing countries, his interest in addressing the people of every country he visits, his availability in receiving at Bucharest as many developing countries’ leaders as possible, Secretary General Ceauşescu is clearly engaged in a process of social identification and elaboration of a set of general principles to define the position Romania
holds in relation with the group of less developed countries. This is a vast self-assigned task. In a first instance, the whole material structure to sustain such a claim needs to be build, starting with the actual diplomatic relations which need to be developed with the vast majority of these countries. In a second instance, neither the Romanians themselves, nor the peoples in the developing countries are familiar with an image of Romania as active player in North-South relations.

Processes of social identification take place on the shared social representations that we call ideologies and social groupness is defined by at least six fundamental categories: self-identity descriptions corresponding to the question ‘Who are we?’; activity-descriptions to answer the question ‘What we do?’; goal-descriptions to answer the related question ‘Why we do this?; norms and value descriptions to establish ‘what is good for us’; position descriptions corresponding to the question ‘What is our position in society and how we relate to other groups?’; and resource descriptions to establish ‘what is ours and what we want to keep at all costs’. Based on linguistic resources, in what follows we will try to uncover some of these basic properties.

2.2.2.2. Self-identity Descriptions: Romania as a ‘Friend’ of the Developing Countries

In his speeches and texts, Ceauşescu takes great care in ascribing easily recognizable and positive identity characteristics to the Romanian people.

In Ceauşescu’s accounts the Romanians are a collaborative people: they cooperate openly not only with other socialist countries, but also with the developing ones, be they socialist or otherwise, as well as any other people, regardless of its political orientation. In the words of Secretary General Ceauşescu:

‘Consistently following a policy oriented towards the improvement of the international environment, our country promotes relations of collaboration in the economic, political, cultural and technical-scientific field, with all countries, irrespective of their social-political order’...’

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830 See a previous section of this thesis for more details on these aspects.
831 Teun Adrianus van Dijk, op. cit.
832 Sesiunea jubiliară... cuvintarea tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu..., op. cit., p. 3.
The Romanian people is also friendly and supportive with those still fighting for their ‘liberation’. As Ceauşescu shows:

> *Romania grants a strong* \(^{833}\) *support of a material, political and diplomatic kind to the movements of national liberation from the African countries – Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia* \(^{834}\).

The support that the Romanian people extends to other peoples is ‘strong’ and diversified (political, material and diplomatic) \(^{835}\), suggesting generosity and compassion.

The Romanian people has been working hard for promoting and achieving its own progress and efforts paid: the Romanian people is a successful one and its model of social and economic development can easily be followed by any developing countries willing to score similar successes:

> ‘The successes obtained by our country in building the new social order ... represent a real contribution to the ... cause of progress, independence and peace’ \(^{836}\).

The Romanian people has ‘feelings’ (of solidarity and ‘support’), it is a peace-loving people and ready to make any effort to ensure peace, not only in Romania but in the whole World:

> ‘The Romanian Communist Party, the government, the whole people will do everything for bringing their contribution to achieving this goal \(^{837}\) of the entire humankind.’ \(^{838}\).

Romanians work hard to build and promote public-goods such as world peace, independence for those who lack it and progress. As Ceauşescu shows:

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\(^{833}\) Author’s emphasis.

\(^{834}\) Raportul prezentat de tovarăşul Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, la Conferinţa Naţională cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-socială a României..., in Scînteia, year XLI, no. 9214, July 20, 1972, p. 7.

\(^{835}\) Idem.

\(^{836}\) Idem, p. 6. See also *Sesiunea jubiliară...,* op. cit., p. 3: ‘In all these years, Romania affirmed itself as an active brigade in the revolutionary fight of peoples for national and social freedom, brought its contribution to strengthening the anti-imperialist forces, to the cause of socialism and peace in the world’.

\(^{837}\) Idem.

\(^{838}\) Idem. See also *Raportul prezentat de tovarăşul Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, la Conferinţa Naţională cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-socială a României...,* in Scînteia, year XLI, no. 9214, July 20, 1972, p. 10 (sub-chapter 7 – ‘Desarmarea generală şi, în primul rând, nucleară – deziderat vital al întregii omeniri’ [The general disarmament and, in the first place, the nuclear disarmament – desideratum of the whole humankind]).
‘Romania unfolded an intensive activity and firmly pronounced itself for solving the conflicts and the litigious problems between states only and only in a peaceful manner, through negotiations’.

For their efforts in the international arena, Romanians are acknowledged and admired by the whole world, as their proposals for international development are very appreciated for being such an active promoter of progress, peace and independence. President Ceaușescu is to be credited with all merits but in the end of the day Romania’s foreign policy ‘has conquered the esteem and appreciation of the world’s peoples’, as Romania’s policy is profoundly realistic and original.

Romanians are sympathetic and close to the developing countries, and they have at least two good reasons for being so: their recent (if not current) experience and their own history. Romania is herself a developing country, struggling with the hurdles of its own development. This way, Romania knows about the battle for development from their own and very recent experience:

‘Being itself a developing country, Romania understands very well the preoccupations of these states; we know that the achievement of economical and social progress requires great efforts from every state’.

At the same time, Romanians have a complex, rich history that is similar – in its struggle for independence and development – with that of the developing countries: ‘our people, that in the course of history knew what exploitation and oppression mean’.

840 See for an example: Sub conducerea președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu poporul român se afirmă ca promotor deosebit de activ al păcii, independenței, progresului. Aprecieri, relatări, comentarii ale presei internaționale, Scînteia, year LIV, no. 13156, December 10, 1984, p. 6. The article is a review of ‘commentaries’ in the foreign press regarding, the exceptionally valuable ideas and orientations, positions and the noteworthy initiatives of the party and state leader consecrated to the country’s prosperity, international collaboration and peace in the whole world, revealing the high prestige that socialist Romania has won in the whole world, given the activities and constructive percourses of president Nicolae Ceaușescu.
841 Mircea Angelescu, ‘Gândirea social-politică a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, fundamentul teoretic și practic al prestigiuului mondial al României’, in Munca de partid, year XXIII, no. 4, April 1979, p. 16. This article presents two of the latest books published under the signature of President Ceaușescu.
842 Raportul prezentat de tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, la Conferința Națională cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-socială a României..., in Scînteia, year XLI, no. 9214, July 20, 1972, p. 9 (sub-chapter 2 – „Relațiile României cu țările care au pășit pe calea dezvoltării independente” [Relations of Romania with the countries that stepped on the path of independent development].
843 Sesiunea jubiliară..., op. cit., p. 3.
What is not said, but it is implied is that Romanians are, above all, resourceful, as only a ‘people’ with collective wealth, assets and ascertained material and immaterial reserves could fulfill such global tasks. It is, in Ceauşescu’s own terminology, a ‘multi-laterally developed society’, the image that best describes the tableau.

This positive tableau is conveyed through means of categorical, strong and objective modality that reinforces authority. All verbs are positive, while adjectives and adverbs range from: (supporting) “warmly” and “fully”, “fervid” (greetings), “absolutely” (supportive), (will do) “everything” (to…), “profoundly” (interested), “profound” (sympathy). Modality, in the social-semiotic sense that Hodge and Kress employ it, describes the relation between speakers gauged in terms of different degrees of affinity or the degree of affinity with or affiliation to her own statement. One important type of modality that has dramatic consequences for the discursive construction of both social relations and knowledge systems is truth or those knowledge claims that are presented as indisputable. There would be an important difference between a hypothetical “I think the Romanian people knows…” (subjective modality) and the actual “The Romanian people knows…” (objective modality). In the first situation (subjective modality) the personal basis for the selected degree of affinity would be explicit (it is the speakers’ own opinion), while the objective modality often implies some form of power given by the speaker’s will to project his perception of the reality as being universal. Indeed, with the second choice it is not clear whose perspective is being represented and the reader / hearer can only wonder if Ceauşescu is projecting his own perspective as universal, if he is genuinely presenting the viewpoint of the country’s 20 millions citizens, or perhaps that of a third social actor (ex. the Soviet Union). What is obvious though is that the speaker presents interpretations of reality regarding Romania’s readiness to act as a friend and supporter of

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844 Bob Hodge and Gunther R. Kress, Social Semiotics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, 1988, p. 123: ‘Modality expresses affinity – or lack of it – of speaker with hearer (…). Affinity is therefore an indicator of relations of solidarity and power… A high degree of affinity indicates the expression of solidarity between participants. A low degree of affinity indicates that power differences is at issue’.


846 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, Sage Publications, London, 2002, p. 83. As Jørgensen and Phillips show, the statements ‘it’s cold’ and ‘I think it’s cold’ are different ways of expressing oneself about temperature: they represent different modalities by which speakers commit themselves to their statements to varying degrees.

847 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, op. cit., p. 84. These authors show that the statement ‘Hardening of the arteries attack the arteries…’ presents a particular knowledge-claim as true and incontrovertible, whereas the statement, ‘Hardening of the arteries may attack the arteries…’ expresses a lower degree of certainty.

the developing countries as if they were solid facts that need no be verified, but accepted as undeniable truths.

But Romania – or ‘us’ - is part of a dyad. It is Romania on one side and the developing countries – or the ‘Other’ - on the other side. If the image built for Romania is that of a country ready to offer its support, the underlying assumption is that these countries are in need of such support. Unlike Romania, which turned this page of its history while ago, these countries still fight ‘arms in hand’ for their freedom from colonial powers. Even if unspoken, the implicit consideration is that “we” are ahead, more advanced than these countries, already ‘liberated’, so that “we” only have to use “our” reservoir of experience to grant the needed “support”. ‘They’ need ‘us’ and we can and have to “help” them.

This way, Ceaușescu re-enforces the two classical categories of the ‘advanced’ and the ‘backward’, of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, placing Romania in the former group while other developing countries (especially in Africa and Asia) remain in the latter. The lower-status position of other developing countries is also suggested by the adjective ‘young’ that he frequently uses to designate the former colonies. Colloquially, the young age is frequently associated (among others) with lack of experience and knowledge. In an international system in which some states need the ‘support’ of other states, lack of experience relegates the ‘young states’ to a lower-status position.

If this may seem discourteous, one needs to note that such conclusion is reached rather indirectly and mildly, if we were to consider the manners of other world leaders who are more inclined to use blunt, negative lexicalization. To make the example of an American President – Richard Nixon – a guest of Ceaușescu at Bucharest, we will look at his inaugural address, on the 20th of January 1969 (precisely 8 months before Ceaușescu’s speech before the Great National Assembly). In this occasion, Nixon says:

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849 See the 25th anniversary of its liberation from the ‘fascist’ yoke.
850 For instance, in texts in Italian: ‘I partiti comunisti, le forze rivoluzionarie avanzate hanno un ruolo importante nella lotta per lo sviluppo democratico e progressista dei giovani Stati indipendenti’. (Report on the external policy of the Party presented to the Great National Assembly, 24-26 July, 1967); ‘Il nostro paese sviluppa rapporti con i giovani Stati dell’Africa e dell’Asia, sostenendoli nella lotta per uno sviluppo autonomo...’ (Speech to the assembly dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, 17 april, 1970); ‘Il popolo romeno segue con profonda simpatia gli sforzi dei giovani Stati dell’Africa e di altri continenti per la difesa e il consolidamento della loro indipendenza...’ (Toast in occasion of the visit of Zambia’s President, 12 May, 1970). See La Romania sulla via verso il socialismo e nella lotta contro l’imperialismo, Milano, Edizioni del Calendario, 1971.
“I know that peace does not come through wishing for it - that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy. I also know the people of the world. I have seen the hunger of a homeless child, the pain of a man wounded in battle, the grief of a mother who has lost her son. I know these have no ideology, no race. I know America. I know the heart of America is good”\textsuperscript{851}.

Nixon also speaks in the name of his nation – calling it ‘country’ or ‘America’ rather than ‘people’. Just like his counterpart in Romania, he shows a ‘good’, help-inclined, America, while - and in contrast with Ceauşescu - he uses negative lexicalization to refer to the ‘Other’. Thus, ‘the people of the world’ is afflicted by hunger, pain, wounds, homelessness, war (“battle”), grief, loss: half of the lexical words of the third phrase (the one talking about the ‘people of the world) have a negative, distress-related meaning. While Romania legitimates its superiority in international relations through its own, inherent, even if ideologically and discursively-built characteristics, the United States seem to be more inclined to achieve the same objective by emphasizing both inner positive attributes and negative features of the ‘Other’. In ideological terms, Romania moves surreptitiously, playing the ‘similarity’ part (‘we’ are like ‘you’, only some more knowledgeable and experienced), while the US moves overtly, playing the ‘compassion’ cord (we are completely different, but we have a ‘good heart’).

2.2.2.2.3. Activity Descriptions. What is Romania Doing for the Developing Countries?

The self-assigned task of both America and Romania (according to their respective leaders in the ‘70s) is to support and be ‘good’ towards (other) developing countries. In the former case, America will do this out of the goodness of her ‘heart’ and its technological superiority (mentioned by Truman in another famous speech), while Romania – out of her readiness and the awareness given by similar historical experience. In Romania’s case, the activities proposed for ‘helping’ the less developed countries are rather abstract and general. Thus, the Romanian people develops relations of ‘friendly collaboration’ with the developing countries, it has a ‘strong sympathy towards’ their cause, expresses its ‘full solidarity’ with the fight that they conduct against imperialism and it is ‘by their side’ in

the efforts of protecting their revolutionary conquests. The Romanian leader makes frequent reference to Romania’s ‘support’ for the developing countries, but such support is rarely specified or quantified. In spite of its rhetoric, Scînteia never produces concrete data on the quality or quantity of such ‘support’. Occasionally, in his Ceauşescu informs that the ‘support’ granted by Romania can be of a material, political and diplomatic kind, but neither one of these types of support is made clearer to the audience / readership.

Regarding Romania’s diplomatic ‘support’, President Ceauşescu makes reference to occasions in which Romania upheld and promoted, in the international settings and organizations, various issues that were important for the developing countries. The most intangible form of support that the developing countries can receive from Romania is related to the many occasions in which Romania ‘greets’ the developing countries’ efforts in the development ‘battle’, or ‘wishes’ those who are still struggling for their freedom to accomplish their fight.

What is said is vague and expressed in unquantifiable over-generalizations: in its relations with the developing countries Romania will ‘extend its relations with all the countries that stepped on the path of their independent development’ and ‘will do everything’ (va face totul) for its cooperation relations to correspond to the ‘mutual advantage’.

An abstract agent (the ‘people’) is, thus, responsible for abstract tasks, in a discursive effort to convey the image of and idealized Romania, without disclosing too much detail about its actual activities. The aim can be the same as that disclosed by Ilie: ‘to impose a politically-biased representation of social reality in terms of idealized and unquestionable generalizations’. Indeed, who among the 20 million citizens of Romania would deny greetings, wishes and a declaratively supportive attitude towards the worse-off countries of the world?

2.2.2.2.4 Goal-Description and Sources of Legitimacy

853 Raportul prezentat de tovarășul Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, la Conferința Națională cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-socială a României..., in Scînteia, year XLI, no. 9214, July 20, 1972, p. 9.
Van Dijk shows that ideological discourse will usually focus on the good goals of the group and argues that such goal-descriptions are by definition ideological before being factual. ‘This is how groups and their members see themselves, or want themselves to be seen and evaluated’ and not necessarily how these groups are in ‘real’ life. It is rather difficult to evaluate the extent to which Romanians used to see themselves as good, international ‘Samaritans’, ready to invest time and energy to attain global peace and international development, but it is obvious by now that their leader was rather motivated for promoting them as such. The goals that President Ceauşescu promoted in Romania’s relations with the developing countries fall in the category of desirable global public goods that nobody could actually have a word against. Thus, President Ceauşescu fights for ‘global peace’ and disarmament, for the freedom of those who are still ‘exploited’ through colonialist practices, for progress and prosperity, for national independence, for unity among peoples, for strengthening the role of peace-loving international institutions (such as the United Nations), for self-efficiency and self-reliant development.

As already mentioned, one of the sources of legitimacy for Ceauşescu’s South policy lies in the historical argument. Katherine Verdery shows that President Ceauşescu exhibited ‘tremendous’ interest in history – unusual even by the standards of Marxist-Leninist regimes. Furthermore, she claims that ‘historical references often indicated actual or intended relations with powers to which a small country like Romania is subject’. Indeed Romanians’ ‘origin’ and their permanence on the ‘national’ territory were much discussed, especially in relation with Hungary and Russia, in the various cases of border disputes. In such disputes historical facts were called in to speak the ‘truth’ of Romania’s right over one or the other of ‘its’ territories. Starting with the 60s and, in particular, with Ceauşescu’s involvement in international affairs, this strategy seems to have been employed not only in relation to the neighboring powers, but also in relation with far off and non-power countries. In the first case aspects such as Romanian’s ‘continuity’ on a territory were used to support territorial claims. In its relations with (particularly small and medium-sized) developing countries, Romania used other historical arguments such as the

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historical commonalities represented by the fight against foreign oppression. In both cases, history becomes a source of legitimacy.

In other occasions argumentations are built on rather vague entities. In many instances Ceauşescu will appeal to ‘life’ itself as the ultimate source of legitimacy. Thus, it is not unusual for the General Secretary to start his reasoning by saying: ‘Life itself teaches us that...’, or ‘Life demonstrates us that...’. An example can be found in his Report of 1967 to the National Assembly, when Ceauşescu builds his arguments on the assumption that:

‘Life shows that imperialism, the capitalist order is not capable of ensuring the rapid economic and social progress of the underdeveloped countries’. 

As a matter of fact - he says - the ‘evolution of international life confirms the realism, viability and efficiency of the policy of peaceful co-existence among states with differing social orders’.

2.2.2.2.5. Linguistic Means of Ceauşescu’s Discourse: the Yoke Metaphor

Traditionally associated with poetry, metaphors are not only ‘superficial stylistic adornments’: they have a massive influence on the construction of reality. As Fairclough shows “When we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another”. Metaphors give the direction of our thinking and activity, having the implicit power of orienting our system of beliefs and knowledge. If discourse determines what can be said and thought at a given time and how we can talk about specific topics, an observer can only analyze the surface of discourse; she/he can notice what is on the agenda and what kind of reality is shaped but...
not how topics are constructed through language. This is something that can be grasped only by combining the analysis of discourse with analysis of metaphors.\(^{863}\)

Metaphors are far from being absent from Ceaușescu’s glossary and one of the most intensely used of his metaphors is the ‘yoke’ metaphor, which he employs powerfully when referring – into his international relations speeches – to global inequalities.\(^{864}\) In his communications ‘developing peoples’ and ‘developing countries’ frequently collocate with the ‘yoke’ metaphor in automatic association. In his speech of 22 August 1969, he says: ‘Our people is absolutely supportive towards those peoples that raise to shake off the foreign yoke’.

The yoke metaphor has a long history of association with suffering and hardship. As Hall shows, the iron yoke was a familiar metaphor for submission to the rule of gods and kings in the ancient Near East\(^{865}\) and texts from Mesopotamia and Palestine use this metaphor for referring to political and religious subordination.\(^{866}\) In the Christian tradition the yoke metaphor takes a different, positive meaning, as the ‘yoke’ of Jesus is one of liberation and salvation from the hardships that humans would otherwise be bearing alone.\(^{867}\)

Considered from a practical perspective the yoke is a device for joining together a pair of draft animals, usually consisting of a crosspiece with two bow-shaped pieces, each enclosing the head of one animal. Beyond this concrete definition, any dictionary will also give a figurative sense for the word ‘yoke’: “to work hardly, beyond one’s own strength; hard, unpleasant, work; slavery, tyranny”. As other languages, Romanian is rich in

\(^{863}\) Jochen Walter and Jan Helmig, op. cit., pp. 119, 123.

\(^{864}\) Some examples, drawn from texts published in Italian, are: “Il movimento di liberazione nazionale dei popoli che gemono ancora sotto il giogo della schiavitù coloniale inflige possenti colpi agli ultimi rimasugli di questo odioso sistema di sfruttamento e di oppressione”. (Speech at the International Conference of the communist and workers’ parties, June 9, 1969); “I popoli che si sono liberati dal giogo imperialista affermano la loro volontà di valorizzare le risorse, l’energia e la forza-lavoro nazionali a loro proprio vantaggio...” (…) Il popolo romeno, che ha conosciuto l’oppressione imperialista, rivolge fervide congratulazioni a tutti i popoli che si sono liberati dal giogo imperialista... Rivolgiamo i più fervidi auguri di successo ai popoli che lottano per la liberazione dal giogo imperialista”. (Speech at the UNO General Assembly, 19 October, 1970); “E’ noto che a dispetto di ogni sorta di ostacoli e dell’occupazione straniera, i popoli soggiogati non cessano la lotta di liberazione...” (Speech at the 45th anniversary of the creation of the Romanian Communist Party, 7th of May, 1966). See La Romania sulla via verso il socialismo e nella lotta contro l’imperialismo, Milano, Edizioni del Calendario, 1971.


expressions built around the word ‘yoke’ and most of these have a meaning of toil and servitude: ‘a trage la jug’ (to pull into the yoke) means ‘to work extremely hard’; ‘a trage impreuna la jug’ (to draw the yoke together) or ‘a trage impreuna la acelasi jug’ (to pull together at the same yoke) can be used to suggest the difficulties of marriage; a se băga în jug (to get oneself into the yoke) can refer to one’s commitment to do something that is extremely difficult.\footnote{Dictionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române, available online http://dexonline.ro/ as of February 2009.}

In its concrete form the ‘yoke’ is associated with a simple or a double pair of draft animals, usually oxen. As a metaphor it implies that the subjects need to join their forces, to divide the burden equally and maintain the same direction and rhythm for as long as an external, powerful force will require them do so. The animals pulling the cart – the oxen – are considered among the least intelligent\footnote{In Romanian ‘You are an ox’ – is an insult, a way of disqualifying somebody as a rational human being.}, even if endowed with useful strength. Oxen used to be the most important asset a peasant family could own, a source of present welfare and insurance for the future\footnote{For a study of the importance of oxen and other draft animals in the English farm see: John Langdon, Horses, Oxen and Technological Innovation: The Use of Draught Animals in English Farming from 1066 to 1500, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1986.}, being costly to maintain, not every peasant household could afford them so that, in the rural society, a good pair of oxen was – beyond a source of income – also a source of pride and social status\footnote{More on the relations between animals and humans: Joanna Swabe, Animals, Disease, and Human Society. Human-animal relations and the rise of veterinary medicine, Routledge, London, 1999, pp. 42-44. On the importance of acknowledging the social and spiritual value of cattle in humanitarian action: Francis Mading Deng, ‘The World of Dinka. A Portrait of a Threatened Culture’, in Kevin M. Cahill, Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action. International humanitarian affairs, no. 3, Fordham University Press and The Center for International Health and Cooperation, New York, 2003, pp. 62-62.}.

In the lexicon of the Romanian Communist Party, the ‘yoke’ metaphor can be found anywhere. Article 3 of the 1952 Constitution of the Popular Republic of Romania accommodates it and reads:

‘The Popular Republic of Romania was born and grew strong as a result of our country’s eliberation from the fascist yoke and the imperialist dommination by the armed forces of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, as a result of the defeat of the power of the landowners and the capitalists by the masses from towns and villages headed by the working class, under the leadership of The Romanian Communist Party’.
However, as an important symbol in (at least) two areas of social activity that communism wanted to see weakened\textsuperscript{872} - the Church\textsuperscript{873} and the peasantry\textsuperscript{874} - the ‘yoke’ might appear as an odd incorporation of a religious and rural expression into the communist linguistic corpus. In all socialist countries the Communist Parties put the church and the rural world under significant pressure\textsuperscript{875}, as under communism all forms of religion were rejected programatically as ideologically incompatible with dialectical materialism\textsuperscript{876}.

Nonetheless, across the world, millions in the audiences of communist leaders were Church followers and members of the peasantry. Discourse analysts draw the attention on the experiential basis of metaphors\textsuperscript{877}, as well as the ‘the dialectical relationship’ between discourse and social structure, with discourse having the property of being both shaped by social structure and socially constitutive\textsuperscript{878}. The ‘new’ social structure (socialism) will rely therefore on lexical categories of the ‘old’ one, while striving to give these lexical categories new meanings, more adequate to the ideology that is underlying the ‘new’ social practices. Powerful language and metaphors are essential in setting the tone and gaining commitment; ultimately they are essential in the reality-building process\textsuperscript{879}. As Leeuwen shows,

‘all metaphors are based on similarity, and as all similarities are partial, metaphors tend to highlight some aspects of their domain of application and obscure others\textsuperscript{880}’.  

Indeed, the features that are retained by the socialist discourse in the ‘yoke’ metaphor refer to an oppressive, unequal and traditional system, while the deleted characteristics were

\textsuperscript{872} According to Boia, Ceauşescu took advantage of his ‘systematization’ project to accomplish both ends: dismantle rural life (by confining villagers in town-like blocks of flats) and have many churches, including historical monument, demolished. More on this aspect: Lucian Boia, Romania: Borderland of Europe, Topographics, Reaktion, London, 2001, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{873} An instance of the use of the yoke metaphor is Matthew 11:28-30, that reads: “Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me….”.

\textsuperscript{874} In agriculture, until recent times, the oxen were the main ‘labor-force’ and the yoke was the instrument that made this labor-force work for him. In the Romanian cultural landscape, the yoked oxen pulling the heavy four-wheeled cart are particularly present: the paintings of Nicolae Grigorescu (1838-1907), considered to be the founder of the modern Romanian painting art, made them the emblem of rural Romania.

\textsuperscript{875} Jean-Francois Soulet, Istoria comparatǎ a statelor comuniste: din 1945 pânǎ în zilele noastre, Polirom, Iaşi 1998, trad. Silvia Albisteaniu and Ana Zbârcea.


\textsuperscript{880} Theo van Leeuwen, op. cit., p. 32.
those related to the practicality of this instrument (the yoke) which helped increase the productivity; those related to the good care the peasants used to have for their oxen; the pride the peasants took in showing their strong and well-groomed oxen in social and religious festivities and so on.

Using this metaphor for signifying the international relations system, the socialist block may have succeeded in various aims: disqualify the rural world as a world of oppression and unequal relations; ‘metaphorize’ international relations as relations between de-humanized entities (those ‘in control’ de-humanized by their brute use of force and those ‘controlled’ because of their being overexploited); legitimize the communist system as one that denounces and takes action against such a dehumanized international system. Ceaușescu’s continuous and constant use of this metaphor to designate international relations, along with the historical allusions to past oppressions of Romania by foreign powers also had the role of creating a sense of solidarity with the former colonies, now developing countries. Solidarity is here understood as ‘based on similarities that make for like-mindedness or similar behavior dispositions’.881

2.2.2.3. Concluding Remarks
President Ceaușescu unfolds an extensive and powerful discourse activity on issues regarding the developing countries and international development. Such activity is performed in the most varied, formal and important national and international settings: socialist Romania is a country where issues of international development are discussed at the highest levels of society and given generous media coverage. President Ceaușescu aims not only at having Romanians familiarized with matters relating to underdevelopment, but he also strives to create a sense of solidarity and similarity between his country and the developing nations. The identity that is created and communicated for Romania is that of a ‘concerned’ and active actor that, after fighting underdevelopment at home, is ready to share its experience and model of development with other developing countries. As professor Bari is assuming – two decades later, in an interview with the author: ‘it was also

an emotional thing, he (Ceauşescu) could understand them (the underdeveloped ones): he had been himself from a poor family from a rural area.  

2.2.3. Talking Romanians into International Development: Scînteia Articles

Beginning with the 1960s, Romania’s policy towards the Global South became ever more active and this was also reflected in the amount of space that foreign policy issues were given in the Romanian mass-media. Nearly every newspaper of the time used to have a special page (usually the last one, like in Scînteia, Scînteia tineretului or România Liberă, dedicated to international affairs, or at least a section that reflected international events from various perspectives: political, economic, social, cultural. Romania’s specialized foreign policy journal ‘Lumea’ (The World) - established (in 1963 by George Ivaşcu) – was conceived as a sign of de-sovietization and, more importantly, as an alternative view of the international scene. For the foreign readership there was Lumea’s counterpart, ‘Revue Roumaine d’Etudes Internationales’ (Romanian Review of International Studies), published in Romanian, English, French and Russian.

Retrospectively, on Lumea Romanian historian and politician Adrian Cioroianu avowed
that in spite of initial drawbacks (having been the press organ that the RCP needed to make its theses known; having had an original editorial team that was put together rather from political than journalistic reasons; the fact that its director – George Ivaşcu – accepted to reflect in Lumea the content and the nuances that the regime needed),

‘what is sure is that ... I can not see in the history of the Romanian press, another weekly of foreign affairs that could compete it’.889

With Ceauşescu systematically cultivating relations with the developing countries890, development issues and Romania’s relations with these countries are given high priority. In addition to Scînteia, România Liberă, the ‘daily of the National Council of the Socialist Unity Front’891, as it recalls itself, covers extensively international development in its ‘international actuality’ page (the last page of the newspaper)892. Magazines Lumea, Revue Roumaine d’Etudes Internationales, Era Socialistǎ893, Munca894 – all publish articles

the History of Romanian Communism’ and other books on Romania’s history (particularly that of Communist Romania). Between April 2007 and April 2008 he acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs; previously he had served as a Member of the European Parliament.

889 Adrian Cioroianu, ‘Căpitanul n-a avut nepoŃei. Si totuşi…’, in Dilema Veche, year III, no. 123, June 2006, available online at http://www.dilemaveche.ro/index.php?nr=123&cmd=articol&id=607, as of January 2009. Cioroianu goes on to show that while the weekly itself passed away, the title survived and ‘Lumea’ is now a doubtful, even ‘risible’ publication.


891 The National Council of the Socialist Unity Front was Romania’s electoral body. The Front was the only institution vested with the right to nominate candidates. See William B. Simons, The Constitutions of the Communist World, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1980, p. 313. Ceauşescu was chairman of this body. The Front had an impressive clout on the Romanian society: its member organisations counted not only the Romanian Communist Party, but also labor unions, cooperative farmer organisations, consumer cooperatives, professional, social and cultural organisations, student, youth and women’s as well as veterans’ associations and even religious bodies and representatives of Hungarian, German, Serbian and Ukrainian minorities. See Eugene K., op. cit., p. 246.


893 The social-political and theoretical review of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

894 ‘Labor’, a 12-page weekly edited by the Central Council of the General Union of Trade Unions from Romania. The last page of this periodical, called ‘Meridiane’ covers international affairs, mostly related to trade unions and labor conditions in other countries, Third World countries included, but also issue related to global development and underdevelopment. As other periodicals, Munca is also reflecting President
related to Third World countries. Even the Romanian Review, a cultural monthly published – as Revue Roumaine d’Etudes Internationales - in English, French, German and Russian and generally reflecting developments in the Romanian culture (literature, cinema, theatre, music), occasionally used to give space to authors reflecting on Third World and global development.

The reader bearing with the long pages illustrating the ‘great achievements’ and the ‘concepts’ and ‘actions’ of ‘Tovarăşul Nicolae Ceauşescu’ and his wife, could find news from practically any developing country of the world. Beyond feature and opinion articles on international development, readers could also find translations from the ‘Times’, the ‘Economist’ or the ‘International Herald Tribune’, as well as interviews with various political leaders of Third World countries. To give a quick and intuitive image of matters of global (under)development and to reflect controversial aspects of the development policies (of course, mainly those promoted by the ‘rich’ countries), charts, diagrams, graphic illustrations and - very frequently - comic strips were employed; these visual aids (the comic strips included) were used not only by Scînteia, but also by more scientifically-oriented periodicals. In its regular section on ‘World Economy’, ‘Revista Economică’ [The Economic Review], edited by Romania’s Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development, almost any article reflecting international development matters is illustrated by a chart or diagram, but frequently an intuitive comic strip underlines the ideas expressed in the text. In many cases, more comic strips (having a higher intuitive content) than scientific graphs, are used. In one instance a 2-page article uses no less than five

Ceauşescu’s views. See, for an example, the 1984 series ‘ConcepŃia şi acŃiunea tovarǎşului Nicolae Ceauşescu – contribuŃii de largǎ rezonanŃǎ internaŃionalǎ la soluŃionarea marilor probleme ale omeniri i. [In English: The Concept and Action of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu – Contributions of Large International Resonance for Solving the Great Problems of the Humankind.] In this series, see articles like: Constantin Flitan, ‘Lichidarea subdezvoltǎrii şi instaurarea unei noi ordini economice internaŃionale – cerinŃe de prim-ordin ale epocii noastre’ [Liquidating underdevelopment and the instauration of the new international economic order – first order requirements of our Epoch’], in Munca, year XL, no. 26/8760, July 6, 1984, p. 12; Nicolae Micu, ‘Participarea, pe bazǎ de egalitate, a tuturor statelor la viaŃa internaŃionalǎ’ [Participation, on equal basis, of all states at the international life], in Munca, year XL, no. 31/8675, August 3, 1984, p. 12; Eugenia Cristea, ‘Imperativul înfǎptuirii unei noi ordini economice mondiale’ [The imperative of building a new economic world order], in Munca, year XL, no. 39/8773, September, 28, 1984, p. 12; etc.

Ex.: Mircea Maliţa will reflect in the pages of this periodical a critical view on the Western debate on the ‘basic needs’ theory of development. The author will argue that not only social minimum standards should be established but also social maximum ones, echoing the work of Gunnar Adler-Karlsson that shows that ‘to exceed that standard only means to defy permanently the needs of other people and to make an unacceptable waste’ (p. 105). Maliţa takes the opportunity to emphasize that with Ceauşescu’s message to the UNCATD-V, Romania had drawn up a constructive program of action in the process of reorganizing the economic relations among states (p. 103). The whole article: Mircea Maliţa, ‘Man and his Necessities’, in Romanian Review, XXXIIIrd year, no. 9 / 1979, Arta Grafică, Bucureşti, pp. 100-110.

In 1980 Revista Economică used to have four main sections: ‘national economy’, ‘theories and ideas’, ‘management and organization’, ‘world economy’. This last section reflected mainly on issues of (under)development.
illustrations as to represent various aspects relating to global underdevelopment. In one of these illustrations, whose title is ‘Basic Needs’, a black child is shown outside a house in which other black children sit comfortably around a table. The text underneath says that ‘1/4 of the world children are deprived of the minimum conditions for life’. A second image, called ‘Priorities’ shows the Globe on an unbalanced weighing machine, with a big sack on one side and a small one on the other side of the plate. On the big sack it is written ‘Military spending’ and on the other one - ‘Aid’; the text underneath reads: ‘The World spends 20 times more in the military field than for helping the developing countries’. A third representation, titled ‘Health’, shows a disproportionately large syringe on a coffin, with a text informing that ‘5 million children die annually of illnesses that can be avoided through immunization’. A fourth figure, corresponding to ‘Research’, shows a row of apparently identical test tubes. While 3 of these are ‘real’, laboratory-like test tubes, other 2 are slightly modified as to suggest the shape of a rocket; and indeed, the text underneath says that ‘2/5 of the scientific research and development activity are consecrated to the military field’. Finally, a last illustration, called ‘Objectives for 2000’, shows a man and a woman (their backs to the reader), holding their hands and looking to what appears to be the rays of a shining sun. Four call-outs spell out four objectives that are currently known to any development worker and MDG (Millennium Development Goals) campaigner of our days: ‘abolishing malnutrition’ (corresponding to MDG 1), ‘primary education and decent labor conditions’ (reminding of MDG 2), ‘reducing by half child mortality in the Third World countries and the increase of life expectancy from 56 to 65 years’ (recalling MDG 4), and ‘immunization against the main diseases’ (reminding MDG 6).

Together, these journals and magazines were thus reaching a much diversified public, practically any citizen willing to read a newspaper or a periodical issued in Romania. At least on its surface, international development was hardly a topic for the exclusive interest of the Romanian elite: the masses, the Romanian general public, was associated to the flow of knowledge and information regarding the developing countries and the broad topic of

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899 See other interesting illustrations in Revista Economică. Ex.: ‘Calcule în unități… submarine’ [Calculations in…submarine unities], no. 27, Friday July 4, 1980, p. 31. Based on research done at the International Institute on Peace from Stockholm, various budgets for development purposes are compared to the cost of one nuclear submarine (ex. the FAO budget stands at 0.59, Cameroon’s GDP for 1978 stands at 0.25 and so on).
global development. The official journal of the Romanian Communist Party, Scînteia, was particularly well-positioned for being an instrument in this sense.

First published in Bucharest on the 15th of August 1931, Scînteia had been an illegal publication for many years; by the 1980s Scînteia had by far the largest circulation in Romania, being

‘an outlet for party policy pronouncements and semi official government positions on national and international issues’.

Moreover, its editorials, feature sections and chief articles used to be reprinted in the provincial newspapers and enterprise newsletters.

In the 1970s and 1980s Scînteia was published in a six-page format, with the sixth page regularly dedicated to international affairs. This page was named ‘the international life’ (by similitude Free Romania’s page for international affairs was called ‘the international actuality’) and was made of a wide array of texts: articles written by specialized journalists and commentators, frequently reporting from international high-level meetings or summits; articles published under no signature; short notices quoted by Scînteia from other news agencies; photos from international events; news on the relations between the Romanian Communist Party and other Communist parties in the World and so on. The figure below offers an example regarding the topics covered by the ‘sixth page’, and the way they were arranged spatially on the page. The example is a real case, corresponding to Scînteia’s edition of the 17th of May 1984, year LIII, no. 12 979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romanian-Mauritanian High-level exchange of messages</th>
<th>Exchange of messages between the RCP Secretary General and CC Secretary of the Greek Communist Party</th>
<th>Romanian Cultural Manifestations</th>
<th>The Session of the Great General Assembly of the Chinese Communist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scînteia</td>
<td>The report regarding the activity of the Government, presented by the Prime Minister of the State Council, Zhao Ziyang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

900 The day has subsequently become the ‘Romanian Press’ Day’.
902 Idem, p. 269.
WESTERN BERLIN:
NO to nuclear arms in Europe!

