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CLEAVAGE POLITICS IN CHANGING TIMES
Political Realignment Processes in Western European Countries

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation fits the political realignment literature and aims to provide further insights into cleavage politics by investigating voting behaviour in the Western European countries' national elections. In particular, the dissertation focuses on the class and value voting patterns and on the change of these patterns in different countries and over the course of time. Peculiar processes affected all Western European party systems: whilst the «traditional» cleavage theory accounts for National and Industrial revolutions, those processes assumed to constitute the «societal modernization» determined changes in electoral competitions that questioned the relevance of individuals' social positions to study electoral preferences. Since the associations between social positions and voting behaviour underpin the so-called political cleavage, the dealignment perspective assumes them to have been eroding since the second half of the XX century. On the other hand, the realignment perspective argues that the cleavage theory still accounts for individuals' vote choices: of the four «traditional» cleavages, this perspective hypothesizes new class voting patterns and alignments between electoral preferences and a new line of conflict, that is based on values. The dissertation provides a theoretical account of the realignment of the class cleavage and a new conceptualization of value voting. Then, class and value voting patterns are explored. The analyses employ *European Social Survey* data and detect general and country-specific patterns. The dissertation adopts a mediation perspective and aims to observe how class voting patterns change when controlling for value orientations. The results are provided with a sensitivity analysis, indeed two versions of the measures computed for value orientations are compared. The findings show that social class continues to affect voting behaviour and that value orientations both mediate this effect and affect electoral preferences.

Keywords: cleavage politics; political sociology; voting behaviour; realignment; class voting.

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INTRODUCTION

The dissertation fits the debate over political dealignment and realignment and aims to provide further insights into cleavage politics in Western Europe in the first two decades of the XXI century. Indeed, since the late Sixties, studies of voting behaviour have been characterized by the debate regarding social positions as key determinants of political preferences. According to modernization theory, during the latter half of the XX century, Western countries underwent economic and social processes that affected every single sphere of people's everyday life. Summed up by the concept of «societal modernization», processes such as deindustrialization and secularization affected the same elements which social identification was previously based on (von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). Social positions and social conflicts have constituted the core of voting behaviour theories since the earliest studies conducted at Columbia University in the Forties and Fifties, and the seminal work by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) which hypothesized the formation and «freezing» of four cleavages in Western European electoral competition. However, a different perspective focused on rational-choice theory and grounded on modernization theory, has become the prevalent approach to the study of voting behaviour since the late Sixties. This approach argues that political behaviours are no longer anchored on social positions and are now much more «volatile» (Evans 2004; Thomassen 2005a; von Schoultz 2017). Such a perspective, known as political dealignment, has resulted in a shift in focus towards more proximal voting determinants than social positions, based on their flexibility in explaining both electoral preferences and the variation of such preferences over time. However, a different perspective, called political realignment, has it that this «thawing» of «frozen» cleavages has generated «a temporary phase of partisan decay, before new alignments between parties and voter are established» (von Schoultz 2017, 31). The redefinition of cleavage theory, which introduces a top-down perspective along with its bottom-up «traditional» formulation, enables the new

alignments detected in Western European countries to be accounted for together with a new line of conflict based on political values, both products of political demand and supply. The current literature argues that of the four «traditional» cleavages, two continue to shape voters' choices: the center-periphery and the social class cleavage. Religion, on the other hand, has weakened as a source of social identity reflected in political conflict, despite being considered a defining element of the new line of conflict. As regards the rural-urban cleavage, this has been significantly reduced following the shift towards a post-industrial society (see Chapter 1). The dissertation focuses on the question of the class cleavage and the long-standing and long-lasting debate concerning that cleavage (see Elff 2009), and on a new «critical juncture» centered on political values. These values are organized in value orientations and are structured in long-standing political ideologies. An economic continuum and two social «worldviews» constitute the Western Europe's political ideological space. The three ideologies in question are: economic conservatism-liberalism; social conservatism-liberalism; and authoritarianism-libertarianism. However, not all values are fully embraced by one of these ideologies: people's evaluations of specific issues may cut across the three ideologies and be framed and debated close to election day, structuring in more proximal political attitudes (see Enyedi 2008). In accounting for value orientations, the realignment perspective assumes that the correlation between social positions and voting behaviour is mediated by the associations between the latter and value orientations (see Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995). Furthermore, the literature defines class divisions as having shifted from their previous strong anchoring to political preferences, to factors structuring value orientations towards issues which may be «matched» by the proposals and stances of the political actors concerned (Evans 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018; Langsæther 2019).

Therefore, the dissertation adopts the perspective of political realignment, which fulfills the passage from «sociology of politics» to «political sociology» as theorized by Sartori (1969), in order to evaluate the links between political preferences, social class and value orientations. The dissertation aims to answer two research questions: do social class and political values affect voting behaviour in Western European general elections? And how do the patterns of social

class and value voting change in different countries and over the course of time? According to the hypothesized relationships between social class and value orientations, the first research question also pertains to the assessment of how political ideologies and attitudes, which value divides ground on, mediate class voting.

The dissertation offers a full analysis of the associations between the variables at stake. Those variables are: the party a person voted for in the most recent general election, and an individual's social positions, political ideologies and political attitudes.

Chapter 1 summarizes the main approaches to the study of political preferences, and looks at the ongoing debate concerning political dealignment and realignment, accounting for the hypotheses concerning the de- and re-structuration of the associations between people's social positions and their political preferences. The dissertation is framed from a political realignment perspective, and Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical chapters. It also provides a new conceptualization of value voting divides, based on political ideologies, and linking social class and voting behaviour. Subsequently, three empirical chapters explore cleavage voting patterns. The focus on political cleavages limits the analyses to Western European countries. Furthermore, use of the nine rounds of *European Social Survey* data constrains the analyses to the first two decades of the XXI century. The *ESS* data provide information about political preferences and socio-cultural, economic and political opinions pertaining to a substantial number of Western European general elections.

Chapter 2 provides an assessment of the general patterns of class and value voting in Western European countries, by aggregating the data for the twelve countries concerned with regard to all *ESS* rounds and the general elections held in those countries. The analyses are based on individual probability models centered on political demand, and investigate which parties constituting Western European political supply are perceived by voters as reflecting to their own demands according to their social class and value orientations. The results enable us to assess class voting patterns and their mediation by value divides.

Since the specific patterns and their variations can only be accounted for by focusing on individual general elections (see Thomassen 2005a), Chapter 3 aims to detect the differences between differing political contexts and over time, by conducting comparative individual analyses for each general election held over the time span covered by the data in four different countries: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. The chapter thus focuses on the contextual differences between the countries concerned and over time within each country, and offer answers to the second research question. Particular attention is paid to a specific event common to Western democracies, namely the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008, and that resulted in the rise of «anti-establishment» parties and increasing distrust of political institutions among the most deprived strata of society (*e.g.* Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). The cases analyzed in the chapter, were chosen on the basis of the welfare state institutional factor, which is strongly linked to social stratification and to different classes' degree of political mobilization (Oesch 2006a; Rennwald 2020).

Chapter 4 provides a sensitivity analysis for what concerns the patterns and mediating role of value divides. Indeed, the nine *ESS* rounds share only a specific set of items, through which measures of political ideologies and attitudes are computed. According to the comparative focus of the analyses, this prevents the inclusion of rotating modules items. Rounds 4 and 8 include a broader range of items, with a specific focus on people's opinions of economic issues, for which only one variable is present in all rounds. Indeed, the accuracy of the measurements computed in order to assess ideologies and attitudes, relies on the availability of items, and this is a commonly-found issue when dealing with cross-country datasets (Dalton 2018) such as the *ESS*. Therefore, the chapter examines if more accurate measures of political ideologies and attitudes provide stronger mediations of the associations between social classes and vote choices. The results are then compared with those obtained in Chapters 2 and 3.

The concluding section summarizes the results and the main findings of the four chapters, and offers an answer to the aforementioned research questions.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL DEALIGNMENT AND POLITICAL REALIGNMENT: THE ONGOING DEBATE IN CLEAVAGE POLITICS

1.1. Introduction

Voting behaviour constitutes a research topic around which a bulk of theories and models developed. Literature usually assumes it as segmented in three «families»: social-psychological, economic and sociological. Yet, a proliferation of different analytical models and conceptualizations of their factors within each family is observed. Furthermore, the classification reveals improper with respect to three points. Firstly, the three families define according to the social behaviour paradigm, not according to a specific discipline (Evans 2004). Then, a significant number of authors lack explicit reference to a «family», even when they apply principles and/or methodologies that the literature ascribes to one of those. Finally, the three «schools» do not always provide researchers with accurate operational definitions of their alleged core concepts (Visser 1998). The chapter introduces voting behaviour studies based on their underpinning social behaviour paradigm: the focus remains on the voters, what differs, however, is how they are conceived (Carmines, Huckfeldt 1996). Indeed, the developments in electoral studies are strictly tied to developments in social theory. Such a connection is accounted for in the chapter, since the assumptions within electoral studies pertain to recalls and critiques of previous approaches[1] (Evans 2004, 20).

[1] Sometimes, these assumptions can also affect the territorial applicability of the theory. For example, the concept of «partisanship» (developed in the inter-war and post-Second World War United States context) does not have the same performance in other countries (Evans 2004). Other scholars hypothesize the same for cleavage theory

After a brief introduction of the first analytical endeavours by Columbia University and Michigan school, the focus shifts to the ongoing debate between cleavage politics and rational-choice models: whereas the former introduces historical and country-specific elements in the analysis of the associations between social positions and political preferences, the latter postulate the erosion of such anchoring. However, some of the literature hypothesizes that dealignment processes may be followed by realignment ones (von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). Both perspectives are debated, stressing how realignment view provides analytical and empirical insights by accounting for the ongoing prominence of socio-structural factors in explaining political behaviours. Despite the erosion of «traditional» alignments between these factors and political preferences, new patterns are detected, some of which are based on the same determinants, but some of which are based on new ones. Among these, political values found their place in voting behaviour literature: the chapter provides a discussion of their role and proposes a new conceptualization.

1.2. Defining voting behaviour

After the first studies focused on demographic factors at the beginning of the XX century, «psephology» (the study of voting) experienced a strong development with «the advent of the first public opinion polls», focused on the individual voter, in the Thirties (Visser 1998, 7). Furthermore, since voting constitutes a specific type of political behaviours[2], the so-called «behavioural persuasion» among social sciences in the Fifties contributes to its development (Visser 1998; Arzheimer, Evans 2008). Focusing on individual decisions which affect

outside Western Europe (von Schoultz 2017). These points are delved into in the next sections.

[2] Political behaviours are broadly defined as «concerned with the relation between citizens and their governments» (Visser 1998, 7).

other people, voting behaviour pertains to turnout, *i.e.* «why» people vote, and vote choice, *i.e.* «how» people vote (Evans 2004; Arzheimer, Evans, Lewis-Beck 2017). Its study is focused on motivations and determinants behind both the choices to vote or not to vote, and to prefer a certain party or candidate among the others (Arzheimer, Evans, Lewis-Beck 2017). Theories and models look for individual and/or collective elements able to explain differences and to provide regularities (Visser 1998; Evans 2004). Therefore, the various approaches focus on social behaviour paradigms, such as in the study of other kinds of behaviours. However, voting differs from the behavours people do in everyday life, according to its «discontinuous» nature (Visser 1998) and the impossibility to withdraw from the system for the ones who lose[3] (Evans 2004).

1.3. The first approaches: from structuralism to cognitivism

According to the literature, voting behaviour is affected by long- and short-term determinants, which are reconciliated in the voting booth by the voters themselves making their personal choice (Arzheimer, Evans, Lewis-Beck 2017). The focus on one or both of the two sets of factors, alongside the social paradigm adopted, characterizes the first attempts to study this topic. The first features of these approaches become prominent since the further developments follow two directions, aiming either to overcome the critical issues of the previous proposals, or to deepen and improve their analytical perspective (Arzheimer, Falter 2008). The first studies focusing on individual voters were published by

[3] In democratic systems, indeed, the decision of the majority of the population is imposed to the whole citizenship. Therefore, people who do not vote or do vote losing parties are forced to accept its decision (Evans 2004).

Columbia University in the Forties and Fifties[4]. Accordingly, the first direction relates to paradigm shifts from such studies to both the Michigan school and rational-choice models. The second direction, instead, refers to cleavage theory.

Reacting to wide-spreading behaviourism, the theoretical assumptions of the Columbia University studies ground on structural-functionalism and political communication theory, merging the analysis of individuals with the ones of the context in which individuals find (Visser 1998; Evans 2004). This set of assumptions hypothesizes final decisions as the result of the interaction (over time) between inner factors, relating to attitudes developed within the individual, and outer ones, concerning the influences from the social environment. Accordingly, people are understood to have sets of attitudes towards the political sphere which can strengthen or change according to external influences[5]. Despite the interest in the role of communications and mass media, in the three main studies published by Columbia University, socio-structural factors prove to be the most influential for political preferences. The main results are threefold (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Mcphee 1954): vote choice differences are due to social differentiation affecting policy interests, mainly religion, area of residence and socio-economic

[4] The main three works pertaining to Columbia University are: *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet 1944), *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Mcphee 1954) and *Personal Influence* (Katz, Lazarsfeld 1955).

[5] In *The People's Choice*. *How the Voter Makes up his mind in a Presidential Campaign* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet 1944), the authors develop for the first time a micro-model to study voting behaviour, focusing on the 1940 United States presidential election. A sample of Erie County (Ohio), has been interviewed seven times during the electoral campaign, employing a panel strategy. Such a study has been replicated for 1948 election, interviewing a sample in Elmira (New York). The resulting second work, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Mcphee 1954), aimed to integrate the previous findings, focusing more on preference formation and less on the exposure to electoral campaign and mass media (Visser 1998; Evans 2004).

status[6] («differentiation»); social groups of belonging, which constitute the social environment of embeddedness, act as political socialization agents, transmitting political values, which lead to the formation of attitudes affecting actual behaviours, from generation to generation («transmission»); social and physical proximity among members of a group preserves and reinforces the homogeneity of attitudes and values tied to electoral behaviours, in order to avoid the development of cross-pressures due to individuals' embeddedness in more than one group («contact»). Since political preferences are socially determined, individuals are mobilized by the social belongings and the context of embeddedness, *i.e.* they vote more for their group than for candidates and parties, and selectively use new information to reinforce rather than challenge previous opinions[7] (*ibidem*). Accordingly, voting behaviour emerges as a social calculus (Beck *et al.* 2002): being embedded in a social context (a non-neutral source of political information), constituted by social groups within which individuals interact and specific political discourses circulate, leads to a process of (imperfect) behavioural homogenization inside social groups, and among social groups themselves depending on the interaction between groups themselves. Indeed, besides the socialization process, the influence of the larger community reinforces a specific position over the alternatives when the elector's closest primary groups are not in agreement[8] («breakage effect» [Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954]).

[6] These three factors are then combined by the authors to construct the Index of Political Predisposition, based on the associations between political preferences and social groups of belonging (Arzheimer, Falter 2008; Antunes 2010; Hutchings, Jefferson 2018).

[7] These elements are further developed by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) in their analysis of the two-step flow of communication process, a tool for socialization focused on the reception of messages from mass media. It is also connected to «reactivation», according to which the social relationships within the very social group strengthen the tendency to the specific electoral position (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954).

[8] Social attributes do not translate in a deterministic way to a set of preferences, but «they locate individuals in social structures and hence affect exposure to political

Accordingly, such a perspective focuses on how social structures affect political behaviours and political systems, without accounting for how political systems, alongside socio-cultural and economic processes, can also impose on social structures. This relates to what Sartori (1969) defines «sociology of politics» (Evans 2004; Arzheimer, Falter 2008). The associations between social positions and vote choice are hypothesized to keep stable from election to election, and the account of the actions of parties and candidates to mobilize voters is missed.

In criticism of structuralist approaches for the inability of socio-structural factors to explain electoral «volatility»[9], the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan proposed a formalized model of voting behaviour which pays more attention to the «political objects of orientation, such as the candidates and issues, which do shift in the short term» (Campbell *et al.* 1960, 17). The central concept of such an approach is partisanship and its theoretical assumptions ground on reference group theory (Hyman 1942) and field theory (Lewin 1951): the first hypothesizes that social groups of belonging affect individuals' judgments and assessments, underpinning the empirical focus on both socio-structural factors and a psychological determinant, *i.e.* partisanship[10]; according

information» (Carmines, Huckfeldt 1996, 228). This structuralist element is associated to a functionalist one: the existence of different groups ensures the plurality of ideas and proposals, vital for democracy (Bartels 2010; Antunes 2010). Furthermore, social contexts are unavoidable sources of political stimuli, affecting political behaviours by supplementing the individual calculus with a social one (Huckfeldt 1980; Beck *et al.* 2002). The context influence is accounted for by the complementarity of two models, based on the interactions within and between social groups and on a behavioural contagion («bandwagon» effect [Huckfeldt 1983]).

[9] The inductive approach of Columbia University has been criticized too: a theory for political preferences has been structured by generalizing the results of a survey focused on a single county (Evans 2004).

[10] Partisanship is defined as a relatively stable positive or negative affective orientation towards a political party, resulting in a social identification (Campbell *et al.* 1960). Such a concept is employed «to characterize the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment» (*ibidem*, 121).

to field theory, the final behaviour is explained investigating the closest elements in temporal terms and their connection to more distal ones. As a result, the final form of the Michigan model refers to a funnel of causality, in which partisanship is a long-term factor, affecting shorter-term assessments of candidates and issues and affected by individuals' socio-structural background. This latter includes reference groups, social contexts and past experiences, which shape the socialization process and provide people with a «psychological predisposition towards a certain party» (Evans 2004, 25). Such a predisposition acts as a perceptual filter, defining attitudinal forces towards (or assessments of) the different objects constituting the political field[11] (*e.g.* parties, candidates, issues [Visser 1998]). Indeed, within the funnel, which is a metaphor of the causal time chain bringing to vote choice (Campbell *et al.* 1960), long-term factors concern socio-structural elements and values, whereas short-term factors pertain to evaluations of issues and candidates, group benefits, electoral campaign, government actions and the influence of friends. Partisanship constitutes a mediator, overcoming the direct association between social background and political behaviours theorized by Columbia University[12] (Visser 1998). Indeed, it affects more proximal attitudes, which when taken into consideration accounts for electoral «volatility» and behaviours of «disloyalty» to the party of identification: in circumstances such as scandals, crisis and inconsistencies between party proposals and voter's expectations, the «filtering» role of partisanship may be not enough (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Evans 2004; Antunes 2010; Hutchings, Jefferson 2018). In such cases, the behaviour deviates from the predisposition to «normal vote» (Converse 1966).

[11] Partisanship helps in «reading» electoral campaigns, devaluing what is unfavourable and valuing what is favourable for the closest party (Arzheimer, Evans 2008; Antunes 2010). Indeed, forming opinions about actual proposals needs for an amount of knowledge which most of the people lack (Campbell *et al.* 1960)

[12] Changes in party identification would be due to changes in individuals' social background. According to Campbell *et al.* (1960), such changes are infrequent, since they are the result of either significant socio-economic processes and events or mutations in individual characteristics.

Therefore, the selection of policy positions and candidates by parties may result in a loss of voters (Converse 1966; Evans 2004)[13].

Despite Michigan school's purpose to overcome the limitations of the Columbia University approach, the voting determinants considered do not differ substantially between the two, and the same focus on motivations and cognitive aspects of action is provided. Furthermore, partisanship is shown to be not stable over time and studies in the Seventies and Eighties identify a mutual influence between short-term factors and party identification[14] (Visser 1998; Antunes 2010). Accordingly, a focus shift to the conscious elements of vote choice, identified by proximal determinants, occurred, based on the application of rational-choice theory to political decision-making processes. Initially theorized (without engaging in empirical studies) in the Fifties by Downs (1957), so-called economic approaches developed in the Seventies, in opposition to previous «deterministic» proposals (Evans 2004). Adopting the market analogy, voters actively exchange their votes (necessary for parties/candidates to gain political power) for the realization of specific political goals, aiming to maximize their utility function. Therefore, they rationally[15] weigh between the cost of voting and the expected gains, trying to maximize the difference in deciding on which party to

[13] Among Michigan school scholars, Key (1955) analyzes elections focusing on the relationship between political supply and demand. When abrupt changes occur in the structure of the party system, in their main ideologies, issues and leaders, and even in the electoral bases of voting, the specific election is called «critical» or «realigning».

[14] Partisanship seems to just reflects vote choice in those electoral context which do not show a bi-partisan feature (differently from United States) but are characterized by fluid or fractionated party systems (Visser 1998; Thomassen 2005a). Furthermore, partisanship resulted to weaken together with the hypothesized increasing distrust towards political institutions and actors over generations and after the end of the II World War (Nie, Verba, Petrocik 1976, 62-65).

[15] The concept of rationality pertains to actors' means, not to their ends. They are assumed to define specific choices as appropriate to reach prefixed goals using «the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output» (Downs 1957, 5).

invest their trust (Evans 2004; Arzheimer, Falter 2008; Antunes 2010). Parties locate themselves on political issues according to the expected gains in terms of votes, whereas voters evaluate the options constituting the political supply assuming that parties behave in a consistent and reliable way over time[16]. Parties' positioning and voters' perceptions ground on a cognitive shortcut, *i.e.* the ideological continuum left-right[17] (Downs 1957). Besides the rationality of both voters and parties, the democratic system in which they act is characterized by a certain degree of both trustworthiness, enabling to foresee the aftermath of choices pertaining either to political preferences or to the positions on political issues, and uncertainty, according to the cost of information (Downs 1957; Evans 2004; Antunes 2010). These assumptions underpin the spatial model developed by Enelow and Hinich (1982; 1984): «reasoning» electors try to maximize their utility function by choosing the «closest» (the «least distant») party to their «ideal point»[18]. However, in multi-party systems voters do not always give their vote to the party whose policy proposals they consider the most beneficial for themselves. Indeed, if the most beneficial party has a small vote share, they may prefer their second or even third preference, aiming to hinder the win of an undesired actor (Downs 1957; Evans 2004; Antunes 2010; Dowding 2018).

[16] Incumbents are assessed through their previous actions, assuming a continuity with their past policies, while other parties are evaluated according to their supposed performances (Downs 1957; Antunes 2010).

[17] Downs (1957, 96) defines «an *ideology* as a verbal image of the good and of the chief means of constructing such a society». This dimension is defined as a «super-issue» (Enelow, Hinich 1982), according to the idea that the position on the continuum summarizes issues and conflicts that structure the political competition (Dalton 2008), even for those not yet arisen (Dowding 2018). Aiming to attract as many voters as possible, parties locate on such a continuum, converging to the so-called median voter (Evans 2004; Dowding 2018).

[18] Rational-choice models also apply to policies and issues and include Voting Popularity-function, focused on incumbent party's performance. Issues are defined as concerns towards topics on which the decisions of the government matter (Evans 2004).

Contrary to structuralist approaches, rational-choice approaches are based on cognitivism, which spread in the Sixties and assumes people «as information-processing devices, receiving input from their environment (perception), processing the input (thinking), and converting it into output (action, decision)» (Visser 1998, 48). Grounding on this paradigm, these approaches invoke the decreasing prominence of socio-structural factors to explain voting behaviour. Such a perspective is also referred to as political dealignment and contested by the political realignment view. The next two sections introduce both theoretical positions. However, beforehand, the critical issues of rational-choice approaches must also be stressed. These pertain to the lack of realism and the limitation in the theoretical scope. Indeed, the so-called *homo economicus* theory of action is characterized by a simplification of the empirical reality, through narrow assumptions coming from neo-classical economy[19] (Kriesi 2005). It assumes the formation of the political position preference set and the shortcut as exogenous (Arzheimer, Falter 2008). Accordingly, these approaches cannot explain actions which either are not grounded on cost-benefit analysis or do not aim towards a specific goal, such as value-oriented, altruistic and low cost (habitual, ritualized, traditional) behaviours. Indeed, these approaches assume behaviours independent from the constraints of historical, social and cultural processes, *i.e.* the social reality surrounding voters[20] (Kriesi 2005).

[19] Kriesi (2005) highlights that not all parties redefines aiming to attract the median voter and stresses the prominence of an accurate definition of the dimensionality of the political issue-space. Furthermore, the author states that the predictions of such models are more reliable in two-party systems.

[20] It must be stressed that most of these factors were not considered even by early structuralist studies (Thomassen 2005a).

1.4. Political dealignment

Rational-based perspective is based on modernization theory, according to which the alignments theorized by structuralist studies have been eroding in affluent Western democracies since the development of new economic (*e.g.* deindustrialization, service sector's growth) and social (*e.g.* movements for fair rights, secularization) processes in the second half of the XX century (Thomassen 2005a; Kriesi 2005; Elff 2007; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). Summed up in the concept of «societal modernization», these processes are assumed to be tied to «cognitive mobilization» and its focus on cognitive abilities of rational people, and to affect the same elements on which social identification was previously based. According to «cognitive mobilization», voters become more individualized and independent from «political cues provided by social groups», because of the «rising level of education and the spread of mass media» (Elff 2007, 284). Indeed, rational-choice models focus on the shift from the concept of party identification to shorter-term factors, due to the criticisms ascribed to the Michigan one, assuming a more educated and politically aware electorate (Nie, Verba, Petrocik 1976; Evans 2004). Yet, «cognitive mobilization» alone is not sufficient to determine political dealignment: the weakening of groups' collective identities is necessary to upset social conflicts' side, on which party competition grounds (Elff 2007). As a consequence of «societal modernization», political behaviours were hypothesized to lose their strong anchoring on socio-structural positions and to become increasingly «volatile», towards a society constituted by individualized and political sophisticated voters (Evans 2004; Thomassen 2005a, 2005b; von Schoultz 2017). These elements define political dealignment, «according to which parties to a lesser extent than before are understood as representatives of clearly outlined social groups» (von Schoultz 2017, 31), and determine a focus shift to proximal determinants, because of their flexibility, *i.e.* their ability to account for different reaction to the same situation according to the cognitive shortcut adopted to process the stimulus and the context providing it (Visser, 1998). As such, proximal determinants are more suitable to explain both the political preferences and their variation over time of

informed, competent and instrumentally-oriented voters. These are assumed to structure their choice from election to election, independently from «traditional» sources. This is referred to as «individualization of politics» (Thomassen 2005a; 2005b), becoming more relevant in voting behaviour literature since the early Two-Thousands and since the onset of the financial crisis in European countries in 2008 (see Bellucci, Lobo, Lewis-Beck 2012).

> «At the turn of the century, flux rather than stability seems to characterize politics in the well-established democracies of Western Europe. […] The changes that have occurred in advanced industrial democracies are usually summarized as the *process of societal modernization*. […] Economic development, the growing size and diversity of the mass media, the enormous rise of the average level of education, the development of the welfare state, the growing importance of the service sector, and increasing geographical and social mobility have led to changes at the level of individual citizens which in turn might be indicated as *individual modernization*.» (Thomassen 2005a, 4-6)

Furthermore, in employing shortcut, party identification is considered less effective than cognitive ones, according to the theorized decreased cost of information and increased sophistication of voters (Thomassen 2005a; 2005b).

The literature agrees in stating that the «societal modernization» processes weakened the «traditional» associations between social positions and party preferences. Yet, despite such perspective, the political actors which shaped these alignments still exist and gain votes (Thomassen 2005b; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). According to the alternative perspective, *i.e.* political realignment, this means that they appeal to electoral bases which may be different than before, defined by either the same social factors, following new patterns[21], or completely new factors. Furthermore, the hypothesized political sophistication of voters is questioned: indeed, most of the people seem unable «to make any specific inferences with regards to parties' or candidates' policy positions» (Elff 2018, 139). The next section introduces realignment perspective and its assumptions, and discusses the core topic of debate between political dealignment and realignment, *i.e.* cleavage voting.

[21] Partisanship seems to suffer a more general decrease trend, without realignment chances (Thomassen 2005b; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020).

1.5. Cleavage theory and political realignment

Adopting a functionalist-structuralist paradigm, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) delve into the associations between people's social positions and their political preferences previously observed by Columbia University, introducing historical and country-specific elements to account for the structuration of these alignments[22]. In their seminal comparative study of Western Europe, they theorize four social conflicts («critical junctures»): two originating in National Revolution, concerning the center-periphery model (central-dominant vs. territorial cultures) and state-church conflicts (nation-state secularization process vs. Church historical privileges), due to the nation-state's standardization and secularization thrusts[23]; two originating in Industrial Revolution, focused on the allocation of resources, production and economic benefits and concerning rural-urban opposition between economic development models (secondary vs. primary sectors' economic interests, *i.e.* landowners vs. industrial entrepreneurs) and capital-labour (owners vs. workers) conflicts. These four divisions structure countries' political supply, which reflects the set of conflicts at the time of suffrage extension. However, the importance of cleavages differs from country to country depending on the historical and contextual characteristics of these two revolutions. Indeed, party systems are made up of alternatives offering packages of issues, commitments and values («worldviews») which mobilize social groups by leveraging on their socio-cultural and economic interests[24] (Lipset, Rokkan 1967;

[22] Taking their cue from the structural-functionalist A-G-I-L schema, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) centered their analysis on interchanges between the four focuses of action. Among these, conflicts arise, and their institutionalization in social and political spheres occurs.

[23] Center-periphery and state-church conflicts pertain, respectively, to the regional oppositions to the dominant national established élites (mainly in terms of identity) and to the «conceptions of moral right and interpretations of history and human destiny» (Lipset, Rokkan 1967, 11-12).

[24] According to political sociological perspective, groups in society compete for scarce economic and socio-cultural resources (Evans 2004).

Knutsen, Scarborugh 1995; Oskarson 2005; Arzhemeier, Falter 2008; Antunes 2010; von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018). Once these social divisions institutionalize in the political and party system, such social cleavages turn into political cleavages.

> «It was the work of parties, with the advent of adult suffrage, to translate group conflicts into political oppositions—by crystallizing and articulating conflicting interests, constructing political alliances, creating organizational networks, and devising electoral strategies.» (Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995, 493)

Although the two authors do not provide a definition of such a concept, the literature agrees upon considering political cleavages to be constituted by three intertwined elements: first, a structural base, according to individuals' social characteristics (*e.g.* class, religion, or other social indicators), which defines specific social groups (hypothesizing a low rate of social mobility) and their opposing interests; a strong link between the individual and his/her social group (intended as a social identification or consciousness feeling by some scholars), whose members are socialized to (and therefore share) the same value orientations; third, the institutionalization of the social division in the interactions both between individuals and organizations, which may have different forms, most commonly political parties, that mobilize support by appealing to «worldviews» common to some social groups and turn the opposition in a democratic frame[25] (Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995; Evans 2004; Antunes 2010; von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). The «freezing hypothesis» complements the theorization of political competition and its patterns:

> «*the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s*. This is a crucial characteristic of Western competitive politics in the age of 'high mass consumption': *the*

[25] Political parties transform social divisions in political cleavages «by giving coherence and organized political expression to what are otherwise inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values, and experiences among members of some social group or some cluster of groups» (Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995, 494). Therefore, they translate conflicts of interests in a democratic frame (Lipset 1981), which constitutes «a means to resolve competing social interests, and Lipset and Rokkan tracked these interests back to the social structure» (Dalton 2018, 10).

> *party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates*. To most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part of the political landscape […] at least since they were first faced with the choice between alternative 'packages' on election day.» (Lipset, Rokkan 1967, 50)

The attention paid to the economic and socio-cultural value orientations transferred by social groups, which define their needs and interests, pertains to structural-functionalism and refers to the concepts of political culture and political socialization. In the same period and adopting the same paradigm of cleavage theory, Almond and Verba (1963) provide a comparative study of political culture, introducing historical and country-specific elements to investigate the differences in socialization processes and the following interiorization of political values. The authors define the concept of political culture as the patterns of individuals' political orientations or attitudes (of cognitive, evaluative or affective content) towards political objects (the political system, the political actions, the policy output and the «self» as political actor) in which a political system (structures and processes) is embedded, either in a congruent or incongruent way[26]. However, structural-functionalism is «unidirectional» and does not account for changing processes: social structures (consequences of historical processes) affect attitudes and behaviours through socialization and are «frozen». To overcome these issues, interpretative paradigms developed in the late Sixties and Seventies (Baert 1998). Their focus on an everyday life dimension and socially shared sets of values, constituting the significances which shape a culture[27], accounts for production, reproduction and change of such significances.

[26] It should be stressed that Almond and Verba (1963) conceive the political culture developed in Anglo-Saxon countries as the best one for democratic systems. As a consequence, the main critics moved to the work of the two authors focus on the need of a neutral concept of political culture, which should also encompasses the differences arising among social groups in the same country. Indeed, the two authors assume such differences as deviations from the dominant process of political socialization, which is intended to reproduce a dominant political culture over time (Caciagli 2017).

[27] Culture is conceived as a «tool kit» to orientate in the social world constituted by significances. These latter are defined by a socially shared set of «taken for granted»

Furthermore, these paradigms do not overlook the mutual influence of both institutions/élites and individual actors in forming, preserving, modifying and transferring cultural significances (see Griswold 1994): the role of agency gains prominence along with social structures. Referring to the insights provided by this paradigm shift, political sociology defines political culture as a system of values or «common sense» specifically focused on politics, whose elements are acquired through political socialization, *i.e.* the process of learning and internalization of a lens of political understanding. This lens pertains to beliefs about the ideal organization of political power and the world at large, structured in ideologies or «worldviews» which define and give meaning to people's political behaviours (Glasberg, Shannon 2011; Neundorf, Smets 2017). Political and non-political sources intervene during childhood, adolescence and adulthood, either keeping constant or modifying individuals' «common sense» according to the role played by social positions, political élites and processes in social, economic and political spheres (Neundorf, Smets 2017). Indeed, a third element of «societal modernization» concerns the changes in the composition of social groups and the process of value change[28]. Factors like new models of economic development and labour market (*e.g.* deindustrialization and growth of service sector), demographic processes (*e.g.* immigration and population aging), social processes (*e.g.* secularization and heterogenization of life experiences) and new

beliefs, norms and values (cultural elements), which provides expectations in social situations and assumes a normative dimension. Such a set is defined «common sense» and is produced, reproduced and even questioned in everyday life actions and interactions (see Jedlowski, Leccardi 2003).

[28] According to Inglehart (1971; 1977), modernization process, constituted by technological and economic developments after the end of the II World War, affected the set of values people are socialized to, creating a generation gap between the ones who spent their childhood before and after it. Once everyday life became less attached to material survival in affluent Western societies, values focused on free self-expression, life quality and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction gained importance. Such a value shift («silent revolution») is conceived by the author as a passage from materialistic to post-materialistic orientations.

protest movements (which introduce up-to-date elements in the public debate) determine a weaker attachment to social groups, the erosion in quantitative terms of some groups, and the resolution of the main social conflicts characterizing the modernity in its first phase (Kriesi 1998, 2010; Elff 2007; von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). The effect of social positions on political behaviours is assumed as weakening, and electoral «volatility» is observed as increasing over time, paving the way for the shift to short-term variables and rational-choice models (Evans 2004; Thomassen 2005a; Dalton 2018). Therefore, «cognitive mobilization», changes in social groups' composition and changes in socialization processes, spreading in affluent Western democracies since the late Sixties, contributed to electoral dealignment. However, realignment perspective hypothesizes that the same processes which «thaw» cleavages generate «a temporary phase of partisan decay, before new alignments between parties and voter are established» (von Schoultz 2017, 31), grounding on both the same social positions and new social factors.

Accordingly, cleavage theory is redefined to encompass the reorganization of party competition, accounting for processes in both political supply and demand. A top-down perspective is considered along and interacting with the bottom-up of its first formulation, recognizing political élites' agency (Mair *et al.* 1999; Enyedi 2008) in shaping social divisions. Indeed, political supply's actors offer different interpretations of political issues, influencing voters' choices and structuring/restructuring the connections between social positions, political values and party preferences (Enyedi 2005; von Schoultz 2017; Evans, der Graaf 2013; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020; Rennwald 2020). The actions of voters do not occur in isolation from what occurs in the political supply (Enyedi 2005; von Schoultz 2017). Realignment perspective accounts for both the redefinition of «traditional» cleavages and the «birth» of new lines of conflicts, which cut across the old divisions and restructure the basis of political competition. Indeed, the intertwined «societal modernization» and party systems' processes transform the Western European electoral competition in the Seventies and the Eighties, generating the conditions for new conflicts and mobilization chances (Enyedi 2008; Ford, Jennings 2020).

> «But there is another possibility, raised by Lipset & Rokkan's (1967) original analysis but neglected by many of the researchers focused on freezing and thawing—that cleavage structures could change organically, with new divides emerging as others fade away. A decline of traditional cleavages need not produce an open, unstructured politics but could instead result in the reorganization of party competition around new structural cleavages, as new divides open up in society and are mobilized and organized either by new parties or by major realignments in the support of existing parties.» (Ford, Jennings 2020, 298)

The redefinition or waning of the four «traditional» cleavages is now discussed, analyzing their current role in structuring political competition. Then, the chapter introduces the new line of conflict theorized by several authors.

1.6. Cleavage politics in changing times

Among «societal modernization» processes, secularization[29] is hypothesized to have spread in Western democracies, eroding the prominence of religion in structuring everyday life and therefore «thawing» religious cleavage (von Schoultz 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018). Yet, such a picture is not empirically observed (see Elff 2007), needing a more fine-grained discussion. The first period of secularization, occurred during nation-building, generated a conflict between religious and secular voters. Right-wing parties, confessionally-denominated or conservative actors, usually used to leverage religious issues, mobilizing religion-based groups (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Despite dealignment theory assuming that religiosity is weakened and parties have been redefined as «catch-all» actors (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017; Dalton 2018), other scholars state that its

[29] Secularization is defined as «a systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs» (Norris, Inglehart 2011, 5) and their role in structuring everyday life and political behaviours. It concerns the weakening of group ties due to increasing social mobility, the lack of religion imposition by most governments, and the heterogeneity of belief systems within a single faith (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Furthermore, the expansion of social welfare replaced the social role and the social security measures of churches (Elff, Roßteutscher 2011).

historical legacy still shapes people's «worldviews» and defines cultural zones, both consciously and unconsciously (Norris, Inglehart, 2011). Furthermore, since this process refers to affluent Western societies, non-Western countries constitute emigration basins where religiosity is far from vanishing. Alongside freedom and pluralism granted by governments, this lead to two directions: an increase in religiosity feeling towards non-Christian faiths; a «religious backlash», whose propaganda is centered on alleged cultural identities (Norris, Inglehart 2011; Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Such cultural narratives are cases of secularization halting or reversing, as in United States after 11th of September 2001 (Norris, Inglehart 2011). Accordingly, despite the «traditional» cleavage, between religious and secular value orientations, is no more apt to explain political behaviours in Western countries, religious issues still persist[30]. The transformed line of conflict pertains to the opposition between the preservation of alleged religious traditions and the acceptance and tolerance for new and different worships and also practices. Indeed, religious cleavage captures two dimensions: the religiosity at the individual level and the group consciousness/identification at the contextual one. The second can persist even with decreasing individual levels (Evans, Northmore-Balls 2018), according to increased activism by religious «traditionalists» and value shift (Norris, Inglehart 2011; Elff, Roßteutscher 2017).

> «The spread of sexual liberalization, emancipated women, and secular policies can generate powerful reactions among those who cherish traditional values. We have already seen symptoms such as the resurgence of fundamentalist movements, and support for leaders and parties who mobilize popular support based on appeals to religious values, among people with traditional beliefs. […] Moreover, fundamentalist groups in advanced industrial societies have been galvanized into unprecedented levels of organized action because they perceive that many of their most basic values (concerning abortion, divorce, homosexuality, and family values) are being threatened by rapid cultural changes in their societies.» (Norris, Inglehart 2011, 241)

Bottom-up perspective focuses on the increasingly blurry distinction between religious and non-religious people in their value orientations, whereas the top-

[30] Religious cleavage is significant if there is a variation between parties in appealing to religious groups which then persists. However, it may also interact with landowners-entrepreneurs one, resulting spurious (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017).

down view accounts for the role of political parties in activating/de-activating «the relevance of religious social divisions for political competition» (Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018, 128). However, despite a «revival» of religious-based line of conflicts in few general elections, religion weakened as a source of social identity and constitutes a defining element of a new conflict, focused on political ideologies, including religious/secular value orientations[31] (Kriesi 1998, 2010; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020).

> «[…] the role of religion may have declined in Europe and the US, in so far as it matters less what religious denominations voters adhere to, but may well have increased in so far as it matters more whether voters have (in particular traditional) religious beliefs. [...] Yet any generalisation has to be qualified and contextualised with regard to a country's particular setting. For a proper analysis of such questions it is necessary to take into account that the political positions of parties and their strategies of mobilising voters are not fixed, not even for parties that are members of a party family such as the Christian Democrats.» (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017, 212)

The assumption of the place of residence as a determinant of political behaviours dates back to Columbia University. Cleavage theory starts out from the concept of social calculus and provides historical and country-specific accounts about how a «worldview» opposition between territorial areas occurred in Western European countries during National Revolution. The resulting center-periphery model grounds on resentments towards the central government which structure in political subcultures (Lipset, Rokkan 1967). Even though dealignment perspective stresses the increasingly heterogeneity and «volatility» within the same place of residence, current studies are re-assessing geographical voting determinants, underpinned by new patterns and upheavals in both the political demand and supply (Ford, Jennings 2020). For what concerns the demand side, the geographical distribution of citizens is strongly tied to their social positions, and the switch to post-industrialism, characterized by the reconversion to service sector, determines the concentration of the younger, more educated and skilled, and higher earning people in the most affluent districts of the thriving cities in the most economically developed regions. Accordingly, a gap in terms of human

[31] Religious values are usually related to a tendency to authority submission and to the clash to what is perceived as different, helping in define people's ideological positions (Norris, Inglehart 2011).

and economic capital occurs between these areas and those suffering from economic transition (*ibidem*). Such places constitute the peripheries, whose less material and immaterial resources go along with the territorial segregation of the most deprived strata of the society, *i.e.* immigrant and low-skilled workers, whereas the upper sections converge to cosmopolitan thriving cities and metropolises (Rodríguez-Pose 2018). The effect of geography on political behaviours is based on the historical, social and economic features of areas, which determine their supply of resources and people's residential sorting based on to their social positions. On the supply side, so-called «anti-establishment» (mainly «populist») political forces were born to strongly oppose to the political system and its actors and gained relevance in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and of the broader Great Recession (Hernández, Kriesi 2016; Evans 2017; Ceccarini 2018). «Anti-establishment» parties «give voice» to the most deprived citizens (Rodríguez-Pose 2018) who are disaffected by mainstream ones, which are identified as responsible for not caring about their interests and needs[32] (Rennwald 2020). Rodríguez-Pose (2018) defines this phenomenon as a «protest vote», *i.e.* a «revenge of the places that do not matter», due to the increased prominence of economic and social differences/inequalities among areas of the same country in favour of new political actors[33]. Since such conflict concerns a feeling of

[32] The electoral competition pertaining to these citizens also includes abstention behaviour (Rennwald 2020).

[33] These places, *e.g.* Northern England, East Germany and Southern Italy, are characterized by the perceived failure of the interventions of both national and supra-national governments. Indeed, their economies are still dependent on transfers and welfare state. Therefore, their inhabitants feel «left behind» by political élites and attracted by «anti-establishment» actors. Such a process has been detected in many Western elections (*e.g.* 2016 United States, 2017 French and 2017 German elections). In spite of the salience of inequalities among areas, the economically developed and middle-income countries have been experiencing a reduction of territorial disparities since the Nineties. «It has been thus the places that don't matter, not the "people that don't matter", that have reacted» (Rodríguez-Pose 2018, 201). Such a mobilization may also intertwin with the regionalist strategies of regionalist parties. The connections between the realigned

resentment towards mainstream parties, some scholars hypothesize that it has its roots in specific social groups, overlooking the territorial influence on their different concentrations. Kriesi *et al.* (2006) conceptualize this center-periphery duality focusing on social classes: Western societies are divided into «winners» and «losers» of the undergone transformations, and this division turns into a conflict between who benefit from both cultural and economic global interconnection (upper-middle classes) and who instead feel threatened or perceive material and immaterial deprivation[34]. Conversely, Gidron and Hall (2017) theorize a spatial concentration of social classes according to economic, educational and employment opportunities offered by the context of residence. They define those who perceive a low subjective social status as «left behind», mainly manual workers, who are sensitive to «populist» right. Such a reconceptualized center-periphery cleavage focuses on «the impact of context on perceptions of in- and out-groups, and on feelings of relative political and economic status»: some voters link the decline of peripheral areas to political favoritism towards more resourceful cities and their residents, developing anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic and political discontent attitudes (Ford, Jennings 2020, 308). This conflict focuses on opposing sets of political attitudes: according to the literature, the most deprived sections of the society (historically associated to leftist actors) are oriented towards fairer economic conditions and welfare redistribution and located on more heterogeneous positions on socio-cultural issues (Abou-Chadi, Wagner, 2020). The dissolution of the bond with social-democratic parties, the subsequent political disaffection and abstention, and a general antagonism to other

cleavage and such political actors should be assessed in analyses which focus on specific individual countries.

[34] «Anti-establishment» actors attack the factors on which economic development has been based in recent years, bringing forward proposals in opposition to globalization, immigration, open market and economic integration (Rodríguez-Pose 2018). These parties attract the «losers», who are identified with the most disadvantaged classes, with less material and immaterial resources, especially unqualified workers (Kriesi 1998, 2010; Ceccarini 2018).

minorities complete this profile (Ceccarini 2018; Rennwald 2020). Again, the redefinition of the cleavage pertains to value orientations.

> «Economic agglomeration is thus shaping a geographical cleavage due to polarization in the mixes of people living in different areas: the young, educated, more ethnically diverse populations of major cities are more likely to hold socially liberal values, whereas the older, less educated, and more ethnically homogeneous populations of outlying regions tend to hold more populist and socially conservative outlooks […] Through these processes, populations are increasingly sorted and self-select into particular areas, with local context reinforcing the stark geographical distribution of political preferences—structuring the ideological conflict between cosmopolitan-liberal and socially conservative values.» (Ford, Jennings 2020, 307-308)

Turning to cleavages arising during Industrial Revolution, the rural-urban cleavage has considerably weakened with the shift to post-industrialism. Such a cleavage was considered strong in Nordic countries, characterized by agrarian parties (Elff 2007), and some scholars (*e.g.* Deegan-Krause 2007) hypothesize its inclusion in the center-periphery model. Conversely, there is a long-standing debate centering on social class. The change of economic development model and the consequential decline of its main institutions (industries and trade unions) affected the labour market, disrupting the former vertical social hierarchy, characterized by the opposition between the manual workers and the bourgeoisie. The main processes concern the growth of the service sector, women's participation and education levels (scholarization). «Traditional» class voting theorizes associations between working class and left parties and between the upper classes and right-wing ones (Oesch 2006a, 2006b; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). However, the literature agrees in stating that this pattern has been weakening at least since the Nineties (*e.g.* Clark, Lipset 1991). Political realignment perspective hypothesizes that such evidence is due to outdated operationalizations of class, and that the weakening has been occurring in countries where class cleavage has never played a prominent role (von Schoultz 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018). Indeed, «work» is still a core element of people's life, defining, besides income, the individuals' objective social status and position in the social stratification (Oesch 2006a). A person's location in the labour market affects the amount of available resources, structuring inequalities between social groups and differences between their shared interests: since political citizenship affects

labour market through political institutions' formation (*ibidem*), sharing specific interests actually affects political attitudes and behaviours (Kitschelt, Rehm 2014; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Ares 2020). The main consequences of the three aforementioned trends in labour market concern the working classes' decrease in quantitative terms, the blurring of the duality between manual and non-manual jobs (workers-employees), and the salaried middle-class expansion and heterogenization[35]. Such changes are better accounted for by intertwining the hierarchical dimension with a horizontal one: the former is defined by the employer's perspective, or the advantages attached to an employment relationship, which are consequences of employee's endowment with marketable skills; the second dimension discriminates within the hierarchically equivalent classes, according to employment status and work logic[36]. The two dimensions identify daily work experiences and routines, which affect value orientations in the social world (Kitschelt, Rehm 2014; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Ares 2020). Schema proposals which discriminate both between self-employed and employees and within the heterogeneous hierarchically equivalent classes enable the detection of more fine-grained class voting patterns[37]. Along with these changes in the political demand, realignment perspective also considers how the supply faces these

[35] Elff and Roßteutscher (2011) stresses that the accounts of a decline of a cleavage focus on two dimensions, concerning the numerical decline and the loss of identity. According to the hypothesis of a decline of class cleavage, the aforementioned labour market processes reduced the demand for routine manual workers and blurred the income and lifestyles differences between working and middle classes.

[36] According to Oesch's (2006a) proposal, employment status identifies self-employed (autonomous workers and employers) and employees. Within employees, work logic or employee's perspective distinguishes among jobs characterized by same vertical benefits. The author defines three work logics: organizational, technical and interpersonal.

[37] However, other scholars detected the same patterns adopting updated versions of previous (hierarchical) schemas and new schemas, concluding that the criticism against the former has been exaggerated (Langsæther 2019).

changes: mainstream parties redefined as «catch-all» whereas new «anti-establishment» actors arise. Accordingly, new alignments are detected[38]: upper-middle employee classes find representation in centre-left parties, whereas business owners and managers prefer mainstream right-wing ones; working classes are shown to be sensitive to «anti-establishment» and far-right political actors, which were introduced in the political niches constituted by people whose interests were previously mobilized by left-wing forces (Evans 2017; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020; Rennwald 2020). Indeed, according to the literature, since «societal modernization» processes have reduced working class size and generated a wide and heterogeneous middle class, mainstream political parties, strategically reasoning, have been moderating their positions on social and/or economic issues at least since the Seventies. Redefining them as «catch-all» parties, left-wing forces have shifted to a less extreme opposition to neoliberal policies, whereas right-wing ones softened their authoritative and conservative stances[39]. Some niches of the electorate (*i.e.* the most deprived strata) have been «left behind» (Gidron, Hall 2017; Dalton 2018; Ceccarini 2018; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020) and are attracted by «anti-establishment» and «anti-élites» parties, which leverage their political marginalization (Evans 2017; Ceccarini 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). These actors usually propose economic policies focused on social benefits and subsidies together with social conservative and authoritative values (*e.g.* nationalist proposals). Accounting for the changes and upheaval in the political supply (*e.g.* Mair *et al.* 1999), political realignment opposes to the hypothesized «end» of social class and «trendless

[38] Even if voting patterns can vary among countries and over time according to political supply and its developments (Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020), some general regularities are detected.

[39] Centre-left parties seek support from the middle classes and ethnic minorities, focusing on socially liberal and cosmopolitan outlooks. Mainstream right actors must choose between shifting to more moderate positions or coalizing with far-right parties, risking the loss, respectively, of more extreme or moderate voters (Ford, Jennings 2020).

fluctuation» (Evans 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018). The focus on classes' sets of values and their associations with political supply's proposals shows that class divisions are no more relevant as party loyalties as well as orientations towards issues activated/de-activated by political actors[40]: social classes prefer specific political forces when their value orientations are «matched» with parties' proposals and stances (Evans 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018; Langsæther 2019).

Political realignment literature agrees that «reports of the death of social cleavages are exaggerated» (Elff 2007, 289). Besides the redefinition of «traditional» alignments, such a perspective is also characterized by the theorization of a new line of conflict, whose main conceptualizations and definition is debated in the next section. This new line of conflict is based on values, whose relationship with social structures has been introduced discussing the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However, it is not assumed to have displaced socially-based cleavages (Elff 2007), but to mediate the alignments between social positions and political preferences (*e.g.* Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995; Knutsen 2017).

1.7. A new line of conflict

Along with the redefinition of cleavages, realignment perspective concerns the theorization of a new «critical juncture», which focuses on values and is hypothesized both a consequence of «societal modernization» and able to explain electoral «volatility» (Dalton 2018). This primarily pertains to Inglehart's (1971; 1977) value shift thesis, stating that a value-related theory could explain changes and decreasing power of structural lines of conflict. In his own thesis, the author neglects both a persistence of a direct association between socio-structural elements and political preferences, and the processes which may occur within

[40] Chapter 2 further deepens this point.

political supply (Elff 2007), *e.g.* handovers, new strategies and rising of new actors. This theory suggests a distinction between material and post-material values, linked to different generational experiences and social status, and to preferences for old and new parties. Yet, it mainly focuses «on mapping the value changes in society», without delving into how parties organize such value orientations in electoral competition (Ford, Jennings 2020, 299). Indeed, socio-structural variables still show associations with political preferences, which are understandable within the processes in political supply and demand and when considering political value orientations which play a mediating role. Kriesi (1998; 2010) and Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) propose the main formal conceptualizations of such a conflict. The first author hypothesizes the existence of a value cleavage, focused on globalization, denationalization and the opening up of national borders. The structural foundations of these cultural-identity, political and economic integration issues should be social groups defined by who benefits from and who feels more exposed to the risks of these processes (Häusermann, Kriesi 2015). However, in a first review of its conceptualization, Kriesi (2010) refers to Enyedi's (2008, 293) account of values «not simply as integral elements of cleavages but also as their potential base». As a result, leaving aside the need to find structural bases, the concept of cleavage is adopted without socio-structural roots.

> «In a society, where interactions between individuals are less determined by spatially or social-structurally ascribed (gender, age, family) or achieved (job, profession) proximity and more by individual value orientations and personal interests, it seems natural that the social groups are less defined in social-structural terms than in terms of value orientations.» (Kriesi 2010, 678)

The author assumes value orientations as able to shape coherent sets of political preferences and identities, towards the structuration of a full-fledged value-based cleavage in European countries (*ibidem*). Together with economic material-based dimension, a rising cultural (universalism-particularism) dimension could account for the political preferences of «winners» and «losers», defined by

demarcation-supranational integration and authoritarian-libertarian conflicts[41]. Finally, in a second review, the author hypothesizes a blurring of the boundaries between these two dimensions, towards a mono-dimensional European political space (Häusermann, Kriesi 2015). It should be stressed that the author, referring to so-called «new politics» approach (Enyedi 2008), adopts the concept of cleavage hypothesizing that political values define divisions between social groups mobilized by political parties without structural roots. Similarly, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) consider a third European revolution (after National and Industrial revolutions [Ford, Jennings 2020]) as bringing about a new cultural divide cutting across the «traditional» economic left-right one: a transnational and ideologically structured cleavage defined GAL-TAN (Green-Alternative-Liberal vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) and based on the reaction against political (European Union), economic and social (immigration) integration, strongly tied to the changing processes occurring within party systems (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002). The divide roots in the opposition between those who benefit and those who feel threatened from the transnationalism developed by treaties and negotiations aimed to ease people and trade circulation[42] (Hooghe, Marks 2009), especially in the wake of the financial crisis. This generates new key issues, better leveraged by new political actors, usually poorly pro-

[41] The cultural continuum is assumed as a reconfiguration of a long-established dimension on which mainstream parties result less able to locate (Ford, Jennings 2020) and has been defined by several authors. Among these, Kitschelt (1994) focuses on authoritarianism-libertarianism and Bornschier (2010) theorizes a conflict given by the interconnection between this value opposition and communitarianism-universalism.

[42] The literature (*e.g.* Hooghe, Marks 2016; Ceccarini 2018) assumes those who lack material and immaterial resources to compete in a transnational world as showing an anti-immigration attitude. Indeed, they perceive immigrants as a threat to their cultural identities and their securities pertaining to citizenships status, and as competitor in the labour market. Such an account does not differ from what detected by Lipset (1981) concerning the working class. Conversely, who profit from these forms of integration constitute a global élite, whose benefits are hindered by national states and their laws (Hooghe, Marks 2016; Ceccarini 2018).

integration, differently from mainstream parties. Indeed, «anti-establishment» radical right political forces leverage on national sovereignty, identities and values, whereas mainstream parties result unable to shift on the new key political issues (Hooghe, Marks 2016). However, these two conceptualizations

> «exhibit the opposite mix of strengths and weaknesses. Both focus on the organizational aspect of the second dimension, typically operationalizing that dimension in terms of the issues that parties emphasize and talk about. This approach provides systematic evidence on how party systems are re-orienting their appeals around new ideological divides, but it gives us little direct evidence on the changes within the electorate that are stimulating these shifts.» (Ford, Jennings 2020, 299-300)

With respect to these conceptualizations, other scholars do not agree in stating that «traditional» conflicts have been replace by a new one (Enyedi 2008). Moreover, many authors are reluctant to accept a definition of value voting as a cleavage: the attempts to detect structural bases and to hypothesize groups' identity formation through shared sets of values find no support (von Schoultz 2017). According to the typology proposed by Deegan-Krause (2007), the alignments between value orientations and party preferences seem to be better conceived by the notion of a «divide», defined by the interplay between issues and vote choices. A value-based divide does not ground on structures, since no stable patterns of value sharing have been identified among social groups (von Schoultz 2017).

