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THE ENGAGEMENT OF YUGOSLAV TECHNICAL COOPERATION EXPERTS IN POST-COLONIAL ALGERIA (1962-1990). A GLOBAL MICROHISTORY OF EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The venture of socialist Eastern Europe in assisting the development efforts of the post-colonial countries opened up official migratory channels to the Global South for a specific labour group engaged under international technical cooperation programmes. By taking post-colonial Algeria as a space of East-South interactions and intense inter-socialist competition, the thesis studies labour mobility from socialist Yugoslavia of a heterogeneous group labelled "technical cooperation experts" in the period from 1962 to 1990. While CMEA members dispatched to the country personnel in great numbers, after 1965, Yugoslavia failed to do so. Tracing them beyond the institutional level, the thesis aims at detecting and exposing factors which inhibited the attempts to increase the presence of Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria. It argues that instead of building an alternative, solidarity-based aid model, Yugoslav technical cooperation with the developing countries was reduced to mediation in the employment of highly-skilled labour abroad. The cooperation scheme, which differed from one of its Eastern European counterparts, manifested in the employment and legal status as well as everyday life and work experiences of Yugoslav citizens. Relying on the methodological approach of global microhistory, which strongly favours the micro-historical analysis of primary sources in studying global processes, the thesis provides a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of Yugoslav globalization endeavours. By shifting the focus to the experiences of ordinary people who were under the strong influence of globalization forces of the Cold War era, the thesis adds a "human" dimension to the history of East-South relations.

PREFACE

A historian places every actor and event he writes about in a wider historical context. However, it is equally essential for the reader to take into account the context in which the historiographic work came into existence, that is, the circumstances and the modus operandi of the author, which were taking place during the creative process of writing. Such considerations can offer an explanation for some of the author's choices and outcomes of his/her endeavours. The undertaking of research and writing of this dissertation was deeply marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, which utterly changed the course of the global economy and transformed the dynamics of many societies. When in March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak of a global pandemic, I had been immersed only a few months into my journey as a student in the PhD program of Global Histories, Cultures and Politics at the University of Bologna in Italy. The global medical emergency unseen since the Spanish flu of 1918/1919 significantly affected my research activities and shifted the trajectory of the project I chose to work on. With the restrictions on international travel, my academic exchange was postponed to an undefined time. Yet, even when governments lifted travel restrictions, the hassle of getting slots in archives and libraries, the reduced working hours, and the limited number of daily visitors were newly imposed conditions to which we researchers had to adjust. We had to learn how to operate in this unexpected situation so as to minimally interfere with the set goals and desired outcomes of our work. And though the project was carried out to a successful end, the originally scheduled activities and timeline unavoidably suffered upheavals and delays. The hardships were not only related to the scientific but also to the social aspects of the research process. For most of the first two years of my PhD studies, communication with my supervisor and colleagues became exclusively virtual, lacking in-person interaction. At the same time, even though the organisers did excellent work setting up virtual workshops and conferences, notable was the missing social interaction with fellow historians. Since they provide a less-formal and structured way for interaction and networking opportunities, many of my colleagues from academia would probably agree with the statement that coffee breaks can be sometimes a more important component of an academic event than the panels themselves. Fortunately, pandemic-related restrictions were significantly eased during the year 2022 and got our research finally back on track.

Whenever reflecting on the three years of the PhD journey, I recall the anecdote from the Croatian State Archive in Zagreb at the end of 2019. In the reading room lit by sumptuous Art Nouveau chandeliers and hundreds of green table lamps, I ran into my former Master's thesis co-supervisor and, nowadays, a close friend of mine. Though looking forward to the challenges of the new project with optimism and enthusiasm, I was overwhelmed by the quantity of archival records I had encountered there. During one of our coffee breaks, he responded to my concerns by suggesting I should have *immediately* made digital copies of *all* those documents without leaving them for potential future visits: *"Well, you never know what kind of disaster can happen. The records you are interested in tomorrow might not be available anymore."* Knowing that the capital of Croatia was soon after hit not only by a pandemic but also by two earthquakes that limited the availability of records for some time. His words, which gained a prophetic meaning, helped me to complete my work on time.

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The journey towards earning my own ticket to academia would not be the same without dear friends, colleagues, professors and institutions who provided immense support along the way. First of all, I am deeply indebted to the University of Bologna which recognized the potentiality of my research proposal and offered me the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to pursue PhD studies at the world's oldest university in continuous operation. Alongside many of Bologna's teaching staff, I particularly remain thankful to Professor Paolo Capuzzo, who accepted to take up the role of my thesis supervisor. Shared interests in Yugoslavia's non-aligned ties with the African continent connected me to Nemanja Radonjić, Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade, to whom I would also like to express my deepest gratitude for fruitful discussions and for inspiring my own research. Together with Nemanja, excellent company during my stay at the Institute for Recent History in Belgrade was Milan Piljak, a colleague historian and excellent host in the Serbian capital. He helped me in "deciphering" hard-to-read Cyrillic manuscripts, deepening my understanding of Yugoslavia's economic history, but also discovering the finest of Belgrade's restaurants. The subject of Africa's post-colonial networks with the global communist movement deepened my friendship with colleague Arianna Pasqualini, who shared with me the road towards earning the PhD title. I tremendously enjoyed our days in Bologna's Giardini Margherita organizing our conjoint workshop. A person who was always there for me, providing encouragement and helping me bypass occasional motivation deficits was Stipica Grgić, Research Associate at the Croatian Institute of History, to whom I cannot express enough gratitude. I would also like to thank my friends Petra Vručina and Petra Babić for keeping my spirits high during the pandemic period. Though we pursued our PhD studies at different institutions, our passion for history kept us bonded from the first days of undergraduate studies. Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the Embassy of Algeria in Croatia, and particularly the Ambassador, H. E. Mokhtar Amine Khelif, for granting me a visit and unforgettable first-hand experience of the country and people I had hitherto only been reading and writing about. The same gratitude I owe to the Ambassador of Croatia to Algeria, H. E. Ilija Želalić, who hosted me in his residence and walked me down the streets of Algiers' neighbourhood of Hydra.

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INTRODUCTION

I. Theoretical Framework: Socialist Globalizations, Labour Mobilities and Global Development

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the shift of the dominant political trajectory towards the West, the geopolitical space of the formerly socialist Eastern Europe turned its back on the historical connections and partnerships with the post-colonial world. However, historiography has recently re-discovered intense relations in the political, economic, military and cultural domains between the Eastern European and the post-colonial countries forged during decolonization and the Cold War. Many such partnerships arose from the 1954-1962 Algerian War of Independence, whose success resonated throughout the anti-colonial world and beyond. The non-aligned Yugoslavia was, in fact, one of the first and most persistent supporters of the Algerian Revolution, which was the first anti-colonial conflict that Tito's leadership actively backed up by illegal dispatches of arms. From the initial contacts with the representatives of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) established in Cairo in 1954, resulting in the deliveries of the first contingents of weapons via Egypt, to becoming the first European country that officially and fully recognized Algeria's independence in September 1961, Yugoslav leadership aimed at building on solidarity principles a strong network of political, economic and cultural ties across the Global South.

Studied from a global perspective and the perspective of ordinary, non-elite actors, the general focus of this dissertation is on the networks and links between Eastern Europe and the post-colonial world. The latter subject has gained enormous popularity in the academic community of historians and related disciplines. In the past few years, a plethora of articles, monographs and theses have been published discussing the movement of technology, capital, knowledge, information and people between East and South. The proliferation of the topic of East-South relations got the impetus from the collaborative project "Socialism Goes Global: Cold War Connections Between the 'Second' and 'Third Worlds'", which was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) with the help from the University of Exeter. Coordinated by James Mark (University of Exeter) and Paul Betts (University of Oxford), the project brought

together historians from the University of Belgrade, Columbia University, University of Exeter, Leipzig University, University of Oxford, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and University College London,[1] whose collaboration, among others, resulted in valuable publications "Alternative Globalizations. Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World"[2] and the all-encompassing monograph "Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization".[3] Centred around the premise that alternative non-capitalist globalization projects were launched by the Soviet Union and East European countries during the Cold War,[4] the research departed from the dominant idea of Western capitalism as the single engine of globalization. In the latest work, the old metanarrative of globalization as a process of accelerated interactions between core and periphery has been substituted by a vision of globalization as a multidirectional process of forging global interconnections. Though it became a widely accepted notion in the academic community, some authors expressed a certain degree of divergence in defining Cold War globalization processes. Certainly, the most prominent "dissident" has been economic historian Oscar Sanchez-Sibony and his book "Red Globalization. The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev". For striving to integrate into the capitalist economic system and coming to the Global South as secondary partners, rather than defining it as an "alternative", Sanchez-Sibony regards the position of the Cold War socialist economies as a "subaltern" to Western globalization.

Whether envisioning "socialist globalizations" as an intrinsic part of capitalist globalization or a parallel, alternative system of networks, it is indisputable that the protagonists in this process were not solely superpowers but minor actors who forged and developed ties with the rest of the world under their autonomous agendas. Indeed, this thesis is part of the latest historiographic trend aiming to decentre the research of the Cold War by focusing on "smaller" protagonists to add complexity to the narratives of 20th-century globalization processes. The non-aligned Yugoslavia was one of the

[1] "Socialism Goes Global", *Exeter.ac.uk*, https://socialismgoesglobal.exeter.ac.uk/about/. Accessed 29 January 2023.
[2] James Mark, Artemy M. Kalinovsky, Steffi Marung, eds., *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020).
[3] James Mark and Paul Betts, eds. *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonisation* (Oxford University Press, 2022).
[4] Anna Calori et. al., eds, *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019).

countries actively participating in globalization currents, forging links with the post-colonial governments based on anti-imperialist solidarity and proclaiming mutually beneficial cooperation and partnership among equals. Whether the solidarity discourse of the state-party leadership was backed up by *genuine* apprehension or reduced to a rhetorical tool for achieving political and economic goals remains a rather complex question. However, the Yugoslav leadership was open about assisting the development efforts of the Global South under the premise that supporting trade relations promotes economic growth at home. Managing limited financial capital, Yugoslavia attempted to supplement loans offered to the developing countries with another form of development aid – highly-skilled human resources. Becoming active participants in socialist globalizations, the central protagonists of these exchanges were Yugoslav citizens, usually with higher education, who decided to respond to a request from the Algerian government and give up on their domestic job to temporary work and settle abroad.

Intensified mobilities between East and South were a particularly discernible phenomenon of global Cold War entanglements. The growing political, economic and cultural networks between Eastern European and post-colonial countries stimulated the circulation of non-elite actors within the hitherto disconnected geographies. While international policies defined the migration space, individuals engaged in transnational mobilities actively seized the opportunity to pursue their own agendas. After the end of the Second World War, an opportunity for migration in the Cold War environment was introduced by the platform of international technical cooperation for a distinct social group, which falls under the category of highly skilled labour. However, this was an almost invisible migration flow that was not captured in migration statistics, consequently remaining out of the interest of migration-based research. One of the reasons is that scholars nor policy-makers defined actors in question within the category of "migrants". This situation equally reflects the reality of migrant classification and understandings determined by the Global North. Strongly associated with the North-South divide, historical cross-border movements of the expert workforce have remained out of interest in migration studies. In fact, transnational mobile people from

the Global North have generally not been depicted as migrants *per se* but usually as "expatriates" or sometimes as "cosmopolitans".[5]

As a result, researchers have kept the tendency to focus exclusively on South-to-North movements. Aside from epistemological issues, the idea that "migration" implies a particular migratory trajectory while depicting the mobility experience of individuals from the North as "non-migration", brought about disparate expectations regarding the integration of individuals in the host society. A common belief is that "expatriates" are exempted from integration expectations, what again separates them from their counterparts from the Global South, particularly from the category of low-skilled migrants. However, recently has been argued that regardless of origin and skill level, all migrants encounter similar challenges in the host society. Despite facilitated integration in the foreign labour market by being recruited through dedicated channels, they face social and cultural integration issues equal to their low-skilled counterparts. However, their full labour potential and labour market integration can be obstructed by the absence of language skills, place-based knowledge and professional experience. In turn, these obstacles can lead to the loss of social status, overskilling, underemployment, and eventually "brain waste" – phenomena typical for highly skilled migration.[6]

For the same reasons mentioned above, historiography has overlooked alternative paths of labour migration from socialist Yugoslavia that occurred beyond the West. Until recently, research on Yugoslav labour migration has covered almost exclusively East-West movements and their economic aspects.[7] To open new research horizons and fill the gap in the scholarship, the thesis deals with Yugoslav labour migration to the Global South. By studying the case of post-colonial Algeria as the destination country, the dissertation looks into some of the crucial aspects of Yugoslav highly-skilled labour mobility in the Global South during the Cold War era. Studying workers engaged in Algeria under the platform of international technical cooperation

[5] Agnieszka Weinar, Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels. *Highly-Skilled Migration: Between Settlement and Mobility* (Springer, 2020), p. 2, 26.
[6] Ibid, p. 49-51.
[7] See for example: Ulf Brunnbauer, "Labour emigration from the Yugoslav region from the late 19th century until the end of socialism: continuities and changes", and Novinšćak Kölker, Karolina, "The Recruiting and Sending of Yugoslav 'Gastarbeiter' to Germany: Between Socialist Demands and Economic Needs", in Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics. Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslav Region 19th-21st Century, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 17-50; 121-44; Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno. Jugoslavenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji 1965.-1973* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012).

and looking into related government policies which evolved around Yugoslavia's globalization efforts, the dissertation addresses the effect of macro-structural Cold War forces in shaping migration processes and trajectories. While accounting for the structuring effect of government policies on migration by facilitating and actively stimulating the cross-border movement of certain social groups, at the same time, the thesis acknowledges the ability of individuals to exert agency when operating within a given structure. In other words, it recognizes the ability of actors to make independent and free choices and decide whether to leave or to stay.

While I tend to primarily address as "cooperants"[8] individuals from the West, in this thesis, I occasionally use the term interchangeably with "technical experts" or oftentimes only "experts" to refer to the Yugoslav personnel dispatched to the developing countries within the international technical cooperation agenda. Since it occupies a central position in the research, it is necessary to clarify at the beginning the main conceptual problems which appear in this work. Since the Yugoslav and Algerian administrations in the official documents referred to the labour group in question by using the French plural noun "experts" or the Serbo-Croatian equivalent "stručnjaci" or "eksperti", I chose to give priority in the thesis to the English word "experts". Alternatively, to specify and define it more clearly, I use the entire phrase "technical cooperation experts" ("stručnjaci tehničke suradnje") or "technical assistance experts" ("stručnjaci tehničke pomoći"). The term "expert" should not be confused with other usages of the noun in different contexts, as the sources and literature also use it to refer to a person of high expertise.

Rather than describing them as "expatriates", I study the group of workers from socialist Yugoslavia identified as "technical cooperation experts" within the category of "highly skilled migrants" or "highly skilled labour". Although one might be inclined to intuitively think about the matter, it is important to stress that highly skilled labour does not necessarily correspond to the obtained higher education qualifications, i.e., to individuals holding an academic degree. In reality, both policymakers and academics have been struggling to conceptualize highly skilled migration, sometimes referred to as "highly educated" or "highly qualified". When defining the term, the literature usually

[8] The term derives from the French word „coopérants" (pl.), referring to the personnel employed abroad under international technical cooperation programs.

focuses on one of the three principal criteria – education, skills and wage. However, such an approach showed flaws. For example, for the sake of simplification, economists equated "highly skilled" with tertiary-level education, excluding those who acquired vocational training and education.[9] On the other hand, the concept of skill is socially constructed and context related. Different actors have different interpretations and evaluations of skills, often depending on subjective aspects such as gender, race and nationality.[10] Instead, migration researchers Agnieszka Weinar and Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels suggested defining highly skilled migration *vis-à-vis* the receiving government, which decides the typology of skills corresponding to the labour market demands.[11]

Under the highly skilled migration category, I propose to study Yugoslav technical cooperation experts. As explained, we should not fall into the trap of equating highly skilled migrants with the obtained educational level.[12] Although most Yugoslav experts completed tertiary-level education, there were individuals with vocational training, particularly among healthcare professionals (nurses, midwives, medical technicians, radiologic technologists, laboratory technicians, etc.). Instead, as a heterogeneous group composed of individuals with diverse educational backgrounds, skills and incomes, their common denominator was that the receiving country granted them entry and employment under the bilateral technical cooperation agreements. While the semantic meaning of the word "expert" describes someone who possesses the expertise, expert skill or knowledge in a particular field, these skills were defined by the host government with regard to the needs of its labour market. However, the host administration measured their skill level by proxy variables such as education credentials or occupational experience.

While arguing that Yugoslav workers contracted under technical cooperation agreements fall under the migration phenomenon, I indicate the difference with workers

[9] Weinar and Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Highly-Skilled Migration*, p. 1.
[10] Gracia Liu-Farrer, Brenda S. Yeoh, Michiel Baas, "Social construction of skill: an analytical approach toward the question of skill in cross-border labour mobilities", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47, no. 10 (2021): p. 2237-2251.
[11] Weinar and Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Highly-Skilled Migration*, p. 13-15.
[12] The term should equally not be confused with the Yugoslav self-management terminology of "highly skilled worker" (*visokokvalifikovani radnik*).

accompanying investment projects of Yugoslav enterprises across the Global South.[13] Because the topic has remained under-researched, recent publications which refer to the issue failed to acknowledge the distinction among the Yugoslav labour in the Global South. It is important to stress that unlike the white- and blue-collar workers posted abroad by their enterprises, which was the most common occurrence, the protagonists of this dissertation were workers in the employ of the receiving governments. As a result, they acquired completely distinct labour and everyday experiences. Indeed, pointing out the differences between the categories of Yugoslav workers in the Global South can be recognized as one of the crucial contributions of this dissertation. Apart from the two mentioned modalities of employment, Yugoslav citizens worked in the developing world within various legal frameworks. Another possibility for employment in the Global South was being outsourced as an employee of a Yugoslav enterprise to foreign governments or public enterprises. Lastly, individuals had the opportunity to self-initiatively find work on a private contract without the mediation of government agencies or enterprises. Contrary to the stance on the employment of highly skilled labour in the West, whereby imposing multiple restrictions to inhibit migration, I will show that the Yugoslav authorities encouraged, promoted and sponsored labour mobility to the Global South under its technical cooperation programmes for the means of pursuing foreign policy goals and economic interests.

Since the thesis is a case study of Yugoslav highly-skilled labour mobility to Algeria conducted through the government channels of technical cooperation, it is important to define the meaning of the phrase. In simple terms, technical cooperation or technical assistance is a type of development aid, where expertise, advice and skill-sharing are provided to developing countries through the dispatching of specialist personnel, hosting scholarship and training programmes for students and trainees, or similar associated activities. Though "cooperation" was deemed to describe a more collaborative approach and a non-hierarchical partnership than „assistance", in this thesis, I will use the terms "technical assistance", "technical aid" and "technical cooperation" as synonyms.

[13] See for example: Nemanja Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji (1945-1991)" (PhD diss., University of Belgrade, 2020); Ljubica Spaskovska, "Building a better world? Construction, labour mobility and the pursuit of collective self-reliance in the 'global South', 1950–1990", *Labor History* 59, no. 3 (2018), p. 335.

The Yugoslav technical cooperation with the Global South, including Algeria, took place within multiple state bodies and organizations, such as The Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (*Savezni Sekretarijat za spoljnje poslove*, SSIP) – where the VI Directorate (*VI Uprava*) or The Directorate for the Middle East and North Africa (*Uprava za Bliski istok i Severnu Afriku*) was in charge of the Maghreb region, Foreign Trade Secretariat (*Savezni Sekretarijat za Spoljnu Trgovinu*, SSST), Federal Commission for Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries (*Savezna komisije za kulturnu saradnju sa inostranstvom*) or enterprises directly.[14] Alongside institutions and enterprises, as the central administrative body responsible for managing Yugoslav activities in bilateral and multilateral technical cooperation stood the Federal Administration for International Technical Cooperation (*Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju*; ZAMTES). Reporting straight to the government, ZAMTES was responsible for the implementation of technical cooperation agreements, including those related to the engagement of technical experts abroad. However, a coordinated approach and agenda has never been established among the Yugoslav actors involved in international technical cooperation.

While in the archival documents, the acronym occasionally appears as YUZAMS, throughout this dissertation, I will refer to it under the more frequently mentioned acronym ZAMTES. Origins of ZAMTES can be traced back to the task of the Federal Planning Commission (*Savezna planska komisija*) and later the Economic Council of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (*Privredni Savet vlade FNRJ*) to handle technical aid received from the UN. Due to the extension of Yugoslav participation in international technical cooperation to providing technical aid to developing countries, in 1953 established was the Directorate for Economic and Technical Assistance (*Uprava za ekonomsku i tehničku pomoć*) within the Ministry of Industry, which was reorganized in 1956 as the Committee for Technical Assistance (*Komisija za tehničku pomoć*). With the increase in the scope of activities, in 1961, technical assistance was exempted from the Ministry of Industry and organized as a separate administrative body – the Bureau for Technical Assistance (*Zavod za tehničku pomoć*).[15] Only a year later, in 1962, the term "assistance" was replaced with

[14] „Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji", Beograd, 20 January 1968; AJ (Arhiv Jugoslavije)-130 (fond)-607(box), p. 48-49.
[15] Blagoje Bogavac, „Jugoslavija u međunarodnoj tehničkoj suradnji", *Jugoslovenski pregled: informativno-dokumentarni priručnik o Jugoslaviji* (June 1970): p. 52; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 213.

"cooperation" and the adjective "international" was added, which resulted in a new title – the Federal Administration for International Technical Cooperation. These semantic changes in the title were to reflect Yugoslav determination to a mutually beneficial collaboration, equality and partnership.[16]

After the administrative reconstruction in Yugoslavia and the abolition of bodies in the field of cultural, education and sports cooperation, such as the Federal Commission for Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries, in October 1971, ZAMTES fully took over the aforementioned affairs and was reorganized as the Federal Administration for International Scientific, Educational, Cultural and Technical Cooperation (*Zavod za međunarodnu znanstvenu, kulturnu i tehničku suradnju*).[17] As reflected in the epithet of the "international technical cooperation", the activities of ZAMTES were not limited to "developing countries" but were organized in two other separate sectors dealing with socialist countries (the CMEA), and developed countries (the OECD and the UN agencies). Within the developing countries sector, the responsibility for dispatching experts was held within the Department for Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries. Among other staff, the Department employed the Independent Expert Associate for Algeria (*Samostalni stručni suradnik za Alžir*), the official responsible for Algeria-related affairs. The position was abolished in 1969 and merged under the Independent Expert Associate for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (*Samostalni stručni suradnik za Maroko, Alžir i Tunis*).[18] On top of the ZAMTES hierarchy stood the Director of ZAMTES, who was directly appointed by the government, and his right hand – the Assistant Director of the ZAMTES.[19] Since all ZAMTES proposals had to undergo evaluation and approval of the Federal Executive Council (*Savezno izvršno vijeće*, SIV), I occasionally refer to the activities and reasonings of ZAMTES as those of the "Yugoslav government" or "Yugoslav authorities".

[16] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 172.
[17] In 1966, the tasks related to providing scholarships to foreign students were transferred from the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries to ZAMTES. „Zakon o organizaciji i delokrugu saveznih organa uprave i saveznih organizacija", *Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 32/1971.
[18] „Rješenje o sistematizaciji radnih mjesta u Savezom zavodu za međunarodnom tehničku saradnju", 13 December 1968, AJ-130-607, p. 3.
[19] „Prilog 5. Pregled radnika Saveznog zavoda za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju na dan 25. jula 1969. godine", in *Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju* (Belgrade: Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju, 1969), p. 57-60.

Proclaimed an expression of anti-imperialist, non-aligned and socialist solidarity, technical cooperation set off in the early stages of Yugoslavia's involvement in the affairs of the "Third World", becoming one of the cornerstones of close bilateral relations with post-colonial countries, particularly Algeria. On the one hand, studying Yugoslavia within East-South interactions makes a unique case because, despite being an East European socialist country, its leadership aimed at presenting itself as utterly different from the members of the socialist camp. Ever since the Yugoslav political leadership decided to break away from Soviet control and the international communist movement, the country held a special position in the global Cold War international politics and developed its own brand of the socialist system. Not only this, but as we will see in this thesis, the model of technical cooperation was significantly different from other Eastern European countries. On the other hand, the political reputation in the Third World and intense bilateral relations with socialist countries justify the choice of Algeria as the space for East-South interactions. Since the early days of its independence, Algeria was the destination of a high number of technical cooperation experts from all over the socialist world and beyond.

After explaining the choice of the case study, it should be briefly reflected on the periodization. The historical time framework observed in the thesis is the period between the year 1962, marked by the arrival of the first group of Yugoslav experts to the newly independent Algeria, until 1990, distinguished by the last session of the Joint Commission held in June of the same year in Belgrade, the return from Algeria of the last Yugoslav expert in September 1990, and finally the dissolution of the Federation in the upcoming years. A longue durée perspective of roughly thirty years offers the possibility to detect continuities and discontinuities in the relations and technical cooperation which occurred under global economic shifts as well as the changes in the Yugoslav socio-economic system of self-management. Not less important, as a process which is an intrinsic part of social change, migration phenomena require observation from a chronologically wider perspective to be comprehensively understood. This approach will allow us to detect the impact of the global trend of commercialization of development aid occurring in the socialist world and the economic, social and legal transformations in Yugoslavia, both interconnected with the micro-level experiences. The outlook will help us to answer the central question of this dissertation about the

causes of the low presence of Yugoslav experts in Algeria after 1965. Together with Libya, the Yugoslav government held Algeria as its most important Yugoslav partner in the domain of international technical cooperation.[20] Despite the long-standing efforts to increase the number of technical experts in the country, their presence was insignificant. For illustration, while between mid-1962 and 1965, more than 500 Yugoslavs worked in Algeria as part of bilateral technical cooperation, from 1983 to 1988, Yugoslavia managed to dispatch to Algeria only 81 experts in total.[21] This development can be explained by the central hypothesis that, rather than solidarity-based aid, the technical expert programme was transformed into mediation in the employment of the highly-skilled workforce in the labour markets of the Global South.

II. Methodology and Approaches

An Attempt at Writing A Global Microhistory

A way historiography addresses the impact of macro-structural factors on the lives of "ordinary" people is by setting microhistory's small scale of enquiry into a larger framework of global history. Tracing global entanglements to the micro-level seeks the implementation of a methodological approach known as "global microhistory". Despite spurring debates, historians have not been able to reach a consensus on what *exactly* the sub-discipline of global microhistory implies. In fact, its essential components – global history and microhistory – have equally never received a universal definition. Originally, global microhistory emerged as an attempt to integrate microhistory and global history after Tonio Andrade had called historians to "adopt micro-historical and biographical approaches to help populate our models and theories with real people, to write what one might call global microhistory".[22] Though the key characteristic of global microhistory is a human-centred history, the approach should not be simplistically

[20] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, 25 June 1987, HDA (Hrvatski državni arhiv)-1727(fond)-345(box).
[21] Because ZAMTES did not keep a systematized record of experts abroad, it is almost impossible to precisely determine the exact number of dispatched Yugoslav technical experts to Algeria in the period before 1982. For this reason, statistical values related to the period before 1982, reported in this work, are only estimated.
[22] Tonio Andrande, „A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord: Toward a Global Microhistory", *Journal of World History* 21, no. 4 (2010): p. 574.

reduced to narrating, what Andrande called, "stories of individual lives in global contexts".[23]

Global microhistory can be defined as a method of micro-historical analysis conjoined with a global historical perspective.[24] Generally, the approach is an answer to the issue of interconnection and interaction between micro- and macro- levels of historical analysis. Whether it be an actor, object, idea or knowledge, they never exist without broader connections. As one of the pioneers of *microstoria*, Giovanni Levi put it, "even the apparently minutest action of, say, somebody going to buy a loaf of bread, actually encompasses the far wider system of the whole world's grain markets".[25] According to another famous Italian "microhistorian" Francesca Trivellato, "the protagonists of these global microhistories [...] are individuals who embody geographical and cultural dislocation."[26] In fact, microhistorians show the tendency towards studying "global mobile lives of non-elite actors".[27] Following these ideas, I put under the historiographic microscope mobile non-elite actors whose lives were shaped by large-scale global processes. Not less important, Andrade pointed to another, for most academics often trivial, even undesirable aspect of microhistory, that "this human focus makes books fun to read, exciting even, and they've reached a wide audience".[28] Thus, under the spotlight of this dissertation, I put individuals who would normally be left out of global history or only collectively and sporadically mentioned. Instead of high-level political and public figures, I focus on physicians and nurses, engineers, architects, teachers and other mobile actors. By grasping their desires, concerns, problems, their moments of hopefulness and desperation, I try to understand globalization processes

[23] Ibid.
[24] See theoretical and methodological discussions on global microhistory in 2019 supplement volume edited by John-Paul A. Ghobrial, ed., "Global History and Microhistory," special issue, *Past and Present* 242, issue supplement 14, 2019. A special issue of the French journal "Annales" was dedicated in 2021 to global microhistory by hosting four articles addressing different topics, albeit with a common denominator of implementing a global microhistorical approach to their writings. "Microanalysis and global history – Work and society", *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 73, Issue 1, 2018.
[25] Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory", in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke (University Park, 1992), p. 96.
[26] Francesca Trivellato, „Is There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global History?", *California Italian Studies*, 2, 1 (2011).
[27] Marcia C. Schenck and Jiyoon Kim, „A Conversation about Global Lives in Global History: South Korean overseas travelers and Angolan and Mozambican laborers in East Germany during the Cold War", *L'Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques* [online], 18 (2018). Last access: 29 January 2023.
[28] Andrane, „A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord: Toward a Global Microhistory", p. 574.

from a grassroots perspective. Because not only the global processes shaped them, but they in turn shaped these processes.

While approaching the writing of the thesis as a "global microhistory" which embodies a variety of perspectives and levels of analysis, the adoption of a theoretical, methodological and disciplinary eclecticism makes this dissertation stand out as a particular piece of historical work. A more profound understanding of the subject of transnational mobilities can only be achieved by abandoning methodological and disciplinary parochialism. Though the dissertation is primarily an empirical-based historical study, it borrows theoretical concepts from other disciplines (principally international relations, migration studies, and postcolonial studies) and combines different methodologies of international, economic, social and cultural history.

Sources

According to Oxford Historian John-Paul Ghobrial, works of global microhistory are characterized by merging the study of global historical processes and a strong focus on the primary source analysis, which reveals stories of individual lives and events seeking strong contextualization.[29] By combining official documents and individual testimonies, which reflect the point of view from both institutions and life stories, respectively, the dissertation provides an all-encompassing picture of Yugoslavia's close relations with post-colonial Algeria and a richer understanding of its transnational network of political, economic and cultural ties. Before presenting the structure of the thesis, I will briefly expose the analysed primary sources.

Apart from the fact that microhistorical analysis requires a close reading of primary sources, maximum attention to the archival records was dedicated due to the missing narrative on the Yugoslav-Algerian relations after 1965 and the subject of Yugoslav engagement in international technical cooperation being entirely unresearched. The most important primary sources consulted through the course of this research were records from the Archives of Yugoslavia (*Arhiv Jugoslavije*, AJ) in

[29] John-Paul A. Ghobrial, „Introduction: Seeing the World like a Microhistorian", *Past & Present*, vol 242, Issue Supplement 14, November 2019, p. 16.

Belgrade, primarily archival fond AJ-465 of the Federal Institute for International Technical Cooperation. From the fond AJ-465, a total of 28 files (precisely, from AJ-465-6545 to AJ-465-6572)[30] were systematically processed and analysed. While another fond, AJ-208, related to ZAMTES activities in the period from 1952 to 1971 is kept at the Archives of Yugoslavia, access to the records has been temporarily restricted to the researchers due to a process of the internal arrangement of the fond. As a result, the knowledge about the first years of technical cooperation and the technical experts themselves remains to a certain extent limited for the moment. The major part of the consulted documents deals with the technical cooperation with Algeria during the period of the 1980s. Consequently, the thesis covered in more detail the final phase of dispatching Yugoslav experts to Algeria. A setback in the process of conducting archival research presented the absence of systematization and arrangement of the documents within the fonds and functional archival guides. Other relevant archival records examined throughout the research are located in the Croatian State Archive (*Hrvatski državni arhiv*, HDA) in Zagreb, precisely fond HR-HDA-1727 by the Republic Bureau for International Scientific and Technical Cooperation (*Republički zavod za međunarodnu znanstveno-tehničku* suradnju, RZMZTS). From the latter fond, consulted were in total 25 files (from HR-HDA-1727-344 to -348, and from HR-HDA-1727-448 to -467).

The content of studied archival units consists of diverse bilateral agreements in the field of technical cooperation, reports from the meetings, instructions to the Yugoslav delegation for carrying out the negotiations received from SIV, SSIP, SSST and ZAMTES, reports and instructions from ZAMTES to the branch offices and their internal correspondence, diplomatic notes by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria as well as by the Algerian Embassy in Belgrade, various other official documents but also informal notes drawn by ZAMTES officials. From this material, we get to understand the practice of technical cooperation between Algeria and Yugoslavia and the terms and conditions of experts' engagement. However, sources of the highest value were letters[31] and reports on the daily life and work written by experts during their stay in Algeria and upon

[30] The exception are the records kept in the file „Alžir – Državni centar", under the archival signature AJ-465-6556, which I did not look into. However, to the fond classification was added a file under the signature AJ-465-6556a, thus bringing to a total of 28 files.

[31] Unless otherwise specified in the footnote, ZAMTES can be regarded as the addressee of letters. Apart from Serbo-Croatian, the letters were written in Macedonian and Slovenian language, mostly in the Latin script, though there were also those composed using Cyrillic script.

return to Yugoslavia. These records, composed of individual, first-hand testimonies written in an open form, provide valuable elements for understanding various profiles of experts who worked in Algeria and their individual and collective experiences of employment abroad, both addressed in the thesis.

Adding to the substance of the archival material, inevitable primary sources were mass-printed daily Yugoslav newspapers (e.g. "Vjesnik", "Borba", "Večernji list") and the journal "Jugoslovenski pregled: informativno-dokumentarni priručnik o Jugoslaviji" which brought detailed political, social and economic reports and studies on Yugoslavia. Indispensable material for the research of technical cooperation with the Global South and important sources of data and statistics were ZAMTES publications and the comprehensive and detailed 1972 study "Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju" by Rodoljub Jemuović and Avguštin Lah.[32] Other sources I looked into were memoirs of Yugoslav diplomats and high-level politicians as well as published interviews with former posted workers and technical experts who conducted labour activities in Algeria.

Alongside studying primary sources, consulted was rich and ever-growing secondary literature on the topic of East-South relations. One of the most valuable works often referred to, is the PhD dissertation „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji" by Nemanja Radonjić,[33] who dedicated a chapter of his thesis to study the image of Africa from the perspective of various groups of Yugoslav labour in Africa – including technical experts. Valuable insights into the diversification strategy developed by the post-colonial Algerian leadership aiming to decrease dependence on France and mitigate neo-colonial influences were offered by Jeffrey J. Byrne in „Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order".[34] An important work to understand the position of technical cooperation in the global arena of international development aid was Sara Lorenzini's "Global Development: A Cold War History", which studied the impact of Cold War dynamics on the distribution of aid and the participation of the diverse actors (states, international and regional organizations).[35] Albeit not covering a

[32] Rodoljub Jemuović and Avguštin Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju* (Ljubljana: Center za proučevanje sodelovanja z deželami v razvoju, 1972).
[33] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji".
[34] Jeffrey J. Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third Orde*r (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[35] Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

case from socialist Yugoslavia, the volume "Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War"[36] contains eight excellent case studies of Eastern Europe's interactions with the post-colonial South in the domain of economic and technical cooperation, providing useful material for comparative analysis. Although published more than 50 years ago, the book "Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World" by Alvin Z. Rubinstein remains a relevant starting point for researching Yugoslavian connections to the Global South. Finally, in the past years, several case studies appeared on the subject of East-to-South labour mobilities. For example, some of the works addressing dispatched expert labour as a part of development efforts of socialist Eastern Europe in the post-colonial countries are the PhD dissertation "Socialist Internationalism in Practice: Shifting Patterns of the Czechoslovak Educational Aid Programmes to Sub-Saharan Africa" by Barbora Buzássyová,[37] Zsombor Bódy's paper „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'? The Hungarian Presence in Algeria from the 1960s to the 1980s"[38] and a joint contribution from Bogdan C. Iacob and Iolanda Vasile "Agents of Decolonization? Romanian Activities in Mozambique's Oil and Healthcare Sectors (1976-1984)".[39]

The research has the potential to be complemented in the future with additional primary sources. For example, the reports of the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria are kept at the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (*Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova*). To achieve an even more comprehensive and balanced perspective, it is of utmost importance to conduct archival research at the National Archival Centre (*Centre Nationale des Archives*) in Algiers, whose post-1962 documents remain under limited access. Nevertheless, the voices from the other side are still present in this thesis from the reports of meetings and negotiations, diplomatic notes and official correspondence. Documentation related to Yugoslavia's international technical cooperation with the Global South, especially

[36] Calori et. al., eds, *Between East and South*.
[37] Barbora Buzássyová, „Socialist Internationalism in Practice: Shifting Patterns of the Czechoslovak Educational Aid Programmes to Sub-Saharan Africa" (Institute of History of Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2021).
[38] Zsombor Bódy, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'? The Hungarian Presence in Algeria from the 1960s to the 1980s", HistGlob Working Paper 4, MTA–SZTE–ELTE History of Globalization Research Group.
[39] Bogdan C. Iacob, and Iolanda Vasile. "Agents of Decolonization? Romanian Activities in Mozambique's Oil and Healthcare Sectors (1976-1984)" in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, eds. Anna Calori et al. (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 133–163.

studies, reports and periodicals are part of the rich fundus of the Institute for Development and International Relations (*Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose*, IRMO), which was founded in 1963 as the Institute for the Study of Africa (Institut za proučvanje Afrike). Unfortunately, due to the 2020 Zagreb earthquake, the content of the library has been dislocated and has not been available for use.

As an aside project, I have been working on setting up a database of Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria, containing parameters such as regional provenience, year of birth, marital and family status, professional occupation, proficiency in the French language, the employer in Yugoslavia, the employer, workplace location, date arrival and date of departure from Algeria. Although with some exceptions, this data was extracted from the files (dossiers) of technical experts which were kept at the ZAMTES Belgrade office as well as regional branch offices, nowadays part of previously mentioned fonds AJ-465 and HDA-1727. These data as these might prove valuable for further analyses and research, for example, extension to a comparative research project of Yugoslav experts in the Maghreb – adding case-studies of Libya, Tunisia and Morocco.

The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into four structurally separated but interconnected chapters. The first two chapters take a global perspective providing the context of international politics and Yugoslav – Algerian bilateral relations, while the last two engage in a microhistorical approach zooming in on the lived experiences of Yugoslav experts in Algeria.

Chapter 1 aims to understand the rationale guiding Yugoslavia's provision of technical assistance to the Global South. While showing an incentive to support the socialist path to development of the post-colonial state, national political and economic interest prevailed over solidarity motives in dispatching experts to Algeria.

Chapter 2 exposes a conflicting relationship between state-driven cooperation interests and a market-oriented entrepreneurial logic. It studies the Yugoslav case as a part of the transformation of the global East's solidarity model of technical cooperation

into a predominantly commercial one, which occurred under the pressure of economic difficulties and penetration of a capitalist mindset into the socialist economy.

Departing from high-level meetings and exchanges of delegations, *Chapter 3* shifts the historical lens onto the ordinary Yugoslav citizens before they were dispatched overseas to work within development projects. The dissection of the recruitment process and the pre-departure preparations reveals a plethora of factors on both sides which discouraged potential candidates from becoming technical cooperation experts.

Chapter 4 looks into the daily life and work experiences of Yugoslav experts after their arrival in Algeria. The chapter not only reveals experts faced difficulties in navigating the local administration and cross-cultural interactions and encounters due to superficial pre-departure preparations but also indicates a lack of support and supervision from Yugoslav institutions, which made a significant impact on the outcome of their mission.

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF YUGOSLAV EXPERTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

> *"The main task of our experts is to help the country to which they are sent, to contribute with their work to the development of political and economic relations with that country, and at the same time to represent our community in a certain way."*[40]

As more countries were adding it to their Third World agenda, a global competition over the provision of development aid emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. On the spot, this policy was reflected in numerous missions of foreign experts dispatched to the Global South within the framework of international technical cooperation. In this realm of development assistance, socialist Yugoslavia acted simultaneously as a donor *and* a recipient of aid. After hosting thousands of foreign experts who had arrived at the victory of the anti-fascist partisan movement to help in the state-building process, Yugoslav officials acknowledged that multilateral and bilateral technical aid had "directly contributed to the economic development and general progress of the country".[41] Under the ideas of internationalism and solidarity, while carrying the experience of a successful modernization project at home, Yugoslavia enthusiastically went down the road of a donor country to address and alleviate global development issues. However, development objectives were not the only nor main rationale behind the decision to provide technical aid. In her recent monograph *Global Development: A*

[40] Explanation to ZAMTES proposal for guiding the selection of experts, 3 September 1965, AJ (Arhiv Jugoslavije)- fond 130 (Savezno izvršno veće)- box 607, p. 5-7.
[41] "Zaključci savetovanja direktora Saveznog zavoda za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju i direktora republičkih zavoda za tehničku saradnju", 5 December 1968, AJ-130-607.

Cold War History, Sara Lorenzini argued that despite the universal strive for modernization, development projects conducted during the Cold War were still predominantly serving the national interests of both donor and recipient countries. As Lorenzini explained, donors aimed at advancing their political or economic goals while recipients managed to manipulate those interests to their benefit.[42] Focusing on the case of Algeria, under this premise shall be studied Yugoslavia's engagement in technical cooperation with the Global South.

This chapter argues that the Yugoslav authorities intended technical aid to serve *Yugoslav* interests primarily. While the government started dispatching teams of experts to Algeria under a discourse of "friendship and solidarity", I claim that national political and economic rationale prevailed over solidarity principles and development concerns in guiding Yugoslav technical assistance to Algeria. On the other hand, having a clear understanding of the global political situation and the aims and capacities of their partners allowed the Algerian government to dictate the conditions of the aid – shifting power relations towards their side.

Generally, the motives of the state to dispatch technical cooperation experts to the Global South corresponded to the three principal groups of tasks that were assigned to them: the task to assist the host country's development, the task to promote political and economic relations and the task to represent the country abroad. Associating them to the three main roles of experts – agents of socialist development, representatives of national interests and the country's unofficial ambassadors, I will examine each of these groups of tasks taking a broader, global Cold War outlook. The dominant perspective will be the one of the global competition for influence in the Third World taking place between socialist countries. To understand the position Yugoslav experts held in the Cold War arena of development aid, we first need to look into the genealogy of international technical cooperation.

[42] Lorenzini, *Global Development*, p. 5.

1.1. Agents of Socialist Development

The Cold War Arena of International Development Aid

Promises of prosperity and improvement in the living standard made by future leaders of the emerging Third World nations had multiplied on the eve of their independence. Yet, the post-colonial reality abruptly shattered initial optimism together with expectations that "economic backwardness" would simply disappear with the end of colonial rule.[43] Instead, as a path to economic growth and welfare, newly independent countries assigned long-term modernization projects for which they required additional engagement and resources from abroad. Having their national interests in mind, the industrialized capitalist countries took up the role of donors while offering their development models as a paradigm of a successful social and economic transformation. As a result, the discourse of development assistance, supporting post-colonial state-building projects in line with the chosen ideological orientation, took over from the humanitarian aid hitherto distributed to alleviate the immediate costs of decolonization and national liberation struggles.[44] Apart from grants and loans, development aid has encompassed technical assistance as its fundamental instrument. Rather than on material aspects, this type of aid has aimed at assisting development through the sharing and transfer of "unlimited" and non-tangible assets – skills, knowledge and know-how. On the one hand, technical assistance opened up greater possibilities for actors with limited financial and material resources to engage as donors in the international development arena.[45] On the other hand, post-colonial states, suffering a shortage of technical knowledge and skills due to a long-standing colonial marginalization, regarded it as a "customized" answer to the lack of domestic cadre and the desire to increase labour productivity.

On the other hand, some authors regard activities related to the provision of foreign aid as a perpetuation of the colonial narrative of the "White man's burden" and

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[43] Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju. Od ideje do pokreta* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2019), 146; Lorenzini, *Global Development,* p. 33-34.

[44] Providing an overview of the history of global humanitarianism, Silvia Salvatici in her recent book "A History of Humanitarianism" acknowledged that, since the Cold War, the lines between humanitarian and development aid have been blurred and indistinguishable. Silvia Salvatici, *A History of Humanitarianism, 1755–1989: In the Name of Others* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019); Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 3.

[45] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 212-213.

paternalistic attitudes and power imbalances.[46] In fact, technical assistance programmes started to appear at the end of the Second World War as endeavours of the Western developed world to support the "less-fortunate" parts of the globe on the path to development and technological progress. The Cold War reasonings and a belief in the power of knowledge in eradicating poverty, disease and misery in the Third World as the breeding ground for communism guided the initial incentives launched in the West.[47] As was the case with other types of development aid, donors had recognized that technical assistance could serve not only as a tool of development but also as a tool of foreign influence, most notably when conducted in the bilateral form.

The first government-initiated technical assistance programme, known as the Point Four Program, was inaugurated by Harry S. Truman in January 1949. However, by then, the UN had already developed a program of multilateral technical assistance. On December 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the resolution to assist the economic development of "less-developed countries" by providing fellowships for foreign students, training programmes for local technicians and most significantly – expertise advisory. The UN institutionalized the decision in the form of the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), which in the year 1965 came under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[48] Prelude to institutionalization was the first official technical assistance mission carried out in 1946. Upon the request of the Greek government, the UN specialized agency FAO dispatched experts to provide counselling services to the country's agricultural sector. The action in Greece was recognized as carrying the potential to act as long-term development aid in contrast to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) programme of emergency, short-term relief and infrastructural reconstruction.[49]

Understanding the concerns of post-colonial elites around retaining recently-gained sovereignty, the UN advocated composing multi-national teams of experts to

[46] William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden*: *Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (Penguin Press, 2006.)
[47] Hong*, Cold War Germany,* p. 30-31.
[48] Lorenzini, *Global Development*, p. 104.
[49] Donna C. Mehos, Suzanne M. Moon, "The Uses of Portability: Circulating Experts in the Technopolitics of Cold War and Decolonization", in *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (MIT Press, 2011): p. 56-58.

"diminish the perception of political interference".[50] Under the banner of the UN and its burgeoning network of agencies, technical experts of different ideologies, national backgrounds and national development levels joined the platform of international technical cooperation. However, not only were the UN experts predominantly recruited from the Western capitalist world but many of them had previously served as colonial personnel. According to Joseph Hodge, the redeployment of former colonial officials to serve as advisors to the post-colonial governments was a common developmentalist pattern.[51] Aware of the possibility of abusing the position of a donor to impose latent neo-colonial influence and secure the continuation of presence and interests, the post-colonial elites were vigilant when this type of assistance was deployed by the former colonial metropoles. Therefore, as an efficient mechanism of resistance and agency, they implemented diversification of political partnership at the core of their foreign policy. In the Cold War environment, it proved to be an efficient strategy as soon as the Eastern Bloc adopted the platform of technical assistance into the Third World policy agenda. Initially, the Soviet Union attacked the Point Four Programme for carrying an imperialist design and stayed out of the EPTA until 1953. With Moscow's global opening and outreach towards the Third World in the second half of the 1950s, the Eastern Bloc countries entered the international development arena launching bilateral programmes of technical assistance. To systematically coordinate the distribution of technical aid to the Global South, in June 1961, the Soviet Bloc established the Permanent Commission for Technical Assistance within the CMEA.[52]

With a modified outlook, the socialist camp commenced regarding post-colonial nations as fertile ground for experiments in socialist development. Likewise, because capitalism was associated with colonialism and neo-colonial influences, most of the newly established countries in Africa were inclined towards a closer partnership with the socialist countries. To them, as Marcia C. Schenck et al. put it in the introductory chapter of the recently published book *Navigating Socialist Encounters*, "[…] socialism promised an alluring break with the colonial and neo-colonial order. Their experience of capitalist exploitation and institutionalized racism under European colonialism made

[50]Mehos and Moon, "The Uses of Portability, p. 59.
[51] Joseph Morgan Hodge, "Beyond Dependency: North-South Relationships in the Age of Development" in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, eds. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 14.
[52] Lorenzini, *Global Development,* p. 38-39, 81-82.

socialism an attractive foundation on which to build their visions of modernity."[53] Moreover, at the heart of socialist development aid stood the concept of solidarity by which socialist donors translated the political nature of foreign aid into a discourse of mutual understanding among anti-imperialist forces. While Western benefactors openly asserted hierarchical relationships, socialist countries discursively constructed themselves as equal partners, thus blurring the lines dividing donors from recipients. In line with this, to reflect the principles of equality and mutual benefit, rather than unilateral "aid" or "assistance", socialist countries opted for the term "cooperation" in their official rhetoric.[54]

Whilst proclaiming assistance with "no strings attached", socialist countries provided the so-called "tied aid" in the form of investment loans, committing recipient governments to purchase goods and services from their markets. That was related to the Eastern Bloc's rationale for supporting development in the Global South, which was not limited to internationalism and gathering allies against Western capitalism. The provision of development aid enabled new trading partners outside the bloc,[55] which would eventually become integrated into an alternative, socialist world economy. As a result of these endeavours, socialist countries took part in the respatialization of the international division of labour. Namely, helping the Global South to raise industries for processing raw materials, socialist actors geographically shifted the industrial production process to the developing countries. In other words, countries which made up the *socialist*, developed world carried out investment projects outsourcing the first stages of processing to the Global South. Consequently, countries in the periphery took the place in the new international division of labour not only as suppliers of raw materials and cheap labour but also as producers of processed goods. However, the outsourced projects socialist governments handed over to local authorities. On that account, the provision of development assistance to the Global South was not exclusively guided by national self-interest but also by principles of solidarity and mutual benefit.

[53] Marcia C. Schenck et al., „Introduction: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War" in *Navigating Socialist Encounters: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War*, ed. Eric Burton et al. (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021), p. 18.
[54] Lorenzini, *Global Development*, pp. 45, 81.
[55] Schenck et al., „Introduction", p. 17.

According to Anna Calori et al., this was "the main distinctive feature of socialist globalization".[56]

By studying interactions and networks with the South, contrary to a long-held belief, it has been argued that the socialist camp consisted of independent international actors with heterogeneous foreign political interests.[57] Recent scholarship has given significant attention to the reinterpretation of the status of Eastern European countries within the Warsaw Pact, thus contributing to the "decentralization" of the Cold War narrative. Instead of "satellites", members of the CMEA have been acknowledged as "junior allies" of the Soviet Union.[58] In fact, in the Cold War environment, the Third World turned into an arena of competition – not only between capitalism and socialism but also between socialist countries and their respective development models. Yet, the post-colonial countries and liberation movements took the advantage of this conflict between socialist countries to acquire increased aid, trade and other benefits.[59] Namely, the plethora of potential "patrons" opened a greater space for manoeuvre and freedom of action for the Third World.[60] By threatening to get aligned with the other side, they were able to multiply the benefits, possibly secure "the best offer" and even bypass political and economic conditionalities attached to the aid. In fact, prioritizing their own interests, post-colonial governments and liberation movements oftentimes demonstrated indifference towards the source of aid. Aware that the Cold War politics determined the distribution of aid, in practice, pragmatism dominated over ideological or solidarity principles of developing countries.[61]

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[56] Anna Calori et al., „Alternative Globalization? Spaces of Economic Interaction between the 'Socialist Camp' and the 'Global South'", in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 11-16.
[57] Schenck et al., „Introduction", p. 39.
[58] Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva, eds, *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (I.B. Tauris, 2018).
[59] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, p. 164.
[60] James Mark and Yakov Feygin, "The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Alternative Visions of a Global Economy 1950s–1980," in *Alternative Globalizations. Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World*, eds., James Mark, Artem Malinovsky, and Steffi Marung (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), p. 35–58.
[61] Lorenzini, *Global Development,* p. 4-5.

Providing development assistance was nowhere a prerogative of the two power blocs. In an attempt to challenge development paradigms dictated by the North and the hegemonic power of "traditional development actors" – the UN, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries and the Permanent Commission for Technical Assistance in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) – emerged South-South Cooperation (SSC) as an alternative development strategy. The initial ideological framework for SSC was set up in 1955 at the Conference on Afro-Asian Peoples (also known as the Bandung Conference), which promoted self-determination, political sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs and supported the collective development efforts of the Global South. After the Bandung Conference, the comprehension that economic emancipation was a prerequisite for achieving full sovereignty converged postcolonial countries at the international development forums in the forthcoming decades.

The 1960s and the 1970s have represented the most dynamic period of the developing world's struggle to reduce inequalities in the international economic order and promote development in the Global South. An important role in these endeavours was played by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Since the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1961, the NAM drew the attention of the international community to the voices of countries which had decided to remain outside of the two power blocs. The participants of the 1961 Belgrade Summit undertook concrete initiatives to address global economic power asymmetries. In July 1962, the ministers of non-aligned countries gathered in Cairo at the Conference on the Problem of Economic Development, marking a starting point of the developing world's coordinated endeavours to transform the international economic system. In the Declaration, issued as the final document of the summit, conference participants called for the convening of an international conference on economic development under the auspices of the UN.[62]

[62] For a detailed and extensive overview of the history of the NAM, see: Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2018) and Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*. As for the role of Yugoslavia within the Non-Aligned Movement, its economic, political, social and cultural connections with the member countries are extensively explored in the latest

Out of the Cairo appeal born was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in 1964 in Geneva. As it turned into a permanent UN body, prominent Argentine economist and proposer of the development theory Raul Prebisch, whom the UN Secretary-General U Thant had appointed as his representative at the 1962 Conference in Cairo, was named the first Secretary-General of the UNCTAD. During the first session, known as UNCTAD I, developing counties established a lobbying group within the UN system to promote their interest and increase their negotiation capacities. The coalition was dubbed the Group of 77 (G77) after the concluding document – the "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries". The G77 became an important platform for the coordination of developing countries' interests and activities. The group's membership almost entirely overlapped and complemented the ones of the NAM. Following up on the ideas of the NAM, the G77 reaffirmed mutual trade and economic and technical cooperation among developing countries as a precondition for achieving development.

Under the influence of its members, economic questions took priority over political matters in the NAM's agenda. With a strong focus on the issues of development and inequality, participants at the NAM 1970 Lusaka Summit defined the concept of national and collective self-reliance. The idea of "collective self-reliance" rested on increased trade exchange and mutually beneficial collaboration among countries of the Global South in order to reduce the influence and economic dependency on the capitalist economies of the Global North, usually former colonial metropoles. One of the instruments of overcoming dependency was to build developing nations' capacities through technical cooperation,[63] which implied the share of knowledge, skills, expertise, and resources among developing countries to meet their common development goals.[64] Subsequent NAM gatherings further articulated the project of collective self-reliance. The 1973 Algiers Summit issued the Action program for Economic Cooperation in which the non-aligned countries reaffirmed their belief that the primary responsibility for ensuring the rapid development of their countries rested among themselves. The NAM

volume edited by Paul Stubbs, *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: Social, Cultural, Political, and Economic Imaginaries* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2023).

[63] Spaskovska, "Building a better world?", p. 335-336.

[64] Angela Villani, "A historical perspective on South-South co-operation: a view from the UN", *Asia Maior. The Journal of the Italian think tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989,* special issue, no. 1 (2018), p. 19.

and the G77 meetings further influenced UN institutions. In 1972, the UN established the Working Group on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) in the UNDP, composed of both countries from the South and the North. The group put forward the idea that capabilities and competencies already existed in the countries of the South while the role of the North was only to support, encourage and facilitate their programmes of technical cooperation.