(Thousands of people participated in a manifestation shouting ‘No – to nuclear arms’)

For a political solution for the situation in the Central America.
A new initiative of the ‘Group de la Cantadora’

THE PRESS AGENCIES

(Thousands of people participated in a manifestation shouting ‘No – to nuclear arms’)

For a political solution for the situation in the Central America.
A new initiative of the ‘Group de la Cantadora’

THE MIDDLE EAST

Supporting the cause of Namibia’s independence

The works of the Stockholm Conference

The Lebanese cabinet examined the governmental politics

LIFE confirms: Industrialization represents a basic condition for the liquidation of underdevelopment and the progress of the global economy

The annual session of the UNIDO – ample debate – global economy, international industrial cooperation, etc.

(‘LE FIGARO’)

‘Millions of children threatened’, as a result of the economic recession and unemployment

Through the 1970s and the 1980s, it was a current practice for Romanian scholars, journalists and diplomats to write and publish on global development issues. At Lumea, there were Ilie Şerbânescu, Nicolae Ecobescu, Constantin Trăian, Ion Barac, Paul Graduate of the Economic Studies Academy, PhD in economics (1978), author of ‘Transnational corporations’ (1978), former Minister for Reforms in Ciorbea’s Cabinet, Vice-President of the Romanian Society for Economics, a distinguished author and publicist to the day, one of the few who continued publishing after 1989.

Romanian diplomat, ambassador to the United Nations, author and co-author of more than 40 volumes: ‘Towards a New International Order’, ‘From the ‘control of armaments’ to disarmament’, ‘The
Diaconu and many others. At Scînteia there were Gh. Cercelescu\textsuperscript{905} (mainly on global economy, debt issues included), Valentin Păunescu\textsuperscript{906} (various topics, including South-South relations), Radu Bogdan\textsuperscript{907}, Nicolae Plopeanu\textsuperscript{908}, Dumitru Tinu\textsuperscript{909}, Romulus Câplescu\textsuperscript{910} (on disarmament topics and peace as a condition for the global development), Nicolae Lupu (on African issues), Alexandru Puiu\textsuperscript{911} (debt). This ‘division’ is not strict, in the sense that all these authors could also have published in other newspapers and periodicals. However, their names can be found most frequently associated with Lumea, respectively with Scînteia. Until 1989 all of them write and publish on international development and many will continue their publishing careers after 1989: Ilie Serbănescu will regularly write for Revista 22; Cercelescu will write and contribute to managing the newspaper Ziua; Valentin Păunescu will be director for Curierul NaŃional. Nonetheless, after 1989 their Third World topics will be ever less present in their writings. As professor Ioan Bari (quoted in the previous sub-section of this case-study) shows:

‘in those times (before 1989, n.a.) we (those writing on development matters, n.a.) were like fish in a river; after 1989 some of us, for some years, continued to reflect on these issues; but after a short while nobody was interested in development issues anymore and we stopped writing’.\textsuperscript{912}

Democratization of the Relations among States to the New International Order’, ‘Socialist Romania in International Relations’, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, and so on.

\textsuperscript{905} Until recently Cercelescu continued his journalistic activity with ‘Ziua’ (The Day).

\textsuperscript{906} Valentin Păunescu started his journalistic career with Steagul Roşu and Sportul. Then he works as a reporter and editor at Scînteia, Libertatea and Adevărul. After 1989 he became editor, special reporter and then director (until passing away in 2004) of Curierul NaŃional. A distinguished and well-respected journalist, Păunescu was a founding member of the Global Congress of Newspapers Directors.

\textsuperscript{907} After 1989, director of Nine O’clock, a Romanian English-language newspaper, founded in 1991; its main audience is represented by foreign residents in Romania.


\textsuperscript{909} Apparently, Tinu was not only a journalist, but also an expert and speech writer for Romanian leaders. After 1989 Dumitru Tinu will continue his journalistic career, will manage Adevărul and will become President of the Romanian Press Club. The Romanain Center for Investigation Journalism includes Dumitru Tinu among the ‘Media Dinosaurs’, a list of 12 journalists that created media institutions after 1989 and became extremely influential and powerful in the Romanian society. See Stefan Cândea and Sorin Ozon, Dinozaurii media, published on 6th September 2005, article available online http://www.crji.org/news.php?id=55&l=1, as of February 2009.

\textsuperscript{910} Romulus Câplescu continued his journalistic career through the day, mainly with ‘Adevărul’, the daily that replaced Scînteia. In 2008, after 40 years from the ‘events’ in Prague Romulus Câplescu publishes in Adevărul the article ‘Martor ocular la Praga’ a recount of the first hours of the Soviet occupation. The article is available online at http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/martor-ocular-la-praga-68.html, as of February 2009.

\textsuperscript{911} Romanian scholar, author of books on Romania’s foreign trade and other economic matters.

\textsuperscript{912} Interview by the author.
In what follows we will give a closer look to some of the articles published by these commentators in Scînteia. At the same time, given that the unsigned articles represent more than 60% of the ‘International life’ page of this newspaper, some considerations will also be made in regard to these ‘nameless’ texts. To illustrate the discursive means employed by the Scînteia commentators, one article – ‘The Drought’ - will be analyzed in more depth. The aim is to understand the kind of public knowledge that the official journal was struggling to create and convey on the topic of global development. For this purpose, a first step will be to identify the brand of statements that the average Romanian could read about this topic. Secondly, the analysis will shed light on some of the means employed for producing such knowledge and the way it was constructed to acquire authority in the Romanian society and abroad.

2.2.3.1. Scînteia Commentators on International Development

As already mentioned, Scînteia represented an important instrument for communicating Romania’s official views in all fields, while President Ceauşescu’s views on domestic and global development were given high visibility. A journalist of Scînteia shows that Nicolae Ceauşescu is ‘a man for the entire humankind’, as he is an ‘architect’ of the new economic order, while his politics is one of ‘large openness’ that fights for protecting all peoples’ rights to peace and life. This view was echoed by and intertwined with pronouncements in other newspapers and periodicals like ‘Munca de partid’ [Party Work] showing that the social-political ‘thinking’ of Romania’s President represents a

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913 As an example, beyond individual articles, see the series of features written to celebrate 15 years from the IXth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. In this series, the ‘major contributions of the thinking and action of comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu in the field of external policy’ were highlighted. For one full month every second day such an article was published. See sample articles such as: Nicolae Plopeanu, ‘Amplificarea colaborării cu toate ţările în spiritual coexistenţei paşnice’, in Scînteia, year XLIV, no. 11776, July 2, 1980, p. 6; Viorel Popescu, ‘Rol active, dinamism, participare apreciată la cooperarea economică internaţională’, in Scînteia, year XLIV, no. 11778, July 4, 1980, p. 6; Vasile Oros, ‘Activitate intensă, tencă, neobosită pentru înfăptuirea dezideratului istoric: dezarmarea’, in Scînteia, year XLIV, no. 11781, July 8, 1980, p. 6; Petre Stâncescu, ‘Eforturi consecutive pentru transformarea Balcanilor într-o zonă a păcii şi înțelegerii’, in Scînteia, year XLIV, no. 11784, July 11, 1980, p. 6; Gh. Cercelescu, ‘Spirit active, novator în cristalizarea şi afirmarea conceptului noii ordini economice internaţionale’, Scînteia, year XLIV, no. 11787, July 16, 1980, p. 6; etc.

914 Radu Bogdan, writing on the 24th of January: Nicolae Ceauşescu – România Socialistă – prezenţă demnă, înalt prestigiu în consvintinţa întregii lumi (Nicolae Ceauşescu –Socialist Romania – dignified presence, high prestige in the whole world’s consciousness).

915 This can be considered to come in the context of his personality cult which was very well documented. Romania was said to rival North Korea as the most personalist Communist party-state. Ceauşescu’s titles are countless and range from: President of Romania, to secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, president of the State Council, Chairman of the Council on Social Development, and even honorary chairman of the Academy of Socialist and Political Sciences. See Walter M. Bacon Jr., ‘Romania’ in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Communism in Eastern Europe, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1984, p. 183.
‘constructive doctrine for saving the humankind from poverty and the specter of wars’⁹¹⁶.

The weekly Munca depicts Ceauşescu as ‘a hero of Romania – a hero of peace’, working for ‘protecting peace’ and ‘life on earth’⁹¹⁷.

As showed by Fowler and Kress⁹¹⁸, ‘language use has society’s ideological impress’. It is very likely that the ‘ideological impress’ on Scînteia articles was at least two-fold, as given, on one hand, by the society in which the journalists lived and wrote and, on the other hand, by President Ceauşescu – the source of ‘inspiration’ for any piece of writing. Examples abound. One can see, for instance, an article published on the 1st of February 1984⁹¹⁹: ‘Contribution of exceptional importance to building a new economic order’, preceded by a telling fore-title - ‘Innovative ideas, profoundly humanistic in the theoretical thinking and practical activity at international level of Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu’ - and a quote from the President’s own words:

‘As a socialist developing country, Romania considers that it must be done everything for the realization of a new international economic order, for supporting strongly the developing countries with a view to the socio-economic development – this representing a necessity for the progress and welfare not only of these peoples, but also for the progress of the world economy’⁹²⁰.

Such introductory techniques already place the article in a specific ideological perspective, give the boundaries of the article and suggest that whatever follows is in line with President Ceauşescu’s views regarding the processes which pertain to global development. Indeed, the article argues – in line with President Ceauşescu’s views - that the most important factor in the fight to eliminate underdevelopment was the effort of every state; the next most important factor was related to a system of equal and ‘mutually beneficial’ relations of international cooperation among states. Inspired by Ceauşescu’s work, the

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⁹²⁰ In Romanian: Ca ţarǎ socialistǎ în curs de dezvoltare, România considerǎ că trebuie fǎcut totul pentru realizarea unei noi ordini economice internaŃionale, pentru sprijinirea puternicǎ a Ńǎrilor în curs de dezvoltare în vederea dezvoltǎrii lor economic-sociale – aceasta constituind o necessitate pentru progresul si bunǎstarea nu numai a acestor popoare, dar şi pentru progresul economiei mondiale’.

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article reminds the list of concrete proposals brought forward by Romania: the lightening of the foreign debt of the developing countries and the regulation of the level of interest rates; credits for the developing countries in advantageous conditions and enhancing the official development aid; the fight against protectionism and achievement of free trade, without discriminations and political or other type of conditionality; establishing a just price for the raw materials and the industrial goods; ensuring the access of all states to the conquests of science. The article goes on to reference President Ceaușescu, according to whom underdevelopment had reached such levels that the stability of the global economy was now depending on the national economies’ level of development. A new economic order was needed for the eradication of underdevelopment and such new economic order was not supposed to mean circumstantial philanthropic gestures, but a restructuring of the whole system so that the poor people would be able to benefit of the natural riches and wealth of their respective countries.

If Ceaușescu’s influence is easily discernable, one is emboldened to look for other influences that might be identified. For one, Cercelescu’s article (mentioned above) speaks up for the creation of a new economic order and this is a topic that is strongly supported by President Ceaușescu, as well as the developing countries. However, the kind of arguments that are used, and particularly the way these arguments are shaped, is very similar to the line of reasoning of the West. The core of Cercelescu’s argumentation is based on the belief – also upheld by the Western ‘donors’ - that doing away with global poverty is first and foremost a matter of political will921. For Socialist Romania and its developing counterparts this was to take the shape of a new economic order. In the days of President Truman, this was mainly about making available ‘to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge’922. In both cases, the basic assumption – that is still with us today - is that all it takes for ‘eradicating underdevelopment’ is for world leaders to be determined and mobilize the needed amount of resources.

Like in the Western tradition, Cercelescu’s article constructs the World into ‘haves’ and ‘have not-s’, as he shows that

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921 In the development literature, political will is often quoted as the reason for failure of development programs and strategies. See a discussion of the influence of ‘political will’ in Robert Meyers, The Twelve Who Survive. Strengthening Programmes of Early Childhood Development in the Third World, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 389-391.
922 President Harry Truman’s Inaugural Address, op. cit.
'a quarter of the Globe’s population, situated at the top of the income pyramid, disposes of 80% of the global product, while half of the humankind, situated at its base – (disposes of) only 4%'²²³.

In dollar value – the article explains - that amounts to an income of 6300 dollars for the developed countries and a meager 535 dollars in the developing countries, with a proportion of 12 to 1. For how truthful this information may have been this approach for demonstrating the divide between the developed and the developing countries is far from being specific to socialist Romania and / or its counterparts in the Soviet Block. The same type of calculations had been intensely used by the Western developers and awareness raisers since the dawns of the development ‘era’ to the day. In a recipe-like manner, almost every text or presentation talking about ‘global poverty’ quotes statistics, as a quick way for offering a quantitative face for developing countries’ poverty. Closer to our days, every Human Development Report takes some space to emphasize figures such as the:

“1 billion people living at the margins of survival on less than US$1 a day, with 2.6 billion—40 percent of the world’s population—living on less than US$2 a day”²²⁴ or the ‘1 billion people [who] are denied the right to clean water and 2.6 billion people [who] lack access to adequate sanitation’²²⁵.

Data like these have now come to represent the backbone of any ‘Report’ or speech on global poverty. The ‘2.8 billion versus 2 dollars a day’ and the ‘1.2 billion versus 1 dollar a day’²²⁶ are heard everywhere: from development workers and volunteers to UN or World Bank officials. An example is the World Development Report 2000/2001. In his foreword, World Bank President Wolfensohn might be criticized for over-redundancy when reminding, ever again, that:

‘Of the world’s 6 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than $2 a day, and 1.2 billion on less than $1 a day. Six infants of every 100 do not see their first birthday, and 8 do not survive to their fifth. Of those who do reach school age, 9 boys in 100, and 14 girls, do not go to primary school’²²⁷.

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²²⁶ 2.8 billion people in the World leaving on less than 2 dollars a day and 1 billion people leaving on less than 1 dollar a day.
In a similar vein, every development project will have a section to show how many poor people will be ‘impacted’ by the respective intervention, how many will be ‘lifted’ out of poverty or how many will ‘beneficiate’ in any other way directly and indirectly\(^{928}\). Governments, development agencies, Western Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Western NGOs will use the statistic means to pack a very complex set of data and pass it to the press and the final ‘audience’. Statistics consumption in the development literature is extremely intense, as well as flexible, with ‘developers’ learning to prevent attenuation effects by modifying the ways in which such statistics are presented. Thus, at the time Cercelescu wrote his article in 1984, the practice was to talk about rich-poor discrepancies and emphasize the 80 versus 20 per cent divide. Later on, the focus shifted from the discrepancy towards the poor people themselves: it was the turn of the ‘1 dollar a day’ metaphor. More recently, statistics presentations are of an ever more innovative type, not only in the mass media but in formal documents as well\(^{929}\).

If the above-mentioned article is more like a sounding board for Ceauşescu’s opinions, in other articles Cercelescu shows his own grasp of development concepts and language, be they of Eastern or Western origin. An example is the article he published on June, 12, 1980\(^{930}\). As many texts of the time, this article has a slogan-type title: ‘*In a world of ever tighter interdependencies: the liquidation of underdevelopment – primordial factor of the equilibrium of the world economy*’. To give more credit to the line of reasoning already announced in the title, the author quotes two well-known sources that had a major influence on (particularly the) Western theory and practice of development. One of these is a Western scholar – Rostow – quoted to have said that ‘*we made a mistake when we considered in our minds as legitimate the division of the world in rich countries and poor countries, which lets us think that it is natural for the rich to become richer and the poor to become poorer. The truth proved to be diametrically opposed*’\(^{931}\). The second - is the section in the Brandt Commission’s Report mentioning that ‘*A new economic order would*'}

\(^{928}\) Statement based on the author’s professional experience. One may also check ‘application forms’ issued by the European Commission or any other major donor. See for instance EuropeAid’s Funding website: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?do=publi.welcome.


\(^{931}\) Rostow’s text may well not correspond to his original statement as this is a translation from Romanian back into English.
be for the benefit of the whole international community and which, in none of the case can be considered as a charity action of some developed countries'. Each of these quotes are related to Cercelescu’s own arguments and are used with a view to demonstrating the author’s proposals and manner of conceiving of development. The most important thing, according to this author, is for all countries – developing and developed alike – to understand that the new economic order would be a benefit for all. This is what he calls the ‘psychological’ aspect of the matter. The developing countries need to accept and the developed countries need to understand that

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\text{‘The objectives of the new international economic order is not to transfer a bigger or lesser part of the wealth of the developed countries to the developing ones, but to extend the area of progress towards the countries left behind, for that themselves be able to create wealth’.}
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This is because – as the journalist argues - the old order started to have ‘repercussions’ on the developed countries themselves as they are ever more dependent on the resources of the South, while the much expected progresses of the developing countries will influence the growth in the developed countries as well.

Valentin Păunescu is another Scînteia journalist who writes extensively on development topics. On the 5th of June 1980 Păunescu reports on the access to information of the developing countries. Păunescu’s article is called ‘Gaps which plead for a new economic order in the field of information’ and presents various statistics to demonstrate the thesis he announces in the title: more than 40 developing countries do not have national press agencies; the developed countries represent a third of the world’s population, but they possess as much as 83% of the radio emitting antennas and 90% of the television emitters; for two thirds of the world population there is less than 15% of all publications in the world. Eight years later (May 26, 1988) and many articles in-between, Valentin Păunescu writes about the ‘Lost Development Decade’ and gives an overview of Latin America’s external debt, deploring the fact that this has become a ‘millstone which grinds all efforts for finding a solution for the debt crisis’. In his opinion the measures dictated by creditors are conducive to the ‘destruction of the productive apparatus and of the numerous natural riches’, leading to the stagnation of these economies. Ten years earlier Păunescu had written about famine and hunger on the Globe, echoing an FAO


documentary that showed that almost half a billion people on the Planet suffer of chronic hunger, while forecasts for 2010 warned that the food deficit will increase by 70%. In such a dire context, a huge business – speculating on food – was already under way⁹³⁴.

Scînteia also reflects the workings of UN meetings, G77 summits and other high-level conferences which see developing countries’ interests involved. Such coverage is ensured either by journalists or through Romanian diplomats representing their country in these events. To make some random examples (taken from the second trimester of 1980): in April 1980 Ion Barac reports from New York on the ministerial meeting of the Group of 77⁹³⁵; in June 1980 Valentin Păunescu is in Paris, to report from the World Congress on the Education to Disarmament⁹³⁶; the same month Marin Buhoarǎ⁹³⁷ reports from Vienna from the meeting of the G77⁹³⁸. On April 23, the same year, Radu Bogdan, reports from the UNCTAD meeting, also in Genève⁹³⁹. In his account of the meeting, Radu Bogdan gives an overview about the ‘new directions and forms for the intensification of the collaboration between the developing countries’. This kind of article would usually mention Romania’s role in the debate; Radu Bogdan follows this journalistic tradition for reporting from international summits and mentions Romania’s active participation to the

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⁹³⁵ Ion Barac, ‘Reuniunea ministerialǎ a ‘grupului cel or 77’ evidenŃiazǎ: ‘Relansarea dialogului economic internaŃional – cerinŃǎ a destinderii şi conlucrǎrii egale în drepturi între state’ [The Ministerial Meeting of the ‘Group of 77’ shows: ‘Re’launching the international economic dialogue – requirement of the détente and the equal collaboration among states’], in Scînteia, year XLIX, no. 11700, p. 6.
⁹³⁶ ‘Propuneri prezentate de România la Congresul mondial al educaŃiei pentru Dezarmare’ [Proposals forwarded by Romania at the World Congress for education for Disarmament], in Scînteia, year XLIX, no. 11759, June 12, 1980, p. 6. The correspondent shows that Romania’s representative, prof. Dumitru Chițoran, proposed, on behalf of Romania, that UNESCO initiates a special program regarding the education to disarmament, with the UNESCO’s center in Bucharest taking the lead in promoting and coordinating the needed exchange of information. See also Valentin Păunescu, ‘Congresul mondial al educaŃiei pentru dezarmare, un îndemn la acŃiune energeticǎ adresat popoaeraldelor pentru oprirea cursei înarmǎrilor’ [The World Congress for Education against Disarmament, a call for energetic action addressed to all peoples for stopping the arms race], in Scînteia, year XLIX, no. 11763, June 17, 1980, p. 6.
⁹³⁷ Romanian diplomat, with a long career in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1966 to 1975 Marin Buhoarǎ was attaché, third secretary and second secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Directorate for UN and other International Organizations; from 1975 to1982 (the time he wrote this article) Buhoarǎ was a first secretary and Romania’ alternate permanent representative to the international organizations headquartered in Vienna; from 1982 to1986, he was a member of the negotiating team to Madrid CSCE Conference and to Stockholm Conference on confidence building measures in Europe and from 1986 to1990 an expert on international law and business law matters at the Romanian Ministry of Justice. After 1989 he continued his diplomatic career, up to the level of Ambassador: from 1993 to 1998 he was Romania’s Ambassador to the Netherlands; from 1998 to 2000 he was Ambassador, Head of the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan and then Ambassador to Vietnam.
elaboration of the programs of the Group of 77. Romania’s active participation is explained by the fact that in this group Romania has found

‘new possibilities for expressing its preoccupation for the continuous strengthening of the solidarity and collaboration of all developing countries, for strengthening the efforts for fulfilling the great desideratum of the humankind to build a new world, liberated from the spectrum of poverty and misery, a world in which all nations enjoy the benefactions of progress and civilization’.

2.2.3.2. Scînteia’s Unsigned Articles on International Development

As already mentioned, beyond the development-related articles that are published under the signature of specialized commentators, Scînteia also publishes various texts that bare no signature. Some of these texts are reports initially published by press agencies or foreign journals and retransmitted by Romanian Scînteia; others are texts that are clearly elaborated by Scînteia’s domestic staff, but without any authorship to be claimed.

An example (taken at random) belonging to the first category is the short notice published on June 1, 1988, under the special heading ‘Cooperation’. The text informs that, under the aegis of the Cooperation Institute between the Iberia and the developing countries, the representatives of 20 European non-governmental organizations which cooperate with the developing countries had met in Madrid for ‘examining the problems of the relations with Latin America’. The whole month of June 1988 a host of both signed and un-signed articles were published in Scînteia relating to disarmaments, as the UN Conference on Disarmament was taking place. On the 7th of June, a short, un-signed article (based on information provided by Agerpres and showing that while 800 million people were malnourished huge investments were made in the arms race) is backing Dumitru Tinu’s larger article that introduces the Romanian reader to the proposals made by Nicolae Ceauşescu in occasion of the said conference. A few days later, on June 13 a short article (based on information provided by Agerpres) reports on the address made by the Romanian representative to the International Conference of Labor, held at Geneva; such

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address is said to have reflected on the fact that de external debt hardens the economic situation of the developing countries. One moth later (15 March, 1984) and quoting external sources, Scînteia shows that the external debts and the high interest rates are a heavy burden for the countries of Latin America.

The space available only allows us to introduce these three scattered and randomized examples, but short notices like these are published by Scînteia on a daily basis, along with longer texts that obviously enclose domestically-elaborated reflections on development matters. An example on this second type of un-signed texts is the article published on the 1st of June 1984, in occasion of Children’s Day. The text is published under the heading ‘A world of peace, a better world for all the children on the planet’, with a second title that anchors the article firmly in the development topic: ‘The underdevelopment beclouds the sky of childhood’. The article shows that as

‘a phenomenon with consequences from among the most harmful, underdevelopment affects two thirds of the world population’,

and strikes in the first place and in the most dramatic of ways, the life of the young ‘browse’. The article speaks the ‘statistics language’ and shows – in bullet points – that: every third day, in the developing countries, as many people as the victims caused by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima die; 14 million new-born die before reaching one year of age; 250 million children suffer from undernourishment and annually 15 million people fall victim to this ‘pest’; in the ‘third world’ 125 million children do not have access to education, being deprived from the possibility of vocational training; the rate of child mortality, due to the lack of adequate sanitary conditions, reaches in the poor countries of Africa, 160 per thousand.

2.2.3.3. The Drought – Finer Analysis of One Scînteia Article

Scînteia’s texts on international development, be they signed or not, are surprisingly numerous and resourceful, especially when read in comparison with the contemporary Romanian media that barely reflects any longer on such topics. A closer analysis of one of these articles will give the scholar a richer understanding of the type of development knowledge that was being created and circulated in those times for public consumption.

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944 In Romanian, in original: ‘viața tinerelor mlădițe’.
945 Inverted commas in the original text.
The obvious difficulty of having to choose only one such article was countered by the author through the creation of several criteria for narrowing down the selection process. Thus, articles that contained no direct and explicit reference to Ceauşescu’s worldviews (given that Ceauşescu’s views were already analyzed in a previous sub-section of this case-study) were preferred; articles that belonged to the phase of maximum involvement of Romania with the developing countries (namely the 1970s); that were written in an accessible, non formal language and – to the extent to which this was possible for the standards of the times - lacked the kind of pre-fabricated linguistic formula which usually characterize the Scînteia articles; that were orientated to communicate not only content, but also image and emotion. These criteria were developed and applied with a view to guarding the author from her own subjectivity. However, in spite of this methodological hedge, one may rightfully claim that such subjectivity can be eliminated to a certain degree only. As this may be true, it is also accurate to say that for discourse analysis purposes, objectivity is less of a setback, since this research method ‘does not set out to identify universal processes, as discourse analysts are critical of the notion that such generalizations are possible’.946

One of the articles which responded to the above-mentioned criteria is a text published in Scînteia, on Sunday, May, 28 1978, under the signature of N. Corbu and entitled ‘The Drought’.947 In what follows the text is reproduced entirely, in its English-language translation948.

‘Again alarming news from the Sahel area started to arrive. It was the year 1973, and then 1974. The numbers were tragic – over one hundred thousand deaths as consequence of the prolonged drought, and the photographs, even if they clip only limited shots of the disaster seemed more tragic than the tragic numbers: the earth – a crust rift by the heat, like an enormous distension of clay: bunches of people consummated by thirst around dry wells: a mother carrying aback her child without knowing that the child passed away long ago; skeletal agonizing people, skin on bone, like survivors of the camps in Auschwitz or Buchenwald; simply atrophied animals, turning into dust... Burned lives, vitreous eyes – and an immense, a gigantic mute, hopeless supplication: water, food, water...

Now, again, alarming news started to arrive from the Sahel. Above the eight states in this area, spiked again, pegged with ardent bolts, a fiery sun, a heavy broil, of lurid lead. Of the 30 million inhabitants, directly threatened by famine are 7 million. In danger of death. Pluviometers stuck to zero, there are regions in Sahel where no spatter of water dropped in the last two years. The air burns hotly under the sky’s firmament of broil, the plants of the savanna rot tuberculously, the rivers writhe and disappear putridly...

948 Author’s translation from the original version in Romanian.
Again a mute, hopeless imploration rises: water, food, water...It is the supplication of Sahel – as many other regions of Africa, desert-like, burned down by the drought.

... And no news about any airlift of tractors. No news about air super-cargo boats to land feverishly agricultural machines. Or motorized convoys to bring food, fertilizers. No dispute who parachutes more brigades of agriculturalists, zoo technicians or hydrologists.

It is drought – drought of such news. The situation is so more serious as the 10 million tons of wheat promised to Sahel in 1974 as annual food aid remained promise. It is true instead of the tons of wheat, it was sent to Africa, in these years, from everywhere, other assistance. Many tons, as the steel is heavy. Well, if only the plough were trailed by armored vehicles. Or if the barrels of the guns could be used as irrigation pipes. Or if the population fed with ammunition. Or if the heavy clouds of tension were of rain...The drought wouldn’t raise any problem on the African continent. But irrigations can only be done with water. Only and only water. Not with blood.’’

For analysis purposes the text can be divided in two main parts: a descriptive part which shows the effects of the drought; and a prescriptive part which brings forward possible solutions to the toll on human lives this extreme weather condition is taking. Just like in more recent writings, a ‘problem’ is ‘identified’, ‘needs’ are ‘assessed’ and a solution is proposed. The phrase ‘... And no news about any airlift of tractors’ (underlined in the text) can be considered – for analysis purposes - as the dividing line between the two.

In the first, descriptive part of the text, the exact situation ‘on the ground’ is described in great detail. Any situation, no matter how plain or dramatic, can be depicted in countless ways. For one set of observers an individual claiming membership to a certain group is a ‘terrorist’, while for another group of observers the same individual will be qualified as a ‘freedom fighter’. One way for explaining such ‘inconsistency’ from a discursive point of view is by taking into account the strategy that the observers will use to solve the so-called ‘selectional problem’ (defined by the set of data that the observer will select for basing his analysis on and corresponding to the assumption that ‘any empirical description is in principle a selection from alternative ways of describing a given situation). In the ‘terrorist – freedom fighter’ example, the selectional dilemma is frequently solved by appealing to the observer’s own system of beliefs and experience, but when information is scarce, these are less useful guides. In the hypothetical situation in which one is confronted

949 An examination of the public language on war and terrorism and the role rhetoric can play to justify counter-terrorist strategies like the ones launched by the Bush administration after 9 / 11, can be found in Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism. New approaches to conflict analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005.
951 Idem.
for the first time with an ‘underdeveloped’ society, one may need to decide whether to focus upon the native culture of the ‘indigenous’ people or their lack of ‘culture’ as it is defined by the forms it takes into Western societies (schools, theatres, libraries, etc.); to reflect on diversity, rather than on what the ‘natives’ lack when compared to the Western society (ex. a formal care sector for its ailing members – hospitals); to praise local manifestations of wisdom or condemn them as signs of ‘backward’ beliefs of an ‘underdeveloped’ society. Texts on global development – whether they originate in the Western society or in the former socialist block – are, therefore, highly dependent on the way the selectional problem is solved when describing the features of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’. What will be mentioned or not will then become an argument for or against a given course of action and the sum of all ‘mentionables’ will ultimately represent the natural frame to decide the limits of a specific matter.

The ‘selectional problem’ is thus particularly relevant for the field of international development in general, and for this analysis in particular. To further illustrate how, we may turn to a comparison. In a courtroom a legal representative will emphasize any circumstance that will ‘speak’ for the client; she will continuously define and re-define every misdoing as close to triviality as possible; the entire defense will be built upon linguistic and, more exactly, on discursive means, while the benefits will accrue in a non-discursive, tangible way as soon as the defendant will be absolved. In a similar vein, development institutions and experts will invest all available discursive resources to emphasize one or other feature of the ‘underdevelopment plight’ and construe a specific image of the ‘Third World’ and its needs. The ‘investors’ (political leaders, journalists, essayists, opinion leaders and so on) will collect the tangible return on their investments as soon as they succeed in imposing their view on the public agenda and orienting the approach to be taken for ‘eradicating’ global poverty. The investment is of a discursive nature, as a certain representation will be created of the ‘poorest of the poorest’ by means of reports, publications, speeches, songs, literary works and other cultural manifestations. The return on that investment will bring real benefits, as a certain approach for relieving the poor can be translated in market expansions for certain products, contracts for delivering some types of goods rather than others, development-related jobs of a certain kind rather than others, professional prestige for – say – economists rather than veterinarians and so on.

In Corbu’s text the selectional problem is solved by means of what we may call a type of ‘emotional language’, understood as that kind of language pertaining to involve emotions, by either describing or striving to stir them. In particular, the ‘Drought’ is based on negative emotional language that emphasizes desolation and commiseration. Every lexical item is there to create a compelling snapshot image of the devastating effects the drought has on the natural and human environment. Adjectives like ‘agonizing’ and ‘atrophied’ and adverbs like ‘putridly’ and ‘tuberculously’ create the image of a world in disintegration; ‘lurid’ and ‘vitreous’ (eyes) produce a sense of disgust and emotional abhorrence; ‘alarming’, ‘hopeless’ and ‘tragic’ establish the parameters for the whole scene and ‘enormous’, ‘gigantic’ and ‘immense’ will the sense of its escapeless nature. Nouns like ‘survivors’, ‘disaster’, ‘supplication’ and ‘imploration’ support and deepen the effects realized by the above-mentioned adjectives, while repetitions (‘water, food, water’ and ‘again, alarming news’) create a sense of endlessness and extreme anxiety. The lexical elements are constructed to create clear and powerful descriptions: ‘a dying child’, ‘simply atrophied animals’, ‘a mother carrying her child aback’, ‘bunches of people consummated by thirst’, ‘dry wells’, ‘skeletal agonizing people’, ‘vitreous eyes’, ‘pluviometers stuck to zero’.

‘An image is like a thousand words’ informs a well-known adage, but the technical possibilities of the time hardly allowed Scînteia to publish clear, glossy and colored photographs. But the effect of the image is reached, nonetheless, by an extremely carefully elaborated text that first makes a poignant description of human suffering and despair, followed by a distressing demonstration of how the natural world has become a danger for humans (plants rot ‘tuberculously’, rivers disappear ‘putridly’, the air burns hotly…) and culminating with an account of how the potential rescuers compound the problem by bringing in inadequate, dangerous items (ex. gun machines) instead of life-saving devices. This is how the news bulletins from the Sahel area are ‘alarming’ and the numbers (of the victims) are ‘tragic’, as ‘tragic’ are the photos arriving from ‘there’; the people are simply ‘consummated’ by their plight, reduced to bare bones and ‘vitreous eyes’. Life is entirely disrupted and death becomes a matter of routine, a non-event. In their profound state of confusion and desperation mothers not only fail to grasp the precise minute when their

children die, but long time may go by before they realize the fact. After a short introduction already inducing anxiety - by including the locution ‘alarming’ - the text goes into this comprehensive and bleak description of the victims of the drought. The reader can learn that the area is inhabited by 30 million people, of which 7 million are ‘directly’ threatened by the drought. The implication is that all 30 million people of the area are in danger and the argument is constructed to strike a sensitive cord: by coincidence or not, the difference of 23 million (between the 7 million which are in direct danger, and the 30 million which are only in potential danger) is the approximate size of Romania’s population.

To increase the sense of dread, ‘people’ descriptions do not take ‘demographic’ characteristics, if not exclusively in the form of corporeal attributes. The text talks only about ‘skin’, ‘bones’, ‘eyes’, ‘skeletons’ and lungs (indirectly, by making reference to tuberculosis), while the needs of these individuals are of the most basic nature (water and food). In this context, comparing this drought’s ‘victims’ with the Auschwitz survivors comes easy, with the important difference that while the Holocaust’s time location is in the past, the ‘drought of Sahel’ is an event in the present with the probability of continuing in the future as well, unless action is taken. The ‘Auschwitz’ comparison is an accusation by itself, as it implies a common denominator between the two events – Holocaust and the Drought.

In a previous sub-section of this case study we saw how Romanian scholars and President Ceauşescu employ any mean to construct the image of ‘Romania – friend and model of the developing countries’, in opposition with the Western, former colonial countries which had ‘exploited’ these territories. Nonetheless, the ‘emotional language’ that is now being used is of the same type that the West employs when recounting the faith of these peoples. In particular, it is very similar to the language that Western NGOs use – mainly through the 1970s and the 1980s – when aiming to extract a strong response from their publics for their fundraising or ‘awareness raising’ campaigns. At the time, negative images of development were so violent as to make an authoritative Western commentator⁹⁵⁴ compare them with sheer pornography:

‘The public display of an African child with a bloated kwashiorkor-ridden stomach in advertisements is pornographic, because it exposes something in human life that is as delicate and deeply personal as sexuality, that is suffering. It puts people’s bodies, their misery, their grief and their fears on display with all the details and all the indiscretion that a telescope lens will allow’.  

Negative images – of the kind used by this Scînteia article and many Western media articles that described (say) the Ethiopian famine - are still with us today, as in spite of heated debate regarding their use, the ‘emotional language’ and negative representations of development only continued to be enriched by new and more powerful techniques.

The ‘emotional language’ pertaining Corbu’s text is similar not only to the one used by Western agencies of development cooperation, but also to what Romania would employ again, after 1989, this time to describe its own development needs. Less than two decades after the publication of this article in Scînteia, Romania becomes herself an aid recipient: US aid is available immediately after the events in 1989, while European aid – through the PHARE program – will become available from January 1991. Civil society assistance from Western donors, concentrating on programs that deliver services, teaches development workers - in the newly established Romanian NGOs or the newly opened Romanian branches of international NGOs - the ‘aid-speak’ or that type of professional language that can make the bridge between the ‘need’ of the ‘beneficiaries’

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956 For instance, by letting the victims speak for themselves. A recent example of this technique: on the 28th of May 2008, an article published to describe the situation in Ethiopia, turns the media beam on Genetu Dekebo, a ‘35-year-old mother of four from Serraro woreda (district) in West Arsi zone’, who is quoted, by the relief agency, to have said: "We could no longer find enough food and were eating one meal a day...” and "The children became weak [and] I saw my neighbor’s child die.” See www.reliefweb.int and in particular http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VDUX-7F3MVD?OpenDocument: ‘Ethiopia: Soaring malnutrition hits children hardest’. In contemporary practice, this technique is intensely used by both specialized and non-specialized media. The words of the individual sufferer who describes his or her plight usually form then a background for a more deepened analysis in which the voice of the development or humanitarian worker is quoted in a symmetrical way, most usually to describe the situation ‘better’, also from a geo-political angle.
and the resources that a ‘development project’ can bring for tackling the particular ‘need’.

