The Allocation of Asylum Responsibilities in the EU: a Law & Economics Analysis

This dissertation focuses on how the design of the EU asylum allocation system, the system that allocates the EU’s asylum duties to its member states, relates to the development of asylum crises. The current EU asylum allocation system, the Dublin system, has in the literature frequently been blamed as an important factor that contributed to the events that occurred during the 2015/2016 EU Asylum Crisis. In the first part of this dissertation, I use a Law & Economics methodology based on rational choice theory to study how the Dublin system creates behavioural incentives for both asylum seekers and member states and how this relates to the events during the 2015/2016 EU Asylum Crisis. In the second part, I analyse how behavioural incentives for asylum seekers and member states would change if the EU would replace the Dublin system with a so-called (tradable) quota system. By comparing the outcomes of the first and the second part of the dissertation I make some normative recommendations on desirable features for an EU asylum allocation system that provides better incentives for asylum seekers and member states.