The cumulated efforts of the Global South in international forums resulted in the formation of a highly-influential economic ideology. At the 1973 Algiers Conference, under the Yugoslav impulses, the NAM countries called upon the UN General Secretary to hold a special session of the General Assembly dedicated to economic matters. The initiative led to the adoption of the "Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (NIEO) in 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly at the Sixth Special Session. The NIEO was a set of principles proposed to govern international economic relations. Some of the most relevant aspects that NIEO embodied were the recognition of the historical responsibility of the developed countries related to colonial exploitation, preferential access to the trade of developing countries and their non-reciprocal treatment.[65] The same year, the General Assembly endorsed the establishment of a special unit within the UNDP to promote TCDC, which was the core of what would later become the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC). In 1978, the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries held in Buenos Aires adopted the "Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries". Because it prioritized SSC in the development of the South and singled out TCDC as an effective means of reaching self-reliance, BAPA became one of the cornerstones of the SSC. In the introduction, the document made a celebratory announcement:

> "Technical cooperation among developing countries has emerged as a new dimension of international co-operation for development, which gives expression to the developing

[65] Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind
the New International Economic Order", *Humanity* 6 (2015) 1, š. 109–128.

world's determination to achieve national and collective self-reliance and to the need to bring about the new international economic order."[66]

Despite diplomatic efforts of the previous decades, the practical outcomes of SSC were limited – few technical cooperation programmes and investment projects were concluded among developing countries. While BAPA celebrated and inaugurated the new era of TCDC, from the mid-1970s, global economic turbulences overall reduced the actions of the South-South Cooperation programmes – having revived only in the early 2000s under the pretence of China.[67]

From Humanitarian Aid to Technical Cooperation

Despite being geographically dislocated, Yugoslavia regularly identified with the states defined as the "Global South". In an attempt to legitimize its pretension to a leadership position within the group of non-aligned countries, the Yugoslav leadership initiated, coordinated and supported joint actions of the developing world in international development forums. At the 1973 Algiers Summit, Yugoslavia and Algeria took upon the commitment to contribute to the social and economic development of the Global South through the share of experience, transfer of knowledge and technology. The representatives from both countries agreed to expand bilateral cooperation by implementing the principles set by the Economic Declaration of the 4th NAM Conference, which called for "strengthening and expanding economic, technical and scientific cooperation between developing countries".[68] Within the framework of the NAM, Yugoslavia and Algeria were chosen as "coordinator countries" in the field of transfer of knowledge and technology. As was optimistically declared by the Yugoslav delegation, technical cooperation with Algeria was supposed to serve as a successful example to other developing countries of a practical implementation of the proclaimed principles of South-South Cooperation:

[66] Buenos Aires Plan of Action (1978). https://www.unsouthsouth.org/bapa40/documents/buenos-aires-plan-of-action/. Last access: 29 January 2023.
[67] Peter Kragelund, *South-South Development* (New York: Routledge, 2019).
[68] „Zasjedanje Mešovitog alžirsko-jugoslavenskog komiteta", Algiers, 19 June 1974, Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA), Republički zavod za međunarodnu znanstveno-tehničku suradnju (RZMZTS)-1727-345.

" […] the importance of this cooperation is not only in the realization of bilateral Yugoslav and Algerian interests. Of particular importance is the fact that the two countries, through the implementation of scientific [and technical] cooperation, will provide an outstanding example of this type of cooperation among non-aligned countries, thus illustrating the practical implementation of a policy of self-reliance."[69]

Actively participating in international technical cooperation Yugoslavia started as early as 1951 when it provided the first group of three experts for the UN programme of multilateral technical assistance. While itself a beneficiary of the EPTA (later the UNDP), the country gradually increased the number of technical experts incorporated into the UN's multi-national teams.[70] By 1975, Yugoslavia had dispatched around 1,000 experts to over 50 countries of the Global South within the UN agenda.[71] Yugoslav experts were engaged via the UN's development projects in priority sectors of post-colonial governments, such as agriculture, education, healthcare, and industry. They acted as UNDP representatives, project managers, government advisors and members of expert teams.[72] In the Yugoslav political, academic and public space, the indirect technical assistance through the UN multilateral programmes was presented as "a large contribution to developing countries" which "strengthened further economic and political cooperation and led to bilateral [technical cooperation] agreements".[73]

Indeed, a far greater number of Yugoslav experts was engaged on a bilateral basis. According to Alvin Z. Rubinstein, during a diplomatic visit to Ethiopia in 1951, Yugoslav officials learned about the Western technical assistance programme and the presence of foreign experts in Africa.[74] On the first official visit to Yugoslavia in June 1954, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie proposed to Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on economic and technical cooperation. Upon the initiative of the Ethiopian leader, Yugoslavia signed the first bilateral technical cooperation agreement.[75] The same year, as a result, Yugoslav authorities dispatched the

[69] Report on the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, 15 January 1976, HDA-1727-345.
[70] Blagoje Bogavac, "Jugoslavija u međunarodnoj tehničkoj suradnji", *Jugoslovenski pregled: informativno-dokumentarni priručnik o Jugoslaviji*, June 1970, p. 55.
[71] I. Rapajić, „Angažiranje naših eksperata za organizaciju Ujedinjenih naroda (OUN) i njenih specijaliziranih agencija", *Agronomski glasnik* 37, No. 5-6 (1975), p. 376.
[72] Bogavac, "Jugoslavija u međunarodnoj tehničkoj suradnji", p. 51-57.
[73] I. Rapajić, „Angažiranje naših eksperata", p. 375-377.
[74] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 43-44.
[75] Svetozar Rajak, "No bargaining chips, no spheres of interest: the Yugoslav origins of Cold War non-alignment", *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, No. 1, (2014), p. 162-163.

first group of four technical cooperation experts to Addis Ababa.[76] During the next decade, technical experts were made available to over thirty governments across the Global South. The majority of them were sent to Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia. Due to high post-colonial emergency needs, healthcare professionals were the most demanded Yugoslav experts in that period. They accounted for 75 percent of all dispatched personnel to the Global South in 1962. By the end of the decade, the structure of Yugoslav experts in the Global South substantially changed. In 1969, the number of healthcare experts decreased in favour of experts in commercially important fields such as administration, agriculture, industry, and the construction sector which in total made up 65 percent of all dispatched experts.[77] To illustrate the overall scale of this type of labour mobility, between 1954 and 1970, 2,969 Yugoslav experts were sent to work in developing countries on the basis of bilateral technical cooperation.[78] Yet, the real effects of their service and their contribution to the development efforts of the host countries have remained difficult to estimate.

Yugoslavia's long-term foreign aid, i.e. development assistance, to the Global South sometimes followed as an extension of the short-term humanitarian and military aid to anti-colonial liberation movements. According to Nemanja Radonjić, Yugoslavia assisted at least twenty-four liberation movements in Africa.[79] In a significant example, during the 1960s and the 1970s, Yugoslavia delivered medical services and military equipment, provided technical and military training and financially supported the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau. The Yugoslav assistance to the movements in Lusophone Africa "elevated Yugoslavia's prestige and confirmed the country's revolutionary credentials in the Global South".[80] To use his often-quoted phrase, Alvin Z. Rubinstein stated that solidarity with anti-colonial movements was Yugoslav "credit card to the

[76] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 44.
[77] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u* razvoju, p. 107. Bogavac, "Jugoslavija u međunarodnoj tehničkoj suradnji", p. 59; „Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji", Beograd, 20 January 1968, AJ-130-607, p. 43.
[78] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju,* p. 104.
[79] Ibid, p. 146.
[80] Milorad Lazić, "Comrades in Arms: Yugoslav Military Aid to Liberation Movements of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1976", in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War "East": Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, eds. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders, Helder Adegar Fonseca (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 155.

Third World".[81] The first such "credit card" Yugoslavia gained from the diplomatic, military and humanitarian aid support of the Algerian National Liberation Movement (FLN) fought against French colonial rule.[82] In fact, the assistance provided to the FLN during the Algeria War of Independence (1954 – 1962) came to serve as a Yugoslav paradigm for supporting subsequent anti-colonial movements in Africa.[83]

While dispatching arms and military equipment to the FLN in secrecy, Yugoslav authorities publicly provided humanitarian aid under the umbrella organization of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (*Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije*, SSRNJ).[84] Concealed behind the Socialist Alliance which took the role of the proxy in assisting the FLN, the state-party leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) avoided risking the deterioration of diplomatic relations with France[85] and "minimized the political and ideological controversy"[86] carried in the term "communist" in dealing with the Algerian national liberation movement. From the year 1958/1959, the Yugoslav Red Cross, led by secretary-general Olga Milošević, a former medical officer of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, initiated and organized Yugoslav humanitarian activities in Algeria. The Red Cross provided Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco with healthcare, food, clothing and hygiene supplies. The doctors working under its auspices delivered medicine and medical equipment and took care of the wounded soldiers and civilians. By far most recognized achievement was the launch of the first Rehabilitation Centre for the wounded Algerian soldiers in Nassen, near the city of Tunis, on 22 March 1961. To take over duties at the centre, Algerian physiotherapists and doctors received specialist training in Belgrade. At the same time, severely wounded soldiers were hospitalized in Yugoslavia, about 300 of them by the

[81] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 91.
[82] As I covered the case of Yugoslav aid to the FLN in my Master's thesis, in this dissertation I will refrain from going into details. Instead see: Dora Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira u prvoj polovici 1960-ih: Strategija izgradnje meke moći", MA thesis (University of Zagreb, 2018).
[83] Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat: Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), p. 280.
[84] The role of two constituent organizations within the SSRNJ – the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (*Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije*, SSJ) and the Football Association of Yugoslavia (*Fudbalski Savez Jugoslavije*, FSJ) in serving as proxies of the Yugoslav government in providing the support to the FLN is described in the article by Dora Tot and Stipica Grgić, "The FLN 1961 football tour of Yugoslavia: mobilizing public support for the Algerian cause", *Soccer & Society* 24, no. 2 (2023), pp. 235-244.
[85] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 145.
[86] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, pp. 41-42.

end of the year 1963, according to one source.[87] While the official rhetoric portrayed humanitarian activities as disinterested gestures of solidarity, the Yugoslav authorities insisted on an extensive promotion of assistance to build a positive image of their country in Algeria and the rest of the Third World.[88]

Accompanied by a socialist discourse of "friendship and solidarity", after Algeria had gained independence, short-term wartime aid turned into long-term development assistance. As an answer to principal Algerian concerns over the drastic shortage of specialist personnel, modern technology and scientific development, technical cooperation quickly became the main instrument of development assistance and the cornerstone of early-stage bilateral relations. Under technical assistance programmes, Yugoslavia offered the Algerian government a combination of know-how, working activities and socialist education. The two most relevant forms of technical cooperation were the engagement of Yugoslav experts in Algeria and the provision of a scholarship and training program for Algerian students in Yugoslavia. Though occurring occasionally, sending short-term consulting missions to Algeria and hosting study visits for Algerian officials and specialists in Yugoslavia acquired less significance in the domain of technical cooperation.

The transition towards institutionalized technical cooperation took place in the context of the rivalry among foreign governments over humanitarian assistance to the FLN, whereby aiming at elevating their reputation in the Third World. As post-colonial Algeria turned into the most significant battleground of different socialist actors and their respective visions of development, Yugoslav ideological rivals mobilized experts in Algeria under a similar concept of socialist solidarity.[89] The situation of multiple foreign actors in the country equally reflected the diversification policy of the Algerian government. On the one hand, the Algerian authorities constantly feared a sudden reduction or termination of French aid coming as a reaction to the nationalization of French assets. Therefore, the diversification of sources of supply reduced economic dependence on the former colonial metropole. On the other hand, it increased the

[87] Zdravko Pečar, *Alžir do nezavisnosti* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1967), p. 593, 599–600; „Pour nos blesses", *El Moudjahid*, no. 79, 15 April 1961, p. 459.
[88] Dragan Petrović, *Francusko-jugoslovenski odnosi u vreme Alžirskog rata 1952-1964* (Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 2009), p. 281; Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 185-186.
[89] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution,* p. 134-139.

amount of received aid and at the same time prevented one power from acquiring excessive ideological influence. Not willing to compete and interfere in the French sphere of interest, the initial plan to obtain development assistance from the United States failed. Refusal from the West encouraged Algerian authorities to turn to the socialist camp. Yet, bearing close ties with great socialist powers posed a potential risk to the Algerian ideological autonomy. Contrary, the advantage of a partnership with smaller socialist countries, such as Yugoslavia, was that they posed an insignificant threat to the autonomous path of the Algerian revolution. To dilute ideological influence and stir competition in terms of trade and assistance, Algeria successfully adopted a strategy of playing one socialist country against the other, particularly the Soviet Union and China. The generous amount of aid and open propaganda war between their embassies in Algiers demonstrated that the method bore fruit.[90] Accordingly, the Algerian diversification policy was also reflected in technical cooperation and the engagement of foreign experts. In fact, after 1965, the number of French personnel in Algeria decreased while at the same time, there was a growing number of Soviet experts, estimated at over 3,000.[91] To counterbalance their numerosity, the government was interested in employing experts from other "amical socialist countries". These concerns were clear to Yugoslav officials, who noted that increased interest for their experts was "primarily to reduce the ideological influence of certain countries".[92] The newcomers from Eastern European socialist countries, dubbed *pieds rouges* ("red feet") by the local population,[93] took part in the training of national cadres who were supposed to replace foreign experts in the process of "Algerianization".[94]

The Arrival of the First Yugoslav Experts in Algeria

In the summer of 1962, in the aftermath of the nearly eight-year-long anti-colonial struggle, the country striving for development paralyzed the chaotic political situation

[90] Ibid. p. 153-167.
[91] David Othaway, Marina Othaway, *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 234, 239-240.
[92] Yugoslav-Algerian Technical Cooperation Report, January 1980, HDA-1727-345.
[93] The name was a sarcastic reference to the Algerian colonial population of European origin known as *pieds noirs* („black feet"). Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, p. 5, 159, 273.
[94] Philip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), p. 68-69.

characterized by the struggle for power between the factions of the FLN.[95] The traumatized population heavily suffered the consequences of the war that had left many in poverty and malnutrition. Children were left as orphans while veterans suffered injuries or remained invalid. While some people were displaced along the borders in camps in Tunisia and Morocco, others fled from the countryside to the slums on the outskirts of Algiers. Lack of sanitation and hygiene caused by inadequate housing contributed to the spread of diseases, such as tuberculosis, typhoid, dysentery and cholera.[96] The already severe situation worsened with the massive exodus of French colons dubbed *pieds-noirs* ("black feet"), who had made the majority of skilled labour and technicians, including healthcare workers. Eventually, the population of 11 million people[97] was left with only 200 doctors.[98] Whereas, in rural areas, the health service was virtually absent.[99]

In this context of a post-war humanitarian crisis, Yugoslavia promptly responded to appeals from the Algerian government for urgent medical aid. Under a technical aid programme, the first Yugoslav medical team of 13 doctors and nurses arrived in Algiers on 1 August 1962. The team took over the management of the hospital Parnet in the district Hussein Dey, which had been vacated and shut down since the departure of the French settlers who had previously run its services. The team was led by the thoracic surgeon Ervin Günsberg who was an experienced doctor in the Yugoslav People's Army.[100] Most medical staff provided the newly-established orthopaedic-surgical hospital Banjica from Belgrade, which specialized in treating polio and osteoarticular tuberculosis in children. Despite the lack of medical cadres, the Belgrade hospital nevertheless sent its staff, including two specialists – orthopaedists Cvetko Rakić and Radmilo Višacki. Though primarily of surgical occupation, the first Yugoslav team organized the entire hospital service, provided different medical treatments and trained

[95] Benjamin Stora, *Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 121-129.
[96] Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 1830-1987 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 245.
[97] "Algeria - 1962", *PopulationPyramid.net - Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to 2100*, https://www.populationpyramid.net/algeria/1962/. Last access: 29 January 2023.
[98] The post-colonial reality of the healthcare system was even more disastrous in other African countries. With a population similar to the 1962 Algeria, Mozambique after 1975 had only about 30 medical doctors. Iacob and Vasile, "Agents of Decolonization?, p. 150-151.
[99] Hong, *Cold War Germany*, p. 157.
[100] „Jugoslavenski liječnici u Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 2 August 1962.

their Algerian colleagues.[101] The efforts to organize and run hospital services were accompanied by other humanitarian gestures. For example, the Yugoslav-run hospitals often received generous donations of medical equipment and medicines from the Yugoslav Red Cross and Serbian pharmaceutical company Galenika.[102]

Undoubtedly, the most notable achievement of the first Yugoslav medical team in Algeria was their help in establishing the National Rehabilitation Centre at Douera shortly after arrival. The centre at Douera was, namely, the first Algerian hospital specialising in treating polio and cerebral palsy in children and treating amputees.[103] Because opening a new medical facility demanded the extension of cadres, the Algerian Minister of Health Mohamed Seghir Nekkache in October 1962 requested dispatching an additional contingent of Yugoslav doctors.[104] As early as December 1962, in Douera arrived another orthopaedic-surgical team from Banjica, headed by Ivan Kenig and Milorad Simjanović. The surgical teams of doctors Günsberg and Kenig-Simjanović stayed in Algeria until the end of January and May 1963, respectively, when the new groups of Yugoslav health experts replaced them.[105] The Douera Centre became a symbol of Yugoslav humanitarian efforts in Algeria. According to a statement of Tito during his talks with Ben Bella held in April 1965 in Algiers, in the hospital jointly worked 36 Yugoslav and 35 Algerian physicians. On the occasion, Tito's wife Jovanka Broz herself paid a visit to Douera.[106]

In April and May 1963, dispatched was the first medical team from the Socialist Republic (SR) of Croatia under the leadership of a well-renowned cardiothoracic surgeon Vinko Frančišković, who took over the hospital Parnet. A member of the LCY, he acted as the head of the Surgery Clinic at the Hospital "Dr Zdravko Kučić" in Sušak, Rijeka at the time. Before that, he had served as the army surgeon in Pula, where many of his patients were high party officials and their families who spent holidays on nearby Brijuni islands. Besides personal acquaintances with party leaders, who were familiar

[101] Cvetko Rakić, ed., *10 godina od osnivanja ustanove: Specijalna ortopedsko-hirurška bolnica "Banjica" Beograd 1961-1971* (Beograd: Specijalna ortopedska-hirurška bolnica „Banjica", 1971), p. 20, 35, 42; Vesna Nikolić et al., eds., *Knjiga uspomena* (Beograd: Specijalna ortopedska-hirurška bolnica „Banjica", 2017), p. 44-48.
[102] „CK Narodne omladine Jugoslavije poslao lijekove omladini Alžira", *Vjesnik*, 29 June 1962; „*Galenika* dariva Alžirce", Vjesnik, 11 January 1963.
[103] Rakić, ed., *10 godina od osnivanja ustanove*, p. 42.
[104] „Jugoslavenski crveni križ nastavlja pomoć Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 31 October 1962.
[105] „Smjena jugoslavenskim liječnicima u Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 10 May 1963.
[106] „Razgovori Tito-Ben Bella", *Vjesnik*, 17 April 1965.

with his professional work, Frančišković was a university professor and affirmed surgeon with nearly 20 years of work experience.[107] Frančišković's cardiothoracic surgical team joined two of his colleagues from the Hospital "Dr Zdravko Kučić", namely surgeons Nikola Zaninović and Branimir Budisavljević, accompanied by the scrub nurse Ilijana Pavelin Jenušić.[108] Because it was difficult for one institution to provide a complete team, paediatrician Marijan Capar, surgeon and anaesthesiologist Dragutin Deprato and scrub nurse Soka Čerman joined from the Pula Medical Centre. Other than them, the team was made up of two young specialists, radiologist Sergije Zergollern from the hospital "Dr Josip Kajfeš", Zagreb and internist Alma Polić from the hospital "Braća dr Sobol" in Rijeka.[109] Overall, the new mission at Parnet counted 13 health workers who were employed under a one-year regular contact with the Algerian Ministry of Public Health. Those included paediatrician Vera Šoštarić and paediatric nurse Dragica Krušelj who were dispatched as early as February 1963. Though initially envisioned for a brief, two-month internship, the two were eventually brought into the fold of the new mission and prolonged their stay in Algeria.[110] Due to a general shortage of medical and paramedical staff, particularly nurses and midwives, their parent institutions were not prone to such a course of events.[111]

This last case indicates that Yugoslavia did not initially plan a systematic long-term campaign of medical experts' aid to Algeria. Above all, there was a shortage and high demand for medical personnel at home. However, the performance of proclaimed solidarity brought desired political results, while the number of socialist competitors that could jeopardize Yugoslav positions in Algeria, including the Soviets, the Cubans, the Bulgarians, the Polish, the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks, was growing.[112] In this situation, on 23 July 1963, the two countries signed the bilateral Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation (*Accord sur la cooperation scientifique et technique; Sporazum o naučno-tehničkoj suradnji*), by which they officially agreed upon the

[107] Davor Primc, et al. „New contributions to the study of the life and work of Vinko Frančišković (1919-1984), pioneer of Croatian cardiothoracic and transplantation surgery", *Acta medico-historica Adriatica* 15, no .1 (2017): p. 123.
[108] The change of teams at hospital Parnet, 11 April 1964, HDA-1727-346.
[109] The change of teams at hospital Parnet, 31 March 1964, HDA-1727-346
[110] „Krušelj Dragica – rad u Alžiru", 29 September 1963, HDA-1727-456.
[111] Predrag Dovijanić, „Zdravstveni radnici sa medicinskom spremom u 1964", in: *Jugoslovenski pregled*, June 1965, p. 11-14.
[112] According to a Yugoslav news report, in 1964 there were about 520 Bulgarian, 260 French, 100 Soviet medical professionals. „Alžir mobilizira liječnike", *Vjesnik*, 31 May 1964.

"exchange experts". In practice, this move meant that the Yugoslav government took upon an *unwritten* international obligation to make available skilled cadres as well as offer educational programmes and host Algerian students and trainees.[113] Though it was not legally binding under International Law and compliance to the Agreement was not explicitly demanded, Yugoslavia *had to* respond to Algerian demands for cadres in order to prove itself as a reliable and trustworthy partner and practically demonstrate adherence to the principles of solidarity. In turn, the institutionalization of technical cooperation by an official agreement gave Yugoslavia the priority to take over healthcare services in Algeria from their socialist competitors, for example, the Bulgarians in *wilaya* Orleansville.[114] A prompt reaction was crucial to get ahead of the competition. For example, due to the slow mobilization of Yugoslav experts, the Faculty of Medicine in Oran was eventually taken over by a team of Czechoslovak experts.[115]

The number of Yugoslav experts and the conditions of their engagement in Algeria were defined by periodic plans of cooperation. According to the First Annual Plan for 1963/1964, the Algerian Ministry of Public Health requested a total of 149 medical workers – 56 doctors and 43 paramedical staff to serve in hospitals and 42 general practitioners to serve as 'rural doctors' in the *wilayas*. Apart from hospitals Parnet and Douera, for which it had already provided the majority of the newly requested cadres, the 1963/1964 Plan foresaw Yugoslav missions in hospitals in Orleansville, Miliana, Cherchell, Tenes and Medea.[116] Except for the latter, all hospitals were taken over and supervised by teams from SR Croatia. On 4 September 1963, the Clinical Hospital of the Faculty of Medicine Zagreb dispatched the mission under neurosurgeon Boris Hameršak to the Centre Hospitalier D'Oreansville. The Zagreb hospital "Dr Josip Kajfeš" provided a team under the lead of internal medicine specialist Dobroslav Babić for the hospital in Miliana. The hospital "Dr Mladen Stojanović" from Zagreb staffed the hospital in Cherchell.[117] Generally, Croatian hospitals in Pula, Rijeka and Zagreb provided the majority of healthcare workers in Algeria. That was because SR

[113] Sporazum između vlade Jugoslavije i vlade Alžira o naučno-tehničkoj suradnji, *Službeni list SFRJ, Međunarodni ugovori,* no. 10/1964; The change of teams at hospital Parnet, 11 April 1964, HDA-1727-346.
[114] Letter from Boris Hameršak to the Director of ZAMTES, Orleansville, 19 September 1963, HDA-1727-346.
[115] Report by Mirko Jankov, Algiers, 6 June 1967, HDA-1727-457.
[116] Prvi periodični plan naučno-tehničke saradnje između Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 12/1964.
[117] Information on experts in Algeria, 16 October 1964, HDA-1727-346.

Croatia and respective medical institutions had the most favourable healthcare picture in Yugoslavia, which, to an extent, made possible the temporary absence of medical cadres.[118]

1.2. Representatives of National Interests

Foreign policy decision-making is a result of a complex interaction between global political forces and elements of domestic politics. In this regard, we have to examine the motives that guided the Yugoslav government's decision to dispatch experts to Algeria. The officials of ZAMTES explained that "the engagement of Yugoslav experts in developing countries within the framework of international scientific and technical cooperation was of wider social [national] interest, given their role in improving political and economic relations with these countries."[119] The indicator of the significance that technical cooperation had in promoting Yugoslav interests was that the constitution of socialist Yugoslavia defined it as an activity of political and economic importance for the state.

Yet, to understand what the assigned task of "improving political and economic relations" encompassed, we need to examine the Yugoslav diplomatic (political) and economic goals behind it. I argue that Yugoslav technical assistance to Algeria was a result of the strategical prioritization of long-term diplomatic (and, in the later period economic) goals over short-term commercial gains. An important element of technical assistance agreements was that they implied *unconditional* and *untied* aid, i.e. aid with 'no strings attached'. Unlike other instruments of development assistance, particularly loans, the outcomes of technical aid are, in fact, rarely instantaneous. Therefore, an emerging question is *how* Yugoslavia planned to take advantage of technical cooperation experts in the Global South to achieve desired foreign political goals. Without any formalized commitments from the recipient governments, Yugoslav policy-makers could only hope to see the principle of reciprocity at work.

Yugoslavia's Third World policy was initially inspired by national security and geostrategic preoccupations in the late 1940s. Expulsion from Cominform in June 1948

[118] Dovijanić, „Zdravstveni radnici sa medicinskom spremom u 1964", p. 11-14.
[119] Information technical cooperation with Algeria, 22 October 1980, HDA-1727-346.

led to international isolation and increased Soviet pressure, which posed a threat to the security and survival of the state. As a prompt and tentative solution to an unprecedented situation, the country turned to the West for military and economic aid. Despite close pragmatic ties with NATO in the first half of the 1950s, the Yugoslav political elite resolved to avoid foreign domination and preserve the socialist regime under the LCY. Therefore, it had to define and secure international support for a new foreign policy strategy outside the bloc division.[120] In the context of permanent threats to the country's sovereignty, the Yugoslav leadership had recognized the importance of the changes in the global political system catalysed by the ongoing process of decolonization and identified national liberation movements and newly independent states of Asia and Africa as potential allies.[121] Not less significant, international recognition and prestige abroad were translated into greater legitimacy of Tito's regime at home.[122]

In addition to external pressure, emerging interest in cooperation with decolonized countries was motivated by internal factors, mainly economic instability. By expanding economic ties with the developing world, Yugoslavia worked towards reducing dependence on the Western market. From the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, Yugoslav leadership tried to ease the consequences of a substantial trade deficit that had resulted from the policy of the newly formed European Economic Community (EEC).[123] Moreover, the fast-growing Yugoslav industry sought to expand the market to sell industrial products and purchase raw materials. The authorities believed that Yugoslavia was an attractive trading partner for the Third World countries as it had a "suitable degree" of technological development. Due to the lack of convertible currencies on both sides, barter trade with developing countries became a paradigm. Artificially stimulated by granting favourable loans for purchasing its goods and services, bilateral trade with developing countries had never reached a significant percentage of the Yugoslav foreign trade.[124] Substantial trade volume was reached with only 12

[120] Rajak, "No bargaining chips", p. 151-154.
[121] Vladimir Petrović, „Jugoslovenska samit-diplomatija 1944-1961", in *Jugoslovenska diplomatija 1945-1961*, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2012), p. 40.
[122] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 134-142.
[123] For a detailed analysis of Yugoslav relations with the EEC see: Benedetto Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956-1961* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), p. 147-168.
[124] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 209-212.

developing countries, with India and the United Arab Republic as the major trading partners. In the period from 1960 to 1969, developing countries participated in Yugoslav exports with an average of 17.5 percent and 11.3 percent in imports.[125] Because of the limited production of industrial goods, in the structure of Yugoslavia's imports from the Global South heavily dominated agricultural products (coffee, cotton, sugar, exotic fruits, etc.) and raw materials (crude oil, phosphates).[126] However, those were usually second-grade ones, since the higher quality products were rather sold on the Western markets for hard currencies.[127] In sum, economic cooperation with the Global South in the 1960s was still only an adjunct to the political relations with the non-aligned states.

The intensification of Yugoslav relations with the Global South can be traced in parallel with the development of the foreign policy of non-alignment. The outreach to Africa of a country situated in the Balkan Peninsula, a region that hitherto had only sporadic historical contacts with the continent, was closely related to the two previously mentioned goals. In search of a position outside the bloc domains, experienced Yugoslav diplomats recognized the potentiality of building ties with post-colonial states that had declared the principle of non-engagement as the basis of conducting international affairs.[128] To get first-hand impressions and assess the potentiality of extending diplomatic and economic ties with Ethiopia and Egypt, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Jože Vilfan led in October 1951 a goodwill mission to these countries. In the following years, Yugoslav elites intensified relations with the new "progressive" Egyptian authorities headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, who became the first African leader to visit Yugoslavia.[129] From the mid-1950s, these two countries became the Yugoslav ticket for entering the African political arena. Over the next decade, Yugoslav communists extensively engaged in building ties with independent African states, which served as diplomatic headquarters from where they could get to know and make connections with the rest of the continent.[130]

[125] Bogdan Popović, „Robna razmena Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju", *Jugoslavenski pregled*, July – August 1970, p. 111-116.
[126] „Razvoj i problematika odnosa SFRJ sa zemljama u razvoju", 18 June 1970, AJ-130-611, p. 20-23.
[127] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 212.
[128] Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, p. 9-50.
[129] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 43-44.
[130] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 32, 58.

Through the intensification of cooperation with Egypt, Yugoslavia got the opportunity for the first time to express in practice its non-engaged character to Africa. By selling a smaller amount of weapons to Egypt in 1954, Yugoslavia demonstrated an independent position outside the influence of the two blocs. As a result, the Yugoslav political elite gained credibility with the Egyptian authorities for "courageously" resisting Western pressure and subsequently risking sanctions. Cairo received this move with enthusiasm as it showed that the country was able to resist neo-imperial demands.[131] Namely, the Western powers set Egypt as a condition for the supply of weapons to enter the Western defence system. However, arms deals with Yugoslavia were not sufficient to achieve a balance of power against Israel. Therefore, Nasser turned to Czechoslovakia, which was back then one of the largest arms exporters, concluding a vast sales agreement in September 1955.[132] This time, Yugoslavia decided to play an important role in Egyptian affairs by mediating the Czechoslovak arms shipment. From the port of Rijeka, ships sailing under the Yugoslav flag transported Czechoslovak weapons and ammunition to the coast of Egypt. Part of this armament Nasser was secretly delivering to the FLN, the movement that in 1954 had started and led the Algerian revolution and was sponsored by the Egyptian leader. The Yugoslav venture also left an impression on the members of the FLN, who organized the resistance movement from their Cairo bases. Through Cairo, the Yugoslav officials made initial contact with the FLN representatives.[133] Several years after, Yugoslavia commenced directly contributing to their cause.

Though having a political interest in supporting the Algerian revolutionary movement, the LCY leadership explained it had been guided by the principles of revolutionary internationalism. For example, the LCY member Veljko Vlahović in an article for the organ *Komunist* reflected:

> "Because the help we provided […] was our revolutionary debt. The Algerian people had the right to that help because they fought not only for their freedom but for the freedom

[131] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World,* p. 52-53, 233.
[132] Philip E. Muehlbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa 1945-1968* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 91-95.
[133] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World,* p. 52-53, 85.

of other peoples. […] It seems to me that this is the source of understanding, respect, friendship, fondness and solidarity." [134]

The Yugoslav political elite additionally supported relations with the FLN by promoting the discourse of "two fraternal peoples" (*dva bratska naroda*) that emanated from emphasizing similarities and comparing the Algerian anti-colonial movement to the Yugoslav Second World War national liberation movement.[135] In fact, Milorad Lazić claims that solidarity with liberation movements was an intrinsic part of Yugoslavia's revolutionary identity and was therefore not exclusively guided by foreign political pragmatism.[136] Similarly, Nemanja Radonjić explains that the transfer of arms, some of which the Yugoslav partisan guerrillas had used against the fascist occupiers, was not only a practical delivery of weaponry but also a symbolic inauguration of the proclaimed "brotherhood". Furthermore, Radonjić observed that the discourses of "brotherhood and friendship" dominated over the typical socialist terminology of "comradery".[137]

By the time the country gained independence in July 1962, Yugoslavia had accumulated substantial political capital in Algeria.[138] Diplomatic relations with the Algerian political elite raised to the highest level with the appointment of Nijaz Dizdarević as Yugoslav ambassador to Algeria. In June 1963, Redha Malek took the position of the Algerian ambassador to Yugoslavia, replacing Brahim Hasnan, who had served as *charge d'affaires*.[139] As they had successfully carried out the war against France, the FLN became a prominent figure among anti-colonial movements and postcolonial governments. Moreover, the government of Ben Bella became one of the biggest sponsors of national liberation movements for which the capital Algiers earned the reputation of "Mecca of revolutionaries".[140] With an extensive network of transcontinental contacts, the international community considered Algeria as a gateway to multiple regions of the Global South. In such a position, Ben Bella's country was a perfect fit for the Yugoslav foreign policy strategy of expanding influence among anti-colonial movements and non-aligned countries. Furthermore, Tito saw the Algerian president as one of his crucial supporters of the "concept of universalism" over the idea

[134] Veljko Vlahović, "Kod alžirskih prijatelja", *Komunist*, 1 April 1965.
[135] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 13.
[136] Lazić, "Comrades in Arms", p. 155.
[137] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 161.
[138] Ibid, p. 186.
[139] Tot, "Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 16.
[140] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, p. 202.

of regional cooperation in the Third World – by which China aimed to marginalize the Yugoslav role among the postcolonial nations.[141] On the other hand, the Algerians were aware that Yugoslavs tried to build a reputation across the Third World through a relationship with their country. Ambassador Malek in August 1963 reported: "The Yugoslavs would like to strengthen their own cooperation with African and Arab countries through their good relations with us."[142]

Anticipating imminent sovereignty, as early as May 1962, the Yugoslav government had developed a plan for a multi-faceted partnership with Algeria.[143] One of the cornerstones of Yugoslav bilateral relations with Algeria was carried out in the form of technical cooperation. In this way, the Yugoslav state-party elite sought to substitute wartime aid with development assistance and thus take part in the Algerian state-building process. To institutionalize the growing Yugoslav technical aid, in 1963, the two countries signed The Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. According to the Agreement, Yugoslavia became "obliged" annually to place at disposal the requested number of personnel. According to the First Annual Plan 1963/1964, it had to provide Algeria with 287 experts, out of which 52 were already working there.[144] Considering the structure of experts, they engaged in the sectors of healthcare (149), agriculture (94), industry (29) and postal and telecommunications (15). By sending 254 new experts, the Plan was entirely fulfilled. Moreover, outside the Plan, three advisers to the Algerian Ministry of Youth, Sports and Tourism were sent in February 1963 to help in the organization of youth work actions.[145] Concerning the Second Annual Plan for the year 1963/1964, it foresaw the engagement of a total of 348 experts, since another 61 experts from the public works (41) and transport (20) sectors were added to the previous request. Until 1965, a total of approximately 500 Yugoslav experts from healthcare, industry, agriculture, postal service and telecommunications, education, and public works temporarily moved to Algeria. In the period of the most intense

[141] Jeffrey J. Byrne, „Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment", *The International History Review* 37, No. 5, (2015), p. 922.
[142] Cited as in: Byrne, „Beyond Continents", p. 922.
[143] Jovan Čavoški, „Jugoslavija, Alžir, nesvrstane zemlje i velike sile u hladnom ratu 1954–1962", in *Jugoslavija – Alžir: zbornik radova sa naučne konferencije*, ed. Miladin Milošević (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2013), p. 139.
[144] Prvi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 12/1964.
[145] One of the dispatched youth was a member of the Central Committee of the Union of Youth of Yugoslavia (*Centralni komitet Saveza omladine Jugoslavije*), Mirko Bolfek, who would later become appointed as the Croatian Ambassador to Algeria from 2007 to 2012.

cooperation, about half of the total number of Yugoslav technical cooperation experts in the South was dispatched to Algeria.[146] Apart from taking the role of technical advisors, they performed vocational training of national personnel, transferring knowledge and providing the necessary know-how.

In the quest to earn the goodwill of the Algerian government, the creators of Yugoslav activities in the Third World acknowledged the potential diplomatic gains and advantages against the competitors, that could also be acquired by "being first". This attitude can be noticed in some of the earliest Yugoslav ventures in post-colonial Algeria. First of all, Yugoslavia became the first country to dispatch in August 1962 a complete team of health experts to independent Algeria. Only after followed socialist counterparts from Bulgaria[147] and the USSR, as well as China and Cuba, whose missions arrived in May 1963.[148] Furthermore, in October 1962, Yugoslavia immediately responded to the emergency request of the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture. Within two days of the request, governments concluded the deal of selling 500 Zadrugar 50/1 tractors.[149] By the end of the month, the mechanization arrived together with a group of 35 tractor maintenance personnel. They provided help in the sowing process and held courses whereby trained 550 tractor drivers and 60 mechanics. Later joined a group of agronomy engineers who assisted in organizing Algerian agricultural production.[150] Last but not least, Yugoslavia helped in raising the first Algerian factories. The latter example of the first Yugoslav investment projects in Algeria showcases that political preoccupations dominated economic considerations well into the 1960s.

After independence, the Algerian government chose a socialist planned economy with a strong emphasis on industrialization as the path to development. However, the authorities did not neglect the light industry. Instead, projects of light industries were supposed to serve as a lead-in to heavy industrialization and supply the domestic demand for basic consumer goods. Therefore, the government decided to develop light

[146] Drugi periodični plan naučno-tehničke saradnje između Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1965; Bogavac, „Jugoslavija u međunarodnoj tehničkoj suradnji", p. 59.
[147] By the end of 1963, Bulgaria kept over 400 medical professionals in Algeria.
[148] Hong, Cold War Germany, p. 157.
[149] Industrija motora Rakovica (IMR) manufactured Zadrugar 50/1 tractors, popularly known as "Landin(i)s" (*landini/landinac*), under the license of the Italian company Landini. Between 1959 and 1968, IMR produced around 8,000 tractors of that model. Dragoljub Obradović, et al., "Hronologija i trend razvoja proizvodnje traktora u Srbiji", *Poljoprivredna tehnika* 36, no. 1 (2011): p. 5.
[150] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 22.

industries previously favoured by the French colonial economy, including the cotton-textile industry. The government's plan envisioned building textile manufacturing facilities and garment manufacturing plants, which would allow the country to minimize the dependence on imported textiles, above all from the French market.[151] To finance the development of the textile industry, the Algerians turned to their socialist partners. The Yugoslav government immediately offered two investment loans of a total of US$ 20 million which served the purpose of building and equipping two textile manufacturing complexes near Oran, a leather processing factory in Rouiba (district of Algiers) and a fruit juice factory in El Asnam (today Chlef).[152]

On many occasions, Yugoslav officials and the press remarked that the country participated in erecting the first industrial complexes in independent Algeria. Understanding the soft power behind such undertakings, there is a likelihood the act had been premeditated by the Yugoslav decision-makers. Though the works were running behind the scheduled deadline, efforts were made to speed up the process and as soon as possible put into operation one of the factories. Eventually, Yugoslav wishes did come true. The Oued Tlelat spinning mill, the first industrial facility built in post-colonial Algeria, started operating in 1966, while the complex El-Kerma (Valmy) was put into operation with a delay a year after. Both factories were inaugurated and commissioned personally by the second Algerian President Houari Boumediene. Until that time, those were some of the most large-scale Yugoslav overseas projects. The Belgrade-based construction enterprise Energoprojekt developed both projects. Enterprises Tekstilstroj, Ventilator, Monter, Prvomajska, Bratstvo from Zagreb, Metalac from Čakovec, Krušik from Valjevo and OKOS from Kranj delivered weaving and spinning machines through the exporter of textile machinery Mašinoimpex.[153] Owing to the profit made in Algeria, in 1966, Mašinoimpex erected an imposing office and residential building in today's Varšavska street in Zagreb, which the employees dubbed "Alžirka" ('The Algerian" [f.]).[154]

[151] Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, p. 129, 167.
[152] Tot, „ Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 22.
[153] „Jugoslavija u Oranu", *Večernji list*, 3 April 1976.
[154] Edin Smajlagić, „Tkalac koji tka prijateljstva" [intervju with Sulejman Čičić], *Preporodov journal*, no. 150-151, April/May 2013, p. 5.

To run the factories and train local workers, Société Nationale des Industries Textiles (SONITEX) had to employ technicians from abroad. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, SONITEX was a national company established in 1966 to supervise and coordinate the operation of newly-established textile complexes in Algeria. To put the factory into operation and train local workers for managing the delivered machines, Mašinoimpex dispatched its employees to the Yugoslav-raised factories Oued Tlélat and El-Kerma. Through the mediation of ZAMTES, other Yugoslav textile factories, predominantly Pamučna industrija Duga Resa and Tekstilni kombinat Zagreb, provided mechanics, technicians and engineers to SONITEX.[155] Furthermore, Yugoslavia offered a vocational training and specialization programme for young Algerians to fill the vacant positions at textile factories and gradually replace foreign experts. In September 1963, the first group of 78 Algerian citizens arrived for professional training - 60 were trained in Zagreb in the textile sector, while the other 18 received training in the leather domain in Domžale in Slovenia.[156]

Nevertheless, these investment projects did not prove economically viable for Yugoslavia. The commercial profit was only instantaneous, given that Yugoslavia could equip these factories with textile machines of its own production. On the other hand, the products of these factories were not in demand in the Yugoslav market. Whether or not a market analysis had been conducted, Yugoslavia entered the business to become the first country to build factories in independent Algeria.[157] Even though the first Yugoslav investments in Algeria were not profitable in the long term, Yugoslavia acquired significant symbolic capital by participating in their construction. Even though Oued Tlelat was a relatively small textile plant, it had the highest production rate, and thus testified to the achievements of Yugoslav modernization. Moreover, technical cooperation programmes and the "exchange" between Yugoslav experts and Algerian students, added a symbolic value to these factories. Yugoslav experts transferred their know-how, working hand in hand with Algerian workers, and they materialized ideas of Yugoslav internationalism or "people's friendship". Finally, the first factories were supposed to strengthen the Yugoslav political relationship with Algeria, which was

[155] „Jugoslavija u Oranu", *Večernji list*, 3 April 1976.
[156] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 30.
[157] Ibid, 22-24.

symbolically reflected in marriages between Yugoslav women and Algerian men who arrived in Yugoslavia as trainees of these factories.[158]

The diplomatic goals of Yugoslavia were closely related to the non-alignment policy. Therefore, long-term economic goals could become the priority in the Yugoslav Third World agenda only when the non-alignment policy had been firmly established in both the international and domestic environment. However, this did not happen before the mid-1970s. In fact, after the 1964 Cairo Conference, the NAM underwent a period that Dragan Bogetić dubbed the "crisis of continuity" or simply the "crisis of the non-alignment".[159] That period characterized a lack of coherence and growing tensions among the non-aligned countries. On top of that, the 'movement' lost some of its key figures. In June 1965, Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown in a coup. After that, the defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 prompted Nasser to forge closer military ties with the Soviet Union. His decision to refrain from attending the 1970 Lusaka Conference drew other Arab leaders with him, except for Sudan. Having said that, during the mid-1960s, voices of internal adversaries of the non-aligned orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy were amplified as well. While a part of the Yugoslav state-party elite criticized the government's non-alignment strategy for providing development aid to the Third World rather than directing financial and other resources to the less developed republics and provinces of Yugoslavia, others saw relations with the Third World as unprofitable and instead advocated turn to the European Community.[160]

However, two international occurrences diverted Yugoslav policy-makers from abandoning their partnership with the Third World and revived their interest in the non-alignment. The first was the launching of the Tet Offensive in January 1968 and the escalation of the Vietnam War. The other was the crashing of the Prague Spring by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which was later justified under the "Brezhnev Doctrine". These interventions of superpowers sent a red light to Tito. The potential security threat to sovereignty was a momentum in which Yugoslav leadership aimed at reactivating the group of non-aligned countries and strengthening

[158] „Jugoslavija u Oranu", *Večernji list*, 3 April 1976.
[159] Dragan Bogetić, „Jugoslavija i nesvrstanost: Prilog prevazilaženju predsrasuda i stereotipa", *Annales* 24, no. 4, Beograd, 2014, p. 619.
[160] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement,* p. 125-126.

political and military networks with governments and movements of the Global South. The head of the Yugoslav state embarked on a new grand tour of Africa and Asia in order to revive the reduced interest for the upcoming Third NAM Summit in Lusaka. During the 'diplomatic offensive', between 1969 and 1971, Tito visited eleven countries, including Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya. Visits to these countries were a result of a greater unanimity among the domestic political elite regarding the importance of alliances with the non-aligned countries in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union.[161] In the following decade, non-alignment reached the zenith. In fact, the 1970s became known as the "golden age" of the NAM. With the development of institutional mechanisms at the 1970 Lusaka Conference, the group gathering around the idea of active neutrality profiled into a full-fledged movement. While the political rationale remained, once having firmly established its international position and safeguarded sovereignty, from the early 1970s Yugoslavia was gradually shifting the agenda in the Global South towards economic concerns. The Yugoslav economic decision-makers in 1969 pertained that the Mediterranean region in particular was the "natural direction of [market] expansion" of the Yugoslav economy.[162]

1.3. Country's Unofficial Ambassadors

Construction of the Yugoslav Self-Image

After the ambassadors of Eastern European countries and the USSR[163] demonstratively left the congress hall,[164] the representatives of the Global South, primarily African anti-colonial movements and parties remained to listen, speak and discuss with the members of the LCY.[165] Criticism of the Soviet model of socialism and politics of Stalin's era by the Yugoslav party officials marked the Seventh Congress of the LCY held in April 1958. The tensions between the two communist subjects began growing shortly before the rally as

[161] Lazić, "Comrades in Arms", p. 161-162; Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, p. 144-145; Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 143-145.
[162] SSST, „Informacija u vezi predstojećih pregovora Mještovitog komiteta", Belgrade, 10 Janary 1969, AJ-130-607, p. 14
[163] Refusing to send their party delegation, the countries were represented as observers by their ambassadors. Bogetić, *Nova strategija,* p. 187, 189.
[164] Ibid, p. 190.
[165] Sava Mijalković and Aleksa Brajović, *Gosti socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Privredna štampa, 1980), p. 131-132.

a Soviet reaction to the draft programmatic text developed by Yugoslav Marxist theorists. The document, adopted at the Congress as the "Program of the LCY", elaborated the Yugoslav view of the situation in the international communist movement. More importantly, after almost a decade of practice, the party leaders officially proclaimed the platform of "different paths to socialism" and provided a theoretical background to the Yugoslav self-management system.[166]

The officials in Moscow saw this text not only to serve Yugoslav party leaders as a theoretical basis and justification of their 'nationalist revisionism' but also as an offensive against Soviet socialism and the imposition of a self-management system on other countries. Translations into several languages and wide distribution of the Program's copies provided Kremlin with an argument for these accusations.[167] The Yugoslav Communists, on the other hand, stressed that their ideological interpretation rightfully followed the lines of Marxism-Leninism while the Soviet one was based on a revisionist concept, misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Marx's ideas. In fact, the Soviet model of socialism *was* what the Yugoslav *was not*. They perceived it as the exact opposite and aimed to convey this image to the socialist world and beyond.[168]

As Dejan Jović noted, the Soviet model of socialism after 1948 had become the most prominent Yugoslav "Other" against which the elites constructed the new, post-Soviet identity. Apart from the political pressure posed by the Soviet Union, he recognised that the principal reason for this was of ideological nature. As Jović explains, the Yugoslav Communists believed that "the real political choice was not between liberalism and socialism but between various types of socialism".[169] I expand these ideas by showing that the socialist competition for influence in the Global South, particularly in Africa, was another important factor in annotating alternative socialisms as the main ideological Others. Aside from the Soviets, during the 1950s and 1960s, those were represented by the Chinese and the Cuban model. In the situation of multiple socialisms, Yugoslavia aimed at distinguishing itself from the Others and presenting as a *more humane* socialist alternative. Because the image of the Self is constructed against the

[166] Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija,* p. 187-190.
[167] Ibid*,* p. 187.
[168] Dejan Jović, „Communist Yugoslavia and Its 'Others'", in: *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, ed. John Lampe, Mark Mazower (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), p. 277, 280, 285.
[169] Ibid, p. 285-288.

image of the Other,[170] I juxtapose the Yugoslav self-image with the image of the ideological Others – the Soviet, the Chinese and the Cuban. This was, of course, not a reflection of the reality but was a view of the Other and Self shared by the Yugoslav state-party elite, and was aimed at being conveyed to Africa.

The conflicted brands of socialism sought international confirmation of their correctness through the presence and implementation in Africa and the rest of the developing world.[171] Successful implementation of technical aid programs, in particular, was seen as one of the best possible advertisements for their respective vision of socialist modernity.[172] In this context, the Yugoslav state-party elite set out a new approach to building a network of influence throughout the Global South. However, as early as 1959, officials of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia feared that USSR and China would try to obstruct their actions in Africa.[173] Not long after that, the quest for earning Africa's goodwill joined Cuba.[174] In this situation of multiple competing socialism, Yugoslav communists had to show they were different from the Others but at the same time similar to Africans and with a profound understanding of their problems.

The Soviets became the most prominent Yugoslav Other after 1948, when the country was expelled from the Cominform, following accusations of deviating from Marxism-Leninism. Outside the bloc division, facing increased Soviet pressure and international isolation, the Yugoslav leaders made a radical turn in internal and foreign affairs by introducing self-management and non-alignment, which became the two most important pillars of the post-Soviet Yugoslav identity.[175] Under the new leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, who initiated de-Stalinization, the relations between Belgrade and Moscow entered the phase of rapprochement. However, the attempts at reconciliation opposing socialist ideologies were mostly unsuccessful and short-lived. In 1958, ideological conflict was renewed and gradually transferred to the interstate level. At that time, Chinese leadership stood by the Soviet side, launching sharp attacks on Yugoslav

[170] See for example: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
[171] Nemanja Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 65, 71.
[172] Hong, *Cold War Germany*, p. 40.
[173] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 65.
[174] Piero Gleijeses, „Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965", *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, No. 1 (1996).
[175] Dejan Jović, „Communist Yugoslavia and Its 'Others'", p. 285-286.

"revisionism".[176] Meanwhile, with the changed outlook of Khrushchev on national liberation movements, which were previously marked as 'national bourgeois' by Stalin, Moscow commenced to approach and offer Africa their model of socialism and aid in the state-building process.[177]

To defend their ideological independence as well as to compete against the Soviets in Africa, Yugoslav communists insisted on the right of every nation to choose the path of internal development that followed "its own needs", historical background and "specific conditions" in the country. Self-management socialism was, therefore, presented as "solving problems [of internal development] in a non-dogmatic way". From the Yugoslav perspective, it was a clear antipode to the Soviet 'rigid' state socialism and Stalinist dogmatism.[178] Contrasting the Soviet model, Yugoslavia presented itself as a socialist country free from "dogmatism". In turn, by stressing similarities of historical conditions, Yugoslavs claimed to have the most suitable development model for the decolonized African countries. For instance, during his visit to Guinea in 1961, Tito reported to a journalist that Yugoslavia for the African nations "represent a case of how a country, which in the past was enslaved and underdeveloped, can rise on its own [...] to the level at which Yugoslavia is today."[179]

Stressing that the Yugoslav model should not be uncritically copied but instead adapted to the historical and socio-cultural peculiarities of each country, Yugoslavia promoted the idea of "multiple paths to socialism" in Africa under the concept of "African socialism"[180] or "Arab socialism".[181] For example, when the Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella expressed his interest in Yugoslav self-management, the president of the Central Council of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo warned him to avoid "blindly copying the Yugoslav model" but instead to adjust it to their "own specific conditions".[182] According to the anecdote conveyed by Tito's adviser Blažo Mandić, which occurred during the first presidential visit to Algeria in 1965, Yugoslav delegates aimed at imparting this idea even in less

[176] Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija,* p. 184-199.
[177] Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism After Stalin. Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 22-23.
[178] Dejan Jović, „Communist Yugoslavia and Its 'Others'", p. 281.
[179] Zdravko Pečar, *Afrička kretanja* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1965), p. 588.
[180] „Druga etapa nacionalnog oslobođenja", *Vjesnik*, 31 May 1962.
[181] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 70-71.
[182] „Izgraditi platformu zajedničke borbe", *Vjesnik*, 26 January 1963.

formal situations. To suggest that there were no "sharper drinks" on the table during the lunch, a member of the Yugoslav delegation told the Algerian hosts: " […] 'we pour a little wine on our way, while yours is strictly non-alcoholic… Differences must be taken into account, but I think we have agreed not to impose anything on each other.'"[183] In this way, the Yugoslav communists showed the flexibility of their brand of Marxism-Leninism, respect for the right to self-determination and commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs.[184] Those principles, in their view, were not shared by their Soviet counterparts.

Because it was one of the two superpowers with extensive military, economic and technological capabilities, the Yugoslav Communists considered the Soviet Union a "natural hegemon". In their view, the Soviet Union exerted hegemonic aspirations by influencing domestic politics through development aid, particularly loan agreements. The first African country to receive an extensive Soviet loan was Ethiopia. In July 1959, Moscow granted Addis Ababa a loan of US$102 million for its economic development, while later the same year provided loans to Guinea and Mali.[185] These events raised concerns in the ranks of LCY leadership that the competition for socialist influence in Africa had amplified. Herself receiving aid from the West, Yugoslavia was not able to keep track of the socialist superpower. The circumstances under which Yugoslavia was granting commodity loans were openly declared to their African partners. On this matter, the Yugoslav leader told:

> "We give and will continue to give loans to these [African] countries, but at the same time, of course, we cannot go beyond our capabilities. [...] Indeed, we cannot compete with the great powers and give hefty loans, but our contribution will continue to increase in the future."[186]

In Algeria, the loans granted by the Soviets in 1963 and 1964 amounted to a total of US$ 230 million,[187] while the Yugoslav ones reached no more than US$ 30 million.[188]

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[183] Blažo Mandić, *Tito u dijalogu sa svetom* (Novi Sad: Agencija Mir, 2005), p. 189.
[184] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 319.
[185] Gu Guan-Fu, „Soviet Aid to the Third World. An Analysis of Its Strategy", *Soviet Studies* 35, no. 1 (1983), p. 79.
[186] Pečar, *Afrička kretanja*, p. 591-592
[187] Guan-Fu, „Soviet Aid to the Third World", p. 79.
[188] As per Agreements of 23 July 1963 and 3 April 3 1968, Yugoslavia approved loans to Algeria in the amount of US$ 20 million and US$ 10 million, respectively, with an interest rate of 3%, advance of 10%, and 10-years repayment period. However, only the first (US$ 10 million) out of three granted loans was

Namely, on 31 January 1963, the Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade (Jugoslavenska banka za vanjsku trgovinu), better known as Jugobanka, concluded a trade agreement whereby approving Algeria a US$ 10 million investment loan. Soon after, on 23 July 1963, it approved a second loan in the equivalent amount. The third loan was authorized on 3 April 1968, under conditions of a 3% interest rate, with a 10% advance, and a repayment period from 8 to 10 years. Tito and the Yugoslav government turned the tables and stressed that the symbolic value of their loans exceeded the 'modest' financial value since they had been granted without any conditions and with the objective of a mutual benefit. Conversely, they claimed that the position of the Soviet Union and the East European 'satellites', being a part of the developed (socialist) world,[189] implied hierarchies and patronizing attitudes towards the Global South.

As opposed to the 'latent imperialism' of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia emphasized its anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic character rooted in socialist internationalism. Though undergoing decolonization, most of the African continent in the late 1950s and the early 1960s was still under colonial domination. As a way of approaching national liberation movements and leaders, the political elite adopted anti-colonial discourse and implemented anti-colonialism as one of the main principles of foreign policy. The state-party leadership recognized anti-colonialism as a 'historical' and 'inevitable' global process. Although political entities in socialist Yugoslavia have never been under colonial oppression, the political elite often addressed the similarity of historical experiences. The discourse of the 'shared past' was mainly developed by identifying the Yugoslav partisan liberation movement with the Algerian anti-colonial struggle. A typical example of this rhetoric can be found in a letter Tito addressed to the Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella:

> "Deep mutual sympathies, cultivated by our peoples, are an expression of our long-standing solidarity and common temptations in the past and similar, very difficult and glorious, historical paths of our revolutions."[190]

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utilized, while the other two expired. Str. 9, „Informacija o stanju ekonomskih odnosa između SFRJ i Alžira", 7 May 1974, AJ-465-6549; Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 22-24.