In two different historical moments, the ‘emotional language’ is used: once for international and once for domestic development purposes. In both cases the ‘emotional language’ is an instrument for solving what we have called ‘the selectional problem’, or the type of information that will be emphasized so as to call for a certain type of ‘intervention’. The solutions proposed – either for pre-89 international development or for post-89 domestic development – are circumscribed to a moral tradition that holds that those unaffected should act to alleviate the sufferings of those under stress. However, the means of intervention are different from one context to the other. While in the post-89 domestic development context, the resources that are expected are represented by the private donor’s cash or the institutional donor’s funds, for the pre-89 international development context, the second – prescriptive – part of Corbu’s text indicates other priorities. Thus, the last part of Corbu’s text will speak not so much of funding as of food, tools, machines and other material devices that are – in his opinion – needed. Mirroring the socialist obsession with industry as a ‘base of independence and progress’ and a ‘factor of complex development’, Corbu will urge potential donors to grant such industrial devices as ‘airlifts of tractors’ and ‘motorized convoys’ led by ‘brigades of agriculturalists, zoo technicians and hydrologists’. The claim that the ‘agricultural machines’ are the single most important relief item in case of severe drought has both an ideological base and a self-interested relevance, as at the time when this drought is described, Romania is an active exporter of the precise agricultural machines that are here portrayed as vital for this humanitarian emergency. At the same time Romanian

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961 The term ‘emotional language’ was actually suggested to the author by a Romanian NGO worker, a ‘program officer’ whose main duty was to ‘show the need’ by drafting project proposals and by taking donors and potential donors to field visits. To reach remote and poor areas, the donor would have plenty of opportunities to notice beautiful landscapes dominated by large villas, luxury cars or Western-like supermarkets. To show the donor the reality of poverty ‘beyond SUVs and opulent houses’ the program officer would practice what she herself calls - ‘the emotional language’. In the program officer’s own explanation the ‘emotional language’ is an instrument for constructing her arguments as to have the interlocutor share an emotional reaction to her illustration of poverty. Both verbal and non-verbal means would be used. At a non-verbal level the donor would be taken to visit two types of households: the very poor family and a modest but not obviously poor family that allegedly owed (part of) its well-being to the ‘development project’ managed by the respective NGO. The donor would then be urged to keep her commitment towards the development program.
962 Gavril Horja, op. cit., p. 49.
963 Sorica Sava, op. cit., p. 116.
964 As Gafton (op.cit.) shows, starting with the 70s, Romania had been broadening its ties with the ‘Black Africa’ due, in particular, to Bucharest’s economic interests: Africa had important amounts of natural
‘specialists’ (how they are called by the Romanian media) working in the developing countries in a variety of fields (agriculture and hydrology included) are an important source of hard currency for the Romanian regime. Like other ‘donors’, Romania constructs and proposes an image of the humanitarian scene in such a way so as to serve its own potential interest (ex. in the forms of the exports it can make).

The whole text is filled with sadness and bitterness, but in the prescriptive part of the text these feelings are compounded by implicit blame and tacit revolt, as the reader can find out that the wheat promised to Africans never reached Africa while military ‘assistance’ was very generous for this continent. The source of such ‘assistance’ is not mentioned, it could have been either from the East or the West as both Eastern and Western powers were well-known for their military assistance for the African continent. However, what it is mentioned is that such assistance only fueled the existing ‘clouds of tension’, while leaving the population in despair as ‘irrigations can only be done with water… not with blood’.

Last but not least, in the critical discourse analysis tradition, the whole text can be read as a power struggle for creating ‘subject positions’ for those affected by the drought, for creating the kind of ‘victims’ that would suit the type of support that ‘we’ can make available, for constructing the ‘patients’ in the image of ‘our’ ideological ideal.

2.2.3.4. Concluding Remarks

Romanian magazines and newspapers – and in particular Scînteia (Romania’s most widespread journal) – published extensively on international development so that before 1989, the Romanian public could find a wide (even if possibly ‘filtered’) amount of data and facts pertaining to this field. Scînteia did not limit itself to quote foreign news agencies, but encouraged specialization among its own journalists, while also offering a space for Romanian diplomats and scholars willing to write on global development. In its resources that Romania wanted in exchange of its industrial goods that were difficult to sell on the Western markets.

965 Thomas Barnett, op. cit.


967 More on how ‘subject positions’ are created discursively, in Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Pearson Education Limited, Edinburgh, 2001, pp. 84-89. This author shows that ‘Subject positions are specific to discourse types, and ideologically variable’.
official pronouncements, Romania refrains from using negative lexicalization when referring to the developing countries, ascribing them mainly positive characteristics. However, the usual images of misery and despair – the same that the West is used with – reach the Romanian public through the articles published by Romania’s main newspaper. If development is a historically produced discourse\(^{968}\), then Romania was among of those countries that contributed both to its horizontal expansion – by including a new country into its sphere – and to its vertical distention – by contributing its own elements and strengthening such discourse by ading its own voice to the development choir.

\(^{968}\) Escobar, op. cit., p. 6.
Chapter 3 New Member State. New Donor. New Discourse.

This chapter aims to offer an overview of Romania’s ‘new’ discourse of international development, as it is now being shaped in the interaction with the European Union. This chapter is divided in four main parts. The first part reviews Romania’s diminished level of interaction with the developing countries in the transition years. The second part analyzes the role that the European Union had in shaping Romania’s new discourse of development cooperation. The third part is a study of the Romanian national strategy for development cooperation, while the fourth part analyses the role of the Romanian NGOs as promoters and actors of international development in the geo-political context that sees Romania a member of the European Union.

3.1. From ‘Donor’ to Recipient and Back Again in 17 ‘Transition’ Years

With the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new and continuously expanding field of research and study – transitology - has emerged, as a flurry of scholarly activity across a range of disciplines (particularly in the field of political sciences and economics) has produced an abundant literature on such topics as privatization, decollectivization and market economy, democratization, civil society and nationalism.\(^{969}\)

While some authors choose to focus on economics as well as political processes and institutions, some others discuss the notion of ‘transition’ itself and look at it mainly as a cultural construct of the ‘West’, most often informed by Western experience and studies of the developing countries. \(^{970}\) Katherine Verdery is one of the voices that speaks for the abandonment of the ‘transition’ notion and in her volume ‘What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?’ she even ‘mocks the naiveté of so much fashionable transitology’, as in her opinion

\[\text{to assume that we are witnessing a transition from socialism to capitalism, democracy or market economy is mistaken. I hold with Stark, Burroway, Bunce, and others who see the decade of the 1990s as a time of transformations in the countries that have emerged from socialism; these transformations will produce a}\]


\(^{970}\) Idem.
This section will refrain from further discussing the notion of ‘transition’, as this is hardly the object of this work. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that this term can be viewed as a Western cultural construct, this author will do employ it and she will mostly do so for the sake of ease and simplicity. Sometimes the inverted commas will be attached to this word as to indicate the author’s reserve for it.

In the context of this work that focuses on Romania’s discourse and practices of international development, the term ‘transition’ is intended to cover the timeframe going from the fall of Nicoale Ceauşescu in 1989 and 2007 - the year of Romania’s accession to the European Union. This is not to implicitly suggest that with the integration into the European Union Romania’s ‘transition’ was completed. The choice of these two points in time is not motivated by a geo-political perspective, but it stays firmly with those facts relating to Romania’s status as an actor in the field of international development. Thus, the author would like to point to the fact that 2007 was not only Romania’s first year as a member of the European Union, but also Romania’s first year as a ‘new’ donor. Immediately after 1989 Romania became a ‘recipient’ country of Western aid and relegated to oblivion most of its relations with the developing countries. 2007 is the year when – for the first time after almost two decades – Romania donates again, and this time according to OECD-DAC criteria. This chapter will show the main steps of this process that lead Romania from a socialist-type to an OECD-DAC-compliant donor, through a period of experimenting itself the status of a recipient of Western aid.

3.1.1. Romanian - South Relations after 1989: a Steep Decline
As already shown, up to 1989 Romania’s policy towards the South was one of the most active among the Eastern European countries, current ‘new’ Member States of the European Union. Reflecting this level of high activism, Romania’s discourse of international development was particularly vivid: the Romanian President spoke eloquently on development matters and brought forward ‘Romania’s proposals’ in the fight against underdevelopment; through specialized journals and general media the Romanian

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public at all levels was exposed to facts and news regarding international development events and initiatives (even if one can argue that President Ceauşescu’s own views were emphasized ad nauseam); last but not least, Romanian scholars and commentators published extensively on international development matters and discussed theoretical approaches for developing countries’ development.

After 1989, Romania’s involvement in North-South relations severely diminished both in economic and diplomatic terms. Starting with the 1970s, one of the economic ambitions of Ceauşescu had been to reorient as much as thirty percent of Romania’s trade towards the developing countries, so as to diminished Romania’s dependency of Russian imports. By the end of the 1980s this aim was nearly reached and according to official sources more than twenty percent of Romania’s trade was conducted with the Third World countries. Only fifteen years after the events in 1989, Romania’s trade was firmly re-oriented towards the developed world, in particular the European Union and other European countries whose share in Romania’s commercial relations was now well above eighty percent.

Similarly, Romania’s new ‘lodestone’ for foreign policy ceased to indicate East or South, as integration in the Western economic and security structures was now the aim. Through the 70s and the 80s Romania had signed – with official ceremonies amply described by the major Romanian newspapers, if not also broadcasted on the national television - no less that 13 treaties of friendship and cooperation with as many developing countries (in alphabetical order: Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Costa Rica, Gabon, Guinea, Mozambique, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe). None of these

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972 Mainly due to oil imports. See section on Romania’s policy towards the South.
975 The practice of Scînteia was to prepare a socio-economic dossier and publish it together with an overview of Romania’s relations with the respective country. The signing ceremony – mostly often taking place in the partner country, upon one of Ceauşescu’s state visits - was described in detail by Scînteia and the text of the treaty was fully published. See Scînteia for dates such as: September 1973 (treaty with Costa Rica), March 1974 (treaty with Argentina and Guinea), May 1978 (treaty with Cambodia), March 1980 (treaty with Zaire), November 1981 (treaty with Zimbabwe), May 1985 (treaty with Congo, the last one signed by Ceauşescu).
countries continued to have a high significance in Romania’s foreign policy after 1989. Hardly any new agreement or political document was ever signed again between these countries and Romania. Prior to 1989 Romania had signed six treaties and agreements with Angola\textsuperscript{976} and only one after 1989\textsuperscript{977}, while trade volumes – not very significant in 1970s\textsuperscript{978}, collapsed altogether in the 1990s\textsuperscript{979}. Romania closed its embassy in Bujumbura (Burundi) in 1997 and in the first semester of 2008 the commercial exchanges between the two countries were valued at $ 0.3 million, representing mainly coffee imports from Burundi\textsuperscript{980}. Before 1989 hundreds of Congolese students had studied in Romanian universities\textsuperscript{981}, most of the times on Romanian Government’s scholarships; after 1990 this study program was discontinued and the cultural exchanges between the two countries were reduced at minimum levels: under the heading ‘Cultural Cooperation’, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs can only mention that ‘two photo-documentary exhibitions and short documentaries were presented at Brazaville\textsuperscript{982}. Guinea maintained part of its economic importance, mainly due to the Romanian imports of aluminum and bauxite\textsuperscript{983}, but Guinean relations with Romania are now coordinated from Guinea’s embassy in


\textsuperscript{978} According to Wassilko and Moore, op. cit., p. 6, in 1977 the volume of Angolan-Romanian trade was only 27.900,000 Romanian lei.

\textsuperscript{979} Between 1999 and 2006 Romania exported goods worth 9 million, while imports from Angola worth less than 0.5 million EUR for each of these years. See Anuarul Statistic al României, Comerț Internațional, available online at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/ro/cap18.pdf, as of February 2009.

\textsuperscript{980} Republica Burundi, Prezentare Generală, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online at http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5514&idLnk=1&cat=3, as of February 2009. In 1995 Romania’s embassy at Brazaville was also closed “for financial reasons”.

\textsuperscript{981} More than 1000 according to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Republica Congo, Prezentare Generală, Relații Culturale, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5538&idLnk=1&cat=3 as of February 2009.

Belgrade as Guinea closed its embassy in Romania in 1998\textsuperscript{984}. Diplomatic relations between Romania and Mozambique used to be particularly vivid in the 1970s, with the presidents of the two countries meeting no less than four times in eight years\textsuperscript{985} to sign various agreements and understandings (a credit agreement included)\textsuperscript{986}. Relations between the two countries also continued after 1989 with three agreements signed in 1995 and 1996, but in spite of continued relations, the Romanian embassy in Mozambique was closed in 1999, while commercial exchanges between the two countries in 2007 were as low as $ 0.707 million\textsuperscript{987}. Before 1989 Romania and Zambia had shared a demanding diplomatic agenda, signing 3 agreements, one protocol, various credit agreements, one treaty, and various conventions\textsuperscript{988}, while at the time being Zambia is not even mentioned on the list of African countries that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has it posted on its website\textsuperscript{989}. Last but not least, before 1989 Romania extended hundreds of millions of US dollars in credit for the developing countries\textsuperscript{990}; in the transitions years up to the present no new credits or any other kind of aid are mentioned by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{991} and, more significantly, Romania was accused by the international civil society and debt-relief campaigners of bad practices and dishonest behavior in its handling of Zambia’s debt relief\textsuperscript{992}.

\textsuperscript{985} Wassilko and Moore, op. cit., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{986} Idem.
\textsuperscript{988} Paul Gafton, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
\textsuperscript{989} See the list at http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5461&idlnk=1&cat=3, as of February 2009.
\textsuperscript{990} See a list of Romanian credits granted to Africa in Paul Gafton, op. cit., as well as the sub-section on Romania’s policy towards the Global South in this case-study.
\textsuperscript{991} See the page on bilateral relations of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5772&idlnk=1&cat=3, as of February 2009.
\textsuperscript{992} During communism, Romanians – like other socialist countries – used to emphasize that aiding developing countries is a moral duty not for themselves, but for the former colonial powers. Nonetheless, they still engaged in ‘mutually advantageous relations’ and borrowed to the ‘developing’ countries. In 1979, the Romanian government extended an export credit (of, allegedly, 50 million USD) to Zambia for this country to buy Romanian tractors. Zambia did not keep the payments up and in 1999, Romania and Zambia negotiated to liquidate this debt for $3m. Before the agreement was finalized, British Virgin Islands-based Donegal International made an offer to the Romanian Government for buying Zambia’s debt for $ 3.3m and then sued Zambia for a $42m repayment (equal to all debt relief that Zambia had received just one year before). Donegal International claimed that its bill was the result of interest and costs, but the judged ruled that Zambia should pay ‘only’ $15 million. The ruling angered anti-debt campaigners, for undermining Zambia's plans for poverty reduction. In Romania the whole issue went unnoticed, even when Western campaigners brought the case to global attention and presented it as the living definition of so-called ‘vulture funds’ – companies which buy up the debt of poor nations cheaply when it is about to be written off, then sue for the full value of the debt plus interest. See more on this at: 'Zambia loses vulture case' http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6365433.stm and ‘Stop Vulture Funds’, Jubilee Debt Campaign: http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=2893, as of August, 2008.
As in other former socialist countries of Eastern Europe\(^\text{993}\) that made a painful transition from one socio-economic system to the other, immediately after 1989 Romania’s involvement in and interest for North – South relations drastically decreased. As emphasized by professor Bari, a former ‘globe-trotter’ for the socialist regime, with the role of establishing cooperation relations between the Romanian student associations and their counterparts in the developing countries

‘After 1989 we did try to continue writing and publishing about these countries. But nobody was interested to read those things any longer. They only wanted to know about NATO, Europe and things like that\(^\text{994}\).’

And indeed, after 1989 the developing countries and their underdevelopment plight almost disappeared from Romania’s public attention. Before 1989 news about and from the developing countries were published on a daily basis in the Romanian newspapers and magazines. This is not any longer the case after 1989. Most of the newspapers published before 1989 will simply disappear, but Scînteia, with most of its journalists and with a new name – ‘Adevărul’ (The Truth) will continue to be published. However, all the editorial space previously dedicated to the developing countries will now be redistributed for covering other topics of foreign policy. At the Lumea magazine – Romania’s specialized foreign affairs journal – similar editorial decisions will be made. At academic level, the tableau is not any brighter: one can hardly find a post-1989 volume on Romania’s foreign policy or any type of relations with the developing countries. After decades of Eastern-driven dictatorship and hardships, for one more time in their history\(^\text{995}\) Romanians turned all eyes towards the West\(^\text{996}\). For many in Romania, the European Union was the ‘last train’\(^\text{997}\), the last ‘life buoy’\(^\text{998}\) for Romania’s ‘desperate’ situation, the last possible

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\(^\text{993}\) See the example of Poland in: Pawel Baginski, *Poland’s development cooperation*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, available online at [http://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/01424002.htm#LOCE9E2](http://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/01424002.htm#LOCE9E2), as of August, 2008.

\(^\text{994}\) Interview with the author, December 2008.

\(^\text{995}\) Western influence in the period between the two World Wars is well documented. For a short overview see Lucian Boia, *România. Tară de frontieră a Europei*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2005.

\(^\text{996}\) Lucian Boia, op. cit.


\(^\text{998}\) The expression ‘life buoy’ is mainly used with reference to the European structural funds. See for example Liliana Popa, *Fondurile europene raman colacul de salvare al litoralului romanesc* [The European funds remain the life buoy for the Romanian litoral], Financiarul, February 17, 2009, available online [http://www.financiarul.com/articol_21892/fondurile-europene-raman-colacul-de-salvare-al-litoralului-romanesc.html](http://www.financiarul.com/articol_21892/fondurile-europene-raman-colacul-de-salvare-al-litoralului-romanesc.html), as of February 2009.
remedy against the danger of being swallowed back into the remnants of that very system that had caused the disaster in the first place.

Vacillatingly and unenthusiastically in the Iliescu years (1990-1996), and ever more vigorously after Professor Emil Constantinescu replaced Ion Iliescu in power, all available resources were directed towards a profound transformation to make Romania fit for political integration in Western organizations such as NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development\textsuperscript{999}. Romania’s policy ‘of friendship, collaboration and mutual advantage’\textsuperscript{1000} not only lost all the importance it used to have only a few years before, but it also came to be belittled as just ‘one of those Ceauşescu things’\textsuperscript{1001}. Through the day, Romanian supporters of international development (be they diplomats in the MFA’s office for official development assistance or NGO workers advocating for a more active involvement of their country in international development activities) are either not aware, reluctant or reticent to talk about Romania’s past experience with the developing countries. At most, when discussing Romania’s possible role as a ‘new’ donor, they emphasize that Romania’s own experience as a recent recipient can be ‘transferred’ to support the transition efforts of other recipient countries\textsuperscript{1002}.

3.1.2. Romania – a Recipient of Western Aid

A salient feature of Romania’s early transition years was its absence of a decisive break with the bureaucratic-centralism and statist traditions inherited from Leninism\textsuperscript{1003}, but this can hardly also be said in relation to Romania’s policy towards the South: before 1989 Romania’s relations with the developing countries were organized as a ‘state policy’ that simply disintegrated after Ceauşescu fell from power\textsuperscript{1004}.

\textsuperscript{999} As many commentators show, the 1996 elections marked a change in Romania’s domestic and foreign policy. See Steven D. Roper, Romania: the Unfinished Revolution, op.cit., p. 109.
\textsuperscript{1001} According to author’s field research; view expressed by many respondents, including from the public authorities, when Ceauşescu’s South policy was brought into discussion.
\textsuperscript{1002} Based on fieldwork.
\textsuperscript{1004} Author’s interview with Ion Bari, December 2008.
In the socialist times relations of *mutual* aid were envisaged between Romania and the developing countries and Romania was considered as one - at times the most important one\textsuperscript{1005} - among the Eastern European donors. After 1989, far from granting any type of foreign assistance any longer, Romania concentrated its efforts on eliciting, receiving and managing development aid for itself\textsuperscript{1006}. From a socialist country and small donor with a certain profile in the developing countries, Romania turns into a recipient of Western assistance, on an equal footing with any other developing country, while at the same time seeming to renounce all relations with the latter.

From a simply financial perspective, among all countries in the wider region of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, Romania’s transformation into a recipient of foreign aid may seem the most unexpected. Unlike its counterparts in Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans that stepped into the transition with foreign debts awaiting to be repaid, in December 1989 not only was Romania an unobligated country, but it could also rely on a current account surplus of US$2.8 billion, as well as foreign exchange of more than US$1.7 billion so that in 1989 the country’s current account balance, debt-to-GDP ratio and hard currency holdings were better than any other East European country\textsuperscript{1007}. Nonetheless, Romania’s US$2.8 billion current account surplus in hard currency became a US$ 1.6 billion deficit by the end of 1990 and foreign exchange reserves were depleted to less than US$400 million\textsuperscript{1008}.

The current account surplus and foreign exchange reserves had been reached with no little effort. At the beginning of the 1980s Romania’s foreign debt stood at a staggering US$10 billion to be repaid mainly to those Western private banks that had invested in Ceauşescu’s programs for ‘multilateral’ development. Faced with continuous economic downturn Ceauşescu’s approach was to push for and impose on Romanians an economic austerity

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\textsuperscript{1005} According to Vernon V. Aspaturian, in 1974, Romania alone accounted for 54% of all Eastern European aid (to Africa) for that year. See Vernon V. Aspaturian, ‘Eastern Europe in World Perspective’, in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (ed.), *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1984, p. 35.


\textsuperscript{1007} Steven D. Roper, op. cit., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{1008} Idem, p. 89. See also Adam Zwass, *The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Thorny Path from Political to Economic Integration*, Armonk, 1989, p. 200
\end{flushleft}
program to pay off the country’s debt. For 1988 and 1989 the country repaid a total of US$4 billion\textsuperscript{1009}, with the well-known ensuing difficulties for the Romanian population.

Ironically and at the pace shown in the table below, only ten years after Ceauşescu’s fall from power, Romania had ‘recovered’ the most part of the external debt that Ceauşescu had incurred and then set to eliminate starting with the 1980s\textsuperscript{1010}.

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<td>Real GDP growth</td>
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<td>Foreign debt in billion $</td>
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When the East European communist regimes were turned out of office in 1989 questions arose regarding the type of assistance that was required to transform these countries’ economies into market oriented systems. Some scholars, in particular economists who had been working on the implementation of adjustment policies in the less developed countries argued that some of the experiences of LDCs were relevant to the newly liberalizing economies of Eastern Europe and advocated for the donors’ experiences in the Third World to be transferred to the former Second World\textsuperscript{1011}. Western donors reacted quickly and by May 1990 the G-24 had made aid commitments totalling $8.5 billion to Hungary and Poland. By the end of 1992, the total had increased to $37.4 billion and Romania (along with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) was also included in the official list of recipient countries\textsuperscript{1012}.

Even before that year, it was obvious and self-understood that Romania would become a recipient country along with the other former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe: as soon as December 27 1989 President Bush announced that the United States

\textsuperscript{1009} Idem. As Roper shows: ‘The irony of the Romanian revolution was that Ceausescu’s hated austerity program provided a positive economic legacy to the country’.


was providing US$ 500,000 in emergency aid to Romania through the International Red Cross, as well as an air lift to provide medical supplies worth $250,000\textsuperscript{1013}. From one year to the next Romania’s status as a recipient country was consolidated and (as the chart below shows) ever more aid resources flown into the country, with the European Union representing the main donor.

**Figure 11 - Total Aid by All Donors Compared with EU Aid: 1994-2004**

![Total Aid by All Donors Compared with EU Aid: 1994-2004](image)


Beyond commitments by Western governments, Western citizens also added to the aid efforts. Impressed by the televised images of the Romanian ‘revolution’ as well as the plight of the 200,000 Romanian abandoned children suffering hunger, cold and abuse in creeping orphanages\textsuperscript{1014}, they started to give for relief work through NGOs: World Vision alone would develop programs of around US$ 10 million a year in various regions of the country with support from private citizens from the United States, Canada, Australia and even Taiwan.\textsuperscript{1015} Groups of citizens from Western Europe started to organize fundraising activities and humanitarian convoys for Romania\textsuperscript{1016}. The case of George Soros – the

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\textsuperscript{1013} Idem, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{1014} As ‘The Relief Fund for Romania’ (an UK-based charity) shows: ‘When the first cameras entered the Romanian orphanages in 1990 the world was stunned by what was revealed. The pictures of starving, freezing unloved children had a huge impact’. Relief Fund for Romania was established by leading Romanian exiles from Romania led by Ion Ratiu (1917 – 2000), Romanian diplomat, entrepreneur, publisher, writer and humanitarian. He is acknowledge for having devoted his life to the fight for democracy in Romania. Source: [http://www.relieffundforromania.co.uk/romanian_orphans.html](http://www.relieffundforromania.co.uk/romanian_orphans.html) as of February 2009.
\textsuperscript{1015} Information based on the author’s fieldwork. See also [www.worldvision.ro](http://www.worldvision.ro).
\textsuperscript{1016} Fieldwork, interviews with a Brussels-based group of non-professional humanitarian aid activists for Romania. According to such interviews, before 1989 this group was active in signing petitions against Ceausescu’s ‘systematization’ plans; immediately after the events in 1989, in March 1990, the group organized a first convoy to Romania, mainly bringing food items. After this, first exploratory convoy, a
American philanthropist with Hungarian origins - is well-known. In Romania, through the 1990s, the Soros Foundation for an Open Society, with an annual programme budget of US$ 10 million, had a very broad agenda: education, research, children and youth, civil society, medicine and health, economic reform and management, media, publishing, public administration, arts and culture – in a way that represented a ‘very important factor in influencing public consciousness’\footnote{Valentin Stan, ‘Influencing Regim Change in the Balkans: the Role of the External Forces in the Transition’, in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (ed.), Experimenting with Democracy. Regime Change in the Balkans, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 156.}.

In her book, ‘Collision and Collusion. The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe’, Janine Wedel shows that the progression of aid effort to Central and Eastern Europe can be traced in three main phases. The initial euphoria on the part of donors and recipients alike was the first phase, which she calls ‘Triumphalism’. This phase – she shows – was always followed by a period of frustration and resentment that she calls ‘Disillusionment’. Eventually, the donors and recipients adjusted to each other in a subsequent phase that is called ‘Adjustment’\footnote{Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion. The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe. 1989-1998, St Martins Press, New York, 2001, p. 7.}.

Beyond this general categorization, in the Eastern European countries and most particularly in Romania, there were two other major and parallel phases. The first phase corresponds to the task of building and strengthening democracy, while the second task is related to these countries’ preparations for becoming EU Member States. In the first half of the 1990s, the first task was on all institutional donors’ agendas, with the United States being one of the major players\footnote{Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1996.}. In the second phase – that of building capacity for EU membership – the role and importance of the American aid, while EU assistance increased and became ever more complex.

\textit{Democracy Assistance}

In Romania, before 1989 the opposition had been rather small, with very few overt dissidents, human rights groups, independent unions or other such entities. Without a civil
society and opposition leaders to feel the vacuum of power opened by the fall of the Ceauşescus, members of the old elite took over and gave much fear of a return to repression. Tom Gallagher brightly captured such sentiments when talking about the ‘theft’ of the Romanian nation by leading players in the previous regime and strategically-placed activists in the former state apparatus, showing that ‘at first Ion Iliescu (…) was looking for ways to pursue a semi-authoritarian course’, as ‘fully-fledged liberal democracy appeared too risky and problematic’¹⁰²⁰.

Western donors rushed to grant support for democratization and creation of a civil society that could eventually formulate and uphold an internal demand for democracy. As Thomas Carothers shows, the United States was one of the most important donors in this sense, with assistance unfolding in three main stages. In a first stage, from December 1989 to the May 1990 election, representatives of US organisations travelled to Romania looking for potential local partners for US-funded projects. Their interpretation was that mostly electoral assistance was needed for Romania, so as to help organisations such as the Group for Social Dialogue (a group of prominent Romanian intellectuals), Frăţia (the first independent trade union) or România Liberă (the largest opposition newspaper) to become fully operational before the 1990 elections. The next round of elections (to be held in 1992) became the focal point for the second phase of US democracy assistance to Romania, while from 1992 to 1996 (the third of the phases documented by Carothers) the US democracy assistance shifted away from the electoral emphasis, devoting more effort to strengthening the parliament and including a wide range of civic education activities and NGO support. From 1990 to 1994 the United States Agency for International Development and the National Endowment Fund had jointly spent $13.5 million in Romanian focusing mainly on: media, elections, political parties, parliament, unions, civil society, rule of law¹⁰²¹.

As in the case of other East and Central European countries one salient feature of democracy assistance was the fact that practically all aid was mainly channelled through NGOs: beyond helping new elites to establish electoral systems and democratic institutions, donors were reluctant to engage with national governments and state

institutions. The particularity in Romania’s case was that most, if not all of these ‘civil society’ organisations needed to be created from zero or supported to develop from a very incipient stage. As Dan Petrescu, a Romanian researcher and World Bank consultant, shows:

‘The first, heroic days of democracy assistance often involved finding an active group or person ready to promote universal democratic values and struggling to put out a newsletter or hold a conference or something of that sort’.

Democracy assistance was granted in a context that saw the evolution from the neo-liberal anti-state philosophy in the early 1990s to a focus on NGOs as part of good governance and partnership with the state in the run-up to EU accession.

On its side, the European Union has also played an important role in the democratization process, even if at a later stage when compared with the swift engagement of the United States. Thus, it was not before the 1993 Copenhagen European Council that the European heads of state decided that democracy was one of the fundamental criteria that needed to be met by a candidate country to EU membership. However, it was only the Luxemburg European Council of December 1997, which launched the pre-accession strategy that the EU moved from indirect influence to direct leverage, by translating the Copenhagen political conditions into demand for specific reforms and by monitoring progress made by each of the candidate countries in complying with the reform demands.

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1024 Adam Fanagan, op. cit., p. 118.
1025 Jeff Lovitt shows that in the 1980s the EU governments – both individually and collectively - lagged behind US support in terms of democratic assistance to non-governmental organisations in countries where democracy was either absent or in its early stages of development and that ‘unfortunately, this democracy assistance gap on the part of the EU persists today’. Thus, on the EU’s doorstep, for instance in Georgia and Ukraine, US support to civil society continues to outstrip the EU’s support – not only in terms of political support, but in terms of financial support to non-governmental organisations. See Jeff Lovitt and Věra Řiháčková, Is the EU ready to put democracy assistance at the heart of European foreign policy?, Policy Association for an Open Society, Policy Brief No. 1, 2008, p. 2.
EU Membership-related Assistance

Romania’s accession process was a lengthy one. In 1990 the first negotiations for an agreement started. One year later, in 1991, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed and in 1994 this agreement was superseded by the Europe Agreement. In June 1995 Romania filed its formal application for membership to the European Union and in July 1997 the candidate status was granted. In February 2000 formal negotiations for membership were started and in April 2005 the Accession Treaty was signed by Romania, while full membership was effective as of January 2007.

Initially, the European Community and then the European Union’s main framework for assisting the reform process in the East European countries was (and still is in what the current candidate countries are concerned) the PHARE program.

**Figure 12 - Romania towards the European Union: Main Steps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>First negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Europe Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Formal application for EU membership filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Candidate status granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Formal negotiations for accession started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Accession Treaty signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Full Membership granted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information collected by the author.

In time and as the countries were growing closer to accession, the range of available financing instruments was increased\(^{1027}\) to include various EU multicountry and horizontal programs such as TAIEX, the Large Scale Infrastructure Facility, cross-border and regional development and cooperation programs, ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession)\(^{1028}\) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and

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\(^{1028}\) Based on the principles that govern the Cohesion Fund, ISPA provides assistance for infrastructure projects in the EU priority fields of environment and transport. Its objectives are the following: familiarising the candidate countries with the policies, procedures and the funding principles of the EU; helping them catch up with EU environmental standards; upgrading and expanding links with the trans-European transport networks. See European Commission, Regional Policy, ISPA, [http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/ispa/ispa_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/ispa/ispa_en.htm), as of March 2009.
Rural Development)\textsuperscript{1029}, but PHARE remained one the most complex pre-accession instruments. As Romanian scholar Sorin IoniŃţa shows, PHARE’s complexity derived from the fact that: the final beneficiaries could be central government institutions, local governments or private for-profit as well as non-profit actors; in terms of sectors and activities covered, PHARE financed capacity building at the central and local levels, grant-giving schemes for the civil society or small and medium enterprises, social programs to tackle unemployment or marginalized groups, local and regional infrastructure, Schengen-related projects, etc.; some components were run directly through central government institutions, while others were run (in Romania’s case) through eight Regional Development Agencies or private contractors; numerous derogations and reallocations were approved along the implementation periods\textsuperscript{1030}. With the aid granted to Romania not only policies and goods were transferred from the donors to Romania, but also ideas and procedures, a whole ‘technology of government’ and ‘good practice’\textsuperscript{1031}.

Designed for granting assistance to Hungary and Poland and then extended to the remaining of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, PHARE was not initially related to EC / EU accession, but it was the instrument for aiding these countries through the transition process. Aid through the PHARE program was granted immediately after the fall of the communist governments in 1989, years before these countries filed a formal application for membership. But the Essen Council in December 1994 defined PHARE as one of the important tools of what later was to emerge as the pre-accession strategy that would assist further reform steps in line with reaching the \textit{acquis communautaire}, that is to say the rights and obligations deriving from the EU treaties and legislation\textsuperscript{1032}. In other words, as soon as the option of EU membership for the former socialist countries gained strength the PHARE program shifted its focus from being demand-driven (assistance being granted according to the needs of transition, as established by the recipient) to being accession-driven (assistance being designed to help

\textsuperscript{1029} SAPARD was aimed at supporting the efforts made by the Central and Eastern European applicant countries in the pre-accession period as they were preparing for their participation in the common agricultural policy and the single market. SAPARD involved two major objectives: contribute to the implementation of the \textit{acquis} in the agricultural sector; and solve priority and specific problems in the area of agriculture and rural development. The overall budget in each year of the programme's seven-year run (2000-06) amounts to 520 million Euro, with Romania receiving 150,636 million EUR. See European Commission, Agriculture, Enlargement, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external/enlarge/back/index_en.htm}, as of March 2009.


\textsuperscript{1032} Renate Langewiesche, op. cit., p. 109.
candidates the goals set by the EU as criteria for acceptance of new members)\textsuperscript{1033}. This way, one of the most important objectives that PHARE achieved was probably that of preparing these countries (Romania included) for becoming EU members at the end of their transition process.

At the pace shown by the figure below, by the year of its application for EU membership (1995), Romania had benefited of 607.7 million ECU of aid through the PHARE program, while 475 million ECU were also granted to Romania as EIB loans in the period 1990-1996.\textsuperscript{1034}

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount (million ECU)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>134.3</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>139.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
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\textit{Source: Karen Elizabeth Smith, op. cit., p. 74.}

In its first years (1990-1993), the PHARE program in Romania was limited mainly to agricultural restructuring\textsuperscript{1035}, while subsequently it also covered for developing the private sector, environment and nuclear safety, infrastructure development, education and training as well as humanitarian and food aid. Most of the aid was concentrated on providing know-how and technical assistance to help draft legislation, design policy and build institutions\textsuperscript{1036}. Later on, with the 1993-1997 guidelines, PHARE was started to move away from technical assistance to investment support measures in sectors such as environment, energy, job creation and infrastructure so as to reflect the progression of economic reforms\textsuperscript{1037}. Once the formal negotiations started, the focus was on economic and social cohesion, followed by meeting the obligations of the \textit{acquis}, the political criteria, Community programs, economic criteria and strengthening of the administrative capacity\textsuperscript{1038}.


\textsuperscript{1036} Karen Elizabeth Smith, op. cit., p. 73.

\textsuperscript{1037} Karen Elizabeth Smith, op. cit., p. 77.

\textsuperscript{1038} Elena Barcani, op. cit., p. 63.
After the candidate status was granted and in the run-up to opening the membership negotiations (period 1998-2000), Romania was allocated through PHARE EUR 470.5 million with much of this being used for projects focused on institutional capacity-building, particularly through twinning programs, while a screening program was developed so as to familiarize the Romanian administration with the acquis and identify the areas where further assistance would be required\textsuperscript{1039}. The screening process, with annual reports issued by Commission experts, was tedious and – as one scholar showed – even ‘humiliating’, but it has been nevertheless accepted largely due to two main reasons: 1) most of the reforms were necessary in any liberal democracy so that the EU constraint was an effective tool for promoting unpopular measures; 2) even when resenting the intrusiveness of the process the political elites could realize that the domestic political costs in case of failure of the EU access would be much higher\textsuperscript{1040}.

At times, the EU’s financial assistance was viewed as having an important role in creating the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ of the pre-accession process\textsuperscript{1041}, with Romania susceptible to be on the losers’ side, given its inability to use the EU’s assistance effectively. To explain such inability EU scholars and public officials used to point at Romania’s limited ‘absorption capacity’ due to inconsistent government policies, administrative limitations on access to information, monopolistic structures, lack of experience in dealing with EU structures and rules and political controversies\textsuperscript{1042}. Romanians instead pointed to excessive bureaucracy of the European financing procedures (when, for instance, compared to US funding) that led to the so-called ‘golden burden of the EU funds’\textsuperscript{1043} in a context in which – as late as the accession year - most public administrators in Romania were still not realizing what project management means\textsuperscript{1044}.

3.1.3. Back to Donorship: First Steps

Together with its Member States, the European Union is the biggest donor of the world. Each and every one of the previous Enlargements had a certain impact on the EC’s / EU’s

\textsuperscript{1040} Jacques Rupnik, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1042} Jacques Rupnik, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1043} Sorin Ioniță, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1044} Idem, p. 85.
policy for development cooperation\textsuperscript{1045}, but in the past – with few exceptions – the acceding countries were donors themselves, sometimes among the most important ones of the World.

