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**IS MOZAMBIQUE THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN  
FRONTIER?**

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GREAT LIMPOPO  
TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREA ON THE LIVELIHOOD  
STRATEGIES OF BORDER COMMUNITIES IN THE PAFURI ADMINISTRATIVE  
POST.

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**Esame finale anno 2008**

*To my parents who have  
supported me this far,  
trusting I would make the  
right choices and come up with  
the best results, thank you.*

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(Italian)

## INTRODUZIONE

La formazione dello Stato e della Nazione, in Africa meridionale, non ha seguito l'evoluzione europea iniziata con la Pace di Westfalia (1648), consacrata dalla Rivoluzione Francese (1789) e affermata con il Concerto Europeo (1815 – 1856)<sup>1</sup>. Alla fine del XIX secolo, infatti, gli stati Africani erano ancora basati su un sistema che richiama quello feudale di stampo europeo mantenuto da rapporti di vassallaggio, qui sovrapposti alle relazioni di *clan*, e da tattiche di guerra, che miravano al saccheggio e alla razzia<sup>2</sup>. I regni più forti tendevano a inglobare quelli più piccoli e deboli, mantenendone struttura e tradizioni, ma in un rapporto di subordinazione rispetto all'impero che si stava costituendo. Il vassallaggio veniva anche rafforzato attraverso legami di sangue, che spesso includevano il matrimonio forzato una figlia del re-imperatore con il figlio del conquistato: questo imparentamento forzato portava a vincoli di consanguineità e di fedeltà al re-imperatore, che si traducevano nell'inserimento dei nuovi capi fra gli *induna* (il consiglio degli anziani). Le necessità politiche e quelle economiche si fondevano nella gestione del feudo, sebbene esistessero alcuni esempi di società in cui il controllo sull'autorità politica, da parte degli anziani, era un importante bilanciamento alla tirannia del sovrano. Questo è il caso dei Barotse nell'attuale Zambia e di Asante in Africa Occidentale<sup>3</sup>, mentre in Africa meridionale prevalevano le dittature militari di sovrani quali Chaka Zulu, Mzilikazi e Shoshangane, che resistettero al dominio europeo più di altre società in cui la forza militare non era una priorità. Oltre alle normali necessità di sopravvivenza, infatti, vincenti tattiche di guerra hanno permesso ad alcune popolazioni di prevaricare clan più piccoli e servirsene per alimentare la crescente tratta degli schiavi, che i mercanti arabi ed europei avevano portato a livelli sempre crescenti, nonostante i divieti internazionali. Poiché la schiavitù dei prigionieri di guerra era comunque una tradizione nei rapporti fra sovrani in Africa, l'istituzione di un mercato tanto vasto non fece altro che esacerbare l'offerta con gravi conseguenze, non solo per la densità demografica, ma anche e

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<sup>1</sup>Formigoni, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Davidson, 1992 , e Reader, 1994.

<sup>3</sup> Davidson, 1992.

soprattutto per la lenta ma inesorabile distruzione dei pochi regni rimasti. Se da un lato i mercanti di schiavi arabi ed europei spopolavano il continente, l'avanzata di un sistema coloniale sempre più legalizzato permise l'annientamento di tutti i grandi regni del continente e l'asservimento di tutta la popolazione ai nuovi governanti europei o africani di prima o seconda generazione. Nonostante i divieti sulla tratta degli schiavi, e il lento declino di tale mercato, infatti, le popolazioni indigene continuarono a essere trattate come paria dalla società coloniale ed imperialista, che tolse loro gli strumenti della tradizione, le ricchezze (come il bestiame) e, per finire, le terre. Questo trattamento ebbe come conseguenza non solo l'impoverimento economico delle popolazioni ma anche quello spirituale di cui, oggi, si sente maggiormente l'influenza. Il fabbisogno di manodopera per le miniere e le fattorie sudafricane, infine, contribuì largamente all'istituzione di flussi migratori dalla regione verso Kimberly, Johannesburg e la provincia del Transvaal, creando movimenti di persone che infittirono i legami tradizionali ove possibile, e in ogni caso servirono come rito di iniziazione verso l'età adulta e il conseguente diritto a prendere moglie, sostituendo la guerra.

La zona di confine di Pafuri, che è il centro geografico del GLTFCA (*Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area*), reca traccia di tutte queste vicende attraverso la sua geografia fisica e umana, nonché il suo paesaggio culturale. Pafuri è tuttora il centro di movimenti migratori verso il Sudafrica, e di scambi informali e illegali fra i tre paesi su cui si estende: Mozambico, Sudafrica e Zimbabwe. La storia di Pafuri riporta allo *mfecane* di Chaka Zulu<sup>4</sup>, alle migrazioni del clan dei Kumalo che poi si unì a Mzilikazi dominando lo Zimbabwe dopo la civiltà Rozwi-Shona, alla rotta dell'avorio che veniva smerciato a Johannesburg, alle guerre post-coloniali contro il Mozambico indipendente, infine alla creazione di uno spazio per la conservazione dell'ecosistema della savana africana e dei suoi animali. La storia del Sudafrica, tuttavia, insegna che la conservazione della natura ha talora servito anche interessi politici, strategici e militari, a partire dalla creazione del Parco Nazionale Kruger, fino alla sua estensione a nord – proprio nella zona di Pafuri – nel 1969. La tesi, quindi, si

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<sup>4</sup>Lo *mfecane* è una fase di guerre scatenate da Chaka Zulu intorno al 1831 che sconvolse la geografia umana del Sudafrica orientale, del Mozambico sud-occidentale, e dello Zimbabwe meridionale. La leggenda vuole che il dolore di Chaka per la morte della madre lo rese pazzo e quindi si vendicò su tutto il suo popolo costringendo molti dei suoi generali alla fuga. Gli storici, in generale, concordano sulla necessità di Chaka di ottenere schiavi per commerciare con gli Europei insediati nel Natal e a Laurenço Marques (attuale Maputo).

propone di analizzare quali siano le motivazioni politiche che sottendono la creazione del Parco Transfrontaliero, soprattutto vista la sua commercializzazione come 'Parco della Pace' (*Peace Park* o PP), all'interno di una rete creata dalla Peace Park Foundation che mira a unire la conservazione a riflessioni sulla pace, seguendo le linee guida della IUCN (*The World Conservation Union*)<sup>5</sup>. Al fine di produrre un'analisi sensata e utile per lo studio dell'GLTFCA e del PP, inoltre, si è deciso di presentare la valutazione socio-economica di una comunità che si trova nella zona di Pafuri, lato Mozambicano, geograficamente al centro di un crocevia di passaggio fra i tre Stati confinanti, e dei movimenti di popolazione che si spingono fino al centro del Mozambico e al Malawi. Attraverso uno studio socio-economico e geografico, infatti, è possibile valutare quale sarà l'impatto locale del mega progetto, le cui priorità sono essenzialmente la conservazione e la sicurezza di uno Stato (il Sudafrica) attraverso la fine delle migrazioni illegali e dei traffici illeciti ed informali verso i due paesi confinanti ad Est.

Al fine di facilitare la lettura della tesi, questo riassunto si prefigge di evidenziare i tratti salienti della ricerca. In primo luogo verranno presentate le assunzioni di base derivate dalla letteratura scientifica, in particolare le teorie di geografia politica sulle distinzioni fra Stato e Nazione, confine e frontiera, verranno incluse in un contesto storico-economico, georeferenziato per quanto possibile, e riferito alle popolazioni chiave della frontiera orientale sudafricana. In secondo luogo, verrà presentata la metodologia, seguita sul campo, e i metodi per l'analisi dei dati. Seguirà una sezione che presenterà l'area di studio: il Mozambico, a carattere generale, e l'area di Pafuri nello specifico. In quarto luogo, verranno presentati i dati salienti rilevati dall'investigazione etno-geografica e dalle fonti primarie. Infine, le conclusioni dimostreranno o confuteranno le teorie iniziali.

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<sup>5</sup> Peddle *et al.* 2004, e Zbizc, 1999.

## STORIA DI CONFINE E FRONTIERE IN AFRICA MERIDIONALE: L'APPROCCIO DI GEOGRAFICO-POLITICO

*La vraie décolonisation passe par le rejet de l'État de type européen. La question est donc politique et la décision uniquement africaine : doit-il se séparer de l'État-nation et de ses mythologies ? (Le Roy, in Tshiyembe, 2001)<sup>6</sup>*

La geografia politica definisce lo Stato-Nazione come l'identificazione, pressoché ideale, di una forma governativa (lo Stato) con l'identità di un popolo (la Nazione)<sup>7</sup>. Tuttavia, come nota Seindman, lo Stato-Nazione si è dimostrato essere una finzione<sup>8</sup> in termini applicativi per due motivi: (1) la Francia è forse l'unico stato in cui si fonde l'ideale di nazione con il costrutto dello Stato, identificato come *fenomeno sociale*<sup>9</sup>; (2) in Europa è stato sfruttato dall'*ancien régime* per giustificare rivolte aristocratiche in nome dell'identità nazionale, pur mantenendo le divisioni sociali<sup>10</sup>; (3) nella politica coloniale è servito a giustificare le opere di civilizzazione che hanno portato all'annichilimento delle tradizioni e delle religioni ancestrali che avevano caratterizzato le civiltà africane, gli embrioni dello Stato-Nazione che seguiva i tessuti sociali locali<sup>11</sup>. Questo capitolo si occupa di illustrare, a partire dalla definizione di Stato-Nazione, l'analisi geo-politica dei fenomeni storici e sociali che hanno portato alla creazione degli Stati africani post-coloniali, con una sezione dedicata all'Africa australe e la sua specificità politica e sociale.

### ***L'imperialismo in Africa: il declino delle civiltà e delle etnie africane.***

Motore primo delle scoperte coloniali, lo Stato moderno fu in grado di giustificare la crescente ingerenza politico-economica e religiosa degli Europei nel continente africano, raggiungendo il suo apice con la creazione della Rhodesia, un possedimento terriero personale come indicato dal nome, sebbene ufficialmente affiliato alla corona britannica, il cui scopo era l'arricchimento di Sir Cecil John Rhodes per creare il suo sogno di un impero britannico dal Capo al Cairo. Attraverso l'opera dei missionari e dei commercianti, si preparò l'opera di conquista politico-

<sup>6</sup> 'La vera decolonizzazione passa per il rifiuto dello Stato di tipo europeo. La questione è, dunque, politica e la decisione unicamente africana: bisogna separarsi dallo Stato-Nazione e dalle sue mitologie?' (TdA).

<sup>7</sup> Glassner, 1995, Pounds, 1992 e Muir, 1975.

<sup>8</sup> Seindman, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Tshiyembe, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Formigoni, 2000, e Davidson, 1992.

<sup>11</sup> Davidson, 1992, e Reader, 1994.

militari delle popolazioni indigene divise fra i riti animisti e l'accettazione del nuovo Dio cristiano, introdotte agli eccessi dell'alcool e di altre abitudini europee, pronte all'uso di armi moderne per le loro guerre tribali, incoscienti del pericolo che la loro integrità stava subendo. La Conferenza di Berlino, voluta dal Concerto Europeo a seguito delle pretese coloniali di Re Leopoldo del Belgio, infine, decretò la spartizione coloniale dell'Africa e avviò per molti paesi il passaggio dall'epoca coloniale a quella imperialista, forti della concertazione diplomatica nel vecchio continente. In questo modo, lo Stato africano passò da una divisione territoriale articolata in clan, organizzati gerarchicamente in piccoli regni soggetti a un regno-impero dominante, che prevedeva un centro politico-religioso circondato da una zona di influenza decrescente fino ai territori di frontiera, a una demarcazione territoriale di stampo europeo che prevedeva l'uso dei confini come linee di separazione fra territori confinanti, indiscutibili perché già negoziati in seno alla conferenza. Con la fase imperialista, la divisione territoriale e l'imposizione di forme di governo di stampo europeo si moltiplicarono fino a includere anche le zone più remote, dove i rapporti socio-economici tradizionali erano stati poco influenzati dai colonizzatori. L'imperialismo bloccò definitivamente ogni possibilità di sviluppo politico dello Stato Africano, adducendo all'opera civilizzatrice la necessità di una gestione governativa moderna della politica e dei rapporti fra indigeni e coloni, che ovviamente andava a vantaggio di questi ultimi. Il principio di sovranità e di identità nazionale, che in Europa portarono alla creazione di alcuni stati moderni, nelle colonie furono validi solo per le popolazioni bianche. Le popolazioni autoctone, invece, si trovarono costrette a riconoscere il potere del denaro per la sopravvivenza - quindi a lavorare per i coloni bianchi nelle fattorie o nelle miniere - e riconoscere le autorità governative europee che avevano gradualmente eliminato tutti i sovrani locali da Dingane a Lobengula, a Gungunhane alla fine del XIX secolo<sup>12</sup>.

Attraverso l'analisi dei fenomeni storico-politici che caratterizzarono l'influenza europea in Africa, la ricerca si propone di fornire un quadro generale in relazione all'impatto dell'applicazione dello Stato, nei termini in cui è stato fin qui esposto, sulle zone di frontiera lontane dai centri di potere. L'ipotesi, in questo caso, è che le aree remote di scarso interesse economico seguissero i meccanismi di centro-periferia dei sistemi economici e politici di base, e quindi fossero poco influenzate dalle decisioni

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<sup>12</sup> Reader, 1994, Maloka, 1997, e Manghezi, 1998

del governo centrale. Le popolazioni, quindi, dovevano essere in grado di mantenere stili di vita tradizionali, pressoché immutati, incluse le relazioni fra comunità divise dalla Conferenza di Berlino, creando delle aree di frontiera non regolate dalle leggi coloniali, dove il confine era una linea immaginaria inutile ai fini della sopravvivenza sociale ed economica.

### ***Il Nazionalismo Africano e il mantenimento dei confini coloniali.***

I confini coloniali, sebbene spesso criticati dai movimenti politici in favore dell'indipendenza, tuttavia, non mutarono quando i nuovi governi africani si insediarono. Al contrario, l'Organizzazione dell'Unità Africana stabilì senza eccezioni il carattere di immutabilità dei confini africani e il divieto assoluto di modificare i confini stabiliti da parte dei nuovi Stati sovrani<sup>13</sup>. Questa decisione appare sensata solo se si considerano gli alti costi economici che i cambiamenti di confine avrebbero portato, tuttavia sia seguendo il filone del Nazionalismo Africano di Fanon<sup>14</sup>, sia aprendosi alla necessità di mantenere rapporti economici con le ex-colonie<sup>15</sup>, appare chiaro che i fautori dell'indipendenza africana aspiravano ad un nazionalismo che prescindesse da differenze etniche o statali, ma che ostentasse la forza dell'*Africanità*, come unica filosofia che permettesse da un lato di riacquistare la dignità perduta dopo secoli di dominio politico e sociale, e dall'altro di negoziare alla pari con gli ex colonizzatori per creare delle fondamenta finanziarie ai nuovi stati. L'*Africanità* celava il bisogno, da parte dei nuovi governi, di costituire un'identità nazionale che garantisse la governabilità dei vari paesi e prescindesse le differenze etniche racchiuse entro i confini del territorio. Se, tuttavia, questa impresa si rivelò semplice per stati come il Botswana, dove gli Tswana sono l'etnia dominante, con pochi gruppi di Boscimani relegati nel deserto del Kalahari, lo stesso non si può dire della Nigeria, del Ruanda, della Somalia, dell'Eritrea, dello Zaire, e della maggior parte dei paesi africani dove gli stessi governi scatenarono, con politiche segregazioniste o attraverso la forza militare, delle sanguinose guerre civili che talora ancora perdurano. Nel contempo, l'espansione della Guerra Fredda sulla scena geopolitica mondiale coinvolse il continente Africano, le cui élite vedevano nelle teorie marxiste di giustizia ed eguaglianza l'unico vero contributo alle loro lotte per

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<sup>13</sup> Griffiths, 1986.

<sup>14</sup> Seindman, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Davidson, 1992.

l'indipendenza, confermato soprattutto dai forti finanziamenti e dal supporto logistico (militare-amministrativo) provenienti da Cina, Unione Sovietica e Cuba (con riferimento specifico all'Angola). La scelta politica di molti Stati di adottare un governo, non-democratico, fondato sulle dottrine comuniste sovietiche, scatenò il contrattacco americano che, dal 1975, coinvolse solo due paesi: la Rhodesia del Sud (ora Zimbabwe) e il Sudafrica, comprendente anche l'Africa di Sud-Ovest (ora Namibia). Mentre nel centro-nord del continente si scatenavano guerre civili fondate su divisioni etniche, l'Africa australe era devastata dalle guerre di destabilizzazione iniziate da Rhodesia e Sudafrica contro Angola, Africa di Sud-Ovest e Mozambico, che si conclusero solo nei primi anni Novanta.

In base ad una lettura geo-politica della storia recente del continente africano, è possibile confermare la tesi precedente sulla validità del modello centro-periferia per la vita economica, sociale e politica delle aree di confine, e proporre la possibilità dell'esistenza di uno spazio umano e geografico di confine che trascende lo Stato politico ma riflette l'identità nazionale sdoppiata a sua volta in nazionalismo etnico e nazionalismo africano. L'esistenza di questo spazio, teoricamente, permetterebbe di affermare che le popolazioni di confine in Africa, qualora esista un legame sociale transfrontaliero antecedente l'imperialismo europeo, sono legate sia alla società tradizionale (che comprende ritualità religiose e sociali, nonché il commercio) sia allo stato sovrano, i cui governanti hanno liberato tutta la popolazione dal giogo coloniale e avviato la fase di ricostruzione del paese all'interno del Nazionalismo Africano.

### ***Gli Stati dell'Africa meridionale: indipendenza e guerre di confine.***

Un caso particolare, tuttavia, è rappresentato dagli Stati dell'Africa australe il cui processo di indipendenza ha seguito fasi e sorti diverse dalla maggior parte dei paesi africani nel periodo seguente la Seconda Guerra Mondiale: Angola, Sudafrica, Rhodesia del Sud, Mozambico. Anche in questi Stati, come nel resto del continente, le idee del *Nazionalismo Africano* portarono alla creazione di movimenti per l'indipendenza dal giogo coloniale, sebbene sia il Sudafrica sia la Rhodesia del Sud fossero già formalmente indipendenti dalla madre patria dall'inizio del XX secolo, mentre il Portogallo, sotto la dittatura di Salazar, rifiutava l'indipendenza alle colonie. In tutti i paesi, tuttavia, i movimenti anti-governativi erano di stampo comunista e si appoggiavano alla Cina o all'Unione Sovietica (nonché a Cuba per l'Angola) per il

supporto militare e politico. Quando Salazar fu deposto nel 1974, il nuovo governo concesse l'indipendenza alle ex colonie, ratificata nel 1975. Angola e Mozambico, nonostante l'influenza sovietica, erano tuttavia legate rispettivamente agli Stati Uniti d'America, per il petrolio, e al Sudafrica per le riserve aurifere attraverso il lavoro in miniera. La dicotomia fra ideologia politica e dipendenza economica, inoltre, era aggravata dalle divisioni sociali in relazione al Sudafrica dell'*apartheid*, appoggiato dagli Stati Uniti in contrattacco nella spartizione delle aree di influenza per la vittoria della Guerra Fredda<sup>16</sup>.

Essendo sia il Sudafrica sia la Rhodesia già indipendenti dalla madre patria, tuttavia, si dimostra attraverso l'analisi storica e politica che i movimenti anti-governativi non possono essere considerati 'indipendentisti' ma 'riformisti', in quanto avevano come obiettivo le riforme sociali e il cambiamento del sistema elettivo a maggioranza effettiva.

Similmente l'evoluzione politica dell'Angola e del Mozambico incluse la creazione *ex-novo* e il finanziamento di movimenti anti-governativi da parte di Rhodesia e Sudafrica che condussero guerre di destabilizzazione, con risvolti simili ai conflitti civili, con lo scopo di cambiare l'assetto governativo dei rispettivi paesi<sup>17</sup>. Le cosiddette guerre di confine o 'bush wars' iniziarono per la Rhodesia nel 1975 quando il Mozambico indipendente diede appoggio a uno dei movimenti per la democratizzazione del paese: ironicamente, lo ZANU di Robert Mugabe, l'attuale Presidente dello Zimbabwe. Nel Sudafrica, invece, iniziarono alla fine degli anni Sessanta con la nascita della SWAPO, l'organizzazione per l'indipendenza dell'Africa di Sud-Ovest, e si intensificarono dal 1975 con l'indipendenza dell'Angola. Sebbene per il Sudafrica, il fronte angolano fu da sempre il più impegnativo, il confine con il Mozambico fu teatro di scontri sia durante il conflitto guidato dalla Rhodesia, sia durante il conflitto sudafricano. In primo luogo, l'appoggio dato allo ZANU da parte del governo FRELIMO (Mozambico) scatenò la reazione immediata del governo di Ian Smith che, oltre alle normali misure tattiche militari, creò un corpo militare specializzato nella guerra di infiltrazione, gli Selous Scouts, e un gruppo militare che operasse all'interno del Mozambico capeggiato da un ex leader della rivoluzione mozambicana di FRELIMO, André Matsangaissa, e dai suoi seguaci di etnia Ndau<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Hall & Young, 1997, Minter, 1998, Gervasi, 1984.

<sup>17</sup> Minter, 1998.

<sup>18</sup> Roesh, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Honwana, 1997.

Il movimento fu chiamato da principio NMR (National Mozambican Resistance), poi noto come RENAMO dopo la firma degli accordi di pace di Nkomati, 1984, quando acquistò maggiore indipendenza organizzativa e di azione. La peculiarità di RENAMO, in relazione ad altri movimenti ribelli, fu l'aperta caratteristica etnica imposta su tutti gli appartenenti al movimento. E' noto, infatti, che soltanto i membri di origine Ndaou potevano fare carriera all'interno dell'organizzazione, il dialetto Ndaou era imposto a tutti i membri indipendentemente dalla provenienza etnico-geografica, e i riti tradizionali erano usati per infondere coraggio o impaurire le vittime e gli schiavi<sup>19</sup>. Questo movimento venne creato, addestrato, e finanziato dal governo Rhodesiano e fu complice di varie operazioni volte a destabilizzare economicamente il Mozambico, in particolar modo la provincia di Gaza, attaccando le infrastrutture di base del paese e razziando i villaggi rurali secondo le antiche tattiche militari<sup>20</sup>. Al momento dell'indipendenza, inoltre, molti Selous Scouts vennero inviati alla base militare di Phalaborwa e il progetto RENAMO continuò a essere finanziato dalla South African Defence Force (SADF). Il fronte mozambicano, per il Sudafrica, quindi fu impegnativo solo nella misura in cui i contatti e i rifornimenti ai membri della RENAMO si fecero più difficili dopo gli accordi di Nkomati, e il confine lungo il Parco Kruger era pattugliato per evitare le infiltrazioni di membri dell'ANC<sup>21</sup>.

In base all'analisi storica, quindi, il confine fra Sudafrica, Zimbabwe e Mozambico è stato testimone di conflitti fra Stati che utilizzavano strategie anti-terroristiche di infiltrazione con l'obiettivo di destabilizzare il Mozambico. L'ipotesi derivata dalla storiografia è l'identificazione in Pafuri di uno spazio che, riprendendo l'ipotesi precedente, non solo trascenda l'ordine costituito, ma crei una coincidenza fra luogo geografico e identità culturale, simile all'idea di Stato-Nazione concepita in Europa, per cui nonostante gli spostamenti forzati (migrazioni canalizzate per le miniere in Sudafrica attraverso la TEBA; dislocazione dovuta a guerre e conflitti; spostamenti dovuti a siccità e inondazioni straordinarie) le popolazioni ritornano sempre nel luogo di origine. Se questa ipotesi fosse verificata, l'importanza di Pafuri come luogo culturale per eccellenza nel cuore del GLTFCA diventerebbe strategica per la commercializzazione del PP, come luogo di ritorno alla tradizione e di

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<sup>19</sup> Lubkemann, 2005, Roesch, 1992, e Hall & Young, 1992.

<sup>20</sup> Minter, 1998, Lubkemann, 2005, Roesch, 1992.

<sup>21</sup> Anon, 1996, and Allport, 2007. Per maggiori dettagli sui rapporti geo-politici in Africa meridionale, nonché agli eventi delle 'bush wars', vedere il Capitolo 3.1 della tesi.

comprensione della storia che ha generato alcune delle principali diaspore sudafricane. In risposta alla domanda della citazione di Tshiyembe a inizio capitolo, infine, lo Stato Africano dovrebbe allontanarsi dall'idea europea di Stato-Nazione, in favore della percezione locale di Stato, come governo, e nazione, come identità culturale, che viene rispettata dal governo centrale promotore, come sempre, di un'idea di nazionalità totale che abbraccia tutte le etnie: lo stato multi-nazionale discusso, appunto, da Tshiyembe (2001). Paradossalmente questa fu e, in proporzione minore, rimane la politica di FRELIMO, percepita dai Mozambicani che hanno sopportato la guerra e tuttora sopportano la povertà, ma non dello Zimbabwe, dove le divisioni etniche furono all'origine dell'eccidio dei Matabele, e attualmente delle divisioni politiche e degli abusi sociali.

#### **LA POLITICA DELLA CONSERVAZIONE SUDAFRICANA: I PARCHI TRANSFRONTALIERI.**

La lettura attenta della storia del Sudafrica rivela che la conservazione della natura ha da sempre svolto anche un ruolo politico, nella protezione dei confini nazionali. La creazione del Parco Kruger avvalsa questa teoria dimostrando che, a prescindere dall'inconfutabile disegno di conservazione alla base del Parco portato avanti da Stevenson-Hamilton, la preservazione dell'identità nazionale e dei suoi confini ha avuto un ruolo non trascurabile sulla sua gestione ed estensione. In generale, è bene notare che la conservazione della natura, nata negli Stati Uniti per la fruizione turistica<sup>22</sup> si sviluppò gradualmente in altri dove, invece, prevalse la logica della protezione totale, con conseguente esclusione delle popolazioni umane. In Sudafrica, la necessità di conservare il patrimonio naturale derivò dalla caccia non-regolamentata agli animali da trofeo praticata dai coloni, ma la strategia di esclusione colpì principalmente le popolazioni autoctone che usavano le risorse naturali per sopravvivere<sup>23</sup>. La presenza di bracconieri di origine europea che, a Pafuri, vivevano ai margini della legalità sono sintomatici di un fenomeno degenerato, la caccia per trofeo, che toccava prevalentemente la comunità di origine europea, mentre le popolazioni locali servivano come *tracker* e portatori<sup>24</sup>. Tuttavia, furono queste a subire il maggiore danno, in quanto vennero espulse dalle aree incluse nelle riserve

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<sup>22</sup> Warren A e Goldsmith F.B, ed, 1983, *Conservation in perspective*, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, Chichester.

<sup>23</sup> Cencini, 1999.

<sup>24</sup> Bulpin, 1954.

che poi formarono il Parco, e spostate in luoghi più aridi e difficili da sfruttare. In teoria, la rimozione delle comunità locali dalle zone di confine che occupavano può anche essere letta come una strategia di separazione delle popolazioni locali già smembrate dal confine fra in due o più Stati. L'impero di Soshangaane, infatti si estendeva dalla provincia di Gaza in Mozambico, fino al confine occidentale con il Sudafrica, includendo il Bantustan di Gazankulo, oggi parte della Provincia del Limpopo, creando dei legami di vassallaggio con le popolazioni all'interno di quest'ultimo. Il Parco Kruger servì a dividere queste popolazioni appartenenti allo stesso impero e includerle nello Stato di nuova formazione. La difesa del confine lungo il selvaggio Mozambico, dove i Portoghesi non avevano ancora penetrato tutta la vastità dell'entroterra mozambicano, era inoltre di fondamentale importanza per il Sudafrica emergente dalla Guerra Boera. Nei decenni successivi, la creazione della TEBA come agenzia unica per il reclutamento di minatori poneva il problema di fermare gli adescatori che facevano clandestinamente emigrare locali in cerca di lavoro<sup>25</sup>, il Parco e i suoi *rangers* formarono un deterrente relativamente forte contro le migrazioni illegali, anche perché simultaneamente la TEBA offriva maggiori garanzie e al confine era possibile recarsi legalmente in Sudafrica per le relazioni socio-culturali delle popolazioni autoctone. L'estensione a nord del Parco, infine, venne decisa contestualmente all'indipendenza Mozambicana, al supporto all'ANC, nonché all'imminente sconfitta Rhodesiana a causa delle pressioni britanniche, statunitensi e sudafricane per la devoluzione dei poteri ai movimenti rivoluzionari, fino ad allora trattati come terroristi. Inoltre, lo spostamento del clan Makuleke oltre i confini del Parco in direzione sud riuscì ad attenuare, almeno temporaneamente, i rapporti fra comunità locali che da un secolo avevano occupato quel territorio di confine, noto come *Crooks Corner* data la qualità delle persone che sceglievano di abitarvi e dei traffici di locali e stranieri.

Lungi dal costituire un'eccezione alla regola, la conservazione transfrontaliera appare nell'ottica geo-politica come strumento di gestione del territorio, che necessariamente richiede l'intervento politico per gli accordi fra paesi<sup>26</sup>. Tuttavia, la conservazione transfrontaliera venne accolta e fortemente incoraggiata dalle lobby di potere che già supportavano il WWF<sup>27</sup>, proprio all'indomani delle elezioni che videro

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Duffy 1997 e 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Ramutsindela, 2004, e Dzingirai, 2004.

Nelson Mandela diventare il nuovo presidente sudafricano, e della fine della guerra mozambicana che aveva stremato il paese e le sue risorse naturali, ma lo aveva incluso nel circuito delle donazioni internazionali<sup>28</sup>. Nonostante gli anni di guerra, il Sudafrica era rimasto un paese ricco la cui economia era solidamente fondata sulle industrie nate da anni di isolamento politico ed economico, a causa delle sanzioni ONU collegate al regime di *apartheid*. La permanenza delle miniere e la riapertura di alcune postazioni di reclutamento della TEBA, assieme alla crescita di altri settori ad alta richiesta di manodopera, dall'industria all'agricoltura, riaccese il fuoco mai spento delle migrazioni, che le guerre civili avevano provocato specialmente in zone di confine. Nell'ultima decade, così, il tasso di immigrazione illegale dai paesi poveri confinanti, primi fra tutti il Mozambico, lo Zimbabwe, lo Swaziland e il Lesotho, è aumentato tanto da focalizzare la xenofobia sudafricana sulle connessioni fra crescita della criminalità e dei flussi migratori<sup>29</sup>. Nel contempo, le transazioni illegali sono aumentate, in particolar modo per quanto riguarda armi, vetture e droga con il Mozambico<sup>30</sup>. E il peggioramento economico in Zimbabwe e in Mozambico hanno acutizzato il commercio informale dal Sudafrica. A partire dalla fine dei conflitti civili, quindi, c'è stata una intensificazione dei rapporti informali e illegali fra Sudafrica e paesi confinanti, specialmente lungo il confine orientale. La conservazione transfrontaliera, quindi, viene incoraggiata da organizzazioni nazionali e internazionali in un momento in cui i confini nazionali sono percepiti come linee fragili, e le relazioni transfrontaliere fra popolazioni di confine si sono intensificate per ragioni sociali ed economiche.

Per quanto riguarda il GLTFCA, il trattato costitutivo e le pagine del sito internet forniscono un'idea del PP come un area la cui principale utilità ecologica indiretta è sollevare il Parco Kruger dalla pressione di elefanti e altre specie animali che, localmente, non sono in via di estinzione ma superano la capacità di carico, con la scusante di ristabilire antiche rotte migratorie che sono esistite, in base all'unico studio esistente, solo per due sottopopolazioni di zebre e di gnu, rispettivamente<sup>31</sup>. Poiché il *culling* è vietato, infatti, il Parco mira a condividere i propri animali con il

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<sup>28</sup> Hanlon, 1991, è l'iniziatore delle teorie sugli aiuti al Mozambico in epoca di conflitto, tuttavia altre sono seguite che vanno da infondate teorie di cospirazione a provate implicazioni politiche. Vedere i capitoli 2.4.2; 3.2; 3.4.

<sup>29</sup> Bayart, 2006, Crush, 2000, e Thornton, 1994

<sup>30</sup> Numerosi rapporti sull'argomento sono stati pubblicati dall'Istituto per le Ricerche sulla Sicurezza (Africa) di Pretoria.

<sup>31</sup> Anderson, 2002, fare riferimento per un'analisi più dettagliata al Capitolo 5.3 della tesi.

vicino Mozambico, privato della fauna locale dalle penurie della guerra e della fame, da un lato risolvendo i propri problemi, e dall'altro ripopolando il *bush* mozambicano. Similmente, pur proiettando l'idea di conservazione senza frontiere, è necessario un attento controllo ai confini degli Stati ed entro i confini del parco per assicurare la fine del bracconaggio che ancora influenza queste zone soprattutto in Mozambico, nell'area a sud del fiume Oliante, limite meridionale del Parco Nazionale del Limpopo<sup>32</sup>. Lo stesso sistema di controllo, tuttavia, si occupa anche di ogni potenziale danno alla flora e fauna selvatica, includendo i tradizionali flussi migratori delle popolazioni locali e regionali verso il Sudafrica, le attività economiche informali e, indirettamente, i rapporti transfrontalieri socio-economici di base per la sussistenza delle comunità di confine nei tre paesi. Si tratta, anche in questo caso, di una procedura che riuscirebbe a raggiungere due scopi con un unico mezzo. Di conseguenza, nonostante l'obiettivo dei favorire l'unità culturale fra popolazioni confinanti nei tre paesi, l'implementazione di controlli severi per la sicurezza e la creazione di corridoi ecologici non recintati porterà ad un rilocalizzazione, relativamente forzata, delle popolazioni di confine. Il risultato è quello di allontanare sempre di più i depositari della storia locale, creando discontinuità culturale per favorire quella ecologica. Considerando il grado di pianificazione ecologica del GLTFCA, l'attivo coinvolgimento di grandi donatori (FMI e Banco Mondiale) le cui pratiche richiedono la partecipazione delle popolazioni locali, le quantità di studi multidisciplinari svolti sull'argomento, e l'attiva partecipazione governativa sembra improbabile che, nel nuovo Sudafrica, un impatto socio-economico e culturale di tale portata sia sfuggito alle agenzie governative e internazionali, nonché al comitato di gestione del GLTFCA e alla Peace Park Foundation. Sembra più verosimile l'ipotesi di un progetto dal doppio-scopo: la conservazione e la promozione, sulla carta, della pace fra paesi da un lato, la sicurezza dei confini sudafricani e della sua economia dall'altro. Seguendo questo filone, la ricerca si propone di valutare quale può essere l'impatto seguendo l'attuale sistema di gestione, e portare soluzioni derivate dall'analisi di terreno.

L'approccio di geografia politica per la formulazione delle ipotesi di base per la ricerca ha permesso un'attenta analisi storica e antropologica della regione studiata,

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<sup>32</sup> Le interviste al Capo Ispettore Coetzer, Polizia di Skukuza, e alla Famiglia DuPont, della Xonguile Game Reserve, rivela un tasso non ininfluente di bracconieri a sud del fiume Oliphants, sia in territorio privato sia nel Parco Nazionale Kruger, le cui prede principali sono ippopotami ed elefanti nel Kruger e antilopi in Mozambico.

l'Africa Meridionale, e dei rapporti internazionali fra gli Stati coinvolti nell'istituzione del GLTFCA. A partire dalle teorie sull'affermazione dello Stato-Nazione, e sulle differenze fra confini e frontiere, si è arrivati a delineare la storia della regione meridionale seguendo un percorso separato rispetto al resto del continente, sebbene incastonato nei vari contesti che hanno formato l'attuale *status quo*: il colonialismo, l'imperialismo e l'indipendenza. Infine, questo approccio ha permesso di rivalutare la creazione del GLTFCA attraverso le scelte strategiche dei paesi coinvolti, in particolare il Sudafrica, e il ruolo delle lobby di potere che hanno iniziato e appoggiato la conservazione transfrontaliera.

## **METODOLOGIA DI RICERCA**

La ricerca è stata ideata seguendo il carattere multidisciplinare che caratterizza le aree di confine<sup>33</sup>, e ambisce a produrre una analisi teorica e pratica della zona di confine di Pafuri come centro nevralgico dell'economia informale che lega il Sudafrica, al Mozambico e allo Zimbabwe, destinato quindi a due scenari: (1) l'assunzione di un carattere strategico per l'implementazione di un vero TFCA e PP, grazie alle sue caratteristiche geo-fisiche e storico-culturali; (2) venire annientato secondo la logica di sicurezza del GLTFCA, che confermerebbe l'ipotesi secondo cui il Sudafrica mira a una espansione economica ad est, attraverso l'acquisizione di territorio attraverso lo Stato o i privati, pur difendendo l'integrità dei propri confini. In questo capitolo verrà presentata la metodologia usata per la ricerca, partendo dalla ricerca bibliografica, fino ad arrivare all'analisi dei dati raccolti con l'indagine di terreno.

### ***Le fonti primarie e secondarie***

Lo studio fondato sull'analisi geo-politica dei fenomeni storici ha permesso di elaborare concetti di base, utilizzati per la creazione di ipotesi di ricerca. La bibliografia usata è composta principalmente di fonti bibliografiche secondarie, che partono dagli anni Sessanta fino ad arrivare al 2007. Le fonti primarie, infatti, si limitano ai testi chiave della Geografia Politica (Muir, 1975, Agnew, 1992, Pounds, 1992, e Glassner, 1995) per identificare le caratteristiche generali degli elementi centrali per la ricerca, cui è seguito lo studio di testi antropologici e multidisciplinari

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<sup>33</sup> Donnan & Wilson, 1999.

sullo studio delle frontiere in generale (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & Donnan, 1998) e sulle migrazioni transfrontaliere in Africa australe (Whitman, 2000; McDonald, 2000). Infine i manuali sulla conservazione transfrontaliera sono stati analizzati con particolare interesse Peddle *et al.*, 2004, sulla sicurezza nelle aree di conservazione transfrontaliera. Un testo prezioso per comprendere le politiche del Mozambico indipendente è stata la raccolta dei discorsi pronunciati dal Presidente Samora Machel, durante la lotta politica armata, ai congressi di partito. Le fonti secondarie principali, invece, sono i testi di storia europea e africana, per ottenere una visione generale degli eventi che caratterizzarono e unirono i due continenti in epoca antica e moderna (Reader, 1994, e Formigoni, 2000). A questi è seguita una ricerca approfondita di testi riportanti indagine storiche sulle popolazioni principali dell'area studiata, che risalgono agli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta, principalmente. Successivamente è stata effettuata la raccolta di articoli sulle migrazioni verso il Sudafrica, che colpiscono il Mozambico in epoca pre e post coloniale, per valutare il risvolto economico, politico e locale. Infine le ricerche pubblicate sul Mozambico indipendente sono state studiate per trarre informazioni sull'impatto della guerra nelle comunità rurali, sui rapporti est-ovest a scala locale, regionale e globale durante la guerra e i risvolti socio-economici attuali (Minter, 1998, Pitcher, 2002, e Hall & Young, 1997). Infine, durante la permanenza in Mozambico sono stati raccolti articoli di giornali che riflettessero il grado di informazione sullo stato di avanzamento del Parco Transfrontaliero; il Sudafrica e i suoi rapporti con gli immigrati e i paesi confinanti; le politiche di integrazione economica nella regione del SADC (*Southern African Development Committee*).

### **La cartografia**

La cartografia raccolta è frutto di una selettiva ricerca su internet usando il motore di ricerca Google. Le mappe delineanti il Parco Transfrontaliero e il Parco del Limpopo sono state donate dall'Unità per le TFCA del Ministero del Turismo Mozambicana. Infine le altre mappe sono state create utilizzando i risultati della ricerca attraverso Google Earth e GPSVisualiser. La tecnica di riproduzione cartografica dei dati ha seguito le innovazioni portate dal *Community Integrated GIS*, un metodo realizzato in Sudafrica e ancora nella sua fase iniziale che vuole utilizzare il GIS per l'analisi di dati che variano dall'analisi sociologica, a quella economica,

all'ecologia e alla geografia fisica, per risolvere situazioni conflittuali fra popolazioni e governo, particolarmente in seno alla conservazione transfrontaliera: lo scopo è quello di creare semplici mappe contenenti dati derivanti da indagini etno-geografiche, tali da permetterne la comprensione da parte delle popolazioni locali e iniziare un dialogo sulla gestione del territorio e l'identificazione di potenziali conflitti<sup>34</sup>.

### ***L'analisi di terreno: metodologia qualitativa***

La permanenza di un anno e mezzo in Mozambico ha permesso di creare una metodologia qualitativa che non fosse solo basata su interviste programmate e *focus groups* organizzati, ma di creare dei contesti di discussione attraverso la pianificazione di una serie di incontri con informatori chiave (Dr. Jorge Ferrão, ex coordinatore internazionale dell'GLTFCA), transect walks con persone importanti per la conservazione in Africa meridionale (Ted Reilly, fondatore di Big Game Parks, e ideatore della legge per la conservazione della flora e fauna selvatica dello Swaziland), e conversazioni informali con persone coinvolte direttamente o meno nel GLTFCA (la famiglia Du Pont, proprietaria della Xhonguile Game Reserve, confinante con il Kruger a sud del Parco del Limpopo; Dr. Marcus Wishart, ex Conservation manager per ARA-SUL, l'agenzia per le acque del Mozambico territoriale incaricata della ristrutturazione della diga di Massingir; Dr. Harry van der Linde dell'African Wildlife Foundation; Chief. Insp. Coetzer, della Polizia di Skukuza, a capo del programma di sicurezza transfrontaliera; Dr. John Hutton, dell'agenzia mozambicana Impacto; Dr. Billy Swanepoel, capo del programma di ripopolamento del Parco Nazionale del Limpopo). Con l'eccezione degli ufficiali di polizia, gli informatori chiave legati alle aree di conservazione hanno una formazione principalmente ecologica e gestionale, come richiesto dalla posizione che ricoprono. La geografia, quindi, diventa un elemento territoriale legato all'ecologia, all'idrologia, alla geomorfologia e alle necessità gestionali, ed entra in gioco a livello secondario solo nella pianificazione. La mancanza dell'impronta geografica, infatti, si rivela alla semplice osservazione delle mappe che illustrano la pianificazione del Parco del Limpopo e del GLTCA, per quanto riguarda la geografia umana del territorio<sup>35</sup>. Infine, attraverso varie esperienze di volontariato locale, sono riuscita a ricevere molte informazioni su argomenti interenti la ricerca, anche se indirettamente, attraverso i

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<sup>34</sup> Jones, undated.

<sup>35</sup> Vedi Mappa 1.1 e Mappa 1.2 nel testo della tesi.

rapporti continuativi con persone conosciute in loco, e attraverso alcuni viaggi per motivi personali o di lavoro. La creazione spontanea, dato il numero consistente di ricercatori sul TFCA, di un gruppo di ricerca locale ha contribuito negli ultimi mesi a creare un importante sistema di *peer-review*.

Per quanto riguarda le analisi di terreno, infine, le tecniche etnografiche di osservazione diretta, registrazione degli eventi in un diario giornaliero, e discussioni con membri della comunità ed eventuali visitatori si sono rivelate molto utili per creare sia un confronto con i dati quantitativi sia una base di comprensione e di identificazione dei teorie nella prassi quotidiana. In questo senso l'analisi qualitativa si è rivelata essenziale per identificare le relazioni fra famiglie all'interno del villaggio, nonché le differenze fra rapporti gerarchici governativi, le classi sociali e le divisioni familiari. Inoltre, grazie alla metodologia qualitativa è stato possibile apprendere i pochi frammenti di storia culturale ricordati dagli anziani del villaggio, e le conoscenze tradizionali della flora locale, che sono stati preziosi termini di paragone con le descrizioni presenti nella letteratura.

Le informazioni raccolte attraverso l'analisi qualitativa, quindi, hanno contribuito in maniera diretta e indiretta alla formazione delle ipotesi e all'analisi delle fonti primarie e secondarie utilizzate per la stesura della tesi. Non tutte le fonti sono state direttamente citate nel testo ma sono riscontrabili nei racconti storici, nell'analisi socio-economica e nelle interpretazioni di eventi e teorie.

### ***L'analisi di terreno: metodologia quantitativa***

Considerando che nessuno aveva mai compiuto un'indagine quantitativa a Pafuri, per individuare la dipendenza dal confine delle varie comunità locali, era evidente che qualsiasi aspirazione propositiva per risolvere il presupposto conflitto fra priorità gestionali del GLTFCA e sviluppo socio-economico delle comunità locali doveva fondarsi sullo studio approfondito della località e dei suoi abitanti. Dopo le prime due visite preliminari, seguendo l'approccio etnografico, è stato preparato un questionario da sottoporre a un membro per famiglia, durante una permanenza estesa *in loco*. Conoscendo la tradizione Shangaana e Nguni (il ceppo etnico che accomuna gli abitanti del confine orientale del Sudafrica), ogni famiglia corrisponde geograficamente a un gruppo di case, monolocali, ciascuna ospitante un micro nucleo familiare (i genitori, il primogenito e la moglie, i figli fino alla pubertà, le

sorelle e i fratelli non sposati del primogenito). Che il rispondente fosse uomo o donna era indifferente ai fini della ricerca, tuttavia fu sorprendente avere come interlocutore alcune giovani ragazzine, quando i genitori fossero assenti, per lavorare nei campi. Poiché le interviste venivano condotte prevalentemente di mattina, i rispondenti erano spesso anziani che erano sopravvissuti alle guerre e al lavoro in miniera, tuttavia pochi furono in grado di raccontare le origini della nazione Shangaana.

Il questionario, incluso come Allegato 7, è suddiviso in quattro sezioni, ciascuna riferita ad argomenti precisi. La prima sezione corrisponde alla ricerca demografica, e si prefigge di capire il grado di scolarizzazione degli abitanti, le strategie di sussistenza, e il possesso di un documento di identità. Quest'ultimo, analizzato alla luce dei movimenti transfrontalieri, indica il livello di obbedienza alle leggi governative e la percezione del confine. La seconda sezione riguarda il commercio ed è fondata sull'ipotesi che il commercio di prodotti agricoli o provenienti dal Sudafrica, con lo Zimbabwe, fosse molto importante per l'economia locale. La terza sezione è dedicata alle migrazioni per lavoro e ambisce a differenziare i luoghi, le professioni, la frequenza del ritorno, e la frequenza dell'invio di soldi e beni alla famiglia. L'ipotesi, in questo caso, è che come in Zimbabwe le cosiddette *remittances* (rimesse) costituissero un aiuto sostanzioso alla gestione economica familiare. La quarta sezione riguarda le relazioni familiari fra paesi confinanti e si basa sull'ipotesi che se le relazioni lavorative siano più propense verso il Sudafrica, quelle familiari lo siano verso lo Zimbabwe, dove l'attraversamento del confine è poco controllato, data l'inesistenza di una frontiera ufficiale a Pafuri, ma smorzato dalla presenza di un campo minato che si estende da Crooks' Corner fino alla frontiera ufficiale a Chiqualaquala.

I dati ottenuti sono stati analizzati con SPSS (Statistic Package for the Social Sciences), al fine di ottenere una visione comprensiva dei vari fenomeni e dei collegamenti fra loro, e alcuni sono stati georeferenziati con ArcExplorer e GPSVisualizer per testare alcune ipotesi geografiche, come la correlazione fra posizione della famiglia e inclinazione al commercio o alla migrazione verso uno o più paesi confinanti.

## AREA GEOGRAFICA DI STUDIO

Il Mozambico si estende per oltre 2000km in direzione Nord-Est dal Sudafrica e lo Swaziland fino alla Tanzania, toccando Zimbabwe, Zambia e Malawi nell'entroterra. Lo sviluppo del commercio già in epoca antica si tradusse con l'avvio coloniale nello sviluppo costiero a discapito delle regioni interne, difficili da raggiungere se non con trasporto fluviale<sup>36</sup>.



Mappa 1: La Provincia di Gaza - modificata per gli scopi della presentazione della tesi.

<sup>36</sup> Modello di sviluppo riconosciuto da Griffiths, 1986.

Lo stesso modello economico si nota attualmente, visto che la maggiore concentrazione si ha lungo la costa, grazie soprattutto al turismo rinato dopo la guerra civile. Nonostante il gruppo militare anti-colonialista, FRELIMO, sia cresciuto all'interno della filosofia socio-economica Marxista-Leninista, le guerre e le carestie hanno costretto il governo ad affacciarsi ad occidente per evitare il collasso demografico ed economico a partire dalla prima metà degli anni Ottanta<sup>37</sup>. L'approccio liberale del governo è cresciuto nel tempo fino all'attuale gestione prettamente consumistica, anziché socialista, nonostante le politiche votate, sulla carta, alla riduzione della povertà assoluta, alla lotta contro l'AIDS-HIV, allo sfruttamento dei minori e alla violenza sulle donne e i bambini<sup>38</sup>. FRELIMO è riuscita da un lato a creare un senso di 'orgoglio mozambicano' che però si rivela solo nei giorni di festa, durante le elezioni e in antitesi ad eventuali ingerenze non gradite, attraverso un'efficace campagna propagandistica<sup>39</sup>. Se il ricordo delle barbarie dei *banditi* RENAMO<sup>40</sup> è ormai offuscato dalla propaganda per la ricostruzione, quello del ruolo del colonialismo europeo è iscritto nella memoria di molti nelle zone urbane, come in quelle rurali, influenzando spesso i rapporti fra locali e stranieri, nonché le strategie di investimento straniero promosse dal governo per risollevare l'economia.

La provincia di Gaza, fra la provincia di Maputo e quella di Inhambane, confina ad ovest direttamente con il Sudafrica, a nord con lo Zimbabwe, ed è demarcata ad est dalla provincia di Manica e ha come capoluogo Xai-Xai, vedi Mappa 1, un tempo zona balenare importante presso le foci dello storico fiume Limpopo, che nasce in Sudafrica, e ne costeggia il confine con Botswana e Zimbabwe, fino ad arrivare in Mozambico dove devia verso sud e l'oceano. Al momento, tuttavia, Xai-Xai altro non è che un capoluogo amministrativo essendo stata superata da altre località turistiche quali Bilene e Chidenguele, e le straordinarie piene del Limpopo del 2000-2001 hanno peggiorato l'aspetto della città. La provincia di Gaza prende il nome dal nonno di Soshangaane<sup>41</sup>, che fondò il suo impero dal Limpopo allo Zambesi, una volta

<sup>37</sup> Pitcher, 2002; Hanlon, 1991, Hall & Young, 1997.

<sup>38</sup> Vedi il testo del PARPA, per la riduzione della povertà assoluta nel paese (in bibliografia) e Falck *et al.*, 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Attraverso la partecipazione a tutte le manifestazioni dei giorni di festa sia internazionali (Festa della donna) sia nazionali (Festa della donna mozambicana), nonché l'osservazione della merce propagandistica distribuita durante queste occasioni e in vendita in alcuni negozi popolari, è stato possibile valutare il grado di controllo sulla popolazione che è tuttora esercitato dal governo.

<sup>40</sup> Il termine 'bandito' in Mozambico si riferisce solo ed esclusivamente ai guerriglieri della RENAMO, e per estensione ai sovversivi e ai criminali, vedi anche Lubkemann (2005) e Roesch (1992).

<sup>41</sup> Beach, 1974.

fuggito da Chaka Zulu durante le 'guerre degli Nguni', come vengono ricordate a Pafuri. All'apice della sua espansione territoriale, Soshangaane dominava un territorio esteso da Bilene fino a Chimoio, sottomettendo la popolazione Ndaus pre-insediata. Questo elemento non è irrilevante, considerando che la provincia di Gaza durante le guerre ospitava anche i guerriglieri Ndaus della RENAMO, i quali si servivano di questo corridoio per i rifornimenti dal Sudafrica. Nell'estremo nord-ovest di Gaza si trova il Posto amministrativo di Pafuri, un nome che indica non solo la parte mozambicana, ma anche la controparte Sudafricana e Zimbabweana, a causa della continuità etnica fra i tre stati. La popolazione di Pafuri, come spazio geografico che prescinde i confini politici, infatti è principalmente Shangaan nei tre stati. Tuttavia, sia in Sudafrica sia in Zimbabwe, gli Shangaan condividono le terre comunitarie con altre due popolazioni i Venda e i Matabele (ceppo Makuleke in Sudafrica). Solo in Mozambico, quindi, la popolazione è puramente Shangaana. L'angolino di Pafuri dove il Luhuvhu confluisce con il Limpopo è più noto agli appassionati di storia sudafricana come *Crooks' Corner* (ovvero l'angolo dei malfattori). Questo angolo apparteneva al territorio dei Makuleke, e proprio a pochi passi dall'angolo geografico, si trovava il negozio Makuleke gestito, secondo Bulpin, da due europei che si occupavano anche di organizzare il commercio fra bracconieri e potenziali compratori, protetti dal Capo Makuleke<sup>42</sup>. La località era la preferita non solo per la vasta quantità di animali da trofei che si incontravano in Mozambico e Zimbabwe, ma anche perché bastava spostare il demarcatore di frontiera di pochi metri per confondere la Polizia in cerca dei malfattori<sup>43</sup>. Sebbene quasi un secolo sia passato dai tempi dei bracconieri, di Bvekenya (che si è lasciato dietro un numero discreto di prole) e del negozio Makuleke, e nonostante il forzato trasloco delle famiglie Makuleke nel 1969, la zona mantiene la sua aura e la sua nomea per essere il centro di molte attività al confine fra il formale e l'informale, come sottolineano gli ufficiali di frontiera, la cui esistenza è direttamente dipendente dalla presenza del confine<sup>44</sup>. Lo stabilimento dell'agenzia della TEBA per il reclutamento di manovalanza per le miniere, agli inizi del XIX secolo, fu il primo segno fisico della divisione fra Sudafrica e Mozambico, nonché la prima presenza ufficiale nella zona di Pafuri. La

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<sup>42</sup> Bulpin, 1954.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Intervista con Chief Insp. Tshambalala (SAPS) e Chefe Serrano (Immigrazione del GoM), vedi anche Capitolo 3.3.1 della tesi.

presenza della TEBA, tuttavia, incrementò il carattere di centralità per i flussi migratori già mostrato dall'area di Pafuri, raccogliendo gli immigrati provenienti dallo Zambia e dal Malawi. Questo carattere di centralità è ancora presente nonostante la chiusura dei centri TEBA, con le migrazioni illegali attraverso il Parco Nazionale Kruger, il cui elemento deterrente è quasi totalmente scomparso nella mentalità degli emigranti<sup>45</sup>. L'attuale pianificazione del GLTFCA, lungi dallo sfruttare questa ricchezza storico-culturale, rischia di uccidere il carattere transfrontaliero della località che potrebbe simboleggiare l'intero parco vista la storia di violenza e dislocazione delle comunità locali, con la creazione di un corridoio ecologico non recintato lungo il confine fra Zimbabwe e Mozambico, che è stato recentemente sminato. Questo danno sociale, inoltre, rischia di avere conseguenze gravi sulle strategie di sussistenza locali, rendendo necessaria un'analisi accurata delle possibilità di conflitto e delle strategie di mitigazione che la ricerca si è prefissa di individuare.

La comunità prescelta per l'indagine campione è Dumela, un villaggio di 89 famiglie (allargate) che si trova a nord del fiume Limpopo, a poche centinaia di metri dal confine Zimbabwe, lungo le rotte principali che dal Sudafrica portano in Mozambico, sia in direzione nord verso Chiqualaquala, sia in direzione sud verso la costa, con un collegamento a Mapai in direzione est per raggiungere il Parco Nazionale di Banchine e Vilankulos, sulla costa. A Mapai, inoltre, c'è uno degli ingressi del Parco Nazionale del Limpopo, nato dalle ceneri dell'area di caccia Coutada 16, che permette di raggiungere attraverso il parco il villaggio di Massingir, centro turistico prioritario del parco, da cui ci si ricongiunge alla Chokwe-Chiqualaquala per raggiungere la costa a Macia. Infine, esiste un sentiero poco battuto che da Dumela, in direzione ovest, raggiunge la comunità di Sengwe in Zimbabwe, attraverso il futuro corridoio ecologico. La locazione del villaggio rispetto alle vie di comunicazione principali e secondarie, la sua storia di migrazioni e spostamenti forzati dovuti a guerre e carestie, l'incongruità fra la povertà visibile e quella dichiarata durante le visite, nonché la presenza di tre negozi, mentre l'unico esistente alla frontiera per gli ufficiali governativi ha chiuso, generano ragionevoli dubbi sul ruolo ricoperto dal questo villaggio, apparentemente insignificante, nel mercato transfrontaliero che unisce i tre paesi confinanti. La povertà dichiarata,

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<sup>45</sup> Mporfu *et al.*, 1999, interviste con giovani adulti di Dumela in preparazione per il viaggio verso il Sudafrica (Settembre, 2006)


infatti, potrebbe far pensare davvero a una zona di confine remota dagli instabili contatti con il mondo esterno. Al contrario, la sua locazione geografica, al crocevia di tre vie di comunicazione strategiche, la presenza di tre negozi, dove per dichiarazione degli intervistati la povertà è devastante, e la regolarità di mercanti dallo Zimbabwe, dalla Provincia di Gaza, e i flussi migratori, dimostrano il carattere centrale di Dumela e, per estensione di Pafuri, nonché la 'relativa' povertà rispetto ad altre zone limitrofe, più lontane dal confine o dalle vie di comunicazione principali.

## **ANALISI DEI DATI**

Basata sulle informazioni ottenute dall'analisi quantitativa di Dumela, basata sui questionari a domande prevalentemente chiuse, e l'analisi qualitativa di Dumela, del Posto Amministrativo di Pafuri e delle zone limitrofe sia in Sudafrica, sia lungo il confine con lo Zimbabwe, l'analisi sarà comparativa usando le informazioni secondarie derivata dalla poca letteratura disponibile su Pafuri, principalmente Mpofu *et al.*, 1999, che hanno condotto il Participatory Rural Appraisal nella Sengwe Communal Land, in Zimbabwe, e indirettamente Koch *et al.*, 1995, e Connor, 2003, che hanno condotto alcune ricerche di stampo sociologico su Pafuri in Mozambico.


### ***La demografia***

Dumela è composta da 89 gruppi famigliari, per un totale di circa 130 famiglie, il 44,3 % dei quali è composto da 6 a 10 persone, mentre solo il 10,2% ha più di 15 persone. La distribuzione per fascia di età è stata valutata qualitativamente, e si è osservato che gli adolescenti maschi sono quasi completamente assenti dal villaggio. Più che una causa delle migrazioni causate dalla guerra recente, tuttavia, le interviste con Ana, l'antica insegnante del villaggio, e le trasformazioni culturali rilevate dall'analisi storica, rivelano l'importanza delle migrazioni come rito di passaggio. Quasi certamente, infatti, i ragazzi in età fra i 15 e i 20 anni si trovano in Sudafrica a lavorare, mentre le adolescenti femmine sono al villaggio. Il livello di scolarità, in relazione alla dimensione famigliare, è alquanto allarmante, considerando che nel 26% dei casi nessun membro famigliare ha la licenza elementare e solo l'8% delle famiglie ha dai 3 ai 5 membri con la licenza. Inoltre,



**Mappa 2: Densità demografica ed estensione del villaggio di Dumela. (Elab. dati quantitativi)**

Ana ha affermato che, nonostante gli sforzi per insegnare il Portoghese, la lingua ufficiale, i bambini non riescono ad apprendere la lingua. Questo deriva, senza dubbio, dal fatto che gli stessi famigliari parlano solo Shangaan, o il Fannagalo (l'idioma delle miniere). Anche chi ha vissuto all'estero, ha imparato una o due lingue dei bianchi (Inglese e Afrikaans) solo se vi è stato costretto per motivi di lavoro, visto che lo Shangaan è parlato correntemente nei villaggi confinanti con il Parco Kruger ed è intelligibile con gli altri idiomi Nguni (vedi Allegato 5).



**Figura 1: Percentuale di gruppi famigliari con documenti di identità (Fonte: questionari)**

Degli 89 gruppi famigliari, inoltre, la stragrande maggioranza non possiede un documento di identità, eppure si sposta oltre confine sia verso il Sudafrica sia verso lo Zimbabwe. Questo dato indica (1) che esiste uno spazio geografico umano trascendente le regole governative; (2) che le persone sono identificabili solo attraverso il riconoscimento dei loro pari, quindi se fermati alla frontiera possono mentire sulle loro origini e identità, qualora convenga loro, se l'ufficiale non è del luogo. Tuttavia, il fatto di non possedere un documento di identità è percepito come una mancanza, nella maggioranza dei casi (osservazione personale) non una sfida, tesi confermata dall'Isp. Capo Tshambalala, Capo della Polizia di Pafuri, il quale ha confermato che la presenza il loco di un funzionario mozambicano apposto alla distribuzione dei documenti di identità contribuirebbe a diminuire il problema, vista l'esperienza di un'ex-ufficiale, su base puramente volontaristica. Si tratta di un ragionamento logico considerando il grado di estrema periferia attribuibile a Pafuri, tuttavia dimostra il grado di interesse o di capacità gestionale da parte del governo mozambicano nell'amministrare l'interno del Paese. Infine, per quanto riguarda le attività redditizie della popolazione di Dumela, la Machamba (ossia le coltivazioni di sussistenza) è ancora l'elemento fondamentale, seguito dal progetto del Ministero dell'Agricoltura.

**Tabella dati incrociati: Numero di componenti famigliari\*Strategie di sussistenza**

			Strategie di sussistenza					Totale
			Commercio	Rimesse	Impiego	Machamba	Altro	
Numero di componenti famigliari	1-5 componenti	Conteggio % fra il Numero di componenti famigliari	3 13,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	15 65,2%	5 21,7%	23 100,0%
	6-10 componenti	Conteggio % fra il Numero di componenti famigliari	3 7,7%	0 ,0%	1 2,6%	34 87,2%	1 2,6%	39 100,0%
	11-15 componenti	Conteggio % fra il Numero di componenti famigliari	3 17,6%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	13 76,5%	1 5,9%	17 100,0%
	Più di 15 componenti	Conteggio % fra il Numero di componenti famigliari	2 22,2%	1 11,1%	0 ,0%	6 66,7%	0 ,0%	9 100,0%
Totale		Conteggio % fra il Numero di componenti famigliari	11 12,5%	1 1,1%	1 1,1%	68 77,3%	7 8,0%	88 100,0%

**Tabella 1: Le strategie di sopravvivenza in relazione alla densità del gruppo famigliare. (Fonte: Questionari)**

La Tabella 1 mostra che il 68% dei gruppi famigliari ricava il suo fabbisogno, o quasi, dalla Machamba, di questi solo il 12,5% si dedica al commercio, ma in 4 degli

11 casi, si tratta di 3 famiglie che hanno un negozietto in loco e di un privato che vende vestiti e beni di consumo agli Zimbabweani, in un sistema di baratto, considerando l'inflazione devastante del Dollaro Zimbabweano. Solo una famiglia ha ammesso di ricevere rimesse dai figli all'estero, dato che contrasta con i dati raccolti da Mpofo *et al.* (1999) a Sengwe, dove le famiglie ricevono fino a 2000 ZAR per rimessa, dai famigliari in Sudafrica.

L'immagine generale di Dumela, quindi, è di un villaggio a densità medio-alta considerando la lontananza dai centri di potere, con livelli di scolarità molto bassi, e nessun tipo di documento di identità, nonostante le relazioni transfrontaliere, e uno stile di vita legato all'agricoltura. Tuttavia, è importante notare che le risposte al questionario possono essere falsate, poiché la popolazione si aspettava che, nonostante le mie specificazione sul fatto che questo fosse uno studio, a quest'indagine seguisse un progetto di sviluppo, che ovviamente non è mai stato promesso. Quindi la popolazione ha risposto in modo da sembrare relativamente più bisognosa rispetto alla realtà, intenzione che è stata notata in varie occasioni per incongruenze fra le risposte e il grado di 'ricchezza' domestica.

### ***I legami transfrontalieri: migrazioni per lavoro***

Le ipotesi basate sulla ricerca storica di Pafuri rivelano dei forti legami fra questo territorio di frontiera e, principalmente, l'ex-Transvaal, la provincia Sudafricana ricca di fattorie e miniere dove la richiesta di manodopera non specializzata è sempre stata in crescente richiesta. Pafuri fungeva da punto di incontro per gli emigranti provenienti dalle province a nord del Mozambico, nonché dal Malawi e dal Mashonaland (Nord Zimbabwe). Dumela svolge ancora questo ruolo catalizzatore di emigranti, poiché si trova sulle vie di comunicazione secondarie per il Nord, e in posizione favorevole per permettere il riposo prima dell'attraversamento notturno. Durante le visite e la permanenza, infatti, sono stati individuati flussi settimanali di emigranti di varia nazionalità e provenienza. L'attraversamento notturno è tipico per evitare le guardie di frontiera, ma è maggiormente rischioso poiché è in questa parte del giorno che gli animali si nutrono, e accade che alcuni degli emigranti non sopravvivano al Parco Kruger. Tuttavia, l'accettazione del rischio è sintomatica (1) della disperazione cui la povertà spinge le persone; (2) la percezione, ancora, del viaggio come rito di passaggio; (3) l'incapacità della

conservazione di fungere da minaccia contro i flussi migratori. Questo dovrebbe costituire una *lesson learnt* per la gestione e l'implementazione del GLTFCA nonché un monito a creare una zona che tenga conto delle affinità storico-culturale e aiuti i flussi rendendoli legali, anziché chiudersi in posizioni protezionistiche.

**Tabella dati incrociati: membri famigliari permanentemente all'estero\*paese di emigrazione**

			Paese di emigrazione			Totale
			Nessuno	Sudafrica	Zimbabwe	
Componenti famigliari permanentemente all'estero	Zero	Conteggio	28	24	0	52
		% fra Componenti famigliari permanentemente all'estero	53,8%	46,2%	,0%	100,0%
	1-2	Conteggio	0	24	2	26
		% fra Componenti famigliari permanentemente all'estero	,0%	92,3%	7,7%	100,0%
	3-5	Conteggio	0	10	0	10
		% fra Componenti famigliari permanentemente all'estero	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Totale	Conteggio	28	58	2	88	
	% fra Componenti famigliari permanentemente all'estero	32,9%	64,8%	2,3%	100,0%	

**Tabella 2: Relazione fra paese di migrazione e tipo di permanenza – permanente (Fonte: questionari)**

Una percentuale minoritaria della popolazione ha dei componenti che sono permanentemente all'estero, il 49% ha da 1 a 5 membri famigliari nei paesi confinanti. Il Sudafrica è, ovviamente, il paese prescelto dato il fattore d'attrazione socio-economico esercitato sull'intera regione (Tabella 2). Le due persone in Zimbabwe sono sposate con un locale: l'unicità di questo dato, altrimenti irrilevante, indica che il legame con lo Zimbabwe è sociale, non economico, e fa riferimento al mantenimento dei tradizionali sistemi di accasamento, che prevedono la scelta della donna fra i *kraal* vicini di eguale etnia, indipendentemente dai confini di stato. La percentuale relativamente bassa di migrazioni permanenti conferma, appunto, che esistono dei cambiamenti nella percezione delle opportunità che il Sudafrica può dare alla manodopera non specializzata: la chiusura di molte miniere, il sequestro delle fattorie da parte dello Stato<sup>46</sup>, l'aumento senza precedenti degli omicidi in fattorie, i furti che hanno forzato molti proprietari terrieri a chiudere le fattorie, e l'aumento generale della criminalità, hanno contribuito a percepire la migrazione in Sudafrica come un movimento obbligato per guadagnare denaro, ma ritornare in

<sup>46</sup> Du Toit, P., 2004, *The Great South African Land Scandal*, Legacy Publications, Centurion, ZA.

patria non appena la somma desiderata è stata raggiunta<sup>47</sup>. Le migrazioni temporanee, infatti, sono più frequenti toccando il 61,3% delle famiglie intervistate.

**Tabella dati incrociati: Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero\* Paese di emigrazione**

			Paese di emigrazione			Totale
			Nessuno	Sudafrica	Zimbabwe	
Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero	Zero	Conteggio	28	6	0	34
		% fra i Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero	82,4%	17,6%	,0%	100,0%
	1-2	Conteggio	0	37	2	39
		% fra i Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero	,0%	94,9%	5,1%	100,0%
	3-5	Conteggio	0	15	0	15
		% fra i Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Totale	Conteggio	28	58	2	88	
	% fra i Componenti famigliari temporaneamente all'estero	33,0%	64,8%	2,3%	100,0%	

**Tabella 3: Rapporto fra paese di migrazione e tipo di permanenza – temporanea (Fonte: questionari)**


Anche in questo caso il paese prescelto è il Sudafrica, ma gli emigranti cercano di rimanere nella provincia del Limpopo, la più vicina possibile, per facilitare gli spostamenti. Infine, il lavoro di miniera è stato completamente sostituito dal lavoro in fattoria (62,7%) e da altri lavori fra cui spiccano i muratori, gli idraulici e i meccanici.