[189] Iacob and Vasile, "Agents of Decolonization?", p. 138.

[190] „Poruka predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita – Ahmedu Ben Beli, predsjedniku vlade Demokratske i Narodne Republike Alžira", Belgrade, 16 January 1963 [document no. 14], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi 1956-1979*, ed. Miladin Milošević and Nada Pantelić (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, Ambasada Demokratske Narodne Republike Alžira, 2014), p. 28.

In certain instances, the attempts to associate with the colonial movements and post-colonial countries went so far as to claim the Ottoman and Hapsburg rule over Yugoslav territories as "colonial".[191] At the same time, the fact that the country lacked colonizing past was highlighted[192] and served to additionally reassure the local elites that the danger of establishing neo-colonial relations towards Africa was non-existent.

With the 1961 Sino-Soviet split came the second rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade. As a result, the ideological focus of Yugoslav communists for a brief period shifted to the Chinese socialist model and their engagement in Africa. The ideological conflict in the communist world dynamically manifested through a struggle for influence and supremacy in Africa, from which geopolitically strengthened China sought to exclude Yugoslavia.[193] Therefore, the Yugoslav party officials, diplomats and the media carefully followed Chinese activities in Africa. Through their embassies in the main political centres of Africa, socialist countries forged an open propaganda war. An illustrative example serves the event of the Chinese economic exhibition opening in Algiers in September 1963. The exhibition was widely welcomed by both the Algerian authorities and the citizens – Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella himself opened the fair that visited over 150,000 Algerians.[194] At the event, China disseminated anti-Yugoslav propaganda material in French which "had slandered the peoples of the SFRY and its head of state".[195] It can be assumed that the content of the pamphlet was similar to the article published later that month in the Chinese newspapers. Entitled "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", the article attacked 'Tito's clique' for revisionism, denied socialism in Yugoslavia and accused them of subserving U.S. imperialism.[196] The Yugoslav press reacted, holding the Algerian authorities accountable for the incident and expressed surprise they had not taken any actions against the Chinese propaganda. However, to stress that the Algerian people recognised Yugoslav authenticity, the dailies Vjesnik reported that "[m]any Algerian visitors of this exhibition, as they glanced the content of

[191] Ana Sladojević, *Slike o Africi/Images of Africa* (Beograd: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 2015), p. 15-17.
[192] Catherine Baker, "Postcoloniality Without Race? Racial Exceptionalism and Southeast European Cultural Studies", *Interventions* 20, no. 6 (2018), p. 778-779; Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji, p. 269.
[193] Byrne, „Beyond Continents", p. 914, 921.
[194] Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), p. 136–138.
[195] „Zloupotreba gostoprimstva", *Vjesnik*, 4 September 1963.
[196] "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", *Renmin Ribao,* September 26, 1963; translated in *Peking Review*, vi [September 27, 1963], p. 14-27. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/yugoslavia.htm

Chinese pamphlets, threw them into the sea".[197] Similar propaganda, China had spread since 1962 in Africa against the Soviet Union, accusing it of neo-imperialism and equating it with the United States.[198]

As a consequence of Khrushchev's ideologic flexibility, Yugoslavs afterwards detected China as the principal enemy of socialism and world peace. In the course of bilateral meetings with the Algerians, Tito referred to these changes in the communist world. During his first official visit to Algiers in 1965, he told his hosts that "the Chinese look at things dogmatically […] now [they] took Stalinist positions".[199] Considering peace a precondition for the development of socialism and presenting Yugoslavia as a peace-loving country that offered peaceful solutions to global problems, Tito pointed out that the USSR and Eastern European countries, together with Yugoslavia, advocate peaceful coexistence, while he sharply criticized the Chinese idea of the inevitability of a global conflict:

> "When we talk about polarization to reactionary forces and peaceful forces, it is understood that this mainly applies to Western countries. But, on the other hand, antagonisms also occurred in the eastern camp [...] the Chinese have a different position in foreign policy and advocate the theory of permanent conflict, arguing that a clash through war is inevitable between capitalism and socialism, which increases the possibility of a world war. [...] we believe that China stands on the positions of force when it argues the force is necessary to deal with the capitalist world."[200]

From the Yugoslav perspective, another significant point of departure from China was the question of foreign aid. In Algeria, China was seen as particularly threatening. In October 1962, China donated US$ 1,8 million to the Algerian budget and a year later provided an interest-free loan to Ben Bella's government in the value of US$ 50 million,[201] while during the war it granted a credit of US$ 50 million for arms

[197] „Zloupotreba gostoprimstva", *Vjesnik*, 3 September 1963.
[198] Byrne, „Beyond Continents", 921.
[199] „Zabeleške o jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima vođenim prilikom posete predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita Alžiru 15, 16, 18,. i 24. aprila 1965." [document no. 28], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 128.
[200] „Beleška o jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima održanim u Beogradu u zgradi Saveznog izvršnog veća", Beograd, 6 March 1964 [document no. 20], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 41.
[201] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War,* p. 136.

purchase.[202] Accusing the Chinese of giving aid to impose self-interest, Yugoslavs claimed their assistance was without selfish interest and the cooperation with the Algerian government was based on "equality, mutual respect and solidarity".

Advocating geographically and racially defined gathering of states, the Chinese leadership threatened to marginalize Yugoslavia in Africa and challenge the non-alignment. Namely, in contrast to the Yugoslav vision of non-aligned universalism, China championed regional cooperation and was, at that time, preparing the Second Bandung Conference. Contrary to the definition of the Third World exclusively through the expressions of Afro-Asian identity, defined as Southern, 'coloured' and postcolonial, Tito envisioned the non-alignment as a "broad movement for peace and international cooperation".[203] Seeking to jeopardize their credibility among the African and Asian nations and exclude Yugoslavia from the partnership with the Third World along racial lines, the Chinese authorities attacked the "whiteness" of Yugoslavs.[204] As a response, Tito accused China of promoting racism, argued that anti-colonialism was not racially defined[205] and justified the Yugoslav role in Africa through the principle of socialist internationalism:

> "[...] why Yugoslavia is so interested in, say, Africa. Because, outside Africa and Asia, Yugoslavia was the only country among the non-aligned, but not with the desire to derive some benefit from it. Namely, we are here [in Africa] because we are aware that, as long as colonialism is present, there is a danger of a new conflict in the world that would affect all of us. Besides, we believe that, as a socialist country, we have a duty to help all nations that have not yet been liberated, or have gained independence but need outside help."[206]

After launching the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China became preoccupied with internal affairs and temporarily backed down from the international scene.[207] In turn, Yugoslav elites replaced China with Castro's Cuba as the central ideological competitor

[202] Guy Burton, *China and Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present* (Routledge, 2020), 32.
[203] Byrne, „Beyond Continents", p. 914, 921.
[204] Ibid, p. 923.
[205] „Beleška o jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima održanim u Beogradu u zgradi Saveznog izvršnog veća", Beograd, 6 March 1964 [document no. 20], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi,* p. 40–44.
[206] Zvonko Štaubringer, *Maršal mira* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), p. 203.
[207] Burton, *China and Middle East Conflicts*, p. 33.

in Africa. Like China and the Soviet Union before that,[208] the new socialist actor was seen to jeopardize the Yugoslav position in the Third World, most notably in Africa. The engagement of Cuba in the affairs of the continent started in the early 1960s by assisting the Algerian anti-colonial struggle and continued after the country gained independence.[209]

Similarly to the Chinese, the Cubans had stressed Yugoslav "whiteness" and claimed it prevented them from understanding "coloured peoples". In 1966, Cuba organized the Tricontinental Conference in Havana which, as a European polity, excluded Yugoslavia from the Third World meeting.[210] According to Radonjić, Yugoslav leadership generally expressed a tendency to avoid the term "Third World". This is because of the risk that the country could then be classified as the "Second World", which in turn would serve as a justification for competitors to exclude it from continental affairs.[211] Alternatively, Yugoslavia strategically identified itself as part of the developing world, precisely as an "insufficiently developed"[212] or "slightly more developed developing country".[213] For example, Tito explained to his Algerian interlocutors that "Yugoslavia itself is not so developed. It has industrialized, but it still feels the heavy burden of the past."[214] In fact, to account for the leadership position in the Third World, the Yugoslav elites preferred the term "non-aligned countries", which promoted the concept of universalism. When in the late 1960s the North-South global dichotomy was becoming more prominent, the Yugoslav Communists presented their country as part of the Global South.

For it went against one of the keystones of the non-alignment – the principle of non-interference, the Yugoslavs also opposed the radical attitude of Castro who promoted the export of revolution. In a conversation with Ben Bella, Tito explained this stance:

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[208] Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959-1962* (Beograd: INIS, 2009), p. 156-159.
[209] Piero Gleijeses, „Cuba's First Venture in Africa".
[210] Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011), p. 54-56.
[211] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 74.
[212] Ibid, p. 166.
[213] Spaskovska, "Building a better world?", p. 334.
[214] „Zabeleške o jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima vođenim prilikom posete predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita Alžiru 15, 16, 18,. i 24. aprila 1965." [document no. 28], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 105.

> "Usually all novel, revolutionary organisms tend in the beginning to export the revolution. Cuba has made a big mistake in that regard and this is taking revenge on it. Revolutions and regime change are a matter for every nation to solve. It is understood that the people who carried out the revolution should be given all possible support from the outside to stand on their own feet […] When it does, internal practice will work best on its neighbours."[215]

According to the Yugoslav view, the successful internal development and rapid industrialization in the 1950s were the best and sufficient proof of the correctness of the socialist development and would therefore be emulated in other countries.

Branding the Non-Aligned Expert

As the most powerful person in the state and party structure, Tito had a decisive influence on foreign policy formation and implementation. Together with the official diplomatic representatives – ambassadors, the President of the Republic played the key role in representing Yugoslavia in the Global South. Undertaking extensive voyages, which were an expression of his personal diplomacy, he established close contacts with the leaders of postcolonial states and anti-colonial movements.[216] The first such trip Tito took was in 1954/55, during which he visited India and Burma, and upon return Egypt where he made initial contacts with Nasser. In his longest official journey lasting from February to April 1961, Tito visited North and West Africa. Through these trips, we can distinguish some of the most distinctive components of Tito's image in Africa – a fighter for peace, a friend of the continent and a moderniser – also reflecting the image of the country.[217]

Already dubbing his extensive international trips "voyages of peace" (*putovanja mira*) by the members of Tito's cabinet, served the image of Yugoslavia and its leader as promoters of world peace.[218] Unlike the colonists who were arriving with arms in their hands, Tito stepped on the African soil as a 'white man' bringing peace, a 'different

[215] „Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirski razgovora u Beloj vili na Brionima", Brioni, 11 March 1964 [document no. 21], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 63.
[216] Vladimir Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija: studije i dokumentarni prilozi* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010), p. 40.
[217] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 100-114.
[218] Mandić, *Tito u dijalogu sa svetom*.

White' who had no imperial background. In fact, many Yugoslav sources claimed him „the most respected White in Africa".[219] For if they wanted to play a part in the Third World project, Tito and Yugoslavia needed to surpass their whiteness, which enhanced their Chinese and Cuban competitors. The second element of Tito's image was the 'friend of Africa'. This was reflected through his personal and close relations with African leaders which gradually evolved into a network of bilateral relations across the continent.[220] Finally, the diplomatic gifts probably at most conveyed the image of Tito as a moderniser. For example, during his great 1961 African tour, Tito gifted African leaders Yugoslav-made Fiat 1100 cars. Besides the modernization, the fact that they were constructed in the Crvena Zastava factory under the Italian licence sent a message of successful cooperation which the Yugoslav brand of socialism was able to achieve with the West.[221]

Before the arrival of the President, the first 'official' impressions of Yugoslavia were usually conveyed by the ambassadors. On the Yugoslav mental map of Africa, independent African countries held an important position because they opened the possibility of creating a network of influence. Once independent, it was possible to send governmental delegations or to set up permanent diplomatic missions in the form of embassies or consulates.[222] Two ambassadors who played a distinguished role in conveying the earliest image of Yugoslavia to Africa were Marko Nikezić and Nijaz Dizdarević. In the period from 1953 to 1956, Nikezić was a Yugoslav ambassador in Cairo, where he set the initial contacts, and agreements and mediated the delivery of arms to the FLN. With this engagement, Yugoslavia demonstrated its anti-imperial and anti-colonial character in practice first to the Algerian and later to the rest of the continent.[223] Another example of a highly representative Yugoslav diplomat was Nijaz Dizdarević, who served from 1962 to 1965 as the first Yugoslav ambassador in Algiers. Dizdarević was distinguished for his multilingualism, including excellent knowledge of Arabic, and close relations with the FLN members, particularly with Ben Bella.[224] In a conversation between the two delegations, Ben Bella commented: "I would also like to

[219] Zdravko Pečar, *Afričke kretanja*, p. 594.
[220] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 79.
[221] Radina Vučetić, „Titova Afrika. Reprezentacija moći na Titovim afričkim putovanjima", in *Tito u Africi. Slike solidarnosti*, eds. Paul Betts and Radina Vučetić (Beograd: Muzej Jugoslavije, 2017), p. 31.
[222] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 58.
[223] Ibid, p. 160.
[224] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, p. 166.

point out the very friendly and useful activity of your ambassador [Dizarević] to our country, who is a high-class ambassador. […] He is not an ambassador for us, but a brother."[225]

Behind the political spotlight of the President of the Republic and the Yugoslav diplomatic corps remained workers as non-elite actors engaged in representing and disseminating the desired image of Yugoslavia in the Global South. In this regard, technical cooperation experts served as Yugoslavia's "unofficial ambassadors". The task was assigned to them since, unlike the workers accompanying overseas investment projects of Yugoslav enterprises, technical cooperation experts were in daily contact with the host society and institutions. Both in and outside of the workplace, experts embodied Yugoslav political principles and social values. Above all, they represented the Yugoslav development model. Successfully carrying out labour activities, experts demonstrated achievements in Yugoslav social and economic development. An official of ZAMTES commented that technical cooperation experts "[…] affirmed our [Yugoslav] science and achieved a greater reputation for their expertise and commitment. In addition, they represented socialist Yugoslavia, helped and contributed to the realization and deepening of the future of our non-aligned foreign policy, especially with developing countries."[226]

Praises received from foreign leaders for their work efforts, expertise and skills reassured Yugoslav officials of technical experts' importance in representing the country in the Global South. However, the success was by no means a chance. Conversely, it came as a result of a careful selection of the most suitable experts for promoting Yugoslav socialist development. This was particularly notable in the field of medicine. Directly dealing with "backwardness" and underdevelopment, many socialist governments considered the realm of medicine and public healthcare as an exact depiction of the modernization level. When reaching out to healthcare institutions to recruit medical teams for the Algerian government, ZAMTES explicitly requested "experts who will well represent our country" and "maintain the reputation [of previous medical teams]".[227] Usually, those were well-established teams that had previously worked together, thus

[225] „Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirski razgovora u Beloj vili na Brionima", Brioni, 11 March 1964 [document no. 21], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 66.
[226] I. Rapajić, „Angažiranje naših eksperata", p. 377.
[227] „Zamjena zdravstvene ekipe u Bolnici Oreansville u Rep.[ublici] Alžiru", 24 April 1964, HDA-1727-346.

implying more experience and professionality. Moreover, some of the dispatched health workers were renowned specialists of high expertise who proved highly professional and hard-working.

The Algerian officials publicly acknowledged "the efficient and active aid" which had been provided by the teams of Yugoslav healthcare workers. The government newspaper El Moudjahid dubbed them "ambassadors of friendship who left their homes and families to, day and night, without sparing their forces, act for the benefit of Algerian people".[228] The arrival and performance of the Yugoslav medical mission not only left an impression on the authorities but also on the local population, which recognised Parnet as "the Yugoslav hospital".[229] To the satisfaction of Yugoslav officials, the FLN leaders on multiple occasions expressed words of gratitude and public praise in front of local and foreign media for the Yugoslav efforts.[230] During the first official visit to Algeria in April 1965, Tito himself received compliments from his hosts for the work of Yugoslav experts, particularly medical teams.[231] According to a statement of the Yugoslav ambassador in Algiers, at that time around 280 Yugoslav citizens were working in Algeria, mostly medical professionals.

Apart from the Yugoslav socialist development, another significant element of the Yugoslav image conveyed through technical cooperation experts was the disinterested engagement. Namely, Yugoslav citizens had to embody development aid which was guided not by financial interests but by *genuine* ideas of solidarity. While reporting to the government on his first voyage to Africa in 1961, Tito remarked: "They [experts] know that they did not come to these [African] countries to make money, but to, in the first place, help those peoples and act as *Yugoslavs*."[232] In this sense, Yugoslav workers had to act as agents of socialist development and not as capitalist profiteers. Furthermore, the Yugoslav government did not impose any political conditionalities on the aid and did not demand ideological compatibility from aid recipients. Aware newly independent African countries were sensitive about their sovereign rights, Yugoslavia

[228] „Iskreni dokaz prijateljstva", *Vjesnik*, 14 November 1962.
[229] „Jugoslavenski liječnici u Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 2 August 1962.
[230] Paul Betts, "A Red Wind of Change: African Media Coverage of Tito's Tours of Decolonizing Africa" in *Tito u Africi. Slike solidarnosti*, eds. Paul Betts and Radina Vučetić (Beograd: Muzej Jugoslavije, 2017), p. 72; „Priznanje jugoslavenskim liječnicima u Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 1 February 1963.
[231] „Posjet jugoslavenskog predsjednika Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 22 April 1965.
[232] As cited in: Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 180.

demonstrated the principle of non-interference in internal affairs by allowing the recipient African governments to directly employ its citizens. As such, Yugoslav institutions, i.e. ZAMTES, were only responsible for recruiting personnel. In this way, the Yugoslav leadership aimed at reassuring Africa's political elites and gaining their trust.

Indeed, the most distinguishing feature of the Yugoslav image that technical cooperation experts embodied was the non-alignment. The Yugoslav authorities invited the experts to portray this stance by focusing on labour activities and refraining from engaging in "political propaganda". During an internal meeting, the officials of ZAMTES explained that "[…] some developing countries are particularly interested in Yugoslav experts, primarily for political reasons. There is trust in Yugoslav experts, in their objectivity and independence from the economic interests of the great powers [sic] and non-interference in the internal affairs of the country."[233] The experts had to portray the principles of non-alignment in the workplace, where the relationships between foreign experts reflected the competition among socialist countries.[234] Because of their "neutral" stance, Radonjić noted that Yugoslav experts had exposed themselves to propaganda attacks and accusations from politically active counterparts.[235]

For most of the Cold War, Yugoslavia aimed at differentiating from its socialist counterparts with a foreign policy independent from the Soviet bloc and a non-dogmatic form of communism. However, the reception of the Yugoslav image in the Third World challenges this widely accepted narrative of the so-called "Yugoslav exceptionalism".[236] The case of Yugoslav technical cooperation with Algeria debunks this myth. The notion of exceptionalism was so deeply embedded in the Yugoslav political culture that the officials of ZAMTES were left surprised each time the Algerian negotiators offered conditions of engagement of Yugoslav experts equal to the ones of Eastern European socialist counterparts.[237] In their view, this question was not only a matter of "securing acceptable conditions" for the experts but also directly interfered with the "special status" of Yugoslavia within the Global South. The Assistant Director of ZAMTES,

[233] „Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji", Beograd, 20 January 1968, AJ-130-607.
[234] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 151.
[235] Ibid, p. 186.
[236] Nebojša Vladisavljević, *Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution* (London: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 25-27.
[237] Report on the talks on technical cooperation at the 7th Session of the Joint Commission, 15 January 1976, HDA-1727-449, p. 5; Minutes of the meeting of the Directors' board, 6 March 1981, HDA-1727-449, p. 2.

Ljubomir Reljić, stressed that Yugoslavia "should not be equated with other Eastern European socialist countries, given the specifics of our [Yugoslav] socialist system."[238]

The Yugoslav policy-makers believed that self-identification with the developing world accompanied by activities within the NAM and the G77 secured them a special place among countries of the Global South. On the one hand, in their contacts with Yugoslav officials, Algerian counterparts had tried to convey a sense of Yugoslavia's privileged position within the socialist world. On many occasions, including a conversation between Ben Bella and Tito, the Algerians stipulated that Yugoslavia was "the first socialist country to establish relations with Algeria".[239] Along these lines, the Yugoslav discourse emphasized that Yugoslavia had been "among the first countries to provide assistance to Algeria during and after gaining independence, among other things by providing personnel in a large number (200-300 per year)".[240] On the other hand, despite efforts, Yugoslavia did not succeed to take the position of a preferential socialist partner of Algeria. Instead, the Algerians regarded Yugoslavia as "one of the many" Eastern European socialist countries. Even administratively, Yugoslav affairs were part of the Department of East European Socialist Countries at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, the idea of Yugoslav exceptionalism did not live up in the Global South.

[238] Note on ZAMTES meeting, 28 December 1977, HDA-1727-346.
[239] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 10, 19.
[240] Report by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, 15 December 1981, AJ-465-6562.

CHAPTER 2. BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND COMMERCIALIZATION

> *"With significantly lower costs, it [dispatching experts] can have a greater effect than [keeping] individual representative offices."*[241]

Chapter 2 aims at exposing two crucial developments on the domestic level which redefined Yugoslavia's technical cooperation programme with the Global South. Firstly, the Yugoslav government during the 1960s inflicted restrictions on the federal budget from which technical cooperation was largely funded, thereby causing upheavals in the financing structure. Secondly, liberalization processes and socio-economic reforms which reinforced self-management and shifted the decision-making towards the enterprises whose viewpoints on technical cooperation diverged from those of the state authorities. On the international level, though outside of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia shared fundamental economic concepts and the destiny of the CMEA countries which were gradually becoming integrated into the global capitalist system. In such circumstances, as exposed by the contributions in the volume *Between East and South*, Eastern Europe's socialist solidarity with the postcolonial world became subordinated to commercial interests.[242] Studying the Yugoslav scholarship program for students from the Global South, Peter Quinnan Wright argued that from the late 1960s marketization processes started dominating the technical cooperation agenda.[243] On the case of the Yugoslav technical expert program with Algeria, I seek to verify Wright's

[241] Agenda for the talks with the Director of „Hidrozavod DTD", n.d., AJ-465-6570.
[242] Calori et. al., eds, *Between East and South.*
[243] Peter Quinnan Wright, "Between the Market and Solidarity: Commercializing Development Aid and International Higher Education in Socialist Yugoslavia", Nationalities Papers 49 (2021), no. 3.: p. 462–82.

hypothesis by arguing that the commercialization (marketization) of technical cooperation with the Global South made a significant impact on decreasing the number of Yugoslav experts in Algeria.

Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the postcolonial agency by questioning the international power relations between donor and recipient countries during the Cold War. According to some political scientists, foreign aid is defined by the function of "symbolic domination" which re-affirms the existing hierarchies between donor and recipient.[244] As explained by Marcel Mauss, "[t]o give is to show one's superiority […] To accept without giving in return, or without giving more back, is to become client and servant, to become small, to fall lower […]."[245] However, in the case of Yugoslav technical aid to Algeria, we can see an example of how a „receiving" post-colonial country contested the North-South hierarchies by actively driving the cooperation agenda. While welcoming cooperants to assist its development, the Algerians were the ones leading the negotiation processes and defining the terms and conditions of employment of Yugoslav experts.

[244] Tomohisa Hattori, "Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid", *Review of International Political Economy* 8, no. 4, 2001, pp. 633–660.
[245] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. (London: Routledge, 2006). p. 95

2.1. The Failed Attempts to Revive Technical Cooperation

Algeria's Diversification of Technical Cooperation

The phenomenon of foreign advisors in the Global South emerged as a legacy of the discriminatory colonial system that had obstructed the schooling of local populations. Under the pretence of the "civilizing mission", only a very limited number of locals had access to the centrally administered public education system. While the minority of the domestic Francophone intellectual elite, for which the administration of the Belgian and French empires used the derogatory term *évolués* ("the evolved"), was granted access to white-collar jobs, the vast majority of the rural population was destined to remain working in the agriculture. As it had gone through the analogous historic trajectory, the Algerian post-colonial labour structure was similar to that of the other newly independent states. Coming as a result of the exclusive French educational policy, the Algerian public institutions and the industry-in-making lacked the much necessary skilled and highly skilled workers after the decolonization war. To temporarily fill vacancies in all economic sectors, the Algerian government invited foreign experts from both the Eastern and the Western Bloc, as well as from the non-aligned world.

In order to manage the growing number of foreign staff, in September 1964, the Algerian government founded the *Direction de la Coopération Economique et Technique* within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[246] At the same time, in line with the goals of the 1964 Algiers Charter, which called for the "Algerianization" of the local administration, the authorities prioritized skills training and education of national cadres instead of solely inviting experts to occupy vacant high-skilled positions.[247] Until local technicians could have entirely replaced foreigners, the Algerian authorities by a diversification strategy aimed at diluting the influences of dominant national groups of experts, particularly those coming from the former metropole. Pragmatism and diversification were dominant trademarks of Algeria's foreign policy, and not much difference was in the sphere of technical cooperation vis-à-vis experts.

The first wave of technical experts, primarily the French, arrived with the proclamation of Algeria's independence. In the summer of 1962, a sudden, unexpected

[246] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, p. 278.
[247] Naylor, *France and Algeria,* p. 63, 68.

exodus of pieds noirs, who had almost exclusively constituted the country's bureaucratic, professional, commercial, and managerial echelons, decimated the administrative apparatus and public services. According to some estimates, only 200,000 out of the original 1 million pieds noirs had remained, which left newly independent Algeria in an outright socioeconomic crisis.[248] To "maintain essential services" in the country, approximately 25,000 French *cooperants* came to substitute Algeria's fled European population.[249] In the case of French experts, the term "cooperants" referred to a composite group carrying out working and advisory activities in Algeria under bilateral cooperation agreements.[250] The "technical cooperants", both civilian and military, offered their expertise in different economic sectors and indirectly participated in the formation of domestic cadres through working activities. Simultaneously, "cultural cooperants" took positions at all levels of Algeria's educational sector, which was directly responsible for raising a new generation of local professionals, technicians and bureaucrats. By signing the April 1966 bilateral Convention on Technical and Cultural Cooperation with France, Algeria obtained a long-term French commitment to assist the development and modernization of its former colony. Yet, the perpetuation of the French influence through the education and the formation of Algerian cadres reproduced colonial power relations in a neo-colonial form.[251]

Technical and cultural cooperation also sustained a postcolonial "psycho-cultural" problem which was reflected in the continuation of the use of the French language as an instrument of diffusion of the French influence or the so-called *rayonnement*. The enduring domination of the language of the former metropole directly challenged the objectives of Algeria's Cultural Revolution, the pursuit of which was imparted in the 1976 National Charter together with the Industrial and Agricultural Revolution.[252] Namely, the second Algerian President, Houari Boumediene, called for the "decolonization of the mind" (*décolonisation des esprits*) as a prerequisite to the full

[248] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution,* p. 135, 138.
[249] Naylor, *France and Algeria,* p. 63.
[250] Sabah Chaïb, „Les coopérants français en Algérie (1962-1966)", *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 221-222, (2016), 243-266, p. 245.
[251] Naylor, *France and Algeria*, p. 62-63, 82-83.
[252] Ibid, p. 82, 108, 125, 133.

emancipation of the Algerian nation.[253] As third-party observers in Algeria, Yugoslav officials reported on the strong influence in the educational and cultural sector of the "French lobby", which had its supporters among Algerian francophone intelligentsia.[254]

Though their overall number was reduced by approximately 60% in comparison to the year 1963, in 1972, 4,000 out of 6,500 French cooperants served the Algerian educational sector.[255] According to the available data, in 1975, 54% of the teaching staff at higher education institutions were foreigners, dominantly French. In 1978, this figure dropped to 40%. In contrast, during the same year, only 18% of foreign experts were employed at secondary schools.[256] The drop in the number of foreign lecturers was directly related to the systematic process of Arabisation, which had been intensively set out in the 1970s on all educational levels. By the end of the 1980s, the Arabic language gradually substituted French in almost all primary and most secondary schools. Consequently, the number of foreign teaching staff fell sharply. Among other foreigners, the Ministry of National Education dismissed Yugoslav teachers due to the introduction, in the school year 1986/1987, of exclusively Arabic language classes for the first grades of secondary schools. On the other hand, only some university courses, predominantly in humanities and social sciences, were held in Arabic. In fact, one of the last Yugoslav technical experts to leave Algeria were employees of the Ministry of Higher Education, namely, Stevan Crnogorac, a professor of agrochemistry at the University of Sidi Bel Abbes and Vojislav Mudrinski, a mathematics professor at the University of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene (USTHB).

As with cultural cooperants, the Algerian government by time managed to minimize the overall number of French technical experts employed in the industrial sector, particularly after Boumediene nationalised French hydrocarbon assets in February 1971. In anticipation of the boycott from the former metropole shaking the economy, Algeria had already designed an economic diversification strategy. By the time France, as retribution for the nationalization, stopped the import of Algerian goods, predominantly oil and wine, while at the same time significantly decreasing the amount

[253] Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 69.
[254] Report on Yugoslav-Algerian technical cooperation, Belgrade, January 1980, HDA-1727-345, p. 7.
[255] Note from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to ZAMTES, Algiers, 18 May 1974, AJ-465-6549, p. 27-28.
[256] Radia Kesseiri, „Ideologised Foreign Policy and the Pragmatic Rationale: The Case of Algeria under Houari Boumedienne, 1965-1978", PhD dissertation, University of Leeds, 2005, p. 93.

of aid,[257] Algeria had already successfully created a global network of economic and political partnerships. Economic partners were to be found on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the capitalist West, a new commercial partnership was formed with Italy and Japan, while strengthening the existing commercial ties with West Germany and the US. In fact, the majority of Algeria's foreign trade rested within the EEC, as much as 70%.[258]

On the other hand, Algeria placed high importance on the political and military ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, particularly with Boumediene's size of power. To ease the consequences of the French boycott following the nationalization, the Soviets intervened and helped Algeria out by purchasing large quantities of wine and crude oil, which had been left unsold on the French market.[259] However, Algeria's foreign trade with the members of the CMEA was limited, amounting to only about 5%. Yet, relations with the socialist East acquired particular importance in the sphere of technical cooperation. Under favourable financial conditions, the countries of the CMEA posted thousands of technicians, medical staff and even military personnel in Algeria and other countries of the Global South. However, by the end of the 1960s, the disenchantment with technical cooperation which had resulted in a negative cost-benefit ratio led to the abandonment of the prerogative to export the Soviet model of development in favour of economic rationalism. Proclaimed under the principle of "mutual benefit", profit-seeking investment projects continued to be dubbed "technical cooperation". Pragmatism started dominating the CMEA approach to the Third World.[260]

Different from the long-dominating public and historiographic belief of the Warsaw Pact consisting of a monolith bloc, under the doctrine of "active foreign policy", Moscow encouraged its junior members to independently foster economic relations

[257] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 147-148.
[258] With minimum fluctuation throughout the years, the bulk of Algeria's trade, about 70%, rested within the EEC. The US constituted about 10% of the Algerian commercial exchange, while the CMEA accounted for less than 5%. Charles Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present, (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1991), p. 135. To illustrate the position in Algeria's global network of partnerships, in 1977, Yugoslavia participated in Algerian foreign trade with only 0.43% in imports and 0.03% in exports.
[259] In 1969, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Algeria for the purchase of 5 million hectoliters of wine for the consecutive 7 years at a fixed rate. Giulia Meloni and Johan Swinnen. "The Rise and Fall of the World's Largest Wine Exporter—And Its Institutional Legacy." *Journal of Wine Economics* 9, no. 1 (2014): p. 3–33.
[260] Max Trecker, "The 'Grapes of Cooperation'? Bulgarian and East German Plans to Build a Syrian Cement Industry from Scratch" in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, eds. Anna Calori, Anne-Kristin Hartmetz, Bence Kocsev, James Mark, and Jan Zofka (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 33–57.

with the Third World. With granted autonomy in foreign policy, the CMEA countries developed their own agendas towards the Third World, only loosely coordinated with Kremlin.[261] A practical example of Soviet junior allies' autonomy serves the Czechoslovak stance in the Sand Wars fought between Algeria and Morocco in October and November 1963 over a resource-rich frontier. In order not to put relations with Morocco, its leading economic partner in Africa, at stake, Czechoslovak policymakers chose not to follow the official Soviet camp policy and refrained from publicly supporting Algeria.[262] This example also points out the primacy of domestic economic considerations over ideological ones, which was another important aspect of the altered Bloc's policy. From the mid-1960s, most CMEA countries were turning to the South in search of commercial opportunities in which ideology played only a limited role.

As one of the leaders on the global scale, arms exports played an important role in Czechoslovakia's relations with the South, which had originated and developed from the pre-independence provisions of military aid to national-liberation movements. Nevertheless, there were countries, primarily Bulgaria, which had less direct economic interests in this engagement. Hopes of securing a stronger political and trading position within the Warsaw Pact by acquiring prestige and influence abroad ran Bulgaria's Third World agenda. Somehow similar yet with a strong sense of autonomy, Romania searched in the developing world to strengthen its political and economic independence within the socialist bloc. Through self-identification as a "developing country" and by joining the G77 in 1976, Romania affirmed deep connections with the Global South.[263] Meanwhile, Poland had never developed a particularly active Third World policy but instead set its political and economic focus on Europe. Poland's engagement in the Global South was mostly limited to scholarship programmes for students from developing countries.[264] Since Moscow was heavily occupied with its Western Bloc rivals, sometimes its junior allies played a more prominent role in the Global South. Kremlin approved this situation for its allies served as a gateway to the countries which were hesitant to forge close relations with the Soviet Union fearing its hegemonic

[261] Calori et al., „Alternative Globalization?", p. 22.
[262] Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa, p. 178-179.
[263] Iacob and Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization?", p. 137-138.
[264] Przemysław Gasztold, "Lost Illusions: The Limits of Communist Poland's Involvement in Cold War Africa", *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War*, eds. Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (I.B. Tauris, 2018): p. 197–220.

aspirations. Until 1968, Czechoslovakia held the title of the most influential non-Soviet country in the Global South, while from 1968 this title took over the GDR.[265]

The CMEA countries affiliated with Third World affairs had not only run a competition against the countries of the West but also between each other. Instead of cooperation, an intra-bloc rivalry emerged for the Third World markets, which were seen as an opportunity to acquire economic profit and cover budget deficits. Although set on a rational basis and profit-seeking, it was still necessary to make investments in the markets of the Global South. Thus, when Boumediene called for foreign aid and investments to assist Algeria in development according to the Four-Year Plan (1970-1973), despite their limited resources, socialist countries readily provided enormous low-interest loans together with necessary experts. For example, Romania gave a loan worth US$ 80 million; Hungary US$ 70 million, Czechoslovakia and East Germany US$ 50 million, and Bulgaria US$ 45 million from which both investment projects and technical experts were financed. Though granting the smallest of the aforementioned loans, Bulgaria during the 1970s realized the largest trade exchange with Algeria at a total sum of US$ 43 million. Some of the projects for which the Bulgarian government granted loans were tanneries in Béjaïa and a textile factory in Batna.[266]

The hierarchy of Algeria's partners in the field of technical cooperation was not always proportional to the provided loans. According to the Yugoslav Embassy's estimates, in the year 1972, the USSR kept in Algeria around 2,000 experts, Bulgaria 850, Romania between 500 and 600, Poland over 200, Hungary around 120, and Czechoslovakia over 100. Two years later, they had even raised the number of experts. The Yugoslav Embassy estimated that during 1974 there were 2,500 experts from the USSR, mostly in healthcare and public works, about 1,000 Bulgarians, approximately 600 Romanians, 300 to 400 Czechoslovaks, and an undisclosed number of Hungarians.[267] Moreover, the Embassy reported on 300 Chinese occupying the health

[265] Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva, eds., *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (I.B. Tauris, 2018).
[266] Note from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, Algiers, 18 May 1974, AJ-465-6549, p. 36-38.
[267] These estimates likely correspond to the actual numbers. For comparison, Zsombor Bódy cites 111 Hungarian technical experts working in Algeria at the end of 1972. Similarly to the Yugoslav Embassy's report, Hungarian accounts lack data for the year 1974. Body, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'?", p. 10.

sector who were *pro bono* dispatched to Algeria.[268] Meanwhile, in 1972, Yugoslavia had kept 70 experts, while in 1974 only about 31, mainly in the sectors of agriculture, healthcare, and public works.[269] Over time, their presence only decreased. In contrast, socialist Eastern European countries maintained the continuity and stable development of technical cooperation throughout the years and even expanded the number of their experts. The Algerian officials' statement that these partner countries had found "good solutions" for the implementation of technical cooperation was not well received by the Yugoslav delegates.[270] Yet, the differences in the model of technical cooperation programs were what allowed its main socialist competitors to – unlike Yugoslavia – systematically send experts to Algeria.

A Stalemate in Bilateral Relations (1965 – 1974)

Two years after his public announcement given to the Yugoslav media upon release from prison, Ahmed Ben Bella finally arrived in Yugoslavia in March 1964. The stay marking two years of successful bilateral cooperation was also his first visit to Europe in the service of the President of the Algerian Republic. Expressing prospects of more intense collaboration, the final communique that Ben Bella issued with his host, president Tito, foresaw establishing a joint permanent body responsible for supervising, managing, and developing bilateral affairs. The presidential proposal was realized just a few months later as the "Joint Algerian–Yugoslav Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation". As the name suggested, scientific and technical cooperation played an equally important role in Yugoslav-Algerian bilateralism as the economic domain. For directly succeeding Yugoslavia's wartime aid to the independence movement and answering the need for trained personnel, technical cooperation stood at the foundations of official diplomatic relations. Already at the First Session of the Joint Commission held in Algiers from 10 to 15 July 1964, the leader of the Algerian delegation, Minister of Economy Bachir Boumaza, formally expressed to his counterpart Milutin Morača wishes to increase the presence of Yugoslav experts in Algeria. Initially,

[268] Note the talks between Krsto Bulajić and Abdelghani Kesri, 22 January 1974, AJ-465-6572, p. 2.
[269] Report by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria for the year 1972, AJ-465-6572, p. 2.
[270] Report on Yugoslav-Algerian technical cooperation, Belgrade, January 1980, AJ-465-6545.

the Yugoslav government sponsored the departure of experts to Algeria through various mechanisms. For example, in order to facilitate transnational mobilities, Adria Airlines established regular weekly flights on the route Zagreb – Belgrade – Algiers already in the first weeks of Algerian independence. In April 1965, an agreement was signed between the two governments on the abolition of the visa regime.[271]

The formation of bilateral bodies of government envoys was standard practice in East-South relations.[272] Concerning the Yugoslav-Algerian Joint Commission, delegations were led by high-ranked government officials, namely, heads of ministries that were of priority and mutual interest at that moment. The meetings served as an occasion to, among other deeds, sum up and evaluate the outcomes between the sessions, discuss ongoing issues, give guidelines for cooperation, and adopt annual or "periodic plans" of technical cooperation. To give more attention to important questions and improve the overall productivity of delegations, the Commission was subdivided into working groups, such as industrial cooperation, trade, and technical cooperation. Although scheduled annually, alternating between Algiers and Belgrade, sessions were often held irregularly. One of the most important meetings of the Joint Commission was its 2nd Session, held from 27 to 29 October 1965 in Belgrade. On its last day, 29 October 1965, the two governments concluded The Convention on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, regulating the engagement of experts and the student scholarship program.[273] Together with the 1963 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, the Convention provided a legal framework for dispatching experts to Algeria along the government lines for the next 20 years. Paradoxically, the document was adopted at the starting point of the decline of bilateral relations. In the technical cooperation domain, this decline was reflected in the number of Yugoslav experts in Algeria.

The bilateral relations became under tension with the change of the regime in Algeria in June 1965. Fearing that it might compromise the privileged relationship, the fall of Ben Bella, with whom Yugoslav officials had developed close political and personal ties, left a bitter disappointment in Belgrade.[274] The event sparked worries among

[271] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 19, 24, 26.
[272] Joint comissions established with the governements of post-colonial partner countries were a habitual pratice among CMEA members. Iacob and Iolanda Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization?", p. 142.
[273] Konvencija o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji između vlada Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1966.
[274] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 117-118.

Yugoslav political elites that "moral and political capital" gained during and immediately after the Algerian Revolution would perish and, consequently, Yugoslavia would be deprived of the "rightful position" that it hoped for after making significant diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and financial investments on the other side of the Mediterranean. However, pragmatic reasonings quickly replaced the initial anxiety of the Yugoslav state-party officials that the multi-faceted goals of Yugoslavia's Algerian policy would disappear with the coup. While the foreign policy goal of further cultivation of close political allies seemed less likely, the economic exchange had a much greater perspective.[275] Yet, the most valuable aspect of the pragmatic friendship signalled the 1967 Six-Day War: Yugoslavia should pertain good relations with the Algerian regime in the event of future obstructions in the supply of oil from traditional Middle Eastern markets.

To break the international isolation, Boumediene's Revolutionary Council appealed to the governments across the non-aligned world by sending goodwill missions strategically led by its prominent members who also served in the precedent government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The delegation that visited Yugoslavia in August 1965 was headed by Ahmed Mahsas, who had been serving as the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Holding the same position in the previous government of Ben Bella, he was well-known in the circles of Yugoslav politicians. Still worried about the possibility that one of the two superpowers had stood behind the coup, the initial attempts at rapprochement made a limited impact on the Yugoslav political elites. Yet, by the time of Boumediene's official visit to Yugoslavia in October 1966, the Yugoslav leadership had re-valuated the new regime. Assured that Algeria continued the paths of socialism and non-alignment, Tito pragmatically assessed Boumediene as "progressive", thus offering an ideological justification for the continuation of cooperation with Algeria. The undisputed leader of the Yugoslav state once again demonstrated his diplomatic skills. In order to achieve his goals, Tito was ready to disavow one of his closest foreign political friends. Unscrupulously, he compared the removal of Ben Bella to the recent expulsion from the state-party structure of the Vice President of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Ranković, who was

[275] „Information on bilateral relations between the SFR Yugoslavia and the Algerian Democratic and People's Republic" [*Informacija o bilateralnim odnosima SFR Jugoslavije i Alžirske demokratske i narodne republike*], Belgrade, 6 October 1969, AJ-130-635, p. 6-8.

marked as an opponent of liberal economic and social reforms.[276] Drawing on the internationalist concept of "friendship between peoples", he turned the tables by arguing that "relations between peoples were not tied to individuals [statesmen]".[277] However, by demonstratively leaving the post of Yugoslav ambassador to Algeria, Nijaz Dizdarević, who had a close personal relationship with Ben Bella, sent an antithetic message which was not well received by the new Algerian leadership.[278]

During the meeting on the Brijuni islands, the two presidents also touched on the presence of Yugoslav experts in Algeria. The question was of reciprocal interest since the Algerian government had introduced the Three-year plan (1967-1969) focused on developing industry and agriculture as well as promoting the education of national cadres. According to Boumediene's reporting to Tito, Algeria was missing 1,000 agronomists and 5,000 engineers to carry out the most recent agricultural modernization project. Thus, on that occasion, he personally asked for 30 agronomists to be engaged under special financial terms. While consenting, the Yugoslav leader did not hide the problem of the lack of technical staff and graduates in technical disciplines in his country. He wryly noted: "We could export you philosophers."[279]

The Tito-Boumediene meeting was succeeded by the 3rd Session of the Joint Commission (12 – 19 November 1966) in Algiers. Following fruitful discussions, delegations adopted the 3rd Periodic Plan for the year 1967, which foresaw the employment of 174 Yugoslav experts in Algeria, including 30 agronomists as a part of Boumediene's special request. Grasping the opportunity to reaffirm positions in Algeria, the head representative of the Yugoslav delegation Milutin Morača, promised his counterpart, the Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdesselam, to dispatch the experts in due time.[280] The Algerians came up with a similar proposal in Belgrade during the next, 4th Session of the Joint Commission (26 March – 3 April 1968). The Yugoslav delegation under Ali Shukriu agreed to incorporate the request for the engagement of

[276] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 117-118.
[277] " Zabeleška o razgovoru između predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita i alžirskog predsednika Huari Bumedijena vođenom 10. oktobra uveče u Beloj vili na Brionima, posle završetka zvaničnih razgovora" [document no. 32], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 162.
[278] Neđeljko L. Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate 1948-1983* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011), p. 403.
[279] „Zapisnik o razgovorima predsjednika Tita sa predsjednikom Bumedijenom prilikom zvanične posete Alžiru od 5. do 9. novembra 1969" [document no. 32], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 212.

171 experts, predominantly in the sectors of agriculture and public works, within the 4th Periodic Plan for the year 1968.[281]

The Yugoslav state-party elite remained somewhat sceptical of the new regime and approached it questioningly and cautiously. Likewise, Boumediene felt that he had not fully gained Tito's confidence. In an atmosphere of mistrust, the rapport between the two presidents concurrently cooled the relations between the two countries. That the relations between Tito and Boumediene were not completely settled was revealed by the Algerian government's reaction to the New Delhi Summit which the Yugoslav president attended together with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Indira Gandhi at the end of October 1966, only a few weeks after the Brijuni meeting with Boumediene. The Algerian authorities criticized Tito and the statesmen of India and Egypt for usurping leadership positions within the group of non-aligned countries and acting as their self-proclaimed representatives.[282] Furthermore, the two statesmen had strong disagreements over some of the crucial international foreign policy issues. Significantly divergent opinions arose over the Middle Eastern crisis and Boumediene's stance against the peaceful solution in the favour of an armed conflict. However, the final nail in the coffin was the Algerian leader's support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, expressing great sympathy and concern for the destiny of former president Ben Bella, the Yugoslav media was adding fuel to the fire. On top of everything, Tito cancelled his visit to Algeria scheduled for April 1968, whereby indirectly sending an adverse message to Algiers. Eventually, the successive year, Yugoslavia's new Vice-President Koča Popović paved the way for Tito's official five-day visit in early November 1969. This was his second visit to the country. Previously, he had already stayed in Algeria in April 1965, at the invitation of Boumediene's predecessor. Despite high-level visits[283] and frequent exchanges of delegations between the two countries which gave the impression of diplomatic bliss, behind the curtains a cloud of suspicion loomed over bilateral relations. Yet, the Tito-Boumediene crisis was not the only event that shook the once-strong diplomatic ties. The arrest and conviction in Algiers in February 1968 of a

[281] Information on negotiations at the 4th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 17 April 1968, AJ-465-6549, p. 2.
[282] Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, p. 154-155.
[283] Apart from Tito, high-ranked Yugoslav officials – Vladimir Bakarić, Edvard Kardelj, Petar Stambolić, Lazar Koliševski, Svetozar Vukmanović and Koča Popović, paid an official visits to Algeria. Information on bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and Algeria, 6 October 1969, AJ-465-6549, p. 6.

Yugoslav technical expert to three years in prison for corporate espionage was a not only demotivating factor for potential candidates but also embittered the overall bilateral relations.[284]

Despite the tension in the relations on multiple levels, the position of Yugoslav experts was not significantly affected by the sudden change of the Algerian leadership. In fact, technical experts provided alternative diplomatic channels during the negotiation stalemate and secured the continuity of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, the Algerians did not cease expressing their demands for Yugoslav experts. At the 5th Session of the Joint Commission (29 January – 3 February 1969) held in Algiers, apart from unaccomplished 171 experts from the 4th plan, the delegation requested additional 159 experts within the most recent, 5th Periodic Plan. Aside from that, the Algerians furthermore asked 320 experts from the field of public works and construction. At that point, ZAMTES had to handle 620 requests in total. In no time, the requests piled up to over 1000 as at the 6th Session (6 to 11 July 1970) in Belgrade, Algerians had asked for another 545 Yugoslav personnel. But without having set technical cooperation programmes with developing countries in a long term, Yugoslavia was unprepared to absorb such extensive requests and, consequently, could not fulfil these obligations. The figures speak for themselves. In 1969 and 1970, only 5 and 32 experts arrived in Algeria, respectively, and another 12 in 1971. Apart from the difficulty of finding suitable personnel in a limited pool of candidates, an aggravating circumstance was created by the lack of information on the terms of employment offered by the Algerian administration. Namely, the 1965 Convention abolished the obligation of Algeria to determine in the annual plans crucial parameters of their employment. Without having at disposal the details on the profile, place of work and wages of experts, ZAMTES could not properly inform interested candidates of the positions in Algeria, thereby deterring many from the application process. Furthermore, without receiving feedback on the selection outcome for the majority of submitted candidacies, ZAMTES was reluctant to further search for candidates.[285]

Over the next few years, activities in political, economic and technical cooperation almost completely died down. The reduced volume of bilateral exchange at

[284] Information on Branko Andrić's contract, 22 May 1969, HDA-1727-448.
[285] Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, 15 January 1976, HDA-1727-345.

the time probably best illustrates the fact that the Yugoslav Ambassador Dušan Vejnović was habitually spending his excess free time playing tennis with peers from other diplomatic missions.[286] The absence of mutual political visits and exchange of delegations, requests for experts and most significantly sessions of the Joint Commission between 1971 and 1973, revealed an ongoing political crisis. The power play between the two statesmen, who aspired towards a leadership position in the Third World, crystallized during the 1973 Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers. Upon returning to Algiers, in front of his associates, Tito condemned the host's behaviour of "privatizing" the summit and playing down the role of Yugoslavia in the movement.[287] But there was more to that. President Boumediene nurtured a close rapport with the Soviet Union and state-socialist countries while cooling down relations with Yugoslavia. A sports medicine physician who participated at a specialist congress organized during the Mediterranean Games in Algeria reported to ZAMTES that experts "felt that something was not right in the official relations" by the way they were being treated. Conveyed his point of view on Algerians' stance towards Yugoslavia, he told that:

> „[…] there is a big difference between […] ordinary people and certain low and middle-ranked officials as well as private craftsmen who show sincere sympathy for comrade Tito and our country, while some of the higher civil officials act arrogantly and even incorrectly. (I do not want to report here on how they treated some other official representatives of our country […])."[288]

Yet, the moratorium on new requests ended in 1974 when the one from 1970 was repeated by an additional 80 experts. The number of 625 demanded personnel, mostly in agriculture, public works and healthcare, exceeded realistic Yugoslav capacities.[289] Though not a practice in technical cooperation with developing countries, Yugoslav officials agreed to accept annual plans from Algeria but pragmatically refused to firmly commit to them.[290] Taking upon obligations without realistic possibilities of

[286] Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate,* p. 403.
[287] Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, p. 243-250.
[288] Miran Šlajmer, "Predmet: Kratka informacija o razgovorima u Alžiru", 25 September 1975, AJ-465-6551.
[289] Overview of Algerian requests for experts in the year 1970 and 1974, AJ-465-6572, p. 5.
[290] "Promemorija" [Memorandum], n.d. AJ-465-6546.

their realization eventually had a contra-effect on Yugoslavia's image as it showed the country as an unreliable partner who did not stick to international commitments.[291]

The Question of Experts' Salaries (1965 – 1980)

From an idealist point of view, technical assistance was regarded as an alternative to the export of monetary assets contributing to the development of the Global South. In other words, the idea behind it was "to provide expertise rather than [financial] capital".[292] Moreover, it was supposed to open possibilities for countries with limited financial resources to engage as "donors" in the international development cooperation agenda. In practice, however, this was not always a feasible scenario as technical cooperation still came with costs, including student scholarships and salaries of technical experts. The problem of financing, in fact, became a dominant concern within the Algerian – Yugoslav technical cooperation after 1965. That year marked a turning point since Yugoslavia's decision to abandon the participation in the wages of experts in Algeria coincided with the adoption of a new Convention that adjusted the salaries of experts according to local conditions. This section looks at financial issues which hindered the implementation of technical cooperation.

The abolition of Yugoslav participation in the salaries of experts came as a consequence of the 1960s economic reforms which had been launched by the progressive wing of the LCY that, among other liberal changes, called for stronger decentralization, further development of the self-management system, and integration in the global economy.[293] The constrained Federal budget depleted by the economic reforms induced significant reductions in funds intended for financing Yugoslav experts placed in developing countries. As Yugoslavia's participation in partial or full funding of experts was gradually declining, the costs of salaries of Yugoslav experts were predominantly shifting towards the receiving countries. Based on the available data, we can follow that trend: in 1962, the government through ZAMTES funded about 33% of

[291] A study prepared by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria on economic opportunities and technical cooperations with Algeria, Algiers, 18 May 1974, AJ-465-6549, p. 44.
[292] Mehos and Moon, "The Uses of Portability", p. 58.
[293] Milan Piljak, „Reforme jugoslovenskog ekonomskog sistema 1945–1965", *Istorijska tribina: Istraživanja mladih saradnika Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije,* ed. Zoran Janjetović, (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2013), 231.

the total number of experts, while the following year, 1963, this number dropped to 18%. Two years later, in 1965, Yugoslavia financed only 14% of its dispatched experts. Already in 1968, this went as low as approximately 5%.[294] The Yugoslav financial participation in technical cooperation became limited primarily to personnel sent abroad as a result of direct commitments taken at the highest level, such as the Tito-Boumediene deal. In the situation of reduced financial capacities, in 1973, the Yugoslav government restricted the participation in wages from the federal budget to those experts who worked in the 25 least developed countries (LDCs).[295]

Due to large budget cuts, almost all of the costs of Yugoslav experts fell on developing countries. Expressed in absolute amounts, for example, in 1966 the Yugoslav government provided US$ 128,000 for participation in the salaries of its experts, while in 1967 these funds were reduced by almost a third, that is to US$ 88,800. Interestingly, ZAMTES estimated that the overall expenses for Yugoslav experts placed in the Global South amounted to about US$ 4 million[296]. This means that Yugoslavia provided only 2 to 3% of the total funding of its experts dispatched to assist in the development of the South. It is also interesting to look at the distribution of the funds of the federal budget dedicated to financing Yugoslavia's international technical cooperation. For instance, in the year 1967, the funds dedicated to financing technical experts in the Global South accounted for only 5.44% of the total ZAMTES funds. In contrast, as much as 40% of the funds were allocated for the cost of scholarship programs for students from developing countries.[297] Though, these also started to decrease. As was the case with the scarcity of cadres, Yugoslav officials openly declared the government's limited financial resources for technical cooperation. Howbeit, the Yugoslav President tried to turn the tables by maintaining that

[294] Blagoje Bogavac, ed, *Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju, 1968), p. 27.
[295] Report on the talks of the ad-hoc working group for scientific and technical cooperation, Beograd, 6 November 1974, AJ-465-6553.
[296] „*Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji*" [Yugoslavia's participation in international technical cooperation], Belgrade, 20 January 1968, AJ-130-607, p. 42. The report is almost identical to the publication „Bogavac, *Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji*". However, the former document contained details which are missing in the publication.
[297] Bogavac, *Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji*, p. 28, 65.

> "[r]elative to [Yugoslavia's] economic strength, this [technical] assistance can be valued as proof of our understanding of the problems of developing countries and our selfless readiness to alleviate their development issues to the best of our ability."[298]

Shifting funding costs of technical experts to developing countries had led to a large imbalance in the geopolitical distribution of Yugoslav experts. Such distribution pointed out the disparities between the countries which were able to "purchase" services of foreign experts and those which requested them as free "aid" or with a minimum compensation in the form of local wages. As was best illustrated in the case of Libya, ZAMTES rightfully concluded that in the newly created circumstances, experts had been most attracted to countries that provided "favourable conditions" and "stimulating salaries". In contrast, for experts to accept to work in developing countries offering "low local wages", the Yugoslav government needed to secure an additional source of funding. As a result of these financial shifts, not only posted workers accompanying investment projects but also technical experts became mainly concentrated in the oil-exporting countries. For example, at the end of 1969, in Libya worked 718 out of 1,165 Yugoslav experts, which made up 62% of experts sent to developing countries. On the other hand, only 68 experts, or about 6% of the total number remained in Algeria by the end of the year. For ZAMTES, it was an unwanted outcome. Reasoning the need to reconcile the deployment of experts with national political and economic interests, ZAMTES officials discussed possible ways of directing flows of Yugoslav experts towards principal political partners, like Algeria, while in other countries dispatching less significant numbers just for the sake of maintaining minimal presence and influence.[299]

Concerning technical assistance to Algeria, only in the first year of the country's independence, that is until the 1963 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation had been signed, Yugoslav government fully funded the travel expenses, salaries and stay of dispatched experts. Since the Agreement only generally established the basic principles of cooperation, the conditions for hiring experts in Algeria were to be precisely defined in the supplementary documents. With the adoption of the legal framework and the modalities for the execution of cooperation introduced by the

[298] Cited as in: Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju.*
[299] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u* razvoju, p. 104-108; Bogavac, *Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji*, p. 30-32.