> «In order to establish that […] these new value orientations constitute a full cleavage, it is however crucial to identify stable patterns in which structurally based groups of voters share these values and to connect these groups to organized actors claiming to represent their political interest. This process has proven demanding.» (von Schoultz 2017, 40-41)

However, if value-based conflicts are defined as divides playing a mediating role between socio-structural variables and political behaviours, a new conceptualization is needed. A first element of such a conceptualization concerns the structuration of socio-cultural, economic and political opinions by both everyday life interactions and political élites. Opinions are defined as direct answers expressing approval or disapproval about specific issues (Lazar 1995) and indicators of (unobservable) latent attitudes (Thurstone 1928), conceived as structural orientations to evaluate in a favourably or unfavourably way issues and events (Rosemberg, Hovland 1960; Fishbein, Ajzen 1975; Knutsen 2017). Accordingly,

attitudes are characterized by a strong evaluative dimension, referring to values and their clustering[43] (Schwartz 1992; Halman 2007): such evaluative dimensions are structured in ideologies and transmitted through socialization processes (see Marchesi 2019). Ideologies are conceived as social and historical phenomena, cultural products reproduced and modified by both individuals[44] and political élites (the main actors in cultural production of political values), affecting evaluative orientations in turn (Glasberg, Shannon 2011; Neundorf, Smets 2017). Referring to Converse's (1964) definition, and adopting a different approach than the symbolic one of spatial voting (Elff 2018), an ideology is considered as a relatively structured and coherent system of beliefs, opinions and representations, which structures attitudes and values (see Marchesi 2019). Not few authors hypothesize a two-dimensional political ideological space in Western countries, composed by an economic dimension (materialist) and a social dimension (non-materialist/post-materialist). Despite the fact that «new politics» literature states that this second line of conflict came about after the II World War[45], it has long-standing bases (Dalton 2018; Elff 2018), dating back to Burke's (1790) philosophical account. Yet, the new conceptualization proposed does not summarize these dimensions in a single left-right continuum, nor

[43] Values are the most basic cultural elements. These orient the assessment of objects and events according to what is socially desirable, directing and justifying opinions, attitudes and actions. Differently from attitudes, values are not anchored to objects or events. Attitudes are conceived as organized sets of values (Rokeach 1973; Halman 2007; Knutsen 2017).

[44] Since socio-structural positions define individuals' socialization agents, these same positions affect shared political cultural significances and evaluative orientations in turn. The mediation perspective intertwines with Michigan school's funnel of causality model and cleavage theory. According to such a perspective, controlling for more determinants enables to isolate the «net» effect between each factor and political preferences (see Chapter 2).

[45] Socio-cultural dimension is assumed to have been gaining prominence since the Sixties and Seventies, according to either the perceived loosening of socio-economic anchors, or a «cultural backlash» (Dalton 2018; Ceccarini 2018).

assumes the political ideological space as two-dimensional: along with the economic dimension, the social «worldview» is made up of two dimensions. These are based on different definitions and contents, shown to better-account for political supply and demand, and do not show strong statistical correlation: social conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism-libertarianism (*e.g.* Stenner 2009). Accordingly, it is hypothesized that Western countries witnessed the historical development of three main political ideologies, still structuring political competition. Left-right dimension is assumed as a conservatism-liberalism continuum constituted by two facets: economic, focusing on the involvement of the government in the economy, the regulation of private enterprise and the welfare state (Crowson 2009; Elff 2018); and social, referring to the opposition between the preservation of the alleged moral «traditions», concerning religion[46] and morality, and the tolerance to ambiguity and complexity in the social world (Kirk 1953; Crowson 2009). This second facet is separated from authoritarianism-libertarianism: instead of being focused on social stability and preservation of status quo, such an ideology concerns a predisposition to favour obedience and conformity over freedom and difference («oneness and sameness» [Stenner 2009, 142]). Psychological literature (*e.g.* Duckitt, Farre 1994; Altemeyer 1996) usually defines it as the combination of three dimensions: authoritarian submission, conventionalism, authoritarian aggression. Yet, this operationalization overlaps with other concepts (Vasilopoulos, Lachat 2018). Conversely, Feldman (2003) proposes it as a trade-off between the opposing values of personal autonomy (concerning diversity, freedom, and support for civil liberties and outgroups) and social control (focused on conformity, obedience, authority, social

[46] Religiosity is one of the elements on which social conservatism has historically rooted (Kirk 1953). However, religious voting has not faded: it is strongly associated to this ideology, both in political supply and demand. Indeed, religious heritage «has a lasting imprint on moral issues, such as attitudes toward abortion and suicide» (Norris, Inglehart 2011, 221), both constitutive topics of social conservatism-liberalism dimension (*e.g.* Kirk 1953).

norms, restrictions of civil liberties and intolerance towards outgroups and non-conformists)[47].

Ideologies structure values and attitudes, but not all issues are directly structured by them. The increasing «volatile» Western electoral context is usually analyzed by adopting short-term variables, mainly people's evaluations of specific issues, *i.e.* attitudes. As stated, ideologies structure these evaluations. Yet, certain topics are strongly affected by party, candidate and mass media framing work during electoral campaigns (*e.g.* Dalton 2018). Indeed, some attitudes «do not assimilate easily» into the ideological dimensions, often cross-cutting them (Enyedi 2008, 294). For example, once the demarcation-integration perspective has been refused, the attitude towards the European Union seems to cross-cut the three ideologies (Enyedi 2008; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020). Another set of issues, concerning performances' evaluation, focuses on the trust/distrust of the political and party system, which is strongly related to the rise of «anti-establishment» parties (Dalton 2018). Furthermore, the individual assessment of immigration topics does not pertain to one of the three ideological continuums: it concerns cultural elements (such as religion, social norms, national identity), economic components (such as welfare state policies and labour market competition), and inter-group relations (Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020). Accounting for political attitudes in empirical analyses has become prominent since «anti-establishment» actors mobilize those sections of the electorate whose ideological outlooks are far from main political actors, and which are characterized by strong feelings towards particular topics (Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020). Such political forces usually leverage specific issues, debated and framed close to the election day (Vasilopoulos, Lachat 2018). Accordingly, their ideological alignments with voters may be low (Enyedi, Pedrazzani, Segatti 2020).

[47] From an operationalization perspective, this second definition conceives the continuum not as a personality trait, but as a disposition which complements a political ideology. It is still a matter of debate as of the type of associations among the three ideologies that explain political preferences (Vasilopoulos, Lachat 2018).

1.8. Conclusions

Political realignment perspective opposes dealignment hypothesis: it assumes that social positions still play a role in affecting political preferences, even if they follow new patterns. The introduction of a top-down outlook interacting with the bottom-up perspective of «traditional» cleavage theory enables the detection of these changes, which have been occurring since the Sixties. Conversely to the first structuralist interpretations, parties do not just reflect social divisions, but their agency in structuring interests' conflicts and their democratic expression, by raising and framing political issues, must be recognized (Enyedi 2005; von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018). The two forces of representative democracy are not assumed as having developed in isolation (von Schoultz 2017): party systems are sensitive to social and economic processes on the demand side, and their reactions concur to weaken the «traditional» associations between social groups and parties (Dalton 2018). Furthermore, political élites play a framing role, to which public opinion is in turn sensitive. As previously mentioned, such a joint perspective allows one to detect the redefinition of old social conflicts and the definition of new ones, based on the dealigning processes highlighted by economic voting approaches (Enyedi 2008; Ford, Jennings 2020).

> «To analyse variations in the relationship between social characteristics of the voter and party choice without considering what happens in the party system is to study cleavage voting without politics.» (Oskarson 2005, 105)

Accordingly, political realignment's account of cleavage politics fulfills the passage from «sociology of politics» to «political sociology» theorized by Sartori (1969). The first structural approaches, focused on political behaviours as reflecting social imprinting and stratification, are firstly overcome by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However, even though they account for the actual translation of social conflicts at the party system level and their variations among countries, the two authors define cleavages as «frozen» over time. Introducing the top-down perspective enables to understand cleavages' formation and leveraging, achieving «political sociology»:

> «a real political sociology calls for a simultaneous exploration of how parties are conditioned by the society *and* the society is conditioned by the party system. […] The complete picture requires […] a joint assessment of

> the extent to which parties are dependent variables reflecting social stratification and cleavages and, vice versa, of the extent to which these cleavages reflect the channelling imprint of a structured party system.» (Sartori 1969, 214)

To conclude, the theorization of a new value-based «critical juncture» aims to integrate the redefinition of cleavages and the increasingly «volatile» Western European electoral context (Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). Both «catch-all» and issue-specific parties mobilize social groups to gain political power, whereas social groups themselves share interests and «worldviews» which encompass socio-cultural, economic and political topics: voting preferences still depend on socio-structural positions, but now accounting for the mediation effect of issues' evaluations which are structured in ideologies and attitudes. The conflictual dimensions of political ideologies are defined as divides (see Deegan-Krause 2007), and not as full-fledged cleavages, and after a broad review of the extant literature, this chapter proposes a political ideological space made up of three dimensions (economic conservatism-liberalism, social conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism-libertarianism). Conversely, further political values which «do not assimilate easily» into the three continuums are theorized to structure in attitudes (Enyedi 2008, 294). These pertain to proximal factors underpinning economic models[48].

According to both theoretical and empirical realignment accounts, the political sphere seems characterized by both enduring and new factors, the outcome of the interaction between socio-economic processes and political parties' agency from election to election (Dalton 2018). The mediation perspective, introduced by authors such as Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995), aims to detect these patterns and their path from socio-structural bases to actual behaviours. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 delve into such a perspective.

[48] Indeed, parties compete emphasizing/de-emphasizing their stances on more than one issue (Knutsen 2017; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020).

CHAPTER 2

VOTING PATTERNS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL VALUES ON INDIVIDUAL CHOICES

2.1. Introduction

In accordance with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, the present chapter aims to provide further insights into cleavage politics in Western European countries during the first two decades of the XXI century. Indeed, it aims to answer the first research question, that is: do social class and political values affect voting behaviour in Western European general elections? The analyses center on political demand, by investigating which parties constituting Western European political supply are perceived by voters as responding to their own demands, which in turn reflect their socio-structural positions and values. Thus, individual probability models are performed, as these provide estimations of the associations concerned, which enable to examine the patterns of class cleavage and their mediation by value divides.

Despite the fact that an analysis focusing on the actual existence and direction of voting patterns «would need to take in account both the demand and supply side of politics», the analytical perspective pertains to «the structural context of mobilization, that is party preferences of voters» (Oesch 2008, 334). The supply side is accounted for in the dependent variable, concerning party families. Such an approach make it possible to group together those political actors who share specific names, historical traditions, party programs and membership of transnational organizations (see Knutsen 2004, 14). In spite of this, only a specific focus on general elections held in individual countries enables to introduce in the analyses the processes at political supply level (Thomassen 2005a), and to identify any within-country differences (Knutsen 2004). Chapter 3 does precisely this.

The present chapter focuses on three sets of variables. The first set comprises the socio-structural factors, following the Columbia University studies and cleavage theory. Of these factors, the main focus is placed on social class, whereby voting patterns are assessed along the lines of the literature on the dealignment or realignment of class cleavage. Indeed, current literature argues that of the four cleavages defined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the center-periphery and class cleavages continue to shape voters' electoral behaviour (see Chapter 1). The focus on the latter cleavage is due to the long-standing and long-lasting debate concerning it (Elff 2009). Furthermore, the dataset employed prevents the introduction of a variable concerning the area of residence, as will be discussed in the next section. According to the outlined theoretical framework, social positions do not only provide individuals with material/immaterial resources and constraints, but also define their daily experiences and routines, affecting their orientations in the social world (see Kitschelt, Rehm 2014). Indeed, social positions determine people's social interactions, underpinning individual's socialization, *i.e.* the process of interiorization of cultural significances giving meaning to behaviours (Neundorf, Smets 2017). Within the political sphere, this process conveys political values, which are organized in value orientations and structured in political ideologies (Elff 2018), and which as such constitute the second set of variables. The three-dimensional political ideological space defined in Chapter 1 is employed therein. The last set of variables includes political attitudes. According to the literature (*e.g.* Dalton 2018), increasing electoral «volatility» in Western countries may be assessed through the introduction of short-term issues' evaluations, as framed by political actors during electoral campaigns[49]. Indeed, the political dealignment perspective considers shorter-term factors to be more flexible when accounting for political behaviours and their

[49] Not all political values cluster in one of the three ideological continuums. Indeed, people's evaluations of certain specific issues «do not assimilate easily» into the ideological dimensions, but tend to cut across them (Enyedi 2008, 294). Such evaluations concern topics as framed by political supply and the mass media close to the time of elections (Dalton 2018).

variation over time, as these become gradually detached from individual social positions (Evans 2004; Thomassen 2005a; von Schoultz 2017).

Moreover, it is argued that social class continues to affect voting behaviour, and, if a mediation perspective is adopted (see Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995), it is also argued that social status is an antecedent factor in the establishment of political values. Indeed, since the socialization agents with whom people interact are determined by socio-structural positions, during adulthood these «peer groups» are mainly defined by the occupational position. Although the relationship between social class and value orientations may be reversed, the assumption that the former affects the latter is based on the prominence of working activities in people's everyday lives. However, it should be pointed out that individuals' identities do not only consist of their membership of a given social class, and the prevalence of said factor over others with regard to electoral behaviour depends on the mobilization strategies pursued by the political supply's actors[50] (Bornschier 2010; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Rennwald 2020). Indeed, class divisions are now less relevant as party loyalties than as orientations towards issues activated/de-activated by political actors (Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018). Since social class is assumed to be temporally antecedent to values, and to play a role in the establishment of these, by controlling both political ideologies and political attitudes enables to identify the «net» association between this socio-structural independent variable and the dependent variable (party choice in general elections). Considering the general, all-embracing nature of the Michigan

[50] The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 1, is based on the intertweaving of both top-down and bottom-up processes. The most relevant processes seen on the political supply side pertain to the redefinition of mainstream parties as «catch-all» entities, depending on the strategic moderation of their positions on economic and socio-cultural topics, and the rise of «anti-establishment»/«anti-élites» political forces that mobilize voters by leveraging their political marginalization (Dalton 2018; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020; Ford, Jennings 2020). These latter forces have become popular among the more deprived strata of the population who are historically associated with the social-democratic parties (Rennwald 2020).

framework (Thomassen 2005a, 8), the three sets of variables pertain to its «funnel of causality model», which accounts for the factors affecting political behaviours and their temporal ordering (Evans 2004). Furthermore, the mediation perspective adopted here assumes that each factor is partly affected by previous ones and in turn partly affects the subsequent ones, and therefore provides insights into electoral «volatility» and the re-structuration of cleavages (see Dalton 2018). The next section introduces the dataset employed and the models developed. It also operationalizes all sets of factors and specific hypotheses concerning their associations. The following sections present the results.

2.2. Data and variables

The dataset employed is the *European Social Survey* cumulative from round 1 (2002) to round 9 (2018)[51]. The *ESS* provides cross-national data covering a broad time-span (the first round started collecting data in 2002, while the ninth round was completed in 2020). This dataset comprises information about party preferences in country's most recent general election, respondents' occupations (this is required in order to formulate social class schema), and respondents' opinions on socio-cultural and economic topics. As a result of focus on cleavage voting, the analyses conducted here concern all those Western European countries that participated in all nine rounds, namely: Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Fixed effects multinomial logistic regression models are developed to investigate the associations between political preferences and independent variables, with country and *ESS* round introduced as covariates.

[51] *European Social Survey* Cumulative File, *ESS* 1-9 (2020). Data file edition 1.1. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of *ESS* data for *European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure* (*ESS ERIC*).

Further covariates are: gender, age group, educational attainment (ISCED 3 classification), residence[52] (big city, small city, suburbs/outskirts, village/country). It should be pointed out that the aggregation of countries does not permit the inclusion of the area of residence in the models, since the actual territorial definitions of «center» and «periphery» differ from on country to the next.

Considering only those respondents providing valid responses regarding all variables, the final sample totaled 107 144[53]. Results are presented as Average Marginal Effects (AME)[54], and class polarization is assessed by computing kappa indexes (Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995). Kappa indexes may refer both to the entire set of parties standing for election, and to individual parties or party families. It is interpreted as a measure of the degree to which classes' preferences for political parties vary on average from the corresponding party's average

[52] This variable is based on respondents' own description of their domicile, and it allows to control for the dimension of housing context, considered by the Columbia University studies.

[53] *ESS* weights are recalibrated with regard to the loss of cases according to country, round, gender and age groups. The final weights replicate the distribution of the cross-classification of these variables.

[54] Since the coefficients estimated by logistic models are not directly interpretable, marginal effects are computed. AMEs are the average of the predicted changes (the differences) in the fitted values of the dependent variable (marginal effects) for each unit change in each regressor of a given independent variable for each observation in the sample, while controlling for the other independent variables in the model. It must be pointed out that it is not possible to compute AMEs for the interaction terms introduced in a multinomial logistic model. Indeed, unlike with linear models, an interaction effect in a non-linear model does not vary in a constant (linear) way, since the factors constituting it do not vary in a constant (linear) way. Moreover, it does not vary independently, but rather interdependently, of the values of its components. Therefore, a one unit change in such an interaction term may be the result of several different combinations of changes in its constituents.

preference[55]. Kappa indexes represent total «gross» class voting, the full association, and how this changes when other variables are introduced into the model (Langsæther 2019). This is in keeping with the aforementioned mediation perspective: the association observed between long-term and dependent variables is given by the sum of an indirect effect, *i.e.* the association between a third set of variables (mediators) and both the dependent and independent variables, and the direct effect between these two, net of mediators (see VanderWeele 2015). The dependent variable concerns the questions about the party that people voted for in the most recent general elections. Parties are grouped into six classes: Green, Radical Left, Centre-Left, Centre-Right, Radical Right, Other parties or coalitions[56].

As regards the three sets of independent variables, respondents' class position is assessed by applying Oesch's (2006a) 8-class schema to the data. This schema enables to discern «*hierarchically* between more or less advantageous employment relationships based on people's marketable skills», and «*horizontally* between different work logics» (Oesch, Rennwald 2018, 791). The interaction of these two dimensions differentiate between the self-employed and employees and discriminates within hierarchically equivalent classes (Oesch 2006a; 2006b). Accordingly, such an operationalization provides more fine-grained class voting patterns than the working class-bourgeoisie division. The eight classes are shown in Table 2.2.1. Office clerks constitute the reference category in

[55] The kappa index measures political polarization. This concerns the voting rate by social class, *i.e.* whether a party or party family obtains votes to the same extent among the different social classes.

[56] Table A2.2. in the Appendix shows the current parties' actual location. The categorization adopted is based on Knutsen (2004, 2017), Oesch and Rennwald (2018) and the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (Bakker *et al.* 2020). Other parties or coalitions also include centrist political actors. Indeed, according to the categorizations considered, centrist forces only appear in three countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway). The results presented in the following sections only concern the radical left, the centre-left, the centre-right and the radical right party families.

the subsequent regression models, since they are assumed to approximate to the median voter (Oesch, Rennwald 2018).

Table 2.2.1. The collapsed 8-class schema based on Oesch (2006a).

Independent work logic	*Technical work logic*	*Organizational work logic*	*Interpersonal service work logic*
1. Self-employed professionals and large employers	3. Technical professionals and semi-professionals	5. Managers and associate managers	7. Socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals
2. Small business owners	4. Production workers	6. Office clerks	8. Service workers

The class voting patterns highlighted by the political realignment literature and discussed in Chapter 1 point out the following hypotheses: the upper-middle employee classes tend to perceive that their interests are represented by centre-left parties, while business owners and managers tend to vote for mainstream right-wing ones (*H1*); at the same time, the working classes, and specifically manual workers, reveal to be sensitive to «anti-establishment» radical right actors, and as such their votes are contested for by such actors and the left-wing parties (*H2*). Respondents are assigned to classes according to «their current or, if missing, past job», starting from the ISCO 4-digit variable (Oesch, Rennwald 2018, 792). Those who do not have a current job or have not been employed in the past, are assigned a class position on the basis of the position of his/her partner[57]. A covariate concerning respondents' employment status is introduced into the models to maintain the focus on individuals rather than on households[58].

The second and third sets of independent variables concern political ideologies and attitudes, which are measured by means of scaling procedures[59]. The

[57] The construction of the class schema follows the author's scripts available at: http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts/.

[58] The categories into which this variable is divided are: employed, unemployed, student, retired, household, other.

[59] The scaling procedures developed aim to reduce a set of items in order to obtain a single measure according to a theoretical account which warrants their grouping together in a single index. Therefore, Principal Components Analysis (PCA), which

equivalence across countries of such measures must be accounted for while performing these procedures, especially when cross-national survey data are employed. Three types of equivalence are addressed herein: construct, structural and measurement unit/scalar[60]. The resulting variables, assumed continuous, are

produces components, is preferred to Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), which produces factors. These two procedures mainly differ in the variance they analyze: in a nutshell, PCA analyzes the total variance of each item, whereas EFA focuses exclusively on the common variance (*i.e.* the covariance, and therefore it does not consider the unique variance of items as well as the variance due to error). Factor analysis aims to detect the underlying latent dimension which determines the scores observed for the items, whereas PCA aims to represent the empirical association of a set of variables by extracting the most parsimonious number of components, which are just combinations resulting from the empirical associations of such a set of variables. The scaling procedures performed concern sets of items chosen on the basis of accurate operational definitions, according to which a single component is capable of explaining their variance in the sample. However, the two procedures provides similar results in cases of high communalities, *i.e.* the portion of variance of an item explained by the components/factors extracted (Netemeyer, Bearden, Sharma 2003; Tabachnick, Fidell 2007). Therefore, preference if given to a PCA in order to achieve these analytical purposes. Usually those items whose variance is explained to a minimum degree are «erasable», *i.e.* they can be excluded from the final component/factor. To do this, a cutoff of the size of loadings (*i.e.* the strength of the association between each item and each component/factor extracted) is chosen. However, the literature does not provide any general rules to be adopted. Although multivariate analysis handbooks suggest setting the cutoff at around |0.30| (*i.e.* an overlapping variance between the item and the factor/component of around 10%), the final choice lies with the researcher. In the event of suspected homogeneity (*i.e.* the sample scores on the items considered are similar or are expected to vary very little), a lower cutoff size may be chosen in order to provide a more interpretable final measure (Tabachnick, Fidell 2007). Herein, the cutoff is set at |0.25|.

[60] As far as construct and structural equivalences, the *ESS* were faced with biases regarding the construction and translation of the items before collecting data, and the same ideologies and attitudes (defined and operationalized in the same way) are

recoded between zero and one[61]. However, since data does not provide enough items to cover all the theoretical dimensions of the operational definitions of political ideologies and attitudes (see Chapter 1), some of these constructs must be assessed using proxies. As far as ideologies are concerned, proxies are employed to account for economic conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism-libertarianism. The measure computed for the former ideological position is based on one item introduced in all rounds, concerning the role of government in the economy, previously adopted by Oesch and Rennwald (2018): «Government should reduce differences in income levels» (reverse-score). The resulting proxy has a mean value of 0.31 (SD = 0.26). A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) provides a measure for social conservatism-liberalism. The items taken into account are the ones introduced in every *ESS* round, and considered capable of embracing to a considerable degree the conceptual domain of the corresponding operational definition. These items concern: religion, which has been one of the main elements of social conservatism since its initial theorizations; intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in the social world, including the sexual sphere (conservatives are less tolerant towards new conceptions of sexuality, *i.e.* sexual orientations other than heterosexuality); and traditions, which is another key element of conservatism's definitions (see Kirk 1953). The PCA performed (KMO Test[62] equal to 0.78) reveals just one component with an eigenvalue

believed to have developed in Western European countries. The resulting set of items must be tested across groups: with the aim of assessing the invariance of each index and the correspondence of its factorial structure among countries, the analyses are performed for the sample as a whole and then tested separately for each country (Byrne, Shavelson, Muthén 1989; Georgas *et al.* 2004; van der Vijver 2019).

[61] Zero and one correspond to the two poles of the ideology measured.

[62] The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Test is a validity measure adopted to assess the adequacy of the sample data used when performing a PCA or an EFA. It varies between zero and one, and its value is considered acceptable when equal or greater than 0.60 (Netemeyer, Bearden, Sharma 2003).

greater than one[63] (2.60), accounting for 52.02% of variance. Table 2.2.2. presents the items and their loadings (Cronbach's Alpha[64] is equal to 0.75). The mean of the final measure is 0.36 (SD = 0.21).

Table 2.2.2. Items and loadings of social conservatism-liberalism measure.[65]

Item	Loadings
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (R)	0.25
How religious are you	0.52
How often pray apart from at religious services	0.52
How often attend religious services apart from special occasions	0.51
Important to follow traditions and customs	0.36

As outlined in Chapter 1, the ideological social facet is completed by one further dimension, namely authoritarianism-libertarianism. Psychological literature

[63] Conventionally, a component/factor is considered suitable for extraction when its eigenvalue is greater than one. Indeed, the eigenvalue of a component/factor enables the amount of variance it accounts for to be evaluated, by dividing the eigenvalue by the total number of items introduced into the analysis. An eigenvalue is defined as the sum of the squares of the loadings of each item on the component/factor (Tabachnick, Fidell 2007).

[64] Cronbach's Alpha is adopted as a reliability measure or as a measure of internal consistency. It establishes wheter the items accounted for are measuring the same construct. It takes values of between zero and one, and the minimum acceptability threshold is usually set at between 0.60 and 0.70 (Nunnally 1978; Tabachnick, Fidell 2007).

[65] Choosing |0.25| as the minimum acceptable factor loading, no significant differences are found among the countries concerned. Only the item concerning sexuality reveals a loading of between |0.20| and |0.22| in four of the countries (Sweden, Ireland, Germany, Portugal). As far as Cronbach's Alpha is concerned, its value ranges from 0.69 (Sweden) to 0.77 (Ireland and Spain).

usually defines this as the combination of three elements: authoritarian submission, conventionalism and authoritarian aggression. Yet, this operationalization may overlap with other concepts (Vasilopoulos, Lachat 2018). Furthermore, the *ESS* datasets do not provide items capable of encompassing all of its facets. A different perspective was proposed by Feldman (2003): making no references to specific targets and political arrangements, the author views authoritarianism as a trade-off between the opposing values of personal autonomy (concerning diversity, freedom, and support for civil liberties and outgroups) and social control (centered around conformity, obedience, authority, social norms, limited civil liberties and intolerance towards outgroups and non-conformists). For the purposes of the analyses set out here, this second conceptualization offers a better idea of the authoritarianism-libertarianism continuum, which is defined not in terms of a personality trait, but as a disposition which complements a political ideology, causally prior to political attitudes and vote choice (Vasilopulos, Lachat 2018). The resulting proxy measure is defined as authoritarian predispositions (Feldman 2003; Cohrs *et al.* 2005; Arikan, Sekercioglu 2019), and is based on Schwartz's (1992) Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)[66].

> «Schwartz has identified 10 universal individual-level value orientations that form two higher-order dimensions that represent two fundamental conflicts in societies: openness to change versus conservation and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement (Schwartz, 1992). The first higher-order value dimension contrasts the motivational goals of tradition, conformity, and security with values representing a preference for individual autonomy: self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism. Authoritarian predispositions correspond to the first higher-order dimension. In fact, different measures of authoritarianism […] correlate strongly with Schwartz's openness-versus-conservation dimension […] Since the authoritarian predisposition is defined as the relative priority attached to conformity over autonomy, an individual's authoritarian predisposition is captured by subtracting her score on openness values from her score on conservation values (see, for example, Feldman, 2003).» (Arikan, Sekercioglu 2019, 1103)

Accordingly, the proxy measure is computed by subtracting from the average score on conservation values the score concerning openness to change, *i.e.* opposing conformity, security, and tradition to self-direction and stimulation. Hedonism is not included since it belongs to both the openness-to-change and the

[66] The quasi-circumplex disposition of human values hinders their use in factor analyses, since it clashes with factor extraction in a plain space.

self-enhancement dimensions. Table 2.2.3. shows the final set of items. The measure obtained has a mean of 0.51 (SD = 0.12).

Table 2.2.3. Value dimensions, value orientations and the items in Schwartz's (1992) model of human values provided by the ESS *dataset and used to compute the measure of authoritarian predispositions (see Arikan, Sekercioglu 2019).*

Value Dimension	Value Orientation	Item
Conservation	*Conformity*	Important to do what is told and follow rules Important to behave properly
	Tradition[67]	Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention
	Security	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings Important that government is strong and ensures safety
Openness to change	*Self-Direction*	Important to think new ideas and being creative Important to make own decisions and be free
	Stimulation	Important to seek adventures and have an exciting life Important to try new and different things in life

As regards political ideologies, the following hypotheses are considered: as previous analyses have shown (*e.g.* Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020), social and economic conservatism and authoritarianism are positively associated with mainstream right-wing parties and negatively associated with left-wing parties (*H3*); «anti-establishment» radical right actors are weakly associated with political ideologies, due to the long-standing history of the latter (Dalton 2018; Elff 2018) and the recent rise of the former (*H4*); as social class schemas are based principally on economic issues, the economic continuum accounts more for class polarization than the other dimensions do (*H5*). However, certain topics «do not assimilate easily» into the ideological dimensions, but tend to cut across them (Enyedi 2008, 294) and are strongly affected by the framing

[67] Tradition value orientation is constituted by two items. Yet, one of them focuses on social conservatism and is introduced in its PCA. Accordingly, while computing the measure of authoritarian predispositions only one of them is considered.

operations of political supply and the mass media during electoral campaigns (Vasilopoulos, Lachat 2018; Dalton 2018). It is argued that «anti-establishment» actors gain more leverage from such issues than from issues structured in political ideologies (*H6*). Indeed, these parties mobilize specific feelings, and therefore they may be weakly aligned with their voters in ideological terms (see Enyedi, Pedrazzani, Segatti 2020). The measures computed in order to assess the evaluations of these issues constitute the final set of independent variables.

Indeed, the mediation perspective does not overlook short-term factors, concerning evaluations assumed to be structured in attitudes. Every round of the *ESS* includes items focusing on three political attitudes: opposition to immigration[68], distrust of the European Union, distrust of the political system. As in Knutsen (2017), a PCA is performed in order to measure the first attitude (KMO Test equal to 0.73), by adopting three items concerning the opinions of respondents with regard to the effect of immigration on the economy, the national culture and inter-group relations. These items and their loadings are shown in Table 2.2.4. The only component with an eigenvalue of more than one (2.33) accounts for 77.72% of the variance (Cronbach's Alpha is equal to 0.86). The final measure has a mean of 0.44 (SD = 0.20).

Table 2.2.4. Items and loadings of the measure of the attitude towards immigration.[69]

Item	Loadings
Immigration bad or good for country's economy (R)	0.57
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (R)	0.58
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (R)	0.59

[68] According to Lipset (1981), the most deprived social classes seem to have always been «against» immigration, feeling threatened by what they feel it implies within the context of the competition for scarce resources.

[69] No significant differences were found when comparing factor loadings among countries (these range from |0.56| to |0.60|). As far as Cronbach's Alpha is concerned, its value ranges from 0.77 (the Netherlands) to 0.90 (the United Kingdom).

The stance taken with regard to the European Union constitutes another attitude considered by Knutsen (*ibidem*). Herein, this stance is assessed by means of a single item measuring trust in the EU's supranational parliament. Such a measures is recoded so that lower trust equates to higher values, and the means is equal to 0.54 (SD = 0.22). The final attitude considered here concerns the degree of distrust[70] of the political system, which is argued to be associated with the rise of «anti-establishment» political actors (see Chapter 1). The *ESS* comprises three items reflecting the respondents' trust (or lack thereof) in parliament, politicians and political parties. Unfortunately, only the first two have been included in the questionnaire as of the first round of the *ESS*. This means that a scaling procedure is impossible to perform. Accordingly, a proxy measure has been computed as the average of the two variables[71]. Its mean is equal to 0.53 (SD = 0.21).

The mediation perspective requires an analysis of the associations between the mediators and both dependent and independent variables, in order to understand how and why the other associations differ once new variables are introduced into the model. Such analyses pertain to both kappa indexes and linear regression models, with ideologies or attitudes as the dependent variables and social class as the independent one. While an entire section is devoted to kappa indexes, the second set of analyses is provided in the Appendix and is referred to when commenting on the results.

[70] Distrust is preferred to disaffection since the latter concept is usually employed in political participation studies. Distrust of both national and supranational political institutions seems to be strongly correlated to people's perceived or subjective social status (Gidron, Hall 2017). However, the *ESS* data do not provide information regarding this topic.

[71] A PCA is performed (KMO Test equal to 0.71) using all three items and focusing on rounds 2-9. Only one component has an eigenvalue greater than one (2.48), which accounts for 82.82% of the variance (Cronbach's Alpha is equal to 0.89). The resulting index is standardized between zero and one and has a mean of 0.56 (SD = 0.21). The correlation between this and the proxy measures is 0.98.

2.3. Class voting patterns and the conservatism-liberalism ideological continuums

Before presenting the multinomial logistic regression models that have been performed, class voting patterns are introduced according to the bivariate association between social class and the dependent variable. Figure 2.3.1. shows the class differences in electoral support for radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right party families. It shows that the electoral base of left-wing parties is mainly constituted by socio-cultural professionals and the working classes, while the latter classes are also mobilized by radical right actors. The radical right parties also gained a non-negligible share of their votes from small business owners. The centre-right parties' votes mainly come from those most involved in the market, namely the self-employed classes and managers. This party family is also popular among technical professionals and clerks, whose votes they contend for in competition with the centre-left parties. The bivariate model corroborates the hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*), as well as the empirical literature's findings (*e.g.* Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Rennwald 2020). These patterns are further analyzed by performing multivariate models, whereby these associations are controlled for the covariates and the mediators defined in the previous section.

Figure 2.3.1. Electoral support for radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right party families (relative values). The y-axis intersects the x-axis at the point of marginal electoral support: radical left = 6.55%, centre-left = 29.14%, centre-right = 43.35%, radical right = 5.93% (although green and other party or coalition families are not shown, their marginal elector support is, respectively, 6.93% and 8.09%). N = 107 144. Weighted data.

The models constructed reflect the likelihood of individuals having voted for each of the party families considered, during the Western European general elections held between the late Nineties and 2019 (this is the time span covered by the *ESS* cumulative dataset). A social class AME concerns the difference in

the average likelihood of having voted for a specific party family between the social class observed and the reference category (clerks). Such differences enable to identify the main electoral basis of each party family, *i.e.* those social classes most likely to have voted for the parties constituting such a family. On the other hand, the AME of a continuous measure assesses the differences in the average likelihood of having voted for a specific party family per one unit increase in the measure. These results enable to observe value voting patterns, by detecting the sets of values which given party families tend to appeal to. Each of the three measures of political ideologies is introduced individually in order to establish how its introduction changes the coefficients in question. Table 2.3.2. illustrates the first three models: M1 includes social class and covariates only, M2 introduces the measure of economic conservatism, while M3 introduces the measures of social conservatism.

M1 provides a second assessment of the association between social class and voting. The self-employed classes, both professionals/large employers and small business owners, are those most likely to have voted for centre-right parties in the Western European countries' general elections. Indeed, an individual belonging to one of aforesaid two classes is, respectively, a 11% and 8% more likelihood to have voted for a centre-right actor than clerks (the reference category) are. As expected, managers reveal the same pattern (7% more likely than clerks). Conversely, these three classes are the least likely to have voted for centre-left parties (respectively, -10%, -10% and -3% than clerks). Centre-left parties gathered the majority of their votes from socio-cultural professionals, production workers and service workers (respectively, +2%, +5% and +3% more likely than clerks), and were less likely to have voted for mainstream right-wing parties (respectively, -5%, -9% and -6% than clerks). The same associations observed between social classes and votes for the centre-left party family can also be seen in the case of radical left parties. Considering the radical right parties, production and service workers are the classes most likely to have voted for such actors (respectively, +3% and +1% than clerks), whereas socio-cultural professionals, defined as «leftist» by the literature (see Chapter 1), constitute the class least likely to have vote for them (-3% than clerks). Such patterns are in keeping

with the relative hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*), and offer empirical proof in favour of the three assumptions widely present in class voting realignment literature. These assumptions are the follows: the historical competition between the bourgeoisie and the working classes, who constitute the main electoral bases of, respectively, mainstream right-wing and left-wing parties; the difference between the self-employed, who are more likely to be part of the centre-right constituency than of the centre-left one, and employed workers (except for managers); the electoral competition for the votes of the less privileged classes (the working classes), who are divided between their historical allegiance to the mainstream left-wing political forces and the attractiveness of the radical right. Moreover, given the similarity between the voting patterns of technicians and clerks, despite the former being slightly less likely to vote for radical right-wing parties (-1%), their definition as median voters by Oesch and Rennwald (2018) is corroborated.

Economic conservatism is introduced in M2. As expected (*H3*), this measure is negatively correlated to having voted for radical and centre-left parties (respectively, -13% and -22%) and positively correlated to having voted for radical and centre-right ones (respectively, +3% and +39%). Therefore, the likelihood of having voted for the former or the latter decreases or increases, respectively, as this measure increases[72]. Controlling for economic conservatism confirms the patterns detected in M1, but it also accounts in part for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for party families between the reference category (clerks) and the self-employed classes, managers and the working classes. Indeed, with respect to M1, such differences reduce in absolute value as regards voting for centre-right and left-wing actors: the decision of an individual from

[72] It should be noted that the same variable concerning economic values has been adopted by Oesch and Rennwald (2018), whose associations closely resemble the ones set out in Table 2.3.2. Furthermore, by aggregating elections among countries and over time, the likelihood of having voted for radical right actors reveals a correlation that is close to the corresponding correlation in the case of centre-right voting. According to previous analyses (*e.g.* Knutsen 2017), Western Europe's radical right parties are generally positioned in the middle of this continuum.

one of these classes to vote, or not to vote, for a centre-right or a left-wing party is impacted to some extent by the mediating role played by the specific ideology in question. Conversely, had it not been for the positive association between the measure of economic conservatism and voting for radical or centre-right actors, managers would be less likely to have voted for the former (from -1% than clerks in M1 to -2% than clerks in M2), while technical professionals would be less likely to have voted for the latter (from -0% in M1 to -2% in M2 than clerks). Therefore, the managers' likelihood of having voted for radical right parties and the technicians' likelihood of having voted for centre-right parties, although limited, are partly affected by these parties' economic programmes. Indeed, the self-employed, the managers and the technicians score high on the measure of economic conservatism, whereas production workers and service workers score lowest[73] (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix).

As per the corresponding hypothesis (*H3*), the measure of social conservatism, introduced in M3, is negatively correlated to having voted for radical and centre-left parties (respectively, -16% and -21%) and positively correlated to having voted for centre-right ones (+39%). This variable is also negatively correlated to a slight extent to having voted for radical right political forces (-1%). It should be pointed out that this measure comprises items concerning religion and tradition, whereas these actors are observed mobilize people's on anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic attitudes together with their general political discontent (see Chapter 1). Controlling for social conservatism only provides an insight into certain associations between voting behaviour and social class, as it only accounts for a portion of small business owners' significant preference for centre-

[73] Since the association between the voting behaviour and the specific class is negative, the association between the voting behaviour and the measure is positive, and the specific class scores high on this measure (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix), controlling for this latter provides a stronger difference between the specific class and the reference category (clerks) for what concerns the voting behaviour (the AME increases in absolute value). Indeed, if it had not been for the role played by the measure (mediator), the specific class would be less likely to show such a voting behaviour.

right parties (8% higher than that of clerks in M1 and 7% higher than clerks in M3). Conversely, since service workers score high on this measure (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix), this class would be more likely to have voted for radical left if it had not been for the negative association between this variable and such a political preference (from +1% than clerks in M1 to +2% in M3). Socio-cultural professionals also score high on this measure (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix). Therefore, had it not been for the centre-right and centre-left's stances on social conservatism this class would be less and more likely to have voted, respectively, for the former and for the latter (respectively, from -5% than clerks in M1 to -6% in M3, and from +2% than clerks in M1 to +3% in M3).

Table 2.3.3. shows M4 which introduces both economic and social conservatism. An increase in R^2 is detected between M1 (0.112) and M4 (0.149). The changes in the classes' AMEs mainly follow the patterns discussed for M2. However, controlling for the two measures (and their interaction) accounts for a further share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for centre-left or centre-right parties in the case of small business owners (respectively, from -10% than clerks in M1 to -9% in M4, and from +8% than clerks in M1 to +6% in M4). Conversely, the difference in the likelihood of having voted for centre-left party family between socio-cultural professionals and clerks (the reference category) changes along the lines of the pattern observed in M3 (from +2% than clerks in M1 to +3% in M3). Service workers' and socio-cultural professionals' AMEs concerning centre-right voting do not differ between M1 and M4, despite the introduction of economic conservatism (M2) accounting for a share of these.

Before including the third ideological measure in the model, two points should be made here. Firstly, different party families do boast diverse electorates in the general elections held in Western European countries. The various aspects of such electorates can be identified by employing a class schema combining a horizontal dimension with a vertical one (Oesch 2006a, 2006b; Oesch, Rennwald 2018). Furthermore, the value voting divides based on the two political ideologies accounted for in this section, do actually affect the likelihood of having voted for a party family in the most recent election, as well as the likelihood of differences in voting behaviours among classes.

*Table 2.3.2. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and economic and soaicl conservatism variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+eco	M3+soc	M1+class	M2+eco	M3+soc	M1+class	M2+eco	M3+soc	M1+class	M2+eco	M3+soc
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.10***	0.11***	0.08***	0.11***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small business own.	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02**	0.00	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.03***	0.07***	0.05***	0.07***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01**	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism		-0.13***			-0.22***			0.39***			0.03***	
		(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)	
Social conservatism			-0.16***			-0.21***			0.39***			-0.01***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.112	0.134	0.131	0.112	0.134	0.131	0.112	0.134	0.131	0.112	0.134	0.131
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

*Table 2.3.3. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and economic and social conservatism variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+eco	M4+ec*so	M1+class	M2+eco	M4+ec*so	M1+class	M2+eco	M4+ec*so	M1+class	M2+eco	M4+ec*so
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.11***	0.08***	0.08***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small business own.	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism		-0.13***	-0.11***		-0.22***	-0.21***		0.39***	0.36***		0.03***	0.03***
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Social conservatism			-0.15***			-0.19***			0.36***			-0.01***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Interaction terms (ideol)			yes			yes			yes			yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.112	0.134	0.149	0.112	0.134	0.149	0.112	0.134	0.149	0.112	0.134	0.149
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

2.4. Class voting patterns and ideological divides

The introduction in the model of a third ideological variable, concerning authoritarian predispositions, calls for an assessment of that variable's association with the previous two. Table 2.4.1. provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between these three measures. Economic conservatism results as being weakly (and negatively) correlated to both social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions, which, in turn, are weakly-moderately positively correlated. Therefore, the two ideological dimensions of socio-cultural values share some information.

Table 2.4.1. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the measures of the three political ideologies. N = 107 144. Weighted data.

	Economic conservatism	Social conservatism	Authoritarian pred.
Economic conservatism	1.00		
Social conservatism	-0.01***	1.00	
Authoritarian pred.	-0.09***	0.25***	1.00

The measure of authoritarian predispositions was introduced in M5 alone (Table 2.4.2.). It should be noticed that M5's R^2 (0.119) is lower than those of both M2 (0.134) and M3 (0.131). This variable is positively associated to having voted for centre-right parties (+21%) and is negatively associated to having voted for radical left-wing parties (-9%). Whilst these results confirm the relative hypothesis (*H3*), the same variable shows a weakly-positive association with having voted for centre-left (+2%, although this AME is not statistically significant). Controlling for this measure only slightly affects the differences between classes in the likelihood of having voted for a given party family: had it not been for the negative association between voting for radical left parties and authoritarian predispositions, managers, who score low on its measure, would be less likely to have voted for them (from -1% than clerks in M1 to -2% than clerks in M5). Similarly, holding this ideology constant, the self-employed classes, who score low on said measure, are more likely to have voted for centre-right parties (their AMEs increase in absolute value), therefore these parties gained the support of the self-employed classes despite their authoritarian stances. Indeed, a

vertical pattern is revealed as regards the score of social classes on authoritarian predispositions: the self-employed and upper-middle employee classes score below the lower classes (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix).

The three measures of political ideologies are introduced together in M6: R^2 increases (0.152), previous patterns are confirmed and this set of variables partly explains some of the associations between social class and political preferences. The ideological value voting divides in M6 do not differ from those detected in M2, M3 and M5 concerning, respectively, economic conservatism, social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions. However, since the latter two measures share some of their information (see Table 2.4.1.), the AMEs pertaining to authoritarian predisposition and to having voted for radical left or centre-right, decrease in absolute value (respectively, from -9% in M5 to -4% in M6, and from +21% in M5 to +13% in M6), whereas the AME concerning the same variable and having voted for centre-left increases in absolute value (from +2% in M5 to +6% in M6). Turning to the different classes' AMEs, no differences are detected between M6 and M4 (the model including both economic and social conservatism), with the exception of the difference in the likelihood of having voted for centre-right actors between clerks (the reference category) and self-employed professionals and large employers (from +11% than clerks in M1 to +9% than clerks in M6): such an AME is 1% higher in M6 than it is in M4.

The next section presents the full model (M7), which includes the final set of variables concerning political attitudes. It is hypothesized that the introduction of shorter-term factors can offer further insight into radical right socio-structural voting patterns (*H6*). Indeed, voting for radical right parties results weakly associated to the measures of political ideologies, thus confirming the relative hypothesis (*H4*). However, the models aggregating general elections among countries and over time, show (weak) associations between having voted for radical right and the three measures in question. Such associations are closer to those regarding voting for the mainstream right as far as economic dimension is concerned, and closer to voting for the left as far as concerns social conservatism.

*Table 2.4.2. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M5+aut	M6+ideol	M1+class	M5+aut	M6+ideol	M1+class	M5+aut	M6+ideol	M1+class	M5+aut	M6+ideol
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.08***	0.11***	0.13***	0.09***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small business own.	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.08***	0.09***	0.06***	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.01**	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism			-0.11***			-0.21***			0.36***			0.03***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Social conservatism			-0.15***			-0.20***			0.35***			-0.01***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.09***	-0.04***		0.02	0.06***		0.21***	0.13***		-0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)			yes			yes			yes			yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.112	0.119	0.152	0.112	0.119	0.152	0.112	0.119	0.152	0.112	0.119	0.152
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

2.5. Class voting patterns and value voting divides

The final set of variables introduced focuses on voters' political attitudes. According to the literature ascribing prominence to short-term factors (*e.g.* Dalton 2018), the assessment of specific issues should further the understanding of voting patterns, particularly as regards voting for radical right parties. In discussing the AMEs of the full model (M7), it must be pointed out that political ideologies and political attitudes share some of their information. Indeed, socio-cultural values are structured in two ideologies and three attitudes. As such, the correlation between the resulting five measures may offer a number of unexpected associations: for example, the weakly positive correlation between authoritarian predispositions and having voted for centre-left parties (+6%) in M6. Table 2.5.1. shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the five variables. The only weak-moderate association between a political ideology and a political attitude is the positive correlation between authoritarian predispositions and anti-immigrant attitude (0.21). On the other hand, anti-immigrant attitude is moderately correlated positively (over 0.30) with the other two attitudinal measures, concerning the lack of trust in the EU and the distrust of the political system, while these latter two variables are moderately-strongly correlated (0.62).

M7 is compared to M1 and M6, in Table 2.5.2. As regards the associations between the five measures, those pertaining to political ideologies and to having voted for one of the four party families differ from what is observed in M6. Generally, such associations are weaker in absolute value, with the exception of those between authoritarian predispositions and voting for centre-left or radical right parties. In both cases, controlling for political attitudes, the authoritarianism divide is greater and the associations between attitudes and voting for the two party families have the opposite sign of those concerning authoritarian predispositions[74]. Examining political attitudinal value divides, anti-immigrant

[74] As regards radical right party family, had it not been for the positive relationships between authoritarianism and the three attitudes (mainly anti-immigrant

stances are negatively correlated to having voted for radical left (-5%) or centre-left (-16%) parties, and positively associated to having voted for centre-right (+17%) or radical right (+18%) parties. Distrust of the EU is negatively correlated to having voted for centre-left and centre-right parties. The same pattern is detected with regards to distrust of the political system: the association is positive between this attitude and having voted for more radical forces, and negative between the same attitude and having voted for less radical parties (centre-right parties in particular, whose AME is -16%). Therefore, such results corroborate the hypothesis concerning «anti-establishment» actors' stronger associations with political attitudes than with political ideologies (*H6*). As regards social classes, the working classes score highest on the measures of the three attitudes (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix). Indeed, members of the working classes are assumed to be dissatisfied with mainstream parties (Rennwald 2020) and opposed to processes such as trans-nationalization, denationalization, globalization, and supranational integration (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002; Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Kriesi 2010; von Schoultz 2017; Ford, Jennings 2020; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020). Accordingly, part of the significant likelihood of production workers' voting for radical right parties can be accounted for by their positions on such issues (from +3% than clerks in M6 to +1% than clerks in M7). Conversely, had it not been for the negative associations between the three measures and the preference for centre-left parties, production and service workers would more likely have voted for them (respectively, from +5% than clerks in M6 to +6% than clerks in M7, and from +3% than clerks in M6 to +4% than clerks in M7)[75]. Since self-employed professionals and large employers score low on the three measures (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix), controlling for attitudes increases

one), the most authoritarian voters would be 2% less likely to vote for these parties than the most libertarian ones would have. For the same reason, and focusing on centre-left party family, the most authoritarian voters would be 8% more likely to vote such party family than would have the most libertarian ones.

[75] Accordingly, introducing the three attitudes helps explain the appeal of radical right parties for the lower classes, at the expense of centre-left forces.

the corresponding (already high) likelihood of their having voted for centre-right parties: had it not been for the stances of these parties on immigration issue, this class would be more likely to have voted for centre-right. Conversely, since small business owners score high on all three measures (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix), controlling for attitudes increases the corresponding likelihood of their having voted for centre-left parties: political attitudes account for of the difference between this class and clerks (the reference category) in terms of the likelihood of having voted for such parties. To conclude, socio-cultural professionals are more likely to have voted for mainstream right-wing, and less likely to have voted for mainstream left-wing parties in M7 than in M6. Indeed, since this class scores the lowest on the three attitudinal measures (see Table A2.3. in the Appendix), the correlation between having voted for centre-left and these three dimensions partly accounts for the likelihood differences pertaining to this class. At the same time, had it not been for the association between having voted for centre-right and anti-immigrant attitude, this class would be more likely to have voted for centre-right parties.

Having discussed the class-based patterns of voting for specific party families in Western Europe and the mediation of such patterns by value voting divides, the next section is going to focus on class voting strength. The AMEs only reveal the differences between social classes in terms of their likelihood of having voted for a specific party family. These differences cannot be used to assess which party family is more inter-classist and which is characterized by the most polarized voting. Furthermore, the assessment of the mediating role played by value voting divides identifies which dimension accounts for the greatest share of the differences between classes in terms of their electoral preferences.

Table 2.5.1. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the measures of the three political ideologies and the measures of the three political attitudes. N = 107 144. Weighted data.

	Economic conservatism	Social conservatism	Authoritarian pred.	Anti-immigration	EU distrust	Political system distrust
Economic conservatism	1.00					
Social conservatism	-0.01***	1.00				
Authoritarian pred.	-0.09***	0.25***	1.00			
Anti-immigration	0.00	0.11***	0.21***	1.00		
EU distrust	-0.04***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.30***	1.00	
Political system distrust	-0.12***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.34***	0.62***	1.00

*Table 2.5.2. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M6+ideol	M7+att	M1+class	M6+ideol	M7+att	M1+class	M6+ideol	M7+att	M1+class	M6+ideol	M7+att
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.11***	0.09***	0.10***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small business own.	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.03***	0.03***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.01**	-0.02***	0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism		-0.11***	-0.10***		-0.21***	-0.21***		0.36***	0.35***		0.03***	0.02***
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Social conservatism		-0.15***	-0.13***		-0.20***	-0.21***		0.35***	0.33***		-0.01***	-0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)

Authoritarian pred.		-0.04***	-0.03***		0.06***	0.08***		0.13***	0.07***		0.00	-0.02***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.05***			-0.16***			0.17***			0.18***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
EU distrust			0.05***			-0.05***			-0.01			0.03***
			(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Political system distrust			0.06***			-0.05***			-0.16***			0.07***
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.00)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.112	0.152	0.175	0.112	0.152	0.175	0.112	0.152	0.175	0.112	0.152	0.175
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

2.6. Class polarization

Social class coefficients enable to investigate each party family's electoral base. Yet, class voting analysis also focuses on the degree to which voting for parties is polarized between classes: this polarization ranges from a total lack of any association (complete inter-classism) to the maximum correlation (when a class is completely prone to vote for a specific individual party or party family). Considering each class' probability distribution of voting for each party family, if at least two classes differ in their distribution with regard to the same party family, then an association between social class and political preferences can be said to exist. As previously mentioned, this association is assessed using the kappa index, proposed by Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995): since multinomial logistic regression models provide beta values as log odds ratios, a measure of class voting can be computed as the standard deviation of these coefficients, representing the relative differences among classes[76]. Such an index can measure class polarization regarding each party family and also the entire set of families[77]. When computed for a single party family, the kappa index consists of the standard deviation of the class coefficients (based on the class schema adopted, there are eight such coefficients), with those concerning the reference category kept equal to zero:

[76] The kappa index is equal to zero when there is no association, and positive values are assumed otherwise. However, its maximum value differs in a non-constant way for different numbers of those parties or party families considered, thus preventing comparisons being made among analyses which do not operationalize the dependent variable in the same way. By adopting log odds ratios, a final index can be obtained, which is not sensitive to the marginal distribution of vote choices, *i.e.* it does not account for the different number of respondents in each class (Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995).

[77] «When the application calls for decomposition, kappa is broken down into sub-kappas that apply to any of the separate voting outcomes» (Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995, 813).

$$k_j = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{C}(\beta_{ij} - \beta_{\cdot j})^2}{C}}$$

j is the party family (the voting outcome) the coefficient refers to (j = 1, … J, here J = 6), while i is the social class (i = 1, … C, here C = 8). β_{ij} is the coefficient corresponding to the class i and the party family j, whereas $\beta_{\cdot j}$ is the mean coefficient for the party family j. Accordingly, the total kappa index for the entire model, *i.e.* the whole set of voting outcomes, is computed as follows:

$$k = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J}\sum_{i=1}^{C}(\beta_{ij} - \beta_{\cdot j})^2}{C \times J}}$$

Table 2.6.1. shows kappa indexes computed for each party family in every model performed, with the variables introduced individually and together, from the bivariate to the full one. Therefore, the «gross» association between social class and voting is compared to the «net» ones resulting from the other models, and the degree to which mediators account for the bivariate class differences regarding party preference are investigated (Langsæther 2019). The results show that radical right parties are characterized by the greatest polarization in the time span and array of countries considered in the analyses (0.50 in the bivariate model)[78]. As per the relative hypothesis (*H6*), the value of the kappa index corresponding to such a party family diminishes to the greatest extent in the full model, *i.e.* when introducing political attitudes too: the complete set of variables accounts for about 46.55% of the class polarization pertaining to this party family (from 0.50 to 0.27). On the other hand, both centre-left, centre-right, and radical left forces display their lowest kappa index values (respectively, 0.33, 0.20 and 0.30) when economic conservatism only is introduced. Centre-right party

[78] Despite the fact that the marginal differences associated with the radical right party family in the models are «small» in absolute terms (observing the AMEs), they become «large» in relative terms, when they are observed in relation to class polarization. The differences in the likelihood of having voted for these parties, between the lower and upper classes, are relevant. The graphical representation of these results is shown in Figure A2.1. in the Appendix.

family is associated with the strongest inter-classism, as this is characterized by the lowest kappa index value (0.29 in the bivariate model)[79].

Table 2.6.1. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for party families. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	Radical Left	Center-Left	Center-Right	Radical Right
Class	0.36	0.36	0.29	0.50
Socio-demographic	0.33	0.34	0.22	0.36
Economic cons.	0.30	0.33	0.20	0.36
Social cons.	0.34	0.34	0.22	0.35
Eco.*Soc. cons.	0.31	0.33	0.20	0.35
Authoritarian pred.	0.35	0.34	0.23	0.36
Political ideologies	0.32	0.33	0.20	0.35
Political attitudes	0.34	0.35	0.22	0.28
Full model	0.32	0.33	0.20	0.27

To conclude, Table 2.6.2. shows the kappa indexes computed for the whole set of party families, together with the relative differences once further variables are introduced into the model. Of the various political ideologies, economic conservatism-liberalism is the one that accounts for the largest share of class polarization (25.77%). However, the entire set of political ideologies accounts for an even larger portion (26.31%). Political attitudes play the main role in mediating the association between social class and political preferences (28.95%), since they account for the largest share of radical right parties' class polarization. The full model accounts for the 32.07% of «gross» class polarization (from 0.36 to 0.25)[80]. It should be pointed out that economic conservatism underpins the very class schema (Rennwald 2020), and this confirms the relative hypothesis (*H5*). Indeed, the class schema is based on economic and labour market processes (Oesch 2006a). However, «anti-establishment» the radical right party family

[79] The findings concerning the kappa index values are in keeping with those of Langsæther (2019). However, it is not possible to directly compare these values in the two studies, due to the different sets of countries considered and the different operationalization of the dependent variable in each study. Moreover, the author operationalizes the set of socio-cultural values differently and applies a diverse class schema.

[80] The graphical representation of these results are provided in Figure A2.2. in the Appendix.

does not conform to this pattern, since the electoral appeal of such parties in Western European countries is based more on short-term issue evaluations than on political ideologies (see Chapter 1).

Table 2.6.2. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the whole models and the relative differences compared the bivariate model (first row).