### ***I legami transfrontalieri – migrazioni sociali***

Come accennato in precedenza i legami sociali nello spazio informale di Pafuri sono ancora forti e includono le visite ai rispettivi villaggi. Nonostante, la frequenza delle visite ipotizzata fosse piuttosto alta, la realtà è contraddittoria, visto che sono gli anziani che dovrebbero avventurarsi lungo questi percorsi, e chiaramente il viaggio è difficile e faticoso nonostante la vicinanza se effettuato a piedi. In termini relativi, tuttavia, è bene notare che il 65,3% delle famiglie visita con frequenza trimestrale o semestrale i parenti, e il 62,5% ne riceve le visite. Se poche famiglie hanno figli all'estero, infine, la Mappa dimostra che quasi tutta la popolazione ha parenti in uno o entrambi i paesi confinanti. Solo 10 famiglie su 89, infatti, non hanno parenti in nessuno dei due stati. Fra queste eccezioni, notiamo un

<sup>47</sup> Conversazioni con alcuni trentenni a Dumela, che stavano pianificando la prossima migrazione stagionale in Sudafrica.

ragazzo che usava Dumela come base di appoggio, ma le cui origini sono a Xai-xai, e una signora anziana che ha perso quasi tutta la famiglia.



**Mappa 3: La quantità e distribuzione delle famiglie con parentela in uno nei due paesi confinanti (Fonte: questionari)**

I dati dimostrano un indiscusso legame fra Mozambico, Sudafrica e Zimbabwe, che si fonda sull'unità etnica e sulle necessità economiche. In base a quanto rivelato dai dati raccolti e dalle fonti secondarie emerge una realtà socio-economica che mira all'indipendenza ma è ancora troppo insicura dati gli eventi storici lontani e recenti. Il Parco Kruger, e per estensione il GLTFCA, sono percepiti come fastidi al normale svolgimento della vita quotidiana (poiché non possono uccidere gli animali pericolosi per la vita umana e per le coltivazioni, e poiché la massiccia presenza delle forze dell'ordine impedisce gli spostamenti), non come pericoli. Inoltre la conoscenza degli spostamenti forzati che coinvolgono le popolazioni all'interno del Parco del Limpopo fa riaffiorare alla memoria il ricordo dei Makuleke, forzati oltre i confini del Kruger per motivi ecologici e politici. In modo indiretto, quindi, gli abitanti percepiscono i rischi che correranno a causa del GLTFCA in quanto non potranno proteggersi dagli animali, i loro raccolti saranno saccheggianti o devastati dagli animali, le loro relazioni sociali saranno interrotte, così come le loro relazioni economiche. Esistono alcuni studi che mirano a evidenziare questi problemi e suggerire eventuali soluzioni, che la ricerca ha discusso e ampliato,

con particolare riferimento al rapporto del Refugee Research Programme dell'Università del Witwatersrand (2002), CESVI (2001), Anderson (2002) e Anderson e Pariela (2005), visti nel contesto socio-economico studiato e dei dati qualitativi ottenuti in loco e nelle interviste e i colloqui con informatori che conoscono la zona, la sua popolazione, nonché le strategie del GLTFCA e delle agenzie ad essa legate.

#### **PAFURI: LA FRONTIERA *PAR EXCELLENCE* DIVISA FRA STATO E NAZIONE.**

La ricerca bibliografica e dall'analisi qualitativa e quantitativa di terreno hanno permesso la produzione di informazioni primarie genuine sul villaggio di Dumela e le sue interazioni transfrontaliere. La visione generale che ne deriva è quella di un paese alla periferia dello spazio governativo ed economico ufficiale incentrato su Maputo e sulle località costiere, ma al centro dello spazio economico informale che ha legato i paesi confinanti fin dalla metà del XIX secolo. Nello specifico esistono vari aspetti socio-economici e politici che dimostrano l'importanza strategica di Pafuri per la sostenibilità effettiva del TFCA, tenendo conto delle categorie IUCN, che permettono nelle aree di conservazione l'uso delle risorse naturali da parte delle popolazioni indigene, e delle linee guida generali dei Parchi della Pace, che hanno lo scopo unire paesi in conflitto e gruppi culturali transfrontalieri: quest'ultima dovrebbe essere un giustificazione fondamentale alla conservazione transfrontaliera viste le perenni critiche al ruolo divisore dei confini di Berlino. Riprendendo le ipotesi elencati più sopra nei capitoli precedenti e qui riassunte, verranno di seguito discussi i tratti più salienti della ricerca, derivati dalla ricerca bibliografica e da quella sul campo.

1) Ipotesi: le aree remote di scarso interesse seguono i meccanismi di centro-periferia dei sistemi economici e politici di base, e sono poco influenzate dal governo centrale.

Seguendo la geografia politica di Sudafrica, Mozambico e Zimbabwe sembra che il fiume Limpopo demarchi una terra di confine così remota dai centri di potere da essere quasi esente a obbedienze gerarchiche statali, e infatti questa fu la realtà di Pafuri fino allo stabilimento della TEBA per il reclutamento dei minatori. Pur essendo un crocevia di passaggio di uomini e merci, infatti, raramente veniva visitato dalle autorità e nonostante le linee immaginarie di Berlino separassero famiglie e campi, la realtà era immutata e il territorio unito dalla tradizione, che voleva i fiumi

come catalizzatori di antropizzazione, non separatori di popoli come nella tradizione politico geografica europea. Non essendo una via di passaggio adeguata agli interessi dei *dominions* britannici, né del governo portoghese, che usava il corridoio di Maputo verso il Sudafrica e i corridoi di Mutare e Beira per il commercio con l'entroterra, la popolazione venne tagliata fuori dagli interessi statali, che a partire dal XX secolo venivano rappresentati solo dalla TEBA. La distanza del luogo da tutti i centri di potere, ha creato uno stato di risentimento misto a sollievo, perché fino alle due guerre (contro la Rhodesia e il Sudafrica) anche il lato oscuro del potere coloniale aveva risparmiato il bacino settentrionale del Limpopo nella zona di Pafuri perché inadatto all'agricoltura intensiva. Tuttavia, attraverso le sue politiche nazionalizzatrici e moderniste, il governo FRELIMO riuscì a creare, nei pochi anni antecedenti le guerre, una rete tentacolare di emissari dello stato dal *régulo* (grado più basso) fino all'amministratore provinciale (grado più alto), di posti di salute di base e di scuole primarie, tanto da ricevere l'encomio dell'Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità per le vaccinazioni. Questa rete, i cui emissari furono contrastati dalla popolazione locale in alcuni distretti, consentì a Pafuri di ritrovarsi all'interno di un sistema politico ed economico centralizzato che stava tuttavia erodendo gli usi e costumi tradizionali attraverso l'opera modernizzatrice. Le guerre, tuttavia, interruppero l'opera 'civilizzatrice' e Pafuri si trovò nel centro di due guerre sanguinarie che costrinsero i suoi abitanti alle migrazioni forzate verso i centri per i rifugiati a Sengwe (Zimbabwe) e nel vicino Transvaal sudafricano. Al rientro in patria, la popolazione ritrova da un lato i mezzi di sopravvivenza tradizionali, dall'altro il lungo braccio di FRELIMO a dirigerli e portare lo sviluppo attraverso l'agricoltura collettiva, ora visibile nel progetto finanziato dal Ministero sulla sponda meridionale del lago interno vicino al confine zimbabwano. I legami transfrontalieri furono rafforzati dal periodo di soggiorno nei paesi vicini, come dimostra il fatto che meno di 1 famiglia su dieci non ha parentele in Sudafrica o in Zimbabwe (Questionario di Dumela).

2) Ipotesi: le popolazioni di confine in Africa, qualora esista un legame sociale transfrontaliero antecedente l'imperialismo europeo, sono legate sia alla società tradizionale sia allo stato sovrano.

Seguendo le conclusioni della prima ipotesi, appare evidente che lo spazio politico-economico informale nelle terre di confine si crea solo qualora esista un legame altrettanto forte che precede qualsiasi intervento disturbatore, ma non può essere creato a posteriori, soprattutto in zone in cui le differenze etniche e i rapporti gerarchici hanno un'importanza fondamentale nel costruito sociale. Nel caso di Pafuri, l'arrivo degli Nguni di Soshangaane a seguito dello *mfecane* di Chaka Zulu creò un sistema di vassallaggio dominato dagli Shangaan che si estendeva dai territori Shona (Ndau, Rozwi, Karanga) dei territori attualmente compresi fra lo Zimbabwe Nord-Occidentale e delle province di Tete e Manica, fino ai Venda del Sudafrica orientale. Nel tempo, confluirono anche i Matabele di Mzilikazi e Lobengula che dalla confluenza fra i fiumi Sashe e Limpopo si spostarono a nord-est gradualmente assimilando le popolazioni Shona, fino a toccare i territori Shangaana presso i monti auriferi di Chimanimani<sup>48</sup>. Le popolazioni di Pafuri, quindi, sono Shangaana, Matabele (o 'Ndebele) di cui fa parte il clan Makuleke in Sudafrica, e Venda, con una forte prevalenza dei primi due gruppi. Poiché sia i Matabele sia gli Shangaan sono riconducibili in linea diretta agli Zulu di Chaka, esiste una omogeneità culturale, linguistica e socio-economica fra questi gruppi confinanti, che è molto più forte rispetto ai legami con gli stati di appartenenza. Bisogna, infatti, ricordare che il legame con lo stato di appartenenza si è formato in una relazione causa-effetto solo grazie alle lotte di disobbedienza civile per contrastare i governi separatisti gestiti dai bianchi. Questo dualismo fra appartenenza etnica e politica è continuato negli anni recenti nonostante le guerre e le diaspore, grazie al ruolo accentratore di FRELIMO e, in una certa misura, grazie al separatismo etnico perpetrato dalla RENAMO e dai suoi guerriglieri, le cui azioni spregiate contro le comunità rurali valsero loro la nomea di banditi, e i cui membri volontari non-Ndau venivano misconosciuti dalle famiglie di origine<sup>49</sup>. Al momento, sebbene gran parte delle tradizioni pre-coloniali siano scomparse a causa del cambiamento della percezione gerarchica provocato dalle migrazioni per lavoro e dall'onnipresenza dello stato, è innegabile che esista un legame fra le comunità degli stati confinanti a vari livelli: (1) sociale, il capo di Dumela e parente diretto del capo di Dumela, villaggio omonimo situato in Sudafrica a circa 70 km a sud ovest dall'ingresso di Punda Maria, del Parco Kruger; (2) economico, i

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<sup>48</sup> Liesegang, 1970; Beach, 1974

<sup>49</sup> Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Virtaten, 2005

lavoratori mozambicani presenti in Sudafrica creano una rete di supporto per i neofiti; (3) di sussistenza, chi ha degli eccessi di raccolto lo vende agli Zimbabweani che ciclicamente fanno capolino da Sengwe e si recano fino al posto di confine di Pafuri per barattare; (4) di importazione, chi lavora in Sudafrica importa beni di consumo per i familiari e chi ha un negozio in Mozambico se reca periodicamente in Sudafrica per i rifornimenti. Con la sola esclusione dell'emigrazione per lavoro e alle visite da Sengwe, tutti i movimenti da e per il Sudafrica sono legali, pur rientrando in un mercato informale votato alla sussistenza più che all'arricchimento. L'assenza di negozi al posto di frontiera, che lascia gli ufficiali privi non solo del contatto con l'esterno, ma anche di approvvigionamenti, crea un fenomeno percettibile di connivenza fra 'attraversatori' abituali per il mercato informale e la legge dello Stato. In generale, il crimine è solo l'espatrio illegale o il commercio di prodotti illegali, tutto il resto viene regolato da un sistema di *do-ut-des* che crea una dipendenza quasi totale delle popolazioni dal confine e degli ufficiali verso le popolazioni locali, a causa della lontananza dal centro politico ed economico ufficiale. Questo spazio dimostra a tutti gli effetti l'ambivalenza delle affiliazioni delle popolazioni locali che, per sussistenza, scelgono di non abbandonare le regole tradizionali, pur abbracciando l'ingerenza di FRELIMO, che porta i progetti agricoli, e la presenza degli ufficiali di confine che fermano le migrazioni, ma comprendono le necessità locali.

3) Ipotesi: lo spazio geografico ambivalente è simile al sistema di Stato-Nazione europeo, poiché crea uno stretto legame fra uomini e territorio, simboleggiato dal ritorno al luogo di origine dopo ogni movimento migratorio.

In presenza di uno spazio geografico la cui peculiarità è la presenza di un confine che separa politicamente, contribuisce all'economia di sussistenza, ma è virtualmente inesistente sul piano sociale, si è in presenza di un'area difficilmente valutabile in termini di appartenenza al territorio. Se da un lato il confine di stato separa l'unità etnica e culturale, infatti, dall'altro la presenza del confine è in modo quasi perverso fonte di reddito. A questa criticità si aggiunge la fenomenologia storica delle migrazioni in Pafuri che hanno visto diaspore volontarie, incanalate e obbligate dell'intera popolazione dei vari paesi. Tuttavia, il ritorno è sempre seguito agli spostamenti. Emblematico è il caso riferito dal Capo Muklave, Dumela, secondo cui precedente Capo portò il villaggio al sicuro oltre le sponde del Limpopo, durante la 'guerra di Ian Smith' (così nota ai locali), ma quando decise di stabilirsi

permanentemente nel nuovo territorio la popolazione non accettò e fu ricondotta nel sito originale dal nuovo Capo della famiglia Muklave. Sebbene entrambi i siti offrissero le stesse risorse, la popolazione volle tornare al confine. Similmente, il rientro spontaneo dopo la fine della guerra indiretta con il Sudafrica, nel 1992, venne aiutato dalle agenzie internazionali ma non forzato. Pochissimi decisero di restare in Sudafrica e, in ogni caso non sciolsero mai completamente i legami con Pafuri, come dimostra la famiglia di Lydia (interprete di campo) che ha parenti diretti a Dumela, dove Lydia passa molto tempo per aiutare gli zii nella gestione del negozio più fornito del paese. Il tema del ritorno anche dopo i mesi e gli anni trascorsi in miniera è, a parere personale, fondamentale per capire perché gli adulti di Dumela vedano ora la migrazione, nonostante l'illegalità e i rischi da affrontare, come un modo efficace per guadagnare denaro in poco tempo (3 o 6 mesi) e poi tornare a Dumela dalla famiglia. Questo atteggiamento mostra l'espansione di una nuova tipologia di emigranti che non ambisce alla cittadinanza Sudafrica, quindi al raggiungimento delle facilitazioni scolastico-sanitarie<sup>50</sup>, ma a garantirsi mezzi di sussistenza temporanea da godersi a casa. Gli adulti che emigrano permanentemente sono pochi e normalmente si riferiscono a coppie sposate.

Tale attaccamento al territorio, analizzato nell'ottica dell'identità nazionale sdoppiata (Shangaana e Mozambicana), dimostra la formazione di un'organizzazione politico-sociale simile allo stato-nazione, caratterizzato dall'unitarietà fra territorio e identità linguistico-culturale. Tuttavia, in questo caso, il territorio corrisponde a un'area geografica che si estende per lo meno alla comunità Shangaana di Sengwe, e non si limita al territorio Mozambicana. Durante le visite e la permanenza sul campo, tuttavia, è stato notato un forte orgoglio Shangaana collegato all'orgoglio mozambicana, che si è rivelato essere genuino, al contrario dell'ipotesi iniziale. L'ambivalenza, quindi, dimostra che il vero concetto di Stato-Nazione, così raro nel suo continente di origine, non può essere applicato con successo in Africa dove le identità etnico culturali sovrastano la geografia politica ufficiale di uno stato, confermano la necessità di una alternativa politica o sociale: nel primo caso, lo stato multi-nazionale, nel secondo caso un spazio che trascenda la politica e l'etnicità.

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<sup>50</sup> Crush, 2000.

4) Ipotesi: la conservazione transfrontaliera ha due scopi dichiarati, la conservazione della natura da un lato e la sicurezza del Sudafrica dall'altro, mentre la promozione culturale passa in secondo piano, nonostante il potenziale offerto da Pafuri.

I TFCA e i PP sono nati all'interno di un contesto ecologico di protezione degli ecosistemi, in quanto territori naturali uniti da un *unicum* naturalistico che possono trascendere le frontiere tra stati<sup>51</sup>. Il significato di Parco della Pace, tuttavia, aggiunge lo scopo etico di riunire stati e popolazioni in conflitto fra loro per la promozione della pace sotto l'egida della natura<sup>52</sup>. Nel caso del Grande Limpopo, quindi, troviamo da un lato la denominazione di area di conservazione, che include aree interstiziali dove le popolazioni locali possono vivere e usare le risorse naturali per la sussistenza, nonché partecipare in attività redditizie compatibili con gli scopi dell'area di conservazione e la sostenibilità, dall'altro la denominazione di PP per rimarcare l'unità politica dei tre stati coinvolti in un conflitto durato quasi vent'anni. Conoscendo la storia di Pafuri, inoltre, è palese che il centro geografico del PP abbia le qualità etnico culturali per formare un vero polo di attrazione per i visitatori visto l'ambiente naturale intatto, la presenza di tre gruppi etnici in pace da secoli, la presenza di edifici che ricordano la storia recente del Sudafrica (centri reclutamento TEBA) e i luoghi delle guerre recenti. Il GLTFCA, quindi, potrebbe offrire la possibilità di cancellare la geo-politica di confine e ricreare uno spazio fondato sull'unione culturale in seno all'area di conservazione che riproduca lo spazio socio-economico attuale. Tuttavia, le priorità di sviluppo del Mozambico si incentrano su Massingir, l'ingresso principale del Parco del Limpopo, e snodo principale fra Letaba, il centro del Parco Kruger, e la costa mozambicana, attraverso la frontiera di Giriyaondo, la prima fra i due parchi. Inoltre, non esistono accordi su (1) l'estensione del corridoio ecologico di Sengwe, lungo il confine fra Zimbabwe e Mozambico; (2) la presenza di recinzioni e gli scopi delle stesse, vista la necessità ecologica di contenere le malattie, quali AIDS felino e Afta, alle popolazioni sudafricane; (3) la tipologia di attività permesse nelle zone interstiziali, in particolare il *trophy hunting* per quota. Le giustificazioni contro la pratica della caccia da trofeo, inoltre, si basano sul contrasto della pratica nei confronti dello scopo primario di conservazione, sebbene le autorità

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<sup>51</sup> Van der Linde *et al.*, 2001.

<sup>52</sup> Zbicz, 1999.

mozambicane non trovino contrasti fra questo e la concessione di aree per la prospezione mineraria sulle colline che dal parte settentrionale del Parco del Limpopo scendono nell'area interstiziale, che eventualmente deturperebbero un panorama unico, composto da foreste chiuse naturali intatte, mai sfruttate dall'uomo.

Se lo scopo della conservazione pare essere flessibile alle logiche di potere politico e finanziario, così lo scopo della sicurezza per gli animali sconfinava nella sfera della sicurezza umana e della protezione dell'unicità sudafricana nei confronti della povertà degli Stati confinanti. Il grado di controllo al confine richiesto per l'encomiabile lotta al bracconaggio, infatti, include l'aumento delle forze di polizia su entrambi i lati, con lo scopo di fermare il flusso migratorio illegale dal Mozambico al Sudafrica, dove i crescenti tassi di criminalità hanno generato forti sentimenti xenofobi in tutti gli strati sociali. La protezione dello spazio socio-economico nazionale sudafricano è, quindi, il secondo motore dell'obiettivo di sicurezza, diventato prioritario negli ultimi tre anni, rispetto al ricongiungimento culturale fra gli Stati confinanti. L'impatto diretto di questa misura è ovviamente la diminuzione dei flussi migratori, che risulta nella mancanza dell'unico reddito monetario per le famiglie rurali (nonostante i questionari rivelino una scarsa importanza delle rimesse economiche, per la vicina Sengwe sono fondamentali), nonché l'annullamento dell'unico rito di passaggio per i maschi, sostituitosi alla guerra. Se è vero che i movimenti illegali sono atti penalmente perseguibili, è altrettanto vero che (1) le migrazioni sono temporanee e localizzate; (2) non necessariamente includono atti criminosi; (3) la criminalità organizzata non usa i canali del parco ma quelli semi-ufficiali per lo smercio di armi, droga e refurtiva; (4) la criminalità sudafricana è prevalentemente formata da cittadini sudafricani, in risposta alla mancanza di diritti umani politici e socio-economici di base, nonché alla potenziale impunità di fronte al delitto compiuto<sup>53</sup>; (5) gli atti criminosi e assassini nei confronti dei 'farmer' nelle campagne dell'ex Transvaal sono state valutate come atti precedono un genocidio<sup>54</sup>, quindi interessano prevalentemente le comunità nere del paese. Durante la

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<sup>53</sup> Du Toit, 2004, intervista con il Prof. Neels Moolman, criminologo della University of the North, Sudafrica, che ha collaborato con il corpo di Polizia sudafricano (SAPS) in indagini sulle violenze nelle fattorie, disponibile al seguente link <http://www.carteblanche.co.za/Display/Display.asp?Id=2265>.

<sup>54</sup> Un'analisi delle implicazioni sociali delle violenze sui 'farmers' sudafricani nelle zone ad alta densità agricola sono stati analizzati da Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, leader di Genocide Watch (mandato ONU), il quale ha dichiarato in un'intervista per Carte Blanche (29 Giugno 2003) che le modalità delle uccisioni sono atti di violenza 'de-umanizzante' in grado di degenerare in genocidio. Nel sito esistono varie pubblicazioni sulle uccisioni dei 'farmers' bianchi, soprattutto di origine Boera.

permanenza a Dumela, è stato riscontrato che molti dei potenziali o effettivi migranti del paese sceglierebbero le vie legali se non fosse così faticoso (viaggiare fino al capoluogo di provincia sulla costa) e costoso ottenere il passaporto, dichiarando così che per arrestare o diminuire i flussi illegali basterebbe rendere meno burocratici i meccanismi per il rilascio del documento.

La rivalutazione della culturale locale, quindi, non solo passa in secondo piano nella pianificazione del GLTFCA ma viene oscurata dall'impatto che le strategie di conservazione e la sicurezza sudafricana hanno sulla popolazione locale in termini sociali, di allontanamento dovuto al corridoio ecologico, ed economici per l'arresto delle migrazioni e la mancanza di attività redditizie alternative, visto che le priorità turistiche non passano da Pafuri e il recente bando per l'assegnazione di appezzamenti per il turismo lungo la strada che da Pafuri porta alla costa non forniscono garanzie di sviluppo sufficienti in quanto manca la coordinazione effettiva del parco. Si potrebbe trattare quindi di un'occasione perduta, che poteva trasformare il PP di punta di diamante della Peace Park Foundation, con un PP per antonomasia, dando un esempio concreto di conservazione partecipata e gestione delle risorse naturali per lo sviluppo sostenibile, anziché fossilizzarsi su interessi protezionistici che rischiano di esacerbare i conflitti socio-economici nazionali e transnazionali, considerando che Dumela è solo uno dei paesi che si dislocano nel posto amministrativo di Pafuri, e che il carattere transfrontaliero include le popolazioni ad ovest del Parco Kruger, nonché i villaggi nella terra comunitaria di Sengwe, in Zimbabwe.

## CONCLUSIONI

Alvarez ricorda che i *confini* evocano, nell'immaginario collettivo, *il geo-politico e il metaforico, il letterale e il concettuale*<sup>55</sup>, e quando si tratta dei confini interni del continente africano queste evocazioni si rafforzano a mano a mano che si scopre la storia dei gruppi etnici, le tradizioni socio-culturali, l'influenza dei crescenti insediamenti europei, la storia coloniale e l'eredità lasciata dall'imperialismo e dai governi segregazionisti. In Africa meridionale, il ruolo carismatico di Chaka Zulu, le migrazioni e l'imposizione militare delle etnie di origine Nguni sugli altri gruppi, le lotte fra Inglesi e Boeri per il dominio territoriale, la figura controversa di Sir C.J. Rhodes,

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<sup>55</sup> Alvarez, 1995, p. 448, in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 36.

e le recenti guerre, che hanno vessato le popolazioni attraverso strategie più simili alle guerre Nguni che alle moderne tattiche militari, hanno contribuito a dare un fascino particolare all'Africa australe, percepito dagli studiosi come dagli appassionati lettori di Africa. Il confine fra Sudafrica, Mozambico e Zimbabwe, rientra in un gruppo elitario di località che nell'immaginario collettivo di alcuni, militari, ex-coloni, ecologi, ecc. rappresentano il confine per eccellenza. L'indagine storica e geo-politica qui presentata riassume i motivi principali per cui Pafuri rappresenta ancora la frontiera: (1) la lontananza dai centri di potere; (2) la difficoltà di raggiungimento dal lato Mozambicano e Zimbabwano; (3) la presenza di popolazioni che ancora vivono secondo antichi costumi (più per costrizione che per volontà); (4) la fama di territorio di informalità e illegalità, data la posizione periferica; (5) l'assenza della 'civiltà' intesa come occupazione da parte della popolazione bianca; (6) la vicinanza del Parco Kruger, primo baluardo della conservazione, causa recente di contestazione con lo spostamento dei Makuleke, e potenziale causa di scontro per le popolazioni di Pafuri. Pafuri non è mai stata conquistata o dominata, perché non esistono risorse naturali attrattive per il commercio proficuo, perché la morfologia del suo territorio è tale da non permettere lo sfruttamento agricolo intensivo, perché la sua geografia è tale da rendere economicamente insostenibile il commercio di beni di consumo se non volti alla sussistenza, ora che anche i grandi elefanti e gli animali da trofeo non frequentano più quelle foreste incontaminate. Eppure Pafuri è entrata in un progetto mastodontico per la creazione del TFCA più grande dell'Africa, esteso attraverso un corridoio ecologico che trafiggerà lo spazio socio-culturale, per unire uno spazio ecologico semi-inesistente, visto che dei decantati antichi percorsi migratori degli elefanti non esiste traccia rilevante<sup>56</sup>. Rimane, invece, l'ipotesi che la creazione del GLTFCA sia frutto di strategie ecologiche, solo nella misura in cui la popolazione di grandi mammiferi (in particolare elefanti) nel Parco Kruger necessita di un'area ben più vasta per scongiurare il rischio di insostenibilità delle popolazioni sempre crescenti. Inoltre rimane l'ipotesi politica e strategica per questa estensione a nord-est, che ha forzato la creazione del Parco Nazionale del Limpopo, Mozambico, dove esisteva l'area di caccia Coutada 16, e sta forzando la creazione di un corridoio ecologico ben più vasto del necessario nelle terre comunitarie di Sengwe.

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<sup>56</sup> Anderson, 2002

La prima ipotesi, infatti, è confermata innanzitutto dal fatto che tutte le migrazioni forzate di animali dal Parco Kruger al Parco del Limpopo hanno coinvolto solo o prevalentemente elefanti, a partire dal primo spostamento (a carattere pubblicitario) del 2001, fino a quello più recente del marzo 2007 (comunicazione del Dr. Jorge Ferrao, ex Coordinatore Internazionale del GLTFCA). Inoltre, il censo del 2005 stabilisce che nel solo Parco Nazionale esistevano 12.467 elefanti, il cui numero è ovviamente aumentato dato il rapporto iniquo fra natalità e mortalità nei gruppi, allorché la popolazione sostenibile è di 7.000 – 7.500 appena<sup>57</sup>. Il superamento della capacità di carico di un dato territorio mostra quanto nocivi possano essere gli elefanti all'ecosistema danneggiando alberi e arbusti, a discapito di altri erbivori meno possenti. Con l'eccezione delle pratiche di contraccezione, per il blocco delle nascite, e del *culling* (caccia selettiva) che prevede l'uccisione di gruppi selezionati in base alla tipologia di popolazione e area di foraggio, l'unica soluzione a questo problema è l'allargamento dello stesso Parco. Tuttavia, non potendo occupare i territori oltre il confine occidentale, rimane come unica possibilità l'espansione a est in un territorio che era una zona di caccia, e la cui popolazione di animali selvatici è stata azzerata durante la guerra civile e di confine: l'ex Coutada 16, ora Parco Nazionale del Limpopo. Al di là di ogni disquisizione politica, questa è verosimilmente la ragione principale per l'ideazione del Parco Transfrontaliero. Dal punto di vista strategico e politico, inoltre, appare evidente che per tamponare i flussi migratori illegali di persone e merci quali armi, droga e mercanzia rubata, il Sudafrica necessita di poter controllare meglio i propri confini, soprattutto in aree remote dove la rete di comunicazione fra comunità della stessa etnia o ceppo etnico è estesa capillarmente. La creazione di zone cuscinetto che separino ulteriormente le popolazioni di confine e necessitino di continuo controllo da parte della polizia e dei guardia-parco è una soluzione che permette di portare avanti una politica di sicurezza frontiera necessaria, pur mantenendo i rapporti politici e diplomatici a livello regionale e internazionale grazie all'obiettivo della conservazione della natura.

Come evinto dall'analisi geo-politica e storica, il Sudafrica è stato l'elemento trainante nella storia politica ed economica dell'Africa australe fin dai primi insediamenti Europei, ruolo che continua a svolgere ancora oggi con rinnovato interesse vista l'importanza fondamentale acquisita nella storia recente attraverso

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<sup>57</sup> Purdy, 1998, Contraceptive Safari, University of Georgia Reserach.

figure emblematiche come l'ex Pres. Nelson Mandela e il magnate votato all'ecologia Mr. Anton Rupert. Questi due personaggi sembra incarnino le profonde contraddizioni della *Nazione Arcobaleno*, pur creando percorsi che sembrano avere l'unico scopo di ristabilire gli equilibri perduti. Unica vera potenza politica ed economica, in un continente dilaniato da guerre etniche per la supremazia, dittature sanguinarie, e semi-democrazie alquanto stabili, il Sudafrica post-apartheid è riuscito a crearsi un ruolo di potere in seno alle più importanti organizzazioni sudafricane, talvolta modificandone la costituzione (l'Unione Africana) o dando impeti riformatori i cui benefici socio-economici sono ancora in discussione, come la creazione di uno spazio economico transfrontaliero all'interno del Southern African Development Committee, basato sull'Unione Europea che permetta la libera circolazione di persone, beni e servizi. Per quanto riguarda l'area di interesse per la ricerca, se lo Zimbabwe sta vivendo un periodo di forte crisi politica, sociale ed economica causata dal regime instauratosi con gli accordi di Lancaster, guidato in modo assolutistico dal Pres. Robert Mugabe, il Mozambico è riuscito a superare le divisioni della guerra contro la RENAMO e contro i suoi vicini, instaurando una repubblica democratica nominale, perché monopartitica, che è in grado di garantire la stabilità politica e la ripresa economica grazie soprattutto alle numerose agenzie internazionali presenti sul territorio e agli investitori stranieri, principalmente sudafricani. La creazione di uno spazio economico di stampo europeo, quindi, mira ad abolire i confini per coloro che già operano in ambito internazionale, mentre l'allargamento non porterebbe vantaggi per la popolazione, visto che comunque i controlli alla frontiera devono perdurare al fine di garantire la sicurezza. Allo stesso modo, il TFCA del Great Limpopo abolisce i confini per la fauna selvatica, ineccepibilmente protetta nel Kruger, nonché per turisti e investitori, limitando i flussi migratori incontrollabili se non lungo il confine. Il corridoio ecologico, infine, non farebbe altro che allontanare ulteriormente le uniche due popolazioni originarie di Pafuri e legate dalle stesse origini: gli Shangaana di Sengwe e di Pafuri (Mz); i Venda di Sengwe e di Pafuri (SA). L'estensione a nord del Kruger, infatti, ha già allontanato i Matabele di Sengwe e Pafuri, e il documento che stipula la vittoria del Makuleke Land Claim non fa altro che stabilire la priorità della conservazione su qualsiasi altro uso del territorio nella zona. Nonostante il territorio sia nominalmente di proprietà della comunità Makuleke, infatti, la popolazione ha dovuto accettare il Parco Nazionale Kruger come gestore dell'ecologia dell'area per

50 anni, rinnovabili, nonché l'obbligo di sviluppare il triangolo per l'ecoturismo secondo il modello imposto dal Parco Kruger. L'unico potenziale beneficio per la popolazione, quindi, è il lavoro offerto dai due resort turistici aperti nel triangolo: l'Outpost, e il Pafuri Camp di Wilderness Safari. Tuttavia, dato il basso livello di scolarità effettiva, il personale ha accesso a impieghi di servizio (pulizie, servizio ristorante e bar) e, grazie al training fornito da Wilderness Safari, potranno migliorare solo all'interno di quelle mansioni<sup>58</sup>. E' facile presumere, quindi, che le popolazioni di Pafuri, in Mozambico, schiacciate fra il Corridoio Ecologico e il Parco Nazionale del Limpopo debbano rinunciare alla propria terra, un minaccia fortemente sentita dalla popolazione di Dumela se non adeguatamente protette. Gli incontri comunitari<sup>59</sup>, infatti, hanno rivelato il forte contrasto sentito dagli abitanti di Dumela verso il Parco Nazionale del Limpopo, poiché si ricordano della rimozione forzata dei Makuleke e sanno che le popolazioni che ora vivono all'interno del Parco del Limpopo saranno spostate in altre zone. Inoltre, da quando il GLTFCA è stato implementato sul territorio di Pafuri, con l'arrivo dei Guardia Parco al confine, è stato impedito alle popolazioni locali di uccidere gli animali pericolosi che danneggiavano il raccolto (non sono avvenute, infatti, morti recenti dovute ad animali selvatici, ad esclusione dei coccodrilli del fiume Limpopo). In alcune occasioni, quindi, si è già verificato che gli elefanti si spingessero verso i campi coltivati del progetto del Ministero dell'Agricoltura, e che i babbuini attaccassero i campi seminati. In questo caso, l'uomo messo a guardia dei campi ha sparato in aria per allontanare gli animali, quando in precedenza avrebbe ucciso l'animale proteggendo il raccolto e ottenendo carne per nutrirsi. Il conflitto con il Parco (termine che per la popolazione locale indica, indiscriminatamente, il Parco Nazionale e quello transfrontaliero) è già percepibile nelle conversazioni sull'argomento e si basa su giustificazioni che derivano dalla praticità della vita quotidiana, ma che rimangono inascoltate da chi ha il potere decisionale. A comprova della mancanza di analisi di terreno sia geografica sia etnografica, da parte del comitato di gestione dell'ACTFGL, infine, basta individuare sulla mappa le aree destinate a scopo turistico lungo la strada Pafuri-Mapai, e le aree destinate all'esplorazione mineraria a ridosso del Parco del Limpopo, che sono quasi coincidenti.

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<sup>58</sup> Intervista con la sig. Collen Mullen, manager del Pafuri Camp di Wilderness Safari, Pafuri: 11 Dicembre 2006.

<sup>59</sup> Avvenuti il 7 marzo 2005 e il 6 settembre 2006.

Il mantenimento della continuità culturale, inoltre, non è più uno degli obiettivi del GLTFCA e PP, (1) nonostante i dati qualitativi e quantitativi su Dumela e Pafuri dimostrino uno stretto legame transfrontaliero fra le popolazioni di confine (legami di parentela e frequenza delle migrazioni per lavoro), (2) sebbene la storia di migrazione e dislocazione abbia rafforzato l'identificazione fra spazio geografico e spazio culturale, attraverso il ritorno degli emigrati alla località di origine. Grazie all'identità geo-culturale di Pafuri, infatti, lo spazio transfrontaliero fisico potrebbe coincidere con lo spazio transfrontaliero etnico-culturale, creando un caso esemplare di armonia uomo-natura in un ambiente dove entrambi vengono protetti, attraverso una pianificazione territoriale che tenga conto delle necessità socio-economiche di entrambi, per esempio con la creazione di un sistema di recinzione che riesca sia a evitare la diffusione di malattie quali l'AIDS felino, l'afta e la tubercolosi alle popolazioni sane rimaste nello Zimbabwe, sia a proteggere la popolazione di Sengwe e di Pafuri. In questo modo, per esempio, si tamponerebbe il timore reale di spostamento forzato che crea i maggiori contrasti fra popolazione e Parco. In base a quanto evinto dalla ricerca con la popolazione locale, infatti, basterebbe che un vero processo partecipativo fosse in atto nelle zone rurali periferiche come Dumela, e che si eliminasse la percezione del binomio parco-rilocazione che ha da sempre caratterizzato la storia della conservazione africana. La mancanza di questo segnale dimostra quindi che lo scopo del GLTFCA non è tanto nel mitigare le passate mancanze verso le popolazioni locali attraverso politiche di conservazione ambientale che portino allo sviluppo sostenibile, ma di usare la possibilità offerta dalle teorie di conservazione transfrontaliera basata sulla gestione degli ecosistemi per proteggere i confini dello stato Sudafricano da attacchi esterni, nella forma di flussi migratori e traffici commerciali illegali. In questo senso, la diffidenza della popolazione locale verso il Parco è giustificata, come lo è l'accusa rivolta al Sudafrica di voler usare il Parco come *cordon sanitaire* militarizzato per la salvaguardia dei propri confini a discapito degli Stati confinanti. In base all'esperienza dei Makuleke, con il Pafuri Camp e l'Outpost, infine, si può affermare che il turismo non può portare sviluppo neanche nel lungo periodo, a meno che le popolazioni locali non ricevano un'istruzione di base adeguata e l'accesso a livelli superiori di scolarizzazione. Se questo potesse diventare uno scopo nel lungo periodo, bisogna comunque ricordare che per evitare la degenerazione del conflitto esistente, le popolazioni locali

necessitano di vedere miglioramenti economici a breve termine, per poter appoggiare la conservazione, attraverso attività ad alta-redditività e basso impatto ambientale quali la caccia per trofeo che non richiederebbero una formazione scolastica specifica del personale impiegato.



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## ACRONYMS

ANC – African National Congress

AU – African Union, former O.U.A.

AWF – African Wildlife Foundation

CBNRM – Community Based Natural Resource Management

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CPI – Centro de Promoção de Investimentos

EU – European Union

FNLA – Frente Nacional del Libertação de Angola

FRELIMO – Frente de Libertação Moçambicana

GLPP – Great Limpopo Peace Park

GLTFCA – Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area

GLTFP – Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park

GoM – Government of Mozambique

GNP – Gonarezhou National Park

GTZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for Technical Cooperation)

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IUCN – International Union for the Conservation of Nature

KfW – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)

KNP – Kruger National Park

LNP – Limpopo National Park

MK – Mkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC

MNR – Mozambican National Resistance

MITUR – Ministério do Turismo do Governo da República de Moçambique

MoA – Ministry of Agriculture

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MPLA – Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola

NRM – Natural Resource Management

OUA – Organisation of the African Unity

PARPA - Plano de acção para a redução da pobreza absoluta

PRA – Participatory Rural Appraisal

RENAMO – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana  
SADC – Southern Africa Development Committee  
SADCC – Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference  
SADF – South African Defence Force  
SANP – South African National Parks  
SAPS – South African Police Service  
SLA – Sustainable Livelihoods Approach  
SWAPO – South West Africa People’s Organisation  
TBNRM – Transboundary Natural Resource Management  
TEBA – Mine Recruitment Agency of South Africa  
TFCA – Transfrontier Conservation Area  
TFPA – Transfrontier Protected Area  
TFP – Transfrontier Park  
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
Unita – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola  
WB - GEF – World Bank - Global Environmental Facility  
WENELA (also WNLA) - Witwatersrand Native Labour Association  
WWF – World Wildlife Fund for Nature  
ZANLA – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army  
ZANU PF – Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front  
ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union



# 1. INTRODUCTION

*Some things can only occur at borders...*  
(Donnan & Wilson, 2001, p. 4<sup>1</sup>)

The thesis was originally thought of as a document able to provide the theoretical framework and informative background to a development project for Community Based Natural Resource Management to be carried out in the stretch of land that, in Mozambique, goes from Pafuri to Chiqualaquala, bordering the Sengwe Communal Land in Zimbabwe. This is the geographical centre of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area, which is the biggest Protected Area in the world, attracting millions of tourists in the South African component, the Kruger National Park, and dragging Mozambique and Zimbabwe towards proactive conservation strategies, whilst addressing the rural communities living within and without its boundary. However, such conception shifted through time spent on the field into a more academic analysis of frontiers and borders. The broad aim was to address the failure of the GLTFCA management to reach local communities in the establishment of the protected area, in a historical and political context.

The thesis was approached and written as a learning process, as a space where all academic and life-based knowledge could convey and produce a realistic account of the issues discussed, from history to politics, from conservation to development, to the relative argumentations. This holistic approach sought to cover a gap in Geographic research, identified by Donnan & Wilson, whereby *few studies on nationalism [...] deal with the cultural aspects of international borders, the frontiers with which they are associated and the physical and metaphorical borderlands which stretch away from the legal borderlines between states*<sup>2</sup>. This introductory chapter will present the key themes that were combined to define field research and reach plausible conclusions on the relation between conservation, community and development which has been much debated in the last decade. Beginning with the introduction of political geography, embracing political ecology, as the more apt conceptual framework to

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<sup>1</sup> Italics in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.2

create triangulation patterns, the chapter will move on to critically evaluate Transfrontier Conservation and NRM, with reference to the GLTFCA, followed by the historical patterns of the Pafuri border area, from pre-colonial times to present-day post conflict implications. Secondly, it will present the theoretical foundations to the study, embedded in Political Geography, and the conceptual framework which draws from the *Gestion du Terroir* approach developed in North West Africa. The description of the study area where the local field work was conducted, will follow: this will justify the choice of both Mozambique and Pafuri as case studies. The research will be outlined presenting the aim and objectives of the project, and the structure of the thesis will be explained. The chapter will proceed with a section on the use of terminology in reference to the various denominations for TFCAs, TFP, Peace Parks and so forth; native ethnic groups and languages; and historical events. Finally, the thesis will be presented in order to give a concise outline of each chapter.

## **1.1 KEY RESEARCH THEMES**

Research on TFCAs has often analysed cross-border conservation initiatives under the spectrum provided by political ecology, by framing case studies into conservation polities that are modern, by definition, as they have developed since the 1987 Bruntland Report. All the academic researchers, who had witnessed the failures of CBNRM in devolving empowerment at the local level<sup>3</sup>, posited the failure of TBNRM on the basis that global political and economic interests would prevail on strategies for local development<sup>4</sup>. Obviously, considering that what differs between the two conservation strategies is the scale only, one would not expect a success of the latter, unless lessons learnt were put into practice, while overcoming governance problems with the transfrontier approach. The understanding that drives such projects is that conservation, based on the environmental scale, has shifted the attention away from Political Geography, despite the key factor in the analysis of such processes pertains directly to this field, particularly in Southern Africa.

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<sup>3</sup> See for instance Berkes, 2004; Campbell and Vainjo-Mattila, 2003; Cencini, 2002; Twyman, 2000; Wolmer et al, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> See Duffy, 1997 and 2006; Ramutsindela, 2004; Wolmer, 2003.

### ***1.1.1 The Political geography of Africa and African conservation***

The analysis of the development of nation-states in Africa, in a Political Geographical perspective, has so far been conducted (a) with the purpose of presenting the existence of those African civilisations which the historical and anthropological XIX century revisionism had attempted to delete<sup>5</sup>; (b) by historians of a specific areas<sup>6</sup>; (c) by researchers on border studies<sup>7</sup>. This thesis aims at filling a gap into current analysis, by placing Political Geography at the centre of studies into TFCAs in Southern Africa and by discussing it in a historical perspective of nationhood and states formation at the regional scale, beginning with the acceptance of the differentiation between the concepts of *nation* and *state*, as summarised by Muir (1975) and widely received by academics<sup>8</sup>:

*Whereas the 'state' refers to a particular form of organisation of people and territory, a nation is formed by a human group whose members usually share a range of objective cultural characteristics, values and aspirations, and a close political association with a particular piece of territory. (p. 84)*

Ideally, as Donnan & Wilson (1999) confirm, the State should represent a Nation. This status, however, was never achieved in Europe where minorities are still a major political and economical issue, suffice to mention that Catalans, in Spain, who have been recognised as an ethnic group and their language has become one of the official languages of the European Union, or the ethnic French and German border minorities, in Italy, who have been granted a special status which entails higher devolution from the central government, minor taxation and increased financial contribution, taken from the coffers of the state. It is therefore unthinkable to consider African countries any different, particularly when acknowledging the variety of ethnic groups enclosed by each state's border which remains the heaviest colonial inheritance, although never challenged by the independent governments.

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<sup>5</sup> As presented by Reader, 1994 and Davidson, 1992, with exhaustive argumentations over the impact of European influence in Africa, whilst acknowledging that trade of all goods had pre-existed European domination and slavery was embedded in the African culture.

<sup>6</sup> As best exemplified by Hall & Young (1997) for Mozambique.

<sup>7</sup> See Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Radcliffe, 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Similar theories on the state and the nation state have been proposed by Pounds, 1992; Glassner, 1995; Wilson & Donnan, 1998.

On the contrary, many a war has been fought to maintain the *status quo*, because of natural resources (as it was the case in Nigeria and now in Darfur), or of ethnic hatred (in Rwanda and Zimbabwe).

The political-geographical context serves two key assumptions of the research. Firstly, by accepting that the African continent, specifically Southern Africa, is composed of a number of states within whose governmental and geographical organisation lays a greater number of ethnic minorities, it will prove that such minorities have accepted the state whether by enforcement or by surrender to reality, whilst maintaining a strong cross-border connection. Secondly, by appreciating the fact that borders are the typical economic *milieu* for illegal and informal activities<sup>9</sup>, it will show that in terms of Political Geography such problem might transform the border into a frontier where the arm of one's law can extend its power by exploiting the common governance of a space, as exemplified by TFCAs.

### ***1.1.2 Transfrontier conservation and socio-economic development***

Transfrontier Conservation and Natural Resource Management, as mentioned above, are directly derived from CBNRM strategies to combine conservation and rural development, particularly in areas where natural resources are palatable tourist attractions. In most cases, however, existing local populations encroach on wildlife and spoil the environment by cutting trees, burning grasses, cultivating fertile land for subsistence and killing the occasional wild animal for either defence or economic return, in a word, *live*. As Bell rightfully pointed out CBNRM originates from two strands. The first one is the *conservation strand*, to which he belonged as a biologist, based on *the realisation that government control of wildlife and other biological resources was not working*, in fact conservation only exacerbated the divide between social strata in Southern Africa by depriving native population of land and natural resources, in the name of wildlife protection. The second one is the *social equity strand*, to which I belong, aiming *to redress the problems of rural poverty and inequitable*

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<sup>9</sup> Stated also in Duffy, 2001.

*access to resources*<sup>10</sup> by means of allowing local communities to actively participate in conservation and, generally, in the management of the territory and its resources. Unlike most supporters of this theory, however, I believe that a first *distinguo* should be made between private and governmental conservation projects, particularly in borderline case studies such as Swaziland, where the most effective conservation areas originate from private initiative and are managed with a mandate from the King, but remain *de facto* private institutions. *Community participation*, as posited by most academics and policy-makers, should be suggested for private conservation projects, where viable, but sought only in government funded projects, which become, in developing countries, donor-funded conservation projects, where none of the stakeholders have anything to loose, and can claim failures on local constraints. This is due to the fact that community participation in Southern Africa, whether sought by joint-venture or partnership or contractual agreement, has resulted into a general failure, because once the community could not gain immediate benefit from the project, the people lost interest without losing capital or wealth, as the investment capital was put forward by international donors and NGOs at no risk for the community<sup>11</sup>. This was, for instance, the internal paradox of the CAMPFIRE strategy in Zimbabwe, where devolution of decision-making power to the local level was effective only when the benefits from safari hunting were so great as to trickle down to the communities involved, that is only when the costs of conservation had paid for themselves<sup>12</sup>.

It is clear, therefore, that the relation between land and natural resources on the land is the conundrum which must be solved in order to implement CBNRM successfully. However, since conservation was the main political and economic drive for the idealisation of CBNRM, as a poverty alleviation strategy<sup>13</sup>, conservation

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<sup>10</sup> Bell, 1999, p. 3

<sup>11</sup> Reilly, 2006. In *The Bandwagon*, Mr. Reilly aptly describes the impediments into full community participation into private investments for conservation, which are true for all the private reserves visited during the field research.

<sup>12</sup> Critique over CAMPFIRE is broad, however the arguments are best exemplified by Cencini, 2006, Wolmer *et al.* 2003; Shackleton *et al.*, 2002; Madzuzu, 1996.

<sup>13</sup> Cencini, 2002

paved the way for a new paradigm that focussed on land, in the perspective of ecosystems. Ecosystems, by definition, are *communities of plants, animals, and other organisms, plus their physical environment*<sup>14</sup>, and thus encompass human-made boundaries. With this approach, it became clear that only TFPAs could effectively contribute to saving fragile ecosystems, and TBNRM was to counteract CBNRM as a strategy for socio-economic development of those communities which were absorbed by such projects<sup>15</sup>. More land signifies more resources and higher carrying capacity, thus allowing for medium to long term strategies in addressing controversial issues such as livelihoods and human-animal conflict, with the African justification that rural population had been *implementing TBNRM at a local level for a long time*<sup>16</sup>, by living in a cross-border social and natural network. Ramutsindela has expressed such theory perfectly by stating that *the architects saw 'scale', rather than decentralisation, as the solution to conservation and community integration and development* (p. 5), which can be read between the lines in all the institutional publications on the subject, including van der Linde *et al.* (2001); Griffin *et al.* (1999).

TBNRM emerged with TFCA and Peace Parks, as a substitute approach to CBNRM whose aims are to safeguard the ecosystem and to support local socio-economic development, in rural and peripheral areas where natural resources are the only resource. Because it is so manipulated by international donors, hence by international public opinion, the resulting paradox is that the theory fails to address real issues since it aims to enforce community participation in private or semi-private protected areas to redress social injustices of land access, but softens the idea for government projects, since it is difficult to justify 'killing for conservation'<sup>17</sup> in western societies.

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<sup>14</sup>Definition from Biodiversity Hotspots (<http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/resources/glossary.xml?KNC-adwords&gclid=CPCbgpbYvIoCFRBSZwoddnoImQ#e>)

<sup>15</sup> Ramutsindela, 2004

<sup>16</sup> van der Linde *et al.*, 2001, p.3.

<sup>17</sup> The expression is taken from the title of an inspirational book written by Rosaleen Duffy, 2000, *Killing for Conservation: The Politics of Wildlife in Zimbabwe*, (Oxford: James Currey).

### ***1.1.3 Borders in between: conservation and livelihoods in Pafuri***

The mainstream literature of border studies is focussed on the USA-Mexico border, and looks at other realities only when attracted by major political, socio-economic and ethnic issues rising from the thin line dividing two or more countries<sup>18</sup>. All the literature concerning the border areas of the GLTFCA is limited to either present historical migration patterns<sup>19</sup> or discuss conservation politics, as if they were mutually exclusive. Only recently there have been a few studies which look at the implication of historical narratives into the formation of the border areas, and address the TFCA project in this context<sup>20</sup>. Yet the border is still marginal, compared to the key theoretical frameworks. In this research, instead, the border is seen as a crucial element in history and therefore in conservation strategies, since they both belong to the national and regional political sphere of decision-making.

The Pafuri border area was neglected for years by the respective governments of South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique, had it not been for the occasional poacher being sought after by the national police force and Rhodesian rangers. Border patrol was made effective at the turn of the XX century by the creation of WENELA, the mining recruitment service, whose aim was to control influxes of immigrants into South Africa and regulate employment in the mines, to the benefit of both the South African and the Mozambican governments. With the creation of the Sabie reserve and its successful extension, the Kruger National Park and its conservation requirements were a substantial drive to keep on extending further north, in order to halt poaching in the strip of land between the Luvuvhu and the Limpopo River inhabited by the Makulekes. The timing of such decision was, coincidentally, optimum for the establishment of a people-free buffer zone at a time when political instability, resulting from Mozambican independence and the insurgence of military

<sup>18</sup> Anselmi and Erni, 2001, provide a meaningful selection of case study from contested borders.

<sup>19</sup> See McDonald, 2000; Whitman, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> Thanks to the TBPARI initiative, a number of researchers and student have dedicated time and effort to explain the impact of the GLTFCA on the border areas from Pafuri to Massingir. All information is available on the webpage, <http://www.wits.ac.za/tpari/Researchers.htm>, however, it is worth noting amongst others Dr. W. Dressler, Mr. M. Schoon, Mr. C. Dear, Mr. W. Wande, Ms. H. Hansen.

groups for the independence of both South Africa and Rhodesia, was threatening the *status quo* of segregationist regimes. Rhodesia, instead, resorted to military strategy alone by relocating people into Protected Villages, forming an *ad hoc contras* battalion, the legendary Selous Scouts, and mining the border to reduce infiltrations from the rebels hosted in Mozambique. War-time decision making, whether justified by conservation or not, deeply affected livelihood strategies in the area particularly in terms of displacement, that strengthened social and cultural bonds pre-existing colonial rule, rather than nationalism as imposed by the independent governments.

Without reaching the extent of conspiracy theories on the Peace Parks Foundation and the real justification for TFCA<sup>21</sup>, one is left to wonder if history is repeating itself. After the war, people were moved back into the country, helped by UNHCR through the Pafuri Border Post, and left to recreate their livelihood strategies whilst being abandoned by their government, had it not been for the military presence at the border post. After a period of peace and adjustment, interrupted by the floods in 2000, however, conservation is again imposing itself on people with the establishment of the Limpopo National Park, the Sengwe Ecological Corridor, right on the doorstep of the border communities in Mozambique, and the GLTFCA. The political agenda is of course a renewed bond between independent countries who are at peace with each other and will prove so by cooperating on common interests<sup>22</sup>, namely the conservation of fragile ecosystems and the re-population of the Mozambican and Zimbabwean bush, depredated by decades of poaching. This agenda, however, digs deeper into the needs of the South African component of the GLTFCA, as (a) the number of elephants is increasing beyond carrying capacity, but culling has been stopped on account of Western animalist movements, mainly, (b) South African tourists want to reclaim the bush, instead of driving through the tarred and graded roads of the Kruger and most of other national parks, (c) the levels of

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<sup>21</sup> Namely van der Reijden, 2005; Ellis, 1994; and Ramutsindela, 2004, with reference to the latter.

<sup>22</sup> The aim and objectives of the GLTFP and TFCA are well exposed on the official website, <http://www.greatlimpopopark.com>

illegal migrations into South Africa are threatening the fragile political situation<sup>23</sup>. In the meantime, communities are barely discussed, and livelihood creation is postponed as a self-solving problem. Furthermore, at the time this thesis was being reviewed, the Limpopo National Park has launched a bid for private investors to plan for tourism in the park and the whole area from Pafuri to Mapai has been plotted<sup>24</sup>. Despite mentioning the need to involve rural communities in the bidding document, the simple fact that a governmental institution withdraws from its primary role of addressing the needs of its citizens shows the attitude offered by Mozambique and the main donors of the LNP and GLTFCA (the World Bank and GTZ) towards one of the key objectives of the project:

*...this park will provide jobs and opportunities to generate revenue for many of the thousands of local people affected by decades of civil war. Improving the lives of these rural communities will in turn further contribute towards biodiversity conservation by demonstrating the economic and social advantages to be achieved through conservation as an alternative and viable land-use option.*

*d. develop frameworks and strategies whereby local communities can participate in and tangibly benefit from the management and sustainable use of natural resources that occur within the transfrontier park or TFCA<sup>25</sup>*

The two sentences show how much the TFCA paradigm has borrowed from socio-economic development and CBNRM theories, although failing to implement them as part of the project, which defers the development of such frameworks to the private sector.

## 1.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The research is fully embedded in Political Geography theories over the meaning attached to the *State* and to its *borders*, and their development since the colonisation of the African continent. The inter-relation of *borders* and *frontiers* is of particular interest, in the context of transfrontier conservation, because it helps addressing issues in political ecology over the ownership of natural resource-management

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<sup>23</sup> Hussein, 1996; underlying discourse in Whitman, 2000.

<sup>24</sup> See the bid launched by the Limpopo National Park, anon. (a), 2007.

<sup>25</sup> Both are extracts from the GLTFP web page, 2006

projects in post-independence Southern Africa and the role to which native populations are relegated by broader political strategies.

Accepting Glassner's definition of State as an effectively politically organised territory by a native population, or a resident population, having provided a government of the effective control of the territory<sup>26</sup> (1995, p.15), the analysis of *colonisation* first and *imperialism* later runs the risk of being skewed since the colonies acquire legitimacy, especially in the British area of influence where protectorates encouraged the local governments systems, i.e. Botswana, Malawi, Northern Rhodesia and Swaziland. The historical process, which in Europe led to the conceptualisation of the *Nation-State*<sup>27</sup>, however, balances the approach on the grounds that, whereas in the 'Old Continent' the concept of independent state shifted from the medieval idea of an area of political-economical influence to the formal acceptance of the nationalistic drive<sup>28</sup>, the colonies were denied such right as *colonialism* turned into *imperialism*. The difference between the two processes, as identified by the literature<sup>29</sup>, is essential to understand the contemporary history of Southern Africa, whose unique development is explained by the shift in the perception of state and nation occurred in post-independence Africa and leading to the idea of the *multinational state*<sup>30</sup>. The African states of the final phase of Imperialism, in fact, were European modelled nation-states in a regional contexts, but medieval areas of frontiers on the international level, as the Commonwealth demonstrates.

Transfrontier Conservation and NRM, therefore, are perceived as a modern geographical approach to older political border issues. Despite acknowledgement that conservation, like most environmental issues, is transboundary<sup>31</sup> and therefore

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<sup>26</sup> Translation from the original: 'lo Stato è un territorio organizzato politicamente in maniera effettiva da una popolazione indigena, o comunque ivi residente, avente un governo dotato del controllo effettivo del territorio stesso'.

<sup>27</sup> See Formigoni, 2000, and Davidson, 1992.

<sup>28</sup> See Muir, 1975; Davidson, 1992.

<sup>29</sup> See Marx, K., in Seidman, 2004; Glassener, 1995 and Pounds, 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Tshiyembe, 2001

<sup>31</sup> See Agnew, 2002 ; Doherty and Doyle, 2006.

needs an international approach rather than a localised one, it must not be forgotten that as African borders were drawn and frontier zones disappeared<sup>32</sup>, protected areas could also served as buffer zones between states. This provided a utilitarian scope to remote untouched areas surrounded by native communities. It is not by accident, in fact, that out of 132 total PAs in Africa, 55 share either one or two borders<sup>33</sup>. This is particularly true for dry *lowveld* and *highveld* savannahs and deserts, a typical southern African landscape. Theories expressed by political ecology, however, seem reductive when zooming down from a global to a local scale, as they do not make an allowance for the historical and political implications of both ethnic segregation and politicised conservation in the three countries that were the last stronghold of imperialism, like the systems which impose their law over indigenous people, thus *transforming ideas, institutions and products*<sup>34</sup>.

This research, therefore, draws from two sets of theories which have rarely come together in literature, if not to blindly criticise Transfrontier Conservation<sup>35</sup>. The first is the understanding of African borders as legacy of colonialism, the second adopts conservation as a solution to overcome such problems, despite its political embedding both on the regional and continental scale.

### 1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The phenomenology of African borders, in a historical, geographical and political frame, leads to the conceptualisation of transfrontier conservation as a tool to solve problems arising along borders which are political, in function, and superimposed, in demarcation. This multidisciplinary approach to the theoretical frame is also reflected in the mixed methodology used in field-research.

The starting point of the research was the attempt to understand how dependent border communities are on the existence of the border, and how changes in the

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<sup>32</sup> See Griffiths, 1986; and Glassner 1995.

<sup>33</sup> These figures are taken from Zbicz, 1999, however, the comments provided do not clarify whether the 123 PA taken into consideration are along borders or not, which would drastically change the impact of the statement.

<sup>34</sup> Borrowed from Cohen, in Glassner 1995, p.237

<sup>35</sup> See Moore, 1997.

*functionality* of the border for the states did influence, if at all, their livelihood strategies. Within the umbrella of Sustainable Livelihood Approach, promoted by the FAO, it was found that the *Gestion de Terroirs* approach<sup>36</sup> could frame the research and allow for the objective contextualising of present problems, particularly in terms of access to natural resources and socio-economic development. Stemming from research on rural development for Francophone West Africa, this approach would geographically fit the localities of the GLTFCA because of their common characteristics: (1) rurality; (2) peripheral location, both geographically and institutionally; (3) history of war and displacement.

The weakness identified by one of the authors<sup>37</sup>, by contrast, proved a strength in this case as it was accepted, within the theoretical foundations, that the failure of CBNRM models was due to its lack of localisation, and that TBNRM aggravates the problem, instead of concentrating on the cross-border nature of cultural *milieux* in Africa. In fact, the pragmatism of theories was never abandoned in favour of the creation of models that would fit one locality only, as the sole conception of CBNRM and TBNRM were portrayed as infallible solutions. The *Gestion de Terroirs* approach, instead, works on a local scale and can be extended only to a region sharing the same environmental and socio-economic characteristics<sup>38</sup>. Furthermore, by addressing the *Terroir*, and in some publications the *Terroir villegois*<sup>39</sup>, the assumption of managing a localised territory, in order to achieve sustainability and development, confirms that comprehensive knowledge of the locality is essential to be successful. Political ecology, instead, like CBNRM and TBNRM, places too much stress on the cross-border issue and the glocal implications to provide sustainable local solutions. *Gestion du Terroir*, finally, relies heavily on participation, communication between stakeholders and the accountability of local institutions<sup>40</sup>, thus proving very much site-specific as opposed to generalist NRM approaches.

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<sup>36</sup> Cleary, 2003

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> PSEP, 2006; FAO, 1995

<sup>40</sup> PSEP, 2006; Cleary, 2003; FAO, 1995


Obviously, by providing ambitious aims and relying on the nature of both people and politics, the *Gestion du Terroir* approach is as costly as it is risky. However, because of the type and value of the interests at a stake in the GLTFCA, it was felt that by framing the research with this approach, the obtained results would have been able to influence both decision-makers and professional on the field with a comprehensive outlook of the issues at the stake. The research, therefore, contributes firstly to the academic literature with a localised human geographic and anthropological study of a specific border and its communities, thus tampering the gap identified by Donnan and Wilson<sup>41</sup> (1999, Introduction). Secondly it will provide a new set of data for the human geographical mapping of a problematic border village, which will contribute locally to anti-poaching practices and prevention of informal activities. Thirdly, it will present a valuable analysis of a locality which should benefit all stakeholders in the implementation of the GLTFCA, and related objectives.

#### **1.4 THE STUDY AREA**

The GLTFP was established with an MoU in 2001 to create a Protected Area spanning the Kruger National Park in South Africa, the Limpopo National Park (former Coutada 16 hunting reserve) in Mozambique and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. The GLTFCA, subsequently, was born as part of the ecosystems approach, with the creation of ecological corridors and interstitial areas to connect the Parks and create a buffer zone allowing high-density tourism, around the isolated core for wildlife protection. The GLTFCA project, therefore, encloses several sub-projects differentiated by acronyms, geographical scale and levels of protection according to the IUCN categories for Protected Areas: (a) the GLTP, once Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFP, is the smallest unit which encompasses the three National

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<sup>41</sup> Donnan & Wilson, 1999, Introduction, quoted in p.1 of this thesis.



Map 1.1: The GLTFP, conservation area and full Heartland extension (Source: AWF, 2006).

Parks and the Sengwe Corridor still unsettled; (b) the GLPP covers the same area of the GLTFP but with the Peace Park denomination entails a social objective for security and cross-border cooperation, which has now been taken over by the TFP project as the two entities are increasingly inter-dependent, under the umbrella of the Peace Parks Foundation<sup>42</sup>; (c) the GLTFCA encompasses both the GLTFP area and the

<sup>42</sup> The PPF operates mainly in South Africa, where most of the PP are located: the |Ai-| Ais/Richtersveld, the Kgaladi, the Limpopo/Sashe, the Maloti-Drakensberg, the Great Limpopo and the Lubombo. However, it has recently opened up to the region with the Malawi-Zambia.

‘interstitial zones’, that is the broader area which connects the three Parks in Mozambique only, and which has grown to encompass two other national parks in the country, the Banhine and the Zinave<sup>43</sup>); (d) the GL Heartland, name assigned by the AWF as part of their ‘Protecting Land’ programme touching eight of the main TFCA and PP areas in the continent<sup>44</sup>. As a Heartland the GLTFCA extends from the KNP to the West to the Mozambique coast in the East.

Amongst the immediate difficulties the three governments had to face, there was firstly the establishment of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique (see Map 1.2), in the former Coutada 16 hunting area which was heavily affected, in terms of wildlife numbers, by the national war and the South African and Rhodesian *contras*, and where people had been living in sparse and close settlement since Colonial and pre-colonial times. Changing the status from hunting reserve to National Park, therefore, implied dealing with the eight (8) substantial communities living within the park boundaries, as shown by Map 1.2, three of which in the high-density tourism area, close to the sanctuary which had been created to build the herbivores populations and functioned until the first semester of 2006, when the protective fence was taken down.


Secondly, another strip of land had to undergo changes in its legal status in order to create the Sengwe Ecological Corridor, running from Pafuri to the Southern Border of the Gonarezhou National Park along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, as shown in Map 1.1. Also this project, as envisaged by the Peace Park Foundations and other stakeholders, should entail the forced relocation of some 15,500 people if the corridor measures 26 Km wide at the two most distant extremities<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> World Bank, 2004

<sup>44</sup> The AWF is an NGO operating throughout the continent with the main purposes of protecting animal species and supporting human development. Following the creation of TFCAs and Peace Parks, AWF has been working in some of the selected areas in parallel with the institutions, by creating the Heartland Programme, involving Congo, Virunga, Samburu, Kilimanjaro, Maasai Steppe, Zambesi, Kazungula, Limpopo (<http://www.awf.org/section/land>, 2007)

<sup>45</sup> CESVI, 2001



In order to show the degree of secrecy behind some hidden agendas of the GLTFCA project, it was found through field work, that demining had started in the Southern section in the spring of 2006, but no publicity was given to such an event which people had long been waiting for and no one would have contrasted.

#### ***1.4.1 Mozambique as a case study: justifications.***

The decision to focus on the Mozambican side of the tri-national park derives from the fact that the area extending from the Pafuri to the Chiqualaquala Border posts, the northernmost part of the interstitial zone, was not being sufficiently addressed by the management committee of the TFCA, as demonstrated by the small amount of literature available on the locality<sup>47</sup>. This lack of interest, was assumed, would deteriorated the fragile relation with the establishment of a protected area on their doorstep. Additionally, the area is historically notorious for cross-border activities which can be perceived as either informal or illegal according to the type, the extent in volume and time, and its perpetrators. Considering that cross-border security is one of the main objectives in the establishment of TFCA and TFP, it was deemed important to investigate and evaluate such activities in the context of livelihood strategies in the area. Furthermore, despite being currently at peace, Mozambique came out of a national conflict which began in 1976 against Zimbabwe and continued throughout the Eighties until 1992 against South Africa, in a *contras* war which reduced the country to its knees. A simple geographical analysis of the parties involved in the war show that one of the affected border areas would have been Pafuri in a North-Eastern direction to Chiqualaquala, the border with Zimbabwe, and in the Southern Direction to Massingir. Before that time, the slave and ivory routes, the migrations towards the mines and the movement of foreign poachers in the area left a legacy that is only indirectly linked to colonialism. The peripheral political and economic positionality of the area allowed local communities with liaisons across the border to maintain their traditional practices, such as: choosing a wife, visiting relatives in a near-by village, or reach agricultural fields and

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<sup>47</sup> Bulpin, 1954; Koch et al., 1995; Connor, 2003.

fishing spots, regardless of the country under which they fell. Just before World War I, furthermore, when the Witwatersrand Native Labour Organisation (WENELA) was created to regulate workers into the Johannesburg minefield and keep the cost of labour at a low standard, local inhabitants received permits to travel across the KNP to visit relatives in the Gazankulo area<sup>48</sup>.

Mozambique, therefore, presented an interesting historical and political background to NRM whose influence is still visible, whilst rendering an image of progress towards conservation practices for sustainable rural development. The analysis of informal livelihoods, of migrations and cross-border relations, as well as the influence of governmental decision-making in remote areas would need to be based on data collected along the main route, which leads from Zimbabwe to South Africa via Mozambique. The closest official border post on this road would be Pafuri.

#### 1.4.2 Physical geography and ecology of Pafuri



Map 1.3: The area of Pafuri (Software Google Earth; Source: field work)

Pafuri is part of the northernmost *lowveld* area of the Kruger National Park. This Aanglo-afrikaans term indicates the lower sections of the South African savannah where the temperature is high and the climate is dry, with low rainfall levels (between 325 and 500 mm per year) normally concentrated between November and March, the core of the rain season.

<sup>48</sup> (Koch *et al*, 1995)

Type of animal present	Linnaean nomenclature
Buffalo	<i>Syncerus caffer</i>
Burchell's zebra	<i>Equus quagga</i>
Bushbuck	<i>Tragelaphus scriptus</i>
Chacma Baboon	<i>Papio ursinus</i>
Crocodile	<i>Crocodylus niloticus</i>
Eland	<i>Taurotragus oryx</i>
Elephant	<i>Loxodonta africana</i>
Giraffe	<i>Giraffa camelopardalis</i>
Hippopotamus	<i>Hippopotamus amphibius</i>
Impala	<i>Aepyceros melampus</i>
Klipspringer	<i>Oreotragus oreotragus</i>
Kudu	<i>Tragelaphus strepsiceros</i>
Large-spotted genet	<i>Genetta tigrina</i>
Leopard	<i>Panthera pardus</i>
Lichtenstein's Hartebeest	<i>Sigmoceros lichtensteinii</i> ; <i>Alcelaphus lichtensteinii</i>
Lion	<i>Panthera leo</i>
Nyala	<i>Tragelaphus angasii</i>
Porcupine	<i>Hystrix cristata</i>
Reedbuck	<i>Redunca arundinum</i>
Sable antelope	<i>Hippotragus niger</i>
Steenbok	<i>Raphicerus campestris</i>
Vervet Monkey	<i>Aethiops sabeus</i>
Warthog	<i>Phacochoerus africanus</i>
Waterbuck	<i>Kobus ellipsiprymnus</i>
White Rhinoceros	<i>Ceratotherium simum</i>

**Table 1.4: Animals found in the Makuleke Concession (Source: field work and WS, 2006)**

The area is split by the Lebombo Mountain chain in a North to South direction and cut across by the Limpopo River, on whose sandbanks it is formed. The poorly-drained sandy-clay soil found in *lowveld* section generates close savannah forests along the River which is a favourite refuge for animals, but becomes dry mopane (*Colophospermum mopane*) shrubveld as it comes near the granite hills of the *highveld* sections of the TFCA. The general biome found in the area is the mixed Transvaal bushveld with a vegetation composed of tall trees on Riverine flood plains, Thorn Bushes in dryer spots and baobabs<sup>49</sup> which stand out as landmark of ancient civilisations and beliefs. The presence of the 'great grey-green greasy Limpopo River' as poetically described by R. Kipling in the story of The Elephant's Child, and its affluent the Luvuvhu River generate a dense Riverine forest which extends from South Africa to Mozambique, past the village of Pafuri, and it is rich in Fever Trees amongst other Acacia species.