Protocol (*Protokol o načinu primjenjivanja saradnje; Protocole concernant les modalities d'execution de la cooperation*), accompanying the July 1963 Agreement on Technical Cooperation, the terms of employment and experts' payment conditions were defined through annual plans.[300] According to the initial annual plans of cooperation concluded with Algeria, Yugoslavia agreed to participate in 25% of the salary for 112 experts in the year 1963/1964 (the First Plan) and 130 experts during 1964/1965 (the Second Plan).[301] This made about only slightly more than a third of the annually requested experts. On the other hand, in 1965, the participation of the Yugoslav government in the salaries of experts was for the most part abolished, which meant that cooperants exclusively received their income in Algeria. In fact, the Yugoslav government had not planned to finance technical cooperation with Algeria in the long run. In one of the later reports reflecting on the problem of experts' salaries, the Embassy in Algiers stated that "it was expected [...] Algeria, as an oil exporter and a country with relatively significant financial opportunities, could provide more attractive conditions [for technical experts] […]."[302] However, exceptionally, in instances of high political importance, Yugoslavia did participate in the salaries of the dispatched personnel, as in the case of 21 agronomists who departed in early June 1967 under the presidential Tito-Boumediene deal.[303]

Importantly, significant reductions in ZAMTES funds coincided with the entry into force of the 1965 Convention which brought two important changes in the financing of technical experts in Algeria. First of all, it abolished the obligation of Yugoslav participation in the salaries of experts. Secondly, according to the Convention, Yugoslav experts became subject to local payment terms or the so-called "national treatment" of foreign experts. In other words, new terms defined by Article 14 of the Convention stipulated that the salary of Yugoslav experts was based on equivalent positions and qualifications in Algeria. At the same time, the plane tickets for arrival and departure, including the tickets for the family members and the ticket for the yearly leave trip to

[300] Protokol o načinu primjenjivanja saradnje predviđene Sporazumom o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji između Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 10/1964.
[301] Prvi periodični plan naučno-tehničke saradnje između Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 12/1964; Drugi periodični plan naučno-tehničke saradnje između Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1965.
[302] Report by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, 15 December 1981, HDA-465-6562.
[303] However, ZAMTES received complaints from experts that they had not received the promised bonus of 1,000 Algerian dinars per month during the first 6 months of their stay. "Informacija o pregovorima Komisije za naučno-tehničku saradnju na IV zasedanju Mešovitog jugoslovensko-alžirskog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju", Belgrade, 17 April 1968, AJ-465-6549, p. 3.

Yugoslavia as well as accommodation expenses were covered by the Algerian side. However, ZAMTES evaluated these provisions as "unstimulating", concluding that low salaries in the conditions of an increased cost of living in Algeria were the principal reason for the diminishing number of Yugoslav experts. This stance indicates that behind the national and personal motives stood economic considerations instead of solidarity principles, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

Although ZAMTES officials continually claimed that Algeria had concluded more favourable agreements with other Eastern European partners, experts from these countries had equally been subject to the local "national payment treatment". The segment that made a difference in their salaries was the additional income they had been receiving from their home administrations. Coming at a price equal to Yugoslav ones due to the "national treatment", CMEA experts were generally a better deal for the Algerian government because they repaid them from long-term loans these countries had approved. Moreover, after abandoning the clearing payment in 1976, the transfer of salaries of Yugoslav experts had to be settled in US dollars, which for Algeria meant an additional deprivation of convertible currency. Similarly, French experts kept high salaries due to the participation of their government. Initially, the cost of maintaining French cooperants in Algeria was roughly split by half between the two cooperating governments. From 1970, the participation of the French government in remuneration was reduced to 40%. However, the former metropole assumed the complete salary of military cooperants serving in Algeria. In 1974, the participation of France in the salary of civil cooperants was further reduced to 30%.[304] Yet, the French experts possessed language skills and Western technological education. In sum, the French and CMEA experts for the Algerian authorities were a better option than the experts from Yugoslavia.

To attract experts to Algeria and revive the cooperation, ZAMTES officials were working on the task of increasing salaries and improving conditions of employment through the initiative of amending the Convention. In other words, they expected the receiving country to take responsibility for the augmentation of experts' incomes. Alongside a genuine belief that Yugoslav personnel deserved higher incomes because of

[304] Naylor, *France and Algeria,* p. 82, 327.

their reputation and "working and professional qualities",[305] it was also ideologically unacceptable for ZAMTES that they received wages equal to the ones from other Eastern European countries. Thus, the question was linked not only to the experts' material status but also to the international status of the country. Yet, differently from what they had expected, the Algerians proved to be staunch negotiators who did not prioritize Yugoslavia's "special non-aligned position" nor attribute any particular expertise to its experts. On one occasion, the Algerians told that they "cared to have Yugoslav experts but regarded technical cooperation with Yugoslavia in a global context", and thus were not ready to give salaries higher than those of other Eastern European experts.[306] Apparently, they looked at Eastern Europe as a single labour market, where CMEA cooperants undercut the price of Yugoslav experts.

During the 6th Session of the Joint Commission held in 1970 in Belgrade, Yugoslav delegates raised the issue of experts' salaries stipulated by the 1965 Convention. With a simple argument that the provisions of the Convention were valid for all foreign technical experts in their country, the Algerians refused to continue further discussions on the matter. After several years of waiting for a new opportunity for negotiations, to the disappointment of the Yugoslav side, the question of amending the Convention was completely left out of the 7th session of the Joint Commission held between 17 and 21 June 1974 in Algiers.[307] However, a special working group was scheduled to separately discuss the issue of experts' salaries. After numerous complications over the organization of the arrival of the Algerian delegation to Yugoslavia, the ad-hoc working group for technical cooperation held talks in Belgrade in October 1974. An absolute organizational fiasco overshadowed the meeting, perhaps best illustrated by the Algerians' comment that "the welcome and reception of the delegation had been under any critique". The Embassy in Algiers immediately forwarded the criticism to ZAMTES, the host to the Algerians, remarking that having "every Algerian delegation return from

[305] A study by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria on economic opportunities and technical cooperations with Algeria, Algiers, 18 May 1974, AJ-465-6549, p. 43.
[306] Embassy's note No. 867, 4 December 1981, AJ-465-6562.
[307] „Izvještaj o razgovorima u oblasti naučno tehničke saradnje na VIII zasedanju Mešovitog jugoslovensko-alžirskog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju, održanom u Beogradu od 9. do 12. decembra 1975." [Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, held from 9 to 12 December 1975], Beograd, 22 January 1975, AJ-465-345.

Yugoslavia discouraged" would have negatively impacted overall bilateral relations.[308] The Algerians were generally not pleased with their counterparts asking for modification of the Convention, commenting that Yugoslavs had been "bargaining over salaries".[309] In one of the discussions, the Algerian representative supposedly made an ironic remark about Yugoslav requisitions saying that "in this case, the Convention is not needed, but we /Algerians/ might just open an office in Yugoslavia for hiring labour."[310] This stance was a clear indication of different perceptions and expectations related to the financial aspects of technical cooperation.

Only five years after the initial attempt, in January 1975, the ZAMTES delegation headed by Director-General Krsto Bulajić managed to convince the Algerian partners of the need to increase Yugoslav experts' incomes under the growing inflation rates. The arrival in Yugoslavia of numerous delegations paved the way for fruitful negotiations. To name a few, in March 1975 arrived the delegation of the Ministry of Health for a study visit; in April 1975 delegation of the Ministry of Youth and Sports led by Minister Abdallah Fadel; a delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture led by Mustapha Tounsi, a graduate of Economics at the University of Zagreb. After two postponements and a delay for over a year, the negotiations took place in Belgrade from 9 to 12 December 1975[311] during the 8th Session of the Joint Commission. As a result, the Commission's chairmen Layachi Yaker, the Minister of Trade, and Boško Dimitrijević, the Minister of Transport, adopted the Exchange of Letters of 13 December 1975,[312] a document which revised Article 14 of the Convention. Despite that it increased gross salaries by around 40%[313] and envisioned multiple bonuses,[314] ZAMTES continued to evaluate the financial conditions of the employment in Algeria as "insufficiently stimulating" for Yugoslav

[308] SSIP, „Zabilješka o neuspjelim pregovorima o naučno-tehničkoj suradnji", 3 December 1974, AJ-465-6572.
[309] „Zabilješka o razgovoru K. Bulajića sa Abdelghani Kesri" [Note the talks between Krsto Bulajić and Abdelghani Kesri], 22 January 1974, AJ-465-6572, p. 2.
[310] SSIP, „Zabilješka o neuspjelim pregovorima o naučno-tehničkoj suradnji", 3 December 1974, AJ-465-6572.
[311] Information on the upcoming 8th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, May 1974, HDA-1727-345, p. 1.
[312] Exchange of Letters, 13 December 1975, HDA-1727-345, p. 1.
[313] "Izvještaj o razgovorima u oblasti naučno tehničke saradnje na VIII zasedanju Mešovitog jugoslovensko-alžirskog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju, održanom u Beogradu od 9. do 12. decembra 1975." [Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, held from 9 to 12 December 1975], Beograd, 22 January 1975, AJ-465-345, p. 4.
[314] Exchange of Letters, 13 December 1975, HDA-1727-345, p. 2-4.

experts.[315] The first reason was the progressive taxation accompanying salary growth, which effectively lowered experts' net income.[316] Secondly, regardless wheatear the expert came to Algeria alone or with the family, the percentage of the salary eligible for foreign currency transfer was set to a unique rate of 45%.[317] Until the enforcement of the Exchange of Letters, experts whose families remained in Yugoslavia were entitled to send home half of the earnings. While their position worsened with the new regulation, the minority of experts – bachelors and those who lived in Algeria with their families were – enjoyed a transfer rate increase by 15%.[318]

At the same time, Yugoslav workers engaged on private contracts with the Algerian administration – outside of the bilateral technical cooperation framework – enjoyed more favourable terms of employment. With salaries twice as high as the maximum salary envisioned by the Exchange of Letters, ranging between 7,000 and 8,000 Algerian Dinars or US$ 1,750 and US$ 2,000, seven Yugoslav experts had already been employed by the state oil company SONATRACH.[319] Therefore, Yugoslav officials had high hopes of carrying out the request for 64 experts to work for Algerian national petrochemical companies on a private contract, which was a part of the extensive request for 565 experts delivered during the 8th Session of the Joint Commission.[320] A similar monthly salary and free lodgement were offered by the Ministry of High Education and Scientific Research when it had in March 1977 requested almost 400 teaching staff for Algerian universities in Oran, Constantine, Tizi-Ouzu, El-Harrach, and Bab Ezzouar.[321] Despite these "special terms", ZAMTES succeeded in finding only 21 candidates. However, with an explanation that Yugoslav experts "cannot be paid more than other [Eastern European] socialist experts", the Algerians quickly returned the

[315] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, HDA-1727-345, 3 July 1978, p. 1.
[316] Letter by Dragoslav Zonjić, n.d., AJ-465-6553.
[317] Exchange of Letters, 13 December 1975, HDA-1727-345, p. 4.
[318] Konvencija o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji između vlada Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1966.
[319] "Predmet: Alžir" [Subject: Algeria], 22 January 1976, HDA-1727-345, p. 1-2.
[320] The requested profiles of experts were as follows: public works and construction sector (120), hydraulics (25), agriculture and agrarian Reform (60), high education and scientific research (177 university professors and 120 assistants). Attachment: Algerian request for Yugoslav experts in 1976, n.d., HDA-1727-345, p. 1-3; "Izvještaj o razgovorima u oblasti naučno tehničke saradnje na VIII zasedanju Mešovitog jugoslovensko-alžirskog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju, održanom u Beogradu od 9. do 12. decembra 1975." [Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, held from 9 to 12 December 1975], Beograd, 22 January 1975, AJ-465-345, p. 8.
[321] Request for hiring teaching staff for Algerian universities, 15 April 1977, AJ-465-6572.

conditions to the ones of the 1965 Convention, reducing the initially promised salary by about 50%.[322] However, due to a strong deficit and urgent need for teaching staff, the Algerian government eventually decided to offer employment for two categories of Yugoslav experts under "special conditions". During the 1970s, precisely between 1971 and 1978, the Algerian government established nine new universities. Moreover, as the health system was still under pressure, Algeria's need for teaching medical staff was particularly pronounced. Hence, in May 1978, the Ministry of High Education delivered a proposal for the Protocol for the Engagement of University Staff. Though generally satisfied with the conditions of the Protocol, ZAMTES insisted on higher salaries for non-medical staff, US$ 1,125 and US$ 2,125 for assistants and professors, respectively.[323] Due to the emerged disagreements on the financial terms, the Protocol had never been signed and the 16 accepted candidates remained in Yugoslavia.[324]

On the other hand, a similar protocol was successfully adopted for the engagement of Yugoslav healthcare professionals. The protocol was proposed by the head of the Algerian delegation and the Minister of Finance M'Hammad Yalla at the 9th session of the Joint Commission held on 20 and 21 June 1979 in Belgrade.[325] After further negotiations with the Yugoslav delegation which was led by Vuko Dragašević, government member and the chairman of the Commission for Economic Cooperation with Developing Countries, on 22 December 1979, the Algerian Ministry of Health and ZAMTES signed the Protocol on conditions of employment, work and reward of Yugoslav experts at the Algerian public healthcare institutions (*Protokol o uslovima zapošljavanja, rada i nagrađivanja jugoslovenskih stručnjaka u alžirskim ustanovama javnog zdravstva*).[326] According to the Protocol, net salaries ranged from US$ 850 to US$ 1600, depending on the expert's experience. There were also additional provisions, such as free housing with utilities included. Though the Yugoslavs during negotiations had tried to raise the transfer rate to 70%, the transferable part of the salary was set to 50%.[327] In

[322] Information regarding the hiring of university staff, Belgrade, 22 December 1977, AJ-465-6572.
[323] Convention on the conditions of referral and engagement of teaching staff at Algerian universities, 1 June 1979, HDA-1727-346.
[324] "Informacija o znanstveno-tehničkoj saradnji s Alžirom" [Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria], Belgrade, 3 July 1978, HDA-1727-345.
[325] The session was initially scheduled for February 1977 but postponed to November 1978.
[326] Report by the Yugoslav delegation on the 9th session of the Joint Commission, 23 July 1979, HDA-1727-344, p. 1-2, 5, 8, 17-18.
[327] "Protokol o uslovima zapošljavanja, rada i nagrađivanja jugoslovenskih stručnjaka u alžirskim zdravstvenim ustanovama", [signed] 22 December 1979, HDA-1727-345.

return, Yugoslavia committed to dispatching 32 medical doctors-specialists in the upcoming year.

In March 1980, ZAMTES branch offices delivered calls to healthcare institutions across their respective territories to refer candidates to work in Algeria's medical sector. For example, the office in Zagreb sent such a call to the address of almost 200 institutions in SR Croatia. As the outcome of these efforts had been only a few candidates, it decided to publish a public call in daily newspapers.[328] The outcome of the initiative was 8 submitted applications, all accepted by the Algerian Ministry of Health. However, because of prolongated waiting on more detailed conditions of employment, one of the candidates eventually lost interest, while 4 others gave up after familiarizing themselves with the terms. Eventually, on 2 February 1981, the remaining 3 doctors, an internist and 2 gynaecologists, were sent to Algeria. Yet, dissatisfied with living and working conditions in Algeria, all three of them soon got back.

The Slovenian Bureau similarly reported that they had received only one application after sending the request to health institutions in SR Slovenia. After becoming familiar with the conditions of employment, the only applicant eventually gave up on his engagement abroad.[329] The renewed action of ZAMTES to recruit candidates through a public call for the rest of the 29 specialist positions was equally without success.[330] Apart from a general lack of cadres, the low interest of Yugoslav citizens ZAMTES attributed to „unstimulating (payment) conditions" prescribed by the Convention, the increased cost of living in Algeria, improvement of the standard of white-collar workers in Yugoslavia, and finally, the possibility of employment in other developing countries under more favourable conditions.[331] While all these structural changes affected the descending interest of potential candidates, the increase in mobility freedoms introduced with the liberalisation of the Yugoslav visa regime in the 1960s should also be taken into consideration. Technical cooperation programmes became less

[328] The engagement of healthcare experts for Algeria, 20 March 1980, HDA-1727-344.
[329] Report by the Slovenian branch office of ZAMTES, 23 April 1980, AJ-465-6650; Report by the Slovenian branch office of ZAMTES, 7 May 1980, AJ-465-6650.
[330] Letter from ZAMTES to the branch offices on technical cooperation with Algeria, 30 January 1981, HDA-1727-346.
[331] A brief review of the state of technical cooperation with Algeria, n.d. HDA-1727-345 [also in: HDA-1727-346]; Platform for the 10th session of the Joint Commission, n.d., HDA-1727-344, p. 19.

attractive as *legal* transcontinental travel was becoming less exclusive.[332] The situation was confirmed by the number of dispatched Yugoslav experts. From December 1975 until October 1980, Yugoslavia sent to Algeria only 4 of them.[333]

Putting a Band-Aid on a Bullet Wound: Adoption of the 1982 Agreement

In the atmosphere of high-level visits, highlighted by the meeting between the newly elected president Chadli Bendjedid and Tito in May 1979, a wave of optimism flooded encounters between Algerian and Yugoslav representatives. The presidential détente was reflected on all institutional levels. Hoping it would give technical cooperation new momentum, in December 1979, the delegates of ZAMTES and Algerian ministries made a deal to draw a new bilateral document prescribing conditions of technical experts' employment in Algeria, fairly similar to the Protocol regulating the engagement of health professionals.[334] Most of the content of the new Agreement was preliminarily agreed already during the first set of negotiations held at ZAMTES' offices in June 1980. However, certain Yugoslav state bodies strongly objected to the draft. The loudest of all was the government's Federal Committee on Labour, Health and Social Welfare which demanded the compliance of the new Agreement with the Act on the Basic Conditions for Temporary Employment and Protection of Yugoslav Citizens Abroad (*Zakon o osnovnim uslovima za privremeno zapošljavanje i zaštitu jugoslavenskih građana u inozemstvu*), which also applied to technical cooperation experts. In line with the Act, the Committee demanded the warranty of a set of workers' rights for the Yugoslav citizens working as technical cooperants in Algeria.[335] Primarily drawn while having in mind Yugoslav workers employed in developed countries, certain conditions of the Act, such as unrestricted sick leave and foreign currency transfer, were difficult to implement within the framework of technical cooperation with developing countries. The Algerian

[332] Hein De Haas, "A Theory of Migration: The Aspirations-Capabilities Framework", *Comparative Migration Studies* 9, no. 1, 2021, p. 18-19.
[333] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, Belgrade, 22 October 1980, HDA-1727-345, p. 1.
[334] Report on Yugoslav-Algerian scientific and technical cooperation, HDA-1727-345, p. 1.
[335] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, 22 October 1980, Belgrade, HDA-1727-345; Letter from the Federal Committee for Labour, Health and Social Security, Belgrade, 19 January 1981, AJ-465-6548.

case proved that. At the 10th session (22 - 25 December 1980) in Algiers, the hosts explicitly refused both these proposals.

After further internal consultations, in January 1981, the Yugoslav government approved the revised draft in compliance with the Act on Temporary Employment and Protection of Yugoslav Citizens Abroad.[336] Also, because of the experience with the "overly general character" of the Convention, ZAMTES was determined to define more precisely the terms of employment in the new agreement.[337] In the Yugoslav version of the draft, added were stipulations regarding the information on the accommodation, the definition of a minimal percentage of transfer, the permission for a full foreign currency transfer in case of expert's work incapacity, prohibition of non-consensual relocation of the expert, the duty of the Algerian side to take care of administrative procedures regulating the employment of experts and, finally, the signing of the contract with the Algerian employer before departure in Yugoslavia. Finally, to secure experts from losing part of their earnings, the proposal included fixing the pay scale in US Dollars. An alternative solution was a periodical revision of the scale according to the inflation rate and depreciation of the Algerian Dinar.[338] Apart from striving to protect the workers, the state apparatus tried to protect itself – thus insisted that the clause on sending experts to Algeria be defined as "according to possibilities" instead of as an "obligation" of the Yugoslav government.[339]

To finalize the negotiations, the Yugoslav delegation led by the new ZAMTES Director Miljenko Zrelec in February 1982 travelled to Algiers to present the revised draft. By discarding it, the Algerians made clear that they would not step away from their initial positions. Eventually, ZAMTES evaluated that the only way to conclude the Agreement was to give up on the beforementioned requisitions.[340] To sign the new agreement at the earliest possible, the Yugoslav government decided to waive most of its requirements.

[336] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, Belgrade, 22 October 1980, HDA-1727-345, p. 1.
[337] „Izvještaj o razgovorima u oblasti naučno tehničke saradnje na VIII zasedanju Mešovitog jugoslovensko-alžirskog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju, održanom u Beogradu od 9. do 12. decembra 1975." [Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 8th Session of the Joint Commission, held from 9 to 12 December 1975], Beograd, 22 January 1975, AJ-465-345., p. 5.
[338] Minutes from the meeting of the board of directors, 6 March 1981, HDA-1727-345, p. 2.
[339] Report on the negotiations in the field of scientific and technical cooperation held in Algeria from 17 to 21 February 1982, 1 March 1982, HDA-1727-344.
[340] Ibid.

The only exception was a clause by which Yugoslav experts conclude the contract with the employer before departing to Algeria. In this way, experts could still in time get acquainted with the terms of the contract. The 11th Session of the Joint Commission held from 5 to 11 April 1982 in Belgrade was an opportunity for Vuko Dragašević and his associates to forward this proposal to the Algerian delegation led by the Minister of Heavy Industry Kasdi Merbah.[341] Upon Algerians' argument that the conclusion of the contract abroad would put them in legal-administrative difficulties, the Yugoslav government eventually gave up on their final request. Due to keeping a negligent number of experts while their competitors' personnel counted in the hundreds, the Yugoslav authorities were in an unfavourable negotiating position. Aware of the existing power relations, the ZAMTES officials commented that „[the Algerians] need us but dictate conditions to us".[342] Yet, this assessment did not reveal the complete picture of bilateral relations. The Algerians were au courant with the capitalist-inflicted Yugoslav economy craving global expansion, particularly the construction sector, and the role of technical experts in penetrating foreign markets.

Waiving all its previous demands Yugoslavia paved the way for the signing of the agreement regulating the stay and work of Yugoslav experts in Algeria. On 15 June 1982, the two governments signed the Agreement on the Conditions for the Secondment and Work of Yugoslav Experts in Algeria (*Sporazum o uvjetima upućivanja i rada jugoslavenskih stručnjaka u Alžiru*).[343] Though the document defined the process of candidacy, acceptance, rights and obligations of experts sent to Algeria within the framework of technical cooperation, it did not significantly improve experts' material conditions.[344] Given that they primarily raised the issue of the new agreement to improve the financial terms of engagement, ZAMTES officials were heavily disappointed with the salary increase of only 5%. It became clear to them that a solution to the problem had to be found within Yugoslavia.

[341] Report by the Yugoslav delegation on the 11th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 7 June 1982, AJ-465-6545.
[342] Note from the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Croatia to Marin Geršković, 24 May 1982, HDA-1727-356.
[343] Sporazum između Saveznog izvršnog vijeća Skupštine Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Vlade Demokratske Narodne Republike Alžira o uvjetima upućivanja i rada jugoslavenskih stručnjaka u Alžiru, *Službeni list SFRJ, Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 11/1984.
[344] Letter from ZAMTES on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, 24 June 1982, HDA-1727-346.

As a provisory solution, ZAMTES proposed a financing scheme that included the Fund of Solidarity with Non-Aligned Countries and Developing countries established in 1975.[345] Discussions over the re-introduction of Yugoslav participation in the salaries of Yugoslav experts were initiated by ZAMTES in the past years, initially proposing a funding mechanism where federal units would equally split the cost of the participation with the Federation or directly pay social security contributions.[346] While that idea did not live up to, on 16 June 1982, the Yugoslav government enforced ZAMTES' proposal to participate in the salaries of experts working in Algeria from the Fund of Solidarity with Non-Aligned Countries and Developing Countries.[347] Approximately a third of the budget secured by the Fund was planned for covering the costs of scholarships for 70 Algerian students of forestry and hydraulics, while the rest was intended for the participation in the salaries of 120 Yugoslav experts working in the sectors of civil engineering, agronomy and hydraulics. In practice, experts were to get paid through ZAMTES an amount of 25,000 dinars per month, mainly to cover the expenses of Yugoslav social security contributions.[348] Anticipating that the new salary scale would come into effect at the beginning of 1983, the budget was initially foreseen to be valid only for the last six months of the year 1982.[349] However, because not a single expert was sent to Algeria in 1982, the funds were left untouched. Thus, ZAMTES requested transferring the financial resources to the following year, which was important as the announced salary increase did not come into effect.

It was only in January 1983 that Yugoslavia dispatched to Algeria the first experts within the framework of the 1982 Agreement. At the 12th Session of the Commission held from 7 to 11 June 1983 in Algiers, the chair of the Algerian delegation and the Minister of Heavy Industry Kasdi Merbah expressed to his counterpart Živorad Kovačević the dissatisfaction with receiving only a group of 15 agricultural experts since the adoption of the new bilateral document.[350] Explaining the Yugoslav situation by the

[345] Vlatko Mileta, "Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju", *Politička misao* 23, no. 3, 1986, p. 56.
[346] Information with a proposal for determining participation in the salaries of Yugoslav experts in developing countries, Belgrade, March 1981, AJ-465-6571, p. 5.
[347] Decision on the provision of scientific and technical assistance to Algeria from the funds of the Solidarity Fund, Belgrade, 16 June 1982, AJ-465-6559; Report of the Yugoslav delegation from the 12th Session of the Joint Commission, 21 July 1983, HDA-1727-344.
[348] Proposal for utilizing funds from the Fund of Solidarity Fund, Belgrade, 27 May 1982, AJ-465-6559.
[349] "Beleška o predviđenim aktivnostima za jačanje NTS sa Alžirom", 17 October 1983, HDA-1727-344.
[350] „Dopuna beleške", 19 October 1983, HDA-1727-344.

unstimulating financial conditions, which they tried to solve by introducing participation in salaries, the Algerians had promised to increase the salaries of technical cooperation experts from socialist countries by 30%.[351] Eventually, the payment rose only by 25%. The decision was enforced with the Exchange of Letters of 3 March 1984, which was retroactively valid from 1 January 1983 until 31 December 1985. Yet, experts waited a whole year to get paid the difference in salary increase. On the other hand, the document set the transferable part of earnings to a unique rate of 50%. While keeping in mind that the number of requested experts far exceeded realistic Yugoslav capacities, to reciprocate the concession, Yugoslavia committed to "taking all possible measures" to send to Algeria 300 experts by 31 December 1985, out of which 150 were until the end of 1984.[352] Launching a country-wide search for candidates, ZAMTES collected 140 dossiers in total. Though playing a significant role, the financial aspect was not the only factor determining the low presence of Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria. That became evident as the increased salaries did not achieve the desired effect. At the 13th session of the Joint Commission held from 28 to 31 May 1984 in Belgrade, the Yugoslav delegation led by Živorad Kovačević brought up a whole set of other problems related to the engagement of Yugoslav experts and the enforcement of the Agreement,[353] which will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

To deal with the growing number of issues within the technical cooperation domain, the Joint Commission established a new permanent body – the Yugoslav-Algerian Sub-Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Difficulties concerning the implementation of technical cooperation were dominating the discussions of the 1st Session held between 22 and 24 December 1984, chaired by Amar Bendjama, Assistant Director for European Socialist Countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mirko Peševski, Assistant Director of ZAMTES. Yet, the Session also served as an occasion for the Algerians to expose the idea of the integration of all foreign workforce in their country within the technical cooperation framework. The Yugoslav delegates were caught by surprise. Namely, this meant that, apart from technical

[351] „Informacija o pitanju povećanja plata jugoslavenskim stručnjacima u Alžiru", 2 June 1983, AJ-465-6546.
[352] Exchange of Letters, Algiers, 3 March 1984, HDA-1727-347.
[353] The Algerian delegation was led by the Minister of Trade Abdelaziz Khelef. „Izvještaj o razgovorima o oblasti naučno-tehničke suradnje na 13. zasjedanju Jugoslovensko-alžirskog mešovitog komiteta", 8 June 1984, HDA-1727-345.

cooperation experts, Yugoslav workers engaged under private and service contracts (*ugovor o pružanju usluga*) enjoying preferential salaries would become subject to the terms of the 1982 Agreement.[354]

The question was further discussed at the 14th Session of the Joint Commission held on 13 and 14 July 1985 in Algiers. The Yugoslav stance on the proposed integration plan was ambiguous. On the one hand, they wished to see Western experts, who mostly worked on lucrative private contracts, deprived of their privileged position. On the other hand, this move would have also negatively affected many Yugoslavs employed on private and service contracts outside the Agreement. At the time, about 900 Yugoslavs worked in Algeria on various grounds, out of which 400 were privately contracted sailors.[355] Since employment conditions were subject to negotiation with the employer, salaries based on private contracts varied significantly among experts, ranging anywhere from 6,000 to 12,000 Algerian Dinars.[356] In highly deficit occupations or seasonal or short-term employment lasting several months, the Algerian government was ready to offer more favourable conditions. Such was, for example, the 1981 request for 16 pilots for agricultural aviation. A similar case was with service contracts that companies concluded with the Algerian administration offering "intellectual services" of their employees on commercially agreed terms. Namely, in practice, only through such commercial contracts it was possible to acquire homogeneous, well-established teams. For example, Skopje-based civil engineering company Mavrovo, at that time posted about 25 highly-skilled workers in Algeria. Although nominally agreeing with the equation of the status of all foreign experts, Yugoslav representatives decided to postpone the final verdict.[357] In the meantime, the Algerian government, unilaterally, incorporated private contracts into the terms of the 1982 Agreement. The Algerians brought the issue back to the table in 1986, demanding to do the same with workers on service contracts.[358]

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[354] Ibid.
[355] Report from the 1st Session of the Joint Subcommission for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, AJ-465-6572.
[356] Letter from the Embassy to ZAMTES on the terms of payment of experts in Algeria, Algiers, 16 March 1981, AJ-465-6559.
[357] Report on discussions in the field of scientific and technical cooperation at the 14th Session of the Joint Commission, 31 July 1985, HDA-1727-344, p. 4.
[358] "Izvještaj jugoslovenske delegacije sa XV zasedanja Mešovitog komiteta za privrednu i naučno tehničku saradnju", Beograd, 24 Jula 1986, AJ-465-6571.

Despite facing difficulties in the recruitment process, at the 15th Session held from 7 to 12 July 1986 in Belgrade, the head of the Yugoslav delegation Andrej Ocvirk, who served as the President of the Federal Committee for Energy and Industry (Savezni komitet za energetiku i industriju) handed to his counterpart Mohamed Rouighi, the member of the FLN Central Committee and Minister of Hydraulics a list of 269 candidates. Most importantly, through the mechanism of the Exchange of Letters of July 12, 1986, they extended the validity of the Agreement with a pay scale lasting until December 31, 1988. As Yugoslavia did not succeed in dispatching the previously agreed number of experts by the end of 1985, the deadline was extended and the number of experts was reduced from 300 to 200.[359] Although it was overly optimistically planned to send 200 experts by the end of 1988, in Algeria that year resided only about 15 experts. In fact, throughout the 1980s, the maximum number of experts Yugoslavia managed to keep in Algeria was 47 in 1985. Thus, it became clear that both mechanisms to increase the incomes of Yugoslav experts acted as a Band-Aid. Neither the new Agreement nor the participation from the Fund of Solidarity brought about significant changes nor resolved the issues surrounding the engagement of Yugoslav experts.

Though the hosts at the 16th Session held in December 1987 in Algiers expressed interest in Yugoslav experts, the bilateral scientific and technical cooperation had reached a point of no return. In the second half of the 1980s, Algeria was undergoing a deep economic, political and social crisis. The national economy, entirely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, was heavily affected by the 1980s oil glut. As the prices of oil on the global market plummeted, so did the Algerian income and the state budget. At the same time, the national debt was skyrocketing.[360] As keeping foreign experts in the country was a significant burden to the state budget, the government was gradually decreasing their number. Simultaneously, it intensified the process of *Algerization*, which focused on hiring local staff while reducing the number of cooperants in the state administration.[361] Thus, Algerian socialist partners, including Yugoslavia, received fewer requests for experts. The last kernel of hope was the request for 22 university professors that was, however, expected to fail in the realization. At the 2nd Session of Sub-Commission for Technical Cooperation held from 7 to 9 June 1988 in Belgrade, led

[359] Exchange of Letters, 11 July 1986, HDA-1727-344.
[360] See: James D. Le Sueur, *Algeria since 1989: Between Terror and Democracy* (Zed Books: 2013).
[361] Naylor, *France and Algeria*, 134.

by Marijan Strbašić, Director of ZAMTES and Amar Bendjama, the employment of experts entirely fell into the background. The focus was set on other forms of collaboration, predominantly on the scientific aspect, such as conjoint research projects in different disciplines (agriculture, civil engineering, geology, and healthcare). Comparable to the enterprises' stance regarding technical cooperation, most Yugoslav academic and scientific institutions did not express interest in scientific cooperation with Algeria. As exposed in the subsequent chapters, a similar situation happened with the majority of potential candidates for expert positions.

In spite of everything, ZAMTES was showing a certain level of determination to achieve better conditions for their experts' and thus initiated the process of amending the Agreement.[362] The fact that the Algerians easily accepted the proposal and even left Yugoslavia the initiative to suggest the scale of salaries of the new agreement[363] probably testifies to their real loss of interest. Because there were no new requests as of 1989, ZAMTES eventually decided to suspend these activities. At the final, 17th Session of the Joint Commission held from 20 to 23 June 1990 in Belgrade, both countries declaratively expressed their wishes to continue with the cooperation. Yet, the situation on the ground spoke for itself. Out of all countries which kept technical experts in Algeria, Yugoslavia had the least number of them. Yet, hundreds of workers hired directly as part of investment projects successfully carried out their duties and transferred their knowledge to the Algerian workers.[364]

2.2. A Long-Term Investment or a Short-Term Profit?

Discrepancy of Interests between Self-Managing Enterprises and the Government

The political and ideological divergence from the Soviet Union and reorientation toward workers' self-management intercepted the Yugoslav centralist state-building project based on the command economy and government control. This sharp turn towards decentralization vis-à-vis self-management bestowed Yugoslavia with a unique,

[362] Minutes from the 2nd Session of the Joint Subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation, 9 June 1988, HDA-1727-345.
[363] Report of the 17th Session of the Joint Commission, 26 July 1990, HDA-1727-347.
[364] Platform for the 1st Session of the Joint Subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation, 24 September 1984, HDA-1727-345.

internationally recognizable Marxist identity.[365] At the same time, the non-aligned balancing between the two superpowers was another dominant feature of the country. Yet, during the mid-1960s, the Yugoslav pendulum somewhat prevailed on the Western side, exposing the socialist-declared state to the influence of global market forces. In that period, Yugoslavia had gone through a series of economic and decentralization reforms which led domestic enterprises to acquire greater autonomy in the decision-making process. Still, the Yugoslav path towards the open market economy was winding. President Tito himself was leaning towards the USSR, which had been a direct outcome of the reconciliation with Moscow reinforced by the Sino-Soviet split. Namely, in June 1955 Nikita Khrushchev accepted the notion of different paths to socialism, giving Tito's communism a green light and ever greater international legitimacy for his regime.[366] During the next year, Yugoslavia concluded a series of loan agreements with the Eastern bloc countries, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which amounted to a total of US$ 464 million.[367] Ultimately, top-notch relations with the Soviets were crowned by Yugoslavia's joining the COMECON as an associated member in September 1964. Though the voice of the reform wing party warning Tito of the existing Soviet threat had been growing stronger, a series of concurrent events eventually deterred the Yugoslav leader from the Soviet bloc and convinced him to introduce the economic model of market socialism. Firstly, with the disposal of Khrushchev in October 1964 and Brezhnev's rise to power, Tito lost hopes of further acquiring Soviet aid. Secondly, a negative balance of trade causing the lack of hard currency and an empty budget compelled Yugoslavia to resort to loans to the IMF. Finally, the 1968 Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia dealt a final blow to closer relations with the East.[368]

While the decentralization process in Yugoslavia had commenced as early as 1950 with the introduction of workers' self-management, its development proceeded throughout the next decades, that is until the dissolution of the Federation. The system where the "working people" held a stake in deciding Yugoslavia's political and economic direction provided Tito's communist regime with internal (democratic) legitimacy.[369]

[365] Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 69.
[366] Ibid, p. 74.
[367] Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe,* p. 16.
[368] Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, *Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment* (I.B. Tauris: 2016): p. 214-215, 218.
[369] Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy*, p. 79-80.

The Yugoslav self-management rested on the idea of transferring to the workers the rights to control and decide on all relevant issues related to the means of production, best depicted by the omnipresent contemporary parole "Factories to the workers!" ("Tvornice radnicima!"). The principal units where workers were able to exercise their rights in practice were worker's councils (*radnički savjeti*). Though first implemented in the factories, the self-management doctrine was gradually extended to (all) other spheres of Yugoslav social and political life – including foreign policy.[370]

With the 1965 reform liberalizing foreign trade and reinforcing market-based thinking, self-managing enterprises had acquired an ever-increasing role in the economic life of Yugoslavia. In the next decade, the process went ahead. Calling for further decentralization and democratization, the government passed the 1976 Associated Labour Act, which was also popularly known as the Workers' Constitution. The act introduced the concept of BOALs or Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (*Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada*, OOUR), which broke down the enterprises (radna organizacija) into smaller self-managing units. Through the mechanism of self-management agreements (*samoupravni sporazumi*), BOALs were able to form Complex Organizations of Associated Labour or COALs (*Složena organizacija udruženog rada*, SOUR).[371] The liberalization and marketization, as Spaskovska and Calori put it, were legitimized under the goal of a "long-term integration of Yugoslav economy in the international division of labour on a basis of equality and mutual interests". Moreover, Yugoslav political and economic elites found an ideological justification for these processes which had been attesting to the competitiveness and equal (if not better) efficiency of socialist enterprises against the capitalist ones – thus extolling the economic viability of the socialist system.[372]

Under a capitalist agenda, from the mid-1960s, self-managing enterprises embarked on a quest to expand beyond the geographically limited Yugoslav market. What is more, Yugoslav diplomacy had already set up a favourable international environment for the global expansion of business entities. Facilitated by non-aligned

[370] Ibid, p. 69
[371] Goran Musić, *Making and Breaking the Yugoslav Working Class: The Story of Two Self-Managed Factories* (Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 2021), p. 35.
[372] Ljubica Spaskovska and Anna Calori, "A Nonaligned Business World: The Global Socialist Enterprise between Self-Management and Transnational Capitalism", *Nationalities Papers* 49, No. 3 (2021), p. 413, 415, 417.

geopolitical positioning, Yugoslav enterprises carried out investment projects from the Global South to the COMECON and the OECD. However, a significant contribution was made by the managerial elites' ("techno-bureaucracy") outward-looking and export-oriented business mindset which aimed at increasing the enterprises' technological advancement and international competitiveness. While they did not refrain from implementing Western-style management practices, the doctrine of socialist self-management had never been put into question. Further contributed to the general (social) climate which measured the success of self-managing enterprises against the presence in the global markets.[373] However, the globally oriented Yugoslav business sector clashed their ideas with economic reasonings developed within ZAMTES.

Although international trade relations were left to free market mechanisms, the government tried to stimulate imports from developing countries by introducing a preferential tariff system. As much as ZAMTES officials were trying to persuade companies of technical cooperation being an indirect, long-term investment for their business, most Yugoslav export-oriented enterprises had no real interest in the developing markets. According to some estimates, in the mid-1960s, Yugoslav trade with the Global South accounted for mere 19%, while the rest made up the Western and the Eastern Bloc countries, accounting for 48% and 33% of the total trade, respectively.[374] The situation had not significantly changed in the next decades. Calculated for the period from 1980 to 1983, trade with the developing countries barely reached 18%.[375] In most cases, Yugoslav enterprises reduced markets of the Global South to dumping sites of surplus goods left after completed transactions with the East and the West. This was partially due to previous experiences of conducting business with developing countries which often failed to meet their financial obligations or the discouragement arising from the insufficient knowledge of their markets. Another serious drawback in the East–South relations was not only ignorance of the country's commercial regulations and legislation but also the business culture. Thus, the Yugoslav commercial representatives had difficulties in conducting business with Algerian partners. As one expert had noted, Yugoslav companies engaged as part of investment cooperation „enter[ed] into business and relations with the Arab world with too little psychological preparation and

[373] Ibid, p. 416, 421.
[374] Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy*, p. 70.
[375] The calculation was made according to the data provided in: Mileta, "Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju", p. 52.

ignorance of the mentality of that world."[376] Albeit in the spirit of colonial discourse, the expert pointed out Yugoslav businessmen's scarce knowledge of the Arab business culture and etiquette which led to cross-cultural misunderstandings and reluctance to conduct business. Even ZAMTES officials lamented how collaborating with the Algerians required "patience" and "a double effort".

Expressing interest in investment cooperation, in the mid-1960s, about 40 engineering and export enterprises established the Section for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation with Algeria within the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, which would help penetrate the Algerian market. Moreover, manufacturing and export enterprises created a network of foreign representations in Algeria, some of which were: Interexport, Geosonda, Rudnap, Generalinvest, INGRA, Jedinstvo, Jugoinvest, Konstruktor, Mašinoimpeks, and Minel.[377] However, in the early period, as a part of the granted commodity loan,[378] Yugoslav enterprises had raised four factories, while the Slovenian enterprise Rudis was engaged in geological exploration and setting for exploitation of zinc, lead and iron deposits at Kherzet Youssef, Djebel Gustar, El Halia, Bou Jaber, and Mesloula. Dissatisfied with the ongoing works, SONAREM cancelled the contract to Rudis for the exploration of Kherzet Youcef and in 1966 translated it into the hands of a Soviet enterprise.[379] This was not an isolated case. The Algerians were not entirely satisfied with some other Yugoslav projects either, particularly with the construction of the juice factory in El Asnam which was conducted by the enterprise "Jedinstvo". They complained about the delay in the execution of the works but especially about the installation of equipment of lower quality and technological level than the one they had contracted for.[380] Questioning their business ethics ("moral aspects"), the Algerian authorities appealed to the Yugoslav government to induce stronger control over enterprises involved in their market.[381] The implications were,

[376] Miran Šlajmer, "Predmet: Kratka informacija o razgovorima u Alžiru", 25 September 1975, AJ-465-6551.
[377] Information on bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and Algeria, 6 October 1969, AJ-465-6549, p. 9.
[378] Aside from purchasing agricultural aircrafts from the Pančevo-based aircraft manufacturer „Utva", as part of the Yugoslav loan, in 1966, Algeria bought from the enterprise Brodoimpex five fishing boats. However, only two were delivered. After being caught in a storm on their way to Algeria, the other three boats sunk in the Mediterranean Sea. Information on problems in the economic cooperation with Algeria, Belgrade, 19 October 1967, AJ-130-635, p. 5.
[379] „Historical background of Rudis", Rudis, https://www.rudis.si/en/company/historical-background-of-rudis/ . Last access: 29 January 2023.
[380] Report on the 5th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 20 February 1969, AJ-465-6549, p. 4.
[381] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 179.

presumably, much broader than just verbal remarks. Between 1966 and 1975, Yugoslav enterprises have not concluded a single major investment business deal with the Algerian administration. Thus, until its expiration in 1973, only a third of the US$ 30 million loan was used. However, the economic activities did not completely die off. For example, in 1971, Belgrade-based enterprise Minel established a joint venture for electricity and gas distribution "TRAVELEC" with the Algerian national electric company SONELGAZ. Without having concluded any significant deals for an extended period, by 1973 Yugoslav enterprises closed the representative offices in the Algerian capital.[382] While having a hard time breaking into the Algerian market autonomously, Yugoslav enterprises participated in investment projects as members of international consortiums or as sub-contractors of Western companies.

At that time, the agenda to pursue long-term economic goals of market expansion for the export of industrial products and import of low-cost materials started to gradually outweigh political considerations. In 1972, Tito himself remarked that the economic future of Yugoslavia rested upon trade and investment cooperation with the Global South.[383] Yet, trade between Algeria and Yugoslavia permanently suffered from a low volume and limited range of goods. Apart from agricultural mechanisation, there was a clear lack of industrial products on both sides. While in Algerian export structure to Yugoslavia dominated citrus fruits, phosphates, crude oil, and tires, Yugoslavia exported mainly timber, livestock (sheep), textiles, but also tractors. After the first delivery of 500 Zadrugar tractors in 1962, only in 1967, a new delivery of agricultural machinery followed, that is 300 tractors from factories "14. Oktobar" and "Industrija motora Rakovica" (IMR) together with 100 combine harvesters from "Zmaj" factory.[384] The Serbian factory "14. Oktobar" in the period from 1962 to 1979 sold about 16.100 crawler tractors of the model TG-50 D to Algeria.[385] An article in the daily newspaper "Politika" from November 1972 illustrated the situation of the lack of Yugoslav industrial products and consumer goods in the Algerian market:

[382] Information on the upcoming 9th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, June 1978, AJ-465-6572, p. 9.
[383] Calori et al., „Alternative Globalization?", p. 11-16.
[384] „400 poljoprivrednih strojeva isporučeno Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 11 August 1967.
[385] Extract from the minutes of the 333rd Session of the FEC, Attachment No. 6, 19 February 1982, AJ-465-6545.

> "Very few of our products are known in Algeria so far. Maybe we could find only about 1,000 tractors ("Zadrugar" and "14 Oktobar") on their agricultural lands. […] While the Yugoslav gets his hands on an Algerian orange or mandarin, the Algerian can find almost nothing in his shops that would help him create the impression that some goods were produced in Yugoslavia."[386]

At first glance, the sale of tractors might seem like a success story but the customers expressed dissatisfaction with the technology of Yugoslav agricultural mechanisation. According to the statement of the Algerian representative, the farmers reported frequent failures and technical defectiveness of Zadrugar tractors which proved unsuitable for the Maghrebi terrain, as well as the fact that IMR had not secured spare parts for the tractors.[387] Similar impressions were conveyed by the users of 7,000 IMT tractors delivered in 1981. As the main competitor for the tender was a renowned West German company Deutz-Fahr, the contracted business even had an additional ideological value. Yet, the Algerian representatives repeatedly reminded that no commercial nor technological rationale had existed behind the purchase but that the trade deal was based on a political decision made at the highest level. The Yugoslav enterprise, however, did not justify the given trust. In addition to the significant delay in delivery, some of the tractors arrived at the Algerian port with damages caused by improper storage and transportation. On top of that, the Algerians accused IMT that the engines of the delivered tractors were weaker than what was stated in the contract. Although the Yugoslav side was denying the accusations, the OECD inspection confirmed the truth of the Algerians' claims. Despite the fact that they eventually installed reducers in some of the tractors, and financially compensated for the other part, the reputation of the enterprise was irreversibly damaged by the affair.[388] Immensely exasperated, the Algerian officials told that IMT "had shut its doors to the Algerian market".[389] But one man's loss is another man's gain: the following year, Rijeka-based enterprise Torpedo sold 2,500 tractors to Algeria.

Aside from the fact that Yugoslav industrial products by their price and quality could not compete with the latest Western technology which Algerians preferred,[390]

[386] Anton Rupnik, „Naši pioniri u Sahari", *Politika*, 27 November 1972.
[387] Report on the 1st Session of the Joint Commission, n.d., AJ-465-6549, p. 4.
[388] Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate*, p. 429-430.
[389] Embassy's note No. 867, 4 December 1981, AJ-465-6562.
[390] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, p. 212.

enterprises avoided selling their industrial products through clearing, which was the agreed payment system until 1975. While Algeria through clearing trade offered goods which were difficult to sell for hard currency, such as wine, iron ore and certain minor industrial products, due to the supply from the local production, there were equally no interested buyers in the Yugoslav market. On the other hand, goods for which the Yugoslav market showed interest, most notably oil, phosphates and eventually citrus fruit, were limited for purchase through barter trade. Instead, the Algerian government opted to sell those exclusively for convertible currency.[391] To escape the stalemate and increase the trade volume, the Yugoslav delegation raised the question of passing from clearing to a convertible payment system already during the 4th Session of the Joint Commission in 1968. Yet, it took years to convince their partners in doing so. Although almost 90% of the bilateral trade was carried out on the convertible market, Algeria resisted leaving the clearing system of payments. From the beginning of the 1970s, Yugoslavia gradually abandoned clearing with developing countries. In the meantime, it switched to convertible payments with some of the main economic partners among developing countries (Ghana, Tunisia, the UAR, Guinea, India, Mali).[392] Finally, on 13 December 1975, the new Payment Agreement was signed between Algeria and Yugoslavia. From 1 January 1976, the transactions between the two countries had to be executed in convertible currencies. The changes in the payment system had not affected only economic cooperation but also had significant consequences on technical cooperation. Due to the 1963 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which stipulated that the payment of experts had to be conducted according to the payment agreement in effect at the time, the experts' hard currency transfer was carried out through barter payment. Namely, the services of Yugoslav experts were included in the balance of the clearing exchange. With the new model, the Algerian administration had to directly pay experts in US Dollars. While such a solution suited Yugoslavia also because of the extra foreign currency inflow from Algerian remittances, it additionally deprived Algeria of scarce convertible currencies.

The transition to payment in convertible currencies did prove to be highly stimulative for the trade. After a period of stagnation during the 1970s, at the beginning of the next decade, Yugoslavia revived economic cooperation with Algeria, one of its

[391] Information on bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and Algeria, 6 October 1969, AJ-465-6549, p. 10.
[392] Popović, „Robna razmena Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju", p. 113.

principal NAM partners. The reported figures show a slightly positive trend which occurred in the second half of the 1970s and a sudden increase in the 1980s. In quantitative terms, the average trade balance between the years 1976 and 1979 amounted to US$ 36 million, while for the years from 1980 to 1986, the average annual bilateral trade reached more than US$ 280 million. To improve business contacts and gain a better insight into the market, some of the leading Yugoslav enterprises re-installed their permanent representatives to Algeria. Officially as a part of the strategy to revitalize economic relations, the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce established in the year 1980 the Common Commercial Representation (*Zajedničko privredno predstavništvo*, ZPP) in Algiers and appointed to the Director position Atanas Atanasievski, who until then served as the Assistant Minister for Foreign Trade.[393] Apart from increasing operational costs and the unsettled diplomatic status of the Director, the ZPP was a largely inert and disengaged body. Despite being its primary purpose, it did not contribute to a better understanding of the Algerian market and local regulations. Moreover, it did not maintain regular communication with the Embassy and enterprises in Yugoslavia, which often too late found out about published public tenders in Algeria. With the opening of the Common Commercial Representation, Vasilije Delibašić left the position of economic adviser at the Embassy. Paradoxically, in the moment when Yugoslav trade and investments in Algeria were at its height, not a single official at the diplomatic mission in Algiers was in charge of economic affairs.[394]

While the import structure from Algeria was heavily dominated by raw materials, predominantly oil (approximately 90%), and to a lesser extent zinc, iron and phosphates, Yugoslavia exported to Algeria industrial products, such as tractors, agricultural machinery, cars, washing machines, refrigerators, stoves, and television receivers.[395] Accumulating US$ 378,19 million in both directions, the trade between Algeria and Yugoslavia reached its peak in 1981. Almost the entire structure of imports

[393] Within the Common Commercial Representation in Algiers operated 18 representative offices of Yugoslav manufacturing and export enterprises, some of which were held by Interexport, Ingra, Minel, Astra-Mašinoimpex, Rudnap, Energoinvest, Geosonda, Makotekst, Naftagas, Hidrotehnika, Hidroelektra, Investimport, Genex, etc. Report by Atanas Atansievski, Algiers, 17 December 1983, AJ-465-6559.
[394] Embassy's note No. 1455 , 17 December 1982, AJ-465-6546.
[395] In 1980 and 1981, respectively, Zastava concluded a contract for the sales of 8,000 and 10,000 vehicles of the Zastava 101 model. Popularly known as "stojadin", the car had been produced in cooperation with the Italian FIAT since 1971. Another great deal concluded the manufacturer Obod from Cetinje by selling 80,000 refrigerators to Algeria in 1982. Moreover, the Algerian households enjoyed watching television programmes on their black-and-white and colour TV receivers made in Yugoslavia by the company Ei Niš.

(99%) from Algeria was made up of crude oil, and only to a negligible extent of zinc (0.8%).[396] A record amount of 789,000 tons of black gold was delivered to Yugoslavia within the framework of a long-term contract on the import of a minimum of 500,000 tons of crude oil per year until 1990, which Yugoslav oil companies concluded with SONATRACH.[397] However, due to financial difficulties and a lack of convertible currencies, Yugoslav companies irregularly withdrew the contracted quantities (for example, in the years 1982 and 1983). Moreover, Yugoslav companies for their investment works were partially paid in oil. However, these transactions were not included in the balance of the annual oil import from Algeria.

At the same time, Yugoslav political elites set an eye on Algeria's other hydrocarbon assets. From the beginning of the 1980s, Yugoslavia started negotiations regarding the import of gas once the Trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline was completed. Because it held a contract with SONATRACH for oil and gas exploration in Algeria since 1970, the enterprise NAFTAGAS from Novi Sad was set up to take over the deliveries. The political terrain was also being polished. At the invitation of the Algerian Minister of Foreign Trade and the President of the Commission Abdelaziz Khelef, in January 1985, the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković made an official stay in Algeria. A few months after, in July 1985, Yugoslavia signed the 20-year contract on gas deliveries from Algeria, which was supposed to start in December 1988.

While foreign trade in Algeria was under strict state control, the Yugoslav authorities left the market initiatives and international economic activities to self-managing enterprises. Nevertheless, the state tried to stimulate trade with Algeria. Since the competitiveness of Yugoslav exports largely depended on the ability to grant loans on favourable terms, JUBMES or the Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation (Jugoslavenska banka za međunarodnu ekonomsku saradnju) secured a loan of US$ 150 million to export equipment for the construction of industrial facilities in Algeria. Though gaining strong momentum from the beginning of the 1980s, investment cooperation was beset with problems. Enterprises participating in the developing countries' markets tended to pursue their autonomous agenda independently from

[396] Lightbulbs were the only quantitatively significant industrial product imported from Algeria. Extract from the minutes of the 333rd session of the FEC, Attachment No. 3, 19 February 1982, AJ-465-6545.
[397] Platform for the 11th session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 23 February 1982, AJ-465-6545, p. 5, 18.

Yugoslav institutions and state authorities. On the verge of Algerian independence in 1962, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Tunis Miloš Lalović warned Yugoslav officials not to repeat in Algeria the same "mistake of unorganized [uncoordinated] appearance" as had happened in Tunisia.[398] Instead of partnerships between contractors and manufacturers of equipment, machinery, and materials, and despite the warnings, competition and unfair trade practices between Yugoslav enterprises prevailed in the Maghreb. As a result, not only many business opportunities were lost but also tarnished the country's image.[399] This was the case even with companies that had formally joined a consortium, such as the one to carry out investment works in the Algerian hydraulics sector (*Samoupravni sporazum o udruživanju rada i sredstava za zajednički nastup u izvođenju investicionih radova u vodoprivredi Alžira*) established in November 1981.