At the time of their accession, Romania and its fellow counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe were considered and acting as recipients of development aid and official development assistance. In Romania’s case, this status (of recipient) or its lack of concern for the developing countries hardly changed with Romania’s drawing closer to the EU: Romania only started to be challenged by the European Commission – no more than to a feeble extent, though – for its non-donor status as late as 2005, at the time the Accession Treaty was already being signed. By that time, the European Commission’s monitoring reports clearly emphasized that Romania was not yet an institutional donor, implying that being a donor is one of the conditions for EU membership\textsuperscript{1046}.

Thus, 2005 is the first year when the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RMFA) starts to take an interest towards development cooperation issues, by participating in an ever longer series of events and international debates that consider this issue\textsuperscript{1047}. This series of events that see Romania’s participation is opened by a study trip organized by TRIALOG, an EC-funded project to raise NMS’ awareness of international development. The stated aim of this study-trip is that of facilitating the exchange of experience between the representatives of the civil society and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. This is actually a moment that sets the basis of the collaboration between RMFA and the Romanian NGOs that will form the core of the future national federation of development NGOs. This is not the only moment when the RMFA and civil society representatives seem to learn together about development cooperation. Other seminars and conferences will follow and the RMFA grows also in its role of organizer and not only participant to such events.

After these initial contacts and experiences of institutional learning, the RMFA efforts in this field started to be oriented towards the creation of a legal and institutional framework


\textsuperscript{1046} See in the following section a discussion of the role of the EC’s monitoring reports in shaping Romania’s behavior in the field of international development.

\textsuperscript{1047} Author’s fieldwork and Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Demersuri MAE pe linie ODA, available online at: \url{http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=35297&idlnk=1&cat=3}, as of March 2009.
for Romania’s policy for international development. With the support of a twinning light project between the RMFA and the German Ministry for Economic Development and Development (BMZ), Romania’s first official document in this field was to be prepared and launched in 2006: the Romanian national strategy concerning the national policy for international development cooperation (to be discussed in a dedicated section). To create such a strategy in the framework of this project, the RMFA launched a process of internal and external (a series of three seminars with the participation of the Romanian civil society) consultations for selecting the thematic and geographic priorities of Romania’s policy for international development.

For the RMFA, one main aim of this exercise is that of ensuring compliance and alignment with the EU’s policies in this field. Thus, the endorsement of the European Commission for the national strategy for international development is requested and obtained before (21 March 2006) this document being published for public consultation on the RMFA’s website (30 March 2006).

Based on the national strategy launched in 2006, Romania will make its first aid disbursements in 2007 – its first year as a Member State of the European Union. 80 million EUR will be dedicated by Romania for development cooperation or 0.07% of its GDP\textsuperscript{1048}. The expectations – spelled at the European Council in June 2005 – is that by 2010 the ‘new’ Member States would contribute with 0.17% of their respective GDPs, while this amount would increase to 0.33% of GDP by 2015. Romania is thus expected to increase its contributions from one year to the next.

This way, through the 1990s various actors and stakeholders concurred to create a donor status for Romania, with Romania welcoming and managing the resources thus made available. With no lengthy preparations, in its first year as an EU Member State, Romania makes its first disbursements of official development assistance. This is how, in less than two decades, Romania completed a full circle in what its relations with the developing countries are concerned. During its socialist years (in particular the last decades), Romania held an unambiguous interest towards the developing countries, it was a foreign policy-maker that claimed the willingness and the capability of offering its assistance (not only financial, but mostly diplomatic, cultural or scientific). During the 1990s, Romania

completely removed the developing countries from its sphere of interest and concentrated on its own processes of development and relations with its own donors. Starting with 2005, due to its membership to the European Union Romania develops again an interest for matters of international development.

In view of Romania’s past experience in this field, various paths for the future could be envisioned. At an extreme one may imagine an attempt for recuperating, re-constituting, re-creating and ‘updating’ Romania’s former donor status, based on Romania’s historical ‘friendship’ with all developing countries and its earlier membership to the G77 and other organizations of the developing countries. At the other extreme, there could rather be the attempt of erasing all past experience, of building a donor status ‘from zero’, of disregarding all pre-‘89 policies and relations and simply copy-pasting Western discourse and practices. In between - various degrees of preservation of past elements, wits adaptations of old discourse and practices to new standards (or vice versa), in particular those of the Union in which now Romania is a full member. For the moment it is rather soon for predicting one or the other of the ways, but in what follows we will analyze the steps already taken by Romania on its way of becoming a new donor state. In so doing, we will scrutinize and try to understand the role of three main actors that assumed a more or less important role in shaping Romania’s path towards renewed practices and discourse of development cooperation: the European Union itself; the Romanian national authorities and authorities; and Romanian and European NGOs. The timeframe for analyzing such roles is relatively confined; it looks at data and developments that mainly regard the two years preceding and the two years succeeding the EU accession moment (the 1st of January 2007). This strategy was favored to a long-term survey since, on one hand, a certain level of detailed insight was preferred for this work; on the other hand, this is the exact period that saw the concentration of the most important events regarding Romania’s entry into a new group of states: that of the Western donors.

3.2. EU and Romania’s Development Discourse: Direct and Indirect Influence.
As of recent date and practice, candidate countries aspiring to EU membership and not yet fulfilling the three Copenhagen criteria, were encouraged and supported (for instance,
through funding from the Phare Programme) for going through what has been called a ‘process of socialization to the European norms and values’. The values that the European Union proclaims to be upholding at international level – sustainable development, democracy, peace and security, as well as human rights and liberalism – are consistently promoted by means of development cooperation. Some degree of conditionality in this field, then, could be expected.

Membership conditionality – for some, a successor of the old ‘standard of civilization’ – can be seen as an expression of the assumptions used to distinguish those that belong to the expanding European Union from those that do not. Those who fulfill the political and economic conditions will be brought inside, while those that fail to conform will be left behind. In the European context, conditionality is by now wide ranging and continually evolving, comprising – at the time being - the Copenhagen criteria, specific legislation (the so-called acquis communautaire with its 31 chapters and no less than 81,000 pages), other relevant legislation such as the stability and growth pact and the convergence criteria, the Lisbon strategy. A country’s process of EU accession can, therefore, lead to a wide range of transformations and at least four different outcomes: ‘reformed membership’ when the applicant and the European Union work together so that the enlargement objective is achieved; non-membership when no enlargement takes place due to applicant’s inability to implement reforms; ‘unreformed membership’ when the applicant does not carry out the required domestic reforms; and ‘reformed satellite’ when the applicant changes its domestic policies while the EU refuses to support the applicant.

1051 Karin Arts and Anna D. Dickson, ‘EU development cooperation: from model to symbol’, in Karin Arts and Anna D. Dickson (eds.), EU development cooperation. From model to symbol, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004, p. 1.
1053 Idem.
There is a wide range of fields that are usually reached and transformed by membership conditionality: from minority rights, to justice and home affairs or conflict resolution\textsuperscript{1056}. This section will seek to understand and circumscribe the type and extent of conditionality in a specific field, that of development cooperation, with the aim of deepening our understanding regarding the role that the European Union might have had in transforming Romania into a new donor. That the European Union did have a role in this sense is one of the basic assumptions of this section that will not be demonstrated; what is under consideration here is more related to the mechanisms that were used by the EU to accomplish this role and, at the same, the type of ‘donorship’ that the European Union proposes to the NMS and, in particular, to Romania.

For analytic purposes only, the study of the mechanisms for influence has been divided in two main categories: ‘direct’ influence as it was identified in official ‘Reports’ such as the Progress Reports, the Monitoring Reports, the Comprehensive Papers; and ‘indirect’ mechanisms identified in various projects financed by the European Union, even if not always also implemented by its own institutions (ex. ‘capacity-building’ or institutional ‘twinning’ projects). When these influence mechanisms encountered and intersected with other influence instruments used by other stakeholders with an interest in influencing the NMS’ orientation towards donorship, the latter were also discussed with the intent of shedding more light on the whole process. The focus here is on the European Union, but this does not mean that other traditional donors – such as Canada – were absent from the process that saw the creation of twelve new donors in Central and Eastern Europe. On the contrary: as we will show in what follows, at a certain point – even if not any longer – this was rather a ‘crowded place’.

3.2.1. European Union’s Direct Influence: the Progress Reports

\textsuperscript{1056} There is a whole body of research relating to ethnic politics and the role of the European Union in promoting minority protection and integration. Some authors argue that minority protection and nondiscrimination legislation in Romania were largely triggered by external conditionality and rule promotion especially by EU. See: Guido Schwelnuss, ‘Nondiscrimination and Minority Protection Rules’ in Door Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, \textit{The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe}, p. 59; Jan Roper, op. cit.; Milada Ada Vachudova, \textit{Europe Undivided: democracy, leverage and integration after Communism}, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005; Dimitris Papadimitrou and David Phinnemore, op. cit., also discuss conditionality related to justice and home affairs. For EU conditionality and conflict resolution see the series of case-studies from the European periphery edited by Door Bruno Coppikers, \textit{Europeanization and conflict resolution}, Academia Press, Gent, 2004.
The first and perhaps handiest source of information for understanding one of the ways in which the European Union steered Romania towards its joining the European group of donor countries is the collection of the so-called ‘Progress Reports’. The European Commission presented the first Progress Reports in November 1998 and the European Council took notice of them in December. Subsequently the Commission reported every year on the progress of each candidate country and supplemented these individual reports with a ‘Composite Paper’ that summed up the most relevant developments for all countries in the respective year. These comprehensive documents accounted of the progress made by candidate and potential candidate countries on their road towards EU accession, by offering information regarding the implementation and the enforcement of EU standards. Such Reports represent thus the basis for the decisions to be then taken by the European Council regarding the respective country’s prospects and pace for EU accession.

For Romanian authorities and citizens (as most likely for all candidate countries) ‘the Report’ was a clear indication of ‘what the EU expects from us’. An extensive list of activity fields - jointly giving the image of the governance model that the EU was proposing - was drawn and screened, so that every such Report represented a reason for domestic debates involving all relevant domestic stakeholders that had an interest in Romania’s progress towards the European Union integration: politicians, mass-media, civil society, citizens.

In what follows we will analyze these reports from the specific point of view of the sector regarding the field of development cooperation, sometimes by comparison with similar reports for other NMS so that any peculiarities concerning Romania could better be emphasized.

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1060 Democracy and rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities, economic development and fiscal affairs, innovation, sectoral policies, economic and social cohesion, quality of life and environment, justice and home affairs, etc. Development policy is included in the chapter regarding the external policy, together with trade and international economic relations, customs and common foreign and security policy.
The first (1998) regular report on Romania’s progress towards accession very succinctly shows that

‘In the 1997-1998 period, Romania has continued to improve the legal framework for its relations with developing countries, mainly in the fields of economic and trade cooperation’,

even if

‘No progress has been achieved concerning development cooperation with ACP countries’.

Among its fellow candidates Romania seems to be lagging behind forerunners like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which – listening to the Commission language - are clearly leading candidates in this field. Thus, the Czech Republic is acknowledged to have

‘continued with its foreign development assistance through its Humanitarian Assistance budget of Ecu 830.000 and Foreign Development Assistance budget of Ecu 9.05 million’.

Poland

‘has continued to play a constructive regional and international role in the field of development’,

while in Hungary

‘There is a foreign aid fund managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through which Hungary provides development and humanitarian aid’.

Most significant is Poland’s case, on which the Report optimistically mentions that ‘no particular problems are envisaged’.

1066 Regular report from the Commission on Poland’s progress towards accession, op. cit.
As implied by the language used by the Commission in these reports, there seems to be a four-leveled hierarchy in the candidates’ preparedness for taking up responsibilities as donor countries\(^\text{1067}\). Leading the cohort are Poland and the Czech Republic that already run a special budget for international development and are not expected to constitute a ‘problem’ in this sense. Second in range are those candidate countries – like Estonia or Latvia - that do not have a special budget or institutions for development cooperation, but still have a certain awareness regarding the challenges of international development and contribute on a ‘case-by-case’ basis (the case of Latvia) or started to develop plans for allocating resources for humanitarian and development assistance (Estonia). Third come candidates like Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania itself that either did not take any step to adopt development policies in line with those of the European Union (Lithuania) or achieved no progress in this field. Last, are countries like Turkey and Cyprus whose Progress Reports do not even mention development cooperation. A significant case is that of Bulgaria. The Commission’s Report shows that

‘Bulgaria traditionally maintains good relations with developing countries and despite its financial difficulties it has invariably responded to appeals and taken part in initiatives of the international community for helping developing countries, including the granting of humanitarian aid’.

Bulgaria is the only one among the candidate countries that is thus acknowledged for its traditional ‘good relations’ with the developing countries, but this comes in spite of the fact that, historically, other countries in the region (Romania included) used to have equally intense – if not more so - exchanges with the global South\(^\text{1069}\).

With little variation, the above-mentioned hierarchy is maintained in 1999, with Bulgaria ‘continuing’ its good relations with the developing countries\(^\text{1070}\), the Czech Republic managing a EUR 9 million fund for development cooperation and making steps to adapt its development practices to the principles laid down by the OECD - Development Assistance Statement based on the author’s analysis of all Progress Reports of all candidate countries from 1998 onwards.


\(^{1068}\) Statement based on the author’s analysis of all Progress Reports of all candidate countries from 1998 onwards.


Committee\textsuperscript{1071}; Estonia including in its state budget a special budget line for financing the implementation of Estonian humanitarian and development projects (€460,000 for 1999) and whose \textit{Riigikogu} (Parliament) adopted the "Principles of Development Cooperation for the Years 1999-2000" that incorporated all basic principles laid down for humanitarian and development\textsuperscript{1072}; Latvia continuing its ‘case-by-case’ practice\textsuperscript{1073}; Poland continuing to play its ‘constructive regional and international role in the field of development’\textsuperscript{1074}; Cyprus’ and Turkey’s not being mentioned in what development matter are concerned\textsuperscript{1075}; Romania only mentioned for its lack of progress and ‘specific developments’\textsuperscript{1076}, while Lithuania\textsuperscript{1077}, Slovakia\textsuperscript{1078} and Slovenia\textsuperscript{1079} do not see significant changes from the previous year.

In the years to come, until all candidates’ accession to the European Union, Poland and the Czech Republic will continue to lead, while Romania has a slow and apparently inadequate growth in the field of development cooperation. Year after year, and Report after Report, Romania fails to grow either institutions or a ‘policy framework for managing external assistance’\textsuperscript{1080}. Disappointingly, in 2002 ‘Romania is (still) not an international donor and does not have a development policy although contributions are made to certain

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{1078} 1999 Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia’s progress towards accession, 1999, p. 52, available online at \url{http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/slovakia_en.pdf} as of February 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{1080} 1999 Regular report from the Commission on Romania’s progress towards accession, op.cit.
\end{enumerate}
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United Nations development programmes and funds. However, if development cooperation is not yet a priority, by 2001 Romania starts being acknowledged for having provided ‘emergency assistance following natural disasters in other countries’ in a ‘consistent’ manner. Romania becomes thus a humanitarian aid provider, most frequently to countries in the Balkan, Black Sea and Central Asian regions. The word ‘consistent’ is here very relevant as it might be an indicator for increased awareness and improved implementation capacity of the Romanian authorities.

If the Progress Reports, as central drivers of membership conditionality, were intended to put some amount of pressure on the ‘reported’ country, then one may expect the maximum leverage in that field to be achieved before a certain chapter was closed in the negotiations process. Leonard Orban, former Chief Negotiator of Romania, shows that the pace of negotiations (not only with Romania, but with all candidates) was determined

‘not only by the commitments made by the individual candidates, but also by the correct transposition and implementation of the acquis, including effective and efficient application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.’

In other words, where needed, concrete and swift re-orientations of political behavior were expected from the candidate countries once the negotiation process was started. But in what the field of development cooperation was concerned, this was apparently not Romania’s case.

Romania officially opened accession negotiations with the European Union in February 2000, following a decision of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. In

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1084 Marc Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’, in Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 36-37. Maresceau shows that the Accession Partnership Regulation 622/98 contains a clear conditionality clause reading that ’where an element that is essential for continuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking (…), the Council (…) may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession assistance granted to an applicant state’. However, the application of this regulation was never needed, as ‘the simple knowledge that a progress report will follow seems to have put sufficient pressure in practice on the candidate countries to conform to the EU requirements’.
1086 Idem.
spite of insignificant progress in the field of development cooperation (as demonstrated above), ‘external relations’ was among the first chapters to be ‘provisionally’ closed, along with ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises’, ‘Science and research’, ‘Education and training’, ‘Common foreign and security policy’ and ‘Statistics’, without Romania requesting any transitional arrangement.\footnote{Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union, Accession Negotiations, The Evolution of Negotiations, available online at \url{http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=351}, as of February 2009.} Given that in the transition years Romania had been a recipient and not a donor of foreign aid, it is noticeable that Romania – as the other candidate countries – hardly had the ability to ‘transpose’ or ‘implement’ any of the European Union’s \textit{acquis} in the field of development cooperation. A second obvious constrained was related to the time available for doing this, given that previously Romania never had a fully-fledged policy or strategy in the specific field of development cooperation. And indeed, Romania’s first ever strategy of international development was issued in 2006, six years after this negotiation chapter was closed. An obvious contradiction can be easily grasped and, if not else, such contradiction can be interpreted as an indicator that, in the accession process, development cooperation was rather a low item on the political agenda not only for Romania, but also for the European Union.

Of course, the broad economic and political context needs to be taken into consideration. Lucian Boia, one of Romania’s most prestigious historians, shows that Romania’s own development and transition to a market economy - a fundamental criterion for EU membership – were being considered particularly slow not only through the Iliescu years (1990-1996), but also while the Democratic Convention had been in power. Moreover, at the time the negotiations were started, political stability was again under question. To replace Ion Iliescu – a former communist activist - from power, in 1996 Emil Constantinescu – a professor at the Bucharest University - had raised significant levels of hope, by promising what the average Romanian wanted to hear: accelerated alignment with the West; legislation to protect and restore property rights; foreign capital ‘infusions’; vigorous action against corruption at all levels and so on. ‘From now on the ones to sacrifice themselves will be the leaders’ had said Constantinescu, while showing that 15,000 highly skilled experts were prepared to join him and his party for achieving these grand aims. Nonetheless, at the end of his mandate, Constantinescu could show rather limited results and withdrew from the political life, while the party that had backed him collapsed without being able to put forward another credible candidate. Ion Iliescu re-emerged and was again a candidate to Romania’s higher political position. For all those
Romanians that had already voted Iliescu out in 1996, more than willing to break with the communist past, Iliescu was hardly a real choice but the his main opponent turned to be Corneliu Vadim Tudor, another former communist activist and author of adulatory verses for the Ceauşescu couple, now promising to bring order and ‘clean’ Romania by all means, even if that would take ‘mass executions’ or ‘sending journalists to forced labor camps’. Many in Romania and the West were wondering if – with Vadim in power – it would have been Romania’s turn to replicate Serbia’s unhappy experience under Milosevic\textsuperscript{1088}.

In this sense, other matters – the rule of law, the fight against poverty and corruption, political stability – were given much more consideration and crowded out the available attention span. The experience of the other eleven candidate countries shows that this was a more general case and Romania was hardly an exception. International development did have a low profile in the negotiations process in general, as it is also proved by the fact that neither the Composite Papers\textsuperscript{1089} of 1998 and 1999, nor the Strategy Papers of 2000, 2001 and 2002 mention the need for the candidate countries to improve or accelerate their policies or practices in the field of development cooperation. Nonetheless, other second-range issues like telecommunications, culture or audio-visual policies did have some space – as limited as it might have been – in these all-inclusive documents\textsuperscript{1090}. It is only in 2003, with the Comprehensive Monitoring Report\textsuperscript{1091} for the ten candidate countries to accede in 2004 that any reference to development cooperation was made in such a summarizing document. Yet, development and humanitarian aid and policies are mentioned in the list of fields in which some of the candidate countries (namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta) are said to be ‘expected to be in a position to implement the acquis’. When their turn will come – in 2005 - to be assessed through a Comprehensive Monitoring Report\textsuperscript{1092}, Romania and Bulgaria will fail to see even such passing word. Development aid activists may have been disappointed to see that – for comparison - ‘animal welfare’ received significant attention while development cooperation was not

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\item[1089] The summary papers of all Progress Reports of all candidate countries for one particular year.
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mentioned at all. It is clear that, in the words of a policy paper drafted by TRIALOG, a project financed by the European Commission to raise development awareness in the new Member States,

‘development cooperation constitutes neither a priority for the EU nor for the accession countries in the pre-accession strategy’.

Nonetheless, in its first year as a Member State of the European Union, Romania also made its first contributions as a new donor. If the leverage opportunity was practically missed by the European Union before the ‘External Relations’ chapter was closed, after its ‘provisional’ closure, some progress towards the creation of Romanian institutions and policies in this field seems to be achieved. In 2003, the Progress Report reiterates that ‘Romania is not an international donor and does not have a development policy’, but it acknowledges Romania for continuing with its role as provider of humanitarian assistance (mostly for Iraq and Afghanistan) and a contributor to various UN development programs. Most importantly, the Report shows that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had established an Office for Development Cooperation ‘in order to coordinate Romania’s input into EU development policy’. Wording is evocative and built on the assumption that such Romanian ‘input’ already exists so that it needs the ‘coordination’ this office is called to provide. Further progress is also acknowledged by the Regular Report in 2004 as an inter-ministerial working group had been established and allegedly started its work for defining the future objectives of Romanian strategy for development cooperation and for making an inventory of Romanian programs for third countries that might be assimilated to development cooperation assistance. Moreover, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is acknowledged to having closely cooperated with the Commission services in order to build capacity in the area of development, while Romania continued to make provide humanitarian assistance for earthquakes Iran and Morocco in the.

As of 2005, the Regular Reports are replaced by the Monitoring Reports. Issued in Brussels, on the 25th of October 2005, the ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report’ for Romania dedicated 8 paragraphs for External relations, of which one is specifically devoted to the humanitarian aid and development policy. In contrast to the series of


Progress Reports which used to limit themselves to offering a very short account of Romania’s evolution in its endeavor to build a framework for development cooperation, the Monitoring Report takes a more extensive, explanatory and informative stance. Thus, the Romanian readership can find out – for the first time ever from this type of document - that ‘In June 2005 the EU agreed to commit to new intermediate and global Official Development Assistance (ODA) targets’.

The Report then goes on to show that Romania ‘must’ make adequate budgetary provisions upon accession and develop its institutional framework and administrative capacity for the implementation of the EU acquis in this area.\(^{1095}\)

Compared to previous pronouncements in this field, this is a rather clear and strong message, formulating an obvious expectation regarding Romania’s contribution to development assistance, even if such expectation is not also translated into an unambiguous standard. The adjective ‘adequate’ used in conjunction with ‘budgetary provisions’ softens the ‘must’ expressed before and opens a possibility for any progress to be considered satisfactory enough. If this is a ‘gap’, than this is a significant one, as the standard could have been easily provided, based on previously approved documents worked at the highest levels. Indeed, the conclusions of the GAERC Council of May 2005 show that the EU Member States ‘commit’ themselves to achieving 0.7 % of ODA by 2015, while those States that had become Members after 2002 would strive to raise their ODA contributions up to at least 0.17% of their respective GDPs until 2010, so as to ‘reach’ 0.33% by 2015.\(^{1096}\) But if this is not so much of a gap, then one possible explanation is that the aim of this exercise was not so much to thrust upon Romania a quantitative commitment of financial resources to be made upon accession to international development assistance, but rather to establish the practice, the ‘way of thinking’ that will make future budget allocations possible in a country that only recently had been among those which could expect such allocations from other countries. Being an ‘assisted’ country is hardly compatible with membership to the group of the biggest donors in the World. The shift from the recipient mentality to the donor mentality will need to be


eventually made and the first logical step is to engage in donor discourse formation. This is
also the wisest one: an outright request for funding ‘other’, while ‘we’ still have ‘so much
poverty at home’ could be welcome with fierce resistance, but such resistance can be
dissipated as soon as a specific discourse is created to support such claim.

The 2005 Report will be the last one to show Romania’s progress towards building its
capacity for development cooperation, even if in point of fact this was not the last
Monitoring Report for Romania. The last such Report - the May 2006 Monitoring
Report\textsuperscript{1097} - will make no reference to a number of 11 chapters, including chapter 26
corresponding to external relations and development co-operation\textsuperscript{1098}. More importantly,
no assistance for strengthening development cooperation capacities will be granted by the
European Union upon Romania’s accession\textsuperscript{1099}.

Progress Reports, Monitoring Reports, Strategic Papers, Composite Papers and other
documents of this type can be seen as building blocks of a goal-directed and power-laden
'strategic discourse'. As shown by various discourse analysts\textsuperscript{1100}, the seminal work in the
field of strategic discourse belongs to Habermas who distinguishes 'strategic discourse'
from other form of talk such as 'communicative discourse' and shows that the former is
power laden and goal-directed, while the latter, at least in its ideal manifestation, is about
speakers symmetrically engaging in achieving mutual understanding. Strategic discourse is
therefore about getting results through an intentional use of language and its resources.
And indeed, Commission's Reports are written not only to account for 'progress' towards
accession in a neutral and disinterested manner, but they also play a crucial part in shaping
institutional behavior by showing what the desired standards are for the candidate country
to be acknowledged as achieving such ‘progress’. They are not merely witnessing, they are

\begin{itemize}
\item The other chapters without not mentioned by the Monitoring Report are: 11 – Economic and Monetary
Telecommunications and information technology, 23 – Consumers and health protection, 27 – Common
\item The fields that do benefit from such assistance are: agriculture, child protection, civil society, company
law, competition, consumer protection, culture and audiovisual, customs, education, energy, enterprise,
environment, free movement of goods, infrastructure, intellectual property, justice and home affairs,
privatization and industrial policy, public administration reform, public finance, public health, regional
development, research, rroma, social sector, statistics, telecommunications, transport.
\item See: Joanna Thornborrow, \textit{Powerful talk: language and interaction in institutional discourse}, Longman,
\end{itemize}
constituting. By showing, at a time when Romania had a clearly consolidated status of a recipient country, that ‘Romania is not an international donor’, the text of the Report implies that being an international donor is an objective that a candidate country needs to fulfill in the wake of accession. Similarly, by showing that Romania ‘still’ lacks a development policy, the Report implies that this candidate country – as all the other ones - is expected to take such a bureaucratic practice, even if Romania is already acknowledged as a donor of humanitarian aid. Or, when emphasizing that ‘No progress has been achieved concerning development cooperation with ACP countries’, the Report creates a standard regarding the geographical priorities: objectively, Romania was equally weak in its development cooperation with Latin America or Asia, but these regions are not being mentioned.

Thus, for the field of development cooperation, the Reports have a clear role of shaping the political choices the new Member States make, by setting a series of standards that the candidates need to achieve for them to be acknowledged as making ‘progress’. At least three such standards can be identified: putting in place a development ‘policy’, as it is current practice in the ‘traditional’ donor countries; establishing and running institutions for implementing the said policy and for managing the country’s development aid; and ensuring an optimum level of administrative capacity that allows for a sufficient integration and coordination with other donors. In this field (like in other spheres of activity\textsuperscript{1101}) the candidate countries are supposed to ‘catch-up’ with practices developed by other members of the European Union and this mainly means a certain level of bureaucratization and professionalization of the kind that allows the European Union to present itself as the ‘biggest provider of development aid in the world’\textsuperscript{1102}.

Beyond accounting for progress and setting the standards, the role of these texts is also to create and impress upon the new Member States a specific vision of ‘international development’, by shaping the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of the new citizens of the European Union in such a way as for them to ‘accept their role in the existing order


\textsuperscript{1102} As showed by the European Commission’s website: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm}, as of August 2008.
as the natural way of managing this sector of social life. In particular, citizens in the new Member States are socialized in a way of seeing the world as being divided in the unjust categories of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ that can be legitimately fought against by means of a pre-defined concept of ‘development cooperation’. Thus, the need for creating policies and growing institutions is presented by these reports as being un-debatable. Candidates are not provided with an option; they have to create development cooperation policies and strategies and institutionalize this field of activity. At the same time, the compliance with the ‘existing order of things’ is facilitated by the candidate countries’ particular context. In a field like development cooperation – that presents low strategic importance – Romania, a ‘candidate’ with limited bargaining power, is more motivated to comply than to struggle. It is likely that if the Report suggests that the deficiency is the lack of ‘policy’, Romanian civil servants’ first question be ‘How can we give ourselves an EU-acceptable policy in the shortest time possible?’, rather than ‘Does Romania really needs such policy? Does a world that already has at least 200\textsuperscript{1104} policy-making agencies need one more such policy? Is there a new model that, given our experience of recent recipients, we can propose?’ In a similar manner, if the shortcoming is insufficient administrative capacity, the first question is likely to be ‘How do we do to strengthen our administrative capacity?’, rather than ‘Will it really help the poorest, hungriest and most oppressed in the World if Romania will ‘strengthen’ its administrative capacity according to the standards set by the European Union?’, or ‘As a former recipient country, shouldn’t we hear the growing number of voices calling for the sheer dismantling of the entire discourse of development\textsuperscript{1105}?’. 

This is how the ‘Reports’, an instrument of the Commission supposed to merely inform the Council ‘on the progress made by candidate and potential candidate countries on their road towards the EU’\textsuperscript{1106}, have also a clear role of promoting, in the candidate countries, the idea of development cooperation. However, the general message is not about mere ‘giving’, about the need of the new Member States to genuinely help the least developed countries of the world in their fight against hunger and disease, according to their own resources and systems of beliefs. The general message is about a specific way of giving –

\textsuperscript{1103} Stuart Hall, quoted by Thornborrow, op. cit., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{1104} Figure quoted by Roger Ridell, op. cit., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{1105} The fact the Third World calls for such dismantling is documented by Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 15.
official development assistance – through specific channels and practices that had already been developed by the European Union and that are known as ‘development cooperation’. The new Member States are called to contribute and take it as given a vision about ‘giving’ that is already in place at the time of their late arrival.

3.2.2. European Union’s Indirect Influence: Building Capacities for Development Cooperation

Beyond those directly connected to the field of development cooperation (ex. staff and diplomats of the Development Cooperation Direction in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), few have a clear understanding of this concept. Many in Romania, when hearing about ‘development cooperation’ are hardly aware of its international dimension and easily assume that the speaker refers to Romania’s ‘own’ development. The Romanian MFA itself refers to the 'national policy for international cooperation for development', rather than to a national policy for international development. Corina Creţu, the only Romanian MEP in the European Parliament’s Development Committee, is herself reluctant on being overtly ‘on the side’ of the developing countries, when talking about

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1107 Statement based on direct observation during fieldwork. A recent example can be made, based on the author’s participation in the 2008 the European Socialist Day. In this year, at the initiative of Romanian Member of the European Parliament, Corina Creţu member of the EP’s Committee on Development, the European Socialist Day was held at Bucharest on the 2nd of October. Only a reduced number of the Romanian speakers chose or were able to refer to international development. Ion Iliescu, former Romanian President, as well as Adrian Năstase, former Romanian Prime Minister chose to refer to Romania’s own process of development. Thus, Ion Iliescu showed that ‘Romania’s sustainable development, as long-term complex process, must aim, in particular, at the reduction of historical gaps of development, making a better use of the internal efforts, together with the chances and advantages that the process of European integration and market globalization can give us’. However, at this conference not Romania, but the developing countries were in focus. This made one of the participants show that ‘Except the foreign guests, Corina Creţu, Rovana Plumb and few others, nobody understood what this conference should have been about’. For Iliescu’s speech, see Ion Iliescu, Alocuţiune ziua dezvoltării. IntervenŃie în cadrul lucrărilor seminariului PSE dedicat Zilei Dezvoltării, 2 octombrie 2008, Sala Drepturilor Omului, available online at http://ioniliescu.wordpress.com/media/alocutiune-ziua-dezvoltarii, as of February 2009.


1110 The Development Committee is responsible for: 1. the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the Union (political dialogue with developing countries, aid and cooperation agreements with the developing countries, promotion of democratic values, good governance and human rights in developing countries); 2. matters relating to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and relations with the relevant bodies; 3. Parliament's involvement in election observation missions, when appropriate in cooperation with other relevant committees and delegations. See more information: Presentation and Competencies at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/homeCom.do?language=EN&body=DEVE, as of March 2009.
(international) ‘development’ to the Romanian audience. For instance, in a recent interview that she released in occasion of her being elected a member of the leading team of the PnoWB (Parliamentary Network on The World Bank), she rather makes reference to ‘the Africa at home’ and says:

“What shocked me, in a way, is the lack of interest of most of the MEPs coming from the former socialist countries for these problems. It is true that many of the actions of the Parliamentary Network on The World Bank is referred to the countries in Africa and Latin America. But shouldn’t we be aware that we have enough Africa and enough of Latin America here, in our countries? And when I say that I refer to the sameness of the problems related to underdevelopment, of infrastructure, of the access to essential public goods: water, sewage, education, social protection.”

However, when concepts are clarified, the European and global practice of development cooperation are hardly challenged. The basic idea that the rich should rescue the poor is easily accepted and some – the NGOs in particular – already claim that Romania should become a part of the global effort for international development and give back to the international community part of what it was invested in Romania’s own development. As the statute of the Romanian Federation of the Development NGOs, shows

“The international cooperation for development and the international solidarity have been essential elements in the development of the Romanian society after 1989. Once integrated into the European Union, it has come the time that the Romanian civil society to give back some of the support that it had in all these years and become actively involved in granting aid to the poorer countries of the world.”

But to reach this level of awareness and openness, considerable amounts of resources have been invested in building the ‘capacity’ of the Romanian civil society (as it was also the case with the other candidate countries).

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‘Capacity-building’ has now become one of the ‘buzz words’ of the development vocabulary, just like ‘participation’, ‘ownership’, ‘partnership’, ‘stakeholder’, ‘accountability’1113 and other words that form the contemporary ‘development dictionary’1114. Generally, capacity-building is referred to external efforts aimed at strengthening (government’s) capacity to carry out various tasks, from service delivery to policy and it apparently arose as a reaction against the tendency for development projects to generate dependency and an inability to sustain performance after the end of the project1115. However, like most concepts in the development lexis, ‘capacity building’ lacks a universally accepted and unitary definition. Besides, while some still talk about capacity building, others prefer the term ‘capacity development’, as to do away with the implications – present in the concept of ‘capacity building’ – of ‘building something from nothing, based on a pre-conceived design’1116. Nonetheless, in the case of the new Member States’ capacity for international development, such a distinction was hardly performed and the term ‘capacity-building’ was prevalently used, as the widespread opinion is that these countries are indeed in-experienced ‘newcomers’ to the field of development cooperation1117.

From a discursive point of view ‘capacity-building’ activities can also be considered a means of influence, a tool for ‘disciplining and regulating conduct’1118 as the ‘capacity builder’ will always build his partner’s capacities in the context of his own experience and mind frame. Capacity-building will always be about transferring a certain version of reality, while ignoring or even discrediting other versions. Put simply, ‘capacity building’

1117 Such view is promoted not only by the ‘traditional’ donors, but also by the ‘emerging’ donors themselves. Ibolya Bárány, Director of HUN-IDA (the Hungarian Agency for Development Co-operation) shows that ‘many NMS are not yet completely ready to be “normal” donors’ as “They are not completely able to keep the pace and volume of development assistance on the global value.” See his presentation in the framework of the international conference ‘Development Assistance Operators from EU New Member States: Experiences, Trends and Challenges’, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 3-4 iunie, 2008. The Report of the Conference is available at http://www.cef-see.org/oda/ODA_NMS_conference_final_report.pdf as of March 2009.
could be the easiest way for transferring models of professional behavior, as capacity building is first and foremost about ‘induction’\textsuperscript{1119}.

Around the time of the EU accession of the now ‘new’ Member States, the more ‘established’ donors developed various capacity-building programs to ‘assist’ the candidate countries in their efforts to establish modern-day development programs and institutions. This is the sense of such diversified initiatives as: twinning projects among the ministries of foreign affairs of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States; the TRIALOG project which was mainly focused on building the capacities of development NGOs in the NMS\textsuperscript{1120}; an ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) funded project\textsuperscript{1121} implemented by VOICE\textsuperscript{1122} to offer support for increased participation of humanitarian/development organisations from NMS in VOICE activities; or ODACE (Official Development Assistance in Central Europe), a capacity-building project put in place by the Canadian International Development Agency. In what follows we will look in each of these programs, so as to grasp the sense of their individual and collective leverage upon the formation of a development cooperation discourse in the new Member States of the European Union.

For the Romanian context, the ODACE program was perhaps the least relevant, as this S$12-million project only targeted the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (in a first phase) and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (in a second phase)\textsuperscript{1123}. As Katarzyna Kardas (one of the representatives of ODACE) showed, ODACE has been a ‘gracious exit’ of the Canadian Agency for International Development from this region, that provided for the

\textit{‘unique opportunity for an established aid agency to help create and strengthen new counterpart organisations’}\textsuperscript{1124}.

\textsuperscript{1119} Definition formulated by an EAPN (European Anti-Poverty Network) representative, in a meeting with the Romanian Network against Poverty, attended by the author.
\textsuperscript{1120} See \url{www.trialog.or.at}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1122} VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the European Union on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. More about VOICE: \url{http://www.ngovoice.org/}, October 2008.
\textsuperscript{1123} Katarzyna Kardas, \textit{Official Development Assistance in Central Europe}, presentation given at the international conference “Joining forces in Cooperation for Development Assistance”, held at Trieste - Italy, on the 10th of June 2005, available online at \url{http://www.ceinet.org/download/CIDA_Kardas.ppt} as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1124} Katarzyna Kardas, op. cit.
Other stated aims of this project were to increase the net quantity of international aid available to the developing world and, significantly, to contribute to donor harmonization and alignment. ODACE’s importance for the new donors in the European Union cannot be underestimated: as a result of internal factors, as well as the Canadian support, these countries (particularly those who had been in the program since its beginning: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) made a quicker progress in launching their programs of development cooperation and represented a ‘model’ for other new donors like Romania.