<sup>49</sup> Tainton, 1999

In the KNP, because of the relocation of the Makulekes from Crooks' Corner in 1969, the forest is still very pristine and extends for many kilometres on both sides of the River up to their conjunction, with the exception of the area once inhabited, where the paths and dwellings sites are still clear of vegetation. As shown by Map 1.1, the forest is reduced to a mere few hectares in Mozambique; however, south of the Limpopo River, it is much thicker than in the northern side and in the KNP. The impenetrability of the forest remnants makes it a perfect area for the family of some ten (10) elephants, which have been spotted drinking at the River in the evening and followed back to the site early in the morning. Whereas in the communal lands the variety of animals is reduced to crocodiles, baboons and vervet monkeys, only, due to human density and predation, the KNP side hosts an enviable richness in wildlife, particularly antelopes, and birdlife. The rhinoceros, it is worth noting, were recently reintroduced, thanks to a repopulation programme implemented by Wilderness Safari, the owner of one of the two lodges in the Makuleke Concession, Pafuri Camp on the Luvuvhu River. Unfortunately the number of predators are still low, and it would be very rare to have a big five seeing in the area. However, it must be said that the whole area is populated by a variety of birds which is worth of note. In this rare and delicate environment, in fact, a multitude of species is found from the endemic Yellow-billed Oxpecker (*Buphagus africanus*), ridding animals of ticks and flies, to the common helmeted Guinea fowl (*Numida meleagris*), from the majestic Fish Eagle (*Haliaeetus vocifer*) to the long-tailed Pintailed Whydah (*Vidua macroura*). Some species, furthermore, are endemic to the Pafuri area, such as the Mottled Spinetails (*Telacanthura ussheri*), the Racket-tailed Roller (*Coracias spatulata*), the Three-Banded Courser (*Rhinoptilus cinctus*), the Southern Hyliota (*Hyliota australis*), Pel's Fishing Owl (*Scotopelia peli*), Meve's Starling (*Lamprotornis mevesii*) and the Tropical Boubou (*Laniarius aethiopicus*).

### **1.4.3 The human geography of Pafuri**

Part of the Shoshangane kingdom whose origins and sites are still controversial and will be discussed further in Chapter 2 and 3, the area of Pafuri is predominantly

Tsonga-Shangaan speaking. This mixture is a Nguni language, deriving from the Congo-Niger Bantu ethnic group. At present two groups of common language and culture populate the area: (1) Maluleke in South Africa, which were relocated from Crooks' Corner in 1969 to extend the KNP, and now live at Makuleke some 25 kms South of Punda Maria Gate; (2) Shangaan in both Mozambique and Sengwe Communal Land in Zimbabwe. However, in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the area of influence is shared with the Venda, a non-Nguni group who populated the Limpopo basin before the arrival of Soshangane and his kraal. In Zimbabwe and Mozambique, instead, the presence of the Ronga, of the Shona group, is still consistent. The familiar connection between the three Tsonga-Shangaana communities are of two types: (1) marital and social between Zimbabwe and Mozambique; (2) economic and social with South Africa. This difference, of course, is due to the pulling factor exercised by South Africa as a wealthier country with job opportunities in the mines first and as manpower second. Recently, women have been migrating as well, mainly to accompany their man, and look for jobs in housekeeping<sup>50</sup>.

The human geography of Pafuri changed particularly because of (a) relocation in South Africa, which endangered social relations and trade, (b) and displacement during the wars, when entire villages changed site within Mozambique, or moved to the two other countries where refugees camps had been organised. At present, the remnants of the old Makuleke village are still visible at Crooks' Corner, and so are the rests of the military occupation during the last war. Pafuri, however, had been populated by white South Africans and Europeans in the second half of the XIX century because of the availability of game, particularly elephants, and of people to be informally recruited for the mines. The landscape of the area changed impressively with the creation of two WENELA<sup>51</sup> (later TEBA) recruitment posts and

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<sup>50</sup> Field work: visit to Gyiani and Makuleke, and discussion with Cecilia Muklave, Dumela, September 2006.

<sup>51</sup> The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA or WENELA) was funded in 1902 to regulate the flux and costs of migrants from outside South Africa, into the mines. In agreement with the Portuguese government in Mozambique, WNLA established a series of recruitment posts as far North as Maxixe. The name was later changed into TEBA and the relations with Mozambique changed with its independence. All the offices, in fact, were closed and the recruitment halted when

with the creation and enforcement of the border in the last years of the 1980s. Currently, people are used to the border post, although it is only the people with a valid passport who cross the border legally, alongside with the adventurous tourists over Christmas and Easter holidays.

At this stage it is relevant to note that, despite the area is generally very dry and hot, particularly in the summer, it was hit by a devastating flood in 2000. The downfall of the devastation reached the coast where damages are still recognisable. In Pafuri, notwithstanding damages to wildlife and cultivations, the flood deprived the local populations of shelters for many days, and some people lived on tree branches for up to three days before being able to climb down again<sup>52</sup>. On that occasion, all the basic infrastructure at the border post (electricity and telephone poles) were swiped away thus leaving the government representatives without light and communications until the present time.

## 1.5 RESEARCH OUTLINE

The research aims at investigating the influence of TF conservation politics in the livelihood strategies of border communities at Pafuri Administrative Post, Mozambique, whilst taking into account the geography of the area and the zoning of the GLTFCA in the three adjoining countries. In order to achieve exhaustive conclusions, able to influence decision-makers and stakeholders over the management of the Pafuri locality, three different objectives have been identified.

- 1.to critically evaluate the impact of recent history into traditional livelihood strategies;
- 2.to present the political agenda of conservation in South Africa, in the past century, and assess its influence on NRM and socio-economic development;
- 3.to understand how TF Conservation can effectively transform a border into a frontier and sacrifice community livelihoods to political targets.

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the country gave open support to the ANC movement for the independence of South Africa (Koch *et al.*, 1995). At present, only five offices remain in Mozambique, and TEBA still regulates the recruitment of people, although the company is now looking into tourism as well with the renovation of the Pafuri site in South Africa and the Quissico site, on the coast of Mozambique.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Simon Chaukwe, Dumela, 2007

The underlying discourse in the research is the *Gestion do Terroir*, with the Sustainable Livelihood Approach of the FAO, since the aim is to present a positive approach to NRM, within the territory, based on both primary and secondary data sources on the history of Pafuri and the relations among the three countries. The historical section concentrates on three main periods: (1) pre-colonisation and the origin of the Shangaana ethnic group; (2) colonisation, from poachers' paradise to recruiting territory; (3) the border (or bush) wars with Rhodesia and South Africa. Similarly, the field investigation focuses on the evaluation of community livelihood strategies, both formal and informal, with a mixed methodological approach. The findings are compared with former research in the broader Pafuri area<sup>53</sup> in order to evaluate the two economically-dependent countries in relation to South Africa, the pulling element for trade and migrations.

## 1.6 TERMINOLOGY AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

### 1.6.1 *Transfrontier Conservation: policies and acronyms*

At this stage, it is essential to introduce a brief discussion over the terminology used in this text, beginning with the acronyms referring to cross-borders conservation and natural resource management. Firstly, as explained in the Theoretical Framework, Natural Resource Management (NRM) derives from Sustainable Development practices for socio-economic development in rural areas, and draws mainly from the CAMPIRE experience in Zimbabwe, for Southern Africa. All other acronyms, instead, are referred to conservation only, which of course has in time shifted towards participative approaches, involving local communities around protected areas again for socio-economic development, as shown in Table 1.2.

<b>Transboundary Natural Resource Management Area (TBNRM Area)</b>	An area in which cooperation to manage natural resources occurs across boundaries (Griffin <i>et al</i> 1999). Note that this concept does not necessarily involve any formal protected areas.
<b>Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA)</b>	An area or component of a large ecological region that straddles the boundaries of two or more countries, encompassing one or more protected areas, as well as

<sup>53</sup> The information is derived from CESVI, 1999 and Koch, 1995, as well as Connor, 2003.

	multiple resource use areas (as defined in the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, 1999). This is a term used particularly in southern and eastern Africa, with more or less the same meaning as TBCA (see below)
<b>Transboundary Conservation Area (TBCA)</b>	An area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means (Sandwith <i>et al</i> 2001).
<b>Transboundary Protected Area (TBPA)</b>	An area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means (Sandwith <i>et al</i> 2001).
<b>Transfrontier Park (TFP)</b>	Essentially the equivalent of a TBPA, implying that all or most of the areas comprising the jointly-managed Transfrontier Park are high-status formal protected areas, usually of National Park status, with perhaps one or more smaller areas serving as linking corridors.
<b>Parks for Peace (also Peace Parks, PP)</b>	Parks for Peace are transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and to the promotion of peace and co-operation (Sandwith <i>et al</i> 2001).

**Table 1.5: Terminology associated with cross-border initiatives (Source: Peddle *et al.*, 2004)**

The terminology debate stems, of course, from the field implications of each type of initiative, which is where IUCN categories for protected areas come into play. Through the years, in fact, IUCN has produced a system which is internationally recognised and approved for the establishment of protected areas based on land use and natural resources management. Of course, there are exceptions to this system, such as Great Britain's oldest National Parks, but generally speaking the world, with the coordination of WWF and other donors has agreed to adopt the classification when establishing a new area for conservation. In the light of these observations, therefore, it is relevant to note that the study was conducted on the GLTFCA, and is it focussed on the interstitial areas, which includes potential corridors or buffer zones

around the GFTFP, and the Banhine and Zinave National Parks in Mozambique. Considering that the Peace Park foundation includes the interstitial areas in the GL Peace Park project, both GLTFCA and GLPP will be used as synonyms whenever the frequency of usage in a paragraph will require so and unless otherwise meant by the context. The acronym GLTFP will only be used in reference to the Kruger-Limpopo-Gonarezhou cluster. TBCA and TBPA will not be used in reference to the GLTFCA because it does not apply to the case, considering the delicate issue of sovereignties and security involved.

Category	Description
I. Scientific Reserve /Strict nature reserve	a. Area of outstanding or representative ecosystems, natural features and/or species primarily available for scientific research or monitoring; b. Large area of unmodified or slightly modified land and/or sea without the human settlement, so preserved in its conditions
II. National Park	Natural areas designated to (a) protect its ecological integrity for present and future generations; (b) exclude exploitation or damaging activities; (c) provide foundations for environmentally and culturally compatible visitor opportunities
III. Natural Monument/ Natural landmark	Area with one or more outstanding and unique natural and/or cultural feature
IV. Nature Conservation Reserve/ Managed Nature Reserve/ Wildlife Sanctuary	Area of land and/or sea subject to active management intervention to ensure its maintenance
V. Protected Landscape	Area of land (including coast and sea) where the human-nature interaction has produced a unique area with significant features and high biodiversity. The preservation of the traditional interaction is paramount.
VI. Resource Reserve	Area with mainly unmodified ecosystems managed for long term protection and maintenance of its biodiversity, while meeting the needs of local communities through the flow of natural products and services.
<b>The following are the four categories eliminated from the 1978 list, with Recommendation 17 of the IUCN congress.</b>	
VII. Natural Biotic Area/ Anthropological Reserve	Sustainable use of natural ecosystems
VIII. Multiple Use Management Area/ Managed Resource Area	Area where two or more sustainable and non-impairing uses of natural resources are managed in coordination.
IX. Biosphere Reserve	Area with an ecologically representative landscape, with a range of activities from total protection to intensive production, requiring monitoring, research and education for multi-level cooperation.
X. World Heritage Site (natural)	Area where distinctive natural features must be protected and publicised worldwide.

Table 1.6: IUCN categories (Source: IUCN, 1994)

### 1.6.2 Native languages and populations

Names are artificial constructs which are bestowed by humans to understand the world around them, and the cases of African languages and ethnic groups are no exception. In fact, historians often argues that the name give to each African ethnicity is derived from European need to identify and categorise each group as part of their *dividi et impera* imperial strategy<sup>54</sup>. This process, however, proved to be very useful for researchers to understand the history of the continent, decades after imperialism had re-created its human geography.

Origin	Name of the group	Language <sup>55</sup>
Nguni	Zulu	isiZulu
Nguni	Shangaan	xiTsonga
Nguni	Matabele	isiNdebele
Venda	Venda	tshiVenda
Shona	Karanga (of Zimbabwe)	chiShona

Table 1.1.7: People and languages mentioned in the text (Source: bibliography and field work)

For the purpose of the text, actually, it is necessary to point out that there exists extensive but not exhaustive literature explaining the history and the origin the population object of this research: the Shangaan. It is agreed that they are an Nguni group, as classified by Guthrie and confirmed by their affiliation to Shaka Zulu<sup>56</sup>, and that they speak a Niger-Congo Bantu language. But the exact origins of the Shangaana could not be exactly traced. Of the Zulu, for instance, it is acknowledged that the use of this appellative in pre-Shaka times would be an anachronism<sup>57</sup>, similarly as the ethnic name Shangaan derives from the military chief Soshangane, despite the many other names he was known for, this population was either inexistent or a kraal within a bigger kingdom (the Zulu) before the *mfecane*. As for the Nguni, Marks (1967) briefly states in a footnote that the Xhosa are the only group which should be called Nguni, since they can trace a direct ancestral line to the leader Mnguni, unlike any other. In order to simplify explanations in the text, therefore, it

<sup>54</sup> See Reader 1994; Liesegang, 1969; without forgetting Guthrie's classification discussed in Chapter 3.

<sup>55</sup> The prefix in all names means language.

<sup>56</sup> Aside from bibliographical and cartographical research, the discussion groups in Dumela, and the interviews with Police officers from the Gyiani areas have corroborated this fact.

<sup>57</sup> Marks, 1967.

has been decided to comply with the general indications and refer to the concerned ethnic groups following Table 1.4.

Alongside these key names, others are important to the history of Pafuri, but their origin is still debatable as it is the case for Tsonga and Maluleke. In a web article on the Tsonga people, it is told that Makuleke are one of the last remnants of the Tsonga group, once occupying territory extending as far south as Northern Zululand, as descendants of the Mabhudu (Zulu for Maputo), now counting Xikundu, Xigalo and Mingha, only <sup>58</sup>. From the field work investigation, instead, the Maluleke have been presented as a clan of the Matabele of Zimbabwe, who were separated by the border along the Limpopo. The naming of Matabele, in turn, was bequeathed by the Tswana onto the people of Mzilikazi. The term was generally used to indicate people coming from the South East. After 1840, however, when Mzilikazi crossed the Limpopo and gradually form Matabeleland, the term indicated his kingdom only. Their name was later changed to *Ndebele*, artificial Zulu, which bears no meaning but is still used to indicate their ethnicity<sup>59</sup>. As for the Shangaana, instead, history and field work has shown that the Shangaana language has been associated with isiTsonga. In interviews with local people in Pafuri and Dumela, the explanation provided was that the Tsonga were culturally and linguistically *assimilated* by the Shangaana who moved north along the Limpopo River, into South West Zimbabwe to reconstruct their empire after having been challenged by Dingane's Zulu army<sup>60</sup>. Despite the term Shangaana is used in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to indicate both people and language, Guthrie and the succeeding classificators have omitted it in favour of Tsonga. The conclusion taken by the author, therefore, is that Shangaana may refer to the people (deriving from its original leader Soshangane) but the language is Tsonga, regardless of current location. This decision might come in contrast with Johnston, who explains that the lack of clicks in the Tsonga language indicates a later arrival in the area, thus escaping influences from the original Khoi

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<sup>58</sup> Anon. 2007 (b). The three names refer to the villages on the main road from Giyani to Punda Maria Gate.

<sup>59</sup> Etherington, 2004.

<sup>60</sup> See Liesegang, 1969 and 1970.

and San languages<sup>61</sup>. However, field work has shown that self-called Shangaan groups in the Gaza province do not have the tongue clicks either, thus reinforcing the assumption that Tsonga and Shangaan are two names indicating the same group. The questions over the double-name for the people were answered, in Pafuri, with the indication that those Shangaan, who found themselves in South Africa after border demarcation, chose to be called Tsonga to avoid any confusion with Mozambican Shangaan, which would also explain the abandoning of the toponym 'Gazankulo', after the end of apartheid<sup>62</sup>.

Finally, in order to avoid confusions, the term 'racial' will be used in the text only when confronting Black and White populations, whereas the term 'ethnic' will be used for Black African groups. This is just to avoid confusion over which types of populations are involved in the argument, and has no judgemental implications over positivists theory of racial division and classification.

### ***1.6.3 African toponyms and history***

Contemporary history has greatly affected African toponomastic due to the European need to know and understand the territory, as well as to leave a mark of their presence. Recent history, however, has not been less productive particularly in independent states with the example of Zaire or Democratic Republic of Congo, changing due to the endless civil conflict. In South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, toponyms have been changed to suit the new government in the name of African tradition, as well as to give a strong sign to mark the end of an era. This is how Pretoria became Tshwane, Louis Trichard became Makhado, Messina became Musina; Laurenço Marques became Maputo and Vila Salazar became Chiqualaquala; and Salisbury became Harare, to name but a few.

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<sup>61</sup> Johnston, 1973, introductory paragraph.

<sup>62</sup> The general opinion that those Shangaan born or bred in South Africa would look down on their Mozambican origin, hence the choice of using a different ethnic identification, is not to be disregarded as the theory of local rural villagers. As research in the Manica area (Shona speakers), in fact, reveal the same pattern on those Mozambicans raised in Zimbabwe (Virtanen, 2005).

Since the historical context is very important to contextualise this research by positing that conservation has always served political and security purposes along the eastern South African border, which was at once a border and frontier for both white and black communities, it was deemed important to relate history and toponymy. Therefore, the name of a place will relate to the historical phase discussed: hence the name Rhodesia will be used for events up to the year 1980, and Zimbabwe for the following years.

The history presented is based mainly of secondary sources, particularly Davidson (1992) Reader (1994) and Minter (1998) for the general overview and the bush wars, with integrations from journal articles and specific publications. The bibliography shows that many articles on the history of African populations dates back to the time between the 1960s and the 1970s, and their bibliography goes back to the beginning of the last century and beyond. This is because modern publications refrain from historical analysis thus taking for granted a history of human conflict alongside the increased protection of natural resources, which creates unsolved dissents amongst local populations over land and NRM management. In order to provide a deeper understanding of actual conflicts, instead, history will encroach most of the text from the first chapter discussing the meaning and implications of nation and state, continuing with the second chapter presenting an abridged version of the contemporary history of wars and independence, in the attempt to understand why the European nation-state model cannot be applied to Africa. In the second section, history will serve to present the border object of the research, and the case study areas, so as to frame the data discussed.

## **1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE**

The thesis is organised in two parts separated by the methodology chapter. The first part will discuss Political Geographical and historical issues with the aims of presenting African history, its relation to contemporary European history and the post independence period. The State formation is the main thread which this part

will follow, in order to understand the implications of colonial borders in Africa, the differences between nationalism and African nationalism which have led a partial interpretation of historical event, and the role played by conservation in the current political geographical situation in Southern Africa. The structure is quite symmetrical and proposes, for each chapter, three sections on historical, geo-political and human geographical analysis, with the fourth section discussing the role of conservation in South Africa as a political tool.

The second chapter will begin by addressing the cause-effect relation between borders and nation-state in European contemporary history. The effect of European transformation will then be transposed on the African history, to show the inner contradiction of a political system which was expected to work in Africa, whilst it never attained full success in Europe. The Scramble for Africa will be analysed as the climax of European geo-political influence in the African continents, which will lead to the argumentations over why was the Berlin *status quo* not challenged by African independent states. The chapter will end with the presentation of Transfrontier Conservation as the panacea for solving the question of African borders.

The third chapter will address questions of nationhood in Africa, by arguing that the rise of African nationalism as a movement against Imperialism has given Africans a continental dream to be followed within ethnic divisions, thus generating political and social havoc at independence in the most divided countries. In order to focus the attention on the case study area, the wars which shattered the region since 1975, when Mozambique attained independence are presented to show the dichotomies in official historical terminology for concept such as civil war and national struggle. Secondly, the Peace process in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe will be discussed to demonstrate how politics imbue all the spheres of a state, particularly when border security, hence sovereignty, is concerned. The permeability of the borders in the Limpopo River basin will then be discussed in relation to the human use of geomorphology in Southern Africa, in the attempt to show that the interpretation of frontiers, hence borders, in Africa is different from

the European concept due to the conformation of the landscape. Furthermore, the traditional movements of people will not stop because of the enforcement of a strong Western border, as they are firstly cultural and secondly necessary for local livelihoods. Finally the GLTFCA will be presented in the context of migrations to understand priorities and challenges of this mega-park.

The fourth chapter will present the methodology, which uses both geographical and ethnographical methods in order to produce a detailed account of border communities in the case study area. The case study area will firstly be presented by describing its physical, political and human geographical traits. The use of quantitative data will be discussed to which qualitative data will follow. The contextualisation of the data will conclude the chapter.

The fifth chapter will describe Crooks' Corner, Pafuri, the broader historical area which is the geographic core of the GLTFCA. It will first attempt to provide an account of the main people who populate this area: the Shangaana, in relation to other local populations, the Venda and the Makuleke. It will also present its inter-cultural nature by discussing all the categories of people who have been using the border, to show that human mobility in Pafuri is not new, nor easily stoppable. Secondly, an attempt will be made based on ethnographic research and secondary data to understand what type of border is Pafuri and what its functions imply for the livelihoods of local people. Thirdly, the reality of moving wildlife will be discussed in the light of the geographical planning and zoning of the GLTFCA. This will lead to the final section on the role of TFCAs and Peace Parks in promoting peace at the regional level, considering the politicisation of the process and the animalist lobbying.

The sixth chapter is entirely dedicated to understanding the case study, Dumela, and its relation to the presence of the border. Firstly, the population will be presented using demographic data on family numbers, identification, education and livelihood strategies. Secondly, the influence of the state through hierarchy and policies will be

discussed in relation to the contribution it give to local livelihoods. Thirdly, the degree on dependency on the border will be evaluated using the data collected on trade and migrations, as well as personal observation and interviews at the border. Finally, the human-wildlife conflict will be discussed in the light of the GLTFCA and the Sengwe Corridor as potential threats to human survival in the area, which will be crashed between a rock, the TFCA, and a hard place, the Ecological corridor.

Finally, the conclusions will draw from the main argumentations presented in each chapter and will focus on the influence that the local history of violence and displacement had on social and economic cross-border relations at Pafuri. Secondly, the idea of TFCA as the catalyser of socio-economic cohesion will be discussed and evaluated. Thirdly, a the impact of the GLTFCA will be evaluated against a 'what if' scenario. The fourth section will be a summary of the main findings and the potential for further research stemming from this work.

## 2. AFRICAN BORDERS FROM MYTH TO REALITY

*La plus extravagante idée qui puisse naître dans la tête d'un politique est de croire qu'il suffise à un peuple d'entrer à main armée chez un peuple étranger pour lui faire adopter ses lois et sa Constitution. (Maximilien M.I. de Robespierre)<sup>1</sup>*

*La vraie décolonisation passe par le rejet de l'État de type européen. La question est donc politique et la décision uniquement africaine : doit-il se séparer de l'État-nation et de ses mythologies ? (Le Roy, in Tshiyembe, 2001)<sup>2</sup>*

Part of the modern social theory suggests that the nation-state is an artefact, that exists only by recognition from a network of other nation-states. This pattern creates social networks that are defined by 'distinct boundaries and histories'<sup>3</sup>. Developing Marxist views on the connections between imperialism and capitalism, Wallersteins define such networks 'world-systems', thus implying that, throughout history, there has been and there is a world order. This is formed by political and economical networks of groups of entities recognising each other as sovereign states with a delimited territory, but always in conflict with each other because of socio-economic inequalities. Such theory explains not only imperialism or colonisation as it occurred since the second half of the XIX century, but also globalisation as we know it today. The major contemporary history events were dependant on two key factors: politics and economics, both affecting the degree of power a state held, and therefore the degree of power it might or might not have exercised over another country. These factors contributed to the rise and affirmation of European nation-states, but also to the colonisation of other states or cultural entities in the *periphery*<sup>4</sup> of the world

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<sup>1</sup> Translation by the author: 'The most extravagant idea which could be born out of a politician's mind is to believe that it would be sufficient to enter the territory of a foreign people with an army, to force it to adopt their laws and Constitution'. This quote is part of the speech held by M. M. I. De Robespierre, as a senior deputy of the Constituent Assembly and President of the Revolutionary Jacobin Club, at the meeting of the latter, on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1792.

<sup>2</sup> Translation by the author: 'The true decolonisation goes through the refusal of the European type of State. The matter is therefore political and the decision solely African: should it be separated from the nation-state and its mythologies?'

<sup>3</sup> See Seidman S. 2004, p. 263.

<sup>4</sup> As Wallerstein suggests, three zones characterise all world orders: (1) the core, with the wealthiest and most diversified economies; (2) the periphery, with the poorest and less advanced economies; and the semiperiphery, with traits belonging to both previous groups. It is relevant to note that states can

system. It is surprising, however, that at a time when Europe was discovering the importance of nationalism and self-determination for the creation of independent sovereign states, as the Conference of Vienna (1814-1815) after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo tried to exemplify, it was also so adamant to subjugate half of the world in a core-periphery political and economic relation, as the Conference of Berlin brilliantly demonstrated (1884-1885). Ironically, it was the role taken up by all European leaders in Vienna with the formation of the Concert of Europe as defendant of (1) borders to define sovereign states; (2) nationalisms, to demarcate such borders; (3) self-determination, to liberate people from the joke of oppressing regimes, which contributed to the creation of a culture of moral superiority, whose role was to extend their sense of justice and development to all people still living in the *dark ages*. What could have been a highly humanitarian sense for politics became, instead, the major justification for the perpetration of a world system of influences and conquest which radically changed the political geography of the world, particularly of a whole continent which had been largely unexplored.

A simple glimpse at a political map of Africa, in fact, leaves the observer with the impression that something is missing from the general interpretation of borders. Classical theories in the political geographical study of borders show that such divisions are normally created using natural elements such as rivers and mountains, with a specific function such as defence<sup>5</sup>. And despite most African borders do follow the natural elements, the straight lines cutting across deserts and the shape of some countries (for example in West Africa) tell us a different story: one of occupation that survived for less than a Century but left a legacy that is hard to overcome, particularly because of borders. Africa shows an obvious incongruity between the predicaments of the Concert of Europe and their implementation in overseas territory. Notwithstanding the criticised process of the Scramble for Africa, however, there must have been strong political reasons for the maintaining of the

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move from one zone to another according to their performance, since the world order is a dynamic system. See Seidman S. 2004, pp. 261-273.

<sup>5</sup> See Glassner, 1995; Pounds, 1992

*status quo* at independence, which in turn triggered civil fights in the whole continent and regional wars in East Southern Africa, along contested borders.

By tracing a story of the European influence in the continent, this chapter aims at proving that there are two stages of influence, colonisation and imperialism, to which two separate types of human geographic legacy are associated: frontier and border, respectively. Therefore as colonialism became imperialism, so the frontier became a border. The two sets of terms, however, must be placed in the Political Geography and Historical context of XIX century Europe in order to understand the paradox of imperialism and the cultural devastation it caused. The first section, therefore, will be used to discuss the relation between the modern State and borders, and introduce the politics of African colonisation up until the Conference of Berlin. The Scramble for Africa will, then, be presented to explain the difference between borders and frontier in the continent. The third section will critically evaluate suggestions as to why were the colonial borders not discussed at independence and present the new conception of the African state. Finally, the Peace Parks project will be introduced as political ecological solution to the border issues of the continent.

## **2.1 BORDERS AS SYMBOLS OF THE NATION STATE**

The state is a socio-political European construct derived from the transition from the Medieval to the Modern political system, where a *state was in existence when a people is settled in a territory under its own sovereign government*<sup>6</sup>, as theorised by the German school. This evolution, however, was neither easy nor quick to be accomplished. On the contrary the process had to go through a series of stages that began with the independence of medieval lords from their king, or the Pope, and the formation, in continental Europe, of a network of small geographically demarcated, as opposed to the wider kingdoms of France and Prussia. The principality of Monaco, a French-Italian enclave on the Côte d'Azur is but an example of the small mutations undergoing in the later medieval period. With the ascendance of the

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<sup>6</sup>Muir, 1975, p. 79, the underlined section corresponds to italics in the original.

Modern State, in the XIII century, so changed the notion of frontiers, gradually becoming borders. This section will provide a small historical excursus over the achievement of sovereign nation-states in Europe and the shift from frontiers to border.

### ***2.1.1 The sovereign state: areas of influence and buffer zones***

The characteristics of the Modern state were (a) the separation in principle of the temporal and spiritual powers; (b) the creation of an administrative and defensive apparatus; (c) the progressive generation of a national language. Its natural evolution was towards a fully independent state, developed in the XVI century with the sovereign state, which *superiorem non recognoscens*, ruled by a king who is *imperator in regno suo*<sup>7</sup>. The perception of such a 'one-man' sovereignty lead to the formation of a political system funded on God-descended monarchs, whose power was both temporal and spiritual, as best exemplified by King Henry VIII after the schism with the Church of Rome. In the Christian Catholic world, however, the monarch was under the political influence of the Pope, as the only warrant of its divine heritage. Where the two powers did not converge onto one man, therefore, they were still strongly connected to the extent that when the slave trade began in the XV century, it was the Papal Bull *Dum Diversas*, written by Pope Nicholas V in 1452, which authorised Portuguese navigators to reduce to *hereditary slavery* any unbeliever. To this, the *Romanus Pontifex* followed in 1455, which granted Alfonso V of Portugal and all Christian kingdoms of Europe the right of dominion of all lands discovered<sup>8</sup> in the explorations of the world. Temporal and spiritual powers, therefore, were still converging in the Modern European state, at a time when the Asante and the Barotse kingdoms of West Africa and Zambia, respectively, were governed with a system of *checks-and-balance*<sup>9</sup>, a concept theorised by Montesquieu within the theory of separation of powers in *The Spirit of Law*, published in 1748. Another characteristic prevailing from the Medieval system, was the concept of area of influence, whereby

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<sup>7</sup>See the introductory chapter of Formigoni, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Reader 1994, p. 333.

<sup>9</sup> Davidson, 1992, pp. 55-64; 74-85.

states were separated by frontier zones<sup>10</sup>. These were areas of decreasing influence over the people, far from the core of the state and not cost-effective to be managed. The frontier was a buffer-zone between two or more states, and was ready for conquest at the occurrence, as well as being a safety belt in case of war. Ironically, those peripheries became the most contested areas between European powers and one, specifically, was one of the many causes of the two World Wars: the Franco-German frontier zone running along Alsace and Lorraine.

### ***2.1.2 Nationhood and sovereignty: subverting the ancien régime***

The system created by the implementation of the sovereign state was to be known as *ancien régime*, in the retrospective argument that indicated a political and social regime which was unsustainable for the masses. The areas of influence were expanding over seas with Portuguese and Spanish discoveries in the new world (the Americas) and the Black continent (Africa), trading goods and slaves to the frustration of France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, whose religious disagreement with Rome left them out of the deal. In addition to the Bulls mentioned above, the *Inter Caetera* of 1493 of Pope Alexander VI had divided the world into two spheres of influence: 1. the Spanish sphere was to the west and south of the Pole of Pole line, 100 leagues to the west and south of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands; 2. the Portuguese sphere was the rest of the world, that is Africa and all the markets it could bring about. The demarcation line, rather than orderly dividing the world, was interpreted by all the other European countries as a frontier zone, and battles were fought on the sea between corsairs<sup>11</sup>, with a commission from a sovereign state, and merchant ships, with a mandate from the Pope.

While the Dutch and the British ships were gradually reducing the Portuguese influence in Africa, Europe was re-defining its political geography once again. The French revolution, of 1789, accelerated the transition to modernity and moved it a

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<sup>10</sup> This theory belongs to Kristof, but it is found in Muir, 1975; also in Pounds 1992, p.77.

<sup>11</sup> Although often used as synonyms, a corsair (or a privateer) was different from a pirate as he had commission from a sovereign state, and when assaulting another ship could not be charged with piracy.

step forward, with the introduction of the *nation*. Found in popular literature as a synonym of the state, in political geography this term defines a group of people sharing the same language, culture and symbols which distinguish them from others, on the same territory<sup>12</sup>. To continue with the example, the fight of a whole country, uniting peasants and intellectuals, against the established regime of the State was an act of total civil disobedience which gave this people the right to claim their *nationhood*. Hence, the French school of Political Geography affirms the fusion of the State and the Nation, considering the State a *social phenomenon*<sup>13</sup> rather than a political construct. No other continental country at the time could boast such strong a sense of nationhood, which would succeed in destroying a political system that was not only sovereign but ordered by God. The events that followed the revolution are of little relevance here, suffice it to say however, that after this period the French sense of nationhood dwindled only during the Second World War, when the hero of the First World War, Gen. Pétain, handed its country over to the Hitler's Germany.

### ***2.1.3 Consecrating the Nation-state: the Concert of Europe***

Kohn interestingly suggests that *nationalities emerge only when some objective boundaries delineate a social group*<sup>14</sup>, implying that only when a form of constriction whether physical or metaphysical is forced over a set of people, they will find strength to fight back within features that unite them. This description fits perfectly the case of the French revolution, as well as the insurgencies of all ethnic minorities *vis à vis* the attempts to annihilate them by majority sovereign states. The mere existence of ethnic minorities within European states, such as the Basques in Spain and the Südtirol in Italy, refutes the French acceptance of the state as *juridical personification of the nation*<sup>15</sup>, in favour of the more pragmatic German approach of the Nation and the State as two separate entities, which only ideally coalesce. The result of the French revolution, in terms of Political Geography, is therefore the Nation-

<sup>12</sup> Muir, 1975; Glassner, 1995; Punds, 1992.

<sup>13</sup> Tshyembe, 2001, p.40 – 44.

<sup>14</sup> Kohn in Punds, 1992, p. 19, translated from the Italian 'Le nazionalità vengono alla luce solo quando certi confini oggettivi delimitano un gruppo sociale'.

<sup>15</sup> Carré de Malberg, in Tshiyembe, 2001, p.41.

State, a sovereign entity whose *raison d'être* lays in the supremacy of *centripetal forces*, that is its common language, culture and symbols in which the nation identify itself, over *centripetal forces*, that is cultural and geographical division<sup>16</sup>. The geographical innovation of the Nation-State construct, however, is the disappearance on the European map of frontier zones. As the State unites people in a specific area, this area must be demarcated so as to coincide with the power of the state whose priority is to protect the nation. The concept of border replaces the one of frontier, and thin lines are now separating Nation-states, marking the limits of their jurisdiction<sup>17</sup>. The shift from power over people to power over land was facilitated by nationalism, as it became widely accepted that people were the main promoter of the nation-state.

These theories are funded on a historical event which followed turbulent years in the heart of Europe: the Napoleonic Wars. After the battle of Waterloo, when the French Emperor was finally defeated, the European states gathered together for the Peace Agreement, and later for the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) which in itself was a masterpiece of diplomacy in bringing together civil aspirations of nation and political interests, whilst enforcing the Restoration of the pre-Napoleonic setting. The outcome of the Congress was the 'Concert of Europe' a political system, involving all the European *leading powers*<sup>18</sup>, which aimed at maintaining the *status quo* of countries (demarcated nation-states) whose actions and interests were validated by a system of treaties and consensual agreements, rather than by war. As Formigoni notes, no state would have been able to unilaterally consider its territory, regardless of the network of international treaties and agreements, any longer<sup>19</sup>. This was the first modern example of geopolitics and binding international law, with a humanitarian touch as the slave trade was condemned for the first time.

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<sup>16</sup> Drawn from definitions in Muir, 1975; Glassner, 1995; Punds, 1992.


<sup>17</sup> Glassner, 1995, p.96.

<sup>18</sup> This was the symbolic definition given by Viscount Castlereagh, the British representative to the Congress, in Formigoni, 2000, p. 83.

<sup>19</sup> Formigoni, 2000, p. 85.

### 2.1.4 Focussing on the world: the Concert of Europe in Africa

The peace established in the Old continent with a general agreement over the need for Restoration, allowed all the *leading powers* with an interest overseas to concentrate their political and financial resources on the new frontier zones. The rest of the world, in fact, became a frontier to be conquered and explored, and by extending the old Medieval concept of *area of influence* to the new continents, the power of the nation-state would have been accrued beyond imagination. Africa, at this stage, had only barely been explored and yet, the richness of its natural resources had been visible in Europe ever since the first merchants came back with slaves, gold and ivory.



Map 2.4: This map was published in 1787 – present border overlaid (Source: Google Earth, 2006)

At the time of the Concert of Europe, Africa was covered by an aura of myths concerning the Golden Meadows of Sofala, where yellow and black gold had been

sold for centuries to the Arab world; the kingdom of Prester John, the Christian Emperor separating Muslim areas of influence in Egypt and Tanzania and warden of the most powerful Christian treasures; the kingdom of Asante in the West, whose riches grew with trade, and Monomotapa in the South, whose wealth increased with war and conquest, as well as agreement with European explorers<sup>20</sup>. The map above, shows the extent of information available for the coast of Southern Africa, and the general knowledge acquired over the native peoples and the territory they controlled. The embryonic state of political geography in the continent shows again the presence of areas of influence, based on control over people and land, particularly as the most ancient populations, the Khoi and the San were nomads, thus heavily reliant on natural resources<sup>21</sup>. The progressive European conquest implied the gradual reduction of territory available to the native populations, hence the increased difficulty in pursuing a traditional livelihood, which forced many natives to seek work in the colonies. The only tribal groups able to resist were those occupying inner remote areas, and those relying on the military power to impose their status quo. The Zulus were emblematic as they succeeded in temporarily halting the Voortrekkers advance into present-day northern Natal<sup>22</sup>. The *Great Trek*, leading Cape Afrikaners out of their colony into the continent to avoid the British ban over the use of slaves, was the first attempt to colonise non-coastal areas in the Southern part of Africa. The movement of people seeking land for establishing new colonies, together with the increase in the slave trade from Delagoa Bay (Maputo) which pushed native populations inland looking for refuge, increased competition for those few territories offering water and suitability for settlement. If those Voortrekkers moving north easily defeated all resistance from native population, those moving south into Natal had to face the Zulus of Dingane. It was not until the Battle of Blood River, in 1838, in fact, that the Boers managed to impart a severe loss

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<sup>20</sup> The history of Africa is described by Reader (1994), some of the civilisations, furthermore, have been analysed in detail by Davidson, 1992.

<sup>21</sup> Burger, 1997, pp. 171-173.

<sup>22</sup> In Reader, 1994, pp. 484 – 488.

to the Zulu army, thus conquering the land and find the cooperation of Mpande, Dingane's and Shaka's half brother, to take control over the people as well<sup>23</sup>.

The idea of nation-state, therefore, transposed in the post Waterloo period a new stage in the European diplomacy and political decision-making. Firstly, *sovereignty* became inextricably linked to the demarcation of borders, which consolidated the innovation of the Treaty of Westphalia. Secondly, by agreeing on the European set-up of the Restoration, all leading powers moved to the only territory which was left to explore: Africa. In the light of European transformation and ambitions, Africa was increasingly divided into Black and White frontiers, fighting for land and people respectively<sup>24</sup>, and still threatened by the personal aspiration of European monarch, triggered by the political cartography of the known continent. King Leopold I of Belgium best exemplifies this threat with his will to conquer, for his personal gain, a meaningful piece of Africa which would grant resources and access to the sea, at the Congo Delta<sup>25</sup>. The enterprise of securing an inland river port, however, was spoilt by the French who had sent an exploration team coming from the North. This event, particularly, prompted the Concert of Europe to discuss the areas of influence in Africa<sup>26</sup>.

## **2.2 THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: FINALISING AFRICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY**

The Scramble for Africa was a long process of occupation and demarcation which begun with the Imperialist aspirations of European leading powers over a continent, whose natural resources were promising to be durable and income-generating. The conflicts generated by European greed, however, forced the Concert of Europe to meet once again and discuss the partition of the territory. As Griffiths rightfully states, *few of the present boundaries of Africa existed*, prior to the Conference of Berlin<sup>27</sup>, however the continent was not devoided of nations and states whose societies were

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. pp. 456 – 467.

<sup>25</sup> Burger, 1997, p. 163.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, pp. 517 – 520.

<sup>27</sup> In Griffiths, 1986, p. 204.

just as politically developed as the European state<sup>28</sup>. The simple geographic inference, about colonial borders, however, hides a deeper disruption of social systems, linked to the territory, which triggered post-independence conflicts.

### ***2.2.1 Civilisations and states in pre-colonial Africa***

African kingdoms developed thanks to a combination of (a) geographical positioning along rivers and the coast, (b) the presence of natural resources to be traded and (c) the development of the ruling elite into an effective military and political hierarchy able to defend and extend its boundaries. The emergence of the best known five indigenous African states, with a vertical society, in fact, coincided with the increased use of gold for economic trade both in the Mediterranean and other areas, after the third century AD<sup>29</sup>. The modern concept of *raison d'être* of a State, which saw in the defence and expansion of the state the primary objective of a king, in XVI century Europe, was also valid for African civilisations, from the Iron Age until imperialism. These states, however, enforced a supervision over the king's decision-making through the elders whose powers of mitigation maintained the Igbo society in Nigeria, the Asante in Ghana, and all the Nguni<sup>30</sup> kingdoms of Southern Africa. The map below shows these civilisations, whose future development was deeply affected by European imperialism, and whose generated incongruences still affect current national politics.

Northern Africa had been accustomed to trading with Muslims for centuries and, with time, expertise was gathered on the trade with Europe. The initial easiness in commercial relation and cheapness of goods, exchanged for precious slaves and African products, was replaced by an acute conception of the benefits Europeans could bring to the economy and military power of a State and its ruler. At the same


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<sup>28</sup> In Davidson, 1992.

<sup>29</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 272 – 273 and 278 – 279.

<sup>30</sup> Nguni is the name of a Congo-Niger Bantu language which spread in East-Southern Africa and includes Ibo, Ndebele, Ronga, Shangaana, Swati, Xhosa, Zulu. Ngoni (found in Reader, 1994, p. 463) is not a synonym but a group living in Malawi, descendant of the South African Group. From the Nguni derives the *Nguni cattle* a specific type of cow, which is now almost extinct and protected at Mkhaya Sanctuary, of Big Game Parks, Swaziland.

time, the progressive condemnation of slavery in the European world deprived merchants of a high-valued market resources. The same governments who, on the one hand abhorred slavery, found in imperialism the only solution to maintain some profitability from their colonies.



Map 2.5: Main kingdoms of Africa before the Conference of Berlin (Source: Gaydish, 1998<sup>31</sup>)

<sup>31</sup> The map is an alteration of the original in R. O. Collins, J. M. Burns, and E. K. Ching, eds., 1994, *Historical Problems of Imperial Africa* (Princeton: Markus Wiener), 6D.

### 2.2.2 *Changing geographies: from colonialism to imperialism*

The broadest definition of colonialism is derived from Strachey and describes it as a process through which *peoples and nations conquer, subjugate and consequently permanently rule over other people and other nations*<sup>32</sup>. This generalisation, however, is very dangerous as it does not distinguish between colonialism, as the establishment of settlements, and imperialism as the system of domination. It is true that for some countries such as France, the two processes coincided in the politics of extending nationalism from the metropole to the dependencies<sup>33</sup>. However, for most of the colonial powers, the systematic ruling over their possessions was a gradual process which varied according to the colonial power and the localities of the dominion. The British, for instance, implemented a policy based on native rule, whereby, with the exception of strategic ports such as the Cape and present-day Durban, they acknowledged in the Roman acceptance of *hic sunt leones*: a territory ruled by native kings, friendly to the European administration if military threatened by other ethnic groups. It is by no coincidence, in fact, that the Boer war was fought over commercial needs and that the Rhodesia were conquered by Cecil Rhodes with the British South Africa company, not the British Army, in pursue of his own dream to extend the British Empire. Of course, the Crown obliged this generosity, but Sir Rhodes was first and foremost a genial tradesman with a dream.

The creation of the first colonies did not exert any influence on the political geography of Africa, rather on its human geography, by enslaving or confining native population to the lands outside the colonies<sup>34</sup>. Imperialism, instead, paved the way for all transformations that generated Africa inner contradictions. The reports coming from visitors in Africa, be them explorers, priests or navigators, depicted a continent of pagans whose barbarian lifestyle was in need of European good will to bring civilisation. This conception, of course, thrived over the historical and anthropological revisionism over the nature and development of African states and

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<sup>32</sup> Found in Pounds 1992, II, p. 146.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. pp. 161 – 165.

<sup>34</sup> Burger, 1997, pp. 163 – 165.

induced a substantial differentiation in the aims of colonialism: the economic opportunity, the moral obligation and geopolitical strategy<sup>35</sup>. Each motive, coincidentally, represented each of the powers within the European Nation-state: the government, the Church and the tradesmen. It is, however, through the emphasis on moral obligation that colonisation could turn, with the approval of all social strata, into imperialism, which played also on national pride.

Imperialism, in the view of Cohen, imposes the law of the mother country onto the natives and *transforms their ideas, institutions and products*<sup>36</sup>, through military supremacy, it should be pointed out. If on the one hand the European colonial powers were repudiating slavery, their colonies were funded on the slave-like condition of native workers and the unfair deals with the few remaining African kings, who were utterly subjugated by the new products introduced on the market, particularly weapons, and by the power of religion, which brought along education and sanitation. The harsh conditions and the violence of the Belgium domination over the Congo for the collection of rubber, for example, were no myth<sup>37</sup> and forced Europe to come to terms with an unpredicted reality. Elsewhere the hypocrisy of white rule allowed for appearances to be kept, but the discoveries of the mines at Kimberly changed, yet again, the human geography of Southern Africa, by attracting an ever increasing amount of migrants from Europe in search of fortune and from Africa in search for work. Having been forced outside their land, survival strategies of native population were challenged by the environment, the new power-relations within and without their group, the higher competition for natural resources and the general contingencies brought by nature. Working for the White seemed a feasible solution for young men, who considered that gaining money would allow them to buy the food and goods they needed by the minefield and bring them home. People came from as far as Congo, Malawi and Zambia to work in the mines, and continued to pour in as new sites were open for prospecting. The creation of a mine language,

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
<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 146 – 154.

<sup>36</sup> Cohen, 1963, in Glassner, 1995, p. 237.

<sup>37</sup> Reader, 1994, 517 – 542; Burger, 1997, see above; and Davidson, 1992, p. 219.

which is a mixture of Zulu, English and Afrikaans, the three most representative linguistic groups, is symptomatic of the magnitude of the phenomenon. *Fanagalo* was so common that is still spoken by former miners and most white people to communicate with Black Africans, without speaking their ethnic language.

### 2.2.3 Borders in Africa: the Congress of Berlin



Map 2.6: Africa as divided at the Congress of Berlin (1884-1885).<sup>38</sup>

The climax of the whole invasion process of the African continent was the Congress of Berlin (1884-1885) which was called by the European *leading powers* to resolve diplomatically the conflicts over land. The solution, of course, was the division of the continent into areas of influence which were based on the actual conquests of each country, and the only way to categorically define such areas was,

<sup>38</sup> Source: <http://www.homestead.com/wysinger/berlinconference.html>

once again, by drawing borders. All the frontiers had been conquered by Europeans on the field, what was needed then was a ratification and the Congress of Berlin provided it, despite leaving enough disputes to contribute to the First World War.

The post-Berlin Africa was heavily marked by British and French presence, with Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia as the only independent countries, although Egypt was under the British Protectorate because of the Suez Canal. All possessions had access to the sea, and the only land-locked countries were still under the protection of the same European country, such as Bechuanaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyassa, all under Great Britain as was South Africa. The following table will attempt to summarise the characteristic of the Berlin borders by taking into consideration European interests and objectives only, which proves the 'weakness' inferred by Griffiths (1986).

Broadly speaking, however, it was the first time that African people were dealing with borders separating states, rather than a frontier zone, and since those borders had been drawn in Europe they took into little account the reality on the field, they had rather followed astronomical lines, as Barbour indicated in 1964<sup>39</sup>. However, as Griffith points out, African indigenous borders were taken into consideration whenever supported by treaties with local chiefs and kings, hence becoming assets in 'territorial bargaining' with other states<sup>40</sup>. The issues raised by this division of Africa are, nonetheless, related to borders only in so far as they separated ethnic groups. True enough, the Berlin borders were not enforced right away on the territory and, in peripheral areas, natives still enjoyed the environment and their societal relations as they used to. However, this changed with the independence of the African States, whose elites had accepted both the *status quo* and the European construct of the nation-state.

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<sup>39</sup> This theory was later discarded by scientists, but it is metaphorically very significant (Griffiths, 1886, p. 205).

<sup>40</sup> See Griffiths, 1986, p. 207.

Classification	Type	Justification
Geographical	All (mountain, river, lakes)	Most of the borders use natural geographical features, although the shapes taken by the country reveals the needs of colonisers (eg. West Africa). (Griffiths, 2001)
Historical & cultural	Superimposed	Even when previous kingdoms were present, they were disregarded by Europeans, with the exception of Ethiopia, the only Christian Empire, ruled by Prester John. (Reader, 1997)
Transboundary interaction	Separation	The main objective of the African partition was to create spheres of interests, and trade was prolific with the spheres or with friendly areas.
Duration	From 1885 to the 1960s	Despite previous presence, such as the Cape Colony, the border demarcation was effective only after the Conference of Berlin, and lasted until 1975 when all countries were independent from the Mother country <sup>41</sup> .
Pressure level on boundary	Dead	The borders were the African theatre of the two World Wars; and pressure was put on them only in war time, during and after colonisation.
Relationship to landscape	Artificial	In agreement with Muir that, as human product all boundaries are artificial and do not fit the natural and cultural environment.
Gen. S.W. Blogg's classification	Complex	Assuming this will entail a mix of the other types: physical; anthropo-geographical and geometrical.

**Table 2.8: Characteristics of African borders, derived from Muir (1975, pp. 126–130). Source: bibliography.**

<sup>41</sup> It must be noted that, for historic precision, one cannot accept theories that propose Zimbabwe independent in 1980 and South Africa in 1995. The fights which followed the unilateral declaration of independence in the two countries are to all effect civil fight for majority rule, against the national government. Mozambique and Angola, instead, were under Portuguese control until the Fascist dictatorship in the mother country was subverted, and the new government warranted independence to the colonies.

## 2.3 MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO AT INDEPENDENCE: INTERNAL CONFLICTS

*The Berlin Conference was Africa's undoing in more ways than one. The colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African continent. By the time independence returned to Africa in 1950, the realm had acquired a legacy of political fragmentation that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily. (de Biij et al. 1997, p. 340)*

The European influence in Africa brought theories and practices that were sometimes contradictory, as the anti-slavery spirit, but were mostly forced upon the territory and its people. Firstly, the use of cheap goods to trade in natural resources (minerals, animals and vegetal products) dismantled the ancient relation between natives and their land. Secondly, the occupation of growing portions of land forced locals into harsh inhabited areas, thus disrupting their traditional livelihoods and pushing them towards towns in search for work. Thirdly, religion offered sanitation to improve health and education to compete with the White man, at the cost of traditional beliefs and culture. Fourthly, the construction of the railway roads increased the exports of precious materials, gold and diamonds, and goods such as trophies, ivory and animal skins, at a high cost for nature, and people as working conditions in the mines worsened. Fifthly, the separation of society based on race triggered a hatred which is still felt today in areas where former White rule has stayed on after independence (South Africa and Zimbabwe). Sixthly, within imperialism lied the biggest hypocrisy of all, as natives were denied all rights in their own continent, but were forced to fight in two World Wars, both at home and abroad, defending a state that was not their own. Finally, borders separated cultural groups by placing them under different states and administrative systems, thus generating a class division according to the type of government and the wealth of the state, a community was falling under. Similarly, borders brought together ethnic groups whose history was one of war and conflict, hence creating *time-bombs waiting for a change of political circumstance to ignite the fuse*<sup>42</sup> and this is precisely what happened as States were acquiring independence in the 1960s. And since all the

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<sup>42</sup> Griffiths, 1986, p. 209.

major philosophers of independence agreed with this vision<sup>43</sup>, the question is why did the new African elite not challenge the colonial borders at independence?

### 2.3.1 *The rise of African Nationalism*

Davidson defines African Nationalism has a sentiment which originates from two different sets of people who, like in European countries at the turn of the XIX century, had the common goal of the nation but with a different socio-political idea for its implementation: the educated and the non-educated<sup>44</sup>. In the case of Africa, however, there are two further implications in the development of nationalistic ideas. The first is political and embedded into colonisation, hence fomented the misconception that freedom and independence from the European yoke would bring development<sup>45</sup>. The second is social and draws from the cultural gap between rural communities still relying on traditional polities, despite adjusting to modernisation, and the urban elite with a European education<sup>46</sup>. In between the two extremes, of course, there is a small but determinate group of people who aimed at liberation, but relied more on practicalities and left the solution of the divide till when the fights were over, but drew from the perceptions of both groups in the meanwhile<sup>47</sup>.

The degree of education brought to Africa by the missions increased to the extent of including University training in Western countries, mainly British, French and North American, where students learnt of philosophies talking of equality of all men (particularly Marx and Engels), of policies discussing the right to self determination of people, and experienced the benefits of living in a developed country<sup>48</sup>. This group of people, including the *assimilados*, typical of Portuguese and French colonies<sup>49</sup> and

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<sup>43</sup> See Farnon and Said in Seidman, 2004.

<sup>44</sup> See Davidson, 1992, pp. 21-51.

<sup>45</sup> As confirmed by Tshiyembe, 2001; Davidson, 1992, central chapters; and Pounds, 1992, II, p. 175.

<sup>46</sup> Davidson, 1992, Chapters 1 and 4.

<sup>47</sup> Refers to para-military groups, theory drawn from Hall&Young, 1997, pp. 61 – 80.

<sup>48</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 619-630.

<sup>49</sup> *Assimilados* were those native who managed to go through all stages of colonial education, hence proving worth of being assimilated within the 'European' elite. *Assimilados* were still treated as inferiors and mocked by both natives and European for wanting to be something different. In Rwanda, all Tutsis were 'assimilated' and took over the administration of the country, much to the discontent of the Hutus who looked for revenge as soon as European control was over.

the children of the *recaptives*<sup>50</sup> of the Western coast, came to form the intellectual and revolutionary elite, who praised for maintaining the European type of nation-state within existing boundaries, so as to exploit both their knowledge of and position within the system.



Map 2.7: African independence<sup>51</sup> (the independence of South Africa and Zimbabwe is arguable)

<sup>50</sup> Found in Davidson, 1994, *recaptives* were the liberated slaves who found home along the coast and had to adjust to new cities, custom and language, since they were unable to reach their original home. They gradually occupied niches in trade and administration, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Their wealth allowed them to give education to their children, who were ready to take over the control of the country at independence, arguing for modernity and a European type of nation-state.

<sup>51</sup> Source: <http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m10/activity4.php>

Such decision was dictated on the one hand by the easiness of continuity. Since all the administrative tools were in place, including borders, to change them would have meant the investment of huge capitals which the countries did not have. On the other, hand, to have maintained the *status quo* would have signified to maintain cooperation with the mother country, and Europe, by proving that all past was to be forgotten once independence was granted<sup>52</sup>.

Despite all calculations over how to reach independence and maintain relations with the colonial powers, however, the influence of Marxism and equalitarian theories<sup>53</sup> lead to the creation of para-military groups for independence who were persuaded that the only way to achieve full-independence, hence freedom and development, was through armed struggle<sup>54</sup>. One issue, however, associated both the elite and the guerrilla-fighter, the need to create a nation within the colonial boundaries, while refusing any idea of federalism<sup>55</sup>.

African Nationalism, therefore, relied first and foremost on the conception of Africa as a nation, which shared a common past and must build a common future based on political and social independence from the coloniser. In this sense the situation of both South Africa and Zimbabwe is open for argumentation as technically the former had been self-governing, under the status of dominion, since 1910, and both had been independent from the mother land since 31<sup>st</sup> May 1961 and 11<sup>th</sup> of November 1965, respectively. Of course, what was missing from the independence discourse was democratic and socio-economic rights for the majority, that is all Black citizens. The struggles which followed, therefore, led not to the independence of the country but the establishment of a democratic government of majority rule, rather than a segregationist regime.

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<sup>52</sup> Davidson, 1994, pp. 113 – 114.

<sup>53</sup> Reader, 1994; Seidman, 2004; Masolo, 1994.

<sup>54</sup> Fanon in Seidman, 2004, and Masolo, 1994.

<sup>55</sup> Davidson, 1992, p. 113.

### 2.3.2 *The implementation of African Nationalism*

As African colonial states were granted independence, the real implications of the 'weak' superimposed borders and of the differences between *tribalism* and modernity were surfacing and causing major disruptions to the development process. Despite being yet another European construct, *tribalism* is used here to indicate those groups of Black Africans who were looking at independence as the possibility to create the African nation-state rooted into traditional structures and hierarchies, particularly in Western Africa where the memories of the Asante kingdoms and Igbo civilisation were still visible<sup>56</sup>. As this dream was shattered and federations opposed, the Igbo secessionist movement seeking to fund the independent state of Biafra was promptly repressed by the Nigerian military. This was the first of a long series of civil fights in post-independence Africa<sup>57</sup> which proved that, despite Marxist demagoguery against the Western states whose capitalism was the climax of imperialism, the *status quo* was not being questioned.

Furthermore, the Organisation of the African Unity, founded in 1963, made a point of clearly stating in its Charter that *all member states pledge 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state'*<sup>58</sup>. This pledge, of course, grants the new sovereign states the duty to create a nation out of the patchwork of communities, which compose the state, and the right to defend those borders for its security and integrity, which according to Tshiyembe is the principle behind the creation of the European nation-state<sup>59</sup>. And the number and types of national conflicts which devastated the continent from independence until present demonstrate the validity of this theory. If Nigeria shows the difference between tribalism and modernity, Zimbabwe determines the importance of *tribalism* even within those groups who aspire to modernity. Despite having been united in anti-segregation fight, Shona and Ndebele groups had separate training centres and patrons (Mozambique and Zambia,

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid; and Reader, 1994.

<sup>57</sup> A fully comprehensive list can be found in Burger, 1997, pp. 164 – 165.

<sup>58</sup> Quote from Paragraph 3, Art. III, of the Charter of the OUA, in Griffiths, 1986, p. 213; see also Burger, 1997, p. 163.

<sup>59</sup> Tshiyembe, 2001, p. 44-45.

respectively), as well as belonging to different spheres of influence: ZANU PF were Marxist and ZAPU were Maoist. After the signature of the Lancaster House Agreements in 1979, the two parties lead the government, despite disagreement, under Pres. Robert Mugabe. The majority of the ZANU PF members, including the President, are Shona, the dominant ethnic group in the country under Monomotapa until the arrival of the Ndebele of Mzilikazi, in the mid XIX century. Under the OUA pledge, Pres. Mugabe created a case against possible insurrections in the South and asked North Korea to train his military, despite argumentation from Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU. In the second half of 1981, the President called for the *Gukurahundi*, which in Shona means 'the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains'. The situation worsened and in 1983 the Korea trained Fifth Brigade, answerable only to the Prime Minister, followed the command of eradicating of dissidents, of course Ndebele people in the South. It is curious how metaphores repeat themselves throughout African countries, suffice it to mention the Hutu call to 'cut down the tall trees' and 'crush the *Inyenzi*', thus beginning massacres in Rwanda<sup>60</sup>. The Zimbabwean genocide counted between 3,000 and 4,000 deaths, plus tortures and detentions<sup>61</sup>, and almost an entire generation of Ndebeles was slaughtered to create Shona supremacy both in government and in population numbers. The invention of the Shona Zimbabwean nation-state, in fact, began with the choice of the country name, which means 'the house of stone', referring to the Great Zimbabwe site home of the old Shona king, continued with the adoption of the Zimbabwe bird, also symbol of the Monomotapa kingdom, and concluded with the elimination of most of the non-Shona members of the government, as well as the physical elimination of thousands of Ndebeles.

If the creation of African Nationalism, in the idea of Fanon, as the violent struggle against colonisation lead to the misjudgement that independence would bring freedom and prosperity, the implementation of African Nationalism in a European

<sup>60</sup> See Reader, 1994, pp. 665 – 668; and the movie 'Hotel Rwanda' directed by Terry George and distributed by Lions Gate Films MGM Distribution Co., released on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2004.

<sup>61</sup> Legal Resources Foundation and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 2007, part II. Numbers are undervalued.

style nation-state confirmed that African boundaries were markers of no state. With a few exceptions, such as Botswana and Zambia, all independent countries have faced brutal internal conflicts to define supremacy, hence sovereignty. In many cases, such conflicts were fomented by the Cold War, not only in terms of political theories but above all in terms of financial and military support, thus suppressing all attempts to peace and development.

### 2.3.3 *The multi-national state*

The failure of imposing the European model of nation-state in post-colonial Africa, despite attempts to legislate the established borders, lays in the many conflicts generated to define power-relations between conflicting ethnic groups within the same country, as it has been the case for Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and is the case for Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somaliland, and Sudan to name but a few. Geographically, most issues could be solved by shifting borderlines so as to group together ethnic group with a common heritage and separate those who have been in conflict. Politically, however, the situation is more complex as the OUA only allowed one border change between Swaziland and South Africa in 1982<sup>62</sup>, and generally prefers non intervention over border issues. Furthermore, the inference of international political and economical interests validates all theories on a new type of imperialism, through economic dependence.

The solution to the failure of the nation-state in Africa, as posited by Thsyiembe (2001), is the creation of multi-national states, by acknowledging that within existing borders many *nationalities* coexist. Therefore, if the borders cannot be challenged, the construct which they protect should be. Multi-national states are not new to the Political Geographical scene, suffice it to mention Switzerland, the Russian Federation, pre and post 1989, former Yugoslavia, China, Belgium, but few have survived the turmoil of political change, either because of a strong undemocratic government or because the shared contemporary history has created a bond that overcomes ethnic differences. In Africa, however, the presence of many ethnic-based

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<sup>62</sup> Griffiths, 1986, p. 214.

military dictatorships has failed on the one hand to construct a nation most citizens could identify with, and on the other to deliver development by plunging the continent into economic and political enslavement to either economic lobbies (oil, diamonds, IT minerals) or to international organisations (the creation of a UN system dedicated to Mozambique only is emblematic). Yet, the presentation of South Africa as a *rainbow nation*, encompassing of all ethnic representations in society, could be seen as the first attempt to drop ethnic rivalries and past conflicts, so as to establish a future of cooperation and growth. Were it not for the intrinsic xenophobia of South Africans of all colours and religions, the country's aspiration to oversee African development, and the racial issues visible in everyday life (exemplified by the existence of a law defining racial quotas for employers, until Spring 2006) the rainbow nation would succeed in producing a political model for the continent. The role of South Africa behind the creation of the African Union from the ashes of the OUA, and its lobbying for the new interventionist philosophy *vis à vis* violations of funding principles, show that Africa has entered a new phase, where sovereignty is no longer in the hands of the nation-state only, but it is shared with supranational entities whose decision-making may change the course of events. This is a challenge to the European model of nation-state, it must be said, but again it follows the Western model of concerted decision-making, and reminds more of the Restoration and the Concert of Europe, rather than of the European Union.

In areas of economic and political stability, however, the idea of a multinational state has surfaced with the promotion of cross-border cooperation, thus taking the multinational issue a step further. Ideally one could posit that by accepting that borders divide communities, which are at one time part of a nation yet bound to localities, to reduce border formalities where encroachment occurs would entail the creation of a multi-national cross-border community. Reality, however, is less influenced by social politics, and more by geopolitics and economics. The one issue, as old as Imperialism, of access to sea, for trade, and the need to create a competitive economic space which relies on the balance between developed and developing

countries may effectively lay behind the shift of the Southern Africa Development Committee toward a EU type of organisation, centred again on the role of South Africa. Letting security, read *immigration*, issues for others to solve, South Africa has opened doors for trade within and without the country in the SADC region, beginning with the abolition of visa permits for SADC residents and the reduction of import-export fees for goods, with a final aim of creating a space of free movements of people, goods and services, by 2010. The multinational state, therefore, has been by-passed to create a cross-border community, whose integration though is arguable.

## **2.4 THE PEACE PARKS: OPEN BORDERS ACROSS SOUTHERN AFRICA**

When the African frontiers changed into borders, these have been contested because they took in little consideration native populations and their space. When independence struggles began, fights occurred mainly along the borders to reach the core of the state in an attempt to define the new state. At the turn of the XXI century, African borders had been swinging from national core to periphery settling finally somewhere in between as conservation areas, which had been established to create buffer zones or to give remote areas a purpose, and became increasingly important in developing political strategies both nationally and internationally. The Peace Parks of Southern Africa quickly embodied the ambitions and challenges of the region, which still await resolutions, such as security.

### **2.4.1 *From conservation to natural resources management.***

From 'exclusive' conservation, which entailed excluding native people from fenced areas to protect African wildlife, to participative conservation, which imposed conservation and related business as a socio-economic development strategy for previously excluded native communities, South Africa and neighbouring countries had to reconsider regional wildlife protection and economic development in terms of cooperation<sup>63</sup>. Each decision had to be effective and symbolic had the same time, so

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<sup>63</sup> Büscher and Dietz, 2005, pp. 2-3.

as to guarantee international political and financial approval, and conservation was to make the heyday of post-liberation Southern Africa.

The conservation paradigm shifted from 'state-centric' fortresses for animal protection to CBNRM<sup>64</sup>, due to the social and ecological unsustainability of the concept. On the one hand, in fact, communities could no longer be excluded from the use of natural resources in the New South Africa, and on the other hand animal populations were exceeding the carrying capacities of protected areas. Furthermore, culling could not often be justified in the light of radical Western-style environmentalism and animal protection. These issues had to be inscribed in the regional context whereby, with the exclusion of Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia, all countries had recently ended horrific wars of destabilisation leaving the population poorer and traumatised, and wildlife depleted because of hunger and illegal trade<sup>65</sup>. When the first CBNRM projects began to fail, due mainly to the lack of decision-making devolution at the grass-root level, another concept which accidentally would have helped very well the South African strategy of inclusion and protection was internationally approved: Trans-boundary NRM. The basic definition of TBNRM as *any process of collaboration across boundaries that increases the effectiveness of attaining an Natural Resource Management or biodiversity conservation goal(s)*<sup>66</sup> implies the existence of a combined political will to manage or preserve the environment across the borders, thus renouncing to part of their sovereignty over their territory. TBNRM developed into conservation strategies that would enhance the existing protected areas to form the typically South African concept of TB Protected Areas, with the purpose of strengthening the ownership of the concept<sup>67</sup> and take it a step further with Peace Parks. The concept of Peace Park, however, is not uniquely South African, contrary to popular belief, as it can be traced back to the establishment of the Waterston-Glacier Park, in 1832, between the USA and Canada, and to the

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<sup>64</sup> Dzingirai, 2004.

<sup>65</sup> The trade of ivory, particularly, was conducted by the military in exchange for payment, see Ellis, 1994..

<sup>66</sup> Van der Linde *et al.*, 2001, p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Wolmer, 2003, van der Linde *et al.*, 2001 and Griffins *et al.*, 1999.

theorisation of 'Parks for Peace' by IUCN in the 1980s<sup>68</sup>. The creation of the Peace Parks Foundation, however, by Mr. Anton Rupert with Prince Bernhard of Belgium, centred the 'Parks for Peace' discourse over the Southern African regions whose past of war and exclusion was to be forgotten in the name of conservation and sustainable socio-economic development, all supervised by the New South Africa, the *Rainbow nation*.



Map 2.8: In the green circles all the TFCAs overseen and funded by the PPF (Source: PPF, 2007)

#### 2.4.2 Origins and objectives of the Southern African Peace Parks

Much discussion has been carried out in scholarly papers and technical publications about the importance of correct terminology, for the correct objective, in dealing with TFCAs and Peace Parks. Specifically, the use of IUCN categories to

<sup>68</sup> Derived from van Amerom and Büscher, 2005, see also van der Linde *et al.*, 2001, and Budowski, 2003.

identify the degree of required protection in a specific area to either plan or discuss planning was exploited to the point that, based on field experience and literature, IUCN began to work of a new category that would accommodate the needs of conservation and the rights to development, beginning with considerations over the real possibilities offered by TFCAs<sup>69</sup>. The aims and objectives of this project, instead, bear a different meaning in so far as land management and security issues are concerned.