Model	**Kappa index**	**Δ**
Class	0.36	
Socio-demographic	0.28	-23.7%
Economic cons.	0.27	-25.9%
Social cons.	0.28	-23.2%
Eco.*Soc. cons.	0.27	-25.8%
Authoritarian pred.	0.28	-22.4%
Political ideologies	0.27	-26.3%
Political attitudes	0.26	-29.0%
Full model	0.25	-32.1%

2.7. Conclusions

The analyses presented in this chapter identified the electoral bases of Western European party families, by exploring which social classes they appeal to. The models performed detect which classes are most likely to have voted, on average, for each party family. In doing so, it should be said that the so-called «catch-all» parties gather a non-negligible amount of votes from all social classes, for whose votes they compete with the other actors constituting the political supply (Rennwald 2020). Despite this, they do tend to mobilize specific social groups, which in turn provide the majority of their electoral support. Accordingly, such an analytical focus enables to distinguish three patterns pertaining to social class:

> «some classes are one party pole's *preserve*, other classes are the *contested stronghold* of two party poles, and over still other classes there is an *open competition* between three party poles.» (Oesch, Rennwald 2018, 799)

The self-employed classes and managers result as being the preserve of the centre-right, whereas socio-cultural professionals constitute the contested stronghold between the two left-wing families. The votes of the working classes, on the other hand, are openly contested by the radical left, the centre-left and the

radical right[81]. Socio-cultural professionals and managers are those least likely to have voted for radical right parties. These clear-cut patterns corroborate the first two hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*) and confirm Oesch and Rennwald's (*ibidem*) findings.

Party families leverage political values too: mainstream actors strongly mobilize voters along the conservatism-liberalism continuum, whereas radical right actors seem to «fill» the gaps in electoral representativeness by leveraging topics framed and debated during electoral campaigns. Indeed, most of the conform to expectations (*H3*): the likelihood of having voted for left-wing parties is correlated to higher levels of social and economic liberalism, whereas the opposite can be said in the case of mainstream right-wing actors. Although the same patterns were hypothesized for authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension, centre-left actors show a weak but positive association with the measure of authoritarian predispositions, which will be examined when conducting the country- and election-specific analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. The radical right party family, which includes «anti-establishment» actors, was more weakly correlated to political ideological measures than were the mainstream parties, revealing their stronger associations with political attitudes (*H4*). The rise of a wide array of «anti-establishment» parties is a recent phenomenon, and the literature connects the emergence of this phenomenon with the development of dealignment and realignment processes (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, these parties are «the main beneficiaries» of the Great Recession which interested the Western World in the Two-Thousands, since their vote shares increased during and after the economic crisis[82] (Hernández, Kriesi 2016, 221). Chapters 3 and 4, which focus on the analysis of national elections, further explore this observation.

[81] According to Rennwald (2020), the working classes' vote in Western Europe general elections is contested by social-democratic and radical right parties in the main, and less often by radical left actors.

[82] These political parties generally performed best in the first general elections after the economic and financial crisis (Hernández, Kriesi 2016).

Kappa indexes enable to establish which sets of mediators best account for the class polarization of voting behaviour in the sample. Whilst AMEs reveal the party families' electoral bases, the kappa indexes help to understand the relative weights of the class differences regarding electoral preferences. The economic bases of the class schemas, which are grounded in individuals' occupations (Rennwald 2020), suggest that economic conservatism-liberalism is the political-ideological continuum that accounts for the largest part of class polarization (*H5*). However, political attitudes constitute the set of variables associated with the largest reduction in the value of the kappa index, depending on their role in accounting for the class polarization of the radical right parties. This finding backs up the hypothesis concerning the prominence of those issues debated and framed near to the date of an election in terms of the decision to vote for a party of the radical right (*H6*). Furthermore, the same results tally with those presented by Langsæther (2019),), according to whom the political attitude resulting in the largest reduction in the kappa index concerns the issue of immigration. Indeed, there is wide evidence in the literature for the existence of a positive association between the preference for radical right or centre-right parties and anti-immigration attitude, and also for that between voting for social-democratic parties and the holding of pro-EU views (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002; Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Rennwald 2020; Ford, Jennings 2020; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020). Distrust of institutional actors resulted as being positively associated to both radical left and radical right party families. These associations are in line with the literature, which argues that such feelings are leveraged by radical and «anti-establishment» actors (Gidron, Hall 2017; Ford, Jennings 2020). According to both voting patterns and kappa indexes, the radical right parties' electoral success seems strongly tied to the fragmentation of the working classes' voting behaviour. Indeed, these classes appear susceptible to the appeal of those actors who leverage voters on specific topics, this primarily consisting in said parties' expressed views on socio-cultural issues (*e.g.* distrust of institutions and opposition to immigration). For example, Rennwald (2020, 74) says:

> «One can therefore conceptualise today's competition for the workers' vote in the following way. Workers can be mobilised on the basis of their social class by left-wing parties to improve redistribution (on this issue social

> democratic parties are in competition with radical left parties) or they can be mobilised by far right parties on the basis of their nationality to restrict immigration.»

If a mediation perspective is adopted, it is possible to see that the associations between social classes and voting for the party families constituting the Western European political supply have been «depurated». Indeed, this chapter has aimed to identify class voting patterns in Western European countries and account for such in terms of value voting divides. The kappa indexes add to the results by providing a measure of class polarization, *i.e.* an assessment of class voting strength for each party family and for the entire set of party families. However, the results are affected by a twofold heterogeneity, concerning national contexts on the one hand, and the dependent variable itself on the other. Considering a wide array of countries means bringing together different historical and institutional elements in the same analysis. This enables to identify any common patterns by controlling for these elements. Simultaneously, the focus on party families, although mandatory when studying several countries together, differs from the focus on specific political actors. Within the same family, while parties share common features, they also may differ according to their political traditions, rivalries and strategies. For example, it is not possible to consider the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany to be the same party in two different national contexts, regardless of the common characteristics leading to their inclusion in the same (centre-right) party family. Furthermore, as far as the *ESS* cumulative dataset is concerned, not every country's party system includes at least one actor for every party family considered. Indeed, Western European countries have undergone processes which have seen their party systems develop differently.

Despite these limitations, the findings presented here are in keeping with the political realignment literature, and provide insights with which to assess class cleavage politics in Western European countries in the first two decades of the XXI century, over the time period covered by *ESS* data. The models are based on comparative analyses, and enable to investigate the validity of the same theoretical framework both among countries and over time (Thomassen 2005a). Indeed, the specific features of individual countries' political demand and supply

should not be overlooked (von Schoultz 2017). The common patterns detected need to be examined with a specific focus on countries' elections: Chapters 3 and 4 offer such a focus and attempt to overcome the aforementioned limitations.

CHAPTER 3

DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL CLASS AND VALUE VOTING PATTERNS AMONG COUNTRIES AND OVER TIME. EVIDENCE FROM FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS

3.1. Introduction

The «traditional» theory of political cleavages accounts for the structuration of the links between parties and social groups, and offers a comparison of such a process among Western European countries according to their specific historical and contextual elements. For example, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified class and religious voting as being the most prominent aspects of electoral behaviour in, respectively, in the English-speaking European countries and Scandinavia, and in the continental European countries (Evans, De Graaf 2013). Institutional elements, together with the focus on institutional actors' agency offered by the political realignment perspective, highlight the prominence of comparative analyses among countries and over time. However, comparative studies

> «often do not acknowledge that the relevant cleavages and their general impact vary between countries. It is hence not only the fact that de- and realignment processes take place at different periods of time in different countries that complicates things; also the point of departure and prerequisites for change are far from constant.» (von Schoultz 2017, 48)

According to Thomassen (2005a), comparative research provides two main benefits when analyzing electoral behaviour: it enables to test whether the same theoretical framework is valid in a set of different countries (generalization), and it accounts for the role played by political systems in affecting the relationships observed on the demand side. Indeed, the introduction of contextual elements in the analyses is in keeping with the focus on both bottom-up and top-down perspectives, and reflects the transition towards the concept of «political sociology» as defined by Sartori (1969). Therefore, differences or similarities in political-institutional context should be assessed «both between countries and within countries between different elections» (Thomassen 2005a, 3). The analyses

provided in this chapter focus on individual elections, and aim to identify the persistence of, or the change in, class and value voting patterns. Four countries have been selected from those participating in all nine rounds of the *European Social Survey*. A dependent variable is established for every election held in each selected country during the period that the cumulative dataset covers. Political parties are not grouped together in families, thus removing the corresponding source of heterogeneity discussed in Chapter 2. The political supply dimension is introduced and the specific features and transformation of political actors, as well as the rise of new parties, are discussed. This approach offers the opportunity for a more fine-grained interpretation of the links between voters' social positions and their voting behaviour.

The cross-national analyses performed in Chapter 2 enabled to assess general voting patterns in terms of class cleavage and value divides in Western Europe. However, in order to assess the impact of parties on voting patters, it is necessary to focus on individual countries (Elff 2009). Removing the heterogeneity that different national contexts and timeframes entail, through the separation of political parties previously grouped together into families, may enable to establish the different ways in which they mobilize voters. Indeed,

> «case studies enable us to take into account the contextual complexities referred to by nationally specific social and political factors for explaining the pattern and strength of cleavages. Whereas the pooled comparative analysis identifies the most general patterns observable and attempts to explain them.» (Evans, De Graaf 2013, 26)

Besides contextual differences, also common events and processes that affect party-voter alignments. In the Two-Thousands, one such event was the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008. The economic turmoil and the Eurozone's recession up until 2013 determined a phase of political instability affecting all Western European governments and party systems. Generally speaking, this resulted in realignment processes in those countries whereby «anti-establishment» parties benefited at the expense of mainstream ones (Hernández, Kriesi 2016; Evans 2017). The electoral competition between mainstream parties and the new political actors on the rise should be assessed from a political realignment perspective (see Chapter 1). These new political forces are theorized to leverage short-term political issues, whose debate is not immediately joined by

the mainstream parties. Furthermore, this perspective also accounts for more specific dealignment and realignment processes which may have occurred over the general elections held within specific countries.

The chapter examines the alignments identified in the analyses conducted in Chapter 2, by building election-specific models, with the aim of answering the second research question, namely: how do the patterns of social class and value voting change in different countries and over the course of time? Country-specific processes, that have affected both political supply and demand, are accounted for by the analyses and by the interpretation of the results those analyses. The following section introduces the case selection method. There is then a brief introduction of the models in question. The conclusions offer some insight into both common and distinct voting patterns.

3.2. Case selection

The present chapter focuses on four national cases, each belonging to a subset of Western European countries. The selection methods are based on an institutional element, *i.e.* the welfare state, which plays a fundamental role in structuring social stratification[83]. Furthermore, the welfare state has also determined the difference prominence of social stratification among countries (Oesch 2006a; Rennwald 2020). The actual transition to welfare states was established in Western countries during the XX century. While these countries have shared a common focus on the role of the government in administrating economic issues, they have differed in terms of their specific management of the interconnections between the State and the market (*i.e.* between the «public» and «private» spheres).

[83] The grouping strategy described in this section also refers to Knutsen (2017). According to the author, the welfare state is a prominent background variable for the purposes of comparative analysis among countries, since it is related to the development of different party systems and electoral competitions.

The resulting institutionalizations of the welfare states has aimed to temper the reliance of individuals' livelihoods on their position in the labour market, which social stratification is based on («de-commodification»), and to emancipate the lower strata of the population (the working classes) by extending their social rights. However, individual have not performed this transition in isolation. Esping-Andersen (1990) identifies and portrays three welfare state regimes which reveal common patterns regarding how the action of government interweaves with the role of both the market and the family with regard to social provisions. These regimes are labelled liberal, corporatist-conservative and social-democratic, respectively:

- the liberal regime, which is characteristic of English-speaking countries, is based on a means-tested social assistance, together with modest universal transfers or social insurance. It aims to encourage citizens to choose work over welfare, and to ensure that only those in need are entitled to the (modest) benefits distributed. Such a system encourages people to rely on the market for their own welfare needs and to appeal to the (stigmatized) public services as little as possible. Accordingly, it minimizes any «de-commodification» effects, reduces the development of social rights, and generates another form of social stratification opposing low-income recipients of welfare benefits and the affluent people who can afford the market welfare.
- The corporatist-conservative (transfer-centered) regime is rooted in the historical corporatist-statist legacy characterizing Continental Europe. Going back to Bismarck, such a system aims to preserve status differentials by linking social rights to social status. Accordingly, the state intervenes as welfare provider only when other institutions are not able to, but with limited redistributive effect. In virtue of its strong connection with the Church, this «subsidiarity» principle relies on the preservation of the family's role in satisfying the needs of its members.
- The social-democratic regime strongly differs from the previous two and aims to achieve the greatest possible universalism and «de-commodification» of social rights. The welfare state directly provides a

universal insurance system which guarantees equal social rights to all citizens, and assigns a marginal role to the market. The benefits depend on individual earnings, and, consequently, they are tailored to diverse expectations. This regime is in place in Scandinavian countries, whose goal is the achievement of full employment, which would sustain the costs of such a generous system of benefits and redistribution.

Despite the comprehensive nature of this typology, a number of scholars have argued that there is a fourth sub-set of countries within Continental Europe with what has been called a Mediterranean welfare regime (Ferrera 1996). Southern Europe is not considered as «lagging behind» the corporatist-conservative model. Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy are deemed to constitute a distinct cluster, consisting of an extreme variant of the transfer-centered regime characterizing Continental Europe. In this variant, the social benefits are based on employment status. However, there is a dualism between the strong benefits granted to key economic sectors, and the limited benefits offered to the poorly institutionalized and regularized sectors. As regards income protection, the family plays a unique role in the Mediterranean welfare state model, constituting an intermediary actor between the labour market and the institutional income protection system. On the other hand, the healthcare system is a universally guaranteed right of all citizens, and does not depend on an individual's occupational status. Yet, the competences and roles of the public and private spheres are not clearly distinguished. To conclude, this welfare state regime offers a «particularistic-clientelist» form of social welfare, due to a dual deficit of «stateness» concerning: the scope of private institutions on the one hand, and the vulnerability of the public administration to external pressures from political and social groups on the other (*ibidem*).

The aforementioned effects of institutional elements on social stratification are rather evident in the case of welfare state regimes (*e.g.* Oesch 2006a; Rennwald 2020). According to Esping-Andersen (1990), an individual's position in the labour market affects the resources and opportunities available to that person in their everyday life, and national welfare institutions aim to temper reliance on the market for the preservation of their livelihood. The development of industrial

capitalism and mass democracies, together with the growth of the manual working class, were the main drivers of the development of welfare states in the XX century. Indeed, the extension of political citizenship to the lower classes also boosted the extension of their social citizenship in affluent Western democracies[84]. The political mobilization of such classes by communist/socialist and social-democratic parties affected the actual welfare state policies (Rennwald 2020). According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the universalistic approach developed in those countries (Scandinavia) where the emerging and growing middle class formed a coalition with the working class. Conversely, the liberal welfare regime developed in those nations where the middle class was well embedded in the market economy, and therefore no such coalitions came about. Finally, the middle class in Continental European tended to vote for conservative and Catholic parties, leading to employment-based social insurance programmes (*ibidem*). Since the development of a nation's specific welfare regime is connected to the political mobilization of that nation's social classes, institutional elements and social stratification are mutually interconnected. Case studies of the set of countries that took part to all nine rounds of the *ESS*[85] were selected according to their welfare state regime. One country for each regime was chosen: Oesch (2006a) defines the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany as the archetypes of, respectively, the liberal, the social-democratic and the corporatist-conservative regimes. Spain is then added to represent the Mediterranean regime[86].

[84] The actual institutionalization of welfare state regimes only took place after the II World War.

[85] The countries for which data are available are: Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal.

[86] The cumulative dataset obliges to choose between Spain and Portugal. The larger sample size justifies the selection of the former country.

3.3. Data and variables

The analyses conducted herein employ the *European Social Survey*'s cumulative dataset (comprising rounds 1-9). Unlike in Chapter 2, the focus here is on only four of the twelve countries for which data is available for all rounds. The multinomial logistic regression models defined in Chapter 2[87] are performed for the four case studies in question, and aim to compare country-specific class and value voting patterns. Therefore, the independent variables do not differ, whereas the dependent ones are based on country-elections pairs. Each pair is characterized by a different sample and sample size. Results are presented as Average Marginal Effects (AME), and kappa indexes are computed for each election to «gauge changes in total class voting or its components» (Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995, 813).

Chapter 2 examined the associations between both social class and value orientations, and political preferences, and concluded with a full model with which to study voting behaviour in Western Europe. The analyses contained in the present chapter focus on the three main models discussed in Chapter 2: the first model shows the association between social class and voting behaviour, without controlling for political values (M1); subsequently, the three political ideologies are introduced, and the degree to which such an association changes by introducing the first set of value voting factors is then established (M2); finally, political attitudes are introduced, and the first two models are compared to the full one (M3). The dependent variables do not aggregate parties in families, but focus on the main political parties standing at the general elections analyzed: the specific parties may differ between subsequent elections, and therefore such an operationalization strategy enables to account for the main processes affecting the political supply. It should be pointed out that the *ESS* data were collected in given years for all participating countries. Accordingly, a data from one round may refer to more than one election day (if such election days

[87] In accordance with the focus on individual countries and general elections, these models do not need to include the specific country and *ESS* round as covariates.

occurred within the prescribed time period of data collection), and also data for the same general elections may have been collected in more than one round. Indeed, the independent variables focus on the parties that respondents actually declared having voted for at the last general election. Therefore, country-election dependent variables are defined according to election days: data pertaining to the period of time between two election days provide information about the votes cast in the least recent of the two. The resulting set of dependent variables defines the very sample for each country-election analysis[88]. Such an operationalization constitutes an element of methodological innovation in the use of *ESS* data, since researchers usually focus on individual rounds rather than on individual elections, and aggregate data for several general elections, therefore any dealignment and realignment process will overlap over time. A more accurate definition of the dependent variables should enable to detect the direction and strength of the alignment between independent variables and political preferences in a more fine-grained way, providing more valuable results as a result. The stability or evolution of such alignments, which constitutes the object of investigation, are therefore assessed over time, from one election to the next. Tables 3.3.1., 3.3.2., 3.3.3. and 3.3.4. show the official electoral results for each general election held in the time span covered by the *ESS* data, specify the rounds and provide information about the first four parties following the vote count.

[88] Focusing on the question of the party voted in most recent national election, introduced in all rounds, the answers are aggregated according to the date of response, from the election day to the day before the next election day. Therefore, the sample pertaining to each general election analyzed is defined according to the operationalization of the relative dependent variable.

Table 3.3.1. The leading four parties' shares of the vote at each Swedish general election for which data is provided by the ESS[89].

Election day	First four parties	Vote share	*ESS* data
15th September 2002	Swedish Social Democratic Party	39.85%	Round 1-2
	Moderate Party	15.26%	
	Liberal People's Party	13.39%	
	Christian Democrats	9.15%	
17th September 2006	Swedish Social Democratic Party	34.99%	Round 3-4
	Moderate Party	26.23%	
	Center Party	7.88%	
	Liberal People's Party	7.54%	
19th September 2010	Swedish Social Democratic Party	30.66%	Round 5-7
	Moderate Party	30.06%	
	Environmental Party-The Greens	7.34%	
	Liberal People's Party	7.1%	
14th September 2014	Swedish Social Democratic Party	31.01%	Round 7-9
	Moderate Party	23.33%	
	Swedish Democrats	12.86%	
	Environmental Party-The Greens	6.89%	
9th September 2018	Swedish Social Democratic Party	28.26%	Round 9
	Moderate Party	19.84%	
	Swedish Democrats	17.52%	
	Center Party	8.61%	

Table 3.3.2. The leading four parties' shares of the vote at each United Kingdom general election for which data is provided by the ESS[90].

Election day	First four parties	Vote share	*ESS* data
7th June 2001	Labour Party	40.68%	Round 1-2
	Conservative Party	31.70%	
	Liberal Democratic Party	18.26%	
	Scottish National Party	1.76%	
5th May 2005	Labour Party	35.19%	Round 3-4
	Conservative Party	32.36%	
	Liberal Democratic Party	22.05%	
	UK Indipendence Party	2.23%	
6th May 2010	Conservative Party	36.05%	Round 5-7
	Labour Party	20.00%	
	Liberal Democratic Party	23.03%	
	UK Indipendence Party	3.10%	
7th May 2015	Conservative Party	36.81%	Round 7-8
	Labour Party	30.45%	
	UK Indipendence Party	12.64%	
	Liberal Democratic Party	7.87%	
8th June 2017	Conservative Party	42.34%	Round 9
	Labour Party	39.99%	
	Liberal Democratic Party	7.37%	
	Scottish National Party	3.04%	

[89] Source: *Valmyndigheten* (val.se).

[90] Source: *House of Commons Library* (commonslibrary.parliament.uk).

Table 3.3.3. The leading four parties' shares of the vote at each German federal election for which data is provided by the ESS[91].

Election day	First four parties	Vote share	*ESS* data
22nd September 2002	Social Democratic Party of Germany	38.52%	Round 1-2
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	38.51%	
	Alliance 90/The Greens	8.56%	
	Free Democratic Party	7.37%	
18th September 2005	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	35.17%	Round 3-4
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	34.23%	
	Free Democratic Party	9.82%	
	Party of Democratic Socialism	8.71%	
27th September 2009	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	33.80%	Round 5-6
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	23.03%	
	Free Democratic Party	14.56%	
	The Left	11.89%	
23rd September 2013	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	41.54%	Round 7-8
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	25.73%	
	The Left	8.59%	
	Alliance 90/The Greens	8.45%	
24th September 2017	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	32.93%	Round 9
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	20.51%	
	Alternative for Germany	12.64%	
	Free Democratic Party	10.75%	

Table 3.3.4. The leading four parties' shares of the vote at each Spanish general election for which data is provided by the ESS[92]*. The table continues in the next page.*

Election day	First four parties	Vote share	*ESS* data
12th March 2000	People's Party	44.52%	Round 1
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	34.16%	
	United Left	5.45%	
	Convergence and Unity	4.19%	
14th March 2004	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	42.59%	Round 2-3
	People's Party	37.71%	
	United Left	4.96%	
	Convergence and Unity	3.23%	
9th March 2008	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	43.87%	Round 4-5
	People's Party	39.94%	
	United Left	3.77%	
	Convergence and Unity	3.03%	
20th November 2011	People's Party	44.63%	Round 6-7
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	28.76%	
	Plural Left	6.92%	

[91] Source: *Der Bundeswahlleiter* (bundeswahlleiter.de).

[92] Source: *Ministerio del Interior* (infoelectoral.mir.es).

	Union, Progress, and Democracy	4.70%	
20th December 2015			*no data*
26th June 2016	People's Party Spanish Socialist Workers' Party We Can Citizens	33.01% 22.63% 21.15% 13.06%	Round 8
28th April 2019			*no data*
10th November 2019	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party People's Party Vox We Can	28.00% 20.81% 15.08% 12.86%	Round 9

The actual categorical dependent variables are illustrated in the following sections. Small sample sizes required that the number of categories be reduced in specific cases[93]. Furthermore, small sample sizes are also associated with higher values of standard errors, since these latter are inversely proportional to the size of the sample. Given that the higher the standard error of an estimation, the higher its *p*-value, *i.e.* the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis by stating that such an estimation is equal to zero when it is actually true, performing regression models will likely detect associations which may be defined as not statistically significant. Although such a definition will be adopted to define this kind of associations, its usage as a mean to discern between relevant and irrelevant associations has been strongly criticized. Indeed, it has been suggested that an account be given of both the theory and the previous results provided by the literature when discussing results, since a *p*-value is more a measure of the «compatibility» of data with hypotheses than an index of the plausibility, presence, truth or prominence of an association (Wasserstein, Schirm, Lazar 2019). Adopting this perspective, the results will be discussed according to the literature and to previous findings, regardless of their statistical significance. However, the concept of statistical significance will be considered in order to contextualize the results in relation to the well-known traditional approach.

[93] In particular, Spain is characterized by both small sample sizes and a great number of regionalist parties that cannot be accounted for in the analyses.

A set of general hypotheses is stated in accordance with the findings of Chapter 2. Firstly, the same associations between social classes and vote choices are to be expected: the self-employed classes and managers are expected to constitute the largest share of the mainstream right parties' electorate, while socio-cultural professionals are expected to vote for radical and centre-left parties; the working classes, on the other hand, will be attracted towards the radical left, centre-left and radical right actors (*H1*). However, the literature regarding the redefinition of centre-left and centre-right parties as «catch-all» forces, argues that higher levels of inter-classism (*i.e.* lower levels of class polarization and lower values of kappa index) are correlated to such political actors, whereas the opposite is expected hold insofar as «anti-establishment» forces are concerned (*H2*). Turning now to the question of value voting, it is hypothesized that voting for mainstream parties is strongly associated to both economic and social conservatism, whereas radical right «anti-establishment» political forces are expected to be more strongly correlated to political attitudes. Generally speaking, higher levels of economic and social conservatism are expected to be associated with voting for right-wing actors, and lower levels to left-wing parties, and the ought to be true in regard to authoritarian predispositions. The introduction of such variables is also expected to be associated with the reduction in class voting AMEs and kappa index values (*H3*). The following political attitudinal divides are hypothesized: right-wing parties will be correlated to higher anti-immigration scores, while left-wing parties will be correlated to higher pro-immigration scores; pro-EU stances are expected among the voters of mainstream actors, while anti-EU stances are expected to prevail among those voting for «anti-establishment» forces (*H4*). Given that the surveys took place after the elections had been held, lower levels of distrust of the political system are hypothesized to be observed among those voting for the winning parties, whereas the opposite is expected to be true among those voting for the principal losers, in particular the parties that gained the second largest share of votes (*H5*). Indeed, if a perspective focused on the electoral competitions itself is adopted, the voters of non-elected parties may agree less with the work done by a government led by the rival politicians. To conclude, the difference in political preferences among

the voters who constitute the largest electorate of radical right parties, *i.e.* the working classes, should be understood to a greater degree through the introduction of political attitudes, in terms of absolute changes in AMEs. Political attitudes should provide greater insight into these differences than political ideologies do, even prior to the advent of said «anti-establishment» actors (*H6*).

3.4. Stable class voting patterns and realignment processes in Sweden following the Great Recession

Sweden held five general elections between 2002 and 2020, as shown in Table 3.4.1. However, the sample concerning the 2018 general election counts only 7 self-employed respondents. Therefore, that specific general election cannot be analyzed here, since the dataset does not provide a sufficient number of cases to be able to account for the political preferences of voters who are self-employed, according to the 8-class schema proposed by Oesch (2006a). The official results show that the centre-left Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the centre-right Moderate Party (M) constantly came first and second, respectively, in all of the country's general elections. The Liberal People's Party (L) and the Christian Democrats (KD) are the other centre-right parties, whereas the Centre Party (C) and the Environmental Party-The Greens (MP) are the main political forces of, respectively, the centre and green party families[94]. Finally, the Swedish Democrats (SD) is a radical right party founded in 1989, which won its first seats in parliament at the 2010 general election. Its entry to the Swedish parliament and its subsequent electoral growth represents a break with the Sweden's long-standing stable party system (Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015). It should be pointed out that the literature (*e.g.* Holmberg, Oscarsson 2015; Oskarson

[94] The categorization adopted refers to Knutsen (2017) and *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (Bakker *et al.* 2020).

2015) sees Swedish voters as constantly voting on the basis of their corresponding social class and economic ideology[95].

Table 3.4.1. Frequency distribution and total sample numbers for each category of vote choice dependent variable pertaining to Sweden. Weighted data.

Election day	Party	N	%	N tot	*ESS* data
15th September 2002	Swedish Social Democratic Party	846	39.13%	2 162	Round 1-2
	Moderate Party	391	18.07%		
	Liberal People's Party	300	13.86%		
	Christian Democrats	153	7.09%		
17th September 2006	Swedish Social Democratic Party	667	32.42%	2 056	Round 3-4
	Moderate Party	630	30.64%		
	Liberal People's Party	189	9.17%		
	Center Party	138	6.74%		
19th September 2010	Swedish Social Democratic Party	747	28.61%	2 609	Round 5-7
	Moderate Party	857	32.88%		
	Environmental Party-The Greens	264	10.11%		
	Liberal People's Party	211	8.10%		
14th September 2014	Swedish Social Democratic Party	600	30.27%	1 981	Round 7-9
	Moderate Party	507	25.61%		
	Environmental Party-The Greens	181	9.12%		
	Swedish Democrats	138	6.97%		
9th September 2018	Swedish Social Democratic Party	263	28.50%	924	Round 9
	Moderate Party	174	18.86%		
	Swedish Democrats	90	9.72%		

Figures 3.4.1. and 3.4.2. show the bivariate associations of having voted for the SAP or the M with both social class and political ideologies. The figures highlight differences between the electorates of the two parties and from election to election. These differences are explored when discussing the results.

[95] These two elements, together with high turnout and little personal contact between political demand and supply, characterized the Swedish exceptionalism (Holmberg, Oscarsson 2015).

Figure 3.4.1. Class composition of the electorate of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party in every Swedish general election considered. Weighted data.



Figure 3.4.2. Average score of the voters of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party on the measures of the three political ideologies in every Swedish general election considered. Weighted data.



Table 3.4.2. shows the three models regarding voting for the main four parties in Sweden's 2002 general election. The first assessment of the associations between social class and vote choices (M1) provides two key insights: despite the fact that having voted for the KD, a religious-based party, is weakly associated with social class, this party is popular among small business owners and upper-middle employee classes (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant), whereas the centre-left party and the two centre-right ones reveal class voting patterns in keeping with the findings in Chapter 2 (*H1*). Indeed, the self-employed are the ones least likely to have voted for the SAP, a party that has «traditionally» drawn the majority of its votes from manifacturing workers (indeed, production workers are 14% more likely to have voted for this party

than clerks are). It has also been gaining popularity among classes of employee, including those at upper-middle, since the late Sixties, which witnessed the post-industrialism transition, the reduction in the size of the working class, and the expansion of the welfare state (Oskarson 2015). Conversely, the self-employed are the most likely to have voted for the M (although the AME concerning small business owners is not statistically significant), whereas production and service workers together with socio-cultural professionals are the ones least likely to have voted for this party (respectively, 14%, 9% and 14%less likely than clerks). The patterns of voting for the L are similar to those of the M: self-employed professionals and large employers on the one hand, and production workers on the other, constitute the classes, respectively, most likely and least likely to have voted for the L (respectively, +10% and -6% than clerks). Furthermore, socio-cultural professionals and service workers are positively associated to having voted for the SAP and negatively associated to having voted for the M, whereas the opposite is true of managers. M2 introduces the measures of political ideologies, and reveals the existence of clear patterns with regard to economic conservatism: its measure is negatively correlated to having voted for the SAP (-33%) and positively correlated to having voted for one of the other three parties[96]. Social conservatism is positively correlated to having voted for the religious-based KD (+35%) and negatively correlated to having voted for the SAP (-20%) or the M (-12%). This latter result was not totally unexpected, since the M has expressed a social liberal stance on issues such as same-sex marriage[97].

[96] The hypothesized convergence on economic dimension between left and right wing parties (*e.g.* Oskarson 2005, 2015; Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015) does not translate in homogeneous electoral bases for what concerns economic values.

[97] It must be stressed that the measure of social conservatism adopted focuses on religiosity and same-sex couples' rights. According to election survey data, M voters do not differ substantially from SAP voters for what concerns low religiosity levels. Indeed, Swedish centre-right parties are the most secular centre-right actors among Northern European countries (Knutsen 2017). Conversely, KD voters show the highest level of religiosity (Granberg, Persson 2013, 153-154).

The measure of authoritarian predispositions measure is positively correlated to having voted for the centre-left actor (+42%). Although this result is not in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H3*), it should be said that Scandinavian elections, especially those of Denmark and Sweden, tend to be characterized by radical left and green parties mobilizing the most libertarian voters, while radical right, centre, agrarian and social democratic voters tend to vote more authoritarian parties[98] (Knutsen 2017, 215). The introduction of political ideologies accounts for a share of the differences between classes in the likelihood of having voted for a specific party: all the aforementioned AMEs are smaller in absolute value, and therefore political ideologies impact the association between social class and vote choices. On the other hand, the AME relating to the association between having voted for the KD and the self-employed professionals and large employers increases in absolute value: had it not been for the positive association between voting for the KD and holding conservative views, this class, which scores high on its measure (see Table A3.1. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for that party (from -3% than clerks in M1 to -5% than clerks in M2). Political attitudes are introduced in M3. According to Oskarson (2015), previous findings pointed to stronger differences among classes on socio-economic issues than on issues such as immigration and environmentalism. Anti-immigration attitude is positively associated to having voted for the M (+19%) and the KD (+6%), and negatively associated to having voted for the L (-10%). Distrust of the EU is negatively associated to having voted for the centre-right parties M and L (-18%)[99] and positively associated to having voted for the KD (+6%). While the findings concerning political attitudes and centre-right parties

[98] According to Kitschelt (1994), the SAP is faced with a more moderate electorate in this regard than are the centre-left parties in other Western European countries. Furthermore, the most libertarian Swedish voters seem to prefer radical left actors. Finally, centre-right parties are situated more centrally in the continuum (Knutsen 2017).

[99] M and L constitute the two parties associated to the most positive value orientations towards EU (Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015).

are in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H4*), having voted for the SAP, on the other hand, is weakly but positively associated to these two measures (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). Finally, distrust of the political system follows the hypothesized pattern (*H5*): its measure is positively associated to having voted for the main losing parties (M and L), and negatively associated to having voted for the winning party (SAP). The introduction of political attitudes reveals four main changes in AMEs of social class. Indeed, controlling for such measures increases the likelihood of production workers having voted for the SAP (from +12% than clerks in M2 to +13% than clerks in M3), based on this class' high level of distrust of the political system (see Table A3.1. in the Appendix). The position of the M on the three issues accounts in part for the limited likelihood of socio-cultural professionals voting for such a party (from -12% than clerks in M2 to -10% than clerks in M3), whereas had it nor been for the M's position on immigration and on distrust of the political system, production workers would be less likely to have voted for it (from -11% than clerks in M2 to -13% than clerks in M3). Finally, if it had not been for the positive association between distrust of the political system and having voted for the L, self-employed professionals and large employers, who score low on the measure of this attitude (see Table A3.1. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this actor (from +9% in M2 to +10% in M3). The kappa indexes are shown in Table 3.4.3. Economic conservatism is the dimension that accounts for the largest share of class polarization computed with regard to all parties (-18.94% than in the bivariate model). Indeed, this dimension is associated with the lowest kappa indexes of the M, L and KD parties. Conversely, the SAP's class polarization is better accounted for by authoritarian predispositions. Although the hypothesis of low levels of class polarization in the case of mainstream actors (*H2*), M is associated to a much higher value of kappa index in the bivariate model than the other political forces (0.81).

*Table 3.4.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2002 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Christian Democrats**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.19***	-0.13**	-0.13***	0.15**	0.11*	0.11*	0.10*	0.09	0.10*	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.21***	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.14***	0.12***	0.13***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.10***	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.09**	-0.06*	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.33***	-0.34***		0.38***	0.34***		0.17***	0.17***		0.06***	0.06***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		-0.20***	-0.23***		-0.12***	-0.11**		0.05	0.05		0.35***	0.36***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.42***	0.35***		-0.11	-0.11		-0.02	0.00		-0.03	-0.03
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.06			0.19***			-0.10**			0.06**
			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.18***			-0.18***			0.06**
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.41***			0.30***			0.15***			0.02
			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159
N	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162

Table 3.4.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2002 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Liberal People's Party**	**Christian Democrats**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.43	0.81	0.67	0.40	0.54	
Socio-demographic	0.46	0.71	0.55	0.40	0.49	-9.93%
Economic cons.	0.47	0.62	0.48	0.35	0.44	-18.94%
Social cons.	0.46	0.71	0.55	0.45	0.50	-8.17%
Authoritarian pred.	0.44	0.71	0.56	0.39	0.48	-10.80%
Political ideologies	0.44	0.63	0.50	0.40	0.45	-17.14%
Political attitudes	0.49	0.71	0.54	0.44	0.50	-8.29%
Full model	0.47	0.64	0.50	0.45	0.46	-14.22%

The 2006 Swedish general election resulted in a coalition government formed by the M, L, KD and C parties («Alliance for Sweden»). Indeed, although the SAP obtained the highest number of votes, it recorded its worst score since 1920 (Aylott, Bolin 2007). The M increased its vote share at the expense of the L and the SAP, and joined forces with the other three main non-social-democratic political forces. The class voting patterns in M1 (Table 3.4.4.) only differ from those shown in Table 3.4.2. as far as voting for the L is concerned. Indeed, the L's electorate now consists mainly of managers, who are the most likely to have voted for this party (6% more so than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant), rather than self-employed professionals and large employers. Small business owners constitute the class most likely to have voted for the C (+6% than clerks), and in fact this party focused on the interests of such a social class during its electoral campaign[100] (Aylott, Bolin 2007). M2 introduces political ideologies, and the same differences shown in Table 3.4.2. are seen here, with one exception: having voted for the L is negatively correlated to social conservatism (-10%). Having voted for the C is associated with economic and social conservatism, and such associations (respectively, +4% and +6%) are in keeping with those previously seen for having voted for KD. Again, by controlling for political ideologies some of the class voting differences pertaining to the two main parties can be accounted for. Specifically, the AMEs of the self-employed classes and production workers fall in absolute value. Turning to the question of political attitudes (M3), the associations between the three measures and voting behaviour follow the hypothesized directions (*H4* and *H5*). Controlling for political attitudes accounts for a share portion of small business owners' high likelihood of having voted for the M (from +20% than clerks in M2 to +19% than clerks in M3), whereas had it not been for the positive association between this voting preference and anti-immigration issue, production workers, who score high on this measure (Table A3.3. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for it (from -12% than clerks in M2 to -14% than clerks in M3).

[100] This class was the most likely to have preferred KD in Table 3.4.2. (despite the relative AME was not statistically significant).

Table 3.4.5. shows the kappa indexes. With regard to Table 3.4.3., despite economic conservatism being the political ideology that accounts for the largest share of class polarization observed for the entire set of parties (-12.05% than in the bivariate model), political attitudes account for a still larger share (-12.94% than in the bivariate model) and the full model accounts for the largest one (-13.96% than in the bivariate model). Economic conservatism is correlated to the largest reduction in the values of the kappa index concerning the M[101] and the C (respectively, down from 0.65 in the bivariate model to 0.55, *i.e.* -15.45%, and from 0.50 in the bivariate model to 0.42, *i.e.* -16.63%). The SAP and the L reveal the lowest kappa index values in the full model (respectively, down from 0.54 in the bivariate model to 0.50, *i.e.* –8.75%, and from 0.50 in the bivariate model to 0.42, *i.e.* -19.87%).

[101] This result is in line with M focus on economic issues during the electoral campaign (Aylott, Bolin 2007).

*Table 3.4.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Center Party**			**Liberal People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.24***	-0.21***	-0.21***	0.31***	0.27***	0.27***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	-0.24***	-0.21***	-0.21***	0.25***	0.20***	0.19***	0.06*	0.06*	0.07**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.17***	0.15***	0.15***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.06**	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.37***	-0.37***		0.43***	0.40***		0.04*	0.04*		0.10***	0.09***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.10*	-0.11*		-0.07	-0.08		0.06**	0.06**		-0.10**	-0.11**
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.36***	0.35***		-0.19**	-0.25***		0.02	0.02		0.05	0.06
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.01			0.30***			-0.03			-0.04
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.07			-0.17***			0.03			-0.09**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.07			0.09			-0.06			0.02
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131
N	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056

Table 3.4.5. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2006 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Center Party**	**Liberal People's Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.54	0.65	0.50	0.58	0.51	
Socio-demographic	0.56	0.63	0.46	0.50	0.48	-5.28%
Economic cons.	0.55	0.55	0.42	0.47	0.45	-12.05%
Social cons.	0.55	0.63	0.46	0.50	0.48	-5.62%
Authoritarian pred.	0.53	0.63	0.47	0.51	0.48	-6.11%
Political ideologies	0.50	0.57	0.43	0.48	0.44	-12.94%
Political attitudes	0.54	0.67	0.45	0.51	0.49	-4.21%
Full model	0.50	0.59	0.42	0.46	0.44	-13.16%

Table 3.4.6. shows the three models for the 2010 Swedish general election, that was held during an ongoing economic downturn which the literature associates with different voting behaviours for different socio-economic groups. Indeed, those voters of a higher socio-economic status were more likely than voters of a lower socio-economic status to vote for centre-right parties, in virtue of the welfare policies adopted by the centre-right coalition government. Indeed, such policies were unfavourable to unemployed and more economically vulnerable citizens (Lindvall, Matinsson, Oscarsson 2013). According to class voting patterns in M1, the self-employed are the ones most likely to have voted for the M and the least likely to have voted for the SAP, whereas the opposite holds true for production workers. Furthermore, the voting patterns of technical professionals and managers are similar of those of the self-employed. Again, the L is least likely to have been voted for by production workers (4% less likely than by clerks). The MP is not characterized by any clear class voting pattern. Indeed, green parties ought to mobilize voters with regard to environmental issues[102]. The ideological value divides (M2) concerning the SAP, the M and the L are similar to those detected in Table 3.4.2.: in the 2010 general election, these three political parties mobilized voters on the same ideological lines as they had done in the 2002 general election. Therefore, having voted for the L is once again positively correlated to social conservatism again (+8%). The MP is negatively associated with the measures of economic and social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions measures (although the AME pertaining to this latter dimension is not statistically significant)[103]. The introduction of political ideologies partly accounts for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the SAP or the M among different social classes, since their AMEs decline in absolute value. Furthermore, by also introducing political attitudes into the full model (M3), an even greater share of such differences is accounted for, especially with

[102] It must be pointed out that the items concerning such an attitude are not covered by all rounds of the *ESS*.

[103] The results in the case of MP lies on the left of the ideological continuums, as previously observed by Oscarsson and Holmberg (2015).

regard to votes for the M. Coming to grips with value voting divides concerning anti-immigration and anti-EU attitudes, the same patterns are detected in Tables 3.4.4. and 3.4.6., and having voted for the MP reveals the same associations observed in the case of the SAP. Finally, the correlations between vote choices and political system distrust differ from the previous models: although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant, having voted for the M is the only voting behaviour negatively correlated to its measure (-9%). Turning now to the class polarization (Table 3.4.7.), the full model accounts for 28.00% of the class polarization observed for the entire set of parties. Indeed, the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the M, MP or L among different social classes are better accounted for by the full model than by any other model performed. Unlike in the first two elections analyzed, the SAP now has the highest kappa index value (0.59), the strongest reduction of which comes about with the introduction of political ideologies (0.44, *i.e.* -25.30% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.4.6. Voting for the main political parties in the 2010 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Environmental Party-The Greens**			**Liberal People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.25***	-0.22***	-0.21***	0.20***	0.17***	0.15**	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.15***	-0.12***	0.12***	0.16***	0.13***	0.12***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.10***	-0.07	-0.06	0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.08*	0.08*	0.08**	-0.08*	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.10***	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.13***	0.09**	0.08*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.41***	-0.43***		0.53***	0.51***		-0.14***	-0.12***		0.09***	0.09***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		-0.05	-0.06		-0.15***	-0.17***		-0.06*	-0.05		0.08***	0.09***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.36***	0.35***		-0.17**	-0.22***		-0.05	-0.02		-0.07	-0.06
		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.03)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.01			0.13**			-0.13***			-0.04
			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.03)
EU distrust			-0.05			-0.18***			-0.00			-0.02
			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			0.07			-0.09			0.03			0.02
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132
N	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609

Table 3.4.7. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2010 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Environmental Party-The Greens**	**Liberal People's Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.59	0.46	0.45	0.54	0.46	
Socio-demographic	0.51	0.42	0.30	0.45	0.38	-17.25%
Economic cons.	0.50	0.38	0.30	0.43	0.36	-20.53%
Social cons.	0.49	0.43	0.31	0.45	0.38	-17.09%
Authoritarian pred.	0.47	0.41	0.29	0.44	0.37	-20.32%
Political ideologies	0.44	0.39	0.32	0.42	0.35	-23.10%
Political attitudes	0.54	0.38	0.24	0.40	0.36	-21.70%
Full model	0.47	0.34	0.26	0.37	0.33	-28.00%

The 2014 Swedish general election was the first held after the Great Recession, and as such was characterized by the positive electoral performance of the SD, due to the new voters it attracted from the centre-right parties, due to its anti-immigration stances[104] (Berg, Oscarsson 2015; Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015), and due to the decline of the L. The results of that election led to a change in the government coalition: the centre-right coalition «did not manage to win the voters' confidence for a third term», and was replaced by a social-democratic and green coalition (Berg, Oscarsson 2015, 91). Table 3.4.8. shows the three models, starting from the one concerning the association between social class and vote choices. It should be said that despite the fact that the literature assumes class cleavage as «thawing» in Western countries, previous findings identified a greater degree of class voting in the 2014 Swedish general election than in any other election held in a Western democracy during the same period (Holmberg, Oscarsson 2015). Observing M1, the voting patterns of the self-employed classes and managers do not vary between the 2010 and 2014 general elections: these classes are the most likely to have voted for the M and the least likely to have voted for the SAP[105]. Conversely, the working classes' voting patterns reveal the opposite correlations with these two parties. However, in the 2014 general election service workers are more likely to have voted for centre-left than production workers are (respectively, +8% than clerks and +7% than clerks). This difference

[104] The SD's mobilization of voters on anti-immigration issue does not imply that Swedish voters had become less tolerant of foreigners, but that such an issue was now more relevant than it had been in previous general elections. Indeed, the class pattern of anti-immigration attitude seems to have remained constant over time: production workers are the most intolerant, whereas the professional classes are the most pro-immigration. The self-employed and other working classes appear to be less critical than production workers are. However, another prominent factor is political distrust, in regard to which class differences widened over time, with higher levels among working classes than among the professionals (Oskarson, Demker 2015).

[105] The same pattern is seen in the case of technical professionals, whose AMEs are not statistically significant.

from the previous models may be due to the competition for the votes of the working classes between this centre-left party and the «anti-establishment» radical right one, the SD. Indeed, this party is more likely to have been voted for by production workers than by the other classes (10% more than clerks). The literature explains the shift of these voters from the SAP to the SD in terms of a realignment process that accounts for the mobilization of this class by the SD on the basis of political distrust and socio-cultural issues[106] (Oskarson, Demker 2015; Oskarson 2015). In keeping with the findings of Chapter 2, socio-cultural professionals are seen as being among those classes least likely to have voted for centre- or radical right parties (respectively, -11% than clerks and -4% than clerks). Furthermore, the self-employed classes are among those most likely to have voted for the radical right actor (although the corresponding AME is not statistically significant). Finally, having voted for the MP is more strongly associated with social class in 2014 than it was in 2010: production workers on the one hand, and self-employed professionals and large employers on the other, are the classes least likely to have voted for this party (respectively, -5% than clerks and -8% than clerks). The value divides concerning political ideologies, introduced in M2, do not differ from the ones observed in previous models, with the exception of the weak (and non-statistically significant) positive association between authoritarian predispositions measure and having voted for the MP (+1%). Again, the introduction of such variables reduces the classes' AMEs concerning the two main political parties in absolute value, with the exception of those AMEs pertaining to the association between being a member of the working classes and having voted for SAP, which do not differ between M1 and M2. Furthermore, the likelihood of production workers having voted for the MP declines when controlling for the three measures: indeed, if it had not been for the negative association between this voting behaviour and economic conservatism, then production workers, who score low in this regard (see Table A3.7. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for this party (from -5% than

[106] It should be said that the SAP has been losing its appeal to the working classes since the Nineties (Oskarson, Demker 2015).

clerks in M1 to -6% than clerks in M2). As hypothesized (*H3*), the differences in the likelihood of having voted for «anti-establishment» radical right actors are more related to political attitudes than to political ideologies. According to value voting divides in M3, having voted for the SD is positively associated with anti-immigration attitude (+29%) and to the distrust of the political system (+10%). Having voted for the SAP is unexpectedly positively correlated (*H4*) to the measure of anti-immigration (+9%, although this AME is not statistically significant), whereas having voted for the MP is negatively correlated to the same variable (-11%). Distrust of the EU is positively correlated to having voted for the SAP and the SD (respectively, +9% and +1%, although these AMEs are not statistically significant), and negatively correlated to having voted for the M and the MP (respectively, -21% and -4%, although this latter AME is not statistically significant). Finally, having voted for the M is positively correlated to distrust of the political system (+21%), whereas the opposite holds true in relation to having voted for the SAP (-18%), which was the party that gained the largest share of the votes (*H5*). In keeping with the expectations (*H6*), controlling for political attitudes provides a more fine-grained assessment of working class voting patterns: the AME for production workers and having voted for the SD is roughly halved between one model and the other (from +10% than clerks in M2 to +5% than clerks in M3), whereas had it no been for the negative association between having voted for the SAP and the distrust of the political system, service workers, who score high this measure (see Table A3.7. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +8% than clerks in M2 to +9% than clerks in M3). The introduction of the three measures accounts to a degree for the self-employed classes' low likelihood of having voted for the SAP and for socio-cultural professionals' low likelihood of having voted for the M or SD (their AMEs fall in absolute value). Furthermore, had it not been for the positive associations between having voted for the SAP with both EU distrust and anti-immigration attitudes, socio-cultural professionals, who score low on both these measures (see Table A3.7. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +2% than clerks in M2 to +3% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Similarly, if it had not been for the

associations between having preferred M with distrusting either the EU or the political system, the self-employed classes, who score high here (see Table A3.7. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (their AMEs increase in absolute value). Table 3.4.9. shows the kappa indexes, which reveal that the «anti-establishment» actor is associated with the highest level of class polarization (1.17 in the bivariate model), and that such polarization is better accounted for by political attitudes (0.66, *i.e.* -43.69% than in the bivariate model) than by any other factor introduced (*H2* and *H3*). However, its lowest level is the one associated with the full model (0.61, *i.e.* -47.91% than in the bivariate model). Economic conservatism still accounts for the largest share of class polarization in regard to the M (from 0.45 in the bivariate model to 0.33, *i.e.* -27.18%): indeed, this centre-right party used to focus on economic issues in its own political agenda (Berg, Oscarsson 2015). Conversely, the introduction of both political ideologies and political attitudes is associated with the lowest levels of the kappa index for both the SAP and the MP (respectively, down from 0.52 in the bivariate model to 0.39, *i.e.* -17.96%, and from 0.55 in the bivariate model to 0.45, *i.e.* -17.27%). The full model also accounts for the largest share of class polarization when observed at the level of all parties (-37.50% than in the bivariate model). Compared to previous elections, the rise of the «anti-establishment» and radical right party means shorter-term issues have become more relevant in public debate (see Berg, Oscarsson 2015) and as mediators of the relationship between social class and electoral preferences.

The results set out in Tables 3.4.2., 3.4.4., 3.4.6. and 3.4.8. show strong, lasting alignments of the self-employed classes and managers with having voted for the M, and of the working classes with having voted for the SAP, which, respectively, constitute those two party's main electoral bases. However, an element of realignment is observed with regard to the SAP: production workers are now attracted towards the SD, which competes with the centre-left actor for their votes, while service workers became the new key voters of the SAP at the 2014 general election. Therefore in Swedish elections, the self-employed classes and managers result the preserve of the main centre-right party, especially given the decline of other centre-right forces (mainly the L in 2002 and the C in 2006).

However, the SD's electorate also comprises a non-negligible number of self-employed voters. Conversely, the working classes are now contested between the latter radical right and centre-left and parties (*H1*). Coming to grips with the value divides, the M has strongly pushed its agenda of economic conservatism, pro-EU and anti-immigration policy, while revealing itself to be more socially liberal than other Western European centre-right actors, in particular as far as concerns religious matters (see Knutsen 2017). Conversely, having voted for the SAP is constantly negatively correlated to social and economic conservatism, but positively correlated to authoritarian predispositions. Having voted for the SD is strongly associated to with anti-immigration attitude and a distrust of the political system. Therefore, the hypothesis concerning ideological and attitudinal value divides (*H3* and *H4*) has been almost fully corroborated. Furthermore, mainstream parties' class polarization is better accounted for by political ideologies than by political attitudes, unlike that of the SD (*H3*). Indeed, the hypothesized prominence of economic issues in explaining class polarization (see Holmberg, Oscarsson 2015; Oskarson 2015) is revealed in Tables 3.4.3., 3.4.5., 3.4.7. and 3.4.9., particularly as regards the centre-right M party. The kappa indexes show that political attitudes have gained prominence as mediating factors in those elections held during and in particular after the Great Recession (the 2010 and 2014 Swedish general elections), simultaneously with the increase in the SD's share of votes. It should be pointed out that the Swedish party system has been defined as one-dimensional, *i.e.* it has been characterized by party competition centered on the economic dimension (the «super-issue»), since the end of the XIX century (Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015). In the models provided, such a continuum constantly plays a prominent role as a voting and mediating factor, although political attitudes have become the most prominent independent variables as regards both value voting and accounting for class voting patterns. This latter result is connected to the Great Recession and the rise of a radical right and «anti-establishment» political party.

*Table 3.4.8. Voting for the main political parties in the 2014 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**			**Environmental Party-The Greens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.18***	-0.14**	-0.13**	0.19**	0.17**	0.18**	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.08**	-0.08*	-0.08*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	-0.14***	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.12**	0.11**	0.12**	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.07	-0.06	-0.05	0.10***	0.10***	0.05**	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.06*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.08**	-0.06	-0.05	0.08*	0.05	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.11**	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.35***	-0.36***		0.49***	0.48***		0.04	-0.01		-0.12***	-0.10***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.10	-0.11		-0.03	-0.04		0.04	0.04		-0.11**	-0.10**
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31***	0.26***		-0.03	-0.07		-0.07	-0.03		0.01	0.03
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.09			0.06			0.29***			-0.11**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.09			-0.14**			0.01			-0.04
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.18**			0.21***			0.10***			0.01
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176
N	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981

Table 3.4.9. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2014 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Swedish Democrats**	**Environmental Party-The Greens**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.52	0.45	1.17	0.55	0.66	
Socio-demographic	0.49	0.39	0.95	0.53	0.56	-14.30%
Economic cons.	0.47	0.33	0.94	0.50	0.54	-17.47%
Social cons.	0.49	0.39	0.96	0.51	0.56	-14.88%
Authoritarian pred.	0.46	0.39	0.95	0.52	0.56	-15.23%
Political ideologies	0.43	0.35	0.91	0.46	0.52	-20.86%
Political attitudes	0.45	0.38	0.66	0.52	0.46	-30.24%
Full model	0.39	0.35	0.61	0.45	0.41	-37.50%

3.5. Electoral mobilization in the United Kingdom: class cleavage realignments, the stability of economic divide, and the rising importance of political attitudes

The parties covered by the analyses of the five United Kingdom general elections held between 2001 and 2017 are shown in Table 3.5.1. However, *ESS* data does not enable to analyze the 2019 election. Compared to the official results shown in Table 3.3.2., the dependent variables do not include the Scottish regionalist party (Scottish National Party)[107], while the ones concerning the 2005 and 2010 elections do not include the UK Independence Party (UKIP), since too few respondents stated having voted for that party. The United Kingdom elections have always been characterized by the competition between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, which have mobilized, respectively, the working and bourgeois classes (Enyedi 2005).

> «The political system in the United Kingdom is usually described as a two-party system that is defined by a single Left–Right dimension, with the Labour Party on the Left and the Conservative Party on the Right. […] With the rise of the Labour Party in the first part of the twentieth century socio-economic class became the most politically salient division in society and Left and Right were seen primarily in economic terms. The Labour Party represented the working class or labor, and the Conservatives, representing capital, were seen as defenders of the middle classes.» (Wheatley 2016, 459)

Previous analyses have identified a weakening of class voting in the United Kingdom since the Sixties and Seventies, which is linked to the transformation of the economy and the labour market, and to the more centrist strategies of the two main parties[108] (Evans, Tilley 2013, 2017; Wheatley 2016; Barisione, De

[107] Chapter 2 did not account for regionalist parties either. Indeed, regionalist actors only participate in general elections in their specific areas of interest. Accordingly, they cannot be voted for thorough the entire country, and thus an independent variable would be required that focuses on the voters' place of residence in order to accurately account for their voting patterns.

[108] In terms of value divides, the typical or average voter is now identified as the member of the middle class, rather than as the manual worker. This had consequences on the parties' strategies. However, any change in such strategies must be perceived by voters in order to yield a change in actual voting (Evans, Tilley 2017).

Luca 2018). However, political realignment literature states that class voting has been reshaped, with the spreading of two main forms of behaviour identified: abstention and voting for new political parties, therefore abandoning mainstream actors (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Evans, Tilley 2017). Indeed, according to Evans and Tilley (2017, 2), class division

> «remains a key element of Britain's political picture, but in a new way. Whereas working class people once formed the heart of the class structure and the focal point of political competition, they now lack political representation. This is because the political environment has changed. Parties have reacted to changing class structures by changing their ideology, policy programmes, rhetoric, and elite recruitment strategies. Vote-seeking parties now focus on the middle class, not the working class […]»

In Britain, such a realignment refers to the aftermath of the Great Recession and the phase of strong popularity enjoyed by UKIP. This «anti-establishment» and radical right party obtained votes from people with the lowest levels of socio-economic status by leveraging their economic and social deprivation resulting from the processes of change and the financial crisis witnessed in Western democracies, respectively, in the second half of the XX century and during the Two-Thousands. Such people have been referred to as the «left behind» voters[109] (Ford, Goodwin 2014).

[109] Chapter 1 discussed the similarity between the concepts of «left behind» (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Gidron, Hall 2017) and «losers of globalization» (Kriesi *et al.* 2006). Many authors (*e.g.* Wheatley 2016; Ceccarini 2018) agree that the two are almost synonymous. Herein, the term «left behind» is used.

Table 3.5.1. Frequency distribution and total sample numbers for each category of vote choice dependent variable pertaining to the United Kingdom. Weighted data.