TRIALOG, a similar project financed by the European Commission, had a more direct influence on the Romanian context, particularly if NGOs are also considered. Implemented by a consortium of old and (now also) new Member States’ NGOs led by the Vienna-based Horizont3000, this project was initiated (in 2000) upon European Commission funding, with the intent of ‘strengthening development cooperation through the full integration of development NGOs (NGDOs) from New EU Member States (NMS) and Accession Countries (AC) into CONCORD and other European networks’. The expression ‘full integration’ calls for attention, in a context in which some of the current new Member States, had in their socialist past, a development cooperation tradition and experience that was sometimes at variance with that of the current old Member States.

In line with its stated aim, TRIALOG had a significant contribution in introducing and socializing the NMS’ NGOs to / in the European Unions’ development cooperation discourse, through a wide array of available means and activities as TRIALOG

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1125 Idem.
1126 The example of the Czech Republic is frequently mentioned in the professional debates among Romanian NGDOs.
1127 Currently, the consortium is formed of Horizont3000 (Austria), AGEH (Germany), Brot für die Welt (Germany), Polish Humanitarian Organisations, eRko (Slovakia), the Ecumenical Academy Prague (Czech Republic), Concord (the European NGDO platform) and Kopin (Malta). More information on the consortium is available at [http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=93&B=58](http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=93&B=58) as of March 2009.
1128 More information on this development NGO is available at [http://www.horizont3000.at/](http://www.horizont3000.at/) as of March 2009.
1129 CONCORD is the European platform of development and relief NGOs. CONCORD is organized like a ‘confederation’ of NGOs and likes to emphasize that it represents more than 2000 European NGOs. See more information on CONCORD at [www.concordeurope.org](http://www.concordeurope.org) as of March 2009.
1130 See the TRIALOG website: [http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=96](http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=96) as of March 2009.
1131 This contribution is acknowledged by a recent evaluation report of the European Commission. The said report shows that TRIALOG has increased the capacity of NGOs in NMS to work in development education and initiate dialogue with their own national government as well as networking amongst themselves. At the same time, TRIALOG has had an impact on Civil Society's involvement in the field of development in New Member States, which was not so common at the beginning of the enlargement process (p. 74). For more information see: Paul Sfez and Karen Sherlock, The European Union’s Development Cooperation Instrument
'provides opportunities for increased networking, information exchange, mutual learning, partnership and joint projects between NGDOs from the EU, new member states/accession countries and developing countries'.

To start with, TRIALOG invested considerable amounts of energy in ‘building capacities’ and organizing the NGOs in the NMS on a model that is identical to that in the old Member States, as well as other more established donors. In most of the EU12 countries, the development NGOs are organized into federations or associations of NGOs called - in the EU-wide jargon - ‘national platforms’: in Germany there is VENRO, in France there is Coordination Sud, in Italy there is Associazione delle ONG Italiane, in Spain there is Coordinadora ONG para el desarrollo, and so on. These federations develop a wide array of activities and have various aims; one thing that seems to be common to most of all is – as one of them phrased it - to

‘represent the common interests and positions of the member organisations vis-à-vis the public, the government, the European Commission and other international organisations'.

One of the first things that TRIALOG did in the candidate NMS was to promote the creation of such ‘national platforms’. Of course, TRIALOG’s official objective was rather to ‘facilitate the inclusion of NGDO Platforms from new member states and accession countries into CONCORD, the European NGO confederation for relief and development’, but in order for them to be included, they first needed to be created, as such structures were inexistent before accession, and, in particular, before TRIALOG’s intervention. In Romania’s particular case, the first contacts that TRIALOG had with Romania’s CSOs and authorities was in 2005, two years before accession. In May, an

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TRIALOG’s Specific Objective, Linking the NGDOs, [http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=90&B=58](http://www.trialog.or.at/start.asp?ID=90&B=58), as of March 2009.
information seminar was organized in Bucharest and then a multi-country study visit including Romanian NGO workers and MFA staff followed in December. A whole series of events and exchanges followed until the formal establishment of FOND – the Romanian Federation of Development NGOs. Once established, the NMS national platforms can usually continue to rely on TRIALOG’s technical support. Thus, TRIALOG makes available resources for NMS platforms’ representatives to be able to participate in EU-level and development-related working groups, seminars, conferences, etc. For Romania TRIALOG offered even more than this kind of technical support: through a specially-financed project, TRIALOG made available the resources needed for employing a platform coordinator.

Not only for the Romanian NGOs was this project relevant. According to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania’s official activities in the field of development cooperation started with the already-mentioned TRIALOG-organized study trip in 2005 (27 November – 2 December). NGO and MFA representatives from Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus were facilitated an exchange of practices and information with their counterparts in Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Beyond the international significance (new Member States learning together and from other old and new Member States), the visit is very relevant for the national context too, by setting the bases for the collaboration between the Romanian MFA representatives and a small group of NGOs that will then form the heart of the Romanian NGDO platform. As one of FOND’s board members will later on recall

\[ X \text{ (name of MFA representative) participated to this study-visit and she came back convinced of the importance of development cooperation). I saw it with my own eyes.}\]

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1139 This information is based on the author’s fieldwork. See also the presentation ‘Romania’, made by a representative of the Civil Society Development Foundation at the TRIALOG Central Training in March 9-10 in Budapest. The document is available online at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/ro_ngdos_ct2006.ppt#256,1,ROMANIA TRIALOG Central Training, March 9-10, Budapest, as of March 2009.


1141 For instance: in 2006 the author supported TRIALOG in organizing ‘regional information days’ in three main regions of Romania (Timișoara, Cluj-Napoca and Iași), as well as a ‘platform-building’ seminar in Bucharest.


1143 Including the Romanian MFA website, the section on ‘Demersuri în domeniul cooperării oficiale pentru dezvoltare’ (Activities in the field of development cooperation): http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=35297&idlnk=1&cat=3, as of March 2009.

1144 Based on author’s fieldwork.
This is not the only instance of MFA and NGOs learning together about development cooperation. The example set by TRIALOG is soon followed with other seminars, conferences, the European Development Days, roundtables and so on. Whenever the NGOs will be the organizers of such events, the participation of the MFA representatives is sought and encouraged\textsuperscript{1145}. Up to a certain point, NGOs seem to be better informed and conversed in international development matters. Beyond a whole array of capacity building opportunities, they also have an ‘intuition’ advantage. For many years, most NGOs had been at the ‘receiving end’ of international development assistance and many are members of international NGO ‘families’ (ex. Caritas, Save the Children, World Vision) that, at a global level, are important players in the development field. At the same time, the MFA seems to lack qualified human resources and administrative structures that are conducive to organizational learning\textsuperscript{1146}. However, from 2006 and even more so after the 2007 Enlargement, the MFA representatives are ever more present in such learning contexts – at European and global level – that are out of the reach of the Romanian NGOs: inter-governmental conferences, inter-ministerial meetings, EU-wide meetings of ministers and development officials, meetings of EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council, OECD’s Global Forum, Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund Committee, high-level conferences and forums and so on\textsuperscript{1147}.

Thus, TRIALOG’s main task was to ‘plant the seed’, to bring the European model of development cooperation in the new Member States. In particular, TRIALOG was there to show the NMS NGOs a way of structuring their activities, a model of self-management that had been created by their counterparts in the old Member States. The task seems to have been well accomplished: at current date, every NMS has an NGO ‘national platform’; seven out of the twelve new Member States (more than half) are fee-paying members of CONCORD\textsuperscript{1148}, and all of them send their representatives in CONCORD’s working groups. No alternative model was created by the twelve countries that joined the European Union in its fifth Enlargement, even if in terms of international development tradition, experience and thinking, the NMS have more in common among themselves, than with the

\textsuperscript{1145} For instance, at FOND’s General Assembly of 2008, the Romanian Office for Development Cooperation is represented at highest level (statement based on the author’s fieldwork).

\textsuperscript{1146} The rotation of staff in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs is a case in point. This is considered a limitation: by the time a diplomat learns about development cooperation he / she will be assigned to a different position. In two years of fieldwork, the author observed how three different officials took office at the head of the Romanian Office for Official Development Assistance.

\textsuperscript{1147} See Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Demersuri MAE pe linie ODA, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{1148} CONCORD, Members, list available online at http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=17, as of March 2009.
old Member States. The NMS share a recent past of aid recipients; they all have an interest for the near abroad, rather than the ‘global South; their relations with the developing countries was not influenced by a (inexistent) colonial past. Nonetheless, never (to the acknowledge) was there circulated the idea of creating an autonomous ‘NMS platform’ to discuss NMS-specific or ‘emerging’ donor issues or create synergies for proposing a new concept of development cooperation based on these countries specificities. Also as a consequence of TRIALOG’s activity, the NMS are all struggling to ‘catch-up’ with more established European donors.

TRIALOG, financed by the European Commission and supported by CONCORD (the European platform for development NGOs), had a main focus on development NGOs; but in Europe (as well as worldwide), many make a clear distinction between development and relief work and intervention. From this perspective, if TRIALOG was mainly about development, a different tool was needed to increase the capacity of NMS for humanitarian aid and relief work. However, steps in this direction were only made after the fifth Enlargement (in contrast to TRIALOG that started its work in 2000, way before the Enlargement) and in a less intrepid manner, though on the same model that had already been tested for development. Thus, in 2008 a project similar to TRIALOG was started by VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies), upon funding from the European Commission Humanitarian Office. The aim of this special project is to support capacity building for the NMS NGOs through ‘networking, training and coordination’ and indeed, NMS NGOs’ participation in trainings, seminars and other events is supported through this project. However, the objectives, and as a consequence, the first results, of this project are less ambitious when compared to those of TRIALOG. TRIALOG aimed to ‘fully integrate’ the NMS NGOs into the European ‘community’ of development NGOs, while also supporting their lobby efforts at national level. VOICE is merely aiming to facilitate NMS NGOs’ access to training opportunities in the field of relief. Similarly, TRIALOG advocated for the NMS NGOs to become members of

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1149 See the existence of two different ‘platforms’ (CONCORD for development NGOs and VOICE for relief NGOs), even if many NGOs are doing both relief and development work, while others are more specialized in their intervention (doing either relief or development). However, such distinction is frequently criticized and as being arbitrary (see Philomena Essed, 2006, p. 169) and counterproductive (see Geoff Harris, 1999, p. 115).
1150 CONCORD’s counterpart for relief work. As of self-reference, VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the European Union on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. More information on VOICE is available at www.ngovoice.org, as of March 2009.
CONCORD (through their national platforms), while VOICE is still a place mainly for OMS NGOs: none of the EU12 is represented in this ‘European’ platform.\(^{1152}\)

A further example of development-specific knowledge transfer and institutional learning at official level is the Twining Light program. As Papadimitriou and Phinnemore show, in the absence of a ‘thick’ acquis on public administration, the European Commission has encouraged administrative reform in the candidate countries by employing instruments such as TAIEX\(^{1153}\) or Sigma\(^{1154}\). Launched in May 1998, the ‘twinning’ system is the largest and most comprehensive of these instruments, as one of the pillars of the EU accession strategy\(^{1155}\). Its stated aim was to help beneficiaries (the candidate or accession countries) to develop ‘modern and efficient’ administrations, with the structures, human resources and management skills needed to implement the acquis communautaire\(^{1156}\). Nonetheless, critics saw this program as ‘the Union’s most invasive tool for building candidate capacity to implement Community law’, entailing ‘the delegation of member state administrative experts (‘preaccession advisors’) to candidate countries ministries and government agencies, usually for one or two years’\(^{1157}\).

Romania was one of the new Member States that used most extensively this ‘learning’ tool: from 1998 (when the program was launched) to 2005, it had conducted 191 such projects, compared to Poland’s 185 (second in range) or Bulgaria’s 140 (third in range).\(^{1158}\) This was also the tool that was chosen for building Romania’s capacity in the field of development cooperation. In an usual twinning project, the parties (‘old’ Member States

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\(^{1152}\) The list of VOICE members is available at http://www.ngovoice.org/index.php?page=121, as of March 2009. In CONCORD the membership is formed by national platforms and ‘multinational’ NGOs like Caritas, Save the Children, World Vision, etc. In VOICE the membership is exclusively formed by NGOs, as the relief NGOs do not so frequently organize themselves in formally established ‘national platforms’. Currently the members of VOICE come from all EU15 plus Switzerland and Norway. In spite of it not having a single member from EU12, VOICE claims to be (and probably is) ‘the main interlocutor with the European Union in emergency, aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness’.


\(^{1154}\) More on SIGMA – Support for Improvement in Governance and Management – at http://www.sigmaweb.org/pages/0.2987.en_33638100_33638151_1_1_1_1_1_1.00.html

\(^{1155}\) Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, Romania and the European Union. From Marginalization to Membership, Routledge, 2005, p. 115.


on one hand and candidate countries on the other hand) will agree in advance on a detailed work program to meet an objective concerning priority areas of the *acquis*, as set out in the Accession Partnerships. While Twinning Projects are intended to reforms of the general or legal framework, "Twinning Light" will be more limited in scope, geared towards the implementation of more specific measures and adjustments of already existing structures. The view over the twinning system is that it is usually driven by multiple actors with competing interests, not least the wish of some ‘old’ Member States to build ‘vectors of influence’ in the ‘new’ Member States and cast a certain model in these countries.\(^{1159}\)

Romania’s partner in the twinning light project aimed at building Romania’s capacity for international development was Germany’s BMZ – the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The cooperation between the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German BMZ led to the creation of a crucial document: the first ever official statement on Romania’s policy for development cooperation. Thus, Romania’s National Strategy on International Development Cooperation Policy was created. Many of the elements building this strategy resulted from the interaction between the Romanian officials and their German counterparts, but many other elements have been elaborated in three ‘consultation seminars’ organized by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of the German consultants.

Hosted in the Gafencu Room in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the consultation seminars took the ‘classical’ form: formal presentations for the opening (to introduce the aims of the twinning light project, some basic elements of the European Union’s development policy, some facts regarding Germany’s model for development cooperation, etc.), working groups (to discuss: the geographic areas that Romania’s policy for development cooperation should cover; the ‘sectorial’ or thematic priorities, etc.) presentations in the plenary (for the groups to share the results of their work), a time for debate (to ensure internal consistency and agreement) and conclusions. The seminars were attended by representatives of various interested stakeholders: representatives from other ministries (usually at level of ‘officer’ or ‘advisor’ indicating low priority given to this issue in the respective ministries), from TRIALOG (at level of project coordinator, indicating high priority given to these events) and NGOs (represented at directors’ or management level, indicating medium to high interest) that were present at the event in

\(^{1159}\) Beate Sissenich, op. cit., p. 147.
relatively high number (NGOs representatives were at least as numerous as the government representatives).

The main categories of players around the table were, therefore: the Romanian government (represented by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries such as the Ministry of Public Finances, Ministry of Labor, etc.), the European Commission (indirectly represented by the two projects it was financing – TRIALOG and the twining light project) and civil society represented by those Romanian NGOs that were knowledgeable about and interested in international development. The list of absentees is as significant as the list of attendants: nobody was there to represent the business sector, academia or the Romanian public (through, for instance, members of the Romanian Parliament or observers from political parties)\textsuperscript{1160}.

Nonetheless, the document that will be created in the framework of these seminars (the Romanian strategy for international development) will then be enshrined in a Government Decision, namely "hotărârea de guvern’ no. 703 of May 31 2006 (or 703 / 2006): The National Strategy concerning the National Policy on International Cooperation and the Action Plan for Applying the National Strategy. This government decision defines a ‘Romanian perspective’ on international development and introduces the geographic (Eastern Europe, Western Balkans and South Caucasus), as well as the sectorial priorities (good governance, democracy consolidation, employment, health, education, economic development, infrastructure development and environment protection). The Government Decision is a breaking point and a path-opener as it will soon be followed by other important pieces of legislation such as: the Law no. 404/2006 regarding the financing of official development assistance, giving the juridical framework for financing, through the state budget, Romania’s assistance for international development; the Government Decision no. 747 / 2007 regulating specific actions correlated to the financing of Romania assistance establishing the institutional framework for programming the official development assistance, as well as the institutional and financing framework for disbursing the official development assistance, and last but not least Romania’s ratification of The Cotonou Agreement\textsuperscript{1161}.

\textsuperscript{1160} Information based on fieldwork, in particular direct observation by the author. See also www.mae.ro.
\textsuperscript{1161} This section is based on the Romanian MFA’s website: http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=35301&idlnk=1&cat=3 – Cadrul legislativ.
With this legal framework and with its first disbursements in 2007 – standing at 0.07% of its national GDP\textsuperscript{1162} – Romania is now an international donor of development assistance.

To conclude, we may say that in the pre-Enlargement era, the power to define what exactly 'development cooperation' is resided with the European Union, and in particular with the European Commission that 'monitored' the NMS and funded various capacity-building initiatives in the private (NGO) and public sector. A specific view of development cooperation was promoted for adoption by the NMS. In particular, this was a bureaucratized view of international development that involved the creation of a public system for official development assistance, of a policy-driven framework for international giving, of a specific role for the central administration (and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), of a circumscribed role for the 'development' NGOs. Alternative views, based on specificities of the NMS, were never alluded to or encouraged. A \textit{de facto} alliance was proposed by the European NGO and public administration elite for a common conceptualization of international development, along the lines already in use in the OMS. The dominant discourse of development cooperation was thus shielded from the risk of fragmentation and the premises for its smooth extension were created.

3.3. Romania’s National Strategy for Development Cooperation – A Complying Discourse?

In the contemporary system of development cooperation, it is now taken for granted that ministries of foreign affairs have a role in foreign assistance. As the 'DAC Guidelines and Reference Series' shows, given that 'foreign assistance implies working with the people, institutions and governments of other countries, there is an inextricable link between development cooperation and foreign relations'\textsuperscript{1163}.

And indeed, among 'traditional’ donors or those countries that had a chief role in creating a development discourse in the aftermath of the second World War (ex. USA\textsuperscript{1164} or the


founding members of the European Community\textsuperscript{1165}, development cooperation is most often under the direct or indirect responsibility of the ministries of foreign affairs\textsuperscript{1166}. Usually, the various specialized departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) have a more or less important role in: drafting that country’s policies of development cooperation; setting the main objectives for development cooperation as well as the long-term strategies; giving the guidelines for implementing such strategies; monitoring and sometimes building ‘awareness’ in the public opinion; coordinating and harmonizing their country’s own policies and practices with those of other donors. Needless to say, these administrative entities are influenced and influence, in their turn, various stakeholders of development cooperation: non-governmental organisations in the donor countries as well as those in the developing countries, private companies, universities, think tanks and research institutes and others.

As explained by the ‘DAC Guidelines and Reference Series’, there can be various organizing models: in some countries a development cooperation division may exist within the ministry of foreign affairs or the ministry may have responsibility for a specific aspect of the aid program, such as humanitarian aid, the promotion of democracy and good governance or contributions to some multilateral agencies. Another possibility is for an organisation with a large degree of autonomy to manage development cooperation programs while falling under the political responsibility of the ministry of foreign affairs. In countries where a number of government entities are involved in delivering foreign assistance the MFA may take a leadership or co-ordination role\textsuperscript{1167}. This is also the role assigned to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of its own website:

\textit{The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the responsible institution for the coordination and the management of the national policy of international cooperation for development}\textsuperscript{1168}.

Romania’s standing on development cooperation can hardly be understood without an overview of the official discourse\textsuperscript{1169} in this field. At the time being, the development

\textsuperscript{1165} For a broad-ranging analysis of the European Community's relations with the developing world see Martin Holland, \textit{The European Union and the Third World}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

\textsuperscript{1166} An interesting case is that of Denmark which has two Ministers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation.

\textsuperscript{1167} Michael Laird, op. cit. p. 52 and p. 54.

\textsuperscript{1168} Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, programul de guvernare, Politica de cooperare pentru dezvoltare, Misiuni si valori, available online at \url{http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=35295&idlnk=1&cat=3} as of March 2009.
cooperation policy is one of the policies that seem to be confidently embraced by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: it is part of the MFA’s ‘government program’; it is the object of a series of legislative initiatives; it is the field of work for a growing unit in the Romanian MFA’s institutional structure; it is being mentioned in Romania’s official Report of foreign policy. In what follows we will look at the discursive framework that supports this field of political action; in particular we will look at Romania’s national strategy for development cooperation.

The ‘Strategy’ is a 6-page document, organized in 9 sections, each discussing a separate topic. In a first section, the ‘context’ of the policy is explained; the second section gives eight principles (ownership, differentiation, coordination, coherence, complementarity, effectiveness, transparency, conditionality) for the Romanian development assistance; the third section sets Romania’s objectives for its development aid; the fourth section establishes the geographic and ‘sectorial’ (thematic) priorities; the fifth part gives information about the types of assistance that Romania envisages (bilateral, multilateral and trilateral); the sixth section speaks about the institutional framework, putting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge as coordinator and giving the main responsibilities of this institutions; the financial resources are discussed in the seventh section of the ‘Strategy’, while the last two sections discuss the role of NGOs as well as the envisaged activities for development awareness and development education.

According to the ‘Strategy’ document,

‘Romania will support the objectives established by the international community for guaranteeing prosperity and development at a global level’

And in so doing Romania will give its full support for the Millennium Development Goals:

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1169 In faucauldian tradition, we take the term ‘discourse’ to mean an ‘institutionalized’ way of thinking in a specific field, a social boundary defining what can be said or not about a specific topic.
1171 As shown above. Besides, at the date of writing the office for development assistance is working on amendments to the government decision 747 / 2006, with the idea to improving it.
1172 The Office for Official Development Assistance in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs grew from 2 staff in 2007 to 7 staff at current date.
1173 Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Raport privind politica externǎ a României 2005-2008, op. cit., p. 21. Surprisingly, the development cooperation policy is given considerable importance in the text of the Report, as it is being presented immediately after Romania’s major ‘achievements’: the integration to the European Union and its playing host for the NATO summit in 2008. It is followed by sections on: the economic diplomacy, the ‘trans-atlantic relation’, regional cooperation, relations with the Western Balkans, the relations with the Republic of Moldova, the Eastern neighborhood, the Russian Federation, the other regions of the world and so on.
‘the main goal of Romania’s assistance policy consists in reduction of poverty, as poverty represents the major obstacle for a country’s social and economic development’¹¹⁷⁴.

Like many of the other ‘new’ Member States (see table below), Romania’s first geographic focus is towards its own neighbors and other countries in the ‘near abroad’: Eastern European states, the West Balkans and South Caucasus. The strategy document shows that Romania will, in principle, also support least developed and low income countries, as

‘the list of beneficiary states can be expanded towards Central Asia, Africa and Latin America, once Romanian capacities in the assistance for development field are being consolidated’¹¹⁷⁵.

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**Figure 14 - Priority countries for NMS' development cooperation¹¹⁷⁶**

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¹¹⁷⁵ Idem.

¹¹⁷⁶ Source: Mirko Dautović, ODA priority territories of the New EU Member States (NMS), available online at [http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/nms_oda_priority_countries.pdf](http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/nms_oda_priority_countries.pdf) as of September 2008.
The ‘Strategy’ enumerates six main areas in which Romania deems itself prepared to offer development assistance: 1. Good governance (citizens’ participation, reform of the public administration, decentralization, access to information); 2. The strengthening of democracy and the rule of law: promoting human rights (child protection, equal opportunities, combating discrimination), legislative and institutional reform; 3. Economic development: sustaining the transition towards a market economy, development of the private sector including by means of public private partnerships (PPP), sustaining the privatization process, formulation of the monetary policy, management of public finances, assisting the development of the information society; 4. Education and career development / employment: supporting partner states in developing a curriculum, the trainers formation, reform of professional and technical education, labor market reforms; 5. Health, with a focus on the reproduction health, prevention and control of diseases, fighting HIV/AIDS (promoting Romanian good practices in administrating the programs financed by the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the formation of trained medical personnel); 6. Development of infrastructure and environment protection, by contributing to rural infrastructure projects (water supplying, roads viability), to transport infrastructure programs, energy, telecommunication, housing projects, tourism projects, developing policies for environment protection by integrating environmental policies (wastage management, water economy, protecting and preserving the biological diversity, managing dangerous chemical substances and genetically modified organisms, pollution control and risk management, protection of soil and subsoil). However, in the first phase, Romania is said to focus on a limited number of areas, in particular those where it has a ‘strong advantage in comparison to the other donor countries’. These areas are considered to be:
human rights promotion, strengthening of democracy, education and career development and economic development.

In terms of financial resources, the Strategy shows that

‘In line with the Member States’ practice, Romania will finance the development cooperation activities from the national budget’.

Such activities are foreseen to be implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and financed through its budget, with the exception of the governmental scholarship fund for the international students, which will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Research. The document shows that

‘Romania, like the other new EU member states, will strive to increase by 2015 the ODA/GNP rate to 0.33 %’\(^\text{1177}\).

Regarding the role of the NGOs, the Strategy sets out from showing that cooperating with the non-governmental organizations is a ‘standard modality applied by EU donors’. Such cooperation is deemed to also be useful for Romania, having in mind its ‘limited human resources in state administration in the area of Development Assistance’ and NGO’s specific experience in Romania that can be transferred to the developing countries. The sectors that are considered to be most ‘transferable’ are related to the “experience within the transition process”, particularly in the social sphere, education and work with volunteers. For these reasons, the Romanian government is shown to be willing to strengthen its partnership with the Romanian CSOs, while encouraging the establishment of a Romanian “Development Cooperation Round Table”, to bring together Romanian NGOs interested in development issues. The ‘Strategy’ shows that the

‘Romanian NGOs will participate in policy formulation through a genuine consultative, inclusive process and will have the opportunity to apply for implementing projects. As a further step, a national NGO platform should be established’\(^\text{1178}\).

\(^{1177}\) Hotărâre pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale privind politica de cooperare internațională pentru dezvoltare și a Planului de Acțiune privind politica de cooperare internațională pentru dezvoltare Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I (Legi, Decrete, Hotărâri și Alte Acte), Anul 174 (XVIII), nr. 506, Luni 12 iunie, 2006, p. 27.

\(^{1178}\) Idem. Indeed, FOND, The Romanian NGDO platform was formally established shortly after, even if not so much as a result of the MFA’s ‘encouragements’, as of intellectual, logistic and financial support from Western European NGOs coming through the TRIALOG project financed by the European Union to raise awareness on development issues in the new Member States of the European Union.
Under the last section – public awareness and development education – the ‘Strategy’ shows that Romania regards development education as being ‘an integral part of Development Policy’ and the main aim of these activities will be to increase the awareness of the Romanian public, as well as its sense of solidarity with the developing countries. The methods envisaged are the usual ones: broad information campaigns, seminars, conferences, ‘open days’ events, fostering “transfer” labels for fair trade with developing countries. An official annual report on Romanian Development Cooperation\footnote{As of current date, the author is not aware of the publication of such a Report. The 2005-2008 Report of the MFA on Romania’s external policy does include a special section (1 page) on Romania’s Development Policy. See Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Raportul… op. cit.} is foreseen in order to facilitate the general public’s understanding of this new policy area of the Romanian state and, as a matter of fact, development training and education are seen as additional to Romania’s development policy and represent an important part of the Action Plan that accompanies the strategy. Several important points of this plan are aimed at raising Romanians’ awareness of matters relating to international development. To make two examples, according to this plan, through the year 2007 a development awareness campaign should have been carried out and by September 2007 development cooperation courses should have been introduced in the Romanian universities\footnote{While some of the development awareness activities did take place, the university courses are not there yet.}. Other actions envisaged by the plan were: by April 2007, the creation of a Consultative Council for development cooperation formed of Parliament representatives, NGOs, churches, trade unions and mass-media\footnote{According to the author’s knowledge this Consultative Council was not formed or – if it was – it never produced any significant result.}; by the end of 2006 the Diplomacy Law, with a special section to define the general framework of the development policy, to be sent to the Parliament; by the end of 2006, a round table with the Romanian NGOs to be formed to ‘create a discussion framework’; implement by the end of 2006 a first ODA reporting exercise, so as for the Romanian part to gain experience in ODA reporting\footnote{Optionally, it was mentioned, this exercise could be extended through the first months of 2007 as this activity (ODA reporting) would become mandatory starting with 2008.}; from July to September 2006, create the country strategies for Romania’s priority countries\footnote{If realized, these country strategies did not become public documents. Romania’s priority countries (The Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Serbia-Montenegro did benefit though from Romanian ODA through multilateral arrangements between the Romanian MFA and the United Nations Development Program).}. All these actions were supposed, thus, to be implemented through the years 2006 and 2007. However, the degree of achievement of these objectives can only be presumed as, to the date, there has been no formal report or evaluation of this action plan.
From a discursive point of view, the ‘Strategy’ and its ‘Statement of reasons’ (‘Expunere de motive’) make it clear that Romania’s choices in terms of development policy are heavily influenced by the European discourse and practice. The two documents (the strategy and the statement of reasons) have a very similar rhetorical structure. For instance, they both mention from their very first sentence the commitments made by Romania in the EU negotiation process. In its first section (‘Context’ of the development policy), the ‘Strategy’ makes a clear reference to the ‘obligations’ that Romania will have as an EU member, upon accession, obligations that entail the creation and the implementation of a development cooperation policy. The ‘Strategy’ sets then to briefly introduce the EU development policy and to underscore that the Romanian development cooperation policy is aligned with the European Consensus for Development so that the policy will consist in ‘supporting poor people in developing countries, including low income and middle income countries’. Since the fight against global poverty will be the focus of this policy, ‘poverty’ is then defined. The definition is given in general, negative lexical terms:

‘Poverty is not simply defined as the lack of financial resources but also citizens’ deprivation of food, education, health services, jobs, political involvement and infrastructure. The poor population is the victim, as well as the cause of the environment deterioration, because it generally lives in ecologically vulnerable areas. This affects its health, but, in the same time, it deteriorates the natural resources, polluting the environment. There is a strong link between poverty, fragile or non-democratic government systems and multiplication of security risks. There is no development without security and no security without good governance and respect of human rights’.

In a next paragraph the ‘Strategy’ shows that ‘after becoming an EU member, Romania will change its status from receiver to donor of development assistance’, while the Romanian development policy will work complementarily with Romania’s foreign policy

1184 A separate, introductory document that accompany all official documents seeking a Government Decision.
1185 The development policy being a shared competence between the Commission and the Member States, it being based on articles 177 to 181 of the Treaty of the EC, it being ‘at the heart of the EU’s relations with all developing countries’, it having as overarching objective the eradication of poverty and the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals.
1186 The so-called ‘European Consensus on Development’ is a joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union. As shown by the European Commission, this is the document that for the first time in fifty years of cooperation ‘defines the framework of common principles within which the EU and its Member States will each implement their development policies in a spirit of complementarity’. See more at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12544.htm, as of March 2009.
and its foreign economic relations, but in such a way as for its objectives to be correlated with the ones established at the EU and international levels.

The Statement of Reasons has an equal strength in what the ‘European reason’ is concerned. With 3 exceptions only, every single paragraph of this document links back to some EU institution, principle or commitment. Unequivocally, this document reads:

‘In this sense, Romania has to define, according to the European practice, the institutional and legislative framework that will ensure compliance with the commitments taken (...).

Modality is categorical - Romania has to define its development cooperation policy – suggesting that no choice is left than complying, or perhaps no other reason is stronger than the ‘European’ one.

As in other cases\textsuperscript{1187}, the arguments building the case for this public policy are not articulated from existing problems to proposed solutions: the problem seems to be the mere nonexistence of the policy itself. Similarly, the benefits for Romania for such a policy are not clearly expressed. Legitimacy for development cooperation policy is built on the need for Romania to comply with European practices, at the precise time when the legitimacy of the whole discourse of development cooperation, in the form it has been historically upbuilt by Western donors, is ever more under assail\textsuperscript{1188}. (To make an example) William Easterly, a renowned scholar of development economics, argues that the Western development discourse is based on the belief and practice of the ‘Big Plans’ that can ‘save’ all the poor people of the Planet from one decade to the other\textsuperscript{1189}. According to this author, the ‘Marshal Plan’, the ‘Big Push’ exhorted by Tony Blair, the Millennium Development Goals are all manifestations of the ‘Big Plan’ way of conceiving to international development. But in Easterly’s view, these are just utopian solutions that the West proposes for the ‘Rest’s’ developmental problems. Such visionary, but impracticable, schemes are preferred to a set of simple and specific things that may actually work for the poor. But

\textsuperscript{1187} See, for an example. Norman Fairclough, Discourses in processes of social change, available online at http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/paper1.doc, as of 2007. In this article Fairclough analyses the Romanian ‘National Strategy for the promotion of the New Economy and the implementation of the Information Society’.

\textsuperscript{1188} See the critical writing of authors like Gustavo Esteva, Arturo Escobar, Carmen Raff, William Easterly, etc.

\textsuperscript{1189} See also the three ‘decades’ of development that were proposed by the United Nations from the 1960s to the 1980s.
‘asking the aid agencies and development workers to attain utopian ideals makes them much worse at achieving doable things’ and ‘much less accountable for making specific things work, as the focus on the Big Goals of the Big Plan distracts everyone’s attention from whether more children are getting twelve-cent medicines’.

That could actually save their lives from such a disease like malaria, that the Western donors have long ago eradicating in their own countries.

Romania, as a number of other ‘new’ Member States are set to join the ‘traditional’ donors in their efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, according to a set of ‘principles’ that are shared by an ever larger number of donors, through means that comply with the set of internationally agreed standards that were developed by the Western donors starting several decades ago. While a certain alignment to the international practices of development cooperation might be desirable, the opportunity cost Romania may find itself to pay for what seems to be a massive import of development ideology can be a tapering space for alternative development thinking. To paraphrase Easterly, by asking Romania and the other new Member States to join the ‘traditional’ donors in the realization of idealistic-like objectives, one possible result might be to prevent these countries with a recent experience as ‘recipients’, to reflect on their recent experience and identify those ‘doables’ that could work inside or – why not? - outside the ‘Big Plan’ methodology.

3.4. Romanian NGOs as Advocates for Development Cooperation

In such an influential donor country like the United States of America, Carol Lancaster (author of numerous books and articles on development issues and professor of politics

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1191 Hotărâre pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale privind politica de cooperare internațională pentru dezvoltare și a Planului de Acțiune privind politica de cooperare internațională pentru dezvoltare, op. cit., p. 26.
1192 The ‘principles’ on which the Romanian development policy is based, are the same principles that other Western donors mention: coherence, coordination, ownership, etc.
1193 See for instance the use – with no exception – among the NMS of the OECD-DAC criteria for disbursing and reporting ODA.
1194 Put it differently, it precludes them from asking such important questions of development cooperation as: ‘How is it that after more than half a century of development, people still die from hunger?’, ‘Are we really ‘helpful?’’, ‘Do we really know what is exactly that poor people need?’, ‘Are we supplying that?’, etc.
with an extensive career in government\footnote{Curriculum vitae available at http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/lancastc/cv.doc, as of March 2009.} notes that starting with the 1970s there was a noteworthy rise in number and influence of those NGOs advocating for development-aid and shows that NGOs and USAID are now the ‘core constituency for development aid\footnote{Carol Lancaster, Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 105.} in her country. Similar statements have been made and demonstrated for other donor countries as well\footnote{Example, for Japan: Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 64-70; See also Barbara Rugendyke, NGOs as Advocates for Development in a Globalising World, Routledge, London, 2007.}, so that analyses of aid constituencies outside the governmental sphere frequently identify NGOs among the main stakeholders of the ‘aid lobby’\footnote{Carol Lancaster, op. cit. p. 102.}.

Critical authors of development aid show that it is through private organisations like these (as well as governmental and inter-governmental institutions), that knowledge about how to achieve development is updated and refined and it is also through these organisations that ‘decrees of development from various expert offices to the local settings in Africa, Asia and Latin America\footnote{Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, Zed Books, London, 2000, p. 21.} are channeled. Based on practices observed within and among Romanian organisations, this section will show that these organisations serve not only to ‘deepen’ the development knowledge by transmitted it vertically from ‘developed’ to ‘underdeveloped’ areas, but also to ‘widen’ it by co-opting organisations in new donor countries in the dominant discourse of development cooperation. To show how this happened in Romania, experiences of Romanian NGOs working abroad are collected and analyzed and the creation of FOND - Romania’s ‘national platform’ for development NGOs will be witnessed and described\footnote{Analyzing the activity of FOND is very relevant in a context in which FOND is the only stakeholder specifically mentioned by the Romanian Strategy on development cooperation as the MFA’s partner in implementing such strategy.}.

### 3.4.1. Experience of Romanian NGOs’. But whose moral and humanitarian concerns?

For many observers and commentators, EU donors are now of two main kinds: the ‘old’, ‘traditional’ ones corresponding to EU15 and the ‘new’, ‘emerging’ donors of EU12\footnote{The division is acknowledged at all levels. In a recent workshop in occasion of the 2008 European Development Days a DG DEV representative called for this division between new and old Member States, between the new and the old donors in the European Union to be overcome. See more at www.eudevdays.eu/Files/media/PressRelease/Rsum15/UE12_EN.pdf, as of March 2009.}.