The Peace Parks Foundation, as the umbrella organisation, was created with the general objective of 'securing space' for transfrontier conservation, by Mr. Anton Rupert with Prince Bernhard of Belgium, also co-founders of WWF South Africa, with Pres. Nelson Mandela. Following from the international lead over the need to manage ecosystems for conservation, whilst allowing local communities around protected areas to pro-actively enjoy the benefits of conservation by working for it<sup>70</sup>, the PPF took over the role of supervisor and fundraiser for TFPA projects on the South African soil, recently looking at the region with Zambia and Malawi, as shown by map 2.5. The idealistic vision stated by the organisation is rather a dream of a fenceless Africa, that is an Africa without borders:

*Dream of ancient migration trails trodden deep by an instinct that time has never contained. Dream of a wilderness where the elephant roams and the roar of the lion shatters the night. Dream, like us, of experiencing Africa wild and free, where people can reap the benefits of nature and in turn support her. This is the dream of Peace Parks Foundation. A dream that will only be realised through the establishment of peace parks<sup>71</sup>.*

This concept is perfectly in line with the African nationalism theories which see the continent as a country, sharing positive and negative issues, but it also justifies the criticism on the possibility of a new Cape-to-Cairo colonisation project, in the name of conservation<sup>72</sup>, as well as the more cautious view of a top-down land and resource management approach disguised by the 'socio-economic development' and

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<sup>69</sup> Nhantumbo and Magane, 2005.

<sup>70</sup> From Duffy, 2001, van der Linde et al., 2001; Sandwith et al., 2001; Wolmer, 2003,

<sup>71</sup> See official website: [http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=6&pid=5&m=3\\_1](http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=6&pid=5&m=3_1)

<sup>72</sup> Moore, 1997.

‘community participation’<sup>73</sup> plans which recur in all project planning. In fact, transboundary conservation is the central objective of the Peace Park Foundations and the main attraction for donors, as clearly stated also in the official publications<sup>74</sup>. Furthermore, the key objectives of the PPF foundation in fostering TFPAs may be summarised as follows:

- 1) to help the protection of biodiversity;
- 2) to re-establish migratory routes for animals;
- 3) to promote the image of a peaceful region;
- 4) to help the local communities that live within or near the area.

Whereby, the protection of biodiversity is the main objective<sup>75</sup>, the re-establishment of migratory routes is a by-product<sup>76</sup> eventually linking the whole region, the promotion of a peaceful region is a consequence and the contribution to local communities is a recent *addendum* due to the critical reviews over the failure of TFPAs in the whole region (a) to actively involve local populations in the conservation process, (b) to allow for participation in income-generating activities, (c) and to include traditional NRM into land management for conservation. On this last remark, however, it is worth noticing a new vision of the PPF, whereby *peace* is no longer promoted as the opposite of *war* in the regional context, but as personal internal peace with the environment. One is left to wonder if this change in ideals might underpin the acknowledgement that (a) the region is not peaceful; (b) the failure to directly address development issues within conservation and security priorities might impair the original idealism, whereby the area will no longer see conflict.

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<sup>73</sup> The most productive critics of the GLTFCA project in a Political Ecology perspective are Wolmer and Duffy, extensively quoted in literature. The ODI has also published a few papers on the issue with a general view of TFCA projects. Recently, two IUCN officers, Nhantumbo and Magane, have co-authored an unpublished paper, on the impact of TFCAs on local livelihoods. Finally, Jones deals with land use and protection conflict along the Southern side of the South African and Mozambican border.

<sup>74</sup> See mainly van der Linde *et al.*, 2001; Griffin *et al.*, 1999; the GLTFP treaty in Peddle *et al.*, 2004.

<sup>75</sup> See the website [www.peaceparksfoundation.org](http://www.peaceparksfoundation.org), and publications within.

<sup>76</sup> See conclusions from Anderson, 2002

### 2.4.3 The security challenge of Peace Parks

Developed to respond to the needs of conservation in the new context of ecosystems protection within a bio-region, some TBPAAs were incorporated by the PPF into the new dream of nature preservation for the benefits of wildlife, visitors and local populations. It is of no surprise, therefore, that one of the key events which marked the new conservation philosophy of Southern Africa would be the Makuleke Land Claim.



**Map 2.9:** The Makuleke store pointer indicates the former village and military post during the bush war.

The Makuleke used to live near Crooks' Corner in Pafuri, the northernmost area of the KNP, and were forcibly relocated outside of the park in 1969. In the 1990s, the community began a law suit to claim the land back on the basis of the Nama claim for the Richtersveld National Park in Namaqualand, Cape Province. In 1998, the Makuleke won the claim and the land<sup>77</sup>, but there is a sheer discrepancy between what was publicised in the media and the real settlement deal. On the one hand, the

<sup>77</sup> Mahoney and Van Zyn, 2001.

Makuleke's became the success story of people over conservation in the New South Africa, but in reality the SANP remained a partner in the land management for fifty (50) years, renewable, as the area became a Contractual Park. Furthermore, the Makuleke, unlike the Namas, were not allowed to move back to their original Kraal, or to use natural resources, but had to commit themselves to develop the area for tourism and accept conservation as the only land use<sup>78</sup>. So despite the legal form of the Contractual Park, a big novelty at the time of the Nama concession, the Northern section of the Kruger may be seen as reductive in terms of benefits to the rural communities.

The Makuleke Land Claim, which could have appeared as settlement of a past injustice, is in fact a reminder that conservation is a priority, especially along border areas where human geography is so contrasting with political geography: where communities are united across boundaries. Whereas it is obvious that in a protected area conservation should be paramount, in fact, one can only explaining the contractual differences between the Namaqualand and the Makuleke example by looking at the geographical context of the contested area. Being still the wealthier and more developed country of the region, with ethnic groups that represent the whole SADC thanks to the mine-related immigrations of the past century, South Africa attracts millions of migrants in search for a job or a fortune. The continuous influx of people into a political and economic systems which is precarious, and perceived as such by its citizens, has generated a sort of xenophobia towards the alien people who come to depredate the country and make it unsafe<sup>79</sup>. Unemployment rates and criminality are often perceived in South Africa as by-products of illegal immigration from poorer countries; ironically, however, South Africans are in turn perceived as the criminals in neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Swaziland<sup>80</sup>. Nonetheless, illegal immigration and illegal

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.; interview with Colleen Mullen, Manager of Pafuri Camp for Wilderness Safari.

<sup>79</sup> MacDonald, 2000, p. 2-3; Nduru, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Conversation with Ms. Ana Leão, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Research, Pretoria, and qualitative data collected through informal conversation in both Mozambique and Swaziland. Mr. Garreth Evans, owner of the Engen Petrol Station in Mbabane, Swaziland, remarked that the

trafficking particularly on South African Eastern border from Zimbabwe all the way down to Swaziland, along Mozambique, are reaching concerning levels in terms of stolen vehicles, weapons, drugs and wildlife by-products. The refusal to allow the Makuleke people back into their traditional kraal close to other Shangaan people, in this context, fits the governmental need to reduce and halt this movements of goods and people, despite regional SADC politics say otherwise, particularly when they occur through protected areas.

## 2.5 CONCLUSION

Conservation, in the past decade, has opened the border which were had been frontier lands of war since the 1970s with the aim of preserving the African environment and contributing, with income-generating activities to the socio-economic development of border communities living outside the Parks, but often inside the Conservation Areas. The Peace Parks are the marketable tip of the iceberg in such huge project as it aims at combining such objectives, while generating an image of peace and cooperation between countries previously at war. This aim, however, is in stark contrast with the security needs of South Africa as the economic centre of developing peripheries. The Rainbow Nation, in fact, feels threatened by the numbers of immigrants who mostly illegally cross borders to find work, and may end up joining existing criminals. As Mac Donalds points out, however, job seeking is not 'the only reason that people go to South Africa' for, more common is shopping and visiting friends and family<sup>81</sup>. The close relation between people within and without South Africa is to be found in the history of planned migrations for mines and farms, and of course to the demarcation of borders which divided ethnic groups. Of course, the close net of people often engages in informal, at times illegal, cross-border trade, but because the political and economic regional trend is towards integration on the basis of the EU model, conservation is asked once again to serve

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number of theft experienced in the area had increased after the elimination of the visa requirement to cross the border. The criminal records also escalated in Maputo where, in the year which followed the opening of the border, car hijacking, armed bank robberies and armed burglary had increased from a figures that were close to irrelevant.

<sup>81</sup> MacDonalds, 2000, p. 8.

the political purpose of separation and border patrol. Whilst opening up frontiers for animals and tourists, the Peace Park may end up closing borders for local people and begin the cycle of exclusion.

### 3. THE BORDER WARS: NATIONAL STRUGGLE OR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE?

*All men recognise the right to revolution: that is the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist the government when its tyranny or its inefficiency are unendurable. (Thoreau, 1986, p. 389)<sup>1</sup>*

The modern history of Africa is constellated by movements of resistance to the establishment, being it the French ruling in the North, the German, Portuguese and Belgian domination in the centre and the East, or the British and Boer command over the South. Such movements were varied, according to locations and the type of domination, and involved different ethnic groups. Despite peaceful resistance, operated by a few African monarchs throughout the continent<sup>2</sup> and the adjustment of liberated slaves in both Liberia and the Gold Coast<sup>3</sup>, the first and most important resistance to foreign dominance was the Nama and the Herero rebellion in 1904 against the German military regime in modern-day Namibia (West-South Africa)<sup>4</sup>. The rebellion ended up in an overwhelming victory for the German soldiers, of course, followed by a semi-total extermination to extinguish any last flame of the fire. This, however, was not a national struggle as land and culture were only a secondary issue compared to the frustration of hierarchical relations; it was rather an act of civil disobedience, of rebellion against a system – colonialism – that was no longer *endurable*.

Nationalism is still a delicate issue when discussing the native rebellions to the colonial regimes, especially during the independence wars. In a political geographical perspective, in fact, nationalism characterises those movements of people united under linguistic and cultural backgrounds, which aspire to self-

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<sup>1</sup> H.D. Thoreau wrote 'Civil Disobedience', where this statement is taken from, was printed in Elizabeth Peabody's *Aesthetic Papers*, published by Ticknor and Fields, Boston, 1866, in order to clarify his position on slavery and the injustices perpetrated by the American government.

<sup>2</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 573 – 577.

<sup>3</sup> Davidson, 1992, pp. 21 – 35.

<sup>4</sup> Reader, 1994, 587 – 590.

governing<sup>5</sup>. Ethnicity, for instance, may be considered the fundament for a nation; but, if Africa had to be divided into ethnic groups, the continent would become a puzzle of little states, such as Lesotho and Swaziland, most likely at war between them for boundary issues. As it was in pre-colonial time, each border would be a frontier to break with a population to conquer and/or enslave and resources to raid<sup>6</sup>. To this the Colonial power superimposed *boundaries which [...] are so nonsensical that without our sense of unity they should be a cause of friction*<sup>7</sup>, in the words of the Kenian President Julius Nyerere. And yet, this sense of unity only works on a continental level as an expression of African Nationalism, not on the local level where ethnicity has proved to be a strong discriminator in post-independence state-formation.

Ironically, if we consider ethnicities as nations at the embryonic stage only, the first national struggle in Southern Africa was the Anglo-Boer war. Having been cut off from the mother country, the Boer people of South Africa created a nation of their own within the land they had occupied in the Cape Colony first, and in Orange and Trasvaal after the British occupied the Cape and Natal. The Boers represented a nation of their own, as they shared: culture, societal structure, and land, notwithstanding the belief in a God-sent mission to civilise the natives, as still represented in modern monuments<sup>8</sup>, and above all a language, Afrikaans, which was no longer Dutch, rather a mixture of all European minorities which were in time incorporated into the Boer society and became one nation. The British wanted the land, because of its natural resources (gold and diamonds), and were prepared to go to war for it. The Afrikaaners, therefore, defended their nationhood and nation against a different culture and establishment. It is only by a historical accident, one may say, that the Afrikaaners considered their own a land that belonged to all the

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<sup>5</sup> See definition in Pounds, 1992, p. 19

<sup>6</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 283 – 290. The system of raid and loot is typical of pre-colonial inter-ethnic wars, and has been replicated in post-independence conflicts.

<sup>7</sup> Reader, 1994, p. 659, Julius Nyerere was the first leader of independent Tanzania, and a strong supporter, with Mozambique, of the SADCC as the platform to complete the independence of all Southern African states. He pronounced these words at the first meeting to form the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in Addis Abeba, May 1963.

<sup>8</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 479 – 490. Also not the *Afrikaanse Taal* monument in Pearl, Franshoek, Western Cape.

other ethnic groups they were annihilating through enslavement and religious teaching. The British, on the other hand, were engaging a nation-state into war in order to break through the *frontier* and incorporate the rich lands of the Rand<sup>9</sup>. Since the British victory, however, instead of engaging into acts of civil disobedience, the Afrikaners entered the new political and economical system, based on white minority ruling, and to an extent dominated it on a local level first, then on a national level after the unilateral decision to leave the Commonwealth and pursue a policy of racial segregation, *apartheid*, in order to maintain the status quo in South Africa.

Other countries in the region adopted the same segregationists policies and refused to abide by the new sense for political democracy and ethnic justice which followed the horror of concentration camps and the Holocaust in Europe: namely, Angola and Mozambique, under the dictatorship of Salazar from Portugal, and Rhodesia, under the political leadership of Ian Smith. This decision motivated the embargo from the Western countries on all goods, including weapons, trade and worldwide competitions, and this is how South Africa (at the time including also South-West Africa) and Zimbabwe became industrially and agriculturally self-reliant. *Apartheid*, however, had a deeper long-term impact in the region, which is only being measured now in terms of perception, psychological and physical damage yet, as it sparked off from acts of civil disobedience: the border wars (or bush wars).

By focussing on the South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique border wars, though mentioning the full extent of the military operation by placing them into a broader geographical, political and economical context that is both regional and international, this chapter aims: on the one hand at suggesting the use of the expression *independence fights* (stemming from civil disobedience) as a more appropriate term to indicate the struggles in Angola, Mozambique (from Portugal), Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (from *apartheid*); on the other hand at demonstrating the politicisation of the South African conservation processes,

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<sup>9</sup> The Rand is the geographical area around Johannesburg where all the diamonds and gold mines were found.

including the Great Limpopo TFCA. It will firstly discuss the origins of the wars, the development on the field and the changes which in time shifted the course and the impact of the conflicts. Secondly, it will discuss the effects of the war on the frontiers between the three countries, which defines one aspect of the permeability of the Pafuri border area. Finally, it will discuss the outcomes of the peace process for both Mozambique and the two other countries involved, thus introducing the theme of migration in the GLTFCA.

### **3.1 THE IMPACT OF APARTHEID IN THE REGION**

Regimes of racial segregation were not uncommon in the colonies, regardless of the European country of affiliation, however, they could no longer be condoned after the extremes to which Nazism took the theories of the race. Despite this change in the ethical morality of the international opinion, racial segregation was still perpetrated in many countries but in one place a name was created to define the political system it was based on: *apartheid*. In a conversation with a group of young South African people, held in Maputo in November 2006, everyone agreed that the big mistake of South Africa was not to have based a social system on racial segregation, but to have given a name to this socio-political structure that was refuted by the rest of the world, although widely practised between the lines. This is true in the sense that racial discrimination is still a considerable problem in the whole world but, unlike the South African, Rhodesian and pre-independence Mozambican governments, the rest of the world tries to fight it, not to regulate it. In fact, while the world was supporting majority rule in the colonies, the Southern tip of Africa continued to perpetrate colonial policies, which in turn prompted acts of civil disobedience, leading to independence fights. Apartheid, as enforced in Rhodesia and South Africa, actually, had the greater impact in the contemporary history of the region, as the countries organised themselves to protect both their boundaries and their economy and instigated a series of wars that shattered the regional economy, deranging its population. What triggered such deployment of military force was, of course, the independence of both Mozambique and Angola after the end of the Fascist regime in

Portugal, and the threat posed by FRELIMO political affiliation, as well as its successful nationwide policies<sup>10</sup>.

### ***3.1.1 The first Border War: Rhodesian defeat***

FRELIMO was the only organised rebellion group during the fights for the colonial independence of Mozambique, consequently it is of no surprise that its hierarchical elite took power after the Lusaka agreements with Portugal's democratic government, in 1975. As part of a network of parties and military groups which aimed at establishing national independent governments in Africa under the aegis of Communism, FRELIMO supported rebellious groups in the region specifically ZANU led by Mr. Robert Mugabe and the South African ANC, as well as the respective armed wings (ZANLA and MK), by allowing them both to establish training camps in the country<sup>11</sup>. When in 1975, *Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seemed to have made the tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table*<sup>12</sup>, South Africa and Mozambique were beginning to feel the threat a Rhodesian conflict would impinge over their economy.

South Africa and the USA, at that stage were favouring a diplomatic resolution of the controversy, but Ian Smith shared a different opinion as *the 800-mile-long border with Mozambique, [was paved with] 3,000 armed, trained and increasingly bold black Rhodesian guerrillas stand[ing] ready to attack. [And on the opposite side of the border,] At least 5,000 more, in a half-dozen camps, are being trained by Chinese and Mozambican advisors to make deadly forays back into their white-dominated homeland*<sup>13</sup>. The province of Gaza, bordering both South Africa and Rhodesia, became both a stronghold for ZANLA rebels and a battle ground for the parties involved, particularly in the area

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
<sup>10</sup> Hanlon, 1991, as well as Hall & Young, 1997, and Pitcher, 2002, describe in detail FRELIMO's post independence policies and agree that on education and sanitation, the government managed to reach unprecedented levels without foreign aid. On vaccination, especially, the country received a mention from the World Health Organisation.

<sup>11</sup> Find more information in both Hall & Young, 1997, and Minter, 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Rand Daily Mail Editorial, May 1976, in Anon. 1976, p.2.

<sup>13</sup> Anon, 1976, p.2.

between Chiqualaquala and Chokwe. Regardless of what happened in the rest of the countries, war was waged in this border area for over ten years, where the winds of nationalism were only blowing with new military attacks.



Map 3.10: Supply routes to Rhodesia (Source: Selous Scouts website, 2006)

The Rhodesian response to the civil disobedience was repression and, even before Mozambique took the unilateral decision of closing the borders with Rhodesia in 1976, thus cutting off the two most straightforward supply routes for the land-locked country, the regime of Ian Smith exacerbated both national politics, by grouping native communities into Protected Villages that were easier to control (based on the Portuguese *aldeamento*), and international politics by creating, in 1974, the Selous Scouts - the Tracker Combat Unit - responsible for most of the events of the Bush War. Aside from the conscription system enforced, free-lance combatants were hired from abroad, and included Vietnam war veterans from the USA and Australia.

After Mozambican independence, in fact, Rhodesia's military strategy changed to adjust to the new situation. The rebel movements were being supported both militarily and logistically by two neighbouring countries (Mozambique and Zambia), it was therefore essential to protect the borders and to adapt conventional war tactics to guerrilla warfare whose aim was not just to fight the terrorists but to destabilise the one country which had altered regional balance, i.e. Mozambique.

The Selous Scouts were engaged and became operative for the first time in August 1976 with their first mission across the border, and their ruthlessness was such that the unit was dismantled straight after independence. Furthermore, a deeper and more effective strategy of creating a Mozambican insurgency movement was sought with the Project MNR, whose first leader was André Matsangaissa, an Ndaou (Shona speaker) and ex-FRELIMO army commander<sup>14</sup>. Project MNR was essentially the creation of a military force whose role was to complement the Selous Scouts into destabilising Mozambique. In fact, whereas the Selous Scouts were operating mainly along the borders and conducted 'hit and run' attacks, MNR members were spread inside Mozambique to recruit new members, while terrorising civilians and destroying infrastructures. Both Selous Scouts and MNR forces were soon to incorporate native people in order to infiltrate rebel groups and begin a real propaganda campaign in Mozambique. The MNR recruitment, despite what some may argue<sup>15</sup>, was not always based on volunteering, as detailed by Minter's field research<sup>16</sup>, and relied on the implementation of a *contras* strategy in the neighbouring country.

Conversely, to define the Zimbabwean resistance as a national struggle is not so straightforward for many a reason. The most basic one is that three parties were


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<sup>14</sup> The ethnic affiliation was very important to RENAMO as, unlike FRELIMO, they maintained the importance of ethnical divisions amongst the Mozambican population. The RENAMO elite was Ndaou, and all recruits had to learn Ndaou as the only language spoken amongst the militia. This naturally affected popular support to RENAMO, particularly in Gaza where the Shangaan population had demonstrated military supremacy over the Ndaou under Soshangane (Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005)

<sup>15</sup> See Anon, 2002, and field work: conversations with former Selous Scouts members, Maputo, May 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Minter, 1998.

involved in the contest for the country: ZANU, ZAPU and the segregationist government, each fighting for their own nation. Secondly, despite different Russian and Maoist affiliations, respectively, ZANU and ZAPU were fighting for the same aim: native rule, or at least majority rule, that is power to the native people. History shows that nationhood was never a drive for the struggle thus suggesting the assumption that what has been called *national struggle* was, actually, an act of civil disobedience.



Map 3.11: Selous Scouts external operations<sup>17</sup> (Source: Selous Scouts website, 2006; field work)

Theoretically, it would not be possible to otherwise explain the almost total extermination of the Ndebele people in the South, carefully planned by the Shona leaders. Similarly, one is left to ask which country were MNR, later RENAMO, and FRELIMO fighting for. On the one hand, Minter claims that the FRELIMO idea of that state was funded on people, particularly peasants, which is why, as it is often pointed out, the policies were aiming at breaking away from traditional customs and

<sup>17</sup> The letters in red refer to targets: on C and D, the areas of the GLTFCA, a series of operation were conducted from 1976 to 1979, namely Operation Detachment against the ZANLA base in Chigamane; Operation Long John, ZANLA base in Mapai; Operation Maradon, against ZANLA and FRELIMO at Jorge do Limpopo and Massengena respectively; Operation Aztec against both ZANLA and FRELIMO at Jorge do Limpopo, Mapai, and Madulo Pan.

move towards a positivist approach into education, health and work organisation<sup>18</sup>. However, by seeking support at the local level first and by enforcing such modernising policies<sup>19</sup>, FRELIMO created internal divisions which were exploited for a little but sufficient time by RENAMO, an advocate of ethnicity and traditional practices, including witchcraft and magic<sup>20</sup>. On the other hand, RENAMO would never have been created had it not been for the Rhodesian involvement, and the amount of support it had acquired both militarily, at the time, and political at present, is not sufficient to define it a national movement, as people were generally afraid of its members rather than agreeing with their cause<sup>21</sup>. The whole project seems more like an extension of the Rhodesian frontier into Mozambique, as the Zimbabwean – Shona rebels were hosted and supported by FRELIMO and NMR was supported by Rhodesia.

To conclude, the Selous Scouts and MNR, were militarily responsible for the end of the Zimbabwean internal conflict, with yet an operation that deeply affected the Gaza Province: Operation URIC/Bootlace. Considering the frequent and uncontrollable incursion of ZANLA militants into Rhodesia, a major operation was devised to persuade the Mozambican government to discontinue their support to ZANLA fighters. This was obviously a *contras* style of attack, detailed in Map 3.3, which also included non-military objectives, such as the mining of roads, in the area from Chiqualaquala (then Vila Salazar) to Chòkwe. The general aim of the operation was to force ZANLA out of Mozambique, and to an extent out of the war, by

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
<sup>18</sup> Minter, 1998, p. 126; such theories are shown into Hall & Young, 1997, but were clearly expressed by first and unforgotten leader Samara Moisés Machel (Machel, 1975, pp. 32-35; 50-58). In addition, the creation of the Mozambican national identity follows the patterns discussed in Ch. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 89 - 137

<sup>20</sup> See Roesch, 1992; Hownwana, 1997.

<sup>21</sup> According to the literature, only Ndaou people did follow RENAMO militias willingly by accepting the ethnical approach. In the northern provinces, where conflicts between the FRELIMO affiliated Muslims and the locals clans were stronger, the latter sided with RENAMO to protest against the government. Apart from these two exceptions, however, RENAMO was joined by youngsters who saw in the lure of the militias the end of poverty and subjugations, regardless of ethnic affiliations. These were banned from their family and clan, because they chose to become 'bandits', as RENAMO fighters were called by the people. (See Roesch, 1992; Lubkemann, 2005; Honwana, 1997)

showing the Mozambican government the damage that Rhodesia could inflict onto its country and people<sup>22</sup>.



Map 3.12: The extension of Operation URIC into Mozambican soil (Source: Rhodesian Forces website<sup>23</sup>)

<sup>22</sup> Binda, unknown.

<sup>23</sup> Detail of Operation URIC can be found on the sites belonging to former Rhodesian army members, such as the one where this map was taken. However, to give an example of the type of human resources Rhodesia could count on, it must be said that in this operation 15 Selous Scouts died, against

<sup>300</sup> ZANLA and FRELIMO.

The plan worked, and after this operation Robert Mugabe was forced to sit at the negotiating table at Lancaster House. Much to the Rhodesians' dismay, however, the Lancaster House meeting was not a surrender of ZANU, but a devolution of powers which was enforced in 1980. Similarly, however, Ian Smith was forced to negotiate due to the pressure of South Africa, which was no longer going to support logistically and militarily the Rhodesian struggle. Operation URIC was, therefore, the last Rhodesian attempt to affirm their supremacy.

Far from being over, however, the internal conflict in Mozambique was just at the beginning of a 12 year war, as the ANC/MK was still enjoying the support of fellow Samora Machel, and South Africa took over the MNR project and the Selous Scouts, then based at Phalaborwa, to continue the *contras* war of destabilisation with the help of the CIA. The border war was incorporated in the 'Total war', which South Africa waged on the Eastern and North-western front (until the independence of Namibia), but Mozambique, unlike Angola, had to fight it alone, with the logistic support of Tanzania and the ideological support of the Soviet Union.

### ***3.1.2 South Africa's total war: the geopolitical contexts***

Mozambique counts some 10 ethnic groups, divided into subgroups and sub-languages: if Zimbabwe dominated by two main groups only (Shona and 'Ndebele) cannot be a nation, it is rather unlikely this could happen in Mozambique. Paradoxically, FRELIMO original policy of 'Mozambicanisation' was the only solution to create a nation within its boundaries, which is fully contextualised within African Nationalism and the post-independence pressure to adopt the European model of nation-state, instead of adjusting to the African traditions and reality. Admittedly, as argued in the previous chapter, the nation-state allows for major control over people and this is exactly what post-colonial governments needed in order to become operational within a short lapse of time. However, as the African borders are the never-ending legacy of colonialism, although define the embryo of a nation-state, one must agree that fights cannot have a nationalistic character so long as the ethnic divisions are the cause of internal conflicts and massacres, as the recent

history of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe show. Similarly, the war engaged by South Africa in the 1980s, as the only survived enclave of White domination in the continent, cannot be classified as a national struggle, firstly because the majority of the population was cast outside the nation, secondly because the South African whites themselves were not sharing the same idea of nation, but of state (as in the government). South African apartheid regime was mainly in the hands of the Afrikaaner population, although most of the other white minorities shared the same political view. With the shift in regional geopolitics, towards Communist native governments, South Africa was facing economic isolation and political threat from the increasing ANC activism. As Olton rightfully states, the 'Defence White Paper' of 1977<sup>24</sup> marked a turning point in the future of the region. By acclaiming P.W. Botha at the head of the state and by acknowledging the SADCC, dominated by the Front Line States<sup>25</sup>, as the catalyser of economic development strategies, South Africa opened the way for a 'Total War' as the ultimate means to re-establish itself as a leading power in the region.

In the regional geopolitical context, therefore, the 'Total War' strategy pursued by South Africa on the Mozambican and the Angolan/Namibian fronts from the beginning of the 1980s could be seen as a suicidal attempt to maintain a state that was politically anachronistic, yet economically self-sufficient. Having suffered a tightening embargo since the unilateral decision of 1961, South Africa proved to have a strong economy able to manufacture all that was required for the country to progress, whilst heavily financing the military sector to support Rhodesia and eventually prepare to fight its own war. Of course, sharing benefits amongst a little percentage of the population only, did help balancing the sheets, nonetheless the

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<sup>24</sup> Olton, 1990, p. 21.

<sup>25</sup> The Front Line States defines the group of Southern Africa States which, after acquiring independence, began to work for a common future for economic development within the umbrella of the OUA. The group features Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania as leaders. These constituted a political *front line*, as they were affiliated to the Soviet Union (with the exception of Lesotho and Botswana), and eventually a military *front line* as they supported the insurrection movements against South Africa, thus becoming involved in the contras war against the apartheid government and, indirectly, the U.S.A. (Gervasi, 1984; Olton, 1990; Reader, 1994; Minter, 1998; Anon. (a), 2006)

collapse of the system in the New South Africa does tell a great deal about state management.

In the international geopolitical context, therefore, the 'Total War' is inscribed into the Cold War system of areas of influences. As discussed in the previous chapter, furthermore, the new wave of African nationalism and independence shared the only aim of ridding the continent from imperialism and racial segregation regimes, with theories that were based on Marxist philosophy and Communist ideals of justice and equality<sup>26</sup>. It does not surprise, therefore, that when in need of financial and political support, the dissident groups and the new independent state would turn to either the Soviet Union or China for help in implementing their preaching. This allowed the Communist block to create a growing area of influence in Africa, thus influencing the bi-polar division of the world, much to the USA dismay. As the only anti Black-rule and anti-communist country left in Southern Africa<sup>27</sup>, South Africa attracted invariably the attention of the USA as a means to halt the spreading of Communism in the region, without engaging a direct war. The military support through the CIA to the SADF, in the Reagan years, and the public and private financing of operations both on the Angolan and Mozambican fronts increased through time, regardless of international condemnation of South African politics. After Reagan, in fact, it was the most conservative wing of the Senate and the Congress which privately sent money with the help of the CIA<sup>28</sup>. Such great contribution also explains how South Africa could continue to thrive economically, despite the heavy toll of two wars.

### ***3.1.3 The Angolan and Mozambican fronts of South Africa***

After Rhodesian defeat, therefore, capitalist South Africa was surrounded by new majority rule governments, within a communist frame, hosting and supporting the

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<sup>26</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 623 – 630.

<sup>27</sup> Malawi was ruled by a Black puppet government, affiliated to the USA, which also contributed to South Africa military operation during the war with Mozambique, whereas Swaziland and Lesotho were too weak to fight against South Africa (Minter, 1998, pp.152-155, 220 – 252).

<sup>28</sup> Minter, 1998, Chapters 1 and 2.

terrorist movements which were aiming at subverting the establishment. On the east front Mozambique was supporting the ANC whereas, on the north west front, Angola was supporting SWAPO, of Namibia. Three important differences must be drawn between Angola and Mozambique, at this stage.

Firstly, in the independence fight against Portugal, Angola had two separate movements, both referring to a communist cause: FNLA, the National Front (1957), and MPLA, the People Movement (1956) for the Liberation of Angola. Only at a later stage, FNLA lost power to Unita, a politically independent military movement which was funded by Jonathan Savimbi in 1966. Faithful to the African tradition of post-colonial politics, each party had a different ethnic affiliation, but it was the MPLA which came to form a government. Savimbi, then, used Unita to trigger a civil war within Angola, and thanks to his lack of political affiliation easily found support from South Africa and the USA in the fight against communism. Strategically, in fact, Savimbi wanted power, the USA wanted sympathetic governments to extend its political influence and maintain the oil supplies, and South Africa wanted to maintain its position in the region. The cooperation between the three parties was, therefore, a win-win-win situation in principle. Since the Second World War, however, Angola had been very close to Europe and North America, because of the oil resources it could provide, and this relation continued even after the soviet-style people's republic was installed after 1976<sup>29</sup>. The USA therefore were on the one hand supplying Unita with weapons and funds to defeat MPLA, and on the other politically supporting the MPLA official government to maintain oil supplies. On its side, the Angolan government was politically affiliated to the Soviet block, but economically obliging to the capitalists powers. Mozambique, instead, was far from the economic scene of the Cold War and barely implied politically, because FRELIMO took the Marxist turn at its 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress in 1977, only<sup>30</sup>. Furthermore, the civil war stemmed from the involvement of a foreign country successfully tapping

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<sup>29</sup> Minter, 1998.

<sup>30</sup> Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 61 – 72.

into localised discontent and the resulting military group was acquiring consensus by terrorising people, more than by proposing a viable government alternative.

Secondly, Mozambique had the political support from the Soviet Union, but never a consistent financial or military contribution to the war or against the droughts and famines, which hit the country since 1981<sup>31</sup>. As a matter of fact, in 1983, the country was refused entrance in the COMECON, the Russian economic cooperation agency<sup>32</sup>. Angola, instead, managed to get financial contribution from Russia and part of the Cuban army regularly on duty along the borders, where the South African *contras* were dislocated. The centrality of the Angola situation to the power-balances of the Cold War and the regional position of South Africa, which was risking of losing both South West Africa and the war against communism, can be inferred from the international involvement in the geopolitics of Southern Africa. Furthermore, the suggestion made by Olson that the years 1989-1990 might mark a third change in regional geopolitics, due to the relaxation of the USA-USSR relation and the foreseen independence of Namibia<sup>33</sup>, shows that on the Western front people were fighting for self-determination along one of the frontiers of the Cold War. The difference in type and amount of support received by Angola and Mozambique is critical in analysing the two fronts and the South African strategies. Bearing in mind that 'Total war' was accepted by the Apartheid government only in 1978 with the appointment of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister, South Africa had been suffering from the official embargo on weapons since 1977<sup>34</sup> and had to define a cost-effective military strategy which would allow it to maintain a strategic position. As Olson also points out, the creation of contra-insurrection groups composed of Angola and Mozambican nationals, respectively, would allow South Africa to maintain a detachment from the two *civil wars*<sup>35</sup>. At the same time, however, the SADF could focus on more strategic operations in the hotspots, whilst organising logistics for the

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<sup>31</sup> Hanlon, 1991.

<sup>32</sup> Anon, 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Olson T., 1989, p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 22-23.

affiliated groups. On the Angola front, in fact, the major and most infamous operations, such as the Askari and the Protea occurred. Whereas, considering that Mozambique had to rely on its own army, with little contribution from Zimbabwe, SADF was mainly concerned with supplying and training RENAMO, from its base at Phalaborwa, through the Fifth Reconnaissance Regiment, and patrolling the border, with the Sixth Reconnaissance Regiment, with the important contribution of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts<sup>36</sup>.

Thirdly, Angola had been engaged in a war knowing exactly who the enemy was, thus allowing for more efficient tactics. Despite having to face a *contras* type of conflict, in fact, the number and quality of SA military operations, together with the support given to Unita, were 'balanced' by the support MPLA was getting from Cuba in the defence of its own government and the support given to SWAPO of South-West Africa. In Mozambique, instead, the situation changed dramatically after 1984, when the 'Nkomati Non-Agression Pact' was signed between the two parties, which *pledged both sides to prevent "armed bands" from organizing within their respective territories*<sup>37</sup>, with reference to RENAMO for South Africa and MK, the ANC armed wing for Mozambique. The first four years of the 1980s, brought havoc into the country with the occurrence of two major droughts, with consequential famines, in the rural areas<sup>38</sup>. Because of the destabilisation perpetrated by RENAMO, which focussed on the destruction of communications, roads and bridges, hospitals and other basic infrastructure, it was very difficult for the FRELIMO government to devise emergency plans to tamper the situation and, by 1984, the country was forced to the negotiating table both politically, by adopting politics that were more inclined towards the West in the hope of help<sup>39</sup>, and militarily with the agreement at Nkomati

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<sup>36</sup> See Anon. 1996, based on the CIA World Factbook and the Library of Congress Country Studies – South Africa. From now on these regiments will be called 5<sup>th</sup> Recce and 6<sup>th</sup> Recce. The Selous Scouts flag, in fact, was officially standing with the SADF ones at this base, where most of the Rhodesian soldiers were taken straight after the Lancaster House agreements, by silent agreement between the two countries (Allport, 2007).

<sup>37</sup> Ibid; see also Anon, 2006; Pinto & Huber, 1985.

<sup>38</sup> Hanlon, 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

between Presidents Samora Machel and P.W. Botha. The Agreement, of course, also included an economic plan which would help both the South African economy, by distributing exports with Mozambique (thus avoiding competition) and the Mozambican economy, by entering in the sphere of a powerful neighbour<sup>40</sup>. Finally could it be just a coincidence that, after three years of pledges, it was only in 1984 that Mozambique was granted its first IMF loan and became the largest recipient of the U.S. Food Aid Program<sup>41</sup>? Nonetheless, whereas Mozambique did respect the pacts, South Africa continued its contribution to RENAMO, though to a lesser extent. This resulted into an unfair conflict as Mozambique, having lost the support of MK guerrillas in the Maputo province, saw the Zimbabwean contribution reduced to the Mutware-Beira corridor for the transports of goods between the two countries, whilst RENAMO managed from the Gorongosa National Park, its headquarters, to increase its activities in the Gaza, Inhambane and Zambesia Provinces, with excruciating violence. The 5<sup>th</sup> Recce continued to train new RENAMO members and to carry out brief infiltrations across the border, whereas the 6<sup>th</sup> Recce was responsible for the supplies of goods and weapons. The events, which could have had a positive turnout for both countries, instead, developed an unfair conflict to the detriment of Mozambique, and specifically its southern provinces which could guarantee air and land contact with South Africa, whilst the withdrawal of Malawi from supporting RENAMO<sup>42</sup>, through the SADF, smoothed the overall situation in the northern provinces.

### ***3.1.4 The 'Total war' along the Mozambican border***

The South African – Mozambican border along the KNP from Pafuri down to the Indian Ocean was seldom theatre of important military actions other than reconnaissance trips in the South. However, the permanence of contacts between the SADF and RENAMO continued after 1984, thus requiring new strategies for support to the Mozambican soldiers. By this stage, in fact, RENAMO had become a fully

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<sup>40</sup> Pinto & Huber, 1985.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

Mozambican army, whether by will or by force, with a separate agenda from the South African destabilisation plans. The formation of a solid hierarchical group of combatants, in fact, had prompted aspirations in the future ruling of the country, once FRELIMO had been defeated. If on the one hand South Africa had hoped to install RENAMO as puppet government and accrue its regional powers, on the other hand the RENAMO elite felt ready to respond to such call<sup>43</sup>. Ironically, therefore, the role played by the Army base of Phalaborwa became even more strategic in the aftermath of the Nkomati Agreement, since the contacts between SADF and RENAMO had to be carefully planned, and could no longer freely rely on air bridges to the Gorongosa National Park. In the Gaza Province, therefore, RENAMO converged in the areas close to the border to intensify contact with South Africa; at the same time, in the central areas north-east of the Gorongosa soldiers had to rely on looting from already impoverished villages which exasperated the situation to actions of sheer cruelty and cannibalism<sup>44</sup>.

Although local villagers at Pafuri remember moving location because of the *Ian Smith's war*<sup>45</sup>, the presence of SADF military and SAPS along the Limpopo River in the Venda and Makuleke sections of the present-day Limpopo province was irrelevant as non-disruptive, although remnants of their presence are still visible at Crooks corner, where they had a semi-permanent camp both before and after 1980. Training camps for the 44 Parachute were also carried out in the area<sup>46</sup>, thus enforcing the idea that military presence at the Pafuri border had become increasingly acknowledged since the end of the 1970s and the creation of a border post during the 'Total War' was but an actual proof of the sensitivity of the area<sup>47</sup>. On

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<sup>43</sup> The lack of a RENAMO political programme at present (interview with Ms. Paola Rolletta, freelance journalist, media advisor for the Comunità di Sant'Egidio, Maputo), in fact, shows that the party has never grown apart from the military targets and objectives it was given by Rhodesia and South Africa.

<sup>44</sup> Stories of cannibalism perpetrated by RENAMO fighters are widely told in the Provinces of Inhambane and northern Zambesia in particular, for sources see Newitt, 1994.

<sup>45</sup> As referred to by all interviewees in Pafuri, and on many occasions by Simon Chaukwe, elder of Dumela.

<sup>46</sup> McAleese, 2000.

<sup>47</sup> Before 1996, in fact, the UNHCR began repatriation from South Africa, the border was just a military post, close to transit (interview with Chief Tshabalala, Pafuri BP, 12 December 2006).

the one hand, the traditional social and economic bounds between populations in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique, hence the movement of people across the border, posed a security threat to South Africa, since any native could have been a potential terrorist affiliated to MK. The presence of an area filled with wild animals, far from becoming the hoped for buffer zone against illegal migrations, was perceived locally as the law-less frontier zone it used to be in the previous century, thus requiring systematic patrolling. Simultaneously, the creation of refuge camps intensified migrations into South Africa and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the security issues were also allowing the contacts between SADF and RENAMO, who used the bush as a hideaway.

No evidence was found during the course of the research of important operations, of the magnitude of URIC/Bootlace, to have been carried out by South African troops in the Pafuri area, or in the Gaza Province, other than patrolling and supplies. However, this is not surprising considering the type of conflict engaged with Mozambique, whereby South Africa's role was reduced to training and weapon supply to RENAMO. Furthermore, South Africa's direct involvement had to be kept particularly secret after the Nkomati agreement, not to incur in a breach of a multilateral agreement brokered by the U.S.A. Within the context of the 'Total War' engaged by South Africa, therefore, the Mozambican border was only marginal to the broader geopolitical context. However, it reconnects to the discourse of using conservation for political geographical aims, as the KNP did facilitate military operations in the sense that it was a problem-free buffer zone, unlike other populated areas. Furthermore, it facilitated the extension of the SADF operational territory in the Mozambican state. In both cases of the Rhodesian and the South African war, therefore, Mozambique lent itself to be a frontier land.

### **3.2 THE PEACE PROCESS AND REGIONAL INDEPENDENCE**

The mid 1980s, despite the deceit of the Nkomati Agreement, brought new international political geographical conditions which contributed to smooth the

situation in the region and negotiate the peace in Southern Africa. Firstly, the involvement of UN agencies for emergency relief programme and the establishment of organised refugee camps in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania contributed to bring to international attention a war which had been avoiding the spotlight since its commencement, thus showing on the one hand the incongruences of apartheid and on the other the tragedy of what became known as the Mozambican civil war. At the same time, international civil pressure on the injustices of the apartheid regime gathered momentum and impact on both U.S.A. and U.K. governmental strategies<sup>48</sup>. Secondly, after the closing down of the Reagan era, the tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. were allayed, and the gradual dissents of the civil society in the Soviet Block brought winds of change in Eastern Europe, thanks to the sensible leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Thirdly, the moderate civil society of South Africa began to protest against apartheid side by side with ANC affiliates, as Nelson Mandela was praising for abandoning the armed fight and resorting to peaceful civil disobedience only. At the end of the Eighties, the whole world was changing and this directly impacted on the 'Total war' strategy.

### ***3.2.1 The last two years of a decade: international geopolitics and regional impact***

In 1989 the world witnessed the most meaningful geopolitical event since the end of the Second World War: thousands of people dismantled the Berlin Wall, which had been separating a continent in the name of political philosophies, and the world at a high human cost. As it has been shown, the 'Total war' was fully embedded into the Cold War scenario, on both fronts, and would possibly not have been happening without this international context. The most important influence on the Southern African conflict, however, concerned South Africa only, as with the end of the rivalry between the East and the West, the main reasons for the U.S.A. support to Botha's government were undermined. In fact, the only financing sent, by then, from the States was produced by private politicians, not by the government. Therefore, less

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<sup>48</sup> Hufbauer *et al.*, 2006.

funding meant less feasibility of carrying on a war which most of the citizens, regardless of skin colour, were no longer approving.

In 1989, President Botha had a small heart failure which prevented him from maintaining his position, and F. W. De Klerk was voted as his successor<sup>49</sup>. De Klerk was a *dove*, which placed him in contrast with the military type of government which Botha had been running for over ten years. His political vision led to two major changes which constituted landmarks in the recent history of the country, and by and large to the region: the independence of Namibia and the release of Nelson Mandela, from his prison in Franshoek, Cape Province, with five other ANC members.

Both events happened in the 1990 but were announced as soon as De Klerk took office, thus reinforcing the anti-sanction faction in the West led by President Bush senior and P.M. Thatcher<sup>50</sup>. The progressive disarmament of the Angolan border and the loosening of relations with RENAMO were directly imputable to this political decisions. At this stage, however, as mentioned in the former section, the involvement of South Africa was barely influential, as RENAMO had acquired a status of its own within the country. Furthermore, on the international scene another event influenced South Africa. Despite being strongly supportive of the Angolan war because of its interests in oil, the Bush administration had to fight a direct conflict thus cutting down on the financing to Savimbi<sup>51</sup>, and by extension to South Africa. Already at the end of 1989, in fact, the First Gulf War was looming over the U.S.A. and the Western countries were called to defend Kuwait, a major USA-friendly oil reserve in the Middle East. The States military expenditure was expected to soar over the next year, and Bush senior could not loose the Angolan oil reserves. Therefore, in November 1990, both Russia and the States became directly involved in the peace negotiations between Unita and MPLA, and Mozambique indirectly<sup>52</sup>. A year later,

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<sup>49</sup> Minter, 1998, p. 64.

<sup>50</sup> Hufbauer *et al.*, 2006.

<sup>51</sup> Minter, 1998, p. 68.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

the MPLA refuted its Marxist-Leninist approach, which FRELIMO had done in 1990 already.

In 1990, according to international requirements, FRELIMO adopted a multi-party system based on democratic elections, so as to eventually incorporate RENAMO as a second political party. This event marked the complete abandonment of any soviet-style political ambition and opened up the negotiation table, under the aegis of the Roman Catholic *Comunità di Sant'Egidio*, which was persuaded by the Mozambican government to hold the peace negotiations in Rome. In 1991, the first round of agreements allowed for the ceasefire on the Limpopo and the Beira corridors. In October 1992, finally, a total ceasefire<sup>53</sup> was agreed upon and Mozambique began to look at the future.

At the same time, De Klerk gave a strong signal of the direction South Africa was taking with the liberation of Nelson Mandela. This began the peace negotiations between the government and the ANC, including MK. Escalated violence in 1990, due to De Klerk's refusal to consider majority rule and the permanence of apartheid regulations in local municipalities, however, did not make the process easy. In the same year, in fact, Mandela also threatened to unleash ANC violence through MK, if problems did not stop in Natal, where Battalion 32 was also briefly involved, Soweto and other problematic areas. The gradual lifting of all sanctions, instead, promoted the inclusion of South Africa into the post-Cold War socio-economic system, and in 1993 De Klerk and Mandela were awarded the Nobel Price for Peace. In 1994, finally, South Africa saw its first democratic elections, much to the dismay of all the soldiers who went back to civil society in a different world.

### ***3.2.2 South Africa withdraws from the frontier and protects its borders***

In order to reach its political strategy, South Africa extended its frontier in Mozambique and Angola for over a decade, with direct and indirect military operations. Post-apartheid South Africa, instead, had to monitor what was

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 68 – 69.

happening within its borders and build a nation over a past of racial discrimination. Of the possible liberated South Africa scenarios, posited by Davies, the outcome was an attempt towards democratisation based on 'non-racist socialism'<sup>54</sup>, that could manage the country politically and economically under the great umbrella of the *rainbow nation*. What is of interest to this thesis, however, is the widespread xenophobia which developed in South Africa amongst people of all colours and races due to immigration from neighbouring countries. Despite being unable to provide for its own citizens, despite the employment quotas set within the frame of the Black Empowerment and the failed promises for extended socio-economic rights, in fact, South Africa is still wealthier than Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where most of the *aliens* come from<sup>55</sup>. The paradox of post-apartheid South Africa therefore is that it acts as a pulling factor for jobseekers abroad, whilst being unable to satisfy its own citizens thus generating conflict situations, particularly in the bigger cities of the former Transvaal area, where most immigrants concentrate. Studies have suggested that the type of migrant has changed during the years, and has conformed with the general movements of people imposed by globalisation, to include professionals who move around the region and the continent<sup>56</sup>. In addition, visiting friends and families is another reason why people go to South Africa from the region, yet the idea that foreigners are the cause of all crimes is instilled in the minds of all South Africans to the point of generating violent reactions towards immigrants.

Social debates aside, the migrations are perceived by the government as a national security threat, as it is often impossible to control these movements, particularly in permeable border areas, hence the need to enforce stricter controls without loosing credibility within the region, the continent and the world. The question, however, was how could the *rainbow nation* close its door to the people in need? The solution to the conundrum lied into finding a way to extend the frontier once again, whilst continuing with the politics of regional economic cooperation and

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<sup>54</sup> Davies, 1990, pp. 145 – 146.

<sup>55</sup> Term borrowed from Whitman, 2000

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

integration which South Africa supported within the SADC and the AU. Once more, the interests generated by the savannah environment and its endangered wildlife provided the perfect solution: by promoting transfrontier conservation and natural resource management, in fact, there would be the need for serious border patrol in all countries involved in order to halt poaching and create a safe environment for tourists. Furthermore, the removal of population along borders areas to create protected areas would extend the frontier zone between the countries that would be more difficult to cross because of wildlife and policing.

Without creating a cause-effect scenario, therefore, it is relevant to point out that the implementation of TFCA in post-apartheid South Africa would serve the security objective on the one hand, and the economic objective on the other by promoting Southern Africa as a peaceful area, where freedom is enjoyed by all, at last.

### **3.3 PERMEABLE BORDERS IN EAST SOUTHERN AFRICA**

The previous sections have presented the historical events leading to self-determination of Southern African countries, within a regional and international geopolitical context. By now, it is clear that South Africa always played a key role, since colonial times, in shaping the political and economical future of the region. Furthermore, the international politicisation of anti-apartheid movements and the appointment of Nelson Mandela as the personification of African nationalism, as posited by Fanon<sup>57</sup>, have contributed to create an image of the country as an 'all welcoming' place embodying the new and successful liberated Africa. Of course, the level of political stability and development of post-apartheid South Africa is comparably higher than in the rest of the region, particularly in respect with Angola and Zimbabwe, for great political instability, and Mozambique and Malawi, for poverty and unemployment. However, the socio-economic issues the ANC had to address once in power were clearly beyond their managerial limits, as the country is experiencing (1) lack of local development, (2) failure to deliver effective health and

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<sup>57</sup> See Chapter 2, section 3.2, Fanon envisaged armed struggle, alongside political action to reach full independence from Imperial powers (Seidman, 2004)

sanitation measures, (3) soaring crime rates, which could even impact on the choice of South Africa as the host country of the 2010 Football World Cup, as the government is failing to actively solve the situation<sup>58</sup>, (4) a consistent breach in human rights both socio-economic and political. Migrations from the SADC region, in the form of jobseekers, refugees and potential criminals, furthermore is worsening the relation between the people and their government, in that xenophobia is a cross-cultural and cross-social feeling which is not being addressed. But, it must be stressed, the border separating South Africa from the rest of the region was never a strong one.

Borrowing from the geographical approach followed by Bukowczyk *et al.* (2005) in their study of the U.S.-Canadian permeable border, this section will aim at explaining the migrations patterns of the region, with a special focus on the South Africa-Mozambique-Zimbabwe border by illustrating the regional human geography, in a historical perspective, the 'pull' factors exercised by extensive farming and mining, the 'push' factors caused by regional wars and conflicts, as well as the conflict situations South Africa is experiencing at present due to the permanent influxes of people both legally and informally.


### ***3.3.1 The Limpopo River: a natural border or a cradle for settlements?***

In the descriptive section about borders, it was stated that African borders drawn in Europe use natural landmark to define a territory, but this does not necessarily acknowledge the population patterns of the area. Being Africa, specifically the desert and the *lowveld* areas, a particularly dry place in relation to Europe, water is a precious resource and people tend to settle close-by it. The catchment basin of a River therefore becomes a natural enclosure for settlements, and the River a

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<sup>58</sup> The new USA Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. Eric Bost, has expressed his concerns over security issues with regards to the 2010 World Cup, considering the high rates of crime throughout the country and the governmental failure to address the situation (Anon, 2006b). Mr. Charles Nkagula, the Safety and Security Minister addressed the South African Parliament on soaring crime rates and popular concern by saying that 'they can continue to winge until they are blue in the face, they can continue to be as negative as they want to, or they can simply leave this country' (ENews, South African television channel, the footage is available online at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2QK1PBZo5Y&mode=related&search=>, added on the 25<sup>th</sup> October 2006)

landmark of unification instead of a barrier. The settlement pattern on both sides of a River, in this view, simply defines a clan separation within the same ethnicity and follows the land use of agro-pastoral societies, which place agriculture and grazing land on the River bank to simplify irrigation schemes.



Map 3.13 Land formations of the Limpopo River basin (Source: ARC-LNR & IWMI, 2003)

The Limpopo River basin, separating Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (in a west to east direction), boasts a catchment area of about 413,000 Km<sup>2</sup> hosting a population of 14 millions<sup>59</sup>. This population belongs to the Congo-Niger Bantu speaking group, but is divided into three main ethnicities (Sotho-Tswana, Nguni and Venda), whose location and affiliation has changed over the years. Considering the wealth in natural resources, it is not surprising that the Limpopo basin saw the raise of two main civilisations of the African Iron Age: Mapungubwe, at the conjunction between the Sashe and the Limpopo Rivers (Botswana - South Africa - Zimbabwe), and Thulamela, just a few kilometres south of the conjunction between the Luvuvhu and the Limpopo Rivers. These civilisations thrived between 500 AD, with the first settlements at Mapungubwe, and 1000 AD with Thulamela<sup>60</sup>. Furthermore, findings at these sites demonstrate not only the natives' ability to manipulate metals, including gold, and to carve River shells,

<sup>59</sup> ARC-LNR & IWMI, 2003.

<sup>60</sup> The third great civilization was, of course, the kingdom of Monomotapa at Great Zimbabwe.

ostrich egg shells, ivory, bones and wood, but also the existence of a trade network linking the inland areas with the coast, as proven by the discoveries of Chinese porcelain and glass beads<sup>61</sup>. The presence of precious minerals, such as gold, in fact, provided the best exchange currency until the increase in demand of a different resource changed livelihoods and migration patterns in the area: slaves. Practiced by the Arab since 750 AD, the slave trade never reached the numbers required by Europe and the Americas from the XVI century onwards<sup>62</sup>, despite official bans.

Considering the livelihoods necessities imposed by a harsh environment, therefore, it seems clear that there was a major misunderstanding as for the definition of frontier between the natives and the Europeans, who applied their geopolitical construct in the division of the continent. As it was the case for all major African Rivers, the Limpopo was a catalyser of human settlement and activities<sup>63</sup>. Dwellings, in fact, might have occurred on each side of the River, but these were not comparable to the village polity as we know it, and posited it, in Europe. These settlements were *kraals* headed by a military chief or an *Induna* (elder, also chief in Tsonga), and hosted his extended family, including slaves<sup>64</sup>. Each kraal was under the leadership of a common chief, therefore all kraals were administered by a single person and its councillors. The Shona kingdom, for example, was ruled by the Monomotapa, but extended for kilometres in all directions from the area now known as Great Zimbabwe (the administrative and religious centre). This explanation helps to place the human geography of the Limpopo basin in an African political context, which differs from the traditional European administrative divisions, whilst being comparable to medieval polities. The River, therefore, was never interpreted in African tradition as a barrier between people, but a place where people could live

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<sup>61</sup> Visit to Thulamela archeological site, with KNP ranger and guide, 12<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

<sup>62</sup> Withman, 2000, p.12; Reader, 1994, symbolically in Chapter 28, *Merrie Africa*, and in the following chapters.

<sup>63</sup> The field research of Mpofu *et al.*, 1999, also confirms this theory by stating that from the group discussions carried out in Sengwe Communal emerged that water attracted the first settlers because of direct and in direct benefit, such as the River basin vegetations and the good soils.

<sup>64</sup> As Reader, 1994, points out the practice of having slaves was always in use in Africa. In the traditional society, however, slave were subject to a family after their population had been conquered and could aspire to become free subjects.

and thrive, notwithstanding the presence of wildlife threatening both human beings and crops. The African frontiers were not visible as land marks, but were indicated by barren areas where no people could live.

### ***3.3.2 Migration Patterns in the Limpopo River Basin: needs and traditions***

The western side of the River basin was part of the cyclical migration territory of the Khoisan populations, who now are split between hunters gatherers in the Namib and the Kalahari desert and sheep-herders in Namaqualand, but once formed a distinct language group: the !Kung. Having acknowledged that both the !Kung and the Niger-Congo Bantu are two of the four most ancient languages in the world (the two others being the Nilo-Saharan of the Maasai and the Afro-Asiatic of Ethiopia), it is worth noting that *to speak one of [the Khoisan languages] fluently is to exploit human phonetic ability to the full*<sup>65</sup>. The typical Khoi sound obtained by the clicking the tongue on the palate has been incorporated in the majority of Congo-Niger Bantu languages in South Africa, thus providing more information on the order of arrival of the Bantu speakers in the area and the degree of contact and assimilation with the Khoisan<sup>66</sup>. Contacts, in fact, could not be avoided as the Khoisan were the first people to establish a cyclical migration pattern from Southern Zimbabwe to the Cape Coast.

The second migration pattern was formed by the arrival of first Niger-Congo Bantu speakers<sup>67</sup>, from the area now spanning South Nigeria and Cameroon, and their 'colonisation' of Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>68</sup>. These 'people' settled in the area included within present-day South Africa, to the west, and Tanzania, to the East, and generated various ethnic groups which had an undeniable impact on the population patterns of the area. The first classification of the Bantu groups was published in four volumes by Malcom Guthrie, between 1967 and 1971. Guthrie produced both a

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<sup>65</sup> Ruhlen in Ross, p. 71, and in Robert Wright, p. 67, as quoted in Reader, 1994, p. 107.

<sup>66</sup> Johnston, 1973, differentiates Nguni languages in terms of permanence in the area, by the influential click of the tongue, typical of original South African languages.

<sup>67</sup> The term Bantu was created by the German philologist Wilhelm Bleek to describe a group of languages amongst which *the word-stem ntu, meaning some thing or person, is universal* [and the] *prefix ba denotes the plural, so literally ba-ntu means 'people'*, see Reader, 1994 p. 176 (underlined words indicate Italics in the original).

<sup>68</sup> Reader, 1994, pp. 175 – 178; see also map in Attachment 4.

genetic classification and attempted to reconstruct the *Proto-Bantu*, that is the common language shared by a very heterogeneous group of people. The most succinct and recent operation of classification, however, has been compiled by Jouni Filip Maho<sup>69</sup>, and shows the ethnic affiliation of each language group from Rwanda to the Cape, thus contributing to the historical understanding of forced and traditional migration patterns within the Bantu.

In so far as the Limpopo basin is concerned, one anomaly is worth mentioning, though, and that is the absence from all three classifications of Shangaana, the Nguni language brought to the area by Shoshangane, the Zulu general who occupied the actual Gaza Province in Mozambique. In all publications, Shangaana is associated with Tsonga, but a historical explanation of affiliation is never provided<sup>70</sup>. As both Tsonga and Ndebele are present in the three classifications structured by Maho<sup>71</sup>, and both languages pertain to the history of the Pafuri area, it would be consequential to suggest that the Tsonga language represents the Shangaana and not vice versa. Therefore, the population in Sengwe and Gaza, self-defined Shangaana, should be Tsonga speakers, whose first leader was Shoshangane. Consequentially, the term Shangaana should simply indicate the historical origin of this group, not its language<sup>72</sup>. Furthermore, the Ndebele people are often associated to the eastern section of Zimbabwe, which is not correct if we agree with Etherington's study on African cartography<sup>73</sup> and historical events. The history of both the Ndebele and Shangaana group, in fact, may be seen as emblematic of motives and occurrences of migrations in Southern Africa.

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<sup>69</sup> Maho, 2002, the relevant pages from the Guthrie classification is found in Attachment 5.

<sup>70</sup> Connor, 2003; Wolmer *et al.*, 2003; Jeater, 2001; Johnston, 1973.

<sup>71</sup> Maho, 2002.

<sup>72</sup> On this subject, more information is required to understand if *Shoshangane* was given to Manicusse as a name upon his arrival in Mozambique, or rather if *Shoshangane* gave the name to its people and the River Changana, running through the Gaza Province.

<sup>73</sup> Etherington, 2004, conducted a study on the false information provided by cartography based on missionaries and first explorations and printed up until the 1850. As used by modern researchers, they provided a skewed image of historical human geographical patterns in the Limpopo River basin.

The third migration pattern was established by a well known historical event, Shaka Zulu's *mfecane* (the crushing). The Zulu settled in present day Kwa-Zulu Natal are part of the Nguni linguistic group (which extends through Mozambique all the way to Malawi) and the makers of XIX century history of Southern Africa. The climax of the Zulu kingdom was reached under Shaka, the illegitimate son of the previous king Dingiswayo, because born out of his illicit affair with Princess Nandi kaBebe, a relative from the eLangeni clan<sup>74</sup>. Shaka was a despot whose strength in fighting and brightness in military strategy allowed him to conquer, within the first two years of his reign, fifty (50) neighbouring independent kingdoms with the exception of the Basotho, whose king Morena Moshoeshoe - *the African Socrates*<sup>75</sup> - managed to maintain amicable relations<sup>76</sup>. At one stage, however, his strategy became fury and that is when the big migrations towards the north and away from coastal areas began. Du Preez places the beginning of Shaka's crushing at the moment his beloved mother died<sup>77</sup>. However, this explanation seems rather naïve when looking at what was happening around the kingdom in the early XIX century, that is the intensification of the slave trade around Delagoa Bay, where the Portuguese fort was built. Within the first half of the 1820s, it is known that one of Shaka's general had left because threatened by his king. Mzilikazi migrated north with kraal, and in line with Nguni traditions he conquered all the groups he met on the way, eventually settling around the Magaliesberg mountains north of current Pretoria. The Tswana gave him and his people the name of Matabele, a general term to indicate people coming from the South East. However, faithful to the tradition of vassal relationship and military conquest, Mzilikazi and his people moved north and crossed the Limpopo River, thus entering the Shona kingdom of Monomotapa<sup>78</sup>. The

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<sup>74</sup> Du Preez, 2004, pp. 93 – 109. The eLangeni clan was an Nguni clan, occupying part of present day KwaZulu Natal, together with other clans such as the Zulus who, at the time, were just a small community.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. pp. 43 – 56.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 105-106.

<sup>77</sup> Du Preez, 2004, pp. 93 – 109 and Walter, 1966. Both authors discuss Shaka's mental insanity, Du Preez dedicates a whole chapter to a theory which seems plausible, but possibly secondary to the lucrative slave trade perpetrated from Delagoa Bay, Maputo.

<sup>78</sup> Etherington, 2004.

Shona were gradually defeated and confined to the northern sections of present-day Zimbabwe, as well as stripped of their status as a military power. After 1840, when Matabeleland was formed, the term indicated Mzilikazi's kingdom only. The name was later changed to Ndebele, artificial Zulu, which bears no meaning yet is still used to indicate the ethnicity<sup>79</sup>.

The fourth migration pattern can be identified with the finalising of settlements in South Africa. The need to employ workers for extensive agriculture, first, and the mines, second, forced settlers to look everywhere for workers, to the point of engaging in agreements with local chiefs for the supply of labour. Prisoners of tribal conflicts, which traditionally would be slaves, could therefore be sold to the settler, or the slave traders on the coast. Towards the end of the XIX century, with the growth of the Kimberly mines, the beginning of gold mining Witwatersrand, and the implementation of the agricultural production to supply the increased food demand<sup>80</sup>, provoked a sudden need for unskilled workers that were not expensive and, above all, not regulated. Native population again supplied the demand, and *within less than a year of the opening of the mines, every black society south of the Zambesi, with the exception only of the Venda and the Zulu, was represented in the diamond fields, whether by independent businessmen, artisans, or labourers*<sup>81</sup>. Of course, the understanding of employment by native population was derived from decades of direct economic deals with Europeans, which taught them that money or precious minerals (gold) and stones (diamonds) were the best exchange currency to buy food, cows and weapons, thus improving their status and strength back home. The years of the cowry shells were over<sup>82</sup>, and settlers soon realised that native people might have been cheap labour but needed to be checked thoroughly to avoid stealing. In 1872, a Government Notice established that all workers had to be employed for at least three months, and had to register upon arrival, hence received

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<sup>79</sup> See Beach, 1974.

<sup>80</sup> Whitman, 2000, pp. 13 – 15.

<sup>81</sup> Reader, 1994, p. 499, with reference to the Kimberly mines.

<sup>82</sup> The first 'currency' used in Africa in transactions between natives and foreigners, still used in African jewellery and artefacts for decoration. (Reader, 1994, pp. 383 – 390, and field work)

an entry pass and required an exit pass to leave<sup>83</sup>. This thinking resulted in 'concentration camp' style of settings, which De Beers invented and still uses in its most productive mines<sup>84</sup>. Work conditions aside, the monopolisation of Kimberly, and the acquisition of the Witwatersrand mines after the Anglo-Boer war, led to the creation of a system for the recruitment of workers which was supported by the national government to avoid touts, operating individually: WENELA/TEBA<sup>85</sup>. This migration pattern, therefore, is related to the economic growth of South Africa, through natural resources, and initiated as a spontaneous movement yet developed into a channeled migration due to the disruption of traditional livelihood strategies and the increased perception of money to acquire wealth and status, as well as to pay the *hut tax*, implying a Westernisation of customs.

To conclude, for the purpose of this research the massive forced migration provoked by the Atlantic slave trade will not be considered because it involves frontiers and border perception only in so far as slaves were acquired inland through territorial conquest. However, towards the end of the XIX century, the economic patterns of the native societies had been so transformed by Europeans desire for land that the slave trade was perpetrated only by those who did not belong to any societal group. Slavery, in fact, became a threat to all populations, and the inland forced migration from the area of provenance to the coast, does not impact on the migration patterns envisaged in this research to understand the porosity of Southern African borders.

### ***3.3.3 Modern migrations across a permeable border***

Movements of people were never sporadic events in Southern Africa history, rather they were the most feasible solution to overcome social and natural

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<sup>83</sup> Reader, 1994, views this act as the first legal foundation of the apartheid system (pp. 502 –503).

<sup>84</sup> With the arrival of Cecil Rhodes on the Kimberly mines, all concession owners were bought out and the De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd was funded to acquire the monopoly of the area. From this moment on, tight regulations on workers began and resulted in the creation of fenced villages for workers, who were checked thoroughly on their way in and out to avoid theft (Reader, 1994, 504 – 511).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid; Whitman, 2000; Crush, 2000; Koch *et al.*, 1995, p. 127; and Bulpin, 1954

constraints. In time, however, migrations changed in direction and cause: with the exclusion of the Nguni southward migration, the first big waves was the *difecane*, the scattering which involved former Zulu generals and the populations crushed by Zulu power, in south to north direction. As a consequence of social conflict, migrants could be considered refugees in search for a suitable land to settle, and since the land was already scarce due to the growing number of white settlements, the refugees replicated Shaka's polity and subjugated the defeated groups, as was the case of Mzilikazi in the north, and Soshangane in the east. The second big wave was the north to south movement caused by the opening of the mines and the increased poverty of rural populations, which follows a typical core-periphery pattern, exercised by pushing factors (poverty) and pulling factors (employment and money)<sup>86</sup>. This pattern is still very much present today, and despite attempts have been made to regulate the influx of people into South Africa, with TEBA for the mines, as well as border patrols and post for general movements, the border still proves to be very permeable.

The causes for this perception are to be found firstly in history, as mentioned above. What Europeans consider a border, the River or a higher mountain, the Africans consider a resource and a safe place for settling. Both Thulamela and Mapungubwe, in fact, were built on the higher hills, close to a River. Secondly, the waves of *difecane* have generated not only migrations, but new relations between groups who shared the same area. Both the kingdoms of Mzilikazi and Soshangane, for instance, ended up in the Limpopo River basin, despite having taken different roads when leaving Shaka. Having incorporated other tribes on the way, the familiar Zulu-Nguni bond in the language was again a unifying factor, as proven by the fact that Tsonga (spoken by Soshangane people) is more similar to 'Ndebele, which is

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<sup>86</sup> Lubkemann (2005) also suggests labour migrations into South Africa as a disengagement from the war, both the Luzo-Gaza and the RENAMO wars: a typical popular reaction to very violent and fragmented wars. As a form of passive resistance, moreover, Roesch suggests that migration was also a means to escape the harshness of Portuguese colonial practices particularly in the *colonados* (Roesch, 1991 and 1992).

spoken in Zimbabwe and South Africa, than to Ronga<sup>87</sup>, spoken in the Maputo Province, separating Shoshangane's Gaza<sup>88</sup> from Shaka's Zululand. Furthermore, the two border wars between Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa, contributed to strengthen the social relations of local populations, with the creation of refugee camps for Mozambicans in the areas where familiar bonds were traditionally strong. What the war sought to separate and hinder, i.e. the illegal migrations of people from and into the three countries, the war itself has later united and helped, by threatening the lives of border communities.

It is not surprising, therefore, that for many people border crossing is perceived more as a stroll across a dangerous River (because of crocodiles) and a dangerous bush (because of wild animals), since these impediments have always been part of rural survival strategy. The presence of police officers and parks officials, instead, is perceived as a threat because of the subsequent punishment, be it jail or the confiscation of all his/her goods. However, as both bibliographical and field research show, the movements continue when the poverty strikes very hard as a pushing factor, and the big South African cities still attract people in need or wanting to improve their lives, which is a major pulling factor. Despite internal problems, therefore, South Africa becomes the economic core of the region, with Mozambicans preferring to risk their lives jumping across the border at Pafuri, rather than looking for work in Maputo<sup>89</sup>. The pre-existence of familiar connections in South Africa both

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<sup>87</sup> Ronga language belongs to the Tswa-Ronga group, and it is intelligible with Tsonga mainly in greetings and basic daily descriptions with some important differences, in terms of word use. (Fieldwork)

<sup>88</sup> Unlike most areas which are named after the ethnic group which occupies it, the name of Shoshangane Empire, Gaza, was bestowed by Shoshangane in honour of his grandfather. This information was sought after in secondary sources and with primary data collection but was found only in Beach, 1974.