Election day	Party	N	%	N tot	*ESS* data
7th June 2001	Labour Party	856	47.67%	1 800	Round 1-2
	Conservative Party	511	28.39%		
	Liberal Democratic Party	300	16.68%		
5th May 2005	Labour Party	1 020	41.14%	2 479	Round 3-4
	Conservative Party	766	30.89%		
	Liberal Democratic Party	455	18.37%		
6th May 2010	Conservative Party	1 124	34.62%	3 247	Round 5-7
	Labour Party	1 049	32.32%		
	Liberal Democratic Party	659	20.31%		
7th May 2015	Conservative Party	503	36.8%	1 346	Round 7-8
	Labour Party	470	30.4%		
	Liberal Democratic Party	137	10.18%		
	UK Indipendence Party	92	6.87%		
8th June 2017	Labour Party	469	41.79%	1 122	Round 9
	Conservative Party	410	36.56%		
	Liberal Democratic Party	95	8.43%		

How having voted for the Labour Party or the Conservative Party correlate to social classes and to political ideologies is shown in Figures 3.5.1. and 3.5.2. The differences observed, both between the two electoral preferences and from election to election, are delved into in the models presented.

Figure 3.5.1. Class composition of the electorate of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in every United Kingdom general election considered. Weighted data.



Figure 3.5.2. Average score of the voters of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party on the measures of the three political ideologies in every United Kingdom general election considered. Weighted data.



The individual probability models concerning voting preferences at the 2001 United Kingdom general election are set out in Table 3.5.2. M1 clearly shows the main differences between the voting patterns of Labours and Conservatives as regards social classes: production and service workers, together with socio-cultural professionals, the classes most likely to have voted for the former (respectively, +22%, +19% and +12% than clerks), and the least likely to have voted for the latter (respectively, -15%, -15% and -10% than clerks). These findings are in keeping with the ones set out in Chapter 2 and with the relative hypothesis (*H1*). Bearing in mind that the literature links the popularity of the Labour Party to its shift towards more centrist positions on economic issues during the 1997 electoral campaign (Bara, Budge 1997), thus appealing to

upper-middle employee classes (Evans, Tilley 2017), it should be added that even technical professionals and managers are among those classes most likely to have voted for this party (respectively, +9% and +6% than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The results show that social class was still key to voting behaviour in the 2001 United Kingdom general election (Andersen, Evans 2003). Finally, the Liberal Democratic Party has performed poorly among small business owners, the working classes, technicians and managers (although only the AME pertaining to production workers is statistically significant). M2 shows that economic conservatism is the ideology characterized by the strongest associations with having voted for one of the two main political forces: its measure is positively correlated to having voted Conservative (+33%) and negatively correlated to having voted Labour (-31%). The value divides pertaining to the other two political ideologies follow the same direction (despite their AMEs are not statistically significant)[110], which is in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H3*). Furthermore, having voted for the Liberals is negatively, albeit weakly, correlated to the three measures in question (the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). The introduction of the three dimensions partly accounts for service workers' vote for the Labour Party (the corresponding AME falls from +19% than clerks in M1 to +18% than clerks in M2). Conversely, had it not been for the negative association of having voted for the Labour Party with the measure of economic conservatism, technical professionals and managers, who score high on that measure[111] (see Table A3.9. in the

[110] The measures of social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions are not significantly associated with having voted for one of the three parties. It must be pointed out that the social conservatism measure focuses on religiosity, which is weakly correlated to voting behaviour in the United Kingdom. The main effect of religion on people's vote choice concerns denominational groups (Tilley 2014).

[111] According to Evans and Tilley (2013), class voting strength in the United Kingdom is mainly mediated by the salience of economic issues at elections. Although parties can strategically emphasize economic ideology or not, class voting patterns with regard to said dimension is constant over time: the working classes are economically

Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (respectively, from +9% than clerks in M1 to +11% than clerks in M2, and from +6% than clerks in M1 to +9% than clerks in M2). Finally, had it not been for the positive association of having voted for the Conservatives with social conservatism, socio-cultural professionals, who score high on its measure (see Table A3.9. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for this party (from -10% than clerks in M1 to -11% than clerks in M2). The full model (M3) provides value voting patterns concerning political attitudes: having voted for Labour is negatively associated with the three measures, whereas having voted for Conservative is positively associated with anti-immigration attitude (+31%) and EU distrust (+28%), and negatively associated with distrust of the political system (-5%, although this AME is not statistically significant); having voted for the Liberal Democrats is negatively associated with anti-immigration attitude (-16%) and positively associated with the other two attitudes (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). It should be pointed out that the positive association between distrust of the EU and having voted for the main centre-right actor does not corroborate the corresponding hypothesis (*H4*), but is strongly tied to the political developments in this country during the second decade of the XXI century. Turning now to the differences among classes in the likelihood of having voted for one of the two main parties, by controlling for political attitudes a share of such differences is accounted for (the AMEs fall in absolute value). In particular, political attitudes account for working classes voting more than political ideologies do (*H6*). The kappa indexes set out in Table 3.5.3. show that the

liberal, manager and business owners are more economically conservative, while employee professionals are more centrist. Indeed, the survey data confirms that more privileged people are keener to favour economic conservative policies, in contrast to less privileged strata of the population. Furthermore, those classes more involved in the market (employers, business owners and managers) share economic conservative principles to a greater degree than do the other upper-middle classes (Evans, Tilley 2017, 61).

Labour Party displays the strongest degree of inter-classism, *i.e.* the lowest kappa index value (0.31 in the bivariate model). Conversely, the Liberal Democratic Party displays the highest value of said index (0.66 in the bivariate model). Class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties is better accounted for by economic conservatism than by any other factor (-7.19% than in the bivariate model), thus confirming the prominence of such an issue at the 2001 general election (Bara, Budge 2001). Political attitudes alone, on the other hand, do not account for any share of class polarization: anti-immigration and EU integration issues, despite revealing constant patterns, were more prominent in the Eighties than in the Nineties and in the early Two-Thousands, before voters were strongly mobilized in regard to such issues in the first two decades of the XXI century (Evans, Tilley 2017).

*Table 3.5.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2001 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.09	0.11*	0.09	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.22***	0.22***	0.21***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.06	0.09**	0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.12**	0.12**	0.10**	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.07*	0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.19***	0.18***	0.17***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.31***	-0.27***		0.33***	0.29***		-0.02	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.09	-0.11*		0.06	0.07		-0.03	-0.03
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.08	-0.03		0.14	0.05		-0.01	0.02
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.15**			0.31***			-0.16***
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.05)
EU distrust			-0.20***			0.28***			0.02
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.05			0.09
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.048	0.071	0.109	0.048	0.071	0.109	0.048	0.071	0.109
N	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800

Table 3.5.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2001 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Labour Party**	**Conservative Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.31	0.50	0.66	0.44	
Socio-demographic	0.33	0.54	0.56	0.42	-4.61%
Economic cons.	0.33	0.50	0.56	0.41	-7.19%
Social cons.	0.32	0.53	0.55	0.41	-5.95%
Authoritarian pred.	0.33	0.55	0.56	0.43	-2.63%
Political ideologies	0.33	0.51	0.56	0.41	-5.62%
Political attitudes	0.35	0.60	0.56	0.45	+1.39%
Full model	0.33	0.55	0.55	0.42	-4.17%

The results of the 2005 United Kingdom general election confirmed the Labour Party's leading parliamentary role, despite its declining share of votes (Clarke *et al.* 2006), as well as the rise of UKIP, which is not accounted for in this analysis. Table 3.5.4. provides the three models concerned. M1 shows class voting patterns similar to the ones seen in Table 3.5.2. (*H1*): production workers, service workers and socio-cultural professionals are the classes most likely to have voted for the Labours (respectively, +18%, +16% and +10% than clerks), and at the same time the least likely to have voted for the Conservatives (respectively, -20%, -16% and -18% than clerks). However, technical professionals are now less likely to have voted Conservative (-9% than clerks), while managers are no longer one of those classes most likely to have voted for the Labour Party (-2% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant). Another difference between the 2001 and 2005 general elections, in terms of class voting patterns, concerns the Liberal Democratic Party, which were now competing with the Labour Party for the votes of socio-cultural professionals, which now constitutes the class most likely to have voted Liberal Democrat (+7% than clerks). Turning to the value divides of political ideologies (M2), economic[112] and social conservatism follow the same patterns as in Table 3.5.2. Conversely, the measure of authoritarian predispositions is now positively associated with having voted for Labour (+22%), and negatively associated with having voted for the Liberal Democrats (-27%). Therefore, the relative hypothesis (*H3*) is only partially corroborated by this evidence. Controlling for political ideologies accounts for a share of the differences between clerks (the reference category) and both production and service workers in terms of their likelihood of having voted Labour or Conservative (their AMEs decline in absolute value). Conversely, had it not been for the positive association between the measure of authoritarian predispositions and having voted for the Labour Party, socio-cultural professionals,

[112] Economic issues were strongly focused on by the two main political parties: the likelihood of having voted for the Conservatives increases as the degree of economic conservatism rises, whereas the opposite can be said in the case of having voted for the Labours (Green, Hobolt 2008).

who score low on this measure (see Table A3.11. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +10% than clerks in M1 to +12% than clerks in M2). Since having voted Liberal Democrat is negatively correlated to the same measure, its introduction accounts for a share of the high likelihood of this class having voted for this party (from +7% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2). M3 includes political attitudes, and the corresponding value divides are the same as in Table 3.5.4., with the sole exception of the negative correlation between distrust of the EU and having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party (-4%, although this AME is not statistically significant). It should be pointed out that the immigration issue was held by the Conservative Party during the 2005 electoral campaign, by focusing on the Iraq war after the events of the 11th of September 2001 (Clarke *et al.* 2006; Green, Hobolt 2008). On the other hand, the hypotheses concerning distrust of the EU (*H4*) and of the political system (*H5*) are not fully confirmed. Since production workers score high on the measures of anti-immigration attitude and distrust of the EU (see Table A3.11. in the Appendix), they would be more likely to have voted for the centre-left party had it not been for this party's negative association with these two measures (from +15% than clerks in M2 to +16% than clerks in M3). Conversely, had it not been for the Conservative Party's positive association with the such measures, service workers, who score high on them (see Table A3.11. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for them (from -13% than clerks in M2 to -14% than clerks in M3). Controlling for political attitudes accounts for a part of socio-cultural professionals' likelihood of having voted for one of the three political forces (the AMEs pertaining to this class decline in absolute value): indeed, they score low on all three measures (see Table A3.11. in the Appendix). Table 3.5.5. shows the kappa indexes: Labour Party, once again, is associated with the lowest degree of class polarization in the bivariate model (0.21), which is not accounted for by the introduction of further factors, with the sole exception of authoritarian predispositions (-0.63% than in the bivariate model). The highest value of the kappa index is no longer associated with the Liberal Democratic Party, but the Conservative Party (0.38 in the bivariate model). The largest portion of class polarization relating to the latter is accounted

for by economic conservatism (0.35, *i.e.* -7.68% than in the bivariate model), which is what is observed regarding the entire set of parties (-7.52% than in the bivariate model). Therefore, the class polarization characterizing votes for the two main parties is better accounted for by political ideologies than by political attitudes (*H2*). Furthermore, the latter do not provide any greater insight as regards the working classes' AMEs than political ideologies do, and this does not fir the corresponding hypothesis (*H6*). On the other hand, the largest share of the Liberal Democratic Party's class polarization is accounted for by the introduction of political attitudes (0.26, *i.e.* -30.68% than in the bivariate model). Economic conservatism remains the most prominent variable accounting for class voting patterns. However, shorter-term issues, such as immigration, are gaining prominence (Clarke *et al.* 2006). Indeed, political attitudes account for a larger portion of class polarization in the 2005 general election than in the one held in the 2001 (see Table 3.5.3.).

*Table 3.5.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.18***	0.15***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.10**	0.12***	0.10**	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.16***	0.07**	0.06*	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.16***	0.14***	0.14***	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.24***	-0.24***		0.39***	0.37***		-0.05	-0.04
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.20***	-0.24***		0.17***	0.20***		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.22**	0.22**		0.14*	0.04		-0.27***	-0.19***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.05			0.23***			-0.20***
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.12*			0.23***			-0.04
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.30***			-0.02			0.12**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.050	0.085	0.112	0.050	0.085	0.112	0.050	0.085	0.112
N	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479

Table 3.5.5. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Labour Party**	**Conservative Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.21	0.38	0.37	0.28	
Socio-demographic	0.22	0.40	0.33	0.28	+0.20%
Economic cons.	0.24	0.35	0.31	0.26	-7.52%
Social cons.	0.25	0.40	0.34	0.29	+2.33%
Authoritarian pred.	0.21	0.42	0.33	0.28	+0.36%
Political ideologies	0.25	0.37	0.34	0.28	-0.96%
Political attitudes	0.28	0.39	0.26	0.27	-3.29%
Full model	0.30	0.35	0.28	0.27	-4.05%

Table 3.5.6. shows the models for the 2010 United Kingdom general election, which resulted in a decline in support for Labours (Evans, Chzhen 2013) linked to the ongoing financial crisis (Green, Prosser 2016), and in the constitution of the first coalition government since 1945. That government comprised the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, and was led by a conservative and Eurosceptic leader (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Green, Prosser 2016). Again, the class voting patterns in M1 show that the working classes and socio-cultural professionals are those most likely to have voted for the Labour Party (respectively, +14%, +6% and +4% than clerks, although the AME pertaining to socio-cultural professionals is not statistically significant), and the least likely to have voted for the Conservative Party (respectively, -11%, -1% and -5% than clerks, although the AMEs pertaining to service workers and socio-cultural professionals are not statistically significant). The Conservative Party obtained most of its votes among the self-employed classes and managers (although the AME pertaining to self-employed professionals and large employers is not statistically significant). Finally, production workers and small business owners are those least likely to have voted Liberal (respectively, -6% than clerks and -8% than clerks). By introducing political ideologies into M2 it is possible to observe that the strong appeal of the Conservative Party to those classes most involved in the market, *i.e.* the self-employed classes and managers, can be partly accounted for by the position of that party on the economic dimension, whose measure the aforementioned classes score high on (see Table A3.13. in the Appendix). Indeed, the corresponding AMEs fall in absolute value in M2, as do those concerning the likelihood of production and service workers having voted for the Conservatives or Labour. No differences are observed between the ideological value divides in Table 3.5.4. and in Table 3.5.6., with the exception of the weak but positive association of having voted for the Labour Party with social conservatism (+1%, although this AME is not statistically significant). M3 includes political attitudes: again, no differences are detected with respect to the same model performed for the previous election, with the sole exception of the correlation between having voted for the Labour Party and the measure of distrust of the political system. Indeed, the change in government determined a value

opposition between the likelihood of having voted either for the Conservatives, which is negatively correlated to such a variable (-55%), or for Labour, the losing party, which is positively correlated to the same variable (+16%), as per the corresponding hypothesis (*H5*). Moreover, the decision to vote for the Liberals is positively associated with such an attitude (+13%), despite this party joined the governing coalition. The introduction of the variable of the distrust of the political system, in regard to which the classes score high (see Table A3.13. in the Appendix), accounts for a further share of production workers' low likelihood of having voted for the Conservative Party (from -10% than clerks in M2 to -9% than clerks in M3), as well as part of service workers' high likelihood of having voted for the Labour Party (from +5% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3). Therefore, political attitudes provide further insight on the working classes voting patters, as hypothesized (*H6*). Conversely, had it not been for the positive correlation between having voted Conservatives and anti-immigration views, managers, who score low on this measure (see Table A3.13. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +6% than clerks in M2 to +7% than clerks in M3). This class has been more likely to vote in this way despite this party's position on immigration. Indeed, survey data on British voters revealed the increased salience of this issue between 2005 and 2010, due to a general negative assessment of how the Labour government had been handling it and to the belief that the opposition would be able to deal with the issue in a more competent manner (Evans, Chzhen 2013)[113]. Turning to the question of class polarization, the measures of which are set out in Table 3.5.7., the Labour Party continues to be associated with the lowest value (0.21 in the bivariate model). The kappa index of the Conservative Party falls if economic conservatism and political attitudes are introduced, and thus said index's largest reduction is observed in the full model (down from 0.49 in the bivariate model to 0.39, *i.e.* -19.57%). Whilst economic conservatism is the political ideology

[113] According to Evans and Chzhen (2013), the immigration issue became more relevant than the ongoing financial crisis in generating a negative assessment of the Labour government.

that accounts for the largest share of class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties (-13.62% than in the bivariate model), political attitudes become more prominent mediators (-21.96% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.5.6. Voting for the main political parties in the 2010 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	0.08**	0.06*	0.06*	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.10***	0.06**	0.07**	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.06*	0.05*	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.37***	0.31***		-0.29***	-0.27***		-0.02	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.10**	0.07*		0.01	-0.00		-0.17***	-0.16***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.14*	0.04		0.03	0.07		-0.16**	-0.10
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.29***			-0.12**			-0.24***
			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.34***			-0.20***			-0.11**
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.55***			0.16***			0.13**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.038	0.066	0.099	0.038	0.066	0.099	0.038	0.066	0.099
N	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247

Table 3.5.7. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2010 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Conservative Party**	**Labour Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.49	0.21	0.52	0.37	
Socio-demographic	0.49	0.23	0.42	0.34	-7.81%
Economic cons.	0.43	0.25	0.41	0.32	-13.62%
Social cons.	0.49	0.24	0.43	0.35	-6.48%
Authoritarian pred.	0.49	0.23	0.42	0.34	-7.96%
Political ideologies	0.44	0.26	0.42	0.33	-11.09%
Political attitudes	0.43	0.21	0.33	0.29	-21.96%
Full model	0.39	0.23	0.33	0.28	-23.94%

The 2015 United Kingdom general election, the models for which are shown in Table 3.5.8., resulted in government being led by the Conservative Party, the decline of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the emergence of UKIP as the third major political force (Green, Prosser 2016). The unprecedented electoral volatility (Green, Prosser 2016; Surridge 2020) seems to have resulted in less clearly defined class voting patterns in M1. Indeed, self-employed professionals and large employers are now less likely to have voted for the Conservatives (-12% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant), and more likely to have voted for the Labours (+4% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant) or the Liberal Democrats (+6% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant). The Liberal Democratic Party was also popular among the upper-middle classes. Again, socio-cultural professionals, service workers and production workers are among the classes most likely to have voted Labour (respectively, +5%, +8% and +1% than clerks, although the AMEs pertaining to socio-cultural professionals and production workers are not statistically significant). However, the latter now constitute the main electoral base of UKIP (+7% than clerks). As expected, this «anti-establishment» actor is more likely to have been voted for by manual workers, and compete for their votes with the centre-left party, which in turn has turned its focus to retaining the voted of the middle classes since the 1997 general election (Ford, Goodwin 2014). The movement of voters from mainstream left-wing parties to radical right forces, due to their disaffection towards social-democratic actors, has already been detected in Western democracies (Rennwald 2020) and mainly pertains to the lowest social strata, labelled as the «left behind» (Ford, Goodwin 2014). However, M1 shows that such an account only concerns production workers, since service workers constitute the class most likely to have voted Labour. Furthermore, besides the so-called «Labour leavers» (Surridge 2020), a non-negligible portion of new UKIP voters came from those who had voted Conservative in 2010 (Green, Prosser 2016): indeed, small business owners constitute the second class most likely to have voted for UKIP (+4% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant). These patterns are in line with the relative hypothesis (*H1*), with the exception of the dealignment of the association between having

voted for the Conservative Party and the class of self-employed professionals and large employers, previously detected by Barisione and De Luca (2018). Political ideological value divides, accounted for in M2, show only one difference with respect to Table 3.5.6.: having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party is now positively associated to economic conservatism (+5%, although this AME is not statistically significant). As hypothesized (*H3*), having voted for the «anti-establishment» party is weakly associated with the three measures. However, its negative association with social conservatism (-8%) must be pointed out. Indeed, UKIP differs from other radical right parties that have recently emerged in Western European countries since it stands within «the grey area» of the socio-cultural divides, which do not concern the three specific issues the party leverage: opposition to EU membership, opposition to the effects of immigration on Britain's economy and society, and disaffection towards the political and party system of the United Kingdom and disappointment with its management of the financial crisis[114] (Ford, Goodwin 2014). Whilst introducing political ideologies reduces the working classes' likelihood of having voted for Conservative or Labour, (the relative AMEs decline in absolute value), had it not been for the positive correlation of economic conservatism with the former party and its negative correlation with the Labour Party, self-employed professionals and large employers, who score high on this measure (see Table A3.15. in the Appendix), would be, respectively, less and more likely to have voted for the two political forces in question (respectively, from -12% than clerks in M1 to -14% than clerks in M2, and from +4% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2, although the AMEs pertaining to Labour are not statistically significant). Since socio-cultural professionals score high on social conservatism and low on economic conservatism (see Table A3.15. in the Appendix), had it not been for the

[114] The disaffection towards the party system on the part of «left behind» voters concerns not only the Labour Party, which had previously been popular among those voters, but also Conservative Party. Indeed, the moderating strategies pursued by them generated a share of marginalized voters who were subsequently attracted towards the aforementioned «anti-establishment» party (Ford, Goodwin 2014).

associations between these two variables and having voted for the Liberal Democrats, this class would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +5% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2). Finally, the same class would be more likely to have voted for the Conservative Party had it not been for the stances of this political force as regards social conservatism (from -9% than clerks in M1 to -11% than clerks in M2). Turning to the value divides concerning political attitudes, the full model (M3) in Table 3.5.8. shows the same value divides concerning political attitudes that emerged in Table 3.5.6. as regards the three mainstream parties. As hypothesized (*H3*), having voted for the «anti-establishment» party is associated more with political attitudes than with political ideologies. This party is positively correlated to both anti-immigration (+16%) and the distrust of EU (+22%), but is negatively correlated to the distrust of the political system (-7%). It should be pointed out that the *ESS* data for the 2015 United Kingdom general election was collected between 2015 and 2017, and that the average score of UKIP voters on such a measure has declined considerably over the years[115]. Generally speaking, the value divides are in keeping with the results provided in the literature (*e.g.* Green, Prosser 2016), and corroborate the patterns hypothesized (*H4* and *H5*). Turning now to the changes in the AMEs pertaining to social class, controlling for political attitudes accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for one of the three mainstream parties in the case of self-employed professionals and large employers, socio-cultural professionals and service workers[116] (their AMEs decline in absolute value). As hypothesized (*H3*), political attitudes better accounts for having voted for the «anti-establishment» radical right actor than political ideologies do:

[115] It must be also said that between 2015 and 2017 the government was led by the Conservative Party, which, together with UKIP, called for the Brexit referendum. Furthermore, UKIP lost almost all of its vote share in the 2017 general election.

[116] The AMEs of service workers are affected by the introduction of the distrust of EU and the political system, since they score low on the former and high on the latter (see Table A3.15. in the Appendix).

the introduction of such variables accounts for a share of production workers' considerable likelihood of having voted for that party (from +7% than clerks in M2 to +5% than clerks in M3). Indeed, production workers score highest on all three measures. Conversely, since the self-employed classes score low on the measure of anti-immigration, while self-employed professionals and large employers also score low on the measure of distrust of the EU (see Table A3.15. in the Appendix), had it not been for this party's stance on this issue, these two classes would be more likely to have voted for the same political force (their AMEs increase in absolute value, although the one pertaining to self-employed professionals and large employers is not statistically significant). In keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H2*), UKIP displays the strongest degree of class voting (0.74 in the bivariate model) in Table 3.5.9., and the largest reduction in this value is associated with the full model (0.50, *i.e.* -32.34% than in the bivariate model). Such a result is in line with the literature, which defines UKIP's strategy as an attempt to mobilize a specific class according to specific value divides, while holding unclear positions on issues other than immigration and EU membership (Evans, Tilley 2017). Conversely, the degree of class polarization pertaining to the Conservative Party and the Labour Party (still associated to the lowest kappa index value in the bivariate model) are better accounted for by political ideologies than by any other factor (respectively, down from 0.35 in the bivariate model to 0.32, *i.e.* -7.27%, and from 0.20 in the bivariate model to 0.15, *i.e.* -22.88%). At the all-party level, economic conservatism remains the one political ideology that accounts for the largest share of its class polarization (-18.86%), although political attitudes do play a more prominent mediating role (-19.17%). The primary importance of the value divides based on political attitudes has been identified by other authors (*e.g.* Wheatley 2016), and is linked to the entry on the electoral scene of a new political actor that leverages these dimensions.

The models show that social class was still a prominent factor in voting behaviour in the United Kingdom general elections in the first two decades of the XXI century. The working classes and socio-cultural professionals constitute the electoral base of the Labour Party: the latter class is contested between this party

and the Liberal Democratic Party, which had become popular among the upper-middle classes over the course of time, with the exception of small business owners; the working classes, on the other hand, are contested between the centre-left mainstream party and the rising «anti-establishment» radical right actor (*H1*). Indeed, UKIP has targeted the lowest strata of the population, by opposing the «left behind» working classes to the upper-middle classes (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Green, Prosser 2016; Wheatley 2016). However, it failed to generate any new value divides within the framework of United Kingdom electoral competition, but has introduced in and has given political expression to already existing divides (Ford, Goodwin 2014). Therefore, a realignment process was in progress, which may have «stopped» in 2017, to judge by this party's loss of votes. Another realignment process concerns managers, who were more likely to vote for Labour in the 2001 general election, but who subsequently joined small business owners as part of the Conservatives' electorate. As far as value divides are concerned, economic conservatism remains the most prominent political ideology mediating the association between social class and voting behaviour, especially as regards the two main political actors, *i.e.* the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. However, this prominence has been overcome by political attitudes over the course of recent elections. As was observed in the Swedish case, shorter-term factors became more relevant factors in voting behaviour and more important mediators of class voting both during (*i.e.* 2010 general election) and after the Great Recession (*i.e.* 2015 general election), together with the contemporary rise of the «anti-establishment» parties. Indeed, according to Evans and Tilley (2017, 10):

> «economic issues are still related to class, with the middle classes wanting less interventionist and redistributive policies, and issues such as immigration and the EU are also powerfully divisive along class and education lines. […] Objective inequalities, perceptions of those inequalities, awareness of class position and divisions, and the political ideologies of the different classes largely remain unchanged in Britain.»

*Table 3.5.8. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.12	-0.14*	-0.11	0.04	0.06	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05*	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.08*	0.08*	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.07**	0.07**	0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.09	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.05*	0.06*	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	0.08*	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.41***	0.28***		-0.40***	-0.32***		-0.00	-0.04		0.05	0.08**
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.15**	0.07		0.01	0.06		-0.08*	-0.09**		-0.07	-0.06
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.16	-0.04		-0.00	0.07		0.01	0.00		-0.01	0.05
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.32***			-0.20***			0.16***			-0.18***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.03)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.32***			-0.19**			0.22***			-0.16***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.73***			0.41***			-0.07*			0.09
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190
N	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346

Table 3.5.9. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Conservative Party**	**Labour Party**	**UK Independence Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.35	0.20	0.74	0.54	0.45	
Socio-demographic	0.35	0.18	0.56	0.46	0.37	-17.31%
Economic cons.	0.35	0.18	0.56	0.43	0.36	-18.86%
Social cons.	0.36	0.18	0.55	0.46	0.37	-17.94%
Authoritarian pred.	0.35	0.26	0.56	0.46	0.37	-17.58%
Political ideologies	0.32	0.15	0.52	0.43	0.34	-23.03%
Political attitudes	0.41	0.21	0.53	0.40	0.36	-19.17%
Full model	0.39	0.18	0.50	0.36	0.34	-24.82%

3.6. The instability of class voting patterns over the first two decades of the XXI century in German federal elections

Germany held five federal elections between 2002 and 2017, characterized by strong competition between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the coalition constituted by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) which had dominated the elections in West Germany and continued to do so in the reunified Germany[117]. The literature agrees that these two mainstream actors have been strategically moderating their positions on key issues over the course of time, tending towards a «catch-all» position: the SDP has abandoned its historical Marxist views, in keeping with the economic and labour market transition to post-industrialism, while the CDU/CSU coalitions has adopted slightly more secular opinions, in keeping with the process of societal secularization. This convergence of political positions resulted in the «Grand Coalition» formed after the 2005 federal election. However, class and religious cleavages are considered to have persisted[118], at least up until the 2009 federal election. The results of this latter election showed a strong decline in the SDP's share of votes, which enabled the constitution of a coalition government comprising the CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a smaller centre-right actor that subsequently lost all of its parliamentary seats at the 2013 election

[117] The East Germany versions of these parties tended to merge with their Western counterparts (Elff 2013, 281).

[118] According to Elff and Roßteutscher (2011), religious and class cleavages characterized German elections at least until the 2009 elections. The changes in both the social composition of the electorate and the mobilization strategies adopted by political parties, resulted in slight changes in these cleavages. As regards the class cleavage, the working classes have always been mobilized by the SDP, which has moderated its position on economic questions to gain popularity among the middle employee classes. This strategy has intensified the competition for the votes of the working class among left-wing parties. The analysis of the two cleavages should be assessed separately for East and West Germany (Elff, Roßteutscher 2011; 2017): the variable concerning the area of residence of respondents has already been discussed, specifically in Chapter 2.

(Elff 2013; Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). The CDU/CSU has been in power since 2005. This coalition differs from Scandinavian and United Kingdom mainstream centre-right parties: whilst the latter are characterized by a secular type of social conservatism, the CDU/CSU is associated with a more «traditionalist» version of the same ideology (see Elff 2009). The main German radical left party, which subsequently merged in The Left, was the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), a political force related to the former communist Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Elff 2013). Finally, the main radical right party in Germany is the Alternative for Germany (AfD): founded in 2013, it gained its first parliamentary seats at the 2017 federal election. It has not been possible to analyze that election since the *ESS* data available for it only concerns one respondent from the self-employed professionals and large employers class.

Table 3.6.1. Frequency distribution and total sample numbers for each category of vote choice dependent variable pertaining to Germany. Weighted data.

Election day	First four parties	N	%	N tot	*ESS* data
22nd September 2002	Social Democratic Party of Germany	1 066	35.78%	2 980	Round 1-2
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	985	33.08%		
	Alliance 90/The Greens	391	13.11%		
	Free Democratic Party	219	7.33		
18th September 2005	Social Democratic Party of Germany	968	33.53%	2 887	Round 3-4
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	941	32.58%		
	Free Democratic Party	287	9.93%		
	Party of Democratic Socialism	274	9.50%		
27th September 2009	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	1 058	33.88%	3 123	Round 5-6
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	849	27.20%		
	Free Democratic Party	335	10.74%		
	The Left	300	9.62%		
23rd September 2013	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	1 328	36.99%	3 589	Round 7-8
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	968	26.99%		
	Alliance 90/The Greens	470	13.08%		
	The Left	359	10.00%		
24th September 2017	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	432	33.07%	1 307	Round 9
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	298	22.83%		
	Free Democratic Party	117	8.94%		
	Alternative for Germany	81	6.22%		

Again, Figures 3.6.1. and 3.6.2. introduce to the bivariate associations between the electoral preference for the main centre-left and centre-right parties.

Figure 3.6.1. Class composition of the electorate of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the CDU/CSU in every German federal election considered. Weighted data.



Figure 3.6.2. Average score of the voters of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the CDU/CSU on the measures of the three political ideologies in every German federal election considered. Weighted data.



The SDP won the 2002 federal elections, the models of which are presented in Table 3.6.2. Class voting patterns in M1 provides four main insights. The self-employed classes are those most likely to have voted for the main centre-right party (+13% than clerks), and the least likely to have voted for the SDP. This latter actor is more popular among production workers and technical professionals than among other classes (respectively, +5% and +3% than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Alliance 90/The Greens has been voted for in the main by self-employed professionals and large employers (+9% than clerks). The same party competes for their votes with the CDU/CSU, as well as by socio-cultural professionals (+14% than clerks), a class which is among the ones least likely to have voted for the other parties standing for

elections. Finally, the FDP was voted for in the main by the self-employed classes and managers (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). Therefore, the hypothesis concerning class voting patterns (*H1*) is corroborated as far as the centre-right parties are concerned, whereas the SDP is seen to be a more «catch-all» party, and this feature enabled it to win both the 1998 and the 2002 elections (see Elff, Roßteutscher 2011). M2, which includes political ideologies, shows clear-cut social and economic conservatism value divides: both dimensions are positively correlated to having voted for centre-right actors and negatively correlated to having voted centre-left and green actors[119], in keeping with the relative hypothesis (*H3*). On the other hand, having voted the green coalition is the only vote choice negatively correlated to authoritarian predispositions measure. Furthermore, this choice is more strongly related to this dimension than to the other two (-36%). In view of these ideological voting patterns, it should be said that, according to the literature, the CDU/CSU has always mobilized voters by leveraging religious stances, in opposition to secular and «detraditionalized» left-wing parties (Elff 2013). Indeed, having voted for this coalition is strongly correlated to the measure of social conservatism (+55%). German elections have also always been characterized by the strong opposition between centre-right and left-green parties with regard to economic issues (Schoen, Schumann 2007). Finally, the associations between the three ideologies and having voted for the green coalition is in keeping with the description of said political force provided by the literature: this coalition brought together environmentally-minded groups and «new social», anti-nuclear, pacifist and feminist movements (Elff 2013). Political ideologies account for a share of class voting differences regarding the two main political parties: indeed, the social classes' AMEs relating to having voted for the SDP or CDU/CSU decline in absolute value. The same as far as the correlation between having voted for the green coalition and the classes of socio-cultural professionals is concerned (from +14% than clerks in M1 to +12% than clerks in M2) and of self-employed professionals and large

[119] The relative AMEs pertaining to the green coalition and the association between the FDP and social conservatism are not statistically significant.

employers (from +9% than clerks in M1 to +5% than clerks in M2). The full model (M3) incorporates political attitudes. The corresponding value divides see the preference for left-green actors opposed to that of having voted for centre-right parties: the tendency to have voted for the formed is negatively correlated to both anti-immigration attitude and to political system distrust, but positively correlated to distrust of the EU; in the case of the latter parties, on the other hand, the opposite correlations hold true. With regard to the relative hypotheses (*H4* and *H5*), the only unexpected result concerns voters' distrust of the EU, the weak (and statistically non-significant) AMEs indicating a positive correlation between such attitude and having voted for the SDP (+6%) or the green coalition (+1%)[120]. It should be pointed out that the mainstream parties' opposing stances on immigration issues are in keeping with the results of previous studies (*e.g.* Schoen, Schumann 2007). Controlling for the three attitudinal dimensions accounts for a further share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the CDU/CSU or for the green coalition in the case of socio-cultural professionals (respectively, from -13% than clerks in M2 to -11% than clerks in M3, and from +12% than clerks in M2 to +11% than clerks in M3). Also the difference in the likelihood of having voted for the SPD between small business owners and clerks (the reference category) is partly accounted for by the introduction of these three measures (from -12% in M2 to -11% in M1 than clerks). Conversely, since self-employed professionals and large employers score low on anti-immigration (see Table A3.17. in the Appendix), if it were not for CDU/CSU and SDP, respectively, positive and negative associations with its measure, they would be, respectively, more and less likely to have voted for the two parties (respectively, from +13% than clerks in M2 to +15% than clerks in M3, and from -18% than clerks in M2 to -19% than clerks in M3). Finally, socio-cultural professionals would be less likely to have voted for the SDP (from -5% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3) had it not been for the negative associations

[120] Furthermore, the AME pertaining to anti-immigration attitude and having voted for the FDP and the AME pertaining to political system distrust and having voted for the CDU/CSU or the green coalition are not statistically significant.

between this voting behaviour and the measures of anti-immigration attitude and of political system distrust, in regard to which this class scores low (see Table A3.17. in the Appendix). Table 3.6.3. shows the corresponding kappa indexes. The highest level of class polarization is associated with the green coalition (0.59 in the bivariate model)[121], the strongest reduction of which is seen in the full model (0.30, *i.e.* -49.78% than the bivariate model). Similarly to what was observed for the United Kingdom general elections, the main centre-left party in Germany is characterized by the weakest degree of class polarization (0.21 in the bivariate level). The class polarization of the centre-right parties is better accounted for by political ideologies, especially economic conservatism, than by any other factor. The same pattern is seen when looking at the entire set of parties (down from 0.44 in the bivariate model to 0.34, *i.e.* -23.71%).

[121] The analyses provided by Knutsen (2017) established that having voted for a party of the Green family shows the strongest correlation with social class.

*Table 3.6.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2002 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Social Democratic Party of Germany			**CDU/CSU**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**			**Free Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.19***	0.13**	0.13***	0.15***	0.09**	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.13***	0.10***	0.10**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.11***	0.14***	0.12***	0.11***	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.09***	-0.12***		0.21***	0.22***		-0.03	-0.03		0.05***	0.05***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		-0.21***	-0.26***		0.55***	0.56***		-0.01	-0.01		0.01	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Authoritarian pred.		0.06	0.03		0.17**	0.13*		-0.36***	-0.31***		0.02	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.11**			0.30***			-0.23***			0.04
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.03			0.01			-0.01
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.28***			0.03			-0.04			0.07**
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127
N	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980

Table 3.6.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2002 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**CDU/CSU**	**Alliance 90/The Greens**	**Free Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.21	0.56	0.59	0.54	0.44	
Socio-demographic	0.20	0.56	0.45	0.50	0.40	-9.44%
Economic cons.	0.20	0.49	0.41	0.41	0.35	-20.80%
Social cons.	0.22	0.57	0.46	0.49	0.41	-8.64%
Authoritarian pred.	0.20	0.57	0.37	0.50	0.39	-12.91%
Political ideologies	0.25	0.49	0.36	0.38	0.34	-23.71%
Political attitudes	0.25	0.58	0.36	0.49	0.39	-11.95%
Full model	0.29	0.52	0.30	0.38	0.34	-23.43%

The left-green coalition, which governed following the 2002 German federal election, fell in 2005. Fresh elections resulted in a «Grand Coalition» between the SDP and the CDU/CSU, as well as the decline of the green parties and the rise of the PDS, which became the fourth political force. The PDS competed with the SDP for the votes of the left-wing electorate and constituted the main expression of the class cleavage in the country (Elff 2013; Elff, Roßteutscher 2011). The class voting patterns (M1), shown in Table 3.6.4., reveal differences from those in Table 3.6.2. Firstly, the CDU/CSU has been mainly voted by clerks and small business owners[122], whereas its previous popularity among self-employed professionals and large employers declined (-12% than clerks). Production and service workers (respectively, -12% and -8% than clerks), socio-cultural professionals (-11% than clerks) and technicians (-10% than clerks) are the other classes least likely to have voted for this party. Again, the classes least likely to have voted for the SDP are the self-employed classes, but this political force increased its popularity among the upper-middle classes. Production workers and technicians are the classes most likely to have voted for the SDP (respectively, +6% and +10% than clerks). As hypothesized (*H1*), the radical left party's electorate comprises the working classes and socio-cultural professionals, while the electorate of the other centre-right party remains composed by the self-employed classes (although the AME pertaining to small business owners is not statistically significant). With regard to this latter result and to CDU/CSU class voting patterns, self-employed professionals and large employers seem to have been strongly mobilized by the FDP during the 2005 electoral campaign (+6% than clerks). The value divides based on political ideologies (M2) of the CDU/CSU, SDP and FDP do not differ from the ones previously detected[123],

[122] Since the AMEs of social classes in the case of the CDU/CSU are negative, clerks (the reference category) are the most likely to have voted for this coalition. Small business owners are characterized by the weakest AME (-2% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant).

[123] The only exception is the negative correlation between having voted for the FDP and social conservatism, which was weak and positive in Table 3.6.2. In both

whereas the PDS's ideological voting patterns do not differ from those of the centre-left actor (see Schoen, Schumann 2007). Controlling for these variables accounts for a share of the electoral behaviour of the working classes and of technical professionals, whose AMEs decline in absolute value. Furthermore, the introduction of such variables also accounts for some of the difference in the likelihood of having voted for the SDP as far as the self-employed classes are concerned. On the other hand, since socio-cultural professionals score high on social conservatism (see Table A3.19. in the Appendix), this specific class would be, respectively, more or less likely to have voted for, respectively, the PDS or the CDU/CSU had it not been for said parties' stances on such a dimension (respectively, from +4% than clerks in M1 to +5% than clerks in M2, and from -11% than clerks in M1 to -12% than clerks in M2). Finally, since the self-employed classes score low on the measure of authoritarian predispositions and high on that of economic conservatism (see Table A3.19. in the Appendix), had it not been for the associations between these dimensions and having voted for the PDS, or for the association between authoritarian predispositions and having voted for the FDP, these classes would be more likely to have voted for these parties (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). Political attitudes are introduced in M3. Anti-immigration attitude is once again positively correlated to having voted for centre-right parties[124] and negatively correlated to having voted for left-wing ones (although the AME pertaining to PDS is not statistically significant). Distrust of the political system is negatively correlated to having voted for the winning party (-32%) and positively correlated to having

cases, such an association is weak (+1% in Table 3.6.2. and -1% in Table 3.6.4.) and is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the weak (and non-statistically significant) association between having voted for the SDP and economic conservatism is in keeping with the purported moderation of this party's economic position.

[124] Controlling for the three attitudes explains almost the entire association between authoritarian predispositions and having voted for CDU/CSU (from +16% in M2 to +3% in M3). Indeed, the correlation between authoritarian predispositions and anti-immigration is 0.55 when computed on the sub-sample of CDU/CSU voters.

preferred one of the other political forces (although only the AME pertaining to the PDS is statistically significant). These two results corroborate the corresponding hypotheses (*H4* and *H5*). Conversely, distrust of the EU is not strongly (and statistically significantly) associated with any particular vote choice. The introduction of these measures partly accounts for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the CDU/CSU on the part of socio-cultural professionals and self-employed professionals and large employers (from -12% than clerks in M2 to -11% than clerks in M3) together with the difference in the likelihood of having voted for the FDP on the part of small business owners (from +5% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Conversely, self-employed professionals and large employers would be less likely to have voted for the SDP (from -9% than clerks in M2 to -10% than clerks in M3) had it not been for this party's negative association with the measure of anti-immigration, in regard to which this class scores low (see Table A3.19. in the Appendix). The same holds true as regards managers and having voted for the CDU/CSU (from -5% than clerks in M2 to -6% than clerks in M3), considering the fact that this class scores low on the measure of distrust of the political system (see Table A3.19. in the Appendix). Contrary to the expectations (*H6*), controlling for political attitudes does not provide any further insights with regard to the working classes, with the exception of the AME pertaining to production workers and having voted for the SDP. Indeed, since this class scores high on the anti-immigration index (see Table A3.19. in the Appendix), had it not been for the negative correlation between having voted for the SDP and this variable, the aforesaid class would be more likely to have voted for it (from +4% than clerks in M2 to +5% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Moving on to the question of class polarization (Table 3.6.5.), the SDP now displays the highest value of the kappa index (0.59 in the bivariate model). This is better accounted for by authoritarian predispositions than by any other factor (0.40, *i.e.* -22.38% than in the bivariate model). The same result is observed for the CDU/CSU (down from 0.41 in the bivariate model to 0.32, *i.e.* -22.10%). Therefore, unlike what was found in the case of the 2002 German federal election, in the 2005 election authoritarian

predispositions, rather than economic conservatism, constitutes the political ideology which is central to understand the electoral competition between the two main political parties. Conversely, the FDP's class polarization is better accounted for by political attitudes (down from 0.40 in the bivariate model to 0.31, *i.e.* -21.93%), whereas the PDS records the largest reduction in its kappa index value (0.46 in the bivariate model) in M3, which accounts for the 62.66% of its class polarization. When observing the entire set of parties, authoritarian predispositions constitute the political ideology accounting for the largest share of class polarization (-23.12% than in the bivariate model), while political ideologies still account for a larger share thereof than political attitudes (respectively, -20.74% and -20.54% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.6.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.09*	-0.10**	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.02	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.10**	-0.08**	-0.08**	0.10**	0.09**	-0.09**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.12***	-0.09**	-0.09***	0.06*	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.05**	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06*	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.04**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.08**	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.06***	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		0.25***	0.22***		-0.04	-0.05		0.11***	0.12***		-0.24***	-0.21***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.55***	0.51***		-0.16***	-0.15***		-0.01	-0.01		-0.34***	-0.31***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.16**	0.03		0.07	0.13		0.10**	0.09*		0.06	0.07
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.37***			-0.19***			0.05*			-0.02
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.02			0.02			0.02			-0.01
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.32***			0.03			0.02			0.18***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129
N	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887

Table 3.6.5. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2005 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**CDU/CSU**	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**Free Democratic Party**	**Party of Democratic Socialism**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.42	0.51	0.40	0.46	0.40	
Socio-demographic	0.38	0.48	0.33	0.38	0.35	-12.20%
Economic cons.	0.43	0.49	0.36	0.31	0.36	-10.13%
Social cons.	0.42	0.48	0.34	0.35	0.36	-10.44%
Authoritarian pred.	0.32	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.31	-23.12%
Political ideologies	0.41	0.40	0.38	0.20	0.32	-20.74%
Political attitudes	0.33	0.45	0.31	0.32	0.32	-20.54%
Full model	0.38	0.39	0.36	0.17	0.30	-25.26%

Table 3.6.6. provides the three models concerning the 2009 German federal elections, which is characterized by the loss of vote share by the two main political forces, the SDP and the CDU/CSU, in favour of, respectively, left-green smaller parties (The Left and The Greens) and the FDP. The decline in the support of the two mainstream parties is assumed as an evidence of the «thawing» of the previously «frozen» German electoral competition (Elff 2013). The same decline also refers to high levels of abstention in both the 2009 and 2013 federal elections (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Indeed, M1 in Table 3.6.6. shows that whilst the CDU/CSU confirms its poor class cleavage-based feature, the SDP reveals a de-alignment process. As regards the former coalition, its electoral base was constituted by the self-employed classes in the 2002 federal election, and by clerks and small business owners in the 2005 federal election. In 2009, small business owners constitute the class most likely to have voted for the CDU/CSU (+6% than clerks), but this political force gains votes from all social classes, including the working ones, with the exception of socio-cultural professionals (-6% than clerks). Differing from such a «catch-all» feature, the SDP remains less likely to have been voted for by the self-employed classes than by any other social class, and also loses its appeal among upper-middle employee classes and production workers result less likely to have preferred this party than clerks (although their AMEs are not statistically significant). The two smaller political forces, which benefited from the aforesaid decline in the votes gained by the CDU/CSU and the SDP, are characterized by clear-cut class voting patterns. Indeed, The Left, which constitutes a radical left coalition founded in 2007 and comprising the PDS with other left-wing parties, is less likely to have been voted for by the self-employed classes than by any other class. These classes, instead, are those most likely to have voted for the FDP, as it was observed as regards the 2002 and 2005 federal elections. However, this centre-right party also increases its appeal among the upper-middle classes, in particular as far as managers are concerned (+6% than clerks), in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H1*). The correlations between having voted for the CDU/CSU or the SDP and the three measure of political ideologies do not differ from those observed in Table 3.6.4., and concerning the 2005 federal election. Also the associations of having voted for

The Left with the same measures are in keeping with those previously detected for the electoral preference for the PDS. Finally, having voted for the FDP differs from the previous models as regards its associations with social conservatism, now positive (+3%, although this AME is not statistically significant), and authoritarian predispositions, now negative (-3%, although this AME is not statistically significant). Controlling for these variables accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the SDP, the FDP and The Left in the case of the self-employed classes and managers (their AMEs fall in absolute value). Differently, socio-cultural professionals, who score high on the measure of social conservatism (see Table A3.21. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for the CDU/CSU had it not been for this coalition's social conservative stances (from -6% than clerks in M1 to -7% than clerks in M2). Production workers reveal to have voted for the CDU/CSU despite its stances on economic conservatism, since the corresponding difference in the likelihood increases by controlling for this measure (from +4% than clerks in M1 to +5% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs is not statistically significant), on which this class scores low (see Table A3.21. in the Appendix). The value divides concerning political attitudes (M3) closely resemble the ones set out in the previous models (Tables 3.6.2. and 3.6.4.): anti-immigration attitude is positively correlated to having voted for the CDU/CSU (+35%) and negatively correlated to having voted for the SDP (-6%, although this AME is not statistically significant); distrust of the EU is positively correlated to all voting behaviour but having voted for SDP (-3%, although this AME is not statistically significant). The corresponding hypothesis (*H4*) is only partially corroborated by these results, together with the pattern observed for the measure of the distrust of the political system (*H5*). Indeed, this measure continues to be negatively associated with having voted the party which actually won the election (-42%), and shows the only positive correlation with having voted for The Left (+16%) or the FDP (+3%, although this AME is not statistically significant). The socio-cultural professionals' low likelihood to have voted for the CDU/CSU is partly accounted for by controlling for anti-immigration attitude and distrust of the EU (from -7% than clerks in M2 to -6% than clerks in M3), on which this class

scores low (see Table A3.21. in the Appendix). Considering that small business owners show a low level of anti-immigration attitude and high levels of distrust of the EU and the political system (see Table A3.21. in the Appendix), this class reveals to have voted for the CDU/CSU despite this party's stances on the three attitudes (from +6% than clerks in M2 + 7% than clerks in M3). On the other hand, by the introduction of the three measures in the model the same class' likelihood to have voted for the FDP is partly accounted for (down from +5% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3), as well as the production workers' likelihood to have voted for the CDU/CSU or the SDP (respectively, down from +5% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3, and down from -5% than clerks in M2 to -4% than clerks in M3, although the AMEs in the case of having voted for CDU/CSU are not statistically significant). As far as the values of the kappa index are concerned, the most important differences between Tables 3.6.5. and 3.6.7., respectively of the 2005 and 2009 federal elections, focus on the centre-left party and the radical left coalition. Indeed, the SDP is now the party associated with the lowest level of class polarization (0.31 in the bivariate model), as it was observed for the 2002 federal election, while The Left reveals the highest level of the same measure (0.52 in the bivariate model). Political attitudes result important mediators of the class voting strenght, in particular for what concerns having voted for the CDU/CSU (down from 0.35 in the bivariate model to 0.21, *i.e.* -38.25%). However, turning to the entire set of parties, authoritarian predispositions continues to constitute the political ideology which accounts for the largest share of class polarization (-19.66% than in the bivariate model), and the three political ideologies account for a larger share than political attitudes do (respectively, -22.54% and -19.87% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.6.6. Voting for the main political parties in the 2009 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**The Left**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.09**	-0.07	-0.07	0.11**	0.09**	0.09**	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.06*	0.06	0.07*	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.06**	0.05*	0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		0.20***	0.18***		-0.11***	-0.12***		0.13***	0.13***		-0.17***	-0.15***
		(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.40***	0.36***		-0.06	-0.08*		0.03	0.04		-0.33***	-0.30***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.24***	0.12		0.04	0.05		-0.03	-0.02		0.06	0.06
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.35***			-0.06			-0.04			0.01
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.11**			-0.03			0.02			0.03
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.42***			-0.04			0.03			0.16***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099
N	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123

Table 3.6.7. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2009 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**CDU/CSU**	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**Free Democratic Party**	**The Left**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.35	0.31	0.33	0.52	0.34	
Socio-demographic	0.24	0.25	0.33	0.45	0.29	-14.70%
Economic cons.	0.24	0.24	0.29	0.44	0.28	-18.41%
Social cons.	0.26	0.25	0.34	0.47	0.30	-12.21%
Authoritarian pred.	0.24	0.20	0.35	0.40	0.28	-19.66%
Political ideologies	0.25	0.20	0.31	0.40	0.27	-22.54%
Political attitudes	0.21	0.21	0.34	0.42	0.28	-19.87%
Full model	0.22	0.19	0.31	0.38	0.26	-25.48%

In September 2013 the first German federal election after the Great Recession was held. The resulting government was led by the CDU/CSU coalition. It should be pointed out that the *ESS* data did not enable to include the voting behaviour for the main «anti-establishment» radical right party, therefore to assess its impact on the German party system (see Hernández, Kriesi 2016). Furthermore, this election was characterized by a high rate of abstention, which the literature associates with another SDP's negative electoral result and with this party's inability to mobilize social classes other than the ones which previously constituted its electoral base (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Also the FDP witnessed a negative electoral result, whereas the green parties gained back a significant share of votes. M1 in Table 3.6.8. shows class voting patterns which are more in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H1*) than M1 in Table 3.6.6. did. Indeed, CDU/CSU is less likely to have been voted for by the working and upper-middle employee classes, with the exception of managers. Clerks constitute the SDP's main electoral base, and this party continues to be least likely to have been voted for by the self-employed classes. Once again, the working classes are not among those classes most likely to have voted for the SDP. The literature accounts for this result according to the working classes' high rate of abstention, which constitutes a non-voting behaviour, or «alignment without mobilization» (*ibidem*, 29). The Left continues to be popular among socio-cultural professionals and the working classes (although only the AME concerning production workers is statistically significant). In keeping with the definition of the German green coalition's class voting patterns as differing from those of the centre-left parties, this coalition gains the major portion of its preferences among the self-employed and upper-middle employee classes (except for managers). The value divides which are based on political ideologies (M2) do not differ from those shown in the case of the previous elections analyzed, with the exception of the negative association between authoritarian predispositions and having voted for the SDP (-6%, although this AME is not statistically significant). The same index is the one showing the strongest association with having voted for the green coalition (-26%). Controlling for the three measures, the classes' AMEs pertaining

to having voted for the CDU/CSU fall in absolute value[125], with the exception of small business owners. Indeed, this class is likely to have voted for CDU/CSU despite this coalition's authoritarian stances (down from +4% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2). The self-employed classes would be more likely to have voted for the SDP, had it not been for this party's negative association with economic conservatism, whose high average scores characterized these classes (see Table A3.23. in the Appendix). Also the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the green coalitions as regards the self-employed classes, technicians and socio-cultural professionals are partly accounted for by controlling for authoritarian predispositions, since these classes score low on its measure (see Table A3.23. in the Appendix). M2 shows a fall in classes' AMEs also in the case of the working classes and socio-cultural professionals and having voted for The Left (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). Turning to the introduction of political attitudes in the model (M3), the sole difference from what was observed in Table 3.6.6. is the now negative association of having voted for the radical left political force and the measure of the anti-immigration attitude (-7%). Having voted for the green parties is negatively correlated to both anti-immigration attitude (-32%) and distrust of the EU (-6%), while positively correlated to the distrust of the political system (+6%). Controlling for these measures accounts for a share of the socio-cultural professionals' low likelihood of having voted for the CDU/CSU (down from -8% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3) and high likelihood of having voted for the green coalition (from +8% than clerks in M2 to +6% than clerks in M3). Conversely, had it not been for the position of the green coalition on immigration issues, production workers, who score high on its measure (see Table A3.23. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for it (from +3% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3). Furthermore, had it not been for parties' stances on these issues, socio-cultural professionals, who score low on all three measures (see

[125] It should be stressed that, according to Elff and Roßteutscher (2017), religiosity, included in the measure of social conservatism, is still a prominent voting factor in 2013 federal election.

Table A3.23. in the Appendix), would be more or less likely to have voted, respectively, for The Left or the SDP (respectively, down from +2% than clerks in M2 to +3% than clerks in M3, and from -3% than clerks in M2 to -4% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). As regards the kappa indexes (Table 3.6.9.), the radical left political force is no more associated with the highest degree of class polarization. Having voted for the green coalition is now the behaviour which shows its highest degree (0.38 in the bivariate model), which is more than halved in the final model (0.17, *i.e.* -55.09%). The lowest value of the kappa index is observed for having voted for the CDU/CSU (0.26 in the bivariate model). To conclude, at the level of the entire set of parties, economic conservatism now constitutes the political ideology which accounts for the largest share of class polarization (-11.61%), as it was for the analyses of the 2002 federal election (Table 3.6.3.). All three political ideologies continue to account for a larger share than political attitudes do (respectively, -15.15% and -4.36% than in the bivariate model).

Class polarization is not associated to clear-cut patterns over the federal elections held in Germany during the first two decades of the XXI century: although the green coalition show the highest value of the kappa index in those analyses accounting for its likelihood of having been voted for, the SPD is alternatively associated with the lowest (2002 and 2009) and to highest values (2005 and 2013), while the radical left forces reveal a fall in their class voting strength at the 2013 election. The factor which accounts for the largest portion of class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties shifts from economic conservatism (2002) to authoritarian predispositions (2005 and 2009), to economic conservatism again (2013). The analyses show that political ideologies account for a larger share of the value of the kappa index than political attitudes do. The mediating role of these latter falls at the first election held after the Great Recession (2013). Such an heterogeneity of results also characterizes the class voting patterns. Whilst managers are the electoral preserve of centre-right parties, the CDU/CSU competes for the votes of the self-employed classes with the FDP and the green coalition at the 2002 and 2013 federal elections. The upper-middle employee classes are the green coalition's electoral base, but this political force

does not only compete for the votes of managers, but also for the votes of the socio-cultural professionals. Indeed, this latter class is mobilized by green and radical left parties, and shows low likelihoods of having voted for the SDP. In keeping with the literature (*e.g.* Elff 2013), this party lost its working classes' share of votes subsequently the 2005 federal election, while the financial crisis were developing (Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Therefore, a dealignment process is observed in the case of these classes' likelihood of having voted for the main centre-left party. The working classes constituted the electoral preserve of the radical left actors, although they are also mobilized by the CDU/CSU at the 2009 election. These results only partially corroborate the corresponding hypothesis (*H1*). To conclude, economic and social conservatism show value divides which oppose the CDU/CSU and the left-wing parties (*H3*). The former is more strongly associated with social conservatism than with any other measure, in keeping with its stances on religious issues (Elff, Roßteutscher 2011). Having voted for this actor is also constantly positively associated with anti-immigration attitude, in contrast with what is observed in the case of the SDP. Conversely, the distrust of the EU and of the political system do not show strong correlations or clear-cut voting patterns over time. Accordingly, the hypothesis centered on political attitudes (*H4*) is only partially corroborated by this evidence.