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\textsuperscript{1195} Curriculum vitae available at http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/lancastc/cv.doc, as of March 2009. \\
\textsuperscript{1196} Carol Lancaster, Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 105. \\
\textsuperscript{1197} Example, for Japan: Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 64-70; See also Barbara Rugendyke, NGOs as Advocates for Development in a Globalising World, Routledge, London, 2007. \\
\textsuperscript{1198} Carol Lancaster, op. cit. p. 102. \\
\textsuperscript{1200} Analyzing the activity of FOND is very relevant in a context in which FOND is the only stakeholder specifically mentioned by the Romanian Strategy on development cooperation as the MFA’s partner in implementing such strategy. \\
\textsuperscript{1201} The division is acknowledged at all levels. In a recent workshop in occasion of the 2008 European Development Days a DG DEV representative called for this division between new and old Member States, between the new and the old donors in the European Union to be overcome. See more at www.eudevdays.eu/Files/media/PressRelease/Rsum15/UE12_EN.pdf, as of March 2009.
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With the fifth Enlargement of the European Union debates on the ‘role of the new donors’ are frequently organised either at national\textsuperscript{1202} or European level\textsuperscript{1203}, involving an ever larger number of experts, politicians, government official and NGOs. The EU15 donors are most often pictured as more ‘experienced’ donors, while EU12 donors are presented as less experienced, given that – as the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation once commented

‘many of these countries have had only a few years to switch from being a recipient to a donor.’

Therefore, they are naturally less experienced, needing to ‘catch-up with the others’\textsuperscript{1204}, both in quantitative (amount of ODA made available) and qualitative (the type of policies they adopt) terms. The need for ‘catching-up' is talked about in any context, it is a common goal, it is considered obvious, it is commonsensical and it is expressed both at public (Ministries of Foreign Affairs) and civil society level (namely NGOs). Based on information available from the NGO sector, this section aims to investigate this ‘catch-up’ line of argument — and understand its role in constructing the development cooperation discourse in the NMS and, in particular, in Romania.

This analysis was triggered by two main factors and the contradictory relation between them. The first factor is given by the sense of ‘easy’ consensus that seems to exist among all stakeholders involved – be they from new or old Member States, from the civil society or MFA level, from national or European level – regarding the NMS’s ‘lack of experience’ and ‘lack of tradition’ in what development cooperation is concerned. From a discursive


\textsuperscript{1203} See for instance the parliamentary debates organized by the European Commission and UNDP in the 12 new Member States of the European Union, in 2007 to ‘debate on the role of the new members of the European Union in providing development assistance’. See PMs from new EU member States discuss new role as donors, available online at http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2007/october/eu-new-members-20071031_en;jsessionid=axbWzt_7cMxWz_?categoryID=998963&lang=en, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1204} In a recent meeting in the framework of the European Development Days, Marek Dabrowski, from the Centre for Social and Economic Research, based in Warsaw, showed that first and foremost, “new donors must catch up with the others.” The statement came as response to European Commission representative calling for NMS to think how they can use their transition experience in future programs for development cooperation. See EU donors and their role in the European development agenda, EDD, Saturday 15 November, available online at http://www.eudevdays.eu/Files/media/PressRelease/PressReleaseEU20071031_EN.pdf, as of March 2009. For 'catching-up' in quantitative terms see: Lars Knuchel, The impact of EU expansion to the east on development policy, Development Policy Meeting, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 03.05.2004, available online at http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Dossiers/ressources/resource_en_24329.pdf, as of March 2009.
point of view such a consensus simply called for an analysis, particularly when looked upon from the perspective given by the second main factor that prompted this analysis. This second main factor is related to the empirical observation, made in the Romanian context, that many Romanian NGOs located in the South-Western, Eastern and Northern regions, bordering Serbia, The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine respectively, had developed and implemented so-called ‘cross-border cooperation projects’ well before 2007, when Romania became a member of the European Union and a donor country. As soon as Romania gave itself a national strategy for development cooperation, two of the three countries mentioned above (the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) along with Georgia – became ‘priority countries’ for Romania’s policy of development cooperation. Moreover, these particular ‘cross-border projects’ have the characteristic of being developed in countries that were and still are on the OECD-DAC List of ODA recipients. This way, according to the OECD-DAC definition of official development assistance, at least in theory, these NGOs’ experience may be qualified as know-how in the field of development cooperation. What is then the sense of a ‘catch-up’ claim so strongly promoted?

In 2004 Romanian NGOs in the social field developed various projects with their counterparts in the Republic of Moldova: Save the Children (the Iaşi office) had, for example, developed a quarter a million EUR - worth project to develop social and psychological services for ‘children in need’ from Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Similarly Pro Women Foundation implemented a project to develop a

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1205 Phare CBC (cross-border cooperation) was introduced in 1994 to assist border regions in the applicant countries overcome their specific development problems and integrate more closely with the European Union, with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and within their own national economies. See Phare Programme Types, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/phare/programmes_types_en.htm, as of December.


1207 According to the OECD-DAC definition one of the conditions for an activity to be considered ‘official development assistance’ is that the receiving countries and territories be on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients. See Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC), DAC’s Glossary, available online at http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965586, as of March 2009. Ukraine, Serbia and Moldova are all on the list of ODA recipients. See the list online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/48/41655745.pdf as of March 2009.

1208 Romanian region bordering the Republic of Moldova.


1210 Pro Women promotes women’s participation in strengthening democracy by raising their level of self confidence and personal development. More on this NGO at www.prowomen.ro.
cross-border partnership for developing social-educational services for young people\textsuperscript{1211}, as well as a project to create ‘partnerships for development’\textsuperscript{1212}. CATHARSIS (Society for psychotherapy and psycho-social intervention)\textsuperscript{1213} implemented a program for trans-national cooperation regarding the traffic in human beings\textsuperscript{1214}, while the Corona Foundation\textsuperscript{1215} developed a project to reduce the impact of waste on the environment\textsuperscript{1216}.

The same year (2004), similar projects were developed by Romanian NGOs at the Serbian border. The Youth Foundation from Mehedinți\textsuperscript{1217} implemented a pilot project to develop the cross-border tourism; NERA, the Ecologic Group for Cooperation, contributes to the improvement of the management of protected areas in the Danube – Nera Caras micro-region; the Union of Professional Journalists from Romania, the office in Caras Severin implements a cultural project regarding the cross-border ‘Historic Banat’ region; Constantin Brâncuși Cultural Association proposed a project to revive the memory of popular traditions and valorise them as a bridge between the inhabitants of the cross-border area; and the Activity Foundation for Human Resources and Sustainable Development from Reșița implemented ‘the Path of the good example’\textsuperscript{1218} to improve the quality of life standards by cultural and educational activities, by creating and supporting a local network for women in sustainable development and by promoting and supporting the traditional crafts\textsuperscript{1219}.

In 2005, through the Romania – Moldova CBC Program 62 entities implemented cross-border projects. 24 of the grantees were NGOs like Accord Association (implementing the...
Tourist Information Campaign in the Cross-Border Region Romania – Moldova’), Pro Women Foundation (with the project “Business Center for Women Entrepreneurs”)
Alaturi de Voi Foundation (the project ‘Together For a Healthy Community’), Social Alternatives Association (the project ‘An efficient partnership – a safer border’), Iosif Foundation (Cross-border partnership for supporting children in difficulty) and others1220.

In the same year (2005), at the Serbian border, the Association Exploratorii, the Association Banat Ripensis for the Development of Communities, the Cseconics Association, the Banat Foundation and the Pro Association implemented projects under the ‘Local Economic and Social Development Scheme’ of an approximate value of 800.000 EUR. Under the People-to-people Priority the Bethany Foundation for Social Services, the Rubin Foundation, the Activity Foundation, the Diaspora Foundation, the Radio Semenic Association and the European Union Banat Association implemented projects for approximately 270.000 EUR1221.

Romanian NGOs also cooperated (and are still doing so) with their counterparts in Ukraine. For instance, in 2006, under the Romania-Ukraine CBC Programme, the European Center for Resources and Consultancy Suceava developed ‘Cultural itineraries Suceava – Hotin’, the Professional Association for Regional Management Suceava created a center for cross-border cooperation and development in the field of tourism, while the Association for European Integration of the Tulcea county implemented a system for air monitoring in the bordering region Tulcea – Odessa1222.

Most of the organisations mentioned above (and many others that implemented cross-border projects without being mentioned here) are not members of Romania’s national platform - FOND. Examples of FOND members involved in cross-border cooperation are

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1220 Data elaborated by the author based on information provided by Biorul Regional pentru Cooperare Transfrontaliera Iasi, available online at http://cbc.mie.ro/Moldova/gen/main.php, as of March 2009.
CREST, AIDROM, the Civil Society Development Foundation and others\(^1\)\(^2\). From 2007 to 2008 FOND member CREST Resource Center\(^1\)\(^2\) implemented a project aiming to develop human resources for local and trans-border economies and for promoting the traditional multiculturalism by developing the cross-border rural tourism between Romania and Ukraine\(^1\)\(^2\). PATRIR – Peace Action, Training and Research Institute – is one other active member of FOND developing projects abroad and one of the only ones predominantly involved in peace promotion. Cooperative peace project Moldova-Transnistria\(^1\)\(^2\), developed over a period of three years, aims at promoting a constructive partnership and dialogue, as well as positive engagements, both in the framework of the civil society and between the civil society and the local authorities on both sides of the Nistru River. Equally active is AIDROM\(^1\)\(^2\) with projects to develop the NGO international network to prevent and fight against the traffic in human beings between Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova; to support the groups of Moldavian women to become involved in the social and religious life of their communities; and to inform young people at risk on the work offers on the domestic and international labour market, so as to prevent them to be trafficked. The Civil Society Development Foundation\(^1\)\(^2\) has also been active in transferring knowledge and skills for representatives of the Moldavian civil society regarding project management and the access to European funding as well as in raising the awareness in Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on the European Neighbourhood Instrument and strengthening the involvement of Moldovan, Ukrainian and Romanian civil society organizations in the ENPI programming.

\(^{1223}\) Information elaborated by the author based on fieldwork, interviews and correspondence with staff in these organizations.

\(^{1224}\) Based in Satu Mare in Northern Romania, CREST’s main objectives are to promote projects for the long-term development of the Romanian society; to contribute to the strategic development of the nongovernmental organizations, to promote the support of civil sector by the private sector and to support the development of the problem solving capacity of public authorities. More on CREST at www.crest.ro.

\(^{1225}\) More information available online at http://www.crest.ro/rohtml/rofr5.htm, as of December 2008. IPP Bucharest and IPP Chisinau develop a series of common projects with the aim of promoting a stability climate in the region, by facilitating the exchange of expertise in domains that are crucial for the neighborly relations between the two countries: border security, the reform of the local public administration and not least the crisis in Transnistria.

\(^{1226}\) More information on this project is available at http://fondromania.wordpress.com/experienta-noastra/, as of December 2008.

\(^{1227}\) The Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania. The Associations main aims are to ‘get the Churches concretely involved in the public education, in forming trainers, to organize conferences and attract all categories of mass-media’ and to ‘come up with the support –both material and spiritual—for the groups of persons in need’. See more on AIDROM’s work at www.aidrom.ro.

\(^{1228}\) The Civil Society Development Foundation is an ‘independent, non-governmental organisation, established in 1994 at the initiative of European Commission’. The work of the Civil Society Development Foundation is dedicated to supporting organizations from the non-profit sector. See more at www.fdsc.ro.
If the examples of Romanian NGOs cooperating with their counterparts in Ukraine, Serbia and the Republic of Moldova abound\textsuperscript{1229}, examples of Romanian NGOs cooperating with and implementing projects in Georgia\textsuperscript{1230} are rather limited\textsuperscript{1231}. Lack of previous cultural links and lack of available sources of funding are major obstacles. Indeed, beyond the funding made available by the European Union, the Soros Foundation was among the very few other sources of funding and support for Romanian NGOs willing to cooperate with their counterparts in other countries, mainly through the Program East-East: Partnership Beyond Border\textsuperscript{1232}. But even when alternative funding – scarce as it might be – is available, Romanian-Georgian initiatives are hardly given preference. Exceptions do exist, such as the project implemented by the Romanian Society for Contraceptive and Sexual Education – SECS – to train Georgian trainers in the logistic system for contraceptives’ management\textsuperscript{1233}. Similarly limited is also the experience that Romanian NGOs can show in implementing development projects in least developed countries or countries from other continents. An exception is the ‘Alaturi de Voi’ Foundation which, through various projects, established links and shared experience in the field of HIV / AIDS prevention and cure with organisations from Nigeria\textsuperscript{1234}, without these first contacts to be followed by more structured activities\textsuperscript{1235}.

If all these projects are more development-oriented, Romanian NGOs and citizens are not aloof from humanitarian actions either. In occasion of the war in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, between December 1999 and March 2000, World Vision Romania implemented a 1.9 million USD program in the Mitrovita region in Kosovo, aiming at supporting families and communities affected by war and at establishing and re-establishing commercial relations between Romania and Kosovo by developing the regional partnership and trade\textsuperscript{1236}. But the ‘proof’ regarding Romanians’ capacity and willingness to be involved in humanitarian activities arrived in 2005 and 2006. When the

\textsuperscript{1229} The author would like to stress vividly that the list of projects and organizations here mentioned is far from being complete and exhaustive. Many more FOND and non-FOND NGOs implement projects in these three countries, but given the obvious lack of space, only some of them could be referred to in this paper.

\textsuperscript{1231} Based on fieldwork.

\textsuperscript{1232} See more on this program at http://www.osf.ro/ro/program.php?program=10, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1233} More information available online at http://fondromania.wordpress.com/experienta-noastra/ as of December 2008.

\textsuperscript{1234} More information is available online at http://www.alaturidevoi.ro/ro/php/afis_comunicat.php?id=222, as of December 2008.

\textsuperscript{1235} Interview with the author.

\textsuperscript{1236} Information based on fieldwork. See also FOND, Experienta noastra, available online at http://fondromania.wordpress.com/experienta-noastra/, as of March 2009.
2005 tsunami hit, the world was surprised by the massive waves of subsequent international solidarity that followed. In Romania the surprise was twice as unexpected, as that was the first time ever that Romanians participated, wholeheartedly and on a large scale, to humanitarian fundraising. Realitatea TV (in collaboration with World Vision Romania) organized a 'unique campaign' - 'Hell in Paradise' to raise funds for the tsunami victims: thousands of Romanians donated in a live Telethon, with President Traian Băsescu donating his first salary as President of Romania.

Similarly, the Caritas Confederation in Romania launched the campaign ‘Make a solidarity gesture – The people from Southern Asia need your help’ (Fă un gest de solidaritate! - Oamenii din sudul Asiei au nevoie de ajutorul tau!) with the same aim. For Caritas Romania this was not the 'usual' fundraising campaign, but a campaign that opened a whole new branch of activities, that of international humanitarian relief. The 2005 tsunami was an opener and other initiatives, on different topics and needs, followed.

Even if this is not intended like an accurate overview of NGOs’ activities in the neighbouring countries, it is obvious that, along the years, the Romanian NGOs demonstrated a clear interest for cooperating with their Moldavian, Serbian, Ukrainian or Georgian counterparts. In spite of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, dozens of projects worth millions of euros raised from the European Union were implemented by the Romanian NGOs (mostly from the Cross-border Cooperation Program) and put to work in cross-border projects. The partner countries - Serbia, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia - are nowadays target countries for Romania’s development assistance and each of

1237 Jan Egeland, the UN emergency coordinator is frequently quoted to say: 'It is the most generous and most immediately funded international emergency debt relief effort ever. In terms of volume and speed it was fantastic'. See Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen and Philip Nel, 'The Study of International Relations', in Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen, Philip Nel, *Power, Wealth and Global Equity*, UCT Press, Landsowne, 2006, p. 6.


1239 Fieldwork and interview with a Caritas worker. See also FOND, Experienta noastra, available online http://fondromania.wordpress.com/experienta-noastra/ as of March 2009.

1240 An example is ‘Rewrite the Future’ campaign of Save the Children Romania. An initiative of the Save the Children Alliance, the campaign is now also supported by Save the Children Romania and advocates for education to be included as a fourth component (along with food, medical services and shelter) of humanitarian aid in armed conflict situations. In the framework of this campaign Save the Children Romania managed to raise the needed funds for purchasing 300 school bags with the needed books and notebooks as well as beds and water for the children in the South of Afghanistan. More information at www.salvaticopiii.ro as well as a presentation (in Romanian) on FOND's website http://www.fondromania.org/library/salvati%20copiii.pdf, as of March 2009.

1241 Mentioned by all respondents.
them is on the OECD-DAC list of recipient countries. Elsewhere, projects that respond to both of these criteria or even only one, would be called ‘development cooperation projects’, ‘co-development’ projects or perhaps 'de-centralized cooperation' and surely counted as experience in the field of development.

Nonetheless, such experience is hardly acknowledged either in Romania or at EU level, as it is hardly known even by those who may have (had) a strong interest in revealing and promoting it with every possible occasion. In 2007, at FOND’s General Assembly, an MFA guest speaker, called upon the Romanian NGOs to back the MFA’s initiative in widening the domestic policy space for development cooperation and grant their support to ‘convince’ the Ministry of Public Finances (presented like an opponent of development cooperation disbursements) about Romania’s implementation capacities of such projects. The fear was there that the Ministry of Public Finances would oppose creating an ODA budget line over fears that such resources would hardly be spent anyway. To countervail such a possibility the NGOs were suggested to put together a common dossier to show and demonstrate that Romania does have relevant experience in the field of development cooperation and the availability of eventual funds would be met with already-tested instruments and methodologies for implementation. The MFA representative was at the time raising an important aspect: Romanian politicians, as the Romanian public in general, were largely unaware of such cooperation initiatives of Romanian NGOs. FOND was in its beginnings, while most of the organisations mentioned above are rather regional or local organisations, without significant visibility at national level, some of them hardly even having a website and rather project-oriented, without an interest in lobbying for a development policy of which they were largely oblivious. Thus, FOND had been able to identify and attract towards membership only a small part – and sometimes not the most experienced – of these organisations as, at the time, FOND was itself largely unaware of the existence and the activities of these organisations. In spite of the important challenge ahead, FOND’s secretariat – coordinated by a junior-level officer – hastily prepared a word document with a table showing approximately twenty different projects that had been developed by Romanian NGOs in other countries. Only those NGOs that are FOND members will be mentioned in this document. No stylish ‘Report’, no heartbreaking photos from the field, no sophisticated analyses, no press-conference, no convincing plea, no ‘recommendations’ or policy calls from FOND on the Ministry of Finance and other public

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1242 Statement based on a comparison of FOND's members and the organizations that had developed cross-border cooperation projects funded by the European Union.
decision-makers with responsibilities in the field of development cooperation. In short, no use of usual lobby techniques which are so characteristic of more established umbrella organisations. Eventually, after much delay, anxiety and internal lobby, funds for development cooperation were approved, but – in spite of the good news – it will be obvious (later on) that FOND had failed to convince: in occasion of its next (2008) General Assembly, FOND is again invited to present ‘concrete – but very concrete! - project ideas’, while the whole budget of the previous year had been implemented through UNDP Romania and other UN institutions.

Thus, in spite of 'experience' being much talked about, such experience has not been recognized (at least not yet) as it was never systematically investigated by neither of the stakeholders that might have an interest in so doing: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - as initiator and coordinator of Romania's policy for development cooperation; FOND – as the umbrella organisation of development NGOs with a mission in promoting development issues in the Romanian society; TRIALOG – as a project aiming at the 'full integration' of development NGOs in the NMS in the European discourse of development cooperation.

Moreover, the concept of 'experience', the terms of the 'catch-up' exercise are not defined. The lack of experience is accepted as being implicit, but there are no standards or indicators to show what an 'experienced' organisation or institution looks like. If development 'experience' were defined in terms of the organisations’ past relations and projects with third countries on the OECD-DAC list of recipients (regardless of their geographical position or proximity to the European Union borders) – then Romanian NGOs could theoretically claim having development experience and, virtually, they could claim that the ‘catch-up’ process in the Enlarged Europe be a two-way, rather than a one-way process; they could claim that all Member States ‘catch-up’ with one another, by sharing experiences and accommodating the experience of the ‘newcomers’, while the newcomers take in the experience of those having been more in other geographical areas and with other instruments. On the contrary, if 'experience' is defined exclusively on the basis of contacts, relations and projects with – for instance – African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, then Romanian NGOs claims would be more difficult to support given their rather limited level of involvement in this geographical areas.

1243 Funding for development collaboration was approved only in September (to be disbursed by October) upon the procedure of “budget rectification” (rectificare bugetara).
Nonetheless, at European level, NMS – and implicitly also Romania - are constructed as 'inexperienced' donors, that need to 'catch-up'. With the recent and past (before 1989) experiences being consciously or unconsciously excluded from the public debate, Romanians will sooner or later ‘catch-up’ and, with that, ‘fully integrate’ into the dominant discourse of development cooperation that ‘is always presented as a humanitarian and moral concern’1244. The question will then be: whose ‘humanitarian and moral concerns’ will Romania’s development policy address, given this process of unilateral integration?

3.4.2. The Romanian Platform for Development Cooperation: a Brick in a Pyramid

Nowadays, development NGOs in the donor countries have a specific and hierarchic form of organization, aiming at binding them together, while connecting and giving them access - as a group – with / to aid-related decision-makers in the public administrations in each donor country, and also with regional and global centres of power1245. To describe this organizational structure, one can refer to and imagine a pyramid.

Sooner or later in its development cooperation history, each donor or recipient country witnessed at some point the following phenomenon: some of the development NGOs, acting on their own initiative or encouraged by their governments, formed what is now called a ‘national platform’ of ‘NGDOs’ or non-governmental development organisations1246. After a while, all the national platforms in a coherent geographic area

1245 Statement based on the author’s fieldwork and direct observation.
1246 According to the author’s knowledge, there are now 86 national platforms. See The International Forum of NGO platforms, Composition of the International Forum of national NGO platforms (list of members), available online at http://www.ong-ngo.org/IMG/doc/Composition_of_the_International_Forum_of_NGO_platforms-2.doc, as of March 2009.
form a regional or even a continental platform and sometimes these regional platforms manage to coordinate for common goals.

The various thousands of individual NGOs that form these platforms can be seen as the very basis of the pyramid, while the individual platforms from the various countries can be likened to the middle layer of the pyramid. The top that gets all eyes to look into the sky is represented by the supra-national platform that reunites all national platforms from a particular geographical area. In the European Union, at the ‘top’ there is CONCORD – the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, representing more than 1600 these NGOs and playing the most important role in the policy dialogue between the European NGOs and the European institutions. All old Member States platforms are represented in CONCORD, but not all new Member States are yet members of CONCORD, even if all of them already have an ‘observer’ status and participate in this capacity to the various CONCORD working groups.

The ‘pyramid’ is now largely taken for granted and looked upon as the most efficient and rational form of organization, in spite of its actual and potential flaws. Even after having been charged of public funds mismanagement by the European Commission, CLONG (the umbrella organisation that existed before CONCORD) was reconstituted with the help of the same European Commission into the present-day CONCORD. Apparently, neither the European Commission, nor the NGOs were able or willing to identify a radically different form of organization: the idea of a European, Brussels-based umbrella

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1248 Coordination tools have been developed. An example is the Portal of national NGO platforms ‘for a non governmental diplomacy’, available at http://www.ong-ngo.org/spip.php?page=sommaire&id_rubrique=4 as of March 2009.

1249 For more information on CONCORD see www.concordeurope.org.

1250 CONCORD, About CONCORD, http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=8, as of March 2009. Currently CONCORD counts in its membership 18 international networks (such as Save the Children, Caritas, APRODEV, ADRA, World Vision and others) and 22 national platforms from the European Union Member States.


1252 Idem, pp. 202-203.
organisation stayed. More than that, its initial structure and functioning has been change so as to actually widen its scope\textsuperscript{1253}.

Upon the accession to the European Union of the 12 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the ‘pyramid’-model was successfully introduced into the now new Member States, so that at the time being not only in the old Member States but also in the new Member States are the national platforms considered as being essential for international development purposes. As a Lithuanian development worker best put it:

\textit{‘The platform is not only needed, it is vital! The platform is needed for representing the NGOs in their communication with the national institutions so that they can see the whole range of strength of NGOs. Internationally we need the platform to start talking and communicating and sharing information, knowledge and represent us in the EU and allow us participate as a partner in both formation and implementation of the development policy’\textsuperscript{1254}.}

Of course, obstacles did exist: NGOs lack of expertise and capacity; lack of interest of those which should have been the main interlocutors of the national platforms – the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; lack of interest from a sufficient if not also representative number of NGOs, and so on. But these obstacles were all removed, most often with the help of the European partners. Thus, in overcoming the gaps in expertise and capacity were concerned, TRIALOG – an EC-funded project – had the paramount role. Many, in both old and new Member States, are ready to acknowledge the importance that TRIALOG had from this point of view. An independent evaluation of TRIALOG, based on interviews with all major stakeholders (representatives of the national platforms included) clearly shows that

\textit{‘Without TRIALOG’s support, many (countries) would not have been able to build their National Platforms and most would not have been able to access the information necessary to begin to understand EU policies and processes’\textsuperscript{1255}.}

\textsuperscript{1253} CLONG’s membership was formed only by national platforms, while CONCORD also includes ‘families’ of international organizations. Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1254} Interview with the author, November 2007.
\textsuperscript{1255} Nikki van der Gaag, External evaluation of TRIALOG II. Executive Summary, September 4, 2006, p. 4, available online at \url{http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/executivesummary_evaluation.pdf}, as of March 2009.
The lack of interest of the main interlocutor at national level – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the respective country – was galvanized by the strong signals sent by representatives of the European Commission and other EU institutions. Thus, in Slovenia no less than three attempts were made to form a national platform for development NGOs and the only successful one was that following the visit of a DG Development and ECHO representative to Ljubljana\textsuperscript{1256}.

Last but not least, at the time of accession, few NGOs in the NMS were actually implementing what the old member states would define as ‘development cooperation projects’. Their overwhelming majority were developing services for fighting domestic rather than global poverty. What could have been a major obstacle (lack of interest of the NMS NGOs) proved to be less of a problem as soon as NGOs that were potentially interested in development cooperation were considered for participation in training and capacity building opportunities and for membership for the future national platform.

The European Commission’s objective for the NMS national platforms – expressed through the TRIALOG project which it finances - is for them to become ‘fully integrated’ into CONCORD, the EU-level structure that the Commission recognizes as legitimate interlocutor. That NMS national platforms should be ‘fully integrated’ into CONCORD is now widely accepted: most of NMS national platforms are already members of CONORD, while those who are not yet members, have an ‘observer’ status that will ultimately lead to membership. The impact of institutional structures on outcomes of development projects has been acknowledged\textsuperscript{1257}, therefore the way that the NMS are integrated in the EU structures for development cooperation is important. It is argued and arguable that NMS NGOs share more challenges and strengths among themselves, then with the OMS. As a Polish participant to a CONCORD working groups showed:

\begin{quote}
We (NMS NGOs) have a lot in common. First of all we are cheaper. If you have 4000 EUR and need a malaria expert, you will get a junior level one in the OMS, but the best award-winning professor in Poland. One common denomination of the NMS, one common thing is legacy of the difficult past (reference to communism);
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1256} See SLOGA – Slovenian Global Action, History, available online at \url{http://www.sloga-platform.org/history}, as of March 2009. Apparently, Slovenia’s national platform was very much strengthened by the advent of the Slovenian Presidency of the European Union.

\textsuperscript{1257} See for an example of negative impact: Joel Bolnick, \textit{A Pro-Poor Urban Agenda for Africa: Clarifying Ecological and Development Issues for Poor and Vulnerable Populations}, IIED, London, 2006, p. 65: ‘The institutional structure of official aid agencies and development banks are largely incapable of supporting the diverse local processes that really deliver for the poor’.
we have experience in building institutions in transition times; we are not former colonizers and don’t have that thing in mind.\textsuperscript{1258}

Nonetheless, not an EU 12 platform, a platform to gather and represent all NMS, has been created, but an EU-wide one, to integrate the ‘newcomers’ in a structure that was already in place. Given that it is the ‘newcomers’ that have less experience, it will be the newcomers who will be naturally adjusting themselves to the existing structure and not so much the existing structure changing for the needs of the newcomers.\textsuperscript{1259}

Thus, the similarity in the aims declared by NMS and OMS platforms is striking. BOND – UK’s national platform, established in 1993, with generous support from the Overseas Development Administration, was intended to provide the government with a formal partner for dialogue,\textsuperscript{1260} while also sharing information about development and creating and agreeing strategies for putting development onto the agenda of states and multilateral agencies.\textsuperscript{1261} VENRO,\textsuperscript{1262} Dochas\textsuperscript{1263}, Associazione ONG Italiane\textsuperscript{1264}, the Spanish Coordinador\textsuperscript{1265} and each of the remaining 11 platforms of the old Member States share similar aims. As VENRO illustrates, the main objectives of a national platform can be: to work towards a coherent development policy at all political levels; to strengthen the dialogue between private and government actors in the field of development cooperation; and to safeguard and enlarge the social and political contribution of development NGOs.\textsuperscript{1266} Shaped by TRIALOG (which had a crucial role in their creation), the national platforms in the NMS have similar objectives. To make only one example, Poland’s Grupa Zagranica has among its main goals to facilitate the exchange of information among Polish NGOs; to participate in shaping and accomplishing Poland’s development assistance; to sensitize the Polish public opinion to the issues of international aid.\textsuperscript{1267}

\textsuperscript{1258} Author’s fieldwork, participation at FDR CONCORD working group of March 2008.
\textsuperscript{1259} 7 national platform representatives sit on CONCORD’s board. Only one is from the NMS, while the other six are all from the old Member States. See CONCORD, The Board, http://www.concordeurope.org/Public/Page.php?ID=26, as of March 2009. At the same time, the secretariat of CONCORD is made of mainly OMS nationals (direct observation of the author).
\textsuperscript{1261} Idem, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{1262} The German national platform. See more on VENRO at http://www.venro.org/.
\textsuperscript{1263} The Irish Association Non-Governmental Development Organisations. See more on DOCHAS at http://www.dochas.ie.
\textsuperscript{1264} See more on Associazione ONG Italiane at http://www.ongitaliane.it.
\textsuperscript{1265} See more on the Coordinadora ONG para el desarrollo Espana at http://www.congde.org.
\textsuperscript{1266} VENRO, What we want, available online at http://www.venro.org/whatwewant.html, as of March 2009.
In Romania, FOND’s stated main objective is the ‘responsible and effective involvement of the Romanian civil society and Government in international development cooperation and humanitarian aid’. Three main aims are mentioned by FOND’s statute:
a) promoting the involvement of Romanian NGOs in the national and European policy of development cooperation; b) supporting the Romanian NGOs for effectively contributing to the sustainable development of less developed countries; c) raising the awareness of Romanian citizens regarding the principles of international solidarity and development cooperation as means of fighting poverty, for promoting freedom and human rights and for granting assistance in cases of humanitarian crises taking place wherever in the World.
FOND is bound by its statutes to work for representing the common interests of its members in the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian aid and development education; for offering relevant information to its members; for facilitating the exchange of information and for supporting the learning process among members; for cooperating with the Romanian public authorities and international partners in development cooperation; for promoting the access of its members to the financing modalities of the EU and the existing opportunities for strengthening its members’ actions in the field of development cooperation.

As shown elsewhere, the first contacts between TRIALOG - on one hand - and the Romanian NGOs and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - on the other hand - took place in 2005, only two years before accession. But for the following year (2006), TRIALOG’s objectives for Romania (among others) were to identify all Romanian NGOs interested in development cooperation and to develop a legally established platform of development NGOs, while connecting such platform to the European ones.

The objectives were duly achieved and, by the end of the year, 34 Romanian NGOs met and signed the by-laws of the Romanian Federation of Development NGOs – FOND.

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1268 The Federation of Romanian development NGOs.
1270 The objective was carried out through a series of three regional meetings that took place in Timisoara, Iasi and Cluj. More than 100 NGOs participated in these meetings. Additionally, a ‘platform-building’ seminar was delivered in Bucharest to facilitate the creation of the Romanian platform. See ‘Despre noi’ section of FOND’s blog, available at http://fondromania.wordpress.com/despre-noi/ as of December 2008.
Apparently this was an exceptional event in Romania’s history of NGO federalization, as very rarely did a federation start with so many founding members\footnote{By comparison, the Romanian network against poverty, only had 13 founding members.}. As a participant to this meeting later on said:

‘You can not imagine what was there. Every organisation had to sign and stamp the statute and the other documents. It was like an international peace conference. There was such a tension in the room, you could feel it!’\footnote{Fieldwork, interview with the author.}

FOND members are extremely varied in focus, size and scope: some of them are local NGOs, while others have a national coverage or they are local branches of international development, relief or advocacy NGOs; some run budgets in the range of few thousands or hundreds of euros, while others operate with hundreds of thousands of euros; some – have a few employees and mostly rely on volunteer work, while others have scores of employees and only complement their work with the help of volunteers; some are more service providing oriented, while others are more involved in consultancy work. In terms of development cooperation, however, they all share a similar condition: they have mostly been at the ‘receiving’ end of it while Romania was still a recipient country, fighting for overcoming its own poverty and lack of development. Nonetheless, these organisations obviously feel confident enough so as to set as their common objective to

‘Support the development (process n.a.) in the states from the geographic areas identified as having priority for Romania’s external relations, respectively Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus\footnote{FOND Romania, Misiune, Obiective, available online at http://www.fondromania.org/pagini/organizatii-membre.php as of March 2009}’.

On the organisational model of CONCORD and other national platforms in the European Union, FOND’s members (now 40 of them)\footnote{See the list of FOND members at http://www.fondromania.org/pagini/statutul-fond.php, as of March 2009} meet altogether in the General Assembly (usually held once a year), as well as in various working groups that carry out FOND’s activity\footnote{These working groups are: Policy and Advocacy Working Group, The Moldova – Georgia Working Group and the group for Development Education. See FOND, Grupurile de lucru FOND, available online http://www.fondromania.org/pagini/nnn.php, as of March 2009.}. The type of activities is also very similar, and as a ‘rule of thumb’ every high-level event would see the involvement of European experts whose choice was meant to boost the profile of the respective event.
In 2007, in its first year of existence, FOND’s small secretariat\textsuperscript{1278} and FOND’s three working groups organized several lower-scale activities\textsuperscript{1279}, while 2008 was dominated by the organization of one major event: the Black Sea NGO Forum\textsuperscript{1280}. Most of the efforts accomplished in 2007 and 2008 were subsumed to one very important need felt by all three working groups: that for the FOND members to meet and establish working relations with potential partner organizations from the three target regions of Romanian development assistance (the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus)\textsuperscript{1281}. As already showed, few of those organisations that had developed cross-border cooperation projects had joined FOND so that many members of FOND had rather limited contacts with Romania’s priority countries for development cooperation and other developing countries. For these organisations, such contacts were therefore vital. As one of FOND members repeatedly used to say:

‘How can we do development cooperation without knowing the organisations in those countries? What kind of partnerships can we have with them if we know nothing about them? We have to meet, to discuss. Georgia is a priority country for our Ministry of Foreign Affairs but Romanian NGOs know nothing about this country. Where should we start our ‘cooperation’ from? And how can we bring ‘development’ to a place we know nothing of?’\textsuperscript{1282}

While relations with the neighboring Republic of Moldova and Serbia-Montenegro (two of Romania’s target countries) had been facilitated by geographic proximity (and common language and history in the case of the Republic of Moldova), as well as funding available through the European Union's cross-border cooperation program, NGO relations with countries in the South Caucasus (particularly Georgia – the other target country of Romania’s development assistance), were quasi nonexistent. But Georgia had become a

\textsuperscript{1278} In its beginnings, FOND’s secretariat was ensured – on a volunteer basis – by staff in one of its future members – Fundatia pentru Dezvoltarea Societatii Civile – that then became the President of FOND’s Council oo Directors. In the second half of 2007 FOND’s secretariat employed its first staff, upon funding from TRIALOG. Information based on the author’s fieldwork and interview with FOND’s first employed coordinator.

\textsuperscript{1279} FOND, Activitati FOND, Principalele activitati FOND in anul 2007, available online at http://www.fondromania.org/library/FOND%20Raport%20Anual%202007.pdf, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1280} The Black Sea NGO Forum. The Forum was promoted as the ‘start of an annual tradition bringing together over 100 NGOs from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Republic of Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Russia, and other EU member states active in the wider Black Sea region’. The Forum was supported by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is partially motivated by Romania’s geographic priority for development cooperation. More on the Black Sea NGO Forum: http://www.blackseango.org/pagini/index.php, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1281} Repeated interviews with FOND member in March, September and November 2008.

\textsuperscript{1282} Idem.
priority country for the Romanian strategy for development cooperation: bridges to connect the Romanian NGOs and their Georgian counterparts were now needed, given the expectation of Romanian NGOs that funding would be soon available from Romania’s budget for official development assistance.

Therefore, in May 2007 the Civil Society Development Foundation in partnership with World Vision Romania Foundation, within the framework of the ‘Moldova – Georgia’ Working Group of FOND, organized the seminar “Georgia, priority country in Romania’s development cooperation strategy. Opportunities and challenges for Romanian NGOs”1283. The meeting, attended by representatives from the Georgian Embassy in Romania, Georgian NGOs (World Vision Georgia), the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Ministry for Development1284, Romanian non-governmental organizations and academia had as main objectives to develop the participants' knowledge of the Georgia's priorities for socio-economic development; to create contacts between the Romanian civil society organisations and the Georgian authorities; to have an exchange of views with the European organisations involved in Georgia1285. Most importantly, the Romanian NGOs were expecting to be able to make a first evaluation of the cooperation opportunities opened by Romania's national policy of development cooperation and the European Neighborhood Policy. The ‘evaluation’ (at informal level as no official document was produced) gave rather modest results: in spite of the fact that the socio-economic needs revealed by the Georgian guest speaker seemed to fit with the type of expertise that Romanian NGOs had available, it was obvious for the FOND representatives that funding opportunities for NGO-initiated projects were limited in the framework of the above-mentioned policies. Alternative sources were to be investigated1286.