Albeit with ambivalent results, among the Yugoslav business consortia in Algeria to the fore came the activities of INPROS (*Poslovno udruženje proizvođača za industrijsku proizvodnju stanova i drugih investicionih objekata u zemlji i inostranstvu*), which concluded in 1982 a deal for the construction of 35,000 apartments in Algeria. But because of financial difficulties on both sides culminating with the economic crisis in Algeria, eventually, only 8,136 apartments were built in the wilayas of Bejaia, Jijel and Oran. In the construction of these apartments over 3,100 Yugoslav and around 2,400 Algerian workers were employed. The project was marked by delays in the works caused by non-payments and painstaking negotiations over the currency clause. Due to the fluctuations in exchange rates, INPROS insisted on inserting a currency clause in the contracts which, according to Algerian regulations, demanded expressing the price of the projects in Algerian dinars.[400] Because of taking a resolute position which caused delays, and thus the disaffection of Algerian authorities, the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers concluded that INPROS „created bad blood" and „poisoned the relations between Algeria and Yugoslavia",[401] and even blamed it compromised and excluded many other Yugoslav enterprises from the construction of industrial and civil facilities in Algeria.[402] Namely, in the first half of the 1980s, Yugoslav enterprises delivered a large number of bids for

[398] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 179.
[399] Embassy's note No. 346, 16 March 1984, AJ-465-6546.
[400] Platform for the 11th session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 23 February 1982, AJ-465-6545.
[401] Letter by the Yugoslav Embassy, 21 February 1982, AJ-465-6562.
[402] Platform for the 11th session of the Joint Commission, Attachment 2, Belgrade, 20 June 1986, AJ-465-6571; Embassy's note No. 195, 21 February 1982, AJ-465-6562.

investment works and export of goods which remained unfulfilled, estimated at US$ 3 to 3,5 billion and US$ 300 million, respectively. Among some of the most significant unrealized Yugoslav projects were centres for vocational training of workers and technicians, for which negotiations had been going since 1975. Though Yugoslav enterprises delivered the bid for 10 centres in Jijel, Skikda, Bejaia and the pilot centre in Taher, eventually they did not participate in raising any of the 281 centres across Algeria. While the Embassy blamed INPROS for the failure of the project,[403] it is more likely that Yugoslavia's inability to finance the project through a loan determined the outcome.[404] Despite of the failed project of training centres, in that period, Yugoslav enterprises realized investment projects reaching a staggering sum of over US$ 2 billion.

"Sawing Off the Branch We Are Sitting On"

The presence of Yugoslav construction and engineering enterprises across the Global South was one of the most visible expressions of the growing network of the NAM political alliances and economic contacts.[405] Much the same as the trade, Yugoslav investments across the Mediterranean exploded in the first half of the 1980s. The Algerian government granted export-oriented enterprises, prominently Hidroelektra, Hidrotehnika, Energoprojekt, Viadukt, and INGRA[406] large-scale civil engineering projects such as the construction of dams, roads and bridges. These engineering arrangements proved highly stimulative on other industrial sectors in Yugoslavia. With the multiplication of projects of the Zagreb-based enterprises Hidroelektra, INGRA and Viadukt, in June 1985, JAT introduced an additional, third weekly direct flight on the route Zagreb – Algiers.[407] By the value of investment works in 1985, which amounted close to US$ 0,5 billion Algeria became Yugoslavia's first partner in the Global South,

[403] Embassy's note No. 518, n.d., AJ-465-6562. Records related to the negotiations on the construction of centers for the education and training of workers in Algeria are part of the fond AJ-465-4564, which was not looked into for writing this.
[404] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, Belgrade, 3 July 1978, HDA-1727-345.
[405] Spaskovska and Calori, "A Nonaligned Business World", p. 414.
[406] Some of the most significant works carried out by INGRA in Algeria were the construction of two port and six continental silos, the port of Arzew and the textile factory in Biskra. Together with Hidroelektra, INGRA participated in the works on the Chiffa – Berrouaghia road and Boufarik military airport. INGRA, „Informacijski memorandum", p. 37-38, http://185.103.219.61/userdocsimages/prospekti/INGR-M-146AProspekt-17102011144607.pdf. Last access: 30 January 2023.
[407] JAT advertisement, *Večernji list*, no. 7928, 12 June 1985.

ahead of Iraq and Libya. Until that time, the total value of the performed investment works amounted to over US$ 2 billion.[408] The bulk of that amount, about US$ 950 million, was within the water management sector.[409] Although many Yugoslav companies were present in Algeria's investment market, Zagreb-based engineering enterprise Hidroelektra dominated the construction arena. The company was for the first time engaged in 1980 by the Ministry of Public Works on the construction of a single carriageway RN1 Chiffa – Berrouaghia, while later by the Ministry of Defence on the Boufarik military airport. However, most of the projects Hidroelektra conducted for the Ministry of Hydraulics, Environment and Forestry, including works on the system for supplying drinking water to Algiers (*Système de Production Isser Keddara*, SPIK)[410] and several dams across Algeria, for example, Sidi Yacoub, Mina, Chiffa, and Zeralda.[411]

The importance and size of the hydraulics sector making up Algerian investment plans were clear to Yugoslav decision-makers. That is why Yugoslav delegates took seriously the warning issued by their hosts during the 12th Session of the Algerian – Yugoslav Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which gathered in June 1983 in Algiers. As a clear expression of their discontent, the Algerian hosts adjourned the talks. The cause of misunderstanding between the two non-aligned partners arose over the issue of experts' engagement within the bilateral technical cooperation framework. Namely, within a year since the enforcement of the Agreement in June 1982, Yugoslavia had dispatched to Algeria only 15 experts. Though various Algerian ministries raised the issue of a venial presence of Yugoslav technical experts in their country, the representative of the Ministry of Hydraulics was particularly sharp in addressing the matter. He had put forward the fact that Yugoslavia had not fulfilled the request to 55 dispatch technicians and provide scholarships for 150 students promised

[408] In 1981 and 1982, Yugoslav enterprises concluded investment deals in the amount of US$ 560 million. In addition to the construction of three dams carried out by Hidrotehnika and Hidroelektra worth US$ 400 million, the latter enterprise participated in building a section of the Algiers highway, Rudis Trbovlje raised two shoe factories in Frenda and El Bayadh. Soon after, Rudis signed a contract to build a third shoe factory in Bou Saada. The first of three shoe factories was put into operation in 1984. As part of a consortium with the French company SECIM, enterprise Makmetal participated in the construction of the factory of aluminum profiles. As mentioned, INPROS designed and constructed apartments in Bejaia, Jijel and Oran. SSST, Platform for the 11th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 23 February 1982, p. 6, AJ-465-6545.

[409] Platform for the 15th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 20 June 1986, AJ-465-6571, p. 1.

[410] Hidroelektra carried out the works on SPIK jointly with enterprises Hidrotehnika i Unioninvest.

[411] Saša Šimpraga, "Politika je omogućila projekte" [interview with Ivan Martinović], *Vizkultura*, 21 December 2020. https://vizkultura.hr/politika-je-omogucila-projekte/. Last access: 29 January 2023.

to his Ministry.[412] At the meeting, the Algerians made clear to their counterparts that the decision to award important investment projects to Yugoslav enterprises had not derived from commercial factors but from "a political decision at a high level". In fact, Yugoslavia's signature non-aligned policy played a decisive moment in securing engineering works in Algeria for the business sector.[413] Namely, Yugoslav offers were often uncompetitive due to high prices and lower technological levels than Western companies. Another disadvantage was the limited possibility to grant loans with low interests rate and long repayment plan, which was one of the main concerns of developing countries.[414] Therefore, as compensation for lucrative business deals, particularly related to the construction of dams, the Algerian government had requested scholarships for students and a highly-skilled workforce acting as technical cooperation experts.[415] Within one such request of November 1982, the Ministry of Hydraulics demanded 55 experts to be dispatched by the end of 1984.[416]

The meeting raised Yugoslav officials' awareness that the outcomes of public tenders and the possibility of future investments depended on the ability to positively respond to Algerian requests for specialized personnel.[417] Yet, there was more to that. Experts engaged through government channels took upon the duty "to work on the improvement of economic and other relations" with the host country. The assigned task

[412] Aside from the bilateral technical cooperation framework, based on the contract for the construction of dams of Ain Zada, Keddara, and Sidi Yakoub, enterprises committed to organising higher education schooling in Yugoslavia for 156 Algerian students. Between 1981 and 1983, holders of the Algerian Ministry of Water Management's scholarships arrived for regular studies in Yugoslavia. Mostly in engineering disciplines, the Algerians were admitted to a 6-years-programme, with the first year dedicated to learning and mastering the Serbo-Croatian language. Hidroelektra welcomed the first 22 students in October 1981 and the second group of 28 students in October 1982. The enterprise took over the responsibility for the schooling of 50, while Hidrotehnika had over 106 Algerian students. Alongside covering the costs of their tuition fees, dormitory accommodation, internships, books, and language course fees, the enterprises were responsible for monitoring the academic performance and results of the Algerian youth. Because they had shown poor study results and a lack of discipline, the Algerian authorities decided to send home almost half of them. For illustration, out of 106 Hidrotenika scholarship holders, only 14 successfully passed the first year of study. Due to a surprisingly low success rate, the Algerian authorities reconsidered sending their students for education in Yugoslavia in the future. „Bilješka o razgovoru održanom na Sveučilištu o Beogradu o problemu školovanja alžirskih studenata", Belgrade, 20 January 1986; „Informacija o školovanju alžirskih kadrova", 30 January 1986; „Ugovor o izgradnji hidroobjekata - brana Sidi Yakoub", n.d.; Vilko Usmiani, „Izvještaj o alžirskim studentima koji se školuju u organizaciji Hidroelektre", n.d.; Dragan Obradović, „Informacija o školovanju alžirskih studenata – Hidrotehnika", 19 December 1985, AJ-465-6562.

[413] Šimpraga, "Politika je omogućila projekte" [interview], 2020.

[414] Report on the 9th Session of the Joint Commission, 10 October 1979, HDA-1727-347, p. 3-4.

[415] Request for 70 hydraulics experts, 8 December 1982, HDA-1727-347.

[416] Embassy's note No. 1391, December 1982, AJ-465-6562.

[417] Report from the 12th session of the Joint Commission, 21 July 1983, HDA-1727-344. p. 2.

included serving as mediators between Yugoslav enterprises and the Algerian administration, hence avoiding its immobile communication channels. Eventually, the ultimate goal was to secure firms with further lucrative business deals. This task came to the fore when experts acted from the position of ministerial advisors. The value of experts' activities in the Global South during the 1980s economic crisis for the Yugoslav construction sector depicted a Croatian engineer who at that time was an employee of the Algerian Ministry of Public Works: "In this difficult time for us constructors, every person at such spot [technical cooperation expert in the Global South] is a potential opportunity for the development of [investment] cooperation […]".[418]

Yet, it is also relevant to stress that the Algerians were not entirely satisfied with Yugoslav companies as the construction of projects took a prolonged period and the works often exceeded the set deadlines. However, some of the reasons for that were also to be found on the Algerian side. For instance, the Algerian authorities introduced a quota for foreign blue-collar workers in order to give priority to hiring local low-skilled, unemployed staff at foreign enterprises. Without having received adequate training for operating the machinery, local personnel frequently caused breakdowns of machines owned by Yugoslav contractors. Because there was oftentimes no possibility to purchase spare parts or conduct repairs in Algeria, enterprises were forced to take the machinery outs of the country and repair it back in Yugoslavia. On top of that, the absence of a sea lane on the route Yugoslavia – Algeria complicated transportation and increased shipping costs. This had not only caused delays but also extraordinary costs to the enterprises since they had to pay custom import duties when bringing the machinery back into Algeria.[419] Thus, enterprises opted to rather bring along their employees from Yugoslavia. In that case, the start of work was delayed because of the difficulties to obtain work permits for blue-collar Yugoslav workers (for example, machine operators or chefs). The Algerian labour legislation impacted the workers as well. Because their stay was not legally regulated, they were only able to acquire a tourist visa to enter Algeria. Thus, every three months they had to exit and re-enter the country, usually through neighbouring Tunisia.

[418] Letter from J. V. to Dobrivoje Drašković, Skikda, 18 April 1986, HDA-1727-466.
[419] SSST, „Platforma za XI zasedanje Mešovitog komiteta za privrednu i naučno-tehničku saradnju između SFR Jugoslavije i Demokratske Narodne Republike Alžira", Annex no. 10, Belgrade, 23 February 1982, AJ-465-6545, p. 3; Economic relations of the Socialist Republic of Croatia with Algeria, n.d., HDA-1727-346, p. 5-6.

Fearing that the low level of technical cooperation could not only jeopardize further economic relations but also the overall bilateral ties, Yugoslav authorities decided to react immediately. Hoping that the export of high-level labour services would benefit economic cooperation, the institution in charge of international technical cooperation, ZAMTES, urged enterprises already engaged or showing interest in concluding investment works in Algeria to make their employees available for recruitment under the technical cooperation agenda. To their disappointment, most of the appeals were left without a response. Only in 1984, ZAMTES managed to recruit and by the end of the year dispatch eight employees of Hidroelektra, an enterprise which had been conducting large-scale projects in Algeria.[420] Within the same request of the Ministry of Hydraulics, in August 1986, ZAMTES in cooperation with INGRA proposed two teams of 9 experts,[421] one to work in the central administration of the Ministry, and the other on the ongoing projects on construction sites.[422] Though none of the selected experts was INGRA's employee, they were to represent the enterprise to improve its business positions and "repay" for the investment works.[423] However, the plan had never been realized. A similar request was expressed by the Ministry of Public Works in 1984 for 18 road engineers and 6 professors who specialized in the construction of bridges, overbridges and tunnels. In the domain of public works, enterprises from Croatia – Hidroelektra and Viadukt – construction of highways and supporting facilities, respectively.[424] Despite ZAMTES urging enterprises to stimulate their employees, only one member of Viadukt applied but eventually gave up.[425] Only after it had published a publicly advertised call in 1985, ZAMTES recruited and dispatched 6 experts in February 1986.

First of all, enterprises refrained from ceding their leading experts for a period of a few years as it implied an instant loss of profit for the business.[426] Moreover, they saw technical cooperation as a direct competition to their commercial activities by reducing the price of their employees' services. Because of their stance, ZAMTES accused them of "blocking" employees' departure. Namely, to become eligible for employment abroad,

[420] Engagement of eight Hidroelektra's experts, Belgrade, 4 December 1984, HDA-1727-347.
[421] Information on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, Zagreb, 25 June 1987, HDA-1727-345.
[422] Request of the Ministry of Hydraulics to hire experts, 20 December 1985, HDA-1727-347.
[423] A letter to INGRA requesting teams of experts for the Algerian Ministry of Hydraulics, 15 April 1986, HDA-1727-347.
[424] Embassy's note No. 533, 23 April 1984, AJ-465-6562.
[425] Note from Zrelec to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, 24 July 1984, AJ-465-6562.
[426] Note from ZAMTES to DTD, 14 February 1983, AJ-465-6556a.

experts had to terminate their employment at home. Without a secured position upon return from the "mission" abroad, experts were discouraged from taking employment in Algeria. Secondly, enterprises were hesitant to allocate for technical cooperation not only their human but also financial capital. That became clear after the initiative to involve enterprises in the funding schemes of technical cooperation in Algeria was launched in June 1983, shortly after the 12th Session of the Joint Commission. The plan foresaw establishing a separate budget to which enterprises carrying out or those interested in establishing economic cooperation with Algeria would financially contribute 0,2% of the total value of contracted works.[427] Under the name "Fund of organizations of associated labour for Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Algeria" (*Fond organizacija udruženog rada za naučno-tehničku suradnju s Alžirom*), the budget was expected to start operating from 1984, instead of the Solidarity Fund, within the Algerian Section of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce. The deposit was intended to cover the expenses of increasing the salaries of experts in order to stimulate them to take up job positions in Algeria within the bilateral framework. The concept was reminiscent of the "Fund for the Accelerated Development of Less-Developed Republics and Kosovo", which started operating in 1965 and to which enterprises had to allocate 4% of capital gains.[428] But because the vast majority of members of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce's Section for Algeria refrained from voting or voted against the founding agreement (*Samoupravni sporazum o udruživanju sredstava i osnivanju Fonda za financiranje naučno-tehničke suradnje s Alžirom*), the idea of the Fund was ultimately abandoned.[429] Because neither finances from the Federal budget had been secured, upon ZAMTES' appeal, the Fund re-approved to finance also in 1984 the stay of 157 Yugoslav experts in Algeria and 140 Algerian students in Yugoslavia.

Failures to dispatch the requested number of experts led to accusations from many Third World leaders of Yugoslavia taking a commercial approach to technical cooperation and neglecting the principles of solidarity in favour of capitalist profiteering. In line with this, the Algerians denounced Yugoslavs for declaring their commitment to the South-South cooperation but that in practice were „mere

[427] Report of the Yugoslav delegation from the 12th Session of the Joint Commission, 21 July 1983, HDA-1727-344, p. 10.
[428] Piljak, „Reforme jugoslovenskog ekonomskog sistema", p. 232.
[429] The Algerian Section of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce counted almost 200 members.

profiteers".[430] Due to such attitudes and practices of cost-benefit calculations by the enterprises, the Algerian representatives made their counterparts repeatedly aware that "the commercial aspect of the relationship [with Yugoslavia] was overemphasized".[431] Because of international critiques addressed to Yugoslavia, ZAMTES accused domestic enterprises of being driven by instant profits instead of focusing on long-term bilateral cooperation goals[432] and prioritizing national interests ("general interest of the community").[433] The existence of conflicting agendas within the Yugoslav society was particularly evident in the example of the 1981/82 Algerian request for 93 agricultural experts.

Launching the project of the restructuration of the agricultural sector, in September 1981, the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture appealed to Eastern European socialist countries for agronomists, including 15 places foreseen for Yugoslav experts. A few months later, in February 1982, the request to Yugoslavia grew to 93 experts.[434] Regardless of the possible difficulties to fulfil this number, both ZAMTES and the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers were optimistic about the successful integration of economic cooperation with the activities of technical cooperation. Namely, representatives of ZAMTES believed that the experts working as ministerial or management advisors could have secured Yugoslav enterprises in future important business deals in the Algerian agriculture sector. In a similar fashion, Yugoslav diplomats in Algiers regarded technical cooperation as a "precursor" to economic cooperation, while the absence of it was "a handicap".[435] Accordingly, Yugoslavia sent in May 1982 a joint consulting mission consisting of three agricultural experts for technical cooperation together with three experts from Yugoslav companies assigned to examine not only the state of the Algerian agricultural sector but also the perspectives of economic cooperation with Algeria. Understanding the scope of food imports and the potential of investments in Algeria under the restructuring of agriculture, ZAMTES officials reasoned that by taking positions in the central administration of the Algerian Ministry, experts could influence the choice of equipment, technology and contractors.

[430] Embassy's note No. 1171, 8 October 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[431] Report from the 12th session of the Joint Commission, 21 July 1983, HDA-1727-344; Report by the Yugoslav delegation on the 11th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 7 June 1982, AJ-465-6545.
[432] Embassy's note No. 1148, 2 October 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[433] Report on the business trip to Algeria by Blažo Krstajić, January 1972, AJ-465-6572.
[434] Agenda on the engagement of 15 agricultural experts, n.d., AJ-465-6570.
[435] Embassy's note No. 632, 19 May 1982, AJ-465-6570.

They were also expected to support and increase the chances for Yugoslav enterprises, specifically Poljoprivredni kombinat Beograd (PKB) and Energoprojekt to win tenders for projects in Western Mitidja and Soummam respectively.[436] In other words, Yugoslav personnel would help in directing the Algerian agricultural sector toward concluding trade and investment deals with Yugoslav enterprises. Likewise, the Embassy regarded successful experts' work performances as "a reference for obtaining further business deals".[437] Therefore, not even a new increase in the request of the Algerian Ministry to 172 experts delivered in August 1982 did not discourage ZAMTES. On the contrary, its officials regarded the request as a ground-breaking opportunity which would open a new chapter in the technical cooperation between the two countries.[438] More so because the Algerians promised favourable employment conditions by hiring experts on a service contract.[439]

Explaining the importance of the request and the significance of the positions at the Algerian Ministry for increasing the chances of future Yugoslav investments in the Algerian agricultural sector, ZAMTES called upon enterprises to appoint their most qualified experts.[440] Yet, Yugoslav enterprises showed reluctance to outsource their employees below the market price. The negotiations between the Algerian delegation and the representatives of Yugoslavia's Chamber of Commerce and enterprises, most notably „Poljoprivredni kombinat Beograd", „Agrokombinat 13. jul", „Emona", „DTD", and „Energoprojekt", broke over the price of experts. Evaluating the offer made by the Yugoslav businessmen as "exaggerated" and jeopardizing the conclusion of the deal, the Embassy urged to offer personnel at a significantly lower price. Yet, before the consensus on the matter in Yugoslavia had been reached, the Algerians decided to terminate the negotiations.[441]

Strongly disappointed in how the negotiations played out, the Embassy in Algiers immediately launched critiques towards enterprises for prioritizing their commercial self-interest over Yugoslav national interest since they "put the instant profit in the

[436] Letter from Ambassador Faik Dizdarević, 10 May 1983, AJ-465-6546.
[437] Embassy's note No. 632, 19 May 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[438] Letter to ZAMTES branch offices, 15 February 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[439] Embassy's note No. 677, 31 May 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[440] Blažo Krstajić's fax to ZAMTES branch office in Croatia, Belgrade, 15 February 1982, HDA-1727-346.
[441] Scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria in agriculture, 5 October 1982, HDA-1727-344; Information on the economic part of the cooperation, 21 December 1982, HDA-1727-344.

forefront by asking for very high salaries for their experts".[442] Thus, the Embassy warned that "the commercialization of technical cooperation can only have negative consequences for overall [Yugoslav] presence in Algeria".[443] Moreover, as the jobs were eventually awarded to competitors from Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the USSR, the Embassy blamed enterprises for "creating a chance for the Eastern bloc to strengthen its position in Algeria."[444] The changed perception of Algerian decision-makers about Yugoslavia's abandonment of the principle of solidarity in favour of commercial interests had already been reinforced by the enterprises' stance when asked to deliver lectures at seminars in hydraulics, a sector in which they were granted jobs worth nearly US$ 1 billion. Upon receiving the offer from the Jaroslav Černi Institute for the Development of Water Resources, asking for a fee of 200 USD per expert per day together with secured accommodation and transportation costs, the officials of the Algerian Ministry complained that Yugoslavs "want to monetize on their needs at all costs." The Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers figuratively assessed that the Institute's proposal "saws off the branch we are sitting on".[445] Here is how the Embassy further explained how the highly commercialized technical aid offer was a self-defeating act for the Yugoslav policy in Algeria:

> *"[…] reducing the STC [scientific and technical cooperation] to honorarium, trading and bargaining at every opportunity is a great shame and is more harmful to our relations than simply not participating in such gatherings [seminars]. We are struggling to get jobs in water management, and "Jaroslav Černi [Institute]" with its demands on the principle of "fee [profit] above all" directly destroys these efforts."*[446]

Unsuccessful attempts of Yugoslavia to increase the number of technical experts in Algeria during the 1980s demonstrated how the solidarity foundations on which the bilateral East–South relations were built started cracking under the pressure of commercial interests. As compensation for the granted investment works in the first half of the 1980s, the Algerian authorities requested Yugoslavia to dispatch highly skilled workers within the bilateral technical cooperation programme. A sense of bilateral commitment fused with a belief in technical cooperation "preceding and contributing to

[442] Embassy's note No. 1383, 29 November 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[443] Embassy's note No. 372, 23 March 1982, AJ, 465-6556a.
[444] Embassy's note No. 1465, 20 December 1982, AJ-465-6570.
[445] Embassy's letter on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, 12 March 1982, AJ-465-6556a.
[446] Embassy's note No. 360, 21 March 1982, AJ-465-6556a.

the establishment and development of economic relations",[447] prompted ZAMTES to encourage enterprises and public institutions to contribute to the government's efforts. However, not fitting in enterprises' open market cost-benefit calculations, ZAMTES' efforts to actively integrate the business sector into these efforts were left without a success. In fact, the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce in 1988 issued a recommendation for the enterprises to reject any Algerian requests for technical cooperation agreements and in case offer their employees' services exclusively on "commercial terms".[448] Thus, technical cooperation based on principles of solidarity became highly contested by the commercial and financial interests of Yugoslav self-managing enterprises. The altered approach to technical cooperation strongly affected the perception of Yugoslavs as "capitalist profiteers" by their counterparts from the Global South.

After a series of unsuccessful attempts to dispatch a more significant number of experts, in 1987, ZAMTES turned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assess the viability of the technical expert program with Algeria and whether to call off this aspect of cooperation. The figures spoke for themselves: Yugoslavia had only about 20 experts in Algeria. At the same time, almost 250 Algerian students sojourned in Yugoslavia, out of whom 39 held Yugoslav scholarships (from Solidarity Fund or enterprises). Though it did not end with a direct resolution, since the Board decided to proceed with the programme for "political and economic reasons",[449] the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia dispelled any further hopes that technical cooperation between the two countries might ever get restored to the level of the early 1960s.

[447] Note on hiring of healthcare professionals in Algeria, 20 March 1980, HDA-1727-344.
[448] Suggestions by Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce regarding the draft Platform for the 2nd Session of the Subcommission, Belgrade, 5 May 1988, AJ-465-6568.
[449] Report to the Solidarity Fund on the realization of sending 61 experts to work in Algeria, 13 February 1987, AJ-465-6559.

CHAPTER 3. THE RECRUITMENT OF YUGOSLAV EXPERTS

> *"Missions in developing countries are entrusted to specially selected individuals with special human and professional qualities. […] According to generally accepted principles in international technical cooperation, such a task is difficult but honourable."*[450]

The recruitment of Yugoslav technical cooperation experts can be considered part of the phenomenon of mass employment of Yugoslav citizens abroad that began in the 1960s. However, unlike the Gasterbeiter program in the West, technical cooperation with the South was less focused on the inflow of foreign currency in the form of remittances from Yugoslav labour abroad. Rather, the Yugoslav government regarded experts principally as "emissaries working on expanding political and especially economic ties".[451] As they personified the relations between the two political entities, the presence of Algerian students in Yugoslavia and Yugoslav experts in Algeria held a significant symbolic meaning. On one occasion, Abderrahmane Bensid, who served as the Algerian Ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1982 and 1984, in a conversation with ZAMTES Director Miljenko Zrelec, stated that technical experts added "a human dimension" to bilateral relations.[452] From the point of view of Yugoslav policymakers, individuals sent as technical experts embodied the country's political goodwill and solidarity with the post-colonial development projects, while simultaneously promoting Yugoslavia and its national interests.

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[450] Letter from ZAMTES to the Office for Petitions and Complaints of the Assembly of the SFRY, 29 February 1984, AJ-465-6561.
[451] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, p. 111.
[452] Note on talks between Miljenko Zrelec and Ambassador Abderrahmane Bensid, 4 January 1984, AJ-465-6559.

While technical cooperation was declared a manifestation of solidarity between people, a micro-level approach offers an alternative perspective in this regard. This Chapter aims to understand if the ideas of anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and socialist solidarity shaped candidates' motives and if their personal interests aligned with the ones of the state. We can try to get an insight into the matter by examining the recruitment methods and the selection process. In other words, the profile of selected experts and the way they were recruited for the mission in Algeria can help us to understand the multiplicity of individual motives behind the engagement. The second part of Chapter 3 will reveal not only ZAMTES' *laissez-faire* approach towards the preparation process for the mission was normally left to the initiative of the experts but also the existence on both sides of plethora of inhibiting factors to the temporary employment in Algeria within the technical cooperation scheme.

3.1. The Recruitment Process

The Application and Pre-Selection of Candidates

Before ZAMTES in 1962 became the administrative body responsible for managing the recruitment, pre-selection and dispatching of Yugoslav technical experts to developing countries, the Department of Personnel Affairs of the FEC (*Uprava za personalne poslove SIV-a*) was in the service of conducting these affairs.[453] However, the practical task of searching for suitable candidates for employment in Algeria within the framework of technical cooperation was carried out by the semiautonomous branch offices in each republic or province. Once they had collected the applications, the offices forwarded them to Belgrade for the final assessment of the compatibility of candidates' profiles with the Algerian requirements. In case of a positive evaluation, ZAMTES approved the selection and submitted the shortlisted candidates' applications to the Algerian government, usually through the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers, but sometimes directly during one of the sessions of the Joint Commission. The branch offices conducted the search for potential candidates in three main ways: internal job postings, external job postings and open job applications.

Internal job postings were the most relevant recruitment tool during the early period of cooperation, clearly reflecting Yugoslav intentions to select and dispatch personnel with the highest qualifications and professional level. The branch offices directly contacted the management of institutions or enterprises in their respective federal units, asking for a recommendation of employees considered most suitable for the assigned positions in Algeria. The accent in these requests was on candidates' high professional expertise and proficiency in the French language.[454] In fact, this recruitment model enabled ZAMTES to obtain candidates of the desired qualities in a relatively short time. As those who held high positions at their workplace were not actively searching for new jobs, a direct and almost personal approach made it more likely for the already employed candidates with stable jobs and incomes to accept the offer to work in Algeria or other developing countries.[455] Indeed, turning down the invitation was rare. In those

[453] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", p. 172.
[454] Announcement of the replacement of teams at Parnet hospital, 31 March 1964, HDA-1727-346.
[455] Replacement of the team at Parnet hospital, 24 April 1964, HDA-1727-346; Notification of the District of Rijeka to the Croatian branch office of ZAMTES, 17 April 1964, HDA-1727-346.

cases, experts usually cited reasons such as the impossibility to be replaced at the workplace or family reasons.

As a result of this recruitment approach, some of the most eminent names in Yugoslav medicine worked in the service of technical experts in Algeria in the 1960s. In addition to the high level of expertise, their common denominator was political activity. Most of the recruited healthcare workers in Algeria were politically engaged as members of the LCY and/or the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia. This indicates they were familiar with their government's goals in the Third World and aware of the ideological function of their engagement. As members of the LCY, the invitation to embark on a mission in Algeria was part of the political duty to represent the country in the Third World. Similarly to what Young Sun-Hong recognized for the Soviet Bloc, technical cooperation programs served as "effective advertisements" for Yugoslav socialist modernization in the Global South.[456] In the persona of an expert, the dedication to improving the public health situation in the host country was entangled with the aim to showcase the achievements of Yugoslav medical knowledge and practice. For example, the head of the first Croatian medical team in Algeria, surgeon Vinko Frančišković, in parallel spoke of Yugoslav medical aid as "contributing to the faster development of these friendly countries" and "an opportunity for the affirmation of Yugoslav medicine abroad".[457] Despite being grounded on the principles of anti-colonial solidarity, modernization discourse regularly accompanied Yugoslav technical expert missions in the Global South. This will be further discussed in the following chapter.

While promoting the achievements of Yugoslav socialist modernization and contributing to the construction of a positive image of the country abroad, experts also saw the engagement as an opportunity to work on their personal branding. The status which the individuals engaged in the first international technical assistance programmes held in Yugoslav society is suggested by the fact that president Tito himself met experts on several occasions. For example, in January 1963, he invited a group of experts who were about to depart for Algeria.[458] Two years after, during his first official visit to Algeria in 1965, Tito received Yugoslav workers in the Algerian government's residence

[456] Hong, *Cold War Germany,* p. 40.
[457] Letter from Vinko Frančišković to Srećko Jaramaz, 19 January 1963, HDA-1727-346.
[458] „Poruka predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita – Ahmedu Ben Beli, predsedniku vlade Demokratske i Narodne Republike Alžira", Beograd, 16 January 1963 [document no. 14], in *Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi*, p. 28.

Palais du Peuple.[459] Enforced by the developmentalist agenda, during the 1950s and 1960s, the engagement of technical experts held high occupational prestige. The internal selection process, and the fact that there were rarely publicly advertised positions, suggest the exclusivity of the postings, which were at the beginning primarily reserved for party members. This could be indicated by a letter addressed to Josip Zmaić, the first Director of ZAMTES, in which an acquaintance of his referenced a young physician, who had self-initiatively applied for the position in Algeria, saying: "Doctor [V.] Š[.] is not a member of the LCY but for her [ideological] view, work, life [conduct] she would deserve it more than many of her colleagues!"[460] In fact, some renewed medical specialists had several missions in developing countries added to their biography. For example, before going to Algeria in 1965, Croatian radiologist Ivo Borovečki worked between 1956 and 1960 as the head of the radiology department at St. Paul in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In the period between the two stays abroad, Borovečki served as a member of the Social and Health Council of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1965). However, we cannot neglect his private interests, which suggests he was a curious person open to learning and experiencing different cultures. Namely, Borovečki was a polyglot fluent in six languages including Esperanto, while of the same number of languages he had fair knowledge, among which were Amharic and Chinese.[461]

There were far fewer cases when candidates self-initiatively applied to take up positions as technical experts in "one of the friendly countries". During the first half of the 1960s, ZAMTES received open cover letters predominantly from paramedical staff and general practitioners. If a position matching their profile had not been open at the moment of application, the received applications were not discarded but instead stored at ZAMTES. The record of potential candidates for employment as technical cooperation experts was kept as Fond of Cadres *(Fond kadrova)* – a collection of dossiers containing a filled-out application form for working in developing countries together with a resume and additional documents. The awareness of employment opportunities within the framework of Yugoslavia's aid to the Third World circulated among peers. The direct exchanges of information and experiences between colleagues are witnessed by an open letter application by Dragica Kramarić, a midwife who worked at the Clinical Hospital of

[459] „Posjet jugoslavenskog predsjednika Alžiru", *Vjesnik*, 22 April 1965.
[460] Letter to Josip Zmaić [sender illegible], 6 November 1962, HDA-1727-464
[461] Robert Matijašić, "Borovečki, Ivo", *Istrapedia - istarska internetska enciklopedija*, 2014. https://www.istrapedia.hr/en/natuknice/2252/borovecki-ivo. Last access: 26 January 2023.

the Medical Faculty in Zagreb, in which she repeated the phrase of her predecessor, nurse Dragica Krušelj in her application three years earlier.[462] Both women, in identical phrasing, mentioned they had been motivated by "a sincere desire to do their best to help those who need it."[463] In general, candidates rarely specified in their application letters *why* they were interested to take up a job in one of the developing countries. Although, some of them generically mentioned their motivation for applying. For instance, physician L.N., who had to wait 3 years before he finally got the opportunity to work as a general practitioner at the health centre in Affreville (today Khemis Miliana), in his 1960 cover letter wrote how he had "a genuine desire to contribute with his professional work to the humane cause of Yugoslavia's efforts to provide versatile and selfless assistance to Afro-Asian underdeveloped countries."[464]

While humanitarian and altruistic motives, to some extent, played a role in accepting employment in the international development sector, some applicants in their letters explicitly claimed the decisiveness of the economic factor in their choice. The latter is by no means surprising since the Algerian Ministry of Public Health, before entry into the force of the 1965 Convention, offered hefty salaries to foreign experts. This is evident from the Periodic plans, which defined the conditions for the employment of Yugoslav medical experts in Algeria. From these documents, which included the list of salaries, we can read that the wage of the medical staff ranged between 1,250 and 1,350 Algerian francs.[465] General practitioners were offered significantly more, that is 2,000 Algerian francs. Medical specialists earned 2,200, augmented by 100 Algerian francs for those appointed as team leaders. Medical doctors who were also professors at the university received 2,500 Algerian francs for their service.[466] While it is difficult to precisely determine the salary ratio, it can be claimed that the wages in Algeria were on average 4 to 5 times higher than those offered for equivalent positions in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Yugoslav government additionally participated in the salaries of experts employed at hospitals Parnet and Douera, granting an extra amount in Yugoslav dinars equivalent to their monthly stipend at the home

[462] Open letter by Dragica Kramarić, 8 June 1963, HDA-1727-455.
[463] Cover letter by Dragica Krušelj, November 1960, HDA-1727-456.
[464] Cover letter by Ladislav Nikolić, 28 November 1960, HDA-1727-460.
[465] The Algerian franc was in circulation until 1964, with equal value and fully convertible against the French franc.
[466] Prvi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 12/1964; Drugi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ,* no. 9/1965.

institution.[467] Yet, unlike the regular transfer rate for Yugoslav experts of 45%, the First Plan and the Second Plan defined the rate for salaries in which the Yugoslav government participated as only 25%.[468] Since three-quarters of the earnings could not be taken out of the country, the experts bought from their savings in local currency a wide range of goods that they shipped back to Yugoslavia. According to the lists of imported goods, these included electronic devices (television and radio receivers, gramophones, tape recorders), household appliances (refrigerators, electric stoves, washing machines, clothes irons, vacuum cleaners, sewing machines), cameras, typewriters, different types of fabrics, bedding, artisan carpets, and traditional art pieces.[469] Considering that in the 1960s the cost of a television receiver in Yugoslavia was equal to seven average wages,[470] we can get the impression of how lucrative the venture in Algeria for the Yugoslavs was back then. The import lists also reveal that after a long-term engagement, it was not uncommon to return home with the most grandiose industrial good at that time and the ultimate status symbol of the socialist era. From one such document, we see that a nurse who worked in Algeria for almost 4 years bought a car from her savings in Algerian dinars.[471] Aware of strong monetary impulses, the Yugoslav authorities warned ZAMTES officials to pay special attention in the recruitment phase that the candidates were not driven to Algeria solely by financial reasonings but also by "professional and political" motives, that is "a desire to provide real help and contribute to the development of [bilateral] relations".[472]

By introducing turmoil in payment conditions, the 1965 Convention significantly changed the financial situation for Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria. First, with the termination of the financial participation of the Yugoslav government, experts' families which stayed at home from that moment on had to rely exclusively on remittances achieved from the transfer of the earnings in Algeria. Secondly, the brand-new bilateral document incorporated experts into the system of local wages. Since experts were to be paid exclusively by the Algerian government, the Yugoslav officials at first gladly

[467] Notification from ZAMTES to the Croatian branch office, 2 March 1963, HDA-1727-464.
[468] Prvi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 12/1964; Drugi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ,* no. 9/1965.
[469] List of items for customs-free import from Algeria (Ivan Zdenković), HDA-1727-467; List of items for customs-free import (Nada Veletić), 28 June 1966, HDA-1727-465.
[470] Ivana Dobrivojević, "Kuće na selu", in *Nikad im bolje nije bilo? Modernizacija svakodnevnog života u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji*, ed. Ana Panić (Beograd: Muzej istorije Jugoslavije): 49.
[471] Customs-free vehicle import request (Ivanka Vrbanić), 12 July 1967, HDA-1727-466.
[472] The organization of technical assistance to Algeria, n.d., AJ-559-56, p. 3.

accepted such provisions, calculating the significant relief on the federal budget. As for experts themselves, this change was quite ambivalent: while physicians were offered higher salaries, the wages of paramedical staff and some groups of engineers significantly decreased. According to a ZAMTES report, physicians received gross amounts from 2,800 to 3,000 Algerian dinars, while medical staff and technicians' salaries ranged anywhere from 600 to 1,200 Algerian dinars per month. Depending on the length of work experience and position, engineers received monthly salaries from 1,500 to 2,500 dinars.[473] Significantly, after the Convention came into force, the salaries were no longer expressed in a fixed pay scale attached to the Periodic Plans but were expected to be communicated through diplomatic channels. Yet, this information was rarely obtained together with the request for experts but was typically announced only after the Algerian administration accepted the candidates and handed out the job offer. Indeed, after they had familiarized themselves with the new financial terms, most candidates eventually gave up on the mission.[474] This showcases how much important monetary considerations were in experts' personal motivations. Thus, it is not surprising that low incomes were one of the main, although not the only, reasons for Yugoslavs losing enthusiasm to work in Algeria. Even so, wages in Algeria had not been reformed for a full 10 years, that is until a new salary scale was adopted with the 1975 Exchange of Letters. Due to a low number of applicants, the period after 1965, which was spanning well into the 1970s, was dubbed "the recruitment crisis".[475]

On the other hand, there were personal motives for the experts to take up the mission in Algeria which were not purely financial or status-seeking. Employment via international technical cooperation programmes represented an opportunity for transcontinental travel and experiencing different lifestyles, and discovering new societies and cultures.[476] While for most of them this was the first time they set foot outside Yugoslavia's European neighbourhood and crossed the Mediterranean, some experts previously worked in Algeria or other developing countries as part of their companies' investment projects, within the UN's agencies' development programmes or other Yugoslavia's bilateral technical aid projects in developing countries.[477] In other

[473] Information on technical cooperation with Algeria, 22 October 1969, AJ-465-6549, p. 6.
[474] Points for negotiations on the subject of technical cooperation, n.d., AJ-465-6549, p.2.
[475] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju,* p. 110
[476] Job application (V. M.), n.d., HDA-1727-457.
[477] For example, see: Curriculum Vitae (F. B.), Zagreb, 13 July 1984, HDA-1727-457.

cases, at some point in their career, the experts had undergone educational programmes or training abroad, usually in the "capitalist countries" of France, West Germany, and the US, whereby acquiring Western technological knowledge and know-how. Although the Yugoslav regulations initially restricted the stay of technical experts abroad to a maximum of 3 years, which was later extended to 5 years, some individuals spent a significant part of their life working in the Global South on a private contract. For example, Julinka Bjelan worked within the technical cooperation agenda as the main nurse at the paediatric department of the hospital in Cherchell in the period from 1963 to 1965. Upon return from Algeria, she had been employed for 6 years at the Clinical Hospital of the Medical Faculty in Zagreb before she decided to take up a job in Libya on a private contract on two occasions – in Tripoli from 1971 to 1979 and Misurata between 1981 and 1984. In 1985, she applied to join the Bou Saada medical team in Algeria as a cooperant but was rejected due to her late age.[478]

Compared to other foreign experts, Phillip C. Naylor indicated a variety of reasons why French cooperants served in Algeria. One of the most common was a substitution for military service. Namely, for the military cooperants or the Volontaires de Service National Actif (VSNA) time spent in Algeria accounted for military service.[479] Another motive for the French to accept the role of cooperants in the former colonial territory was financial gain. The salary of a civilian technical expert could get three times higher than that of their compatriots, usually on account of the daily allowance. On the other hand, there was a significant disparity in salaries between civilian and military cooperants which led to dissatisfaction and complaints of the latter and spurred tensions between the two groups. Other motivations for participation in the missions of technical cooperation were altruism, redemption over the Algerian War and ideological solidarity with the revolutionary regime. Finally, according to a report written by a Yugoslav physician who worked in the Centre Hospitalo-Universitaire Mustapha Pacha, the French cooperants saw former Francophone colonies as a chance to earn the habitation for a university professorship, which was otherwise difficult to obtain in their home country due to the lack of positions and fierce competition.[480]

[478] Curriculum Vitae (J. B.), n.d., HDA-1727-449
[479] Philip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), p. 63, 133.
[480] Report by Mirko Jankov, Algiers, 6 June 1967, HDA-1727-457.

With the loss of occupational prestige and less lucrative salaries offered by the Algerian government, ZAMTES resorted to an alternative method of finding experts. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, external job postings became a more prominent recruitment tool. However, even in the earlier period, the possibilities of employment in the Global South within the framework of international technical cooperation were promoted through occasional public advertisement in media outlets and activities of ZAMTES. For example, in November 1960, technical experts' positions in the Third World were advertised in daily newspapers. As a part of the exhibition "Asia-Africa-Yugoslavia", set up at the 1963 Autumn Zagreb Fair, ZAMTES invited highly skilled workers to Algeria and other countries of the Third World.[481] Already in 1965, in the atmosphere of the democratization and liberalization reforms, the Yugoslav authorities recognized the need that "every citizen – expert, under equal conditions, can compete to work in developing countries". To achieve greater inclusiveness of the positions of international technical experts, the government enforced a decision defining external job postings as the primary recruitment tool, while a direct selection of experts, achieved by reaching out to renewed specialists, was to be conducted only when selecting ministerial advisors or in the case of UN experts.[482] Nevertheless, the method of external job postings was implemented consistently only in the 1980s. Namely, fearing it might reduce the quality of dispatched personnel and the overall results of technical cooperation programmes,[483] ZAMTES favoured the exclusivity and selectivity of the recruitment process. For example, the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers warned ZAMTES that only "AN ADEQUATE CHOICE [of experts] WILL MEAN THE AFFIRMATION OF OUR [socialist] EXPERIENCE AND [self-management] SYSTEM".[484]

As it was becoming increasingly difficult to find candidates under less attractive financial conditions, ZAMTES eventually decided to publish more consistently openings in daily newspapers and specialized journals in order to reach a wider audience. For example, the Croatian office published tenders in dailies Vjesnik and Večernji list in February 1985.[485] A month before, the economy-specialized daily newspaper "Privredni pregled" promoted employment opportunities for technical experts in Algeria by

[481] Tot, „Odnosi Jugoslavije i Alžira", p. 24.
[482] Explanation of the decision of the FEC, 20 March 1963, AJ-130-607, p.6.
[483] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, 110.
[484] Embassy note No. 746, 21 October 1981, AJ-465-6561.
[485] *Večernji list*, 9 and 10 February 1985, vol. XXIX, no. 7825, p. 31.

publishing an article under the title "A Job for the Highly Educated" ("Posao za visokoobrazovane").[486] The highly-requested civil engineer positions at the Algerian Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Urbanism and Construction were advertised in specialized journals for civil engineering – the March 1985 edition of *Ceste i mostovi*[487] and the May 1985 edition of *Građevinar.*[488] Generally, the outcome of these external job postings was low and unsatisfactory. Though, a slight interest was recorded after communicating the Algerian announcement of a 30% salary augmentation.[489] As the economic crisis in the 1980s hit Yugoslavia, particularly the construction industry,[490] in search of financial conditions more favourable than those at home individuals considered employment opportunities in the oil-producing countries of the Global South.[491] However, as clear from some of the cover letters, applicants did not well-comprehend the particularities of the employment within the technical cooperation framework. Oftentimes, they relied on the experiences of the workers who accompanied investment projects of Yugoslav enterprises, who reported having „good living conditions" in these countries.[492] In contrast, technical experts employed directly by foreign governments were paid half as much as the workers posted abroad by the enterprises. Even ZAMTES believed that, by receiving 4,680 Algerian Dinars per month, certain profiles of experts were severely underpaid and were brought to the brink of an existential crisis. After Algerian political representatives had refused the request to increase the wages of secondary school teachers, ZAMTES decided to stop sending personnel to the Ministry of National Education.[493]

Apart from financial incentives, job advertisements grabbed the attention of civil engineers and architects ready to help African statesmen, who preferred to invite urban planners and architects from Eastern Europe for their ideological background, in

[486] *Privredni pregled*, 3 January 1985, vol. XXXIV, no. 7962, p. 3.
[487] *Ceste i mostovi* 31 (3), 1985, p. 120.
[488] *Građevinar* 37 (5), 1985, p. 193.
[489] Letter from ZAMTES to the Board of Directors of the Solidarity Fund, 23 June 1986, AJ-465-6559.
[490] Information with a proposal for determining participation in the salaries of Yugoslav experts in developing countries, Beograd, March 1981, AJ-465-6571, p. 5.
[491] Open letter (V. B.) for employment in African or Arab countries, Rijeka, 30 May 1985, HDA-1727-448.
[492] Open letter (V. B.) for employment in Algeria, Rijeka, 28 May 1985, HDA-1727-448.
[493] Report on discussions on technical cooperation at the 15th Session of the Joint Commission, 1986, HDA-1727-344.

redesigning modern post-colonial urban centres.[494] The African continent, and Algeria in particular, was at the time a large and prospective construction site attracting urban design enthusiasts from around the world. For engineers and architects from Yugoslavia, it was an opportunity to demonstrate their expertise and turn their visions of Yugoslav modernist design into tangible construction projects beyond the national borders.[495] However, unless they were directly engaged by their employers (the case of the Hidroelektra group, which is discussed in Chapter 4), these external job postings did not attract engineers from large, eminent, and export-oriented Yugoslav engineering enterprises who were holding well-paid positions but predominantly workers from smaller, local construction firms, usually from SR Serbia.



Figure 1. Distribution of Yugoslav technical experts in the Algerian administration expressed in absolute values and percentages (1982 - 1990)

In the period of cooperation between 1982 and 1990, civil engineers and architects composed the majority of Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria. Out of a total of 81 dispatched experts, 25 were employed by the Ministry of Planning, Urbanism and Construction. For the Ministry of Hydraulics (the Hidroelektra group) worked 8 experts, and 6 of them were at the Ministry of Public Works. In comparison to the 1960s, when the dominant group of experts were medical professionals, during the 1980s, only 8 of

[494] Paul Betts and Radina Vučetić, "Culture" In *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization*, eds. James Mark and Paul Betts (London: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2022), p. 154-155

[495] Cover letter by J. V., Zagreb, 15 December 1985, HDA-1727-466; Curriculum vitae (T. B.), Split, 25 May 1985, HDA-1727-450, p. 5.

them were sent to Algeria, precisely to the town of Bou Saada in 1987. The regional composition also drastically changed in the 1980s. In 1963, ¾ of dispatched experts came from SR Croatia and SR Serbia, in an approximately equivalent ratio.[496] Interestingly, the candidates from Croatia made up only 13% of all applicants from the Federation.[497] The high success rate testifies that their profiles highly matched the Algerian administration's preferences. With the change in the recruitment methods and conditions of employment, the figures for Croatian experts were gradually dropping. In the 1980s, the percentage of dispatched Croats and Serbs dropped to about 40% in favour of experts from other republics and provinces. Instead, increased recruitment for Algeria was recorded among experts from SR Macedonia (21%), SR Bosnia and Herzegovina (19%) and AP Vojvodina (14%). In absolute proportions, the ratio between republics was relatively balanced. However, more populated and more developed regions had greater human resources potential. The least number of personnel for Algeria – only 4 and 1, were provided by SR Slovenia and SR Montenegro, respectively. Though their applications were recorded, not a single expert was recruited from AP Kosovo.



Figure 2. Regional distribution of Yugoslav experts in Algeria (1982 - 1990)

The Yugoslav recruitment model and the organization of technical cooperation significantly differed from the way experts from state socialist countries of Eastern Europe were hired. This difference, based on the self-management system extending workers' decision-making rights, it seems was not clear to the Algerian political representatives. Speaking to the Algerian negotiators, Yugoslav delegates had to explain

[496] „Tabela br. 4. Pregled izabranih stručnjaka po republikama koji se nalaze na radu u zemljama u razvoju", in *Izvještaj o radu Saveznog zavoda za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju za 1963. godinu i plan rada za 1964. godinu* (Belgrade: Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju, December 1963).
[497] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, p. 108.

that there was "no possibility of administrative selection of experts" but that individuals' decision was determined by the "attractiveness of the terms of engagement" in the host country.[498] In fact, there is no indication whatsoever that Yugoslav experts were impelled directly or indirectly. In a conversation with the Algerian delegates, the Director of ZAMTES Krsto Bulajić

> "[…] pointed out the differences between our country and socialist countries in terms of recruiting experts, as well as the fact that Yugoslavia is an open country and that our experts are free and independent in deciding where to go."[499]

As Bulajić noted, and as is also visible from the submitted applications, the candidates were fully open to deciding which "Third World countries" they would consider going to. Usually, they expressed a preference for countries with "favourable climate". Moreover, they were free to give up at any moment in the hiring process. The ultimate decision was on the individual and ZAMTES could only proceed with the hiring action upon acquiring the consent of the applicant. As it relied on the current interest of candidates and their immediate availability, ZAMTES could not firmly adhere to cooperation programs. In fact, apart from Algeria, Yugoslavia avoided giving strict promises to other partners by defining in advance the number of experts it had to provide. On the other hand, because technical cooperation was integrated with the economic sector, other Eastern European governments easily and rapidly mobilized personnel on *ad-hoc* requests and were ready to provide a replacement for the experts who terminated their missions.[500] Apart from relying exclusively on the wages offered in the Algerian labour market, the fact that Yugoslavia did not have sufficient highly skilled workers with decent knowledge of the French language created additional difficulties for ZAMTES in finding candidates and prevented the fulfilment of the Algerian requests.

The only exception to the rule were the Annual plans for 1963/1964 and 1964/1965, which Yugoslavia almost completely met.[501] However, even at that time, ZAMTES faced serious difficulties in finding personnel due to the general lack of staff. This was especially true for certain groups of medical specialists such as orthopaedists

[498] Report on the talks of the ad-hoc working group for scientific and technical cooperation, Beograd, 6 November 1974, AJ-465-6553.
[499] Note on the talks between Krsto Bulajić and Abdelghani Kesri, 22 January 1974, AJ-465-6572, p. 2.
[500] Ibid.
[501] Prvi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 12/1964; Drugi periodični plan, *Službeni list SFRJ,* no. 9/1965.

and anaesthesiologists, the latter counting only 48 in the entire country. Generally, Yugoslavia's capacities to perform this type of solidarity action were significantly more limited than its socialist Eastern European counterparts. However, Yugoslav officials, including Tito, often turned the tables and proclaimed that sending experts to the partners in the Global South, while the country itself was lacking staff, was ultimately a genuine expression of solidarity. Despite staff shortages, between 1962 and 1965, Yugoslavia dispatched to Algeria as many as 545 experts, predominately health workers. In comparison to other socialist countries, Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1960s had a limited number of doctors, both general practitioners and specialists, despite their gradual yearly increase in absolute numbers. In 1962, there was on average 1 doctor per approximately 1,400 inhabitants in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union, the ratio was 1 doctor per 497 inhabitants. The available data from the Federal Institute of Public Health for the year 1964 show that SR Croatia and SR Slovenia had the most favourable ratio of doctors in Yugoslavia, which amounted to 1,010 and 1,030, respectively. At the same time, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, SR Bosna and Herzegovina and SR Montenegro had the lowest rates (3,185, 2,180 and 1,860, respectively). These numbers indicate that the quota of doctors in Yugoslavia was not sufficient to provide adequate health care to the overall population, especially in rural areas within certain republics and provinces. For instance, in the municipality of Novo Brdo in AP Kosovo and Metohija, the rate was as low as 1 doctor per 29,000 inhabitants. According to the then-standard of the United Nations, the minimum requirement for basic health care conditions in developing countries was 1 doctor over a maximum of 10,000 inhabitants. This norm did not fulfil half of the municipalities in AP Kosovo and Metohija and a total of 10% of municipalities on the federal level.[502]

Apart from the lack of cadres, which was a real drawback for Yugoslavia, ZAMTES experienced additional difficulties in finding candidates. Namely, highly skilled workers were dispatched not only to Algeria but also to other developing countries, predominantly Ethiopia, Libya and Morocco.[503] Instead of Algeria, hundreds of experts,

[502] "Kadrovski potencijal" in *Zdravstvo u Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj: razvoj, stanje, perspektive*, Zdravlje i zdravstvena zaštita, vol. 1, eds. Boško Popović, Slaven Letica and Milan Škrbić (Zagreb : Republički komitet za zdravstvenu i socijalnu zaštitu Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske, Jugoslavenska medicinska naklada, Škola narodnog zdravlja "Andrija Štampar", Medicinski fakultet, 1981): p. 407-421; „Zdravstveni radnici sa medicinskom spremom u 1964" In *Jugoslovenski pregled*, June 1965, p. 11-13.
[503] First Yugoslav medical experts to Libya were dispatched in 1961. Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, p. 107.

particularly healthcare professionals, opted to work in other countries which provided more attractive material conditions, particularly Libya. The already narrow pool of potential candidates was additionally reduced by the language barrier. Concerning the medical teams dispatched in the 1960s, the requirement of proficiency in the French language applied to doctors, especially team leaders, while it was preferred that the rest of the personnel was acquainted with the language. In the later period, proficiency in the French or Arabic language was one of the main conditions for application set by the Algerian side. To improve their language skills, ZAMTES organized group courses for the first groups of experts.[504] However, the practice was quickly abandoned. Instead, future experts were requested to individually enrol in a foreign language course or were encouraged to adopt self-learning methods.