*Table 3.6.8. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**The Left**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.12***	-0.11**	-0.11***	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.06**	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.04	0.06*	0.06*	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.06**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.08***	-0.06*	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.09***	0.08***	0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.07**	-0.05*	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		0.28***	0.25***		-0.13***	-0.14***		-0.21***	-0.18***		-0.05**	-0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		0.45***	0.41***		-0.07*	-0.09**		-0.30***	-0.27***		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.39***	0.27***		-0.06	-0.03		0.04	0.06		-0.26***	-0.14***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.11**			-0.07***			-0.32***
			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.11**			-0.09**			0.02			-0.06**
			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.38***			-0.03			0.19***			0.06*
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130
N	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589

Table 3.6.9. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2013 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**CDU/CSU**	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**The Left**	**Alliance 90/The Greens**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.26	0.36	0.27	0.38	0.29	
Socio-demographic	0.24	0.39	0.33	0.26	0.28	-3.55%
Economic cons.	0.24	0.37	0.25	0.26	0.26	-11.61%
Social cons.	0.23	0.39	0.34	0.26	0.28	-3.53%
Authoritarian pred.	0.23	0.38	0.32	0.25	0.27	-6.86%
Political ideologies	0.23	0.36	0.25	0.24	0.24	-15.15%
Political attitudes	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.21	0.28	-4.36%
Full model	0.21	0.34	0.22	0.17	0.22	-24.71%

3.7. The Spanish «volatile» electoral context

Spain is the country which held the largest number of general elections during the first two decades of the XXI century among those accounted for in this chapter. However, the *ESS* data did not allow to analyze the 2015 and 2019 elections[126]. Since 1982 and up until the end of the Great Recession, the Spanish political supply has been characterized by the electoral competition between the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the People's Party (PP), and also by smaller political forces (Bali 2007; Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, Pozo-Barajas 2017; Montero, Santana 2020; Orriolis 2013). Together with the developing of the Great Recession, United Left (IU), which constituted the third political force, joined a larger radical left coalition, which in 2016 constituted We Can. According to the literature, the impact of social class on voting behaviour in Spain has been affected by both the effects of the Great Recession and the electoral growth of «anti-establishment» actors[127] (Barisione, De Luca 2018). Indeed, Spain exemplifies those European countries[128] that relied on the EU during the financial crisis, and the popularity of new political actors is associated with the people's perception of the EU interventions as determining too expensive social costs (Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, Pozo-Barajas 2017). In addition to these elements, Spain followed the pattern of de-industrialization and service sector growth which characterized the Mediterranean democracies, *i.e.* without having completed the transition to an actual industrial economy. This determined the weak reduction of the working classes' size and the growth the middle and low-skilled working classes (see Orriolis 2013).

[126] No data is available for the 2015 general election, while the subsample pertaining to the 2019 one has 6 small business owners. The small sample sizes also hinder to account for the large number of regionalist parties (see Montero, Santana 2020).

[127] The rise of a third important political actor in the late Two-Thousands refers to the dealignment of the associations between social positions and political preferences. For an extensive analysis (focused on Italy), see Bordignon, Ceccarini, Diamanti (2018).

[128] Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Bellucci, Lobo, Lewis-Beck 2012).

Table 3.7.1. Frequency distribution and total sample numbers for each category of vote choice dependent variable pertaining to Spain. Weighted data.

Election day	First four parties	N	%	N tot	*ESS* data
12th March 2000	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	219	38.17%	575	Round 1
	People's Party	213	37.04%		
14th March 2004	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	737	51.02%	1 444	Round 2-3
	People's Party	479	33.19%		
	United Left	79	5.50%		
9th March 2008	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	947	50.11%	1 890	Round 4-5
	People's Party	621	32.84%		
	United Left	89	4.73%		
20th November 2011	People's Party	686	41.87%	1 638	Round 6-7
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	496	30.32%		
	Plural Left	134	8.18%		
26th June 2016	People's Party	259	28.77%	900	Round 8
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	208	23.11%		
	We Can	194	21.56%		
	Citizens	139	15.46%		
10th November 2019	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	183	32.54%	563	Round 9
	People's Party	93	16.44%		
	We Can	84	15.00%		
	Vox	67	11.98%		

The bivariate associations of having voted for the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party or the People's Party with both social class and political ideologies are shown in Figures 3.7.1. and 3.7.2. The differences observed are further explored by performing multivariate models.

Figure 3.7.1. Class composition of the electorate of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the People's Party in every Spanish general election considered. Weighted data.



Figure 3.7.2. Average score of the voters of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the People's Party on the measures of the three political ideologies in every general election considered. Weighted data.



The models pertaining to the 2000 Spanish general election are shown in Table 3.7.2. These resulted in the PP increase of its electoral advantage over the PSOE (Colomer 2001). According to the class voting patterns in M1, the PP, the centre-right actor, is more likely to have been voted for by small business owners and managers (respectively, +19% than clerks and +18% than clerks), whereas the PSOE, the centre-left actor, is less likely to have been voted for by self-employed classes and managers (although only the AME pertaining to small business owners is statistically significant). Whilst these results corroborate the relative hypothesis (*H1*) and are in keeping with the literature (Chhibber, Torcal 1997; Orriolis 2013; Barisione, De Luca 2018), self-employed professionals and large employers show a low likelihood to have voted for PP (-7% than clerks,

although this AME is not statistically significant), and it is not easy to interpret the working classes' political preferences. The latter point is due to the unavailability of data allowing to include further parties in the dependent variable. Indeed, «class voting has been present in Spain at least since 1989, when the adoption of fiscal and distributive policies by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) increased the salience of social class in politics» (Barisione, De Luca 2018, 87) and has been decreasing since 1993[129] (Orriolis 2013). The two parties moved towards their redefinition as «catch-all» political forces during the early Two-Thousands. Indeed, the PP increases its share of votes among the working classes, while the PSOE's electoral base also comprises the middle employee classes (Montero, Santana 2020; Fraile, Hernández 2020). The measures of political ideologies show a clear-cut pattern: the three variables are positively correlated to having voted for the PP and are negatively correlated to having voted for the PSOE. In the case of social and economic conservatism, these results are in keeping with the expectations (*H3*) and previous analyses (*e.g.* Chhibber, Torcal 1997). As regards the authoritarian continuum, it must be pointed out that the PP was founded from the former People's Alliance, a political force which collected the minister of the Franco's government (Colomer 2001). Controlling for economic conservatism accounts for a share of the low likelihood of both the self-employed classes and managers of having voted for the PSOE (although only the AME pertaining to small business owners is statistically significant), since these classes score high on said measure (see Table A3.25. in the Appendix). Conversely, working classes score high on the measure of social conservatism authoritarian predispositions, therefore they vote for the centre-left party despite its stances on this dimension (despite their AMEs are not statistically significant). Furthermore, introducing the three variables determines a reduction of the likelihood of having voted for the PP of all classes: in particular, this introduction accounts for a share of the high likelihood characterizing small

[129] The stability of the class cleavage, began at the 1982 general election together with the constitution of the Spanish substantial two-party system, has been decreasing right after the Eighties (Orriolis 2013).

business owners and managers (respectively, down from +19% than clerks in M1 to +8% than clekrs in M2, and from +18% than clerks in M1 to +12% than clerks in M2), whereas had it not been for the positive association between this voting behaviour and economic conservatism, self-employed professionals and large employers would be less likely to have voted for this party (from -7% than clerks in M1 to -15% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). M3 introduces political attitudes, and three clear-cut value divides are observed: anti-immigration attitude is positively associated with having voted for PP (+30%) and negatively associated with having voted for PSOE (-17%, although this AME is not statistically significant), while the distrust of the EU and the political system are positively associated with the latter behaviour (respectively, +21% and +6%, although these AMEs are not statistically significative) and negatively associated with the former (respectively, -22% and -30%). These results, with the exception of the correlation between having voted for the centre-left party and distrust of the EU, corroborate the relative hypotheses (*H4* and *H5*). Controlling for these variables accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the two parties among classes (their AMEs fall in absolute value). However, in disagreement with the relative hypothesis (*H6*), political ideologies account more for the working classes' voting behaviour than political attitudes do. To conclude, since self-employed professionals and large employers score low on anti-immigration attitude (see Table A3.25. in the Appendix), they would be less likely to have voted for PSOE had it not been for the positive association between the measure of this attitude and having voted for that party (down from -16% than clerks in M2 to -17% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Table 3.7.3. shows the kappa indexes. The PP results more inter-classist than the PSOE (respectively, 0.65 and 0.72 in the bivariate model). Political attitudes account for the largest share of the former party's class polarization (0.56, *i.e.* -14.25% than in the bivariate model), whereas authoritarian predisposition plays the main mediating role as regards the PSOE (0.65, *i.e.* -10.62% than in the bivariate model) and the entire set of parties (-10.90% than the bivariate model). Since religion is

a low-salience issue in Spain (see Orriolis 2013), social conservatism is a weak mediator.

*Table 3.7.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2000 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.07	-0.15	-0.11	-0.21	-0.16	-0.17
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Small business own.	0.19*	0.08	0.05	-0.20**	-0.16*	-0.16*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Prod. workers	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Managers	0.18*	0.12	0.11	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Service workers	0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Economic conservatism		0.40***	0.35***		-0.38***	-0.34***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Social conservatism		0.56***	0.45***		-0.20*	-0.15
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Authoritarian pred.		0.54***	0.39*		-0.39*	-0.33
		(0.19)	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.21)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30**			-0.17
			(0.12)			(0.13)
EU distrust			-0.22*			0.21
			(0.12)			(0.13)
Political system distrust			-0.30**			0.06
			(0.13)			(0.13)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.071	0.135	0.166	0.071	0.135	0.166
N	575	575	575	575	575	575

Table 3.7.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2000 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**People's Party**	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.65	0.72	0.56	
Socio-demographic	0.58	0.65	0.50	-10.29%
Economic cons.	0.58	0.65	0.50	-10.16%
Social cons.	0.66	0.67	0.54	-3.24%
Authoritarian pred.	0.58	0.64	0.50	-10.90%
Political ideologies	0.66	0.65	0.54	-4.38%
Political attitudes	0.56	0.66	0.50	-10.67%
Full model	0.60	0.66	0.52	-7.67%

The 2004 Spanish general election has been affected by a terrorist attack by Islamic militants in Madrid on the 11th of March 2004, three days before the

election day. This event had an impact on the results of that election because the management of the attack by the government held by the PP, together with its foreign politics (in support of the was in Iraq), mobilized both abstentionists and voters to punish the incumbent party (Bali 2007). Table 3.7.4. shows the three models. M1 reveals that the self-employed classes are those most likely to have voted for the PP and those least likely to have voted for the PSOE, while the opposite is true in the case of all the employee classes, in particular technicians and the working classes (although only the AME concerning the production workers is statistically significant). The IU competes with the PSOE for the votes from the working classes (see Fraile, Hernández 2020) and gains a non-negligible share of votes from socio-cultural professionals (+3% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant). These results are in keeping with the corresponding hypothesis (*H1*), with the exception of managers, who are among the classes least likely to have voted for the PP (-4% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant). Political ideologies, introduced in M2, show value divides which closely resemble those set out in Table 3.7.2. Indeed, although the measures of economic and social conservatism are positively associated with having voted for the PP (respectively, +25% and +72%) and negatively associated with having voted for the left-wing parties[130], authoritarian predispositions is now positively associated with having voted for the PSOE (+31%). Controlling for political ideologies accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the PP or the PSOE among classes (their AMEs fall in absolute value), with the exception of socio-cultural professionals. Indeed, this class scores high on the measure of social conservatism and scores low on that of authoritarian predispositions (see Table A3.27. in the Appendix), therefore had it not been for the two parties' stances on the two continuums, this class would be less or more likely to have voted for, respectively, the former or the latter (respectively, from -6% than clerks in M1 to -7% than clerks in M2, and from +4% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2, although

[130] These results are in keeping with the definition of the PP as market-oriented and popular among more religious voters, contrary to left-wing actors (Bali 2007).

these AMEs are not statistically significant). On the other hand, the introduction of political ideologies accounts to a slight extent for having voted for the radical left party, as well as the introduction of political attitudes in M3. Having voted for the PP is the sole behaviour positively associated with anti-immigration attitude (+42%), having voted for the PSOE is the sole behaviour negatively associated with the distrust of the political system (-35%), and having voted for the IU is the sole behaviour positively associated with distrust of the EU (+6%). Therefore, these associations corroborate the relative hypotheses (*H4* and *H5*). Furthermore, their introduction partly accounts for the self-employed classes' likelihood of having voted for the PP or the PSOE (their AMEs fall in absolute value), and provide insights into those of the working classes (*H6*). Indeed, since the working classes scores high on the measure of anti-immigration attitude (see Table A3.27. in the Appendix), they have voted for the PSOE despite this party's stances on that matter and would be less likely to have voted for the PP had it not been for the centre-right actor's association with the same variable (respectively, from +11% than clerks in M2 to +13% than clerks in M3, and from -14% than clerks in M2 to -16% than clerks in M3). As regards class polarization (Table 3.7.5.), the PP shows the lowest value of the kappa index (0.34 in the bivariate model) once again, while the radical left party reveals the highest value (0.58 in the bivariate model). The latter party's class polarization is partly accounted for only by the introduction of both political ideologies and attitudes in M3 (0.56, *i.e.* -2.68% than in the bivariate model). Therefore, M3 is also associated to the strongest reduction of the value of the kappa index at the level of the entire set of parties (-13.79% than in the bivariate model). However, differently from what was observed in Table 3.7.3., economic conservatism is the factor which accounts for the largest share of class polarization (-11.45% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.7.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2004 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with stand-ard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**United Left**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.13	-0.09	-0.05	0.13	0.07	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.10	0.09	0.09	-0.11	-0.10	-0.10	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.11*	0.11*	0.13**	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.16***	0.04*	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Managers	0.06	0.06	0.07	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	0.07	0.07	0.08*	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.11*	-0.12**		0.25***	0.24***		-0.10***	-0.08***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.44***	-0.44***		0.72***	0.66***		-0.23***	-0.19***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31**	0.30**		-0.02	-0.03		-0.05	-0.02
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.23***			0.42***			-0.14***
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.03)
EU distrust			-0.01			-0.10			0.06*
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.35***			0.21***			0.06
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.056	0.138	0.172	0.056	0.138	0.172	0.056	0.138	0.172
N	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444

Table 3.7.5. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2004 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**People's Party**	**United Left**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.42	0.34	0.58	0.40	
Socio-demographic	0.27	0.27	0.63	0.37	-6.59%
Economic cons.	0.27	0.27	0.58	0.35	-11.45%
Social cons.	0.27	0.27	0.64	0.37	-5.58%
Authoritarian pred.	0.28	0.28	0.61	0.37	-7.61%
Political ideologies	0.28	0.30	0.59	0.36	-8.93%
Political attitudes	0.26	0.27	0.62	0.36	-7.70%
Full model	0.25	0.29	0.56	0.34	-13.79%

The PSOE was the political party that gained the major share of votes also in the 2008 general elections. The election were held in March 2008, few months before the financial crisis began, and this political force was awarded for its good economic performance within 2004 and 2008. Conversely, the IU fell (Chari 2008). Table 3.7.6. shows the results of the three models performed. Although the literature states a weakening of class voting (*e.g.* Orriolis 2013), having voted for one of the two major parties is characterized by the same patterns set out in the analysis of the 2004 general election (Table 3.7.4.) Indeed, Fraile and Hernández (2020) assume that such patterns declined after the 2011 election. However, according to M1, the PSOE is less likely to have been voted for by the self-employed classes and is more likely to have been voted for by production and service workers (respectively, +11% and +4% than clerks, although only the AME pertaining to production workers is statistically significant). This party gained a lower number of votes among the upper-middle employee classes in the 2008 election than in the 2004 one. Once again, managers and the self-employed classes are those most likely to have voted for the PP (respectively, +6% and +10% than clerks, although only the AME pertaining to self-employed professionals and large employers is statistically significant). The fall of the IU is highlighted by the evidence that production and service workers now are among those classes least likely to have voted for it (respectively, -4% and -3% than clerks). This party lost its main electoral base, and now results more popular among technical and socio-cultural professionals (respectively, +2% and +4% than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The value divides pertaining to political ideologies (M2) show the same patterns set out in Table 3.7.2. Indeed, the measures of social conservatism, economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions are negatively associated with having voted for left-wing parties, and positively associated with having voted for the centre-right political force (*H3*). It should be pointed out that the incumbent government, led by the PSOE, proposed a set of policies, then prosecuted after the 2008 election, in favour, for example, of same-sex couples' rights and abortion.

This increased the debate with the PP and the Catholic Church exponents[131], who were less open to change as regards these topics (Chari 2008; Orriolis 2013; Montero, Santana 2020). Introducing the three measures poorly affects the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the IU, whereas it partly accounts for those of having voted for the PP or the PSOE in the case of the self-employed classes and managers. On the other hand, since working classes score high on the measures of social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions (see Table A3.29. in the Appendix), their likelihood of having voted for the PSOE or the PP would be, respectively, higher or lower had it not been for the associations of these two voting behaviours with the said measures. Controlling for social and economic conservatism accounts for a share of the socio-cultural professionals' low likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (from -6% than clerks in M1 to -3% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant), since this class score high on these two measures. M3 shows the value divides pertaining to political attitudes, which do not differ with respect to those set out in the previous models (*H4* and *H5*). Controlling for these variables accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the PP or the PSOE as regards the self-employed classes, and also provides further insights on the working classes' voting behaviour (*H6*). Indeed, the production workers' low likelihood of having voted for the IU is partly accounted for by the introduction of political attitudes (from -4% than clerks in M2 to -3% than clerks in M3). Furthermore, since this class shows the highest score on the measure of anti-immigration attitude (see Table A3.29. in the Appendix), had it not been for the associations of that variable with having voted for the PSOE or the PP, the same class would be more or less likely to have voted, respcetively, for the former or the latter (respectively, from +11% than clerks in M2 to +12% than clerks in M3,

[131] Since 1982 general election, the exponents of both the PP and Catholic Church have been agreeing to avoid to involve religion within the political debate (Orriolis 2013). Furthermore, the literature states that a decrease of the influence of religion on Spanish people's political behaviours as well as of their attendance of religious services since the late Seventies (Orriolis 2013).

and from -6% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3). Indeed, PP mobilize those voters «against» immigration, in particular by highlighting the cultural differences between Spanish and foreign people (Chari 2008). Turning to class polarization (Table 3.7.7.), the PP is once again the party associated with its lowest degree (0.25 in the bivariate model) and the IU is once again the party associated to its highest degree (0.56 in the bivariate model). The authoritarian continuum is the main mediator at the level of the entire set of parties (-10.22% than in the bivariate model), as already observed in Table 3.7.3. However, the full model accounts for the largest share of such index (-12.36% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.7.6. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**United Left**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.14*	-0.11	-0.09	0.10	0.09	0.08	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.07	0.10**	0.10**	0.09**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.11**	0.11**	0.12***	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07*	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.11**	-0.11**		0.20***	0.20***		-0.07***	-0.06**
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.52***	-0.55***		0.66***	0.64***		-0.14***	-0.12***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.06	-0.10		0.41***	0.40***		-0.03	-0.02
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.11			0.28***			-0.10***
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.01			-0.10			0.00
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.52***			0.32***			0.04
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.03)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.040	0.099	0.134	0.040	0.099	0.134	0.040	0.099	0.134
N	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890

Table 3.7.7. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2008 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**People's Party**	**United Left**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.47	0.25	0.56	0.39	
Socio-demographic	0.37	0.18	0.59	0.36	-6.24%
Economic cons.	0.37	0.20	0.58	0.36	-6.52%
Social cons.	0.37	0.22	0.61	0.37	-3.13%
Authoritarian pred.	0.34	0.15	0.59	0.35	-10.22%
Political ideologies	0.33	0.19	0.57	0.34	-10.77%
Political attitudes	0.36	0.19	0.58	0.36	-7.66%
Full model	0.32	0.20	0.56	0.34	-12.36%

Table 3.7.8. shows the three models for the 2011 general election, whose results brought to a government led by the PP, that gained the largest share of votes. On the other hand, the PSOE witnessed its strongest reduction of votes ever, even worsened in the 2015 election. Indeed, new «anti-establishment» actors benefited from the two major parties' loss of votes (Chari 2013). The financial crisis developed in the Western countries determined these changes in the Spanish electoral competition (Chari 2013; Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, Pozo-Barajas 2017; Fraile, Hernández 2020). Observing the class voting patterns (M1), the dealignment processes concerning the working classes' voting behaviour for radical left parties: the Plural Left (IP) results most likely to have been voted for by the upper-middle employee classes, with the exception of managers (although only the AME pertaining to technical professionals is statistically significant). As observed in the case of the previous elections, production and service workers are the most likely to have voted for the PSOE (respectively, +10% and +11% than clerks) and the least likely to have voted for the PP, together with socio-cultural professionals (respectively, -10%, -4% and -5% than clerks, although only the AME pertaining to production workers is statistically significant). The patterns of associations concerning political ideologies (M2) closely resemble those observed in Table 3.7.6. Controlling for these dimensions partly accounts for the self-employed classes' low likelihood of having voted for the IP, and also for the small business worker's high likelihood of having voted for the PP and managers' low likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (although these AMEs are not statistically significant). On the other hand, self-employed professionals and large employers, who score low on the measures of social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix), reveal to have voted for the PP despite this party's stances on the two dimensions (from +9% than clerks in M1 to +10% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Service workers and socio-cultural professionals' would be less likely to have voted for the same party, had it not been for its positions as regards social conservatism (respectively, from -4% than clerks in M1 to -6% than clerks in M3, and from -5% than clerks in M1 to -7% than clerks in M3 than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant), since

these two classes score high on its measure (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix). Finally, controlling for economic conservatism, on which production and service workers score low (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix), accounts for a portion of their high likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (respectively, from +10% than clerks in M1 to +9% than clerks in M2, and from +11% than clerks in M1 to +10% than clerks in M2). Political attitudes are included in M3, and their voting patterns do not differ from those set out as regards the 2008 (Table 3.7.6.). The introduction of the three variables provides further insights on the working classes' voting behaviour (*H6*). Indeed, controlling for these variables accounts for a further share of their high likelihood of having voted for the PSOE, while had it not been for the association of the measure of anti-immigration attitude with the preference for the PP or the IP, service workers, who score high on said measure (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix), would be less or more likely to have voted for, respectively, PP or IP (from -6% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3, and from +2% than clerks in M2 to +3% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Controlling for the same measure, self-employed professionals and large employers, who score low on it (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix), reveal more or less likely to have voted, respectively, for the PP or the PSOE (respectively, from +10% than clerks in M2 to +12% than clerks in M3, and from -2% than clerks in M2 to -4% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The small business owners' likelihoods of having voted for the PP or PSOE are partly accounted for by controlling for political attitudes, but (respectively, from +8% than clerks in M2 to +6% than clerks in M3, and from -1% than clerks in M2 to -0% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). To conclude, technicians, who are characterized by a low degree of distrust of the EU (see Table A3.31. in the Appendix), have voted for the IP despite this party's stances on such an issue (from +7% than clerks in M2 to +8% than clerks in M3). The values of the kappa index are shown in Table 3.7.9. At the level of the entire set of parties, economic conservatism is the factor accounting for the largest share of class polarization (-9.60% than in the bivariate model), while the three political ideologies account for a larger share than the three political attitudes do

(respectively, -7.45% and -4.25% than the bivariate model). These results closely resemble those of the 2004 Spanish general election (Table 3.7.5.). Once again, the PP shows the lowest degree of class polarization (0.34 in the bivariate model), while the radical left actor shows the highest one (0.85 than in the bivariate model). This latter party's value of the kappa index mainly falls introducing the sole socio-demographic variables (0.81, *i.e.* -4.01% than in the bivariate model, therefore the same is observed for the entire set of parties (-10.23% than in the bivariate model).

*Table 3.7.8. Voting for the main political parties in the 2011 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**Plural Left**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.09	0.10	0.12	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.13**	0.08	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.07*	0.07**	0.08**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.08*	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.09	0.06	0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	0.11**	0.10*	0.09*	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.30***	0.26***		-0.18***	-0.16***		-0.10***	-0.09***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.73***	0.61***		-0.18***	-0.15**		-0.31***	-0.27***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.28**	0.21*		-0.08	-0.03		-0.05	-0.03
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.24***			-0.08**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.06			0.01			0.12***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.36***			0.05			-0.05
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.056	0.135	0.164	0.056	0.135	0.164	0.056	0.135	0.164
N	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638

Table 3.7.9. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2011 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**People's Party**	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**Plural Left**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.34	0.45	0.85	0.51	
Socio-demographic	0.29	0.30	0.81	0.46	-10.23%
Economic cons.	0.29	0.30	0.82	0.46	-9.81%
Social cons.	0.31	0.30	0.84	0.47	-7.51%
Authoritarian pred.	0.30	0.30	0.82	0.46	-9.60%
Political ideologies	0.32	0.27	0.84	0.47	-7.45%
Political attitudes	0.29	0.31	0.88	0.49	-4.25%
Full model	0.33	0.29	0.86	0.48	-5.45%

After the end of the Great Recession, two general elections were held in Spain, in March and December 2015. The results of these two elections brought to two brief legislatures, which were not able to form an actual government. Therefore, a third election was held in June 2016 (Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, Pozo-Barajas 2017; Montero, Santana 2020). The two elections held in 2015 are defines by the literature as realigning and affected by the economic and political crisis of the country. Indeed, most of the Spanish voters declared prone to change their previous vote choices, showing a strong disaffection of the political system (Montero, Santana 2020; Fraile, Hernández 2020). Indeed, the «anti-establishment» radical left coalition We Can and the centre-right party Citizens, that was founded in the 2005, competed with the PP and the PSOE at the elections held after the Great Recession. Their increasing popularity is associated to Spanish people's worry about the economic situations and their disaffection of the political and two-party system (Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, Pozo-Barajas 2017; Freile, Hernández 2020; Orriolis, León 2020). In particular, We Can aimed to become the main Spanish left-wing political force, and mobilized voters on «anti-élites» stances (Orriolis, León 2020). The class voting patters of the 2016 general election are shown in M1 in Table 3.7.10. The self-employed classes and managers are again those most likely to have voted for the PP and are also the least likely to have voted for all the other actors (although only the AMEs pertaining to PP and We Can are statistically significant), in keeping with the relative hypothesis (*H1*). The PSOE does not show clear-cut class voting patterns, yet production worker and technicians result those classes most likely to have voted for it (respectively, +7% and +5% than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Technical professionals, who have been mobilized by left-wing parties in the previous elections (Tables 3.7.4., 3.7.6. and 3.7.8.), also constitute the class most likely to have voted for the Citizens and constitute one of those likely to have voted for the PP or the We Can (respectively, +3%, -2% and -10% than clerks, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Furthermore, the self-employed and working classes reveal those least likely to have voted for the Citizens (despite their AMEs are not statistically significant). As regards class voting patterns, the corresponding

hypothesis (*H1*) is corroborated by the evidence pertaining to self-employed classes and managers, while working classes are characterized by a dealignment process. Indeed, these classes are no more part of the electoral base of radical left parties, which is now constituted by clerks, and their votes are contested between the PSOE and the PP[132]. The associations between social and economic conservatism and having voted for centre-right or left-wing parties, shown in M2, corroborate the corresponding hypothesis (*H3*). Conversely, the measure of authoritarian predispositions is negatively associated with having voted the radical left party (-38%), and is positively associated with the other voting behaviours. The introduction of the three measures accounts for a share of the differences in the likelihood of having vote for the PP between clerks (the reference category) and the self-employed classes, managers and the working classes (although the AMEs concerning managers and working classes are not statistically significant). The same introduction reduces the likelihood of technicians and socio-cultural professionals of having voted for this party[133] (respectively, down from +2% than clerks in M1 to -7% than clerks in M2, and from +2% than clerks in M1 to -4% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). If it had not been for the PSOE's stances on economic issues, self-employed professionals and large employers, who score high on their measure (see Table A3.33. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for it (from -1% than clerks in M1 to +5% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Since production workers and technical professionals constitute one of the classes that is characterized by the highest scores on

[132] The electoral competition for the working classes' votes in the 2016 Spanish general election does not pertain to centre- and radical left parties, but is characterized by the main centre-left and centre-right actors.

[133] It should be considered that technical professionals score high on the measures of authoritarian predispositions and economic conservatism, while socio-cultural professionals are characterized by a high degree of social conservatism (see Table A3.33. in the Appendix).

the measures of economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions[134], they show high likelihoods of having voted for the main centre-left political force despite its positions on these two dimensions (respectively, from +5% than clerks in M1 to +6% than clerks in M2, and from +7% than clerks in M1 to +9% than clerks in M2, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The tendency to prefer We Can of the upper-middle employee classes and production workers is partly accounted for by controlling for political ideologies (their AMEs fall in absolute value). M3 includes political attitudes: as regards their value divides, the one of anti-immigration attitude does not differ from what was observed for the previous general elections (*H4*), and the distrust of the political system shows the opposition between having voted for the parties that led the subsequent government and having voted for different parties (*H5*). However, the measure of distrust of the EU is now positively correlated to having voted for the PP (+10%, although this AME is not statistically significant) and negatively corelated to having voted for the PSOE (-18%). Controlling for political attitudes accounts for a further share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the PP or We Can in the case of self-employed professionals and large employers, managers and the working classes (*H6*). To conclude, as regards class polarization (Table 3.7.11.), the PP is once again associated with the lower value of the kappa index (0.41 in the bivariate model), while the «anti-establishment» radical left actor is associated to the highest one (0.51 in the bivariate model). This result corroborates the relative hypothesis (*H2*). Economic conservatism accounts for the 13.39% of class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties. However, the measure of authoritarian predispositions is the factor that accounts for its largest portion (-18.79% than in the bivariate model), and this is due to the fact that it also accounts for the largest share of We Can's class

[134] According the class patterns of the three measures (see Table A3.33. in the Appendix), production workers score high on the measures of economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions and score low on the one of social conservatism. Their score on the measures of social and economic conservatism divert from the other patterns set out in Chapters 2 and 3.

polarization (0.47, *i.e.* -7.07% than in the bivariate model). The mediating role of this variable is in keeping with what was observed in Tables 3.7.3. and 3.7.7. At the level of the entire set of parties, political attitudes account for a larger share of class polarization than political ideologies do (respectively, -13.24% and -4.31% than in the bivariate model).

The voting patters that had been characterizing the Spanish general elections since the 1982 do not show in the elections held in the Two-Thousands. Indeed, the electoral competition between the PSOE, whose electoral base comprised the working and upper-middle employee classes (with the exception of managers), and the PP, that mobilized those most involved in the market (Chhibber, Torcal 1997; Orriolis 2013; Barisione, De Luca 2018), is observed in those elections held between the 2004 and the 2011. The results of the analyses of the 2000 (Table 3.7.2.) and the 2016 (Table 3.7.10.) elections show unclear voting patterns of the working classes, and a dealignment process is observed between these classes and having voted for the radical left parties in the 2008 and the subsequent elections. These elements enable to set out two main conclusions. On the one hand, the main Spanish centre-right party preserves its main electoral base, that comprises the self-employed classes and managers. This pattern only diverted in the 2000 and the 2004 elections, when, respectively, self-employed professionals and large employers and managers resulted more likely to have voted for left-wing parties. On the other hand, the aforementioned dealignment process characterizes the working classes' voting behaviour. These classes constitute the main share of votes of the PSOE, and this party is no more competing for their preferences with the radical left forces, whose main electoral base became constituted by technicians at the 2011 general election, and by clerks at the 2016 general election. However, the PP competed for the votes of the working classes at both the 2000 and the 2016 elections. Therefore, the hypothesis about class voting patterns (*H1*) is corroborated only as far as centre-right and centre-left parties are concerned. Differently, the value voting patterns based on political ideologies are in keeping with the expectations (*H3*), with the exception of the association between authoritarian predispositions and having voted for the PSOE in each election analyzed but the 2000 and 2016 ones. The hypotheses

pertaining to the associations of voting behaviours with anti-immigration attitude (*H4*) and the distrust of the political system (*H5*) are corroborated. Differently, the measure of distrust of the EU does not show stable patterns over the course of time, except for its leverage by radical left forces. Furthermore, having voted for the «anti-establishment» party does not show stronger associations with political attitudes than it does with political ideologies, in disagreement with the relative hypothesis (*H3*). To conclude, the PP is constantly associated with the lowest level of class polarization in the bivariate model and radical left actors are constantly associated with the highest level. The measures of economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions alternatively play the main mediating role, respectively in the 2004 and 2011 elections and at the 2000, 2008 and 2016 ballots. Political attitudes gained importance once the financial crisis ended, since their introduction in the model accounts for a larger portion of class polarization than the introduction of political ideologies does in the 2016 election. However, it must be pointed out that the same result is observed at the 2000 election, and that the 2015 and 2019 elections have not been analyzed. Political attitudes also provide more insights on working classes' voting behaviour than political ideologies do (*H6*) only in the case of the 2004 and 2008 elections.

*Table 3.7.10. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.25**	0.17**	0.14*	-0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.20***	0.18***	0.18***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.13*	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.07	-0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07	-0.10	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.13*	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	0.10	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.39***	0.36***		-0.29***	-0.30***		-0.13*	-0.09		0.12**	0.12**
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.67***	0.57***		-0.13**	-0.13**		-0.52***	-0.44***		0.04	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.32***	0.20*		0.20	0.23*		-0.38***	-0.30**		0.09	0.07
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.31***			-0.05			-0.24***			0.05
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.10			-0.18**			0.08			0.04
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.33***			0.11			0.12			-0.00
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R2	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231
N	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900

Table 3.7.11. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2016 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model.

Model	**People's Party**	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**We Can**	**Citizens**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.41	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.42	
Socio-demographic	0.31	0.26	0.50	0.47	0.36	-15.28%
Economic cons.	0.36	0.26	0.49	0.46	0.36	-13.39%
Social cons.	0.47	0.23	0.54	0.42	0.38	-8.63%
Authoritarian pred.	0.41	0.19	0.47	0.39	0.34	-18.79%
Political ideologies	0.54	0.17	0.58	0.37	0.40	-4.31%
Political attitudes	0.38	0.23	0.51	0.45	0.36	-13.24%
Full model	0.57	0.17	0.59	0.37	0.41	-2.36%

3.8. Conclusions

The analyses provided in the chapter fit the debate between the dealignment and the realignment of class voting patterns in Western European countries' general elections during the first two decades of the XXI century. These analyses also focused on value orientations, according to the hypothesis concerning their role in mediating the association between social class and political preferences. Differently from the Chapter 2, these analyses enable to compare class and value voting patterns among four national cases, by introducing the processes on the political supply side (see Thomassen 2005a), and to assess the potential for generalization of the conclusions set out in Chapter 2. Furthermore, country-specific and broader events, in particular the Great Recession, have been accounted for when commenting on the results. The alignments observed in Chapter 2 and shared by the Western European countries have been explored by performing country-election models to answer to the second research question: how do the patterns of social class and value voting change in different countries and over the course of time? Therefore, Chapter 3 offers more fine-grained associations between social class, value orientations and voting behaviour.

As regards class voting alignments (*H1*), Swedish, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Spanish electoral competitions show that the self-employed classes and managers constitute the electoral base of the main centre-right parties, while the working classes constitute the electoral base of the main centre-left parties. It must be pointed out that, according to the welfare state regimes characterizing these countries, a coalition between the middle and the working classes enabled the development of the social-democratic regime in Scandinavia, the embedment of the middle classes in the market economy impacted on the development of the liberal regime in the United Kingdom (see Esping-Andersen 1990), and a dualism between key and poorly institutionalized/regularized economic sectors defines the regime of the Mediterranean countries (see Ferrera 1996). However, the elections held during and after the Great Recession in Sweden and the United Kingdom are characterized by the introduction of «anti-establishment» radical right parties in the competition for the working classes'

share of votes. This realignment process is defined by the competition between left-wing and radical right political forces, although the latter also gain a non-negligible number of votes from the self-employed classes. However, the differences between national contexts must be pointed out. Firstly, in the United Kingdom and in Spain, the main centre-right political forces do not mobilize self-employed professionals and large employers in all elections. Socio-cultural professionals generally show high likelihoods of having voted for left-wing parties, but the same class does not constitute the electoral base of the centre-left parties in every Swedish election and its share of votes became contested between the main centre-left and the second centre-right parties in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Spanish electoral competition did not witness the growth of a radical right party in the time span considered[135], and is characterized by the stable presence of radical left political forces that competed with the main centre-left party for the votes of the working classes up until the 2008 general election. Since the radical left parties do not mobilize these classes anymore, their tendency to vote for centre-left is challenged by the main centre-right party. On the other hand, the radical left parties' electoral base became constituted by technicians in the 2011 election and by clerks in the 2016 election. Turning now to Germany, this country is characterized by the corporatist-conservative welfare regime, whose development was associated with the middle classes' tendency to vote for conservative and Catholic parties (see Esping-Andersen 1990). Indeed, the literature defines the German electoral competition as focused on religious issues[136] (Evans, De Graaf 2013). However, the results show alignment in keeping with the ones observed in the other countries: managers and socio-cultural professionals constitute the main electoral bases of, respectively, the main centre-right and centre-left parties; the self-employed classes do not show a clear-

[135] The radical right party Vox gained a non-negligible amount of votes only at the two general elections held in 2019.

[136] According to previous results (*e.g.* Knutsen 2017), Northern countries show clear-cut class voting patterns, while German religious-based electoral competition do not show straightforward differences among classes.

cut pattern over the course of time; the alignment between the preference for centre-left and the working classes «thawed» together with the development of the financial crisis (see Elff, Roßteutscher 2017). Therefore, the share of votes of these classes is no more contested among left-wing parties, but became the preserve of the radical left parties.

Turning now to value voting patterns, having voted for the centre-right parties is associated with economic and social conservatism, while the opposite holds true as regards centre-left parties. These patterns result stable in different countries and over the course of time. Conversely, authoritarian predispositions are positively associated with having voted for the Swedish social-democratic party and show unclear association with the preference for centre-left parties in the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain over the general elections. Accordingly, the hypothesis pertaining to the voting patterns based on political ideologies (*H3*) is only partially corroborated by the evidence. As far as political attitudes are concerned, the tendencies to vote for right-wing or left-wing parties clearly differ in their associations with anti-immigration attitude, and the same is observed for distrust of the EU between mainstream and «anti-establishment» actors (*H4*). However, having voted for the radical right «anti-establishment» is the sole voting behaviour that show stronger associations with political attitudes than with political ideologies. Moreover, in Germany and in Spain, whose dependent variables do not include «anti-establishment» radical right parties, distrust of the EU is generally weakly associated to vote choices, and do not show stable patterns over general elections. To conclude, the winner-loser pattern hypothesized for the distrust of the political system (*H5*) result corroborated by the evidence in most of the models performed.

«Anti-establishment» parties are associated with higher levels of class polarization than mainstream political forces (*H2*) in Sweden, the United Kingdom and Spain. Furthermore, the development of the financial crisis and the growth of the «anti-establishment» radical right parties increased the importance of political attitudes as mediators of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the political parties among classes. The introduction of these variables generally provides further insights on the working classes' voting patterns than the

introduction of political ideologies does (*H6*). Indeed, as hypothesized (*H3*), the preference for «anti-establishment» radical right parties is more strongly associated with political attitudes than with political ideologies, and their levels of class polarization is better accounted for by the former set of variables (although few exceptions). Differently, class polarization in the case of mainstream parties does not reduce according to specific factors: political ideologies and political attitudes seem to play diverse mediating role according to country-specific events. It must be pointed out that economic conservatism (the «super-issue») constantly accounts for a non-negligible share of the values of the kappa index, in keeping with previous results (*e.g.* Knutsen 2017) and to the economic bases of the class schemas (Rennwald 2020). Finally, Germany and Spain are also characterized by a non-negligible mediating role played by authoritarian predispositions, and this political ideology challenged economic conservatism as the most important mediator. Indeed, political forces mobilize voters by emphasizing/de-emphasizing more than one issue (Knutsen 2017; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2020).

The class voting patterns result more straightforward in Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Spain than in Germany. The realignment process pertaining to the working classes' (in particular, production workers') share of votes is observed in the Swedish and the United Kingdom electoral competitions, and is associated with the development of the Great Recession. In the same time span, the Spanish radical left forces withdrew from the competition for this share of votes and the German working classes became less prone to give their preference to the mainstream centre-left party than before. The self-employed classes' voting behaviour result quite stable in the selected countries and over general elections, with the exception of Germany. As regards political ideologies, only the authoritarian dimension does not show stable associations with having voted for political parties, with three exceptions: having vote for Swedish centre-left, Swedish centre-right or Spanish radical left show, respectively, positive, negative and negative associations with such a variable. The preference for radical right or radical left parties result positively correlated to distrust of the EU, that focuses on negative views of the supranational integration and refers to the «losers of globalization» (Kriesi *et al.* 2006) or «left behind» voters (Gidron,

Hall 2017)[137]. Indeed, «anti-establishment» and «anti-élite» parties are those that mobilize their economic and political marginalization during the Great Recession (see Hernández, Kriesi 2016). However, it must be pointed out that, among «anti-establishment» parties, the preference for the radical right ones show stronger associations with political attitudes than with political ideologies and also the highest levels of class polarization. Therefore, the pattern in question was stronger in those analyses that accounted for an «anti-establishment» radical right political force. Table 3.8.1. summarizes the main results, highlighting the differences among countries and over the course of time.

Although the analyses provided enable to observe more fine-grained class and value voting patterns, two limitations must be stressed. On the one hand, the small sizes of the samples do not allow to assess the accurate estimations of the social classes' likelihood of having voted for a specific party, but allow to observe only general patterns. Furthermore, the coefficients and the kappa indexes estimated are not directly comparable between models whose data concern different general elections. Indeed, the dependent variables differ as regards the parties these comprise, depending on the changes on the political supply side. This chapter aimed to assess the differences of class and value voting patterns, as well as of the mediating role played by value orientation, among countries and over the course of time. Dealignment and realignment processes have been detected and discussed without overlooking the political supply side. Future analyses may employ the models proposed herein either to assess the changes in voting behaviour over general elections held in a given country, or to compare the voting patterns that characterize general elections held in different countries.

[137] As regards the hypothesis according to which those voters labelled «left behind» or «losers of globalization» would tend to vote for radical parties, Hartman, Kurz and Lengfeld (2022) show that such voting patterns do not suit the German electoral competition.

Table 3.8.1. Main class and value voting patterns observed over the course of the general elections held in Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain in the first two decades of the XXI century.

Country	*Time span*	*Class voting*	*Value voting*	*Class polarization*
Sweden	*Prior to Great Recession*	M: self-employed classes and managers SAP: working classes	M: economic conservatism, anti-immigration, pro-EU SAP: social and economic liberalism, authoritarianism	Economic conservatism main mediator
	Great Recession	Stable patterns	Stable patterns	Political attitudes main mediators
	After Great Recession	SAP-SD competition for production workers SAP: mainly service workers	SD: anti-immigration, political distrust	Political attitudes main mediators
United Kingdom	*Prior to Great Recession*	Conservative Party: self-employed classes Labour Party: working classes and socio-cultural professionals	Conservative Party: social and economic conservatism, anti-EU, anti-immigration Labour Party: social and economic liberalism, pro-immigration, pro-EU	Economic conservatism main mediator
	Great Recession	Conservative Party: also managers	Labour Party: no more social liberalism	Political attitudes main mediators
	After Great Recession	Labour Party-UKIP competition for working classes	UKIP: anti-immigration, anti-EU	Political attitudes main mediators
Germany	*Prior to Great Recession*	CDU/CSU mobilizes managers, CDU/CSU-greens competition for the self-employed classes SDP-radical left competition for working classes, SDP-greens competition for socio-cultural professionals	CDU/CSU: social and economic conservatism, authoritarianism, anti-immigration Left-wing and green parties: social and economic liberalism	Economic conservatism and authoritarianism main mediators Political ideologies stronger mediators than political attitudes
	Great Recession	SDP: no more working classes (CDU/CSU-radical left competition)	CDU/CSU: also anti-EU	Political ideologies stronger mediators than political attitudes
	After Great Recession	CDU/CSU: no more working classes	Stable patterns	Political ideologies stronger mediators than political attitudes
Spain	*Prior to Great Recession*	PP: self-employed classes (except for the 2000 election) and managers (except for the 2004 election) PSOE: upper-middle employee classes (except for managers), PSOE-radical left competition for working classes	PP: social and economic conservatism, authoritarianism, anti-immigration Left-wing parties: social and economic liberalism, pro-immigration	Economic conservatism and authoritarianism main mediators
	Great Recession	Radical left parties: no more working classes, but technical professionals	Radical left parties: also anti-EU	Political ideologies and political attitudes weak mediators
	After Great Recession	PP-PSOE competition for working classes Radical left parties: clerks	Stable patterns	Economic conservatism and authoritarianism main mediators

CHAPTER 4

SAME MODELS, DIFFERENT MEASURES. CAN A MORE FINE-GRAINED SCALING PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES PROVIDE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF VOTING PATTERNS?

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to further explore the associations of voting behaviour with social class, political ideologies and political attitudes by repeating the analyses provided in Chapters 2 and 3 with a focus on rounds 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) of the *European Social Survey*. Indeed, there two rounds include the *ESS* rotating module pertaining to welfare attitudes, useful to integrate the single item employed for the measures of economic conservatism-liberalism, and further items which focus on socio-cultural issues[138]. This sensitivity analysis assesses whether the proxy measures that have been introduced in the models of Chapters 2 and 3, with the aim to compare the data of every *ESS* round, enabled to observe correctly the value voting patterns and the share of class polarization accounted for by value orientations. Indeed, the accuracy of the measures of these latter relies on the availability of items, and this is a commonly-found issue when dealing with cross-country datasets (Dalton 2018).

Therefore, this chapter focuses more on value divides and on the mediating role played by value orientation than on social class. Therefore, whether more accurate measures of political ideologies and attitudes account for a larger share

[138] Every *ESS* round provides few questions which are not included in neither the standard questionnaire nor the rotating modules. Therefore, it is possible to compute value orientations' measures by adopting broader range of items according to what every single round includes. However, this does not enable to compare the results over the course of time. For example, round 8 includes items which focus on environmentalism attitude, that is expected to be strongly correlated to having voted for green parties.

of class polarization than the proxy measures employed in Chapters 2 and 3 is addressed herein. Furthermore, the two rounds enable to investigate voting behaviour in Western European countries' general elections held prior to and after the Great Recession. Accordingly, this chapter also addresses the question of the stronger mediating role played by political attitudes than by political ideologies in accounting for the increased electoral «volatility» after such a financial crisis (Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). The first section introduces the data and the operationalization of the value orientations. This section also assesses the differences between the new measures and those introduced in Chapter 2, according to a theoretical and a methodological perspectives. The following sections discuss the results of individual probability models: the same analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 3 are provided, in order to compare the results obtained by introducing either the less accurate or the more accurate indexes. Therefore, the second section focuses on the twelve countries accounted for in Chapter 2, while the next sections focus on the four case studies of Chapter 3. The conclusions offer a summary assessment of the similarities and differences between the results obtained employing the two versions of the same measures.

4.2. Data and variables

The dataset employed is constituted by the *ESS* rounds 4 and 8. This dataset is used to analyze Such data is adopted to analyze both the twelve countries for which data is available for all rounds[139] and the four countries selected in Chapter 3 (Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain)[140]. The whole sample

[139] The twelve countries are: Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal.

[140] The four case have been selected to represent the welfare state regimes which characterize Western European countries (see Chapter 3).

totaled 24 788[141]. The dependent variable for the analysis of the twelve countries included in every *ESS* round groups those parties voted by the respondents in five families[142]. Differently, the country-election models focus on the main political parties standing at the specific general election in question. These variables constitute the dependent ones of multinomial logistic regression models. The general elections held in the four countries and in the time span covered by the two rounds are: the 2006 and 2014 Swedish general elections, the 2005 and 2015 United Kingdom general elections, the 2005 and 2013 German federal elections, and the 2008 and 2016 Spanish general elections. The vote choices that constitute the actual categories of the dependent variables[143] used to study these general elections are shown in Table 4.2.1. However, three dependent variables differ from what Table 4.2.1. shows: Each one of the next five sections present three models: M1 includes only the socio-demographic variables and social class, M2 introduces the measures of political ideologies, and M3, the full model, introduces the measures of political attitudes. Results are presented as Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and class polarization is assessed by computing kappa indexes (see Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995). The latter measure also

[141] The final sample consists of those respondents who answered to all the questions whose items were introduced in the full models. The whole sample totaled 43 188.

[142] The five families are: Green, Radical Left, Centre-Left, Centre-Right, Radical Right, Other parties or coalitions. The location of each party is provided in Table A2.2. in the Appendix.

[143] As in Chapter 3, the country-election dependent variables are defined according to election days. This operation reduces the sample sizes with the aim to provide accurate investigations of class and value voting patterns. The final dependent variables may differ from those shown in Chapter 3 that focus on the same general election, due to the smaller sample sizes. Indeed, the introduction of a broader range of items determined a reduction in the number of respondents that have answered to all the corresponding questions. For example, no one of those who declared to have voted the coalition Environmental Party-The Greens at the 2014 Swedish general elections is a member of the class of the self-employed professionals and large employers. The models of this chapter are characterized by the same limitations discussed in Chapter 3.

enables to observe which variable or set of variables accounts for the largest share of class polarization. Therefore, it also enables to compare the performance of different versions of the same measure as regards their mediating role. The AMEs enable to observe whether different versions of the same measure show different associations with the same dependent variable and affect the social classes' AMEs to a different extent. Once again, social class is defined according to Oesch's (2006a) 8-class schema. It must be pointed out that the focus on only two rounds and the introduction of a broader range of items reduce the sample sizes with respect to Chapters 2 and 3[144]. Since a small sample size is associated with higher *p*-values and standard errors of the estimated coefficients, associations which may be defined non-statistically significant are more likely to be observed. Chapter 3 introduced the approach adopted to interpret the results (see Wasserstein, Schirm, Lazar 2019). Therefore, the discussion of the latter is based on the literature and the results of the models presented in Chapters 2 and 3.

[144] According to the different sample sizes, the models presented in this chapter and in Chapters 2 and 3 are not directly comparable. It must be pointed out that the period of data collection affects the final results. Indeed, despite the vote casted at a specific election does not change as time goes on, short-term evaluations (*i.e.* political attitudes) are strongly affected by their activation/de-activation, salience and framing by the political supply (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the average score of the same measure may differ between different periods of data collection.

Table 4.2.1. Frequency distribution and total sample numbers for each category of every vote choice dependent variable pertaining to the four countries. Weighted data.

Country	Election day	Party	N	%	N tot	*ESS* data
Sweden	17th September 2006	Swedish Social Democratic Party	337	34.43%	979	Round 4
		Moderate Party	292	29.79%		
		Liberal People's Party	90	9.16%		
	14th September 2014	Swedish Social Democratic Party	326	31.88%	1 022	Round 8
		Moderate Party	276	26.98%		
		Swedish Democrats	80	7.89%		
United Kingdom	5th May 2005	Labour Party	506	41.63%	1 215	Round 4
		Conservative Party	392	32.28%		
		Liberal Democratic Party	201	16.58%		
	7th May 2015	Conservative Party	429	38.59%	1 112	Round 8
		Labour Party	376	33.83%		
		Liberal Democratic Party	98	8.78%		
		UK Independence Party	88	7.94%		
Germany	18th September 2005	Social Democratic Party of Germany	484	33.36%	1, 451	Round 4
		Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	452	31.12%		
		Free Democratic Party	159	10.95%		
		Party of Democratic Socialism	130	8.99%		
	23rd September 2013	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	635	37.29%	1 702	Round 8
		Social Democratic Party of Germany	465	27.34%		
		Alliance 90/The Greens	222	13.06%		
		The Left	168	9.88%		
Spain	9th March 2008	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	510	51.04%	999	Round 4
		People's Party	315	31.59%		
	26th June 2016	People's Party	238	28.02%	850	Round 8
		Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	199	23.46%		
		We Can	183	21.50%		
		Citizens	134	15.81%		

As regards the measures for political ideologies and political attitudes, besides their theoretical equivalence, that has already been checked in Chapter 2, their new operationalizations' cross-country equivalence is addressed herein. Economic conservatism focuses on the involvement of the government in the economy, the regulation of private and the welfare state (Crowson 2009). Therefore, the single item used in Chapters 2 and 3 does not saturate its theoretical dimensions. The *ESS* rotating module introduced in rounds 4 and 8 includes more items which focus on the social benefits and the differences in income and standard of living among social strata. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) provides a measure for the political ideology in question with three out of five

available items[145] (KMO Test equal to 0.64). Their selection is based on their loadings on the only component with an eigenvalue greater than one (1.68), accounting for 56.16% of variance, and on the value of the Cronbach's Alpha (0.63). The three items and their loadings are shown in table 4.2.2. The mean of the final measure (II), recoded between zero and one, is 0.40 (SD = 0.19). The proxy measure (I) has mean of 0.31 (SD = 0.26) and is strongly correlated to the new index (0.79).

Table 4.2.2. Items and loadings of economic conservatism-liberalism measure. Weighted data.[146]

Item	Loadings
Government should reduce differences in income levels (R)	0.60
For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small (R)	0.58
Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts	0.55

Social conservatism-liberalism refers to the opposition between the preservation of alleged moral «traditions» and the tolerance to ambiguity and complexity in the social world (Kirk 1953; Crowson 2009). The measure that was presented in Chapter 2 focused on religion and «traditions», and also concerned the complexity in the social world by referring to same-sex couples' rights. The rounds 4 and 8 include one more item that focuses on «traditions» and the complexity in the

[145] The three items which did not survive the PCA are: «Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges», «Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy», «Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society». An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), with principal axis factoring as method of extraction, has been performed using the same set of items. The results between the EFA and the PCA do not differ as regards the final structure of the factor/component, and the same has been observed for the other measures computed herein.

[146] Choosing |0.25| as the minimum acceptable loading, no sensitive differences are found among the countries, *ESS* rounds and years concerned (they range between |0.45| and |0.68|).

social world: «Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce». This item refers to gender inequalities, an issue that has already been accounted for by many authors (see Marchesi 2019). Items and loadings are shown in Table 4.2.3. The PCA's first component has eigenvalue equal to 2.71, accounting for 45.23% of variance (Cronbach's Alpha is equal to 0.73). The resulting measure (II) has a mean value of 0.33 (SD = 0.19), while the previous index (I) has a mean value of 0.36 (SD = 0.21). The two variables differ by only one item and correlate 0.99.

Table 4.2.3. Items and loadings of the second version of social conservatism-liberalism measure. Weighted data.[147]

Item	Loadings
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (R)	0.27
How religious are you	0.51
How often pray apart from at religious services	0.50
How often attend religious services apart from special occasions	0.49
Important to follow traditions and customs	0.36
Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce	0.24

The two rounds do not provide further items concerning authoritarianism-libertarianism continuum. Therefore, the proposal of Feldman (2003) is adopted,

[147] Although |0.25| has been chosen as the minimum acceptable loading, the final index includes one item whose loading is equal to |0.24|. Indeed, the measures of validity and reliability show acceptable values. No sensitive differences are found among the countries concerned, with the exception of the items concerning sexuality and gender inequalities. These items reveal loadings between |0.20| and |0.23| in five countries (both the items in Sweden; only the item focused on gender inequalities in Norway, Finland and France; only the item focused on sexuality in Germany), in the round 4 data (only the item focused on gender inequalities) and in the data collected in 2009 (only the item focused on gender inequalities). In Ireland these items show loadings lower than |0.20|.

accounting for the continuum as a trade-off between the opposing values of personal autonomy and social control. The proxy measure has a mean of 0.51 (SD = 0.12) when computed on the final sample. Similarly, no further items are provided for the political attitude concerning the distrust of the European Union. The single item adopted has a mean of 0.54 (SD = 0.22). The distrust of the party and political system is measured performing a PCA on three items, whose KMO Test is equal to 0.70. The items and their loadings are shown in Table 4.2.4. The only component with eigenvalue greater than one (2.47) explains the 82.18% of variance. Cronbach's Alpha is equal to 0.89. The final measure (II), rescaled between zero and one, has a mean of 0.55 (SD = 0.20) and correlates 0.97 with the two-items version employed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (I), whose mean is equal to 0.53 (SD = 0.21).

Table 4.2.4. Items and loadings of the second version of distrust of the political system measure. Weighted data.[148]

Item	Loadings
Trust in country's parliament (R)	0.54
Trust in politicians (R)	0.60
Trust in political parties (R)	0.59

The variable concerns anti-immigration attitude. With respect to the measure of this attitude that was introduced in the models presented Chapters 2 and 3, a fourth item is included. This item focuses on the provision of social benefits and services to immigrants. The PCA performed (KMO Test equal to 0.77) reveals just one component with an eigenvalue greater than one (2.56), accounting for 63.96% of variance. Table 4.2.5. presents the items and their loadings (Cronbach's Alpha is equal to 0.81). The mean of the final measure (II) is 0.44

[148] Choosing |0.25| as the minimum acceptable loading, no sensitive differences are found among the countries, *ESS* rounds and years concerned (they range between |0.52| and |0.61|).

(SD = 0.18). The previous measure (I) has a mean of 0.43 (SD = 0.20) and correlates 0.98 with the new variable.

Table 4.2.5. Items and loadings of the second version of anti-immigration attitude measure. Weighted data.[149]

Item	Loadings
Immigration bad or good for country's economy (R)	0.53
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (R)	0.54
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (R)	0.55
When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services (R)	0.34

In the next sections, the model including socio-demographic factors and social class (M1) is compared to the models that are characterized by the introduction of the two versions (identified with I and II) of the measures of political ideologies (M2) and political attitudes (M3). Two general hypotheses are stated: considering that just few items added to the previous measures, the value voting divides observed employing the two versions do not differ in terms of the direction of the associations between the measure and voting behaviours (*H1*); according to the more accurate operationalizations, the second versions are expected to show a larger share of variance accounted for by the models (R^2), stronger associations with vote choices, and a larger share of class polarization accounted for than the first versions (*H2*).