One month later (June 28-29 2007), in the framework of the same working group (Moldova-Georgia) the Civil Society Development Foundation in partnership with ProWomen Foundation, organized, in Iaşi, the seminar „Civil Society and Development Cooperation in the Republic of Moldova in the Context of the European Neighborhood

1283 Fieldwork (author attending the meeting). See also: FOND, Activitati FOND, 22 mai - Masa rotunda “Societatea civila si cooperarea pentru dezvoltare in bazinul Marii Negre – Georgia”, available online at http://www.fondromania.org/library/FOND%20Raport%20Anual%202007.pdf, as of March 2009.
1284 This is a Ministry for domestic development.
1285 Two Brussels-based NGO workers attended the meeting by means of video-conference.
1286 According to the author’s knowledge, at a two years distance from that event, there is only one financed initiative that sees a limited number of FOND members involved in a project in Georgia. This project, financed by the Black Sea Trust and promoted by the Civil Society Development Foundation and CENTRAS, aims at further evaluating the cooperation opportunities.
Policy”. This second event, attended by 40 NGO representatives from Romania and the Republic of Moldova, had as main objective to establish a first contact between FOND members as a group of organisations with similar interests and CSOs from the Republic of Moldova interested to cooperate with their Romanian counterparts belonging to FOND. At the end of the meeting a common declaration was elaborated by the representatives of the Romanian and Moldavian civil society, calling for the Romanian authorities to accelerate the establishment of development cooperation policies towards the Republic of Moldova and to support an active involvement and participation of the civil society in this process. Optimism was not riding this meeting either: one year later (in occasion of a new similar seminar) NGOs could only notice that in spite of significant interest of Romanian and Moldovian organisations to develop joint projects, Romania ‘is too little interested in supporting Romanian NGOs projects in the Republic of Moldova’\(^{1287}\), as

> 'In the context in which Romania has a development cooperation policy, there is not yet a strategy to aim assistance granted to the Republic of Moldova’\(^{1288}\).

Later on, in October 2007, the Civil Society Development Foundation (CSDF), in partnership with FOND and World Vision Romania Foundation organized a parliamentary debate („Romania’s Contribution to the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals“), upon funding from the European Commission within the framework of a program implemented by UNDP (UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre and UNDP Country Office in Poland)\(^{1289}\).

Similar meetings followed and finally, at the end of 2008, FOND’s major event ever since its establishment - the Black Sea NGO Forum - was developed and organised\(^{1290}\), with the support of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^{1291}\). Suggestively called 'Time to


1288 Idem.


1290 By a consortium of three NGOs (the Civil Society Development Foundation, ADO SAH ROM and World Vision Romania Foundation), members of FOND.

1291 For more details, see: [http://www.blackseango.org/pagini/index.php], as of December 2008.
Meet', the ambition of this forum is for it to become a traditional event to take place each year in a different country in the region\textsuperscript{1292}, without it being

'just one more conference with big words, but a concrete floor where organisations can meet for discussing concrete projects to be then developed and implemented together\textsuperscript{1293}'.

The forum was structured accordingly: part of it was dedicated to plenary and panel presentations\textsuperscript{1294}, but a 'partnership fair' was also organised for giving the organisations an opportunity to meet and discuss joint projects. The number of projects discussed and proposed was rather modest (9) compared with the number of participants (220 for the whole forum, and more than 100 for the partnership fair)\textsuperscript{1295}. Nonetheless, the forum was generally considered an enlightening experience and even a myth-buster. As one of the participants said:

'But these organisations... some of them don't need our assistance; their methodologies are as good as our own, if not better. It is clear to me that we should rather speak of co-development, instead of us 'assisting' them...'

As it is the case with any national platform in the European Union, beyond facilitating exchanges with potential partners in the target countries, an equally important task for FOND is that of lobbying for the policy points identified by the seven-member board of directors, by the working groups or through informal exchanges among members. Many of these lobby points are formulated in coordination with other European NGOs. TRIALOG and DEEEP (two projects financed by the European Union to promote development awareness and development education in the NMS), as well as CONCORD, provide many ‘learning’ opportunities for the Romanian NGOs. Thus at a European level, FOND has an observer status with CONCORD and attends three of its working group (FDR - Funding for Relief and Development\textsuperscript{1297}, DEF - Development Education Forum\textsuperscript{1298} and EPAN -

\textsuperscript{1292} Plans are for the next forum to be organized in Odessa, Ukraine. Identifying the next country already seems to be not an easy task, given the various tensions among countries.
\textsuperscript{1293} Interview with organizing staff, October 2008.
\textsuperscript{1294} Three panels were organised, focusing on a cross-cutting issue: Challenges and opportunities for NGO cooperation in the Black Sea region. The three panels were covering: social justice and human rights issues; democracy and good governance; environment. See more at: \url{http://www.blackseango.org/pagini/index.php}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1295} As of author's knowledge, none of these projects was financed by the donors that were invited to the forum, or other donors financing programs in the region. Initially and informally, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed an intention to finance some of the projects, but this did not happen either.
\textsuperscript{1296} Fieldwork, exchange of view with the author.
\textsuperscript{1297} The policy work of FDR focuses on EU-NGO funding policies and priorities, on the allocation of funds to these priorities and on the EU funding process and organisation. More on FDR: CONCORD, About CONCORD, The Working Groups, available online at
Enlargement, Pre-accession and Neighborhood\textsuperscript{1299}, while also supporting the work of the European Aid Watch working group\textsuperscript{1300}. At the same time, FOND has a demanding agenda of involvement and participation in other international events organized by TRIALOG, CONCORD or other international networks like the Global Call against Poverty, the international conference of national platforms, the European Commission-organised European Development Days and so on\textsuperscript{1301}. FOND members’ participation into these working groups is logistically, strategically and financially supported by TRIALOG, as FOND’s financial resources are rather modest and FOND would hardly be able to keep up with the expenses incurred by such activities\textsuperscript{1302}.

From their facilitated participation in these contexts FOND members learned about and started to build their arguments for various issues they then pushed at national level. Examples abound. Thus, one of FOND’s main demands is for Romania to increase its ODA contributions so as to achieve the 0.17 % of GDP that all NMS should be able to achieve by 2010\textsuperscript{1303}. FOND also calls on institution-building (ex. creation of a national

\textsuperscript{1299} This groups aims to ‘link NGO activities with the major changes in the world, and to the new challenges for Development Education in Europe’. More on this group: CONCORD, About CONCORD, The Working Groups, available online at http://www.concordeurope.org/files/media/extranetdocumentsENG/NavigationPrincipale/02_About_CONCORD/02_1_Structure/02_1_6_Working_Group/EUFunding.doc, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1299} EPAN focuses on policy work and information sharing on EU Neighbourhood, Pre-Accession and Enlargement issues, aiming to ensure that the EU respects development objectives and principles when dealing with developing countries in the ENP and the pre-accession region and to contribute to a stronger advocacy and policy work at national and EU levels by European development NGOs including those from current and future new member states (NMS). More on EPAN: CONCORD, About CONCORD, The Working Groups, available online at http://www.concordeurope.org/files/media/internetdocumentsENG/2_About_CONCORD/1_Structure/Structure_of_the_Confederation/4_The_Working_Groups/Description_of_the_Working_Groups/EPAN-ToR-June-2007.doc, as of March 2009.

\textsuperscript{1300} Aid Watch looks into the quality and quantity of the ODA provided by the EU Member States and the European Commission. More on Aid Watch: CONCORD, About CONCORD, The Working Groups, available online at http://www.concordeurope.org/files/media/internetdocumentsENG/2_About_CONCORD/1_Structure/Structure_of_the_Confederation/4_The_Working_Groups/Description_of_the_Working_Groups/Aid-Watch-description-EN.doc, as of March 2009.


\textsuperscript{1302} National platforms in the OMS usually rely on support from their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs. CONCORD is supported by the European Commission. FOND can not rely on such a support from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This role has been partly covered by TRIALOG (thus, the European Commission) not only in what participation to European activities is concerned but also by covering the salary costs of FOND’s platform coordinator.

\textsuperscript{1303} FOND Romania, De ce are nevoie Romania de o politica coerenta de cooperare pentru dezvoltare?, published in occasion of FOND’s General Assembly, 12-13 March 2009, available online at http://www.fondromania.org/library/Raport%20FOND%20martie%202009.pdf, as of March 2009.
agency for development cooperation\textsuperscript{1304}, and, more recently, for the establishment of a Commission on Development Cooperation in the Romanian Parliament on the model of the DEVE Committee in the European Parliament\textsuperscript{1305}; the need for programming instruments to be created on the model already in place in the OMS (ex. ‘country strategy papers’ for Romania’s priority countries, a multi-annual strategy for development cooperation); increased attention for development education in the national strategy for development education\textsuperscript{1306}; funding made available for development NGOs and for FOND\textsuperscript{1307}.

Nonetheless, until recently the lobbying activity was accomplished mainly by informal means and direct exchanges with the policy decision-makers. Collaboration, rather than confrontation, was the preferred approach and the results are considered, by FOND members themselves, rather unsatisfactory. In this context, some of the FOND members start now advocating for a more assertive, if not forceful, position\textsuperscript{1308}. As one very active FOND member (currently vice-president of the board of directors) said:

\begin{quote}
What has this approach delivered? Almost nothing. It was nice to become friends with the MFA staff, but this way they only played us better. No. The approach needs to be formal, with written requests according to all the rules of the transparency law so that this way they will have to take us into account\textsuperscript{1309}.
\end{quote}

For its lobby activity, FOND chose as its main interlocutor the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an attempt to build on the theoretically strong position that this institution acknowledge for FOND while Romania’s strategy for development cooperation


\textsuperscript{1305} FOND Romania, De ce are nevoie..., op. cit.

\textsuperscript{1306} See a CONCORD call on MS to increase attention towards development education: Working to achieve the Millennium Development Goals through greater European public engagement in the fight against global poverty: A Position Paper by the CONCORD Development Education Forum (October 2007), pp. 7-8, available online at http://www.slogaplatform.org/attachments/280/Position%20Paper%20on%20Development%20Education%20-%20%20New%20agreed2.doc, as of March 2009. See for comparison point 10 of FOND’s Recommendations for an efficient policy of development cooperation, in FOND Romania, De ce are nevoie... op. cit.

\textsuperscript{1307} FOND Romania, De ce are nevoie..., op. cit.

\textsuperscript{1308} As a result, in the last elections for FOND’s council of directors, the former FOND President was replaced with the head of an NGO that has recently organized a manifestation against the OPCP (Phare Office for Payments and Contracting), scoring wide audience due to the innovative a powerful messages of this action taken to the streets. As one other FOND member commented to the author: ‘What he did is almost unbelievable! It is the first time in Romania’s history that NGOs protest in front of the Romanian Ministry of Finances! This will remain in Romania’s history of NGO activity.’

\textsuperscript{1309} Interview with the author, September 2008.
was designed. Indeed, in the framework of this important document FOND is nominated as the Foreign Ministry’s partner in implementing such strategy. In this context, other institutions and potential stakeholders were only marginally targeted by FOND. In spite of FOND members having organised – in the framework of an EC-funded project – a parliamentary debate, where a few parliamentarians attended, the members of the Romanian Parliament were not specifically and coherently targeted as potential supporters of Romania’s policy for development cooperation\(^\text{1310}\).

Some relations started to be built, however, with the Romanian Members of the European Parliament\(^\text{1311}\) and, in particular, with MEP Corina Creţu, Romania’s representative in the European Parliament’s DEVE Committee. Thus, on the 25\(^\text{th}\) of November 2007 Romania held its first elections for the European Parliament; already on the 7\(^\text{th}\) of December 2007, a meeting was organized between FOND and the Romanian MEPs representing the Social Democrat Party (PSD), affiliated - in the European Parliament - to the Party of European Socialists. Four out of the 10 elected MEPs\(^\text{1312}\) attended the meeting and their discourse gave some hope to FOND and its members. Titus Corlăţeanu (currently, chairman of the External Relations Commission in the Romanian Senate) showed that Romanian NGOs’ experience was not yet adequately used at the European level. Adrian Severin stated that Romanians need to be informed and involved in the process of development assistance granted to Moldova and Georgia, as well as to Africa as new relations needs to be established so as to ‘make our state known as a European member dignified of respect’.

In FOND’s relations with political stakeholders outside of the sphere of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first aim of those FOND members engaged in such contacts was to make a message pass. But more than influencing positions, FOND’s best hope was to make the interlocutors what development cooperation is. Most often than not, their point of departure in any conversation was to explain the fundamental difference between Romania’s own development process and the ‘development cooperation’ process

\(^{1310}\) This seems to be changing recently as also suggested by the initiative taken by World Vision to organize an ‘international debate’ for the UNITAID international solidarity tax to be introduced in Romania. In occasion of this event, World Vision – supported by UNDP and MFA – launched invitations to a number of parliamentarians. Of these two MPs responded positively and confirmed their participation, but in the end none of them showed up. Nonetheless, the organizers consequently received a support letter from the Chairman of External Affairs of the Romanian Senate, who expressed his interest in the matter.


that was to be driven by a concern for ‘others’ development. In occasion of the European Socialist Day for Development, held at Bucharest on the second of October 2008, disappointed by the level of discourse and constant references to Romania’s ‘own’ development made by such high-level guest-speakers as Ion Iliescu (former President of Romania), Adrian Năstase (former minister of foreign affairs and former Prime-Minister), Nicolae Văcăroiu (President of the Senate of Romania), one FOND member said:

‘Except for the foreign speakers and for Corina Creţu not even one of the Romanian speakers seemed to understand what this day was about…’ \[1313\]

Estimating the impact of such lobby activities is beyond the scope of this section, but what is obvious is that in the ‘crisis year’ 2009, Romania diminished its funding for development cooperation and FOND members still do not have access to funding for their project ideas.

### 3.4.3. Building Legitimacy: Development Education and Awareness Raising

The special Eurobarometer on the attitudes of citizens in the EU12 towards development aid reveals that generally the NMS citizens have a relatively low level of awareness of EU development aid issues, with many being unaware that such aid exists or how much money is involved. Almost half of the poll either say that the EU does not help poor countries or that they do not know if it does, and almost nobody is aware of the amount of aid per inhabitant spent by the EU each year. The situation in the newest Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, is even worse, as the level of awareness in these countries seems to be consistently lower than in other new Member States\[1314\].

One of the connotations of these conclusions is that, in Romania, even more than it seems to be the case in the other NMS, a Romanian policy for development cooperation does not a national constituency. Such constituency that would consequently legitimize the already-introduced policy needs, therefore, to be built. Romanians’ ‘awareness’ needs to be ‘raised’. Formal and informal ‘development education’ as well as media work are currently two of the main intellectual tools for ‘raising awareness’ on development matters in the

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\[1313\] Exchange of views with the author at the end of the event.

donor countries. This section will be a review of some of the first attempts undertaken in Romania by various stakeholders for building a culture of development education and awareness in the Romanian society. Our analysis is built on the hypothesis – supported by various scholars\(^{1315}\) that NGOs and Ministries of Foreign Affairs have an important role in steering such discourse in the donor countries.

Meanings of development education have been constructed over time by a variety of agencies and actors and these meanings also vary across geographic and cultural spaces\(^{1316}\). Put simply, in its beginnings (the 1960s and the 1970s) development education was 'teaching about developing countries and their problems'\(^ {1317}\), but nowadays this concept broadened itself so that development education currently aims to raise awareness and understanding of how global issues affect the everyday lives of individuals, communities and societies and how all of us can and do influence the global dimension of our living space\(^ {1318}\).

In the European context, a more complex, 4-sentence definition is proposed by the EC-financed 'Development Education Exchange in Europe' Project (DEEEP):


Development education is an active learning process, founded on values of solidarity, equality, inclusion and co-operation. It enables people to move from basic awareness of international development priorities and sustainable human development, through understanding of the causes and effects of global issues to personal involvement and informed actions. Development education fosters the full participation of all citizens in world-wide poverty eradication, and the fight against

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\(^{1317}\) Yuri Ishii, *Development..., op.cit.*, p. 5.

exclusion. It seeks to influence more just and sustainable economic, social, environmental, human rights based national and international policies.\[^{1319}\]

In the framework of the European Union's development policy, development education is the object of various high-level documents such as a 'European Consensus for Development Education'\[^{1320}\] or a special resolution of the Council of the European Union calling for

'increased support for development education, and for the corresponding communication policy, by the Commission and the Member States through the establishment of closer links between the various sectors which may help promote development education in areas such as NGOs, schools, universities, adult education, training for trainers, audio-visual media, the press, collective organisations and youth movements.\[^{1322}\]

Issued in 2001, a few years before the fifth Enlargement, the resolution is also relevant for the future 'new' Member States as it

'encourages the initiatives (...) aimed at raising awareness amongst the population of the candidate countries (...) of the importance of supporting international solidarity in the fight against world poverty, as well as promoting development education in general.\[^{1323}\]

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\[^{1319}\] This definition has been approved by the Development Education Forum (a core working group of CONCORD) in 2004 and endorsed by CONCORD during the General Assembly of the same year. Definition is available online at [http://www.deeep.org/whatisde.html](http://www.deeep.org/whatisde.html), as of March 2009. More information on the development education forum is available at [http://www.deeep.org/deveduforum.html](http://www.deeep.org/deveduforum.html), as of March 2009.

\[^{1320}\] The European Consensus of Development, *The contribution of Development Education & Awareness Raising*, 2007, available online at [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/DE_Consensus-education_temp_EN.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/DE_Consensus-education_temp_EN.pdf), as of March 2009. In 2005 the Council of the European Union and the representatives of the governments of the European Union Member States meeting within the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament agreed a joint statement on development (‘The European Consensus on Development’). As the authors themselves show, the document here-above was offered as a contribution to the implementation of the European Consensus on Development, with particular reference to the declaration that ‘... the EU will pay particular attention to development education and raising awareness among EU citizens.’ The document was endorsed by CONCORD's Development Education Forum, various EU institutions (such as European Commission DEV A4, the European Parliament), European ministries of Foreign Affairs (ex. Germany, Slovenia), development agencies (Belgium, Ireland, Portugal), OECD Development Center, etc.


\[^{1323}\] Idem.
A Europe-wide commitment, the so-called 'Maastricht Declaration', was taken in 2002 by government representatives, parliaments, local authorities and civil society organisations to increase the support for global education in Europe^{\text{1324}}. More recently, another resolution of the European Parliament

'notes the lack of public recognition of development cooperation priorities in some of the new Member States and calls for an overall communication and education strategy to remedy this deficit', and also 'stresses the importance of raising awareness of development issues in school curricula, as well as the role of the media in creating public awareness and developing an international volunteer tradition^{\text{1325}}'.

In the Romanian context, once FOND, the national platform, had been established, the concept and the relevance of development education was firmly supported by the members of FOND that formed a special working group for development education^{\text{1326}} and became particularly active in CONCORD's Forum for Development Education^{\text{1327}}.

In their strategy for development education, FOND members show that this type of education is particularly needed in the context of a 'young NGDO^{\text{1328}} sector', for a whole series of reasons. First it sustains a needed process for educating the practitioners (in the NGO sector, the authorities, the Government), the public and the donors in parallel with the activities for development cooperation. Second, this process is needed for raising the awareness of the Romanian public in an activity that is very new, but also very 'needed', as only by becoming aware of the need for development cooperation can Romanians grow 'the dignity of belonging to the global community. Last, but not least, Romania's efforts for development education are already supported at the European level^{\text{1329}}. Thus, the need for development education in Romania is constructed by these NGOs as having three main sources of legitimacy: the actual need for further capacity building; the possibility of

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^{1324} Flavia Virgilio, 'Development Education...', op. cit., p. 170.


^{1326} FOND has three working groups: development education, policy and advocacy and 'Moldova-Georgia'. See http://www.fondromania.org/pagini/grupurile'de'lucru'fond.php as of March 2009.

^{1327} Though Romania is only an observer CONCORD, not yet having the status of a full member, the Romanian representative in CONCORD's Development Education Forum will be elected to act as a co-chair for the group, while the 2009 development education summer school financed through DEEEP, will take place in Romania, with the support of FOND's working group for development education.

^{1328} The acronym stands for: Non-governmental Development Organisation.

^{1329} FOND Romania, Educatie pentru dezvoltare, Strategia Educatiei pentru Dezvoltare, Justificare, available online at http://fondromania.wordpress.com/educatie'pentru'de zvoltare as of March 2009.
creating a presumed public good (enhanced public dignity); and the existing European practices in this field.

Officially, development education is given a prominent space in Romania's national Strategy for development cooperation. Thus, the Strategy unambiguously shows that ‘Development training and education is a complimentary part of the Romanian Development Policy,’ so as ‘to increase the awareness of Romanian public and its sense of solidarity with developing countries’\(^{1330}\). According to this Strategy the development awareness activities ‘may include, for example, broad information campaigns, organizing seminars, conferences, open day events, fostering “transfer” labels for fair trade with developing countries’\(^{1331}\). To achieve the maximum effect ‘promotion of the knowledge of Romanian Development Cooperation will be conducted through the mass media, including the internet and periodical publications (including an official annual report on Romanian Development Cooperation)’\(^{1332}\).

In spite of such emphasis being put on development education, this concept has not – until current date - been defined in a national context. The reasons that are given for explaining the need for development education are 'national', specific to Romania's particular standing and experience in this new field of activity. Nonetheless, the definition given to explain the concept of 'development education' is 'European', as FOND promptly adopted the definition proposed and promoted by the EU-financed DEEEP\(^{1333}\) and refrained from creating its own working definition. Asked what development education is, the coordinator of the development education working group in FOND, says: ‘I go back to the definition...’, and then gives the DEEEP definition\(^{1334}\).

In DEEEP’s definition, development education is described as being embedded in such universal and desirable values as solidarity, equality, inclusion. Criticism is prevented from the very beginning by this very list of legitimating values. Development education is then described as being a process of progressive and controlled change. The student of development education would go from ‘basic awareness’ of development ‘priorities’ to

\(^{1330}\) Hotărâre pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale privind politica de cooperare internațională…’, op. cit.
\(^{1331}\) Idem.
\(^{1332}\) Idem.
\(^{1333}\) See http://www.deeep.org/whatisde.html, as of March 2009.
‘informed actions’ through the ‘understanding of the causes and effects of global issues’. It is not clarified, but it is self-understood that these ‘priorities’ are those established by the ‘international community’, the same that critical authors like Rist, Escobar, Easterly and others would charge for having eroded ‘poor people’s ability to define and take care of their own lives’\textsuperscript{1335}. Terms inhabiting the development vocabulary (‘full participation’, ‘poverty eradication’, ‘exclusion’ etc.) form the backbone of this definition as to underline development education’s close affiliation and belonging to the field of ‘development’. But if development discourse is a product of the Western civilization meant to reinforce the West’s power over the Rest (as these critical authors claim), then development education is development’s by-product in the educational field, an instrument for socializing people everywhere into the dominant discourse of development. From this perspective then, by adopting this definition of development education, Romania’s national platform – as many other platforms in the new Member States – contributes to the expansion of such discourse.

The relative importance of development education was reflected in the budget allocations made by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its role as coordinator of Romania’s policy of development cooperation: from a total of 4.675.000 Euro handled by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the budget line for development cooperation, approximately 10% (500.000) were reported as being invested in a 'program for education and information in the field of development'. However, to this amount other sums need to be added as other projects also have a development education component\textsuperscript{1336}.

Such a share of ODA going for development education would be considered rather generous in other EU donor countries. What development education advocates in the old Member States call for – without always getting – is much more modest: Germany’s VENRO calls for 2%, Irish NGOs call for 3%, Norway – 3% as well\textsuperscript{1337}. Apparently a new Member State is thus more enlightened than many of the old Member States in what the importance of development education is concerned. However, this is the case only to a certain extent: the 10% for Romania’s case is valid only when calculated for the ODA budget that is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was roughly 5 million

\textsuperscript{1335} Arturo Escobar, op. cit., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{1336} See the information available on the website of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Programul de guvermare, Cooperare pentru dezvoltare, Proiecte 2007, available online at http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=35299&iddlvk=1&cat=3 as of March 2009.
euros in 2007. However, the total budget for development cooperation made available by Romania in 2007 was approx. EUR 80 million. Confusions between Romania’s total budget for development cooperation and the ODA budget handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are widespread and not few of the most informed development activists in Romania would be ready to declare that Romania’s ODA for 2007 stood at an ‘embarrassing’ 5 million EUR in 2007.\textsuperscript{1338}

2007 was the first year when the Romanian authorities became involved with the idea of development education. To collect ideas on feasible projects for development education, shortly after the Strategy was approved, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its Office for Official Development Assistance, informally called upon FOND and its members to come forward with short proposals, on the basis of an informal ‘concept note’ of a maximum of two pages. FOND and its members had been strong advocates of development awareness and many saw in this request, a sign of openness and a hope for their project ideas. Therefore, the opportunity was immediately taken by the NGOs to present a whole list of ideas. Individual organisations proposed projects in line with each NGOs' specificity, while the development education working group of FOND mobilized for an overall, more substantial proposal, covering for commonly identified needs. Generally, the aim of these projects was to bring the maximum of visibility to the idea of development cooperation, Romania’s new ‘responsibilities’ in this field and the importance of the citizens to become involved in development cooperation activities. Thus, the project proposed by FOND as a group proposed such visibility activities as: the creation of a ‘VIP consultants’ formed by well-known Romanian personalities that would agree to speak up in favour of international development; the creation of a specially dedicated website, as well as TV ads to be broadcasted nationally or locally, a ‘Romania in the World’ photo-book to show the contributions of Romanians already working in international development; organizing a ‘Development Week’ and so on.\textsuperscript{1339}

Nonetheless, the grant to implement the first ever development education activities under the national strategy for development cooperation was finally awarded not to FOND, its members or other Romanian NGOs, but to one of the UN agencies present in Romania – the United Nations Development Program, the office for Romania. The reason that was given to the discontented NGOs was that an NGO funding mechanism had not been

\textsuperscript{1338} Statement based on the author’s fieldwork and direct observation. More on this - in a separate section.

\textsuperscript{1339} Information based on the author's fieldwork.
designed in the rush of the approval of Romania’s first ODA disbursements in the framework of the very new policy for development cooperation. Indeed, the first budget for development cooperation had been approved under particular circumstances. Even if a law for ODA financing had been approved in 2006\textsuperscript{1340}, the ODA budget was not taken into consideration in the 2007 initial national budget\textsuperscript{1341}; a rectification was made later on so that the funds were available only as from September 2007, on the condition for them to be spent until the end of the same year. If not spent in the three remaining months, the funds were to be returned to the state budget, undermining this way the credibility of the MFA as an efficient implementer of ODA and missing, at the same time, the all-important target of starting the development education activities as soon as possible. A quick solution was needed and the only way out was this collaboration with the United Nations Development Program. Provided with this explanation NGOs did not formally protest: a precedent was established, giving UNDP Romania priority for implementing development education projects in Romania.

Less ambitious in terms of visibility and public involvement when compared to the proposals brought forward by the NGOs, the project agreed by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with UNDP Romania, through a special Memorandum of Understanding (never made public\textsuperscript{1342}) was intended to strengthen Romania’s institutional and educational capacity to carry out ODA programmes/projects (shortly, SNIECODA). This project, running a budget of 1,432,840 USD, scheduled over a period of 25 months, is carved along three main dimensions: raising the institutional and administrative capacity to develop and manage programs and project in Romania’s partner countries (namely the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Georgia); inform and raise awareness of the public opinion regarding the official development assistance and the millennium development goals; and develop a university curriculum in the field of international development studies\textsuperscript{1343}. Nonetheless, the main aim now, as expressed by the Secretary of state who talked to the launching event of this project, was:

\textsuperscript{1340} The Law 404/2006, regarding the financing of the development assistance in the framework of the national policy for international cooperation for development.
\textsuperscript{1341} As referred to the author by a FOND member, ‘they simply forgot’ about development cooperation.
\textsuperscript{1342} Interview with a FOND member. In this interview, the interviewee says: ’No matter how long I looked, I was not able to find this Memorandum’. Plans were made within FOND to make a special request of public information, based on the law 544 of the ‘public transparency’ for this Memorandum to be revealed.
‘For all of us to learn how we should work in development assistance, for being efficient, to avoid wasting money, so that our assistance reaches those that it is intended for’.

Equally important is the aim of making ‘us’ able to ‘support of the international efforts for fighting against poverty’, by ‘taking from the practice of other states’.

The decision to entrust UNDP Romania to carry out the first-ever development education activities in Romania came as an unwelcome surprise for FOND members, in spite of the objective reasons provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the lack of a functional funding mechanism, the 'danger' of 'loosing' the funds if not disbursed with no delay, etc.). As one of FOND's board members put it at the time: ‘one should never take one’s allies by surprise...’, alluding to the Romanian NGOs’ expectation to become themselves implementers of some of those development awareness activities, given their significant experience in campaigning and awareness raising; FOND being mentioned by the national Strategy as ‘partner’ of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in implementing Romania’s strategy for international development cooperation; and last, but not least, FOND’s constant efforts to support the advancement of the development discourse in Romania.

In response, NGOs were later on invited to act as SNIECODA subcontractors to implement small-scale projects for promoting the millennium development goals. FOND's initial expectation was that a budget of at least 800.000 EUR to be made available for implementing the first project ideas that they had prepared, with half of this amount going for a FOND-led complex and unitary project of awareness raising. What they were 'offered' in the framework of the SNIECODA was the possibility of bidding for five different small-scale proposals in individual amount of a maximum of USD 20000, for a total amount of USD 100000. A competition was organized and four FOND members (the Assistance Center for Non-governmental Organisations - CENTRAS, Societatea pentru Educatie Contraceptiva si Sexuala - SECS, Pro Democracy Association - APD and

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1344 Notes of the author from the launching event, April 2008. See also Euractiv.ro, MAE a lansat un program de educatie in domeniul asistentei pentru dezvoltare, 29 April 2008, available online at http://www.euractiv.ro/unionea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_13329/MAE-a-lansat-un-program-de-educatie-in-domeniul-asistentei-pentru-dezvoltare.html, as of March 2009.

1345 Notes of the author, from the speech given by the UNDP representative, manager of this project.

1346 The statement was made – in author's presence - at FOND's General Assembly in 2008.


1348 See more information on SECS at http://www.secs.ro, as of March 2009.
World Vision Romania Foundation - WVRF\textsuperscript{1350} were granted resources to implement six projects in five different Romanian cities (in general, university cities: Bucharest, Iaşi, Timişoara, Cluj-Napoca and Constanţa).

The projects were launched on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of December 2008, so as to also mark the international Day of Human Rights. In Bucharest, the Assistance Center for Nongovernmental Organisations (CENTRAS) launched the campaign “Pay it Forward”, in the presence of Jan Sorensen, UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative and Mihaela Rutjens, Director of Assistance for Development Direction of the MFA\textsuperscript{1351}. SECS launched the campaigns “A Ray of Hope”\textsuperscript{1352} and “For a Better World”\textsuperscript{1353} in Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca. Pro Democtrâţia implements the project “My World Grows Bigger” (Lumea mea creste) in Iaşi and Timişoara\textsuperscript{1354}, while World Vision’s campaign in Constanţa, called “Constanta’s World Vision”, was launched in the presence of a representative of the Direction of Assistance for Development of the MFA and the SNIECODA project manager\textsuperscript{1355}.

The fact of launching all projects at the same date was considered a strategic decision, so as to enhance and boost their visibility in the Romanian society, possibly at national level. However, this objective was hardly achieved: while the local press generally reflected the launching events, these went rather unnoticed at national level. Nonetheless, this can be seen as one of the first coherent exercises of Romanian NGOs to speak publicly in favour of Romania becoming not only a supporter of the millennium development goals, but – more significantly – also an international donor. As the representative of SECS said in Cluj-Napoca

\textsuperscript{1349} See more information on APD at \url{www.apd.ro}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1350} See more information on World Vision Romania at \url{www.wvr.ro}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1351} See more on this campaign at \url{http://www.damaideparte.org}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1352} See more on this campaign at \url{http://www.secs.ro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=73}, as of March 2009.
\textsuperscript{1354} More information on these projects is available at \url{http://www.apd.ro/project.php?id=55}, as of March 2009.
'We always compare ourselves with the richer Western countries and we say we are poor, but we never look to our neighbours that are even poorer...'; "the time has come for Romania to leave behind its status as a poor country, an 'aid receiver', to the status of a 'donor country' which offers help to the less developed countries.'

Similarly, CENTRAS' representatives ad to this argument and show that

Beginning with the 90s, Romanians have benefitted of support from the Western countries (...). The great challenge for us in the present is to understand that the time has come for us to turn our eyes to the poor countries and help them make important steps towards development.

Beyond actions funded by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other development-related activities are carried through by those Romanian NGOs for which global development has become a priority in these last years. For instance, in 2008 the Pro DemocraŃia Association – also a beneficiary of UNDP-MFA funded projects and one of Romania’s best known NGOs - implemented various projects aiming to raise the awareness and understanding on global issues. Thus, from February through December 2008, Pro DemocraŃia implemented a project to strengthen the solidarity between the Central and Eastern Europe and Cuba aiming to create a system to support Cuba’s independent CSOs; on the 13th of August Pro DemocraŃia organized a flash-mob for Georgia’s peace; and between the 12th and 16th of November the same NGO organized a photo exhibition, ‘The Sparkle of Courage’ dedicated to the dissidents in Belarus.

In a similar manner, in October 2008 the Norwegian Embassy, in partnership with the Peace Action Training and Research of Romanian (Patrir), an NGO based in Cluj-Napoca, and FOND organized an awareness event for advocating against the use of the cluster bombs. A ‘Ban Bus’, having departed from Norway, also made a stop in Bucharest with the support of these two organisations, in an attempt to draw attention and urge

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1356 Marius Muresan, NapocaNews. Stiri si atitudini, SECS lanseaza proiectul 'Pentru o lume mai buna', op. cit.
1361 More on this NGO: www.patrir.ro.
European states to sign the Convention regarding the cluster ammunition\textsuperscript{1362}. To stimulate international solidarity, Pro Vobis, the National Volunteer Center, in partnership with VSO UK, started a volunteer-placement project, aiming to send Romanian social workers, advocacy officers, youth leaders, volunteer co-ordinators, NGO managers, social researchers, fundraising experts, doctors, etc. in the developing countries\textsuperscript{1363}.

Alternative funding for more ample projects is actively sought and accessed by Romanian NGOs. As soon as they became eligible in 2007 in the aftermath of Romania’s accession to the European Union, Romanian NGOs started to apply for EC funding under the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) budget line and various Romanian NGOs applied either as ‘main applicants’, or as ‘partners’. In this first round that was also open for Romanian NGOs, less than five concept notes having Romanian NGOs as main applicants were invited to send a full proposal to the European Commission, but more than 30 of the successful concept notes had a partner from Romania. By comparison with other countries, either new or old Member States, the number was impressive: only two of the ‘old’ member states with definitely much longer experience and ‘tradition’ in development education (Italy and France) had had a similar number of successful concept notes with Italian, respectively French NGOs as partners\textsuperscript{1364}. Finally, less than 10 Romanian NGOs were successful in a consortium that included them as one of the partners, but this result was actually an excellent one, having in mind that the NSA&LA budget line is acknowledged by European development workers\textsuperscript{1365} as one of the most competitive in the European Union.

As in the ‘traditional donor’ countries where 'development is always presented as a humanitarian and moral concern'\textsuperscript{1366}, Romanian stakeholder representatives also make use of this 'solidarity argument' when advocating for Romania to become an international donor. The appeal to Christian feelings is an example in this sense. When launching the UNDP SNIECODA project, Romanian State Secretary Răduța Matache says

\textsuperscript{1362} More information available at: \url{http://thebanbus.org/2008/10/romania/}, as of December 2008.


\textsuperscript{1364} Information collected by the author. More information available online, as of December 2008: \url{http://www.deep.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Summer_School_2008/NSA-LA_European_Commission__DESS_2008.ppt#320,12}, Number of partners involved in the pre-selected CN (by EU country).

\textsuperscript{1365} Statement repeatedly heard by the author in her fieldwork, from various development workers from the European headquarters of various development NGOs.

‘I would like to mention in conclusion that I hope that we will all work together in this activity (...) so as to change the lives of some people that did not have the chances that we have here. This is why it is important that we are here in the Holy Week, the Passion Week, a week that helps each of us to be more benevolent. (...) Thank you all for being here with us, and I hope that we will have success in this challenge, so that we make assistance to reach those which need it’.1367

Similarly, Jan Sorensen, UNDP Resident Coordinator, in ending an article written for a Romanian daily, declares that

‘Now, when we get closer to holiday time1368, I am happy that the MFA and the UN system have the opportunity of developing this model of sharing of knowledge and resource in the benefit of those who have a big need’.1369

At the same time, the donor self-interest is also mentioned. Anamaria Almăşan, former deputy director of the MFA office for development assistance openly declared that ‘development assistance is not charity’, echoing a similar statement made by Stefano Manservisi – Director General of DG DEV – few months before, on his visit to Bucharest1370. Asked to explain, in ‘simple words’ what the concept of ‘development cooperation’ is, Anamaria Almăşan said that

‘the international collaboration for development represents first of all a partnership between the donor and the beneficiary countries, a partnership from which both parties will win. I refer first of all to expertise, experience exchange, exchange of good practices and maybe, on a secondary level, benefits of other nature. (...) By helping others you grow your expertise, you accumulate experience’.1371

1367 Author’s notes in occasion of the event.
1368 The article – being published in December – makes refers to Christmas.
1369 Jan Sorensen, România poate deveni un important donator al Asistentei pentru Dezvoltare, [Romania can become an important donor of Development Assistance], Cotidianul, 18 December 2008, available online at http://www.cotidianul.ro/romania_poate_deveni_un_important_donator_al_asistentei_pentru_dezvoltare-68094.html, as of March 2009.
Among the most important benefits that Romania could amass for itself while being a donor is considered to be the boost that its image could have. Romanian MEP and member of the DEVE Committee of the European Parliament, Corina Crețu, shows that

‘The European Union is the most important global actor in the field of development, and Romania, as a Member State, has from now on some responsibilities. I prefer though to look at this as a chance for us to assert ourselves and to bring the image of our country at a level that is comparable with those of other Member States’\(^\text{1372}\).