<sup>89</sup> The field work, both in Pafuri and South Africa shows that Mozambicans from as far as Inhambane (the tourism capital of the Gaza Province) travel one thousand kilometres to reach Pafuri and cross, instead of going to Maputo and cross at Ressano Garcia, if South Africa proves to be the only solution. Furthermore, the former Ganzakulo area (prevalence of Tsonga-Ndebele speakers from the Shoshangane and Makuleke groups) is still attracting young Mozambican workers from the villages along the Limpopo River on the Chókwe-Chiqualaquala road, possibly crossing both the Limpopo and Kruger parks to reach Giyani (the main city) as the crow flies. (Giyani, Dec. 2006; Pafuri, Sept. and Dec. 2006).

in Witwatersrand and in the Limpopo Province, of course, contributed greatly to the migrations.

The development of the manufacturing sector, alongside the increase in mining and agricultural activities, provided an image of South Africa as a land of plenty, and attracted regime hundreds of thousands of people from countries as far north as Congo, despite the apartheid. In an estimate provided by Whitman, in 1964 there were some 497,000 legal migrant workers, half of whom were employed through TEBA<sup>90</sup>. To this number, however, *border jumpers* must be added, considering it is a common practice along the Limpopo River in the trait along the Zimbabwean and Mozambican border. In the case of Mozambique, particularly, they do not speak English, only Tsonga or other local languages, and Funnagalo, learnt from their fathers or relatives who worked in the mines. As a matter of fact, among the interviewees in Dumela, one boy had been working as a gardener in South Africa for years, had a South African ID card, and spoke Tsonga and Afrikaans only, whereas his mother who was born in Xai Xai and was a house keeper at the Pafuri border, was fluent in Portuguese and Tsonga (Dumela, Sept. 2006). Modern migrations, therefore, have a tendency to disrupt state affiliations, in terms of both language and culture, whilst maintaining intact the traditional inter-group relations.

### ***3.3.4 The informal sector across permeable borders***

Through the years, the legal and illegal migrations escalated, particularly in so far as neighbouring countries are concerned, namely Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. This generated two by-products, again derived by the proximity of an economic core: illegal and informal cross-border trading. The informal sector is symptomatic of a developing country undergoing the transition from a traditional to a modern economy, as stated by Mhone<sup>91</sup>. In the light of field experience, however, it could be argued that the informal sector can signal a stall in the national economy of a developing country, to which people react by either selling their produces or

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<sup>90</sup> Whitman, 2000.

<sup>91</sup> Mhone, 1996, introductory chapter.

manufactures, or selling goods available on a nearby market. Therefore, to have relatives in South Africa for Mozambicans and Zimbabwean in Pafuri, or simply to have a car and petty cash for an initial investment in Matabeleland South, means to have the opportunity to go to South Africa, buy the most required goods and sell them across the border with a mark-up. Visiting Musina, on the only border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, or Nelspruit, a few kilometres away from the Ressano Garcia commercial border with Mozambique, on a weekend, one can observe the amount of cars with a Zimbabwean and Mozambican number plate, respectively, loaded with food and other necessities ready to get their VAT back and cross home<sup>92</sup>. Even if most of this ‘one-day’ border shoppers<sup>93</sup> had valid documentation, the law is still against some of them in the regulation of types and quantities of non-taxable goods in the country of provenance. The strictness of the law, of course, is applied only in so far as the officers can benefit from it, thus triggering illegality, as goods are ‘paid out’ to an officer in kind or without a receipt for the fine. The degree of corruption amongst government officers in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, unlike other wealthier countries, is both structural (as the salary corresponds to the minimum salary by-law and there are no benefits) and contingent, since officers are in some cases living in remote areas without contact with the rest of the world. Pafuri, for instance, exemplifies this situation. The standards of living offered to South African officials are definitely higher than their Mozambican counterparts’, in that they have (1) houses with running and drinkable water, (2) satellite TV, phone lines and (3) cars. On the Mozambican side, instead, government officers have no electricity, the lodgings are very basic, no officer has a car, and there is not a phone line. Furthermore, the only *spaza* shop in the village closed down, so the government representatives have to rely on those regular border crossers (and the SA police, of course) to obtain basic food and necessities<sup>94</sup>. Such exchange of favours could and

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<sup>92</sup> Alongside people with a small car, it is very common to find people on foot waiting for public transport and walking. (Field work: Pafuri, March and May 2005; September and December, 2006; Musina, September 2006; Ressano Garcia, August 2005 – September 2006)

<sup>93</sup> Defined in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, pp. 117 – 122

<sup>94</sup> I was given a shopping list every time I was going to South Africa with provisions to bring back for the chief officers, who also grow a vegetable garden behind the immigration offices. Like me, many

does generate a form of *structural* corruption, in the sense that by bringing necessities, traders are less checked for permits, licensing and so forth. However, a line should be drawn according to the context, in the sense that the lacks of the government are tampered by contingency. This, of course, contributes to strengthen bonds that are beyond the state affiliation, and enter the sphere of traditional community ethics, opening a wide gap between patriotism and human relations.

Alongside the informal trade, of course, there exists a vast amount of illegal trade, particularly in weapons, cars, alcohol<sup>95</sup> and luxury goods (for instance, the solar panels used by the Pafuri administrator came from South Africa at a time when several solar panels disappeared from the KNP: most were recovered<sup>96</sup>). The controls on cars at the three border posts with Mozambique are very tough because it is logically considered that criminals would prefer to use trails and untarred roads, rather than national and toll roads, which are permanently patrolled by the Police. At Giryondo and Pafuri, therefore, the Police takes extra time in controlling new comers for car contents and engine numbers. After the SADC decision to allow regional movements of people without visas, the criminal cross-border activities have intensified, even at Ressano Garcia, which resulted in higher crime rates in Maputo and tourist locations<sup>97</sup>. This trade, of course, is neither condoned nor facilitated by officers both at Giryondo and Pafuri.

Migrations in the past have favoured contact between people of different groups, resulting also in supports to the self-determination struggle in South Africa<sup>98</sup>. At

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others bring back the shopping without asking to be paid back, particularly those who need a break on taxes on the imports and on the visa permits. (Pafuri, Sept. and Dec. 2006)

<sup>95</sup> Crush, 2000, gives a detailed explanation of the phenomenon, resulting in the establishment of border posts with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland for the first time in the early 1960s (pp. 17 – 19).

<sup>96</sup> Conversation with the former administrator of Pafuri (March 2005) and with Dr. B. Swanepoel of the LNP conservation and security unit (December 2005)

<sup>97</sup> In the last six months of 2006, in fact, Maputo has seen a steady increase in armed robberies on pedestrians and in houses, rapes and car theft with the traditional South African method, of following the victim home and attack at the house gate with guns. Many have been killed or severely injured, but local newspapers are reticent in publishing news, only *Savanna*, the independent weekly paper, has mentioned the occurrences. Furthermore, an arsenal of small weapons have been found in the house of an identified robber in Marracuene, Maputo Province, all of South African provenance. (Field work: Maputo, 2005-2006).

<sup>98</sup> Whitman, 2000, Introduction.

present, however, there is a clear cut difference between migrants and informal traders from rural areas, and criminals. Nonetheless, the South Africa perception of assimilating all migrants as *aliens*, only exacerbates conflicts, without solving the problem of cross-border criminality.

### **3.4 SUPPORTING MIGRATIONS IN THE GREAT LIMPOPO TFCA?**

As part of the Transfrontier Conservation strategies implemented in Southern Africa at the turn of the last century, with the coordination and funding of international organisations such as the WB, through the GEF fund, the WWF, the IUCN, through the locally-based Peace Park Foundation, the Great Limpopo Peace Park and TFCA is the biggest project in the world encompassing three national parks, via an ecological corridor, and enclosing a wide conservation area, as a buffer zone. A further extension of the project includes the Banhine and Zinave National Parks, in Mozambique, with unique environmental features, such as wetlands both inland and along coastal areas. As a follow up from the last section of Chapter 2, this section will present the GLTFCA in terms of historical development and the objectives set in the establishing treaty. Finally it will discuss the issue of cross-border movements and migrations, thus explaining that on top of the protection of nature, there is a hidden agenda regarding border security which will eventually impair the transfrontier cultural bonds of border communities.

#### ***3.4.1 From GKGTFCA to GLTFCA: a history of names and place***

This project was first known as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFP, from the names of the two parks in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and from the name of the province in Mozambique. Gaza, in fact, defines the territory founded as a result of the *mfecane* by Shoshangane (also known as Manicusse) until his grandson and new emperor, Ngungunhane, was defeated and captured by the Portuguese army on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1895. Originally the Gaza empire extended from the Limpopo to the Zambezi and the capital was near present day Chimoio, hence implying the subjugation of over 200 local groups by Shoshangane and his generals. Following


traditional Political Geography, therefore, the TFP should rightfully encompass both Banhine and Zinave, reuniting the old Gaza kingdom. It is really because of cultural heritage, however, that the name was changed into Great Limpopo in 2004, thus shifting the focus from the human to the physical geography, also foreseeing the possible unification with the Limpopo-Sashe TFCA. The main reasons behind this decision, however, are (1) the presence on the territory of communities who do not belong to the Gaza – Shangaan group, such as Venda<sup>99</sup>, and (2) the desire amongst the South African Tsonga speakers in the former Gazankulo Bantustan<sup>100</sup> to get rid of their Mozambican origin and of the memories of apartheid political and geographical divisions (Source: conversation with Mr. S. Chaukwe and Chief Muklave, Dumela, May 2006).

The GKG began to be talked about in 1997, a few years after the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the settling of post-civil war Mozambique, and after three years of project planning and fundraising (as shown by Map 3.5). The tri-nation treaty was signed on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2002, in Xai-xai, Gaza Province, under the new name of GLTFP. The inauguration of the GLTFP saw the presence of the two main political and economic drives for the creation of the Park: Pres. Nelson Mandela and Mr. Anton Rupert, with Pres. Joaquim Chissano for Mozambique and Pres. Robert Mugabe for Zimbabwe. Five years on, the only survivor of that first treaty is Pres. Mugabe, whose involvement with the TFCA project has been decreasing, almost jeopardising the rotation of the management and the inauguration of the Giryondo Border Post, which was delayed by more than a semester.

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<sup>99</sup> See official website - [http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=164&pid=147&m=1\\_5\\_3](http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?mid=164&pid=147&m=1_5_3)

<sup>100</sup> The Bantustan (*Bantu* = people; *stan* = land of) were tribal reserves for Black natives enforced from 1951, as part of the racial segregation policy, with the ultimate goal of refusing South African citizenship to any black person, because *Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be an obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically* (Ms. C. Mulder, Minister of Plural Relations and Development, addressing the House of Assembly, on 7<sup>th</sup> February 1978, in MacDonald, 2006, p.5). Four Bantustans acquired administrative independence since 1976 (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei) whereas KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa were only awarded partial autonomy. Gazankulo never received independence.



Map 3.14: The first map ever of the GKG TFCA (Source: The Peace Park Foundation, 2006)<sup>101</sup>

The political, economical and social will to implement the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area, however, has not dwindled but increased as tourists began to come through both the Pafuri and the new border post from the day it unofficially opened on 7<sup>th</sup> December 2006. The initial problems, related by tourists and personally experienced, regarding the choice of officers on both sides of the new post, however, were threatening the social viability because the officers on the South African side were white, while on the Mozambican side were black. As MacDonald (2006) meticulously shows in his book, race still matters, both in South and Southern Africa, and as soon as the ethnic origin was uniformed on both sides, things began to run smoothly, although some tourists have been complaining about the attempt on the Mozambican side to twist the law on taxable imports, such as food and alcohol. This was reported to Dr. Billy Swanepoel, head of conservation for the Limpopo

<sup>101</sup> PPF, 2006, The first ever map of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, web article, [www.peaceparksfoundation.org](http://www.peaceparksfoundation.org).

National Park<sup>102</sup>, in the first semester only, while the border traffic was still constant. Furthermore, it is true that South African holiday-makers tend to bring everything they need for the whole holiday from their home country, thus easily incurring in excess of import. This is because they are aware that basic goods are luxury good, if they can be found, once outside of Maputo.

Notwithstanding daily management petty problems, however, it is true that the GLTFCA is still a reality on paper only, whilst its implementation is running slowly due to field contingencies, and the TFP has not officially opened yet, as stated in the official web page of the park<sup>103</sup>. This is a gigantic project aiming at bringing, under a uniformed management for conservation, tourism development and security controls, a 1 million hectares area encompassing three states, whose political and economic development is still hampered by the lack of socio-economic rights.

### ***3.4.2 GLTFCA: aims and objectives of a Peace Park and its TFCA***

The GLTFCA is the diamond project of Southern African transfrontier conservation because of its size and the countries it brings together, and whose conflict history has been thoroughly discussed in the two previous chapters. The GLTFCA aims primarily at *collaboratively establish and manage, on a sustainable basis, a viable Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park with full stakeholder participation, including local communities, fostering regional co-operation, biodiversity conservation, and cross-border socio-economic development*<sup>104</sup>. The vision stresses the value attached to stakeholder participation, in the prospect of socio-economic development for local communities.

The objectives, however, show a major concern with conservation issues, which is understandable as the crucial argumentation for eliminating frontiers is the re-establishment of wildlife migratory routes. Cross-border security, which is one of the main threats to the whole project, is only marginally and allusively mentioned in objective 3. Such theoretical approach is in stark contrast with the implementation

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<sup>102</sup> Personal conversations held in Massingir, between December and March 2006.

<sup>103</sup> See website <http://www.grealimpopopark.com>

<sup>104</sup> Overview of the GLTFCA, see [www.greatlimpopopark.com](http://www.greatlimpopopark.com)

constraints that the GLTFP and CA have to face, in the regional socio-political and conservationist context. Illegal cross-border migrations and informal (and illegal) transnational activities are threatening the fragile equilibrium of South African

Objective 1	To foster transnational collaboration and co-operation between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe in implementing ecosystem management, through the establishment, development and management of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
Objective 2	To promote alliances in the management of biological natural resources by encouraging social, economic and other partnerships among the parties, private sector, local communities and NGO's;
Objective 3	To enhance ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes by harmonising environmental management procedures across international borders and striving to remove artificial barriers impeding the natural movement of animals;
Objective 4	To develop frameworks and strategies whereby local communities can participate in and tangibly benefit from the management and sustainable use of natural resources that occur within the transfrontier park or TFCA;
Objective 5	To facilitate the establishment and maintenance of a subregional economic base by way of appropriate development frameworks, strategies and work plans;
Objective 6	To develop trans-border eco-tourism as a means for fostering regional socio-economic development.

Table 3.9: Objectives of the GLTFP (Source: <http://www.greatlimpopopark.com/>)

society, despite a regional political will to open borders and facilitate movements of people and goods. Poaching in the area has never stopped, despite raising level of private and public wildlife protection projects, particularly in the Southern part of the Kruger and the Limpopo National Parks<sup>105</sup>. Border communities traditionally move in and out of a country to carry out normal day-to-day activities, including visiting friends, choosing a wife and cattle grazing. It is, therefore, rather surprising that security does not appear as one of the key objectives, whereas it treated as an operational priority, as opposed to community participation and development, which is lagging behind both in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

<sup>105</sup> Conversations with Chief Insp. Coetzer (Skukuza Police – KNP) and Mr. Adré Du Pont (owner of Xonghile Game Reserve – Massingir) have confirmed that the poaching of rhinos and gazelles is practiced, and requires daily patrols in the private reserve in Mozambique. In Dumela only one person from a different clan, but living in close proximity, practices poaching as the number of skins around his dwellings confirm.

### 3.4.3 *Security and migrations in the GLTFCA*

Having discussed the cultural and political history of the area which the GLTFCA will encompass, it is obvious that security should be a major concern for conservation planners, in so far as both animals, on the local level, and the political economy of the countries, on a regional scale, are concerned. As Peddle *et al.* point out, a TFCA is not a no man's land<sup>106</sup>, unlike frontier zones, and the law of each country must still be respected, alongside the limitations deriving from nature protection. However, factors such as (a) the presence of a multi-levelled jurisdiction, (b) the removal of protective fencing along the border, (c) the limited number of patrolled roads in relation to the territory show that there is potential for an increase in illegal cross-border activities as a result of transfrontier conservation and peace parks. Furthermore, in the specific case of the GLTFCA, the demining of the Sengwe Ecological corridor will leave a 65 km long stretch of land completely unprotected, where both the border populations and the wildlife will be free to roam, thus generating human-wildlife conflict. Within the planning of the Corridor, it was required by the Sengwe, Chipise and Dite 2 communities in Zimbabwe, to have a protective fence on the northern side to prevent conflict with elephants, buffalos and carnivores. The fence, in reality, should also prevent the spreading of Foot and Mouth Disease and Tuberculosis into healthy Zimbabwean herds of buffalos, lions and impalas<sup>107</sup>. However, this is a secondary level of protection which transcends community requirements, which in turn defeats the purpose of a fence-less park. Within the same geographic area, in addition, the people living along the border in Mozambique would be highly threatened by wildlife presence, as a protective fence has not been planned. This part of the GLTFCA is the interstitial zone, where people have the right to live, not a national park, which excludes settlements according to IUCN categories, and a plan is not being made to deal with these security issues.

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<sup>106</sup> Peddle *et al.*, 2004, chapter 2.

<sup>107</sup> CESVI, 2001.

The security for communities has only been proactively discussed within the management committee, with reference to the eight villages in the LNP. These, in fact, will be soon relocated after an arbitrary consultation process, on the legitimate grounds that it is not safe for people to live in protected areas, because wildlife would threaten their lives and crops. One, however, is left to wonder what happened to the principles set in Objectives 2 and 3. The outlook provided both by literature and the field, in fact, is that the only migratory movements which are protected by the GLTFCA and Peace Park management involve animals, and tourists by extension, as income-generators, hence source of development. Communities, instead, are perceived as a security threat to both categories because of poaching and of illegal cross border migration and informal – illegal activities.

### **3.5 CONCLUSIONS**

The independence struggles which occurred in Africa, both before and after the dismantling of European empires, have been often referred to as national struggles, by inferring that as the majority of the population of a country was against a type of government, it should also share a sense of nationhood. Nothing was further away from the truth as post-independence civil wars and dictatorial regimes have shown. This was of course the result of the division of Africa at a conference table in Europe, back in 1885. However, as it has been argued, the mistake was made not just on the account that local communities did not have a weight in decision-making, as Griffiths (1986) points out referring to protectorates and agreements with local chiefs, but also on the account of a different interpretation of land marks such as Rivers, which in Europe are often used as barriers between people, but in Africa are catalysers of settlements hence a source of life in a dry land. Paradoxically, therefore, it is argued that fights for independence carried out by native populations were acts of civil disobedience against a form of government, which was no longer endurable. Despite theories of African nationalism, in fact, the civil wars and genocides which followed independence and in some countries still affect the population show that there was no sense of nation-building in the people. On the contrary, it was imposed by the

post-independence government as part of the nation-state building process on the European model. The sense of nationhood, which implies in Political Geography, unity of language, culture and aspirations, was instead very much felt by the White communities of Rhodesia and South Africa in their fight against the perceived enemy threatening the *status quo*.

Bearing history in mind, therefore, the creation of TFCAs and Peace Parks in Southern Africa structures itself as an attempt to create *ex-novo* a peace between people who had been at war within each other in pre-colonial times (the Nguni *colonisation* and the *mfecane*), during colonialism and imperialism (the Boer War, the defeat of Ngungunhane, the segregation and the Bush wars) and in the post-colonial era (the Ndebele genocide, the Mozambican war; Angola civil wars; the endless changes in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Furthermore, the borders risk of being perceived again as a no-man's land, unless real community involvement is carried out to create income-generating activities. As eco-tourism is placed as the last objective of the GLTFCA, it is feared that the prolonged indifference towards field problems will aggravate the human-animal conflict. The GLTFCA is the most challenging of all the projects, considering the size the new land uses in communal and former hunting areas, and the security threats it poses in borderlands, for both people and animals. However, the steps which have been taken already for security seem either inadequate (Sengwe corridor) or unfair (forced relocation) for the local populations which are most affected, and this is in sheer contrast with the GLTFCA objectives. Furthermore, considering the role South Africa aspires to play within the SADC and the AU, it seems plausible to suggest that the leading role played in the GLTFCA project will not be limited to a joint supervision of borders and its crossers, despite treaty's provisions on sovereignty and security<sup>108</sup>.

In the chapters which follow the Methodology, all the issues discussed so far in terms of political geography, history and conservation practices for TFCAs will be used to present and discuss Pafuri and Dumela, as case studies.

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<sup>108</sup> See annexure 2, pp. 8 – 10, in Peddle *et al.*, 2004.

## 4. RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE CASE STUDY

*Nobody who followed the 'scientific method'  
ever discovered anything interesting  
(Keesing, 1981, p.4)<sup>1</sup>*

The impact of transfrontier conservation policies in Southern Africa was, initially, the key subject of this research. The assumption argued that the IUCN definition of conservation areas, as a planning system which provides for the maintenance and improvement of livelihood strategies of local populations, was not implemented on the grass root level<sup>2</sup>. As a matter of fact, it was assumed that the lack of action on the field was not only failing one of the main principles behind transboundary and peace parks as such, but also worsening the relations between the management and the population by further severing the fragile *equilibrium* between communities and dry savannah environments. Having chosen, since the very beginning to conduct my research with a mixed methodology, however, I was able to adjust to changes in the focus of study, from a pure socio-economic analysis to a broad investigation on the Pafuri border area, which was aiming at proving the historical permeability of the border as an advantage for the GLTFCA and Peace Park project, instead of a threat to its implementation.

### 4.i *Aim and objectives*

The aim of this research, therefore, became the examination of how historical patterns and political decision-making lead to carve the Pafuri area, in terms of both human and political geography, and what the impact of the GLTFCA would be if culture is not valued in land use and management planning. The study had three objectives:

1. to analyse the pre-colonial and contemporary history of the three countries involved in the TFCA and critically evaluate the influences on local people and livelihoods;

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<sup>1</sup> The author recollects this statement made by a friend of his, a biologist.

<sup>2</sup> See the IUCN website for the categories of protection.

2. to evaluate the role of politics into conservation strategies on a regional level, and use the GLTFCA as a means to understand the implications for local communities;
3. to create a detailed account of the Pafuri area as a symbolic place of national unity and state division, where present history has been written by nature, both within the GLTFCA or without conservation policies.

#### **4.ii *Mixed methodological approach***

Both primary and secondary data sources were essential for the research but had to be framed within a mixed methodology approach<sup>3</sup> that could encompass disciplines on the one hand, and tools on the other. Shifting the main focus onto border studies, in fact, led me to infer my assumptions with the help of political geographical cartography, both ancient and modern. Such theories, however, had to be argued against history and politics in order to provide a strong basis for the research. In fact, as Thomas Khun proved in 1962<sup>4</sup>, the historical context is essential to understand both philosophical and scientific theories, as well as changes; and in my case, the historical context provided rather than a frame, a real explanation to the evolution and application of conservation sciences in Southern Africa. A hybrid approach, therefore, was sought to provide a multi-disciplinary research frame, with the use of various sets of data, relying both on qualitative and quantitative methods.

Within the basic principles of the *Gestion do Terroir*, discussed in the introductory chapter, the mixed methodology was based on the cultural anthropology and ethnographical field research, which was applied to Human Geographical methods, through the geo-referencing of all data collected. By adopting the basic principles of ethnological field research, I was allowed, in the words of Marc Augé, to deal *with at least two spaces*: the former being the *place I study*; the latter, and broader one, being *the place in which it is inscribed, from where are exercised the influences and the bonds which are not deprived of effects on the internal game of local relations (the ethnic group, the*

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<sup>3</sup> Brannen, 1992.

<sup>4</sup> Khun, 1962.

kingdom, the State).<sup>5</sup> This *methodological strabismus*, as Augé refers to, led me to implement a flexible hybrid approach, whose pattern would adapt to contingencies in the field research and to the incorporation of new viewpoints in the analysis of process and policies. In fact, I was able to incorporate local knowledge into the historical and political analysis, not only in the specific perceptions related to conservation and the role of the GLFTCA in the sustainable development of local communities.

#### **4.iii Field work: timing and localities**

The mixed ethnological approach integrated structured and informal interviews, transect walks with key informants, a quantitative survey and cartographical analyses. Considering the time frame of the field work, one year and a half, there is a relevant differentiation to be made between, (1) local field work, carried out in Dumela and the Pafuri area, including the Kruger National Park; (2) and the regional field work, conducted in Maputo, but also throughout the country, as well as in South Africa and Swaziland. If the data collection was planned to provide information to NGOs and government-based organisations working in the GLTFCA, the broad aim gradually became of academic interests as it was clear that the full potential of the Pafuri area was not in the priority agenda of any party involved, whereas the risk of failing again all agendas for sustainable development was increasing, thus following a core-periphery political relation pattern that Pafuri had seen before. Nonetheless, the local field work created a set of data that may have proven precious for zoning in the CA between Pafuri and Chiqualaquala, along the Sengwe ecological corridor.

At this stage, it is important to note that the first person singular will be used in this chapter, as it refers to a personal experience, despite all issues on the positionality of the researcher and objectivity, which were nonetheless pursued. It is worth to reiterate, in fact, that the research became, *in fieri*, a process of understanding rather than analysing, which is the reason why its initial aims and

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<sup>5</sup> Augé Marc, 1998, p.108, in Rossi, 2003, p. 50, translated by the author.

strategies were abandoned for a more theoretical approach grounded on history as told by academics and on history as perceived by people. The thesis, therefore, is developed and written accordingly.

#### **4.iv Chapter outline**

This chapter will firstly present the reasoning behind the selection of the case study, considering a historical perspective, the GLTFCA project and the cultural issues, within the frame of the basic geographical core-periphery modelling for the development and devolution of power. Two sections on methodology and its unstructured process, which allowed for deeper investigation, will follow: the first one will discuss the use of quantitative methodology; the second one will analyse the qualitative methods applied both at the local and regional scale. The final section will present the data and summarise the field work.

### **4.1 SELECTING THE CASE STUDY: CORE AND PERIPHERY**

As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis was conceived after a visit to Sengwe Communal Land, Zimbabwe, when the community leader vehemently discussed the problems related to the creation of the GLTFCA for the lives and livelihoods of his people, with a specific reference to the demarcation of the Sengwe Ecological Corridor, which would take most of the Riverine forest away from the community and involve the relocation of up to 15,000 people if carried out according to the PPF plans<sup>6</sup>. The overlooking of local interests in the establishment and management of the biggest and best known Peace Park in the world prompted me to first look at the literature available on the subject, secondly to investigate how was the Peace Park perceived in the other inhabited areas in Mozambique. The Pafuri area, as it is known in the three states, provided an excellent case to research on Transfrontier Conservation, because (1) the GLTFCA is the largest conservation area ever planned; (2) Pafuri has a truly transboundary history in terms of cultural and

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<sup>6</sup> CESVI, 2001. This paper is the second draft of a concept paper on the Sengwe Corridor, which followed the second meeting of the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area Tri-nation Community Workshop Group, Malilangwe, 12<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> November 2001, p.9.

economic relation; (3) conservation strategies will directly impact on the communities living on the field, running the risk of jeopardising any proposal for community involvement. Furthermore, placing the original assumption into the geographical perspective of a core-periphery model entailed that all disciplines, describing different issues at stake, could contribute to justify the choice of the locality as a case study. The next paragraphs will therefore illustrate the reasons and reasoning behind the choice of Pafuri as the focus area and of Dumela as the case study for this research, which were based on assumptions inferred from literature and Personal Observation as I began to live in Mozambique.

#### ***4.1.1 The historical and political geography of a frontier***

In terms of location, Pafuri is the geographical heart of the GLTFCA, a core that bears a strategic significance for the creation of both the Peace Park and the TFCA and is charged of history both in ancient and contemporary times: it was always a *frontier*, never a border.

The Limpopo River marked, in the South, the area of influence of the Kingdom of Monomotapa, one of three major civilisations of Southern Africa nested in Great Zimbabwe. However, many groups lived along the River banks, including the Venda in the south and Tswana in the east. Pafuri was also the expansion frontier for Mzilikazi and his Matabele fleeing the wrath of Shaka Zulu in the South, as well as for the Gaza Nguni of Soshangane. Before the Europeans even knew of its existence, Pafuri was already a multi-cultural cradle hosting communities from different origins and languages. Later, when the first Europeans settled at the Cape and in Natal, and the English protectorate impaired the Afrikaans style of life, Pafuri was the ultimate frontier also for the Voortrekkers in their attempt to find a land to call their own and rule according to their religious and political believes<sup>7</sup>. After the Conference of Berlin, eventually, the borderland between the three countries became

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<sup>7</sup> Reader, 1994, discusses extensively the dichotomies between the British colonial government and the Afrikaaner practices, as well as the role religion played in forming the Afrikaaner spirit and nation.

the *frontier land* where people could live and operate on the verge of the law, always a beacon away, as described in the famous biography of Bvekenya<sup>8</sup>.

After years of abandonment, in 1969, the Makuleke of South Africa were forcibly relocated to extend the Kruger National Park, thus creating a buffer zone along the border with Mozambique to the East and Zimbabwe to the South. Despite all arguments for conservation strategies, which of course are relevant in so far as the human pressure on the Limpopo Riverine forest was taking its toll on the environment and the local fauna, it must be noted that the decision to extend Kruger Park was taken at a very delicate time in African history. Towards the end of the 1960s, in fact, most African countries were awarded independence on the grounds of the prime rights recognised in the aftermath of the Second World War and the holocaust, justified by the supremacy of the pure Arian race: these were the right to self-determination of people, to non-racial political and social systems, as well as equality. South Africa (including Namibia at the time), Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola were the only countries not to abide by this new political philosophy and maintained their governments of racial segregation. However, it would be very naïve to suppose that the politicians were unaware of the discontent generated by the exacerbation of the apartheid system in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the Fascist regime that Portugal was extending to its colonies. It is more likely, in fact, that attempts were being made to tamper the creation of independent movements and prevent any potential for transfrontier union in the case of independence of one of such countries<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, conservation was very astutely used, by the South African government, to create an area deprived of people and very difficult to cross, because of wildlife, thus discouraging attempts of transfrontier migration<sup>10</sup>. This is the period

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<sup>8</sup> Bulpin, 1954.

<sup>9</sup> The existence of a 'gentleman's agreement' between Portugal and Rhodesia to enable 'their respective troops to cross the common border in pursuit of FRELIMO or ZANLA guerrillas' (p. 34) was in fact disclosed by Gen. Kaúlza de Arriaga in April 1973. Whereas South Africa was always involved directly in the protection of the Cabora Bassa Dam, in the Tete Province, and indirectly supporting the Rhodesian army. (Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 33-35)

<sup>10</sup> It may be argued that such ideas could be part of 'conspiracy theories' that are so popular nowadays. However, as the section dedicated to the recent border history and the involvement of both SA and the USA in the destabilisation war of the 1970s till the 1990s proves, conservation could never

when Pafuri became a *border*, and a heavily demarcated one as well, in order to protect the wildlife from poaching, while prevent human migrations and the gathering of potentially threatening organisations. In the meantime, South Africa was extending its military frontier into Mozambique by supporting RENAMO in its fight. Of course, with the independence of Mozambique in 1975 and Zimbabwe in 1981, South Africa was isolated in a region it used to lead and as the border became a war zone, the Kruger Park became a military headquarter<sup>11</sup>. Only in 2001 was the defensive electric fence along the border taken down in order to give a real signal of peace between the three countries and allow the international community to celebrate transboundary conservation as the new frontier for peace process in the aftermath of conflict<sup>12</sup>.

Despite having been the periphery of three states for many decades, Pafuri found itself to be the core of military strategy in the second part of the last century, and ended up as the semi-periphery of the same three states with new independent governments because of conservation and political issues. Ironically, it must be said, history repeats itself eventually. Conservation, in fact, was the first justification for the interruption of socio-economic relations at Crooks' Corner with the relocation of the Makulekes, and it is now again, with the potential relocation of Sengwe people for the ecological corridor, whereas the destiny of Mozambican communities along the Sengwe border is still unclear. At the same time, the militarization of the border attempted to stop all illegal migrations through the Kruger Park, as wildlife was not a strong enough deterrent, and the current increase in patrolling aims at improving security at the border by stopping illegal migration and preventing poaching which is still practiced, but mainly in the southern zone. Pafuri is therefore a strategic semi-periphery for the establishment and the good functioning of the GLTFCA, as well as for the protection of South African borders.

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be such a strong argument for land demarcation and people relocation at times when things were changing so dramatically throughout the continent and the world.

<sup>11</sup> See Minter, 1998; Ellis, 1994. Personal conversation with a former SA soldier patrolling the border at Pafuri and Crooks corner, Nelspruit, 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2006.

<sup>12</sup> Godwin, 2001.

#### *4.1.2 Geographical core and development periphery*

It is surprising how ambivalent can a locality be if placed under different perspectives. Pafuri epitomises this ambiguity very well as it is the geographical core of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area, but a developmental periphery for the Mozambican government. This location is strategically important for the movements of tourists in the TFCA, and this is the reason why there have been talks about opening a border very close to the existing one between South Africa and Mozambique, thus improving access into Zimbabwe<sup>13</sup>. Surprisingly, in terms of economic development in the Mozambican side of the TFCA, however, Pafuri is a peripheral area which is being neglected by policy-makers within the TFCA management unit of the Ministry of Tourism.

The opening of the Goriyondo Border Post, in December 2005, made it clear to the national and international community that on the one hand the TFCA was officially going across the borders, and on the other hand that South Africa and Mozambique were leading the way. The location of the new Border Post is of course strategic into routing traffic to Mozambique and its beach destinations from the wealthy Gauteng Province (Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the Northern provinces, whilst promoting the country as a safe place where even conservation has found its dimension. Despite the presence of all three heads of state at the inauguration ceremony, which took place almost one year later, however, it is clear that Zimbabwe, and by extension, its borderlands are lagging behind in terms of integration. This is the Pafuri semi-periphery, where the state is present to control but absent in leading. The extension of the Sengwe corridor has not been decided yet and the demining of the corridor only began in great secrecy in summer 2006. Furthermore, Dumela is now visited by Limpopo National Park (LNP) rangers if a problem animal is spotted, but the community struggles to understand that elephants cannot be killed, while the people in the south of the LNP are being moved out without options. Efforts to promote tourism development, in fact, have been focussed on the southern section of the LNP,

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<sup>13</sup> CESVI, 2001; and personal information discussed in 2001 with the late Dr. R.H.V. Bell and Mr. G. Soncini, of CESVI, in Bulawayo.

possibly also in the hope to hasten the relocation of the three villages on the road connecting the Border Post to the main gate at Massingir. After an observation of the official transit moving through the border at Pafuri, it is plausible to state that touristic movements intensify only during Christmas and Easter holidays, whereas Giryondo has witnessed a constant flow, with peaks during school holidays, thus justifying the strategy. Unless actions are taken, Pafuri will soon be the core of all discontent, exasperated by lack of action and explanations.

However, the relegation of Pafuri to a development periphery is not justified when analysing the implications improved infrastructure would have on border government officers, locals and tourists. First of all, as the geographical core of the TFCA, it should be an attraction in itself. In addition, its unspoilt Riverine forests, the quantity and variety of wildlife, and its location on the road from the South African northern provinces to major sea destinations in Mozambique, on graded roads and 4x4 trails, would make it a successful combination with South African tourists, if infrastructure on the road was available for emergencies. In order to reach Macia, the first main town on the EN1 to Bilene, Inhambane and Vilankulos, one must drive for over 700 Km on an untarred road, 250 Km of which are not graded. The only petrol station on the road is at Chòkwe<sup>14</sup>, some 70Km before Macia, and along the road there is no mobile phone coverage, which means that any break-down of a car would leave people utterly stranded. Conversely, from the Giryondo Border Post, there is a 70 Km long 4x4 trail to reach the main gate at Massingir, the 150 Km of tarred road to Chòkwe. From Pafuri there is also an alternative road to get to Vilankulos, which almost circumnavigates the Banhine National Park on graded roads and 4x4 trails, stretching for almost 1000 Km to reach the coast, without meeting with a town offering facilities<sup>15</sup>. Developing Pafuri would of course mean improving infrastructures on the road, whilst respecting the natural 'isolation' and 'remoteness' of the area. In addition, plans for the building of a bridge over the Limpopo River at

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<sup>14</sup> This excluding the informal sellers on the main road from Pafuri to Mapai, then to Chòkwe.

<sup>15</sup> Informal interview with people who use the road for both tourism and business, met at Maputo, Pafuri and Pemba.

Mapai have been discussed between the GoM and the donors, but nothing has been planned, yet. This, of course, would be the first step towards facilitating access to the area.

Secondly, the recent history that characterised the place, including the importance of employment in South African mines through the creation of WENELA/TEBA and the recent wars, could become exceptional justifications for tourism into the Peace Park. People living in Pafuri still remember displacement, migrations, the mines, the war<sup>16</sup> and could be involved in cultural tourism routes that would benefit not only Africans but also other people. If *peace* is the main claim for transfrontier conservation, and cross-border cooperation is called upon to enhance relations between states and to promote cultural bonds, while protecting the environment, Pafuri could become the real core for the TFCA showing its long history of pre-European multi-cultural environment, its transformation through the legalisation of migrations to South Africa alongside the numerous ones who remained illegal, and finally the impact of apartheid ruling in such a remote area.

Thirdly, the lack of support that governmental officers get from the State contributes to the maintenance of informal survival strategies that encompass all affiliation to the government and national legislation. The government officials working at Pafuri Border Post have no access to transport, other than traditional *machibombos*<sup>17</sup>, phone communication, running water and electricity. The floods of 2001 exasperated a situation that was already hard to bear, also considering the comfort and relative luxury in which the South African counterpart lives. Furthermore, there is not a shop available in the area to buy groceries from. Abandoning Pafuri to a condition of periphery, therefore, also entails that the Mozambican State cannot ask its own representatives to be strict in respecting the law, if survival is at stake. In fact, officers rely on legal border-crossers to bring food

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<sup>16</sup> See Connor, 2003; H. Hansen, MSc dissertation from the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

<sup>17</sup> This term is common to refer to public transport, an alternative term is *chapa*, but it is only used in Mozambique. It normally indicate small to medium size minibuses. The most typical of all cars used for this transport is the Toyota Hiace.

back, thus generating a mechanism of barter which could easily degenerate if the leading officers had different moral standards.

Such is the ambiguity of a very remote area, the periphery of three nations which is very remote from all centres of power, but which has attracted and will attract the interests of its governors because of its geographical position and cultural history. This is the reason why, despite the feelings attached to a *frontier land* one experiences upon reaching this area, it must be seen as a semi-periphery where the core is represented by the police, the immigration and the customs officers at the border, as well as the administrative and local governors. Thus said, it is peripheral due to the lack of decision-making about its present and future, and here again the geographical position plays a major role. It is plausible to claim, in fact, that until Zimbabwe will progress in joining the tri-national park, Pafuri will always be cast out of planning for development. The opening of the Giryondo Border Post and the creation of touristic facilities around the Massingir dam in the LNP, actually, prove that the management is concentrating on the South, which is on the one side the most visited area of the KNP and on the other the most accessible route to the beach.

#### ***4.1.3 Dumela, where the informal blends with the cultural***

Pafuri is the most relevant area to this research on border issues within the creation of the GLTFCA, since it is where the Border Post is on the main road connecting South Africa and Mozambique, with secondary roads to Chiqualaquala (the official frontier with Zimbabwe) both to the north and the south of the Limpopo River, and where donkey-trained carts from Zimbabwe sell and buy goods on the road. Pafuri is where the government is somehow present and where TEBA has left an unforgettable inheritance on top of the hills bordering the LNP. However, this was not the village I was described in Sengwe as it was on the road to South Africa, not to Zimbabwe. The village I was looking for had to be very close to the spot known as Crooks' Corner, where the three countries meet; had to be mainly composed of Shangaan people; and had to be a historical settlement on the roads connecting the three countries in this very remote part of the country. Therefore,

upon my first scoping visit, I moved on, crossed the Limpopo River and found the *official* periphery, which was meant to be the centre of all informal activities (from trade to migration), assuming that all I had learnt and theorised from my experience in Sengwe was true. I must admit I could have looked at maps before going that far up north, but this was also a challenge to test my analysing and navigating skills.

The name of this village is Dumela, although Connor refers to it as Thobela<sup>18</sup>, and is composed of about 800 people, some of which live permanently or temporarily abroad, mainly in South Africa. Dumela lies within walking distance of the Zimbabwean border, which is marked by two wooden poles and not often patrolled by Zimbabwean soldiers<sup>19</sup>. At present, actually, the patrolling has stopped because the demining of the strip of land across the border is considered a sufficient deterrent to illegal movements, which of course is not the case.

The history of Dumela is not written anywhere, and the elderly people do not remember clearly their origins or the milestone events in their history, apart from the last forty years. What is known is that the name derives from the leading family who is related to the chief of Dumela, in South Africa, past Giyani on the way North. Most of the older men of Dumela used to work in the mines in South Africa and they all passed through the WENELA/TEBA recruitment stations at Pafuri. During the Mozambican internal war, however, they moved again for their safety and the *diaspora* followed family ties first and refugee camp sites second. Some went to relatives and refugee camps both in South Africa, and in Zimbabwe, a few stayed and hid in the bush, surviving on fruits and roots. An old woman, who married very young to a Zimbabwean, belonged to this last group and lost both her husband and

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<sup>18</sup> See Connor, T., 2003. The geographical description of Thobela makes it correspond exactly with Dumela, which is the official name used in Portuguese maps as well. During my research I learnt from the elders and the chief, that the village derives its name from the original leading family (Dumela). However, during the war against Zimbabwe, the village relocated on the southern banks of the River further down on the road from Pafuri to Mapai. Chief Dumela was not interested in coming back to the original area after the war and the Muklave family were named as the new leaders.

<sup>19</sup> The political and economic situation of a state, however, is irrelevant to the Pafuri border people unless it does make a recognisable change to their lives (such as a war or a real improvement in their economic situation). Therefore, the presence of patrolling along this border is only influential if it effectively stops a relevant activity.

her son to the war<sup>20</sup>. Migrations and cross-borders visiting is endemic in the area, and whereas South Africa is the main pulling factor for employment, Zimbabwe is still important for marriage and visiting is more feasible.

Dumela falls under the Pafuri Administrative Post, in the District of Chiqualaquala, a town 67 Km to the north-east which is the last stop of the railway line going from Maputo to the official border with Zimbabwe, across the Gaza Province. Fridays and Saturdays are trading days and what normally looks like a ghost town comes to life with all sorts of products both new and second hand. Following the post-independence hierarchical settings, the traditional leader (July Muklave) works in conjunction with the *videchane* (secretary of the party), but the former (also called *Nduna*) is recognised both traditionally and by the state. If Dumela, due to its remoteness, is at the periphery of the nation-state, it is also at the centre of traditional human migratory routes in search of a better future and provides a sense of nationhood based on ancestry which transcends all allegiance to the Mozambican state.

In order to understand the real implications of the establishment of the GLTFCA on the communities, I had to identify an area that was geographically affected by such a gigantic project because of its cultural bonds and livelihood strategies. Because of its location and because it is the ultimate outpost before beginning the journey across the border, as well as being closely connected with populations in the two other countries involved, Dumela was deemed an excellent case study to produce grounded theories and scenarios on the future of the GLTFCA, and so it proved to be

## 4.2 THE NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE DATA

The main objective of the research was to provide detailed geo-referenced information of a case study which was representative enough to explain other communities either in the GLTFCA or experiencing a similar situation of ambiguity

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<sup>20</sup> See also Connor, 2003.

in terms of political decision-making. In order to do so, the extensive and exhaustive PRA survey<sup>21</sup> was carried out by CESVI (an Italian NGO) in most villages from Crooks' Corner to the Majinjii Pans, was taken into account, and so were the research by Connor (2003) and Koch *et al.* (1995). Moreover, the ethnic continuity across the border indicated that survival and subsistence patterns might have been very similar, thus rendering a specific data collection effort rather pointless. However, one issue was shifting the situation to the Mozambican side of the area in relations to both Zimbabwe and South Africa. In the first case, in fact, Mozambicans had an official border which allowed for legal (hence safer) import/export of goods, and contacts with relatives living in the immediate proximity of the border in the no man's land between the two gates. In the second case, the relocation of the Makulekes in 1969 created a distance between the people and their spacial geography thus hindering the relations between the community and their old social and economic network<sup>22</sup>. The communities of Pafuri in the Mozambican side, therefore, are the only ones to have retained their original socio-economic status (despite war-related disruptions) within their original geographical boundaries, thus providing an interesting case study to analyse the present and make projections for the future, bearing in mind the experiences of the other populations.

Within the *Gestion du Terroir* approach, quantitative methodology was necessary to (a) confirm the information on livelihood strategies gathered in Sengwe, thus proving continuity across the border; (b) provide basic information on the village and its inhabitants. As McNab points out, obviously facing the same dilemma, *questionnaire surveys represent a critical tool in innovative mixed methodology approaches*<sup>23</sup>, for geographers. Furthermore, since limited descriptive information was sought by

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<sup>21</sup> Participatory Rural Appraisal is a technique of survey which involves a varied methodology to understand communities, and it is used in many NGO-based field projects. The World Bank has produced a series of guidelines to carry out PRA and are available on the site <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sba104.htm>.

<sup>22</sup> Friedman, J., 2005 explains in her BA dissertation the drawbacks of the relocation process, which were not addressed in land claim process, although having impacted on the social patterns of the community.

<sup>23</sup> McNab, 2004, p.61, quoting Sporton (1999).

this means, questionnaire surveys were deemed necessary to gather relevant information, with little misunderstanding, and in a short time. Selected information was then layered onto ArcExplorer, so as to geographically reproduce the living space of the people, at Dumela. Thanks to satellite imagery, available with Google Earth, in addition, the GPS positioning of each surveyed house was layered on the aerial view, which provides a real mapping of the land use. It must be stated, however, that on the River banks land is seasonally used for agriculture, which does not appear from the satellite image, even though the local community marks each plot and each year land-ownership can be traced back despite the floods. Quantitative research was, therefore, essential to reproduce the village and contextualise its geographical and social frame within the border areas, and the most effective way to obtain such information was a questionnaire survey of all dwellings which, in the Shangaana tradition, house the extended family of the husband. The questionnaire was prepared after the first two field visits. The survey was carried out alongside qualitative analysis which provided all background information and allowed for a deeper, and more objective, understanding of the community, as 'one-to-one interviews' were the preferred method<sup>24</sup>. At this stage, moreover, it is important to note that each field research was carried out independently, and with the exception of the first field trip, all other visits involved locally hired assistant/translators. Finally, to simplify the presentation of methodologies, this section will only address issues related to risks in undertaking ethnological research and the questionnaire design, included in Attachment 7.

#### ***4.2.1 Scoping visits: placing the researcher into perspective***

It is a common warning in all ethnographical manuals that the researcher must be aware of being objective in his/her evaluation and that his/her presence in a place must be so discrete so as to transform data collection into a daily practice, rather than making an event out of it<sup>25</sup>. In this specific case, the type of research to be conducted

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<sup>24</sup> De Gabriele (1999) in McNab (2004).

<sup>25</sup> See Copan, 1999, pp. 34-43; Rossi, 2003, pp. 69-92; Burgess, 1984, p. 191.

and the area under investigation was particularly sensitive for local communities and could easily attain to misleading results, especially in relation to a quantitative survey. First of all, access had to be considered in terms of permissions of working in the area, due to the highly bureaucratic type of government in Mozambique. Upon the first visit, therefore, presentations were required both from the Administrator of Pafuri Post and from the border officials in order to avoid issues of discrimination. In Dumela, of course, both the leader and the secretary had to give their approval, as well as the community. A meeting was therefore organised to explain the aims of the research and ask for cooperation. Secondly, it was necessary to understand what the community knew of the LNP and the GLTFCA, which was brought up by some participants at the meeting, and to make sure the population was not associating this research to the Park strategy, whether nationally or internationally. This issue was particularly important as the research had to be understood as a study only, not an assessment of the community leading to a project for development. This message, however, did not pass in either of the community meeting, despite the careful use of the word *projecto* referring to the study project only, because of the immediate identification of foreigners as people who will invest in the area<sup>26</sup>. Thirdly, the unstructured methodological frame was aimed at transforming research into a *social process*<sup>27</sup>, of which field experience and interaction with people was to be an essential part. In fact, living for such an extended amount of time in the country and meeting people of all ages and walks of life, deeply increased my sense of objectivity over the recent history of the region, and the social and cultural changes which have been affected not only by national politics but also by globalisation.

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<sup>26</sup> This pre-conception was found not only in Dumela, but around the country, and is common due to the amount of poverty relief projects in the country. Furthermore, the knowledge of the involvement of foreign people in the GLTFCA would have lead local villagers to assume I was working in conjunction with this project, despite I repeatedly stated I was an independent researcher. Finally, it must be stated that during my stay in September, the District Administrator held a community meeting in Dumela, during which he stated in his speech that it was time for local people to stop waiting for White people to give them help, but to start helping themselves by working. (Field diary: 15<sup>th</sup> September 2006)

<sup>27</sup> Burgess, 1984, p. 31, refers to many scholars to discuss methodology not as a linear procedure, but as an ever changing process which adapts to the reality and the contingency of the field experience. See also Keesing, 1981.

The field research was therefore planned and revised, bearing in mind on the one hand ethical and social issues, and on the other hand logistics. As mentioned before, in fact, the journey was by no means an easy one because of distances, type of roads, as well as the lack of on-the-road and on-the-spot facilities. Driving up to Pafuri involved either crossing the Limpopo National Park, which was done upon the first trip, or driving the Chiqualaquala road to Mapai, then use the trail to Pafuri, which was driven on the way back from the second visit, or cross the border at Ressano Garcia to South Africa and drive along the KNP to Punda Maria, enter the Park, and re-enter Mozambique at Pafuri, which became the preferred route due to the type of road, as well as the network of petrol stations, mechanics and grocery stores. This experience *per se* explains a lot of how Mozambique could develop to increase tourism in the whole country and loose the focus on the coast, so as to weaken human pressure on fragile wetlands, mangrove systems and coral reefs.

Finally, as a foreigner in a foreign country, the language barriers were not easy to overcome. However, having mastered Portuguese, I realised it was much more welcome as a means of communication as opposed to English, which was understood almost at the same level. Of course, the use of Portuguese also pleased the authorities, despite the fact Chief Muklave does not speak or understand it, and showed that effort was being made to get closer to the Mozambican reality; since all attention had always been paid to the neighbouring countries. It is surprising to see how well informed local people were of what was happening in other villages because of the GLTFCA, then again rumour has it that the moment the Peace Agreement was signed in Rome to end the civil war, the *bush drum* spread the news so quickly that in less than twenty-four hours the ceasefire was respected throughout the country regardless of political factions<sup>28</sup>. From the second visit, moreover, the chief and one of the elders were keener to explain the little history they remembered

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<sup>28</sup> Of course the use of radios in rural areas as the only means to feel in touch with the rest of the world helped a lot, nonetheless the degree of people moving around the country by means of public transports, bicycles or on foot is incomprehensible to the European mind.

and the livelihood strategies in times of drought, which to me implied the barrier was being broken despite all differences.

The first scoping visit was carried out in March 2005 and lasted four days only<sup>29</sup>. During this time, all government representatives were met and all permissions were granted to work in the area. The village was explored and the main informant showed the problem-areas, because of wildlife, the routes to Zimbabwe and the agricultural project set up by the Ministry of Agriculture, explaining the main difficulties of living in the area. On the third day, the community meeting was held and the research presented, with a heated discussion on *the Park*<sup>30</sup>, land use and relocation, as opposed to agricultural projects to provide food for the people. The teacher was proposed as the main translator, together with the dRiver, who was a representative of IUCN – Mozambique, my hosting organisation. This visit allowed me to establish a first contact with the local community and gather the first set of qualitative data to prepare the questionnaire. Another short visit followed two months later, when it was possible for me to better understand the work potential of the chief and the community in relation to my research.

#### **4.2.2 Questionnaire design: needs and constraints**

The aim of the questionnaire was to confirm or confute the livelihood strategies and social system of the community in Dumela, in relation to the research undertaken in Zimbabwe<sup>31</sup>. Since the main focus was always the border, and the way its people perceive and use it, the questions were directed to understand how dependent local people are on the border and its meaning. Notwithstanding the aim, I had to take into account the fact that all previous research had been conducted with Participatory Rural Appraisal, within the SLA umbrella, which is very time-

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<sup>29</sup> Originally a week was planned, but as contingencies may change, a sunstroke forced me to leave and seek medical help in South Africa.

<sup>30</sup> This is the depreciative expression by which the local people in western Gaza refer to the GLTFCA.

<sup>31</sup> Many documents have been written on the villages settled between Pafuri and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe. Most of the published and unpublished works are collected at the CAAS library of the University of Zimbabwe, Harare. The most complete papers are Mpofu *et al.*; CESVI, 1999, pp. 11-17, and CESVI 2001.

consuming, involves the use of a team of assistants, and consists of prolonged visits in the field, which in my case were not possible due to the variability of the climate. A major constraint in the frequency and length of the staying was, in fact, the rain, since until May 2006 I had to cross the River every other day to reach Pafuri BP and get drinkable water, or to get assistance in case of a health emergency. The questionnaire, therefore, had to be exhaustive enough to get comparable results with the *Gestion du Terroir* method, but simple enough not to generate any misunderstanding in the translation.

I chose to divide it into four separate sections: 1. demographics, dealing with identification card ownership (ID), schooling and main livelihood sources; 2. trade with people coming from other countries; 3. temporary and permanent migration for work and remittances; 4. family relations across the border. In this way, the three key subjects were covered with close questions, thus providing simple but strategic information to evaluate the respondent and his/her family life. Moreover, having personally followed all interviews, I was able to assess the validity of the answers and ask for more detailed information or historical facts if the interviewed person showed special interest in the study. Despite the methodology of a similar research conducted in the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area, in Kwa-Zulu Natal<sup>32</sup>, with the help of onsite collaborators who carried out the field investigation, after two visits in Pafuri I was felt that my presence on the field was very much required, in order to combine the questionnaire with other qualitative methods, particularly direct observation. To simplify the understanding of the questionnaire, finally, the questions required either a yes/no answer, or specific information on locations and frequency. The only open ended questions referred to the products sold or bought by those people trading with foreigners<sup>33</sup>.

The choices on the type and number of questions were therefore contingent on the impression I gathered of Dumela, upon my first visits. In fact, I tried not to be

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<sup>32</sup> See Jones, undated, pp. 8–11.

<sup>33</sup> See Attachment 7 for the full questionnaire.

very specific on issues that were too personal, such as income, but rather understand more about the way people live and survive. I also asked how many people had an ID or a Passport, although the ID card is not enough to cross the border, so the respondent would not feel uncomfortable showing that he/she might have jumped the border. I was only specific about people working permanently or temporarily abroad, since I assumed that people working permanently would very rarely visit home and/or send remittances. Despite the constraints in terms of specificity, therefore, the questionnaire was structured so as to convey an idea of understanding rather than investigation.

### 4.2.3 *Data analysis and modelling*

The type of data gathered with both quantitative and qualitative investigation needed to be placed in a geographical context in order to understand the connections between the border people and the border area. A recent method of analysis stemming from GIS is Community-Integrated GIS, for which there still exist very little bibliography<sup>34</sup> and a few experimental studies in the world. This is to be considered 'an interdisciplinary multiple scale' tool, which enables researchers to see communities for what they are: social processes in a local and global context<sup>35</sup>. As it is understood, furthermore, CiGIS presents itself as a data analysis method which is easily inscribed in the *Gestion du Terroir*, by allowing the geographical correlation of social data.

It was decided to use different sets of data for two different types of analyses: (1) mapping; (2) descriptive analysis. In the first case, a selection of the most relevant data was used as layers for a GPS based map. Each household was used as a case, for which the location was shown and other attributes could be added. The layers were (1) the number of people per household, for demographics; (2) whether the family

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<sup>34</sup> See Jones, undated, where only three publications are mentioned: Jones *et al.*, forthcoming; Weiner *et al.*, 1995 and Harris and Weiner, 1998). A website is dedicated to CiGIS, that is <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/centre-environmental-studies/Asard/aboutCiGIS.htm>, from the University of Pretoria, South Africa.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

was trading, to plot the location of the household in relation to main roads; (3) whether the respondent had family working abroad, to understand the incidence of migration on families; (4) whether the respondent had relatives abroad, to plot family ties. This was a screening process of the information gathered, which was aiming at testing the inferred connections between the location of the household and the dependence to the border. In addition, by using also a Google Earth imaging, it was possible to understand the system of agricultural land around the village, thus being able to see the total extension of Dumela. This was particularly important as during the field investigation the GPS positioned half of the Western part of the village in Zimbabwe, whereas the layering on geo-referenced maps, Google Earth and ArcExplorer show that the whole village and *machambas* are in Mozambican territory.

All the data gathered with the questionnaire were then loaded onto SPSS in order to get a descriptive analysis of Dumela in terms of livelihood and border dependency. Again, because of the contradiction between qualitative and quantitative results it was deemed more cautious to make little inferential statistics and relate more on questionnaire data to produce a general description of the village, although the use of cross-referenced and multi-variable tables produced interesting results on inferred assumptions.

#### **4.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF QUALITATIVE DATA**

The field trip was extended over one year and a half, with periodical journeys back to Italy, during European summer holidays or Christmas holidays; qualitative data was therefore the most important set of information gathered on the field, whereby I refer to Pafuri, Mozambique, and East Southern Africa. By spending such a long time in the country, I was exposed to an unexpected amount of information which shifted the focus of my research from the pure utilitarian aim of socio-economic research to a more investigative multi-disciplinary approach involving the political and human geography, in relation to border studies. Generally, one of the

first issues that I perceived as crucial, while discussing my research area with people was the remoteness and the sense of forgetfulness. First of all, both white Mozambicans and South Africans, as well as and black Mozambicans were astounded to hear that a European young woman knew about the existence of such place, thus implying that the creation of the biggest TFCA in Africa and the world was very little news in fact. Secondly, everyone considered my idea of conducting my field research there quite absurd because of the lack of facilities: a perception which referred to the war times, not to a present when conservation attracts tourists and tourists attract lodge-owners. Thirdly, they would not believe how willing I was to listen to stories about their idea of Africa, Africanism and *negritude*<sup>36</sup>, the wars and the independence, conservation and politics, without judging what was being said. Curiosity and objectivity, therefore, allowed me to meet an incredible amount of people, coming from various walks of life in Mozambique, but also in South Africa and Swaziland. I also took up small voluntary jobs and consultancies, which allowed me to travel with different collaborators from Cape Town in the South West to Pemba city in the North East. Finally, linguistic abilities were also crucial in being able to reach people, whom I found generally reticent to befriend newcomers; being highly fluent in English helped me with both the South African (white and black) community and the International community, as well as with those Mozambicans who wanted to improve their skills by practising conversation. In addition, being Italian, allowed me to learn the basics of Portuguese (the official Mozambican language) very quickly, with my mistakes resulting into sympathetic understanding of the learning effort. Finally, having studied some Dutch and German, and having a general logic approach to languages, I was able to pick up some Afrikaans which helped again with a very open but conservative community, especially in some former Transvaal enclaves such as the Sabie area in Mpumalanga and Musina in the

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<sup>36</sup> The term *negritude* is used here in the original acception of an anti-colonial sense of common African heritage, which would eventually lead to independence, as posited by the Martinican poet Aimé Césaire in the third issue of *L'étudiant noir* (Paris, 1935), as well as in the critical view proposed by Fanon of the combination of violence with the sense of *negritude*, as the latter alone is still imbued in a sense of subjugation (Seidman, 2004).

Northern Province. As for the local African languages, I knew how to greet in Zulu based languages, thus covering all the border area from Durban to Pafuri, with the exclusion of the Ronga people, the main ethnic group in Maputo, and the Venda in the Eastern part of the Limpopo Province, who were not object of this research.

#### ***4.3.1 Creating the occasions to mingle***

Having moved to Mozambique alone, I had to create any possible occasions to meet people and eventually mingle. This process was very time consuming in the beginning, but at a later stage the number of people I was in touch with for work or social purposes grew unexpectedly. I firstly used my presence at IUCN to introduce myself in the TFCA Unit of the Ministry of Tourism, responsible for nature conservation in Mozambique. This is how I participated to the AWF workshop on the Limpopo Heartland and met with all the major stakeholders in the project, working specifically around the Massingir Dam, planned as a 'high-density tourism area', despite three villages counting between 2,000 and 3,000 people in total, whose relocation will soon be enforced. It must be said that, after this workshop, I have travelled extensively in the Gaza Province, both for my research and other voluntary-based projects I got involved with. This is, in fact, the only Mozambican Province which I know in-land as well along the coast. As for the rest of the country, I visited the coastal areas, as they are the principal tourism attraction during both peak season (that is Christmas and Easter holidays) and low season, thus witnessing touristic movements and the impact on road traffic and accidents. In South Africa, on the contrary, I was lucky enough to travel extensively in the former Transvaal area, now composed of Mpumalanga (capital Nelspruit), Limpopo (capital Polokwane, formerly Pietersburg), Gauteng (main cities Pretoria and Johannesburg) and the North West Province (capital Mafikeng), as well as spending a few days both in Cape Town and the Franschoek area, and Durban. Not all these trips were planned; for instance my first visit to the Kruger National Park happened in a situation of great distress, because I had a sunstroke and was looking for a hospital or a doctor with useful medicines. This is how I ended up at the Skukuza Police Station to recover as a

guest of Chief Inspector Coetzer for two days, and got a lift back to Mozambique through an informal gate with a South African land owner in Massingir and his conservation manager, whom I had met at the AWF workshop. This was, it must be said, the first of a series of unfortunate events which developed into long terms friendships, thus allowing me to discuss many issues freely with people belonging to all strata of society and ethnic groups.

Moving in with a Portuguese lawyer, of my same age, I also became acquainted with the very confined world of the Portuguese people who moved back to Mozambique, whose familiar roots are divided between the two continents, but whose breeding is unmistakably European. Despite the differences in the reasons, which brought about the return to Africa, even among the most liberal people I met there was a disenchanted feeling over the future of the country and the region, such as amongst the South African, stemming from the nature of the local people. As I recorded in my diary, sitting at the very posh Hotel Polana with my flatmate and her friends, I was asked by a Mozambican-born Portuguese man, whose physical traits barely hid mixed blood, what was the difference between a tourist and a racist. Without waiting for my reply, he added 'one month'.<sup>37</sup> The group of Portuguese people I met through my flatmate were, undoubtedly, the most varied ensemble of professionals who found a place within the working society despite being rather isolated in terms of social life. This was very different from the South African groups of people who were either isolated both work-wise and socially, or very selective in their work life, bending mostly towards people with similar backgrounds and origin. Amongst the people I met, finally, the third group I would define the 'Mozambican Portuguese' was overall the most congruent. This is a group of white people who were born in Mozambique and maintained their Mozambican identity after independence, either because they were sympathising with the cause of FRELIMO or because they considered themselves Africans, more like South African whites but

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<sup>37</sup> Diary entry: 10<sup>th</sup> March 2004, just over a month after my arrival in Mozambique, and was to me shocking to see people willing to live in a country whose majority of the population represented a despised or unwanted group.

with a consistent difference: they would fit into the society, instead of creating their own. This does not mean that they are blind to the problems of the country, in terms of hierarchies and bureaucracy, as well as poverty and underdevelopment, but their every day life is not dissimilar or isolated from the rest of the Mozambicans belonging to their social class. On this issue, what a friend from Pretoria once told me was rather eye-opening. He said that differences between black and whites, within the apartheid system, were never about race but about class, that is social stratification of society<sup>38</sup>. This perception derives, undoubtedly, by the social upbringing of the single person, but cannot be ascribed to the whole country, considering that 'the [official] motivation for Apartheid was to prevent – in the mechanical metaphors of the time – *friction* between the races and nations, since racial difference caused *friction* between *race groups*, and this caused *heat*, that is, violence'<sup>39</sup>. A question of class, particularly, in South Africa is barely pertinent to describe the present situation, whereas in Mozambique, due to the events that marked its independence and post-independence period, class is a discriminator to social contact more than race is, for those who consider themselves Africans, regardless of skin colour.

#### 4.3.2 *Unstructured meetings for a comprehensive perspective*

My field research, therefore, was extended from the locality of Dumela to a deeper social analysis of the impact recent history had into modern lives. Having the border as the focus of the research, and cross border relations as the key aspect of my analysis, to live in an environment that was so intercultural allowed me to discuss all my readings about the recent history and the politics of the region with people who have lived through all changes and wars, and have overcome events in very different ways. I have kept a diary of all the meetings and conversations I had, as to keep notes *in fieri* was almost impossible due to the extemporaneity of most conversations. These were, as a matter of fact, the most interesting ones since they showed the

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<sup>38</sup> Personal conversation on growing up in the apartheid system as a white South African, and on the impact of the changes brought about by independence, Maputo, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2004.

<sup>39</sup> Thornton, 1994, p. 11, Italics substitutes inverted commas in the original

paradox within countries whose nations are so different from each other and whose changes in societal behaviour are constantly challenged. For example, I was once told by an Afrikaaner lawyer and farm owner in Rustenberg (North of Pretoria) that he 'fully understood the Palestinian cause', not because of any political empathy, but because he knew what is felt 'to have the land taken away from you'<sup>40</sup>, whether by forcible sales to the government or because of contingency, from repeated robberies in South Africa to life-threatening situations in Zimbabwe.

None of the formal interviews listed in Table 4.1 were recorded, but the minute of the notes taken during the conversation was discussed with the interviewees for confirmation. All other interviews stemmed out of these or other encounters and were mainly informal, which is why writing a diary was the most important method for recording experiences. For instance, after the interview with Dr. Ferrão, I was invited to participate in the AWF workshop, where I met, amongst others, Dr. Marc Stalmans of Conservation International, with whom I discussed my PhD project endless times and who provided me with important documents on the GLTFCA in terms of conservation and community development strategies; Dr. Marcus Wishart, who supported the research in Massingir on the cultural landscape around the dam, now working at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; Mr. Declan Hofmeyr, who took me back to Mozambique after my sunstroke was under control and opened my views on South African society, now working at Madikwe Game Reserve; Mr. Paul DuPont, owner of the Xhonghile Game Reserve, Massingir, who was always present at the right time and in the right place to support me; Dr. Harry van der Linde, of the AWF, who was bearing with me at a time when I was trying to find my place and my research.

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<sup>40</sup> Conversation with Mr. Deandré Botha – lawyer by training, farmer and lodge owner by trade – at his town home in Mooi Nooi, Rustenburg, Sunday 9<sup>th</sup> April 2006.

Name of interviewees	Position	Objective
Dr. Jorge Ferrão	International Coordinator of the GLTFCA - Mozambique	To understand the objectives of the TFCA unit in zoning, their position on relocation, on the minefield in Zimbabwe and the Pafuri area.
Dr. Jean-Michel Pavy	World Bank project manager for the GLTFCA	To evaluate his field knowledge over the implementation of the project and understand his vision for the GLTFCA.
Dr. David Grossman	Ecologist – writer of the management plan for the Limpopo- Banhine and Zinave National Parks	This interview was conducted thanks to and with Jessica Milgroom, a PhD student, to understand his position over the progress of the GLTFCA and the conflict between the management and the local communities.
Mr. Ted Reilly	Conservationist – initiator of Protected Areas in Swaziland and writer of the strictest Conservation and Anti-poaching Law in the world	To understand the role played by the Swazi kings in protecting privately managed conservation projects and the role played by the Swazi government in recent years to establish protected areas.
Mrs. Coleen Mullen	Manager of the Pafuri Camp for Wilderness Safari, SA	To understand the agreement between WS, the KNP and the Makuleke community in managing the Makuleke concession within the KNP.
Chief Inspector Tshabalala	Chief of Police at Pafuri Border Post	To evaluate the type of traffic using the border, the role played by the police in patrolling and the impact of the GLTFCA.