[149] Choosing |0.25| as the minimum acceptable loading, no sensitive differences are found among the countries, *ESS* rounds and years concerned (except for the loading of the item which focuses on social benefits and services in Portugal, equal to |0.21|).

4.3. A more fine-grained assessments of the mediating role played by value divides in Western European countries

The models constructed to explore class and value voting patterns in Western European countries during the first two decades of the XXI century, whose dependent variable groups together the political parties in families, are shown in Tables 4.3.1. and 4.3.2., corresponding, respectively, to the first and the second versions of the measures of political ideologies and attitudes[150]. Since M1 includes social class and covariates only, this model does not differ between the two tables. As regards social class, the same voting patterns observed in Chapter 2 are seen in the model. Indeed, centre-right parties are more likely to have been voted for by self-employed professionals and large employers, small business owners and managers (respectively, +11%, +7% and +7% than clerks). The same classes are those least likely to have voted for centre-left (respectively, -11%, -9% and -3% than clerks) or radical left (respectively, -2%, -1% and -2% than clerks). The opposite can be said for production workers, service workers and socio-cultural professionals: these three classes are the least likely to have voted for centre-right actors (respectively, -9%, -7% and -5% than clerks) and the most likely to have voted for centre-left (respectively, +5%, +3% and +2% than clerks) and radical left (+2% than clerks). To conclude, the working classes are those most likely to have voted for radical right parties (production and service workers are, respectively, 3% and 1% more likely than clerks), while the upper-middle employee classes are those least likely to have voted for the same party family (managers and socio-cultural professionals are, respectively, 1% and 3% less likely than clerks)[151].

[150] As in Chapter 2, Tables 4.3.1. and 4.3.2. do not show the AMEs of voting for the green parties or other parties. These two categories of the dependent variable are accounted for when computing the kappa indexes.

[151] In M1 presented in Chapter 2, the AMEs concerning the likelihoods of having voted for radical right parties of technical professionals and self-employed professionals and large employers were statistically significant.

M2 introduces the measures of political ideologies. The two versions show the same value voting patterns. Having voted for centre-right parties is positively correlated to the three measures, while the opposite holds true as regards having voted for radical left parties. The preference for a party of the centre-left family is negatively correlated to economic and social conservatism, and is positively correlated to the measure of authoritarian predispositions (+11% in M2 I and +12% in M2 II). Finally, the three measures are weakly correlated to the vote for radical right[152]. However, M2 II shows a higher value of R^2 (0.167) and also stronger correlations than M2 I as far as the measures of political ideologies are concerned (*H2*), with the exception of the measure of authoritarian predispositions and having voted centre-right (+11% in M2 I and +9% in M2 II). The strongest differences between the two versions in the associations with having voted for radical left, centre-left and centre-right are observed in the case of economic conservatism (respectively, -11%, -19% and +35% in M2 I, and -17%, -29% and +55% in M2 II). However, the same changes in the classes' AMEs with respect to M1 are detected. Indeed, controlling for political ideologies accounts in part for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for radical left, centre-left or centre-right party families between the reference category (clerks) and the self-employed classes and managers (their AMEs decline in absolute value), while no changes are observed as regards having voted for radical right. Furthermore, controlling for the same variables also accounts in part for the low likelihood of having voted for centre-right parties of socio-cultural professionals and service workers: these classes would be more likely to have voted for these parties had it not been for their stances on economic issues, and in the case of the low likelihood of the former class had it not been also for the same parties' stances on authoritarianism. Finally, socio-cultural professionals would be more likely to have voted for centre-left parties had it not been for their stances on

[152] Having voted for radical right parties is positively correlated to economic conservatism in both M2 I (+2%) and M2 II (+3%), while it is negatively and statistically significantly correalted to social conservatism only in M2 I (-2%).

social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions (from +2% than clerks in M1 to +3% than clerks in M2)[153].

M3, the full model, introduces political attitudes. M3 II provides a higher value of R^2 (0.191) than M3 I. The second version of anti-immigration attitude is more strongly correlated to having voted for centre-left or radical right than the first version (respectively, -18% in M3 I and -20% in M3 II, and +17% in M3 I and +19% in M3 II), whereas the opposite holds true as regards having voted for radical left (-7% in M3 I and -6% in M3 II). Conversely, the second version of the distrust of the political system is more weakly correlated to having voted for radical left (+6% in M3 I and +5% in M3 II), centre-right (-13% in M3 I and -12% in M3 II) or radical right (+7% in M3 I and +6% in M3 II). Therefore, the corresponding hypothesis (*H2*) is only partially corroborated by these results, since accounting for the trust towards political parties weakens the value divide focused on the distrust of the political system. To conclude, although the measure of distrust of the EU does not differ between M3 I and M3 II, its associations with the new versions of the other measures (see Tables A4.3. and A4.4.) provides a stronger value divide in the case of having voted for centre-left or radical right (respectively, -3% in M3 I and -4% in M3 II, and +4% in M3 I and +5% in M3 II). As in the case of political ideologies, the directions of these associations do not differ substantially between the two models (*H1*), and closely resemble those observed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the mainstream party families are negatively associated with the measures of the distrust of the political system and of the EU, while the opposite is observed as regards the radical party families. Moreover, left-wing parties are negatively correlated to anti-immigration attitude, differently from right-wing parties. The introduction of these measures accounts for a larger portion of the differences in the likelihood of having voted

[153] In order to understand these AMEs' changes, it must be considered that socio-cultural professionals and service workers score high on the measure of social conservatism and score low on that of economic conservatism. The two classes differ in their score on authoritarian predispositions measure: the former scores low whereas the latter scores high on it (see Table A4.5. in the Appendix).

for radical right parties as regards productions workers and socio-cultural professionals, with no differences between the two versions of these variables (respectively, from +3% than clerks in M2 to +2% than clerks in M3 and from -3% than clerks in M2 to -2% than clerks in M3). The same pattern holds true as regards the likelihood of having voted for centre-left parties of small business owners and socio-cultural professionals (respectively, from -8% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3 and from +3% than clerks in M2 to +2% than clerks in M3). Controlling for the second versions of the measures of political attitudes also accounts in part for the socio-cultural professionals' low likelihood and managers' high likelihood to have voted for centre-right parties (respectively, from -4% than clerks in M2 II to -3% than clerks in M3 II and from +6% than clerks in M2 II to +5% than clerks in M3 II). On the other hand, the two versions do not differ as regards self-employed professionals and large employers, whose likelihood to have voted for centre-left or centre-right parties would be higher had it not been for these party families' stances on the three attitudes (respectively, from -9% than clerks in M2 to -10% than clerks in M3, and from +10% than clerks in M2 to +11% than clerks in M3), while the opposite can be said as far as production workers are concerned (respectively, from +5% than clerks in M2 to +6% than clerks in M3, and from -9% than clerks in M2 to -10% than clerks in M3). Service workers too would be more likely to have voted for centre-left parties had it not been for the associations of this voting behaviour and the three measures (from +3% than clerks in M2 to +4% than clerks in M3)[154].

Finally, Table 4.3.3. shows the values of the kappa index. The results presented in Chapter 2 revealed that economic conservatism was the political ideology accounting for the largest share of class polarization at the level of the entire set of families, but political ideologies and political attitudes accounted for a larger share. The analyses provided herein show the same pattern, with the exception of the first version of the measure of economic conservatism, which

[154] Indeed, self-employed professionals and large employers score low on the three measures, whereas working classes score high on these (see Table A4.5. in the Appendix).

accounts for a larger share of class polarization than the three political ideologies together do (respectively, -23.12% and -22.37% than in the bivariate model). The new measures account for larger shares of class polarization than the previous measures do, corroborating the relative hypothesis (*H2*). Indeed, M2 II accounts for 0.46% more than M2 I (respectively, -23.83% and -23.37% than in the bivariate model), and M3 II accounts for 0.41% more than M3 II (respectively, -28.47% and -28.06% than in the bivariate model). However, the second version of the measure of social conservatism explains 0.09% less than its first version (respectively, -19.82% and -19.91% than in the bivariate model). Once again, having voted for radical right parties is associated with the highest value of the kappa index (0.59 in the bivariate model), whose strongest reduction come about with the introduction of political attitudes (approximately 0.33 in both versions, *i.e.* -43.67% in the first version and -43.83% in the second version than in the bivariate model). Conversely, having voted for centre-right parties is associated with the lowest value of the same index (0.28 in the bivariate model). Economic conservatism accounts for the largest share of the class polarization of having voted for centre-right or radical left, while the three political ideologies together do so as regards centre-left party family.

Table 4.3.1. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. ESS *rounds 4 and 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.11***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.03**	-0.01	-0.02*	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02*	0.03**	0.02	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01*	0.01**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic conservatism		-0.11***	-0.10***		-0.19***	-0.19***		0.35***	0.34***		0.02***	0.01**
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Social conservatism		-0.15***	-0.14***		-0.19***	-0.20***		0.36***	0.34***		-0.02**	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.04***	-0.03*		0.11***	0.13***		0.11***	0.05*		0.00	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.07***			-0.18***			0.21***			0.17***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
EU distrust			0.05***			-0.03*			-0.05***			0.04***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Political system distrust			0.06***			-0.07***			-0.13***			0.07***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.124	0.160	0.185	0.124	0.160	0.185	0.124	0.160	0.185	0.124	0.160	0.185

N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table 4.3.2. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right. ESS *rounds 4 and 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Radical Left			**Center-Left**			**Center-Right**			**Radical Right**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.11***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.03**	-0.01	-0.02*	0.07***	0.06***	0.05***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02**	0.02**	0.02*	0.03**	0.02	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.03**	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01*	0.01**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic conservatism		-0.17***	-0.16***		-0.29***	-0.28***		0.55***	0.52***		0.03***	0.02***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Social conservatism		-0.16***	-0.14***		-0.20***	-0.21***		0.38***	0.35***		-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.04**	-0.02		0.12***	0.14***		0.09***	0.04		0.00	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.06***			-0.20***			0.21***			0.19***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
EU distrust			0.05***			-0.04**			-0.05**			0.05***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Political system distrust			0.05***			-0.07***			-0.12***			0.06***
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes

Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.124	0.167	0.191	0.124	0.167	0.191	0.124	0.167	0.191	0.124	0.167	0.191
N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table 4.3.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for party families and the whole models and the relative differences compared to the bivariate model (first row). The models employ the ESS *round 4 and 8 data.*

Model	**Radical Left**	**Center-Left**	**Center-Right**	**Radical Right**	**Green**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.34	0.37	0.28	0.59	0.36	0.37	
Socio-demographic	0.33	0.35	0.23	0.41	0.22	0.29	-21.00%
Economic cons. I	0.30	0.34	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.28	-23.12%
Economic cons. II	*0.30*	*0.34*	*0.21*	*0.42*	*0.22*	*0.28*	*-23.29%*
Social cons. I	0.35	0.36	0.24	0.41	0.22	0.29	-19.91%
Social cons. II	*0.35*	*0.36*	*0.24*	*0.41*	*0.21*	*0.29*	*-19.82%*
Eco.*Soc. cons. I	0.35	0.35	0.24	0.41	0.20	0.29	-20.35%
*Eco.*Soc. cons. II*	*0.32*	*0.35*	*0.22*	*0.41*	*0.21*	*0.28*	*-22.62%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.32	0.34	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.29	-22.35%
Political ideologies I	0.33	0.33	0.23	0.41	0.20	0.28	-22.37%
Political ideologies II	*0.32*	*0.33*	*0.22*	*0.41*	*0.19*	*0.28*	*-23.83%*
Political attitudes I	0.34	0.36	0.24	0.33	0.18	0.27	-25.84%
Political attitudes II	*0.34*	*0.36*	*0.24*	*0.33*	*0.17*	*0.27*	*-26.02%*
Full model I	0.34	0.34	0.23	0.33	0.18	0.26	-28.06%
Full model II	*0.33*	*0.34*	*0.23*	*0.33*	*0.17*	*0.26*	*-28.47%*

4.4. The better performance of more accurate measures to study the 2006 and 2014 vote in Sweden

The data offered by *ESS* rounds 4 and 8 enable to analyze the Swedish 2006 and 2014 general elections. The corresponding dependent variables differ from those in Chapter 3 and referred to the same elections, due to the aforementioned smaller sample sizes. As regards the general election held prior to the Great Recession, the models are shown in tables 4.4.1. and 4.4.2. It should be remembered that the 2006 Swedish elections resulted in a coalition government formed by the M, L, KD and C, while the SAP recorded its worst score since 1920 (Aylott, Bolin 2007). M1 shows class voting patterns in keeping with the literature and the findings of Chapter 3. Indeed, the SAP obtained most of its votes by production worker (15% more likely to have voted for this party than clerks are), and the same class is the least likely to have voted for the M (-19% than clerks), together with service workers (-13% than clerks). The opposite pattern holds true as regards the self-employed classes. Managers constitute the main electoral base of the L, being 10% more likely to have voted for this party than clerks (the reference category). M2 introduces political ideologies. In keeping with the relative hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*), M2 II shows a higher value of R^2 (0.134) than M2 I, the value divides show the same directions, and M2 II is characterized by stronger associations between vote choices and political ideologies than M2 I. Economic conservatism is negatively associated with having voted for the SAP (-36% in M2 I and -46% in M2 II) and positively associated with having voted for the M or the L (respectively, +42% in M2 I and +74% in M2 II, and +18% in M2 I and + 22% in M2 II). The measure of authoritarian predispositions is positively correlated to having voted for the SAP (+40% in M2 I and +41% in M2 II) and negatively correlated to having voted for the M (-23% in M2 I and -24% in M2 II). Social conservatism is negatively associated with having voted for the SAP (-11% in M2 I and -14% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant) and shows weak associations with having voted for the M or the L (respectively, -2% in M2 I and +2% in M2 II, and -2% in M2 I and -

4% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant)[155]. The introduction of political ideologies in M2 accounts in part for the self-employed classes' likelihoods of having voted for the SAP or the M and for managers' likelihood of having voted for the L. The decline of the corresponding AMEs in absolute value is stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*). Conversely, while controlling for political ideologies accounted in part for voting behaviours in the case of production workers in the results presented in Chapter 3, the corresponding AMEs increase in absolute value in M2 I. Indeed, this class does not score high on the measure of authoritarian predispositions (see Table A4.9. in the Appendix), while such a measure is positively associated with having voted for the SAP and is negatively associated with having voted for the M (the relative AMEs change, respectively, from -15% than clerks in M1 to -17% than clerks in M2 I, and from -19% than clerks in M1 to -20% than clerks in M2 I). It must be pointed out that the smaller sample sizes do not affect the actual voting patterns, but may affect the changes in the corresponding AMEs when further variables are introduced in the model, according to the specific associations between the independent variables. Turning to the full model, M3 II show a higher value of R^2 (0.156) than M3 I. The distrust of the political system reveals weakly but positively correlated to having voted for one of the three parties, while distrust of the EU shows the opposite pattern (although only the AME of the associations between distrust of the EU and having voted for the L is statistically significant). Anti-immigration attitude is negatively associated with having voted for the SAP or the L and positively associated with having voted for the M: the latter associations (which shows the only statistically significant AME as regards anti-immigration attitude) is stronger in M2 I than in M2 II 8respectively, +32% and +30%). Considering that working classes score high on the measure of anti-immigration, while self-employed professionals and large employers score low on it (see Table A4.9. in the Appendix), had it not been for the positive association between this measure and having voted for the M, these classes would be, respectively, less

[155] See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the associations between political ideologies and Swedish political parties.

and more likely to have voted for it. Furthermore, had it not been for the negative association of having voted for the SAP with the same measure, self-employed professionals and large employers would be less likely to have voted for it (from -24% than clerks in M2 to -25% in M3 than clerks). Another class that scores high on the measure of anti-immigration is constituted by the managers (see Table A4.9. in the Appendix), who would be more likely to have voted for the L had it not been for this party's negative association with that variable (from +9% than clerks in M2 I to +10% than clerks in M3 I, and from +8% than clerks in M2 II to +9% than clerks in M3 II). It must be pointed out that Table 4.4.2. shows that the social classes' AMEs are lower in absolute value in M2 II and M3 II than in M2 I and M3 I (*H2*). To conclude, Table 4.4.3. focuses on the kappa indexes. Economic conservatism is the political ideology which accounts for the largest share of class polarization at the level of single parties and at the level of the entire set of them (-5.51% when its first version is introduced and -12.22% when its second version is introduced than in the bivariate model), and the three political ideologies account for a larger share (-7.32% when their first version are introduced and -13.19% when their second versions are introduced than in the bivariate model). In keeping with the fact that the dependent variable does not include «anti-establishment» parties, the introduction of political attitudes does not account for share of class polarization[156].

[156] The importance of economic issues in the Swedish electoral competition finds support in the literature (*e.g.* Oskarson 2015). However, it must be pointed out that, since the preference for the C is not accounted for herein, the results as regards class polarization are only partially comparable with those presented in Chapter 3.

Table 4.4.1. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.25***	0.33***	0.27***	0.26***	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.22***	0.17**	0.12	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.15**	0.17**	0.17**	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.22***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.10**	0.09**	0.10**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.36***	-0.36***		0.42***	0.38***		0.18***	0.18***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.11	-0.14		-0.02	-0.01		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.40***	0.41***		-0.23*	-0.29**		0.08	0.08
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.13			0.32***			-0.08
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.16			-0.07			-0.12**
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			0.04			0.08			0.05
			(0.11)			(0.10)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.076	0.121	0.134	0.076	0.121	0.134	0.076	0.121	0.134
N	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

Table 4.4.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.25***	0.33***	0.23**	0.23**	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.23***	0.17**	0.10	0.09	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	0.10**	0.08*	0.09**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.46***	-0.46***		0.74***	0.70***		0.22***	0.21***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Social conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		0.02	0.01		-0.04	-0.05
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Authoritarian pred.		0.41***	0.42***		-0.24*	-0.29**		0.08	0.07
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.16			0.30***			-0.05
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.15			-0.07			-0.16**
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			0.04			0.11			0.10
			(0.12)			(0.11)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.076	0.134	0.156	0.076	0.134	0.156	0.076	0.134	0.156
N	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

Table 4.4.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2006 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 4 data.*

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Liberal People's Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.68	0.76	0.66	0.61	
Socio-demographic	0.69	0.75	0.64	0.60	-1.09%
Economic cons. I	0.68	0.70	0.61	0.57	-5.51%
Economic cons. II	*0.67*	*0.62*	*0.55*	*0.53*	*-12.22%*
Social cons. I	0.70	0.74	0.63	0.60	-1.42%
Social cons. II	*0.70*	*0.74*	*0.63*	*0.60*	*-1.59%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.66	0.75	0.64	0.59	-2.26%
Political ideologies I	0.65	0.69	0.61	0.56	-7.32%
Political ideologies II	*0.64*	*0.62*	*0.57*	*0.53*	*-13.19%*
Political attitudes I	0.71	0.79	0.65	0.62	+2.48%
Political attitudes II	*0.71*	*0.80*	*0.67*	*0.63*	*+3.93%*
Full model I	0.68	0.72	0.61	0.58	-4.38%
Full model II	*0.67*	*0.68*	*0.58*	*0.56*	*-8.04%*

Tables 4.4.4. and 4.4.5. show the models pertaining to the 2014 Swedish general elections, the first one held after the Great Recession and characterized by the positive electoral performance of the SD. This party attracted voters from the centre-right parties (in particular the L) and leveraged anti-immigration stances (Berg, Oscarsson 2015; Oscarsson, Holmberg 2015). The small sample size forced to not introduce the green coalition in the dependent variable, although it constituted the resulting coalition government with the SAP. M1 shows class voting patterns which closely resemble those observed in Tables 4.4.1. and 4.4.2. Indeed, the self-employed classes are the most likely to have voted for centre-right and the least likely to have voted for centre-left, while the opposite can be said as regards the working classes. Furthermore, socio-cultural professionals reveal those least likely to have voted for the M (-13% than clerks). As observed in Chapter 3, the upper-middle employee classes are those least likely to have voted for the SD, whereas the working and self-employed classes constitute its electoral base. Indeed, looking at Table 4.6.6., this party is associated with the highest value of the kappa index (1.15 in the bivariate model). The three measures of political ideologies, introduced in M2, show weak associations with the preference for the SD. Although M2 II shows a higher value of R^2 (0.184) than M2 I, the second versions of the measures do not show stronger associations than their fist versions in all cases. As regards economic conservatism, the same directions between the two versions and the stronger associations in M2 II are observed. The same results characterize the measure of social conservatism, with the exception of its association with having voted for the SAP, which is stronger (and statistically significant) in M2 I than in M2 II (-16% and -14%). In the case of the measure of authoritarian predispositions, its associations with having voted for the SAP or M are stronger in M2 I than in M2 II (respectively, +41% in M2 I and +41% in M2 II, and -17% in M2 I and -15% in M2 II, although the AMEs in the case of having voted for the M are not statistically significant). The introduction of political ideologies accounts in part for the self-employed classes' likelihood of having voted for one of the three parties, and the decline of the corresponding AMEs is stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*). The results concerning likelihood of having voted for the M of the working classes and socio-

cultural professionals show the same pattern. On the other hand, the working classes reveal a higher likelihood of having voted for the SAP when political ideologies are introduced, due to their scores on the three measures (see Table A4.11. in the Appendix) and the associations between these and the vote choice in question. M3 includes political attitudes, and, once again, M3 II shows a higher value of R^2 (0.237) than M3 I. Anti-immigration attitude is strongly (and statistically significantly) correlated only to having voted for the SD (+30% in M3 I and +35% in M3 II). Distrust of the EU is strongly (and statistically significantly) associated only with having voted for the M, showing a negative direction (-20% in M3 I and -21% in M3 II) which opposes to its weak (and non-statistically significant) but positive association with having voted for the SAP (+7% in M3 I and +6% in M3 II). The distrust of the political system reveals the most prominent value divide: its measure is positively associated with having voted for the SAP (-24% in M3 I and -18% in M3 II) and is negatively associated with having voted for the M or SD (respectively, +29% in M3 I and +27% in M3 II, and +14% in M3 I and +13% in M3 II). These associations are stronger in M3 II than in M3 I (*H2*). Although the social classes' AMEs of having voted for the SD are not statistically significant, it should be highlighted that controlling for political attitudes is associated with their decline in absolute value, in keeping with the reduction of the value of the kappa index pertaining to this vote choice (see Table 4.4.6.)[157]. Furthermore, the second versions of the measures of political attitudes perform better as mediators than their first versions (*H2*). The introduction of these variables also accounts for a further share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the M in the case of the working classes and socio-cultural professionals. Conversely, these classes would be more likely to have voted for the SAP had it not been for this party's associations with the three measures. Indeed, working classes score high on the measure of the distrust of the political system while having voted for the SAP is negatively associated with this measure, and socio-cultural professionals score low on the measure of anti-

[157] Indeed, such a political actor mobilizes voters on political system distrust and immigration issues (Oskarson, Demker 2015; Oskarson 2015; Berg, Oscarsson 2015).

immigration attitude and distrust of the EU (see Table A4.11. in the Appendix), while having voted for the SAP is weakly but positively associated with these variables. To conclude, had it not been for the M's stances on the distrust of the political system and the EU, the self-employed classes would be more likely to have voted for this party, according to the scores of this class on the measures of these two attitudes (see Table A4.11. in the Appendix). As regards the class polarization (Table 4.4.6.), political attitudes account for a larger share of it then political ideologies do at the level of the entire set of parties. The full model is associated with a reduction of the value of the kappa index of 36.31% in its first version (M3 I), and of 38.61% in its second version (M3 II). Therefore, M3 II accounts for a larger share of the class polarization than M3 I (*H2*). In the case of having voted for the M or SAP, the models accounting for the largest share of the class polarization are, respectively, the one that includes economic conservatism only, in keeping with the M's focus on economic policies and social welfare (Berg, Oscarsson 2015), and the full model. It must be pointed out that, after the Great Recession, political attitudes gained importance as mediating factors of the association between social class and voting behaviour[158].

The results of the analyses focused on the 2006 and 2014 Swedish general elections corroborate the hypotheses concerning the differences between the two versions of the measures of political ideologies and political attitudes (*H1* and *H2*). However, few exceptions, in most cases related to political attitudes, have been observed and highlighted.

[158] Since the SAP competes with the SD for the vote share of the working classes, attitudes gained prominence in accounting for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for this centre-left party among classes.

Table 4.4.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2014 Swedish general election. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.16*	-0.16**	0.27**	0.23**	0.25**	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	-0.12**	-0.08	-0.08	0.11	0.10	0.12*	0.05	0.05	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.13*	0.14**	0.15**	-0.14**	-0.12*	-0.11*	0.06	0.06	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.09	0.09	0.10*	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.11*	0.12**	0.13**	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07	0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.28***	-0.28***		0.52***	0.53***		0.00	-0.06
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.16*	-0.16*		-0.02	-0.02		0.03	0.02
		(0.10)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.42***	0.36***		-0.17	-0.17		-0.06	-0.02
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.07			-0.01			0.30***
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.07			-0.21**			-0.01
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.24**			0.29***			0.14***
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.108	0.163	0.219	0.108	0.163	0.219	0.108	0.163	0.219
N	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022

Table 4.4.5. Voting for the main political parties in the 2014 Swedish general election. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.15*	-0.15**	0.27**	0.22**	0.24**	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.07	0.11	0.10	0.11*	0.05	0.04	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.13*	0.13*	0.14**	-0.14**	-0.11*	-0.10*	0.06	0.06	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.09	0.10	0.11*	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.11*	0.13**	0.13**	-0.10	-0.09	-0.08	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		-0.40***	-0.41***		0.80***	0.79***		0.04	-0.06
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		-0.11	-0.10		0.05	0.04
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.06)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.41***	0.36***		-0.15	-0.17		-0.07	-0.03
		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.04			0.01			0.35***
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.22**			-0.01
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.18*			0.27**			0.13**
			(0.11)			(0.11)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.108	0.184	0.237	0.108	0.184	0.237	0.108	0.184	0.237
N	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022

Table 4.4.6. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2014 Swedish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 8 data.*

Model	**Swedish Social Democratic Party**	**Moderate Party**	**Swedish Democrats**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.49	0.61	1.15	0.70	
Socio-demographic	0.44	0.56	0.81	0.54	-22.90%
Economic cons. I	0.45	0.48	0.78	0.51	-26.85%
Economic cons. II	*0.44*	*0.48*	*0.77*	*0.50*	*-27.71%*
Social cons. I	0.44	0.57	0.81	0.54	-22.70%
Social cons. II	*0.44*	*0.57*	*0.80*	*0.54*	*-22.81%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.42	0.56	0.81	0.53	-23.50%
Political ideologies I	0.41	0.52	0.79	0.51	-26.20%
Political ideologies II	*0.41*	*0.54*	*0.79*	*0.52*	*-25.62%*
Political attitudes I	0.42	0.58	0.55	0.45	-35.11%
Political attitudes II	*0.41*	*0.59*	*0.53*	*0.45*	*-35.81%*
Full model I	0.39	0.57	0.56	0.44	-36.31%
Full model II	*0.38*	*0.60*	*0.48*	*0.43*	*-38.61%*

4.5. The heterogeneous performance of more accurate measures to study the 2005 and 2015 vote in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom general elections have always been characterized by the competition between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, which have mobilized voters according to their social class. The dealignment literature assume that the resulting stable class voting patterns have been weakening since the Sixties. However, the results presented in Chapter 3 corroborated the realignment perspective and highlighted that the definition of «left behind» voters suits the new class voting patterns observed in the United Kingdom after the economic crisis (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Evans, Tilley 2017).

Tables 4.5.1. and 4.5.2. show the models for the 2005 election. The class voting pattern seen in M1 closely resemble those detected in Chapter 3. Indeed, the upper-middle employee classes, except for managers, and the working classes are those least likely to have voted Conservative. The working classes and socio-cultural professionals constitute the electoral base of the Labour Party (although the AME in the case of socio-cultural professionals is not statistically significant). The Liberal Democratic Party is more likely to have been voted by the self-employed classes, socio-cultural professionals and technicians (although the AMEs in the case of self-employed professionals and large employers and in the case of technicians are not statistically significant). M2 introduces political ideologies. The three measures are positively correlated to having voted for the Conservatives. Having voted for the Labour Party is negatively correlated to economic and social conservatism (respectively, -22% in M2 I and -30% in M2 II, and -25% in M2 I and -26% in M2 II), and is positively correlated to authoritarian predispositions (+22% in M2 I and +23% in M2 II). As regards the Liberal Democratic Party, the electoral preference for this actor is weakly (and non-statistically significantly) but positively correlated to social conservatism, and is negatively correlated to economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions (respectively, -5% in M2 I and -11% in M2 II, and -12% in M2 I and -13% in M2 II, although only the AME in the case of the second version of the measure of economic conservatism is statistically significant). These associations result

stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*), except for the correlation between having voted for the Conservative Party and authoritarian predispositions (+9% in M2 I and +12% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant), and for the correlation between having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party and social conservatism (+5% in M2 I and +3% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). It should be noticed that the second version of the measure of economic conservatism highlights the importance of economic issues for the electoral competition between the two mainstream parties (Green, Hobolt 2008). The introduction of these variables accounts in part for the likelihood of having voted for one of the three political parties in the case of the working classes and socio-cultural professionals, except for the tendency of the latter class to have voted Labour. Indeed, had it not been for the negative association of such a voting behaviour with social conservatism, socio-cultural professionals, who score high on its measure (see Table A4.14. in the Appendix), would be more likely to have voted for this party (from +4% than clerks in M1 to +5% than clerks in M2). Controlling for political ideologies also accounts for a portion of the self-employed classes' preference for the Liberal Democratic Party. However, the introduction of the second versions of the measures is not associated with stronger decline in classes' AMEs the their second versions in all cases, therefore the corresponding hypothesis (*H2*) is only partially corroborated. Conversely, M2 II shows a higher value of R^2 (0.101) than M2 I. Turning to the introduction of political attitudes in M3, no differences in the corresponding value divides are observed as regards their directions. Indeed, having voted for the Labours is negatively associated with the three measures. Having voted for the Conservatives is negatively associated with the distrust of the political system (-2% in M3 I and -17% in M3 II, although only the AME in M3 II is statistically significant) and positively associated with the other two attitudes, while the opposite holds true in the case of having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party[159]. Controlling for political attitudes, the socio-cultural professionals' and

[159] The two associations between having voted for the Labour Party and the measures of anti-immigration attitude and of the distrust of the political system are the

service workers' likelihood of having voted for the Conservatives fall in absolute value[160], and the same is observed as far as the self-employed classes' and socio-cultural professionals' likelihoods to have voted for the Liberal Democratic Party are concerned. On the other hand, since production workers score high on the measures of the three political attitudes (see Table A4.14. in the Appendix), had it not been for the Labour Party's stances on the corresponding issues, this class would be more likely to have voted for the Labours (from +9% than clerks in M2 I to +10% than clerks in M3 I, and from +10% than clerks in M2 II to +11% than clerks in M3 II). The same class would be less likely to have voted for the Conservatives had it not been for this party's positions on immigration issues and its distrust of the EU (from -13% than clerks in M2 I to -14% than clerks in M3 I, and from -13% than clerks in M2 II to -15% than clerks in M3 II). To conclude, the self-employed classes and managers, who score low on the three measures would be less likely to have voted for the Labour Party had it not been for the negative associations between the preference for such an actor and the three political attitudes. Conversely, since the preference for the Conservative Party is positively associated to anti-immigration and the distrust of the EU, the opposite pattern is observed (despite the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). The first versions of the measures of political ideologies and political attitudes do not only better account for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the three parties among classes, but also account for larger portions of their class polarization. Table 4.5.3. shows that this result holds true as concerns class polarization of individual parties and of the entire set of them.

only associations which result stronger in M3 I than in M3 II (respectively, -9% in M3 I and -8% in M3 II, and -31% in M3 I and -23% in M3 II, although the AMEs in the case of anti-immigration attitude are not statistically significant).

[160] In Chapter 3, controlling for political attitudes was associated with an increase of the AME in the case of service workers. As regards the sample analyzed herein, clerks score high on the three measures (see Table A4.14. in the Appendix), therefore controlling for these determines a reduction in their likelihood to have voted for the Conservatives, and affects the differences between this class and the other ones.

Table 4.5.1. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05	0.02	0.11	0.10	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.08*	0.08	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.17**	-0.17***	-0.12*	0.09	0.08	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prod. workers	0.12**	0.09	0.10*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.17***	0.16***	0.15***	0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.18***	0.16***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.22***	-0.24***		0.38***	0.38***		-0.05	-0.05
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.25***	-0.30***		0.13**	0.19***		0.05	0.03
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.22*	0.21		0.12	0.03		-0.12	-0.06
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.09			0.31***			-0.21***
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.11			0.21**			-0.02
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.31***			-0.02			0.10
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.095	0.130	0.058	0.095	0.130	0.058	0.095	0.130
N	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215

Table 4.5.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.03	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.11	0.09	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.08*	0.07	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.17**	-0.18***	-0.13*	0.09	0.08	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Prod. workers	0.12**	0.10*	0.11*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.15***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.07	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.05	0.03	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.18***	0.16***	0.15***	0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.30***	-0.33***		0.61***	0.57***		-0.11**	-0.07
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Social conservatism		-0.26***	-0.33***		0.17**	0.24***		0.03	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.23*	0.22*		0.09	-0.03		-0.13	-0.05
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.08			0.34***			-0.25***
			(0.09)			(0.07)			(0.07)
EU distrust			-0.16*			0.31***			-0.06
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.23**			-0.17*			0.15*
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.101	0.138	0.058	0.101	0.138	0.058	0.101	0.138
N	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215

Table 4.5.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 4 data.*

Model	**Labour Party**	**Conservative Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.35	0.54	0.59	0.44	
Socio-demographic	0.34	0.54	0.53	0.42	-4.69%
Economic cons. I	0.35	0.52	0.51	0.40	-7.59%
Economic cons. II	*0.38*	*0.56*	*0.54*	*0.43*	*-1.40%*
Social cons. I	0.34	0.53	0.53	0.41	-5.88%
Social cons. II	*0.34*	*0.54*	*0.53*	*0.41*	*-5.37%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.35	0.58	0.56	0.44	+1.01%
Political ideologies I	0.36	0.55	0.57	0.44	-0.45%
Political ideologies II	*0.39*	*0.61*	*0.61*	*0.47*	*+8.47%*
Political attitudes I	0.38	0.58	0.44	0.41	-5.93%
Political attitudes II	*0.38*	*0.61*	*0.44*	*0.42*	*-3.64%*
Full model I	0.39	0.59	0.49	0.43	-2.16%
Full model II	*0.43*	*0.66*	*0.52*	*0.47*	*+7.89%*

The incumbent government at the 2015 United Kingdom general election comprised the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats and was led by a conservative, Eurosceptic leader (Ford, Goodwin 2014; Green, Prosser 2016). The literature associates the strong electoral «volatility» observed with the emergence of the UKIP as the third major political force, and with the decline of the Liberal Democratic Party (Green, Prosser 2016). Tables 4.5.4. and 4.5.5. show the models performed to explore voting behaviour in the election in question. The class voting patterns (M1) are not clearly defined. However, the working classes and socio-cultural professionals are those least likely to have voted for the Conservative Party, together with self-employed professionals and large employers (although only the AME pertaining to service workers is statistically significant). Production workers constitute the main electoral base of the UKIP (+9% than clerks), according to the «left-behind» voters' mobilization by «anti-establishment» political forces (Ford, Goodwin 2014). Service workers are the preserve of the Labour Party (+14% than clerks), and this party has also gained popularity among self-employed professionals and large employers (although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The upper-middle employee classes, especially technical professionals, continue to be those most likely to have voted for the Liberal Democratic Party (although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Introducing political ideologies, a higher value of R^2 (0.133) is observed in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*). As regards economic conservatism, its value divide clearly opposes the preference for the mainstream right party, with which its measure is positively associated (+41% in M2 I and +71% in M2 II), and the preference for the mainstream left party, with which its measure is negatively associated (-39% in M2 I and -59% in M2 II). Social conservatism is positively correlated to having voted for the Conservative Party (+14% in M2 I and +16% in M2 II), and negatively correlated to having voted for the UKIP (-10%)[161] and the Liberal Democratic Party (-6% in M2 I and -9% in M2 II, although only the AME in M2 II is statistically significant). The tendency to have voted for Labour is weakly (and non statistically significant) associated with this measure.

[161] As regards this association, see Chapter 3.

Generally, the associations observed in M2 II are stronger than those observed in M2 I (*H2*). However, the opposite holds true as concerns authoritarian predispositions. Furthermore having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party results positively associated with economic conservatism in M2 I (+3%), but negatively associated with the same dimension in M2 II (-3%). Although the corresponding AMEs are not statistically significant, the hypothesis that focuses on the directions of the associations is only partially corroborated herein (*H1*). The differences in the likelihood of having voted for the Conservative Party or the Labour Party in the case of self-employed professionals and large employers, socio-cultural professionals and service workers are accounted for a larger share in M2 II than in M2 I (although only the AMEs pertaining to service workers are statistically significant). Observing M2 II, production workers and technicians, who score low on the measure of economic conservatism (see Table A4.17. in the Appendix), would be more to have voted for the Conservatives and less likely to have voted for the Labours, had it not been for these parties' stances on economic issues (although the corresponding AMEs are not statistically significant). The same model shows that production workers have voted for the UKIP despite its stances on economic issues, since they would be more likely to have voted for this party when the measure of economic conservatism is introduced in the model (from +9% than clerks in M1 to +10% than clerks in M2 II). Political attitudes (M3) show stronger associations with the voting behaviours than political ideologies do. Having voted for right-wing parties is positively associated with anti-immigration attitude and with distrust of the EU, while the opposite associations are observed as regards the preference for the other two parties. The measure of the distrust of the political system is negatively associated with having voted for the Conservative Party (-65% in M3 I and -52% in M3 II) or the UKIP (-8% in M3 I and -12% in M3 II, although the AME in M3 I is not statistically significant), and is negatively associated with having voted for the Labour Party or the Liberal Democratic Party (+5% in M3 I and +4% in M3 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Since some of these associations result stronger in M2 I than in M2 II, the corresponding hypothesis (*H2*) is only partially corroborated by these findings. Furthermore, M3 II shows a value R^2

(0.210) that is only slightly higher than that of M3 II. Controlling for political attitudes accounts in part for production workers' high likelihood of having voted for the UKIP (from +9% than clerks in M2 I to +7% than clerks in M3 I, and from +10% than clerks in M2 II to +8% than clerks in M3 II), and for self-employed professionals and large employers' likelihood of having voted for the Labours or Conservatives (although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Furthermore, introducing the measures of distrust of the political system and the EU accounts in part for the likelihood of having voted for the Labour Party in the case of service workers (from +13% in M2 I to +11% in M3 I than clerks), who score high on the former measure and low on the latter one (see Table A4.17. in the Appendix). Conversely, had it not been for the Conservative Party's stances on immigration issues, the same class, which scores high on the second version of its measure (see Table A4.17. in the Appendix), would be less likely to have voted for this mainstream right party (from -7% than clerks in M2 II to -9% than clerks in M3 II)[162]. Furthermore, controlling for political attitudes also accounts in part for most of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the Liberal Democratic Party among classes (although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Table 4.5.6. shows the values of the kappa index. The second versions of the measure reveal to account for larger shares of class polarization than their first versions (*H2*), except for economic conservatism and political attitudes. The UKIP is associated with the highest value of kappa index (0.80 in the bivariate model)[163].

[162] The introduction of the measures of the distrust of the political system and anti-immigration attitude affects service workers' likelihood of having voted for the Conservatives or the Labours according to different patterns between M3 I and M3 II.

[163] The strongest reduction of the UKIP's value of kappa index come about with the introduction of political ideologies (in their first version). In Chapter 3, political attitudes accounted for the largest share of this party's class polarization. It must be pointed out that the *ESS* round 8 data collection in United Kingdom started in September 2016, three months later than the Brexit referendum and at the beginning of a government crisis which led to a new election in 2017. Differently, the cumulative dataset,

The analyses focused on the 2005 and 2015 United Kingdom general elections revealed that the second versions of the measures perform worse as mediating factors than the first one as regards the models of the 2005 general election and better as regards the models of the 2015 election, although relevant exception were pointed out in this second case. Therefore, the results only partially corroborated the hypotheses, in particular the one that expects stronger associations and mediation effects in the models including the second versions of the measures than in the models including their first versions (*H2*).

employed in Chapter 3, also includes data that have been collected in 2015. Accordingly, the differences in class polarization as regards the UKIP between the results observed in Table 4.5.6. and in Chapter 3 are due to a fall in the salience and issue ownership of the distrust of the political system and the EU. Such an account also considers the decline of this political force in the 2017 general election.

Table 4.5.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.10	-0.10	-0.06	0.11	0.12	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.07*	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.09**	0.09**	0.07**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10*	0.06	0.08	0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	0.14**	0.13**	0.11**	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.41***	0.31***		-0.39***	-0.32***		0.00	-0.04		0.03	0.06*
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.14**	0.07		0.01	0.04		-0.10*	-0.10**		-0.06	-0.06
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.09	-0.08		0.07	0.14		0.03	0.02		-0.02	0.01
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.22***			0.18***			-0.18***
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.27***			-0.15*			0.23***			-0.16***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.65***			0.38***			-0.08			0.05
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209
N	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112

Table 4.5.5. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	0.11	0.09	0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06*	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	0.09**	0.10**	0.08**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.07	-0.05	-0.07	0.06	0.05	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.10*	-0.07	-0.09*	0.14**	0.10**	0.10*	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.71***	0.57***		-0.59***	-0.50***		0.07	0.01		-0.03	0.01
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.16**	0.09		0.00	0.03		-0.10*	-0.10*		-0.09	-0.08*
		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.08	-0.06		0.07	0.14		0.02	0.00		-0.02	0.01
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.26***			0.20***			-0.16***
			(0.08)			(0.09)			(0.04)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.22**			-0.12			0.25***			-0.16***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.52***			0.31***			-0.12**			0.04
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210
N	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112

Table 4.5.6. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 8 data.*

Model	**Conservative Party**	**Labour Party**	**UK Independence Party**	**Liberal Democratic Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.34	0.28	0.80	0.68	0.41	
Socio-demographic	0.35	0.32	0.64	0.65	0.40	-1.25%
Economic cons. I	0.31	0.32	0.64	0.62	0.38	-5.54%
Economic cons. II	*0.31*	*0.31*	*0.66*	*0.64*	*0.39*	*-4.53%*
Social cons. I	0.35	0.32	0.63	0.64	0.40	-1.29%
Social cons. II	*0.35*	*0.32*	*0.63*	*0.64*	*0.40*	*-1.51%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.36	0.33	0.66	0.64	0.40	-0.55%
Political ideologies I	0.31	0.33	0.62	0.61	0.38	-5.92%
Political ideologies II	*0.30*	*0.31*	*0.64*	*0.62*	*0.38*	*-6.88%*
Political attitudes I	0.41	0.32	0.67	0.59	0.39	-2.66%
Political attitudes II	*0.41*	*0.32*	*0.67*	*0.60*	*0.40*	*-2.00%*
Full model I	0.38	0.32	0.70	0.54	0.37	-9.54%
Full model II	*0.36*	*0.31*	*0.69*	*0.55*	*0.36*	*-10.38%*

4.6. The heterogeneous performance of more accurate measures to study the 2005 and 2013 vote in Germany

The round 4 and 8 data allow to investigate the class and value voting patterns in the German 2005 and 2013 federal elections. The dependent variables pertaining to these two elections include the two mainstream political parties, *i.e.* SDP and CDU/CSU, and the main radical left political force, *i.e.* PDS, which then became The Left. According to the literature, the «catch-all» strategies of the two mainstream parties as regards economic and socio-cultural issues resulted in the weakening of the religious and class cleavages that have persisted in German general elections up until the 2009 election (Elff 2013; Elff, Roßteutscher 2011, 2017).

The models of the 2005 election are shown in Tables 4.6.1. and 4.6.2. The class voting patterns (M1) closely resemble those observed in Chapter 3. Indeed, clerks are those most likely to have voted for the CDU/CSU. The self-employed classes constitute the electoral base of the FDP, and are those least likely to have voted for the SDP (despite the AME pertaining to small business owners is not statistically significant). Production workers are the most likely to have voted for the latter party (+7% than clerks, although this AME is not statistically significant), and the least likely, together with socio-cultural professionals, to have voted for the CDU/CSU (-12% than clerks). The PDS challenges the SDP as regards the share of votes of the working classes and socio-cultural professionals (although the AME pertaining to production workers is not statistically significant). M2 introduces political ideologies and shows the SDP's moderate stances on the economic dimension: the association between having voted for this party and its measure is weak and negative (-2% in M2 I and -6% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The same ideology is positively correlated to having voted for the CDU/CSU or the FDP (respectively, +24% in M2 I and +43% in M2 II, and +10% in M2 I and +15% in M2 II) and negatively correlated to having voted for the PDS (-20% in M2 I and -28% in M2 II). Social conservatism is positively associated to having voted for the CDU/CSU (+57% in M2 I and +64% in M2 II), and negatively associated to having voted for the

left-wing political forces. To conclude, the measure of authoritarian predispositions is positively correlated to all voting behaviours except for having voted for the SDP (-4%, although this AME is not statistically significant). Generally, these associations result stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*). The only exception pertains to the association between having voted for the FDP and the measure of authoritarian predispositions (+12% in M2 I and +10% in M2 II, although the AME in M2 II is not statistically significant). Controlling for political ideologies accounts in part for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the CDU/CSU among classes, except for the socio-cultural professionals. Indeed, this class scores high on social conservatism (see Table A4.20. in the Appendix), and therefore would be less likely to have voted for this coalition had it not been for their stances on the issues in question (from -12% than clerks in M1 to -13% than clerks in M2). Had it not been for the negative association between the first version of the measure of social conservatism and having voted for the PDS, the same class would be more likely to have voted this party (from +7% than clerks in M1 to +8% than clerks in M2 I). Self-employed professionals and large employers, who score low on social conservatism (see Table A4.20. in the Appendix), result less likely to have voted for SDP controlling for this dimension (from -19% than clerks in M1 to -20% than clerks in M2). As regards the working classes, the introduction of political ideologies accounts in part for their tendencies to have voted for the CDU/CSU, the SDP or the PDS. M2 II and M3 II show higher values of R^2 (respectively, 0.128 and 0.147) than M2 I and M3 I, corroborating the relative hypothesis (*H2*). However, the full model presents stronger associations between vote choices and political attitudes in its second than in its first version only in the case of having voted for the FDP and in the case of the association between the preference for the SDP and the distrust of the political system (+10% in M3 I and +14% in M3 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). The value divide that characterizes anti-immigration attitude clearly opposes having voted for right-wing (to which the measures are positively correlated) or left-wing parties (to which the measures are negatively correlated). The same holds true as regards the distrust of the political system, although the correlations show the opposite directions. Since the working classes

score high on the measure of anti-immigration attitude (see Table A4.20. in the Appendix), controlling for this variable shows that these classes would be less and more likely to have voted, respectively, for the CDU/CSU and the SDP (although the AME in the case of the preference for the SDP are not statistically significant). In M3 I, the negative association between the same measure partly accounts for the high likelihood of socio-cultural professionals to have voted for this party (from +8% than clerks in M2 I to +7% than clerks in M3 I)[164]. In the same mode, this class, who score low on the measure of the distrust of the political system (see Table A4.20. in the Appendix), would also be more likely to have voted for the CDU/CSU (from -13% than clerks in M2 I to -12% than clerks in M3 I). In M3 II, the introduction of the three measures accounts in part for the low likelihood of self-employed professionals and large employers to have voted for the SDP (from -20% in M2 II to -21% in M3 II than clerks). The two versions of the measures of political ideologies and political attitudes show different strengths of their associations with vote choices and impacts on classes' AMEs. The kappa indexes, which are shown in Table 4.6.3., enable to assess their performances as mediating factors. On the one hand, as far as political ideologies are concerned, M2 I accounts for a larger share of class polarization than M2 II does (respectively, -11.84% and -11.29% than in the bivariate model). On the other hand, M3 II is associated to a larger reduction of the value of the kappa index than M3 I (respectively, -11.20% and -10.03% than in the bivariate model). This pattern holds true as regards individual parties' values of the kappa index, except for the preference for the CDU/CSU. As detected in Chapter 3, political ideologies account for a larger share of class polarization than political attitudes do, and the authoritarian continuum is the variable accounting for its largest share (-17.06% than the bivariate model).

[164] Since having voted for PDS is weakly correlated to anti-immigration attitude in M3 II, controlling for the measure of the distrust of the political system accounts in part for the working classes' high likelihoods to have voted for this party (although these AMEs are not statistically significant).

Table 4.6.1. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election. ESS *round 4 data and include. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.11	-0.11	-0.10	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.20***	0.14**	0.14**	0.14***	0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.12**	-0.08*	-0.10**	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.09*	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.07**	0.08**	0.07**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	-0.10**	-0.06	-0.08*	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05*	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.24***	0.24***		-0.02	-0.03		0.10***	0.10***		-0.20***	-0.19***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.57***	0.53***		-0.18***	-0.15**		-0.02	-0.02		-0.34***	-0.33***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.17*	0.03		-0.04	0.05		0.12*	0.10		0.16**	0.21***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.44***			-0.32***			0.07			-0.07*
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.05			0.05			0.08			-0.02
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.22***			0.10			-0.05			0.19***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143
N	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451

Table 4.6.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.11	-0.09	-0.09	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.21***	0.14**	0.14**	0.14***	0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.12**	-0.08*	-0.09**	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.09*	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.08*	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.05*	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.43***	0.41***		-0.06	-0.05		0.15***	0.15***		-0.28***	-0.28***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.64***	0.61***		-0.20***	-0.18**		-0.02	-0.02		-0.38***	-0.36***
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.15	0.04		-0.04	0.04		0.10	0.07		0.19***	0.21***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.37***			-0.31***			0.09*			-0.01
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.04			0.02			0.09*			-0.01
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.20**			0.14			-0.08			0.15**
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147
N	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451

Table 4.6.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2005 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 4 data.*

Model	**CDU/CSU**	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**Free Democratic Party**	**Party of Democratic Socialism**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.41	0.71	0.34	0.50	0.45	
Socio-demographic	0.38	0.68	0.31	0.45	0.42	-6.68%
Economic cons. I	0.44	0.70	0.35	0.41	0.44	-2.79%
Economic cons. II	*0.44*	*0.70*	*0.37*	*0.41*	*0.44*	*-2.38%*
Social cons. I	0.42	0.67	0.31	0.41	0.42	-6.72%
Social cons. II	*0.42*	*0.68*	*0.31*	*0.43*	*0.43*	*-6.22%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.32	0.61	0.35	0.34	0.38	-17.06%
Political ideologies I	0.43	0.64	0.37	0.27	0.40	-11.84%
Political ideologies II	*0.43*	*0.64*	*0.40*	*0.25*	*0.40*	*-11.39%*
Political attitudes I	0.32	0.68	0.30	0.43	0.41	-10.03%
Political attitudes II	*0.33*	*0.67*	*0.29*	*0.42*	*0.40*	*-11.20%*
Full model I	0.40	0.66	0.36	0.26	0.40	-12.54%
Full model II	*0.40*	*0.66*	*0.37*	*0.23*	*0.40*	*-13.07%*

The decline in the share of votes of the SDP and the CDU/CSU that previous authors observed during the Great Recession has been interpreted as the dealignment of the German cleavage-based electoral mobilization (Elff 2013). The first election held after the economic crisis is characterized by a high abstention rate (see Elff, Roßteutscher 2017), which impacted on the shares of votes of the mainstream parties, in particular of the SDP. The models of the 2013 federal election are shown in Tables 4.6.4. and 4.6.5. As observed in the case of the 2005 election, the class voting patterns (M1) closely resembles the findings in Chapter 3. Indeed, the electoral base of the CDU/CSU is constituted by the self-employed classes and managers, while the other classes are those least likely to have voted for this coalition. The self-employed classes are the least likely to have voted for the SDP, whose share of votes is also affected by the low voter turnout and by the competition with radical left and green parties. The Left is characterized by class voting patterns in keeping with those hypothesized for left-wing parties, while the electoral base of the Alliance 90/The Greens is constituted by the upper-middle classes. Introducing political ideologies, a higher value of R^2 (0.106) and, in general, stronger associations between the three measures and vote choices can be seen (*H2*). These associations show the same directions between the two models, corroborating the relative hypothesis (*H1*), and are in keeping with those hypothesized by the literature. Indeed, the two dimension of the conservatism-liberalism continuum are positively associated with having voted for the centre-right party and negatively association with having voted for the left-wing and green parties. The measure of authoritarian predispositions is positively associated with having voted for the CDU/CSU (+33%) or The Left (+5% in M2 I and +6% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant) and negatively associated with having voted for the SDP (-2% in M2 I and -3% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant) or the green coalition (-30% in M2 I and -29% in M2 II). Controlling for political ideologies partly accounts for the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the CDU/CSU, The Left or the green coalition in the case of technicians, socio-cultural professionals and the working classes. The decline of the corresponding AMEs is stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*). However, M2 I also shows a

decline in the AME pertaining to the tendency of self-employed professionals and large employers to have voted for the SDP (from -11% than clerks in M1 to -10% than clerks in M2 I)[165]. Turning to political attitudes, M3 II is associated to a higher value of R^2 (0.136) than M3 I. The measure of anti-immigration attitude is positively associated with having voted for the mainstream right party (+33% in M3 I and +30% in M3 II), and is negatively associated with the other vote choices. The distrust of the political system is positively correlated to having voted for every party, except for the CDU/CSU (-27%). Conversely, the measure of distrust of the EU is weakly (and non-statistically significantly) correlated to the voting behaviours. It should be pointed out that M3 II does not always show stronger associations than in M3 I, therefore the relative hypothesis is only partially corroborated by this evidence (*H2*). Introducing the three measures, in particular in their second versions, accounts for a further share of the upper middle-classes' tendency to have voted for the green parties. Since production workers score high on the measure of anti-immigration attitude (see Table A4.23. in the Appendix), they would be less likely to have voted for the CDU/CSU had it not been for this party's anti-immigrant positions (from -9% than clerks in M2 I to -10% than clerks in M3 I and from -8% than clerks in M2 II to -9% than clerks in M3 II). Socio-cultural professionals, who show a low score on the measure of the distrust of the political system (see Table A4.23. in the Appendix), reveal to have voted for The Left despite this party's stances on that issue (from +4% than clerks in M2 I to +5% than clerks in M2 II). To conclude, considering that self-employed professionals score low on the three measures (see Table A4.23. in the Appendix), had it not been for the associations between these variables and having voted for the SDP, this class would be less likely to have voted for this party (from -10% than clerks in M2 I to -11% than clerks in M3 I and from -11% than clerks in M2 II to -12% than clerks in M3 II).

[165] This class scores high on economic conservatism and low on socio-cultural dimensions (see Table A4.23. in the Appendix). In M2 I, having voted for SDP is less strongly associated to socio-cultural dimensions, therefore if it were not for the negative association with the economic one this class would be more likely to have preferred it.

The values of the kappa index are shown in Table 4.6.6. At the level of the entire set of parties, the full model accounts for the largest share of class polarization, and M3 II is associated with a larger reduction than M3 I (respectively, -21.37% and -23.22%)[166]. M2 results the sole case in which the first versions of the measures provide a stronger mediation than their second versions (respectively, -11.84% and -11.39%). Therefore, the relative hypothesis has been almost fully corroborated (*H2*).

The results of the analyses focused on the 2005 and 2013 German federal elections show heterogeneous performances of the new measures. On the one hand, political ideologies revealed stronger mediators in their first versions than in their second one as regards the 2005 election, although their new measures is more strongly associated with vote choices. On the other hand, as far as the 2013 election is concerned, the second versions of the measures of political ideologies and political attitudes provide more insights on class and value voting patterns than their first versions. As regards the associations with voting behaviours, in the models of the 2013 election the hypothesized pattern (*H2*) has not been fully corroborated.

[166] According to the results presented in Chapter 3, political ideologies accounted for a larger share of class polarization than political attitudes did.

Table 4.6.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**The Left**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.11*	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.07*	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.10*	-0.09*	-0.09*	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.07**	0.06*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.11**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.06**	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10**	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05*	0.07**	0.06*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.26***	0.23***		-0.13***	-0.15***		-0.21***	-0.20***		-0.02	0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.41***	0.39***		-0.09	-0.12**		-0.32***	-0.30***		-0.01	-0.01
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.33***	0.22**		-0.02	-0.01		0.05	0.07		-0.30***	-0.17***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.09			-0.06			-0.35***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.02			0.02			-0.05
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.12			0.17***			0.08
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127
N	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702

Table 4.6.5. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**The Left**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.12*	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.09**	-0.09*	-0.09**	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07*	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.10*	-0.08	-0.08	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.07**	0.06*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.11**	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.06**	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.07**	0.06*	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.46***	0.41***		-0.20***	-0.20***		-0.33***	-0.32***		-0.11**	-0.05
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.45***	0.43***		-0.11*	-0.13**		-0.33***	-0.32***		-0.03	-0.02
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.33***	0.22**		-0.03	-0.00		0.06	0.07		-0.29***	-0.18***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.13*			-0.02			-0.35***
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.03			0.01			-0.05
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.11			0.16***			0.06
			(0.10)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136
N	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702

Table 4.6.6. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2013 German federal election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 8 data.*

Model	**CDU/CSU**	**Social Democratic Party of Germany**	**The Left**	**Alliance 90/The Greens**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.29	0.32	0.44	0.51	0.36	
Socio-demographic	0.26	0.36	0.42	0.37	0.32	-11.20%
Economic cons. I	0.26	0.34	0.38	0.39	0.31	-13.29%
Economic cons. II	*0.26*	*0.34*	*0.35*	*0.40*	*0.30*	*-14.81%*
Social cons. I	0.25	0.36	0.45	0.37	0.33	-8.40%
Social cons. II	*0.25*	*0.36*	*0.44*	*0.37*	*0.32*	*-9.13%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.28	0.35	0.42	0.32	0.31	-13.12%
Political ideologies I	0.27	0.35	0.40	0.33	0.31	-14.45%
Political ideologies II	*0.27*	*0.35*	*0.37*	*0.34*	*0.30*	*-15.84%*
Political attitudes I	0.22	0.35	0.43	0.26	0.29	-18.08%
Political attitudes II	*0.22*	*0.35*	*0.42*	*0.26*	*0.29*	*-19.47%*
Full model I	0.24	0.32	0.41	0.25	0.28	-21.37%
Full model II	*0.22*	*0.32*	*0.39*	*0.25*	*0.27*	*-23.22%*

4.7. More accurate measures and different performances between political ideologies and political attitudes in the Spanish 2008 and 2016 general elections

Spain is characterized by a large number of general elections in the first two decades of the XXI century. Round 4 data enables to explore Spanish electoral preferences in the last election prior to the Great Recession (2008). However, the time period of data collection of round 8 does not pertain to the first election held after the financial crisis (2015), but concerns the 2016 one.