A further benefit is indicated by Cosmin Dobran, director of the ODA office in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

‘Romania’s entry on the ODA market allows a diversification of our external actions, in a time in which the traditional foreign policy, based on security, is not efficient any longer’\(^\text{1373}\).

Ana Maria Almășan also refers to potential economic benefits that the collaboration between Romanian and target country stakeholders could help bring\(^\text{1374}\).

The ‘European argument’ is also mentioned frequently, not only by representatives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Romanian MEPs, but also by NGOs. An example is given by a SECS representative who shows that:

‘Our integration in the European Union brings with it a series of new responsibilities for our country in what the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals are concerned, and among these (responsibilities) one can mention the active engagement in the policy for development cooperation and involvement in actions aiming at promoting and raising the awareness regarding the MDGs’\(^\text{1375}\).

The whole debate regarding Romania’s benefits from being an active donor will be in fact summarised by FOND, the Federation of Romanian NGOs in development. In a Report


\(\text{\footnotesize 1373}\) Euractiv, Romania se implica în ajutarea tarilor în curs de dezvoltare, op. cit.

\(\text{\footnotesize 1374}\) Camelia Moga, Reprezentant MAE: ’Cooperarea pentru dezvoltare nu e caritate’, op. cit.

launched in occasion of its General Assembly in 2009, FOND articulates a list of eight ‘concrete benefits’ that could accrue for Romania if an efficient policy of development cooperation is to be implemented. In introducing these benefits the Report shows that ‘It is important for Romania to create a first European long-term project by supporting a policy for development cooperation that is coherent and consistent, dynamic and pro-active’. The ‘European argument’ is thus given very high visibility: Romania’s policy for development cooperation is meant to be a ‘European project’

Further on, FOND’s list makes reference to: the increase in credibility and visibility that Romania could gain as a responsible actor in the framework of EU’s external action; the contacts and friendship relations that could be established with the partner countries that could lead to mutually advantageous relations, as well as a diversification of Romania’s trade relations as part of ‘Romania’s efforts to reduce its dependency of the EU market’; Romania’s increased capacity to act at a diplomatic level by gaining new allies at the international level; changing Romania’s image in Europe and the world; the increased opportunities for the Romanian human resources and youth to boost their capabilities, skills and abilities to relate to the rest of the world, that could translate into economic innovation. What FOND’s list is striving to achieve, beyond providing a set of arguments in favour of development cooperation, is to create a sense of dignity and pride for Romania as a donor country. In FOND’s vision Romania’s policy of development cooperation is an opportunity for Romania to send the message that ‘Romania is not only that European country that receives financial aid from the European Union, not only the country of origin of beggars’ networks’, but a ‘European country that takes upon its responsibilities of offering assistance to some poorer countries that have no other prospect’.

With less rhetorical emphasis, that sense of pride is also kindled by other Romanian stakeholders. Thus, Jan Sorensen, the UNDP Resident Coordinator will sign an article titled ‘Romania can become an important donor of development assistance’ in which he shows that:

‘Based on my previous experience with other new EU Member States, I can clearly see the unique role that Romania can play in creating a new model of international cooperation that places knowledge at its heart and admits the fact that

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1376 FOND Romania, De ce are nevoie România de o politică de cooperare pentru dezvoltare coerentă?, available online at http://www.fondromania.org/library/Raport%20FOND%20martie%202009.pdf, as of March 2009.
development cooperation is a two-way street, in which the ‘donor’ can benefit as much as the ‘recipient’.

Concretely, this ‘unique model’ model would be based on the experience that the new Member States, with ‘their institutions and their people’, gained in their own struggle for development, during the transition years. Sorensen has the merit of being the first to have articulated for the Romanian public the idea that such a ‘model’ could be possible, even if this idea had already been expressed in 2005, in the article 33 of the European Consensus on Development. This article explicitly says that ‘The EU will capitalise on new Member States’ experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen the role of these countries as new donors’. From this viewpoint, a distinctive feature of NMS’ development cooperation is that they can rely on their already-existing expertise, gained in the home country, during a difficult transition that has been successfully achieved. Their actions can therefore be better legitimized by their own experience. By comparison, many of their EU15 counterparts had started their operations in the developing countries without such a background experience acquired in the home country. The claim of the EU15 and other international NGOs is that they are there to transfer resources from rich to poor countries with the intent of overcoming the development gaps that exist from one part of the world to the other; the claim of EU12 could be to channel the already-tested experience of their own process of development, of what may be called ‘transition’. However, it is self-understood that such experience would be harnessed to the European ‘model’ of development cooperation (the EU will capitalize on the NMS’ experience).

Sorensen proposes a rather optimistic view of the role Romania could have in development cooperation. This confident picture could be challenged by those showing that Romania lacks experience specifically in those geographic areas that are most important for the EU’s development cooperation policy: the ACP countries. But talking about this, Anamaria Almăşan, showed that

‘At national level, Romania has an expertise in Africa, which has perhaps been neglected or forgotten in the last years, but the capital of sympathy that exists in various African countries could be revitalized in the current period. Let us not

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1377 Jan Sorensen, România poate deveni un important donator al AsistenŃei pentru Dezvoltare, op. cit.
forget that we have quite a few African students / scholars schooled in Romania that went back to their countries and are now in key positions in Government, in Parliament, in big private companies. All these contacts could be retied. Secondly, Romania has implemented important industrial and infrastructure projects in Africa and these projects left traces.\textsuperscript{1380}

Of course, all these ties that Romania used to have with Africa, this ‘capital of sympathy’ that is now proudly talked about, was gathered by Romania in a previous social and economic regime - that of Ceauşescu’s – but this is not something to be referred to neither in this context, nor in the official documents. In a previous section of this case-study we showed how in that historical time Romania used to express a sense of pride towards its extended network of relations with the developing countries. After two decades and in the context of a EU-framed Romanian policy of development cooperation some of the reasons of pride are being partially re-created in a joint effort of Romanian stakeholders (NGOs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNDP Romania) to generate a sense of legitimacy for a policy that has already been introduced at the pressure of the European Union, as part of the latter’s \textit{acquis communautaire}. Other sources of legitimacy shared by FOND and the other stakeholders are: Romania’s enlightened self-interest, the ‘European argument’ and a moral concern for the populations in the poorer countries ‘that have no other prospect’. All these arguments comfortably sit together and contribute to building legitimacy for a Romanian policy of development cooperation.

\textbf{3.5. Concluding Remarks}

Right from the onset of the ‘transition’ period, Romania’s previous policy of ‘friendship, collaboration and mutual advantage’, that regulated its relations with the developing countries, lost all the importance that had been attached to it during the socialist years. While struggling to make the conversion from a centralized- to a market- economy, Romania focused exclusively on its own development process. ‘Assisted’ in this process by the main donors of the World, Romania continued to be involved in development cooperation transactions, but from the recipient’s side only.

As the advert goes, the European Union is the biggest donor of the world. The candidate countries that wish to become members of this Union are expected to share the weight of

\textsuperscript{1380} Euractiv, \textit{Reprezentant MAE...}, op. cit.
this ‘burden’ and become donors in their turn. The process though, is not a natural one: in this chapter we have seen how the European Union has put in place various mechanisms of direct and indirect influence for guiding its new members to adopting development policies and ways of thinking that are compatible to its own practices in the field.

In what development practices are concerned, Romania is a complying candidate that easily accepts substantial transfers of international development ideology and technology. This is best understood while analyzing the role of the Romanian NGOs were allowed or encouraged to play in advocating for international development. Thus, while the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was designing Romania’s strategy for development cooperation the voice of Romanian NGOs was sought; but the NGOs who got to speak were not those which had most experience in the field of international cooperation with the three countries – Moldova, Serbia and Georgia – that became Romania’s priority countries for development cooperation. The NGOs who had a chance to influence the process (through FOND) were those that were directly connected to the European discourse of development cooperation through the active facilitation of the TRIALOG project that aimed to ‘smoothly’ integrate them into CONCORD – the European umbrella organization. The ‘expertise’ of this latter group of organizations and the experience of the European organizations was actively sought and accepted as a legitimate model. Similarly, the experience of the past, the ‘capital of sympathy’ that Romania allegedly still has in the developing countries from previous times, was never mentioned in the official documents.

By inspiring and stimulating the Romanian NGOs TRIALOG had a crucial role in orienting Romania’s development discourse: by working with and through a relatively small group of Romanian NGOs, an internal demand for development assistance through public spending was created. This way, not only the public sector – through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – but also the NGOs were harnessed to the European vision of international development. By their actions and talk, Romanian NGO and MFA representatives joined and supported each other in creating a discourse that resonates with the one circulated by the European Union.

Through the influence exercised by the European Union’s institutions (the European Commission, in particular) and practices (Progress Reports, projects, policy frameworks,
coordination bodies) development is likely to achieve the ‘status of a certainty’\textsuperscript{1381} in the Romanian social imaginary, as well as in the other ‘new’ Member States, just as it is now the case in the majority of the other Member States of the European Union, particularly the ‘old’ ones that entered the development discourse as early as its inauguration in the 1950s\textsuperscript{1382}.

There is, though, a significant difference. The ‘old’ Member States arrived at this universal belief in a time when it seemed almost impossible to conceptualize North-South relations differently\textsuperscript{1383}. Romania and the other new Member States enter the development discourse and practice in a time when more and more scholars and practitioners, both in the North and the South, develop a critical attitude towards development, inviting to critical thinking. Moreover, Romania and its fellow new Member States arrive at Western development discourse after having encountered the Eastern or former socialist development discourse and, equally significant, after having spent long years as ‘recipients’ of Western aid once the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were dismantled.

Nonetheless, the formation of an alternative way of thinking of international development in these countries does not seem to be probable. In what it is concerned, Romania’s choice seems to be visibly oriented towards the dominant development discourse proposed by the European Union and its fellow travelers in the long development journey that started in late 40s (mainly the United States of America, Australia, Canada, Japan, etc.). Romania ‘borrows’ everything she can from the more ‘experienced’ donors, without seeming to ‘lend’ much of its own. As in its ‘recipient’ years it was busy with ‘funding absorption’, so now it is busy with ‘donor experience absorption’.

Everything comes at an opportunity cost. One of the opportunity costs Romania may find itself to pay for what seems to be a massive import of development ideology is represented by a decreased space for alternative development thinking. Romania endows itself with mechanisms (a ministerial office for development cooperation, an EU-modeled NGO federation of ‘development NGOs’, a ‘national’ strategy for development cooperation, a

\textsuperscript{1381} Demonstrated by Escobar in his book… Escobar’s demonstration is not referred to the European Union specifically, but to the Western World. We extrapolate, by naturally including the European Union into the West.

\textsuperscript{1382} As already mentioned, a long list of authors (Escobar, 1995; Easterly, 2006; Riddell, 2007, Rist: 1997, etc.) claim that the ‘development era’ was established in the late 40s, with the Fourth Point of the famous ‘Truman Speech’.

\textsuperscript{1383} Arturo Escobar, op. cit.
special budget for development and humanitarian aid) by which a certain order of discourse – in particular, the one proposed and upheld by the European Union and other major donors with whom it ‘coordinates’ – produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible\(^{1384}\) (alternative views and practices of development cooperation).

Former World Bank economist William Easterly showed in his book *The White Man’s Burden* that there are two tragedies related to development aid. The first is that in our affluent world children still die of such illnesses like malaria that only cost 12 cents to prevent. The second tragedy is that after $2.3 trillion of foreign aid over the last five decades, these children still have to die. Instead of Big Golas, this author advocates for ‘doable’ things to be targeted as aims for development cooperation\(^{1385}\). By aiming to become Europe's allies in ideals such as ‘halving poverty by 2015’ as claimed by one of the Millennium Development Goals, these countries – the NMS - that have a recent experience as ‘recipients’, might be giving away their chance to reflect on their own experience and identify those ‘doables’ that could work inside or – why not? - outside the West’s ‘Big Plans’. Put it differently, it precludes them from asking the important questions of development cooperation: ‘How is it that after more than half a century of development, people still die from hunger?’; ‘Are we really ‘helpful?’; ‘Do we really know what is exactly that poor people need?’; ‘Are we supplying that?’ The European discourse of development cooperation is thus in full extension: twelve new countries – almost half of EU’s current membership – are now embarking on it and they will soon ‘take off”, adding to the trillions already spent.

\(^{1384}\) Escobar, op. cit., p. 5.
\(^{1385}\) William Easterly, op. cit.
CHAPTER 4 A Tale of Knowledge and Ignorance

This fourth and final chapter will attempt to draw a short list of relevant conclusions and major contributions.

It shows - in what could be read as a paradox - that for transforming the NMS from recipients to ‘new’ EU donors, processes of knowledge- as well as ignorance-production needed to be mobilized.

Last, but not least a few directions for future research are proposed by the author, based on the limitations that this particular piece of study has known.

4.1. Research Findings and Conclusions

This thesis is about development discourse in the European Union, in particular its new Member States, with a focus on the case of Romania. The European Union conceives of itself and presents itself to the international community as ‘the biggest donor of the World’\textsuperscript{1386}. This research shows (already in the introductory chapter\textsuperscript{1387}) that while institutional donors, be them from the European Union or elsewhere, promote development cooperation as a tool for lifting poor countries from their state of poverty\textsuperscript{1388}, a small but growing and very critical group of authors (such as Esteva, Sachs, Escobar, Said, Ferguson, Rist and others) take an opposite stance and think of it as a device of power and control.

To frame their arguments, these authors propose that development to be thought of not as much in terms of policy and technical operations, but in terms of ‘discourse’ as, in their view, this is one of the few methods able to maintain the focus on the domination effects produced by the practices of international development\textsuperscript{1389}. While the donors talk about aid as \textit{the} instrument for bringing sustainable economic and social development and waging

\textsuperscript{1386} The expression ‘Europe is the biggest provider of development aid in the world’ is on each page of DG DEV’s website. In the EU architecture the Directorate General for Development is the one that’ initiates and drafts development policy’ and ‘promotes a European approach to development across the EU countries to influence international debate and work more effectively to combat poverty’. See DG DEV, Mission and Role, available online at \url{http://ec.europa.eu/development/about/mission_en.cfm}.

\textsuperscript{1387} Section 1.4. – Discourse and Development.

\textsuperscript{1388} As DG DEV puts it ‘Our mission is also to help to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty in the developing countries through the promotion of sustainable development, democracy, peace and security’.

\textsuperscript{1389} Escobar, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
the campaign against poverty¹³⁹⁰, these authors show that the effects of domination that it produces need to be carefully observed, as development – far from being part of the solution to the South’s poverty – is part of its core problems. By following this line of reasoning, one might gather that the twelve new Member States of the European Union that are now making efforts to become new donors, will by these efforts compound the ‘problem’ in the very moment when they state that their aim is to support the European Union in its fight for eradicating global poverty.

By using techniques of discourse analysis and by taking Romania as a case-study, this thesis shows that the transformation of the ‘twelve’ into ‘new’ donors is, as a matter of fact, not a naturally occurring process that takes place when, for instance, these countries have reached a specific status in the international arena (ex. by becoming a member of a group of countries that promotes itself as the biggest donor of the World). On the contrary, at play there is a series of processes of direct and indirect influence that lead to the co-optation of the new members to the EU’s vision of international development.

These processes are framed by their promoters as knowledge-production processes given that they aim at ‘building the capacities’ and ‘raising the awareness’ (therefore the levels of information) of the new donors. However, based on the results of this thesis, it also becomes arguable that these mechanisms work at the same time as mechanisms for producing ignorance. By over-emphasizing the EU’s development values and practices and by making the European model easy to emulate, hardly any coherently-framed additional reflection is devoted by the neophytes to their own recent past of aid recipients or remote past of socialist donors. As it is often recalled, there is a stringent need for the NMS to speed the learning rhythm up: by 2010 they need to be ready to give up to 0.17% of their GDPs to international development, with that amount reaching 0.33% by 2015. But, at the same time, it is also argued that in those cases in which practices of the past can be remembered, unlearning the old ways – so as to make space for the new ones - is ‘clearly a major priority’¹³⁹¹.

¹³⁹⁰ According to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Title XX Development Cooperation, Article 177, the European Union’s self-assigned task in the field of development cooperation is to foster: the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries in the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.
¹³⁹¹ Simon Lightfoot and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizareta, The Emergence of International Development Policies in Central and Eastern European States, Center for Russian, Central and East European Studies, Working Paper Series, WP 2008/05, p. 3.
Romania is a case in point. On one hand, the experience of the pre-1989, socialist past is completely removed from the present public debate. The experience of the socialist past is acknowledged in informal settings, and references are made to the ‘capital of sympathy’ that Romania can count on in the developing countries from previous times. However, such ‘capital of sympathy’ is never harnessed to Romania’s renewed policy of international development and under no circumstance is it made to contribute to Romania’s new strategy in the field. On the other hand, the more recent, ‘transition’ experience is selectively used. For an example, the experience of Romanian NGOs cooperating with their counterparts in Serbia, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova (Romania’s priority countries for international development) is superficially sought after and fails therefore to be acknowledged as a possible contribution to Romania’s policy of development cooperation. This is not to say that Romanian NGOs hardly have a say in the process. On the contrary, Romanian NGOs will do speak, but those who are heard are those that are directly connected to the European discourse of development cooperation through the active facilitation of the EC-financed TRIALOG project that aims to ‘smoothly’ integrate them into CONCORD – the European umbrella organization. The ‘expertise’ of this latter group of organizations and the experience of the European organizations is actively sought and accepted as a legitimate model, at the expense of those perhaps less-known NGOs that already work in Serbia or Moldova (two of Romania’s ‘priority’ countries for development cooperation).

This remarkable oversight can be explained in various ways. This thesis identifies and describes one in particular: the simplified way in which the image of the ‘twelve’ as actors of development cooperation is constructed. Thus, one of the claims made by the European Union is that the twelve new Member States are also ‘new’ donors that lack experience and tradition in the field of development, as opposed to the ‘old’, ‘traditional’ and more ‘experienced’ donors that formed the ‘old’ Europe. Based on the assumption that experience can be transferred, the twelve are exposed to the series of aforementioned processes of influence so as to condense the time they would need for a natural process of ‘capacity-building’.

However, this research shows that at least in one case – Romania’s case – this allegation is hardly tenable. In a previous historical time (the socialist years) Romania’s policy towards
the developing countries was particularly active. More than that, Romania was knowledgeable of and conversant in those years’ discourse of international development. In the most varied, formal and important national and international settings, President Ceaușescu unfolded an extensive discursive activity on issues pertaining to international development. Socialist Romania was a country where issues of international development were discussed at the highest levels and were given generous media coverage at all levels. Through articles they could read every day in Scînteia and other newspapers and magazines, Romanians were not only familiarized with matters relating to underdevelopment, but they were also constructed as having features of solidarity and similarity with the developing nations. The image built for socialist Romania was that of a country that, after having fought underdevelopment at home, was ready to share its experience and model of development with other developing countries. International development was object of academic attention and Romania was able not only to reflect the international debates of global development, but also to formulate its own proposals for international development and upheld them in international fora (such as the UNCTAD-V for example).

Of course, it is arguable that the Romanian concept of international development – as it is expressed by the Romanian president and various Romanian commentators before 1989 – is tributary to this country’s socialist orientation and affiliation. But from a discursive point of view, any theory and practice of international development is tributary to a specific orientation: international development is not to be read as a neutral affair. In a zero-sum fashion, if a socialist theory is to be discarded based on its being ‘socialist’, then a capitalist theory needs to be discarded as being ‘capitalist’, as a ‘Western’ theory needs to be discarded as being ‘Western’. That said, it is tenable that most of the issues and themes dominating the Romanian discourse of the time, as well as the proposals it had advanced, are still topical today and apparently connected to the Western development discourse. Developers of these days still attach enormous importance to the role of education (read this in relation to the second Romanian proposal), to the role of agriculture, industry and infrastructure (first Romanian proposal), to the role of research-based development programs (third proposal), to the role of compensatory finance schemes to stabilize export earnings of the developing countries (see Romania’s call for fair prices for raw materials), to the importance of creating innovative funding for development (see for instance the literature on innovative mechanisms for development in
relation to Romania’s fourth proposal of creating a disarmament – development fund), to the role of up-to-date technology (the sixth proposal), and so on.

It is remarkable that, while being conversant in the dominant discourse of internationals development, Romanian commentators of the past show a sense of pride at Romania’s contributions in the field. At the same time, while attaching considerable importance to the socialist model of ‘mutually advantageous’ co-operation, they are rather critical of the Western forms of aid that is suspected to be offered with doubtful intentions. Romanian scholars go so far as to warn the developing countries about the dangers of the foreign aid.

At the time being, such criticism is relegated to oblivion and the formation of an alternative way of thinking of international development – based on critical thinking elaborated in the past - does not seem to be possible or probable. Given that massive imports of development ideology are accepted and made to appear even more legitimate than domestic reflection, the space for domestic or / and alternative development thinking is kept to a minimum. It appears to be true that in the transition years, in what international development is concerned, a great part of the institutional and the discursive practices were neglected, discredited and lost, but it is equally true that – when faced with the task of rebuilding a status of international donor – Romania is hardly making any attempt to recuperating that institutional and discursive memory. Romania ‘borrows’ massively from the more ‘experienced’ donors, and has nothing to ‘lend’ in exchange.

In this context, far from any longer criticizing or expressing any kind of concern regarding the Western approach of development cooperation, Romania draws a national strategy for international development that reflects – at every paragraph – the European values and principles. The Romanian public – through the actions of the TRIALOG-backed Romanian NGOs and more recently, the actions financed by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through UNDP Romania – starts being co-opted to the European / dominant vision of international development.

This way, development is little by little achieving the ‘status of a certainty’ in the Romanian social imaginary, as well as in the other ‘new’ Member States, just as it is now

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1392 Demonstrated by Escobar in his book… Escobar’s demonstration is not referred to the European Union specifically, but to the Western World. We extrapolate, by naturally including the European Union into the West.
the case in the majority of the other Member States of the European Union that entered the development discourse as early as its inauguration in the 1950s. With that, a certain order of discourse that ‘produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible’ is being produced. In this order of discourse the dominant model of international development (proposed by the European Union and other major donors with whom it ‘coordinates’) is promoted as the most rational and legitimate one, while alternative views and practices of development cooperation – even if (or exactly because) they are based on recent or long past domestic experiences - are inhibited and prevented.

The new Member States (re)join the international community of international donors at a time when radical authors proclaim the death of development and hail the beginning of the post-development era. But post-development is far from the EU new Member States. In these countries development discourse is in full expansion.

1393 As already mentioned, a long list of authors (Escobar, 1995; Easterly, 2006; Riddell, 2007, Rist: 1997, etc.) claim that the ‘development era’ was established in the late 40s, with the Fourth Point of the famous ‘Truman Speech’.

1394 Escobar, op. cit., p. 5.
4.2. Summary of Contributions

Following a school of thought that sees development discourse as a source of ascendancy and control, this thesis’ main contribution is to show how new donors, in particular the new Member States of the European Union, are co-opted to the European and Western discourse of international development, by creating and legitimating the idea that the NMS are ‘new’ donors that need to learn the trade from the ‘old’ ones.

By using discourse analysis techniques and by analyzing one particular case – that of Romania - this research shows that the idea of constructing the NMS as ‘new donors’ with no experience in the field of international development is at the same time historically inaccurate and value-laden. The NMS not only learn about contemporary ways of conducting donor-recipient relations, but they also unlearn, overlook or discount past experiences, while marginalizing experiences of active stakeholders in the present.

Even those willing to discuss the past experiences of the ‘new’ donors, show that the distinction between ‘re-emerging’ donors (such as the Czech Republic) and totally new donors (such as the Baltic countries) might be ‘historically true but of little use when comparing the situation in the 21st century’\textsuperscript{1395}; the prevailing stance, however, is that the NMS’ past experiences are either in-existent or irrelevant as deriving from a socialist ideology. This research shows that at least in the case of Romania, but probably in all other NMS, the experience of the past can hardly be marginalized or discredited. In socialist Romania the development discourse was particularly powerful, with international development being discussed at all levels of the Romania society, while Romanian scholars were active in analyzing development theory and practice and making concrete proposals for global development.

\textsuperscript{1395} Simon Lightfoot and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizareta, op. cit.
4.3. Directions for Further Research

At least two main directions of further research can be envisaged. One would look into the pre-1989 past, while the other could further examine the present.

When investigating the development discourse of the past, this research has focused almost exclusively on one single case-study – that of Romania. Michael Radu had shown that, in what the former Eastern European socialist countries are concerned, there are various categories of policy-makers towards the South. To have a coherent overview of the whole field, case-studies of each of Radu’s categories should be made and then connected to each other. Even the case-study of Romania is far from being exhaustive, as it is focused more on ‘discourse’ than on actual practices. There is a whole field of data that needs to be mined regarding the actual methods or practices of international aid or ‘mutual help’ of the former socialist countries. In a context in which Romania is now in search of its own ‘model’ of development cooperation and the European Union talks about the need of building a ‘transition tool’ for the NMS to make the transition to ‘fully-fledged’ donors, this kind of data might be of greatest relevance.

While looking into the present, similar concerns arise. First, the ‘transition’ years (the years from 1989 to the accession to the European Union) do not form a central piece of this thesis. However, once investigated, they might prove rich in information and ‘lessons’ for the future. Second, while some methods for co-opting the NMS might be relevant and applicable across the board (ex. the TRIALOG project, twinning-light projects, EU accession conditionality), other methods might be country-specific.

Most importantly, from a critical discourse analysis point of view, research is needed for understanding the type of ascendancy that the NMS can gather by aligning their discourse of development cooperation to those of EU and other Western donors.
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ANNEXES

Annex 1 – Seceta Sahelului.

Text published in Scînteia, in the section ‘Chenar de duminică’ [Sunday Agenda], 28 mai 1978, under the signiture of N. Corbu.

‘Din nou au început să sosească vести alarmante din zona Sahelului.

... Era anul 1973, apoi 1974. Cifrele erau trage – peste o sută de mii de morţi ca urmare a secetei prelungite, iar fotografiiile, deşi nu decupau decît secvenŃe limitate ale dezastrului păreau mai tragice decît cifrele tragice: pămîntul – o crustă crâpata de arşiŃă, ca o imensă întindere din petice de lut; ciorchini de oameni sfârşiti de sete în jurul unor ţinti Slovenia secate; o mamă ducîndu'şi în spate copilul fără să ştie că s-a stins de mult; agonizaŃi scheletici, piele pe os, ca supravieŃuitori ai lagărelor de la Auschwitz sau Buchenwald; animale pur și simplu uscate, transformîndu-se în praf...

Vieti arse, ochi sticloşi – şi o imensă, o gigantă rugă mută, desnaşâjduită: apă, hrană, apă... Acum din nou au început să sosească vести alarmante din Sahel. Deasupra celor opt state cuprinse în această zonă s-a pironit din nou, bătut în cuie de foc, un soare mistuitor, o arşiŃă grea, de plumb încins. Din cele 30 de milioane de locuitori sunt direct ameninŃi de foamete 7 milioane. În pericol de moarte. Pluviometrele au înŃepenit la zero, sunt regiuni din Sahel unde n'a mai cazut, de doi ani, strop de apă. Aerul dogoreşte fierbinte sub bolta de jăratic a cerului, plantele savanelor pier tuberculoase, râurile se inchircesc şi dispar, putrede...

Din nou se ridicǎ o implorare mutǎ, deznadajduitǎ: apǎ, hranǎ, apǎ…. Este ruga Sahelului – ca şi atitor altor zone ale Africii, deşertice, pârjolite de secetǎ.

... Si nici o ştire despre vreun pod aerian care să transporte tractoare. Nici o ştire despre supercargoboturi aeriene care să debarce febril mai multe maşini agricole. Sau despre coloane motorizate care să aducǎ alimente, îngrǎşǎminte. Nici o disputǎ despre cine paraşuteazǎ mai multe detaşamente de agronomi, zootehnicieni sau hidrologi.


Ei, dacǎ plugurile ar fi remorcate de blindate. Sau dacǎ Ńevile de tun ar putea fi folosite ca Ńevi pentru irigaŃii. Ori dacǎ populaŃia s-ar hrǎni cu munii. Sau dacǎ norii negri ai încordarii ar fi de ploaie... Seceta n-ar mai ridica nici o problema pe continental Africii. Dar irigaŃiile se pot face numai cu apă. Numai şi numai cu apă.

Nu cu sange.
Annex 2 - Measajul Președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu adresat celei de-a V-a Conferințe a Națiunilor Unite pentru Comerț și Dezvoltare de la Manila

Text published in Scînteia, 6 May 1979

'Imi face o deosebită plăcere să vă adresez dumneavoastră, participanților la cea de a V-a Conferință a Națiunilor Unite pentru comerț și dezvoltare, un cordial mesaj de salut împreună cu cele mai bune urări de succes în desfășurarea lucrărilor acestei importante reuniuni internaționale.

România acordă o mare atenție acestei conferințe chemate să dezbate și să adopte măsuri pentru soluționarea uneia dintre cele mai importante probleme ale epocii contemporane, ale păcii și securității mondiale: lichidarea subdezvoltării și făurirea unei noi ordini economice și politice internaționale, a unor relații noi, întemeiate pe deplină egalitate și echitate între state.

Constituie o gravă anomalie a realității social-politice contemporane faptul că în perioada celei mai ample revoluții tehnico-științifice, a cuceririlor științei și civilizației, ale cunoașterii umane, o mare parte a omenirii trăiește încă în condiții de subdezvoltare, de sărăcie și foame, că lumea continuă să fie împărtășită în țări sărace și țări bogate, ca rezultat al vecchii politici imperialiste și colonialiste de exploatare și asuprire. Aceasta provoacă mari suferințe unor zeci și zeci de popoare, lipsindu-le de cele mai elementare condiții de viață civilizată, de posibilitatea de a-și afirma forța creatoare, de a se manifesta și participa în mod plenar la viața internațională, la eforturile pentru progresul întregii omeniri.

Perpătuarea marilor decalaje economice și sociale dintre țările în curs de dezvoltare și țările avansate constituie, de asemenea, unul dintre factorii permanenți al încordării relațiilor interstatale, al instabilității economice mondiale, al accentuării fenomenelor de criză – economică, energetică, monetară – care au consecințe profound negative asupra evoluției tuturor statelor, a ansamblului vieții internaționale. (…)

Desigur, esențial este în primul rând însuși efortul țărilor rămase în urmă pentru dezvoltarea lor economico-sociață accentuată, precum și amplificarea colabornării dintre ele, a întrajutorării în lupta pentru formarea unei baze tehnico-materiale noi, pentru consolidarea independenței lor economice și politice și ridicarea nivelului de trai al maselor. Totodată, o importanță de prim ordin are făurirea
noii ordini economice internaționale, care să ducă la relații de egalitate și echitate, la respectarea dreptului fiecărei națiuni de a fi deplin stăpână pe bogății naționale și de a le valorifica în deplină concordanță cu interesele proprii, la lichidarea hotărâtă a politicilor imperialiste și colonialiste, precum și sporirea sprijinului pentru popoarele rămase în urmă din partea statelor dezvoltate economic. (…)

Consider de cea mai mare importanță ca actuala sesiune a U.N.C.T.A.D. să elaboreze un ansamblu de măsuri concrete, practice, în vederea soluționării problemelor arzătoare ale vieții economice internaționale și accelerării dezvoltării economico-sociale a țărilor rămase în urmă, insistându-se în mod deosebit asupra următoarelor:

1. Elaborarea unui program de lungă durată – până în anul 2000, cu o primă etapă până în 1990 – care să prevadă măsuri de dezvoltare mai intensă a economiei statelor în curs de dezvoltare. In acest cadru se impune elaborarea unui program special pentru dezvoltarea agriculturii, pe baza extinderii irigațiilor, ameliorării solului și mecanizării lucrărilor, care să asigure satisfacerea cerințelor de consum ale maselor, aprovisionarea corespunzătoare a popoarelor respective. De asemenea, am în vedere alcătuirea unui program pentru dezvoltarea industriei, în special a industriei alimentare și textile, precum și a altor ramuri pentru creșterea respective dispun de materiile prime necesare. O importanță deosebită pentru progresul economic al țărilor slab dezvoltate au totodată, elaborarea și înfăptuirea unui program de dezvoltare a căilor de comunicație, în special a căilor ferate și a transportului pe apele interioare.

2. România propune, de asemenea, adoptarea unui program privind dezvoltarea învățământului, a pregătirii cadrelor naționale pentru toate domeniile de activitate, corespunzător cerințelor progresului multilateral al acestor țări.

3. Având în vedere marea diversitatea a problemelor noi cu care se confruntă țările în curs de dezvoltare, România apreciază că se impune crearea unor organisme de studii și cercetare, pe zone geografice care să analizeze sarcinile și obiectivele economice și sociale specifice ale acestor țări și să prezinte soluții concrete pentru rezolvarea lor.

4. Pornind de la necesitatea ca țările rămase în urmă să primească un sprijin material mai substanțial și concret în eforturile lor de depășire a decalajelor economico-sociale, propunem constituirii cît mai grăbnică a Fondului comun de dezvoltare convenit, și care urmează să se alcătuiască prin participarea țărilor industrializate, precum și prin economiile realizate pe baza reducerii cheltuielilor militare. România propune reducerea
acestor cheltuieli, de către toate statele, cu 10-15 la sută, din care jumătate să fie alocată pentru ajutorarea țărilor slab dezvoltate. Acest fond să fie pus la dispoziție, cu prioritate țărilor în curs de dezvoltare care au un venit național anual pe locuitor până la 500-800 dolari și să fie folosit efectiv pentru realizarea programelor de dezvoltare a industriei, agriculturii, căilor de comunicații și celorlalte ramuri ale economiei naționale. Ajutorul să fie acordat, de asemenea, în primul rând țărilor care alocă ele însele o parte însemnată din venitul național, de cel puțin 20 la sută, pentru propria dezvoltare și care nu cheltuiesc pentru înarmare mai mult de 4-5 la sută din venitul național. (…)

5. Lichidarea subdezvoltării impune trecerea fermă și urgentă la stabilirea unor raporturi juste între prețurile materiilor prime și ale produselor industrializate, între costurile combustibilului și energiei și ale celorlalte produse (…).

De asemenea, trebuie să se convină asupra unor măsuri care să permită dezvoltarea fără restricții vanmale a exporturilor de produse industrializate și de alte produse ale țărilor în curs de dezvoltare pe piața mondială, la prețuri avantajoase.

6. Desfășurarea vertiginoasă a revoluției tehno-științifice mondiale impune ca o cerință fundamentală a depășirii marilor decalaje economice de către țările în curs de dezvoltare, deschiderea accesului lor larg la tehnologiile moderne. În acest sens trebuie reglementate măsuri de sporire a asistenței tehnice acordate de țările dezvoltate, de furnizare a noilor descoperiri științifice și tehnice în condiții avantajoase, care să permită popoarelor rămase în rumă să înainteze mai rapid pe calea progresului lor economic și social.

7. România consideră că o importanță deosebită are reglementarea justă a condițiilor în care își desfășoară activitatea în țările slab dezvoltate companiile străine. În acest sens, se impune asigurarea controlului național atît în ceea ce privește exploatarea diferitelor resurse naturale ale acestora, cît și participarea la beneficii. Considerăm că ar fi just și echitabil ca țările în curs de dezvoltare să aibă o participare efectivă de cel puțin 50 la sută.

8. O importanță deosebită considerăm că au întârâirea unității și solidarității țărilor în curs de dezvoltare, intensificarea colaborării și cooperării dintre ele, a întrajutorării lor reciproce, în vederea soluționării cu forțe comune a problemelor arzătoare ale progresului economic-social. Pornind de la necesitatea întâririirei unității de acțiune a țărilor în curs de dezvoltare pentru promovarea intereselor lor economice vitale, România consideră că este de cea mai mare însemnătate crearea unui organism permanent al acestor state care să trateze cu țările dezvoltate, în mod organizat și în condiții de deplină egalitate, problemele relațiilor dintre ele, pe baza unei platforme comune.
9. România consideră că în întreaga activitate îndreptată spre edificarea unei noi ordini economice internaționale, Organizația Națiunilor Unite trebuie să aibă un rol mult mai activ. În acest sens, apreciem necesitatea constituirii unui organism special al O.N.U. format din țări în curs de dezvoltare, țări socialiste și țări capitaliste avansate care să elaboreze programele concrete pentru lichidarea subdezvoltării și făurirea unei noi ordini economice internaționale (...).

10. (...) Conferință UNCTAD (...) să treacă de îndată la elaborarea unui program unitary de acțiune. Este timpul ca UNCTAD să depășească stadiul discutării generale a acestor probleme bitale pentru omenire și să adopte măsuri practice, concrete pentru soluționarea lor.