**Table 4.10: Interviews conducted for the field work**

Through my former flatmate, Dr. Taciana Catarina de Peao Lopez, I met part of the Portuguese community and people working for the United Nations coming from the Western world, with whom I tried to confront my ideas and understandings. By working for a week at the Maputo trade fair, FACIM, I met the first South African people, whom I became friend with and who triggered an endless series of meetings within a very close but consistent group of South-Africa, Rhodesians<sup>41</sup> and British people who had been in the area for a long time. With a volunteer research project in Massingir, I met people working for CMC Africa Austral, the Southern African branch of the Italian constructions cooperative. By partaking in a consultancy for the Ministry of Environmental Affairs, MICOA, I travelled all the way up to Pemba, where I realised that urban planning in Mozambique was and is inexistent

<sup>41</sup> It is true that Rhodesia has changed its name into Zimbabwe in 1981, however, it would be anachronistic to call Zimbabweans all the people born in Rhodesia, because (1) most of them still hold an invalid Rhodesian Passport, not a Zimbabwean one because they left the country; (2) they fought for Rhodesia and believed in it, regardless of all ethical and moral judgements; (3) they are bonded by a subconscious sense of homelessness, as they are neither South African, despite having lived there for at least 20 years, nor Mozambican (in this cases), they belong to a land that no longer exists.

considering that the local government allocated to private owners plots of lands on the beach. The paradox, again, is firstly that all access to the sea is blocked and nearby communities whose main survival resource is fishing will be deprived of their livelihoods; secondly that this is happening in a stunning area, next door to a new research centre for biological and marine studies, whose targets also include poverty alleviation and community fisheries. This situation obviously reminded me of the planning and management strategies in the GLTFCA. Of course for each new person, there were many others to meet; everyone added value to my research by introducing new facts, perspectives and commentaries on the history of three countries, on the use and meanings of borders, on the adjustment to changes, on the future. The best Mozambican experiences were the cultural evenings organised either by the Franco-Mozambican cultural centre, where I first realised what it means to come from different cultures<sup>42</sup>. of The *Nucleo de Arte*, at times, organised Mozambican poetry reading sessions where people could go and read either their own work or famous local poems. Amazingly, for me, poetry reading is practiced more as an alternative gathering for the youth up to University students, and is very often organised by the international cooperations cultural initiatives. The most known evenings, organised by the *Nucleo*, were also attended by older people who fought for and lived through the freedom of Mozambique and to see them now in the safety of their own independence was enlightening. Political issues were seldom touched at the table, with the exception of international politics and globalisation, the current state of the country was not even thought of, if not in relation to the damage caused by foreign investors, and in general it seemed that young writers were proposing memories older people had long forgotten, and suggesting paths former fighters had long abandoned. On a different tone, instead, I was surprised to see how many Rhodesians and South Africans came back to Mozambique as civilians after having fought the *dirty* wars from the 1970s to the 1990s, some with a positive attitude

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<sup>42</sup> During the European Film Festival, for instance, while watching 'The Windows in Front', only the Europeans and North Americans realised that the numbers carved on the old man's arm meant he had been in a Nazi concentration camp, all the others missed the point and most the movie.

towards the future, others with a tendency to let themselves go to memories, which of course were recorded in my note book. The general idea is that the past might have had its reason then, but now the situation has changed and they must adapt to survive. In a way, this behaviour reflects the spirit of the pioneers who adapted to the new frontier, just like these regional expatriates adjust to living or trading across the border, often without scruples, but then again not many Mozambicans have them either.

As I met and socialised with most of these people outside working hours, I was often taking mental notes of the topics discussed and then writing at home. This delayed transcription, however, allowed me to be more objective in my analysis, because I had gathered information and perceptions from different people, and I had to make *distinguos* in order to see the differences in each person's interpretation of the same fact. I have only used recordings and transcriptions in the focus groups with the communities around Massingir for the cultural landscape project and with the chief in Dumela, because of the need to translate from Shangaana into either Portuguese or English. All the people I talked to and whose comments are reported in this text knew about my research and the type of information I was looking for. Some asked not to be named and this will be respected.

#### **4.3.3 *Research in Pafuri and Dumela***

Qualitative research in the localities was essential to complete the basic set of data acquired with the questionnaire. Because I had to plan time not only for work, but for emergencies, including taking people to the Doctor's or to hospital, going to South Africa for fuel and food and fetching water, my field activities were more scheduled than in Maputo. In the early mornings and late afternoons I would go and interview people with questionnaires, which also included some extra open questions if the people were either interested or interesting or both. In the other hours of the day I would meet the chief, talk to the people and look at the general movements in the village from my primary position right in the centre. Being the only white girl, with a white friend, meant that a lot of people spontaneously came to

see what had brought me there, and this is how I met a father and his two sons from Pretoria, going back home after spending several weeks in the bush and the Zinave National Park for holiday, and a group of American driving on the northern Mapai road to reach one of Inafrika Safaris hunting reserve near the Gonarezhou National Park, owned by the Coetzee family of Vaalwater. These small encounters showed that there is potential for tourism as an income-generating activity in the area, due to its physical and geographical characteristics. A group of Zimbabwean deminers also came to introduce themselves and this is how I got to know that the demining of Sengwe Corridor had started. I also participated in all community meetings with my two research assistants, Lavie one of chief Muklave's nieces from Dumela (Shangaana-Portuguese) and Lydia, a girl from Makuleke whose parents are migrants from Dumela and whose uncle is a plumber in Johannesburg and owner of the only *spaza shop*<sup>43</sup> in the village with a fridge. To me, Lydia, still represents the best example of cross-border relations in the area. I spent time at the border talking to the Immigration officers, particularly Chief Serrano, who had been at Pafuri for many years and had witnessed the ruining of the Border Post especially after the 2001 floods. He is disenchanted but loyal to his country, thus making each conversation interesting especially when a new border jumper was being caught and a new fine or punishment needed to be enforced. By punishment, he meant social work, either in the *machamba*<sup>44</sup> of the officers or cleaning the offices, until the person repaid his debt with the government. The law at Pafuri is always applied, but it is adapted to the reality of the place. This was the case until the new Limpopo National Park Rangers arrived and were placed in charge of border patrol to prevent illegal immigration – and that is when abuses and theft started and poor people in search of a job were left stranded in the bush.

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<sup>43</sup> *Spaza shop* is a South African term indicating small shops normally in poorer areas where necessities can be found and occasionally a phone boot. In disadvantaged or rural areas they are normally built of grey bricks with steal roofs.

<sup>44</sup> *Machamba* is a Shangaana term, used widely in the southern provinces, for orchard, or small cultivated field for subsistence.

Direct observation was the most important source of knowledge of the area, complementing formal and informal interviews. To observe and note people's behaviour, the types of approaches and attitudes towards me or fellow villagers, the mood swings according to who is present and who is not was not only interesting but precious. The oldest man in Dumela to be very active on the public scene is Simon Chaukwe who is originally from Chicumbane, some 100 km south towards Mapai. He went to Pafuri for the first time to work in the mines, then opened his own shop, but the wars were never clement on him, and eventually he settled in Dumela with his wife and daughter. He is a very straight person, attached to traditional values but understanding of modernity, however, he does not condone drinking, which he rightfully sees as a social plague. People around him do not drink alcohol, not even a sip of beer, and moderately maize beer, because they are afraid of his judgement. I have never even seen the chief drinking in front of him, he prefers to leave and go to Lydia's uncle *spaza* shop. He sees the potential brought about by events and people, and the fact that he accepted me on my first visit and introduced me to Chief Muklave when he came back from Pafuri, was my fortune. He organised everything for me, and people obeyed. In retrospect, his character was stronger than the Chief's and the local Nyanga's (witch doctor), the Chief's brother.

It is definitely through qualitative investigation that my research was successfully completed, firstly because all my readings about the three countries were discussed with people who lived those years; secondly because by working with private and governmental organisations I had the chance to see more of the country and its policy-makers, thus becoming aware of incongruences; thirdly, because power relations between people and the conceptualisation of borders, nation and state into everyday life would not have been so clear with the questionnaire survey, only. Selfishly, I must admit, I would also never have had a personalised tour of Swaziland's main conservation areas with their founder discussing paradigm shifts in conservation practices and policies, and the reality of it all.

#### 4.4 PLACING DATA INTO CONTEXT

The research was carried out using a multi-disciplinary mixed method approach that included both qualitative and quantitative data collection as a primary source of data, complemented by secondary data<sup>45</sup> collected both through academic bibliographical research and *in loco*, specifically all the books referring to Mozambican history and the programmes of the FRELIMO party now out of print. Secondary data was used to evaluate the type and quantity of information available on the local field area, in order to avoid duplication of information, and provided the context to analyse the current implementation of the GLTFCA.

As mentioned before, the field work lasted one year and a half, and deeply affected the aim and objectives of the research. Such adjustment was due to the context I was presented with upon my arrival in Mozambique and its development through time. Both the local and the regional fieldtrips, in fact, allowed me to place the GLTFCA into a context that was historical, but drawing heavily from political geography, which is why from a pure socio-economical investigation, the scope shifted to a more complex view of the processes in place. Particularly, the zoning of the LNP which was decided and approved just before my arrival showed me a reality that was completely different from the descriptions on official documents. Moreover, by engaging in various activities and travels throughout the KNP and the Gaza Province, I became aware of the influence geography had and has on political decision-making, primarily in border areas.

This section will briefly outline the essential information on the field research and the methodology, in order to show how the combination of both academic methodology and life experiences provided the vast amount of information used in writing this thesis, which, to reiterate, was conceived out of a learning process and is written accordingly.

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<sup>45</sup> Burgess, 1984

#### 4.4.1 *Planning the research*

The project was divided into three main phases: planning; investigating; and writing-up. However, it would be very simplistic to describe it accordingly as it would overlook all the other processes that prolonged, hence constructed, the research. Table 4.2 will describe schedules specifically, with reference to all the experiences undertaken while on the field. This will provide a rather comprehensive idea of how the field research developed into a field experience. The amount of time spent in Mozambique was initially planned to four plus four months, however, the situation changed due to mis-comprehension and non-compliance to agreements (First field work); delays in payments and the priority given to the funded project (Second field work); changes in the scope of the research towards political geography and border studies, travelling to complete both qualitative and quantitative investigations (Third field work). The time dedicated to the actual writing-up was unexpectedly reduced to a few months, instead of the canonical year which I had planned for, had contingencies not taken such a heavy toll on the research.

<b>Project phase</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Scheduled activity</b>	<b>Real activity</b>
Planning the project	January 2004 - January 2005	To plan activities; to find a link with IUCN, the selected research institute of affiliation, in Maputo; and to update the bibliographical research.	An agreement was established with IUCN for an internship period of 4 months, which included support towards my field work.
First field work	February – May 2005	To complete scoping visits to the research areas and begin the mapping of Dumela, whilst gathering generic information on the local history and socio-economic relations	Only one field visit was possible with IUCN due to failure to maintain the agreement. The other was organised privately.
First review (Italy)	June – August 2005	To review the data collected and plan the quantitative survey.	The organisation of extra funding through a different project, and financially plan the field research.
Second field work	August – December 2005	To carry out the exploratory field work for the PhD and undertake the financed project.	The gathering of all information for the funded project, due to delays in organisational process for the acquisition of a vehicle.
Second review (Italy)	December 2005 – January 2006	To review the data collected and plan the final phase of the field work with the quantitative survey.	The planning of the field work both exploratory and final.
Third field	January –	To carry out the field research	The undertaking of various

work	September 2006	and complete secondary data collection.	activities to complement the field research (qualitative data), and complete the field work.
Third review (Italy)	September – November 2006	To review all data gathered and begin processing all information.	The data were reviewed and processing with Excel began.
Final field work	November – December 2006	To begin writing-up and finalise all information with final interviews	Write-up began and field work was concluded.
Writing-up (Italy)	December 2006 – March 2007	To complete the thesis	The thesis was completed

**Table 4.11: Research phases**

#### ***4.4.2 Quantitative research***

The quantitative survey was essentially a four sections questionnaire, available in Attachment 7, whose aim was to confirm all descriptions of livelihood strategies from the Sengwe Communal Land. Each question represented a topic, and questions on income were inferred by addressing other issues such as trading and family-members working abroad. Considering the case study was the village of Dumela, only, due to its geographical position, the population was not sampled but taken as total, that is 89 households. Unfortunately, the coordinates of one household do not have their matching questionnaire, and this is the only missing set of data, which was discarded during the statistical analysis, although being mapped.

The sets of maps produced complement the maps available on the area from DINAGECA, the National Institute for Geography and Cartography of Mozambique, in terms of district distribution and villages locations, as well as the maps produced by the Peace Park Foundation and AWF on the GLTFCA. The new maps were, subsequently, used to 'localise' all assumptions and verify them against the primary and secondary data collected.

#### ***4.4.3 Qualitative research***

Qualitative research was, of course, more varied and flexible to changes in methodology. The primary data collected was the main contributor to the research, since it gave the research an innovative scope, as well as serving to reach the expected conclusion.

The most relevant data is derived from personal observation and recordings on my diaries. Considering the different experiences of living in Dumela and in Maputo, I decided to keep two sets of diaries: the first for the regional fields where all my travelling was recorded as well, and the second for Dumela and Massingir (the field area for the funded project). All the information was recorded either on the same day or on a weekly basis if the time was uneventful. Most of the information was cross-referenced with photographs and documents, referring to a particular topic (such as the wars or conservation strategies). In this way, I was able to keep a live memory of the occurrence that could be incorporated into the research, and automatically disregard those entries which were not relevant.

Semi-structured interviews were used to understand the point of views of major stakeholders in the GLTFCA and other conservation projects in the region. Apart from a few questions that were serving the objectives of each interview (see Table 4.1), the rest was a conversation, whose topics were varied according to how willing the interviewee was to go into details about conservation, community-based approaches and informal vs. illegal activities. In some cases, the first interview was followed by a series of updating meetings, particularly with Dr. Ferrão discussing the outcomes of field research, the involvement of private investors, in and outside the LNP, and the governmental policies for the implementation of the GLTFCA.

A series of meetings and informal conversations, finally, were conducted with different people, whose experience of Mozambique varied from political to militaristic, from conservationist to business activities, in order to discuss key topics for the research. All the people involved in such conversations were fully aware of the reasons why I was in Mozambique, of the nature of my studies and of the aims and objectives of my research. I occasionally engaged them into conversations to either discuss my research (particularly with Dr. Stalmans and Dr. Wishart), or record some perceptions on the recent histories of the three countries, both in Mozambique and South Africa, as well as discuss the role of conservation in land distribution and the socio-economic development of the areas involved.

Typology	Key informants	Objectives
Conservation policy in Mozambique	Dr. M. Stalmans, Dr. M. Wishart, Dr. M. Couto, Prof. J. Hutton, Mr. P. DuPont, Mr. D. Hofmeyr, Chief Insp. Coetzer, Dr. S. Norfolk, the group of PhD students on the GLTFCA,	To establish the value attached to the GLTFCA project by different stakeholder and professionals, and evaluate the process.
History of the three countries and present time	Ms. Ana Leao, Mrs. Taciana Warburn, Ms. N. Thurton, Ms. P. Rolletta, Ms. S. Dos Santos ,Ms. C. Rocha, Mr. D. Bosman, Mr. P. McIntosh, Mr. G. DuToit, Mr. D. Botha, Mr. T. Young	To evaluate perceptions on colonisation and apartheid regimes on the people who grew up within them and were directly or indirectly involved in the wars, as well as the current political situation.

**Table 4.12: Informal conversations**

## 4.5 CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF MOZAMBIQUE

The context in which the research was carried out was mainly the urban Mozambican environment of Maputo, the neuralgic centre of political decision-making with resonance in the remotest rural areas, with visits to Dumela and Pafuri, as well as other areas in Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. During the period I spent in Mozambique, the implementation of the GLTFCA moved giant steps towards international cooperation for different reasons. Firstly in terms of anti-poaching and anti-migration across the border with South Africa, especially in view of the opening of the Giryiondo Border Post, near Letaba in the KNP in December 2005, and the dropping of the fence protecting the wildlife sanctuary in the LNP, thus exposing communities to a higher risk of human-wildlife contact. Secondly, because the relocation of the three communities north of the Massingir Dam was approved by the WB and other donors, namely GTZ, despite all argumentations from the villagers, specifically Mavodze, where the administrator seats. Thirdly, because of the talks to build a bridge over the Limpopo River, possibly at Mapai, to improve access to the GLTFCA from the northern section (Pafuri – Punda Maria).

In the past two years the country has generally seen an increase in foreign investment, particularly South African and Chinese, in tourism and general economic development related to the use of natural resources. This increase was due not only to the governmental complacency towards foreign capital, but also to the strategic creation of tax-free industrial zones south of Maputo, along the Maputo

Development Corridor, and in the north along major routes to the sea in Nampula and Cabo Delgado<sup>46</sup>. In some cases, fisheries for instance, the government had informal (or private) interests which allow for the predation and devastation of coastal resources by Chinese long-liners. Despite the war and the militaristic type of regime in place until the 1990s, however, the military and police sector have failed to keep up to date with modern technologies that would contribute to reduce the impact of illegal activities (from poaching to smuggling), due to lack of investment by the government into their security system. Also considering the poor wages offered to officers, corruption has now taken over within the army and the police, from the *cinzentinhos*<sup>47</sup> to higher ranks, thus affecting all visitors to the country.

Tourism grew in 2005 by 37% (WTO source), which is the highest rate in the world, and despite acceptable arguments that not all entries into the country are tourists due to visa requirements for businesses, it must be said that all people who come to Mozambique do engage in tourism activities and do visit areas in the country other than Maputo, which is where most business deals are signed. Donors, finally, have continued to pour money into the country since the end of the civil war, which created an addiction to foreign currency both for the government and privates, without requiring much accountability as to the destination of such funds.

Overall, Mozambique is a stable country with a democratic political system, although it is very easy to argue the *democracy*<sup>48</sup> of a country where two parties are sharing the pie, one of which will never manage to take over 'democratically' due to the capillary diffusion of FRELIMO in urban and rural areas. The de-facto mono-

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<sup>46</sup> For further information see the website of the Centre for the Promotion of Investment (CPI), the governmental agency in charge of favouring and regulating foreign investment in all sectors.

<sup>47</sup> The term *cinzentinhos* refers to the lowest grade of policing, and it is derived from the colour of the uniform (greenish grey). These officers patrol the streets for illegal people, hence they are allowed to check passports and visas only and must conduct the illegal person to the police station for further checking and eventually detention. However, they do stop cars on the road pretending to act as traffic wardens, whose job is to patrol the streets and fine people who do not respect the code of the road. Since the *cinzentinhos* do not have a fine book with them, they usually threaten the person who has been stopped to be taken to the station unless he/she pays the fine there, which is totally illegal. Unaware people or those not willing to waste time do pay the corruption fine and begin a never ending cycle, as information over the cars and owners are passed by to colleagues.

<sup>48</sup> See Colliers, 2006, who discusses democracy and democratic values in Africa.

party system has allowed for the private involvement of governmental ministers and officer in business deals, whose detriment to the country socio-economic development is often more outstanding than the benefits. However, since the implementation of the free -trade agreements within the SADC region, which involves the suspension of the VISA requirements for SADC nationals, southern Mozamabique and especially the Maputo district experience soaring rates in violent crimes which include car-highjacking at gunpoint, as well as armed robbery and burglary, which are typical of the South African crime scene and relatively unknown to the country.

## 5. CROOKS' CORNER, THE HEART OF THE GLTFCA

*Where the Luvuvhu River twists its way through  
the wilderness to join the great Limpopo, there  
lies a forgotten corner of the Transvaal, left alone  
to brood in the solitude and the silence of the  
bush. (Bulpin, 1954, p. 21)*

This is the first line of Bulpin's introduction to Crook's Corner: a very poetic image for the types of deals and ordeals which gave the name to the place, yet to paraphrase Donnan & Wilson<sup>1</sup>, some things can only happen at borders. The area is the geographic core of the GLTFCA and bears both an ecological and cultural significance for the objectives of the PPF and the land management of the TFCA. This, in fact, would be the area attracting most animals on the migratory route towards the north, because the rivers would provide water on the way and the intact riverine forest would be a real shelter. The high presence of wildlife in the Pafuri area, actually, validate its ecological importance. Culturally, it is crucial because of its history as a cross-road of ethnicities, traders and history makers, which are inscribed in the historical background discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

This chapter aims firstly at describing Crooks' corner and Pafuri using the little literature available, which can be reduced to Bulpin (1954), Koch *et al.* (1995) and Connor (2003) for the locality of Pafuri and the corner, with few integrations from South African promotional websites for tourism, which aim at portraying the cultural history of the countries many ethnic groups. The qualitative and quantitative field research, therefore, will contribute to this presentation and to the discussion of issues at the stake for the TFCA. Information will mainly be drawn from conversations with Chief Insp. Coetzer, of the Skukuza Police Station; interviews at the Pafuri Border Post with Chief Serrano of the Mozambican Immigration Office, and Chief Inspector Tshambalala of the Pafuri Border Post Police; from conversations with Mr. Simon Chaukwe and Chief Muklave of Dumela, as well as the SANP guides who took me at the Thulamela archaeological site; from direct observations both in Kruger Park and

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<sup>1</sup> See quote of the introduction Donnan & Wilson, 1999.

the Limpopo Province, as well as in Mozambique. Secondly, the chapter will discuss the role engaged by *Peace* in promoting and implementing conservation in the TFCA. This last section will be theoretical, yet based on field work experience.

## 5.1 THE HISTORY OF A LEGENDARY SPOT

Pafuri is a stretch of land situated in the north-east part of South Africa, which geographically extends into both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The original inhabitants of the areas are Venda, a Congo-Niger Bantu group, which settled along the Limpopo River and whose ancestry lines goes back to the Mapungubwe civilisation extending from the Soutspanberg mountain range in the South to the Matopos hills in the north. The kingdom declined around the mid of the XIII century, but Vendas kept their territory along the River and their identity intact despite the migrations brought about by the Voortrekkers and the *mfecane*. The territory which became an independent Bantustan in 1979, however, covers only a small portions of the original area of influence, as the population patterns had already been disrupted by the arrival of the Matabele and Tsonga-Shangaan people in the border area, and its political geography had changed by the state divisions and by the northwards expansion of the Kruger National Park.

In order to understand why this place is widely known as the frontier *par excellence* by all people in the three countries who have heard of it or been there, it is necessary to know what characteristic made it so famous. Firstly, the people of Pafuri have different clans of similar ancestry regardless of which country we are talking about. This is why this chapter will address the area as a whole, notwithstanding the borders. Secondly, the foreigners at Pafuri contributed to the creation of the myth of Crook's Corner, where the legendary baobab so big to hide poachers was found and the border beacon could be moved according to which police was looking for you<sup>2</sup>. Thirdly, the border wars presented in the previous chapter in a national geo-political

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<sup>2</sup> Found in *The Ivory Trail*, Bulpin (1954), these myths are part of the history of the place through the biography of the most famous poacher of all times, Bvekenya, whose sons and daughter still live in the Pafuri area: one works for the Wilderness Safari - Pafuri Camp; the other used to work for CESVI in Zimbabwe. It remain a mystery whether they know of each other or not.

perspective had a great impact locally, and contribute to explain why Peace is so essential to in land management for conservation along the border.

### 5.1.1 *Tracing back the people of Pafuri*

The waves of migrations to the Limpopo River began, of course, with the first Bantu tribes from East Africa, which gave origin to the first interbreeding with native San and Khoi Khoi people: this pre-Iron Age period marked the formation of the Venda culture. The second and most important wave of migrations, to the purpose of the text, however, is the one generated by the *mfecane* of Shaka Zulu, and causing a dispersal of clans and families in the area that spans from Northern Zululand to Tuli Circle in the West, the Zambesi in the North and the Limpopo-Sabe in the East. The available bibliography on the *mfecane* is wide and varied to the extent that some events such as the arrival of Mzilikazi into Shona and Venda territory are widely documented, but the origin of the Shangaane-Tsonga empire is less clear, and so is its development<sup>3</sup>. According to historical accounts, Shaka succeeded his father Dingiswayo in 1818, and the *mfecane* began only two years later. According to his research, Du Preez states that Shaka's desperation on the death of his mother released his evil and the violence against his own and other people began<sup>4</sup>. As true as this story can be, it is more likely that other political and economical factors triggered the military power of the Zulu thus changing the human geography of the region for ever. Reader<sup>5</sup> brings together the slave and other trades which were being dealt with in Delagoa Bay directly by the chiefs of the local peoples, despite the presence of the Portuguese at the Fort of Laurenço Marques (present day Maputo)<sup>6</sup>. To control the people around Delagoa Bay as well as the present day Tembe corridor connecting KwaZulu Natal to the Matola River estuary, therefore, meant the total control over

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<sup>3</sup> This statement is particularly referred to Marks, 1967, and her commentary on four 'new' books on the history of Zulu in Natal. Other texts attempting to provide a chronological account of the Nguni of Soshangaane are both authored by Liesegang (1969 and 1970).

<sup>4</sup> Du Preez, 2004, Charter 9 is dedicated to the history of Shaka, but he figures in other chapters as well. Walter, 1966, also refers to the insanity of Shaka's grief, but he clearly states it was a ruse to hide his ingenious plan of *dividi et impera*, based on social control and terror.

<sup>5</sup> Reader, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Information found in Liesegang, 1969.

trade with Europeans. Hence, Shaka opened war against all the chieftainships along the corridor, and forced them into a vassalage system of tributes. From Du Preez account, it is very clear that Mzilikazi and Shoshangane, being both generals of the Zulu kingdom, left because threatened by Shaka himself, driven insane by grief and pain. In the historical accounts, however, the reasons which forced both generals to move are not clear, although in both cases it is stated that they continued to flee whenever Shaka was getting closer to their new location, which implies a degree of fear over past and future events<sup>7</sup>. The story of movement is very complex and not often consistent, since it has been traced back on governmental papers and epistles, imprecise maps, and oral accounts. What is clear though is that Mzilikazi moved north and was defeated once by the Voortrekkers, thus learning the importance of European weapons, which were eventually used to defeat the Kalanga Shonas of Great Zimbabwe by his successor Gundwane in 1873, at the climax of their power<sup>8</sup>. Soshangane, instead, moved east, thus avoiding the Ndwandwe, of present day Swaziland, but he was not the only leader in the migration eastwards. The first two Nguni chiefs to have left, Nxaba Msane and Ngwana Maseko, moved into Rozwi areas in Southern Mashonaland, which extended to the Limpopo River in the South East. It is uncertain, however, if the two chiefs marched together and for how long. Similarly the later migrations of two other Nguni chiefs Soshangane and Zwangendaba, cannot be clarified as to whether the two operated together in the conquests or not<sup>9</sup>. Transvaal and Southern Mozambique, anyhow, had been influenced by Nguni migrations since 1821. This would explain, therefore, why elders in Dumela refers to the 'Nguni wars' as to the reason for their dispersal, instead of the *mfecane*<sup>10</sup>. Considering that every time the elders were talking about a war-related displacement they were referring to the initiator of the war, as was the case for the 'Ian Smith war' referring to the independence fights in Rhodesia, the

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
<sup>7</sup> Du Preez, 2004, see above. Marks, 1967, Liesegang 1970, Beach 1974 and Etherington, 2004.

<sup>8</sup> A full account of the relations between Matabele and Shona, based on secondary sources, is to be found in Beach, 1974.

<sup>9</sup> See Liesegang, 1970.

<sup>10</sup> Information drawn from fieldwork.

naming of the 'Nguni wars' indicates that at the time of the scattering (*difecane*) of the Nguni people, other chiefs came into play, and Shaka was only one of them.



Map 5.15: Map of the Nguni migrations (Source: Liesegang, 1970)

By assuming the authenticity of Liesegang's reconstruction, also backed by Marks (1967) and Walter (1966), the period which followed the *mfecane* was signed by the imposition of the Zulu-style vassalage state by the four generals in the areas conquered. Only Mzilikazi and Soshangane, however, came to close to the territory

the Zulus of Shaka and his successors wanted to acquire: the route to Delagoa Bay and the people in Transvaal, due to the beginning of labour intensive mine works in Kimberly. Mzilikazi, therefore, went north pass the Limpopo River into South West Mashonaland and Soshangane occupied the area north of Maputo, but eventually had to leave from his head-quarters at Bilene and escape inland, pass the Limpopo and the Sabe River. The lower Limpopo valley, however, was the area where he settled eventually due to the break-out of tse-tse fly at the Sabe River. The Gaza-Nguni, eventually, had a king and a kingdom extending from Matabeleland, after the victories over the Shona, to the Indian Ocean coast from Bilene to Inhambane<sup>11</sup>. By the second half of the XIX century, therefore, Pafuri was no longer a Venda territory, but a melting pot of Ndebele and Gaza-Nguni who found in common language and culture the means for peaceful co-habitation: after all, both groups had moved away from their kraal in Zululand less than a century earlier.

### ***5.1.2 Crooks' Corner: the cultural melting pot***

The core of the varied Pafuri area, of course, would have to be a place bearing useful qualities for local inhabitants, and this was *Sesengamabwene*, or 'the Place of the Sandstone'<sup>12</sup>, but it was also known to the white hunters and renegades as Crook's corner:

*the name man gave long ago to this secluded and sinister wedge of land. It was the last home for many a curious and lawless character: a sanctuary from civilisation, whose solitary state was paradise to all those whose deeds or inclinations made imperative a retreat to some last stronghold of the lawless (Bulpin, 1954, p. 20)*

This description alone serves over a thousand descriptive words for the place, which surprisingly still conveys the same sensations despite over a century and many a war have passed by. Notwithstanding the presence of at least three cultural groups, the Venda, the only original population, now found along the Zimbabwean border in

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<sup>11</sup> See full account in Beach, 1974.

<sup>12</sup> Bulpin, 1954, p. 20, explains that Crooks' corner lays 'atop a low, 500 feet high ridge, which formed a sort of topographical backbone to this wild wedge of land between the Rivers [where] the huntsmen found the stone they used in braying and dressing skin'.

South Africa; the Tsonga, from the Gaza empire; the Makuleke of arguable origin as described in Chapter 1.6.2, some white people decided to move up there following the *Ivory trail*, a trading route which did not use Delagoa Bay, rather the modernising Northern railway in South Africa, through Transvaal.

*The old adventurers' way to Makhuleke left the Great North Road, Midway between the railhead at Pietsberg and Louis Trichard. It dropped down in the bushveld, and for some fifty miles made a thirsty journey through the heat and dust to what was known as Klein Letaba [...] a major milestone along the Ivory Trail. [...] Beyond the hotel [...] it went east-wards to a solitary store standing at the headwaters of the Shingwidzi. This store [...] marked the boundary of the lion country. From thence east-wards, all travellers proceeded with increased caution [...] (Bulpin, 1954, p.22)*

This was the first trait of the Ivory Trail, now the main tourism route in the Limpopo Province, connecting Johannesburg to the northern part of the Kruger National Park, through former Bantustans and archaeological sites. The name of the route is, of course, emblematic of the main resource at Pafuri and explains also why it attracted Europeans in search for both fortune and adventure. Wild game, including big tuskers (elephants) and rhinos, were available both in Mozambique, where no attempt of formal conservation was made until the 1960s, and in South Africa, where the border area of the Shingwedzi became a game reserve in 1903 and was incorporated into the KNP in 1926 only<sup>13</sup>. As Koch *et al.* point out, conservation practices in Zimbabwe were ahead of their time thanks to the application of the 1900 London Convention on the Preservation of Animals, and the heritage left by Sir Cecil Rhodes upon his death in 1902, leading to the creation of the Rhodes-Matopos and the Nyanga National Parks. As a consequence, game hunting was forbidden, but to native population only, who had already been relocated in the 1920s in the African Reserves (Tribal Trust Lands), on the driest parts of the country<sup>14</sup>. The implementation of conservation strategies, therefore, severely impacted the

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<sup>13</sup> Aside from Bvekenya's biography, Koch *et al.*, 1995, refers to Carruthers, 1989, when stating that *in the Transvaal, Boer and African politics prospered from a joint trade in animal products. The decline in wildlife species accelerated in the late 1800s with the discovery of diamonds in the Cape and then gold in the Transvaal and the accompanying influx of European settlers* (p. 8).

<sup>14</sup> See Koch *et al.*, 1995, pp. 11 – 12.

livelihood of the natives who hunted for both trade and food-stock, hence it is not surprising that local people at Pafuri would be so kin to contribute to the hunting trips of white hunters, in exchange for meat. The Shagaan, according to Bulpin, were particularly good trackers and were often used by professional poachers in the Pafuri area, also because of their knowledge of the Mozambican territory. As the particularly harsh climate still forces local population in the Pafuri area (Mozambique and Zimbabwe) to live on tree berries, their knowledge of the types of bushes and the fruit they bear is particularly significant of their knowledge of the bush and its inhabitants<sup>15</sup>. As the story tells, however, the fact that there were no protected areas in Mozambique does not imply that the Portuguese were not jealous of their own ivory stock<sup>16</sup>.

Assuming that Europeans and African whites began to arrive at Pafuri, and Crooks' Corner area, in the second half of the XIX Century, before the first migratory influx to the Kimberly and Johannesburg mines was settled in South Africa, it is plausible to posit that people at Pafuri have been used to trading and dealing with foreigners for at least half a century, which made them accustomed to identify and evaluate goods and information that are precious to the white people. It is not surprising, therefore, that local people did understand the value of money in transaction, just as their chief understood the value of weapons to fight a war. The opening of the mines, more than the plantations in Natal, in fact, began to attract apt men to South Africa in order to gain small fortunes through hard work<sup>17</sup>. The Shangaan were much sought after also for the mines because they would accept three years contracts, as opposed the averaged six months on natives in South Africa, and would accept to work underground<sup>18</sup>. Without any issue on papers and ID cards,

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<sup>15</sup> A detailed account on edible berries was given by Mr. Simon Chaukwe, Dumela, during the field trip of May 2005, yet a real classification was not possible due to the short stay. On the other visits, the changing season did not allow for identification.

<sup>16</sup> See Bulpin, 1954, many references throughout the book.

<sup>17</sup> Kanyenze, 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Maloka, 1997, in commenting four books on the labour migrations to the Rand mines since 1885. The preference for the Shangaan resulted in 1893 in the negotiating with the Portuguese authorities of an agreement for their emigrations, reaching 'a Luso-Transvaal ad hoc labour agreement' (p. 215)

people would cross rivers and mountains to get to the place where workers were sought, and only there were issued with documents to allow them to stay and work<sup>19</sup>. Only towards the end of the XIX century during the war against Gungunhane, the Gaza Emperor, did Shangaan people leave their jobs to fight for their king<sup>20</sup>, which is symptomatic of the duality of their life system, based on modernity to earn a living, yet faithful to traditional chieftainship for administration. The traditional practice of the *lobola* (bride price) which was customarily paid in cattle during pre-colonial time, then in hoes due to the 1860s epidemic, was finally paid in gold pound sterling as mine work became a customary activity of young men<sup>21</sup>. This shows on the one hand the understanding of the value of money, and also the fear that by accumulating wealth the youth would overpower the elderly in the hierarchical structure of villages<sup>22</sup>, which had already been subdivided by mine structures of *boss boys* and *mafunda*<sup>23</sup>. These facts are essential to understand mechanisms within the border *milieu*, which are still valid at present, although in a different perspective. Unfortunately for the Shangaan, Gungunhane was defeated and in 1897 a new agreement was signed for 'the regular supply of Shangaan labour'<sup>24</sup>, which also implied a deal in the payment of labourers, part of which was going directly into the gold reserves of the Portuguese government<sup>25</sup>. For Pafuri, finally, the regulation of work in the mines through WENELA/TEBA, to avoid a modern, yet not less harsh, slave trade<sup>26</sup>, involved the establishment of two

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<sup>19</sup> Bulpin, 1954, however, also suggests that local hunters at Crooks' Corner would act as touts, thus creating a personalised network of work supply, which could have been compared to slavery. It was this informal trade that WENELA sought to halt.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. pp. 214 – 216.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, and Roesch 1991.

<sup>22</sup> As confirmed by Lubkemann (2005), referring to Machaze, in the north-east part of the Gaza Province.

<sup>23</sup> Manghezi, 1998, is the only author to discuss this division between those who had a position as 'boss-boys' thus endangering survival strategies of normal workers, *mafundas*, in order to acquire a position, which in turn reflected in their life back home.

<sup>24</sup> Maloka, 1997. p. 216.

<sup>25</sup> Manghezi, 1998.

<sup>26</sup> This doesn't necessarily mean that similar persuasive strategies were not used by recruiters, such as the sending of gifts to the chiefs and the employment of tradesmen and missionaries living in the areas or, as a last resource, force. This practices lasted until the 1920s (Maloka, 1997), when the supply became stable as working in the mines became a sort of passage rite for all youngsters.

recruitment posts on each side of the borders, whose remnants are still visible<sup>27</sup>. These were the only landmarks of a border division between the two countries, since the border post in itself was not operational as a node of entry. The area was therefore stuck into a paradox of living within a cultural milieu divided into economic and political areas: a multi-level geographical scale.

### ***5.1.3 The bush war: disrupting traditional livelihoods?***

The bush war originated from the militarisation of political movements in both Rhodesia and South Africa, for the implementation of majority rule against racial segregation. These political movements, by accepting the armed struggle, were labelled and fought as terrorists in both white-ruled countries. The physical, economic and military support provided by newly independent Mozambique, moreover, paved the way for exogenous insurrectional acts of civil disobedience, which escalated into a civil war, both as a punishment for its regional involvement and as a warning against the endorsement of Marxism-Leninism. Despite having a regional and international scale, the war was actually fought between neighbouring countries, hence the borders became the core of all fighting, particularly in the Rhodesian phase. The salient events of this sad period in the contemporary history of Southern Africa have been presented and discussed in Chapter 3; here, instead, it is important to note the effect on the cultural *milieu*, for Pafuri and the Limpopo valley in Mozambique.

The officialisation of Shangaan migrations into South Africa contributed to sustain rural livelihood, as well as to maintain the cultural milieu of Pafuri as the convergence of former Zulu chieftainships whose history had been reconciled in that part of Southern Africa: remote, because peripheral to all centres of political or economic power. The independence of Mozambique, in 1975, impaired this equilibrium because of the support that the new FRELIMO government granted to military organisations from Rhodesia, first, and South Africa, second, in their fight

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<sup>27</sup> The recruitment post in South Africa, in fact, was so well kept that has been turned by TEBA into a lodge, operational since 2005.

for majority rule. Furthermore, the development of RENAMO, as a Ndau (Shona) group from the centre of Mozambique<sup>28</sup>, and the controversial policies of *aldeiamento* and *dynamisation*<sup>29</sup> of the rural areas pursued by FRELIMO, contributed to bring a regional war to the local scale: the civil war was, in fact, based more on traditional and cultural allegiance than on military and political affiliation. In order to understand the effects of the war, whether we agree or not with those researchers who firmly believe in the escalation to a Mozambican civil war<sup>30</sup>, on the population at Pafuri, it is very important to bear in mind the differentiation in post-independence African countries between the State and the Nation. Although FRELIMO contributed greatly to the liberation of Mozambique from the Portuguese yoke, the government was still struggling with creating a nation within the colonial boundaries, by interrupting all connection to tradition and ethnical differences. If on the one hand the population was 'grateful' to FRELIMO for newly acquired independence, on the other hand the continuation of Portuguese policies in terms of land distribution, the substitution of traditional with political leadership, and the enforcement of positivism in education, were not often appreciated by rural people<sup>31</sup>. This division

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<sup>28</sup> Roesch, 1992, thoroughly explains the NMR project as a typical *dividi et impera* strategy on the Rhodesian side, by involving former FRELIMO ruling elites which had been excluded because of their incapacity to accept a nationalistic view of the State, able to encompass ethnical divisions. The Ndau characterisation of RENAMO became stronger under the South African patronage as the movement became more independent and the new leadership of Alfonso Dlakama implemented military strategy based on ethnicity. See also Lubkemann, 2005.

<sup>29</sup> *Dynamising* rural Mozambique was one of the priorities of the FRELIMO Marxist-Leninist approach to economic growth, which included the maintenance of Portuguese-style *aldeias*, small villages with a health centre and a school, which allowed to provide for basic needs as well as to maintain control over people. *Grupos dinamisadores* (dynamising groups) were formed by the government or spontaneously to 'explain the party line, carry out basic governmental functions, prevent the destruction of local businesses and factories, and maintain production (Pitcher, 2002, p. 48). In the many discourses of Samora Machel, however, the idea of dynamising groups appears between the lines, as work supervision is needed to maintain levels required (Machel, 1975, pp. 11-23).

<sup>30</sup> The debate is fully exhausted in the introduction of Roesch, 1992.

<sup>31</sup> See Roesch (1992) and Hermele (1998). S. Machel, discussing the role of education in the formation of national unity is worth quoting here: 'O colonialismo procurou acentuar todas as divisões étnicas, linguísticas, religiosas, culturais que podiam existir entre a população moçambicana. Por outro lado, a educação tradicional, exaltando o culto da comunidade linguística a que a pessoa pertence, inculcou-lhe uma attitude de desprezo, por vezes mesmo de ódio, em relação às outras comunidades' and 'A educação deve dar-nos uma personalidade moçambicana, que sem subserviência alguma, assumendo a nossa realidade, saiba em contacto com o mundo exterior, assimilar criticamente, as ideias e experiências de outros povos, transmitindo-lhes também o fruto da nossa reflexão e prática' (1975, pp. 36 and 35) [Colonialism managed to stress all the ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural divisions

between political obliging and cultural affiliation was more representative along soft permeable borders where *flexible citizens*, to paraphrase Ong, had created a *safe space*<sup>32</sup>, characterised by a network of kinships and employment opportunities.

The *Ian Smith war*, as known to local people at Pafuri<sup>33</sup>, marked the first and harsher period of disruption for the Pafuri *safe space*, as Gaza became a frontier for the Rhodesian army during operations against ZANLA army. NMR was unheard of at the time in Pafuri, but the war was very much part of the lives of people, crushed between the Limpopo River and the mined border. It was at this time that Chief Dumela led his people across the River into a safer area some 12 kms south from the border post on the main road to Mapai. The kraal stayed there from 1975 until 1980, and despite connections with family in Zimbabwe were impossible, the movements towards South Africa continued both legally through TEBA and illegally, jumping the border along the KNP fence. The conflict, however, took its toll and in 1975, as Wardman remarks, was a peak year for mine recruitment, with 19% of the active male population of Gaza being employed through TEBA only, the percentage fell to 4% in the following year<sup>34</sup>. Since mining was the main source of livelihood, hence of agricultural investment in the Province, it is also possible to assume that the reduced number in migrations was due to the change in agreement over mine employment between FRELIMO and South Africa, in line with Machel's pledge<sup>35</sup> to put an halt to

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which would have existed amongst the Mozambican population. Similarly traditional education, by exalting the cult of linguistic communities which a person belongs to, instilled an attitude of spite, occasionally even hate, in relation to other communities. (...) Education must give us a Mozambican personality, which without subservience and understanding our reality, can be in touch with the exterior world, can critically learn ideas and experiences of other people, while transmitting the fruit of our actions and reflections – Translated by the author]

<sup>32</sup> Hughes, 1998, thoroughly discuss in the introduction to his paper the borderlands of Mozambique, within the anthropological framework of border studies. Ong, 1993, is quoted in this paper.

<sup>33</sup> The name was always used to indicate the conflict with Rhodesia, denoting a knowledge of current political affairs in the neighbouring country.

<sup>34</sup> Wardman, 1985, p. 296.

<sup>35</sup> Despite his father had been a cotton grower in the Colondado do Limpopo and miner himself, and through this activity was able to buy plows and cattle, thus becoming a very successful farmer by 1940, Machel considered mine recruitment a new form of enslavement, unarguably a demonstration of the evils of capitalism. This view he summarise in this few lines discussing the most cruel forms of exploitation at the hand of the enemies of the revolution: 'Há a venda dos trabalhadores para as minas, os jovens partem fortes para as minas. Muitos morrem nos desastres nas minas. Mais de 2500 morrem nas minas por ano. Outros, não sabemos o número, voltam sem um braço, sem uma perna, os

South African enslavement of Mozambicans in the sector<sup>36</sup>. This change in international agreement did happen, but it was not due to FRELIMO's ideals of freedom, rather to the direct involvement of South Africa in the war and its government refusal to allow Mozambican citizens in the mine. The practice was, in fact, on the one hand supplying FRELIMO's coffers with South African gold, thus financing the war, and on the other hand allowing potential terrorist and subversives in the very heart of South African economy.

RENAMO only arrived in Gaza in 1983, that is after South Africa had taken over the destabilisation project, and within five years the war had spread to the whole province, from the coast to the much more impacted borders, causing the displacement of over 100,000 people<sup>37</sup>. The traditional looting system enforced by RENAMO to feed its militia and the civilians, which were part of the small guerrilla groups, the importance bequeathed to traditional spiritual beliefs and magical practices and the maintenance of the Ndau origin as an ethnic discriminatory element<sup>38</sup>, all contributed to the development in Gaza of an unfair conflict between the *bandits*<sup>39</sup> and the people who were Shangaan first and Mozambicans, as well. The combined effect of the most severe droughts of the decade in the first half of the 1980s<sup>40</sup> and the presence of RENAMO on the territory, produced a period of starvation affecting up to 700,000 people between the Provinces of Gaza and

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pulmões comidos pela tuberculose'. [There is the selling of workers for the mines, the youth leave strong for the mines. Many die in the disasters on the mines. More than 2500 died every year because of the mines. Others, we do not know how many, come back without an arm, without a leg, with their lungs eaten by Tuberculosis – Translation by the author]

<sup>36</sup> Roesch, 1992, also claims that mining was not only a source of livelihood but, in some cases, a contribution towards small entrepreneurial initiatives in rural and agricultural areas. Wardman, 1985, affirms that those peasants who, after independence, tried to go back to the mines found out that 'this alternative was no longer open' (p. 296) without adding further explanations.

<sup>37</sup> See Roesch, 1992, p.468.

<sup>38</sup> Lubkemann (2005), Roesch (1992), and Hall & Young (1992) all describe in detail the characteristics of the RENAMO guerrilla war, ideologies and practices as opposed to the traditional Mozambican way of life.

<sup>39</sup> During the field research in Dumela and other parts of Mozambique, it was noticed that RENAMO was never mentioned in discussing the war, the rebels were referred to as bandits, a terms which marks not only the illegality of the movement but also the social exclusion of people who were outside both the national and traditional system. Other researchers have noted the term 'bandit' as opposed to FRELIMO, and these are Lubkemann (2005) and Roesch (1992).

<sup>40</sup> Hanlon, 1991.

Inhambane. For the community of Dumela, this period translated into high mobility as narrated by an old widow (respondent of questionnaire no. 8). This lady, unlike most villagers, had no relatives in neighbouring countries, and so had no options but to hide in the bush with her family of four, and eat out of natural resources. Both her husband and one of their children did not survive to the war, whereas the one who did survive now lives in South Africa, but never comes home<sup>41</sup>. The rest of the inhabitants went to either Zimbabwe or South Africa, at first hosted by relatives then into refugee camps, where some also learnt a living. Respondent to questionnaire no. 11, actually, is a pastor and was trained as a tailor in the Sengwe refugee camp. He returned to Mozambique only a few years ago, because his ministry had been continuing amongst the Sengwe people. Him and his wife live mainly off their own resources, and subsistence agriculture in their *machamba* (orchard). Their son works on temporary contracts in South Africa but does not earn enough to send remittances.

The general reaction to the violence produced by what Lubkemann refers to as a *fragmented war*, for its geographical and social characteristics<sup>42</sup>, was therefore migration. Helped by the physical geography of Crooks corner, such movements followed partially the usual channels of TEBA, and that is until 1987 when South Africa banned the recruitment of Mozambicans in the mines<sup>43</sup>, but used above all the traditional migratory patterns of border jumping into South Africa and Zimbabwe, where family and social networks were in place. By the end of the war, displaced refugees in these two countries were counted at about one (1) million people, amongst whom almost the entire population of Dumela. Despite the suffering and the disruption, therefore, the war contributed on the one hand to create a Mozambican identity, as a reaction to the ethnic separation which was at the basis of

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<sup>41</sup> This story was collected on the field, while surveying the village. The woman, a well-know user of maize beer and ilala palm wine, was not very clear about what happened during and after the war. Her story is also told in Connor, 2003, although with some differences. From the description, however, the two women are the same one.

<sup>42</sup> Lubkemann, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> See Hall & Young, 1997.

RENAMO, and on the other hand tied those ethnic and cultural knots with people across the border, thus maintaining the separation between the state, the nation, and the cultural belonging which paradoxically created a safe border area for post-war survival at Pafuri.

## 5.2 PAFURI: WHAT TYPE OF BORDER?

*"If you ever get into trouble, just remember that beacon. That's why most of us live here. Whoever comes for you, you can always be on the other side in someone else's territory; and if they all come at once, you can always sit on the beacon top and let them fight over who is to pinch you". (Bulpin, 1954, p. 29).*

Ranger stated in 1994 that Great Britain, France and Portugal drew African borders as 'sifters of labour rather than as barriers to its movement'<sup>44</sup>, and local communities not only took advantage of this but, as Hughes (1998) points out, have erased inconvenient borders thus creating a free movement of people, goods and services, way before the SADC ever considered it feasible. This situation is also typical in cases where one state is considerably wealthier and better administrated than the other(s), as it is the case of the three countries object of the research. In the previous chapters, the nature of borders in general have been discussed as well as the historical formation of African borders, beginning with the Political Geography definition of a border as the container of a nation-state, a political and economical model developed in Europe and imported in the colonies. The role of borders in the context of local activities and national political decision-making were then presented to argue that Pafuri, as many African borders, was treated as a remote frontier zone unless there existed a political or economic requirement to tighten control: as it was the case of the bush wars, first, and transfrontier conservation at present. Finally, the perception of borders as areas of 'socio-political ambivalence'<sup>45</sup> has been discussed with reference to illegal and informal cross-border activities. Situated in such a peripheral area, in relation to all centres of decision-making, and having a history of

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<sup>44</sup> Quote from Ranger, 1994, found in Hughes, 1998, p. 537.

<sup>45</sup> Asiwaju, 1985, in Hughes, 1998, p. 535.

transnational kinships, Pafuri lends itself to exemplify the geo-physical and social characterisation of border areas.

Event	Border of crossing	Date of event	Frequency of trips
Rescued by a Zimbabwean donkey-trained cart from Sengwe coming from the Pafuri border post.	Mozambique – Zimbabwe	5 <sup>th</sup> March 05	At least one a week.
Given a lift to a Mozambican Police officer to Dumela. He was then proceeding to Sengwe to drink ilala palm beer	Mozambique – Zimbabwe	6 <sup>th</sup> March 05	Whenever possible
Visited by demining team at Dumela	Mozambique – Zimbabwe	3 <sup>rd</sup> Sept. 06	On holiday day - Sundays
Found an old Zimbabwean man, visiting a priest who was in Sengwe as a refugee	Mozambique – Zimbabwe	6 <sup>th</sup> Sept. 06	Occasional

**Table 5.13: Events indicating cross-border relations with Zimbabwe.**

Pafuri is a soft border area allowing uncontrolled movements within the three countries. This is not to say that the local police both in South Africa and Mozambique is not aware of these fluxes, yet with the understanding that most of them are related to culture, friendship, and economic need, action is not often required. During the field research, for instance, a few incidents showed that the Dumela-Sengwe relations are so strong in the social and economic context, that the border (marked by two poles only) has in fact been erased. Table 5.1, actually, provides four examples showing not only that movements along the borders are many, but that even officers who should be preventing these from happening engage in crossing the border, thus indicating that the area has adjusted to a self-regulatory code for movements: condoned fluxed are those related to livelihood strategies and contingencies, only.

The questionnaire survey in Dumela, in addition, shows the extent of kinship relations, with exclusion of direct family, that is son and daughters. Table 5.2 indicates that only a small percentage of villagers do not have relations in the two closest countries. This is either because the respondents do not have family any longer, as it is the case for two respondents, or because they have moved to Dumela

from elsewhere in Mozambique. The most significative case, in this sense, was a young boy, who was born in Pafuri as his mother (from Xai-xai, southern Gaza Province) had been working at the border post. As he began to migrate to South Africa to work as a garden boy in a private house, he had a shelter in Dumela, but no family in the village nor in the two neighbouring countries.

Cross-border			Country of the		
			South	Zimbabw	Both
Relatives in	yes	Coun	20	11	41
countrie		Row %	27,8	15,3	56,9

**Table 5.14: Percentage of Dumela villagers with kins across the borders.**

Finally, the number of visits paid to each other is only slightly higher in relation to Zimbabwe. What must also be taken into account is that most interviewees were elder people who are receiving visits mostly from people of their own age, within the group of family and friends. Without means of transport, therefore, it becomes a strenuous undertaking for them. This is how personal observation shows, instead, that crossing the forest is a frequent trip for younger people or people with means of transport.

Secondly, Pafuri is a permeable border area in terms of legal and illegal trading and migrations towards South Africa. Having considered informal movements of people and goods for livelihoods, such as the selling of agricultural produces, it is important to note that there are three preferred routes in and out of the countries by illegal traffickers: (1) the power lines corridor; (2) Crooks' Corner; (3) the Madimbo corridor (from Zimbabwe) into Venda area<sup>46</sup>.

The case represented by the Madimbo Corridor into Bennde Mutale, a little Venda Village on the main road from Pafuri Gate to Tshipise, fully explain the extent of the sense of common heritage which transcends borders. At the end of the month, in fact, people receiving their pension exuberates the number of people living in the

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Chief Insp. Tshambalala, Pafuri, 12<sup>th</sup> Dec. 2006.

village. Despite the permanent army patrol along the River, in fact, many Zimbabweans still manage to get through. From the Mozambican side, instead, it is job seekers who attempt illegal crossings and are occasionally caught by the Police of both countries, and now by the two armed park rangers in Mozambique. Again indicative of the variation of the law, which are endemic in remote borders where people and government officers live, when a border-jumper is caught, he/she would contribute to the running of the border post until the debt with the government is paid. In September 2006, a young boy from Inhambane (almost 1,000 kms away) was caught and was in charge of looking after the orchard of the Immigration officer and help with other daily menial tasks. Yet, at the end of the day, no one of the elders were refusing him a drink or two. In Pafuri, jailing people would not solve the problem, and the border-jumper are more likely to learn a lesson and render a service to the government community before going back home, also because, unlike the South African counterpart, the Mozambican immigration and police would not have the means to escort the person to the police post of competence (in this case Maxixe, near Inhambane) and be tried there. The rangers of the Limpopo National Park, however, have taken a tougher route, as their procedure is to strip the person of all his/her belongings and take them back on the road to Dumela. This methods are both arguably legal, as the wealth of the person would most probably increase the wealth of the guards themselves, and do not even attempt at conveying a lesson as the methods of Chief Serrano of the Immigration would.

Illegal trading, finally, includes stolen vehicles imported into Mozambique, although the Police officers of both sides claim the number is diminishing due to tighter controls at all border posts, whereas the Chiqualaquala post between Zimbabwe and Mozambique is a lot worse. As mentioned in the previous Chapters, stolen goods are also finding their way through the border, yet the main problems for the income of the Mozambican government would be the tax evasion. On the South African side, Chief Insp. Tshambalala laments the absence of the VAT offices

for the inspections and the collection of duties on goods exported<sup>47</sup>, in the form of both remittances and items to be sold at the three *spaza* shops in Dumela, the one place selling cool drinks only in Pafuri (since the shop closed in 2005), and the *spaza* shop on the road to Mapai, some 40 km on the main road from the border where petrol and diesel can be found as well. The lack of specialised officers on the South African side, and the lack of a shop on the Mozambican side have also contributed to the creation of a border milieu that re-adjusts the laws according to real needs, since importers and *spaza* shop owners are the only means for Mozambican officers to get food supplies.

The characteristics of softness and permeability that relates to the Pafuri areas extend to the Beitbridge-Musina border to the west and to the Chiqualaquala border to the east, although the mine contamination does act as a deterrent outside of the Pafuri riverine forest. The explanation for this is of course the cultural and ethnic heritage, the conflicts of the past, but also the presence of South Africa as a pulling economy, which can guarantee a chance of survival and economic development. The establishment of a TFCA in and around this area, therefore, might have a political as well as a socio-economic impact over the lives and livelihood of the border communities, particularly in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Researchers tend to agree that by inscribing the TFCA project into a political ecological perspective, there will be a tightening of border security for the benefits of tourism and conservation, which is confirmed by the objectives set for the Peace Park<sup>48</sup>.

### 5.3 DOES WILDLIFE MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER?

As national politics, economics and communications go global, so does environmental concern in the form of organisation, problem-response and resources management<sup>49</sup>. In this context, it is not surprising that the failures of previous resources management approaches for sustainable socio-economic development have led to a change in perspective and scale going transfrontier. Within the

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Duffy, 2001, and Wolmer, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> For a general overview see Doherty & Doyle, 2006.

sustainable development frame, the transnational character of many African populations despite 'colonial' borders was originally used to explain how would a transboundary approach attain what a localised approach had failed. As van der Linde *et al.* claims *many local communities have been implementing TBNRM at a local level for a long time, which is not surprising since cultures often straddle international borders*<sup>50</sup>. TBNRM, as practiced by native populations, however, simply describes a way of life, whereby people live in nature regardless of a boundary which was their own creation. As a feasible NRM approach, instead, the financial pulling-factor exercised by conservation programmes in Southern Africa, shifted the attention from socially-driven NRM to ecological-driven NRM.

### **5.3.1 Transfrontier migration routes**

In all official documents, beginning with the original funding and feasibility study from the WB-GEF to the PPF website, conservation and particularly the restoration of traditional migratory routes of large mammals, interrupted by colonial and post-colonial state-building, replaced sustainable development as the key objective for the Transfrontier management of wildlife and its environment<sup>51</sup>. In the case of the GLTFCA, the large mammals at the centre of attentions were of course elephants, which were passing carrying capacity levels in the Kruger National Park, whilst culling was being frowned upon by the international community and some local ecologists, and the illegal trade in ivory was heavily affecting populations within and without protected areas<sup>52</sup>. The opening up of the borders was justified by

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<sup>50</sup> Van der Linde *et al.*, 2001, p. 3. This text, however, already mention the migratory routes and ranging species as a key element of TBNRM policies, yet the ecological issue features as a component of a framework encompassing socio-cultural and economic-financial opportunities as well. This revealed an initial focus on the local scale, whereby the locality is the place where people live, regardless of national boundaries. At a later stage, however, the scale of TBNRM grew with its inscription in TFCA projects, thus shifting inevitably towards conservation.

<sup>51</sup> World Bank, 1996.

<sup>52</sup> The April 2006 edition of the Africa Geographic is focussed on elephants, with special features on culling, conflict and the KNP debate. Van Aarde & Jackson argue that only large conservation area can allow for the right separation of dry and wet seasons range, thus enabling traditional migrations, on the contrary Hans explains that habitat alterations caused by elephants prompted culling from the 1960s as a countenance measure, considering the life-span and the daily dietary requirements of these massive herbivores. Only the head of SANParks, actually, admits that culling becomes a worldwide problem only where dealing with *megaherbivores*, whose populations increase in protected areas. The

the fact that wildlife, particularly elephants, would have found their old migratory routes, and by using a wider territory would have had less impact on the local environment.

Species	Spatial behaviour	Home range or Territory size Km <sup>2</sup>	Water dependence	Maximum distance from water	Migratory behaviour
Elephant	H/range	523	Obligate	>10	No
White rhino	Territorial	1-13	Obligate	< 10	No
Black rhino	Territorial	4-130	Obligate	<10	No
Giraffe	Non Territorial	20-160	Facultative	>50	No
Zebra	Nomadic	100-200	Obligate	6	Yes
Buffalo	Non-Territorial	10-250	Obligate	17	No
Wildebeest	Territorial	3	Obligate	10	Yes
Tsessebe	Territorial	4	Obligate	<5	No
Lichtenstein's Hartebeest	Territorial	8-13	Obligate	<5	No
Eland	Nomadic	170-400	No	>50	Yes*
Kudu	H/range	5-11	Obligate	4	No
Nyala	H/range	3.6-5.5	Facultative	<5	No
Roan antelope	Territorial	60-120	Obligate	<10	No
Sable antelope	Territorial	15-30 (300*)	Obligate	3	No
Waterbuck	Territorial	1.5-8	Obligate	2	No
Reedbuck	Territorial	1.2	Facultative	?	No
Impala	Territorial	.08-0.5	Facultative	1.6	No
Warthog	Home range	0.6-1.7	No	3	No
Lion	Territorial*	20-400	Obligate	?	No
Leopard	Territorial	10-63	Facultative	?	No
Spotted hyena	Territorial	10-1776	Obligate	<	No
Brown hyena	Territorial	215-461	No	100	No
Wild dog	Yes	1000	Obligate	<	No

**Table 5.15: Behaviours of large herbivores found in the GLTFCA (Source: Anderson, 2002, p. 4)**

The only study to assess the legitimacy of such assumptions was conducted by Dr. J. Anderson and published in 2002. After having looked at the literature available, he conducted a field research aiming at understanding the existing barriers to animal movements, be them anthropomorphic (the railway line Chiredzi-Chiqualaquala-Maputo, cutting across transversally in a north-west to south east direction the interstitial areas in Mozambique and Zimbabwe) or natural (the Lebombo Mountain Range). Dr. Anderson, then, analysed each of the large herbivores present in the GLTFCA and their migratory potential.

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Q&A section will provide an insight on the divisions of the scientific community over viable economic opportunities within the TBNRM frame. Finally, the CITES decision will be explained in references to the illegal, yet thriving, ivory trade (Various authors, 2006).

Table 5.3 summarises the spatial behaviour, water dependence and known migratory behaviour of all large herbivores in the protected areas that are part of the GLTFCA. The findings, in addition, produce a picture which is not exactly in line with the paramount objective given by official publications on the restoration of routes disrupted by colonial politics, state demarcation and human intervention. In fact, the species with a known migration within the boundaries of the KNP are Wildebeest and Zebra, with concern to two subpopulations: the Western Boundary and the Sweni/Mlondozi<sup>53</sup>. The Shingwedzi elephant population, furthermore, has a tendency to transfrontier migrations within a reduced range, as part of the rainy season migratory route. Finally the Pafuri Eland do take advantage of the Riverine forest on both sides of the River and tend to move around in the three countries, yet within a very close range.

Field research, finally, shows that there is an elephant population in the dense forest on the southern side of the Limpopo on the road to Dumela. The local communities cannot confirm their provenance, and elephants in the northern section of the KNP have been found at Pafuri, west of the main road to the Gate, therefore it may be assumed that the group found in Mozambique might come from the South African side. In September 2006, elephants have come close to the Dumela agricultural project twice only, within the same week, and have been scared off by the guard, without the need to shoot in the air<sup>54</sup>. More apt to transfrontier migration are Vervet monkeys and baboons, the main problem animal for people in Dumela, since they steal seeds, crops and berries.

### ***5.3.2 Wildlife migrations and human security***

The absence of a strong rationale for the creation of TFCAs based on the migrations of animals undermines the foundation of the concept of TFCAs as Peace Parks for wildlife, that is all-encompassing projects providing a solution to

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<sup>53</sup> Anderson, 2002, p. 6.

<sup>54</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture has allowed one rifle in the village to protect people from problem animals. Since the village falls within the TFCA, however, people are not allowed to kill the animal but to simply scare it away by shooting in the air. This is in agreement with the LNP management.

conservation, land management and economic development in remote and rural areas, whilst promoting Peace. This, however, should not mislead from a stringent reality, that is the presence of wildlife close-by inhabited areas.

The geographic conformation of Crooks' corner, particularly, allows for the easy movements of animals within the three bordering countries, as demonstrated by the eland population of Pafuri. The elands, however, are shy animals, with a tendency to stay away from human settlements, hence they do not pose a threat to local communities. Other species however, like monkeys, baboons and elephants, can be very destructive and crocodiles and hippopotamuses life-threatening. If on the one hand people are aware of the presence of crocodiles in the Rivers and of their nesting season, the occurrence of other threatening species is not so easily dealt with. Baboons and monkeys, for instance, are those creating most conflicts, as they use the Crooks Corner territory as a place, not as a space divided in different land-uses. The presence of a permanent guard at the site of the agricultural project, in fact, is more related to them than to elephants, which rarely reach the area.

If on the one hand the IUCN category of a TFCA allows for the continuity of human settlement, on the other hand it poses a great security threat to local population whose risk of encountering wildlife will rise exponentially with time. The idea of living within a National Park and an ecological corridor, in fact, feeds discontent and angst within the population of Pafuri, and Dumela in particular. Its location between the Limpopo and the internal lake, actually, may attract an important quantity of animals once the corridor is demined and opened. This co-habitation scenario is rather difficult to propose, in the light of the inexistent traditional migratory routes of wildlife, which lay at the basis of the TFCA project. It is paramount therefore, that people living in interstitial areas feel protected against the risks and threats of living within a conservation area. This will mitigate conflict and reduce the potential for poaching activities. Anderson, in fact, suggests to rely on (a) wildlife utilisation strategies in interstitial populated area; (b) fencing as disease control measure, as

well as protection for the Sengwe people<sup>55</sup>. The utilisation of wildlife, replicating either a CAMPFIRE or a Makuleke experience, or a combination of the two, would undoubtedly increase rapidly the income of local population with trophy-hunting, based on quotas, and create skills within the tourism sector.

### **5.3.3 Conclusions**

The foundations of the GLTFCA project into the re-establishment of traditional migratory routes for big fauna, particularly herbivores have been dismantled by the study conducted by Dr. Anderson (2002). According to his findings, six sub-populations of four species only do move across the borders from South Africa to Mozambique, and in the Pafuri area, which does not substantiate wildlife migrations as a key objective of the TFCA. It is, however, true that, with a few exceptions in the Limpopo National Park, animals have crossed by forced relocations only, namely the first 'marketing' relocation of elephants in 2001 to celebrate the signature of the MoU; the movement of herbivores for the LNP sanctuary to re-create populations of extinct species; the final movement in March 2007 to repopulate the LNP. Spontaneous movements have been recorder at the Xonghile Game Reserve, south of Massingir, the Massingir Game Reserve next to the Cubo community on the reservoir and into the LNP itself. Such movements involve both carnivore (lions and hyenas) and herbivores (antelopes and elephants) and happened in areas where the non-electrified fence marking the eastern boundary of the KNP has been taken down without authorisation or damaged.

The increased presence of animals poses a serious safety threat to local communities in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Those inhabiting the LNP will be relocated soon, whereas the people living in the interstitial areas will have to cope with the situation without being able to kill a problem animal if posing a serious threat. This will exacerbate the existing tensions between people and park management, in the Pafuri area of both countries. The Sengwe Ecological Corridor

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<sup>55</sup> CESVI, 2001, the communities of Sengwe, Chipise and Dite 2 have requested a protective fence to contain elephant, buffalo and carnivores. The fence will have to be two metres high, multi-stranded and electrified, stretching for about 80 km. (pp. 9 – 10)

will increase the potential for animal movements around the Crooks' Corner area, thus threatening people in both Sengwe Communal Land and Pafuri Administrative Post, along the Zimbabwean border. The solution proposed by Anderson and CESVI<sup>56</sup> is to use veterinary fencing to channel animals and separate them from communities. These fences are, in fact, necessary to the spreading of Foot and Mouth disease and Tuberculosis into Zimbabwean healthy populations of buffalo, impala and lions. In addition, the establishment of wildlife utilisation as posited both by Anderson and CESVI<sup>57</sup>, would contribute to generate income and food provision amongst local people, thus improving their acceptance of wildlife protection, and decreasing the potential for poaching.

#### 5.4 FUTURE PEACE THROUGH CONSERVATION?

*Geopolitics and national security concerns have diverted attention away from challenges like the maintenance of biological and cultural values. In this political climate, transboundary conservation deserves close attention because it has the potential to help bring peace to troubled border regions while also playing an essential role in the protection of endangered species, ecosystems and cultural groups. (Dr. William Jackson, IUCN, 2003)<sup>58</sup>*

In recent years conservation has been asked to fulfil roles that were ecological in principle but political in implementation, ranging from the simple protection of endangered ecosystems in unstable countries to the incorporation of local communities in related activities such as sustainable tourism, fair trade and trophy hunting. As discussed in the previous chapters, conservation moved on from the sanctuary conception to become a source of development through the sustainable, yet consumptive, use of natural resources and tourism-related activities wherever urban or peri-urban centres were found on the doorstep of Protected Areas. In developing countries, the dislocation of native communities at the psychological and physical margins of society created a conflict with conservation practices, only possible in natural areas along the geographical boundaries of anthropic zones, in terms of governmental priorities on land use and distribution. This conflict became

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<sup>56</sup> Anderson, 2002; CESVI, 2001.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. and CESVI, 2001.

<sup>58</sup> ITTO/IUCN, 2003, p. 1.

part of sustainable development strategies at the end of the 1980s, when discourses over the equality of socio-economic and political human rights were also being addressed, and the first concerns over the depletion of natural resources was gaining momentum. The theories of CBNRM are embedded in this socio-environmental background, which grew to incorporate geopolitics and national concerns in both developed and developing countries, where the contrast between urban and rural was generating social turmoil and conservation was no longer endurable as a land management practice.

As summarised by Figure 5.1, conservation embraced the holistic approach suggested by the scientific and political community and became the all-encompassing solution to (1) environmental protection, its classical and fundamental role; (2) cultural heritage enhancement, by promoting the local cultural ethnicities, who had been marginalised until a few years earlier; (3) political engagement, by continuing to provide uninhabited areas acting as buffer zones along state borders, thus promoting border security strategies; (4) peace keeping, by going across the frontier and promoting the re-unification of people and countries once at war, now pacified under the common goal of conservation.




Fig. 5.1: Multi-level of conservation as for Peac Parks, as understood by the scientific community (Source: primary and secondary bibliography)

The interpretation of Transfrontier conservation as a panacea for society and the environment, as posited by Dr. Jackson, is not surprising, particularly as it originates from an old school of theories over the key role played by nature tourism in providing low-impact income generating activities even in fragile environments, which have been discussed in the first part of the thesis. However, both theorisation and implementation of TFCAs in Southern Africa demonstrate that, unlike Dr. Jackson states, all four factors are strictly related to the shift in conservation paradigm. This section will discuss firstly how conservation strategies serve geopolitics and national concern, and secondly how the GTLFCA, far from being an exception, may actually become the flagship project for the holistic approach nature conservation is called to serve.