Overall, the Yugoslav recruitment process showed as time-consuming and inefficient, resulting in delays and failures to meet undertaken obligations. To speed up the procedure and receive experts at the earliest possible, the Algerian administration occasionally sent representatives to Belgrade to personally and on the spot carry out the interviews and the selection of candidates.[505] The lack of long-term planning and organisation of Yugoslavia's international technical cooperation was one of the key reasons for this failure. At the time when bilateral technical aid set off in the early 1960s, ZAMTES discussed the idea of sending experienced professionals to developing countries while substituting them at home with unemployed youth who would later acquire sufficient experience to apply for technical experts' positions themselves. However, the plan of circular dispatching of experts had never been implemented. Instead, fresh university graduates who had the aspiration to travel and work abroad were not eligible to apply because of ZAMTES' requirement of having a minimum of 3 years of work experience. Furthermore, apart from the cases when experts had previously worked as technical experts, ZAMTES did not consider shortlisting unemployed people for missions in developing countries. The eligible candidates were only individuals already employed on a permanent contract in Yugoslavia.[506] In addition

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[504] „Foto vijest: Zdravstvena ekipa za Alžir", *Večernji list*, 3 September 1963.
[505] Note from the meeting of the Permanent Working Group for Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Algeria, 12 March 1985, HDA-1727-344.
[506] "Zabeleška o sastanku u Kabinetu potpretsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća A. Rankovića na dan 14. X. 1959 godine po pitanjima upućivanja stručnjaka u azisko-afričke zemlje", Belgrade, 30 October 1959, AJ-130-607, p. 2.

to ZAMTES, the Algerian administration also set high criteria for the selection of candidates.

The Algerian Selection Criteria

As seen in the previous section, Yugoslavia paid special attention to the professional level of experts dispatched to Algeria. Aiming to secure high-level candidates, ZAMTES introduced a set of pre-selection conditions for the applicants. After passing the first step at their Personnel Commission (*Kadrovska komisija*), candidates awaited the next stage of recruitment – the Algerian selection process. Because of the challenging criteria set by the Algerian administration, the percentage of rejected Yugoslav candidates was unexpectedly high. For illustration, in 1984, the Algerians discarded all 29 candidates for university professor positions. The same year, the entire third group of 23 agronomists nominated in May 1984 was rejected. Another astonishing example was the rejection of 95% of candidates for the hydraulics sector. Until the beginning of 1987, ZAMTES forwarded dossiers of a total of 284 candidates. Only 118 were accepted and eventually, 67 were dispatched. In sum, since the conclusion of the Agreement, about half of Yugoslavia's candidates have been eliminated and only a quarter was sent to work abroad. The Algerian administration offered as an explanation for the high percentage of rejected applicants the fact that ZAMTES' submissions of candidates arrived after the deadline or inadequate candidate profiles, which, however, often came as a result of the absence of delivering precise descriptions of the job positions.[507] Yet, the most common reason for rejection was the age of the candidates. One of the requirements that the Algerians were strictly adhering to was a minimum of 12 years of professional experience enforced by the 1982 Agreement. At the same time, experts had to be less than 60 years of age. In 1985, an exception for medical specialists was introduced, accepting those with 8 to 12 years of professional experience, but with a 10% wage deduction. Because it was difficult to find candidates whose experience matched the age limit, ZAMTES still tried its luck by forwarding dossiers of individuals who were older than 60. Yet, the Algerian authorities were strict in implementing the rule. For example, concerning the 1985 request by the Ministry of Health for 26 specialists for the hospital

[507] Note from the meeting of the Permanent Working Group for Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Algeria, 12 March 1985, HDA-1727-344.

in Bou Saada, 19 candidates were discarded due to their age, including some former experts who served in Algeria in the 1960s. As a result of the Algerian policy, most experienced candidates, some of who previously worked as cooperants, were rejected because they were over 60 years old.[508] To broaden the pool of potential candidates, ZAMTES officials proposed to their partners to extend hiring to young professionals with less experience. The Algerian representatives rejected the Yugoslav proposal, explaining they were not interested in getting younger people with insufficient working experience because "such experts cannot make a satisfactory contribution".[509] By setting such conditions, the Algerians brought ZAMTES into a stalemate position.

In most cases, only experts who were just under the age of 60 could successfully meet the Algerian criteria. In fact, the dispatched experts were on average 55 years old. This age compromise entailed additional problems. Despite the awareness of younger personnel having "greater adaptability to the lack of comfort", ZAMTES was constrained to sending senior experts who had more difficulties in adjusting to the new working environment.[510] Apart from adaptation, older experts were more susceptible to geriatric diseases. Even though experts along the lines of colonial discourses complained that the food, water and climate in Algeria presented a "health risk" (what will be further discussed in the following Chapter), deteriorated working and living conditions in some cases objectively affected their health and exacerbated maladies. Though a standard practice for experts leaving for the mission abroad was to undergo a general medical check to determine their health status, it seems that these examinations were often done routinely and superficially. After several cases of leaving the mission due to the deterioration of chronic diseases (e.g. diabetes, hypertension), Algerians claimed Yugoslavia sent "ill people" to work in their country.[511] Consequently, ZAMTES in the second half of the 1980s adopted more rigorous health criteria for experts scheduled to work in southern Algerian provinces. With regular medical check-ups, the candidate had to undergo a special check-up in order to provide a health certificate testifying to "capability of working in difficult climatic conditions in developing countries".[512]

[508] Report on discussions on technical cooperation at the 16th Session of the Joint Commission, 1987, HDA-1727-344.
[509] Report on the business trip by Dobrivoje Drašković, 1983, HDA-1727-345.
[510] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to ZAMTES, Algiers, 25 June 1984, AJ-465-6561.
[511] Embassy's note No. 394, 10 April 1985, AJ-465-6563.
[512] Health certificate, 30 May 1985, AJ-465-6563.

On the other hand, many candidates who had successfully met the Algerian criteria and were accepted by the Algerian government eventually did not depart on time or even at all. The commonly given explanation by the Algerian authorities was the lack of accommodation capacities.[513] In other cases, experts had their departure delayed for several weeks due to the airline tickets not being delivered on time. Primarily because they had already quit their jobs in Yugoslavia, disruptions in the departure caused experts financial losses. For example, a secondary school teacher, whose departure was postponed for 3 weeks, complained about how she had started paying social security contributions while staying without an income.[514] Moreover, the Algerian practice of stating declarative acceptance but not an actual "official acceptance" created confusion and misunderstandings in the communication channels between ZAMTES and its branch offices. In a case from 1977, a candidate from SR Slovenia was communicated by the Slovenian branch office that the Algerian administration had accepted his candidacy. However, it turned out that the Slovenian officials misinterpreted ZAMTES' note. Thus, not only did he not get the opportunity to work in Algeria, but the candidate lost his previous employment in the Central African Empire as he had already quit his job with the enterprise "Slovenijales" who posted him to Africa. For this reason, he filed a lawsuit against the Slovenian ZAMTES.[515] Likewise, due to the slow process of the Algerian administration's feedback on the applications, numerous experts eventually gave up on the engagement. Some of them had to wait several years before receiving the invitation to take up the job in Algeria. Despite that the deadline to inform of the decision was within 3 months of receiving the list of candidates, the Algerian administration typically did not provide feedback on the selection process.

Another important condition to be conscripted among the contingent cooperants in Algeria was proficiency in the French language. To ensure that candidates had a satisfactory level of language proficiency, ZAMTES organised an assessment of the French language before departure. However, this practice was abolished by the end of the 1960s for pragmatic reasons. Namely, the majority of the working-age population of

[513] Minutes from the 1st Session of the Algerian-Yugoslav Subcommittee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, 24 December 1984, HDA-1727-345.
[514] Termination of the mission (N. L.), 8 July 1987, HDA-1727-347.
[515] For example, see: „ZADEVA: ALŽIRIJA – odškodninski zahtevek tov. Ljuba ing. Podreke", 15 December 1978; Letter from Ljubo Pordreka's attorney-at-law to ZAMTES' Slovenian branch office in Ljubljana, Bangui, n.d.; Lawsuit against the Slovenian branch office, n.d.; AJ-465-6554.

Yugoslavia did not possess knowledge of the French language, which significantly reduced the already limited pool of potential candidates. Though it was one of the most important selection criteria, in practice, ZAMTES turned a blind eye by allowing candidates with only elementary or even without any knowledge to apply. In fact, language skills were one of the main problems with the engagement of Yugoslav experts in Algeria on multiple aspects. Selecting people with insufficient language skills reflected on individuals' daily experiences but also the reputation of Yugoslav experts and overall technical cooperation. Dissatisfied with the level of language proficiency among Yugoslav cooperants, on several occasions, the Algerian administration sent their envoys to Belgrade to directly assess the level of French language proficiency of shortlisted candidates. Due to the nature of the job, which encompassed a direct transfer of knowledge to pupils and students, oral and written language skills were increasingly important for lecturers in secondary schools and universities. For instance, in May 1985, the representatives of the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education arrived in Yugoslavia to conduct interviews with candidates to examine their level of the French language.[516] On the other hand, a group of high school teachers who departed for Algeria in 1985 did not undergo language testing. The Embassy foresaw that the group, in which only one person possessed language proficiency, would have difficulties in everyday life and the working environment due to poor language skills.[517] In the efforts to overcome the language barrier, the Yugoslav side appointed teams with at least one person fluent in the local language, while important missions, such as the one of Hidroelektra in 1985, were accompanied by two interpreters.

Finally, apart from the knowledge of the foreign language, it is important to reflect on the individual characteristics of the dispatched Yugoslav experts. Ideally, to work in a such multicultural environment and oftentimes live in austerity, experts had to possess not only hard skills but also soft skills, particularly adaptability and resourcefulness. Resourceful and adaptable experts had a higher chance to come to terms with the conditions of work and life utterly different from what they were accustomed to back at home. Thus, the overall success of their mission depended not only on their expertise but also on their personality traits such as open-mindedness,

[516] Note on the visit of the commission of the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education, 15 May 1985, AJ-465-6562.
[517] Embassy's note No. 944, 27 September 1985, AJ-465-6562.

cultural sensitivity, patience and humility. An expert noted: "I think the qualities needed for such a mission are modesty and wisdom […] we came here as technical aid, and not to be worshipped."[518] Another expert expressed his awareness that the lack of language skills but also knowledge of traditions and cultures among dispatched experts caused misunderstandings and prejudices.[519] Indeed, experts arrived in Algeria with a set of prejudice that posed a serious obstacle to successful integration into the new environment. Even those who had previous experience in international technical cooperation in diverse countries and regions of the Global South had not been exempted from observing the host country and its society through a combination of ideological, ethnocentric and even (neo)colonial lenses. Of course, this was not an exclusive trait of Yugoslav experts but generally a feature of foreign cooperants, independent of the Cold War bloc division.[520]

Subsequent Recognition of Technical Expert Status

Apart from the three previously mentioned most common ways of recruitment, employment in Algeria under the framework of technical cooperation sometimes took unusual trajectories. This primarily concerned Yugoslav citizen who worked in Algeria on private engagements. For instance, from his letter to ZAMTES, we find out that B. Andronovski had been spending his vacation in France and Italy when he paid a visit to Algeria and found employment "with the help from his comrades from the [Yugoslav] Embassy".[521] Even though they had not been recruited by ZAMTES, Yugoslav citizens employed in Algeria on private contracts were still able to request to be recognized as experts within the framework of the bilateral technical agreement. Namely, Yugoslav citizens holding the status of technical cooperation experts were entitled to certain rights and benefits at home. First of all, if regularly paying contributions in Yugoslavia, experts had their service in Algeria recognized. Secondly, experts benefited from custom privileges. When importing goods bought from savings in Algerian Dinars, they were exempted from customs duties within six months from the return home. In the same vein, they were exempted from foreign income taxation as well as taxation of part of

[518] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.
[519] Report by K. Z.) n.d., AJ-465-6571.
[520] Iacob and Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization", 134.
[521] Letter from B. A., 13 September 1968, AJ-465-6551.

their salary in Yugoslav Dinars. Lastly, experts kept the tenancy rights for public housing they had been granted as employees of Yugoslav firms. Otherwise, they would lose that right by being absent from the apartment due to temporary working abroad.

However, there were certain preconditions for granting the technical expert status. The request could be submitted to ZAMTES upon the prior approval of the foreign employer but only after the expert had worked for long enough to prove his or her "working and moral qualities". Usually, the minimum period for the request was after working for over a year. Apart from that, the Yugoslav Embassy had to give a positive opinion of the expert's "reputation" regarding his/her "expertise and personal conduct".[522] The applicants for expert status within the framework of technical cooperation recognition were usually those individuals who had been previously ZAMTES candidates for Algeria but were offered better financial conditions under a private contract. Similarly, some experts requesting to be recognized were those who after the expiration of the contract with ZAMTES, remained to work in Algeria as part of a private engagement that was outside the scope of the bilateral agreement. The majority of experts who found themselves in this situation were those who, upon return from Algeria, faced difficulties in finding employment in Yugoslavia. In fact, almost as a rule, upon returning from the mission in developing countries, experts ended up unemployed. Only a few fortunate got the chance to get offered a position in Yugoslavia as a reward for their service abroad. One of them was agronomy engineer Ivan Baričević. After completing the five-year mission at the Ministry of Agriculture, he remained in Algeria for another year as the representative of the enterprise „Generalinvest" until October 1969.[523]

Alternatively to seeking job opportunities in the West, unemployed experts often turned to ZAMTES to send them on a new mission in the Global South. As this process was rather slow, they proactively and self-initiatively sought direct employment opportunities across the Mediterranean, subsequently asking ZAMTES to recognize their technical cooperation expert status. For example, after returning in 1968 from the three-year mission at the hospital in Orléansville (later El-Asnam; today Chlef), otorhinolaryngology specialist Božidar Holz held ZAMTES responsible of finding him

[522] Letter from ZAMTES to the Embassy in Algeria, October 1968, AJ-465-6551.
[523] Certificate on the mission in Algeria issued to Ivan Baričević, 20 December 1976, HDA-1727-448.

position at home. However, because ZAMTES was "not authorized to find him employment in the country", the Belgrade office forwarded his curriculum to the Libyan Embassy. Yet, the response from Libya took too long. After remaining unemployed for almost a year and a half, he decided to take things in his hands and return to Algeria. In July 1969, Holz self-initiatively found a job at the Béjaïa hospital, where he stayed until June 1972. His request to be recognised as a technical cooperation expert was positively resolved by ZAMTES in January 1970.[524] However, not all applicants were granted the status of expert. For example, the request of surgeon Boris Hameršak in 1973 was rejected since upon terminating his technical expert contract in Algeria in September 1964, he had emigrated to Morocco and took up a job at the hospital Avicenne in Rabat without ever noting ZAMTES about his transfer.[525]

As some of these examples indicate, after the return from the mission in Algeria, experts did not receive acknowledgement for their service.[526] Apart from previously mentioned benefits – foreign service recognition, exemption from taxation of foreign income, custom privileges, and retaining tenancy rights, the Yugoslav government did not implement further stimulative measures to induce highly-skilled individuals to take up positions as experts in Algeria. On the contrary, certain legislative changes had a disincentive effect as they the legislature treated them "citizens on temporary work abroad" (*građani na privremenom radu u inozemstvu*). For example, after the Customs Law was amended in December 1971, experts lost the right to the customs-free import of unused items. More significant was, however, that they did not receive additional financial stimulation during their stay abroad nor they were guaranteed employment upon return home. Precisely because of the unregulated employment status and uncertainty of re-employment upon return, many potential candidates gave up on the mission. In the rest of the chapter, we will see how the preparations for the departure went for those who decided and were chosen to become experts in Algeria.

[524] „Holz Božidar, OLR. Prijedlog za upućivanje u Libiju ili druge zemlje.", 15 October 1968; „Holz Božidar, OLR. Predložen za rad u Libiju.", 10 March 1969; Note from ZAMTES to Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, 4 November 1969; HDA-1727-453.
[525] Letter from Boris Hameršak to the Yugoslav Embassy in Rabat, Rabat, 20 February 1973; „Predmet: Maroko, molba Hameršak Dr Borisa za priznavanje stručnjaka tehničke saradnje", Belgrade, 2 April 1973; „Predmet: MAROKO, molba Hameršak Dr Borisa za priznavanje statusa stručnjaka tehničke suradnje", Belgrade, 18 April 1973; HDA-1727-453.
[526] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, 105.

3. 2. Pre-Departure Preparations

Employment Status

Both on departure and return, the engagement in Algeria via official government channels was accompanied by a complex set of problems. Once the Algerian government positively resolved the candidacy and accepted the expert, he/she could have begun with administrative pre-departure preparations. One of the most important duties in this phase for the future expert was to regulate his/her employment status in Yugoslavia. Depending on the decision of the current employer, the expert could have been granted unpaid leave. While ZAMTES proposed enterprises offer the possibility of inactive employment status,[527] enterprises and institutions were rarely eager to give a suspension of employment to their employees embarking on missions in the Global South. Despite ZAMTES's recommendation to apply Article 191 of the Associated labour act (*Zakon o udruženom radu*)[528], granting unpaid leave to the employee sent as technical cooperation experts to developing countries, which was also extended to the spouses if joining, the employers refrained from doing so. From the point of view of the employers, the absence of a worker for a couple of years was an instant deficit in human capital. Moreover, since missions were not scheduled ahead, it was difficult to find substitutes for the departing staff. Finally, in some sectors, particularly healthcare in the 1960s, there was a general lack of staff even in Yugoslavia. Resigning was, thus, often the only way for a worker to be able to take up a job as a technical cooperation expert. Without the obtained consent of the employer for a suspension, the expert had to terminate employment in Yugoslavia before setting out on the mission. While until the first half of the 1960s, there was a more favourable stance on the matter, under the expansion of self-management rights and autonomous decision-making, institutions and enterprises rather opted to terminate the contract with the employee who decided to take up a technical expert position abroad or if he/she stayed abroad longer than was originally planned. Namely, the approval of the employer in Yugoslavia was also needed in cases when the worker had been initially granted suspension but eventually resolved to extend the contract with the foreign contractor.

[527] Information on the economic questions related to the Algerian request for agricultural experts, 21 December 1982, HDA-465-344; Note from the meeting on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria in the field of agriculture, 25 November 1982, HDA-465-344.
[528] Article no. 191, In „Zakon o udruženom radu" (Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1977), p. 111.

The employment position of Yugoslav technical experts was determined by the Federation's socio-economic system of self-management and non-aligned foreign political orientation. A particularity of Yugoslav experts was that they signed contracts with host countries' ministries or national enterprises, which means they were in the direct employ of the foreign governments and subjected to their supervision and authority. Instead, ZAMTES was exempted from the supervision of experts in the field and acted solely as a liaison between the host country and experts in the recruitment process. This position of Yugoslav cooperant was a result of the non-aligned principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Aware that newly independent countries were sensitive about their sovereign rights, the Yugoslav government allowed the recipient governments to employ its technical experts directly. In this way, Yugoslavia acquired trust and reassured post-colonial political elites its citizens did not run the risk of becoming involved in local political and economic affairs.[529] Significantly, as can be noted from their letters, experts did not understand why they had been under the employ of the Algerian government and not sent directly by their enterprises or ZAMTES.

Differently from Yugoslav ones, experts from the state socialist Eastern European countries were government employees who were posted to work in Algeria by state decrees. In this way, they continued to receive a salary at home and had their social security contributions paid by their employers. After ending the mission in Algeria, they returned to their old workplaces. Because they had spent some time working in a "friendly country", they acquired a special status and different benefits. [530] For example, in the Polish case, by being granted an unpaid leave, experts had secured their former positions at home, which they could take up upon return from abroad.[531] On the other hand, as previously explained, to be able to acquire temporary employment abroad, Yugoslav experts had to suspend or terminate their job at home. While carrying out the recruitment process, ZAMTES as a state administrative body did not have any legal rights nor influence over the decision-making of the self-managing enterprises and

[529] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, 214.
[530] Note on the talks between Krsto Bulajić and Abdelghani Kesri, 22 January 1974, AJ-465-6572, p. 2.
[531] Łukasz Stanek, " Mobilities of Architecture in the Late Cold War: From Socialist Poland to Kuwait, and Back", In *Second World Postmodernisms: Architecture and Society under Late Socialism*, ed. Vladimir Kulic, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 183.

institutions and was not able to secure experts a job upon their return from the mission abroad.[532]

Social Security Status

The termination of employment in Yugoslavia also had implications for the regulation of experts' social security status. Until 1965, ZAMTES reimbursed experts' gross salaries to enterprises or institutions in Yugoslavia in the average amount of the last three payments. From that amount, the employer in Yugoslavia covered the costs of the social security contribution, while the net amount was deposited to the expert's bank account or the account of a person authorized by the expert, usually a spouse. In this way, "the expert enjoyed full rights as if he were employed in Yugoslavia", meaning the recognition of the length of service, healthcare and pension insurance, and child allowance. Since the experts were guaranteed free health care in Algeria with personal participation in the costs of medical services, enterprises did not have to pay the health insurance part of contributions. Initially, all enterprises accepted the practice where ZAMTES reimbursed them the salary of their employees who went to work abroad as technical experts.

After the abolition of Yugoslavia's obligation to participate in their salaries, experts had to personally regulate the payment of social security contributions as independent contributors before departing for Algeria. Because there was no bilateral agreement on social security insurance, experts did not have the contributions paid in Algeria recognized in Yugoslavia. Based on the bilateral Agreement, Algerians provided experts with free health care but not pension or disability insurance. Thus, while exempted from paying a contribution for health care insurance, experts had to personally cover the costs of pension, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance in Yugoslavia from their Algerian income. Furthermore, experts were not insured in case of disability or death during the mission and ZAMTES legally did not assume any obligations concerning compensation in this case. The only alternative was for experts to buy a private insurance policy that covered such events. However, the individuals most often omitted this responsibility. In fact, in several instances when experts were

[532] Note on the meeting between B. Tomić and M. Mammari, 22 June 1979, AJ-465-6554.

fatally injured in car accidents during their mission abroad, the widowed spouses were not entitled to any financial compensation.[533]

Becoming independent contributors meant not only additional administrative efforts for experts but also an effective reduction of revenues.[534] To make the transition period after the 1965 termination of financial participation in Yugoslavia easier for the experts, some Yugoslav enterprises and institutions temporarily allocated funds from their budget for experts' contributions. For instance, the Clinical Hospital in Zagreb initially granted to their staff working at the hospital in Orléansville about 30% of their former salary for covering the expenses of social security insurance. However, those were short-term and exceptional cases. Until 1982, experts personally had to bear these costs. At first, they could pay them in local currency at the Embassy in Algiers. However, with the change in Yugoslav regulations in 1972, the contributions had to be paid exclusively in convertible currency or Yugoslav Dinars. This meant that they had to additionally give up some part of the transferred cash. More to that, the year before (1971), the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBS) imposed a fee of 18% to convert the clearing payment into convertible currencies.[535] However, in many cases, experts neglected their responsibilities to pay contributions, which was important, among other things, for the recognition of the length of service. Instead, they had the practice to take care of the missing payments only after returning from work abroad. Had the expert passed away during the mission without having covered the contribution fees, the situation became complicated for the family members who were left without social security rights.[536]

To stimulate experts' departure to Algeria, in the early 1980s, ZAMTES discussed several possible legislative measures, including guaranteed employment upon return to Yugoslavia and benefits such as the recognition of double years of service.[537] Most importantly, ZAMTES began contemplating reintroducing financial participation in the wages of experts, envisioned primarily to help them cover the expenses of social

[533] *Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke saradnje koji se upućuju na rad u zemlje u razvoju*, (Beograd: Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku suradnju, 1968), 48-52.
[534] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, 109.
[535] Blažo Krstajić's report from his official trip to Algeria, Belgrade, 16 May 1972, AJ-465-6549, p. 6-7.
[536] Letter from the Croatian branch office of ZAMTES to „Dr Ozren Novosel" hospital in Zagreb, 30 June 1966,
[537] Report by the Yugoslav delegation on the 10th Session of the Joint Commission, Belgrade, 12 January, HDA-465-344, p. 12-13.

security contributions in Yugoslavia. Eventually, the Yugoslav government's participation was introduced in 1982 from the Fund of Solidarity with Non-Aligned Countries and Developing Countries. To keep track of the growing inflation, the amount of participation was annually revised starting from 1986: 25,000 Yugoslav Dinars (until 1985); 35,000 Yugoslav Dinars (1986); 50,000 Yugoslav Dinars (1987); 80,000 Yugoslav Dinars (1988); 140,000 Yugoslav Dinars (1989); 200 Yugoslav Dinars (1990).

Pre-Departure Guidelines

As described in Chapter 2, one of the main tasks that the Yugoslav government assigned to technical experts was to represent the country through their contacts with the local population and administration and try to influence the outcomes of the host authorities' economic decisions. The consequences of the commercialization of technical cooperation and the *laissez-faire* approach to the foreign expert programme in the Global South were felt in the preparation process, which gradually shifted towards individual initiatives. Despite the awareness that the successful performance of labour activities depended on the professional readiness of the experts for their mission, ZAMTES had never devoted significant attention to organizing and establishing a systematic preparation process for the soon-to-depart experts.[538] Instead, for the "ill-preparedness" of experts in Algeria, ZAMTES officials blamed the branch offices, which were in charge of carrying out the preparations. Throughout the whole period of technical cooperation, the preparation process had not significantly changed, let alone improved.

On paper, ZAMTES designed a model of pre-departure preparations of experts to be carried out for the most part by the branch offices in the federal units. Once informed of the positive outcome of the Algerian government's selection process, together with a copy of the bilateral Agreement, experts received in written form general information on the engagement in Algeria, such as schooling opportunities for children, vehicle import, obtaining a residence permit, opening a bank account and foreign currency transfer. Until 1965, when the visa was still required, ZAMTES took care of the visa processing. In some cases, booklets such as "Tropics and tropical diseases" ("Tropi i tropske bolesti")

[538] Report on the 2nd Session of the Subcommittee of Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Belgrade, 30 June 1988, AJ-465-4346.

were handed out to the experts to familiarize themselves with the risks of infectious diseases. Namely, during the 1960s, it was necessary before departure to Algeria to get vaccinated against typhus, cholera and sometimes variola vera. Apart from manuals and booklets, experts were invited to the offices for further inquiries and consultations regarding their upcoming mission in Algeria. However, experts claimed that much of the information obtained turned out to be outdated and unhelpful on the spot.

Collective, multi-day preparations were a rare occasion and were organized for politically or commercially more important missions. For example, in Belgrade in March 1967, ZAMTES organized a 4-day seminar for the preparation of agricultural experts.[539] In another case, ZAMTES scheduled a 3-day seminar in January 1968 to prepare candidates for serving Algerian civil aviation.[540] The main part of the seminar concerned political instructions, whereby informing experts on bilateral relations, their roles and duties. Namely, ZAMTES understood the need to explain to the departing experts the "broader significance of their mission" in order to boost their work enthusiasm. In the second part, they were provided with basic information about the conditions of work and life as well as copies of the bilateral documents to get acquainted with their rights and obligations as technical experts in the service of the Algerian government. To acquire a comprehensive understanding and preparation for this role, especially for those who worked as advisers in the foreign country's administration, ZAMTES reasoned that experts ought to

> "[…] get acquainted with the situation in those countries, with the foreign policy of our country and the self-management social system, and be able to explain the Yugoslav reality there and contribute as much as possible to the country they are going to and to the expansion of relations between Yugoslavia and that country."[541]

A few hours before the departure, experts were required to show up in the office building of ZAMTES in Belgrade for a briefing ("preparatory meeting") during which experts signed the contract with ZAMTES and received final instructions.[542] For example, according to the programme delivered to high school teachers who were

[539] Invitation for a seminar delivered to M. P., 8 March 1967, HDA-1727-460.
[540] Letter from ZAMTES to the Croatian branch office informing on the dismissal of expert S. T., Belgrade, 13 April 1970, HDA-1727-464.
[541] "Yugoslav participation in international technical cooperation" [Učešće Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj tehničkoj saradnji], Belgrade, 20 January 1968, AJ-130-607, p. 49.
[542] Notification to I. V. regarding the engagement in Algeria, 18 March 1986, HDA-1727-466.

departing to Algeria in September 1985, experts were to show up five and a half hours before the plane took off from Belgrade.

Above all, experts were left predominantly to individual initiative and self-preparations. After being communicated the acceptance of their application by the Algerian administration, experts were delivered the "Handbook for international technical cooperation experts sent to work in developing countries" ("Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke saradnje koji se upućuju na rad u zemlje u razvoju"), which systematized the duties regarding the regulation of their status in Yugoslavia. As stated in the Handbook, ZAMTES advised experts to inform themselves about the country's historical, geographical and social characteristics from the literature and regarding the details of life and work there by personally contacting workers who had accompanied enterprises that conducted investment works or former experts.[543] At the same time, ZAMTES apprehended that the informal circulation of information on engagement in Algeria negatively influenced the response of potential candidates.[544] Hearing about the negative experiences of their colleagues directly resulted in low outcomes of job postings. Concerning linguistical preparations, ZAMTES advised them to individually work on improving their French language skills. Only the first groups of experts that departed in the early 1960s ZAMTES organized language courses. With the growing protests from Algiers regarding the linguistic competencies of Yugoslav experts in the 1980s, ZAMTES became aware of the necessity of additional language preparations. Instead of organizing special courses, ZAMTES prompted future experts to enrol in a French language course at a foreign language school and reimbursed them the scholarship fee. On the other hand, despite persistent urges of the Yugoslav Embassy since the 1965 Convention came into force, the Algerians had not submitted detailed information on job positions and descriptions of duties together with the requests.[545] While in the beginning, because of the post-war emergency and collapsed administration, ZAMTES tolerated that experts were not clearly defined tasks before

[543] Notification from ZAMTES on the recruitment of high school and university professors for Algeria, 29 July 1985, AJ-465-6562.
[544] Information on issues related to scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, 19 October 1981, HDA-1727-355, p. 1-2.
[545] Note on talks between Blažo Krstajić and Abderrahmane Benmokhtar, 20 October 1982, HDA-1727-344.

arriving in the country, in the later period of cooperation, this practice resulted in Yugoslav personnel coming to Algeria professionally unprepared.[546]

Occasionally, ZAMTES further complicated experts' arrival at the place of work and departure home. According to the bilateral Agreement, experts were exempted from exchanging US Dollars for Algerian Dinars upon entering as well as paying customs duties on personal belongings within six months of entering Algeria. A civil engineer from Serbia complained that ZAMTES sent him to the city of Constantine in February 1986 without providing him with a French-language certificate proving the status of technical cooperation expert issued by the Algerian Embassy in Belgrade. Without the certificate, at the border crossing, the expert had not only to exchange US$ 200 but also pay the customs duties on household appliances he was carrying in the vehicle.[547] In other cases, ZAMTES directly transferred misinformation received from the Algerian bureaucratic apparatus. For example, repeating the topographic error, ZAMTES sent a secondary school teacher from Zagreb to the non-existing place of "Neabdalah" instead of "M'Chedallah", a town in wilaya Bouïra. She was puzzled when the locals in the city of Bouïra told her that the place where she had to work did not exist.[548] On return home, ZAMTES' fragmentary knowledge of Algerian regulations and misinterpretation of Algerian labour legislation conveyed to experts caused them troubles. In June 1965, a group of about 40 experts, on their return from the mission, experienced inconvenience at the Algiers airport when the customs authorities prevented them from leaving the country upon determining their outstanding tax obligations.[549] After the intervention of the Yugoslav Embassy, the experts eventually embarked on the aeroplane and left Algeria without having settled the tax debt towards the local authorities. On the other hand, though subjected to local fiscal regulations (progressive taxation of about 5%), the tax obligations of Yugoslav technical cooperation experts working in Algeria were not precisely defined before the 1965 Convention came into force. This led to different interpretations and confrontational positions of the two sides regarding the taxation of experts' incomes. The absurd situation was revealed during one of the joint meetings

[546] Report by I. L., Belgrade, 9 September 1965, AJ-465-6552.
[547] Until April 1986, experts' closest relatives were exempted from exchanging US$ 200 when entering Algeria. Report by Đ. J., Belgrade, 5 June 1987, AJ-465-6566; Report by M. B, 26 February 1988, AJ-465-6566.
[548] Contract between I. T. P. and ZAMTES, Belgrade, 29 August 1985, HDA-1727-465 [and -354].
[549] Report (I. L.), Belgrade, 9 September 1965, AJ-465-6552.

when the Yugoslav side interpreted the salary scale from the First Plan as net amounts and the Algerian side as gross amounts. According to their interpretation, the Yugoslav representatives considered that the salaries of experts were exempt from the Algerian tax system. Alternatively, in the case the tax liability of experts was determined, ZAMTES requested from the Algerian authorities to be fully reimbursed the amount paid for experts' tax purposes because of the imprecisely defined provisions. Although without any legal basis, ZAMTES requested reimbursement of costs for settling the tax debts of Yugoslav experts that it covered until the end of October 1965. After years of disputes, in 1968, the Yugoslav government decided no longer to raise the issue for the sake of political goodwill.[550]

Concerning the commercial part of the preparations, the Yugoslav authorities primarily emphasized to the experts the long-term economic dimension of their engagement. As defined in the contract signed with ZAMTES before the departure, one of their duties was to work on "strengthening and expanding" economic cooperation with the host country. In other words, their role implied mediation between economic subjects and the two markets. While in the service of the Algerian authorities, they were supposed to promote the interests of Yugoslav enterprises and assist them in entering or positioning in the host country's market. The Yugoslav documents dubbed this specific task "economic propaganda". As employees of Algerian ministries or public enterprises, experts were in a favourable position to promote domestic technology and manufacturing. Importantly, a certain number of experts held positions in the central services of the Algerian administration, which allowed them to gather first-hand information on the local economic practices, participate in the economic planning and get preliminary insights into the public procurement process and tender specifications. For this reason, the Yugoslav government considered them valuable assets for its commercial expansion in the Global South. For example, one of the first experts who departed to Algeria, Antun Crnolatec, a postal and telecommunications technician from Zagreb, was appointed in 1963 to the position of advisor in the Ministry of Reconstruction, Public Works and Transportation of Algeria.[551] Although aiming at increasing their presence, the percentage of experts holding managerial and advisory positions in foreign countries' administrations decreased over the years. Accordingly to

[550] „Informacija o tehničkoj saradnji sa Alžirom", Belgrade, 7 January 1970, AJ-465-6549, p. 3.
[551] Technical expert mission certificate issued for Antun Crnolatec, 16 February 1965, HDA-1727-450.

the available data, dropping by half, their number decreased from 14% in 1963 to only about 7% in 1970.[552] Naturally, host governments prioritized filling up important and sensitive posts with domestic staff and reducing foreigners to a minimum.

To make use of the gathered commercial information, it was important for the network of Yugoslav entities working on the development of economic relations with Algeria – enterprises' representation offices abroad, the Common Commercial Representation and the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers, and finally, ZAMTES in Belgrade, to initiate and keep regular contact and possibly hold meetings with the experts.[553] Nevertheless, the execution of these activities was usually left to the initiative of the individuals. Yet, not only were experts often cut off from the Algerian capital by communication and infrastructural means, which inhibited them from maintaining regular contact with these institutions but they were focused on solving administrative and everyday problems related to their engagement in Algeria rather than on achieving Yugoslav political and economic goals. While working on the "realization of Yugoslav policy" in Algeria, including influencing the choice of contractors, equipment and technology from Yugoslavia, ZAMTES explicitly instructed experts to "avoid everything that may seem like direct interference in purely Algerian internal affairs."[554] The last part of this chapter will recount the story of how, paradoxically, an expert from the country claiming adherence to non-aligned principles of non-interference ended up as the first foreign cooperant accused of economic espionage.

Failed at Non-Interference?: The Andrić Affair (1967-1968)

Foreign experts taking senior advisory positions at host governments' institutions or enterprises occasionally possessed important and sometimes confidential information. The access of foreigners to sensitive economic data opened up realistic possibilities for espionage activities in the newly independent countries. As part of the non-aligned

[552] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, 107; „Tabela br. 3. Pregled izabranih stručnjaka po republikama koji se nalaze na radu u zemljama u razvoju", in *Izvještaj o radu Saveznog zavoda za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju za 1963. godinu i plan rada za 1964. godinu* (Belgrade: Savezni zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju, December 1963).
[553] Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, p. 118.
[554] Note from the Third Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to ZAMTES, 25 December 1975, AJ-465-6552.

principle of non-interference in internal affairs, Yugoslavia guaranteed the discretion of its experts in keeping the host governments' secrets. The strict obligation to maintain the secrecy of information they had disclosed during the mission was unambiguously defined in the Algerian-Yugoslav bilateral documents regulating technical cooperation.[555] Without having diplomatic status and immunity, Yugoslav experts were not exempt from the application of local laws and regulations in force by the virtue of their status or nationality.

According to the French daily newspaper Le Monde, a Yugoslav expert became the first foreigner charged with corporate espionage in Algeria. Under the accusation of "disclosing economic secret", on 3 February 1968, the court of Algiers sentenced a Yugoslav cooperant to three years in prison. While the Yugoslav media remained silent on the event, the French dailies published an article condemning the Yugoslav expert for "working to the detriment of a young company in an underdeveloped country".[556] Established in September 1964 to supervise the construction of the country's largest industrial complex, the company for which the arrested expert worked was the state-owned enterprise Société nationale de sidérurgie (SNS). The complex was to be constructed along the lines of the 1958 Constantine plan, the unrealized French project of the industrialization of Algeria which had envisioned a steel mill some nine kilometres away from the town of Annaba in the agricultural area of the village El Hadjar (back then Duzerville).[557] For the grandeur project of great economic importance, the Algerian government raised funding from foreign long-term loans, most largely from the USSR.[558] To realize the project, in 1964 the USSR signed an agreement on technical cooperation with Algeria, whereby granting a US$ 127 million loan. As part of its technical assistance, the Soviets took over building the steel division of the complex, while France took charge of the cast iron division.[559]

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[555] Konvencija o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji između vlada Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1966.
[556] "Un coopérant yougoslave condamné à Alger pour espionnage économique", *Le Monde*, 6 February 1968; „La visite du maréchal Tito devrait favoriser un resserrement des liens avec la Yougoslavie", *Le Monde*, 5 November 1969.
[557] David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone, 1870-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80, 102.
[558] „Sporazum Alžir-SSSR", Vjesnik, 4 August 1964; Guan-Fu, „Soviet Aid to the Third World an Analysis of its Strategy", p. 71-89.
[559] "Un coopérant yougoslave condamné à Alger", *Le Monde*, 6 February 1968.

The Algerian authorities invited partner countries across the Cold War divide to take part in the erection of the El Hadjar Iron and Steel Complex in Annaba. The Algerian national steel company was equally interested in obtaining consulting services related to building a hot rolling mill and welded pipe production plant of the metallurgical complex from the Yugoslav ironworks Željezara Sisak. Precisely, the SNS had expressed the wish to temporarily contract the factory's team of experts with a task to conduct a feasibility study, which also included determining the product range and production equipment, and in the later phase assistance in the construction and trial production. The deal between the two enterprises was supposed to also include the training of Algerian cadres in Sisak and further cooperation in the production and sales of steel pipes. The contract was to be signed by the end of 1965, while the employees were expected to stay in Algeria for a maximum of four years or until commissioning the rolling mill in regular production. According to the plan, Anton Grgić, the Director of the Investment Department and the Bureau for Construction would have taken the position of the manager of Željezara Sisak's working group in Annaba, while metallurgical engineer Branko Andrić would have acted as the chief rolling mill technologist. The rest of the group was to include a mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, an archivist working in the documentation office and a commercialist. The requested workers were some of Željezara Sisak's most experienced experts. Holding crucial positions, they were not easily replaceable. The Yugoslav firm's refusal for Grgić to stay in Algeria during his engagement on the project, but only agreeing to send him there occasionally, caused a dispute with the SNS that eventually broke off negotiations.[560] On the other hand, a dealbreaker for Željezara Sisak and loss of business interest was SNS' proposal to employ experts within the framework of bilateral technical cooperation instead of a direct contract with the Yugoslav enterprise. Eventually, the consulting services were entrusted to the British concern Davy & United Engineering Company.

However, a year later, the Minister of Energy and Industry Belaid Abdesselam, on behalf of the SNS, made an official request through the Yugoslav Embassy for engineers Anton Grgić and Branko Andrić to provide "very valuable help" in the construction and supervision of rolling mill facilities at El Hadjar.[561] Because the Algerians wanted to

[560] Proposal of the draft contract between Željezara Sisak and SNS, 30 October 1965, HDA-1727-448.
[561] Note from the Minister Bélaïd Abdesselam to the Ambassador of Algeria to the SFRY, 21 November 1966, HDA-1727-448

engage Željezara Sisak engineers within the framework of technical cooperation, the Embassy forwarded Abdesselam's request to ZAMTES.[562] In fact, the two engineers had already been on ZAMTES' list of potential candidates to serve as Yugoslav experts in developing countries. Unlike Grgić, who came on the list of experts upon ZAMTES internal job posting at Željezara Sisak,[563] Andrić self-initiatively applied on the external job posting of 5 December 1965 for missions in developing countries.[564] Both experts gladly accept the invitation which was sent out by the Algerian Minister personally. Andrić even claimed that during one of the visits to Željezara Sisak, the General Director of the SNS, Mohamed Liassine had personally asked him to come to Algeria. While Andrić told he gave "an affirmative answer [to the invitation], which is easy to understand given the size and importance of the structure to be built there [at El Hadjar]".[565] Similarly, engineer Grgić saw the offer by the Algerian government as a „rare opportunity" in his career.[566] However, both of them explained their acceptance as being motivated not only by personal but also by national interests. For example, Grgić pointed out that ZAMTES had emphasized „the political reflection of the assistance" and set him "the task of finding and proposing specific forms of cooperation between our [Yugoslav] and SNS-affiliated companies", but also that he considered „duty" to work in the interest of Željezara Sisak.[567] The experts were aware of the political implications of their engagement. In a letter to the Željezara Sisak's HR Department, Andrić wrote: "The political significance of my mission of international technical cooperation expert is clear to me, and in the interest of the SFRY I want to perform this task conscientiously." He further stated that, contrary to the case when he had been "even against the will" in 1950 sent out to Željezara Zenica, in the case of Algeria it had been "his choice".[568] Given that the two experts would hold high-level positions in the Algerian national company, ZAMTES officials held the Algerian request equally urgent and important.[569] In a letter to the director of Željezara Sisak Norbert Weber, ZAMTES explained that

[562] Note from ZAMTES to the Croatian branch office, 16 December 1966, HDA-1727-448.
[563] Letter from the Croatian branch office of ZAMTES to the General Director of Željezara Sisak, 2 December 1966, HDA-1727-448.
[564] Letter from Branko Andrić to Željezara Sisak, 17 January 1967, HDA-1727-448.
[565] Letter from Branko Andrić to the Director Norbert Weber, n.d., HDA-1727-448.
[566] Letter from Anton Grgić to Željezara Sisak, 12 January 1967, HDA-1727-453.
[567] Ibid.
[568] Letter from Branko Andrić to Željezara Sisak, 17 January 1967, HDA-1727-448.
[569] Note from ZAMTES to the Croatian branch office, 16 December 1966, HDA-1727-448.

> "such [technical cooperation will be of great benefit in terms of rapprochement and expansion of economic and other cooperation between our two countries, as well as the two ironworks. […] especially comrade engineer A. Grgić could play a positive role in the development of further technical and economic aspects of cooperation, which would be of interest to either Željezara Sisak or other economic organizations in the country."[570]

Yet, the hiring process did not go smoothly. Engineers Grgić and Andrić were employees of Željezara Sisak for over 10 and 18 years, respectively. To be able to depart for Algeria as technical experts, they had requested a temporary suspension of employment. Facing a stalemate with his request, Andrić turned for help to Director Norbert Weber. In the letter addressed to Weber, he confided a suspicion that his request was obstructed due to a "political persecution" ongoing since 1946. According to Andrić, that year, while working at Vareš ironworks, he had been falsely accused of allegiance with "Crusaders", the anti-communist guerrilla army composed mainly of former soldiers of Ustaše, the fascist organisation which established the Independent State of Croatia in 1941, who operated in the aftermath of the victory of the partisan movement. According to Andrić, under suspicion of being "the leader of Crusaders" and "economic saboteur", the Communists had taken him to the prison in Sarajevo but eventually released him after 3 months of pre-trial detention. He confessed to the Director how he "only dared to tell and write this now, i.e. behind the IV plenum of the LCY".[571] Namely, the removal of Aleksandar Ranković during the July 1966 Brioni Plenum and the weakening of the power of the State Security Service (Služba državne sigurnosti, SDS) has been considered as giving a strong impetus to liberalization processes in Yugoslavia. Not only it opened the doors to criticism of authoritarianism and bureaucratic centralism but the move also had a psychological impact on society by "freeing Croatian citizens to some extent from the fear of expressing what they really think, that is, from proclaiming their views and interests."[572] Eventually, Željezara Sisak agreed to suspend employment to both future experts under the condition, which was subject to a penalty, that they had to return to the company within maximum two years. With the starting date on 30 April 1967, the two engineers signed a private two-year

[570] Letter from the Croatian branch office to the Director Norbert Weber, 28 December 1966, HDA-1727-448.
[571] Letter from Branko Andrić to the Director Norbert Weber, n.d., HDA-1727-448.
[572] Josip Mihaljević, *Komunizam i čovjek. Odnos vlasti i pojedinca u Hrvatskoj (1958. – 1972.)*(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2016), 43, 508.

contract with the Ministry of Energy and Industry, which enabled them to have more favourable terms of employment than those offered under the Convention. For example, Grgić had a monthly salary of 4,073 Algerian Dinars, out of which approximately 25% was eligible for transfer to the Yugoslav bank account.[573]

However, neither of the two experts eventually stayed for a longer time at the SNS. While the details of Grgić's engagement, which ended in January 1968, are not well known, the Algerian venture of his colleague took a trajectory of an alternative Cold War spy film plot. On the accusation of "communicating economic information to a West German specialized agency based in Liechtenstein", the Algerian authorities arrested Andrić on 20 September 1967. According to Le Monde, he was arrested after an attempt to send a postcard with „a coded message" containing information on the value of the contract that the SNS had signed that day with the Italian company Innocenti for the instalment of a hot rolling mill. The postcard, written in German language and addressed to a female correspondent in Liechtenstein, Andrić supposedly handed out to be sent from Paris by one of his colleagues working for Sofresid, a French company acting as the main contractor of El Hadjar. Suspicious of illegal activities, his French colleague instead turned the postcard to the General Director of the SNS. Within the company, namely, Andrić held a position allowing him to participate in the selection of the bidder as well as in the final negotiations with Innocenti. Though the Algerian Ministry of Industry and Energy initially considered political reasons to place an order for the hot rolling mill in Czechoslovakia, the prices offered by Škoda-Export were rated too high. At the beginning of 1967, offers came from several major Western suppliers, including Italian Innocenti, West German Krupp, American General Electric, and Austrian VÖEST.[574]

On 30 October 1967, Andrić was brought before the Supreme Court of Algiers. The defence lawyer insisted the case was a result of a "misunderstanding" and recklessness of his client. To defend him, Andrić's lawyer tried to clarify that general information on the postcard could not have been classified as secret, especially since that same day, 16 September, the Algeria-Press-Service had already officially announced that the contract had been signed. As an argument in defence, he further stressed that

[573] Certificate issued to Antun Grgić for the purpose of customs free car import from Algeria, 19 January 1968, HDA-1727-453.
[574] "Un coopérant yougoslave condamné à Alger", *Le Monde*, 6 February 1968; „La visite du maréchal Tito", *Le Monde*, 5 November 1969.

the SNS had not suffered any financial damage and that his client had not derived any material advantage from his action. At the trial, Andrić stated that he had not been aware that his correspondent Marianne Schlütter, who he got to know during his two-and-half months stay at the German industrial conglomerate Mannesmann in 1959/1960, worked for a "West German [intelligence] organization". However, he admitted that during one of his business trips to Paris in the service of an SNS employee, he had been contacted on Schlütter's behalf to pass her the details of bids for the hot rolling mill. Before the final verdict, the lawyer underlined that a harsh sentence would have negatively impacted the stay of other foreign experts in Algeria. The Yugoslav expert was eventually released on 20 December 1968 and returned home 10 days later. While on the day of Andrić's arrest, ZAMTES effectively cancelled his contract,[575] upon release from prison, it retroactively recognized his status as a technical expert for two full years, from 30 April 1967 to 30 April 1969.[576]

[575] Letter from ZAMTES to Željezara Sisak informing about the contract with Branko Andrić, 22 May 1969, HDA-1727-448.
[576] Certificate issued to Branko Andrić by the Croatian office of ZAMTES, Zagreb, 27 April 1971, HDA-1727-448.

CHAPTER 4: EVERYDAY LIFE AND WORK OF YUGOSLAV EXPERTS IN ALGERIA

> *"The heat is enormous and it's quite humid. If only there were another Yugoslav here, it would be much easier for me, [because] I find it difficult being among people with mentality and habits completely opposite to ours."*[577]

The last chapter will take the perspectives of ordinary actors on the bilateral relations forged within the global non-aligned network of political and economic alliances. Focusing on experts' personal experiences of everyday life and work in Algeria, the chapter is largely based on their letters addressed to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers and ZAMTES in Belgrade compiled predominately during the 1980s but also earlier periods. Namely, one of the experts' duties towards ZAMTES included submitting quarterly reports during their stay abroad and the final report composed upon return home. In these reports, written in a completely free form, experts expressed their views on Algerian society, reflected on the experience of their stay abroad, discussed their accomplished professional results, and proposed ways for improving various aspects of cooperation.[578] By the virtue of this task, we can grasp their daily life and working activities tied to their mission in Algeria. By studying construction sites, hospitals and offices across Algeria as spaces of micro-level interactions between the East and the South, we can get an insight into how cooperation ran on the ground. In other words, going beyond the institutional level, the chapter helps us understand the implications on the micro-level of globalization processes in which Yugoslav citizens were embroiled. An

[577] Letter from L. N. to Andrija Pavičić, Affreville (Khemis Miliana), 29 July 1963, HDA-1727-460.
[578] „Ugovor", in *Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke saradnje*, p. 73-75.

analysis of interactions and encounters at the micro-level will also prove beneficial to detect and understand the forces which inhibited the successful implementation of cooperation agreements and contributed to the low presence of Yugoslav experts in Algeria.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the liberalization of Yugoslavia's technical experts' programme brought about a decrease in their presence in Algeria. The adoption of a *laissez-faire* approach by ZAMTES towards the experts' programme had two distinguishable consequences that can be observed on the micro level. Firstly, apart from mediating the recruitment process, ZAMTES did not provide any logistical support to experts once sent abroad. Secondly, the approach was reflected in the lack of supervision and the control of the Yugoslav authorities over experts. As a top-bottom affair, the official Yugoslav solidarity discourse was unsuccessfully translated in Algeria as it had weakened with the great distance from Belgrade and was instead challenged and substituted by a combination of ideological, ethnocentric and colonial attitudes and mindsets.[579] Set within a theoretical framework that looks at the perpetuation of colonial relations through development aid programs in the post-colonial era, the chapter understands Yugoslav engagement as part of the Western modernisation efforts in the Global South.

[579] Iacob and Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization?", p. 134.

4.1. "Find a Way, Comrade!"[580]

The Arrival

In October 1985, two future employees of the Algerian Ministry of Urbanism, Construction and Housing found themselves distressed after discovering they had not had their seats booked on the flight from Ouargla to their final destination Illizi. In an unfamiliar town in the middle of the Sahara desert, some 800 km from the Algerian capital, two future colleagues turned to the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Algiers to help them in reaching the new workplace. Probably hoping for a different answer, to their surprise, the Embassy responded with a not-so-encouraging message to "somehow find a way" in the oasis city of Ouargla. After pleading around the town and begging to be granted a seat on the fully booked Air Algérie flight, the architects managed to reach Illizi (albeit without luggage) on time. Although having come to a favourable end, they felt that the situation with the trip they had gone through was "a disgrace both for them personally and for the country [Yugoslavia]". Later they would report that the disorganisation of the travel foreshadowed problems with their stay in Algeria.[581]

The occurrence of the two architects was not a singular event. Whether experts were coming directly by plane from the Belgrade airport or by car via ports of Palermo or Marseilles[582], the arrival in Algeria was usually the first indicator of the upcoming troublesome stay in the country. Experts had already found themselves in an unpleasant situation on what was officially their first day of the mission. While some received a warm welcome from the representatives of the Algerian ministries, members of the Yugoslav Embassy or workers of the Yugoslav enterprises, most of the experts, however, had not had reception upon arriving in Algiers. For many of them, the journey had to continue from the capital into the country's interior. As the deployment line of Yugoslav

[580] The title is a reference to the popular, 1981 Yugoslav partisan comedy movie „Snađi se, druže!" (*Find a way, Comrade!*) directed by Berislav Makarović. The phrase became a widespread part of the colloquial language in the late Yugoslav socialist period, annotating the necessity and ability of individuals to carry through times of economic crisis and supply shortages.
[581] Joint letter from M. S. and K. Z, Illizi, 30 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[582] Because of the limited availability of public transportation and vast distances between the place of residence and place of work, experts were encouraged to ship their private vehicles to Algeria. Unless they had decided to take a road trip across the Mediterranean, they shipped the car by ferry from the ports of Rijeka or Split.

experts was moving geographically deeper inland throughout the 1980s, this problem was becoming more prominent. Despite arriving as representatives of a "friendly country" within the bilateral framework of technical cooperation, experts had been left on their own, without further arranged transfer or overnight stay. The latter situation was a manifestation of the absence of coordination and communication not only within the Yugoslav administrative apparatus but also between the two countries' representative bodies.

The disordered trip was not the only unpleasant occurrence at the very beginning of their venture. In certain instances, the officials of the Algerian public companies were surprised by the arrival of their new Yugoslav employees, whom they had not been expecting at all, and thus had not determined their position within the company nor defined working tasks for them. Furthermore, there were instances of arbitrary and unannounced relocation of experts to another workplace, usually to the towns and cities deep in the Sahara desert. Namely, while experts signed a contract with ZAMTES before departure, the Algerian government insisted on concluding the contract with them only once they had arrived in the country. Because of this detail, the information regarding the workplace was easily subject to modification. For the experts who had already reached Algeria and left their job in Yugoslavia, this situation was a *fait accompli*, and they had no other choice but to accept the alternative worksite.[583] While these situations indicate a certain level of contact deficiency between the Algerian institutions, for their troubles, experts primarily held accountable the institutions at home and the "extremely sloppy practice" of the Yugoslav diplomatic representation in Algeria.[584] Since he was the official entrusted with matters involving technical experts, the acting consul at the Embassy was most often pointed at personally.[585] Having said that, here is how the two architects viewed the untimely exchange of information between ZAMTES and the Yugoslav Embassy that had affected their arrival:

> "The blame for this harassment is not on the Algerians but is a result of misunderstandings or irresponsibility on our [government's] part. The consul [of the

[583] Report by Đ. J., Belgrade, 5 June 1987, AJ-465-6566.
[584] Joint report by the married couple Tanevski, 20 September 1988, AJ-465-6557.
[585] Embassy's note No. 690, 27 June 1983, AJ-465-6561.

Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria] said that he found out about our arrival only two days ago, and that is why he did not make a booking […]."[586]

Apart from arbitrary relocations, the Algerian employers assigned experts with positions and tasks different from those they had initially agreed upon.[587] In some of these cases, experts ended up employed in occupations below their education and professional experience levels,[588] resulting in a skills-occupation mismatch. Underemployment and overskilling caused them to lose their social status compared to the one they had previously held in Yugoslavia. For example, architects and civil engineers complained that they had been given jobs of draughtsmen and that their professional opinions had often been discredited and ignored by their Algerian supervisors.[589] Disappointed and desperate, experts lamented they had to suffer professional humiliation "for a handful of dollars"[590] and protested for not being treated as "international technical experts from a friendly country".[591] They frequently compared their position in Algeria to the one of a "pečalbar", which in the context of socialist Yugoslavia's colloquial labour terminology was synonymous with a blue-collar migrant worker in the West (predominantly West Germany), known as Gastarbeiter. Perceiving themselves as different and more relevant than their less-skilled counterparts in the West, technical experts in the Global South (but also Yugoslav institutions) asserted the hierarchy of Yugoslav workers abroad. As we will see later in this chapter, technical experts tended to generate hierarchies not only among the Yugoslav migrant labour but also the local workforce.