Tables 4.7.1. and 4.7.2. show the models of the 2008 Spanish general election. The sample size, restricted to round 4 data, enables to focus on the two mainstream parties. Since these models do not account for the electoral preference for the main Spanish radical left party, the analyses provided herein are only partially comparable to those in Chapter 3. The class voting patterns (M1) are affected by the aforementioned smaller sample size. Indeed, the classes' AMEs are not statistically significant, except for the productions workers' likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (+16% than clerks). However, the self-employed classes are those least likely to have voted for the centre-left party, and small business owners and managers are those most likely to have voted for the centre-right party (respectively, +8% and +6% than clerks). The upper-middle employee classes' positive AMEs in the case of having voted for the PSOE and the service workers' positive AME in the case of having voted for the PP are in keeping with the partial redefinition of these two parties as «catch-all» political forces (Chhibber, Torcal 1997; Orriolis 2013; Barisione, De Luca 2018; Montero, Santana 2020; Fraile, Hernández 2020). M2 introduces political ideologies: the three measures are positively associated with having voted for the centre-right party and are negatively associated with have preferred the centre-left party (although the AMEs pertaining to having voted for the PSOE and both economic conservatism and authoritarian predispositions are not statistically

significant)[167]. These associations corroborate the two hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*). The differences in the likelihood of having voted for the two parties among classes accounted for by the introduction of the three measures (pertaining to self-employed professionals and large employers in the case of having voted for the PSOE, and pertaining to technical professionals, socio-cultural professionals and production workers in the case of having voted for the PP) only slightly differ between M2 I and M2 II. Managers show a higher likelihood of having voted for PP (from +6% than clerks in M1 to +10% than clerks in M2 I and to +11% than clerks in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant) and a lower likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (from +1% than clerks in M1 to -1% than clerks in M2 I and to -2% than clerks in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant) when the measures of social conservatism and authoritarian predispositions, on which they score low (see Table A4.26. in the Appendix), are introduced. Controlling for the second version of the measure of economic conservatism also accounts in part for the high production workers' likelihood of having voted for the PSOE (from +16% than clerks in M1 to +15% than clerks in M2 II). Political attitudes (M3) clearly show the opposition of the two parties on the measure of anti-immigration attitude and of the distrust of the political system. These associations are stronger in M3 I than in M3 II, except for that between having voted for the PSOE and anti-immigration attitude (-15% in M3 I and -21% in M3 II, although only the latter AME is statistically significant). Furthermore, the measure of distrust of the EU is weakly correlated to vote choices, and shows a diverse direction in its (non-statistically significantly) association with having voted for the PSOE between M3 I (+2%) and M3 II (-5%). Since both M2 I and M3 I show higher values of R^2 (respectively, 0.105 and 0.154) than the models that include the second versions of the measures, the two hypothesis are not fully confirmed (*H1* and *H2*) are not fully corroborated by the evidence provided. Since production workers score the highest on the measure

[167] The incumbent party, *i.e.* the PSOE, increased the salience of socio-cultural issues by proposing a set of policies in favour, for example, of same-sex couples' rights and abortion (Chari 2008; Orriolis 2013; Montero, Santana 2020).

of anti-immigration attitude (see Table A4.26. in the Appendix), they reveal to have voted for the PSOE despite its stances on the relative issues (from +15% than clerks in M2 II to +16% than clerks in M3 II), and would be less likely to have voted for the PP had it not been for this party's stances on the same issues (from -6% than clerks in M2 to -7% than clerks in M3, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Conversely, introducing the measure of anti-immigration attitude accounts in part for the self-employed classes' likelihoods to have voted for the two parties (although the relative AMEs are not statistically significant). Turning to the values of the kappa index, the PSOE is associated with the highest degree of class polarization (0.59 in the bivariate model), and its largest share is accounted for by the full model, in particular in its first version (0.49, *i.e.* -15.88% than in the bivariate model). Since the measure of authoritarian predispositions accounts for the largest share of the PP's class polarization (0.41, *i.e.* -16.56% than in the bivariate model), the same variable also accounts for the largest share of the value of the kappa index at the level of the entire set of parties (-13.97% than in the bivariate model). Generally, the second versions of the measures play stronger mediating effects than their first versions, except for in the case of political attitudes.

Table 4.7.1. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.16	-0.14	-0.09	0.01	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Small business own.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.08	0.09	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Prod. workers	0.16**	0.16**	0.16***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.10	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		-0.08	-0.06		0.17**	0.16**
		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Social conservatism		-0.47***	-0.47***		0.61***	0.59***
		(0.09)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.22	-0.21		0.61***	0.59***
		(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.15			0.30***
			(0.09)			(0.08)
EU distrust			0.02			-0.10
			(0.10)			(0.09)
Political system distrust			-0.66***			0.38***
			(0.10)			(0.10)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.105	0.154	0.046	0.105	0.154
N	999	999	999	999	999	999

Table 4.7.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.16	-0.14	-0.11	0.01	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Small business own.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Prod. workers	0.16**	0.15**	0.16***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Managers	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.11	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.08	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		0.29***	0.30***
		(0.11)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Social conservatism		-0.47***	-0.47***		0.62***	0.59***
		(0.10)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.25	-0.22		0.64***	0.61***
		(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.21**			0.34***
			(0.10)			(0.09)
EU distrust			-0.05			-0.04
			(0.10)			(0.09)
Political system distrust			-0.53***			0.29***
			(0.10)			(0.10)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.101	0.143	0.046	0.101	0.143
N	999	999	999	999	999	999

Table 4.7.3. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2008 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 4 data.*

Model	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**People's Party**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.59	0.50	0.44	
Socio-demographic	0.54	0.47	0.42	-6.46%
Economic cons. I	0.54	0.47	0.41	-7.06%
Economic cons. II	*0.54*	*0.46*	*0.41*	*-7.18%*
Social cons. I	0.55	0.57	0.46	+3.39%
Social cons. II	*0.56*	*0.56*	*0.46*	*+2.58%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.52	0.41	0.38	-13.97%
Political ideologies I	0.54	0.51	0.43	-3.60%
Political ideologies II	*0.53*	*0.50*	*0.42*	*-5.40%*
Political attitudes I	0.51	0.51	0.42	-6.17%
Political attitudes II	*0.54*	*0.51*	*0.43*	*-3.96%*
Full model I	0.49	0.53	0.42	-5.95%
Full model II	*0.51*	*0.52*	*0.42*	*-5.54%*

The 2016 Spanish general elections was held in a context of economic and political crisis, leveraged by new political forces, in particular We Can and Citizens (see Orriolis, León 2020). These two parties competed with the two mainstream ones, affecting class voting patterns as a result (Barisione, De Luca 2018). According to M1, the self-employed classes constitute the PP's preserve, but this party also gained a non-negligible share of its votes from managers and productions workers (respectively, +9% and +7%, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Having voted for the PSOE does not show strong associations with any specific social class (see Chapter 3). The self-employed and working classes are those least likely to have voted for the Citizens (although their AMEs are not statistically significant). To conclude, We Can shows patterns that differ from those hypothesized for left-wing parties, since production workers (-12% than clerks) joined the self-employed classes, managers and technicians as the classes least likely to have voted for this actor. M2, whose second version shows a higher value of R^2 (0.202) than its first version, is characterized by a clear-cut opposition between having voted for right-wing or left-wing political parties: the former voting behaviour is positively associated with the three measures, while the opposite if observed as concerns the preference for the left-wing actors. These associations are stronger in M2 II than in M2 I (*H2*), except for social conservatism and having voted for the PSOE (-17% in M2 I and -14% in M2 II) or the Citizens (+6% in M2 I and +5% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Controlling for political ideologies accounts in part for the self-employed classes' high likelihood of having voted for the PP: as concerns small business owners, the relative AME declines in absolute value only in M2 II (from +16% than clerks in M1 to +14% than clerks in M2 II); as regards self-employed professionals and large employers, the relative AME declines for a larger share in M2 I than in M2 II (from +24% than clerks in M1 to +17% than clerks in M2 I and +20% than clerks in M2 II). Although the classes' AMEs show a general decline in M2, few exceptions are observed. In particular, important exceptions concern having voted for We Can: had it not been for this party stances on the three continuums, the self-employed and working classes would be less likely to have voted for this party. According to what observed in

Chapter 3, the introduction of political ideologies accounted in part for the production workers' low likelihood to have voted for We Can. The two versions of M2 herein show the opposite result because the variable which affects the most the tendency of this class to vote for the radical left actors is social conservatism, on which the same class scores low (see Table A4.29. in the Appendix)[168]. As regards having voted for the PSOE, controlling for political ideologies only accounts in part for the small business owners' low likelihood and the service workers' high likelihood of having voted for this it (respectively, from -6% than clerks in M1 to -4% than clerks in M2 I and to -3% than clerks in M2 II, and from +5% in M1 to +1% in M2 I and to +3% in M2 II, although these AMEs are not statistically significant). Introducing political attitudes, a slightly higher value of R^2 is observed in M3 I (0.236) than in M3 II, in disagreement with the expectations (*H2*). M3 presents a clear-cut value divide between right-wing and left-wing parties as regards anti-immigration issues. On the other hand, distrust of the EU results negatively correlated only to having voted for the PSOE (-17% in M2 I and -18% in M2 II), and the distrust of the political system results negatively (and statistically significantly) correlated only to having voted for the PP (-35% in M2 I and -24% in M2 II). Controlling for political attitudes accounts for a further share of the differences in the likelihood of having voted for the PP in the case of self-employed professionals and large employers (from +17% than clerks in M2 I to +14% than clerks in M3 I, and from +20% than clerks in M2 II to +18% than clerks in M2 I). The decline observed for this AME is stronger in M3 I than in M3 II, as well as in the case of the AME pertaining to the likelihood of having voted for We Can of this class (from -20% than clerks in M2 I to -19% than clerks in M3 I). Controlling for the three attitudes also accounts for a portion of production workers' low likelihood of having voted for the radical left party (from -12% than clerks in M2 I to -10% than clerks in M3 I, and from -13% than clerks in M2 II to -11% than clerks in M2 I). Generally, M3 provides a reduction of the classes' AMEs in absolute value. However, this reduction is stronger in

[168] This result has been observed by performing the models introducing the measures independently.

M3 I than in M3 II in most cases, in disagreement with the relative hypothesis (*H2*). Table 4.7.6. shows the values of the kappa index. As observed for the 2008 general elections, the measure of authoritarian predispositions is the variable that accounts for the largest share of class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties (-17.28% than in the bivariate model). Indeed, this is the only measure, together with that of economic conservatism, accounting for a share of the value of the kappa index in the case of We Can, *i.e.* the party characterized by the highest degree of class polarization (0.50 in the bivariate model). Political ideologies and political attitudes do not play a strong mediating role as regards the classes' preferences for this political force. The second versions of the measures result better mediators than their first versions at the level of the entire set of parties, except for political attitudes. For what concerns individual parties, although the first versions of the measures of political ideologies provide stronger changes in the classes' AMEs, their second versions account for larger shares of class polarization than their first versions do. Conversely, the reductions of the values of the kappa index due to political attitudes are more relevant when their first versions is introduced in the models. Three divert from this pattern: the PP's class polarization is accounted for a larger share by the first versions of economic conservatism and political ideologies than by their second versions; the same class polarization is accounted for a larger share by the introduction of the second versions of political attitudes than by the introduction of their first versions; the Citizens' class polarization is accounted for a larger share by the first versions of economic conservatism than by its second version.

The analyses of the two versions of the measures of political ideologies and attitudes in the case of Spain show a general pattern: political ideologies are stronger mediating factors of class voting patterns in their second versions than in their first ones, while the opposite holds true as regards political attitudes. Therefore, the relative hypothesis (*H2*) is only partially corroborated. It should be pointed out that M2 I and M3 I are associated to higher values of R^2 than M2 II and M3 II as concerns the models of the 2008 election. Furthermore, focusing on the 2016 election, the second versions of the measures is generally associated with less relevant fall in the classes' AMEs than their first versions.

Table 4.7.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.24**	0.17**	0.14*	-0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.20**	-0.20***	-0.19***	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.16**	0.16***	0.16***	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10	-0.11*	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	0.04	0.06	0.04	-0.08	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	-0.11*	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	0.09	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.10	-0.07	-0.06	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.38***	0.35***		-0.30***	-0.31***		-0.12	-0.09		0.16***	0.15***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.67***	0.57***		-0.17***	-0.18***		-0.51***	-0.43***		0.06	0.05
		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31**	0.21*		0.25**	0.26**		-0.39***	-0.30**		0.06	0.05
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		Yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.31***			-0.02			-0.25***			0.05
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.09			-0.17**			0.07			0.06
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.33***			0.10			0.13			0.01
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850

Table 4.7.5. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Only social class and ideological and attitudinal variables are shown. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All models include covariates. For the full models, see the Appendix.*

	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**		
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.24**	0.20**	0.18**	-0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.20**	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.16**	0.14**	0.14**	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	-0.11*	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	0.04	0.06	0.05	-0.08	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	0.09	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07	0.03	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.04	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Service workers	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.49***	0.44***		-0.35***	-0.37***		-0.26***	-0.20**		0.22***	0.22***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Social conservatism		0.71***	0.64***		-0.14*	-0.15*		-0.55***	-0.46***		0.05	0.04
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.32*	0.23*		0.23*	0.23*		-0.37***	-0.30***		0.05	0.05
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.11)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		Yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.29***			-0.04			-0.24***			0.04
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.18**			0.05			0.06
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.24**			0.12			0.14			0.03
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.090	0.202	0.225	0.090	0.202	0.225	0.090	0.202	0.225	0.090	0.202	0.225
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850

Table 4.7.6. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the main political parties and the whole set of them (with relative differences with respect to the bivariate one) in the 2016 Spanish general election. The first row pertains to the bivariate model. ESS *round 8 data.*

Model	**People's Party**	**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**	**We Can**	**Citizens**	**Total**	**Δ**
Class	0.33	0.44	0.50	0.49	0.40	
Socio-demographic	0.24	0.26	0.50	0.49	0.35	-11.64%
Economic cons. I	0.29	0.26	0.49	0.48	0.35	-11.07%
Economic cons. II	*0.34*	*0.24*	*0.50*	*0.41*	*0.34*	*-13.33%*
Social cons. I	0.40	0.23	0.54	0.43	0.37	-6.67%
Social cons. II	*0.39*	*0.23*	*0.54*	*0.43*	*0.37*	*-7.38%*
Authoritarian pred.	0.34	0.17	0.48	0.41	0.33	-17.28%
Political ideologies I	0.46	0.16	0.60	0.38	0.38	-3.17%
Political ideologies II	*0.49*	*0.14*	*0.58*	*0.32*	*0.37*	*-6.25%*
Political attitudes I	0.32	0.22	0.53	0.47	0.36	-8.65%
Political attitudes II	*0.30*	*0.24*	*0.55*	*0.48*	*0.37*	*-7.36%*
Full model I	0.49	0.16	0.62	0.38	0.40	-0.16%
Full model II	*0.48*	*0.15*	*0.61*	*0.34*	*0.39*	*-3.11%*

4.8. Conclusions

This chapter further explored the associations between voting behaviour in Western European countries, social class, political ideologies and political attitudes. Indeed, this chapter assessed the differences in class and value voting patterns when less or more accurate measures of value orientations are introduced in the models. The focus on *ESS* rounds 4 and 8 also enabled to account for the processes at the level of the political supply that have occurred together with the development of the economic crisis (see Hernández, Kriesi 2016). Considering that the accuracy of the measures relies on the availability of items, in particular in the case of cross-country datasets (see Dalton 2018), and in keeping with the results provided in this chapter, the more accurate measures of political ideologies and political attitudes enable to observe more fine-grained class and value voting patterns. However, as regards the mediation of the associations between vote choices and social classes, the performances of the two versions of the measures vary among different electoral contexts and according to the specific election in question. The comparison between the models of the same elections which included the two versions of the measures reveal that, in general, their more accurate versions perform better in terms of their associations with having voted for a specific political party of party family and of their mediation of the class voting patterns. Although this, since this general pattern is not observed in every election analyzed herein, researchers have to choose between the employment of more accurate measures, that in general offers a more fine-grained assessment of class and value voting patterns, and the employment of proxy measures, that enable to preserve larger sample sizes. Indeed, the further investigation of individuals' likelihood to have voted for a specific party or party family determines a unavoidable loss of valid cases. Whilst the new measures of social conservatism, anti-immigration attitude and the distrust of the political system include only one more item than their first versions, more differences are detected as regards economic conservatism. the main change concerns economic conservatism dimension. Its proxy variable, previously adopted by some authors (*e.g.* Oesch, Rennwald 2018), detect the more general value divides that ground

on economic issues. However, the more accurate measure of economic conservatism provides higher values or R^2 and stronger correlations with vote choices in most cases, and also accounts for a larger share of class polarization at the level of the entire set of parties in five out eight country-election analyses[169] and in the analysis of the preference for party families (*H2*). These results are relevant considering the economic bases of class schemas (see Rennwald 2020). Also the hypothesis concerning the same directions of the associations between the more/less accurate measure and the preference for parties or party families (*H1*) has been generally corroborated by the evidence.

As regards the analysis of having voted for party families, some exceptions do not corroborate the two hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*): the first version of the measure of social conservatism accounts for a larger share of class polarization than its first measure does; the association between having voted for radical left and anti-immigration attitude results stronger when its first measure is introduced in the models; the same is observed as concerns the distrust of the political system for more than one voting behaviour. The more accurate measure of this latter political attitude includes only one more item than its former version. Since this item focuses on the trust/distrust of the political parties, this element reveals to mild the individuals' evaluations of the broader political system.

Coming to grips with the analyses of the four countries, the new measures perform better than their first versions in the case of the Swedish general elections. Conversely, their worse performance was observed by comparing the models of the 2005 United Kingdom and of the 2005 German elections. As concerns this latter country, only political attitudes perform better in their second versions than in their first ones in the case of the 2013 federal election. To conclude, the models of the two Spanish general elections show that political ideologies perform better in their second versions, whereas political attitudes perform better in their less accurate ones.

[169] The analyses that showed a better performance of the proxy measure of economic conservatism are those of the 2005 and 2015 United Kingdom general elections and of the 2005 German federal elections.

CONCLUSIONS

The dissertation fits the debate between political dealignment and realignments, and adopted the latter perspective to provide further insight into cleavage politics in Western Europe in the first two decades of the XXI century. Chapter 1 introduced the ongoing debate and concluded, that political realignment perspective accounts for the re-structuration of the alignments between individuals' social positions and their political preferences, which has been occurring in Western Europe since the late Sixties[170]. This perspective recognizes the agency of the political supply's actors, distinguishing from the «traditional» cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Indeed, parties and candidates do not just reflect social divisions, but they are sensitive to the economic and social processes at demand level and both activate/de-activate and frame political issues, structuring interests' conflicts and their democratic expression in electoral competition (Enyedi 2005; von Schoultz 2017; Dalton 2018). Therefore, the interaction of top-down and bottom-up outlooks characterizes the transition from «sociology of politics» to «political sociology» as theorized by Sartori (1969). According to the author, the latter approach enables to assess political cleavages as the products of the mutual interconnections between political supply and demand. The extensive literature review argued that of the four «traditional» cleavages, two continue to shape voters' choices, *i.e.* the center-periphery and class cleavages. However, the three empirical chapters focused on the latter cleavage due to the long-standing and long-lasting debate concerning it (see Elff 2009) and due to methodological reasons. Indeed, the items pertaining to the respondents' area of residence are rarely included in cross-national surveys (*e.g.* the European Social Survey), while the actual definitions of «center» and «periphery»

[170] Chapter 1 refers to the main authors who faced this debate and offers a further exploration of the realignment perspective and its application to the four «traditional» political cleavage.

differ from one country to the next. Furthermore, political realignment also accounts for a new value-based line of conflict, able to increase the understanding of cleavages' redefinition and «volatile» Western European electoral context (Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020). Voters' choices are still impacted by their social positions, but such associations are mediated by value orientations, which in turn are affected by social positions and affect political preferences (see Knutsen, Scarbrough 1995). Employing a class schema combining a hierarchical dimension with a horizontal one accounts for the main economic and labour market processes as well as detects more fine-grained class voting patterns (Oesch 2006a; Ford, Jennings 2020). The two dimensions identify individuals' daily work experiences and routines, which affect value orientations in the social world (Kitschelt, Rehm 2014; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Ares 2020). Indeed, class divisions are no more relevant as party loyalties as well as orientations towards issues framed and debated by the political supply (Evans 2017; Evans, Northmore-Ball 2018; Langsæther 2019). According to the typology proposed by Deegan-Krause (2007), these value-based conflicts have been defined as divides (not full-fledged cleavages). Value voting divides are based on values which cluster in ideologies or attitudes: Chapter 1 introduced the main conceptualization of these, and proposed a new one. It is theorized that, in Western Europe, economic, socio-cultural and political values are structured in three political ideologies (economic conservatism-liberalism, social conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism-libertarianism) and further political attitudes, which cut across these three ideologies and are framed by the political élites and mass media close to election day[171]. Political attitudes are defined as structural orientation to evaluate issues and events, *e.g.* the party and political system and immigration (see Chapter 1). According to the literature (*e.g.* Dalton 2018), short-term issues' evaluations seem particularly important in order to understand voting for «anti-establishment» parties.

[171] It must be pointed out that *ESS* cumulative dataset introduced three issues in every round: pro-/anti-immigration, trust/distrust of the European Union, trust/distrust of the political system.

The empirical chapters provided a full analysis of the associations between four sets of variables: the party a person voted in the most recent general election (dependent variables), his/her social class, his/her score on the measures of political ideologies, his/her score on the measures of political attitudes. Chapter 2, based on models aggregating data for twelve Western European countries and the nine *ESS* rounds, explored the different electoral bases characterizing each party family which constitute the political supply in Western Europe. These models allow to observe which social classes are the most likely to have voted, on average, for the parties comprising a specific family. Furthermore, the results enabled to identify four class voting patterns: the self-employed classes and managers are the preserve of the centre-right parties; socio-cultural professionals constitute the contested stronghold of the two left-wing party families; radical left and centre-left parties compete with radical right actors for the votes of the working classes; the upper-middle employee classes (particularly, socio-cultural professionals and managers) are those least likely to vote for radical right parties. These patterns are in keeping with the relevant literature (Evans 2017; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Dalton 2018; Ford, Jennings 2020; Rennwald 2020).

However, parties also leverage political values. Indeed, voting for mainstream party families is affected by the two conservatism-liberalism continuums: centre-right parties mobilize voters thanks to their economic and social conservative stances, whereas radical left and centre-left actors gather the majority of their preferences from economic and social liberal voters. Indeed, introducing these two measures accounts for a non-negligible portion of the differences between classes in the likelihood of having voted for radical left, centre-left or centre-right parties. According to the theoretical framework (see Chapter 1), social positions define individuals' material/immaterial resources and constraints as well as their daily experiences and routines. Since individuals' social positions affect their everyday life, these also define their social interactions that underline the socialization process through which values are transferred and acquired, resulting in value orientations (see Elff 2018). Since the socialization agents with whom people interact are defined by social positions, during adulthood the

position in the labour market defines most of these agents[172]. On the other hand, voting for «anti-establishment» radical right parties is shown to be more affected by political attitudes than by political ideologies. Such political forces mobilize voters by activating specific issues (see Enyedi, Pedrazzani, Segatti 2020), and are those who have benefit the most from the Great Recession, in terms of vote shares. Radical right and centre-right parties appeal to those voters characterized by higher levels of anti-immigrant attitude, whereas centre-left actors leverage pro-EU stances. Furthermore, radical left and radical right parties mobilize voters with regard to their mistrust of national and supranational institutions, in particular the most deprived strata of society, labelled «left behind» (Gidron, Hall 2017; Ford, Jennings 2020). Indeed, the working classes' high likelihood to have voted for radical right actors is accounted for by introducing political attitudes into the models. This finding is in keeping with the theoretical framework (see Chapter 1): the working classes are more characterized by institutional mistrust and the opposition to political, economic and social integration than other categories. These attitudes have been exacerbated by the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Political ideologies and political attitudes are shown to be significant mediators, able to account for the different tendency of social classes to vote for each party family. Computing kappa index (see Hout, Brooks, Manza 1995) enabled to assess class polarization and which mediator best account for its measure. Although economic conservatism-liberalism is the political ideology accounting for the largest part of class polarization, due to the fact that the class schemas are primarily based on economic issues (see Rennwald 2020), political attitudes constitute the set of variables associated with the largest reduction of the value of the kappa index, in terms of its relative variation from the value corresponding to the bivariate model. Such a result is due to the importance of political attitudes

[172] However, the identity of individuals does not only consist of social class, and the relevance of the latter in voting behaviour depends on the mobilization strategies pursued by the political supply's actors (Bornschier 2010; Oesch, Rennwald 2018; Rennwald 2020).

in explaining the differences between classes in their likelihood to vote for radical right parties. «Anti-establishment» radical right parties mobilize those voters (the working classes) previously loyal to left-wing actors, due to the economic stances of these latter, and their electoral success is strongly tied to the occurring and the aftermath of the Great Recession, due to radical right actors' opposition to the political and party system and to those processes based on economic, social, cultural and political integration. Therefore, Western European political parties do mobilize voters according to their position in the class structure. Furthermore, accounting for voters' value orientations offers insight into cleavage voting in Western Europe in the first two decades of the XXI century, by both mediating class voting patterns and affecting voting behaviour. These conclusions answer to the first research question.

The class and value voting patterns identified are further explored assessing their differences among four Western European countries and over the general elections held in these countries. The four national contexts have been selected according to their welfare state regime: Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany are considered as the archetypes of, respectively, the social-democratic, the liberal and the corporatist-conservative regimes, and Spain represents the Mediterranean regime. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), during the constitution of welfare states in the XX century, Scandinavian countries have been characterized by a coalition of the middle and working classes which supported the development of a universalistic regime, whereas in liberal countries, where the middle class was well embedded in the market, such a coalition has not occurred. During the same process, Continental European countries have witnessed the mobilization of the middle classes by the Christian political actors, that have determined the preservation of the «subsidiarity» role as welfare providers of the Church and the family. The last regime has been defined with the aim of account for the specificities of Southern European countries, in particular the dualism between key and poorly institutionalized-regularized economic sectors as regards the welfare benefits granted (see Ferrera 1996). As far as class voting is concerned, the main findings revealed some regularities among the Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Spain: the working classes are more

likely to have voted for centre-left parties, whereas the self-employed classes (in particular small business owners) and managers are more likely to have voted for centre-right political actors in the general elections held in the first two decades of the XXI century. Furthermore, the realignment of a class voting pattern has been identified in those countries for which the *ESS* data enabled to include «anti-establishment» radical right actors in the analyses (Sweden and the United Kingdom), namely the open competition between left-wing and radical right parties for the votes of the working classes[173]. On the other hand, the literature argues that German electoral competition is more religious-based than class-based (Evans, De Graaf 2013; Knutsen 2017). Although the self-employed classes do not show a constant voting behaviour over the federal elections analyzed and the link between the working classes and centre-left actors has been dealigning since the beginning of the financial crisis, managers constitute the main electoral base of centre-right parties (see Elff, Roßteutscher 2017).

As regards value divides, the impact of economic and social conservatism-liberalism is in keeping with the results of Chapter 2, therefore resulting constant among countries and over time. Conversely, it is not possible to identify common patterns between authoritarianism-libertarianism and voting for political parties, with the exception of Sweden[174]. Anti-immigrant stances clearly distinguish the mobilization strategies of right-wing and left-wing political actors, as well as pro-EU and anti-EU views distinguish the strategies of mainstream and «anti-establishment» parties. It must be pointed out that voting for the latter political forces is more strongly correlated to political attitudes than to political

[173] It must be pointed out that the results in Chapter 3 also showed a country-specific dealignment process. Indeed, the Spanish radical left coalition has been leaving the electoral competition for the vote of the working classes since the 2008 general election.

[174] The likelihood to vote for the Swedish social-democratic party is correlated to higher levels of authoritarianism, whereas the opposite can be said in the case of centre-right actors.

ideologies[175]. Indeed, the differences between classes in the likelihood to vote for «anti-establishment» radical right parties are better accounted for by controlling for political attitudes than by controlling for political ideologies[176]. The role of political attitudes in accounting for the class polarization of the entire set of parties which compete in a given general election increased together with the development of the financial crisis and its aftermath. This evidence refers to the concept of «left behind» voters (Gidron, Hall 2017) and to the mobilization of their political marginalization by «anti-establishment» actors (Hernández, Kriesi 2016; Evans 2017; Ceccarini 2018). Generally speaking, economic conservatism-liberalism (the «super-issue») accounts for a non-negligible portion of class polarization, but its main mediating role is challenged by authoritarianism-libertarianism in German and Spanish electoral competition.

Chapter 4 offered a sensitivity check of value voting patterns and of the role of value orientations in mediating class voting patterns. Therefore, more accurate measures than the ones employed in Chapter 2 of economic and social conservatism-liberalism, anti-immigration and the distrust of the political system have been computed in Chapter 4. These more accurate measures enable to identify more fine-grained voting patterns, in particular value voting ones, yet their performance in mediating class voting alignments vary among countries and over subsequent general elections. This evidence fits the debate between the accuracy of the measures adopted, since the adoption of more accurate ones entails a reduction in the sample size. As regards, for example, economic conservatism-liberalism, the associations between voting behaviour and the two versions of its measure showed the same sign. According to the results, more accurate measures offer stronger associations between value orientations and voting behaviour, higher values of R^2 and further insights on class voting patterns. On the other

[175] These common patterns have been observed weaker over German and Spanish elections than over Swedish and United Kingdom elections.

[176] These parties are associated to the highest levels of class polarization.

hand, the more accurate measures do not better account for class polarization than the less accurate ones in every model performed[177].

The dissertation identified stable class and value voting patterns, and also dealignment/realignment processes, which characterize Western European electoral competition in the first two decades of the XXI century. The impact of individuals' social class and value orientations on their voting behaviour has been explored. Those classes who constantly prefer specific political actors among countries and over time have been identified, together with the weakening of «traditional» class-party alignments. Furthermore, the role of values in affecting both voting behaviour and the link between social class and voting behaviour has been assessed. Accounting for political values enables to understand constant class voting patterns as well as the dealignment and realignment processes identified. It must be pointed out another time that, as far as the electoral competition in Western Europe in the first two decades of the XXI century is concerned, class and value voting patterns and the mediating role of value orientations should be explored accounting for the Great Recession. «Anti-establishment» political parties gained relevance in the wake of the latter, due to its effects on the economy and the society. The most deprived citizens began to perceive these parties as reflecting their own demands together with the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007-2008. These demands are mainly based on their negative evaluation of the political system and the economic, social and political global interconnectedness. These are the issues framed and debated by the political supply's actors close to the election day, which cut across those evaluations structured in long-standing political ideologies.

[177] Controlling for more accurate measures usually determined stronger changes in classes' AMEs, providing insight into class voting patterns, although few exceptions. However, such changes may imply stronger differences in absolute value. As showed in Chapter 2, these changes may also determine increased differences between classes in the likelihood to vote for a specific party or party family. When this occurs, controlling for value orientations do offer insights on class voting patterns, yet also determining an increase in the value of kappa index.

To conclude, three main limitations must be pointed out. Firstly, the empirical chapters only explored the individual voters' preference for political parties. The independent variables and the models shown may be employed to another type of voting behaviour, *i.e.* voting abstention. Then, the analyses provided in the empirical chapters focused on those Western European countries for which *ESS* data is available. As such, any generalization of the results to other Western European countries or to other countries characterized by the same welfare state regime should be cautious[178]. The models shown may be performed to explore voting behaviour either in different countries than the ones mentioned in the dissertation, or in set of countries characterized by the same institutional elements, or in the same set of countries over different time spans (*e.g.* before, during and after the Great Recession). Lastly, the *ESS* data offer sample sizes which result small for voting behaviour analytical purposes. Indeed, it was not possible to account for the entire set of parties competing in every general election analyzed in the empirical chapters. The same data force to employ proxy measures as regards political ideologies and attitudes and limit to account for a wide set of political issues (*e.g.* environmentalism). Furthermore, information about the voters' area of residence is not provided in every round, therefore the center-periphery cleavage has not been explored[179].

In conclusion, the main contribution offered by the dissertation to the realignment literature is the assessment of the constant impact of social class on voting behaviour and of the role played by political values, accounting for the differences among countries and over time. The insights provided also depends

[178] The very typology of the welfare state regimes is currently questioned in the literature. For a discussion of the different perspectives, see Hall and Soskice (2001), Streeck (2009) and Baccaro and Howell (2017).

[179] The models shown in the dissertation may be employed to explore also the territorial cleavage, providing insights into its theorized realignment process (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, it should be possible to account for territorial polarization by computing kappa indexes employing the same formulas employed for class polarization (see Chapter 2).

on the conceptualization of value voting, *i.e.* the structuration of values in three political ideologies and in political attitudes, that enables to identify more accurate patterns. Although the mobilization of social classes by political parties is partly explained by these classes' value orientations (and the combinations thereof), there is still a portion of class voting which is not accounted for by these. As far as this is concerned, it must be pointed out that class divisions increased their relevance as orientations towards the evaluation of specific issues, but these still affect voting behaviour as the result of conflicts between social groups, according to the «traditional» definition of class cleavage.

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APPENDIX

Appendix to Chapter 2

Table A2.1. The class composition of the twelve Western European countries analyzed. N = 107 144. Weighted data.

	Self-empl. prof. / large empl.	Small business own.	Technical prof.	Prod. workers	Managers	Clerks	Socio-cul-tural prof.	Service workers
Finland	2.10%	11.12%	10.87%	17.92%	16.00%	7.99%	15.57%	18.43%
Sweden	2.85%	7.84%	9.21%	14.48%	17.54%	9.16%	16.75%	22.17%
Norway	1.73%	6.60%	9.61%	13.37%	20.09%	7.87%	19.22%	21.51%
United King-dom	2.57%	9.83%	7.56%	13.44%	19.16%	12.93%	13.55%	20.95%
Ireland	2.42%	12.41%	5.97%	16.81%	15.50%	12.12%	12.54%	22.23%
Belgium	2.59%	10.30%	8.99%	18.49%	17.07%	11.96%	14.49%	16.12%
Netherlands	2.89%	9.32%	6.46%	10.55%	25.06%	11.61%	18.06%	16.05%
France	1.33%	6.69%	11.21%	16.02%	19.43%	11.89%	15.44%	17.98%
Germany	3.50%	8.12%	9.64%	18.37%	17.35%	13.84%	15.17%	14.01%
Switzerland	4.13%	11.22%	9.46%	11.07%	21.62%	10.45%	18.34%	13.71%
Spain	2.55%	14.31%	5.77%	22.70%	11.91%	9.90%	9.43%	23.44%
Portugal	2.18%	13.01%	5.66%	26.60%	8.45%	12.26%	10.22%	21.61%
Total	2.59%	9.78%	8.50%	16.34%	17.81%	11.12%	15.10%	18.77%

Table A2.2. The political parties included in the six party families. The table continues in the next two pages.

Country	**Radical Left**	**Center-Left**	**Center-Right**	**Radical Right**	**Green**	**Other Parties or Coalitions**
Finland	Left Wing Alliance Other parties of communist inspiration	Social Democratic Party	National Coalition Finish Christian League Christian Democrats	True Finns	Ecological Party Green Union	Swedish People's Party Finnish Christian League Finnish Center Other minor parties
Sweden	Left Party	Swedish Social Democratic Party	June List Liberal People's Party Moderate Party Christian Democrats	Sweden Democrats	Environmental Party-The Greens	Center Party Feminist Initiative Pirate Party Other minor parties
Norway	Red	Social Left Party Labour Party	Conservative Party Liberal Party Christian Peoples' Party	Progress Party	GreenLeft	Center Party Coast Party Other minor parties
United Kingdom		Labour Party	Conservative Party Liberal Democratic Party	UK Independence Party British National Party	Green Party	Party of Wales Scottish National Party Democratic Unionist Party Ourselves Alliance Northern Irish parties Other minor parties
Ireland	Socialist Party United Left Alliance People Before Profit Alliance Ourselves	Labour Party	Soldiers of Destiny Progressive Democrats Family of the Irish		Green Party	Other minor parties
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium (PVDA & PTB)	Socialist Party (PS) Socialist Party (SP)	People's Party	National Front Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest	Agalev Green! Ecolo	Other minor parties

		Socialist Party Different (SP.a-Spirit)	Christian Social Party/Humanist Democratic Center Christian People's Party/Christian Democratic and Flemish (with New Flemish Alliance) Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats Reformist Movement List Dedecker			
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Labour Party	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Democrats 66 Christian Democratic Appeal	Center Democrats Lijst Pim Fortuyn Party for Freedom Forum for Democracy	GreenLeft Party for the Animals	Political Reformed Party Christian Union Reformed Political League Reformed Political Federation 50PLUS Other minor parties
France	Workers' Struggle/Revolutionary Communist League French Communist Party Left Party Left Radical Party Unbowed France Other communist and workers' parties	Socialist Party	Union for French Democracy/Democratic Movement (with The Republic on the Move) Liberal Democracy Rally for the Republic Union for Popular Movement The Republicans Centrist Alliance New Center The Republic Forward	National Front/National Rally National Republican Movement Rally for France/Movement for France	Europe Ecology-The Greens Independent Ecological Movement Green Party	Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition Party Other minor parties
Germany		Social Democratic Party of Germany	Christian Democratic Union of	Republikaner	Alliance 90/The Greens	Pirate Party of Germany

	Party of Democratic Socialism/The Left/Left Party		Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria Free Democratic Party	Alternative for Germany National Democratic Party of Germany/German People's Union	Human Environment Animal Protection	Other minor parties
Switzerland	Labour Party	Social Democratic Party	Christian Democratic People's Party Radical Party/Liberal Party Green Liberal Party	Swiss People's Party	Green Party	Other minor parties
Spain	United Left We Can	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party Union, Progress, and Democracy Citizens-Party of the Citizenry		The Greens Initiative for Catalonia Greens More Country	Convergence and Unity Initiative for Catalonia Other minor regionalist parties
Portugal	Left Bloc Democratic Unitarian Coalition Other communist minor parties	Socialist Party	Democratic and Social Center/People's Party Democratic People's Party/Social Democratic Party		Earth Party People-Animals-Nature	Other minor parties

Table A2.3. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.12***	-0.02***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.01***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small business own.	0.05***	0.03***	-0.02***	0.01***	0.02***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	0.06***	-0.07***	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.01**	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	-0.03***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.06***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	0.08***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01***	-0.00	-0.04***	-0.09***	-0.04***	-0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	-0.03***	0.01***	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.29***	0.37***	0.53***	0.45***	0.54***	0.55***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Adj R^2	0.031	0.013	0.027	0.062	0.016	0.032
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

*Table A2.4. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M0 and M1. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Weighted data. The table continues in the next page.*

	M0	M1+class	M0	M1+class	M0	M1+class	M0	M1+class	M0	M1+class	M0	M1+class
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.00**	-0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
65+	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.01	0.00	0.12***	0.10***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.06***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.05***	0.03***	-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.00	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.09***	-0.07***	0.11***	0.07***	-0.06***	-0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01***	0.00	0.01**	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Village/Countryside	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers		-0.02***		-0.10***		0.11***		-0.01**		0.02***		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Small business own.		-0.02***		-0.10***		0.08***		0.00		0.00		0.03***
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Technical prof.		-0.00		0.00		-0.00		-0.01**		0.01**		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Prod. workers		0.02***		0.05***		-0.09***		0.03***		-0.01***		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Managers		-0.01***		-0.03***		0.07***		-0.01***		-0.00		-0.01***

		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.		0.02***		0.02***		-0.05***		-0.03***		0.03***		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Service workers		0.01***		0.03***		-0.06***		0.01***		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed		0.04***		0.01*		-0.08***		0.02***		0.02***		-0.01***
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Student		0.00		-0.01*		-0.01		-0.03***		0.05***		-0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)
Retired		0.01***		0.02***		-0.01		0.00		-0.02***		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Household		-0.00		-0.03***		0.02***		0.01***		-0.00		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Other		0.03***		0.02*		-0.07***		0.02***		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.103	0.112	0.103	0.112	0.103	0.112	0.103	0.112	0.103	0.112	0.103	0.112
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

*Table A2.5. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M2 and M3. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Weighted data. The table continues in the next page.*

	M2+eco	M3+soc	M2+eco	M3+soc	M2+eco	M3+soc	M2+eco	M3+soc	M2+eco	M3+soc	M2+eco	M3+soc
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.01***	0.00*	0.01**	0.03***	-0.00	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.01***	0.00	0.03***	0.04***	0.02***	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00**	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
65+	-0.03***	-0.01***	0.00	0.03***	0.11***	0.06***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.04***	-0.05***	0.03***	0.05***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.05***	0.08***	-0.04***	-0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.00*	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Village/Countryside	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.03***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.08***	-0.10***	0.08***	0.11***	-0.01***	-0.01**	0.03***	0.02***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.07***	0.07***	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.02**	0.00	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.02***	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.01***	0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.03***	0.05***	0.07***	-0.02***	-0.01***	0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01**	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.04***	0.04***	0.01	0.01*	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Student	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Retired	0.00*	0.01***	0.01**	0.02***	0.00	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household	-0.00	0.00	-0.03**	-0.02***	0.02***	-0.00	0.01***	0.01***	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other	0.02***	0.03***	0.01	0.02**	-0.05***	-0.07***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism	-0.13***		-0.22***		0.39***		0.03***		-0.06***		-0.01***	
	(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Social conservatism		-0.16***		-0.21***		0.39***		-0.01***		-0.08***		0.07***
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.134	0.131	0.134	0.131	0.134	0.131	0.134	0.131	0.134	0.131	0.134	0.131
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

*Table A2.6. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M4 and M5. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Weighted data. The table continues in the next page.*

	M4+ec*so	M5+aut	M4+ec*so	M5+aut	M4+ec*so	M5+aut	M4+ec*so	M5+aut	M4+ec*so	M5+aut	M4+ec*so	M5+aut
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.00	-0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.00	-0.00	0.03***	0.03***	0.00	0.01*	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
65+	-0.01***	-0.02***	0.03***	0.00	0.07***	0.09***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.07***	0.08***	-0.04***	-0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00*	0.01**	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Village/Countryside	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.02***	0.03***	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.08***	-0.10***	0.08***	0.13***	-0.01***	-0.01**	0.03***	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.06***	0.09***	0.00	0.00	0.01**	-0.00	0.03***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.01**	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.01***	0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.03***	0.05***	0.07***	-0.02***	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01***

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.00	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.03***	0.04***	0.00	0.02**	-0.06***	-0.08***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Student	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.05***	0.04***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Retired	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.01*	-0.01**	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household	0.00	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.03***	0.00	0.01**	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other	0.02***	0.03***	0.01	0.02*	-0.05***	-0.07***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism	-0.11***		-0.21***		0.36***		0.03***		-0.06***		-0.01***	
	(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Social conservatism	-0.15***		-0.19***		0.36***		-0.01***		-0.08***		0.07***	
	(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Authoritarian pred.		-0.09***		0.02		0.21***		-0.00		-0.17***		0.02***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.149	0.119	0.149	0.119	0.149	0.119	0.149	0.119	0.149	0.119	0.149	0.119
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

*Table A2.7. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M6 and M7. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Weighted data. The table continues in the next page.*

	M6+ideol	M7+att	M6+ideol	M7+att	M6+ideol	M7+att	M6+ideol	M7+att	M6+ideol	M7+att	M6+ideol	M7+att
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.00	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.00	-0.00	0.03***	0.03***	0.00	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
65+	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.06***	0.06***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.04***	0.04***	-0.01***	0.00	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.06***	-0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	-0.04***	-0.02***	0.04***	0.03***	0.00	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01**	0.00*	0.01**	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Village/Countryside	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.05***	-0.04***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.09***	0.10***	-0.01***	-0.01**	0.01***	0.01*	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.06***	0.06***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.01**	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prod. workers	0.01***	0.01***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.03***	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Managers	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.02***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01**

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Service workers	0.01***	0.01***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01***	0.01**	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.03***	0.03***	0.01	0.01*	-0.06***	-0.05***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Student	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.04***	0.03***	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Retired	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01**	0.01*	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other	0.02***	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Economic conservatism	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.21***	-0.21***	0.36***	0.35***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social conservatism	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.20***	-0.21***	0.35***	0.33***	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.06***	-0.05***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Authoritarian pred.	-0.04***	-0.03***	0.06***	0.08***	0.13***	0.07***	0.00	-0.02***	-0.15***	-0.11***	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes
Anti-immigration		-0.05***		-0.16***		0.17***		0.18***		-0.14***		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)
EU distrust		0.05***		-0.05***		-0.01		0.03***		-0.03***		0.01***
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)
Political system distrust		0.06***		-0.05***		-0.16***		0.07***		0.04***		0.04***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Interaction terms (att)		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.152	0.175	0.152	0.175	0.152	0.175	0.152	0.175	0.152	0.175	0.152	0.175
N	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144	107 144

Figure A2.1. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for party families (charts).



Figure A2.2. The class voting polarization measure (kappa index) for the whole models (chart).



Appendix to Chapter 3

Table A3.1. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2002 Sweden general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.14***	-0.01	-0.10***	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.06**	0.03	-0.04***	0.04**	0.05*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.10***	-0.04**	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.02	0.07***	0.08***	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.12***	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	0.01	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.00	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.03*	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.30***	0.31***	0.53***	0.38***	0.58***	0.48***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.069	0.013	0.046	0.076	0.025	0.033
N	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162

*Table A3.2. Voting for the main political parties in the 2002 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Christian Democrats**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.04*	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.09***	0.07**	0.08***	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.16**	0.11	0.10	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.09***	-0.06**	-0.05	0.08***	0.06***	0.05**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.03*	0.03**	0.03**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.18***	-0.13***	-0.13***	0.12***	0.08***	0.09***	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.19***	-0.13**	-0.13***	0.15**	0.11*	0.11*	0.10*	0.09	0.10*	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.21***	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.09**	0.10**	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	-0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.14***	0.12***	0.13***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.07*	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.10***	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.08*	0.06	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.09**	-0.06*	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.12**	-0.14**	-0.14***	0.02	0.05	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.12**	0.10*	0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Student	-0.10**	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.06	0.06*	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Retired	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Household	-0.10	-0.10	-0.09	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.00	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Other	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.33***	-0.34***		0.38***	0.34***		0.17***	0.17***		0.06***	0.06***		-0.29***	-0.23***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.20***	-0.23***		-0.12***	-0.11**		0.05	0.05		0.35***	0.36***		-0.08	-0.08
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.42***	0.35***		-0.11	-0.11		-0.02	0.00		-0.03	-0.03		-0.26***	-0.21***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.06			0.19***			-0.10**			0.06**			-0.22***
			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.18***			-0.18***			0.06**			0.26***
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.41***			0.30***			0.15***			0.02			-0.06
			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159	0.058	0.129	0.159
N	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162	2 162

Table A3.3. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2006 Sweden general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.15***	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.04*	-0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.10***	-0.01	-0.04***	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.14***	-0.07***	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.01	-0.05***	-0.00	0.06***	0.04**	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.09***	-0.02	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.02	-0.03***	-0.11***	-0.06***	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.28***	0.30***	0.51***	0.38***	0.48***	0.055***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.060	0.031	0.020	0.099	0.051	0.022
N	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056

*Table A3.4. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Center Party**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.06**	0.04	0.04	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.11***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.06**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.19***	-0.13***	-0.13***	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.24***	-0.21***	-0.21***	0.31***	0.027***	0.027***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.24***	-0.21***	-0.21***	0.25***	0.20***	0.19***	0.06*	0.06*	0.07**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.17***	0.15***	0.15***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.06**	0.06*	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.07*

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08*	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.15***	-0.13**	-0.13**	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.06	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Student	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.09*	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Retired	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Household	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.09	0.09	0.09	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Other	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08*	0.03	0.07	0.07	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		-0.37***	-0.37***		0.43***	0.40***		0.04*	0.04*		0.10***	0.09***		-0.20***	-0.16***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.10*	-0.11*		-0.07	-0.08		0.06**	0.06**		-0.10**	-0.11**		0.21***	0.24***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.36***	0.35***		-0.19**	-0.25***		0.02	0.02		0.05	0.06		-0.25***	-0.18**
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.01			0.30***			-0.03			-0.04			-0.22***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.07			-0.17***			0.03			-0.09**			0.30***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.07			0.09			-0.06			0.02			0.02
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131	0.072	0.114	0.131
N	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056	2 056

Table A3.5. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2010 Sweden general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.10***	0.01	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.08***	0.02	-0.05***	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.12***	-0.04**	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.02	-0.04***	-0.00	0.07***	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.10***	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.00	0.03*	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.05***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.01	0.02	-0.02**	0.01	-0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.26***	0.28***	0.51***	0.36***	0.55***	0.46***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.042	0.020	0.033	0.082	0.030	0.051
N	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609

*Table A3.6. Voting for the main political parties in the 2010 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Environmental Party-The Greens**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.02*	0.02**	0.02*	-0.04**	-0.05***	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.06**	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05**	0.05**	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.09*	0.12**	0.13**	-0.09***	-0.09**	-0.09***	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.04	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.12***	0.05*	0.01	0.00	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.04	0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.05**	0.06***	0.05***	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.25***	-0.22***	-0.21***	0.20***	0.17***	0.15**	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.15***	-0.12***	0.12***	0.16***	0.13***	0.12***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.10***	-0.07	-0.06	0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.08*	0.08*	0.08**	-0.08*	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.10***	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.13***	0.09**	0.08*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.07	0.06	0.06	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.12***	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Student	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.07	-0.10**	-0.11**	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03	-0.00	-0.00	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Retired	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Household	0.09	0.11	0.11	-0.08	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07**	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Other	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.00	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.41***	-0.43***		0.53***	0.51***		-0.14***	-0.12***		0.09***	0.09***		-0.07*	-0.05
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.05	-0.06		-0.15***	-0.17***		-0.06*	-0.05		0.08***	0.09***		0.18***	0.19***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.36***	0.35***		-0.17**	-0.22***		-0.05	-0.02		-0.07	-0.06		-0.07	-0.05
		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.03)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.01			0.13**			-0.13***			-0.04			0.06
			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.05)
EU distrust			-0.05			-0.18***			-0.00			-0.02			0.26***
			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			0.07			-0.09			0.03			0.02			-0.03
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132	0.069	0.114	0.132
N	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609	2 609

Table A3.7. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2014 Sweden general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.10***	0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.04	0.01	-0.05***	0.00	0.04**	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.05*	-0.07***	-0.04***	-0.07***	0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.00	-0.03*	-0.01	0.08***	0.09***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.07***	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.08***	-0.03*	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05**	0.02	-0.04***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.03	0.01	-0.03**	0.01	0.02	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.31***	0.26***	0.51***	0.38***	0.50***	0.44***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.038	0.024	0.021	0.117	0.032	0.052
N	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981

*Table A3.8. Voting for the main political parties in the 2014 Swedish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**			**Environmental Party-The Greens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03***	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.05**	0.05**	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.07**	0.07**	0.07***	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.10**	0.10**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.12***	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.00	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07**	0.07**	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.04**	0.04*	0.04*	0.09***	0.09***	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04**	0.04**	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Village/Countryside	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.07***	-0.06**	-0.06**	0.04**	0.04**	0.02*	0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	0.10***	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.18***	-0.14**	-0.13**	0.19**	0.17**	0.18**	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.08**	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	-0.14***	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.12**	0.11**	0.12**	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.07	-0.06	-0.05	0.10***	0.10***	0.05**	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	-0.08**	-0.06	-0.05	0.08*	0.05	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.11**	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.09*	0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.06	0.02	0.02	-0.11**	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.08	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Student	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.12**	0.10**	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retired	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.04*	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Household	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.07	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Other	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.11***	0.06*	0.07**	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.08	0.06	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economic conservatism		-0.35***	-0.36***		0.49***	0.48***		0.04	-0.01		-0.12***	-0.10***		-0.06	-0.00
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		-0.10	-0.11		-0.03	-0.04		0.04	0.04		-0.11**	-0.10**		0.20***	0.21***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31***	0.26***		-0.03	-0.07		-0.07	-0.03		0.01	0.03		-0.21**	-0.19**
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.09			0.06			0.29***			-0.11**			-0.33***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.07)
EU distrust			0.09			-0.14**			0.01			-0.04			0.08
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.18**			0.21***			0.10***			0.01			-0.14*
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176	0.086	0.131	0.176
N	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981	1 981

Table A3.9. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2001 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.10**	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.12***	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.09***	-0.06***	-0.04***	-0.04**	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.10***	-0.08***	-0.03***	-0.07***	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.01	-0.07***	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.11***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.08***	-0.04**	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.03	0.02	-0.03***	-0.14***	-0.05**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.33***	0.42***	0.53***	0.55***	0.65***	0.59***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.041	0.023	0.031	0.075	0.014	0.007
N	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800

*Table A3.10. Voting for the main political parties in the 2001 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.05*	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	-0.13***	-0.12**	-0.14***	0.14***	0.13**	0.13***	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.09**	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.08**	-0.06**	-0.10***	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.07	0.05	0.05	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.04	0.04	0.05*	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Village/Countryside	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.09	0.11*	0.09	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.22***	0.22***	0.21***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.06	0.09**	0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02

	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.12**	0.12**	0.10**	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.07*	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.19***	0.18***	0.17***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Student	-0.07	-0.08	-0.10	-0.14*	-0.15*	-0.12	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Retired	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.07	-0.08	-0.04	-0.07	-0.08	-0.10**	-0.09*	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.09**	0.08**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.31***	-0.27***		0.33***	0.29***		-0.02	-0.01		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.09	-0.11*		0.06	0.07		-0.03	-0.03		0.06*	0.07*
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.08	-0.03		0.14	0.05		-0.01	0.02		-0.05	-0.03
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.15**			0.31***			-0.16***			-0.01
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)
EU distrust			-0.20***			0.28***			0.02			-0.11***
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.05			0.09			0.22***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.048	0.071	0.109	0.048	0.071	0.109	0.048	0.071	0.109	0.048	0.071	0.109
N	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800	1 800

Table A3.11. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2005 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.04	-0.06**	-0.07***	-0.17***	-0.02	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.06***	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.08***	-0.04*	-0.03**	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.05***	-0.03**	0.00	0.06***	0.03**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.08***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.08***	-0.03*	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	0.05***	-0.04***	-0.13***	-0.06***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.06***	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.39***	0.36***	0.53***	0.55***	0.66***	0.63***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.045	0.022	0.034	0.085	0.020	0.017
N	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479

*Table A3.12. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.12***	0.09**	0.08*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.13***	0.13***	0.12**	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.18***	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Village/Countryside	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.07***	0.05**	0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.04**	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.18***	0.15***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.05**	0.05*	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.10**	0.12***	0.10**	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.16***	0.07**	0.06*	0.05	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	0.16***	0.14***	0.14***	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Student	-0.20***	-0.18**	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.25***	0.23***	0.21**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Retired	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.11***	-0.07*	-0.08**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.14***	0.12***	0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.24***	-0.24***		0.39***	0.37***		-0.05	-0.04		-0.11***	-0.09***
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		-0.20***	-0.24***		0.17***	0.20***		-0.00	-0.00		0.03	0.04
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.22**	0.22**		0.14*	0.04		-0.27***	-0.19***		-0.09*	-0.07
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.05			0.23***			-0.20***			0.01
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
EU distrust			-0.12*			0.23***			-0.04			-0.07*
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.30***			-0.02			0.12**			0.21***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.050	0.085	0.112	0.050	0.085	0.112	0.050	0.085	0.112	0.050	0.085	0.112
N	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479	2 479

Table A3.13. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2010 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.15***	0.02	-0.04***	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.07***	0.01	-0.03***	-0.03*	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.08***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.05***	-0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.07***	0.06***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.09***	0.00	-0.02***	-0.07***	-0.04***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.02	-0.03***	-0.12***	-0.06***	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.33***	0.34***	0.53***	0.53***	0.67***	0.61***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.031	0.006	0.026	0.073	0.028	0.039
N	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247

*Table A3.14. Voting for the main political parties in the 2010 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.04	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.3)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.13***	0.12***	0.06*	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.05*	0.06**	0.05**	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.05**	0.04**	0.04**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.10***	0.10***	0.09***	0.06***	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.08**	0.13***	0.12***	0.10***	0.05	0.05	0.02	-0.04*	-0.05*	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06***	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.08**	0.06*	0.06*	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08**	0.06*	0.06*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.10***	0.06**	0.07**	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05**