#### **5.4.1 *The geopolitics of transfrontier conservation***

Transfrontier Conservation is strategic into converging the national and regional political interests since it does specifically target geographic areas that are remote, in relation to the political and economic cores of a country: the border areas, or in some cases the frontier. Despite the influence of the European nation-state, in fact, African border areas are centres of human development and community aggregation, which are already transfrontier as they rely on traditional social affiliation for livelihood generation. These areas represent a difficult management riddle in terms of geopolitics, because they are (1) the physical representation of permeable borders where the movements of people and goods often hide away from the vigilant eye of the law; (2) the battleground of many past and present civil wars. The two case studies hereby summarised will show how conservation and geopolitics are interrelated when transboundary issues are so important as to bring together various lobbies of power.

In South Africa, the national concern regarding illegal immigration related to the raise in crime rates focuses on the need to strengthen borders security, to halt or restrict the fluxes of illegal destitute immigrants from poorer neighbouring countries.

If on the one hand such fears are grounded into a reality which particularly involves Mozambique, for human trafficking<sup>59</sup> and spontaneous temporary migrants, and Zimbabwe for daily visits and refugees, as the Mugabe dictatorship is forcing thousands out of the country, including defecting armed forces<sup>60</sup>. On the other hand, there is a general denial over the fact that South African crime is mainly homebred and derives both from a psychological sense of revenge over the apartheid years, and from the unconscious understanding that despite majority rule and Black empowerment, only a small minority of the country has attained a decent quality of life<sup>61</sup>. The general scenario, therefore, is that crime stems from destitution at a national and regional level, but concentrates in South Africa where the stable democracy of the *rainbow nation* has failed to deliver promises of freedom and justice, while showing all the incongruences of modern capitalism. To tamper, at least, the foreign side of crime, however, the government is asked to tackle illegal migrations and trafficking across the border, despite the SADC is planning to create a supranational space in Southern Africa<sup>62</sup>, following the European Union, in order to increase investments in the region, by re-directing them to less developed countries such as Mozambique. The two aims of stopping illegal migration and trade and of

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<sup>59</sup> The trafficking of Mozambican young girls, who are sold as wives or forced into prostitution in South Africa, is a huge problem followed by the local UNICEF office of Maputo. The many posters displayed at the Ressano Garcia border post show the extent of the phenomenon (Source: field work)

<sup>60</sup> Many articles witnessing the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe discuss also the defection of many army and police officers who resort to border jumping into South Africa, instead of risking their lives for little money and a cause which is no longer their own. The most relevant article is Ncube, 2007.

<sup>61</sup> Such perception is derived mainly from field-work analysis including (1) participation in the 2005 presidential rally for Pres. Armando Guebuza, of Mozambique, where Pres. R. Mugabe was present and spoke to the country; (2) a collection of letters sent to the Mozambican newspaper *Noticias* over the role white people are thought to play in the underdevelopment of the country; the watching of *Carte Blanche*, a South African TV programme, with footages available online; (3) the pre-conception of black people towards my role as a white, a woman and a researcher in rural South Africa and Mozambique, which were indirectly aired and led to untrue answers to the questionnaire.

<sup>62</sup> *Some SADC Member States are in the Free Trade Area of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa States (COMESA), which envisages establishing a customs union by the year 2004 [...] SADC has [also] been implementing the Trade protocol, since September 2000 that will lead to a Free Trade Area by 2008. As one of the building blocs of the African Union, SADC has to keep pace with developments on the continent in order to avoid slowing down the continental integration agenda of achieving an Africa wide single market. These quotes are taken from the SADC RISDP, Chapter 4.10 on Trade, Economic Liberalisation and development (SADC, 2007)*

creating a free-space are only superficially in contrast with each other as the former hardly or ever uses the formal routes, yet poses into question the essence of a border as a barrier for state protection. The point which is being made here is the following: how can a state protect its borders whilst approving a border-free zone for goods and people? The answer comes directly from conservation, especially transfrontier conservation, by providing buffer zones which must be patrolled to prevent poaching, and at the same time any other illegal activity, whilst maintaining an open border policy for the region and its tourists, i.e. the legal migrants.

The Sub-Saharan region of Central Africa, instead, shows that transfrontier conservation can be and is used to transcend armed conflicts in the name of important ecosystems and endangered species, whilst providing a less confrontational, yet politicised, small arena for dialogue between the parties. The International Gorilla Conservation Project and the Albertine Rift Conservation Society cases, involving the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, are implemented in areas where civil wars have been ongoing to promote the preservation of natural elements which, naturally, are cross-national. The Parks for Peace initiative in the Great Lakes, involving the above-mentioned countries plus Burundi, furthermore, voices the need to support a reconciliatory process by using a common interest: the conservation of nature and the protection of highly endangered species, including the Mountain Gorilla of the Virunga National Park<sup>63</sup>. Central Africa case studies, therefore, show that Transfrontier Conservation may serve the interests of geopolitics between countries at war, by promoting peaceful resolutions.

#### ***5.4.2 Peace and protection in the GLTFCA and Peace Park***

Unlike Central Africa, the need for reconciliation and peace processes is long gone in Southern Africa, where all the countries involved in the PPF projects have attained independence and have stable semi-democratic governments. The question of which Peace is transfrontier conservation promoting is legitimate, particularly in

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<sup>63</sup> Wilkie *et al.*, 2001, is dedicated to TBNRM projects in Central Africa and fully describes the constraints of operating in conflict situations.

consideration of the GLTFCA, whose history of conflicts began in pre-imperialist time and continued until the mid 1990s. Of the three countries involved, only South Africa and Mozambique have reached stability, whereas Zimbabwe is experiencing an ongoing period of racial and social turmoil, which is concerning to all international observers. However, the GLTFCA has been neglecting the negotiation table with Zimbabwe, reduced to a few marketing appointments such as the opening of the Giryondo border post<sup>64</sup>. By refraining from intervening at the national level, however, the strategies for the GLTFCA do not overlook the regional geopolitics. Therefore, two types of Peace may be the focus of the GLTFCA and Peace Park: on the one hand the celebration of the end of all past inter-cultural conflicts from the *mfecane*, the first big war leaving a mark in those border areas from the coast to the Limpopo, to the independence fights. On the other hand, the end of segregationist regimes and the creation of multi-ethnic society would entail the promotion of a Peace between people of different ethnic background, which is long to be attained. The celebration of the past and the hopes for the future are also the key ecological elements of the GLTFCA as it proposes to protect the natural heritage, by acknowledging that only by being at peace can nature become a real transnational resource.

One argument, however, should be referred to this approach and concerns the dangers of using Peace as a marketing strategy. By engaging past divisions which the local population, particularly in Mozambique has been trying to forget<sup>65</sup>, the project risks of not being appreciated by the communities who should be integrated in it. Considering the ignorance of most Mozambicans over the South African involvement with RENAMO, it is relevant to note that people have forgiven and re-

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<sup>64</sup> Whereas the relations between Pres. Guebuza and Pres. Mugabe have always been amicable, the official opening of the Border Post was delayed for half a year because Pres. Mbeki and Pres. Mugabe could not 'sit together in the same room', due to contrast over the management of Zimbabwe and the role played by Mugabe. (This detail was referred by Noemia Matholo, the admin officer of the TFCA Unit of MITUR, Maputo)

<sup>65</sup> Both youth and elderly people, in fact, do not like to speak about the RENAMO war but as many have told during field research they want to forget and move on looking at the future, rather than at the past. (Fieldwork both in Maputo and in Pafuri) .

integrated most of the former RENAMO combatants<sup>66</sup>, yet have not forgotten the *Whites* for colonialism. Despite the violence involved in colonial practises, which in Mozambique were intensified only in the last years because of resistance movements<sup>67</sup>, in fact, colonialism never reached the brutality of RENAMO's action towards people. However, the last conflict has been forgotten, or at least people do not want to talk about it, whereas colonialism is still blamed for the current economic and political situation: from underdevelopment to corruption. Since social divisions are still present and are at the very basis of crime in both countries, and the rural populations are amongst the most disadvantaged category of people, the management should address ecological and cultural issues at the same time and with the same impetus.

The general vision of Peace for the GLTFCA has currently been reduced to 'peace with one self' as claimed by the PPF web page, thus avoiding any political discourse on the role the GLTFCA is asked to have in promoting Transfrontier Conservation in the region. This is a remarkable loss, considering that the project is the flagship of the PPF, and of international conservation, because of dimensions and its ecological and social challenges. If, as Dr. Jackson states, Transfrontier Conservation does play an 'essential role' in protecting 'cultural groups', the GLTFCA should start by acknowledging the cross-border nature of the neighbouring communities and develop a strategy not for protection but for the enhancement of the traditional life-style within its natural environment, instead of prioritising geopolitics and security

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<sup>66</sup> People who were taken from RENAMO or used to be part of their army have mostly been re-integrated in the society through different rites of cleansing, according to age and affiliation, following the concept of social pollution, part of traditional healing (Honwana, 1997). Field work indicated that only in the Chokwe district on the main road to Massingir RENAMO former combatants have been isolated by local communities and survive on the production of charcoal, regimented by private land-owners or the government. This practice highly contributes to deforestation in a dry plain area. (Field work: March, September and November 2005 – March, September and November 2006)

<sup>67</sup> The Portuguese colonialism has been notorious for its strength and violence on the *prazo*, in the form of forced labour, as described by many authors (Hall & Young, 1997; Pitcher and Isaacman and Chilundo, 1995; Newitt, 1994) yet the sheer repression of human rights was not enforced until the latest years of the dictatorship, when FRELIMO had began their revolutionary war, that the PIDE (Portuguese Secret Police) played a major role in imposing a regime of terror amongst local people. Yet, the few accounts of RENAMO's brutal and generic violence, part of their looting and devastating tactic, was way beyond the limits reached by the Portuguese militia.

issues to halt the 'free' movements of the communities across the Crooks' Corner area. Finally, the Peace to be promoted should be the peace of man within nature, whether one visits the area as a paying tourists or uses the area for living. Obviously, geopolitics impede such vision and focus on attainable results only.

### 5.4.3 Conclusions

Conservation is now covering a crucial position in the promotion of Peace on a transfrontier level, whereby peer and international pressure for conflict resolution and endangered species protection are hoped to act as major drive in peace processes. In Southern Africa, however, peace has been established for over a decade now, and despite the current political situation in Zimbabwe and Angola, all other countries enjoy a degree of democracy and development. However, the PPF has sought to promote Peace Parks as yet another product of the *rainbow nation* who has managed to transcend previous conflicts, whether internal or regional, for the benefits of all people in the country and the region. Despite reality strongly refutes such image of South Africa, the ideal remains and has proven to be highly marketable amongst international organisations and donors.

The words of Dr. Jackson, therefore, seem to be very naïve in depicting transboundary conservation as the means to bring peace where there is conflict and protect nature and people. Geographically, in fact, the PPF project might contribute to the perpetration of colonial memories as Map 2.5 shows, by addressing areas which were deeply affected by racial segregation politics. Politically, the Peace Parks address more the security issues on illegal cross-border activities, protecting nature, yet still relegating local people to play a minor role in the project. Geopolitically, the borders become areas of great concern because of the economic imbalance between South Africa and the rest of the region.

Finally, after having presented and discussed the history of the border area and its human geography, as well as the political geography of the region, it appears clear that the GLTFCA is the flagship project for Southern African Peace Parks, as it

will have to address political, social and environmental issues, which have little to do with a forgotten past and more to consider for a future of national and regional socio-economic peace which will be very difficult to reach unless the governments tackle social injustice, corruption and crime on the national level first.

## 6. DUMELA: BRINGING THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTRE

*...residents of Pafuri can be viewed as citizens of a political state whose authority they are very much aware of, but also as free agents who are not irrevocably caught up in political processes over which they have no control. They are residents of a zone that contains diverse opportunities for them to retain control of their lives and make choices that stand apart from those made for them by officials of the state (Connor, 2003, p. 102)*

The previous chapters have discussed the history of the area now part of the GLTFCA, from pre-colonial to post-independence times, proposing seven key arguments: (1) the traditional ruling hierarchical order was medieval in conception in so far as both political and human geography are concerned, thus relied on frontier zones for protection; (2) the *attack and loot tactics* are a typical warfare strategy used by local population to extend their area of influence under a vassalage system, which also granted them slaves for the increasing market demand<sup>1</sup>; (3) the physical geography of Africa has been interpreted under European standards, hence it generated borders which were not respecting the human geography of the continent, yet were not challenged by independence governments<sup>2</sup>; (4) the *dividi et impera* strategy enforced by colonial and imperial powers relied on stressing ethnic differences, not creating them, as native people were very much aware of clan and ethnic belonging<sup>3</sup>; (5) the end of imperialism was marked by *independence fights*, which cannot be considered national struggles due to the human geography of each

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<sup>1</sup> Points (1) and (2) are based on literature review: Beach (1974), Liesegang (1969) and (1970), Marks (1967), Etherington (2004).

<sup>2</sup> This statement derives from the general understanding over the influence of nature on human settlements in Africa provided by Reader (1994); and the field research of Mpofu *et al.* on settlements in the Pafuri-Sengwe area of Zimbabwe (1999)

<sup>3</sup> With particular reference to the role of missionaries as the best repositories of indigenous knowledge in a European perspective, some authors have proposed the *dividi et impera* strategy as a *ex-novo* tactic devised by settlers to rule over local populations. The assumption that people were united and peaceful before the settlers' arrival is as naïve as the 'merrie Africa' theory, also argued by Reader (1994), is here refused in favour of a more realistic view that changes in the ecological environment and population density for a specific site often led to inter-tribal wars based on ethnic differentiation.

country<sup>4</sup>; (6) the bush wars which, in Southern Africa, saw the end of racial segregation failed all their social objectives, because of the dualism arising from the conflicted, pursued by the states, and the social connection, which linked people together: on the one hand people fought against bandits for Mozambique and FRELIMO, and on the other they rejoined families across the border for safety, thus balancing the dichotomy between state loyalty and social affiliation<sup>5</sup>; (7) the establishment of the GLTFCA runs an effective risk of impairing local livelihoods patterns by favouring ecological and political logics to development and societal imperatives, because of national concern issues<sup>6</sup>. Finally, it was implied throughout the previous chapters that South Africa is playing an ambiguous role in the implementation of TFCAs and Peace Parks because of three main issues: (a) there is a national security threat due to increasing illegal migrations from poorer neighbouring countries<sup>7</sup>; (b) the carrying capacity of damaging species (big mammals) is exceeded in many national parks, and the Kruger NP is at a crucial stage<sup>8</sup>; (c) following from apartheid regional strategies, South Africa aspires at leading not only the region through SADC, but also the continent through the African Union<sup>9</sup>.

The image of the study area, deriving from this historical and political-economical analysis, is one of societal and cultural bonds built through the years, despite temporary conflicts through pre and post colonial history. Here the border (either the lack of it or the strengthening of it) plays a crucial role in defining patterns of aggregation and survival in a space that transcends the states: the Pafuri

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<sup>4</sup> This point is argued extensively through Charter 3.

<sup>5</sup> This statement is derived from the literature on disengagement practices in the Mozambican fragmented war (Lubkemann, 2005), and the field work in Dumela where the location of refugee camps in neighbouring countries were discussed whilst talking about familiar and social relations.

<sup>6</sup> The priorities of the PPF and the GLTFCA management have been thoroughly discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. What appears is that animals, security and tourism are the main management priorities, whereas community development and cultural heritage are lagging behind.

<sup>7</sup> See Whitman, 2000, and McDonald, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> See Various Authors, 2006, for a basic yet exhaustive panorama on elephants in Africa, and Anderson (2002) for the GLTFCA specifics.

<sup>9</sup> See Latini, Bayart, Koffi-Teya in the March 2006 edition of LIMES, as well as Thornton, 1994, and Whitman, 2000.

borderland. True to the description offered by Martínez, this borderland *milieu* has not escaped any of the interactive typologies he identified. Pafuri was *integrated* up until the establishment of the TEBA site for legalised migrations, when it became *interdependent*, as the two countries were establishing a 'symbiotic' relationship through channelled labour. With the wars Pafuri became an *alienated* border, with people being prevented to move around and across the 'supra-statal' space of ethnic affiliation, and eventually turned into a *coexistent* area where all the state formalities are in place, but people's movements and trades are not disrupted if they are legal or informal<sup>10</sup>. The ethnical affiliation of the native inhabitants of Pafuri, therefore, has become less relevant as history unfolded its pathways of migration and relocation, thus creating a social layer, which unifies the people within the geographic space: the people of Pafuri. Despite the forced displacements due to human and natural forces suffered by local inhabitants, there is a sense of belonging rooted in the area. In partial disagreement with the perspective offered by Connor (2003), however, it is argued that the return to previous location of most people, which were displaced because of the wars, drought and famine, demonstrates a sense of place and identity linked to the geographic space. Also, the memories of past migrations (Nguni wars) are long forgotten by the younger generation and only broadly inscribed in the elders' minds: this shows that the migration period is concluded and a new era of temporary migrations with the specific aim of economic development has begun. Most of the young men (aged 25 – 35) born in Dumela, in fact, do not contemplate leaving the village for longer than six months to find work, earn money and come back. Therefore, the freedom of movement across the border is a *conditio sine qua non* for both the creation of a geographical identity with the place, as the questionnaire survey will show, and the alternative generation of income for local inhabitants. The data discussed in this chapter aim at producing a relevant set of information which will allow for the understanding of how the partial management of the GLTFCA,


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<sup>10</sup> See Martínez (1994a, p. 10) in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.51.

towards ecology and tourism, would severe the fragile livelihoods of the people of Pafuri.

In order to provide a logical strain of concepts, this chapter will be organised as follows. The first section will describe the village of Dumela using personal observation and the demographic information collected with the questionnaire survey. The second section will argue the influence of the state and the government over the Pafuri area and the people of Dumela, by looking at the hierarchical structure on the local level and the national policies for development. The third section will present livelihood patterns and discuss their relation to the border and the borderland, by discussing social and economic data. The fourth and last section will look at the different scenarios posed by the GLTFCA in terms of human-wildlife relations, by presenting the ecological risks of not preserving the ecosystem and the socio-economic risks of not addressing community needs in such an anthropological milieu as the Pafuri borderland.

## 6.1 A PEOPLE IN THEIR TERRITORY: DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY



**Map 6.16: Boundaries of the village, the landscape shows marks of anthropisation in its near proximity.**

The village of Dumela is present in the colonial cartography of the Pafuri Administrative Post, thus attesting the longevity of the settlement<sup>11</sup>. Also in *The Ivory Trail*, Bulpin describes the area around Crooks' Corner as inhabited by Shangaan people, referring to the natives of Zimbabwe and Mozambique only, because the South African Makuleke belonged to a different group. What characterised the human geography of Pafuri is of course the River basin, with its sandy soils, fertile patches and rich vegetation, whose inhabitants have learnt to exploit to their maximum advantage within the knowledge and the finance available to them. On the northern side of the Limpopo (Mozambique and Zimbabwe), where conservation practices have not been enforced, the non-forested areas are used for livestock grazing and subsistence agriculture also known as 'slash and burn' typical of poor dry land populations whose survival directly encroaches on the natural environment. However, the natural vegetation of the immediate catchment areas south of the villages of Dumela and Sengwe is still remarkable, considering the decades of occupation, with only the immediate proximities of the villages bearing the marks of anthropisation as shown by the satellite image (Map 6.1). The average population density of 12 people per square Kilometre<sup>12</sup>, in Dumela, and the attentive use nature within its limitations, in fact, has contributed to maintain the natural forested areas both on the River banks and inland. This is remarkable in comparison with the Crooks' Corner (SA) area, where signs of the old Maluleke settlements are still distinguishable at first sight, despite over 30 years of abandonment<sup>13</sup>. Poverty at Dumela compels native inhabitants to recycle everything from metal, to plastic, to pottery, whereas unusable leftovers are burnt: pollution from waste is therefore kept to minimal levels and degenerates only because of outsiders. The field diary, for

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<sup>11</sup> A research on maps at the DINAGECA, the National Geographical Archives, Maputo, shows that the village had existed at least since 1970.

<sup>12</sup> The population density was calculated measuring the area surveyed and the approximate number of inhabitants, gathered with the interviews. Even if the exact number of the population of Dumela had been calculated at the time of research, the values would not be the same at present. The average density is, therefore, close enough to the real value in a changing reality, whose demography is heavily dependent on migrations and high nativity.

<sup>13</sup> The military occupation referred to in the previous chapters, in fact, is only relevant to the Makuleke store area, where the base was.

example, reports an event occurred upon the first scoping visit when a Mozambican Police Officer asked for a lift from Pafuri to Dumela<sup>14</sup>. While in the car, he wanted to throw my rubbish out, as if it was bothering him, and when I asked him to refrain from doing this, firstly he said 'it's only the bush' then, when we approached the Limpopo, he said 'I can throw it away now, because the River is going to take it to the sea so it will not pollute', while trying to be ironic<sup>15</sup>. This attitude is typical of those who come from the urban areas and have little or no education over the damages of waste pollution in a natural environment. To my surprise, my first guide from IUCN was sharing his attitude in the belief that the bush would sort itself out; then again he did not know there were crocodiles in the Limpopo River<sup>16</sup>.

This section will present the village of Dumela under a social and demographic perspective. By using both field notes and the questionnaire data, the population patterns will be discussed in terms of age, education, access to valid identification (ID or Passport) and livelihood strategies. This is the basic information which will enable to draw from the other sets of data the necessary conclusions over the cross-border nature of local relations.

### **6.1.1 Population data: the missing generation**

*It seems that tradition, government and religion are well integrated here (Field notes: 6<sup>th</sup> March 2005)*

This was my first impression on Dumela and I confirm it two years later, as the reasons behind this integration have been clarified by the historical analysis. The local population is pacific, yet cunning, and knows exactly the potential a *mulungu* (white person) can bring to the area from the rumours over what is happening with the TFCA and neighbouring countries. For this reason, I have understood that most

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<sup>14</sup> His plan was to reach the area in Sengwe, close to the border, where the ladies make and sell ilala palm wine, a rarity in Mozambique, this is a very cheap and alcoholic drink.

<sup>15</sup> Field diary, entry 7th March 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Field diary, entry 7th March 2007: 'Since Matola was still in disbelief about crocodiles in the Limpopo (and in Africa in general), after the meeting, while we were sitting with Chief Muklave, I asked him if it was true that there were crocodiles in the River and, naturally, he laughed at this silly question, so I told Simon to tell him that Matola could not believe it, and he gave him a look I'll never forget. Sometimes, even a white European girl is knows things about Africa...'

of the answers given to the questionnaire survey are arguable by personal observation, particularly with reference to those questions attempting to analyse income-generating activities. I was later confirmed by one of my informants, Lydia, that most people in the village tried to depict a worse economic situation in the hope I would bring them money, through development projects, even if I made it clear in every community meeting that my research had no such implication<sup>17</sup>. At first sight, the village looks suspended from the real world into a universe of its own where days go by slowly with the elder sitting in the shade of a tree, the kids looking after the livestock, the men in the fields, and the women washing at the River. On Tuesdays and Saturdays, the women gather with the elders to go to the field on the southern banks of the lake where the Ministry of Agriculture had established an agricultural project, and donated a pump to the community<sup>18</sup>. The only occasion when such pattern is disrupted is on special events, such as the visit of the District administrator coming from Chiquilaquala.


The population of Dumela seems rather heterogeneous at a first glance, but after a few days some anomalies may be noted. The village is composed of 89 households, all surveyed, each counting between one (1) and 15+ people. Only eight households pertain to the last category, and their spatial distribution is rather curious: six are form the central part of the village, and only two of them are directly related to the Chief family. House 23 and 24 are set aside from the village, on the western side, and also own the dwellings on the lake where their fields are. The average household counts between 5 and 10 members (Cat. 2). The rough estimate of the total population is about 1500 people, whose gender and age distribution is rather bizarre. From personal observation, in fact, it was established that gender for both adults and

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<sup>17</sup> I had to community meetings: one introductory on the 7<sup>th</sup> March 2005 and on the 6<sup>th</sup> September 2006. During both of them I presented the research and the questionnaire survey and answered to questions by participating villagers.

<sup>18</sup> The pump was not working upon my first visit and only repaired over one year later. The people in the village do not have the skills to repair a pump, so when it breaks they have to call the Ministry officer in Chiquilaquala, who will come to fetch it and take it for repairs.

children was balanced: the practice of polygamy, perhaps, contributes to the presence of at least one female per each male person.



**Map 6.17: Population distribution, the circle are in relation to the size of the family (Source questionnaire)**

In general, it was rarer to meet a widowed woman than man. Children, as well, were well balanced which could be seen both at school and in the village. Teenagers, instead, were absent. The only persons met in the age between 13 and 20 were Lavie, my interpreter, niece to Chief Muklave, and Simon's daughter, who was brought up very traditionally<sup>19</sup>. I have not met any boy who would fall within this age category, not only during the day, but also at night when people would gather at the new *spaza* shop (providing cool drinks and music) to dance and have fun. A rough calculation will show that teenagers should have been born in the last years of the war, when people had either adjusted to living abroad or were still trying to survive in the bush. Two hypothesis can be made on this issue: (1) teenagers are sent to work

<sup>19</sup> Lavie was the only fluent Portuguese speaker in the village and her attitude was one of confidence and openness. Simon's daughter, instead, was always working or sitting at home. She is being brought up very traditionally, and at the time of my last visit she was wearing the traditional attire of the girls ready to be married.

in South Africa to gather enough money to marry, considering that the *lobolo* (the bride's price) is still widely practiced; (2) this generation was either never born or never survived the harshness of the war. Considering infant mortality rate in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, due to cyclical famines and droughts, as well as the lack of health posts and hygiene, it would not be surprising to discover that very few children actually made it to see the end of the war. However, considering the discrepancy between family numbers and people actually seen in Dumela, it would be sensitive to assume that those teenage boys who survived are now working in neighbouring countries.

### **6.1.2 *Tsonga: the language of the people***

Ana, the teacher at Dumela who left in 2005, stated that the average age for marriage is 10 to 15 years old and that the school drop-out rate from 4<sup>th</sup> grade is very high<sup>20</sup>. This would prove the existence of a teenage generation as well as explaining why teenagers are not easily noted: they are either married or working to get married. Data on primary education, actually, explain a lot on family patterns in the village. As Table 6.1 shows the families counting between 6 and 15 members are also those having a significant number of members with a school certificate, even if this is still a small number in relation to family size. A total of 66.4% of interviewees count 1 or 2 family members who have completed primary school. Only four (4) families counting more than fifteen (15) members have between 3 and 5 members with a primary education certificate. These numbers should refer to teen-age people, considering that a very small group of refugees were able to go to school either in Zimbabwe or in South Africa, during the war, thus confirming the theory that male teenagers have left Dumela to find employment elsewhere.

The poor overall schooling results are also dependent on language fluency, as hinted by Ana. Considering the cross-border mobility of the inhabitants of Dumela, it is not surprising that Tsonga is the only language which is spoken widely and

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<sup>20</sup> In the Mozambican school system, primary education ends on 7th Grade at the age of 13. Children dropping out at 4<sup>th</sup> Grade, therefore are only 10 years old.

fluently, because it is intelligible both in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Therefore, migrants do learn a new language (either English or Afrikaans) only if they work for white people abroad. A broken version of the *Funnagalo* idiom is still spoken by young adults and the elders who worked on the mines, whereas Portuguese is spoken only by the older people who worked for the government (the *videchane*<sup>21</sup> is a good example). Two women were fluent in Portuguese: the first being Lavie who completed her education at the age of 15 in Mapai, the second being a lady who is originally from Xai-xai. Ana, the teacher, expressed the concern that children who go to school do not have a chance to practice Portuguese at home with their parents.

**Respondent's household member \* Members with primary education Crosstabulation**

			Members with primary education			Total
			zero	0-2 <sup>a</sup>	3-5	
Respondent's household member	1-5 members	Count	10	12	1	23
		% within Members with primary education	38,5%	22,2%	12,5%	26,1%
	6-10 members	Count	13	25	1	39
		% within Members with primary education	50,0%	46,3%	12,5%	44,3%
	11-15 members	Count	2	13	2	17
		% within Members with primary education	7,7%	24,1%	25,0%	19,3%
	more than 15 member	Count	1	4	4	9
		% within Members with primary education	3,8%	7,4%	50,0%	10,2%
Total		Count	26	54	8	88
		% within Members with primary education	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: questionnaire survey.

a. the exact reference is 1-2 but SPSS does not allow the use of identical numbers in the value and the range.

**Table 6.16: Cross tab - number of household members and members with primary education.**

The cross-border and cross-cultural nature of the Tsonga language makes it the only viable communication medium that did not disappear through time and modernisation. On the contrary, the Tsonga language is still used as the symbol of the Shagaan identity which has survived wars and displacement and always went back to its original place. In fact, even if there are non-Tsonga speakers in the area, these groups are well aware of past hierarchies and accept Tsonga as their 'official' language, despite speaking Venda, Ndebele, or Rozvi with the family. The past of

<sup>21</sup> The *videchane* is the FRELIMO party representative.

vassalage is guaranteeing a present of identity based on language and tradition. If the choice of not learning a second language, unless required by life constraints, may be seen as laziness towards the acceptance of modernity, yet it must actually be understood modernity has so far offered very little to the people of Pafuri in times of peace.

### ***6.1.3 Identification and the power of the state***

If the borders are the repository of state demarcation, as posited by many political geographers<sup>22</sup>, it should go without saying that the population of the state would be known, hence identifiable. This is not the case in Dumela, the other border communities in Mozambique, as well as most rural areas not located along the coast. As Table 6.2 shows, the missing value, corresponds to the families where no one has an Identification, which means that people in the village are identifiable only by the acknowledgement from their peers.

This is a major security problem for a country whose cross-border movements often occur informally and illegally, as well for the country which receives migrants on a regular basis. The common language and lineage, in fact, may be and is used to gain residence into a different country to acquire benefits without indicating the real origin of the person. This is the case of the Venda women in Zimbabwe claiming benefits in South Africa<sup>23</sup> and of the boy of Dumela who contracted AIDS while working in South Africa as a gardener, and whose ID indicated he was a South African citizen<sup>24</sup>.


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<sup>22</sup> See Sahlins, 1998, as well as Muir, 1986; Glassner, 1995; Pounds, 1992;

<sup>23</sup> Discussed by Chief Insp. Tshambalala, Pafuri border post, 12<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

<sup>24</sup> Field work, September 2007. The boy was taken to the hospital in Chiqualaquala where he was put under a treatment programme, without being asked to produce papers. This in turn indicates that any Zimbabwean Shangaan could use Mozambican hospitals, if the service provided is better than the one given in Sengwe.

### Identifiability of villagers in Dumela



**Table 6.17: Questions of identification in Dumela (Source :questionnaire survey).**

Far from being a form of passive resistance to the state, the lack of identification is a sign of the marginalized economic and geographical condition of people at Pafuri. The direct and indirect costs of ID, in fact, are to be borne by the citizen and have a great impact on the yearly income of a family. Table 6.3 shows the type of costs involved for people leaving at Pafuri to get either a Passport or and Id card.

Direct costs	Indirect costs
Photo	Travelling to the apt immigration office
Taxes	Pay for food and accommodation while waiting for the document to be ready
Notary stamp	Travel back home.

**Table 6.18: Costs incurred when in need of a valid ID card or a Passport (Source: fieldwork)**

For people living at Pafuri, the apt immigration office is Xai-xai, the administrative capital of the Gaza Province, some 1,000 Kms to the South East. The cost of a trip in itself requires a small fortune, and still does not include the expenses for staying on site until the papers are ready. Therefore, for some one who wants to emigrate to earn money, it is not only impractical, but often impossible, to have and spend a considerable amount of money for the right documentation. For example, a

young man was arrested by the Mozambican police while trying to cross into South Africa, who came from Maxixe (Inhambane Province) and used the all the money he had to pay for his trip from the coast to Pafuri, because if he had used it for the documentation it would have defeated his purposes of migration as he would have not had anything left for transport, let alone supporting himself while abroad<sup>25</sup>. As Chief Insp. Tshambalala also noted, it would suffice to have someone at the Border Post taking the photos and gathering all the necessary form, who would be in charge of going once a month to Maxixe to get the passport done. An Immigration officer, known as Lino, used to do this and was taking the papers to Xai-xai to have the passports done. But after he left, no one would take up this responsibility<sup>26</sup>.

Anderson claims that borders are both institutions and processes. In this latter function borders are both the markers of identity and the instrument of state policy. In the case of Pafuri, however, the border is neither<sup>27</sup>. The lack of identification, in fact, implies a lack in state control over its citizens, as their nationality and existence cannot really be proven. This, in turn, indicates that cross-country movements could be more frequent if natural and man-made obstacles were not preventing them. For instance, now that the Sengwe corridor is being demined, it is no longer patrolled by Police officers, which means that people come from Sengwe more often to visit their friends and relatives. During the questionnaire survey, in fact, Sengwe people were found at a few households as daily visitors. Common language and culture, and the lack of tangible proof nationality, therefore, make the people of Pafuri extremely mobile and intermixing, as proved by marriages as well, thus easily escaping official and legalised control systems.

## **6.2 REFLECTING GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICIES ON LOCAL PATTERNS**

The issues of schooling and identification remark a failure of the state in providing basic services to its citizens, which should be regarded as a serious matter

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<sup>25</sup> Personal interview with the prisoner, held with the supervision of Chief Serrano (Immigration Office) at Pafuri, 2nd September 2006.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with Chief Insp. Tshambalala, 12<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

<sup>27</sup> See Anderson, 1996a, quoted in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 5.

in a country where the creation of the national identity has been a priority for the past 30 odd years. The Mozambican reality, moreover, shows the difficulty of implementing strategies aimed at controlling the country whilst being involved in heavy regional and national conflicts for over twenty years. If on the one hand it is true that the NMR-RENAMO project was the main cause of collapse of the Marxist-Leninist project, one must also acknowledge that the modernising socialist approach implemented by FRELIMO did not encounter the mass support it was hoped for amongst the peasants, whose condition of socio-economic pariah never changed. This section will briefly explain the national politics of Mozambique, by adding on specification from what discussed in the previous chapters, in order to discuss the impact of current policies in Pafuri and Dumela. The two segments discussed are the implementation of border security policies, also related to the GLTFCA, and the development strategies for rural communities.

### **6.2.1 *The continuity of FRELIMO: from colonialism to capitalism***

The national politics promoted by Mozambique must be framed in a double context of pre and post civil war, considering one major change in the general approach: from Marxism-Leninism to tamed capitalism, through a process of paradoxical decision making in pragmatic terms<sup>28</sup>. True to the dogma of African Nationalism, concerning the creation of modern liberated states, FRELIMO tried to promote the image of a unified country, by defying ethnic lineage and traditional belief. As Pitcher (2002) notes, however, the transformation was more based on indoctrination than on renovation as the colonial system was maintained under new names when public, and under secrecy, when in sheer contrast with the original FRELIMO ideals. This was the case of the agreement with South Africa for mine labour, which was continued until South Africa itself halted it due to the civil war in the 1980s. After independence, the *prazos* and the *colonados*<sup>29</sup> became collective farms

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<sup>28</sup> The transformation of post-independence Mozambique is fully discussed by Pitcher (2002) and Hall & Young, 1997.

<sup>29</sup> *Prazos* and *colonados* were examples of colonial agriculture based on chibuto (forced labour). The Gaza Province was notorious for the *Colonado do Limpopo* covering most of the lower Limpopo plains from Chokwe to Xonguene (See Vala, unknown; Roesch, 1991 and 1992; Hermele, 1998;

around the old *aldeamentos*, the *colonos* were replaced by dynamising groups and the figure of the *régulo*<sup>30</sup> was maintained as a representative of the party<sup>31</sup>. Tapping on these incongruences between the preaching on freedom and the reality of *induced* labour, NMR grew inside Mozambique as the anti-FRELIMO movement supporting ethnicity and traditional customs. It could be argued that if RENAMO had not stressed the Ndau affiliation to the point of re-fuelling inter-ethnic hatred and had not used traditional spiritual beliefs to justify its horror, present-day Mozambique could be a very different country. The post 1984 Mozambique, moreover, gradually lost the Marxist-Leninist drive, forced by nature with two serious droughts in 1982 and 1983, and by politics with the acknowledgement that RENAMO was becoming a real Mozambican movement even though relegated to the Ndau ethnic group and the anti-Arab groups in Cabo Delgado, and by the acknowledgement that economic help for the government could have only come from the West. As Hanlon pointed out, the FRELIMO government was forced to negotiate a univocal peace with South Africa and abjure its extremist political approach in favour of a more welcoming democracy opened to the favours of capitalism<sup>32</sup>. This was the beginning of the mixed political strategy of Mozambique, which still enforced the Socialist approach to maintain its original unifying and developmental strategy, whilst embracing the benefits of Capitalism in terms of foreign investment. The interference of both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, however, could not be contained by the governments and led to open intrusion in structural adjustment plans for

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Wardman, 1985).

<sup>30</sup> The figure of the *régulo* was created by the Portuguese government to *reinforce state-sponsored political and economic hierarchies* in rural areas (Pitcher, 2002, p. 33), through a system called *regedoria*. Worse than imposing a Portuguese chieftainship, the colonial government appointed 'traditional authorities' to promote the progressive farmers agricultural scheme thus creating a power-system based on nepotism, through direct benefits delivered to the *régulos* and their immediate family. During the independence fights, FRELIMO actively sought to get the support of the *régulos* to strengthen their approval amongst the peasantry, yet de-commissioned the same *régulos* when in power, with the justification that they represented the colonial power and were subservient to it (Pitcher, 2002, p. 33-35; Virtanen, 2005; Roesch, 1991).

<sup>31</sup> The continuity between the Colonial and the independence government for politics concerning land-use practices, agriculture, industry and regional trade, including the export of labour for the mines may be seen as controversial, yet it has been widely documented. See Hall & Young, 1997; Pitcher, 2002; Hermele, 1998; Roesch, 1991 and 1992; Meyers, 1994; Vala, unknown; Friedman, 1980.

<sup>32</sup> See Hanlon, 1991, Introduction and First Chapter.

recovery and development, until the present day<sup>33</sup>. The embracing of capitalism as an economic strategy, finally, surfaces in every aspect of governmental and social life, from the creation of tax-free industrial areas to boost foreign investment<sup>34</sup>, to the growing number of shopping centre selling South African brands, as well as some international products.

### 6.2.2 *PARPA – the last stronghold of socialism?*

The dualism of the FRELIMO political approach, within the drive towards socio-economic development taken by sustainability practices and the Millenium Development Goals, allows for the creation of broad strategies that may be socialist in principle, but blurred in practice. One example of this is PARPA: the holistic policy aiming to fight absolute poverty from education to agricultural production. The first PARPA plan was presented for the 2000-2004 period, but was superseded the following year by another quadrennial plan, which integrates all the different sectors of action under a common fiscal frame. The bases for the creation of such framework are to be found in the IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), which were created in 1999 with the World Bank in order to establish a country-based strategy for poverty reduction, considering the high rates of population growth particularly in developing countries<sup>35</sup>.

Falck *et al.* explore the influence which PRSP had on the latest PARPA, in terms of the use of indicators, the ongoing consultation process and the mixed government-independent monitoring system. The authors even go as far as to posit a new relation between the donors and the recipient, which cannot be proved since the complications of Mozambican bureaucracy and the level of corruptions have highly affected aid in the country. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, the general

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.; Hall & Young, 1997, pp. 144, 154, 197-198, 226-231; and Pitcher, 2002, pp. 146 – 151.

<sup>34</sup> The CPI, Centro de Promoção de Investimentos, was created by the GoM with a specific mandate to promote foreign investment by facilitating the concession of fiscal and customs incentives to investors; identify potential partners for joint ventures; assist with the implementation of investments projects. In addition, a law was passed in 2006 which allows foreigners to open a business without a local partner.

<sup>35</sup> For a comprehensive presentation of PRSP refer to <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm>

assessment is positive as PARPA may contribute to the *institutionalised changes* which can support the effective implementation of poverty reduction policies<sup>36</sup>. However, this survey lacks a real evaluation of PARPA policies at the local level, particularly in so far as the agricultural schemes are concerned.

PARPA, in fact, includes two types of agricultural projects: the first concerning the production on the family and industrial level of the four main produces of Mozambique, namely cereals, Caju nuts, sugar and cotton, by exploiting the colonial land use system for the Cooperatives; the second involving the creation of an agricultural project in remote rural areas where intensive agriculture is not viable<sup>37</sup>. The second type of project involves areas such as Pafuri, and aims at supporting the community by providing tools and basic products (oil, salt, sugar) in inverse proportion to the amount of produces obtained from the agricultural project.

Far from being the last stronghold of socialism, on paper PARPA presents itself as the most feasible solution to counteract growing poverty in rural and dry areas, particularly at times of great climate change, by exploiting international funds and knowledge. Unlike many a strategy, including conservation policies, PRSP stresses the importance of state-based programmes, which address national problems and priority, thus relying on both local expertise and commitment to result. PARPA is definitely the most emblematic policy created by the GoM as it shows the double nature of a ruling party coalescing into a pro-active and holistic strategy thanks to a global shift in the paradigm of economic development.

### **6.2.3 *The demarcation and function of post-war Mozambican borders***

The question of African borders has been discussed in Chapter 3 and Mozambique is of course no exception to the general rule that the colonial borders were not discussed. However, the post independence history of the country shows that borders have been frequently breached by its neighbours in order to destabilise the country, while the border populations have been living in super-statal spaces

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<sup>36</sup> Falck *et al.*, 2003, p. 260.

<sup>37</sup> See <http://www.govmoz.gov.mz/parpa/source/matrizop.xls>

which belong more to the traditional social sphere than to the sovereign state. The migrations towards neighbouring states, during the war, intensified the search for safe areas and were based on ethnic affiliation, particularly towards northern Zimbabwe, from the Provinces of Tete and Manica<sup>38</sup>, and Southern Zimbabwe, from the Gaza Province. In this period, the national politics concerning border issues were contingent to the war, yet the scarce numbers of the Mozambican army combined with their required presence to patrol strategic inland location (the commercial corridors) and to counteract the guerrilla warfare of RENAMO, left border areas virtually in the hands of the enemy, with the exclusion of border posts. Borders were, at one time, limits of isolation and frontiers that were constantly broken by refugees, formal and informal armies, and illegal traders.

The situation shifted at the end of the war towards a more protectionist approach, supported by the repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of a country, funded on a stronger national identity as the ethnical divisions promoted by RENAMO, effectively marked its failure<sup>39</sup>. However, Leão claims that, a security policy had not been envisaged by the GoM by 1994, which prevented, on the social side, the effective understanding of a country at peace and, on the political and security side, the launch of a strong sign against the traffic of small arms within and without the country<sup>40</sup>. By 1997, however, the regional stability and the similar political affiliation of the main governing parties were pushing towards a more cooperative approach towards economic development. As migrants from Mozambique were pouring into South Africa in search for a living, the increase in cross-border illegal activities such as the smuggling of weapons<sup>41</sup>, stolen goods and girls required attention towards the use of borderlands as the lawless frontiers of the pioneers' times. Meanwhile, the raising of conservation as a cost-effective solution to border patrol prompted cooperation in security issues to the benefits of all countries involved in such projects, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. It is not surprising, therefore, that the GoM

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<sup>38</sup> See Hughes, 1999.

<sup>39</sup> Lubkemann, 2005; Roesch, 1992.

<sup>40</sup> Leão, 2004, Chapter 2 and Conclusions

<sup>41</sup> Hennop, 1999; Vines, 1998.

had to react to the South African efficiency in border patrol, due to national concerns over security breaches, and by 2005 it had begun negotiations over the border demarcations both at sea and in land. Such negotiations led to effective field projects in borderlands that had been previously unmanaged, such as:

1. Surveys for the understanding of the border situation between Mozambique and South Africa in the Matutuine District, which will be part of the Ususthu-Tembe Futi TFP, including the Elephant Reserve in the South;
2. Research and data collection on continental border in the Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces, the latter including Dumela, in order to reaffirm the continental borders of the Republic of Mozambique, in relation to South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi<sup>42</sup>.

The connection between transnational conservation projects and the implementation of border securing and security strategies is undeniable, thus underlying that security at the border is becoming paramount not just for legality purposes but also for maintaining a full sovereignty over those borders areas which had been infringed in the past.

#### **6.2.4 *Dumela: addressing national influence – state hierarchy***

The remoteness and informality of Dumela and its villagers still transpire the superimposition of the government. The presence of all hierarchical levels in such a remote yet strategic place is actually remarkable as the GoM is trying to bring the sovereign state to the people through symbols of nation and power<sup>43</sup>. The village Chief (or *Nduna*, in Shangaan) is both the traditional leader and the governmental appointee. He participates in the meetings at the local and district level, and the symbolism of the official uniform is increasing with time. During the scoping visit, in fact, there was no sign of his governmental leadership in the way he dressed, whereas one year later he had a pin and a belt with a big buckle showing the colours and coat of arms of Mozambique. The uniform which should have been worn at official meetings was also forthcoming. In his yard the flag of Mozambique marks his leadership to villagers and visitors alike. The *videchane*, or *régulo*, is the representative

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<sup>42</sup> Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Donnan & Wilson, 1999.

of the FRELIMO party. He does not participate in official meetings where the administration and the governmental policies are discussed, but he is the first and last one to speak at community meetings, which he mediates. Finally, the *Nyanga* (the traditional healer) is the repository of all knowledge concerning traditional treatments and the divinatory arts. In the case of Dumela, the Nyanga is the brother of the Chief<sup>44</sup>. The Chief reports to the *Chefe de Posto*, who resides in Pafuri, and organises the activities and the policies of all the villages falling under his jurisdiction. He reports to the District Administrator who resides in Chiqualaquala and acts as the main link between the local and the national government. Within these four figures both the government and FRELIMO manage to maintain a degree of control over local affairs and implement the policies of reference in order to contribute to development.

#### ***6.2.5 Dumela: addressing national influence – PARPA and agriculture***

Within the same ideal of the colonial government, agriculture has been used by FRELIMO as the main political strategy for employment and growth, with a cooperative system, instead of the Portuguese latifond-based *prazo*. The growing importance acquired by agriculture as the only possible solution for employment and development in rural and remote areas unfolded through strategical plans devised in the post-war period to resume developmental policies and facilitate economic recovery, such as the PARPA.

In trying to address absolute poverty, PARPA is also accountable for the implementation of health and education policies. The latter, in Dumela, cannot be considered successful against the high drop-out rate and the failure to teach the Portuguese language, thus impeding the transmission of information required by normal education standards. Two teachers have been allocated to Dumela, who do not receive enough support from the state and are often dealing with classes of mixed age-groups thus making it very difficult to coordinate lessons, as it is the case

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<sup>44</sup> Unfortunately, the role of the Nyanga could not be clarified as Mr. Frank Muklave was rarely seen sober.

for most peripheral rural areas. The closest health post for Dumela, furthermore, is on the TEBA hill at Pafuri on the opposite side of the River, i.e. almost a one hour walk from the village. The doctor does not periodically visit the communities, and it is very unlikely that a diseased person would be able to reach him there, particularly children and elderly people. The difficulty of the long walk, furthermore, is worsened by the crossing of the crocodile infested Limpopo River, thus making it more sensible to remain at home than to attempt the journey if not in good health.



**Map 6.18: The location and extension of the agricultural project area, south of the lake (Source: field work)**


On two occasions patients were taken to the Pafuri health post and the Chiqualaquala hospital, the former being a child with a mild malaria, the second being a boy with suspected HIV infection. In both cases the people would not have been able to get treatment otherwise without paying transport money to get to both places. The endemic cough which affects both children and adults is no longer

considered a notable disease, even though some severe cases have been noted, whereas a lady with womb haemorrhage could not be helped because of lack of expertise, and because she showed the symptoms on the day of departure. The PARPA proposals on increasing access to health and education, therefore, has miserably failed in this part of Mozambique, where the number of children and elderly people is considerable and the lack of protection from extreme temperatures, coupled with a protein-poor diet, creates a haven for viral diseases.

Furthermore, due to the typology of the soil, Pafuri and Dumela do not benefit from the advantages of intensive agriculture, much to the satisfaction of environmental conservationists. The Ministry of Agriculture, therefore, in line with PARPA, has sponsored an agricultural project at the village scale, involving the community on a voluntary basis, as a small initial investment is required to buy seeds. The participating families, under the leadership of the Chief, agree to dedicate two days of the week to work on the common field. Seasonally, if the field is non productive, each family receives 1 litre of cooking oil, 15 Kg of maize and 3 Kg of beans. The ration is reduced and will gradually stop when production suffices for all the families. The land chosen for the project is located by the lake, where a pump has been installed, as shown by Map 6.3. The women of the participating families work on the field on Tuesday and Sunday mornings. During the scoping visit it was noted that the intensity of work had diminished as the pump had broken down and was taken to the Administrator at Chiqualaquala and the rains had been scarce. During the extended field trip of September 2006, instead, the pump had been fixed and the first products were visible. A guard would, therefore, stay at the field during the night to scare away baboons and elephants. The Ministry also provided a rifle for defence, but due to the TFCA land denomination and the laws on wildlife protection, the guard could only shoot in the air, if threatened, to scare the animals away.

Agriculture is the main source of livelihood in Dumela, as was stated several times during the first community meeting, even though it rarely produces surplus for sales. The only interviewee to openly admit selling surplus to people from

Zimbabwe was the owner of Machamba 1 (see Map 6.3), who is renown in the village for the good quality of his maize, which he grows on the River banks. Most of the other villagers rely on subsistence agriculture and small livestock (chicken and goats), since cattle is the equivalent to a bank deposit and cows are not used for consumption. As shown by Table 6.4, 77.3% of the interviewees rely on Machamba (subsistence agriculture) to survive. Some of the participants to the MoA project declared that the project itself was their main sources of livelihood, whereas virtually all of the people who trade have a *machamba* as well. The level of remittances and employment is irrelevant, in fact only two people were permanently employed in governmental institutions locally, with the exclusion of the Chief. In Sengwe Communal Land, instead, livestock was classed as the first source of livelihood, agricultural produce being the second, remittances third and Ilala palm products (wine or baskets) last<sup>45</sup>.



**Table 6.19: Livelihood strategies – Source: questionnaire survey.**

<sup>45</sup> See Mpofu *et al.*, 1999, p. 106.

### 6.2.6 *Dumela: addressing national influence – the border post and patrols*

The influence of the state has so far only tampered the need for symbolism to reconstruct national identity, which had been promoted mainly by the *videchane*, since independence. The influence of national policies at the local level, in Dumela, are deeply dependent on the amount of economic growth they can create, as the MoA project shows: when the pump was broken and taken away the general attitude was that the State was not good to them, as soon as the pump was fixed and re-installed, confidence about the State was re-boosted. In the meantime, no one in the village was trained to fix the pump, so should an accident happen again the moods will swing likewise. In this precarious environment, however, the border plays a key role in creating the basis for survival by providing crossroads of encounter and trade between people whose sustenance heavily depends on the natural products, both to consume, to transform and to barter or sell. Dumela, and the broader Pafuri area, prove that *a variety of border cultures gain their lifeblood from borders, while ironically providing sustenance to those state structures, like the police, army and immigration authorities, whose task it is to make their borders less penetrable in the political and economic interest of the state*<sup>46</sup>. In fact the interactions between the state apparatus and the border communities happen on a variety of levels, in order to protect the interests of the state, of the community, of the people.

The first level of interaction is of course official, whereby the Police, the Immigration, the Army and the LNP wardens are present to prevent illegal emigrations towards the neighbouring state, through border patrol, to stop illegal cross-border transactions such as the trading of stolen goods and illegal weaponry, the failure to pay due import taxes and the trade in animals and by-products. This role of protection is understood by the local people but disregarded if it impacts their right to roam for grazing pastures, wedding planning and social encounters based on customary traditional law. Of course, this might cause other types of cross-border

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<sup>46</sup> Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 89.

crimes, such as the theft of livestock from Zimbabwean raiders, which was reported several times in the scooping visit, at the community meeting.

The second level of interaction is economical, since the state authorities based at Pafuri cannot freely move around the territory, as they have no vehicles, they must be able to get all the supplies they need locally. Since the only shop in Pafuri closed in 2006, some officers have been growing a *machamba* towards the River banks. However, they still rely on traders and *spaza* shop owners, both in Dumela and along the Mapai road, for non-agricultural products. The years of permanence of the state officers and the frequency of travels for trade could, understandably, produce a series of verbal gentlemen agreements between the parties whereby the officers are increasingly more reliant on local traders than on the State for their well-being.

The third level is traditional and communal, as the time spent in service at the border creates a sense of community between officials (who know both the territory and its people very well) and the community, who is aware of the officers' constraints on the local level. The interpretation of punishment for an unlawful act as a period of service to the community, for instance, was not suggested by any Western philosopher or social scientist, but by common sense only, as people with dichotomous roles and interests are forced to share the same environment. Some governmental officials also take advantage of local typical products if they have a day off and go, *informally*, to Sengwe to sit with the Ilala wine makers and drink the fermented lymph of this bush-size palm. If Dumela produces maize beer, which is very common amongst Shagaan people, the Ilala palm wine can only be produced where the spontaneous growth of this tree allows it, and it is uncommon in Mozambique<sup>47</sup>. The liminality of socio-economic relations between state officers and local communities both in the political and the traditional space, makes it very

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<sup>47</sup> The production of the Ilala palm wine is extensive, as a lot of trees are required to make a considerate amount of drink and highly impacting on the plant, as it halts the growth of the trunk. Due to the long fermentation under the sun, the drink is incredibly alcoholic and very bitter in taste. However, it is very much appreciated even by non-natives as Connor (2003) shows.

difficult to determine the relevance of the State as a sovereign entity over its people and its territory.

### 6.3 BORDER DEPENDENCY: MOBILITY AND LIVELIHOODS




Table 6.20: Stratification of society based on income (Source: Anonymous, 2003)

The Upper Limpopo Zone, of which Dumela is part, is a perfect example of subsistence agriculture<sup>48</sup>, where the border is not a symbol of division, but a catalyser of benefits other remote areas do not have, which derive from the legal and liminal interaction between the state and the citizens. As pointed out in a recent publication, three types of households compose the subsistence agriculture society: poorest, middle and richer<sup>49</sup>. These terms, of course, are all relative to each other, yet depict a stratified society where traditional hierarchies work along side modern ones. Such divisions are visible in Dumela as well. However, unlike other villages in the Upper Limpopo, Dumela has increased market opportunities for surplus produces and imported products, as it sits by two borders between populated areas where there is no access to basic necessities: the Border Post and the Sengwe. Furthermore, being the Pafuri borderland highly porous for the informal sector, Dumela acts as a real cross-road for various socio-economical interests. It is possible, therefore, to assume that trade with foreigners and non-locals is higher than expected in a normal peripheral area. The importance of the border to the community can be measured by

<sup>48</sup> Anon, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

understanding (1) the numbers and patterns of volunteers migrations; (2) the type and numbers of trade with non-Mozambicans; (3) the quantity and quality of family relations across the borders. These three sections were all part of the questionnaire survey and have led to interesting results, combined with personal observation of life in the village and its surroundings.

### ***6.3.1 Changing migrations: exploiting the borderland***

As explained in the previous chapters, border trespassing in Pafuri dates back to the XIX century, and cross-border migrations intensified with the need for employment to earn money and the opening of the mine requiring man power. Confirming the data gathered in the Sengwe communal land, the main drive for migration is still employment. Very few families had members abroad because the daughters got married in South Africa, as it is generally the male member who crosses the River and the border as part of a modernised passage rite from boyhood to adulthood<sup>50</sup>. If the main drive for migration is employment, however, what makes it a rite of passage is not the length of the journey as such, but the risks which migrants are exposed to, considering that they have to cross both a patrolled border and a protected area. Far from justifying Frump's argumentations over the responsibilities of Park Rangers towards the illegal migrants<sup>51</sup>, including their attempts to cover numbers of accidents in the name of conservation, it is true that there are mortal accidents caused by lions and other predators living in the reserve, to the detriment of illegal immigrants. However, the survey carried out in Sengwe shows that the first two constraints to migrations at Crooks' Corner are the electric fence and the River floods, whereas crocodiles and wild animals are rated third and

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<sup>50</sup> This theory is mainly derived from the introduction of channelled labour for the mines, from neighbouring countries and have been explored by Elkan, 1980 and Niemann, 2003. Maphosa, 2004, instead explores migrations as 'rite of passage' in the context on modern south-western Zimbabwe.

<sup>51</sup> Frump, 2006. The author's personal opinion, in fact, is that people have been living and moving around this areas for two centuries and are well aware of the danger posed by wild animals, it is therefore their own free decision to still embark in the journey and must bear the full consequences of this decisions. Also, considering present environmentalists views over animal rights, it is thought that it would be pointless to cover numbers of accidents as the general overview would be that wildlife is dangerous and people must be afraid of it, although mesmerised by its beauty.

fifth respectively<sup>52</sup>. The threat posed by an arrest is, thus, greater than the threat posed by a lion. The electric fence was taken down along the Mozambican border in 2001<sup>53</sup>, thus leaving arrests and wildlife as the main threat to immigrants from Pafuri.

Being employment the main purpose of migrations from the Pafuri – Crooks’ Corner area, Dumela and Sengwe reflect the argumentation posed by both Whitman and McDonalds<sup>54</sup> that migrants are changing and are represented now by a heterogeneous group of people who do not aspire to citizenship in South Africa, but want to earn money and go back to his/her homeland.

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	Family members temping abroad	,78	88	,718	,077
	Family members permanently abroad	,52	88	,694	,074

**Table 6.21: Comparing temporary and permanent migrations (Source: questionnaire survey)**

In Sengwe employment and food are the main reasons for migrations, as stated by focus groups participants<sup>55</sup>. Similarly, in Dumela, the household survey shows that on average more people leave for temporary migrations than in search of a change of residence (implied in the permanence in the selected country). Furthermore, the adult men who were discussing going to South Africa in the summer season (October – March) declared they would only go until they earn sufficient money, then come back to their families. The Shangaana calendar, in fact, shows the months between October and December as the barren period when nature is preparing to bear its fruits and the fields just need watering, thus allowing men to work elsewhere and come back by January – *Hoho* – the month of ‘laughter and festivity’ when the maroela fruit is ripe and ready<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> Mpofu *et al.*, 1999.

<sup>53</sup> Godwin, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> Whitman, 2000, and McDonald, 2000.

<sup>55</sup> Mpofu *et al.*, 1999.

<sup>56</sup> Bulpin, 1954, p. 115.

Far from following the ancient migrations towards the mines, new migrants are using the border as the possibility to gather the money they need to provide for themselves and their family, without abandoning their home. As a matter of fact 55.9% of the respondents stated that none of their direct family never returned home. Considering that South Africa is the place of migration, it is somehow rewarding that local youth is not lured by the myth of the *rainbow nation* where everything is possible, but prefer a simple and harsh lifestyle in their home country, thus creating another paradox in the analysis of the Pafuri borderland.

### **6.3.2 *The role of remittances in determining wealth***

As Maphosa rightly notes, the meaning of the term *remittance* is still quite controversial, though the general idea is that it refers to cash earned by a member of a family and sent back home to contribute towards household economy, whereas only a few scholars consider remittances as both cash and goods<sup>57</sup>. In agreement with Maphosa<sup>58</sup>, and in line with the findings of the field investigation, remittances discussed here include both cash and non-cash commercial goods, from cooking oil to motor-vehicles, i.e. anything that may increase the status of a family within the village. Such broad and encompassing use of the term is found to be closer to reality because of the changing type of migration discussed so far, and because consumerism has, despite stark dichotomies between African cores and peripheries, penetrated the most rural societies thus creating a situation whereby, alongside cattle, the availability of luxury commercial goods may change the status of a family.

The Sengwe survey shows a certain seasonality in the reception of remittances. If April and November show the same relevance within the year, December is the month when remittances acquire a definite importance, probably because accompanied by the migrant, who will bring home more goods, as he would not need to rely on carriers and other people<sup>59</sup>. This is not surprising and can be deduced

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<sup>57</sup> Maphosa, 2004.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> See Mpofu *et al.*, 1999, p. 105. Remittances are normally sent through an informal network of people who are affiliated to the remitter by either kinship or trade relation. Alternatively, public transport do

also for Dumela, following the interviews with local adults on migration, already mentioned. However, Table 6.7 shows irregular frequencies in the reception of remittances both from migrant and from permanent migrants. A majority of the respondents actually claimed they never receive remittances from family abroad, which should not be taken as utter truth considering that many families had commercial goods unavailable in the area such as: plastic chairs; pots and pans; radios. Case 12 is interesting as an example of the reliability of the questionnaire for familiar economy is concerned: the respondent stated that no family members were employed abroad, thus receiving no remittances, and that they were not trading with foreigner and had the *machamba* and the maize beer as only sources of livelihood. This was said at the house of the respondent which was stashed with modern electrical and electronic apparels (from radios to car batteries) as well as mechanical tools. The pots and pans hanging from the wood stacks were visibly new as were the plastic chairs laying in the yard. This family was visibly one of the wealthier in the village, but was not prepared to show it to foreigners, and when the lady was questioned against observation, she just smiled and looked around, meaning she was not going to say anything else. Furthermore, her husband was spotted several times drinking at the new *spaza* shop at night, implying that money was not short. Remittances play, by definition, a key role in the local familiar economies as the main source of cash or products that are not available *in loco*. If Sengwe shows a certain dependency on remittances, as they can reach up to 2,000 ZAR<sup>60</sup>, Dumela has proven the opposite in terms of questionnaire survey, as only 7% of the interviewees admits to remittances sufficing to the household economy. If true, this poses two issues pertaining both to the socio-cultural and traditional sphere. Considering that employment is still the first reason for migrating and that social bonds in the Shangaan community are traditionally very strong when it comes to help out the rest of the family, indeed, the fact that most interviewees declared not receiving remittances from sons and daughters in South Africa, or that these were not

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accept parcels on provision that the receiver will meet the vehicle at the official stops.

<sup>60</sup> Zuid Afrika Rand – the South African currency.

consistently contributing to household management, could indicate either a misinformation, as exemplified by Case 12, or a change in the social pattern of family relations.

Frequency of remittances												
	Family members temping abroad						Family members permanently abroad					
	zero		0-2		3-5		zero		0-2		3-5	
	How often is money sent home		How often is money sent home		How often is money sent home		How often is money sent home		How often is money sent home		How often is money sent home	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
once per semester	1	16,7%			1	6,7%	1	4,2%	1	4,0%		
more often			13	34,2%	5	33,3%	9	37,5%	6	24,0%	3	30,0%
never	5	83,3%	25	65,8%	9	60,0%	14	58,3%	18	72,0%	7	70,0%

Temporary and permanent migrants

**Table 6.22: Frequency of remittances (Source: questionnaire survey)<sup>61</sup>**

Firstly, the Shangaana is a patriarchal society whereby married couples live with the family of the husband. When the latter leaves in search for a job, his wife stays behind and shares the wealth of his family. If the husband does not send money home, the woman might be either bullied in increasingly contributing to familiar economy (smooth form of slavery) or asked to leave, as she is a loss to the family<sup>62</sup>. Such cases have been reported orally through other researchers in the areas, and often presented as theories derived from the Shangaan traditional customs. Even if no such case was reported in Sengwe and in Dumela, it is understandable that when too many people compete for the same resource, it is the weakest or the outsider who will succumb.

Secondly, the case may be that when a person migrates to South Africa with the intention of permanently settling there, he/she deliberately avoids making contacts with the family back home. If true, this is due to the fact that when a Shangaana achieves a relative financial stability, the whole immediate and extended family will expect to see monetary returns, which may become unbearable. This was the case, for instance, of a fair number of Mozambican living in Maputo or in South Africa, who

<sup>61</sup> In the survey, it was not asked to specify if the remitter was either temping or permanently abroad, because most families had both type of migrants. This is the reason why for both '0' values to temping or permanent migrant there correspond a positive answer.


<sup>62</sup> Personal conversation with Dr. Giuliano Soncini, former consultant to CESVI in the Sengwe NRM project, and Dr. Claudia Gandolfi project manager for the CESVI project 'Fermiamo l'AIDS sul nascere' ("Let's stop AIDS at birth" – Translated by the author)

are originally from the rural areas. Particularly a mechanic met in Giyani, who was originally from the Upper Limpopo valley, and never got in touch with his kins after leaving as he knew this would mean he had to support and help up to fifteen (15) people, claiming relations to him.

Remittances, to conclude, are fundamental in determining wealth particularly when it comes to marriages, since traditional authority has been challenged by politics and modernity. To be able to offer a good *lobolo* (bride price) to a woman's family means to be able to marry whoever a man wants, as well as the number of women, since polygamy is still widely practiced. Even if statistics show that Dumela does not thrive on remittances, personal observation indicates that the situation is different for at least 40% of the population, particularly within the younger generation. And the simple fact that three *spaza* shops can coexist within a few metres from each other, whereas none exists at the border post, demonstrates that local people have money to spend.

### ***6.3.3 The socio-cultural sphere: kins across the border***

The second scoping visit to Dumela (May 2005) was planned via South Africa. Travelling along the main road circumnavigating the Western border of the KNP, a village was noted bearing the name of Dumela in the Gazankulo areas past Giyani, its main town. When questioned over this village, Chief Muklave stated that a brother was the chief of that village and that together with Chief Sengwe they formed the last Shangaana 'triumvirate' of Pafuri. Besides the questions of historical settlements and power relations this statement opens, the regular meetings held between the three chiefs are symptomatic of the divisions the border causes and the existence of a hierarchical and social level that is based on traditional leadership, thus implying a double affiliation of the chiefs to the country and to their ethnicity. The meetings with the Chief of Dumela in South Africa vary from one to two per year, because Chief Muklave only recently acquired a passport and it is costly to get to Dumela - SA.



**Map 6.19: Frequency of kinship in neighbouring countries (Source: questionnaire survey)**

The meetings with Chief Sengwe, instead, are more regular and happen at least once per semester. In both cases national politics are discussed as well as important issues such as the TFCA and Sengwe corridor, generally addressed to as ‘the Park’, from the colonial legacy of exclusive conservation entailing forced relocation<sup>63</sup>. Of course, if the trips to South Africa somehow follow the legal route through the border post, this cannot happen for Sengwe as there exists no border post, which means that either the police is complacent or that there is no patrol, although unlikely.

Including the chief, there is considerable 82% of villagers with relatives residing either Zimbabwe or South Africa, or both. These people can only visit each other by crossing the border, thus incurring the same costs and problems as the Chief would, with the major difference that most of these people do not have any form of identification, thus making it too risky to cross illegally. Obviously, however, since

<sup>63</sup> Diary entry – 23rd May 2005.

the Chief is the first person to break the national borders, specifically when going to Sengwe, there is a silent legitimization for the rest of the population to do the same.

**Cross-border kinships**

			Country of the relatives		
			South Africa	Zimbabwe	Both
Relatives in other countries	yes	Count	20	11	41
		Row %	27,8	15,3	56,9

**Table 6.23 Location of kin relations (Source: questionnaire survey)**

Before discussing the frequency of the visits, however, it is important to note with Table 6.8 that Zimbabwe and South Africa are very close in the number of kins they host, with 56.9% of villagers having kins in both countries. Obviously, there is no geographical correlation between the proximity of a household to a border and the country of location of the kin, and the data demonstrate beyond doubt the cross-border nature of Dumela and the Pafuri area. Furthermore, it could be inferred that there exists a mutually supporting network of family relations which were strengthened during the last war, with refugees movement, and might be in place again, if required by the national political situation in one of the countries (i.e. Zimbabwe), which demonstrates (1) the double affiliation to tradition and the modern state; (2) the potential for the use of these cultural bonds through and for the TFCA.

**Frequencies of cross-border visits**

	Does the respondent visit them? yes		Does the respondent get visited? yes	
	How often does he/she visit?		How often does he/she get visited?	
	Count	%	Count	%
every month	2	2,8%	1	1,4%
every 3 months	1	1,4%	1	1,4%
less often	34	47,2%	35	48,6%
never				

**Table 6.24: Frequencies of cross border visits (Source: questionnaire survey)**

Confirming the original assumptions, over 60% of the respondents who declared having relatives across the border do visit them and/or get visited regularly. Six respondents also remarked that that they only visit people in Zimbabwe, which confirms the facility of the crossing. The frequencies of the visits, however, are lower

than expected as almost 50% of the respondents either visit or get visited less than once quarterly. This would be understandable for South Africa, less for Zimbabwe; however, it must be noted that the length of the road from Dumela to the actual village of Sengwe, the presence of mined fields and the age of the people who would have tighter connections are strong enough obstacles to embark on the journey. As a matter of fact, the regular visitors from Sengwe were often on a bicycle or on a donkey-trained cart, and rarely on foot.

#### ***6.3.4 Roaming people: the crossroads to modernity***

The people of Dumela are well inscribed into a network of transfrontier cultural and economic relations, yet their proximity to the border cannot be limited to the analysis of local centrifugal movements. Dumela is in fact the centre of a geographical route network for people who want to emigrate or simply trade at the border. For all the people coming from the north west of the region (particularly north-west Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and southern Malawi) the best route to follow is the same their forefathers took to go to the mines: through northern Gaza to Dumela, across the Limpopo, at Pafuri.

Chiqualaquala is the second crossroad along the migratory route, as it attracts people from Central Zimbabwe and the Gaza and Manica Provinces in Mozambique. Retracing the road backwards to the North, Chimoio is the third crossroad, located along the Beira corridor, the main transport route to the sea for Zimbabwe. Finally Mutarara, leading the road to the Vila Nova de Fronteira border post with Malawi<sup>64</sup>, and Caia, with the pontoon over the Zambesi River leading the way north, received and receive potential migrants from both Malawi and Northern Zimbabwe. The pulling factor South Africa always exercised by providing employment to millions of rural people across the regions is visible through a study of this long and dangerous

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<sup>64</sup> The Dona Ana railway bridge was built in 1935 and was, at the time, the longest bridge in Africa. It is now closed for conversion to rail bridge again, after having been transformed into a motor vehicle bridge in 1995 by CMC Africa Austral. As of 2008, the bridge will be used by railway, pedestrians and bicycles, whereas a new bridge for motor vehicles will be built at Caia.

journey that people were and are prepared to embark upon in order to get there: it is no wonder it became a rite of passage for many.