Consequently, the loss of social status affected experts' mental well-being.[592] Aware of the correlation between the two, based on his experience, an expert concluded that somebody who "cannot forget that at home, in his homeland, he was an esteemed specialist, should better not come here, for life will break him".[593] Having difficulties coping with the fact that they had not enjoyed esteem and respect from their Algerian

[586] Joint letter from M. S. and K. Z, Illizi, 30 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[587] Report by R. Ć., Belgrade, 13 September 1988, AJ-465-6566.
[588] Letter from P. N. to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, Teniet El Had, 28 November 1985, AJ-465-6563.
[589] „PODSETNIK o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji", n.d., AJ-465-6571, p. 6.
[590] Ibid.
[591] Report by B. S., Sarajevo, 28 July 1985, AJ-465-6555.
[592] Rong Zhu and Linfeng Chen, "Overeducation, Overskilling and Mental Well-being", *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 16, no. 4. (2016): 1-33.
[593] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.

colleagues, both subordinates and superiors, experts resigned from their positions. Cast down with the work which failed to meet his professional background and experience, a Yugoslav internist left Algeria after less than four months.[594] He was put down by the fact that, despite having over 15 years of specialist experience in internal medicine, he had been sent to work as a general practitioner in the hospital in Aïn Oussera, a town in wilaya Djelfa with about 50,000 inhabitants at that time. Skills-occupation mismatches, as in the latter example, were not only a drawback for the Yugoslav experts personally but also the host government since, in that way, the Algerian employer had not rationally and maximally utilised their skills and expertise.[595]

Though multiple causes stood behind underemployment and overskilling phenomena, the most obvious was the absence of legislation for foreign qualifications recognition throughout the entire period of cooperation. Only in 1989, the Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Professional Titles, Scientific Degrees and Diplomas of Higher Education (*Sporazum o uzajamnom priznavanju stručnih naziva, naučnih stepena i diploma visokog obrazovanja*) came into force. For this reason, university staff represented a group of experts who were especially affected by this phenomenon. Another reason for the skills-occupation mismatch in the host labour market stemmed from the language incompetence of dispatched Yugoslav workers. Finding fluent French speakers in the already limited pool of suitable candidates in the sending labour market presented an enormous challenge to ZAMTES. Even though facilitated by the bilateral agreements, the absence of sufficient linguistical knowledge constrained experts' full labour market integration. In fact, during the 1980s, Algerian officials evaluated the contribution of Yugoslav experts as "below expectations". To several of them, Algerian employers ended the contract while citing experts' "low level of expertise" and insufficient knowledge of the French language as the reason for the dismissal. Here is how one of the two architects employed in Illizi remarked on the Yugoslav drawback within the linguistical domain:

> "The importance of excellent language skills in Algeria has been so overestimated; it is not in question solely the possibility to communicate, but it is a condition for any kind of contact and a measure of [one's] ability. A person with poor knowledge of French will

[594] Letter from V. J., Aïn Oussera, 8 March 1981, AJ-465-6550.
[595] Note on the talks between ZAMTES Director Marijan Strbašić and the Algerian Ambassador Noureddine Kerroum, 15 April 1987, HDA-1727-344; Report by J. K., Algiers, 21 April 1989, AJ-465-6571.

not be recognised for any expertise, even in jobs where language is of little importance. I am sure that, in addition to our self-criticism and belief in our own geniuses for foreign languages, a sloppy knowledge of French is a key factor in failure in Algeria. People who speak French at such a level that it would enable them to have regular contact in this country are extremely rare at home. And without that, everything else is superfluous."[596]

In an attempt to overcome the language barrier, the Yugoslav side appointed translators to important missions in order to help experts navigate daily life and work.[597] Yet, even when accompanied by interpreters or having sufficient language competencies, experts still encountered problems in dealing with the host administration, which testifies to the importance of local knowledge for successfully carrying out the mission. As seen in the previous chapter, preparatory meetings organized by the branch offices and the final gathering hosted by ZAMTES in Belgrade before the departure proved insufficiently informative and did not provide relevant instructions for the stay abroad. At the same time, support from current Algerian employers and the local authorities was missing since they had considered this not to be a part of their responsibilities. Without adequate information and an understanding of its functioning mechanisms, experts regularly complained of the "slow and inefficient" bureaucratic apparatus operating under a strict hierarchy. An engineer employed in Algeria in the mid-1980s described how, in the absence of local assistance, dealing with the Algerian bureaucracy was gruelling and time-consuming:

"[…] when solving problems, experts are left on their own and have almost no help from the staff of the Algerian administration on the construction site where they work. So we lose a lot of time and nerves arranging residence permits, obtaining a social security card, transferring income, obtaining certificates, buying plane tickets to go on vacation and many other administrative problems, which we had to solve without anyone's help."[598]

Technical cooperation experts did not have the support of the enterprises they had hitherto worked at either. This is because before taking up the mission, they had been required to terminate their employment in Yugoslavia. Concurrently,

[596] Report by K. Z., n.d., AJ-465-6571.
[597] Report by D. Đ. on the arrival of Hidroelektra experts to Algeria, Hammam Meskoutine, 18 March 1985, HDA-1727-346.
[598] Report by H. V,, 1987, HDA-1727-453.

administrative infrastructure that would have acted as a source of knowledge of local circumstances and helped experts and their families adjust to the new environment had not existed. Instead, the Yugoslav institution in charge of international technical cooperation was reduced to a liaison between the host country and experts, primarily in the recruitment process. Namely, ZAMTES did not maintain abroad or in the country any special service responsible solely for dispatched experts since the mid-1960s. Specifically, in November 1966, the Yugoslav government abolished the short-lived official representations of ZAMTES at the Embassy in Algiers and Tripoli. In fact, at that time, ZAMTES representatives reasoned that the Yugoslav administration should have reduced the involvement in the affairs of experts abroad and that the initiatives and the bulk of the responsibilities for the ongoing issues related to their stay should be in the hands of the individuals. Probably to reduce operative costs, the affairs of the representative office were transferred to the regular scope of the Embassy in Algiers, that is, to the then attaché Jerkim Ernest.[599] This move came as a surprise since, at that time, [x][600] technical experts were employed in Algeria, while there were 277 of them in Libya.[601]

Naturally, the sojourners turned for help to their country's diplomatic representation. However, the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers could not assist them efficiently in solving their ongoing issues. Firstly, contrary to the popular Yugoslav non-aligned mythology of a highly-efficient diplomatic network across the African continent, the mission in Algeria was operating with significantly reduced staff burdened by other consular duties. In the state of under-capacitation, there was not a single employee at the Embassy exclusively in charge of technical cooperation experts. Instead, adding to his regular diplomatic duties, the official serving as consul was taking care of the affairs of experts on the go. Secondly, from the country's interior, where most experts were deployed, the Embassy was not easily physically reachable due to great distances, and not by telephone or telex due to insufficiently developed telecommunications infrastructure. At the same time, the postal service was slow, or letters got lost before reaching the recipient. The minority of experts that worked in the capital or its proximity could easier maintain contact with the Embassy. On sporadic occasions, they

[599] Report on the negotiations during the 3rd Session of the Joint Comission, Belgrade, 25 November 1966, AJ-465-6549.
[600] I aim to find the missing data before the final thesis submission.
[601] Jemuović and Lah, *Naučna, tehnička i kulturna saradnja Jugoslavije sa zemljama u razvoju*, p. 107.

got the chance to be invited for consultations with the Ambassador and diplomatic staff at the residence in Hydra and sometimes even to participate in celebrations of Yugoslav national holidays.[602]

Conversely, specialists from socialist countries of Eastern Europe were represented overseas by their national embassies or through technical assistance organisations, which had established offices in the Algerian capital. These services regularly invited cooperants for briefings and instructions regarding their professional duties but also provided them support in personal matters and dealt with the local bureaucracy. For instance, the Hungarian organisation responsible for posting experts overseas – TESCO (Enterprise for Technical and Scientific Cooperation)[603] – opened a Consulting Office in Algiers.[604] In the case of Czechoslovakia, the organisation Polytechna was founded in 1959 as the executive organ of the Ministry of Foreign Trade responsible for the commercial exchange of scientific and technological material and non-material commodities, including the provision of technical aid.[605] The analogous organisation managing specialist labour export from Poland since the year 1961 was Polservice,[606] while in Bulgaria the task was carried out by the foreign trade enterprise Technoexport. The duties related to the export of labour in East Germany were taken over by the organisation Intercoop, while the Romanian equivalent was named Romconsult.[607]

Differently from the Yugoslav model, the CMEA technical assistance programmes were an integral part of their economic cooperation with the Third World. Within the economic-technical cooperation, the public enterprises in charge of technical aid in the state-socialist countries concluded collective contracts with the Algerian administration for the service provision of their experts. The result was a centralised payment system, where the respective organisations proportionally distributed to experts the financial profit acquired from the "intellectual export" to Algeria. In contrast to their Eastern European counterparts, Yugoslav experts received their salaries directly from Algerian employers, who often delayed their payments. However, the Algerians proposed a

[602] Joint report by V. R. and M. J. for the year 1983, Bouchaoui, 4 February 1984, AJ-465-6561.
[603] Apart from sharing the acronym, TESCO has no connection to the British supermarket chain, which also happens to be popular in Hungary.
[604] Body, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'?", p. 9-11.
[605] Buzássyová, „Socialist Internationalism in Practice", p. 37.
[606] Stanek, "Mobilities of Architecture in the Late Cold War", 183.
[607] Łukasz Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War* (Princeton University Press, 2020), p. 27.

similar format of a collective contract to ZAMTES during the negotiations over the 1979 Protocol for Yugoslav experts employed in Algerian public healthcare. But because there had not been reached a consensus over the institution which would take over the financial administration of the contract, Yugoslav negotiators discarded the idea of a centralised payment of their experts.

With the abolishment of ZAMTES representation at the Embassy in Algiers only three years after its establishment, Yugoslav experts were left without an institutional infrastructure to help them with the ongoing issues and protection of their legal rights. A married couple from Skopje, who worked at the University of Oran between 1985 and 1988, disclosed in their joint final report that "[…] when the expert arrives in Algeria, he feels lonely, and often helpless in solving problems that arise at the very beginning of the mission".[608] Without an overseas representative body supporting their interests abroad, experts felt "completely alone and left to the arbitrariness of Algerian administration".[609] As the Embassy told them on several occasions, their only alternative was to "find a way"[610] through their own efforts in the new living and working environment. As we will see in the following pages, the two crucial issues that marked the stay of experts in Algeria concerned the payment and transfer of earnings and the allocated accommodation. The successful resolution of wage and accommodation issues often played a decisive role in the personal verdict on whether to stay or leave the country.

Salary and Hard Currency Transfer

As defined under bilateral agreements, experts were entitled to receive a part of their salary in hard currency, US dollars, which they could send to an account in a Yugoslav bank. In practice, the process of foreign transfer execution often came down to a combination of patience and trial-and-error. Paradoxically, outdated information on the administrative procedure received from ZAMTES and the Embassy, which were not fully acquainted with Algerian regulations, further complicated the struggle with the local bureaucracy. Along the way, experts got into situations with local administration that

[608] Joint report by the married couple Tanevski, 20 September 1988, AJ-465-6557.
[609] Report by J. V., n.d. HDA-1727-466.
[610] Report by B. S., Sarajevo, 28 July 1985, AJ-465-6555.

they perceived as absurd, particularly when trying to execute an international bank transfer for which they needed to obtain special permission from the Algerian authorities.[611] One document dragged another, so only one missing or improper link would break the whole bureaucratic chain. The transfer was possible only with fully attached documentation, including residence and work permits, which experts sometimes could not obtain for months. In other cases, the meticulous Algerian financial institutions dismissed the request due to "improper documentation", which could have been solely a misprint in the contract. For example, a high school teacher of physics could not obtain the right to transfer her salary because, in the preamble of her contract with the Algerian Ministry of National Education, the date of the Convention was misprinted as *15 Janvier 1982* ("15 January 1982") instead of *15 Juin 1982* ("15 June 1982").[612]

The issues with the foreign currency transfer were also caused by the Algerian administration's delayed payments. Namely, when experts finally received their pay, the timeframe for the execution of the transfer had already expired. Irregular payments affected not only experts in Algeria but also their families in Yugoslavia relying on remittances. On average, experts got their first salary after four to six months and were able to transfer the foreign currency part of the income to a Yugoslav bank account only after six to nine months.[613] As a solution to the problem of the time-consuming administrative procedure, by a provision of the Agreement, experts were officially entitled to an advance payment in the amount of 70% of their salary in case of missing paychecks. Yet, paradoxically, the administration often failed to apply the regulation in practice. Because of situations alike, experts insisted on getting the lumpsum already upon their arrival in Algeria. The first Yugoslav experts to be granted the advance payment entitled by the Agreement was the group of medical specialists employed at the hospital in Bou Saada in wilaya M'Sila in June 1987.[614] At the same time, they were one of the last Yugoslav experts to depart for Algeria. The Algerians claimed that the practice was an exclusive privilege granted only to Yugoslavs since experts from other countries received a forfeit from their own governments. Comparably, for the first couple of years, Yugoslav experts received loans from the ZAMTES office at the Yugoslav Embassy.

[611] Body, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'?", p. 18.
[612] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to I. T. P., 24 March 1987, HDA-1727-354.
[613] Report by F. B., 25 January 1987, HDA-1727-449.
[614] Agenda on scientific and technical cooperation with Algeria, n.d., AJ-465-6571, p. 4.

The share of the wage that experts were allowed to send to their bank accounts in Yugoslavia was defined in the bilateral agreements and was prone to frequent alterations. Before the unique rate of 50% was introduced in 1984, the percentage of wage of transfer depended on the expert's family status. The 1965 Convention defined the transfer rate as 50% for experts whose spouses and children stayed in Yugoslavia. Unmarried experts or those who brought their families to Algeria were entitled to 30%. The Yugoslav government aimed to improve not only the salary itself but also the ratio of its transferrable part, which was a subject of constant negotiations with Algerian counterparts.[615] Thus, the 1975 Exchange of Letters, which came as the first increase in salaries, also brought significant changes to hard currency earnings. For the first time, a fixed rate of 45% was introduced. In other words, experts who were not married or were in Algeria together with their families benefited from the new financial regulations as they could now send back home 15% more of their salaries. In comparison, the 1982 Agreement defined the transfer rate according to the enforced Algerian regulations on the matter. Hence, unmarried experts or those who were joined by their families in Algeria could transfer 55% of their salary, while those whose spouses and/or children remained in Yugoslavia were entitled to a higher share of salary in US dollars, that is 75%. The latter was the most favourable transfer rate recorded in bilateral technical cooperation. With the new Algerian national regulation coming into force in April 1983, this rate dropped by 5%, thus to 50% and 70%. In the end, the 1984 Exchange of Letters permitted experts to send half of their salary to Yugoslavia, regardless if their family members joined them in Algeria or not. With the reduction of the transferable amount to 50%, the Yugoslav government decided to increase dinar participation, that is, the recently introduced bonus in Yugoslav dinars. Experts who came to work in Algeria as married couples had an additional reason for dissatisfaction with the Algerian transfer regulations. In April 1983, the Algerian Ministry of Finance enforced a decision under which only one of the spouses working in Algeria was entitled to an overseas salary transfer.[616] This affected a married couple from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, who had just started working together at the end of January 1983 at the University of

[615] Konvencija o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji između vlada Jugoslavije i Alžira, *Službeni list SFRJ - Međunarodni ugovori*, no. 9/1966.
[616] Proclamation of the Algerian Ministry of Finance on the conditions for the partial transfer of incomes of foreign workers in Algeria, Algiers, 28 April 1983, AJ-465-6559.

Sidi Bel Abbes. Because her right to transfer had been terminated, the wife pragmatically decided to end her contract, while her husband remained in Algeria for another year.

While the host government entitled foreign experts to a 100% transfer rate during vacation periods, the negligence or insufficient knowledge of Algerian regulations obstructed them from exercising this right. Namely, experts typically availed the days of annual leave to return home some weeks before the expiration of the contract. Unless they had previously given a power of attorney to one of their colleagues, the only way to execute the transfer was to return to Algeria, which was a significant burden on the experts' personal budget.[617] Importantly, according to the Algerian legislative, the deadline for executing the foreign currency transfer was within six months from the date scheduled for salary payment. In an attempt to get their hands on the leftover sums on the Algerian account, experts intervened with ZAMTES and the Yugoslav Embassy, but also with Algerian ministries directly, as Yugoslav officials had suggested to them. The arrears from Algeria had sometimes been dragging on for years. There were cases where experts claimed overdue bank transfers from Algeria even 20 years after leaving the country. For instance, a former technical expert from Slovenia who had worked as a veterinarian in Algeria between 1963 and 1965 turned to ZAMTES in April 1984 regarding his back pay.[618] This case also indicates that the problem of non-payment of wages and unfulfilled transfers already appeared among the first experts sent to Algeria in the 1960s. Equally unsuccessful experts were in seeking other financial claims, including reimbursement of travel expenses for those who travelled to Algeria by personal means of transportation or paid their own flight tickets.[619]

A further concern due to delayed payments was the expiration of the customs privileges that foreign experts were entitled to. Since they could not transfer about half of their monthly salary to Yugoslavia, from savings, if any, experts instead purchased goods in Algeria and brought them back home. In this way, they tried to preserve purchasing power. Yet, the deadline for duty-free imports to Yugoslavia was up to six months from the date of departure from the country where he worked. Thus, even if the expert managed to finally receive the wage from the Algerian government, he/she had

[617] Request for visa extension by I. Z., 20 December 1965, HDA-1727-467.
[618] Letter from A. H., 2 April 1984, AJ-465-6571.
[619] Report by ZAMTES Croatian branch office on the status of employment in Algeria of expert I. T. P., 14 May 1986, HDA-1727-465.

not only to travel back to Algeria at his/her own expense but also to pay customs duty on imported products. The cost-benefit ratio was oftentimes discouraging so the salaries remained unclaimed.

Additional impediments of irregular salaries and unexecuted transfers appeared when the 1980s oil counter-shock caused turmoil in the Algerian economy. Rising inflation paired with the depreciation of the Algerian dinar sparked novel worries for experts.[620] According to the 1984 Exchange of Letters, the transferable part of the salary had to officially be expressed in Algerian dinars. This meant that the effective salary which could be transferred to Yugoslavia depended on the exchange rate between the Algerian dinar and the US dollar. Due to the oil glut and consequently a significant drop in revenues from the hydrocarbon sector, the Algerian authorities decided to depreciate the national currency to try to stimulate exports and investments. After the collapse of the oil prices, the Bank of Algeria let the Algerian dinar depreciate by 31% between 1986 and 1988.[621] Devaluation paired with rising inflation and the slow execution of transfers was reflected in the significant diminution of the effective amount of earnings. Cognizant of the impact of the economic situation on their remittances, experts had fretted that the ongoing negative monetary trend would "erode the justification of their stay".

Regardless of the transfer, the rising inflation reduced the real value of experts' salaries on the spot. Thus, a common preoccupation among experts was the high cost of living and high prices of basic commodities. With the reduction of imports during the 1980s, experts began facing not only a scarcity of imported consumer goods, which were generally scarce in Algeria due to quotas and high tariffs but also a shortage of basic products such as oil, butter and coffee. A detailed account written in 1987 by a construction engineer J. V., who was employed at the Ministry of Public Works, initially as a bridge design engineer in Skikda, a city on the East coast of Algeria, while after he was relocated to Setif to manage the bridge department of the local Design Bureau, described the socio-economic situation in Algeria on the verge of civil war and the position of foreign experts in the host society:

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[620] Letter from T. V., Ljubljana, 6 August 1989, AJ-465-6571.

[621] Abdallah Zouache and Mohamed-Cherif Ilmane, „Central bank independence in a MENA transition economy: The experience of Algeria" in *Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Middle East and North Africa*, eds. David Cobham and Ghassan Dibeh (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 91.

> "One should keep in mind the difficult situation that is now happening there […] unemployed people wandering the roads […] The situation is tense everywhere. At work, nobody is doing anything, they even sleep at the workplace during working hours. There is a great shortage of basic foodstuffs, so all day long, behind the department stores are queues of people controlled by the militia […]. Many poor people are sitting on the sidewalks and in front of mosques [which] are very active in militarizing the poor […] The everyday atmosphere is in general, so paranoid and stirred with social problems that almost any work is impossible. A foreign expert, so it is believed, is paid in foreign currency […] and is an attractive target for burglars. In the mind of an average citizen, a foreigner [is] equated with goods which were paid for, therefore, there is an absolute right to him. And not only that, a foreigner is always suspicious or […] by definition a spy. The supply of groceries is very difficult because foreigners cannot leave the workplace easily, and after work, the department stores are empty, so it takes months for you to get oil, sugar, etc."[622]

Long queues in front of government-run department stores, the scarcity of basic commodities, locals boycotting work as a form of passive striking, and high unemployment rates among the youth, making up 65% of the population, who resorted to robberies was the day-to-day life in Algeria in the late 1980s. In this situation, as J. V. reported, among foreign cooperants appeared security concerns due to frequent burglaries of homes, which he had also fallen victim to in September 1987. He explained that foreign experts were usually placed either on the ground floor or the top floor apartments since the locals avoided living in them as they were the least safe from burglary.[623] Yet, this was far from having been the only problem experts faced with accommodation in Algeria.

The Accommodation

Apart from financial problems, one of the principal reasons for dissatisfaction among cooperants was the housing problem. First of all, it is important to stress that experts had arrived in Algeria with certain expectations and requirements regarding housing, shaped by the significant improvement of housing standards and general living

[622] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.
[623] Ibid.

standards in Yugoslavia during the 1960s,[624] which affected their overall satisfaction with housing abroad. Experts were openly declaring that in Algeria "the standard of living is low and doesn't suit our people at all because it is significantly below the level we are used to in Yugoslavia".[625] At the same time, the host country suffered a drastic housing shortage. In the 1980s, Algeria was undergoing a severe housing crisis due to strong demographic growth and an accelerated process of urbanization. Since the independence, the population doubled – skyrocketing from 11,6 million in 1962 to 23,1 million inhabitants in 1986. With over a million housing units lacking to accommodate the local population, it had also an abrupt effect on limiting public housing availability for foreign experts.[626] In the absence of accommodation facilities, Yugoslav experts in Algeria were given various alternative accommodation options. This ranged from rooms in student residences (for example, "Résidence Universitaire Revoil" in the Algiers district Hussein Dey)[627] to prefabricated containers on the construction sites in the Sahara desert. Commonly, experts were given rooms in hotels such as "El Manar" in Algiers,[628] or "Maghreb" in Tlemcen.[629] Although in most cases experts were provided with half board (breakfast and dinner) at the hotel, their complaints were focused on the lack of a cooking area (kitchen) which would allow them to prepare their own meals for lunch. Believing that unhygienic conditions prevailed there, they avoided eating lunch in local restaurants. Through the lens of hygienic discourse, which looked at the engagement in Algeria as "risky", Yugoslavs expressed worries that inadequate housing and general living conditions led to various diseases and presented a "health risk".[630]

In fact, many experts as a reason for ending their contract in Algeria mentioned "deteriorated health" as a consequence of housing conditions.[631] The previously mentioned high school teacher of physics, who worked in the town of M'Chedallah in wilaya Bouira, complained about "worrying hygienic and living conditions", as she and her family had been granted "two small rooms in the lyceum with leaking drainage

[624] Panić, Ana, ed. *Nikad Im Bolje Nije Bilo? Modernizacija Svakodnevnog Života u Socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* (Beograd: Muzej istorije Jugoslavije, 2014).
[625] Report by J. K., Algiers, 21 April 1989, AJ-465-6571, p. 5.
[626] Stora, *Algeria*, 193.
[627] Letter from M. J., Algiers, 16 October 1965, AJ-465-6551.
[628] Letter from S. I. Z. to Roža Milčić, Algiers, 20 August 1988, HDA-1727-467.
[629] Letter from A. B. to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, Tlemcen, 18 March 1986, AJ-465-6657.
[630] Letter from V. J., Aïn Oussera, 18 February 1981, AJ-465-6550; Letter from A. B. to Milan Cvetojević, Tlemcen, 9 November 1985, HDA-1727-449.
[631] Report by K. Đ., n.d., AJ-465-6547.

pipes". Therefore, they were provided accommodation in a student dormitory for the first two months of their stay. After that, she finally moved with her husband and son to an apartment near the school where she worked. She described the apartment as:

> "[….] damp, insufficiently furnished and electricity was not connected until early February 1986. In the meantime, we had to use candles, and limited lighting from the generator turned on in the evening. A defective gas stove was available for heating."[632]

Her colleague, a chemistry teacher from Macedonia posted in Annaba from 1985 to 1986, recalled how she "had been ready to return after 15 days spent in school dormitories with two preschool children who got ill because of inadequate housing conditions."[633] As a matter of fact, experts commonly lamented that the accommodation had not been suitable for being joined by their families, particularly children.[634] They complained of "inadequately equipped", "insufficiently furnished" or "unfinished apartments". The lack of furniture and home appliances forced experts to adapt and improvise. A secondary school teacher of physics who worked in Biskra recounted how, for the first two months of his stay, he had to write the preparations for lectures on his knees because there was no desk or a table in the apartment.[635] However, according to the reports, experts had the hardest time coping with water rationing. Apart from lacking potable water, it was difficult for them to adapt to living in apartments without a heating system, electricity, and even air conditioning. Because of "modest" living conditions, experts were usually not accompanied by their families. Those who did bring along their spouses and under-aged children regretted their decision. A Macedonian high school teacher of chemistry commented: "I expected to have a lot of difficulties, but if I had known that an interstate agreement could turn out to be so disorganised, I certainly wouldn't have departed with two preschool children."[636]

Schooling opportunities were another reason experts did not opt to bring their children with them to Algeria. Although there was a possibility of free education in Arab-speaking schools, experts who contemplated bringing their school-age children expressed a strong preference for enrolling them in private French schools. However,

[632] Report by I. T. P., Zagreb, 17 April 1986, HDA-1727-354.
[633] Letter from M. Ć., Annaba, 20 October 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[634] Letter from J. V. to Milan Cvetojević and Roža Milčić, Skikda, 22 April 1986, HDA-1727-466.
[635] Report by K. Đ., n.d., AJ-465-6547.
[636] Letter from M. Ć., Annaba, 20 October 1985, AJ-465-6567.

French schools not only had utterly expensive tuition fees but were restricted to the two largest Algerian cities – Algiers and Oran.[637] While ZAMTES made efforts that experts who decided to bring school-age children to Algeria have the priority to be posted in Oran or Algiers, workplaces in those cities were hardly available.[638] If they could not get a job in one of those two cities, experts preferred to leave the children at home rather than enrol them in public Arabic-speaking schools. A married couple from Macedonia, both employed as lecturers at the University of Oran, expressed their satisfaction with the city, apartment, and schooling of their two children in the French school.[639] Generally, experts residing in Oran, the second-largest Algerian city, went through a significantly shorter adaptation period upon arrival and were overall satisfied with their stay abroad. Aware of the advantages of a metropolitan area, a Macedonian professor of physics, who had initially started working at the University of Sidi Bel Abbes, requested to be transferred and appointed in Oran, about 60 kilometres away.[640] His compatriot and colleague, who was teaching electrical engineering classes at the University of Oran between 1985 and 1988, recalled fond memories of Algeria and his life there with his spouse and child. He recounted that after the initial period of adaptation "[…] remained beautiful impressions from a three-year stay in a beautiful country, hospitable, rich in tradition and authentic culture, where, as Yugoslavs, we did not have the feeling that we were in a foreign country."[641]

However, most experts did not have the opportunity to spend their mission in the urbanised coastal zone. As a result of the *policy* of territorial rebalancing and development of urban centres in the country's interior, the Algerian government opened numerous workplaces in the deep inland of the territory. The place where experts' improvisation and adaptation skills were put to the test was the container camp of a local construction company accommodation in the desert. After they had overcome complications with the travel to Illizi, the two architects were put up in a container house together with a local engineer. They described the spartan housing conditions: "In a 3x4 m^2 room, there were first the two of us, and later they brought an Algerian. There

[637] Embassy's note No. 760, 17 June 1982, AJ-465-6562.
[638] Request from the Algerian Ministry of Urbanism and Construction, 5 January 1988, HDA-1727-450.
[639] Report by the married couple Tanevski, 20 September 1988, AJ-465-6557.
[640] Report by V. U., Skopje, 31 August 1988, AJ-465-6565.
[641] Report by M. B., Skopje, 10 November 1988, AJ-465-6565.

are only three iron beds. We roll things on the dusty floor and hang them on nails."[642] His colleague and roommate conveyed his impressions on the accommodation: "I am sick of this container, there is nothing inside it but a bed; my suitcase serves me as a closet, my knees as a table, and there isn't even a chair. This can be tolerated temporarily, but not for half a year, or, as it seems to me, three years […]." While it might seem a quick fix, because they had not been receiving salaries, furnishing apartments from their own budget was not a feasible solution for experts.[643]

In the end, dissatisfaction with the accommodation provided by the host country was one of the most common reasons for resignation and early departure from Algeria. Through the relationship between cultural differences and housing preferences and needs, we can understand the attitude of Yugoslav cooperants. Some authors disclosed that the house design and functionality reflect cultural values. According to their cultural backgrounds, people may have different housing experiences and satisfaction with certain housing types.[644] In simple terms, housing satisfaction can be defined as a discrepancy between desired and real outcomes regarding the housing environment.[645] Due to their ethnocentric beliefs, experts in Algeria insisted, for instance, on studio-type apartments or heating systems untypical of the local housing norms. Moreover, their expectations regarding accommodation were influenced by the major improvement in housing standard at home. By the beginning of the 1980s, a television receiver, stove and refrigerator became a standard part of a Yugoslav household.[646] Thus, it is not surprising that experts often referred to these appliances as "basic commodities" which they considered to make "minimum living conditions".[647] Modernization discourse, which defined Algeria as an underdeveloped society on a lower civilizational stage, dominated the descriptions of the accommodation:

> "[…] the protocol [1982 Agreement] between our two governments determined that every expert gets a furnished apartment and by that we mean an apartment built according to the principles of modern architecture and construction, that meets hygiene

[642] Letter from M. S. and K. Z., Illizi, 30 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[643] Letter from M. Ć., Annaba, 20 October 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[644] Hyun-Jeong Lee and Kathleen Parrott, "Cultural Background and Housing Satisfaction", *Housing and Society*, 31, no. 2 (2004): p. 145–158.
[645] Silvija Šiljeg, Ivan Marić and Branko Cavrić, „Pregled razvoja teorija u proučavanju zadovoljstva stanovanjem", *Geoadria* 23, no. 1, 51-84, 2018, p. 54.
[646] Dobrivojević, "Kuće na selu", p. 48.
[647] Report by M.B, 26 February 1988, AJ-465-6566.

> requirements, which means it must be clean, painted, have hot and cold water, that the installations for draining dirty water are functioning, that the toilet and the bathroom are modern and that it has all the necessary furniture, it does not have to be new, but in good and clean condition. They told us that was their Algerian standard and that they could not provide us with the conditions we have in Yugoslavia. "[648]

For highly-skilled workers who hitherto lived in urban centres of Yugoslavia, it was difficult to conform to life on the global periphery and lower standard of living. One of them reported: "The conditions and way of life in Algeria differ in many elements from what our man is used to, so the adaptation process is sometimes very difficult. Due to all the above and many other things, our people should not be forced to go to work in Algeria [...]."[649] Another expert described the accommodation in Algeria as "below human dignity".[650] Having a hard time adapting to the austerity, experts emotionally opened up in their letters to ZAMTES. One of them admitted that he had sometimes "cried like a baby" due to the "big change" in the lifestyle and cultural environment.[651] However, unsatisfactory housing conditions were not the only aspect of the local culture which Yugoslavs believed caused them a "very difficult mental and physical state", and ultimately illness.[652]

The Climate

Not only did the experts have difficulties adapting to the new indoor living environment, but also the one outdoors. The climate conditions represented a grave preoccupation for experts before and after their arrival. During the application process, they requested to be allocated to a country with "favourable climate conditions" or explained that their decision to bring their families depended upon the same matter. Indeed, many candidates gave up due to the "climate-unfavourable" regional schedule after being communicated about the place of work they had been selected for. That climate remained one of the principal concerns upon arrival, is testified by the fact that it was usually the first subject they mentioned when informing the Yugoslav authorities about

[648] Letter from V. J., Aïn Oussera, 10 February 1981, AJ-465-6550.
[649] Report by K. Đ., n.d., AJ-465-6547.
[650] Report by Đ. J., Belgrade, 5 June 1987, AJ-465-6566.
[651] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.
[652] Report by B. S., Sarajevo, 28 July 1985, AJ-465-6555.

their initial days abroad. As it occurred independently of geographic locality, shows the influence of colonial perceptions that "atrocious climate" was a universal determinant of the African continent. For example, as the reason for leaving Algeria, expert S. Z. I. employed by the Ministry of Urban Planning and Construction in 1985 and 1986, contributed to the worsening of her daughter's malady to the „severe climate" of Algeria. Yet, she lived with her 8-year-old daughter in a hotel complex in Sidi Fredj on the coast of Algiers, which characterizes the Mediterranean climate identical to the weather conditions of the Yugoslav (today Croatian) Adriatic coast and her hometown of Šibenik.[653]

Such miscomprehensions indicate that experts brought with them the ideas of environmental determinism regarding the negative effects of the hostile "African environment" on the psychological and physiological human state.[654] In line with the colonial discourse, they often attributed to the climate the deterioration of health or reported "intolerance of climatic conditions" as a valid reason for the termination of their contract.[655] "A mental state of inability to adapt to the environment, accompanied by depression, especially in such desert places with a typically African environment and difficult living and working conditions ", experts believed, was a valid reason for requesting an "urgent return home".[656] In a similar fashion, an architect working in the mountain town of Theniet El Had wrote a letter to ZAMTES saying that in order "[t]o survive here [in Algeria], the most important thing is to be healthy, strong and have the support of your family".[657] The adopted survivalist rhetoric was reminiscent of the 18th-century colonial discourse of "White man's grave", typically associated with West Africa, which was notorious for the high mortality rate among Europeans. While Algeria in experts' imaginary geography belonged exclusively to the African continent, we find a disparate account by a university professor of forestry who spent two years, from 1976 to 1978, at the National Institute of Agronomy in the Algiers suburb of El Harrach. In a letter to ZAMTES, he defined the country within the Mediterranean region with climatic

[653] Letter from S. I-Z. to Roža Milčić, Algiers, 20 August 1988, HDA-1727-467.
[654] Weinar and Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Highly-Skilled Migration*, 58.
[654] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", 188.
[655] Letter from S. I-Z. to Roža Milčić, Algiers, 20 August 1988; Letter from Đ. Z., Šibenik, 19 December 1988, HDA-1727-467.
[656] Letter from V. J., Aïn Oussera, 8 March 1981, AJ-465-6550.
[657] Letter from P. N., Theniet El Had, 6 July 1985, AJ-465-6567.

and vegetational characteristics similar to Yugoslavia.[658] It cannot be excluded that the 7th Mediterranean Games held in Algiers in 1975 contributed to his imagining of the country.

The Solitude

"Connections with the world are desperately bad. You can't even call [within] Algeria, let alone [to] Yugoslavia", kvetched the two architects in Illizi.[659] Due to the nature of their job, architects and civil engineers were sent to Algeria's southern territories, precisely wilayas Tamanrasset, Adrar, Bechar, Ouargla, Biskra and Laghouat, for which they were entitled to an increase in salary by 20%. For many of them, this was insufficient compensation for objectively more difficult climatic conditions and especially psychologically challenging isolation that they had to endure. A part of wilaya Ouargla until 1984, Illizi was one of Algeria's most southern provinces. In the capital with the same name, one of the two aforementioned architects described their quarantine-like lifestyle:

> "Illizi alone, as a city, is hard to bear. As we have already reported, there is nothing here, we are left with only work and sleep […] There is no telephone, no newspaper, and even a telegram is very difficult to receive. […] This is how we spend our days in total isolation from the world, our only connection is [via] mail, which arrives slowly. I am convinced that we live in the worst conditions of all Yugoslav experts in Algeria."[660]

After returning home, he comparably reflected on his experience of solitude:

> "By staying in Illizi, one has to come to terms with isolation – it is practically impossible to make phone calls, there are no newspapers, mail arrives slowly and irregularly, supplies are poor, there is no social life, no possibility for visits as there are no hotels or accommodation in the city. Climate conditions are difficult, although it is still the easiest to endure, it is far more difficult to adapt to loneliness and isolation from the [rest of the] world." [661]

[658] Letter from Z. J., Algiers, 18 December 1976, AJ-465-6551.
[659] Joint letter from K. Z. and M. S., Illizi, 6 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[660] Letter from M. S. to Dobrivoje Drašković (ZAMTES), Illizi, 7 March 1986, AJ-465-6567.
[661] Report by M. S., Koper, 24 November 1986, AJ-465-6567.

Due to the nature of their position, Yugoslav technical experts in the Global South had limited contact with fellow compatriots and the home authorities. To facilitate their adaptation and solving of recurring issues, ZAMTES recommended sending experts in groups rather than individually. Though nominally dispatched as "teams", experts were usually separated upon arrival and relocated across the country, depending on their designated workplace. Many were sent to remote areas or villages without infrastructure, typically architects and civil engineers working at construction sites. The broader implication of such a practice exposes a well-recorded case of the group of eight engineers of Zagreb-based construction enterprise Hidroelektra, hired by the Algerian Ministry of Hydraulics, Environment and Forestry in December 1984 within the framework of technical cooperation. Six workers from Hidroelektra's group were assigned to the construction site of the Hammam Debagh dam near Guelma, where they took over the supervision of the project from a group of Czechoslovak engineers. Meanwhile, the other two experts were assigned some 1,000 kilometres West to supervise the construction of the El Izdihar dam in Sidi Abdelli near Tlemcen. Due to the importance of the mission, and with only one engineer fluent in French, Hidroelektra appointed to both groups an interpreter to facilitate communication with the Algerian administration and the new employer. However, in the mid of their stay, expert E.R. working at the construction site of El Izdihar was transferred to the nearby dam Souani near the town of Maghnia, while expert M.R. was relocated from Hammam Debagh dam to Mexa dam near El-Taref.[662] Frequent changes and transfer of staff to another construction site not only caused stagnation and obstructed the progress of works but also had implications on experts' daily life experiences.

Due to limited social life and interactions after work, the feeling of loneliness and apathy frequently appeared among experts who had not been accompanied by their spouses and children. In their letters, we encounter lamentations of how it was "hard to be alone and without a family".[663] At the end of the working day, but especially on weekends, desolation sometimes led to a mental crisis. Reporting to ZAMTES, they often openly conveyed having psychologically difficult moments which seldom ended up in

[662] Letter from M. R. informing about the intention to terminate the contract, Mexa, 30 November 1986, HDA-1727-462.
[663] Letter from E. R. to Roža Milčić, Souani, 16 May 1986, HDA-1727-462.

tears.[664] In one of his letters, expert E. R., who had been set apart from the Hidroelektra group and sent to work at the Souani dam, lamented about his unexpected relocation:

> "I am the only Yugoslav here. […] alone and without a family it is psychologically difficult to endure, but it is a must when there is no work at home. It is physically less strenuous than working for Hidroelektra but mentally harder."[665]

Upon hospitalisation in a psychiatric clinic in Tlemcen in October 1987, he was diagnosed with clinical depression as a "reaction to workplace conflicts and family separation".[666] His diagnosis eventually led him to be declared unfit for work and consequently to terminate the contract with the Algerian Ministry. However, this was not the only recorded case of an expert enduring a nervous breakdown. The employee of the Ministry of Urbanism, Construction and Housing, Serbian architect M. K. who was for less than three months in 1985, stationed in the city of Béchar, some 50 kilometres from the Moroccan border, shared the same fate. Noticing his "very strange behaviour", the local manager suggested him to "travel for a few days back to Belgrade, to see his family".[667] However, under impaired mental health, the Yugoslav architect missed his flight to Belgrade, ending up hospitalised in the Algiers psychiatric clinic for two weeks before returning to Yugoslavia.[668]

On the other hand, workers who remained to work and live together showed resilience and less distress. Therefore, expressions such as "if only there were another Yugoslav here"[669] do not come as a surprise because the company of countrymen with whom they had shared migration experience provided psychological and emotional stability.[670] The need for a safe spot for Yugoslav workers in Algeria and their families set the initiative to establish, by the end of the 1970s, the Club of Yugoslavs in Algeria ("Klub Jugoslovena u Alžiru").[671] Such associations were set up across the countries of the Global South with a larger Yugoslav community.[672] By organizing social events and different activities, these so-called "Yugoslav clubs" imparted a structure to experts' life

[664] Letter from J. V., Skikda, 22 April 1986, HDA-1727-466.
[665] Letter from E. R. to Roža Milčić, Souani, 16 May 1986, HDA-1727-462.
[666] Medical diagnosis, Tlemcen, 3 November 1987, HDA-1727-462.
[667] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to ZAMTES, 30 May 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[668] Telex by the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, May 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[669] Letter from L.N. to Andrija Pavičić, Affreville (Khemis Miliana), 29 July 1963, HDA-1727-460.
[670] Weinar and Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Highly-Skilled Migration*, 58.
[671] Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate*, 526.
[672] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", 182

abroad, fostered solidarity and a sense of community, helped compatriots with their everyday struggles and, importantly, provided them emotional support. The first president of the Club of Yugoslavs in Algeria was Ivan Lipković, a telecommunications engineer from Serbia, who was among the first Yugoslav experts who arrived in Algeria in February 1963. Lipković worked at the central offices of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications until August 1965. It did not take long, precisely a year, before he returned to Algeria upon receiving a direct invitation from his former employer. Eventually, Lipković spent at least 15 years in continuity serving in Algeria, together with his spouse Ljubica Lipković-Mirić and their two children. She was an architectural engineer who was employed at the same Ministry as her husband. Even though they had signed private contracts with the Algerian administration, ZAMTES recognized their status as technical cooperation experts by the virtue of their "honourable service" abroad.

Ideally, but rarely, in places where Yugoslav enterprises conducted engineering projects, experts gathered around camps of posted workers. Indeed, the ill-fated expert E. R. wrote to ZAMTES that he had occasionally travelled to the nearby camp in Ghazaouet, which hosted workers of Croatian construction enterprises Tehnika and Geotehnika.[673] Compared to technical cooperation experts, Yugoslav workers posted in the Global South by their enterprises which had conducted investment projects acquired different living and working experiences.[674] Enjoying a relatively high salary largely paid in convertible currency, and getting extra for overtime, night shifts and work during national holidays, their prime motive for conducting work activities in the Global South was financial gain. Accommodated in camps organised at the construction site, they had virtually no contact with the local population. The camp accommodating workers functioned as a self-sustaining Yugoslav town. It had regular supplies of food and hygiene items but also services of Yugoslav physicians and chefs. Moreover, after work, there was the availability of entertainment, such as Yugoslav printed media, books,

[673] Letter from E. R. to Roža Milčić, Souani, 16 May 1986, HDA-1727-462.
[674] However, it should be noted that workers employed in Algeria as part of the investment cooperation of Yugoslav enterprises also encountered certain, usually, bureaucratic problems due to their unregulated employment status.

radio, and television. At larger construction sites, companies had even set up sports fields.[675]

In fact, the Yugoslav authorities acknowledged that technical experts working in secluded areas of the country had virtually no opportunities for entertainment and spending quality spare time. Experts' reports reveal that they were strongly disappointed with the absence of Western-style places of entertainment, such as cinemas, theatres, cafes, and restaurants.[676] The two architects in Illizi whined about how it was challenging to come to terms with living in a place where one could not buy a newspaper and sit in a cafe.[677] Thus, they had to find alternative, less consumer-oriented forms of recreation. The architect in Theniet El Had wrote that "[t]he entertainment as we know it doesn't exist here. Entertainment is going to another place, visiting each other. And [going to] the seaside in the summer […]."[678] Expecting to face desolation in Algeria, some experts beforehand prepared to bring with them popular products of Western consumer culture. For example, a list of items required for duty-free import to Algeria, composed in 1987 by a surgeon from Zagreb, a not-meant-to-be member of the medical team in Bou Saâda, states exclusively a gaming setup composed of "TV of the brand JVC", "Telefunken mini HIFI" and "personal computer 'Commodore 64' with 2 joysticks and a magnetophone".[679]

Annual leave was a rare occasion to visit family and friends in Yugoslavia. Though they were entitled to 30 days off each year, those could be spent only after 11 months of effective work. Even the holidays did not go without problems for many experts. To exit the country, they had to apply for an Algerian exit visa, which could only be obtained by presenting the employer's confirmation and other relevant documentation. Sometimes prolonged to as many as three months, the lengthy process occasionally wasted some of the vacation days. Due to the slow and demanding bureaucratic procedure of obtaining an exit visa, shorter absences from the country to fly home or visit the neighbouring country of Tunis became almost impossible. The exit visa was needed even for those who had terminated the contract with the Algerian administration. There was a case of

[675] Spaskovska, "Building a better world?", p. 9-10.
[676] Joint letter from K. Z. and M. S., Illizi, 6 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[677] Embassy's note No. 609, 11 August 1986, AJ-465-6567.
[678] Letter from P. N., Theniet El Had, 6 July 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[679] Declaration for customs-free import, Zagreb, 10 June 1987, HDA-1727-453.

an expert who, after his resignation, had to "return illegally" to Yugoslavia with the help of the Embassy in Algiers since the Algerian authorities had not granted him the visa to exit the country. Because of such experiences, experts complained of the restricted freedom of movement they had faced in Algeria. As argued by migration scientist Hein de Haas, the deprivation of mobility freedom induces deterioration of individuals' well-being and even the desire "to escape" the country.[680] This does not come as a surprise as Yugoslav citizens were accustomed to having completely open borders since the government lifted the last visa restrictions in 1966/1967.[681]

The Image of the Yugoslav Expert

The Yugoslav political elite believed in the power of "ordinary citizens" in shaping the perception of the host countries' population about the country and directing political and economic trajectories to its favour. Taking the role of citizen diplomats, Yugoslavia's technical experts represented their country in everyday personal and professional interactions with the local communities across the Global South. Albeit without any diplomatic status, their engagement, at least on paper, assumed many features of a diplomatic mission. Experts' lifestyle, personal conduct and expertise work had to transmit a specific, well-curated image of a non-aligned, solidarity-driven socialist Yugoslavia which had put them at the disposal of the Algerian government. To raise awareness that technical experts' employment in the Global South was not oriented toward money-saving, as was the case of Yugoslav blue-collar workers in the West or Gastarbeiter, in the "Handbook for International Technical Cooperation Specialists Seconded to Work in Developing Countries" issued in 1968, ZAMTES warned to avoid the risk of developing "traits of pečalbar psychosis", such as the accumulation of financial resources at the expense of personal reputation. To convey the desired image of a modern socialist citizen, the recommendation for future experts was to invest a part of their income in the standard of living and physical appearance while residing abroad.[682] Yet, this image for the experts in Algeria was hard to maintain without the assistance of the sending party. In fact, by adopting a *laissez-faire* approach to technical

[680] De Haas, "A Theory of Migration", p. 18-19.
[681] Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*,p. 65-66.
[682] *Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke suradnje*, p. 70.

experts dispatched abroad, ZAMTES induced undesired outcomes and a contrasting effect on the Yugoslav image and overall cooperation.

Though other foreign cooperants recounted having experienced similar problems,[683] Yugoslav experts were characterised by the feeling of abandonment, neglect and lack of support from the home authorities that had recruited and dispatched them to work abroad.[684] While they protested against the treatment from the Algerian administration which "departed from the officially proclaimed policy towards Yugoslavia" and accused it of not fulfilling their contractual obligations and breaching the terms of the bilateral Agreement,[685] for their "miserable" and "dishonourable" living conditions they primarily held accountable Yugoslav institutions.[686] That was because, according to the contract signed with experts prior to their departure, ZAMTES was supposed to oversee the implementation of the bilateral Agreement and "take measures to protect the rights of experts in the event that a foreign partner does not fulfil its obligations towards the expert".[687] Equally, experts did not receive efficient assistance from the Embassy to which they were entitled as Yugoslav citizens in Algeria.[688] Consequently, relying on the continuous pressures on the host administration to ensure improved living conditions and higher salaries, experts conveyed the unintended image of status-seeking and profit-oriented Yugoslav citizens.

On the one hand, experts pointed out to ZAMTES and the Embassy for covering up "the real situation" with Yugoslavia's experts in Algeria. They felt they had been "frauded" and "deceived" by not having been sufficiently informed and truthfully described living and working conditions in the country,[689] which they perceived as "utterly arduous" and "humiliating".[690] Inadequate preparation for the mission, in their opinion, had only worsened their problems. Similarly, Slovenian expert J. K. recruited in July 1986, as part of INGRA's contractual obligation for technical cooperation with SONELGAZ, claimed that the Croatian enterprise "depicted everything in flying colours"

[683] Note on Consul M. Đurić's talks with Christian Bierke, Second Secretary of the GDR Embassy in Algeria, 15 October 1987, AJ-465-6549.
[684] Embassy's note No. 690, 27 June 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[685] Note on Blažo Krstajić's talks with Abderrahmane Benmokhtar, 8 November 1983, HDA-1727-344.
[686] Report by K. Z., n.d., AJ-465-6571.
[687] „Ugovor", *Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke saradnje*, p. 73-75.
[688] Letter from V. J. to Dobrivoje Drašković (ZAMTES), Aïn Oussera, 18 February 1981, AJ-465-6550.
[689] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.
[690] Report by I. T. P., Zagreb, 17 April 1986, HDA-1727-354.

and that he would not have gone to work in Algeria "if properly informed" of the situation.[691] On the other hand, ZAMTES claimed transparency by warning experts to expect "initial difficulties" regarding delayed wages, foreign bank transfer, and accommodation, for the sake of avoiding experts' dissatisfaction upon arrival.[692] Moreover, ZAMTES argued that the situation experts had been experiencing in Algeria was "completely normal for most developing countries", and that in some other places was "even worse".[693] Finally, it is important to stress that ZAMTES did intervene with the Algerian authorities regarding experts' issues through diplomatic channels. In fact, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained about receiving 16 diplomatic notices in two months from the Yugoslav Embassy, "wondering why there were so many problems with Yugoslav experts even though they were not many".[694] However, without a systematic Yugoslav policy and approach towards dispatched experts, these interventions proved to be insufficient.

The inability to have their problems solved had an impact on their mood and finally the decision to end their mission in Algeria. The architect from Zagreb, B. D., who worked for the Ministry of Urbanism in Annaba in 1986 and 1987 described the feelings experts had about their mission in Algeria and ZAMTES inefficient mechanism of cooperation: "[W]e're finding our way but at the expense of our reputation, status, free time, and finally the mood towards this friendly country […]".[695] The last resort for experts was resignation. In practice, the possibility to unilaterally cancel the contract proved to be the only effective instrument of protection guaranteed by the Agreement.[696] Though experts had to obtain consent for terminating (and for extending) the mission and give 3 months prior notice to the Algerian administration, in extraordinary circumstances ZAMTES turned a blind eye to the rule. For example, Serbian architect S. C. left Algeria only after 10 days. Here is how he explained his instant decision to resign from his position in Laghouat:

[691] Report by J. K., Algiers, 21 April 1989, AJ-465-6571, p. 9.
[692] Dispatchment of the first group of agricultural experts to Algeria, 6 January 1983, AJ-465-6570; Embassy's note No. 600, 9 August 1986, AJ-465-6567.
[693] Letter from ZAMTES to the Office for Petitions and Complaints of the Assembly of the SFRY, 29 February 1984, AJ-465-6561.
[694] Embassy's note No. 1150, 14 December 1985, AJ-465-6562.
[695] Report by B. D., Zagreb, 2 June 1987, HDA-1727-451.
[696] Letter from the Director of ZAMTES to T. V., 15 August 1989, AJ-465-6571.

> "I have loved and love Algeria and the Algerian people. I worked from 1971 to 1973 in Tizi Ouzou. I have Algerian friends there. I did not want to go to Algeria to work at all costs, regardless of the location and only because of money. I feel […] devalued and played off and I believe that my requests could have been met with a little determination (from Algerian and our part)."[697]

His peer, another Serbian architect sent in December 1986 to Chlef, a city 200 kilometres from the capital, achieved a record-short stay by packing his suitcases only 5 days after arrival. In fact, most experts dispatched in the 1980s cancelled their contracts in Algeria before the 3-year expiration. From a total of 67 dispatched experts in the period between 1983 and 1986, 29 of them returned to Yugoslavia – out of which 20 prematurely, after voluntarily quitting or being dismissed. According to their reports, many regretted their decision to come to Algeria. However, some of them requested to get transferred or, if not possible, eventually accepted the conditions and remained in the country "because of the shame to return so soon".[698]

This kind of occurrence sparked serious worries among Yugoslav government representatives. First, the Embassy in Algiers feared that resignations and requests for transfer to another workplace "created bad blood" between the two countries.[699] Moreover, the experts were seen as a source of "negative publicity" not only overseas but also at home. Namely, Yugoslav officials expressed general concern regarding the practice of returnees from Algeria disseminating obstructive information about the technical expert mission, thereby discouraging potential candidates from applying.[700] The head of Yugoslavia's diplomatic mission between 1981 and 1985, Faik Dizdarević, brother of the first Yugoslav ambassador to Algeria, in particular, did not show understanding for experts' requests and complaints, considering them groundless and exaggerated. To prove his point, he cited as an example of experts "raising the issue of floor and the insolated side" of the granted apartments.[701] Faced with an increased number of demands from the group of agronomists who departed to Algeria at the beginning of 1983, Dizdarević grumbled that experts prioritized individual over

[697] Report by S. C., Belgrade, 11 April 1985, AJ-465-6563.
[698] Report by K. Z., n.d., AJ-465-6571.
[699] Embassy's note No. 617, 10 June 1985, AJ-465-6546.
[700] Note on the talks between Marijan Strbašić and Ambassador Noureddine Kerroum, 15 April 1987; Note on talks between Dobrivoje Drašković and Moustafa Saddiki, 7 November 1985, HDA-1727-344; „PODSETNIK o naučno-tehničkoj saradnji", n.d., AJ-465-6571, p. 7.
[701] Embassy's note No. 257, 4 March 1983, AJ-465-6561.

collective interest by "constantly putting their problems in the foreground, especially their material status".[702] The root of the problems of bilateral technical cooperation he saw in the individuals who came to Algeria motivated by personal material interests and whose preoccupation with the standard of living distracted them from active engagement at the workplace.[703] In an internal diplomatic note, Dizdarević spoke his mind about Yugoslav experts in Algeria:

> "These experts, by all accounts, are not bound by anything, not even an obligation to their country, by the membership of the LCY. Besides, the vast majority of experts from this group [of agronomists] are primarily focused on earnings, much more than on the development of cooperation with Algeria, and opening the space [of the Algerian market] for our enterprises to conduct business."[704]

Paradoxically, according to his predecessor, upon taking office as the head of the diplomatic mission, Dizdarević requested furnishing his residence in Algiers with modern furniture and purchasing a brand new Mercedes to serve as an official diplomatic vehicle.[705]

In other cases, the inability to resolve their problems and exercise rights guaranteed by the agreement caused tensions between experts, which sometimes ended in conflict, and eventually dismissal from the mission in Algeria. This happened in the well-documented case of a previously mentioned group of 15 agricultural experts, mainly from Vojvodina, who was employed by the Ministry of Agriculture in January 1983. After almost ten months had passed since ZAMTES submitted their candidatures in April 1982, the group of agricultural experts – the first of the three planned groups – arrived in Algeria on 24 January 1983. The mission was given high importance since it had been the first team of Yugoslav technical experts dispatched since the adoption of the Agreement. For example, the daily newspaper "Borba" published an article about experts' departure to Algeria under the celebratory headline "Agronomists are paving the way".[706] Upon arrival, they were welcomed by the Ministry of Agriculture and the representatives of the Yugoslav Embassy joined by the ZAMTES associate, Dobrivoje

[702] Embassy's note No. 304, 14 March 1983; Embassy's note No. 564, 27 May 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[703] Embassy's note No. 757, 21 July 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[704] Embassy's note No. 661, 20 June 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[705] Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate*, p. 539.
[706] „Agronomi utiru put", *Borba*, 15 February 1983.