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.06*	0.05*	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Retired	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.11***	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.09**	0.09**	0.10**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		0.37***	0.31***		-0.29***	-0.27***		-0.02	0.01		-0.06**	-0.04*
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		0.10**	0.07*		0.01	-0.00		-0.17***	-0.16***		0.07**	0.10***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.14*	0.04		0.03	0.07		-0.16**	-0.10		-0.02	-0.01
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.29***			-0.12**			-0.24***			0.08**
			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.34***			-0.20***			-0.11**			-0.03
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.55***			0.16***			0.13**			0.26***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.038	0.066	0.099	0.038	0.066	0.099	0.038	0.066	0.099	0.038	0.066	0.099
N	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247	3 247

Table A3.15. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2015 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.05	-0.04	-0.06***	-0.14***	-0.07*	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.12***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.08**	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.06**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05**	-0.04*	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.05*	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Constant	0.30***	0.32***	0.51***	0.44***	0.66***	0.60***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.029	0.019	0.020	0.065	0.038	0.020
N	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346

*Table A3.16. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Conservative Party			**Labour Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.04**	0.05**	0.04**	0.02	0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.06	0.03	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	-0.03	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.10	-0.09	-0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.08*	-0.07*	-0.07*	0.03	0.03	0.04**	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.06***	0.06***	0.05**	0.00	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.14***	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.30***	0.27***	0.26***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.11***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.14***	0.12***	0.10***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.11***	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.12	-0.14*	-0.11	0.04	0.06	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05*	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.08*	0.08*	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.07**	0.07**	0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.09	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.05*	0.06*	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	0.08*	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.10	-0.11	-0.09	0.13	0.13	0.12*	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Student	0.04	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	0.06	0.07	0.02
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Retired	0.15***	0.15***	0.10**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.13**	0.14**	0.14**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.41***	0.28***		-0.40***	-0.32***		-0.00	-0.04		0.05	0.08**		-0.06	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.15**	0.07		0.01	0.06		-0.08*	-0.09**		-0.07	-0.06		-0.01	0.03
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.16	-0.04		-0.00	0.07		0.01	0.00		-0.01	0.05		-0.16**	-0.08
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.32***			-0.20***			0.16***			-0.18***			-0.09*
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.03)			(0.06)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.32***			-0.19**			0.22***			-0.16***			-0.19***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.73***			0.41***			-0.07*			0.09			0.31***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190	0.072	0.109	0.190
N	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346	1 346

Table A3.17. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2002 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.14***	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.12***	-0.02	-0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.06**	0.02	-0.05***	-0.00	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.06***	-0.03**	-0.05***	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.08***	-0.03**	0.01	0.04***	0.03**	0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Managers	0.04*	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04***	-0.09***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.04*	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.40***	0.36***	0.54***	0.49***	0.55***	0.61***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.038	0.010	0.039	0.062	0.016	0.016
N	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980

*Table A3.18. Voting for the main political parties in the 2002 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Social Democratic Party of Germany			**CDU/CSU**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Other party of coalition**		
Female	0.03	0.04*	0.05**	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.10**	0.01	0.01	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.06	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.03	0.07**	0.08***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04**	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.14***	0.02	0.06	0.09**	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04*	0.03	0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.04**	0.03*	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03**	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.05*	0.05*	0.05	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.19***	0.13**	0.13***	0.15***	0.09**	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.13***	0.10***	0.10**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01

	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.11***	0.14***	0.12***	0.11***	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.06**	0.05**	0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.10***	0.01	0.07*	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.13***	0.08***	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	80.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11*	-0.09	-0.07	0.20***	0.15***	0.13***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Retired	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.04***	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.06***	0.05**	0.04**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	80.02)
Other	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.09***	-0.12***		0.21***	0.22***		-0.03	-0.03		0.05***	0.05***		-0.14***	-0.13***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		-0.21***	-0.26***		0.55***	0.56***		-0.01	-0.01		0.01	0.02		-0.34***	-0.30***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.06	0.03		0.17**	0.13*		-0.36***	-0.31***		0.02	0.02		0.11**	0.13***
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.11**			0.30***			-0.23***			0.04			0.00
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.03			0.01			-0.01			-0.03
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Political system distrust			-0.28***			0.03			-0.04			0.07**			0.22***
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127	0.055	0.107	0.127
N	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980	2 980

Table A3.19. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2005 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.12***	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.11***	0.02	-0.04**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.04*	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.01	0.04**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.04*	-0.06***	-0.00	-0.03**	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.07***	-0.03**	0.03***	0.07***	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Managers	0.06***	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.00	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.06***	-0.01	0.02*	0.04**	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.35***	0.37***	0.52***	0.46***	0.56***	0.59***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.042	0.009	0.044	0.067	0.011	0.024
N	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887

*Table A3.20. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.05**	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.08*	-0.00	0.00	0.06	0.08*	0.08*	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.00	0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.06**	0.05*	0.05*	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***	0.04**	0.01	0.01	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.09*	-0.10**	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.13***	0.11***	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.10**	-0.08**	-0.08**	0.10**	0.09**	-0.09**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.12***	-0.09**	-0.09***	0.06*	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.05**	0.03*	0.03*	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06*	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03

	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.04**	0.05**	0.05**	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.08**	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.06***	0.04*	0.04*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.14***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.14***	0.05**	0.04*	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.11*	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.10*	0.08	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retired	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	0.06*	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.04***	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Other	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Economic conservatism		0.25***	0.22***		-0.04	-0.05		0.11***	0.12***		-0.24***	-0.21***		-0.07***	-0.07***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.55***	0.51***		-0.16***	-0.15***		-0.01	-0.01		-0.34***	-0.31***		-0.05	-0.04
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.16**	0.03		0.07	0.13		0.10**	0.09*		0.06	0.07		-0.39***	-0.32***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.37***			-0.19***			0.05*			-0.02			-0.22***
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.02			0.02			0.02			-0.01			-0.05
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.32***			0.03			0.02			0.18***			0.09**
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129	0.046	0.110	0.129
N	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887	2 887

Table A3.21. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2009 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.11***	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.07***	0.02	-0.05***	-0.02	0.05***	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.06***	-0.03*	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	-0.03*	-0.02	0.01	0.08***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	0.06***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	0.02	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.04***	0.02	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.28***	0.35***	0.53***	0.44***	0.57***	0.57***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.024	0.005	0.032	0.073	0.022	0.023
N	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123

*Table A3.22. Voting for the main political parties in the 2009 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**The Left**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03*	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.10***	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.07*	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08**	0.07**	0.06**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.05*	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.06***	0.03	0.03	-0.05***	-0.05**	-0.04**	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.03**	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.09**	-0.07	-0.07	0.11**	0.09**	0.09**	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.06*	0.06	0.07*	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.06**	0.05*	0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.08***	0.08***	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.08	-0.05	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.11***	0.07**	0.07**	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Student	-0.09*	-0.09*	-0.08	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.06	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Retired	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04**	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		0.20***	0.18***		-0.11***	-0.12***		0.13***	0.13***		-0.17***	-0.15***		-0.05*	-0.04
		(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.40***	0.36***		-0.06	-0.08*		0.03	0.04		-0.33***	-0.30***		-0.03	-0.02
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.24***	0.12		0.04	0.05		-0.03	-0.02		0.06	0.06		-0.32***	-0.22***
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.35***			-0.06			-0.04			0.01			-0.26***
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.11**			-0.03			0.02			0.03			-0.13***
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.42***			-0.04			0.03			0.16***			0.27***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099	0.035	0.079	0.099
N	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123	3 123

Table A3.23. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2013 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.11***	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.00	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.05***	-0.01	-0.06***	-0.03**	0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	0.04**	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	-0.04***	-0.03**	-0.00	0.04***	0.03*	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	0.06***	-0.01	-0.03***	-0.05***	0.00	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.04**	0.00	-0.05***	-0.08***	-0.02	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.04***	-0.01	-0.01	0.04***	0.05***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.29***	0.36***	0.54***	0.43***	0.57***	0.53***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.035	0.005	0.039	0.052	0.008	0.023
N	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589

*Table A3.24. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**The Left**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.04**	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.03**	0.03***	0.03***	-0.03**	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.04*	0.04*	0.05**	0.05**	0.03**	0.04***	0.03***	0.03*	0.04***	0.03**	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	0.08**	0.10***	0.10***	0.03	0.05**	0.04**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.00	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.07***	0.07***	0.04	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.05***	0.02	0.02	0.07***	0.05***	0.03*	0.01	0.01	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.03**	0.03*	0.03	0.01	0.03*	0.03	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	80.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.09***	0.06***	0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05**	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.02*	-0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.12***	-0.11**	-0.11***	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.06**	0.04	0.03	0.07*	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.04	0.06*	0.06*	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*	0.06**	0.05**	0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.08***	-0.06*	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04*	0.05**	0.06***	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.09***	0.08***	0.06***	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	80.02)
Service workers	-0.07**	-0.05*	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04*	0.05**	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.02	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.12***	0.16***	0.11**	0.09**	0.05	0.06	0.08*	0.02	0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Student	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.11**	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.16***	0.13***	0.10**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	80.03)
Retired	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household	0.08**	0.06*	0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Other	-0.04	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		0.28***	0.25***		-0.13***	-0.14***		-0.21***	-0.18***		-0.05**	-0.04		0.10***	0.11***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Social conservatism		0.45***	0.41***		-0.07*	-0.09**		-0.30***	-0.27***		-0.02	-0.02		-0.07**	-0.03
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Authoritarian pred.		0.39***	0.27***		-0.06	-0.03		0.04	0.06		-0.26***	-0.14***		-0.10**	-0.15***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.11**			-0.07***			-0.32***			0.17***
			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
EU distrust			0.11**			-0.09**			0.02			-0.06**			0.03
			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.38***			-0.03			0.19***			0.06*			0.16***
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130	0.046	0.093	0.130
N	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589	3 589

Table A3.25. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2000 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.05	0.03	-0.04	-0.07	0.01	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.07	0.16***	0.06**	0.03	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.13*	-0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.02	0.10**	0.04**	0.02	0.04	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.06	0.06	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.06	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.04	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.03	0.10**	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.20***	0.31***	0.52***	0.44***	0.50***	0.56***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Adj R^2	0.015	0.041	0.063	0.027	0.023	0.031
N	575	575	575	575	575	575

*Table A3.26. Voting for the main political parties in the 2000 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (ref. 18-34)									
35-64	-0.07	-0.13***	-0.14***	0.09*	0.12**	0.12***	-0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
65+	0.03	-0.12	-0.14*	0.06	0.12	0.13	-0.08	-0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)									
Upper secondary	0.05	0.08	0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.06	0.04	0.01	-0.16**	-0.13**	-0.12*	0.10	0.09	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Residence (ref. Small city)									
Big City	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.09	-0.10*	-0.10*	0.10*	0.07	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.09	-0.11	-0.10	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Village/Countryside	-0.07	-0.07	-0.06	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.07	-0.15	-0.11	-0.21	-0.16	-0.17	0.28**	0.31**	0.28**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Small business own.	0.19*	0.08	0.05	-0.20**	-0.16*	-0.16*	0.02	0.08	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Prod. workers	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Managers	0.18*	0.12	0.11	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04	-0.11	-0.08	-0.08

	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Service workers	0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Employment status (ref. Employed)									
Unemployed	-0.12	-0.11	-0.13*	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Student	0.11	0.06	0.05	-0.26*	-0.24*	-0.23	0.15	0.18	0.18
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Retired	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Household	0.22***	0.16**	0.15**	-0.11*	-0.07	-0.07	-0.12**	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other	0.15	0.08	0.12	-0.22**	-0.15	-0.17	0.07	0.06	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Economic conservatism		0.40***	0.35***		-0.38***	-0.34***		-0.02	-0.01
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Social conservatism		0.56***	0.45***		-0.20*	-0.15		-0.36***	-0.30***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Authoritarian pred.		0.54***	0.39*		-0.39*	-0.33		-0.15	-0.06
		(0.19)	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.21)		(0.17)	(0.18)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30**			-0.17			-0.13
			(0.12)			(0.13)			(0.11)
EU distrust			-0.22*			0.21			0.01
			(0.12)			(0.13)			(0.10)
Political system distrust			-0.30**			0.06			0.25**
			(0.13)			(0.13)			(0.12)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.071	0.135	0.166	0.071	0.135	0.166	0.071	0.135	0.166
N	575	575	575	575	575	575	575	575	575

Table A3.27. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2004 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.13***	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.04*	0.06**	0.03***	0.05***	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.09***	-0.06*	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.00	0.05**	0.05***	0.06***	0.02	0.03*
	(0.0)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.05**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.00	0.04*	0.04***	0.04**	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.22***	0.36***	0.53***	0.41***	0.46***	0.52***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.022	0.019	0.039	0.038	0.002	0.007
N	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444

*Table A3.28. Voting for the main political parties in the 2004 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**United Left**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.06**	-0.07**	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03**	0.03**	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	0.08	0.17***	0.13**	0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.09***	-0.07**	-0.06**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.06	-0.07*	-0.08**	-0.00	0.02	0.03	0.05**	0.03**	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.14***	0.03	0.04	0.07**	0.03**	0.02*	0.02	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.07**	0.07**	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.13	-0.09	-0.05	0.13	0.07	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.10	0.09	0.09	-0.11	-0.10	-0.10	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.11*	0.11*	0.13**	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.16***	0.04*	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.06	0.06	0.07	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	0.07	0.07	0.08*	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.05	0.06	0.07	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.14***	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Student	0.08	0.10	0.09	-0.17**	-0.17**	-0.16*	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Retired	-0.17**	-0.17***	-0.17***	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.08*	0.10*	0.10*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Household	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.09*	0.05	0.05	-0.03**	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Other	0.14*	0.16**	0.17**	-0.08	-0.11	-0.10	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		-0.11*	-0.12**		0.25***	0.24***		-0.10***	-0.08***		-0.04	-0.04
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.44***	-0.44***		0.72***	0.66***		-0.23***	-0.19***		-0.05	-0.04
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31**	0.30**		-0.02	-0.03		-0.05	-0.02		-0.24***	-0.25***
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.23***			0.42***			-0.14***			-0.05
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.03)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.01			-0.10			0.06*			0.05
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.03)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.35***			0.21***			0.06			0.09*
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.056	0.138	0.172	0.056	0.138	0.172	0.056	0.138	0.172	0.056	0.138	0.172
N	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444

Table A3.29. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2008 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.04	0.04	-0.04**	-0.04	-0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.00	0.05**	0.02**	0.04**	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.05*	-0.03**	-0.07***	-0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.03*	0.05***	0.03***	0.08***	-0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.07***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04*	0.05**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.05***	0.04**	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.25***	0.35***	0.55***	0.45***	0.52***	0.59***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.025	0.018	0.039	0.056	0.002	0.003
N	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890

*Table A3.30. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**United Left**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.06**	0.08***	0.09***	-0.07***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.05*	0.00	0.00	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03**	-0.01	-0.02	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
65+	-0.15**	-0.03	-0.02	0.11	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	0.08*	0.11**	0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05	-0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07**	0.02	0.02	0.05*	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.09*	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.14*	-0.11	-0.09	0.10	0.09	0.08	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.08	0.06	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.07	0.10**	0.10**	0.09**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.11**	0.11**	0.12***	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07*	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	0.08	0.07	0.08	-0.08	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03**	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retired	0.09	0.11**	0.10*	-0.03	-0.07	-0.06	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Household	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	0.12**	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	0.22***	0.23***	0.26***	-0.09	-0.10	-0.13**	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.08*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.11**	-0.11**		0.20***	0.20***		-0.07***	-0.06**		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		-0.52***	-0.55***		0.66***	0.64***		-0.14***	-0.12***		0.01	0.03
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.06	-0.10		0.41***	0.40***		-0.03	-0.02		-0.31***	-0.29***
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.11			0.28***			-0.10***			-0.08*
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)
EU distrust			0.01			-0.10			0.00			0.09**
			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.04)
Political system distrust			-0.52***			0.32***			0.04			0.15***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.03)			(0.05)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.040	0.099	0.134	0.040	0.099	0.134	0.040	0.099	0.134	0.040	0.099	0.134
N	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890	1 890

Table A3.31. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2011 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.10***	0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.06**	0.05*	0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.05*	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.02	-0.01	0.03**	0.05**	0.05*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Managers	0.05*	0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.06**	-0.00	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Service workers	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Constant	0.16***	0.36***	0.55***	0.44***	0.61***	0.73***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.008	0.013	0.014	0.050	0.013	0.011
N	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638

*Table A3.32. Voting for the main political parties in the 2011 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**Plural Left**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.03	0.05**	0.06**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.03	-0.06*	-0.05	0.06*	0.07**	0.07**	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.08**	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.16**	-0.06	-0.05	0.07	0.14**	0.13**	-0.06**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.16***	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.11***	0.09***	0.11***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.03	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.08**	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.05	-0.07**	-0.07**	0.06*	0.07**	0.07**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.09	0.10	0.12	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.13**	0.08	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.07*	0.07**	0.08**	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	0.10*	0.09*	0.08*	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Managers	0.09	0.06	0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00

	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Service workers	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	0.11**	0.10*	0.09*	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retired	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Household	0.07	0.02	0.03	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	-0.09	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.07	0.07	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economic conservatism		0.30***	0.26***		-0.18***	-0.16***		-0.10***	-0.09***		-0.02	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.73***	0.61***		-0.18***	-0.15**		-0.31***	-0.27***		-0.25***	-0.19***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.28**	0.21*		-0.08	-0.03		-0.05	-0.03		-0.16*	-0.14
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.24***			-0.08**			-0.02
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.05)
EU distrust			-0.06			0.01			0.12***			-0.06
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.03)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.36***			0.05			-0.05			0.36***
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.056	0.135	0.164	0.056	0.135	0.164	0.056	0.135	0.164	0.056	0.135	0.164
N	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638	1 638

Table A3.33. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2016 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism	**Social con-servatism**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust**
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.07	0.03	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.05*	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.11***	0.05	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.05*	0.06*	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.18***	0.33***	0.54***	0.38***	0.56***	0.67***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adj R^2	0.021	0.005	0.019	0.059	0.026	0.035
N	900	900	900	900	900	900

*Table A3.34. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att	M1+class	M2+ideol	M3+att
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05*	0.06***	0.05**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.11***	0.09**	0.11***	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07**	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.32***	0.14*	0.12*	0.10	0.13*	0.15*	-0.19***	-0.11	-0.13*	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.12**	-0.08	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.07	0.09**	0.11***	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.02	0.09**	0.08**	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	0.05	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Village/Countryside	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.25**	0.17**	0.14*	-0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07	0.06	0.07	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.20***	0.18***	0.18***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.13*	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.07	-0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07	-0.10	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.13*	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.10	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.01

	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.07	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.04	0.10**	0.08	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	0.12**	0.08*	0.09**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.05*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.07	-0.04	-0.08	-0.14*	-0.11	-0.11	0.07	0.03	0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.17*	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Household	0.11*	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.18**	-0.16**	-0.16**	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.17***	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.17*	0.17*	0.17*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Economic conservatism		0.39***	0.36***		-0.29***	-0.30***		-0.13*	-0.09		0.12**	0.12**		-0.10*	-0.09
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Social conservatism		0.67***	0.57***		-0.13**	-0.13**		-0.52***	-0.44***		0.04	0.03		-0.07	-0.03
		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.32***	0.20*		0.20	0.23*		-0.38***	-0.30**		0.09	0.07		-0.22**	-0.21**
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.31***			-0.05			-0.24***			0.05			-0.08
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.10			-0.18**			0.08			0.04			-0.05
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.33***			0.11			0.12			-0.00			0.11
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231	0.094	0.203	0.231
N	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900

Appendix to Chapter 4

Table A4.1. Items and loadings of the first version of social conservatism measure. Weighted data.

Item	Loadings
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (R)	0.25
How religious are you	0.53
How often pray apart from at religious services	0.52
How often attend religious services apart from special occasions	0.51
Important to follow traditions and customs	0.36

Table A4.2. Items and loadings of the first version of anti-immigration attitude measure. Weighted data.

Item	Loadings
Immigration bad or good for country's economy (R)	0.57
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (R)	0.58
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (R)	0.59

Table A4.3. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the first versions of the measures of the three political ideologies and those of the three political attitudes. N = 24 788. Weighted data.

	Economic conserv-atism I	Social conserva-tism I	Authoritarian pred.	Anti-immigration I	EU distrust	Political system distrust I
Economic conservatism I	1.00					
Social conservatism I	0.00	1.00				
Authoritarian pred.	-0.08***	0.25***	1.00			
Anti-immigration I	0.02**	0.09***	0.21***	1.00		
EU distrust	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.31***	1.00	
Political system distrust I	-0.11***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.33***	0.62***	1.00

Table A4.4. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the first versions of the measures of the three political ideologies and those of the three political attitudes. N = 24 788. Weighted data.

	Economic conserv-atism II	Social conserva-tism II	Authoritarian pred.	Anti-immigration II	EU distrust	Political system distrust II
Economic conservatism II	1.00					
Social conservatism II	0.01	1.00				
Authoritarian pred.	-0.06***	0.27***	1.00			
Anti-immigration II	0.09***	0.13***	0.21***	1.00		
EU distrust	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.30***	1.00	
Political system distrust II	-0.09***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.31***	0.63***	1.00

Table A4.5. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.09***	0.06***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	0.05***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.03***	0.00	0.00	0.01**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	0.06***	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.05***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.06***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	0.07***	0.06***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.05***	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.29***	0.39***	0.37***	0.34***	0.53***	0.44***	0.46***	0.54***	0.55***	0.57***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Adj R^2	0.027	0.026	0.012	0.015	0.028	0.059	0.059	0.016	0.034	0.029
N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table A4.6. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M1. ESS *rounds 4 and 8 data. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M1+class	M1+class	M1+class	M1+class	M1+class
	Radical Left	**Center-Left**	**Center-Right**	**Radical Right**	**Green**	**Other party or coalition**
Female	-0.01**	0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)						
35-64	-0.01	0.04***	0.01	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
65+	-0.03***	0.01	0.10***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)						
Upper secondary	0.00	-0.05***	0.02**	0.00	0.02***	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01	-0.08***	0.07***	-0.03***	0.04***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Residence (ref. Small city)						
Big City	0.02***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.01***	0.03***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01*	0.00	-0.02**	0.00	0.01*	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Village/Countryside	-0.01***	-0.04***	0.01*	0.01***	-0.01**	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)						
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.02*	-0.11***	0.11***	-0.01	0.03**	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01*	-0.09***	0.07***	-0.00	0.01	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.05***	-0.09***	0.03***	-0.01	-0.00

	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.02***	-0.03**	0.07***	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02***	0.02*	-0.05***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	0.02***	0.03***	-0.07***	0.01*	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment status (ref. Employed)						
Unemployed	0.04***	0.02	-0.10***	0.02**	0.04***	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Student	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.04***	0.05***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Retired	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01*	-0.02***	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Household	-0.00	-0.03***	0.03**	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other	0.03***	0.01	-0.06***	0.02**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124
N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table A4.7. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M2 I and M3 I. ESS *rounds 4 and 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.00	-0.00	0.03***	0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.00	-0.01	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
65+	-0.01*	-0.02**	0.03**	0.03**	0.06***	0.06***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.02**	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.03***	0.03***	0.00	0.01**	0.02***	0.01***	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.07***	-0.09***	0.07***	0.08***	-0.03***	-0.01***	0.04***	0.03***	0.01	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01**	0.01***	0.04***	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.01**	-0.00	0.03***	0.02***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01	0.01*	0.00	0.00	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.00	0.01	0.01*	0.01*	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Village/Countryside	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.04***	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01**	-0.01	-0.00	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.02*	0.06***	0.06***	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**

	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02**	0.02***	0.03**	0.02	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.02**	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01**	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.02***	0.02**	0.01	0.02	-0.07***	-0.07***	0.02**	0.02*	0.03**	0.03***	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Student	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.04***	-0.03***	0.04***	0.03***	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Retired	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01**	0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Household	0.00	0.00	-0.02**	-0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other	0.03***	0.02**	0.00	0.02	-0.05***	-0.04***	0.02***	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic conservatism	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.35***	0.34***	0.02***	0.01**	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social conservatism	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.19***	-0.20***	0.36***	0.34***	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.06***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Authoritarian pred.	-0.04***	-0.03*	0.11***	0.13***	0.11***	0.05*	0.00	-0.01	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interaction terms (ideol)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Anti-immigration		-0.07***		-0.18***		0.21***		0.17***		-0.13***		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
EU distrust		0.05***		-0.03*		-0.05***		0.04***		-0.02**		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Political system distrust		0.06***		-0.07***		-0.13***		0.07***		0.02**		0.04***
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Interaction terms (att)		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.160	0.185	0.160	0.185	0.160	0.185	0.160	0.185	0.160	0.185	0.160	0.185
N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table A4.8. Voting for the radical left, centre-left, centre-right and radical right: M2 I and M3 I. ESS *rounds 4 and 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Radical Left		**Center-Left**		**Center-Right**		**Radical Right**		**Green**		**Other party or coalition**	
Female	-0.00	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	-0.00	-0.01	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
65+	-0.01*	-0.02**	0.03**	0.03**	0.06***	0.06***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.03***	0.03***	0.00	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.07***	-0.10***	0.07***	0.08***	-0.03***	-0.01***	0.04***	0.03***	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.01**	0.01***	0.04***	0.03***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.01**	-0.00	0.03***	0.02***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01*	0.01**	0.00	0.00	-0.02**	-0.03**	0.00	0.01	0.01*	0.01*	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Village/Countryside	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.04***	-0.04***	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01**	-0.01	-0.00	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Small business own.	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.05***	0.05***	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical prof.	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod. workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.05***	0.06***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.02*	0.06***	0.05***	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.01*

	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02**	0.02**	0.03**	0.02	-0.04***	-0.03**	-0.03***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Service workers	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.01**	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.02***	0.02**	0.01	0.02	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.03***	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Student	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.04***	-0.03***	0.04***	0.03***	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Retired	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.01**	0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Household	0.00	0.00	-0.02**	-0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other	0.03***	0.02**	0.00	0.01	-0.05***	-0.04**	0.02***	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic conservatism	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.29***	-0.28***	0.55***	0.52***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social conservatism	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.20***	-0.21***	0.38***	0.35***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Authoritarian pred.	-0.04**	-0.02	0.12***	0.14***	0.09***	0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interaction terms (ideol)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Anti-immigration		-0.06***		-0.20***		0.21***		0.19***		-0.14***		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
EU distrust		0.05***		-0.04**		-0.05**		0.05***		-0.03***		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Political system distrust		0.05***		-0.07***		-0.12***		0.06***		0.03***		0.03**
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Interaction terms (att)		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes
Country and *ESS* round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden R^2	0.167	0.191	0.167	0.191	0.167	0.191	0.167	0.191	0.167	0.191	0.167	0.191
N	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788	24 788

Table A4.9. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2006 Swedish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conservatism I	**Economic conservatism II**	**Social conservatism I**	**Social conservatism II**	**Authoritarian pred.**	**Anti-immigration I**	**Anti-immigration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.14***	0.12***	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.06*	0.04	-0.01	-0.00	-0.07***	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.16***	0.12***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.04***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.02	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.03**	0.09***	0.09***	0.05*	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.09***	0.08***	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.08***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03**	0.04*	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.27***	0.39***	0.30***	0.29***	0.54***	0.36***	0.37***	0.54***	0.45***	0.47***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.055	0.079	0.033	0.036	0.039	0.101	0.109	0.021	0.037	0.034
N	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

Table A4.10. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.12***	0.09**	0.09**	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
65+	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	0.02	0.07	0.07	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.12**	-0.09**	-0.10**	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.07*	0.07*	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.17***	-0.12**	-0.14**	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.10*	0.11**	0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.25***	0.33***	0.27***	0.26***	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.08	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Small business own.	-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.22***	0.17**	0.12	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.10	0.11	0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Prod. workers	0.15**	0.17**	0.17**	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.22***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.06	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Managers	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.10**	0.09**	0.10**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03

	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.12*	0.09	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Service workers	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.09	0.07	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	-0.09	-0.09	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Student	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Retired	0.20*	0.18*	0.17*	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.11*	-0.12**	-0.12**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Household	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Other	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.11	0.07	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Economic conservatism		-0.36***	-0.36***		0.42***	0.38***		0.18***	0.18***		-0.25***	-0.21***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Social conservatism		-0.11	-0.14		-0.02	-0.01		-0.02	-0.02		0.14	0.17*
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Authoritarian pred.		0.40***	0.41***		-0.23*	-0.29**		0.08	0.08		-0.25*	-0.20
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.13			0.32***			-0.08			-0.12
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.09)
EU distrust			-0.16			-0.07			-0.12**			0.35***
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.09)
Political system distrust			0.04			0.08			0.05			-0.17*
			(0.11)			(0.10)			(0.07)			(0.10)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.076	0.121	0.134	0.076	0.121	0.134	0.076	0.121	0.134	0.076	0.121	0.134
N	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

Table A4.10. Voting for the main political parties in the 2006 Swedish general election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Liberal People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.12***	0.09**	0.09**	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
65+	-0.06	-0.11	-0.11	0.02	0.09	0.10	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	-0.12**	-0.09**	-0.10**	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.07*	0.08**	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.17***	-0.11*	-0.14**	0.04	-0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.10*	0.12**	0.13***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.09**	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.25***	0.33***	0.23**	0.23**	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Small business own.	-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.23***	0.17**	0.10	0.09	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.10	0.13	0.15**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	0.00	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Prod. workers	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Managers	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	0.10**	0.08*	0.09**	-0.04	-0.01	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.12*	0.08	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Service workers	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	-0.09	-0.07	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Student	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Retired	0.20*	0.18*	0.18*	-0.10	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.13**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Household	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.07	0.09	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Other	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Economic conservatism		-0.46***	-0.46***		0.74***	0.70***		0.22***	0.21***		-0.50***	-0.45***
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Social conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		0.02	0.01		-0.04	-0.05		0.16	0.19*
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Authoritarian pred.		0.41***	0.42***		-0.24*	-0.29**		0.08	0.07		-0.25*	-0.21
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.16			0.30***			-0.05			-0.10
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.06)			(0.10)
EU distrust			-0.15			-0.07			-0.16**			0.38***
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.09)
Political system distrust			0.04			0.11			0.10			-0.25**
			(0.12)			(0.11)			(0.08)			(0.11)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.076	0.134	0.156	0.076	0.134	0.156	0.076	0.134	0.156	0.076	0.134	0.156
N	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

Table A4.11. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2014 Swedish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.04	0.04	0.07**	0.06**	-0.06**	-0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small business own.	0.02	0.02	0.04*	0.04**	-0.05***	0.03	0.03	0.07**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.03	0.02	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.04**	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***	0.07***	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Managers	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.04*	0.03	-0.05***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.06**	-0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.03*	0.03	0.03	0.05*	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.40***	0.24***	0.22***	0.51***	0.38***	0.38***	0.49***	0.44***	0.47***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.039	0.037	0.036	0.036	0.017	0.130	0.141	0.035	0.058	0.056
N	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022

Table A4.12. Voting for the main political parties in the 2014 Swedish general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.07**	0.05*	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.07*	0.08**	0.08**	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.11**	-0.12***	-0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
65+	0.15*	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.12**	0.14**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.21***	-0.23***	-0.23***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.11**	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.01	0.10**	0.09*	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17***	0.16***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.08*	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.06***	0.06***	0.03*	0.13***	0.12***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.16*	-0.16**	0.27**	0.23**	0.25**	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.10	-0.10	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Small business own.	-0.12**	-0.08	-0.08	0.11	0.10	0.12*	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Prod. workers	0.13*	0.14**	0.15**	-0.14**	-0.12*	-0.11*	0.06	0.06	0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Managers	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.09	0.09	0.10*	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.09	0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.11*	0.12**	0.13**	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.04	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Student	-0.13**	-0.12*	-0.12*	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.14*	0.13	0.14*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.10	0.08	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Household	-0.09	-0.08	-0.10	0.15	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Other	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.15***	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.14**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economic conservatism		-0.28***	-0.28***		0.52***	0.53***		0.00	-0.06		-0.25***	-0.19***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Social conservatism		-0.16*	-0.16*		-0.02	-0.02		0.03	0.02		0.16*	0.16*
		(0.10)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Authoritarian pred.		0.42***	0.36***		-0.17	-0.17		-0.06	-0.02		-0.19	-0.16
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.07			-0.01			0.30***			-0.36***
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.09)
EU distrust			0.07			-0.21**			-0.01			0.15
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.05)			(0.09)
Political system distrust			-0.24**			0.29***			0.14***			-0.20*
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.05)			(0.11)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.108	0.163	0.219	0.108	0.163	0.219	0.108	0.163	0.219	0.108	0.163	0.219
N	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022

Table A4.13. Voting for the main political parties in the Swedish general election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Swedish Social Democratic Party			**Moderate Party**			**Swedish Democrats**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	0.07**	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.07*	0.10***	0.10***	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.11**	-0.13***	-0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
65+	0.15*	0.12*	0.11	0.07	0.11*	0.13**	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.21***	-0.23***	-0.23***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.10**	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.05*	-0.01	0.10**	0.10**	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17***	0.15***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.08*	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Village/Countryside	-0.09**	-0.09***	-0.08**	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.06***	0.06***	0.03*	0.13***	0.12***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.20***	-0.15*	-0.15**	0.27**	0.22**	0.24**	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.10	-0.09	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Small business own.	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.07	0.11	0.10	0.11*	0.05	0.04	0.01	-0.04	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Prod. workers	0.13*	0.13*	0.14**	-0.14**	-0.11*	-0.10*	0.06	0.06	0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Managers	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.09	0.10	0.11*	-0.13**	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.09	0.03	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.11*	0.13**	0.13**	-0.10	-0.09	-0.08	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Student	-0.13**	-0.12*	-0.12*	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.14*	0.12	0.14*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.10	0.07	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Household	-0.09	-0.07	-0.09	0.15	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.06	-0.08	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Other	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.14***	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.12	0.08	0.13*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economic conservatism		-0.40***	-0.41***		0.80***	0.79***		0.04	-0.06		-0.44***	-0.32***
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Social conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		-0.11	-0.10		0.05	0.04		-0.21**	0.21**
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Authoritarian pred.		0.41***	0.36***		-0.15	-0.17		-0.07	-0.03		-0.19	-0.16
		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.04			0.01			0.35***			-0.39***
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.05)			(0.10)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.22**			-0.01			0.17*
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.05)			(0.10)
Political system distrust			-0.18*			0.27**			0.13**			-0.22*
			(0.11)			(0.11)			(0.06)			(0.12)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.108	0.184	0.237	0.108	0.184	0.237	0.108	0.184	0.237	0.108	0.184	0.237
N	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022	1 022

Table A4.14. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2005 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.06	0.02	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.07***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.06*	0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06***	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05*	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.07*	0.05*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03**	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.05**	0.06***	0.04	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.09***	0.08***	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.05***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.01	-0.01	0.06**	0.05*	-0.05***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.05**	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.07**	-0.03*	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.37***	0.46***	0.36***	0.35***	0.53***	0.56***	0.56***	0.67***	0.63***	0.64***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.048	0.046	0.023	0.023	0.043	0.097	0.103	0.023	0.026	0.021
N	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215

Table A4.15. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.14**	0.13*	0.12*	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.15***	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.11***	0.07*	0.06*	0.06*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05	0.02	0.11	0.10	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.08*	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.17**	-0.17***	-0.12*	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.12**	0.09	0.10*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.07*	0.07*	0.06*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.03

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.17***	0.16***	0.15***	0.13**	0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.18***	0.16***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.16**	0.15**	0.12**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Student	-0.18	-0.17	-0.21	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.10**	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.22***	-0.24***		0.38***	0.38***		-0.05	-0.05		-0.11***	-0.09**
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		-0.25***	-0.30***		0.13**	0.19***		0.05	0.03		0.07*	0.07*
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.22*	0.21		0.12	0.03		-0.12	-0.06		-0.22***	-0.18**
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.09			0.31***			-0.21***			-0.01
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.05)
EU distrust			-0.11			0.21**			-0.02			-0.07
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.31***			-0.02			0.10			0.22***
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.095	0.130	0.058	0.095	0.130	0.058	0.095	0.130	0.058	0.095	0.130
N	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215

Table A4.16. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 United Kingdom general election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)												
35-64	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)												
Upper secondary	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. Small city)												
Big City	0.14**	0.15**	0.13*	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.15***	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.11***	0.07*	0.06*	0.05*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)												
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.03	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.11	0.09	0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.08*	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.17**	-0.18***	-0.13*	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.12**	0.10*	0.11*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.15***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.07*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)

Managers	-0.07	-0.05	-0.07	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.05	0.03	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.18***	0.16***	0.15***	0.13**	0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment status (ref. Employed)												
Unemployed	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.16**	0.13**	0.12**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Student	-0.18	-0.20	-0.23*	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Retired	-0.09*	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Household	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic conservatism		-0.30***	-0.33***		0.61***	0.57***		-0.11**	-0.07		-0.21***	-0.18**
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		-0.26***	-0.33***		0.17**	0.24***		0.03	0.02		0.06	0.07
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.23*	0.22*		0.09	-0.03		-0.13	-0.05		-0.19***	-0.15**
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.08			0.34***			-0.25***			-0.00
			(0.09)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.05)
EU distrust			-0.16*			0.31***			-0.06			-0.09
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.23**			-0.17*			0.15*			0.25***
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.08)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.058	0.101	0.138	0.058	0.101	0.138	0.058	0.101	0.138	0.058	0.101	0.138
N	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215	1 215

Table A4.17. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2015 United Kingdom general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06***	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.11***	0.11***	-0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.07**	0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.01	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.05	-0.08**	-0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.08***	0.07***	0.05	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05	0.05	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.00	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.30***	0.30***	0.32***	0.30***	0.51***	0.43***	0.45***	0.66***	0.60***	0.61***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.033	0.017	0.028	0.026	0.019	0.056	0.056	0.034	0.027	0.021
N	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112

Table A4.18. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.06	-0.05	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
65+	-0.04	-0.08	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.10	-0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07	0.07*	0.06	0.07	0.10*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	0.04	0.04	0.05**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.05**	0.05**	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.06	0.33***	0.28***	0.27***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.13***	0.11***	0.12***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.15***	0.13***	0.11***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.11***	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.10	-0.10	-0.06	0.11	0.12	0.05	-0.01	-0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.07*	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.07	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.09**	0.09**	0.07**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Managers	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10*	0.06	0.08	0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Service workers	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	0.14**	0.13**	0.11**	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.05	0.08	0.04	-0.08	-0.10	-0.08	0.14	0.14	0.12*	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Student	-0.00	-0.04	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.02	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Retired	0.14**	0.14***	0.10**	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Other	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.10	0.08	0.08	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economic conservatism		0.41***	0.31***		-0.39***	-0.32***		0.00	-0.04		0.03	0.06*		-0.06	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.14**	0.07		0.01	0.04		-0.10*	-0.10**		-0.06	-0.06		0.01	0.05
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.09	-0.08		0.07	0.14		0.03	0.02		-0.02	0.01		-0.17**	-0.09
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.22***			0.18***			-0.18***			-0.08
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.27***			-0.15*			0.23***			-0.16***			-0.20***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.65***			0.38***			-0.08			0.05			0.31***
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209	0.081	0.120	0.209
N	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112

Table A4.18. Voting for the main political parties in the 2015 United Kingdom general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Labour Party			**Conservative Party**			**UK Independence Party**			**Liberal Democratic Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
65+	-0.04	-0.08	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.10	-0.06	0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07*	0.08*	0.06	0.07	0.10*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or ter-tiary	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.05**	0.05***	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.05	0.33***	0.28***	0.28***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.13***	0.11***	0.11***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Village/Countryside	0.15***	0.13***	0.12***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.12***	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	0.11	0.09	0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06*	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.07	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	0.09**	0.10**	0.08**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Managers	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.07	-0.05	-0.07	0.06	0.05	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Service workers	-0.10*	-0.07	-0.09*	0.14**	0.10**	0.10*	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.05	0.07	0.04	-0.08	-0.09	-0.08	0.14	0.15	0.12*	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Student	-0.00	-0.02	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.05	0.04	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Retired	0.14**	0.13**	0.10**	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0.12*	0.13**	0.13**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Other	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	0.10	0.07	0.08	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economic conservatism		0.71***	0.57***		-0.59***	-0.50***		0.07	0.01		-0.03	0.01		-0.16***	-0.09*
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.16**	0.09		0.00	0.03		-0.10*	-0.10*		-0.09	-0.08*		0.02	0.05
		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.08	-0.06		0.07	0.14		0.02	0.00		-0.02	0.01		-0.17**	-0.09
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.26***			0.20***			-0.16***			-0.09
			(0.08)			(0.09)			(0.04)			(0.06)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.22**			-0.12			0.25***			-0.16***			-0.19***
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.52***			0.31***			-0.12**			0.04			0.29***
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210	0.081	0.133	0.210
N	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112	1 112

Table A4.20. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2005 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conservatism I	**Economic conservatism II**	**Social conservatism I**	**Social conservatism II**	**Authoritarian pred.**	**Anti-immigration I**	**Anti-immigration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.10***	0.05*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.06**	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	0.02	0.04*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05***	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.01	0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.06***	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.02	0.03**	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.06**	0.05***	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.05**	0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.05**	0.06***	0.03	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.43***	0.39***	0.37***	0.52***	0.43***	0.44***	0.53***	0.56***	0.58***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.034	0.031	0.012	0.011	0.053	0.065	0.066	0.012	0.018	0.015
N	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451

Table A4.21. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.07	-0.01	-0.00	0.06	0.08	0.08	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.07*	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.10**	0.14***	0.15***	-0.08	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.08	0.12***	0.14***	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.16**	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.16***	-0.11***	-0.12***	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.05**	-0.04	-0.04*	0.04*	0.01	0.02	0.11***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Village/Countryside	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.11	-0.11	-0.10	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.20***	0.14**	0.14**	0.14***	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.15**	0.13**	0.13**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Small business own.	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	-0.12**	-0.08*	-0.10**	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.09*	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.07**	0.08**	0.07**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	-0.10**	-0.06	-0.08*	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05*	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.17***	-0.09	-0.10	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.15**	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Student	-0.12	-0.13	-0.10	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.00	0.09	0.08	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Retired	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.24***	0.24***		-0.02	-0.03		0.10***	0.10***		-0.20***	-0.19***		-0.12***	-0.12***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.57***	0.53***		-0.18***	-0.15**		-0.02	-0.02		-0.34***	-0.33***		-0.03	-0.03
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.17*	0.03		-0.04	0.05		0.12*	0.10		0.16**	0.21***		-0.41***	-0.39***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.44***			-0.32***			0.07			-0.07*			-0.12**
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.05			0.05			0.08			-0.02			-0.05
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.22***			0.10			-0.05			0.19***			-0.01
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143	0.053	0.119	0.143
N	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451

Table A4.22. Voting for the main political parties in the 2005 German federal election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	0.06	0.09	0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.07*	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.10**	0.14***	0.14***	-0.08	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.08	0.12***	0.15***	-0.11*	-0.14**	-0.16***	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.16***	-0.10***	-0.11***	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04	0.04*	0.01	0.01	0.11***	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Village/Countryside	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03*	0.03	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.11	-0.09	-0.09	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.21***	0.14**	0.14**	0.14***	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.15**	0.12**	0.12**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prod. workers	-0.12**	-0.08*	-0.09**	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Managers	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.09*	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.09**	0.10**	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Service workers	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.08*	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.17***	-0.09	-0.09	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.15**	0.05	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Student	-0.12	-0.13	-0.11	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.09	0.08	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Retired	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.07	0.06	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.43***	0.41***		-0.06	-0.05		0.15***	0.15***		-0.28***	-0.28***		-0.23***	-0.22***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Social conservatism		0.64***	0.61***		-0.20***	-0.18**		-0.02	-0.02		-0.38***	-0.36***		-0.05	-0.05
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.15	0.04		-0.04	0.04		0.10	0.07		0.19***	0.21***		-0.40***	-0.36***
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.37***			-0.31***			0.09*			-0.01			-0.14**
			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.04)			(0.06)
EU distrust			-0.04			0.02			0.09*			-0.01			-0.06
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.20**			0.14			-0.08			0.15**			-0.00
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147	0.053	0.128	0.147
N	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451	1 451

Table A4.23. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2013 German federal election. Weighted data.

	Economic conservatism I	**Economic conservatism II**	**Social conservatism I**	**Social conservatism II**	**Authoritarian pred.**	**Anti-immigration I**	**Anti-immigration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.06	0.02	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business own.	0.05*	0.04*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	0.04	0.01	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.03***	-0.04**	-0.04**	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Prod. workers	-0.05**	-0.05***	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.05**	0.05**	0.03	0.04*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03***	-0.03*	-0.03*	0.00	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.04*	-0.05***	0.01	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.05**	-0.04**	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.04*	0.04*	0.06**	0.05**	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.29***	0.41***	0.36***	0.34***	0.54***	0.44***	0.44***	0.55***	0.53***	0.55***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj R^2	0.027	0.030	0.010	0.008	0.042	0.045	0.043	0.015	0.024	0.021
N	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702

Table A4.24. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**Free Democratic Party**			**Party of Democratic Socialism**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.03**	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.05*	0.05*	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04*	0.05**	0.04**	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	-0.02	-0.08	-0.08	0.12**	0.14***	0.13**	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.05	-0.00	-0.00	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.14***	0.14***	0.12***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.10***	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.06**	0.05**	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Village/Countryside	0.07**	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.11*	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.07*	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.10*	-0.09*	-0.09*	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.07**	0.06*	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.11**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.06**	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06*	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01

	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10**	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05*	0.07**	0.06*	0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.13	-0.09	-0.07	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.13*	0.18**	0.10*	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Student	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.13*	0.06	0.07	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.13*	0.13	0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Retired	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Household	0.12**	0.10**	0.10**	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.26***	0.23***		-0.13***	-0.15***		-0.21***	-0.20***		-0.02	0.01		0.11***	0.10***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Social conservatism		0.41***	0.39***		-0.09	-0.12**		-0.32***	-0.30***		-0.01	-0.01		0.02	0.04
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Authoritarian pred.		0.33***	0.22**		-0.02	-0.01		0.05	0.07		-0.30***	-0.17***		-0.06	-0.11
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.33***			-0.09			-0.06			-0.35***			0.18***
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.02			0.02			-0.05			0.01
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.12			0.17***			0.08			0.14**
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127	0.046	0.094	0.127
N	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702

Table A4.25. Voting for the main political parties in the 2013 German federal election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII
	CDU/CSU			**Social Democratic Party of Germany**			**The Left**			**Alliance 90/The Greens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.00	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04***	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05	0.04	0.05*	0.05*	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04*	0.05**	0.05**	-0.08***	-0.08**	-0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	-0.02	-0.09*	-0.09*	0.12**	0.14***	0.14***	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	-0.03	0-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Post-secondary or ter-tiary	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.14***	0.14***	0.13***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.09**	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.06**	0.05*	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Village/Countryside	0.07**	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.12*	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Small business own.	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.09**	-0.09*	-0.09**	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07*	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.10*	-0.08	-0.08	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.07**	0.06*	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.11**	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.06**	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)

Managers	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.07	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.07**	0.06*	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	-0.13	-0.07	-0.05	-0.15**	-0.16***	-0.14**	0.18**	0.09*	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Student	-0.15**	-0.15**	-0.13*	0.06	0.06	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.13*	0.13*	0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Retired	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Household	0.12**	0.10*	0.10*	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economic conservatism		0.46***	0.41***		-0.20***	-0.20***		-0.33***	-0.32***		-0.11**	-0.05		0.18***	0.16***
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Social conservatism		0.45***	0.43***		-0.11*	-0.13**		-0.33***	-0.32***		-0.03	-0.02		0.02	0.04
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarian pred.		0.33***	0.22**		-0.03	-0.00		0.06	0.07		-0.29***	-0.18***		-0.07	-0.11
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.30***			-0.13*			-0.02			-0.35***			0.19***
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.05)
EU distrust			0.06			-0.03			0.01			-0.05			0.01
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.05)
Political system distrust			-0.27***			-0.11			0.16***			0.06			0.16**
			(0.10)			(0.08)			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136	0.046	0.106	0.136
N	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702	1 702

Table A4.26. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2008 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.00	0.03	0.08*	0.09*	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.08*	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Small business own.	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.07***	0.07***	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical prof.	-0.02	-0.03	-0.09**	-0.07**	-0.04**	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	-0.04*	-0.00	0.06**	0.07***	0.02	0.10***	0.09***	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Managers	0.05	0.03	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.03*	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Service workers	-0.05**	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.06***	0.06***	0.06**	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.28***	0.35***	0.36***	0.33***	0.56***	0.43***	0.44***	0.48***	0.55***	0.59***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.018	0.010	0.034	0.042	0.034	0.048	0.052	0.015	0.005	0.003
N	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999

Table A4.27. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 4 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.08**	0.10***	0.10***	-0.10***	-0.12***	-0.12***	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)									
35-64	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	-0.10	0.04	0.06	0.08	-0.13*	-0.11	0.03	0.09	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)									
Upper secondary	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.07*	0.05	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.07	-0.07	-0.12***	0.04	0.05	0.09**	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Residence (ref. Small city)									
Big City	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.08*	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.07	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Village/Countryside	0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.08**	0.05*	0.04	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.16	-0.14	-0.09	0.01	-0.00	-0.03	0.15	0.15	0.11
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Small business own.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.08	0.09	0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.03	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Prod. workers	0.16**	0.16**	0.16***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08*	-0.10**	-0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Managers	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.10	0.10	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.09*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	0.04	0.02	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)									
Unemployed	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	0.06	0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Student	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Retired	-0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Household	-0.12*	-0.07	-0.09	0.17**	0.10	0.11*	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other	0.29***	0.30***	0.34***	-0.10	-0.12	-0.16**	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.08	-0.06		0.17**	0.16**		-0.09	-0.10*
		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Social conservatism		-0.47***	-0.47***		0.61***	0.59***		-0.14**	-0.12*
		(0.09)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.22	-0.21		0.61***	0.59***		-0.39***	-0.38***
		(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.13)	(0.12)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.15			0.30***			-0.15**
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.07)
EU distrust			0.02			-0.10			0.08
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.66***			0.38***			0.27***
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.105	0.154	0.046	0.105	0.154	0.046	0.105	0.154
N	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999

Table A4.28. Voting for the main political parties in the 2008 Spanish general election: M1, M2 II and M3 II. ESS *round 4 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party			**People's Party**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	0.08**	0.09***	0.09**	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (ref. 18-34)									
35-64	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	-0.10	0.04	0.04	0.08	-0.13*	-0.12*	0.03	0.09	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)									
Upper secondary	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08*	-0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.07*	0.05	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Post-secondary or tertiary	-0.07	-0.08	-0.12***	0.04	0.05	0.10**	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Residence (ref. Small city)									
Big City	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.08*	-0.11**	-0.11***	0.08**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.07	-0.07	-0.06	-0.09	-0.10*	-0.11*	0.16***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Village/Countryside	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.09**	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)									
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	-0.16	-0.14	-0.11	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.15	0.15	0.13
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Small business own.	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.07	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Technical prof.	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Prod. workers	0.16**	0.15**	0.16***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Managers	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.11	0.10	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.09*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.08	-0.06	-0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Service workers	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)									
Unemployed	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.06	-0.01	-0.03	0.06	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Student	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Retired	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Household	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.07	0.17**	0.08	0.09	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other	0.29***	0.32***	0.34***	-0.10	-0.14	-0.16**	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economic conservatism		-0.14	-0.15		0.29***	0.30***		-0.15*	-0.15*
		(0.11)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.08)
Social conservatism		-0.47***	-0.47***		0.62***	0.59***		-0.15*	-0.12*
		(0.10)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Authoritarian pred.		-0.25	-0.22		0.64***	0.61***		-0.39***	-0.39***
		(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			-0.21**			0.34***			-0.14*
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.07)
EU distrust			-0.05			-0.04			0.09
			(0.10)			(0.09)			(0.07)
Political system distrust			-0.53***			0.29***			0.25***
			(0.10)			(0.10)			(0.08)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.046	0.101	0.143	0.046	0.101	0.143	0.046	0.101	0.143
N	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999

Table A4.29. Linear regression models with political ideologies and attitudes as dependent variables and social class as independent variable. 2016 Spanish general election. Weighted data.

	Economic conserva-tism I	**Economic conserva-tism II**	**Social con-servatism I**	**Social con-servatism II**	**Authoritar-ian pred.**	**Anti-immi-gration I**	**Anti-immi-gration II**	**EU distrust**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust I**	**Pol. Sys. Distrust II**
Social class (ref. Clerks)										
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Small business own.	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Technical prof.	0.07	0.06*	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Prod. workers	0.04	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.10***	0.08***	0.04	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Managers	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.09***	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Service workers	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	0.18***	0.27***	0.33***	0.30***	0.54***	0.39***	0.40***	0.56***	0.56***	0.71***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Adj R^2	0.025	0.017	0.005	0.005	0.021	0.054	0.057	0.025	0.030	0.031
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850

Table A4.30. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. First versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI	M1+class	M2+ideolI	M3+attI
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	0.07***	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.11***	0.09**	0.10***	-0.07	-0.03	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.09**	-0.07**	-0.67**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.32***	0.15*	0.13*	0.12	0.15*	0.17**	-0.19***	-0.12	-0.13*	-0.13**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.07	0.10**	0.12***	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.03	0.10**	0.09**	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.15***	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.09	-0.09	-0.10*	-0.12**	-0.10	-0.11*	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Village/Countryside	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.24**	0.17**	0.14*	-0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.20**	-0.20***	-0.19***	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07	0.06	0.07	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Small business own.	0.16**	0.16***	0.16***	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10	-0.11*	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	0.04	0.06	0.04	-0.08	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	-0.11*	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Managers	0.09	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.10	-0.07	-0.06	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.01

	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.03	0.10*	0.07	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	0.13**	0.08*	0.10**	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10	-0.14	-0.11	-0.10	0.09	0.05	0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.10	0.09	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Retired	-0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Household	0.12*	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.06	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.17**	-0.16*	-0.15*	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.19*	0.19***	0.19*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Economic conservatism		0.38***	0.35***		-0.30***	-0.31***		-0.12	-0.09		0.16***	0.15***		-0.11*	-0.11*
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Social conservatism		0.67***	0.57***		-0.17***	-0.18***		-0.51***	-0.43***		0.06	0.05		-0.05	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.31**	0.21*		0.25**	0.26**		-0.39***	-0.30**		0.06	0.05		-0.22**	-0.22**
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.31***			-0.02			-0.25***			0.05			-0.08
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.06)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.09			-0.17**			0.07			0.06			-0.06
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.33***			0.10			0.13			0.01			0.10
			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226	0.090	0.197	0.226
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850

Table A4.31. Voting for the main political parties in the 2016 Spanish general election: M1, M2 I and M3 I. ESS *round 8 data. Second versions of the measures. Marginal effects (with standard errors) based on multinomial logistic regressions. Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The tables continues in the next page.*

	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideo-lII	M3+attII	M1+class	M2+ideolII	M3+attII
	People's Party			**Spanish Socialist Workers' Party**			**We Can**			**Citizens**			**Other party or coalition**		
Female	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.07***	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age (ref. 18-34)															
35-64	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.11***	0.09**	0.11***	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.09**	-0.07**	-0.06**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
65+	0.32***	0.13*	0.11	0.12	0.15*	0.18**	-0.19***	-0.11	-0.12*	-0.13**	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (ref. Lower secondary or less)															
Upper secondary	0.07	0.11***	0.13***	-0.07	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.00	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Post-secondary or tertiary	0.03	0.09**	0.09**	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.13***	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residence (ref. Small city)															
Big City	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Suburbs/Outskirts	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.09	-0.10*	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Village/Countryside	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social class (ref. Clerks)															
Self-empl. prof. / large employers	0.24**	0.20**	0.18**	-0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.20**	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Small business own.	0.16**	0.14**	0.14**	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	-0.11*	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Technical prof.	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	0.04	0.06	0.05	-0.08	-0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Prod. workers	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.11*	-0.13**	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Managers	0.09	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07	0.03	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Service workers	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Employment status (ref. Employed)															
Unemployed	0.03	0.10**	0.08	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	0.13**	0.07*	0.09**	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Student	-0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.14	-0.09	-0.09	0.09	0.06	0.08	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.10	0.10	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	-0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Household	0.12*	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.06	0.06	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other	-0.17**	-0.16**	-0.14*	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.19***	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.19*	0.19**	0.20*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Economic conservatism		0.49***	0.44***		-0.35***	-0.37***		-0.26***	-0.20**		0.22***	0.22***		-0.10*	-0.10
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Social conservatism		0.71***	0.64***		-0.14*	-0.15*		-0.55***	-0.46***		0.05	0.04		-0.07	-0.07
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Authoritarian pred.		0.32*	0.23*		0.23*	0.23*		-0.37***	-0.30***		0.05	0.05		-0.22**	-0.21**
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Interaction terms (ideol)		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Anti-immigration			0.29***			-0.04			-0.24***			0.04			-0.06
			(0.07)			(0.08)			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.06)
EU distrust			0.05			-0.18**			0.05			0.06			0.02
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.06)
Political system distrust			-0.24**			0.12			0.14			0.03			-0.05
			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.07)
Interaction terms (att)			yes			yes			yes			yes			yes
McFadden R^2	0.090	0.202	0.225	0.090	0.197	0.225	0.090	0.197	0.225	0.090	0.197	0.225	0.090	0.197	0.225
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850	850