Map 6.20: Main migratory route to Pafuri (Source: field work and bibliography)

The centrality of Dumela in respect to human migratory routes is very important in terms of cultural and economic exchange. Local people, in fact, occasionally offer 'accommodation' to travellers on the way and the *spaza* shops boost their sales in drink and food as the day turns into night, a more profitable time for border-jumping. During the field work, it was noted that twice a week an open *bakkie*<sup>65</sup> would come down from or going up to Chiqualaquala, with passengers or goods, either as private or public transport. During the second week of September a *bakkie* loaded with over twenty people arrived and dropped off the customers at Dumela. Here the people sat either at the *spaza* shop or at the maize beer ladies until dusk, then walked to the River to cross for Pafuri. Of these people only one was caught and sent back penniless by the LNP warden<sup>66</sup>. Dumela, also sits on the secondary road to

<sup>65</sup> A type of car (either 4x4 or 2 wheel drive) used particularly in the farm to carry loads at the back. The cabin can seat two or five accordingly.

<sup>66</sup> Diary entry – 15th September 2006.

Mapai (on the main road to the coast) which runs along the northern River banks of the Limpopo River, thus accruing the number of people coming through, depending on the water levels.

Similarly, Dumela could be a crossroad for the tourists of the TFCA as the obligatory passage towards Game reserves and National Parks, in Central Mozambique. Whilst in Dumela, over the space of two weeks in September, about ten people (tourists, guides and professional hunters) were met at Dumela, as they stopped to pause. to get some cool drinks, or just to visit the place. In particular, a group of 5 American tourists and their South African guides stopped on the way to a private hunting reserve in Mozambique. The implication of such visits are enormous, considering that tourism is the one activity which should bring low impact development in protected areas, such as the GLTFCA. Firstly, by admitting that trophy hunting is a sustainable tourism-related activity, the amount of income generated by the community would be remarkable and prompt, if Pafuri had to become a legalised and controlled Hunting Corner again. Secondly, the selling of traditional products such as reed mats, interwoven with woollen threads, and the car models children made out of tins and scrap iron threads, which are currently produced industrially in South Africa and sold in tourist shops and markets, would support a network for locally-based produced touristic objects. Thirdly, it would contribute to maintain the cross-border cultural sphere by creating a safe environment where local people would roam freely (as there is no intention to leave their community at present either) and be responsible for the halting of illegal activities, unless their privilege is taken away. This, however, will be discussed in the last section of the Chapter.

#### **6.4 CONSERVATION AND HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICT: POSITIVE SPIN-OFFS?**

The vision of Dumela so far presented is one of the core for cross-border movements, whose livelihood is highly dependent on the presence of the border on three different levels. Being the core of centripetal and centrifugal movements,

Dumela can aspire to recuperate a centrality that is not only geographical but developmental in the context of the GLTFCA, by sustainably using its history, its culture and its natural resources. This rests upon three key conditions which must be analysed against the provisions and the aims of the TFCA.

Local	Province	Nation/Region
Kin and traditional movements with Zimbabwe are 'overseen' by official border patrollers	Traders from the northern section of Gaza are obliged to go through Dumela to reach Pafuri	Migrants who want to reach SA <sup>67</sup> from the North East must reach Dumela as the last outpost before crossing
Personal and <i>Spaza</i> shops trade benefits from the peripheral location and isolation of border officers at Pafuri	Border jumpers are dropped off at Dumela, where they embark upon their journey on foot	Tourists from South Africa wanting to reach the north-east of the country must go through Dumela
Local border-jumper are very close to the border and know the area very well		

**Table 6.25: Cross-border movements from and through Dumela (Source: field work)**

In the first instance, the USA-led 'back-to-barriers' trend in conservation presented by Büscher and Dietz<sup>68</sup> should not be incorporated in PPF and TFCA implementation strategies. It is important to understand that CBC and CBNRM failed due to the lack of power-devolution and training at the grass-root level, and that participation begins with information. Secondly, human-wildlife conflict must be understood and addressed, if required, as one of the first steps towards the convergence of interests: the institutions want protection of the animals, the people want protection from animal. The conflict of interests in place must be solved in order to redress past exclusion of local people, whilst showing that cooperating for conservation may work if planned and implemented with respect of all stakeholders. Finally, the promotion of culture must be re-valued as an objective of the TFCA projects, in order

<sup>67</sup> SA – South Africa

<sup>68</sup> Büscher and Dietz, 2005, warn that a U-turn in conservation strategies is currently enforced by US-led group of scientists who claim that the failure of CBC and CBNRM is due to 1) the ineffectiveness of CBC and Integrated Conservation Development Projects (ICDP), and 2) the mythical status of ecologically friendly locals. To redress the balance for conservation it is required to re-instate 1) the imperative for biodiversity conservation, 2) the critical importance of protected areas, and 5) the immediacy of the need for strict protection.

to enhance the understanding of traditional cultures (for both local and international visitors) whilst promoting a real transfrontier cooperations amongst the people of the CA.

With the aim of demonstrating that the conflict between human and wildlife in interstitial areas, of which Dumela could be a centre for the GLTFCA, is neither inevitable nor unaddressable, this last section will discuss the three *conditios sine qua non* for the effective and inclusive creation of a real Transfrontier Conservation Area. The case study of the GLTFCA will contribute to this analysis as it is tri-national in nature and the flagship of the PPF-TFCA project, as Büscher and Dietz claim: the 'make it or break it' case<sup>69</sup>. Firstly the hostility of local people towards the GLTFCA will be argued in reference to the priority assessments of the management. Secondly, the envisaged solutions will be presented by discussing ecological and cultural strategies.

#### **6.4.1 Conflict generation between parks and people**

Ever since the first land demarcations for nature protection in South Africa, the local populations have been cut off from their resources and land thus generating a conflict which lasted up to present day. The aggravations of this feeling, however, are derived from current conservation projects which, despite the call for including affected local populations in the process, still attempt to content the donors in spite of the people. In the GLTFCA, the history of the border areas is one of suffering, exploiting and exclusion, which is why it is paramount that the management considers the interest of local population in planning and implementation. This, however, has never been the case since the very beginning.

When looking at the GLTFCA, it must be considered that South Africa is the main drive for the project and the main attractor for both donors and tourists due to the marketability of its political and ecological situation. Despite all agreements that each State does not renounce to its sovereignty whilst cooperating for common

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

transfrontier goals (which seems a contradiction in terms)<sup>70</sup>, therefore, South Africa can play a major role in defining: (1) the pace of implementation; (2) the priorities; (3) the rule and regulations, based on its long experience in conservation. This is not just a theory if we consider the responsibility of the then Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Vali Moosa, in reducing the agreed action plan by a half, particularly in so far as the Community Working Group was concerned, in order to present the GLTFCA to his electorate by the end of his mandate<sup>71</sup>. Furthermore, the contribution of the PPF to logistics awarded the Foundation a great decision-making power within all the key institutions, as it has disseminated its officers in virtually all the segments related to the TFCA projects in South Africa, and has brought together all the main donors (such as the World Bank, USAID, and the German Development Bank - KfW)<sup>72</sup>. The lobbying power PPF may exercise within the TFCA project is much stronger than any pressure from either the Mozambican or Zimbabwean governments. Should it come as a real surprise, therefore, that local communities in the interstitial areas and in the populated parks (both the GNP and the LNP) have been neglected in terms of both information and pro-action?

Rhetoric, of course, is of little use when action is required but it is important to note that both the Sengwe Ecological Corridor and the relocation of villages in the LNP have come to an impasse mainly because of failure to compromise, on the management side, and of lack of participative appraisal techniques which have been required by the WB but never implemented<sup>73</sup>. In 2002, CESVI presented a comprehensive document, based on community consultation, explaining both the reasons behind the requirement for a smaller corridor (to reduce relocation to a minimum) and the type of activities which could support the local community and

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<sup>70</sup> See the treaty of the GLTFP.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 9. South Africa, in fact, could afford to proceed without the Community Working Group as the KNP is unpopulated and the communities along its western borders are not part of the wider TFCA project either, whereas both Zimbabwe and Mozambique has to deal with some 10,000 people altogether. Also Spenceley, 2005.

<sup>72</sup> Ramutsindela, 2004.

<sup>73</sup> See the Refugee Research Programme report (2002) on the consultations in the LNP, carried out by IUCN and other contracted NGOs.

generate returns in the short term, while allowing the time for planning the medium-long term strategy. The actual maps of the GLTFCA do not take into consideration the requirements of the Sengwe community nor does the Management Committee accept trophy hunting as a feasible activity in the TFCA, on the grounds that it is incompatible with the vision of the KNP and the projection of the GLPP as a safe haven for wildlife<sup>74</sup>. Similarly, the documents showing the IUCN consultation in the LNP which aimed at spreading awareness over the creation of the LNP and the GLTFCA are inconclusive over the people's reaction to such affecting changes in land use that one wonders if the aims were actually met<sup>75</sup>. Overall, the only target met by the GLTFCA management committee is the relocation of animals in Mozambique; the creation of the sanctuary, now dismantled as the grown population have been freed; and the semi-completion of the demining of the Sengwe corridor, which was finally funded by external donors (suspected KfW, as GTZ had carried out the survey for mapping the mined areas).

The total disrespect towards local population shown so far by both the GLTFCA management and the PPF has generated a hostile behaviour from local communities both in Sengwe and Pafuri. The former lament they do not want to see maps with red lines showing areas that will no longer be theirs, the latter fear an increase in wildlife presence in and around their precarious fields<sup>76</sup>. The general attitude is one of verbal confrontation, as demonstrated by both community meetings in Dumela, but practical respect towards the laws they must abide by (such as the prohibition of animal killing), because of control measures enforced by the LNP. The present discontent, however, could and will degenerate into passive resistance and civil disobedience practices which Africans have continuously put in practice against white rule since the Khoikhoi destroyed the first *padrão* (marking stone) and the

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<sup>74</sup> Bocchino, 2002.

<sup>75</sup> All the documents concerning consultations in the Gaza Province undertaken by IUCN were studied. The most significant are: IUCNa, b, and c – 2001. The documents lacking full bibliographical reference have been looked at but disregarded, yet they are available at the IUCN country office of Maputo, Mozambique. See also the Refugee Research Programme, 2002, to consolidate opinions.

<sup>76</sup> Fieldwork : personal observation.

wooden cross left by Vasco Da Gama's party in 1497<sup>77</sup>. Without protection from wildlife, the community could resort to self-protection through wildlife poisoning or poaching, thus obtaining safety and food, as well as other animal by-products. The attitude towards tourists, furthermore, would suffer and, from actual indifference, it could escalate to unfriendly and/or deceitful behaviours<sup>78</sup>. This would of course damage the peaceful image that the PPF and the GLTFCA management committee are trying to convey to the world in order to attract both donors and tourists, with South Africa being the gemstone of the conservation project with its KNP.

#### 6.4.2 *Measuring sustainability in the GLTFCA*

Five years after the formal establishment of the GLTFCA, communities and their development are being relegated as the least important target from implementation. This is due mainly to the focus of lobbying stakeholders towards conservation, the general attitude that wildlife – including elephants – need protection against all odds and that communities have proven unable to deliver sound sustainable NRM practices<sup>79</sup>. It is legitimate, therefore, to consider how sustainable is this non-adjustable conservation principle, against the evolving concept of sustainable development, in the light of the Millenium Development Goals towards the eradication of absolute poverty and the emerging of tourism as the solution to all human-wildlife conflict in and around Protected Areas. Beginning from the assertion that sustainable development has always discussed economic goals within the respect of the environment and non *vice versa*<sup>80</sup>, one must question what type of sustainable development can TFCAs promote when located on the doorstep of

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<sup>77</sup> Du Preez, 2004, p. 4.

<sup>78</sup> Petty crime is not expected to happen, as the people in Dumela are aware of social and wealth differences and throughout the whole permanence never stole anything, even during prolonged absences from the field. However, the sense of sharing which those who have are made to feel towards the 'have not' may degenerate as more wealthy tourists pour in, furthermore cunning devices would undoubtedly be found to get some cash out of non-experienced visitors.

<sup>79</sup> These attitudes are discussed widely in papers which have been quoted in previous chapters, here it is relevant to quote Wyneberg, 2002; Büscher and Dietz, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> UN-WCED, 1987, also known as the Bruntland report, provides the first definition of 'sustainable development' as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' – Chapter 2.

destitution in peripheral areas where the informal economy and the traditional bonds are stronger than the state and its law.

The answer to this question, certainly, does not lay within the management priorities of the GLTFCA, despite the many opportunities offered by geography, history and culture to create a real Peace Park, a 'make-it' case where the human-wildlife conflict could be solved and generate income at the grass-roots level, thus beginning the cycle of sustainable development through nature conservation, which has been theorised for two decades now. The solutions envisaged, after the presented Historical and Political Geographical analysis as well as the socio-economic data, will here be enumerated and discussed as separate paragraphs.

(1)Conservation priority: whilst it is understandable that conservation is the first priority of a TFCA, this should be implemented bearing in mind, first of all, that the population of one of the most protected species in Africa, the elephant, has passed its carrying capacity in the KNP, to the extent that culling would be needed to redress ecological balance, but this is not psychologically accepted by lay people and some environmentalist organisations. Of course, by increasing the conservation area, the elephant population will, hopefully, occupy a wider space thus redressing balances without human intrusive intervention, but this may take time. The general idea, therefore, is that in the GLTFCA elephants are not endangered, and the same goes for all other species, since most poaching activities concern the Southern part of the KNP and the private Game Reserves south of the LNP, and target primarily rhinos, gazelles, antelopes and lions<sup>81</sup>. In fact, wildlife protection should give way to a more holistic view of conservation that encompasses ecosystem whether natural or anthropised. Secondly, animal diseases present in the KNP, such as feline AIDS, TB and Foot and Mouth, should be prevented from spreading in the two neighbouring countries, where local populations are healthy (Banhine and Zinave NP should be preserved in particular as the population numbers of Gonarezhou NP could diminish

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<sup>81</sup> Private communications from Chief Insp. Coetzer of Skukuza and André Du Pont, owner of Xonghile Game Reserve.

daily, considering the present situation). This is done, naturally, through a system of fencing posited both by CESVI (2002) and Anderson & Pariela (2005), which does progressively prevent migration to infected animals in neighbouring countries.

Suggested solution: Considering the presence of populated interstitial areas, particularly around water access points, and the creation of wildlife corridor, the conservation priority should be shared with safety and security, thus creating a systems of fencing which could protect animals and people, at the same time.

(2)Economic priority: The funds that governments worldwide can afford to allocate to conservation projects are plummeting, hence the theory that conservation must *pay for itself* has been widely accepted particularly in developing countries where many other civil society problems need addressing<sup>82</sup>. Due to its potentially low-environmental impact, tourism has been proposed as the only activity able to generate income for conservation. A number of prefixes and suffixes have been added to the word *tourism* in order to characterise its requirements for tourism in and around Protected Areas: from nature-based tourism to eco-tourism; from sustainable tourism to pro-poor tourism. Rarely these theories have worked in practice, and certainly the GLTFCA is not an example to follow, despite its potentials. Due to the lobbying the KNP and the PPF can exercise on common management policies, in fact, it has been established that the only acceptable forms of tourism are the low-impact photographic safari and guided walks, along side the more polluting 4x4 trails in Mozambique. Such decisions show, without a doubt, that the only economic priority at a stake here is the GLTFCA's, and the respective governments'. Even assuming that local communities would be taking part in this nature-based industry, in fact, this form of tourism would not be sustainable in the short term for the following reasons: (1) only a small number of people would participate, and the selection would be based, firstly, on education and languages spoken for interaction with tourists, which would leave out 90% of the population of Dumela and similar villages with low education density; (2) the training following

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<sup>82</sup> Mowforth & Mount, 1998, p. 163.

the selection would not guarantee a salary, thus making the people still dependent upon traditional livelihoods, endangered by a growing number of wildlife; (3) some real income-generation would be perceivable by the community only in the long term. Even the form of participation implemented in the Makuleke Land Concession is not enough to the communities of the local villages involved, because only a certain number of people can be employed, mainly for menial jobs whilst being trained, and yet conservation is generally not perceived as a profitable activity, by most of the community<sup>83</sup>.

Suggested solution: socio-economic development for local interstitial population should be addressed by understanding the potential offered by the Pafuri borderland. In the case of Dumela both the cross-road essence represented by the geographic location and the presence of tradeable handicrafts as touristic objects should be considered for incorporation in the planning for tourism, with the creation of an *ad hoc* market within the GLTFCA boundaries, such as it is done by the KNP with Venda-cloth objects and in Swaziland by projects for women empowerment, such as 'Gone Rural'. Finally the more varied tourism options are, the easier it is to incorporate interstitial areas in their running (See point 4).

(3)Security priority: this addresses the key 'main characters' of the GLTFCA project, yet in different ways. Whilst animals and tourists are the categories to be safeguarded and protected against crime, populations in interstitial areas are seen as the perpetrators of crime (poaching, border jumping, smuggling and so forth). From the analysis of Dumela and Pafuri, it emerges that the supra-statal space works on the traditional principle of mutual help, not of illegality, with the only exception of border-crossing by job-seekers. Only one man is renown for poaching, but he has been isolated by the community and lives some 25 Kms away from the Zimbabwean border. However, the security priority is still aimed at preventing local people from damaging the outcome of this mega-project, without understanding the reasons

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<sup>83</sup> Interview with Colleen Mullen, WS Pafuri Camp lodge manager, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

behind possible sabotages: their own security from wildlife and their own chance of economic development.

Suggested solution: instead of focussing on the negative aspects of having populated places in a protected areas, which seems a rather backward approach, management committees should pay more attention to local communities as actual exclusion and condemnation may backfire through acts of civil disobedience once the number of wildlife are no longer endurable by the local populations and the threat will raise. The creation of a well trained Problem Animal Control Unit, as posited by Anderson and Pariela (2005), which would in turn train local units in the prevention of conflicts with communities, should be implemented before animal migrations increase in numbers. This unit should be supported also by volunteer Honorary Wildlife Officers, who would deal with specific and highly problematic cases whenever PAC is not sufficient<sup>84</sup>.

(4)Tourism priority: tourism should not be limited to activities that are deemed complacent with 'ideal' conservation, but should coalesce the needs for conservation and the needs of the people who have found themselves within or close to its boundaries. As culling is not condoned as a management practice by some professionals, animalists and lay-people, so trophy-hunting is not tolerated in CA, as it is considered to be against the principles of conservation<sup>85</sup>. What is seldom understood, however, is that trophy hunting by quotas is much less impacting than driving around in a 4x4 along the trails (as more quiet and less polluting), could contribute to the management of wildlife populations (with selective hunting based on population numbers) and makes conservation 'pay for itself', whilst leaving money and meat behind for local communities, who normally act as trackers and porters. Anderson and Pariela have shown that most problem animals present in the GLTFCA are highly valued for trophy hunting, these being elephants, lions and

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<sup>84</sup> Anderson and Pariela, 2005.

<sup>85</sup> A very interesting publication on this topic is Alastair, 2001

buffalos, with crocodiles and hippos bearing a limited value only<sup>86</sup>. The same animals have a high value for non-consumptive tourism, but practicing trophy hunting does not mean they will disappear. The previous experiment of trophy hunting within NRM projects, such as the one in the Chiredzi district under the CAMPFIRE project (Zimbabwe), has been successful in delivering food and income to the participating communities who were able to pay for their own social development (health and education)<sup>87</sup>. The study conducted by CESVI does include trophy hunting by quota as a feasible income-generating activity for the section of the Sengwe Communal land outside the western boundary of the Ecological corridor, however this option was taken in by the management committee.

Suggested solution: the lobbying power of conservationists within the stakeholders group of the TFCA should be over-ridden by the government in favour of a holist approach that is ecologically, economically, socially and politically sustainable. If this approach does include trophy hunting as a feasible activity in some populated area, as it would be, it should be implemented with the direct involvement of the communities who would benefit both economically and materially (meat). Agreements, therefore, should be sought with CITES to (1) allow the ivory stockpiles of the KNP and other relevant areas to be worked into touristic objects and marketed within the boundaries of the GLTFCA, with a special certificate indicating provenance and justification; (2) allow trophy hunting in areas where wildlife populations are present and it is viable to set seasonal quotas to implement the project<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> Anderson and Pariela, 2005. Crocodiles have been deemed important for farming, but a network should be in place and the activity carefully planned. On this issue, it was heard that a crocodile hunting licence (with quotas) was awarded to a group of people in Maputo for the Massingir dam (Personal communication by an interested party, whose identity cannot be disclosed). Hippos have a remarkable ecological value, but not a high value for trophy hunting.

<sup>87</sup> Baker, 1997, proposes a comprehensive analysis on trophy hunting as a sustainable practice in conservation. Child, B., is a major researcher over the benefits and mistakes of CAMPFIRE, see Child, 1991, and Child *et al.*, 1997. A general outlook of the CAMPFIRE project, instead, can be found in Wolmer & Ashley, 2003.

<sup>88</sup> This second idea is also found in Anderson and Pariela, 2005.

In addition to the above points, special attention should be awarded to protective fencing. For Dumela, particularly, and for all the villages along the Pafuri – Chiqualaquala border it is essential to plan a fence that would prevent animals from trespassing into communal land. This, however, does conflict with the general idea of a park without borders. As brilliant as this idea is, it is unfortunately not feasible as competition for land is incredibly high in African peripheral areas, due to the relocation of native populations during imperialism and racial segregation. As much as the idea of killing wildlife for conservation is not appreciated, so is the idea of fencing in villages of native populations as this would remind immediately of concentrations camps, imprisonment and social injustice – fortunately so, as this would also completely halt any existing traditional cross-border relation. The compromise would therefore be to study a fencing system based on a CI-GIS map indicating all the populated areas in the interstitial zones and their socio-economic characteristics. However, from a scoping analysis conducted while in Dumela a fence demarcating the Sengwe corridor on both sides would prevent human-wildlife conflict in both countries, but would halt the traditional network of relations. It is therefore the responsibility of the governments and the park management to carry out consultation on how to solve this issues.

### **6.4.3 Conclusions**

Far from trying to present local populations as the Rousseauvian ‘bon sauvage’, this section has attempted to demonstrate that conflict is inevitable, if humans and animals share the same space, but may generate positive spin-offs if the needs of local populations are understood and addressed. In order to do so, the governments should really put pressure over their right to sovereignty and create opportunity for their citizens thus proving to be a State in full command of its own territory and people.

Unfortunately the pressure exercised by South Africa and international donors seems to be too strong for stable countries like Mozambique to counteract, and Pafuri is stuck in between a rock and a hard place, whereby both traditional practices and

modern understanding will be crushed by the old principle of conservation for conservation's sake. The fear, having looked at the past and present of Pafuri, is that neglecting important socio-economical and political issues will eventually result in the failure of a mega-park which could have really promoted peace between peoples, between people and wildlife, and within one-self thus reconciling a history of conflict, which is apparently destined to last.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

*The frontiers are there, the frontiers are sacred. What else, after all, could guarantee privilege and power to ruling elites? Yet the peoples. It would seem, see matters differently... The frontiers, for them, remain a foreign and unwarranted imposition... So that even whole a 'bourgeois Africa' hardens its frontiers, multiplies its control, and thunders against the smuggling of persons and goods, a 'peoples' Africa' works in quite another way. For it the smuggling of goods and persons appears perverse and wicked when seen by governments in place, peoples in place can evidently find it right enough, end even natural. (Davidson, 1986, pp. 43 – 44)<sup>1</sup>*

Political Geography defines Borders, Frontiers, State and Nations drawing from principles that are derived from European history and philosophy, to which African countries only abide by formally: and this is why, throughout the text, the term State was used in reference to African governments not African country. If the State is generally accepted to be the Nation-State thus implying a strong sense of nationhood which balances centrifugal forces, then Africa is an exception to the theory. African nationalism was born out of African political philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s in order to accelerate the independence of the colonies from motherland and finally return Africa to Black Africans: it was meant to embrace all Africans in the struggle to re-conquer their land centuries after the first colony was established. The political failure to implement on-going lamentations over the fact that African borders are not representative to its peoples, however, has created paradox situations which have evolved into inter-ethnic conflicts in many countries of Central Africa. The continent, in fact, is a puzzle of ethnicities whose identities are split between cultural and political-geographic affiliation, and the state may be either an enemy or a support according which ethnic group is in power. In this contested scenario, borderlands become alienated peripheral spaces integrated into a transcendent system of aggregation based on cultural and geographical belonging, where borders are at once a source of income and a threat to livelihoods. Alvarez affirmed that *borderlands evoke the geo-political and the metaphorical, the literal and the conceptual*<sup>2</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> Found in Cheater, 1998, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Alvarez, 1995, p. 448, in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 36.

which is particularly true for Africa, considering its history of land conquests driven on the one side by pioneers who were breaking frontiers to create their own polity, such as the Vootrekkers, or to increase their wealth and follow a dream, as Sir Cecil Rhodes; and on the other side by native clans who wanted both to increase the chances of trade with Europeans to get weapons and to fight them off their land whenever political disagreement would pull the Whites apart. This violence has prompted movements and migrations following two phenomena, which occurred both separately and simultaneously, according to the historical timeline: (1) the explosion of demand for natural resources of the world market (generating exploration and exploitation); (2) the raising of populated territories to areas of strategic importance in the struggle for hegemony of two powers<sup>3</sup>.

At present, over forty years after African colonial borders had been accepted by independent governments, the frontiers are broken in the name of another dream: conservation without borders. This research has sought firstly to understand the multidimensionality of borders and borderlands in Africa, focussing on Southern Africa, secondly to prove that conservation always had an implicit geo-political purpose in Southern Africa, thirdly to show that Transfrontier Conservation has maintained a political character which does not allow to acquit local communities from a history of conflict and exclusion. The case study of the Limpopo National Park proved an excellent choice because of the importance assigned to this mega-project, the number and type of stakeholders concerned, the special history of cross border movements and migrations attached to the broader area and specifically to its geographical core: Pafuri.

This last chapter aims at drawing the conclusions on the many topics argued in the text, and eventually answer to the main question asked in the title: is Mozambique the new South African frontier? In order to do so a section reflecting on the history of displacement which characterise the people of Pafuri will follow.

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<sup>3</sup> Burger, 1997.

Secondly, conclusions will be drawn as to whether TFCAs can aspire to resolve long-lasting socio-economic and political conflicts within the actual framework for action. Thirdly, the impact of the GLTFCA on the local community will be discussed against a 'what if' scenario, i.e. what is the park was not there. Finally, the main findings will be summarise and the implications for further research will be outlined.

## **7.1 REFLECTIONS ON A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND DISPLACEMENT**

African history is constellated by episodes of violence, as is the history of any continent of the earth, yet there must be a difference between Africa and the rest of the world because violence has capillary penetrated the civil society for centuries and is still a huge problem at present, as demonstrated by the amount and brutality conflicts and crime rates. What makes this difference is impossible to tell, but violence cannot be ascribe to one ethnic group only as each of them, regardless of skin colour, has at least once committed an act of violence worthy of note, it would have depended on who was stronger at the time of the conflict. However, the portrait that is generally presented is one of a continent populated by happy people, living peacefully and in close touch with nature, up until the white man arrived to destroy this delicate and ancestral equilibrium. Nothing could be further from the truth, with the exception of the real ancestral Khoi Khoi peoples of South Africa: slavery was widely practiced in Africa amongst Africans, and derived from the 'raid and loot' war tactic, which has always characterised African conflicts and guerrilla warfare. Trade with Arabs and Chinese had been in place for at least a century before the first Portuguese ships set foot on the continent. And the changing ecology forced people to move around the continent, thus breaking their own frontiers in search for greener pastures, richer resources, and safer places. True enough, however, the arrival of the Europeans added more violence to the place, in line with the moral code of the time, whereby torturing prisoners was considered a right of the capturer not a crime. Thus violence spread and as conflict for natural resources escalated in conflict between ethnicities, whilst the slave trade was already changing the human geography of Southern Africa, the African colonies were shaped. How affecting is the history of the

continent on the fact that it now hosts more civil wars and brutal dictatorships than any other continent could be the subject of another thesis but, judging from the descriptions of the Zulu warfare and the Nguni conquests, it could be substantial.

As the last stronghold of white segregationism, Southern Africa – from Angola to Mozambique across South West Africa, South Africa and Zimbabwe – was exposed until very recently to both inter-racial and inter-ethnic violence, which disrupted the civil society particularly in border areas, where the wars were fought and weapons supplied. The wars in Mozambique and Angola, both engaging South Africa, were particularly *sui generis* as combined guerrilla and *contras* warfare to African military tactics with the aim of destabilising the two newly-independent countries in the name of both enforcing South African supremacy on the regional scale, thus enfranchising apartheid rule, and crush the influence of Communism in the area, hence the heavy financing from the USA – CIA. The displacement which followed the ‘fragmented war’ in Mozambique demonstrated the strength of the cultural bonds existing with people of the same ethnic affiliations who had been enjoying the benefits of an alienated peripheral area for years and suddenly had to abandon their home and seek refuge elsewhere. In the process of constructing national identity implemented by the post-independence Mozambican government, the displacement of millions of people in border areas posed a threat to *Mozambicanisation* of the country, since ethnicity was looming on the horizon of modernity and positivism, and was at the basis of RENAMO values. Yet, this did not happen as identity is strictly associated with place at Pafuri, as demonstrated by the history of Dumela. At present, the Pafuri border areas still bears the sign of a controversial past from the Makuleke store at Crooks’ Corner where professional poachers would find freedom by moving the beacon, to the TEBA recruitment centre on the hills above the border post where millions of South-east Africans have been inspected and sent to South Africa mines, from the electrified fence demarcating to political systems at war to the broken bridge on the Mwanezi. Yet, the local people only want to forget and move

on, a typical Mozambican attitude to be respected<sup>4</sup>, also because now that peace has arrived in the three bordering states, the border has become a direct and indirect source of livelihoods, which are liminal: informal, at times illegal.

The analysis of the Pafuri border history, in the broader regional and international context, has proven that decades of displacement, conflict and violence at a time when independence was hoped to bring development and justice, have produced parallel realities each addressing a different sphere of the social life: the statal and the traditional. The pervasive hierarchy enforced by FRELIMO in the early years of government and pursued, although discontinuously throughout the war, proved able to create a sense of loyalty towards the state (more a permanent sense of gratitude for independence) which is visible in local formalities, such as hailing to FRELIMO or the liberation fight before speaking at a community meeting or the warning not to cross the poles demarcating the Zimbabwean border, because it is not legal<sup>5</sup>. Counteracting this reality is the traditional sphere, where there is no state and no border, where Pafuri is Pafuri and the Shangaan are Shangaan, all belonging to the same history and sharing the same territory. This sphere was also enforced by the war with the creation of refugee camps in Sengwe and Gazankulo, both Shangaan populated areas. In this sphere, *illegal and legal migration [for instance] is best understood as functioning within an extended community which transcends the border itself and within which people occupy differential roles*. Whereas in the statal sphere, *People's economic strategies and the resources on which they draw would differ markedly if the border were not there*<sup>6</sup>.

The history of violence and displacement which characterised Pafuri began in the mid XIX century, yet is far from being over as another reality is layered onto the two existing ones: Transfrontier Conservation.

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<sup>4</sup> Honwana, 1997, and Lubkemann, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Field work – March 2005 and September 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Whiteford, 1979, p. 134, quoted in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 97.

## 7.2 SOUTHERN AFRICAN TFCA ARE THE FUTURE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC COHESION?

It has been argued in the text that wildlife protection in Southern Africa has always had a political character, from the creation of the first reserves, the nucleus of present-day Kruger National Park, to its extension into the Pafuri area in 1969, as can be inferred by simply looking at political cartography from the past century, whilst bearing in mind the chronology of independence and the political issues it brought about. Conservation strategies are intertwined with the notion of state and its role on the national and regional scale, with the idea of nation both as a unification symbol and as a disclaimer for identity, encompassing the protection of boundaries from enemy states. At present, the creation of Transfrontier Conservation Areas raises even more argumentations about the role played by politics into planning for conservation, which has expanded research in a specific sector as political ecology. Contextually, the evolution of conservation principles has been said to have taken a U-turn towards protectionism<sup>7</sup> after the progress made since the Rio Summit in 1992<sup>8</sup>. This may be ascribed to one of the paradoxes of environmental globalisation, whereby the same state which has been and is degrading the environment is asked to plan, and pay, for its protection<sup>9</sup>, and the TFCA projects have been agreed to exemplify such paradox for Southern Africa<sup>10</sup>.

The concept of Parks for Peace and TFCAs is neither new nor African, but the ideological boom which followed the end of intra-state conflict amongst regional politicians and international environmentalist organisations served as a catalyser of attention<sup>11</sup>. The concept is both political and ecological, as it divides nature in man-defined bioregions which straddle borders, thus requiring a concerted international

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<sup>7</sup> Büscher and Dietz, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> For an exhaustive overlook see Wyneberg, 2002

<sup>9</sup> Duffy, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Duffy, 2001, and Ramutsindela, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Of course, the interest shown by Mr. A. Rupert heavily contributed to the project due to the facility of gathering international interest and funding, but unlike Ramutsindela (2004) it is not thought that his TFCA project could be part of the Afrikaaner plan to secure land for a Volkstaat in case of civil war, also posited by Ellis, 1994. This opinion is based on discussion with a close friend of the late Mr. Rupert, Mr. Reilly, founder of Swaziland conservation and writer of the national law for nature protection – the strictest in the world.

effort for protection. To this was attached the TBNRM concept, aspiring to raise from the ashes of CBNRM in promoting the devolution of decision-making at the grass-root level to effectively sustain socio-economic development in areas where the population are highly dependent on nature, yet need to implement sustainable practices and change income-generating practices through conservation. The political nexus of TFCA, therefore cannot be argued; what should be, instead, is the role played by politics in either promoting or impairing the nexus between conservation and socio-economic development.

Thanks to the great international and regional interest in TF projects, shown by SADC, NEPAD and the AU, Peace Parks and TFCAs have not escape the long arm of the national, regional and international politics represented by governments, pan-African organisations, and international donors. This raised many critiques, yet the most powerful one was written by two professionals who had actively worked towards the creation of the GLTFCA: Steekamp and Grossman.

*Particularly on park level, but also on other levels of the organisation, SANP actors continue to act in a manner aimed at maximising their control over the conservation estate. This is particularly the case when it comes to the less than lucrative relations with neighbouring communities and flies in the face of any notions of community empowerment. [...] The reiteration of expressions of goodwill and the need for harmony between people and parks will not be sufficient to establish a constructive relationship between communities and parks. Achieving synergies requires that conflicting interests are explicitly accepted and dealt with transparently. Only once this happens will it be possible to deal rationally with the next major issue, namely the complex political dynamics that come into being within communities once they gain access to resources within parks. (Steekamp & Grossman, 2001, p. 4)*

These few lines summarise the political constraints of transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa: local communities are not powerful stakeholders. Despite the acceptance of the need for socio-economic development in rural areas, and for conservation to become an point of convergence between people, nature and government, TFCAs are failing miserably to redress the unbalances of the past, in the name of westernisation of African-based concept and practices. It should be questioned, in fact, how can an African government take more into account radical environmentalist and animalists movements in the west than destitute communities

at home. One possible answer comes immediately to mind: finance. Major donors to TFCAs projects are either European or North American, and it will be international tourism which will make conservation pay for itself, once the TFCAs are in place. If Southern Africa was portrayed as the place where elephants are culled and trophy hunting allowed, most the Western world would close their eyes in horror, the horror of ignorance<sup>12</sup>. Consequentially, the paradigm of the PPF and its projects have quietly scrubbed away any remnant of socio-economic development which was considered the second objective in the promotion of Peace, up until a few years ago as article published on the subject demonstrate, as opposed the actualised web pages.

This thesis has argued that so far TFCAs have concentrated on conservation and animal relocations to also follow the priorities of the South African National Parks authority, which in turn have been 'infiltrated' by PPF officers, able to lobby governmental decision-making. Similarly, the key objective that were driving the TFCAs, namely conservation and socio-economic development, have been slowly modified to conservation and border security, following the priorities of South African politics over (1) escalating illegal migrations from poorer neighbouring countries, (2) soaring crime rates, also dependent upon the illegal smuggling of weapons from Mozambique, (3) persistence of poaching, particularly in Mozambique, as the political situation in Zimbabwe does not allow for a real investigation. If on the one hand TFCAs could be fully inscribed in the SADC project of a border-less Southern Africa, similar to the European Union, on the other hand the failure of governments to address security problems locally cannot allow for the implementation of this project. The general view is that border communities are still perceived as the procrastinators of illegal criminal cross-border activities, which is not always the case as shown by Dumela, thus placing them in a disadvantaged position against the implementation of TFCA. The exclusion of local communities is dangerous in so far as borderlands are becoming again strategically areas for local

<sup>12</sup> This view over the paradox brought about by TFCA is shared by many researchers on the impact of TFCAs on local livelihoods in interstitial areas, mostly using the GLTFCA as a case study. See Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2004; Ferreira, 2004; Wolmer, 2003; Heher, 2003; Duffy, 1997, 2001, and 2006.

and international politics, whilst the only beneficiaries will be animals, tourists, national governments and the private sector. As tourism is envisaged to make conservation pay for itself, the exclusion of local communities from planning and development of TFCA will directly impact the industry. The investigation on the principles and the actual implementation of the TFCA, in fact, led to the same conclusion drawn by Burger exactly twenty years ago, that tourism resorts built on indigenous lands offer them as tourist attraction, as much as an elephant or a lion could be, and if local communities are excluded from the decision-making process and the implementation of tourism projects, their culture will be treated as an item for sale which will make conflict escalate<sup>13</sup>. This is the risk that TFCA run at present, and if the threat to both animals (human-wildlife conflict) and tourism (human-human conflict) is not enough to force the management and donors to reconsider their approach to local communities in interstitial areas (Mozambique and Zimbabwe), the local geopolitical situation should act as a warning alarm, with Zimbabwe being on the verge of economical and political collapse. The review of the TFCA process in Southern Africa matched with field work has shown that TFCAs have the potential to implement socio-economic development at the local level through a varied portfolio of tourism activities, based on the geographic locality and the state of natural resources, but the lack of political will to do so is preventing Peace Park to answer to their first call: the promotion of international peace. If exclusion is perpetrated in communal land by the same governments who called for Black empowerment and social justice, and the same donors who call out for donations to save Africa from destitution in rural areas, this will generate a new level of conflict which could degenerate no longer in civil disobedience but in national struggle, whereby the sense for nationhood is no longer driven by the hate towards the White minority rule, but by the understanding that a state must represent the interests of the nation it is trying to build, rather than of the people and organisations

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<sup>13</sup> Burger, 1997.

who financially sustain it. Zimbabwe, in this sense, could become the first battleground for the new African state.

### **7.3 THE IMPACT OF THE GLTFCA ON PAFURI: BUT WHAT IF?**

The GLTFCA, the flagship Peace Park of Southern Africa, is the most researched by scholars in various disciplines, from ecology to political ecology, from cultural anthropology to human geography, which also makes it the target of most critiques. A SWOT analysis may help to clarify the actual position where the GLTFCA has been placed in relation to its objectives: (1) foster transnational cooperation for ecosystem management; (2) promote governmental, private and local alliances for conservation; (3) sponsor community participation for the sustainable use of natural resources; (4) endorse ecotourism for socio-economic development.

The positive effects and potentials of the GLTFCA are mainly related to conservation and NRM, whereas the negative issues refer to the relation between conservation and sustainable socio-economic development practices. This division is generated not only by the refusal of the management committee to get involved into costly and time-consuming Participatory Appraisal practise, but also by disregard of those reports which either present the weaknesses of the project (see Anderson and Pariela, 2005) or suggest solutions already negotiated with interested local communities (CESVI, 2002). Therefore, the main threat posed by the GLTFCA derive from the deafness so far shown by the management committee to alternative NRM solutions in interstitial areas, thus acknowledging on the one hand the difficulty of implementing effective sustainable NRM theories, and on the other hand the intention to let the private sector deal with local communities if required by the location of the concession.

This must be added to the forced relocation of some 27,000 people living along the Massingir reservoir (the high density tourism area), and the Shingwedzi River (the low density tourism area), for their own security, the security of the wildlife

(anti-poaching) and the security of international borders (illegal migrations and smuggling).

<p><b>STRENGTHS:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Secure land for conservation;</li> <li>●Improve the management of large mammals for habitat conservation;</li> <li>●Stop poaching activities in the protected areas and adjoining private reserves;</li> <li>●Market the image of a different Africa based on peace and cooperation, instead of conflict and divisions.</li> </ul>	<p><b>WEAKNESSES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Associate conservation with security, instead of development;</li> <li>●Do not allow time for implementing pro-active community participation;</li> <li>●Do not involve local communities in anti-poaching activity;</li> <li>●Promote an image of Africa, which does not correspond to reality on the field.</li> </ul>
<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Create a supra-national space for conservation based on cultural heritage;</li> <li>●Use interstitial area to experiment effective alternative NRM practices;</li> <li>●Show that conservation is adjustable to local needs;</li> <li>●Promote Africa at peace with its own past.</li> </ul>	<p><b>THREATS:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Return to protectionist conservation;</li> <li>●Succumb to international lobbies for funding;</li> <li>●Exclude local population from NRM in interstitial areas;</li> <li>●Cause an escalation of inter-class and inter-racial crime which may result into genocide.</li> </ul>

**Table 7.26: SWOT matrix summarizing the potentials and constraints of the GLTFCA (Source: field work and literature review)**

The promotion of ecotourism, furthermore, has been relegated to the last objective, thus confirming the original assumption that community socio-economic development is not a priority. Yet, it also implies that there is no agreement over what can be included in *ecotourism* in interstitial zones where conservation is superseded by sustainable NRM, and controversial activities such as trophy hunting may be practised if ecologically feasible, thus effectively contributing to short-term income generation and power-devolution at the local level.

The impact of the GLTFCA on Pafuri, therefore, must be measured on different scales because of the glocal nature of the mega-park project, to paraphrase Ramutsindela (2004). Firstly there will be a **security impacts**, as the number of animals roaming freely in the Pafuri area will increase. Security, here, is intended both as life-threatening situation and food-security due to the damage animal cause to crops. Secondly, the **economical impact** will show as the current implementation of the GLTFCA impinges on traditional livelihood strategies by:

- 1.preventing the informal sector from benefiting from cross-border movements of goods and people;
- 2.threaten subsistence agriculture by encouraging animal migrations in a fenceless conservation area;
- 3.halt, or at least plummet, the movement of temporary jobseekers.

This will happen without the provision of a valid alternative to the current livelihood system.

Thirdly, the **cultural impact** of the GLTFCA must be taken into account as the planned Park impedes the existing accessibility between borderlands communities. Zimbabwe and Mozambique, moreover, will be most affected as the inter-marriages still constitute a strong bonding practice. The implementation of the Sengwe corridor in itself, whether fenced or unfenced, will impair the communication, and obviously, the wider the strip of land is the more difficult contacts will become.

As currently planned and enforced, the GLTFCA will create a buffer zone along the South African border where security issues are paramount, thus geographically isolating the rainbow nations from its problematic neighbours, whose government have agreed that the prevention of illegal border activities are essential for successful conservation. The borderland, therefore, are set back to frontier zones where states cooperate to increase security, whilst maintaining sovereignty over their own territory. Yet how effective is land demarcation once the barriers have been taken down? And who will coordinate such concerted effort? The answer to the first question resides upon field operators to answer, whereas the second is rhetorical considering the efficiency of South African Police, Defence Force and Intelligence over their Mozambican and Zimbabwean counterpart, particularly as they have been used to patrol borders in war times for over fifty years.

The long arm of South Africa, therefore, began to extend across its own borders by suggesting the GLTFCA's at a time when the first priority for Mozambique was reconstruction, progressed by promoting cross-border security at a time when the main threat was felt in South Africa, and continued through the promotion of free-

trade areas within SADC for private investment and development with a special interest on Mozambique were most private companies are already South African, and tourism thrives because of South African visitor. Whether state sovereignty is maintained or not, more subtle devices have been enforced to transform Mozambique into a South African frontier, thanks to its dependency on foreign aid and investment to boost economic growth and the 'ideology of the blank page'<sup>14</sup> which has characterised FRELIMO's governments and their understanding of the country. By looking at the history of Mozambique, in fact, it can only be agreed with the Hall and Yong (1997) that the initial drive for Marxism-Leninism was associated with the possibility of gaining military and financial support to the armed struggle and the independence government, yet when the support failed to arrive during the wars with Rhodesia and South Africa, FRELIMO resorted to liberism in order to get financial support from the USA and the western international organisations. What is next, by looking at the condescendence shown towards South Africa leadership in the TFCAs project, in the SADC and in the AU, may as well an open border to South Africa economic expansion, whether driven by the government or by the private white farmers disposed by Pres. Mbeki's land redistribution programme.

Finally, it may be argued that the GLTFCA regardless of the type of implementation will have positive spin-offs on local environment and populations, by preventing environmental degradation and create employment opportunities through land concessions to the private sector. The analysis of Dumela, however, show that is the existence of the border which catalyse income-generating opportunities for border communities, not the presence of a conservation area. Furthermore, the impact of local communities on the environment is very low and could be cost-effectively prevented simply by enforcing tree-planting to counteract the use of local wood for fire. However, the used of damaged trees only and the visible health of the close forests on either side of the Limpopo show that the wood-fire does not pose an immediate threat to the local ecosystem, unlike the Massingir

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<sup>14</sup> An expression coined by Geffray and used by Hall & Young 1997, to indicate the adjustability of FRELIMO's ideology to anything that would give them financial support to rule the country (p. 219)

area, where on both sides of the reservoir the only close forests remnants are in non-accessible places. The GLTFCA, therefore, would bring positive spin-offs for the border communities only if able to interact with them, beginning with informative campaigns, proceeding with consultation processes and land demarcation to understand the amount of space each community needs to sustain itself, and continuing by focussing on nature-based tourism, that is tourism based on natural resources who are sustainably used to promote socio-economic development for people whose livelihoods are precarious to say the least. However, since the human problem is only Mozambican and Zimbabwean, it is up to those states to set the right pace for implementation, thus showing to South Africa that transfrontier conservation is not enforced upon lawless frontiers but is negotiated amongst sovereign states.

#### **7.4 MAIN FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

This multi-disciplinary research was driven by three objectives, each referring to a specific sphere affecting Pafuri as the geographic centre of the GLTFCA, with a complicated history of violence, displacement and migration, whose livelihoods are threatened by the implementation of the TFCA, despite general discourses over the need for socio-economic development in rural areas, the end of conservation as an exclusive process, and the role of tourism to address poverty in rural areas. The objectives were:

1. to critically evaluate the impact of recent history into traditional livelihood strategies;
2. to present the political agenda of conservation in South Africa, in the past century, and assess its influence on NRM and socio-economic development;
3. to understand how TF Conservation can effectively transform a border into a frontier and sacrifice community livelihoods to political targets.

The first objective was engaged in two phases. The first phase was the analysis of African history, within the perspective of Political Geographical processes and

definitions of State and Nation, Border and Frontier. The bibliography used was drawn from the timeline of European penetration in Africa, which included an outlook on the European divisions of power, the general history of post-Westphalian Europe, the application of both Political Geographical and Social Theory issues to the evolution of African countries. The second phase was the analysis of papers produced especially in the 1960s and 1970s on the history of the Nguni populations of South Africa, in order to produce an account of the movements which created the current ethnic geography of the GLTFCA, as well as the historical events which marked local livelihood strategies.

The most relevant findings are of course theoretical. Firstly, the interpretation of landmarks (water sources and hills) for border demarcation in European Political Geography led to the creation of African borders which separated clans and ethnic groups, who converge along water points due to the aridity of the environment. Secondly, the use of the expression 'national struggle' is not correct when discussing the fights for independence in Africa as the main drives for rebellion were (1) the injustice perpetrated by racial segregation and (2) the widespread hatred toward the white domination, in the context of an African nationalism. The expression 'independence fight' has been suggested as the movements fought for majority rule and independence from the European mother country, but nationalism was never an issue as post-independence inter-ethnic conflict demonstrated. Thirdly, the presence of a border deeply affects local livelihood strategies, which are funded on both the informal sector and liminal activities such as cross-border movements of people. Fourthly, that borderlands form an independent polity which transcend the countries of affiliation and enter the cultural and traditional sphere, thus presenting a challenge and a threat to the sovereign state.

The second objective was addressed firstly by reviewing available literature on conservation in South Africa against the historical timeline, in order to understand the extent of political influences over conservation strategies. Secondly, primary sources on conservation, TFCA, Peace Parks and NRM strategies was reviewed and

analysed against secondary sources, i.e. critical publications over the role played by governmental and non-governmental institutions in Southern Africa TF conservation. The interviews and conversation with key informants, such as Dr. J. Ferrão, Dr. M. Stalmans, Dr. M. Wishart, Mr. T. Reilly, and Chief Insp. Coetzer, were also used to put critiques and praises into a real-life perspective, which was enforced by field work in Pafuri, the LNP and the KNP.

The main finding was the confirmation that conservation in South Africa is strictly connected to political requirements, regardless of the government in power. By accepting this statement, it was then posited and confirmed that the failure of alternative NRM strategies to conservation, which include community participation for rural socio-economic uplifting and may involve controversial activities such as trophy-hunting, would not be implemented unless politics make a serious commitment towards the eradication of absolute poverty in rural areas.

Finally, the third objective was addressed by bringing together the theories developed and the field research, which showed that (1) the border is a source of livelihood; (2) cross-border cultural bonds are still strong despite the nationalisation; (3) the main reason for cross-border migration is employment; (4) wildlife conservation is seen as a threat not an opportunity. These were combined with conversations over the role played by the local government to pro-actively address social problems with a varied group of people, from journalists, such as Ms. P. Rolletta, to lawyers as Ms. T. Lopez, from experts in social studies such as Ms. S. A. dos Santos and Ms. A. Leão to expatriates such as Ms. N. Turton.

The main finding was that information over the TFCA is not widely available to the public thus implying hidden political agenda, in the hasty implementation of projects which should require careful planning considering the issues at the stake and the sensitive procedures involve, not least people relocation. Consequently, the idea that Mozambique may become a new frontier for South Africa to conquer did not suddenly seem so out of place, considering that socio-economic development which

is paramount in rural Mozambique has been degraded in the list of the GTLP priorities to serve South Africa's key interest of border security.

These findings lead to the multi-disciplinary implications for further research in at least three fields: (1) cultural ethnography and human geography; (2) political geography and TBNRM; (3) TFCA and strategic implementation. The latter, however, should be conceived as project work with an institutional stakeholder in the GLTFCA in order to be taken into consideration in planning.

The first research should begin from the findings on the Congo-Niger Bantu migrations and produce a comprehensive research on the controversial origin of the Shangaan community beginning with the role of Soshangane/Manicusse at the court of Shaka and concluding with the arrest of Gungunhane, his grand-son by the Portuguese army. This research would finally tap onto current disagreement over the migratory path, the settlement areas, and the duality between the Tsonga and the Shangaan which was here resolved as a linguistic issue only. The findings of such research could be used to implement the concept of transnational cultural heritage in the GLTFCA, and the role of Pafuri as a symbol of this heritage.


The second research should work on two levels: (1) a political geographical analysis of the areas currently involved in TFCAs project in Southern Africa; (2) the role assigned to TBNRM at a time when the only politically acceptable NRM is conservation. The findings should converge to discuss the future, if any, of TBNRM in a region where politics only look after the interests of those sectors able to provide more power in the regional and international arena, such as conservation and tourism at the time being. This would in turn allow to discuss various scenarios in which (1) conservation is no longer able to attract international funds; (2) crime and violence on the national and regional scale, escalate to the point of threatening the state's authority, thus taking security issue onto a higher level.

The third research areas should replicate the questionnaire survey, with necessary adjustments, to all the communities along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border so as

to create a consistent database of information and maps to create an accurate human geographical cartography of the areas directly impacted by the Sengwe corridor in Mozambique. This would contribute to draw the attention of decision-makers over the results of creating a fenceless ecological corridor on the doorstep of local communities and, hopefully, promote strategic implementation. If carried out with ORAM, the Mozambican association for rural mutual assistance, this research could lead to land demarcation and the issuing of a land deed, similar to the one held by the Makulekes, which will give local communities national and international negotiating power against possible relocations and threats posed by human-wildlife conflict.

The last research is deemed the most important at this stage, considering the bid opened by the LNP over the concession for private tourism investment inside and along the borders of the park, including Pafuri.

## ATTACHMENT 1: THE SOUTHERN AFRICA TFPs AND TFCAs



Map indicating all the planned and existing TFCAS in Southern Africa (Source ESRI, 2007)<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> <http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc02/pap1244/p1244.htm>

**Map of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park area.**

**Legend:**

- Spot Heights
- Wildlife Relocation Boma
- Places
- Camps
- Airports
- Entrance Gates
- International Boundaries
- Major Rivers
- Railway Line
- Road Network
  - Primary Road
  - Secondary Roads
  - Tertiary Roads
  - Trails
  - G.K.O. Boundary
- North South Extension
  - Application in Process
  - Sable Game Reserve (McMurray & Hemphill)
  - Coramane Dam
  - Game Reserve (Du Panto & Orese)
  - Gaza Game Reserve (Bila)
  - Inyanga Game Park
  - Northern Expansion
  - Open Space
  - Sable Game Park
  - World Investments
  - Water Bodies
  - Built-up Land: Residential
  - National Parks
  - Other Conservation Areas
- International Boundaries
  - Mozambique
  - South Africa
  - Zimbabwe


**Land Cover:**

- Aquatic meadow
- Bare Soil
- Bushland (3m-height<7m)
- Grassland
- Industrial Area
- Irrigated Cultivation
- Lake, lagoon
- Mangrove (locally degraded)
- Meadow, stable to flood
- Medium thick forest (3m-height<7m)
- Open Woodland (covered 40-70%)
- Plantations
- Rainfed Cultivation
- Recreational Area
- Reservoir Dam
- River Banks
- Soil Pans
- Scrub wooded grassland
- Semiarboreal Dwellling Area
- Shrubland (0.8m-height<3m)
- Sparse grassland, stable to flood
- Tall Thicket (height>7m)
- Urbanized Dwellling Area
- Wooded grassland (covered 10-40%)
- Woodland (covered >70%)

**Scale:** 0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers  
Scale 1:800,000

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## ATTACHMENT 3: THE BANTU LANGUAGES IN AFRICA



Map showing the full number and extension of Bantu languages in Africa (Source: [http://www.sil.org/silesr/2002/016/bantu\\_map.htm](http://www.sil.org/silesr/2002/016/bantu_map.htm))

## ATTACHMENT 4: GUTHRIE'S CLASSIFICATION

<b>N40</b>	<b>SENGA-SENA</b>	—	—	—	—
N41	Nsenga	N41	Senga	N40	Nsenga
N42	Kunda	N42	Kunda	N40	Kunda
N43	Nyungwe, Tete	N43	?	N40	Nyungwe
N44	Sena	N44	Sena	N40	Sena
N45	Rue	N45	?	N40	Sena d Rue
N46	Podzo	N46	?	N40	Podzo
<b>P10</b>	<b>MATUMBI</b>	—	—	—	—
P11	Ndengereko	P11	?	P10	Ndengereko
P12	Ruihi, Rufiji	P12	?	P10	Rufiji
P13	Matumbi	P13	?	P10	Matumbi
P14	Ngindo	P14	?	P10	Ngindo
P15	Mbunga	P15	?	P10	Mbunga
<b>P20</b>	<b>YAO</b>	—	—	—	—
P21	Yao	P21	Yao	P20	Yao
P22	Mwera	P22	?	P20	Mwera
P23	Makonde	P23	?	P20	Makonde
P24	Ndonde, [Mawanda]	P24	?	P20	Ndonde
P25	Mabiha, Mavia	P25	?	P20	Maviha
<b>P30</b>	<b>MAKUA</b>	—	—	—	—
P31	Makua, [Makhuwa]	P31	Makwa	P30	Makhuwa
P32	Lomwe, [West Makua]	P32	Lomwe	P30	Lomwe
P33	Ngulu, West Makua	P33	?	P30	Ngulu = Lomwe
P34	Cuabo, Cuambo, [Chuwabo]	P34	?	P30	Chwabo
R23	Kwambi	R23	?	R20	Kwambi
R24	Ngandyera	R24	?	R20	Ngandyera
<b>R30</b>	<b>HERERO</b>	—	—	—	—
R31	Herero	R31	Herero	R30	Herero
<b>R40</b>	<b>YEYE</b>	—	—	—	—
R41	Yeei, Yeye, Kuba	R41	?	R40	Yeye
<b>S10</b>	<b>SHONA</b>	—	—	—	—
S11	Korekore	S11	Korekore	S10	Shona d Korekore
S12	Zezuru	S12	Zezuru	S10	Shona d Zezuru
S13	Manyika	S13	Manyika	S10	Manyika
S13b	[Manyika d] Tebe	—	—	S10	Manyika d Tebe
S14	Karanga	S14	Karanga	S10	Shona d Karanga
S15	Ndau, Sofala	S15	Ndau	S10	Ndau
S16	Kalanga	S16	Kalanga	S10	Kalanga
<b>S20</b>	<b>VENDA</b>	—	—	—	—
S21	Venda	S21	Venda	S20	Venda
<b>S30</b>	<b>SOTHO-TSWANA</b>	—	—	—	—
S31	Tswana	S31	Tswana	S30	Tswana
S31a	[Central Tswana d] Rolong	—	—	S30	Tswana d Rolong
S31a	Rolong	S31a	?	S30	Tswana d Rolong
S31b	[East Tswana d] Kgatla	S31b	?	S30	Tswana d Kgatla
S31c	[North Tswana d] Ngwatu	S31c	?	S30	Tswana d Ngwatu
S31d	Kgalagadi	S31d	Khalagadi	S30	Kgalagadi
S32	North Sotho	S32	?	S30	Sotho (North)
S32a	Pedi	—	—	S30	Pedi = North Sotho
S32b	Lobedu	—	—	S30	Sotho (North) d Lobedu
S33	South Sotho, Suthu	S33	Southern Sotho	S30	Sotho (South)
<b>S40</b>	<b>NGUNI</b>	—	—	—	—
S41	Xhosa	S41	Xhosa	S40	Xhosa
S42	Zulu	S42	Zulu	S40	Zulu
S43a	Swati, Swazi	S43	Swati	S40	Swati
S43b	Ngoni <Malawi>	S45	Ngoni <Malawi>	N10	Ngoni <Malawi>
S44	Ndebele <Zimbabwe>	S44	Ndebele	S40	Ndebele
<b>S50</b>	<b>TSWA-RONGA</b>	—	—	—	—
S51	Tswa	S51	Tswa	S50	Tswa
S52	Gwamba	S52	?	S50	Tsonga d Gwamba
S53	Tsonga	S53	Tsonga	S50	Tsonga
S54	Ronga	S54	Ronga	S50	Ronga
<b>S60</b>	<b>INHAMBANE</b>	—	—	—	—
S61	Copi	S61	?	S60	Chopi
S61	Lenge	—	—	S60	Chopi d Lengue
S62	Tonga, Shengwe	S62	?	S60	Tonga

List of the relevant linguistic groups, mentioned in the research (Maho, 2002)

## ATTACHMENT 5: A LETTER FROM AFRICA

Dear Mr. Westerner,

2005

My name is Potsotso Motchopi and my family and I still live in a mud hut near a great River you call the Okavango.

Many foreigners visit these last years to witness our country and even ask to buy our land, or for concessions to start businesses for tourism or other industry, saying that they will employ many of our young people and pay us money in exchange for long time control of large areas of our land, and over the years we have agreed to forfeit land and we have received money.

But our children and our lives, are no longer our own. Things have changed from our customary ways to that of the white peoples. We are not sure of who we are any longer.

Our children sometimes send money home, but we don't see them any more as we used to. They prefer to live in the cities now, and have forgotten our culture and ways. They have become westernized, and who can blame them for wanting to drive a shiny new car and live in an air-conditioned house of bricks and iron?

But I do not see their happiness as I used to. I do not see them full of life now? I only see them chasing a demon they cannot catch. They are like the white men now.

---

In our tribe, we understand that we need to stay together to survive, and that each person from the very small to the very old, has a purpose in the community, and that each person has to fulfill that purpose for all of us to be able to survive in this harsh place. Now when our young people, with new ideas, come and visit, they think that money can buy that survival, and it can most times, but it cannot buy our culture, and it cant buy our community, or our tribal ways – it only undermines them, just as we have been undermined by the money that has been paid to some within our tribe.

In our village we now have schools that teach western teachings and values, and we have children who disobey their parents just as they do in the wester schools. Our culture is being eaten away from within. We are being cloned to be like the westerner. We wear their clothes and speak their language. We talk of business and profits. We fight over the money. Who are we now?

There are those that say that we are poor, and that they feel sorry for us, and that they want to improve our miserable lives by introducing us to 'profits' and 'returns',

that we now suddenly need to survive. They say that we should 'invest' and save money in the banks for our old age, and when we one day have 'succeeded' that we will be able to buy a Mercedes Benz car. They say that we should strive to do better, to improve ourselves, to uplift us from poverty. This they say is what they are teaching our children and young men.

-----

Have you ever witnessed a monkey in a tree when he eats, and deliberately drops/shares some food to feed the other animals below who can't climb? Have you ever seen how many animals benefit from the death of another? Have you ever seen anything wasted in nature? We know of these things, and we could not survive without this understanding. We are a part of the same whole.

We do not have a dogs dish – we throw our waste/sharing down, and it is cleaned by the dog/jackal/ant and we all rely on each other for this cycle of life.

There are many things that separate our culture from that of the westerner. For instance we don't have a jail. If we have a wayward person, we take him to the Kgotla/meeting place, and explain the delicate fabric of our culture, and the elders and all the people listen and speak of the problem, and administer the adjustment to bring the person back within the group immediately – even if you consider it be harsh, and the value of the system is that everyone knows the truth of who this person is, and he knows that they know, and this knowledge forces him to behave in a manner that will benefit us all again as a community.

If I got a windfall, I would share it with my friend, my mother and others, because we understand that someone else would also share in my time of need, without even knowing me - our spirit is one. We understand the harshness of survival in nature.

-----

And then you brought non-biodegradable shiny 'things' into our life, that entice our children away and pollute our lives, and destroy our environment. We don't understand these things and they are not a part of our lives. We are losing our power base and being belittled, and our fabric is collapsing. Who are we now?

A white friend of mine was describing how in London he would not greet passers by, and how every person would look away or down when passing, and that he does not know any of his neighbors in any direction – he was confused when I asked, "but why do you do that?" He has no real friends and no-one to come to his assistance in a time of need. I sensed a loneliness of spirit in him, a great empty barrenness of his soul.

Who are you then Mr. Westerner?

I have seen that as a species, the westerner has managed to destroy as many natural things as he has managed to develop amazing technological advances. We now have pollution, global warming, weather out of control, rising tides and plagues that frighten, and the World is at war over greed.

Your prisons are overflowing and you have many thieves who care nothing for your life – it is cheaper to shoot you and take your wrist watch, as the cost of the bullet is less. Your legal system allows the criminal to be anonymous, fancy lawyers who can bend the truth, and ‘rights’ that the criminal can hide behind - this encourages the wayward mind to do it all again.

You are rushing around in that mad world of yours like a chicken without a head, and the aim seems only to be self destruction. Your money god seems to be a useless companion who has left you with only a great loneliness.

You plunder others for their resources .... and you call me poor!

I feel great pity for you white man, because all you have is money, and this money god of yours has given you the arrogance to call me poor without the slightest knowledge of who I really am.

I am a rural Africa still living unchanged the way we have for thousands of years, with respect for each other, and the environment. This is our culture. We understand that if you hurt one that you are actually hurting yourself.  
Yours culture seems to be one of dog eat dog.

Yes I live in a mud hut and we have to collect scarce food and water very far away – and when the surroundings no longer support us, we move on to a new area and start again. This is why we move on, and the old area recovers - this is the cycle of life – we are a part of the cycle of life of nature. We don’t plunder resources from far away to sustain ourselves, and pretend that we are living economically. We live off this land.

We have our Gods who protect us, we have our sunshine, land, animal’s and water all free – we are rich and fulfilled.

-----

I sometimes wonder if these 'donations', to better our 'poverty stricken' lives, is not just a way to appease your conscience, or just to give you a hold on us so that you can plunder our resources without conscience, or maybe in desperation you see it as the only legacy you will leave on the world?

Yes there is a poor person – he is the half westernized African who has lost his culture and his way – he needs all our pity and help. He is the poor soul who is many generations away from being able to compete with a long family line of western industrialist on their own playing field.

Can you not have the common decency to leave us as you found us? We don't want your money, we don't want your value system. How can the earth be owned by one at the expense of others – we each have our donkeys and goats and that is our value, as its our food reserve and that is our measure of wealth.

---

There is an interface where we could live with each other – we know what is done is done and it cant be reversed, but if you showed us the common respect we deserve, we would be able to have a place where many people (even your white people) – where all people, could live in harmony as common respect would be our cord. We obviously need to be able to read and write, so that we can interface with the world, but the disregard for our mud huts and bare feet is an extremely arrogant not constructive attitude.

-----

Yes there are obviously times when small isolated communities need assistance to get back on their feet after a natural disaster – but only for the shortest time to get them to get back on their feet. Don't give them what they never had – as you know you don't value what you got for nothing. It better to teach someone to fish than give them food.

On the subject of fishing – you westerners have given us fine gill nets from the goodness of your compassionate hearts. We then decimated the natural environment with your stupidity. We caught all the fish, and bought the trappings of the west, and now that the fish are all gone, we are hungry – please feed us! The poorest man is not without a dollar – but without a life.

A good story I once heard was that a rich industrialist once found a lazy fisherman relaxing under a tree. The rich man asked the fisherman why he was not out there catching more fish as the day was still young. The fisherman replied that he had caught enough fish for the day.

The rich man patiently explained that if the fisherman worked harder, he would catch more fish and then be able to buy a motor for his boat, which would mean that the fisherman could catch more fish and therefore make more money. The fisherman asked..... "and then?"

Well said the rich man, you could buy more boats and employ people to work for you so that you could catch more fish and make more money. .... "And then?" asked the fisherman again. "Then you could relax like me" answered the rich man. The fisherman replied "but I am relaxing already"?

-----

In conclusion, we African together with the Bushmen understand nature, nature understand us, in that everything of creation must not be the same, however it was created to be in co-existence and this should be respected, and if need be it should be protected from being ruined.

We are not interested into the Whiteman's type and style of development that complicate a man's life and threatens the existence of nature and the balance of life. Leave the world and especially Africa to be diverse and distinct.

Maybe you could use your spare money to buy yourself some time, and then you could come learn about who we really are .....

## ATTACHMENT 6: QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

### Questionnaire: Cross-border relations at Crooks Corner - Dumela Dumela, 1st September 2006

#### Section 1. Demographics

1. How many members is your household composed of?

0 - 5		6 - 10		11 - 15		More than 15	
-------	--	--------	--	---------	--	--------------	--

2. Does any member of your household have a passport or an Identity Card?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

3. If yes, how many?

0 - 2		3 - 5		6 - 8		More than 8	
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	-------------	--

4. How many member of your household have completed primary education?

0 - 2		3 - 5		6 - 8		More than 8	
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	-------------	--

5. What are your livelihood sources?

Trade		Remittances		Pension	
Other		Employment		Machamba	

#### Section 2. Cross-border trade

6. Do you trade with foreigners?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

7. If yes, where do they come from?

5. Africa		Zimbabwe		Both		Other	
-----------	--	----------	--	------	--	-------	--

8. How often do you see them?

Once p.m.		Twice p.m.		More often	
-----------	--	------------	--	------------	--

9. What do you buy?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

10. What do you sell?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

### Section 3. Cross-border employment

11. How many of your household members live temporarily abroad?

0 - 2		3 - 5		6 - 8		More than 8	
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	-------------	--

12. How many of your household members live permanently abroad?

0 - 2		3 - 5		6 - 8		More than 8	
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	-------------	--

13. Where did they move to?

S. Africa		Zimbabwe		Other	
-----------	--	----------	--	-------	--

14. What type of employment did they find?

Mining		Farming	
Factory		Other	

15. How often do they come back home?

Once p.m.		Twice p.m.		More often	
-----------	--	------------	--	------------	--

16. How many have never returned?

0 - 2		3 - 5		6 - 8		More than 8	
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	-------------	--

17. How often do they send money back?

Once per semester		Twice per semester		More often		Never	
-------------------	--	--------------------	--	------------	--	-------	--

18. Is the money enough to sustain the family?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

#### Section 4. Cross-border social relationships

19. Have you got relatives across the border?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

20. If yes, where are they?

S. Africa		Zimbabwe		Both	
-----------	--	----------	--	------	--

21. Do you visit them?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

22. If yes, how often?

Every month		Every 3 months		More often		Never	
-------------	--	----------------	--	------------	--	-------	--

23. Do they visit you?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

22. If yes, how often?

Every month		Every 3 months		More often		Never	
-------------	--	----------------	--	------------	--	-------	--

2000  
2001  
2002

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