Drašković, who had been sent to Algiers to personally welcome and accommodate the arriving experts as well as to hand over the list of 22 candidates for the second group of agronomists (which, however, have never departed).[707] The group split according to their designated workplaces: nine experts were allocated to Bejaia, precisely to the Directorate of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Revolution and Forestry (Directions du Développement Agricole et de la Révolution Agraire et des Forêts, DDARAF) of the wilaya, four to Algiers to work at the National Bureau of Studies for Rural Development (Bureau National d'Études pour le Dévelopement Rural, BNEDER), while the married couple Bačić were sent to work at the Department of Agriculture of the recently established Institute of Technology in Sidi Bel Abbes. Although their arrival had been pompously announced, the reality of the stay was quite different. Already driven up the wall by the fact that they had not yet received their first salary after five months of work,[708] it did not take long before the question of accommodation recrudesced and brewed to the point of inciting disputes between experts. Apart from the Embassy personnel, precisely consul Petar Mijić, who had been sent to Bejaia to talk to the experts and try to appease them, the group in Algiers was not offered any practical solution for their financial and accommodation troubles. Without a sign from the Embassy of making any progress regarding the issues they had reported, experts took the matter into their own hands.

In the office of BNEDER in Bouchaoui, about 20 kilometres away from the capital Algiers, an incident of a physical and verbal confrontation between two Macedonian agronomists took place on 13 June 1983. The conflict arose after Metodi and another member of the group had been informed that they had to leave their apartments and move into less spacious hotel rooms, within the same resort "El Manar" in Sidi Fredj (also known as Sidi Ferruch). The notification arrived as a result of local authorities' decision to secure additional accommodation capacities during the upcoming tourist season. Accusing his counterpart Georgi of abusing his position and favouring himself and another colleague to keep the apartments, Metodi directed at him a few insulting words followed by a punch in the face. The enraged expert had some reasons to assume Georgi had his fingers in the pie. Namely, ZAMTES appointed him as the "coordinator",

[707] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy to the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture, 24 January 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[708] Letter from M. K., n.d., AJ-465-6561.

that is, a representative of agricultural experts in order to take the responsibility for the communication between the group experts on one side and the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture and the Yugoslav Embassy on the other. Nevertheless, the decision of the local authorities could be explained by the fact that they gave priority to more spacious and comfortable accommodation units to experts who came with their wives before the two single experts, one of them Metodi.

Unlike the local authorities, which did not seem to attach much importance to the episode, the Yugoslav diplomatic representation in Algeria fiercely reacted to the incident. Qualifying it as "an attack on the country's reputation"[709] and evaluating that the perpetrators brought "humiliation not only for them but also for Yugoslavia" and "compromised and tarnished the reputation of Yugoslavia", the Embassy requested ZAMTES to recall the perpetrators from their positions and immediately return them home.[710] The unyielding Ambassador Dizdarević expressed worries that the rumours of the incident had spread not merely among the Algerians but had also reached foreign experts.[711] On tenterhooks waiting for the final ZAMTES decision, experts were trying to justify the event and keep their jobs in Algeria. Even the BNEDER unsuccessfully intervened with the Embassy to keep their employees. Yet, the Ambassador was relentless. The experts were recalled in July 1983 from their workplace at the Ministry of Agriculture of Algeria and had to move out of their apartments in Sidi Fredj. However, both expelled experts decided to stay in Algiers for a few more weeks on their personal budget in an attempt to transfer to the Yugoslav bank account the earnings from the previous months. Their attempts to overturn the revocation decision and remain working in Algeria were classified by the Ambassador as "reckless and uncompromising efforts causing great damage to the reputation of all Yugoslavs there."[712] On the other hand, Georgi held the Yugoslav ambassador personally responsible for the "material and moral damage" caused by his "unfounded allegations"[713] about the event and early withdrawal from Algeria, which compromised their right to wire transfer the earnings.[714] He even addressed a letter to the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia

[709] Embassy's note No. 1282, 26 November 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[710] Embassy's note No. 661, 20 June 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[711] Embassy's note No. 757, 21 July 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[712] Embassy's note No. 872, 23 August 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[713] Letter from M. K., n.d., AJ-465-6561.
[714] Appeal by G. I. to the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia Mika Špiljak, Skopje, 28 December 1983, AJ-465-6561.

Mika Špiljak in which he had put complaint about the "arrogant conduct" of Ambassador Dizdarević and requested the return to Algeria. While it seems that Georgi had not managed to fulfil his demands, his act shows that Yugoslav citizens could claim their constitutional prerogative to report any violation of their civil and political rights and legal interests to the public authorities, even at the federal level. As Josip Mihaljević explained, all complaints that citizens addressed to the highest instances of the state were forwarded to be reviewed and responded to by the Office for Petitions and Complaints of the Assembly of the SFRY (*Biro za predstavke i pritužbe Skupštine SFRJ*).[715] Moreover, it demonstrated that Yugoslav citizens possessed a certain degree of freedom in expressing dissatisfaction and criticizing government officials.

While two experts were withdrawn by the decision of the Yugoslav administration, several others from the group of agronomists voluntarily resigned due to inadequate living and working conditions, especially if they had been relocated to the country's periphery by the ministerial decree. Namely, in March 1984, the Algerian government enforced the decision to remove foreign experts from the central offices of the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture. For example, V. R. was sent from the BNEDER office in Algiers to the town Aïn Bessem in Wilaya Bouira, where he complained, among other things, that he had had to travel daily significant distances to reach his workplace. Unsatisfied with the life and work in the provincial town, he soon quit the job in Algeria. The Embassy concluded that "such cases [of resignation] will multiply with the increase in the number of our experts in Algeria and will create problems with serious political implications [on the bilateral relations]."[716]

While without the support of the administration that sent them abroad, the concrete and efficient help experts received from, as they dubbed them, "comrades in distress".[717] The workers of Yugoslav enterprises with permanent representations in Algeria helped their peers on different occasions, making their stay somewhat easier. They offered the experts with meals in the canteens and even accommodation put in place on the construction sites where their enterprises conducted engineering projects. The Algiers branch of Hidroelektra, for example, paid the expense for hotel accommodation upon experts' arrival to Algiers, organised transportation to the

[715] Josip Mihaljević, *Komunizam i čovjek*, p. 167-172, 217.
[716] Embassy's note No., 703, 5 June 1984, AJ-465-6561.
[717] Report by K. Z., n.d., AJ-465-6571.

construction sites, lent money while they were not receiving their salary and offered a corporative vehicle (Renault 4) to commute to the workplace.[718] Similarly, Tehnika, which had set up a camp at the construction site in El Hadjar near Annaba, lent them money and provided experts with accommodation in a prefabricated container.[719] Not only that, but larger enterprises made available their private medical personnel employed at the camps, providing them with free medical check-ups and emergency treatments. In grave cases, physicians of Hidroelektra and Hidrotehnika personally escorted ill experts back to Yugoslavia.[720] Moreover, workers borrowed or gifted them, if they were about to leave the country, various industrial products, such as a TV. Yet, even much more modest gestures experts strongly appreciated. The architects in Illizi reported how Yugoslavs working in the capital had been mailing them tax stamps that could not be found in the town they had worked.[721] Importantly, staying without salary for months, and following the regulations under which citizens were allowed to take up to US$ 250 out of Yugoslavia, experts borrowed cash in the local currency from their counterparts.[722] Although ZAMTES enabled experts to take a loan at the Yugoslav Embassy,[723] they had to pay it off within 3 months of arrival (or 15 days from receiving the advance payment or salary from the Algerian administration). Oftentimes, such loans were impossible to obtain due to physical obstacles, that is, the distance of the workplace from the Embassy. The parole "find a way" truly became the golden rule for experts in Algeria.

[718] Report by F.B., 25 January 1987, HDA-1727-449; Report by V. H, 1987, HDA-1727-453.
[719] Saša Šimpraga, "Bespravni grad" [interview with Borislav Doklestić], *Vizkultura*, 12 October 2020. https://vizkultura.hr/intervju-borislav-doklestic/
[720] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy to ZAMTES, 2 June 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[721] Joint letter from K. Z. and M. S., Illizi, 6 December 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[722] Report by A. B., Zagreb, 3 January 1987, HDA-1727-449.
[723] Employment resolution for I. T. P., 22 May 1986, HDA-1727-354.

4.2. A Microcosm of Global Hierarchies: Cross-Cultural Interactions and Encounters

A "Socialist Civilizing Mission"? Algerians as "Underdeveloped Others"

On 3 October 1958, in the northeastern Algerian city of Constantine, the French president Charles De Gaulle triumphally announced the launching of a program of social and economic reforms to modernise the underdeveloped and impoverished North African colony. Introduced in the heat of the Algerian War, the Constantine Plan was one of the last development programs designed, financed and managed by the French colonial administration. Although it did not come to light until the late 1950s, the Plan was built on the long-standing concept of "mise en valuer", which emerged as early as the 19th century but gained prominence during the interwar period.[724] The idea postulated that metropoles needed to invest material and intellectual resources in their overseas territories to improve the local economic production and population's living standard to promote the empire's self-interest. Contrasting conventional beliefs, this example shows that state-implemented projects directed at improving "backward" societies according to the Western standard preceded modernisation theory and international development aid associated with post-colonial states.[725]

Dubbing it the "age of development", Joseph Morgan Hodge argued that the decades between the 1930s and 1970s constituted a unique historical period bounded by state-led development ideas and plans. Though the colonial development projects seemingly vanished together with their metropolitan architects, Hodge detected the continuities of the late-colonial state's development agenda in the post-colonial world as largely preserved through the deployment of a network of international experts. With the decolonisation bringing empires to an end, many personnel who had previously worked for the colonial administration were re-employed in the overseas territories as technical experts within the framework of bilateral and multilateral development programmes.[726] Through the advisory and practical activities of foreign experts, scientific knowledge and technology were regarded as the main engines of development that could be transferred to the Global South. The central notions of the Western

[724] Natalya Vince, *The Algerian War, The Algerian Revolution*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 116.
[725] Hodge, „Beyond Dependency", 638-660.
[726] Ibid.

development ideology, scientific knowledge and technology played an equally important role in the "civilising mission" of the colonial period and were essential to colonisers' own perceptions of superiority. Anthropologists E. Crewe and E. Harrison pointed out the connections:

> "Just as Europeans could point to their superior technologies, particularly in the areas of warfare and navigation, as justifications for the civilising mission of the 'white man's burden' three centuries ago, they rationalise their role in aid with reference to their more advanced technology and technical expertise."[727]

The perpetuation of the Western colonial agenda during most of the Cold War period in an alternative, developmentalist form was suggested by proponents of postdevelopment theory, one of its most famous representatives being anthropologist Arturo Escobar. According to the theory, developmentalism, as a phenomenon of the late colonial and the post-colonial era, adopted many premises of the colonial rhetoric and asymmetries of the colonial period. Within the developmentalist discourse, the colonial dichotomy of *civilised* – *savage* was substituted with the binarity of *developed* – *underdeveloped* or *traditional* – *modern*.[728] A quote by the Indian sociologist T. K. Oommen illustrates these analogies well: "If civilising mission was the motto of the colonial era, modernisation became the motif during the Cold War."[729]

Postdevelopmentalism appeared in response to the Western modernisation theory dominating in the 1950s and the 1960s, which posited that any "traditional" society could turn into a "modern" one with the proper assistance. After the Second World War, this notion was initially materialised in the form of development aid granted by the capitalist West. While following a different economic trajectory, the East similarly regarded development as a unilinear evolutionary process on the way to the ultimate goal of socialist modernity. Thus, the socialist ideology likewise expressed faith in assisting "underdeveloped" areas with capital, modern technology and expert knowledge on the road to progress and transformation of "traditional societies". Despite the socialist countries' claims of mutually advantageous cooperation between equals,

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[727] Emma Crewe and Elizabeth Harrison, *Whose Development? An Etnography of Aid* (London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 31.
[728] Ibid, p. 30.
[729] T.K. Oommen, „On the Historicity of Globalization: Construction and Deconstruction of 'Others'" in *Social Change in the Age of Globalization*, eds. Jing Tiankui, Masamichi Sasaki, Li Peilin (Boston: Brill, 2006): p. 12.

some authors suggest that socialist development assistance embedded and reproduced many of the dependency practices of the West.[730] From this understanding, within the post-colonial world born was the idea that the ultimate global division was not between the East and the West but was cast along the North-South divide.

Referring to the scholarship which drew the parallel between the colonial civilizing mission and the modernizing mission of the socialist countries, I will argue that colonial premises dominated the implementation of Yugoslav socialist development efforts in Algeria, conducted between the 1960s and the 1980s. This argument seeks to be confirmed by studying the discourse of Yugoslav experts as socialist development agents, which was in sharp contrast to the official discourse of brotherhood and solidarity promoted and supported by the Yugoslav authorities. Although Yugoslavia did not have a colonial past and its citizens were seemingly free from "colonial baggage", which in theory should have facilitated interaction with the locals, the mindset of dispatched experts in Algeria reveals the existence of a parallel, hidden discourse in the Yugoslav society. The continuation of colonial discourses in a developmentalist form was visible in the "othering" of the locals, who were seen as the Other that needed yet to undergo the process of modernization. Shifting the focus to the micro level will provide a more rounded picture of the Yugoslav engagement in the Global South within the non-alignment network.

Already by assuming the position of technical experts, Yugoslavs in the service of development aid programs emphasised their own importance and attempted to impose hierarchical relationships over the domestic population. Dispatched within the framework of international technical cooperation, Yugoslav experts developed a distinctive collective identity defined by their exogenous label of "technical cooperation experts", which had experts had repercussions on their behaviour and perspective on the domestic population. Also, arriving with the mindset of the temporality of their stay contributed to the tendency towards self-segregation. However, the practice of self-ghettoization was not exclusive to Yugoslavs but was a general trait of foreign cooperants in the Global South, which might be read as a reproduction of colonial patterns. Quite the contrary to what they had been instructed by ZAMTES, which insisted on establishing friendly relations with Algerian colleagues "to create an

[730] Calori et al., *Between East and South.*

atmosphere of trust", the interactions on the micro-level occasionally leaned towards antagonisms. At the same time, the local population perceived foreign experts as upholding a privileged position, corrupting youth with Western consumer culture inherent to capitalism, and depriving the country of scarce hard currency. In fact, the continuity of foreign experts' presence in the country since the end of French colonial rule, intensified the processes of Arabization and Islamization of the Algerian society.[731]

Because Yugoslav workers generally tended to avoid everyday social interactions with the locals, workplaces were sites where these encounters reached the highest intensities. Indeed, the image of the Algerian as the "Other" was predominantly constructed in relation to labour which was one of the cornerstone concepts of the socialist ideology. As we can read from experts' accounts, local workers were portrayed through dichotomies of the colonial discourse – such as incompetent, disorganised, irresponsible, and lazy.[732] In the reports, experts frequently described Algerians' unwillingness to perform work activities, and criticised their work habits and general approach to labour. At the same time, they stressed that "all work was done by cooperants" who had to overwork ("work from morning to evening") in order to compensate for the laziness of the locals. The Western-centric perspective of Yugoslav experts can be also found in their comments regarding Algerian workers' productivity ("time has no meaning to them"),[733] a value inherent to the Protestant work ethic and capitalist societies. Not only were locals in the eyes of experts seen as unproductive but also as obstructing their wish to work, thus complaining of not being provided essential work tools, starting from pencils and sheets of paper.

Instead of being focused on work and productivity, the domestic managerial elite was seen as undisciplined, self-interested and greedy. An expert accounted how the managerial echelon within the national enterprise he worked for was characterised by "mutual envy, vanity, the desire to climb the hierarchical ladder quickly […]. They threaten each other and boycott each other at work."[734] This image of the Other was contrasted to the self-image of the Yugoslav worker as the socialist "New Man" who embodied values of hard work and discipline. Complaints about how the Algerian

[731] Body, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'?", p. 28, 32-33.
[732] See, as an example: Report by J. K., Algiers, 21 April 1989, AJ-465-6571, p. 6.
[733] Report by J. K., Algiers, 21 April 1989, AJ-465-6571, p. 5.
[734] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.

officials expected bribes or that "often nothing could be done without bribes" were also a part of the discourse related to linear comprehension of progress, where a high level of corruption reflected the host society's lower stage of development. Understanding progress within the Marxism-Leninism paradigm, experts described Algeria as a backward society ("another time and place") and compared the socio-economic situation with the one in Yugoslavia before the decentralisation and implementation of workers' self-management.[735]

Alongside labour, expertise was another strong marker utilised in constructing the Other. The Algerian technicians and specialists were regarded as undereducated, lacking knowledge and skills. While measuring the development level against the Western-based technological knowledge, Yugoslav experts often maintained that the Algerian technicians were "well below our level in knowledge and experience".[736] Ignoring historical circumstances and socio-economic situation as its outcome, Yugoslav advisors concluded that locals were not competent to manage their own affairs and that foreign experts had a better understanding of the country's needs than its own citizens. This idea was highly present in the statements of architects and civil engineers, maintaining that "[s]ometimes it seems to me that only I think of their homeland"[737] or "without foreigners, they are not able to construct (or design) even a single more complex object."[738] The attitude of the expert can be comparable to the belief of colonialists that "indigenous people", lacking civilizational "maturity", were incapable of self-governing and instead the Westerners had to take over this duty.[739]

As an emblem of socialist modernity, the concept of hygiene also played a significant role in the othering of the Algerians. The colonial hygienic discourse was particularly dominant in the descriptions given by Yugoslav physicians.[740] Based on the accounts of interactions with local patients, we learn that medical experts perceived Algerians as backward and having poor hygiene, as in this typical example of the

[735] Letter from J. V., Skikda, 22 April 1986, HDA-1727-466.
[736] Letter from P. N. to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers, Theniet El Had, 28 November 1985, AJ-465-6563.
[737] Letter from J. V., Skikda, 22 April 1986, HDA-1727-466.
[738] Report by Đ. J., Belgrade, 5 June 1987, AJ-465-6566.
[739] Joanne P. Sharp, *Geographies of Postcolonialism: Spaces of Power and Representation* (London: SAGE Publications, 2009), p. 20.
[740] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", 189, 194.

discourse composed in 1981 in a letter addressed to the officials of ZAMTES by a Serbian internist V.J.:

> „Based on these few days of my work in the clinic […] I conclude that people are noticeably backward, without any hygiene habits, for example, very dirty, poorly dressed, very poorly nourished, almost all are malnourished, suffer from avitaminosis, with chronic diseases […], [act] as if they are doing the check-up for the first time, and they are clumsy, they don't know that they need to undress."[741]

Further expressing their civilisational superiority, physicians reported on the problem of communication with patients who "only spoke Arabic" and medical technicians who "poorly spoke" the French language.[742] The latter example of how Yugoslav medical experts measured the "civilisational level" of the Algerians against the knowledge of a Western language shows that biological racism was replaced by cultural racism within the modernisation discourse. Through these intercultural interactions, Yugoslav experts strengthened the image of the modern "Self". In other words, they sought the confirmation of their European identity by pointing out the differences with the traditional "Other", who was defined as Arab and non-European.[743] The aforementioned internist added the following description of the town of Aïn Oussera where he worked:

> „It is an Algerian village, an exclusively Arab ambience, both architecturally and in terms of all other features. There is not a single European bar where a man could spend one to two hours in his free time. It has a certain number of shops that sell groceries as well as other goods exclusively intended for their needs. Otherwise, they are very poorly supplied. Here a European cannot find what he needs for everyday life."[744]

Yet, racism postulating biological differences between people in some instances can still be encountered as disguised in experts' descriptions of the locals. The Other was seen not only as having different "mentality" and habits but also biological needs – a process of othering which Joanne Sharp called the "transformation of needs":[745]

> "[…] our man is often misunderstood when he complains that there is no water for drinking or washing. Unbelievable, but Algerians are indeed people who often do not

[741] Letter from V. J., 10 February 1981, Aïn Oussera, AJ-465-6550.
[742] Letter from L. N. to Andrija Pavičić, Affreville (Khemis Miliana), 29 July 1963, HDA-1727-460.
[743] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", 273-274.
[744] Letter from V. J., 10 February 1981, Aïn Oussera, AJ-465-6550.
[745] Sharp, *Geographies of Postcolonialism,* p. 14.

have even these most basic life needs, so it is normal that they cannot understand when others ask for them. During the work from 8.00 to 18.00, and in the heat up to 60 degrees [Celsius], I did not see any Algerian who went to look for drinking water. For us, 10 hours on this kind of heat without consuming liquids is a matter of life."[746]

A motive which frequently appears in the accounts of Yugoslav workers' sojourns in Algeria was the practice of distillation of *rakija* at the workers' camps. Widely popular in the Balkan region, rakija is a spirit made of fruit, traditionally plums (*šljivovica* or *slivovitz*), grapes (*lozovača*) or pears (*viljamovka*). Considered a "national drink" by the local population but also foreign observers, rakija added an important "gastronomic" dimension to the (self-)image of Yugoslavia.[747] Thus, it does not come as a surprise that both posted workers and technical experts put as one of the central aspects of their narratives the descriptions of installing cauldrons for rakija distillation, which was clandestinely produced out of widely-available local fruit – oranges and dates.[748] Stories like this show the workers' abilities of adaptation, improvisation and eventually creativity in altered cultural and environmental conditions. But above all, we can read this customary activity as a ritual contributing to the affirmation of a collective identity. By participating in this seemingly ordinary, profane activity, workers expressed and enforced their "Yugoslav" identity and enhanced solidarity ties among the community of Yugoslav workers abroad. Residing in a society which discouraged the consumption of alcoholic drinks, such a practice was a means of drawing a barrier between "Us" and "Them". For Islamic religious practices constituted an integral part of the Algerian identity – and the public abstinence from alcohol was one of the key components, the production and consumption of rakija can be understood as a ritualized process of Othering. This ritualized, non-discursive Othering was another way to affirm the dichotomies between the Yugoslavs and the Arabs.

On the other hand, we cannot speak of a universal Yugoslav gaze on the Global South, Africa or Algeria as we can come across accounts in opposition to previously mentioned discourses. For example, an expert from SR Serbia, working as a Professor of

[746] Report by F. B., 25 January 1987, HDA-1727-449, p. 2.
[747] See: Nemanja Radonjić, „(Dis)unity in eating, a brotherhood in drinking? American travel writers perceptions of Yugoslavia's socialist cuisine" in *Brotherhood and Unity at the Kitchen Table? Cooking, Cuisine and Food Culture in Socialist Yugoslavia*, eds. Vladimir Ivanović, Ruža Fotiadis and Radina Vučetić (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2020), p. 189-192.
[748] Zorić, *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate*, 468-469.

Forestry at the University of Algiers, described the Algerian metropole as „a beautiful and big Mediterranean city" and Algeria as „an interesting Maghreb country" that had „deeply impressed" him and his wife.[749] A chemistry teacher acknowledged that in times of need, the local population's generosity, kindness and compassion had "helped more than any agreement".[750] Even more significant are the accounts of individuals expressing critiques of the dominant colonial discourse of Yugoslav experts in Algeria. Architect from SR Bosnia, K. Z., emphasised the cultural arrogance of Yugoslav experts, comparing their behaviour to one of the former French colonisers, which had nullified the political capital gained from Yugoslavia's aid during the war in Algeria:

> "For such a bad development of cooperation between the two countries which had started great, probably some of our experts are to blame. In casual and unofficial contacts with Algerians […] I got the impression that they often experienced the behaviour of our people as the arrogance of colonisers, who they had once already expelled…"[751]

In the end, he maintained that the wrong choice of experts was the reason for "ruining an exceptional opportunity" for economic cooperation and partnership with Algeria.[752] Yet, experts' attitudes caused broader implications for technical cooperation. Having increased distrust of the local authorities and workers, foreign experts faced difficulties in accessing work-related information, reception of their advice, suggestions and solutions, as well as accessing decision-making positions.[753] Again, Yugoslav cooperants simplistically attributed the stance of the Algerians to their "mentality", who they regarded as distrustful and unprofessional. With micro-level interactions characterised by mutual distrust, development programs were predetermined to achieve limited outcomes.

[749] Letter from Z. J., Algiers, 18 December 1976, AJ-465-6551.
[750] Letter from M. Ć., Annaba, 20 October 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[751] Report by K. Z., n.d., AJ-465-6571.
[752] Ibid.
[753] Report by I. L., Belgrade, 9 September 1965, AJ-465-6552; Report by B. D., Zagreb, 2 June 1987, HDA-1727-451.

Ideological "Others" or Comrades in Distress?

Attempting to grasp business opportunities in the new, perspective Global South market, experts were offered to Algeria "from all sides, especially from France". From both sides of the Iron Curtain and the non-aligned world, white-collar workers flocked to the country under a variety of personal and national agendas. Fully aware that the competition between foreign governments extended onto their citizens abroad, through the engagement of experts the Algerian administration had implemented what Max Trecker dubbed "a system of checks and balances".[754] In this way, the Algerians prevented one national group from exacerbating excessive political control and economic influence, while also achieving indirect supervision over their actions. As seen in the case of the Yugoslav engineer accused of corporative espionage, experts did not refrain from reporting suspicious acts of their counterparts from other countries to the local officials. Apart from that, there was another highly relevant side of the same medal of Algeria's diversification strategy, which was dictating and having control over the price of foreign experts' labour, at least the one from the socialist East. The Algerian administration effectively took advantage of the discord and antagonisms in the socialist world to extend the space of diplomatic manoeuvre and acquire cheap expert labour from the East. In an absence of coordination within the CMEA Commission for Technical Assistance, which prevented them from standing united in front of the Algerian negotiators, socialist countries were driving down the price of their experts. To get the best offer, the Algerian delegates regularly embarked on "technical aid shopping tours" across Eastern Europe.[755]

Though it was a former bloc dissident, the Algerian administration considered Yugoslavia as a part of the Eastern European market of highly skilled labour. Thus, the financial terms it offered to Yugoslav experts were equal to all other Eastern European cooperants. In fact, Algerian diplomacy early adopted the practice of standardized bilateral agreements signed with Eastern European partners. For example, the content of the 1965 Convention on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was based on the text of

[754] Trecker, "The 'Grapes of Cooperation'?", 45.
[755] Eric Burton, James Mark and Steffi Marung, "Development" In *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization*, eds. James Mark and Paul Betts (London: Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 97.

the analogous document concluded with Bulgaria beforehand.[756] Once a deal had been reached with the government providing the most experts, other countries were left with very limited space for bilateral negotiations over the price of their personnel's services. Having significantly decreased the number of its experts, Yugoslavia was not in an enough strong negotiating position to increase their salaries. Yet, the position of Yugoslav experts in Algeria, particularly in financial terms, was regularly brought back to the table by the Yugoslav delegations. This is because the question of personal income was not solely a matter of individuals' financial reward but was a marker reflecting Yugoslavia's global status. For example, the Assistant Director of ZAMTES, Ljubomir Reljić, claimed that "[...] the Algerian side classified Yugosl[av] experts together under the same treatment as all others from the socialist countries (Bulgaria, the USSR, etc.), which does not correspond to Yugoslavia's international position, nor is it in line with the policy of the SFRY [sic]."[757] In other words, the financial terms offered to its technical experts were to "correspond" to the international position of Yugoslavia, its non-aligned "in-betweenness". As ZAMTES officials put it, the "fair price" of Yugoslav experts was "greater than of Eastern European but less than of experts from capitalist countries". The wage level was not the only reference point for Yugoslavia's global positioning. Rumours that experts from some countries were entitled to a higher wage of transfers than Yugoslavs were presented a potentially being "a confirmation of discrimination against our experts".[758] While, for example, in Mozambique, technical experts from different countries were entitled to different transfer rates, in Algeria the transfer rate was for the most part uniquely defined for all East European cooperants. On the other hand, cooperants from the capitalist West were eligible for a higher wage or wage transfer.[759]

In fact, the hierarchy of foreign cooperants in Algeria was a translation of global hierarchies and inequalities. On top of the cooperant pyramid stood experts from the West – French, Italians, Belgians, Spaniards, West Germans, Canadians, Americans, and others. On the ground, the hierarchy of foreign experts was principally reflected in their

[756] Information on the Algerian draft proposal of a new Convention, 25 October 1965, AJ-465-6549.
[757] Note from the meeting of representatives of ZAMTES branch offices, 28 December 1977, HDA-1727-346.
[758] Letter from ZAMTES Director Mirko Peševski to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria, 23 October 1987, AJ-465-6550.
[759] Iacob and Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization?", p. 143-144.

material status, precisely payment terms and housing conditions. A Yugoslav visitor to Algeria in 1975, who himself was interested in embarking on a technical expert mission in Algeria, indignantly commented how a French physician entrusted him of "receiving a monthly salary of 10,000 A[lgerian] D[inars] and a free comfortable apartment in [Algiers'] most elite district of Hydra".[760] While this example was not a representation of a typical housing situation of French cooperants, Western experts generally held a privileged position over experts coming from the other side of the bloc division. Despite the Algerian government on paper making the terms equal for all international experts by assigning them wages of local specialists, the declared equality significantly differed in practice. A partial reason for the significant pay gap between foreign experts can be found in the fact that the sending governments secured additional cash and other benefits for their citizens. More importantly, the Algerian administration was inclined to offer employment to Western experts on private contracts, where the conditions could be individually discussed and were much more financially favourable. To illustrate the hierarchies among foreign experts in Algeria, the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers cited the example of a Yugoslav - Canadian couple, both holding the same position at the Algerian Institute for Hydrocarbons. Yet, unlike the Canadian expert, his wife from Yugoslavia received a 30% lower salary. A comparable example was of the architect Ljubica Lipković, who received a monthly payment of 8,000 Algerian Dinars, while her colleague, a Yugoslav architect who arrived in Algeria on a French passport, enjoyed a salary of 12,000 Algerian dinars.[761] Comparing their position to experts from the West capitalist countries, Yugoslav experts were regarded to be in a subordinate position, which they believed had been a result of constant concessions of Yugoslav authorities under the pressure of the Algerian demands.[762]

Having to carry out labour activities together with foreign experts from other countries, in Algeria, some Yugoslavs for the first time came across a multinational and multicultural working environment. The relations of Yugoslav experts with "the Other" socialist experts were defined by the top-bottom notion of "Yugoslav exceptionalism", which was a vital component of the Yugoslav self-image that the regime had carefully developed by pointing out the diametrical ideological differences against the other

[760] Miran Šlajmer, "Predmet: Kratka informacija o razgovorima u Alžiru", 25 September 1975, AJ-465-6551.
[761] Letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria to ZAMTES, Algiers, 16 March 1981, AJ-465-6559, p. 3.
[762] Report by Đ. J., Belgrade, 5 June 1987, AJ-465-6566.

socialist actors. The Yugoslav leader, Marshall Tito himself asserted this idea by stating that "Yugoslavia had ambitions to play an important role in the socialist world and needed to be treated differently from other socialist countries."[763] This global imaginary, by which Yugoslavia's international position entitled privileged status of the country and its citizens in bilateral relations with the Global South, dispatched experts reproduced onto the grassroots level. For the Yugoslav leadership, the arena of technical assistance was seen as a unique opportunity to represent the country and reaffirm its status in the socialist world and beyond off the stage of high-level multilateral diplomacy.

No different from Yugoslavia, the competition for influence, political partnerships and economic opportunities, socialist governments translated onto the micro-level through their citizens working within the international technical cooperation programmes.[764] That is why Yugoslav workers generally considered experts from other socialist countries not as colleagues and partners in the joint project to assist in the development of the post-colonial state but as "intruders" who endanger Yugoslav positions and interests in Algeria and the Global South. For example, one of the members of the aforementioned group of Hidroelektra engineers stressed that upon arrival at the construction site, the co-workers from Czechoslovakia had given them an "unfriendly welcome" and had shown "a lack of teamwork and respect".[765] In other cases, they held socialist counterparts accountable for Algerian's "negative attitude" towards foreign experts due to "negative experiences" with "very bad Russian doctors [or] technicians that Bulgaria exported as engineers".[766] Despite holding them responsible for evoking distrust among Algerians, Yugoslav experts tended to stay away from confrontations and political agitations as an expression of their political neutrality.[767] Instead, they opted to prove themselves as different and build a positive image primarily through their labour activities, expertise, discipline, and finally, display of the progress of the works at the construction sites.[768]

[763] As cited in: Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy*, p. 71.
[764] Unlike the research of East European cooperants revealed, there is no indication that Yugoslav experts' interactions with foreign workers or locals were supervised by their country's secret police. Iacob and Vasile, „Agents of Decolonization?", p. 146; Body, „Opening up to the 'Third World' or Taking a Detour to the 'West'?", p. 23-28.
[765] Report by V. H, 1987, HDA-1727-453.
[766] Report by J. V., n.d., HDA-1727-466.
[767] Radonjić, „Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji", 181.
[768] Report by F. B., 25 January 1987, HDA-1727-449.

Apart from construction sites, other significant contact spaces with the counterparts from Eastern Europe were medical centres, where the lack of coordination and collaboration between experts of different national backgrounds came to the detriment of the local patients. Having to work hand in hand with Bulgarian physicians in the Hospital Orleansville, the Yugoslav team leader complained how it was "not possible [...] to fairly organize the health service in the hospital because Bulgarian doctors worked according to their own system and under the management of their own people."[769] Along the lines of the discourse of exceptionalism, Yugoslav experts believed their expertise and technical knowledge far exceeded that of cooperants from Eastern European countries, whom they claimed to be "young, inexperienced people with low education levels".[770] Furthermore, they spoke of Eastern European experts bearing „anti-Yugoslav sentiments" and conveyed impressions that the home authorities extolled Yugoslav experts over the rest of the cooperants ("Algerian colleagues declare that we [Yugoslav] experts are the best of all cooperants").[771] While mostly focused on their socialist counterparts, Yugoslavs in the reports and letters also mentioned performances of other national groups in a similar vein – as jealous and ready to sabotage Yugoslav positions in the fierce competition in Algeria. This was very much in opposition to the institutionally proclaimed internationalism. A Yugoslav physician expressed his view on the spaces of interaction in the Global South:

> „First of all, we do not need to send experts individually, because in such a case, the expert joins a mixed team, which is usually composed of Algerians, young and inexperienced, Hindus [Indians], Pakistanis, Egyptians and Bulgarians. All these elements are antagonistic towards us Yugoslavs for competitive reasons and reasons of much greater expertise of our people, which we have clearly proved everywhere we have been in African countries. This results in difficulties at work, tricks, frauds and burdening our expert with the most challenging tasks." [772]

Despite the differences in the political and economic system, Yugoslav experts closely identified with the experts from the West than their counterparts from the East. While aiming to strongly distinguish themselves from the Eastern European experts,

[769] Letter from Boris Hameršak to the Director of ZAMTES, Orleansville (Chlef), 19 September 1963, HDA-1727-346.
[770] Letter from the married couple Bačić to consul Petar Mijić, Sidi Brahim, 30 January 1983, AJ-465-6561.
[771] Report by V. M., Novi Sad, 22 August 1990, AJ-465-6557.
[772] Letter by V. J., Aïn Oussera, 8 March 1981, AJ-465-6550.

Yugoslav experts paralleled their skills and technical knowledge to the Western cooperants. In fact, they represented themselves as a more humane alternative to Western specialists. In other words, the self-image of a Yugoslav expert was of one just as professional and skilled as its counterpart of capitalist provenience but at the same time carrying high moral qualities and human compassion. Thus, in the reports delivered to ZAMTES describing colonial practices of the French medical cooperants in Morocco during the early 1960s, we read that „[Yugoslav] doctors stand out with their expertise, and especially with their work and moral qualities and human attitude towards those who turn to them for medical help".[773]

Not only were the experts invited to represent Yugoslavia's system through their labour activities but also their behaviour and discipline. This was made clear in the contract they signed with ZAMTES, which stipulated that one of the duties of the expert during his mission was to "maintain his reputation and the reputation of the SFRY through his overall work and conduct".[774] In order to uphold the image of the country, the Yugoslav authorities took disciplinary measures against individuals who "tarnished the country's reputation" with their inadequate behaviour. As mentioned in the case of the two Macedonian agronomists who were immediately withdrawn from Algeria, the Yugoslav authorities feared that the incident had been witnessed by other foreign experts. However, this was not the only case when Yugoslav experts showed their recklessness. There are accounts that the Algerian institutions had previously, in 1970, dismissed three experts without reprimand due to "indiscipline and lateness to work". Though the details are missing, from the letter sent by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers, we learn that the Direction of Civil Aviation sent home a Yugoslav civil pilot due to his "unacceptable behaviour" and "lack of professional responsibility".[775]

Experts, however, did not hold sole responsibility for upholding the international image of Yugoslavia. The attitude of the Yugoslav institutions towards experts was largely responsible for their position in Algeria and witnessed Yugoslavia's incapability

[773] Avram Kečkarovski, „Moji utisci i kratak osvrt na uslove života i rada naših stručnjaka u Maroku", 20 September 1962, AJ-465-6551.
[774] „Ugovor", In *Priručnik za stručnjake međunarodne tehničke saradnje*, p. 73-75.
[775] Letter from ZAMTES to the Croatian branch office informing on the dismissal of expert S. T., Belgrade, 13 April 1970, HDA-1727-464.

to implement technical aid programmes. The experts themselves considered that the big blow to the reputation of the citizens of Yugoslavia in Algeria was "a disgrace" that they were "forced to ask for help from the local population and some foreign companies."[776] Besides their compatriots, foreign, mostly Western companies performing investment works in Algeria offered help to Yugoslav experts by providing them rooms in the camps and meals in canteens.[777] For example, the Italian contractor CIR (Cogefar-Italstrade-Recchi) hosted Hidroelektra's technical experts in a camp organised for their workers at the construction site of the Hammam Debagh.[778] Another expert told his Romanian counterpart had hosted him for several months in his apartment. While it might have exposed the limits of the Yugoslav technical assistance program, it equally showed that the individuals' expressions of solidarity from both sides of the Cold War division overcame ideological differences and competition among their countries.

[776] Letter from A. S. to the Yugoslav Ambassador to Algeria, Bordj Bounaama, 18 June 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[777] Letter from P. N., Theniet El Had, 6 July 1985, AJ-465-6567.
[778] Report by V. H., 1987, HDA-1727-453.

CONCLUSIONS

Upon the arrival of the Croatian women's and men's national volleyball teams in the Algerian city of Oran, the host of the 2022 Mediterranean Games, the Croatian media were quick to convey the statement of the secretary of the Croatian volleyball association:

> "Early this morning around 6 o'clock we arrived at the hotel in Oran. I must say that we are unpleasantly surprised with what awaited us here, from the accommodation, transportation, to food, conditions for training where there is no gym, and where the sports halls are up to an hour and a half far from our accommodation, but thanks to our [Croatian] Olympic Committee, […] we are somehow finding our way. I think it will be very difficult to last 14 days here with two teams, the conditions are first of all very, very bad and I think that we need to figure out how to survive this tournament. […]"[779]

While nowadays few citizens from the former Yugoslav republics live and work in Algeria, the discourse of the aforementioned Croatian visitors is reminiscent of the one Yugoslav experts delivered in their reports and letters some forty years ago. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Algeria almost entirely disappeared from the Croatian public and political space. And while some individuals vaguely recall the strong presence of Yugoslav construction and engineering companies on the other side of the Mediterranean, the younger population has a negligible knowledge of the country. Until recently, Algeria has been almost entirely unknown in Croatia.[780] Indeed, the prejudice and ethnocentric perspective we encounter in the words of the Croatian sports official are a result of a lack of knowledge and latent perpetuation of colonial presumptions about the civilizational hierarchy between "developed" and "underdeveloped" cultures.

Similarly, the mission of Yugoslav technical experts in Algeria was accompanied by a sense of cultural superiority over the local population. In sharp contrast to the official discourse of anti-colonial solidarity, Yugoslav experts adopted colonialist prejudices and stereotypes about the Algerian population and interpreted the socio-economic reality of the host country through a combination of ideological, ethnocentric

[779] „Hrvatski odbojkaši šokirani uvjetima u Alžiru: Moramo preživjeti ovaj turnir", Index.hr, 24 June 2022, https://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/hrvatski-odbojkasi-sokirani-uvjetima-u-alziru-moramo-prezivjeti-ovaj-turnir/2374536.aspx. Last access: 30 January 2023.

[780] Only in the past few years, Croatian citizens got the opportunity to get acquainted with the Algerian culture, history and tradition. Thanks to the initiatives undertaken by the Ambassador of Algeria to Croatia, Mokhtar Amine Khelif, who took this position in 2019, a multitude of cultural events, art exhibitions and gastronomic presentations have been organized in the Croatian capital in order to promote Algerian heritage and relations between Algeria and Croatia.

and colonial optics. By studying the discourse of Yugoslav experts who implemented ideas of socialist modernisation in practice, the dissertation revealed that Yugoslav development efforts adopted and reproduced long-standing colonial premises in a developmental form. Referring to the analogy between the civilising mission of the colonial era and socialist modernisation efforts, the dominant perspective through which Yugoslav experts, as international development actors, looked at the host country and its population can be dubbed "socialist civilising mission". Opposing it to the self-image of a socialist "new man" who guided the transformation of underdeveloped societies on the way towards the goal of socialist modernisation, experts constructed the image of the Algerian as the underdeveloped "Other" primarily around concepts of labour and expertise, but also to other symbols of socialist modernity such as hygiene and public health. As a result of this outlook, the implementation of the Yugoslav development program in Algeria was determined by a juncture of colonial stereotypes and prejudices that circulated on a micro level.

Assisting Algeria's socialist development was the primary task of experts assigned by the Yugoslav authorities. Recognizing that post-colonial countries strived to achieve development goals and economic sovereignty from the former metropoles, Yugoslavia was ready to offer to the leaders of post-colonial governments a combination of specialist working activities and training of personnel. Despite it was itself a recipient of development aid, Yugoslavia early joined the platform of international technical cooperation as a donor. As early as 1951, the Yugoslav government dispatched experts to the Global South within multinational UN teams. Gathering experience in the UN, multilateral technical aid opened up the possibility to conclude bilateral technical cooperation programmes with developing countries. As in the case of Algeria, technical assistance oftentimes came as an extension of short-term military and humanitarian aid to the national liberation movements. Consisting of 13 medical professionals who put into service the hospital Parnet in Algiers, the first team of Yugoslav technical experts was dispatched to Algeria in August 1962, even before the two governments officially established a programme of technical cooperation. The Algerian government officials and the media publicly praised Yugoslav medical teams for organising and running hospital services, installing the latest medical devices, applying modern methods of treatment and performing complex surgical procedures. Driven by the successes of the

first medical missions and under the pressure of socialist competitors – medical teams from Cuba, China, the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries, Yugoslavia concluded in July 1963 the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Under this bilateral document, the two countries agreed upon what was defined as the "exchange of experts". However, unilateral in practice, Yugoslavia became "obliged" to dispatch a certain number of experts requested by the Algerian authorities. Even though the Agreement was not legally binding for any of the two sides, it represented an unwritten obligation for Yugoslavia to prove itself as a trustworthy partner. Having a clear understanding of the interests and goals of socialist countries, Algeria took advantage of the situation of the multiple donors competing for influence. The Algerian example showed not only that the post-colonial governments were not passive recipients of aid but that they actively took the advantage of pre-existing tensions in the socialist world and stirred competition between them. In fact, the situation of multiple donors in Algeria was a result of a well-planned political strategy to diversify partners in order to reduce the dependence on the former colonial metropole, minimize the ideological influence of a single "patron" and multiply aid and other benefits.

The second task was related to representing Yugoslavia's political and economic interests. Whilst contributing to the state-building and development project of the receiving country, experts were to improve Yugoslavia's political and economic positioning abroad. In a peculiar geopolitical position of equidistance to the Eastern and Western blocs, Yugoslavia was eager to actively participate and play a prominent role in the international political arena. The wide-range network of non-aligned alliances reinforced Yugoslavia's foreign policy which granted legitimacy to its ambitious position in international affairs. Only when the non-alignment had been firmly internationally and domestically established by the mid-1970s, economic interests started to prevail over political considerations in the engagement with the Global South. However, in the case of Yugoslav policy towards Algeria, this shift had occurred already after the 1965 change of political leadership. Seeking expansion on the markets of the Global South, the idea behind sending experts was to influence the choice of contractors, industrial machinery and equipment for the planned investment projects, especially when taking the position of ministerial advisers. By promoting Yugoslav goods and investments, technical experts were responsible for opening and mediating between the markets. In

some cases, technical cooperation experts were dispatched as compensation for lucrative investment projects granted to Yugoslav enterprises. As a result, the Yugoslav government aimed at dispatching the majority of experts within the sectors in which it sought economic opportunities and market expansion – civil engineering, hydraulics and agriculture. However, technical cooperation between the two countries became a collage of experts – from medical professionals, university professors and civil engineers to rowing coaches, football managers and ballet choreographers.

Finally, technical experts were sent to act as Yugoslavia's "unofficial ambassadors". Impersonated in their engagement, experts were to represent abroad the desired image of the country whose main features were the authentic path to socialism (self-management), non-alignment (neutrality) and disinterested engagement (non-interference). While ideology was a distinctive parameter in defining the Yugoslav self-image, the most politically dynamic part of the globe – the Global South – became an important space for constructing and maintaining the Yugoslav identity. In the situation of socialist competition for influence in the Global South, Yugoslavia annotated alternative socialisms as ideological Others against which it built a distinguishing self-image. In the geopolitical space of the Global South, the self-image of Yugoslavia was constructed against and in distinction to the three main ideological Others – the Soviets, the Chinese and the Cubans – who were fluid and subject to political shifts. To the Global South, Yugoslavia represented itself as diametrically opposite, an antipode to other socialist actors in Africa. By offering "progressive" African states an alternative model of development, which was presented as a "more humane" alternative to the "rigid" socialist models, Yugoslavia tried to contest its socialist competitors. Under universalist principles of non-alignment, Yugoslavia was offering an alternative model of cooperation as a counterpart to the regional Afro-Asian grouping in which it could not take part due to its geographic, historical and racial divergences. Finally, aimed at conveying a commitment to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the Yugoslav government granted the host countries full authority over its technical experts. However, on the accusation of being focused on solving everyday problems, the Yugoslav authorities occasionally criticized experts for neglecting not only their labour-related activities contributing to the Algerian development efforts but also their duties towards the home country in achieving desired political and economic outcomes.

Along the lines of other international actors, Yugoslav authorities regarded experts as a source of soft power, a "diplomatic tool" for influencing decision-making, earning goodwill and fostering relations with their partners related to achieving broad scope of political and later predominantly economic goals. Recognizing the potential diplomatic value of the domestic highly skilled workforce outside the national borders, the Yugoslav authorities paid significant attention to the selection of personnel for the role. The intentions of the Yugoslav administration to send abroad experts of the highest profile were clearly reflected in the system of recruitment of Yugoslav labour for the technical cooperation programmes with the Global South. To be able to secure top-level experts at the earliest possible, ZAMTES initially kept the job openings an exclusive, internal affair by reaching out to the potential candidates, instead vice-versa. Because at that time, the position of international technical expert held occupational prestige, most of the experts accepted the job offer without hesitation. In fact, some of the most eminent names in Yugoslav medicine worked in Algeria in the early 1960s. Only when faced with a chronic scarcity of applications due to Algeria introducing less attractive financial conditions of employment, ZAMTES adopted the recruitment mechanism of external job postings by advertising the positions prevalently in daily newspapers and specialist journals.

Yet, the pre-selection criteria defined by ZAMTES were unachievable for many interested individuals. First of all, believing that it would secure experts of desired qualities, the Yugoslav administration admitted further in the selection process only individuals with permanent employment and sufficient work experience. The recruitment process almost exclusively oriented towards already employed workers led to a paradoxical situation. Such personnel was not interested in leaving their stable positions with relatively high salaries. On the other hand, young, inexperienced people who were more resourceful and adaptable, were not considered a target group. Second, due to the rigorous Algerian criteria, for the mission were selected relatively older experts who, typically, lacked the flexibility and adaptability of their younger counterparts. However, over time, ZAMTES introduced a less strict application of the selection conditions. For example, in the conditions of a general lack of candidates who spoke French, ZAMTES turned a blind eye to the language deficiency of applicants.

Deprived of attractive financial conditions in the host country, the Yugoslav recruitment mechanism proved inefficient and slow. In such conditions, the outcome of the candidate search mostly depended on stimulative measures from the Yugoslav government. While the status of technical experts came with certain benefits, those proved insufficiently stimulative for the Yugoslav citizens who were eligible to apply. In fact, in most cases, the legal regulations were rather discouraging. For example, one of the most discouraging factors for potential candidates was job insecurity upon return from the mission. After finishing their duties in Algeria, many experts struggled to get re-employed.

Importantly, the examination of recruitment methods revealed that there was no pressure on the individuals whatsoever. Ultimately, the choice to go to work in developing countries was voluntary. While the official discourse conceptualized technical cooperation as a mutually beneficial affair based on socialist, non-aligned and anti-colonial solidarity, there is hardly any indication that the engagement on the ground was solidarity-driven. While generic phrases belonging to the solidarity lexicon can still be found, it is more likely that the decision to carry out their mission in Algeria was predominantly based on financial reasonings and other personal motives, such as wanderlust and curiosity. Although sent primarily to promote its foreign policy and economic goals, the Yugoslav authorities did not suppress the manifestation of experts' private interests. While the mission principally served personal self-interests and the one of the sending government, the desire to assist in the development of the recipient country cannot be entirely neglected.

Yet, the outcome of these efforts depended on the effective application of experts' skills and knowledge in the new working environment. While it is not entirely possible to objectively measure and evaluate the Yugoslav experts' contribution to the Algerian development efforts, it is safe to assume that it was, at least to a certain extent, determined by the (un)preparedness for the mission. The Yugoslav programme of technical cooperation was characterized by a lack of systematic instructions and training before the arrival to Algeria, which became a limiting factor to the contribution to the Algerian as well as the Yugoslav goals. In general, since the majority of preparations were left to the initiative of the individuals, experts departed largely unprepared for life and work in Algeria. Although ZAMTES dispatched people of undisputed professional

qualities, their unpreparedness for the mission often prevailed over their professional experience. Without sufficient language skills, their knowledge and technical know-how could not be entirely transferred to local cadres. This deficiency was reflected not only in the workplace but also in everyday experiences. Without knowledge of local circumstances and often even competencies in local languages, experts had a hard time dealing with the local administration trying to realise their rights guaranteed by the bilateral Agreement.

During their stay abroad, experts were shortfall of representation and assistance in their professional and private affairs. The institution responsible for managing the affairs related to technical cooperation, ZAMTES, was effectively turned into a recruitment agency. Without support from former or current employers due to their specific employment position, and from ZAMTES that dispatched them, Yugoslav experts were characterized by a feeling of abandonment. The absence of systematic presence of Yugoslav institutions in the experts' missions abroad caused or intensified the existing hardships related to both work and daily life, which piled up as the deployment line of experts was moving deeper into the interior, away from the coastal urban centres towards the provincial towns in the Sahara desert. Without efficient assistance from the Yugoslav authorities, experts were left to their own devices and improvisations to solve the ongoing problems, primarily related to wages and accommodation. The discrepancy between expectations and encountered conditions in Algeria was a reoccurring reason for experts' dissatisfaction. Hitherto enjoying a high living standard in Yugoslavia, experts insisted on comfort, different benefits, safety and other „social goods". In other cases, they had a hard time coping with the solitude of their workplace and loss of social status and downward social mobility in Algerian society. As their last resort, which in the second half of the 1980s became standard practice, experts began terminating contracts with the Algerian government before the three-years-expiration. As the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria reported, the habit of prematurely leaving the country contributed to an "unpleasant atmosphere" in bilateral relations. At the same time, the circulation of experiences of former experts left potential candidates discouraged enough to refrain from applying. Significantly contributing to an evermore reduced interest, by the end of the late 1980s, ZAMTES received only a few applications for engagement in Algeria.

Despite the enduring desire to revive technical cooperation and increase the presence of experts in Algeria, a combination of micro-level factors inhibited these efforts: a rarity of stimulative measures at home, preparations for the mission largely left to the initiative of the experts, absence of institutional support during the stay abroad, and decision-making of potential candidates left to depending on favourable employment conditions in Algeria. Altogether, these reveal that the engagement of experts within the framework of bilateral technical cooperation was *de facto* reduced to a mediation of the Yugoslav administration in the public employment of the local highly-skilled workforce in the Global South. However, the micro-level factors were interconnected with macro-structural obstacles. Although the authorities endorsed the departure of experts to the countries of the Global South, Yugoslavia had limited human and financial resources at their disposal to efficiently run technical cooperation programmes. Without the collaboration of the business sector, participation in international technical cooperation presented a real challenge to the authorities.

Initially, the Yugoslav government regarded technical assistance as a way to surpass its reduced ability to provide favourable loans, as it was, ideally, an alternative to the strictly monetary-based types of foreign aid. Though the idea behind it was to provide "expertise rather than the [financial] capital", keeping technical experts overseas still came with costs, primarily in the form of labour costs. As a continuation of the aid to the Algerian liberation movement, in the full sense, Yugoslav technical assistance took place only in the first year of the Algerian independence. Until the end of June 1963, the Yugoslav government entirely covered the expenses of their experts' stay in Algeria. Paradoxically, the institutionalization of technical cooperation, which came into effect with the 1963 Technical Cooperation Agreement, marked a turn towards a more commercialized market approach. From that point, the financial burden started to gradually shift towards the receiving country, which was, with a few exceptions, not case-specific to Algeria but a general trend in Yugoslavia's practice of international technical assistance. Eventually, the 1965 Convention abolished the Yugoslav government's obligation to share the costs of keeping the experts in Algeria. Initially, Yugoslav officials were more than satisfied with such a provision because it provided instant relief on the constrained federal budget. Yet, they misjudged the possibility of successfully running technical cooperation with minimal financial investments. Thus,

while concealed in the early stages of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation, the problem of expenditure for this type of assistance came to the surface in 1965, when both governments simultaneously reduced the salaries of experts due to the pressure on their budgets. The move was instantly reflected in the presence of Yugoslav experts in the country. While in Algeria their figures were gradually decreasing, the opposite trend was occurring in Libya, where the local government offered lucrative salaries. As this case clearly shows, not all countries were able to provide or, conversely, afford technical assistance.

The Yugoslav government was quick to realize that the solution for the financial obstacles to the cooperation had to be found in its own backyard. Consequently, from the beginning of the 1980s, ZAMTES intensified the initiative to include domestic enterprises in the financial schemes of technical cooperation with Algeria. However, these largely unsuccessful attempts revealed two divergent and conflicting stances on technical cooperation within Yugoslavia. While the state authorities represented by ZAMTES regarded it a long-term, soft-power strategy to secure trade deals and investments in the future, the market-oriented Yugoslav business sector was unwilling to invest human and financial capital in technical cooperation programmes. In other words, guided by capitalist reasonings and cost-benefit analysis, enterprises were reluctant to provide their employees' services below the market price, accept a temporary, three-year absence of their workers, or financially contribute to financing experts' stay abroad. Apart from the capitalist globalization processes affecting the socialist world, on a domestic level, the transformation of Yugoslavia's technical cooperation model came as a consequence of the socio-economic reforms and liberalization policies of the 1960s, which recognized enterprises as independent, self-managing entities and autonomous decision-makers. Differently from the practice in East European countries, in Yugoslavia, technical cooperation had never been integrated with economic and business interests. Instead of coordination, the activities of ZAMTES were conducted in parallel with the incentives of the other commercial institutions and enterprises. Finally, the Yugoslav administration had never developed a long-term strategy of technical cooperation with Algeria or the rest of the Global South.

On the other hand, initiated and proclaimed by the socialist countries a tangible expression of solidarity and internationalism, the Algerian government claimed

technical assistance was not supposed to be subject to capitalist-style profit-making but to be provided free of charge or at least below the market price. Yet, through bilateral technical cooperation agreements with Yugoslavia, Algeria was able to acquire highly skilled Yugoslav *workers* directly responsible to its administration and usually *below* the real market price of specialist labour. While the idea behind technical assistance was to dispatch advisory personnel who would on the spot provide training, knowledge and skills sharing, in reality, under the label of "technical cooperation", the Algerian government secured a systematic influx of foreign highly skilled workforce that lacked on the domestic labour market after the exodus of *pieds-noirs*. In a situation of competition between Eastern European socialist countries, Algerians pro-actively expressed demands for Yugoslav cadres whereby dictating the terms and conditions of their engagement. Eventually, the socialist East had to tailor technical cooperation according to the needs of the Algerian economic sectors and not the other way around.

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